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A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM
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A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM Ideas, Interests, and Institutions VOLUME I
Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor Editors
Copyright 2010 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A history of the U.S. political system : ideas, interests, and institutions / Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor, editors. 3 v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-713-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) --- ISBN 978-1-85109-718-0 (ebook) 1. United States---Politics and government. I. Harris, Richard A., 1951- II. Tichenor, Daniel J., 1966JK31.H57 2010 320.973---dc22
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
About the Editors
Richard A. Harris, PhD, is a professor at Rutgers University--Camden with a joint appointment in political science and public policy and administration. He directs the Senator Walter Rand Institute for Public Affairs. He has written and edited several books, including Coal Firms Under the New Social Regulation (Duke University Press), The Politics of Regulatory Change (Oxford University Press, coauthored), and Remaking American Politics (Westview Press, coedited). He has been a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and received the Mary Parker Follett Award and the Jack Walker Award from the American Political Science Association for best article (coauthored) in Politics and History and Political Organizations and Parties, respectively. Daniel J. Tichenor, PhD, is Philip H. Knight professor of social science senior faculty fellow at the Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon. In addition to numerous articles and chapters, he has published Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton University Press) and The Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press). He has been the recipient of fellowships from the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, the Brookings Institution, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Along with Dr. Harris, he has received the Follett and Walker awards. He also was awarded the Gladys Kammerer Prize by the American Political Science Association for best book in American public policy and politics.
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Contents Volume I Section 1: Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought, 1 Introduction, 1 The Enlightenment and Classic Liberalism Joseph Romance, 3 Political Thought in the Early Republic Brian Danoff, 14 The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Brian Stipelman, 26 Documents, 51 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15
John Locke, Second Treatise, 1689, 51 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies, July 4, 1776, 55 Articles of Confederation, 57 The Constitution of the United States, 61 James Madison, Federalist No. 10, 68 James Madison, Federalist No. 39, 71 James Madison, Federalist No. 48, 74 James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 76 Anti-Federalist No. 26, 79 Anti-Federalist No. 28, 80 Anti-Federalist No. 48, 82 Anti-Federalist No. 84, 83 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835, 86 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery, March 16, 1849, 88 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address, September 23, 1932, 91
Section 2: Religion and American Politics, 97 Introduction, 97 Religion and the American Founding Mark David Hall, 99 Church and State in American Political Development Paul R. Babbitt, 113
viii Contents Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics Michael Janson, 123 Documents, 135 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11
John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill, 1630, 135 The Maryland Toleration Act, 1649, 136 Roger Williams, A Plea for Religious Liberty, 1644, 138 Nathaniel Niles, Sermon, 1774, 141 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, June 20, 1785, 143 George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 3, 1789, 147 George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, August 1790, 147 Henry Ward Beecher, The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty, June 4, 1869, 148 Walter Rauschenbusch, On the Social Gospel, 1908, 149 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 151 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983, 156
Section 3: Cities, States, and American Federalism, 161 Introduction, 161 Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism John Dinan, 163 The City in American Political Development Richardson Dilworth, 175 Documents, 191 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15, 191 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21, 194 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 44, 197 Anti-Federalist No. 11, 200 Anti-Federalist No. 35, 202 McCulloch v. Maryland et al., 17 U.S. 316 (1819), 203 John Calhoun, Fort Hill Address, July 26, 1831, 207 John Peter Altgeld, On Municipal Government and Ownership, September 5, 1897, 211 W. D. Lawson, Letter to Lucius Clay on Eisenhower and States’ Rights, January 21, 1956, 214 Fiorello H. La Guardia, Speech on Tammany and the Spoils System, 1933, 215 William Jefferson Clinton, Executive Order No. 13132, August 4, 1999, 215
Section 4: The Congress, 221 Introduction, 221 The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 Gregory Koger, 223 The Making of the Modern Congress Richard A. Harris, 241 Documents, 259 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
James Madison, Federalist No. 52, James Madison, Federalist No. 54, James Madison, Federalist No. 62, James Madison, Federalist No. 64, Anti-Federalist No. 9, 268 Anti-Federalist No. 17, 270
259 261 263 266
Contents 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11
Anti-Federalist No. 55, 272 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885, 275 War Powers Resolution, November 7, 1973, 277 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), 280 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, December 1993, 285
Section 5: The Presidency, 291 Introduction, 291 Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 Michael J. Korzi, 293 Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR Saladin M. Ambar, 312 Lincoln and the Civil War State Avram Fechter, 325 Documents, 343 5.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 67, 343 5.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69, 345 5.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70, 348 5.4 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74, 351 5.5 Anti-Federalist No. 67, 352 5.6 Anti-Federalist No. 70, 354 5.7 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Albert G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, 355 5.8 Theodore Roosevelt on Presidential Power, 1913, 356 5.9 William Howard Taft on Presidential Power, 1916, 357 5.10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Fireside Chat, March 12, 1933, 359 5.11 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 361 5.12 Lyndon B. Johnson, Gulf of Tonkin Address, Message to Congress, August 5, 1964, 364 5.13 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, August 7, 1964, 364 5.14 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 1998, 365 5.15 George W. Bush, War on Terrorism Address, September 20, 2001, 367
Section 6: The Federal Bureaucracy, 371 Introduction, 371 Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy Deanna Malatesta, 373 Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview Stephan Lavertu, 391 Documents, 407 6.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74, 407 6.2 Anti-Federalist No. 24, 409 6.3 U.S. Supreme Court, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), 412 6.4 Chester Barnard, Functions of the Executive, 1938, 416 6.5 Administrative Procedures Act, 1949, 417 6.6 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), 418 6.7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 421 6.8 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), 424 6.9 Executive Order No. 12866, September 30, 1993, 427 6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council, October 8, 2001, 431
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Section 7: The Courts, 437 Introduction, 437 The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development G. Alan Tarr, 439 The Contemporary Supreme Court Michael Besso, 452 Documents, 465 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, 465 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80, 468 Anti-Federalist Nos. 78--79, 471 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), 473 Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in U.S., 1831, 476 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Court-Packing Plan Address, March 9, 1937, 480 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 483 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 486 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 488
Index, 493
Section 1 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought
Introduction
13 states. While first-generation Americans, particularly the educated and landed elites, shared a classical liberal ideology, there was a good deal of disagreement about what kind of political and governmental institutions would best guarantee the preservation of liberty and individual rights. This initial disagreement between the Federalists, who favored a strong central union, and the Anti-Federalists, who argued for a greater conservation of authority at the state level, set in motion a debate that continues to this day. Joseph Romance and Brian Danoff explore the critical intellectual underpinnings of U.S. liberal tradition and the emergent controversy between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Their essays demonstrate the extent to which liberalism frames and constrains political discourse in the United States, even discourse about transforming political processes and governing institutions. Brian Stipelman picks up this theme, explaining how the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt’s rhetoric brought about remarkable change, but did so by adapting liberal thought to pragmatic concerns. In many respects, New Deal liberalism was merely an iteration of the discourse begun in 1787, a struggle to remain true to U.S. liberal traditions while meeting new social and economic challenges. At the heart of this struggle, as Romance, Danoff, and Stipleman show, is the question of the national government’s role in the preservation of its commitment to liberty, including property rights and freedom from government control. On the
More than any other nation, the United States’ founding represents concerted action in the name of ideas. The ordinary history of nation-building involves narratives of war and conquest, or political ambition and intrigue. In such instances, ideas emerged to justify political action ex post facto, whether the political act in question was the creation of a new nation or, more often, the transformation of an existing one. Thus, John Locke’s famous treatise on government was a justification of the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Great Britain, a nation previously organized through nonideological struggle. To be sure, America was formed out of a violent revolution. That revolution, however, proceeded in the name of ideas rather than interests, albeit ideas that were imported from Europe rather than homegrown. The constellation of thought on which America was founded is classical liberalism, a powerful assertion of liberty and of the primacy of the individual in society. The founding documents, the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, both reflect these classical liberal intellectual origins of our nation---even though the former made the case for breaking a political arrangement, the U.S. colonial relationship with Great Britain, whereas the latter made the case for constituting a new political arrangement, the creation of an ‘‘extended republic,’’ as James Madison termed it, to supplant the original confederation among the
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2 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought one hand, the classical liberal view insists that the government that governs best is the government that governs least. On the other hand, if liberty in the form of laissez-faire leads to a situation in which concentrations of power are ‘‘free’’ to pursue particular interests
at the expense of both individual welfare and civic virtue, liberal ideals may call for federal regulation. These authors examine these questions in historical and philosophical perspective. ---Richard A. Harris
The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism Joseph Romance Professor of Political Science, Drew University
capitalism and is protected by clearly articulated rights. Finally, in a political sense, the ideal of freedom and individual rights was born of a belief in limited government and fear of tyranny. This fear of tyranny gave rise to skepticism about government power and a strong demand that only a balanced government, with separation of powers and checks and balances, could guarantee that freedom could be maintained. This skepticism about power is one of the key legacies that the Enlightenment bequeathed to what became classical liberal political theory.
The Enlightenment was, and continues to be, one of the most important intellectual, social, and political movements of the modern era. This movement reached its zenith in the 17th and 18th century in Europe and North America. Yet, whatever counter movements have emerged in the past 200 years---romanticism or postmodernism, to name two prominent movements---the Enlightenment remains an influential and vital source of political thought. In many ways, America (and later the United States) is the Enlightenment political project par excellent. Although the Enlightenment’s most prominent writers were based in Europe, what they taught was most pointedly expressed in America. This is most powerfully true in the realm of politics and political thought. Debates continue over the extent of America’s pervasive liberal tradition and how to appreciate the conservative forces that influence the nation’s history, but it is inarguable that to fully grasp the American political experience one must acknowledge and comprehend its Enlightenment roots. This is certainly true when considering how a European intellectual movement helped to shape to a significant degree political thinking in America and how that thinking shaped America’s founding documents---including the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. And in so doing, the Enlightenment laid the groundwork for fostering the classical liberalism that lies at the heart of the American political experience. This is a liberalism that values freedom above all else. Furthermore, this freedom finds prominent expression in the workings of
The Enlightenment’s Legacy To define the Enlightenment is a difficult task. This is because it was a movement that crossed areas of human experience and was widely adapted, in various guises, in different geographic locales. Thus, we now speak of the French, Scottish, English, and German Enlightenments. Each influenced the American experience in different ways and it is reasonable to say that eventually an American Enlightenment emerged. Each of the European enlightenments helped to shape the American experience. The roots of the Enlightenment can be traced back to ancient Greece, and the ideals of freedom and limited government---the hallmarks of classical liberalism---can be found in many ancient societies. Yet, despite the way writers pick and choose ways to reassemble ideas, something distinctive remains about the Enlightenment and the political theories it engendered.
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4 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought One way to comprehend the Enlightenment is to ascertain what its proponents believed in and what they attacked. Most of the writers who are associated with the movement endorsed reason, and this belief in reason would result in an expansion of human knowledge that would improve mankind and foster human happiness. Indeed, the idea of progress was an essential component to many of the movement’s thinkers. Finally, most proponents of the Enlightenment believed in the universal idea of the Enlightenment itself. Thus, universal human attributes and needs dictate fundamental truths about what it means to be human. The result of this belief was that, although differences existed between people and nations, these differences did not obliterate the use of human reason to realize political and social truths. It is in this light that we can understand how Joseph De Maistre, a critic of the Enlightenment, could say that he had never seen a human being acting only a Frenchman, or a German, or a Russian. To an Enlightenment thinker, this would be a heretical statement. To worry about some essential humanness and how humans use universal reason to further society was an important attribute to the Enlightenment and it deeply affected the political thought of many Americans. Even considering prominent reactions against this belief, it cannot be discounted when trying to understand the modern era and the modern era’s most representative nation---the United States. Standing in the way of this project were traditional religions and their institutional structures and what was perceived by Enlightenment writers as entrenched powers, superstitions, and reactionary forces that endorsed the status quo. For the Enlightenment to succeed in its goals of furthering human knowledge and political progress, it was a project that necessitated both a destructive and constructive act. The old order, to various degrees depending on the thinker and situation, had to be attacked. Whether this required political revolution and change or internal reforms was open to debate. But certain traditional ways of viewing the world had to be changed. If that was achieved, the way could be open to creating a new political world based on reason and dedicated to individual freedom. This dialectic goes far in explaining the Enlightenment, particularly with regards to its political implications. This would not be lost on the American experience or on its founders and later political leaders. This championing of reason complicates an understanding of the Enlightenment, because reason was applied to so many areas of human thought and endeavors. In so many intellectual areas, traditional approaches were rejected and replaced with a new emphasis on
Though a profoundly respected philosopher of the Enlightenment, David Hume is most remembered for his assault on reason as a reliable mode of philosophical inquiry. (Library of Congress)
rational thought and scientific inquiry. Thus, the Enlightenment had an immense influence on scientific thought: Sir Isaac Newton was a hero to other Enlightenment figures; philosophic inquiry, via Voltaire, Kant, Locke, and Hume; political thought, via Locke, Montesquieu, and Hume; and economic thought, most famously by Adam Smith. These names are just a few in a pantheon of people that could be expanded to include hundreds. This was a radical experiment that started with questioning the old ways. And, by throwing so much into question, politics would be transformed. For the purposes of this essay, we will focus on the political teachings of the Enlightenment. (We should not completely ignore the broader movement. Newton’s achievement in seeing a seamless interconnected universe has obvious political implications and gave heart to those who believed in universal political rules and natural rights and laws for politics.) Yet, even here there is much controversy. Profound disagreements emerged between many key thinkers, and the political solutions they suggested are not uniform. Yet, if we take Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and baron de Montesquieu as the key political thinkers of the age, we can begin to develop a working vocabulary that sets the
The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism parameters of political discussions. Each of these men contributed significantly to the development of what became known as liberalism. This is particularly true when we consider how American political thinkers talked about and shaped politics in the new nation. What were the key ways in which political thought was shaped and defined by Enlightenment thinking? First, by rejecting traditional political teachings, the Enlightenment gave to its descendents a powerful inquiry into human nature. This is not to say that earlier political thinkers cared little about this question. Rather, it is to suggest that the Enlightenment gave a new urgency to the question about how to reason about what was essential about human nature and, when that was reasoned through, how to conceive of politics. What this meant, in practice, was imagining what was essential about humans, and this meant starting political inquiry with the individual. This was something a bit radical in political thought. Earlier thinkers often started with the social nature of humanity---Aristotle’s idea of a political man in essence contrasts with the assumption that one could imagine man in isolation as a starting point for political thought. Politically this resulted in a fundamental belief in the individual as a starting point---and ultimately an ending point---for political goals. By placing the individual, and not, say, the community or city, as the starting point for political thought, the Enlightenment developed a strong appreciation for individual freedom. Starting with people imagining how they could think about themselves in isolation from the group significantly weakened any belief that virtue or the community or fraternity were the starting points of political thought. The idea of freedom is an ancient one, yet the Enlightenment insistence on individual freedom as a starting point lends itself to an insistence on rights as paramount to political discourse. Indeed, a case can be made that by starting with individuals as the key focus of political inquiry, a language of rights is implicit. Second, this discourse about individuals often began with an imagining of a state of nature---that is, what was the individual like without groups, the state, or society? What was man like removed from the trappings of society and the community created by his interactions with his fellow human beings? Numerous possible answers to these questions were considered; however, the most frequent political move was to next think about the social contract. The social contract was a thought experiment about what kind of agreement would be entered into by the numerous participants of a new society. This approach led to a series of interesting possible political questions, such as the following: What kind of
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laws, if any, existed before the creation of the state? And, did one have to obey them and why? What kinds of rights were natural and bound to be respected by the society created by free men? What would naturally free men give up to create society? Why would people be driven to leave the state of nature---the place of pure freedom before society---in the first place? Different thinkers gave vastly different answers to these questions. But these questions and the key terms they included provide a kind of Enlightenment vocabulary about politics. And in answering these questions, classical liberalism was born. In the end, the idea of natural man, natural rights, freedom, and how best to protect freedom in any created society function together as the common language of the era, even if individual thinkers could reason about these matters in significantly different ways. Despite the significant influence that European Enlightenment thinkers had on America, the relationship between the European intellectual movement and American political thought and practice is still ambiguous. As the contemporary historian Bernard Bailyn rightly points out, America was on the periphery of Western civilization. In many ways, this gave Americans like Jefferson, Madison, and Franklin more room and freedom to think about political reform. The distance from the center of political thought was vital in allowing these men to think more clearly and with dispatch about how to create a new government in the New World. In another sense, America’s distance from Europe was important in creating new and vital ways of the conceiving of politics. Thus, Americans experienced the Enlightenment as a practical matter---how to apply ideas to real-world political experiences. In Europe, for the most part, Enlightenment ideas were seen as theoretical abstractions that had to deal with entrenched political forces that were often powerful and hostile. The weight of doing things as had been done was bound to limit the political expression of these ideas. (Of course, this would radically change with the French Revolution and Europe’s own eventual effort to apply theory to practice.) The Enlightenment had an ambiguous relationship with America in another key way. It is certainly true that America has an Enlightenment ‘‘voice.’’ Indeed, Thomas Jefferson deserves credit among those in the Enlightenment pantheon. And the documents created by the American founding---namely, the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution---are significant practical applications of Enlightenment thought. Both revealed an underlying faith in reason and political freedom.
6 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought As many historians and political theorist have pointed out, however, America, also has a ‘‘second voice.’’ This second voice does not use the language of individualism, natural rights, and the state of nature or social contracts. This second voice, while believing in freedom, is more deeply concerned with individual responsibility to the broader community and is more attached to ideas about equality than normally are associated with the Enlightenment or liberalism. This second voice is best represented by strongly religious people, often influenced by the Puritan past of the country and a continuing influence of religion in the day-to-day life of most Americans. Politically, many of these ideas were expressed by the divergent writers we now call the Anti-Federalists---those opposed to the ratification of the Constitution. This voice, often buried or ignored in American political discourse, is more apt to champion the community, the common good, and local customs. While embracing communality as the children of God, these writers were more often apt to see ways in which experiences in localities shaped, in vital ways, U.S. customs and expectations about politics. Indeed, while these writers were just as committed to a belief in the dignity of man that Enlightenment figures championed, their belief was that such a dignity could be achieved only with a recognition of people as situated in some locality. This belief would throw into question the great faith that Enlightenment insisted was part of the use of reason in furthering the progress of human freedom. Furthermore, this second voice was, in many ways, more sympathetic to equality and democracy than Enlightenment thinkers were or classical liberal theory might insist. This second voice is less prominent in the American political experiment, but it is vital to our understanding of America and its founding documents. Indeed, American political history can be read, to a degree, as the dialectical encounter between the Enlightenment voice of universal reason, individual freedom, and rational governance, and the idea of local customs, collective equality, and traditional religion that insisted on human dignity found within a supportive community of believers. Neither voice has ever fully silenced the other. Neither voice has ever been fully triumphant.
Those Who Influenced America The Enlightenment and classical liberalism is really the story of many related movements in many fields of human thought involving numerous people. It would be impossible to discuss all the people who influenced American political discourse. The American
founders---Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, to name the most famous---were widely read and steeped in currents that flowed from Europe. Four thinkers, however, stand out as influencing the American founding and subsequent history: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and baron de Montesquieu. Thomas Hobbes probably had the least direct influence of any of these thinkers on American politics. In large measure, this is because of Hobbes’s dangerous and unpalatable reputation. His advocacy of a Leviathan (the title of his most famous, or infamous, book)---an all-powerful centralized state---was an anathema to many. Furthermore, his skepticism about religion caused great concern among many. Indeed, Hobbes could be quite scathing and sarcastic in discussions of religion. Yet, Hobbes cannot be ignored because of his huge influence on liberalism and Enlightenment political thinking. This influence was less about adopting his suggestions and more about the intellectual concepts that he used and that subsequently were used to different ends by others. Thus, because Hobbes was not an advocate of natural rights and because he did not champion human freedom, he was suspect. (In this regard, he stands outside the Enlightenment and liberal traditions.) Yet, his ideas about a state of nature and the social contract provide key concepts that were vital tools later employed by other thinkers to develop their political ideas. Hobbes was extremely individualistic in his approach to politics. Man may not have natural rights; however, when we think about politics, we start by thinking about what motivates an individual, how they would proceed in life, and what they are afraid of. Man, in Hobbes’s state of nature, was alone and free. This freedom was actually a problem because all would be free to harm others. Thus, freedom must be sacrificed to achieve order and stability. If the endpoint of Hobbes’s theory were antiliberal, his starting point was vintage classical liberal thinking. The second key thinker who influenced American political thought was John Locke. John Locke’s prominence stems from his philosophical and political works. Philosophically, in his Essay on Human Understanding, Locke developed the idea that man was a tabula rasa--a blank slate---and was thus shaped by his environment. Ideas are not innate, according to Locke. Locke’s epistemology was highly individualistic. People are thought about as individuals, not as members of some broader group. These ideas were central to the way liberals thought. Locke’s ideas about man and knowledge were linked to his political thought, which received its clearest expression in the Two Treatises on Government. In that work, Locke used much of the language of
The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism
John Locke was a 17th-century political philosopher who gave the Western world the first distinctly modern theory of human nature. (Library of Congress)
Hobbes, but made it more palatable to his readers through important differences. According to Locke, man was endowed with natural rights given to us by the creator, and man maintained these rights in the state of nature. Furthermore, all reasonable men can agree on a natural law. Thus, in the state of nature, people can acquire property, develop commerce, and form the basis of society. Indeed, a long chapter in the Treatise deals with how one acquires property and maintain it. This is a hallmark of classical liberalism--the acquisition and protection of property. We leave the state of nature, not because as Hobbes believed that the state of nature was brutal and unforgiving; rather, we leave the state of nature, via a social contract, to protect our lives, liberties, and estates. Thus, the government created by the social contract is less an act of desperation and more an act of reasonable, enlightened men. Once men form a society and create a government, Locke proceeds to discuss the proper way to organize that government. Locke champions popular sovereignty and the role of the legislature in deciding policy. Furthermore, he continually worries in that text about tyranny and the dangers of the usurpers of power.
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Even more important, in the American context, is that Locke developed a theory of justified revolution. If instituted governments engage in ‘‘a long train of abuses,’’ then men are justified in engaging in a revolution to overthrow a tyrant. However, those abuses do not put men back into the state of nature; rather, they force men to dissolve the government and to act as a group of men in a recognized society reconstituting a new government. In the American context, this becomes clearer. When Americans declared their independence, they did it as a corporate body, in a Continental Congress, against a tyrannical king. Many of these ideas and much of the language in the Declaration of Independence parallel Locke’s ideas and language. Although Locke’s influence on America has been downplayed, it remains true that his work was widely read and that his ideas did seep into the thought of American political actors. In recent years the importance of David Hume has been established. Hume was always an important European thinker, yet his centrality to American thought was less appreciated. We know that Hume, particularly through his essays, was widely read by many Americans. Hume does not fit neatly into the Enlightenment canon. His politics had a patina of conservatism to them, and he had a healthy skepticism about progress and the ability of people to use reason to reach perfect knowledge. In his essays, he argued that conflict was a central part of society and that this conflict existed because of the different material desires of people. Hume’s influence on James Madison is evident, and it has been established that Madison read Hume while at Princeton. In Madison’s contribution to the Federalist Papers, for example, Hume’s presence is clearly felt. In Federalist No. 10, his appreciation of the complexity of factions shows a familiarity with Hume’s ideas, passions, and opinions creating stubborn challenges to any stable and free society. And later in Federalist Nos. 37--39, in which Madison urges his readers to accept the difficulty of founding a Republic and the need to accept the Constitution, he uses language that can, at times, seem strikingly Humean. Finally, in writing the Constitution, many of the framers of the Constitution were influenced by Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu. In his work The Spirit of the Laws the importance of separation of powers and checks and balances are thoroughly discussed. The necessity for such concepts as central to forging any free society was not lost on the Americans. Montesquieu saw these principles embodied in the English political system; however, his analysis of the English system was vital in helping Americans think
8 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought through what they were doing. Although, in thinking about England’s influence on the Constitution, the framers did not speak with one voice. Alexander Hamilton thought the English Constitution was perfect, whereas others were more skeptical. The key animating principle was that each branch of government---legislative, executive, and judicial---should share political power and that each should be directed by different people.
The Declaration and the Constitution One of the problems in discussing the Enlightenment’s influence on America, and how we should think about classical liberalism, is that the U.S. founding and America’s subsequent history are shaped by two different documents: the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Both documents are clearly an expression of Enlightenment thinking and are considered key documents in classical liberalism, but they are not documents that seamlessly reflect the same thinking. They were written years apart and by different authors. The Declaration was largely, though not exclusively, the work of one man---Thomas Jefferson. The U.S. Constitution reflects the ideas of a team of men with, at times, vastly different approaches to politics. As a reflection of Enlightenment thinking and classical liberalism, the Declaration of Independence is the more problematic of the two. In many ways, Thomas Jefferson took a great deal of Lockean thought and incorporated it into the Declaration. Indeed, much of the language parallels Locke. What is most striking about the work is that it assumes the common sense of Locke’s ideas. Men are endowed with natural rights, government exists by the consent of the people, men are equal, and society is created by a kind of social contract. Furthermore, if the rights of the people are violated, then the people are allowed to engage in revolution. In this way, many of the ideas of Locke, and the era he reflected, had simply become part of the intellectual air in which people like Jefferson breathed. All Jefferson really had to do was take these ideas and distill them to their practical essence in language that resonates even today. Thus, he remarks, it is ‘‘selfevident’’ that ‘‘all man are created equal. Furthermore, taking a lesson from the latter half of The Treatise on Government, Jefferson justifies revolution. Locke’s idea of a ‘‘long train of abuses’’ is reflected in the extensive catalog of wrongs committed by the king against the colonies. Thus, the Declaration of Independence, and the revolution it justified, is reasonable---a cornerstone of Enlightenment thought. Finally, the Declaration
champions human freedom and demands that a selfconscious society of people forge their own way in the New World and not be shackled to a tyrannical regime. The document is problematic as well, which is apparent on at least two grounds. First, Jefferson never fully defines what he means by equality. This is one of the most difficult aspects of both the American experience and Enlightenment thought. Championing equality is hypocritical in a land that tolerated, even embraced, slavery. As Samuel Johnson rightly observed, ‘‘How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?’’ At a deeper philosophical level, equality is difficult for many Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, some Enlightenment thinkers, like Voltaire, endorsed the concept of philosophic kings---hardly an embrace of the concept of political equality. Furthermore, the more central concept of the Enlightenment and classical liberalism is the ideal of freedom. The freedom to create a new political world was a more vital part of the Declaration than the rhetoric of equality that it contained. On a second level, the Declaration of Independence was a document designed to appeal to as many people as possible. Thus, Jefferson needed to compose something that would appeal to those unaffected or unfriendly to Enlightenment thought. This might include many religious people or those less hostile to traditional society. As Jefferson later said, the Declaration was a ‘‘harmonizing document.’’ The Constitution is a more straightforward document in reflecting Enlightenment and liberal thinking, which is evident on many levels. The document is devoid of references to history, local or national customs, and religion. Earlier constitutions, going back to the Greek city states, were apt to make numerous references to the long history of the regime in question. But the framers of the U.S. Constitution were about starting the world anew---an Enlightenment ideal. In so doing, the framers used reason to write a rather spare, abstract work that includes the basic rules for governance. In fact, few, if any, specific policies are demanded in the document. (For instance, the German constitution specifically bans the Nazi Party.) Most central to the document is the concept of separation of powers and the defining of the three branches of government that separation demanded. The separation of powers, as Madison made clear in Federalist No. 51, was designed to make ‘‘ambition counteract ambition.’’ The protection of personal freedom is the animating principle of classical liberalism and is reflected in the separation of powers. A more apt phrase actually would be shared powers, because all three branches interact frequently on political decisions. Each branch is involved in the
First page of the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution was drafted by representatives of the original 13 states meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, between July and September 1787. (National Archives/Corbis)
10 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought working of government as policy is created. Each branch is selected in a different way, with constituencies, and each has different political time horizons. Thus, the president thinks in terms of four years, senators six years, house members two years, and the federal court a lifetime. Thus, the idea of balance is politically maintained---this is another Enlightenment ideal. This does not mean, however, that the three branches are of equal power. It is clear that the Congress was meant to be the preeminent branch of government, whatever history has foretold. And the judiciary was, as Hamilton said, ‘‘the least dangerous branch,’’ in part because it was the weakest. Even this quintessential Enlightenment document holds within it hidden traces of non-Enlightenment thinking. The document allows for, even if it does not embrace, that second voice of American politics. That is, the voice of locality over the nation, community over the individual, and equality paired with freedom. In important ways, this voice is more democratic and has a much greater faith in self-governance. This is found in a few places in the work. First of all, the states were not abolished, and we developed a Federalist system. This does not guarantee the ideas of locality, community, and equality. It does, however, make room for these ideas. States may be large entities, indeed, but they were and are closer to the people than the distant national government. Second, opponents of the Constitution---the Anti-Federalists---championed the ideas mentioned above. Although they failed to stop the ratification of the Constitution, they were able to raise serious questions and give pause to the process. And they did not lose outright. In their opposition, they were able to extract a promise for a series of amendments to the document---the Bill of Rights. On first glance, the Bill of Rights does not seem to be such an endorsement of locality, community, and equality. Yet, a more careful reading reveals just that. The First Amendment, for instance, allows for assembly and protects religious freedom. Implicit in the amendments is the idea of a limited national government. Not only is government power checked by the internal working of the government (checks and balances), but also the government is limited by the inherent rights of the people, which are partially articulated in the actual amendments. Localities and equality were fostered by the Bill of Rights in other more subtle ways. The right to juries, for instance, allowed local citizens to determine justice. As Forest McDonald points out, ‘‘In an everyday sense, juries were the government, and it was upon them that the safety of all rights to liberty and to property depended.’’ The First Amendment, while clearly
protecting individual liberty, also protects communal life by shielding religious practices and the right of the people to assemble. In the early 21st century, far-flung people can meet via the virtual reality of the Internet; however, most of us understand assembly, and certainly through most of American history the concept has been understood, to be people gathering face to face in their communities to express themselves. If Madison and Hamilton and the other framers wanted a national government that could touch citizens individually and directly, the Anti-Federalists wanted to ensure that the people could unite and find political ways to counter national power.
Political Destruction and Political Creation An inherent tension exists between these two documents. The Declaration of Independence is a largely destructive document, but not in any pejorative sense; rather, it is destructive in that it states a desire on the part of the colonists to sever the connection between America and Great Britain. And, in fact, it is usually the case that revolutions are naturally destructive. Furthermore, it is often difficult to construct a coherent and complete conception of governance from a revolutionary manifesto. Such writings tend to be open to the broadest possible interpretation, precisely to unite widely disparate groups under the banner of change. If specific constructive proposals are made, it might be difficult to unify the opposition. Thus, the Declaration of Independence is vague about natural rights in the very act of asserting their existence. Rights are ‘‘selfevident,’’ and the specifics of the document are about the abuses committed by the crown. Conversely, the U.S. Constitution is a constructive act of political creation. It outlines, if at times vaguely, the power of three precise branches of government. It lays out, in general terms, what these branches do and how they interact. And in the case of article one, it details a rather specific set of powers delegated to the legislative branch. Thus, it is not surprising that the U.S. Constitution, in its ratification phase, engendered a great deal of debate and criticism. In fact, coming on the heals of an overarching rejection of the Articles of Confederation, it is apparent how it would invite such criticism. (The Articles were adopted after the American Revolution and it was the governing document until it was superseded by the U.S. Constitution.) The Articles accepted a great deal more decentralization of power and allowed the states much more leeway and freedom in action. The Declaration of Independence required a simple affirmation or rejection of the Revolution itself.
The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism This admittedly posed a difficult, though not complex, choice. In many ways, this affirmation of the Revolution reflected Enlightenment thought, in general. For the Enlightenment was a destructive act of overthrowing the old intellectual order and a constructive act of creating a new way of thinking about the world. Thus, to take an example from Locke, the First Treatise systematically destroyed Robert Filmers theory of patriarchalism and the Second Treatise then created a theory of how government should be founded.
Continuing Influence The Enlightenment and the political documents it generated at the founding continue to influence American political thought and history. Indeed, the principles, rhetoric, and institutions created by the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution remain a set of lenses through which Americans perceive the political world. It is beyond the scope of this essay to illustrate all the ways in which each document influenced later political actions; nonetheless, a few key moments and individuals stand out in American politics and reflect their continuing influence. The Declaration of Independence, for the most part, lacks any constitutional force. Most Supreme Court justices do not recognize it as having any binding power. Yet, its rhetoric and underlying principles have inspired subsequent political actors. The most famous case is Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln always maintained that his political philosophy, and his understanding of the U.S. Constitution, was inspired and framed by the Declaration of Independence: Let us re-adopt the Declaration of Independence, and with it, the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it. Let north and south---let all Americans let all lovers of liberty everywhere---join in the great good work. If we do this, we shall not only save the Union; but we shall have saved it, as to make, and to keep it, forever worthy of the saving. For Lincoln, the Declaration was an inspiring reflection about the fundamental ideas of consent---we can be governed only by a regime to which we consent--and equality---that all are equal in the eyes of the government. What is central to any reading of the Declaration is that America is about equality. By claiming that people are inherently equal and that government can exist only by the consent of the people, the democratic elements of American society were reinforced. And, by interpreting the Constitution via an understanding of
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the Declaration, it was easier to see the possibility of a democratic Constitution. In point of fact, the Constitution created a republic with many nondemocratic practices. The president is not directly elected, senators were not elected until the 20th century, and federal judges serve lifetime tenures. Indeed, only the House of Representatives was always elected by a wide suffrage. And given the allowance of slavery that the Constitution did not forbid and the discrimination against women it upheld, at times, it can be difficult to see democracy flowing from the Constitution. But if the reader starts with the Declaration, and views the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration, then the democratic elements come to the forefront. A limited government allows people to live their lives as they please, elections are manifestly important, and the government is accountable to the people. These are vital elements to a democratic society. One cannot say that the Constitution, on its face, demands democracy. It does not preclude it and can, over time, lead to a fostering of a democratic culture that insists on the rule of the people. Furthermore, the Civil War, inspired in part by the rhetoric of the Declaration, led to the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Each of these amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, has been used by the Courts to strengthen the democratic process. In the 18th century, using the standards of the present day, it would be difficult to say that the United States was a democracy. Yet, through its history, the United States has become a full-fledged democracy. Furthermore, a culture that proudly embraced the rough equality about which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote so vividly has developed a set of institutional practices that are, at their heart, democratic. At the same time, the belief in private property and limited government, the touchstone ideals of classical liberalism remain integral parts of the American experiment. The Constitution, of course, has a more obvious influence on American political history. On the first level, the Constitution created the very institutions by which the national government functions. Even if the specific articles are, at times, vague, it is nonetheless true that the basic parameters of American political institutions are bounded by the rules created by the Constitution. And, indeed, one can point to many specific instances in American political history in which the Constitution, interpreted via the Supreme Court, was used to halt or channel the political evolution of the country. Thus, the Progressives in the early part of the 20th century believed that it was necessary to amend the Constitution to give the power of levying an income tax to the
12 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought federal government, via the Sixteenth Amendment, and to establish the direct election of senators, via the Seventeenth Amendment. At a deeper level, Americans have an innate belief in the Constitution as a defining document. Garry Wills, in A Necessary Evil, points out that even Americans opposed to the current state of politics look to the Constitution for inspiration and guidance in understanding the world. Nonetheless, we must recognize the tension that exists at the heart of the classical liberalism and that is revealed in the American political experience. This is the tension between equality and freedom. The Enlightenment championed both ideals. In practice, however, classical liberalism usually has sided with personal freedom at the expanse of equality, if these ideals come into conflict. On the one hand, the Enlightenment promised a newly found freedom that was necessary for the advancement of knowledge, the progress of humanity, and the delineation of natural law and natural rights. Intellectual and political freedoms were central to the Enlightenment project. And in political theory, these aspirations became central to liberal theory. Yet, the American experiment includes a strong penchant for democracy and this belief in democracy cannot exist without a healthy regard for equality. Classical liberalism has always championed political equality and equality before the law, but it has been less concerned with notions of economic and social equality. This concern has found a home in that second voice of American politics, and it goes a long way toward understanding how classical liberalism gave way, in some quarters, to contemporary liberalism. In many ways, this is reflected in the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers that was designed to create as much freedom as possible and still maintain a stable political world. As Madison argues in Federalist No. 10, it is ‘‘folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life.’’ In later American politics, this thinking was reflected in the Federalist Party and the political thought of such men as Alexander Hamilton. Custom and traditionally religious attitudes stood in the way of this freedom, and although we may now associate the Federalist with political conservatism, it is more accurate to see these men as devoted to creating a new political society dedicated to the idea of freedom. In this sense, America is and remains a product of the Enlightenment. The American faith in individual freedom, progress, and a general belief that all problems can be solved reveal us as children of the Enlightenment. The second part of the Enlightenment is the belief in equality. The Enlightenment, in its questioning of traditional order, opened up the possibility that seemingly
natural hierarchies were not, indeed, natural. By its embrace of natural rights and, in the case of John Locke, an equal access to the natural law, the idea of political equality is an open possibility. Even if the men of the Enlightenment did not fully live up to their rhetoric---after all, oppression of women and slaves persisted in the United States---the language employed by Enlightenment men like Jefferson created political tension. We all have rights and an equal understanding of the natural law. This reinforces a notion of equality that persists in America to this day. If we are all equal in this way, it is hard to accept any political inequality. In many ways, the Declaration of Independence represents this second strand of Enlightenment thought. And we cannot discount the way classical liberals thought, with their emphasis on the individual and her inherent rights, which fostered a kind of equality. Yet, classical liberalism, with its belief in the ability to acquire property and a suspicion of too strong a government, has much less to say about economic inequality. And, if one has any concerns about the way economic inequality can affect political power, then classical liberalism raises troublesome worries. The Enlightenment had an enormous influence on the United States---even before the founding of the Republic. Many of the writers of the Enlightenment and proto-Enlightenment---Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Montesquieu, were avidly read by the American founders. At a deeper cultural level, many of the idea of the Enlightenment---the faith in reason, the belief in progress, and fostering of science---are embedded in American culture. In the institutions created by the Constitution, the underlying principle of checks and balances, the rhetoric of equality, and the faith in freedom, we find abundant evidence of Enlightenment influence, and ultimately an expression of what we now identify as classical liberalism. This classical liberalism, with its starting point in the individual, represents a belief in rights and a skepticism about centralized political power that is a deeply American tradition. The Enlightenment influence was made all the more possible because America, at least the America created by European colonists, was a new world where new ideas and practices could receive their greatest expression. America was not burdened by a long history or a set of entrenched traditions that battled with new ideas and movements---as was the case in Europe. In the United States, people influenced by the Enlightenment did not have to do battle with any ancient regime or established church. In the political realm, the ideas of classical liberalism flourished.
The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism Yet, this is only part of the American story. There was a second voice in American politics---that is, the voice of religion, the broader community, and the collective we over the individual. It is the voice of democracy, equality, and self-governance. In many ways, the U.S. story can be seen as a dialectical exchange between the ideas of the Enlightenment---a belief in freedom, the individual, and progress---and the belief in the community, tradition, and religious faith. To
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ignore either is to invite a misunderstanding of the American political experience.
References and Further Reading Staloff, Darren. Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding. New York: Hill and Wong, 2005. Wootton, David, ed. The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers. Indianapolis, IN: Hacckett Publishing Co. 2003.
Political Thought in the Early Republic Brian Danoff Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami University
laws would now be the ‘‘supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’’
The first constitution of the United States was the Articles of Confederation, ratified by all 13 states in 1781. The Articles of Confederation stated that its aim was to create a ‘‘league of friendship’’ in which ‘‘each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence.’’ The Articles thus created an alliance of sovereign states, as opposed to a powerful national government. By 1787, many American political leaders believed that the Articles had not created a sufficiently strong central government. As a result of this widespread belief, in February of 1787, the Confederation Congress called for a convention to meet at Philadelphia, ‘‘for the sole purpose of revising the articles of Confederation’’ in a way that would ‘‘render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.’’ In the summer of 1787, the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention eventually agreed to a plan for a new Constitution that would bring sweeping changes to the American political system. In contrast to the weak central government that existed under the Articles, this new national government would contain powerful executive and judicial branches. Moreover, a greatly strengthened legislative branch would be given a number of new powers, including the power to regulate interstate commerce, the power to maintain an army during peace time, and the power to tax individuals directly. Whereas under the Articles, the states were said to retain their sovereignty, Article VI of the new Constitution stated that the Constitution and all federal
Samuel Adams was a revolutionary and American statesman who is famous for organizing colonial resistance to British policies in Massachusetts. (National Archives)
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Political Thought in the Early Republic 15 It was declared by the Philadelphia Convention that the new Constitution would go into effect if nine of the 13 states chose to ratify it in special state conventions. During the fall of 1787 and the winter of 1788, as delegates to the special conventions were elected and then met to deliberate, a great debate raged across the United States over the question of whether the proposed Constitution should be ratified. The Constitution was endorsed by widely respected leaders such as Benjamin Franklin and George Washington. However, there was also a considerable amount of opposition to the Constitution, and this opposition came from such famous Revolutionary figures as Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry. The opposition also included a number of anonymous authors whose identity remains uncertain today. Writing under such pseudonyms as Brutus, the Federal Farmer, and Cincinnatus, these authors wrote essays in newspapers urging that the new Constitution be rejected. The opponents of the Constitution came to be known as the Anti-Federalists. The Anti-Federalists were a diverse group, and there was some disagreement among them regarding the Constitution’s flaws. And yet, while Anti-Federalists sometimes disagreed with one another on particular points, one can discern an underlying unity in their ideas; on the whole, the Anti-Federalists can be usefully understood as defenders of the political theory of republicanism. The republican tradition of political thought extends back to Aristotle, and was articulated, in different ways, in the work of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and other classical political theorists. As they sought to prevent what they perceived to be the dissolution of the 13 republics into one large state, the Anti-Federalists gave voice to this rich theoretical tradition of republicanism. The opponents of the Constitution were labeled ‘‘Anti-Federalists’’ by the proponents of the Constitution, who called themselves the ‘‘Federalists.’’ The opponents of the Constitution were not pleased to be labeled as ‘‘Anti-Federalists,’’ for in their view, it was they who were the true defenders of federalism. The Constitution’s opponents argued that federalism is a system of government in which sovereign states join together for limited purposes, such as common defense. In a federal system, the locus of political power and political activity should remain with the individual states, as opposed to the central government. According to this view, the Articles of Confederation created a genuinely federal system. The Anti-Federalists believed that the new Constitution, in contrast, did not create a federal form of government at all, but rather created a
single ‘‘consolidated’’ government, under which the 13 state governments would become irrelevant in practice, even if they still existed on paper. In the Anti-Federalist view, this effort to create a gigantic ‘‘consolidated’’ republic was destined to be disastrous. They believed that the end result of the Constitution would be the creation of a large empire, not a large republic at all. This empire would be ruled over by a small number of aristocratic elites, and the republican principles of self-government for which the American revolutionaries fought would be lost. The Anti-Federalists believed that under the Articles of Confederation, public liberty---the liberty of every citizen to participate in public affairs---was able to flourish within the 13 separate republics at the state and local levels. The Anti-Federalists feared that by destroying the power of the state and local governments, the new Constitution would crush public liberty, and thus crush republicanism, as political life would come to be monopolized by a small number of central government officials. Like the Anti-Federalists, the Federalists claimed that they were, in fact, sincere republicans, and they insisted that the Constitution was entirely consistent with republican principles. The Anti-Federalists, however, believed that the Federalists were trying to replace the classical republican tradition of political thought with a new science of politics. According to this modern science of politics, government should promote private liberty (the liberty to live one’s life as one sees fit), but not necessarily public liberty (the liberty to actively participate in public life). The Federalists’ departure from classical republicanism can be seen in Federalist No. 10. In this essay, Madison claims that the new national government will be a republic. However, he defines a ‘‘republic’’ simply as a ‘‘government in which the scheme of representation takes place’’ (Hamilton 1982, 55). For Madison, then, if the leaders of a regime are elected by the citizenry, then that regime can fairly be called a republic. For the Anti-Federalists, however, Madison’s definition of a ‘‘republic’’ is far too meager. The Anti-Federalists were attached to an older conception of republicanism, according to which a republic is not simply a regime in which the people are ruled over by elites of their choice. For the Anti-Federalists, a state can only be called a republic---and freedom can only be said to exist---if the state is made up of citizens who actively engage in self-rule, through direct participation in political life. The Anti-Federalists also believed that if a republic is to be preserved, it must succeed in cultivating citizens who have a certain kind of character;
16 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought specifically, a republic’s citizens must be passionately committed to public affairs, and they must be willing, at times, to sacrifice their own private interest for the sake of the common good. As we shall see, the AntiFederalists rejected the Constitution, because they believed that it would create a regime that would depart from these classical republican ideals.
Citizen Participation and the Constitution The Anti-Federalist emphasis on citizen participation can be discerned if one contrasts their understanding of representation with the understanding of the Federalists. In the modern science of politics favored by the Federalists, the device of representation plays a key role. In Federalist No. 10, Madison suggests that a representative republic is far superior to a ‘‘pure democracy’’ in which all citizens ‘‘assemble and administer the government in person.’’ Madison argues that under ‘‘pure’’ democracies, individual rights are inevitably trampled on by mob-like majorities, and the public good is ignored. In contrast, in a large representative republic, there is a good chance that the representatives will be wise citizens who can ‘‘refine and enlarge the public views’’ (Hamilton 1982, 55). Rather than simply enact into law whatever the masses desire, the representatives will make decisions on the basis of their own independent judgment. For the Federalists, then, representation provides protection against what Alexander Hamilton called (behind the closed doors of the Philadelphia Convention) ‘‘the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit’’ (Ketcham 1986, 76). In the view of the Federalists, the device of representation promises to create an enlightened government made up of elected elites, as opposed to an intemperate government made up of the people themselves. In contrast to the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists tended to celebrate the kind of direct democracy that flourished in the town-hall meetings of America. For instance, a Maryland farmer declared: ‘‘I feel unspeakable horror at every step, which removes power and rights, at a greater distance from the body of the people, to whom they belong, and confines them to the hands of the few’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 49). The AntiFederalists did concede that the device of representation would need to be used at the state and national levels, simply because these entities were too big to support direct democracy. However, although they accepted the device of representation as a practical necessity, they never joined the Federalists in celebrating representation as a positive good. Unlike the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists did not think of
representation as an indispensable method of filtering out the dangerous demands and passions of the masses. Whereas the Federalists wanted to insulate the representatives from public opinion through such devices as long terms of office, the Anti-Federalists sought to make representatives close to the people by having annual elections, small legislative districts, and mandatory rotation in office. The Anti-Federalists believed that all of these devices would enable the citizenry to carefully monitor and instruct their representatives. Moreover, as the historian Ralph Ketcham notes, ‘‘the [Anti-Federalist] ideal went beyond a close control of officials by the people. In a truly self-governing society, there would be such dialogue, empathy, and even intimacy that the very distinction between ruler and ruled would tend to disappear’’ (Ketcham 1986, 19). In the Anti-Federalist vision of representation, then, the people should engage actively in self-rule through their representatives. For the Federalists, in contrast, the representatives essentially rule in place of the people. The Anti-Federalists noted that the Constitution provided for only a small amount of legislators (26 senators and 65 house members). These legislators would not be elected annually, and there would be no limit on how many terms they could serve. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, this would tend to produce an aristocratic legislative body that would rule the people from above. In contrast, the Anti-Federalists hoped to create a legislative body that would help to facilitate---rather than replace---the rule of the people. The Anti-Federalists believed that the participation of the citizenry in government would be undermined not just by the Constitution’s scheme of representation, but also by its judicial system. The Anti-Federalists noted that while Article III of the Constitution declared that ‘‘the trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury,’’ it did not guarantee trial by jury in civil cases. The Anti-Federalists feared that the institution of the jury would thus decline under the Constitution. If the jury declined, the people would lose one of their most important means of participating in public life. Just as the town-hall meetings allow the direct participation of citizens in the making of the law, jury trials allow the direct participation of citizens in the administration of the law. The Anti-Federalists feared that the loss of this form of participation would rob the people of a crucial form of political education. If they are no longer able to serve frequently on juries, then ordinary Americans’ faculties of legal and moral reasoning would begin to atrophy. As a Maryland farmer noted in an essay on the jury system, ‘‘Men no longer cultivate, what is no longer useful---should every opportunity be taken
Political Thought in the Early Republic 17 away, of exercising their reason, you will reduce them to [a] state of mental baseness’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 39). According to the Anti-Federalists, the best way to educate people for self-rule is to allow them to practice self-rule. As a Maryland farmer put it, ‘‘Our people are capable of being made any thing, that human nature was or is capable of, if we would only have a little patience and give them good and wholesome institutions’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 30). The Anti-Federalists believed that the framers of the Constitution had failed to create ‘‘good and wholesome institutions’’ insofar as they abandoned the task of founding and maintaining institutions that would foster the political participation---and thus the political education--- of the people. In an influential essay, the historian Cecilia Kenyon (1955) called the Anti-Federalists ‘‘men of little faith,’’ partly because they were so deeply suspicious of governmental power. While Kenyon’s description of the Anti-Federalists is partly correct, it must be noted that the Anti-Federalists actually had a tremendous amount of faith in the ability of ordinary citizens to run their own affairs, as long as they were properly educated. From the Anti-Federalist view, it was the Federalists who had abandoned this ancient republican faith in the people. The Anti-Federalists believed, as the satirist Montezuma put it, that the authors of the Constitution were intent on ‘‘drawing a line between’’ those who are allegedly ‘‘ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any share in its administration’’ (Kenyon 1966, 61--62). According to this view, the Federalists had departed from the republican principles of the American Revolution. As one observer noted, during the Revolution it was believed that ‘‘the common people were good judges in the affairs of government,’’ and ‘‘their time was well spent when it was devoted to the study of politicks’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 202). In the view of Anti-Federalists such as the satirist Aristocrotis, the Federalists were now telling the common people to ‘‘mind their own business, and leave the affairs of government’’ to others (Storing 1981a, v. 3, 198). The Anti-Federalists were opposed to the notion of creating one enormous republic in part because a large state only allows a tiny percentage of the people to actively share in political rule. In a system of 13 confederated republics, a much higher proportion of citizens can participate at the local and state levels. One could argue that the new Constitution allows local and state politics to continue to flourish; however, the AntiFederalists believed, as Melancton Smith put it, that ratification will mean that the ‘‘state governments, without object or authority, will soon dwindle into
insignificance, and be despised by the people themselves’’ (Ketcham 1986, 353). Local governments would lose significance as well, because power under the new regime would be centralized in the nation’s capital. The only people who genuinely could experience public liberty, then, would be a small number of national officials.
Civic Virtue and the Constitution The Anti-Federalists feared that, ultimately, the Constitution would destroy the republican sprit of the people through its failure to generate civic virtue. In other words, the Anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution would create a regime that would fail to cultivate the kind of citizens that republican government requires. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists wanted citizens to actively engage in self-rule. But to rule themselves properly, they would need a proper moral education. According to the Anti-Federalists, the framers of the Constitution were too little concerned with creating institutions that could perform this crucial educative task. For instance, Denatus insisted that ‘‘the first, or second article’’ of the Constitution should have established academies ‘‘at every proper place throughout the United States for the education of youth in morality [and] the principles of the Christian religion’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 264). As this quote suggests, the Anti-Federalist belief that the framers had neglected schools often overlapped with their belief that the framers had dangerously ignored the importance of religion. The Anti-Federalists believed that a successful republic requires citizens who focus on the common good, and who seek to master the all-toohuman passions for power and luxuries. In the view of many Anti-Federalists, religion is crucial in forming this type of citizen. Charles Turner, for instance, argued that ‘‘without the prevalence of Christian piety, and morals, the best republican Constitution can never save us from slavery and ruin’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 221). In other words, even if a Constitution establishes republican institutions, the spirit of republicanism will die out if it is not cultivated and sustained by the moral principles that are inculcated by religion. According to Denatus, when ‘‘vanity, ambition, and the love of riches . . . overcome reason and conscience, they produce our misery. To guard against this misfortune, as much as human foresight could discover, ought to have been the chief business’’ of the Philadelphia Convention (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 263--264). But rather than make the moral education of the citizenry their ‘‘chief business,’’ the Federalists emphasized, as Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, ‘‘that neither moral
18 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control’’ over ‘‘the injustice and violence of individuals’’ (Hamilton 1982, 54). Madison is here addressing the problem of ‘‘faction,’’ which he defines as a group of citizens ‘‘who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community’’ (Hamilton 1982, 51). Boldly challenging the republican tradition’s emphasis on the small republic, Madison claims that large republics are superior to small ones, because in a large state, it is very difficult for any particular faction to form a tyrannical majority. Madison thus rejects the idea of using moral education to diminish the strength of selfinterested passions; instead, Madison argued that these passions could be effectively neutralized if given free rein in a large and diverse state. The Federalist attempt to solve the problem of faction is thus very different from the approach of the Anti-Federalists. For the Anti-Federalists, a republic should try to avoid self-interested factions from arising in the first place by trying to form citizens who are devoted to the common good. Whereas the Anti-Federalists strived to minimize selfish passions, the Federalists accepted the prevalence of these passions and tried to create institutions that either neutralized these passions or channeled them in constructive ways. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, the end result of the Federalist approach would be the cultivation of citizens who are ‘‘too selfish and avaricious’’ to preserve a republican government, as Mercy Warren put it (Storing 1981a, v. 6, 216). The Anti-Federalists feared that the citizens shaped by the Constitution would be focused excessively on commerce and the pursuit of luxuries. Under the Constitution, the federal government would now have the power to regulate interstate commerce. Most AntiFederalists actually agreed that this was one new power that Congress should be granted; at the same time, AntiFederalists feared that the new government would foster the desire to enrich oneself, at the expense of the desire to serve the public good. As a customer put it, under the new regime, Americans will spend their time on ‘‘the pursuit of wealth,’’ as opposed to the nobler activities of ‘‘politicks and religion’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 202). Anti-Federalists believed that the new government would cultivate in its citizens not only dreams of private enrichment, but also dreams of military conquest. Patrick Henry asserted that Federalists were trying to create a ‘‘great and mighty empire’’ that would rival the large monarchical powers of Europe (Kenyon 1966, 250). Henry warned his fellow Virginians that, ‘‘those
Patrick Henry helped lead Virginia to independence and served as a wartime governor, but later opposed the Constitution. (Library of Congress)
nations who have gone in search of grandeur, power and splendor, have . . . been the victims of their own folly. While they acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their freedom’’ (Kenyon 1966, 243). In Henry’s view, the citizenry of a republic must be willing to die in defense of their homeland, but they should not be encouraged to chase after glorious dreams of empire, for empires are invariably ruled over by a monarch or an aristocracy. If republican liberty is to be preserved, the focus should be on cultivating a simple, virtuous, and peaceful life at home. This kind of virtuous and free life potentially could be cultivated within each of the 13 republics, but it would never be cultivated by a massive consolidated state that puts commerce and war at the center of its ambitions. The Anti-Federalist emphasis on the importance of civic virtue also can be seen in their response to Federalist claims that America in the late 1780s had entered a ‘‘critical period’’ that necessitated the creation of a powerful central government. The Federalists argued that America’s domestic economy and international standing were on the brink of ruin, and the country
Political Thought in the Early Republic 19 could be saved only by the new Constitution. Antifederalists sometimes responded that there was, in fact, no crisis, and that Federalists were merely attempting to scare Americans into embracing a powerful centralized state that would entail the end of republican selfrule. As Patrick Henry put it, Go to the poor man, and ask him what he does. He will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security. . . . Why, then, tell us of danger, to terrify us into an adoption of this new form of government? (Kenyon 1966, 251) Henry argued that if America did face domestic or foreign challenges, the country would be saved not by the central government, but rather by the republican spirit of the people. If America wanted to remain strong, the answer lay not in creating a more energetic government, but in cultivating the civic virtue of the citizenry, and this cultivation must take place primarily within the close-knit local communities that were found in the 13 separate republics. Some Anti-Federalists actually agreed with the Federalists that America was facing major economic and political crises in the late 1780s, and they believed that the Articles could thus use some reform. However, they believed that America’s problems were not primarily the result of problems with the Articles, or with the various state constitutions, but rather resulted from a decline in civic virtue. According to many AntiFederalists, the republican sprit was at its peak during the American Revolution, for this was a time when citizens focused on the common good rather than their own narrow interests. As the memory of the war started to fade, though, so, too, did the civic virtue of the people begin to decline, and it was this loss of virtue that was causing America’s economic and political problems. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution would simply exacerbate this corruption of the American character. At the Philadelphia Convention, Benjamin Franklin said, in support of the Constitution, that the newly created federal government is ‘‘likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic government, being incapable of any other’’ (Ketcham 1986, 176). The Anti-Federalists agreed with Franklin that the fate of liberty was dependent on whether or not the citizenry became corrupt. They would argue, though, that Franklin had apparently failed to perceive the ways in
which the Constitution itself was likely to bring about the corruption of the people’s character. In other words, while Federalists such as Franklin occasionally acknowledged that a republic cannot survive without a degree of civic virtue in the citizens, they refused to acknowledge that civic virtue might be undermined by the very regime that they sought to create. As Melancton Smith put it, ‘‘Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well as the spirit of the people operates upon it.. . . Our duty is to frame a government friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind, which will tend to cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among our citizens’’ (Kenyon 1966, 388). In the view of the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution would not, in fact, ‘‘cultivate a love of liberty,’’ or at least not a love of public liberty. Instead, the new regime would simply encourage Americans to focus on their own private pursuits, allowing elites to control public affairs.
The Constitution’s Three Branches and the Fate of Republicanism Anti-Federalists made arguments that each of the proposed Constitution’s three branches of government posed a threat to American republicanism. According to Cecilia Kenyon, when the Anti-Federalists criticized what they saw as the likely consequences of the Constitution, they offered nothing but a ‘‘parade of imaginary horribles’’ (1955, 15). While Kenyon claims that most of the fears of the Anti-Federalists were little more than paranoid fantasies, other political scientists have argued that the Anti-Federalists were actually quite prescient with many of their criticisms. Indeed, while some of the Anti-Federalists’ worst fears have never come to pass, one could argue that American political development under the Constitution has actually followed, to a considerable degree, the predictions of the Anti-Federalists. When considering the proposed executive branch, Patrick Henry argued that the Constitution ‘‘squints towards monarchy,’’ insofar as the ‘‘President may easily become King’’ (Kenyon 1966, 257). In the same vein, Cato noted that the language concerning presidential powers in Article II is ‘‘vague and inexplicit’’ (Kenyon 1966, 307). Given the ambiguity of the language relating to presidential power, the president might claim that virtually anything he desires to do is constitutionally permissible. As Young William Symmes put it, the president might think he is allowed to ‘‘reject the sense of the legislature, and establish his own,’’ rendering himself ‘‘to all intents and purpose absolute’’ (Storing 1981b, 49). In the worst-case
20 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought
George Washington presides over the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia. (National Archives)
scenario envisioned by Anti-Federalists, the president might even use his power as commander in chief to establish a military despotism over the nation. To reduce the chances that the president would gain monarchical powers, some Anti-Federalists suggested that there should be a plural executive. Others suggested that there should be an executive council, without whose support the president would be unable to act. Hamilton and other Federalists responded that it would be a terrible mistake to destroy the unity of the executive by creating either a plural executive or an executive council. To master foreign and domestic threats to the nation, the president must be capable of acting decisively, quickly, and, at times, secretly. In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton argued that a single executive leader is far more likely to be able to act in these requisite ways than is a group of people. To these arguments, the Anti-Federalists sometimes replied, as George Mason did during the Philadelphia Convention, that the best way to strengthen the nation is not to give the president great powers; instead, the best way to
strengthen the nation is to cultivate citizens who are deeply attached to their government. The Constitution will not produce civic virtue in the citizenry, and so the nation will end up weak, no matter how much power is given to the president. While the Anti-Federalists’ most awful fears about the executive branch may not ever have been realized, one could argue that the Anti-Federalists foresaw, in general terms, the development of what the historian Arthur Schlesinger (1973) called the ‘‘imperial presidency.’’ Schlesinger and many other scholars have argued that the modern executive has assumed powers that the framers did not intend it to have, particularly in the area of war-making. The Anti-Federalists would be troubled---but not at all surprised---by the expansion of power undergone by the modern presidency. Anti-Federalists such as Brutus would be unsurprised by the powerful role that the Supreme Court has played in American politics. The power of federal courts to strike down unconstitutional laws is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but Brutus
Political Thought in the Early Republic 21 accurately predicted that federal judges would strike down laws that they deem to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Brutus not only correctly foresaw the power of judicial review; he also correctly predicted that the courts would use this power to augment the power of the federal government as a whole. Brutus was particularly worried about the possibility that federal courts would point to such sweeping clauses as the ‘‘necessary and proper clause’’ as a way to ‘‘mould the government, into almost any shape they please’’ (Kenyon 1966, 342). And, indeed, Chief Justice Marshall would use the ‘‘necessary and proper clause’’ to bolster the power of the federal government at the expense of the states in the important case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). The Supreme Court at first resisted, but then eventually sanctioned, the further growth of federal power during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The Supreme Court cited the ‘‘interstate commerce clause’’ to determine the constitutionality of much of the economic legislation passed by Congress during the New Deal. Brutus did not anticipate the Court’s expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce clause, and Brutus was wrong when he suggested that the Court would utilize the broad language of the Constitution’s preamble to legitimate the growth of the central government. Even if he did not always accurately predict the exact legal reasoning of the Court, some have argued that Brutus was, on the whole, absolutely right in predicting that the Court’s decisions ‘‘may establish certain principles, which . . . will enlarge the sphere of [Congressional] power beyond all bounds’’ (Kenyon 1966, 343). The Rehnquist Court’s ‘‘New Federalism’’ decisions, such as U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000), can be seen as an attempt to roll back this expansion of power in a way that Brutus might have appreciated. Although the Anti-Federalists sometimes criticized the judicial and executive branches, most of their fears were centered on the legislative branch. AntiFederalists believed that, under the Articles, the people were allowed to rule themselves through their local and state governments; under the new constitution, in contrast, the Anti-Federalists feared that the people would be dominated by distant and aristocratic congressional representatives who would lack the people’s ‘‘confidence,’’ as the Anti-Federalists often put it. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, representatives can gain the people’s confidence only if the people know them well, ideally on a face-to-face basis. Given that the new constitution would create large legislative districts, few constituents would ever know their
representatives well enough to establish a genuine relationship of trust. Moreover, in a large legislative district, hard-working middle-class citizens were unlikely to be elected. Congress would be dominated by the wealthy, for only rich and prominent men would have the resources and the name recognition to win elections in districts of great size. A legislature composed of upper-class citizens would be able to represent the wealthy, but its members would not be able to really know, nor give voice to, the concerns of people who ‘‘walk in the plain and frugal paths of life,’’ as Melancton Smith put it (Kenyon 1966, 383). According to Smith, representatives should ‘‘resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people; possess a knowledge of their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests’’ (Kenyon 1966, 382). Under the new constitution, however, Congress would not ‘‘resemble’’ the people at all, since it would be dominated by ‘‘the rich and great,’’ as Brutus put it (Ketcham 1986, 326). For the Anti-Federalists, then, the legislative branch would not genuinely represent the people, which meant, in the words of Brutus, that it ‘‘will be a government, not according to the will of the people, but according to the will of a few’’ (Ketcham 1986, 325). To help resolve this problem, the Anti-Federalists often suggested that the size of the House of Representatives be increased beyond the proposed number of 65, which was based on an allotment of one representative per 30,000 people. The Anti-Federalists argued that if the size of the legislature were increased, the chance would be greater that the legislature would be made up of citizens from diverse walks of life. Increasing the size of the legislature would thus create a legislature that more accurately mirrored the people. An increase in the size of the legislature would decrease the size of the legislative districts, which would make it more likely that citizens and representatives could truly know one another well enough for the legislature to gain the confidence of the people. The Anti-Federalists believed that under the proposed constitution the representatives would be so distant---both literally and figuratively---from the people that they would not be trusted. Lacking the people’s trust, representatives would not be freely obeyed. And without the freely granted support of the people, the government would resort to force ‘‘to compel obedience,’’ as the federal farmer put it (Storing 1981a, v. 2, 384). For instance, as Brutus noted, if the American people were asked to pay taxes to a federal government from which they felt estranged, they would do so only
22 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought if forced. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, republics are based on ‘‘persuasion,’’ whereas despotic governments rest on ‘‘force’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 2, 264). Some Anti-Federalists claimed that the constitution allowed for the creation of a standing army precisely because the Federalists realized that their new regime would be a despotic one based on coercion. The Federalists responded that the new government would, in fact, gain the confidence of the people, even though the make-up of the legislature probably would not mirror the people. In Federalist No. 27, Hamilton claimed that, ‘‘It may be laid down as a general rule’’ that ‘‘confidence in and obedience to a government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration’’ (Hamilton 1982, 156). For Hamilton, then, people will be loyal to the government if it is efficient, competent, and useful to them. AntiFederalists noted that the logic of Hamilton’s argument would point to the conclusion that a monarchical or aristocratic government would be perfectly legitimate if it were administratively effective. Hamilton attempts to deny this in Federalist No. 68, when he writes that ‘‘we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: ‘For forms of government let fools contest--That which is best administered is best’’’ (Hamilton 1982, 416). Nevertheless, by emphasizing the quality of a government’s administration as the main criterion for its ability to attain the confidence of the people, Hamilton deemphasized the questions of democratic legitimacy that were so important to the Anti-Federalists. For the Anti-Federalists, a government will have only what Brutus called the ‘‘confidence, respect and affection’’ of the people if the representatives share the values, aspirations, and problems of their constituents (Ketcham 1986, 278). From today’s perspective, the worst nightmares of the Anti-Federalists regarding Congress have not been borne out, for---with the exception of the kind of fringe groups who make up the ‘‘militia movement’’--Americans tend to view the federal government as legitimate. Moreover, although many Americans only pay taxes because they fear the coercive powers of the IRS, a few Americans probably view the federal government as a police-state that rules solely by force. Finally, one could argue that the dire predictions of the Anti-Federalists were wrong insofar as opinion polls consistently reveal that most Americans believe that their own congress members are doing a good job of representing their districts. Conversely, Congress as an institution is often held in low regard by the American public, and in this case, the continuing relevance of Anti-Federalist fears about
the legislative branch is relevant. In opinion polls, large numbers (although not always a majority) of Americans consistently state that Congress is out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people, precisely as the AntiFederalists predicted. Americans often refer to ‘‘insidethe-beltway’’ politicians with disdain, suggesting that the federal government is made up of elites who neither know nor care about the problems of average citizens. National politicians thus often run for office claiming to be ‘‘outsiders,’’ for to be perceived as a Washington insider is to be seen as someone who is separated from the values and aspirations of middle-class Americans. The Anti-Federalist fear that the American people would not genuinely feel represented by Congress, then, is a concern that still remains highly salient in American politics today.
The Rights of Republican Citizens In addition to criticizing the structure of the Constitution’s three branches of government, the AntiFederalists also criticized the Constitution for what it left out---namely, a Bill of Rights. Anti-Federalists feared that without a federal bill of rights, the government would be more likely to try people without a jury, to establish a single state religion, to engage in cruel and unusual punishment, and to undertake unreasonable searches and seizures. Anti-Federalists also believed that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious exercise should all be guaranteed in a Bill of Rights. James Wilson and other Federalists claimed that while a Bill of Rights might be expedient for a state constitution, a Bill of Rights was unnecessary at the federal level. According to this argument, state governments are assumed to have broad police powers, and thus need to be restrained by a Bill of Rights. In contrast, the federal government under the Constitution would be a government of enumerated powers, which is to say that the federal government can act only in areas where it has been explicitly authorized to act by the Constitution. According to the Federalists, then, there is no need for a Bill of Rights stating that Congress cannot, for example, prohibit the free exercise of religion, because nowhere in the Constitution is Congress authorized to regulate religion in the first place. To take another example, because regulation of the press is not one of Congress’s enumerated powers, there is no need to state in a Bill of Rights that Congress may not abridge the freedom of the press. Indeed, such a statement might even be dangerous, because it could imply that Congress does have some role to play
Political Thought in the Early Republic 23 regarding the regulation of the press. As Wilson put it, ‘‘that very declaration might have been construed to imply that some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent’’ (Ketcham 1986, 185). Anti-Federalists were not at all satisfied by the argument that a Bill of Rights would be unnecessary. As noted earlier, the Anti-Federalists believed that the ‘‘necessary and proper’’ clause could easily expand government power beyond the powers specifically granted to it by the Constitution. Given that the government could assume powers that were not explicitly enumerated, a Bill of Rights was absolutely crucial. In addition to arguing that a Bill of Rights would be unnecessary, or even dangerous, Federalists sometimes argued that a Bill of Rights would be useless, because it would merely set up ‘‘parchment barriers.’’ According to the Federalists, whether rights are protected will not ultimately depend on the existence of a Bill of Rights; in the end, the protection of rights will ‘‘depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government,’’ as Hamilton put it (Hamilton 1982, 525). To this argument, the Anti-Federalists responded that the Federalists were absolutely correct that rights would be respected only if the people retained their republican spirit. What the Federalists failed to appreciate, though, was that a Bill of Rights actually would help maintain this spirit, for a Bill of Rights, known throughout the land, would serve as an important form of civic education. As the political theorist Michael Lienesch puts it, the Anti-Federalists considered the Bill of Rights to be ‘‘a symbol, a source of political education, or a reminder to future citizens, not only of their rights, but also of their responsibilities’’ (1988, 155).
The Defeat of the Anti-Federalists The Constitution was ratified only after the Federalists promised that it would quickly be amended to include a Bill of Rights. One important aspect of the AntiFederalists’ legacy is thus the Bill of Rights. Although the Anti-Federalists won the battle over the Bill of Rights, they lost the larger war over ratification. Given that Americans in the late-18th century tended to be highly suspicious of centralized power, why did the Anti-Federalists lose? They lost, in part, because virtually all Americans, including most Anti-Federalists, were in agreement that at least some strengthening of the central government was necessary. For instance, most Anti-Federalists agreed that the government needed some way to ensure that states contributed their fair share of tax revenue to the federal government;
and, as noted earlier, most Anti-Federalists agreed that the federal government should be able to regulate interstate commerce. Given that most Anti-Federalists conceded that some reform of the Articles was needed, it was difficult for them to stave off a proposal for change that was publicly defended with so much ingenuity by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and others. Many Americans felt that if reform did not happen now, then the moment might be lost forever, and they were willing to trust that great patriots like George Washington and Benjamin Franklin would never have supported a plan that would take away the liberties of the people. In short, at a moment that appeared to many to be a crisis, the Federalists were boldly able to set the agenda, as they put aside their differences and united behind a single plan for a more vigorous central government. In contrast, the Anti-Federalists were put on the defensive, and they were less united than their opponents, because they did not all rally behind one alternative plan for constitutional reform. The Anti-Federalists may have been disadvantaged by the fact that most newspapers supported the Federalists. Many Anti-Federalists believed that the media was not giving their side a fair hearing. Indeed, some Anti-Federalists believed that their opponents had not fought fairly from the start. According to many AntiFederalists, the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention had acted illegally, for the Confederation Congress had authorized the Convention only to revise the Articles, whereas the delegates proposed that the Articles be replaced with a totally different system of government. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation stated that amendment of the Articles can take place only if the states unanimously agree to changes; the Federalists therefore may have acted illegally when they suggested that the new constitution would go into effect after being ratified by nine of the 13 states, in special conventions that were nowhere mentioned in the Articles. The Anti-Federalists were troubled that the Convention met behind closed doors, without press coverage of their deliberations. Given what they perceived to be so much secrecy and illegality, some Anti-Federalists believed that the Federalists were engaged in a kind of coup d’etat aimed at replacing republican government with monarchical or aristocratic government. The legal complaints of the Anti-Federalists may appear to have considerable merit, but the Federalists suggested that an excess of legal formalism should not be allowed to prevent the people from considering, at a critical moment, a plan of action that they believed would create ‘‘a more perfect union.’’ Rather than
24 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought attempting a coup d’etat, the Federalists argued that they were trying to save republicanism, by embedding it in a stronger system of government that was based on the modern science of politics.
The Enduring Significance of the Anti-Federalists From today’s perspective, the Federalists and AntiFederalists both appear to have been patriotic Americans who had two different visions of the kind of regime that Americans should strive to create. While the Federalists may have won the war over the Constitution, the Anti-Federalist vision of politics has been of enduring significance, and Anti-Federalist ideas remain relevant to contemporary debates about American political life. The historian Saul Cornell has argued that while ‘‘the structure of American government was crafted by the Federalists, the spirit of American politics has more often been inspired by the Antifederalists’’ (1999, 1). Cornell notes that the AntiFederalist emphasis on the importance of local government has been echoed by a host of political actors across the political spectrum, throughout American history. With their criticisms of a powerful central government, both Jeffersonians and Jacksonians invoked Anti-Federalist themes. Later, in the 1960s, sharp critiques of the enervating effects of centralized government came both from conservatives such as Barry Goldwater, and New Left activists such as Students for a Democratic Society. Both the American Right and the American Left, then, have Anti-Federalist strands running through their respective ideas (Cornell 1999, 2, 304). Anti-Federalist ideas resonate with the concerns raised in recent years by a host of social scientists regarding the health of American civil society. The political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain defines ‘‘civil society’’ as ‘‘the many forms of community and association that dot the landscape of a democratic culture, from families to churches to neighborhood groups to trade unions to self-help movements to volunteer assistance to the needy’’ (1995, 5). In the view of Elshtain and many others, civil society is fraying, and this bodes ill for democracy in America. According to the political scientist Robert Putnam (2000), American communities are in danger of collapse, as Americans are joining together less and less. Putnam’s data suggest that Americans not only are participating in politics in low numbers, but also are connecting less often with their neighbors, friends, and even families. The sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues
(1985) argue that one can also discern the decline of American community in the very language that Americans use to talk about their lives. Bellah and his colleagues found that Americans are well-versed in the language of individualism, but they find it difficult to articulate themselves in the language of commitment and obligation to others. Clearly, the Anti-Federalists anticipated some of the problems with American civic life that have been identified by Elshtain, Putnam, and Bellah. The AntiFederalists feared that the Constitution would create a regime in which people would ignore public affairs, and instead focus solely on their own private pursuits. The Anti-Federalists would not be surprised by the decline in political and civic participation noted by Putnam, because they were convinced that the Constitution was not designed to facilitate or encourage active citizenship. Nor would the Anti-Federalists be surprised by the prevalence of individualism noted by Bellah, because the Anti-Federalists believed that the Federalists intended to create a regime that was built largely on the pursuit of self-interest rather than devotion to the common good. The Anti-Federalists believed that if people were to develop their potential for civic virtue, then they would need to be nurtured by local institutions such as town-hall meetings, schools, and churches. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists feared that the Constitution did far too little to sustain these kinds of civil society institutions. The contemporary attempt to revive civil society can thus draw intellectual sustenance, and inspiration from the Anti-Federalist vision of the good life. This is not to say that Anti-Federalist ideas can simply be adopted today uncritically. For instance, it must be noted that some Anti-Federalists attacked the Constitution for prohibiting religious tests for office; in the view of some Anti-Federalists, political office should be restricted to Protestants. As this example suggests, in their desire to ground community in shared moral principles, the Anti-Federalists sometimes became intolerant of differences in a way that most Americans would today reject. According to some commentators, Anti-Federalist political thought is, on the whole, too nostalgic for a vanished world of small and homogenous communities to be of much use in contemporary times. The Anti-Federalists, then, may not offer us a perfect blueprint for American political and social life today. And yet, the Anti-Federalists undoubtedly were correct in their fundamental belief that republican government requires citizens who possess certain virtues, and they were equally correct that some political and social institutions foster, and others weaken, those virtues.
Political Thought in the Early Republic 25 Today, as we continue the crucial task of debating what kinds of virtues are necessary for our republic, and how they can best be cultivated, we would do well to carefully reflect on---even if we do not always fully embrace---the ideas of the Anti-Federalists.
References and Further Reading Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788--1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dry, Murray. 2003. ‘‘Anti-Federalist Political Thought: Brutus and The Federal Farmer.’’ In History of American Political Thought. Edited by Bryan-Paul Frost and Jeffrey Sikkenga, 216--229. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Duncan, Christopher. 1995. The Antifederalists and Early American Political Thought. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1995. Democracy on Trial. New York: Basic Books. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 1982. The Federalist Papers. New York: Bantam.
Kenyon, Cecilia. 1955. ‘‘Men of Little Faith: The Antifederalists on the Nature of Representative Government.’’ William and Mary Quarterly 12: 3--43. Kenyon, Cecilia, ed. 1966. The Antifederalists. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. 1986. The Antifederalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. New York: Mentor. Lienesch, Michael. 1988. New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Main, Jackson Turner. 1961. The Antifederalists. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1980. ‘‘Democracy and the Citizen: Community, Dignity, and the Crisis of Contemporary Politics in America.’’ In How Democratic Is the Constitution? Edited by Robert A. Goldwin and William Schambra, 79--101. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Schlesinger, Arthur. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Storing, Herbert, ed. 1981a. The Complete Antifederalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ---------. 1981b. What the Antifederalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution. 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Brian Stipelman Assistant Professor of Political Science, Dowling College
works to prevent the expansion of the welfare state, but proves ineffective against entitlements Americans now take for granted. At best the legacy of the New Deal must be attacked from the margins.3 The New Deal is no longer radical, but neither are human rights or democracy. Time and success has always turned radicalism into the status quo. The New Deal in part is an effort for America to catch up to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Little can be found within it that had not already been theorized and implemented by Progressive European Liberals following John Stuart Mill4 or the social democratic tradition coming out of Karl Marx. The New Deal’s significance is found not in its originality, but in its ability to present Progressive ideas in a way that Americans would accept, to ground them in our native categories and traditions. Politically (and historically), what matters is less the pedigree of a philosophy than its widespread acceptance. Roosevelt understood and was able to work within our American boundaries. He was able to take old ideas, synthesize and popularize them, and link them to our American traditions. By doing so, he gave them permanence that far outlasted any previous (and arguably future) American reform movement. Although Roosevelt did not create an entirely new philosophy,5 he still changed American liberalism in a number of significant ways. Of primary importance was the new emphasis placed on security as a precondition of liberty. This idea could be traced back to the
The liberal party . . . believes that, as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes the duty of the government itself to find new remedies with which to meet them. The liberal party insists that the Government has the definite duty to use all its power and resources to meet new social problems with new social controls. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Goldman 1952, 368) The New Deal affected a permanent change in the way Americans think about government and their liberal tradition, moving classical liberals into the Libertarian and conservative camps while giving social democratic policy (if not philosophy) a degree of mainstream legitimacy that has lasted into the 21st century. The New Deal legacy determines the boundaries in which political life plays itself out. The Left fights to maintain and expand the welfare state---the services it provides and the people it provides them to. The Right curses the New Deal and bemoans a cumbersome, paternalistic government that interferes with human initiative and freedom, but the electorate will not allow them to overtly dismantle it. Americans may grumble about paying taxes, complain about incompetent government bureaucracy, and indulge in fantasies of unregulated free markets and a return to the glory days of laissezfaire liberalism,1 but they are not willing to abandon social security, minimum wages, or the right to unionize. The specter of communism and socialism2 still 26
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism proto-liberalism of Thomas Hobbes, but Hobbes’s arguments about physical security had largely ignored economic implications. Roosevelt’s central claim, one that the public at least somewhat accepted, was that our freedom to pursue happiness is freedom in name only when people are not free from doubt about their future. We cannot have meaningful freedom without conquering both the reality of necessity and our fear of it. Therefore, as Roosevelt responded to a Canadian journalist asking him about the social objectives of the New Deal, the state needs To try to increase the security and happiness of a larger number of people in all occupations of life and in all parts of the country; to give them more of the good things of life, to give them a greater distribution not only of wealth in the narrow terms, but of wealth in the wider terms; to given them places to go in the summertime---recreation; to give them assurances that they are not going to starve in their old age; to give honest business a chance to go ahead and make a reasonable profit, and to give everyone a chance to earn a living (Abbot 1990, 125). Society, acting through the machinery of the state, must provide the security (social insurance, wage and hours laws, and education assistance) necessary to make the pursuit of happiness genuinely possible for an everexpanding number of Americans. Related to this was a newfound emphasis on humanitarian public policy, inspired by Roosevelt’s simplistic, but heartfelt religious faith. ‘‘We call what we have been doing ‘human security’ and ‘social justice.’ In the last analysis all of those terms can be described by one word; and that is ‘Christianity’’’ (Informal Remarks to Visiting Protestant Ministers, January 31, 1938, quoted in Morone 2002, 354--355). Roosevelt’s Christianity is the Christianity of the Sermon on the Mount.6 Social justice trumps concerns about moral character. The brute fact of human need and suffering is given pride of place over predatory property rights and the longterm orientation of American economic thinking, which argued that charity today created want tomorrow. Harry Hopkins,7 a member of Roosevelt’s inner circle, railed that ‘‘people don’t eat in the long-run, they eat every day’’ (Goldman 1952, 332). There was government recognition that poverty has structural causes. Economists close to the New Deal could never quite agree on the cause of the Depression,8 but they all agreed that fault did not lie with the individual worker, who was a victim of events far beyond his ability to
27
master. This realization greatly affected attitudes toward poverty, at least at the national level. People affected by the Depression did not need to blame themselves. Poverty was the result not of personal or moral failure, but of powerful economic forces acting beyond their ability, or even the ability of their local and state government, to control. The challenge was to find a way to control those forces without sacrificing the individual. The New Deal created a set of entitlements for citizens, designed to protect them against the destructive variability of the market. The government need not guarantee happiness or success, but human decency requires that the costs of failure be minimized and that the basic tools for happiness be supplied. A powerful sense of moral obligation informed all Progressive New Deal policy; a sense that the community must provide the individual with the means necessary to pursue happiness, and the individual in turn must be willing to furnish the community with the resources it needs to meet its obligations. Roosevelt offered new (for America) criteria for judging the effectiveness of the state. Instead of its ability to balance the budget,9 or facilitate the growth of private fortunes, the state is to be judged by its ability to create conditions in which everyone is able to better their individual lives. The radical, ‘‘rugged’’ individualism that characterized America was to be replaced by a new morality that mixed an appreciation of individual rights with a utilitarian desire to guarantee those rights (above all the right to pursue happiness) for as many people as possible. This did not entail the subjugation of the individual to the greater good. Freedom would still remain more important than equality. It did mean that some Americans (the wealthy in particular) would find that property rights no longer enjoyed its previously sacrosanct status, especially if those rights significantly interfered with the freedom of others to pursue happiness. This new emphasis on utility and widespread happiness underscores the sense of community that categorized much of the New Deal. Roosevelt took seriously the idea that the president is the president of all the people, even those who lacked the money and organization to make their voices heard in American politics. This commitment was anchored in his fervent belief that underneath our disparate self-interests a public interest, a public good, could be shared by all Americans. The tensions between the rich and poor, capitalist and laborer, that color the Marxist analysis of political economy is absent here. Roosevelt believed that common ground could be found between competing
28 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought interests,10 that a ‘‘great community’’ of America was possible, and that the necessity of interdependence11 could create bonds of fellow feeling that united all Americans across boundaries of class, race, and gender.12 It was the job of the president ‘‘to find among many discordant elements that unity of purpose that is best for the nation as a whole’’ (Burns 1956, 182). This is one reason why the New Deal sought to shift economic discourse away from the battle between capitalists and workers, labor and finance, and instead emphasize our commonalties as consumers. Inclusion was always to be preferred to irreconcilable hostility. While the parallels are strong, the New Deal’s liberal economics differs from Marxism, largely through the absence of class. Workers did not see industrial society as their enemy. What they hated was their exclusion from it (McWilliams 1973, 542),13 their inability to reap
the rewards that hovered so tantalizingly close. The battle lines instead were between the selfish and the virtuous, those who would abuse their power versus those who use it to expand access to the American Dream. The lines between the two groups are moral, and fluid. There are no static class barriers, and no hopeless antagonisms. The poor were not members of a class with separate interests, but people who needed aid to facilitate their rise to the middle class where they could pursue their own unique vision of happiness. This made the New Deal vision inclusive, a vision of a genuinely middle-class society, while failing to understand that there are limits to the power of moral appeals to generosity and cooperation. Roosevelt never fully accepted the idea that capitalism might have imperatives that are irrevocably hostile to those of workers and consumers, and as a result, regulation was never
Members of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a key New Deal program to address the unemployment crisis, file past President Franklin D. Roosevelt to receive a cheery nod and ‘‘good work.’’ (Bettmann/Corbis)
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism strong enough to do more than constrain the worst excesses of business. Roosevelt hoped that the profit motive was capable of voluntary restraint by appeals to decency and self-control, but history has shown that the logic to capitalist accumulation will never respond to preaching.14 The New Deal’s attempts at social engineering were possible, and in many cases quite successful, for two reasons. The humanitarian instincts of the New Dealers (which for Roosevelt were synonymous with Christianity) demanded action, and their faith in progress and agency made this action possible. There was a belief, inherited from Progressives, that the world could be mastered by public power,15 and that our mastery would create an ever-rising standard of living. Economic forces could be made to serve our needs---we need not be at the mercy of the market. Related to that was a pragmatic sensibility unmatched by any administration before or afterward. While Roosevelt never wavered in the moral ends of the New Deal (humanitarian obligations, security as the basis of freedom, marshaling social energies to pursue a public good), the particular methods to be used were always flexible. The New Deal was profoundly undogmatic. Roosevelt listened to ideas from everyone, left and right, liberal and conservative, businessman and union organizer. While not a Socialist, he knew of the presence of radical elements within New Deal circles and never thought to purge them. He granted his own subordinates impressive leeway to experiment in their own domains, and wed himself to results rather than theories. Even beliefs that he felt a deep personal or political commitment to (like a balanced budget) could be challenged as circumstances dictated. This gave the New Deal unprecedented flexibility and a humility that was the source of its political strength, and, in hindsight, some of its weakness.
The American Context However ‘‘objective’’ the conditions for the Marxian apocalypse now became, what emerged to deal with the economic problem was a movement within the framework of the liberal faith. ---Hartz (1955, 259) The New Deal was grounded in America’s liberal tradition, but that tradition is broad and elastic, and Roosevelt stretched it in significant new ways. The hysteria that characterized the conservative opposition testifies to the power of the broadside challenge to American ideals the New Deal represented. Gen. Smedley Butler testified before the House of Representatives that
29
‘‘during the summer of 1934 a group of Wall Street brokers had urged him to lead a fascist march on Washington and overthrow the government in order to protect business interests’’ (Rauch 1944, 137). What is particularly remarkable here is that these brokers were organizing a coup not during the Populist Second New Deal, but during the First New Deal during which high commodity prices and business confidence were seen as the keys to escaping the Depression and industrial interests were writing the National Recovery Administration (NRA) regulatory codes. The equally hostile Chicago Tribune tried a more democratic approach to overthrowing Roosevelt. In the weeks leading up to the 1936 election, the switchboard operators at the Tribune’s offices were instructed to remind callers ‘‘that there are only X days to save your country’’---that is, from Roosevelt (Grafton 1999, 57). While he had strong support among rank-and-file journalists and workers he always faced tremendous opposition from the nations editors and business elite, to the point at which many refused to even say his name. Roosevelt became ‘‘that man in the White House.’’ The New Deal never really threatened the power of entrenched elites. Its most progressive measures were always watered down or defeated in Congress, and in its early stages, the New Deal was quite sympathetic to the practical needs of business, because recovery from the Depression depended on the recovery of private industrial strength. The New Deal did not affect a class revolution in the United States and never intended to. A liberal (as opposed to Marxist) movement to the core, class struggle never really entered into the picture. Instead, the New Deal sought to make good on the promise of the American Dream, where hard work could lead to a modestly comfortable existence for yourself and a reasonable inheritance for your children (and wealth, if you were blessed with a mixture of talent, discipline, and luck). Like Martin Luther King, 30 years later, Roosevelt held up a mirror to Depression-Era America and demanded a choice. Either abandon claims that America is a land of freedom and opportunity for all Americans, or create institutions that will make it so. Even Roosevelt’s most intractable foes on the right, if not the left, would have agreed that the preservation of the American Dream is a worthwhile goal. Elite hostility was a response to the existential threat the New Deal liberalism represented to the connection between wealth and worth. Although the United States was ostensibly an egalitarian and middle-class society, in reality, the rich enjoyed an honored place at the top of our social pyramid, not because of their money, but
30 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought because wealth had long been equated with personal virtue. The presence of wealth did not make you better, but the ability to accumulate wealth testified to the quality of your character. The New Deal sought to change this. The vehemence of the rightist revolt against Roosevelt can be explained only in terms of feelings of depravation and insecurity on the part of the business community. Roosevelt had robbed them of something far more important than their cliches and their money---he had sapped their self-esteem. The men who had been economic lords of creation found themselves in a world where political leaders were masters of headlines, of applause, and of difference. Men who felt that they had shouldered the great tasks of building the economy of the whole nation found themselves saddled with the responsibly for the depression (Burns 1956, 240). Once celebrated as the cornerstone of American prosperity, the businessman is now the cause of its greatest economic disaster. Our national heroes had become our great villains. A nameless mill worker knew exactly what was at stake when he said, ‘‘Mr. Roosevelt is the only man we ever had in the White House who would understand that my boss is a sonofabitch’’ (Goldman 1952, 345). This mill worker was not just blowing off steam. This attitude, apparently shared by the president, threatened to undermine the very fabric of our social tapestry. American mythology had long taught us that success in America was almost solely a function of hard work, determination, and ingenuity. The presence of wealth therefore indicated the presence of worthwhile virtues. The Horatio Alger myth of the self-made ‘‘rags to riches’’ millionaire, while greatly exaggerated (the vast majority of millionaires came from privileged or upper-middle-class backgrounds), was true enough to be emotionally resonant and legitimize the social standing of the powerful. This legitimation was not merely a form of social control that justified wealth and status, but something felt in an intensely personal, meaningful way. The flip side of the myth was that those who were unsuccessful had only themselves to blame. In a land of unlimited opportunity, the cause of failure was located in the individual’s character, not the environment or economic structure. The people at the bottom were responsible for their own shortcomings and had no recourse to ask anyone else for help, especially not the government. To do so was not only economically irresponsible16 but also morally illegitimate. The poor
deserved their lot as assuredly as the rich deserved theirs. Class was a moral, not an economic, category. Even the New Deal (and Roosevelt especially) could never fully embrace structural economic theories without introducing a moral component. Market forces might pressure a business to act in ways that run counter to the public interest, but its owners could take an ethical stand against those pressures and was worthy of condemnation when they failed to do so. American thinking about government had long been shaped by a unique combination of mutually reinforcing historical, intellectual, and geographic factors that made us hostile toward public inference in economic matters.17 The United States had always been a liberal country.18 The classical liberalism that had so influenced American political development assumed a world of abundance and opportunity, in fact depended on it. Next to the cluttered and static world of Europe, ours was a land of limitless possibility. Those who were unsuccessful in the east could always move west and start over. An unsuccessful entrepreneur could always find another investor to grant him the capital necessary to start over. We could call ourselves free because America was not bound by necessity. In such a world, the government is a source of restraint, a form of coercive power that interferes with our attempts to be free, to pursue happiness, which was almost always conflated with making money. With some notable exceptions, this view of American opportunity was accurate enough to serve as the foundation of our American gospel. However, material conditions always seem to change faster than our ability to make sense of them. Our understanding of government was frozen in a time that no longer existed. The Industrial Revolution created new concentrations of economic power, and after the Civil War, that power quickly overwhelmed a country that lacked the intellectual traditions and political tools to cope with, or even understand, the changes. When Americans looked into the mirror, their reflections still showed a land of small farmers and independent shopkeepers, masters of our own fate, long after the corporation, holding company, and trust subjected us all to the ‘‘freedom’’ of wage labor.19 Even those who felt the sting were reluctant to ask the government for help, because the version of classical liberalism worshiped in America taught us that the laws of capitalism are eternal and immutable. Any attempt by the government to interfere with those laws would damn our nation to an economic hell.20 If that were not bad enough, government aid to the poor and assistance to the downtrodden would create a nation of dependents and be the first step on an
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism inexorable road to tyranny. Welfare would destroy both our political and economic systems. Nor was welfare a moral necessity. Undeserved poverty was temporary, and permanent poverty was deserved and therefore no cause for public concern. Social Darwinism taught us that inequality and poverty, suffering and despair were evolutionary growing pains. Moral outrage was anachronistic, a reflection of ignorance about social biology. George Cutten, president of Colgate College, argued ‘‘Nothing could threaten the race as seriously as this [the New Deal]. It is begging the fit to be more unfit’’ (Fischer 2005, 491). This understanding of Darwin gelled nicely with the claims of economists who argued that the short-term selfishness of capitalism would produce prosperity in the long term. Americans believed this with the fervor and sincerity normally reserved for religion. In significant ways, it was their religion (for a fascinating discussion of this, see Arnold 1935, 2000 [1937]). The Progressive Era (and the Populists before them) represent our first grasping attempts to update American thinking about economics and government in modern conditions and connect that thought to a viable political movement. The origins of much New Deal political theory can be found here. Many Progressives opposed the New Deal, but all the New Dealers embraced at least some aspect of the Progressive tradition, in particular the possibility of public mastery of social problems like poverty. Their innovation was their newfound concern with security. Most Progressive reformers sought to level the playing field, but once you were allowed to play, little concern was shared for the losers. Edward Ross, a founding figure in the reform Darwinism movement that laid much of the groundwork for the New Deal, argued ‘‘security, as a goal, is essentially un-American because it implies a willingness to sacrifice the possibility of a great future for a safe present’’ (quoted in Goldman 1952, 370). Competing Progressive philosophies often found themselves reprising their old battles within the administration itself, which at times gave the New Deal the appearance of incoherence. The New Nationalism21 of Theodore Roosevelt, with its Hamiltonian acceptance of large-scale industrialization, found itself at odds with the New Freedom22 of Woodrow Wilson, with its attempts to limit the impact of industrialization in the name of old-fashioned Jeffersonian ideals. New Nationalism told us that we need only fear ‘‘bad’’ trusts, while the New Freedom claimed that size itself was the problem, because American democracy required a spirit of independence, responsibility, and self-reliance that could be fostered only by owning a small business or
31
farm. Despite their differences, both philosophies believed that the best solution for economic and social ills were located in the federal government led by a strong and dynamic executive. Their understanding of executive power profoundly influenced Roosevelt, who came of age admiring his cousin Teddy and had his first position of national importance under Wilson.23 Drawing on the history of American political thought24 and immeasurably aided by the existential crisis created by worldwide depression and the rise of fascism, Franklin Roosevelt, and the collection of disparate advisors, politicians, and intellectuals that coalesced around him were able to redefine what liberalism means in America. The New Deal was a middle-class restoration, an attempt to provide the social services and government regulation necessary to limit the excesses of capitalism. It was meant to limit the power of oligarchic feudalism and create substantive democracy within our country. It short, it was an attempt to bring social conditions in line with our social ideals. In that respect, the New Deal can be said to be a conservative movement. Rather than breaking with the past, Roosevelt attempted to update the past to new conditions. Roosevelt offered the ‘‘forgotten man’’ of America a new deal, but he never offered to change the game, or even change the cards. There was never a rejection of traditional American values like minimal government or of the pursuit of happiness facilitated by a capitalist economic system. Even at its most radical stages, freedom remained more important than equality. The New Deal simply took steps to protect those values from the predatory and destructive tendencies of industrial capitalism. Roosevelt argued that ‘‘Liberalism becomes the protection for the far-sighted conservative . . . I am that kind of conservative because I am that kind of liberal’’ (quoted in Young 1996, 171). Francis Perkins, his secretary of labor and long-time member of his inner circle, declared Roosevelt to be just ‘‘a little left of center.’’ That is accurate, but lest we overstate this point, we also need to remember just how far to the right the center was located. We should bear this in mind as we take a deeper look into how the New Deal redefined the American understanding of liberalism.
New Deal Pragmatism Nothing in human judgment is final. One may courageously take the step that seems right today because it can be modified tomorrow if it doesn’t work well. ---Perkins, describing Roosevelt (1946, 164)25
32 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought It is common to describe the New Deal as pragmatic, but we should be careful. All people, especially political people, are pragmatic to a degree, weighing costs against benefits. Only the most committed ideologues refuse to bend. Pragmatism is a rigorous and sophisticated philosophy, one that privileges a process of inquiry in which beliefs are corrected in light of experience. It requires a degree of detachment and control that is not feasible in democratic politics. Instead, the New Deal represented a goal-oriented approach that was remarkably flexible (some say too flexible) about the methods used to pursue them, highly sympathetic to pragmatism but ultimately something different. Rather than looking to John Dewey, the great pragmatist, we can find the New Deal’s political sensibilities reflected in Machiavelli, who argued that effective leadership, while clear about its ends, must be willing to be completely flexible about the means used to pursue it. The ultimate mark of political virtue is that flexibility, and binding ourselves to a particular method (or ideological approach) ends up constraining the ability of the leader to react to changing political circumstances. It denies us the freedom necessary to avoid, or quickly shed, failure. In a world where social conditions are not static, our thinking about them must be dynamic. Effective princes, especially those who have to run for reelection, need to avoid becoming prisoners of their own preferred methods and ideologies. A refreshing honesty also characterized the New Deal’s experimental approach. Roosevelt freely admitted that he has ‘‘no expectation of making a hit every time I come to bat’’ (quoted in Goldman 1952, 324), and his second fireside chat warned Americans that some policies would fail.26 The history of the NRA provides an illustrative example. The NRA sought to bring about recovery through the creation and enforcement of industrial codes. These codes were to be designed by and reflect the interests of capitalists, workers, and consumers. The NRA would provide the administrative mechanism necessary for a concert of interests that would benefit all three groups. In reality, organized business interests overpowered inchoate consumer and labor groups, quickly capturing the NRA. There were various attempts to reform the NRA and make it more responsive to the needs of labor and consumers, but ultimately these were unsuccessful. When the Supreme Court ruled that the NRA’s codes were unconstitutional, Franklin Roosevelt endorsed independent labor, wage, and hours rules to meet the same goals, allowing the unsuccessful industrial codes to die. At times, his flexibility failed him, notably in his court-packing plan, but
this failure stands out precisely because it was such a departure from the administration Related to this flexibility was a keen appreciation of political possibilities. Franklin Roosevelt was fond of referring people to Carl Sandburg’s biography of Abraham Lincoln, in which Lincoln is presented as a sad, almost tragic figure whose sense of political responsibility required him to make ideological sacrifices and compromises that he found morally offensive. Given the reality of the Depression and the brute fact of people’s suffering, Roosevelt found himself forced to accept compromises he found distasteful and to shy away from taking stands he wished to take. For his critics on the left, these embodied failures of leadership and vision. From the standpoint of his governing philosophy, one he shared with Lincoln and Machiavelli, the willingness to make painful compromises to advance larger ends is the essence of leadership. It is the embodiment of courage, sacrifice, and responsibility. Roosevelt thought of himself as a political and moral, rather than philosophic, thinker. His humanitarianism and faith in American principles of freedom, opportunity, democracy, humanitarianism, and capitalism were grounded in emotion and experience instead of reasoned reflection. Despite, or perhaps because of, the unquestioning acceptance he granted them, he focused himself on practical questions of implementation instead of abstract questions of theory. What could work, practically and politically, served as his primary guide. Programs were not looked at in terms of their ideology; discussions about theories of government were dismissed as abstractions that a leader with political responsibly did not have the luxury of indulging. Action and strategy had to be looked at based on their impact on people---a balance between their short-term needs and long-term welfare. Policy was evaluated based on its potential effectiveness, not on its ability to fit into abstract categories of capitalism or socialism. His religious faith buttressed his practical humanitarianism, making him well aware of man’s sinful nature and limited capacities for goodness. We were to be forgiven for our imperfections and had to do the best we could with the tools we have been given. Moral, political, and economic utopias were never guideposts for the New Deal. Even policy discussions were subordinate to electoral considerations, however. If he failed to get reelected, or maintain control over a schizophrenic democratic coalition, no change was possible. Political realities served as a constant check on his ability to put his programs into practice. What people would accept
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism
33
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Social Security Act on August 14, 1935. Initially a New Deal program, Social Security today is a government program that provides retirement, death, and disability benefits to all eligible Americans. It is the largest federal entitlement program. (Library of Congress)
had to affect policy decisions as much as the policy itself. Here Roosevelt’s fundamental acceptance of American values and the way he tried to root himself in its traditions served him well. Policies that could be seen as organically American were easier for the electorate to digest. The Tennessee Valley Authority was an instance of genuine socialism, but it used the familiar guise of a corporation to hide it. Social Security dressed itself in the language and symbols of private insurance. Roosevelt’s emphasis on practicality affected his approach toward constitutional interpretation. Roosevelt (and especially for his legal advisors) rejected the notion that the Constitution embodied unchanging legal truths. Instead, the Constitution was a living document, designed to be flexible to the needs (not the arbitrary whims27) of the people. It was a gift from our founders, but the gift was a responsive tool, not a divine mandate. His Jacksonian attitude toward the
Constitution explains in part why he reacted so strongly to what he saw as the Supreme Courts obstruction of popular will and abuse of the founders’ gift. The courts were flouting the general desires of the people in the name of narrow and selfish interests. Members of his administration went a step further and took the position of the legal realist. The Constitution has no inherent meaning and the interpretation is subjected to the arbitrary whim of the judge doing the interpreting. They will find what they want to find, what their background has encouraged them to find. So the New Deal was not a pragmatist movement in the technical sense of the term. Instead it was a political movement consistently informed by moral ends. Political considerations were of paramount importance, but the goal was never power for its own sake. Power was needed to implement a Progressive agenda, which for Roosevelt was synonymous with humanitarianism.
34 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Power was needed to make life ‘‘decent’’28 for Americans. Elections made change possible, compromising on one policy cleared the space for another policy, and compromises were always balanced against each other to maximize the moral ends of the New Deal.
The ‘‘Liberalism’’ of the New Deal The deeper purpose of democratic government is to assist as many of its citizens as possible, especially those who need it most, to improve their conditions of life, to retain all personal liberty which does not adversely affect their neighbors, and to pursue the happiness which comes with security and an opportunity for recreation and culture. ---Roosevelt (State of the Union, January 6, 1937) Although the social aims of the New Deal were quite sympathetic to social democracy, these aims were pursued within a liberal framework, using liberal, rather than Marxist theory to justify policy.29 Some of this was a reflection of Roosevelt’s personal beliefs,30 and some of it was a calculated attempt to link new ideas to old traditions familiar and acceptable to Americans, an attempt to update classic liberal categories for a new era. Roosevelt’s self-conscious use of the word liberal to describe what had formally been called Progressivism, and to call classic liberals conservative (which infuriated them), is evidence of that attempt. Liberalism has a pedigree dating back to the American Revolution, whereas Progressivism could trace its roots back a mere 40 years. The historical links Roosevelt drew helped to legitimate the New Deal. In his September 23, 1932, address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, originally entitled ‘‘Individualism, Romantic and Realistic,’’ Roosevelt explicitly grounds his philosophy in the liberal tradition. Since its origins in the European Wars of Religion, liberalism’s primary concern has been minimizing the impact of arbitrary power in the life of the individual. The original threat to individual liberty was the power of the unaccountable monarch, usually allied with a church and eager to use its power to enforce a particular form of religion, introducing social coercion into the most private of matters. Historically, then, liberalism was concerned with limiting the power of absolute political authority, through democratic forms, constitutional checks, and the use of economic power to counterbalance political power. Roosevelt provides his Commonwealth Club audience with a brief education in the history of political history and liberal thought, describing how national
governments grew out of a desire to have a central power protect weak individuals from the machinations of feudal barons. This desire for security justified centralized power, and while it undermined liberty for some (the barons), the vast majority of the people had no meaningful liberty to lose. Furthermore, the peace and security that the monarch provided created the space for individual liberty to flourish. The time eventually came when the powers granted to the monarch became onerous, no longer necessary to guarantee security and counterproductive to the well-being of individual citizens. A gradual introduction of checks on arbitrary power followed, through constitutional limitations, increased democratic participation, and the increasing power of a moral ideal---namely, that ‘‘a ruler bore a responsibly for the welfare of his subjects’’ (Grafton 1999, 19). These democratizing and liberalizing currents produced the American Revolution, and opposition to centralized authority formed the core of our political philosophy. Over time, however, we forgot why we were suspicious of government and why we prized economic freedom. Rather than serve as a means to liberty, these currents came to define it. By definition, government interference in economic affairs was tyrannical. A practical philosophy based on political and historical experience became a form of rigid and unsophisticated dogmatism. For the first half of our history, this was not a problem. A rural country with vast untapped stretches of land could afford to equate liberty with minimal government and unregulated economies,31 because those who were left behind could always go west. The Industrial Revolution soon offered us seductive visions of a newly mastered world, and this changed attitudes toward government and economics. It legitimated interference, but only of a certain type. As Roosevelt observes, the machine age dangled the possibility of ever-rising standards of living in front of our eyes, and the powers of the government were put into the service of the great industrial barons of the day. There the human cost often was spectacular, but such is the price of progress. So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. (Grafton 1999, 22) As long as our ‘‘financial Titans’’ were producing results, the republic could absorb their excesses, and
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism the open frontier was there to welcome those who were left behind.32 The end of the 19th century marked a reassessment of industry’s promise. The frontier had closed, and with it the opportunity of last resort it provided. This was accompanied by the rise of the trust, holding company, and great concentrations of economic power, constricting the possibilities of small business owners. Industrial agriculture did the same to small farms. Roosevelt’s response rejects the language and imagery of Marxism, seen as cold, alien, and offensive to American sensibilities. He instead harkens back to the early struggles for freedom that produced liberalism, using its familiar concepts. Just as Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, liberty in America were threatened by a new set of American ‘‘feudal barons’’ that undermined our economic freedom as surely as the European barons of old took away our political freedom.33 As Roosevelt toured the country in 1932, he noted that ‘‘we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already’’ (Grafton 1999, 24). Classical liberalism is in many ways a pre-Industrial philosophy. After the Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrial (later finance) capitalism, new forms of liberalism sought to deal with the impact of arbitrary economic power in people’s lives (particularly through the corporation).34 Despite the early warnings of Tocqueville, American political thought failed to keep pace with European innovation, so strong was our faith in our rugged individualism and the opportunities America presented to us. The attitude of Tocqueville and others spoke of limits in a land without them and threatened to undermine the rugged American individualism that was believed to be the source of our collective greatness. The Great Depression had called this faith into question, but it did not undermine it completely. America was ready to rethink its understanding of liberalism, but not abandon it. Change had to be understood within our liberal framework. Roosevelt, sensing this, was quick to point out that the crisis affecting individual American citizens is the same one that affected their Revolutionary forebears. The problem is the limitation of freedom and the rise of arbitrary power, and successful American reform movements have always made their appeals in these terms.35 As Roosevelt makes clear in the beginning of his Commonwealth address, ‘‘The issue of government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of government or economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve individual men and women’’ (Grafton
35
1999, 19). This was an old question for Americans, but Roosevelt gave it a new twist by placing economic systems alongside political systems as potential tyrants (and servants) of individual liberty. Immediately following this argument, he affirms his Progressive belief in progress and change, which opposes static faith in eternal constitutional and economic principles that left the government powerless to take proactive steps against the Depression. Mastery was an act of will. As long as people accepted a goal as ‘‘sound and moral,’’ (Perkins 1946, 476) a way to achieve it could be found. Roosevelt had a functional view of the state. It was not romanticized as the embodiment of the nation, nor was it demonized as an implacable enemy of individual liberty. Democracies need not fear the state, because the state ‘‘is but the machinery through which mutual aid and protection are achieved’’ (Grafton 1999, 10). It is a tool of organized society, designed to facilitate both the protection and well-being of its citizens. It is a servant of our collective will.36 Not only that, but society, acting through the state, has a moral obligation to care for people who find themselves victims of adverse circumstances, who are unable to survive, let alone prosper and seek happiness, without some kind of external aid. This, Perkins argued, was Roosevelt’s most important idea: [T]he idea that government had a positive responsibility for the general welfare. Not that government itself must do everything, but that everything practicable must be done. Whether government does it, or private enterprise, is an operating decision dependent on many factors---but government must insure that something is done (Perkins 1946, 476). Under normal circumstances private enterprise can be entrusted with meeting the needs of the general welfare. But when it fails to perform, the government must step in to ensure that basic needs are met. Early in his second inaugural, Roosevelt argues that through government we find ‘‘the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individuals the ever rising problems of a complex civilization’’ (Grafton 1999, 58). The government exists as a tool of democratic society, a servant of our will rather than a source of oppression. It enables us to master the world, working in tandem with private initiative and picking up the slack when private initiative fails. Other nations must grapple with the problem of necessity, but in America, the primary obstacle to mastery is our own fear, hesitation, and timidity---our unwillingness (bordering at times on superstition and reactionary stubbornness) to
36 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought use the tools at our disposal. There is also a reminder that our civilization is complex and interdependent and that only through collective action can meet its challenges. The day of the individuals solving problems on their own has ended. We now need to act collectively to solve the problems that impede the individual, because these impediments are beyond the ability of the individual to master. The democratic, and therefore accountable (ultimately in a way that private forms of economic power can never be), machinery of government is meant to aid us. Rather than being a necessary (and necessarily hostile) force existing outside of society, it was a tool that society could use to advance its own collective interests. What classical liberals (now called conservatives) miss is that we need not fear the power of government when that power is democratically controlled. Positive state intervention can help to create space in which individuals can come to empower themselves--by providing security and making capital accountable to the community and the individual consumer. In his Commonwealth address, Roosevelt takes pains to dispel the myth that America has traditionally tolerated no government interference in its economy.37 Business has always welcomed, and in many cases, demanded, aid from the government in the form of subsidies, tariffs, and even military aid when confronting workers movements. What they refused to tolerate was competition or even regulation from the government. This stubborn intolerance is not good public policy (as its proponents claimed), just narrow selfinterest. Roosevelt goes a step further and argues that no such thing as a business community with its own independent interests can be juxtaposed to the interests of workers. Instead there are narrow sectoral interests, and within those sectors competing firms, and each was concerned not with any larger common good, or even the good of the economy as a whole, but their own private agenda. This idea is not new, of course. In Federalist No. 10, Madison demonstrates how the U.S. government is designed to both accept the inevitability of these interests and deflect them toward a larger public ends. The problem that confronted America in the Depression was that these interests have overridden the checks designed to contain them. Instead of balance, there is domination and subservience. In his nomination acceptance speech in 1936, Roosevelt is much clearer about what is at stake. He reprises themes from the Commonwealth Club speech, especially the history of American and liberal thought as a struggle against freedom from ‘‘some restraining power’’ (Grafton 1999, 48) He ratcheted up the
language, however, and now that the immediate scare of the Depression was over, he more clearly defined the new threat to our freedom. For out of this modern civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties. New Kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things. Through new uses of corporations, banks and securities, new machinery of industry and agriculture, of labor and capital---all undreamed of by the fathers---the whole structure of modern life was impressed into his royal service (Grafton 1999, 48--49). Their power was not confined to the economic sphere alone. These new economic dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control over movement itself. They created a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction. In its service new mercenaries sought to regiment the people, their labor, their property. And as a result, the average man once more confronts the problem that faced the Minute Man of seventy six. The hours men and women worked, the wages they received, the conditions of their labor---these had passed beyond the control of the people, and were imposed by this new industrial dictatorship (Grafton 1999, 49). Tyranny is tyranny, and while economic freedom once created the space for political freedom by weakening political tyrants, today our democratic political freedom must be used to limit the arbitrary power of economic tyrants to achieve real economic democracy. For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor---other people’s lives. For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness (Grafton 1999, 49). Roosevelt links economic freedom to political freedom. No longer can we bracket the two and keep them separate. ‘‘Freedom is no half and half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal opportunity in the market
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism place’’ (Grafton 1999, 50). What ultimately matters is the expansion of human freedom, of creating larger spaces in which we can pursue our own understanding of what happiness is. Past laissez-faire economic policies were a way to guarantee political freedom. Now we must use our hard-won political liberty to guarantee our economic freedom. These goals are quite sympathetic to social democracy and are not new to the Western Hemisphere or even to American civilization. What is new is that these words are not coming from dissident intellectuals but the sitting (and exceedingly popular) president of the United States. What is also new is that the language avoids class antagonism. Proletariat and capitalist need not be at each other’s throat. Instead, the fight is between far-sighted and morally upright progressive people (rich and poor alike38) against the forces of shortsighted selfishness and reaction. The economic royalist squares off against the ‘‘forgotten man.’’ The common people have to rise up against this modern form of our ancient monarchical nemesis and reclaim their liberty one more time (Landy 2002, 80--81). The Liberty League, the great coalition of Roosevelt haters, tried to frame things differently. In their eyes, they were the great defenders of liberty (in particular, property rights) against the tyranny of Roosevelt. However, their classical understanding of liberalism was, at least temporarily, in decline. Property rights and the protection of profits were no longer sacrosanct. Liberty now meant something very different. There is no mention made here in these two things [property and profits] about the concern of the community, in other words, the government, to try and make it possible for people who are willing to work, to find work to do. For people who want to keep themselves from starvation, keep a roof over their heads, lead decent lives, have proper educational standards those are the concerns of Government, besides these points, and another thing which isn’t mentioned is the protection of life and liberty of the individual against the elements in the community which seek to enrich or advance themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens. They have just as much right to protection by government as anybody else (Burns 1956, 208). Roosevelt is not just directing his argument toward workers and farmers. Our economic royalty squeezes the small businessman as surely as the man on the assembly line. All of them are being denied the opportunity to use their own initiative to carve out their own private sphere
37
of happiness. The tactics of the economic royalist should offend those who have won their fortunes through legitimate hard work and who defend it through competition. All of these groups can unite in the defense of American values against those who would pervert them, because the goal is not equality of outcome, but equality of opportunity. It is simultaneously a classless and completely middle-class vision, one shared by those who are living in and who aspire to it. Roosevelt argues that a ‘‘re-appraisal of values’’ is necessary if we desire a society based on opportunity. Just as the monarch’s privileges were no longer necessary once the feudal barons had been put down, the ‘‘financial Titan’’ no longer need be granted the same degree of leeway he once was. In fact, to continue to do so would only stifle the cause of liberty and the possibility of individual self-development. The world had been conquered, the industrial plant built. What is needed now is the administration of that plant for the good of the people as a whole, although the people are still understood to be a collectivity of individuals. This does not mean that capitalism, or even corporations, should be done away with. As Roosevelt reminded us at the start of the Commonwealth Club address, progress and change are always pushing us forward, and we cannot return to a world of small farms and independent shops, no more than the country could be divided back into 5039 self-sufficient states. Plus, Roosevelt has great admiration for the way in which capitalism can reward initiative and facilitate invention. Instead, what is needed is regulation, to ensure that concentrated corporate power serves the community as a whole instead of a narrow band of stockholders. Without that regulation, our very liberty and the democracy that protects it, cannot long survive. Because we cherished our system of private property and free enterprise and were determined to preserve it as the foundation of our traditional American system, we recalled the warning of Thomas Jefferson that ‘widespread poverty and concentrated wealth cannot long endure side by side in a democracy. . . . And so our job was to preserve the American ideal of economic as well as political democracy, against the abuse of concentration of economic power that had been insidiously growing up amongst us in the last fifty years, particularly during the twelve years of preceding Administrations. Free economic enterprise was being weeded out at an alarming pace (Grafton 1999, 53). Roosevelt recognizes that private property and free enterprise are now dependent on government regulation
38 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Banking Act of 1933, a part of which established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on June 16, 1933. At Roosevelt’s immediate right and left are Sen. Carter Glass of Virginia and Rep. Henry Steagall of Alabama, the two most prominent figures in the bill’s development. Repeal of this act was a prime mover in the finacial crisis of 2008. (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)
to protect them against concentrations of economic power. The connection between economic power and political democracy is clear. The problem is not merely that more and more wealth is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. It is that the wealth itself is in many cases illegitimate, as ‘‘this concentration of wealth and power has been built upon other people’s money, other people’s business, other people’s labor’’ (Grafton 1999, 54). This concentration of wealth is no longer justifiable in terms of efficiency (as many of the legal and financial ties that prop up these corporations have nothing to do with efficacy), and offers little benefit to the average investor or independent businessman, let alone a worker or small farmer. Concentrations of private economic power should exist at the sufferance of society, and only as long as they are providing a meaningful social benefit. This is not to say that the government should run those enterprises, but regulation and taxation guaranteeing that corporations serve a public purpose is
completely legitimate. Without regulation, private enterprise becomes ‘‘a kind of private government and is a power unto itself---a regimentation of other people’s money and other people’s lives’’ (Grafton 1999, 54). Again, the necessity of regulation and active government come back to the preservation of freedom. It is freedom for the individual, but that freedom can be guaranteed only by the community acting through its democratic institutions. The middle-class American ideal of owning a small business and succeeding in a competitive marketplace remains unchallenged. The New Deal is a restoration of sorts, an attempt to return the United States to a situation where that ideal actually exists. It is a rejection of our fictitious world, where industrial barons legitimate their power through a set of ideals that no longer correspond to reality: ‘‘The people of America have no quarrel with business. They insist only that the power of concentrated wealth shall not be abused’’ (Grafton 1999, 55). In this respect the New Deal manages to be
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism progressive and conservative at the same time. It is progressive in its recognition of changing circumstances and the proposal of new and comparatively innovative ways of dealing with those circumstances. In terms of policy, like public relief and social security, there are strong breaks with the past. But these breaks are made in the name of classical American values. We must modernize the present to preserve the past. It would be mistaken to call Roosevelt a conservative in the classical sense, although that argument has been made (Burns 1956, 234--238). Roosevelt, for example, did not emphasize hierarchy, nor did his New Deal articulate any meaningful forms of prejudice. He was aware of and had respect for tradition, but these traditions were to inform progress, rather than impede it. He placed an emphasis on community, but it is a warm and open, almost cosmopolitan sense of community, one that highlights regional and sectoral interdependence. He had an acceptance of individualism, but it is individualism that must be restrained by larger social questions. Echoing the harm principle of John Stuart Mill, Roosevelt says, I believe in individualism. I believe in it in the arts, the sciences and professions. I believe in it in business. I believe in individualism in all these things--up to the point where the individualist starts to operate at the expense of society. And the overwhelming majority of American businessmen do not believe in it beyond that point. We have all suffered in the past from individualism run wild---society has suffered and business has suffered (Grafton 1999, 55). We have left the world of the independent farmer, the small shopkeeper, and the frontier. We have been forced to abandon the world in which states could isolate themselves from one another, solving local problems as they see fit. Our world is complex and interdependent. It refuses to recognize artificial boundaries. The preservation of a healthy (as opposed to pathological) individualism requires both the recognition of interdependence and the recognition that certain forms of predation must be restrained to preserve individualism in others. We have long accepted that laws against murder, while violating the absolute freedom of the murder, are not tyrannical. Roosevelt asks us to accept that the same is true of our property rights. Our rights to dispose of our property may compete with the competing claims of others. These competing claims are to be resolved by referring them to the standard of maximizing individual freedom for the greatest number
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possible. In the end, minimum wage laws may take away the freedom of the employer to pay what he wishes, but the sacrifice is justified by the increased opportunities higher wages afford the worker.
Security and Liberty We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. ‘‘Necessitous men are not free men.’’ People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. ---Roosevelt (State of the Union, January 11, 1944) Staying firmly within the liberal tradition, Roosevelt frames the New Deal’s economic and social reforms as a question of rights. What are needed are a set of economic rights to parallel our political rights, to recognize that the emancipatory role unregulated economic power once played has ended, just as the absolute monarch eventually outlived his own usefulness. And, paralleling the development of political freedom, the first requirement of economic freedom is economic security. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argued that all political rights are dependent first on physical security, which the sovereign is expected to provide. When we fear for our lives, we cannot be free. Likewise, we cannot actively pursue happiness, our birthright as Americans, if we live in constant fear of economic uncertainty. As far back as his speech to the Commonwealth Club, Roosevelt set about addressing the need for economic rights as necessary preconditions for the pursuit of happiness---for him, the right to work justified a right to economic security. Roosevelt argues that the right to work matters for its ‘‘moral and spiritual values’’ as much as the wage it provides. Work inculcates a sense of responsibly, obligation, and agency. It enables us to contribute something positive to the community, to give back to the society from which we receive both tangible and intangible benefits. Without work, we feel that we lack value, that we are a drain on society.40 Perkins tells a story of a near deaf, elderly lawyer, trained at Harvard but unable to find work during the Depression. He was given a job with the Works Progress Administration acting as a caretaker at a small seaside park. He took great pride in his work and always tearfully asked Perkins to pass along his thanks to Roosevelt for ‘‘an honorable occupation that made him feel useful and not like a bum and derelict’’ (Perkins 1946, 187). His relief job kept
40 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought him off the dole, granting him dignity and a chance to serve his community in some fashion. The history of the New Deal abounds with similar stories. This social dimension of work is easy to miss, and the New Deal cannot be understood without it. Roosevelt loved to use the language of the pioneer, not because of the rugged individualism often associated with the frontier, but because of the sense of community, hard work, shared obligation, and responsibility that is often left out of our visions of the West. Without the active cooperation of friends, neighbors, and families, life on the frontier was difficult, if not impossible. The same holds true in modern, industrial America. The forces arrayed against the individual will easily overpower him without the active support of his larger community. Alongside work is the right to ‘‘a reasonable measure of security.’’ Work creates a sense of self-worth that makes happiness possible, but without security for our family and ourselves, we can never cast aside the anxieties standing in the way of happiness. Introducing security as an essential component of liberty and happiness is Roosevelt’s most important innovation in American liberal thought. We cannot truly be said to be free unless we are free from want and fear. Because freedom is a right, security becomes a right. Without a feeling of job security, without protection against arbitrary economic power, we cannot really be said to have any significant degree of freedom. The pursuit of happiness, always intimately linked with freedom, becomes meaningless. Roosevelt’s liberalism never guarantees happiness---in a society of individuals, there would be too many individual interpretations of happiness for that to be feasible. Society, however, has a moral obligation to provide the preconditions for a real attempt. Without certain basic material needs guaranteed (the right to have a job, the right to food and shelter, and later the right to health care and an education---first established with the G.I. Bill), the pursuit of happiness is pursuit in name only. This was a direct challenge to the older, laissez-faire understanding of liberalism, with its reactionary fear of any positive government involvement in economic life. The New Deal attempted to change our understanding of natural rights, to move beyond formal political rights and recognize that we can be tyrannized in the economic realm as surely as we could be in the political. The right to work becomes as important as the right to vote. Economic democracy serves as the precondition for political democracy, and political democracy is the only way to guarantee economic democracy. The two realms are intimately linked. Natural rights are expanded
to include the right to subsistence, food, shelter, and safety from the economic depredations of others. In the end, freedom was no longer something naturally conferred upon us. It was a right that needed to be guaranteed through collective social force checked by democratic and constitutional procedures. Society in turn was morally obligated to guarantee those rights for an ever-expanding number of its citizens.41 Some of his strongest statements on the issue came long after the active phase of the New Deal had ended, when ‘‘Dr. Win The War’’ had replaced ‘‘Dr. New Deal.’’ In his ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ State of the Union address of 1941, Roosevelt reminded an American audience what the New Deal stood for. Equal opportunity for youth and for others. Jobs for those who can work. Security for those who need it. The ending of special privileges for the few. The preservation of civil liberties for all. The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living (Grafton 1999, 98). A government is democratic to the extent it provides these benefits for all its citizens. Roosevelt moves from here to discuss his four freedoms. The first two, freedom of speech and freedom to worship, are classical liberal values that need no discussion. Freedom from want is something new. This goes beyond freedom of opportunity. Instead, it implies that freedom means knowing not only that our necessities are met, but also that we can all share in the abundance that is the promise of American life. Norman Rockwell’s famous ‘‘Freedom from Want’’ painting shows a happy, middle-class family sitting down to enjoy a large meal in comfort together. This painting captured the imagination of the American people and illustrated the promise of the New Deal---a society in which every family could enjoy such a meal, and whose government took active steps to make it possible. The final freedom is freedom from fear. His definition here, obviously colored by the war, revolves around reductions of arms and defense from militarism, but there are echoes of the psychic argument. Fear limits freedom, because it limits our sense of possibility. When we know fear, when we lack security, we are unable to take advantage of our human capacities to dream, to better ourselves, and to seek our own private version of happiness. When there is fear, there cannot be real freedom.
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism As the war began to approach its end, Roosevelt sought a return to the agenda of the Second New Deal in his 1944 State of the Union address. In this address, we find concrete recognition that while freedom may be an inalienable right, without protection, it means nothing. His second Bill of Rights is nothing short of a redefinition of the American social contract: We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all---regardless of station, race, or creed. These rights include: The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation; The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living; The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; The right of every family to a decent home; The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; The right to a good education (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 11, 1944 [author’s emphasis]).
As Roosevelt points out, all of these rights are designed to guarantee us security, for without that security, meaningful liberty and the pursuit of happiness are not possible. With his second Bill of Rights, the right to economic security becomes as essential to democracy as the rights to conscience and due process. The world had furnished Roosevelt with powerful examples of what happens when a democratic society can no longer guarantee the pursuit of happiness. Without it, we are not only unable to guarantee any kind of peace in the world, but we also cannot prevent the rise of fascism at home. Democracy, especially liberal democracy, functions only when it is able to provide for the material needs of its citizens. If it fails to do so, it breeds either the passivity of the servant or the anger and fear that breeds fascism.
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Roosevelt reaffirmed our right to property, but was careful to explain precisely what the right to property entails. It is again defined in terms of security, and when the rights of the speculator or financier come up against the need of people to have security against old age, sickness, and unemployment, the right of security trumps the freedom to speculate, for without that security meaningful expansions of liberty become impossible. It is important, of course, that every man and woman in the country be able to find work, that every factory run, that business as a whole earn profits. But government in a democratic nation does not exist solely, or ever primarily, for that purpose. . . . It is not enough that the wheels turn. They must carry us in the direction of a greater satisfaction in the life for the average man. The deeper purpose of democratic government is to assist as many of its citizens as possible---especially those who need it most---to improve their conditions of life, to retain all personal liberty which does not adversely affect their neighbors, and to pursue the happiness which comes with security and an opportunity for recreation and culture (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 6, 1937 [author’s emphasis]). Roosevelt’s use of the word ‘‘assist’’ is important. Ideally, Roosevelt wants to see private society and private imitative meet our needs. Like most liberals, he was never eager to have the government involve itself in anyone’s life. But, when needs cannot be met through private channels, society has a moral obligation to give people what they need to make their pursuit of happiness possible. That is the ‘‘deeper purpose of democratic government’’ (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 6, 1937).
New Deal Humanitarianism The idea was that all the political and practical forces of the community should and could be directed to making lives better for ordinary people. ---Perkins (1946, 167) Roosevelt’s humanitarianism was most evident in his general attitude toward relief, heavily informed by his religious commitments. Poverty was a moral problem, a problem that focused on the alleviation of suffering, rather than the placing of blame. Recognizing that poverty was as much (if not more) the result of structural as well as personal failing, he devoted unprecedented sums to relief and administered it in ways that were
42 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought less judgmental and humiliating than in the past.42 Being downtrodden did not require one to surrender their dignity, and helping people maintain their sense of self-worth received nearly as much emphasis as making sure they did not go hungry. Significantly, Roosevelt uses the language of obligation: ‘‘To these unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by Government, not as a matter of charity, but as a matter of social duty’’ (Grafton 1999). Roosevelt attacks the idea that aid should be administered only through private charities, refuting the idea that public support is somehow illegitimate, or even harmful for those receiving it. Yet we must be careful not to push this idea too far. Roosevelt never fully abandoned the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. His heart and sympathies went out to those who wished to work but were unable to do so, either due to disability or larger economic forces. At first, his welfare policies privileged the out of work middle and working classes, but as the plight of the permanent underclass, those left stranded by society, came to his attention, he devoted energy to them.43 A noteworthy difference between the New Deal advocates and many Progressives was that, while both had a moral concern about the poor, the New Deal lost the moralizing and judgmental tone that characterized many Progressive viewpoints. ‘‘One began to see the poor as people with hopes, fears, virtues, and vices, as fellow citizens who were part of the fabric of American life, instead of a depressed class who would always be with us’’ (Perkins 1946, 18). The New Deal granted the people at the bottom a dignity they previously lacked. Your social status did not necessarily reflect your worth. Roosevelt always worried about the dole, both because of the social stigma attached to it, and because he believed much of the stigma itself. While he rejected the idea that poverty was a result of character flaws, he worried that receiving public assistance could have an enervating effect on the sense of worth and initiative of the recipient. This was why Roosevelt placed such a great emphasis on work relief and made sure that relief jobs paid better than dole jobs (and less than private industry). Work relief was superior because it allowed the recipient to do something active and constructive with his time, to both give back to his community and give back to himself. The Federal Art, Writing, and Theater projects reflect his commitment to this cause. Out-of-work artists and performers had their own set of skills and needed to eat as much as anyone else. The result was both a flourishing and democratization of art, moving it out of the mansion and into the Post Office and living room (for discussion of this trend, see
Abbot 1990, 82--84). Federal employment, however, should always be a last resort and was designed not to interfere with private industry. The government should function as an employer of last resort, but private employment was better because even beneficial government programs could not help but be paternalistic.44 Work relief provided security, but was not meant to be a permanent profession. The New Deal was always a liberal movement, and if people could provide for themselves without the government’s help, then that was to be preferred, both politically and philosophically.
The Economics of the New Deal [T]he responsible heads of finance and industry, instead of acting each for himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Grafton 1999, 26) If a job and a living wage are rights, and we wish to avoid excessive government involvement in our lives, those who control the ‘‘great industrial and financial combinations that dominate so large a part of our industrial life’’ have an obligation to ensure that those fundamental rights are met (Grafton 1999, 25--26). In Roosevelt’s eyes, corporations were a public trust, and while private industry was entitled to profit, that profit had to be balanced against the services they provided to the community. In particular, private industry had to provide our rights to a job and living wage. Failing to do so requires the government to step in and provide the regulation necessary to guarantee the public’s rights to a job and a wage---our natural right of security, as surely we would expect it to guarantee our rights to speech, assembly, or due process. The government, as an agent of the public, could intervene in economic affairs in the name of the public interest. The problem became how to determine what the public was---a task made especially difficult in a political system designed to foster competing private interests. The New Deal rejected traditional dichotomies between producer and nonproducer, as well as Marxist divisions based on class or employer versus employee. Roosevelt was concerned about the labor movement45 insofar as he saw it as a way to balance the power of corporations and increase the quality of life of workers, but he refused to categorically privilege their interests over those of business. The New Deal, concerned about inclusion and wanting to be a movement for all people, settled on the category of consumer.
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism The consumer seemed to be the ideal category. It was certainly broad enough to include all people---not everyone works for a wage, nor does everyone own a business, but we are all consumers. Few people could be stockholders, and even fewer could be stockholders of any consequence, but all Americans are united by a desire to spend. David Hackett Fisher has traced our fascination with material abundance back to the early days of the Republic, where it became ‘‘an artifact of liberty and freedom’’ (2005, 475). Given how Americans have long equated happiness with material possessions, any public philosophy encouraging consumption would seem a natural fit. Using the consumer as a test for public policy also enabled the New Deal to weight benefits toward the middle and working classes---the groups who spent a much greater percentage of their income and would benefit from plans designed to boost consumption. A focus on consumption also enabled Roosevelt to argue that consumer-friendly legislation served to fight the Depression, creating a demand for goods that would stimulate the economy and put people back to work. As a neutral category, the consumer enabled Roosevelt to bypass traditional class conflicts and offered a comparatively easy way to test the public usefulness of a company. Did it serve its clients efficiently and effectively? If the answer was no, government regulation was justified. This approach came to dominate New Deal policy, especially during its later trust-busting phase.46 This focus on consumption, as well as the increased power of unions,47 helped facilitate what Roosevelt hoped would be a redefinition of the profit motive, where the point of work is not unlimited acquisition, but the accumulation of enough money to live a decent life. When excessive profits threaten the ability of others to live decently, they should be reigned in. As Roosevelt noted in his 1935 State of the Union address, private enterprise is not rejected, but it is given a social democratic cast. By the profit motive we mean the right by work to earn a decent livelihood for ourselves and for our families. . . . We have . . . a clear mandate from the people. That Americans must forswear that conception of the acquisition of wealth which through excessive profits, creates undue private power over private affairs and, tour misfortune, over public affairs as well . . . the ambition of the individual to obtain for him and his a proper security, a reasonable leisure, and a decent living throughout life is an ambition to be preferred to the appetite for great wealth and great power (Rauch 1944, 156--157).
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This redefinition of the profit motive is central to understanding the economic philosophy of the New Deal. Capital is not rejected---in fact, individual initiative and the private profit motive are still the lynchpins of the economy. But Roosevelt expects those motives to be tempered by a sense of the public interest. We count, in the future as in the past, on the driving power of individual initiative and the incentive of fair private profit, strengthened with the acceptance of those obligations to the public interest which rest upon us all. We have the right to expect that this driving power will be given patriotically and wholeheartedly to our nation (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). The idea of a concert of interests, or a common public good, was a deep-seated belief of Roosevelt’s. While private interests could be intense, they could be overcome by intelligent, patriotic, moral, and farsighted public policy capable of binding disparate groups together. This was more than just simple Madisonianism, however. He fully expected all sides of an issue to be willing to put aside their own narrow interests and make sacrifices for the good of the society as a whole. Some would do it willingly, others might require appeals to their religious beliefs or their patriotism, but such sacrifices were expected. FDR’s optimism, and his personal sense of public spiritedness, made this type of thinking possible. In a land of plenty, people could afford to be generous. In a world of progress, cooperation will pay off in the long run. People are decent enough to look past their grasping, acquisitive nature and sacrifice for the good of society (typically embodied by the consumer). He would insist on moral and social responsibility for all the institutions of human life; for the school, for the family, for business and industry, for labor, for professional services, for money management, for government---yes, even for the Church. He would insist in his way of thinking that all of these institutions should accept and practice a moral responsibility for making the life of the individuals who make up the life of the common people ‘‘more decent,’’ and in the common people he included the rich and poor alike (Perkins 1946, 333). The justifications for all programs were to be found in these appeals to the national community. People were not asked to sacrifice for particular interests, but for the good of their friends and neighbors, whether those
44 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought neighbors are found in the east, west, north, south, farm, or city. Of course, Roosevelt was politically astute enough to follow these pleas with the observation that helping your neighbors would increase their ability to buy your own products. Interest was never far behind principle. Early New Deal programs like the NRA tried to achieve a harmony of interests among business, labor, and consumers. The working assumption was that all these needs could be fairly satisfied, or at the very least, no irreconcilable differences existed between the groups. There should be at least a full and fair trial given to these means of ending industrial warfare; and in such an effort we should be able to secure for employers and employees and consumers the benefits that all derive from the continuous, peaceful operation of our essential enterprises. . . . I shall not ask either employers or employees permanently to lay aside the weapons common to industrial war. But I shall ask both groups to give a fair trial to peaceful methods of adjusting their conflicts of opinion and interest, and to experiment for a reasonable time with measures suitable to civilize our industrial civilization (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). The NRA was supposed to represent a middle ground between a total public takeover of the private economy and the morally repugnant strategy of letting the depression solve itself.48 As Roosevelt noted in his 1936 acceptance speech, ‘‘Better the occasional faults of a Government that lives in a sprit of charity than the consistent omissions of a Government frozen in the ice of its own indifference’’ (Grafton 1999, 50). The government should do for us only what we are unable to do for ourselves, but it must do something. It acts in the interest of returning power to the individual, as a way of helping us find ways to expand our personal freedom by enhancing our security. In our efforts for recovery we have avoided on the one hand the theory that business should and must be taken over into an all-embracing Government. We have avoided on the other hand the equally untenable theory that it is an interference with liberty to offer reasonable help when private enterprise is in need of help. The course we have followed fits the American practice of Government---a practice of taking action step by step, of regulating only to meet concrete needs---a practice of courageous recognition of change. I believe with Abraham Lincoln, that ‘‘The
legitimate object of Government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done but cannot do at all or cannot do so well for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. I still believe in ideals. I am not for a return to that definition of Liberty under which for many years a free people were being gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer that broader definition of Liberty under which we are moving forward to greater freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has ever known before in the history of America (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). It is was this hope for cooperation that explains in part Roosevelt’s fierce and bitter anger toward implacable business interests that refused to sacrifice a small bit of their liberty to greatly expand the liberty of others. Even at his most militant, he never stopped believing that concentrations of private economic power can be harnessed for public ends. It is the role of political government to facilitate that self-denial, to make sure that ‘‘irresponsible’’ heads of finance and industry are required to toe the line. Corporations can and should be privately managed, but a corporation is a public trust and must serve the public interest. Government regulation is a legitimate response to private failure, but private regulation is always preferred to public regulation when it can demonstrably serve the public good.
A New Social Contract Faith in America, faith in our tradition of personal responsibility, faith in our institutions, faith in ourselves, demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Grafton 1999, 26--27) Although what Roosevelt ultimately proposed and accomplished with the New Deal went far beyond the accomplishments of his progressive predecessors Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,49 he was careful to link himself to those traditions, legitimating the forward march of progress by establishing continuity with the past. This belief in progress is essential to understanding the New Deal and the liberalism that sustained it. The world is malleable, and capable of mastery. Not only can situations improve, they can and will improve only through human agency, through active involvement of the people through their machinery of government. There are no static or transcendent economic laws, just as we discovered that the power of kings was actually
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism sanctioned by the people instead of God. In his 1932 acceptance speech, Roosevelt said, ‘‘We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings’’ (Grafton 1999, 16). Laws made by humans can be made to serve them. Given his liberal faith in progress, it is not surprising that the five lines into his first inaugural address Roosevelt emphasized that ‘‘the only thing we have to fear is fear itself---nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance’’ (Grafton 1999, 29). In a land of abundance, human agency is limited only by its own self-doubt. In many ways, the crisis facing Americans during the Depression was an existential one. We had lost faith in our economic system, had lost faith in the American dream, and because these were such critical aspects of our identity, we had lost faith in ourselves. Progress would be indefinitely stalled without a restoration of that faith But while faith is essential, more than faith is necessary. Because economic laws are not static, the failure of the Depression was above all a human failure, an abdication of responsibility by the ‘‘rulers of exchange,’’ the ‘‘money changers’’ who were driven from ‘‘their high seats in the temple of our civilization’’ (Grafton 1999, 30). With their failure came opportunity; one Roosevelt knew would be brief. He was fond of quoting an insight of Woodrow Wilson’s: ‘‘It is only once in a generation that a people can be lifted above material things. That is why conservative government is in the saddle two-thirds of the time’’ (Burns 1956, 54). The crisis of the Great Depression gave the normally conservative American people a limited window50 through which they could cast off their old symbols, their old heroes, and adopt, however briefly, new ones that would privilege cooperation and social responsibility. As Roosevelt said in his 1933 inaugural address, ‘‘social values more noble than mere monetary profit’’ (Grafton 1999). The New Deal was a self-conscious attempt to deliberately fashion a new set of American values. Roosevelt’s rhetoric, which was always more progressive than New Deal policy, was a statement of these ideals. It was an attempt to use the position of the presidency to provide Americans a moral education. Individualism was not to be abandoned, but the ways in which individualism are rooted in a complex interdependent society could now be highlighted, and happiness could come to mean more than making money. Roosevelt explained: Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money; it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy and moral stimulation of work
45
no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits. These dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and our fellow men. (quoted in Grafton 1999, 30) This happiness was the ideal. In reality, most Americans would continue to define themselves as consumers---but at least policy oriented toward the consumer could expand the chances of most Americans to find some form of happiness. The New Deal was always a moral enterprise, but it was a moral enterprise that also recognized the connection between economic and moral conditions. We could only become better individuals if our society became more just. The actions of the government could create the conditions of social justice that might produce a more moral set of individual citizens. What that action required changed over time, as certain programs proved successful and others did not. Mistakes were made, and some, like the cutting of spending in the summer of 1937, play a major role in the derailment of the New Deal. But nonetheless, action, direct intervention, mastery of social conditions, was required. The limits to that action were primarily psychological, which Roosevelt recognizes when he argues that we must respond to the Depression like we would respond to a war. He is not calling for martial law or even martial virtues. Instead, he refers to the way in which war focuses our attention, concentrates our energies, and can override selfishness (in some) in the name of a larger public project. War also tends to generate feelings of patriotism and unity, which highlight our interdependence, and recognition of this interdependence is critical. As Roosevelt said, If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we can not merely take but we must give as well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger goal. This I propose to offer, pledging that the larger purposes will bind upon us all as a sacred obligation with a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife (quoted in Grafton 1999, 32).
46 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought This first inaugural address concludes by bringing us back to the essential liberal project, the desire for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The goal has never changed, but the conditions in which we find ourselves have. Just as we once recognized that freedom was meaningless in the face of arbitrary political power exercised by unaccountable barons and monarchs, today we must realize that arbitrary economic power poses the same threat to our freedom. Only by altering our expectations of what government can provide for us, and demanding that it meet those expectations, can we preserve our freedom. Perhaps remembering Wilson’s warning about the fleeting nature of Progressive movements, Roosevelt reminds America that with the return of prosperity also comes a return of the ‘‘ruthless self-interests’’ that caused the Depression in the first place. As the middle class returns to its long-accustomed routines, he also reminds us that we have obligations to those who have not yet made it that far, the one-third of the nation that remained ‘‘ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished’’ (Grafton 1999, 61). In practice, little ended up being done for this one-third. The fact that these people now were worthy of attention, however, was relatively new. Not merely beneficiaries of middle-class scraps, this group was entitled to its own New Deal. The president of the United States declared his determination to make every American citizens the subject of his country’s interest and concern; and we will never regard any faithful law-abiding group within our borders as superfluous. The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little (Grafton 1999, 61). These are remarkable sentiments, and although little was done for a variety of political reasons, the moral imperative was evident. The record of how little the New Deal had done for blacks, tenant farmers, and other excluded groups is clear, but what is less emphasized is that it was often New Dealers who raised these very concerns in the first place. The New Deal, like all political movements, was not perfect, and it failed to permanently defeat the attractiveness of classical laissez-faire liberalism---a liberalism whose roots are so deep they may be impossible to permanently remove. The New Deal introduced a tradition to counter it, however, one that privileges mutual obligation and responsibility, humanitarian decency, and a greater sense of social possibilities for government, and that recognizes the relationship between
economic opportunity and political democracy. Above all else, the New Deal introduced the idea of security into the American understanding of liberty.
References and Further Reading Abbot, Philip. 1990. The Exemplary President. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Arnold, Thurman. 1935. The Symbols of Government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Arnold, Thurman. 1980 [1937]. The Folklore of Capitalism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Badger, Anthony. 1989. New Deal: The Depression Years. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Brinkley, Alan. 1996. The End of Reform. New York: Vintage Books. Brinkley, Alan. 2003. ‘‘The New Deal Experiment.’’ In The Achievements of American Liberalism. Edited by William Chafe. New York: Columbia University Press. Burns, James MacGregor. 1956 Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York: Harcourt Brace & World. Conkin, Paul. 1975. The New Deal. Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing. Croly, Herbert. 1909. The Promise of American Life. New York: Macmillan Co. Edsforth, Ronald. 2000. The New Deal: America’s Response to the Great Depression. New York: Blackwell Publishing. Fischer, David Hackett. 2005. Liberty and Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Foner, Eric. 1998. The Story of American Freedom. New York: Norton. Freidel, Frank. 1990. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. New York: Little Brown and Co. Goldman, Eric. 1952. Rendezvous with Destiny. Chicago: Knopf. Grafton, John, ed. 1999. Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Great Speeches. New York: Dover Publications. Hamby, Alonzo. 1992. Liberalism and Its Challengers: From FDR to Bush. New York: Oxford University Press. Hamby, Alonzo, ed. 1981. New Deal: Analysis and Interpretation. New York: Longman Publishing. Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. Himmelberg, Robert. 2001. The Great Depression and the New Deal. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage Books. Humphrey, Hubert. 1970. The Political Philosophy of the New Deal. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970 Landy, Mark. 2002. ‘‘Presidential Party Leadership and Party Realignment: FDR and the Making of the New Deal Democratic Party.’’ In The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism. Edited by Sidney Milkis and Jerome Mileur, 80--81. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Leuchtenburg, William. 1995. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy. New York: Columbia University Press. McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1973. The Idea of Fraternity In America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Milkis, Sid, and Jerome Mileur, eds. 2002. The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Miroff, Bruce. 2000. Icons of Democracy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Morone, James. 1998. The Democratic Wish. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Morone, James. 2003. Hellfire Nation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Perkins, Francis. 1946. The Roosevelt I Knew. New York: Viking Press. Plotke, David. 1996. Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930’s and 1940’s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rauch, Basil. 1944. The History of the New Deal 1933--1938. New York: Creative Age Press. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1934. Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934. Available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/chat6.html. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1937. State of the Union Address, January 6, 1937. Available at http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/ state-of-the-union/148.html. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1944. State of the Union Address, January 11, 1944. Available at http://www.feri.org/archives/ speeches/jan1144.cfm. Young, James. 1996. Reconsidering American Liberalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zinn, Howard, ed. 2003 [1966]. New Deal Thought. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
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Notes 1. Not that laissez-faire liberalism ever actually existed. Even today, there are few authentic calls for genuine minimal government. Instead, calls for less government mean less government protection and patronage for projects and groups you oppose, and support for those you approve (for instance, less money spent on public housing and more for prisons or less government regulation for consumer protection and greater legal protections for corporations). 2. Marx’s analogy of communism as a specter is particularly apt in the American case. In Europe, Communist and Socialist movements were powerful political forces that had to be reckoned with. They had a real tangible weight that they lacked in America, even when the movements were at their most powerful. In the United States, the terms socialism and communism are thrown about without any real understanding of what the words mean, but they are not meant to be analytic categories. Instead they are vague and ephemeral horrors, malevolent shadows haunting a loosely defined but emotionally powerful American dream. 3. Early in his administration one of Ronald Reagan’s economic advisors came up with the strategy of ‘‘starving the beast’’ as a way to undermine the welfare state. If going after middle-class entitlement programs was political suicide, creating a deficit so great that we could no longer afford to maintain them becomes a viable way to dismantle it. While President Bush’s attempts to privatize part of Social Security proved to be unpopular, even at the height of its momentum supporters were able to
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challenge only the efficacy of Social Security, not its legitimacy. Public acceptance does not prevent the dismantling of entitlement programs by those with political power, but their methods and goals have to be obscured. The New Deal, as a liberal movement, would not be reflexively against the privatization of Social Security and other entitlement programs. What matters is that the appropriate services are guaranteed for all citizens. If privatization can meet that test (which thus far seems doubtful) there is no ideological reason to oppose it. Roosevelt once referred to Mill as ‘‘one of the father of all economists’’ (see Abbot 1990, 74). Roosevelt was the heart of the New Deal, but not its mind. Others wrote his speeches (although he stayed involved in the process) and New Dealers like Henry Wallace, Rexford Tugwell, Thurman Arnold, and his wife Eleanor (among others) were theorists in their own right and far more sophisticated than Roosevelt. Their various streams of thought collected in the person of Roosevelt, however, and had influence because he allowed them to. As such, Roosevelt could be said to embody the New Deal and we will use him as such. Roosevelt exhorted clergy to emphasize the Sermon on the Mount during his second term (quoted in Morone 1998, 354). Who felt that his job was to ‘‘feed the hungry, and god damned fast’’ (Goldman 1952, 332). The Depression was considered, in part, the result of a mixture of overproduction, underconsumption, irresponsible speculation, selfish and self-destructive business practices, and a weakened international economy. Time proved John Maynard Keynes to be correct, but at the time, he was just one voice in a crowded chorus. Roosevelt was a firm believer in budget balancing, to the point that it may have caused the 1937 recession that helped defeat the New Deal, but he was also clear that humanitarian needs had to trump fiscal policy. A common strategy used by Roosevelt when his advisors disagreed was to ‘‘Put them in a room tighter, and tell them no lunch until they agree!’’ (quoted in Burns 1956, 183). A theme he constantly hammered home whenever he campaigned. Local issues were always put into a larger national context. The plight of the small farmer who was not paid enough for his crops would be connected to the conditions of industrial workers who could not afford to buy them. Race and gender, which currently enjoy a privileged status that trumps class, were not top priorities for the New Deal. Compared with the progress made in later movements the New Deal did little, but to judge the New Deal too harshly on this score ignores both the political realities that confronted the New Deal and its universal language. Women and minority groups lacked the organizational power to beat the forces of reaction marshaled against them, and had FDR expended political capital to fight for them it would have destroyed the New Deal coalition that made other progressive change possible. Instead, Roosevelt gave women and minorities unprecedented access to positions of power and influence within his administration, and framed policy and
48 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought
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programs in an inclusive way that made their future expansion possible. The New Deal was not the civil rights movement, but the civil rights movement may not have been possible without the groundwork laid by the New Deal. McWilliams goes on to note that ‘‘This alone helps account for the consistent tendency of the unions to sacrifice every other good to the attainment of economic gain, a pattern made more compelling by the desperate need of members.’’ Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s secretary of labor and the first women to ever hold a cabinet positioning the United States, has noted that Roosevelt was never able to get inside the mind of the capitalist. ‘‘Roosevelt never understood the point of view of the business community, nor could he make out why it didn’t like him. He did not hold that everything should be judged by whether or not it makes money, and this made the business people incomprehensible to him’’ (Perkins 1946, 155). Mastery of the world (its possibility and desirability) is a long-standing liberal tenet, but historically that mastery was a private, not public, undertaking. It cannot be overstated how prevalent this belief was in the United States when Roosevelt took over, especially amongst elite opinion makers. That the government could not hope but fail if it engaged in economic functions that private industry could provide was an article of faith believed with the same sincerity with which Christians believed Jesus was the son of God. And, like all forms of faith, contradictory evidence (such as the impressive performance of the War Industries Board in World War I that inspired so many New Dealers) was ignored or dismissed, the exception rather than the rule. Thurman Arnold does a wonderful job demonstrating the similarities (and consequences) between ideology and religious faith in The Symbols of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism (2000 [1937]). The latter work impressed some New Dealers so much that they made Arnold assistant attorney general. This is not the place to discuss them in any great detail, but suffice it to say the presence of our frontier offered the appearance of limitless opportunities necessary to justify laissez-faire capitalism, and the comparative ease with which (white men at least) were able to secure their political rights prevented the rise of class-based movements found in Europe, where the fight for economic and political democracy were inextricably linked. While there have been other traditions (republican, puritan, even feudal), it has always been a liberal framework that dominated our thinking about government and made space to incorporate these competing ideas. Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) is generally considered to be the definitive presentation of this argument, with more recent works like James Young’s masterful Reconsidering American Liberalism (1996) providing some needed nuance and counterpoint. Ironically southern apologists for slavery picked up on this right away, noting that a slaveholder at least had a vested interest in making sure their workers did not starve. An investment in a particular body was missing in a system of wage labor. A dead slave was expensive to
20.
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replace, whereas wages could go to whatever body was present on a particular day. The American understanding of classical liberalism was fairly unsophisticated, and did not grasp the nuance and complexity within it that could justify social reform. This in part is why the New Deal reformation of liberalism felt more philosophically groundbreaking than it actually was. The principal text of New Nationalism was Herbert Croly’s The Promise of American Life (1909). In it, he argued that the American promise (economic well-being, democratic politics, and spiritual peace) would not appear automatically. Instead it required active government intervention, especially in economic matters. Excessive economic individualism was destroying democracy while pretending to embody it. We could make good on the promise of American life only with an organized, efficient, and empowered national government capable of regulation and planning. The New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson and William Brandies represented a more Populist/Jeffersonian approach to the threats to American democracy that New Nationalism identified. Like New Nationalism, New Freedom would also require a great expansion of executive power to address these issues. However, Wilson wanted to use that power less to regulate large-scale industry and instead sought to preserve smaller farms and businesses, which were more authentically democratic. Local forms of participation (in economic and political life) were encouraged to counteract the centralizing and bureaucratic tendencies of modern life. He was appointed assistant secretary of the Navy, a position Roosevelt requested because it was the same post held by cousin Theodore. Outside of the progressive tradition FDR leaned heavily on the populism of Andrew Jackson (the people versus the interests) and the crisis rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln (for an excellent discussion of the ways Roosevelt drew from past presidents, see Abbot 1990). She goes on to note ‘‘it was this faculty which released him from the driven, frightened, psychosis of the period’’ (Perkins 1946, 164). Although Paul Conkin has pointed out that he rarely came out and ‘‘frankly admit the failure of one of his policies’’ (Conkin 1975, 11). Although how one tells the difference between the two is another matter. By decent Roosevelt meant ‘‘a proper, adequate, and intelligent way of living’’ (Perkins 1946, 332). The differences are not just tactical, however. The liberal critique of capitalism believes that it is capable of reformation, while the Marxist critique argues the differences between capitalist and worker are irreconcilable. So while the two traditions share many similar policy goals, their long-term orientation is quite different. One seeks to tame capitalism, the other to replace it. Perkins believed that ‘‘Roosevelt took the status quo in our economic system as much for granted as his family. . . . He felt that it ought to be humane, fair, and honest, and that adjustments out to be made so that the people would not suffer form poverty and neglect, and so that all would share’’
The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism
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(Perkins 1946, 328). If the Marxist critique is correct, what Roosevelt asks for is ultimately impossible through regulatory reform, but Roosevelt never failed to believe in that possibility. Roosevelt was too steeped in American traditions (as well as too politically aware) to ever seriously think about abandoning capitalism. Unregulated economies in theory. In practice, the business apostles of laissez-faire capitalism (as opposed to its philosophic apostles) used their considerable political clout to get favorable tariffs, land to develop railroads, and so on. Whether or not this option existed in practice was irrelevant. This type of thinking was supposed to provide moral and existential legitimacy for the status quo, not represent an accurate reflection of the world. This realization produced the antitrust laws, and the Progressive movement of the early 1900s, a movement that was derailed by World War I before it could reach its full potential. The Socialist tradition, on the other hand, also sought to replace capitalism with more democratic forms of ownership. The more radical edges of the New Deal, particularly its planned communities, flirted with these ideas but only the Tennessee Valley Authority achieved mainstream prominence. Fischer (2005) and Morone (1998) both make this argument at some length. Fischer observes that successful reformers are always the ones who can persuade the public that they are on the side of liberty and freedom. Morone argues that the most influential social movements in our history have appealed to our ‘‘democratic wish,’’ that is, our desire to restore democracy to our communities when political, social, and economic forces take it away. Again, it was the use of state power to deal with economic matters that is new here. As James Morone demonstrates so effectively in Hellfire Nation, the state had always been active in intensely personal matters. Religious blue laws had been with us from the beginning, and the state legislating on behalf and in opposition to slavery is intensely personal. The New Deal began at the tail end of the Prohibition experiment, which was a massive intrusion into private life. These intrusions were justified by appealing to our strong moral and religious sensibilities, even when there was an economic component to them. Roosevelt understood the power of the crusading mentality that was constantly simmering below the surface of the American people, waiting to be tapped. By making economic concerns moral concerns, the New Deal was able to expanded state power into previously forbidden areas. And, as he never tired of saying as relations between the two sides got increasingly hostile, the nations banking and business interests were begging for the government to do something about the depression when Roosevelt took office. Progressive members of the business community always had a voice in the New Deal. Forty-eight at the time. Marxists would argue that our dependency on work to feel value is an example of capitalism’s pathological
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effect on workers’ sense of self. Roosevelt certainly would have rejected that critique, but as previously discussed, Roosevelt never critically questioned capitalism either. In this respect, he was no different than most Americans. Even American labor unions during the 1930s never challenged the connection between work and value in any serious way. There were real political limits to the groups the New Deal was able to help. Organized interests fared better than unorganized groups, as they have throughout time. The inchoate nature of the federal state meant that programs were often administered locally and reflected local prejudice. Southern influence in Congress was able to ensure that its hierarchical society suffered only minimal disruptions. Social Security originally excluded many forms of low-paying work, especially those dominated by women and blacks. However, the language of the New Deal was one that explicitly refused to draw distinctions between citizens, and its universal cast left the possibility of future expansion wide open. David Plotke observes, ‘‘If the administration rarely challenged images of the ‘people’ as white, openly racist themes declined. . . . The severely discriminatory character of the racial order meant that when new Federal programs were not explicitly racist they put elements of that order into question . . . [opening] political space for challenges to conventional racial practices’’ (Plotke 1996, 179). Poverty was treated as a condition bordering on criminality, attitudes the New Deal worked to alter. Perkins tells a story of a Public Employment Service office in New York, where applicants would wait for work in a room with no chairs, benches, or electric lights because ‘‘as the manager said, the men would steal the bulbs and would go to sleep if you gave them benches’’ (Perkins 1946, 92). Despite his strong words in his second inaugural address and periodic attempts to raise the issue after that by the time he began to focus on them much of his political capital was spent and what was left was being mustered towards the war effort, so while the actions fail to match the rhetoric here this reflected a real commitment, rather than political opportunism. These groups were not organized in any meaningful way and were more of a political liability than anything else. Roosevelt’s thinking here reflects his liberal biases. From a social democratic perspective, one could easily challenge the idea that private employment is more liberating, but Roosevelt’s thinking was already to the left of mainstream America in this regard. His support of private employment always went hand in hand with proposals for stronger laws on wages, hours, and working conditions. Roosevelt encouraged Perkins to represent labor interests early in his first term, telling her ‘‘I think the secretary of labor ought to be for labor’’ (Perkins 1946, 215). Thurman Arnold, author of The Folklore of Capitalism (2000 [1937]), was the New Deal’s chief trustbuster and laid out the logic behind its consumer friendly economic philosophy in The Bottlenecks of Business (1940). The rising political clout of labor helped give Roosevelt the electoral support he needed to move left during the Second
50 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought New Deal (1934--1935). However, that support existed because of the steps the New Deal took to revitalize a labor movement decimated by the depression. The most prominent example was the inclusion of section 7a in the NRA, guaranteeing labor a right to organize (and liberally interpreted by John L. Lewis to mean that the president wanted workers to join unions) and the efforts of the Department of Labor to compensate for ‘‘the fact that representation of working people through their own organizations was pathetically limited’’ in the early days of the New Deal (Perkins 1946, 214).
48. Historically, this was the way the United States had solved previous depressions. 49. The first two years of the New Deal saw more Progressive legislation than their four terms. 50. The regressive nature of Social Security taxation reflects this pessimism. Roosevelt feared that a future act of Congress could undo even the limited social security he was able to create. But if workers paid in now to receive benefits in the future, attempts to limit those benefits would entail enormous political risks.
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necessarily follow from every Man’s being Judge in his own Case, by setting up a known Authority, to which every one of that Society may Appeal upon any Injury received, or Controversie that may arise, and which every one of the Society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an Authority to Appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so is every Absolute Prince in respect of those who are under his Dominion. 91. For he being suppos’d to have all, both Legislative and Executive Power in himself alone, there is no Judge to be found, no Appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with Authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any Injury or Inconveniency, that may be suffered from the Prince or by his Order: So that such a Man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please, is as much in the state of Nature, with all under his Dominion, as he is with the rest of Mankind. For where-ever any two Men are, who have no standing Rule, and common Judge to Appeal to on Earth for the determination of Controversies of Right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of Nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the Subject, or rather Slave of an Absolute Prince: That whereas, in the ordinary State of Nature, he has a liberty to judge of his Right, and according to the best of his Power, to maintain it; now whenever his Property is invaded by the Will and Order of his Monarch, he has not only no Appeal, as those in
1.1 John Locke, Second Treatise, 1689 Sections 89--94, 134--42, 212 89. Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only is a Political, or Civil Society. And this is done where-ever any number of Men, in the state of Nature, enter into Society to make one People, one Body Politick under one Supreme Government, or else when any one joyns himself to, and incorporates with any Government already made. For hereby he authorizes the Society, or which is all one, the Legislative thereof to make Laws for him as the publick good of the Society shall require; to the Execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own Decrees) is due. And this puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth, by setting up a Judge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies, and redress the Injuries, that may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth; which Judge is the Legislative, or Magistrates appointed by it. And whereever there are any number of Men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature. 90. Hence it is evident, that Absolute Monarchy, which by some Men is counted the only Government in the World, is indeed inconsistent with Civil Society, and so can be no Form of Civil Government at all. For the end of Civil Society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which 51
52 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his Right, and so is exposed to all the Misery and Inconveniencies that a Man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with Power. 92. For he that thinks absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods, and corrects the baseness of Humane Nature, need read but the History of this, or any other Age to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of America, would not probably be much better in a Throne; where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be found out to justifie all, that he shall do to his Subjects, and the Sword presently silence all those that dare question it. For what the Protection of Absolute Monarchy is, what kind of Fathers of their Countries it makes Princes to be, and to what a degree of Happiness and Security it carries Civil Society where this sort of Government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late Relation of Ceylon, may easily see. 93. In Absolute Monarchies indeed, as well as other Governments of the World, the Subjects have an Appeal to the Law, and Judges to decide any Controversies, and restrain any Violence that may happen betwixt the Subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared Enemy to Society and Mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true Love of Mankind and Society, and such a Charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt. For this is no more, than what every Man who loves his own Power, Profit, or Greatness, may, and naturally must do, keep those Animals from hurting or destroying one another who labour and drudge only for his Pleasure and Advantage, and so are taken care of, not out of any Love the Master has for them, but Love of himself, and the Profit they bring him. For if it be asked, what Security, what Fence is there in such a State, against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler? The very Question can scarce be born. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves Death only to ask after Safety. Betwist Subject and Subject, they will grant, there must be Measures, Laws, and Judges, for their mutual Peace and Security: But as for the Ruler, he ought to be Absolute, and is above all such Circumstances: because he has Power to do more hurt and wrong, ’tis right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of Faction and Rebellion. As if when
Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions. 94. But whatever Flatterers may talk to amuze Peoples Understandings, it hinders not Men, from feeling: and when they perceive, that any Man, in what Station soever, is out of the Bounds of the Civil Society which they are of; and that they have no Appeal on Earth against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him, whom they find to be so; and to take care as soon as they can, to have that Safety and Security in Civil Society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this Discourse) some one good and excellent Man, having got a Preheminency amongst the rest, had this Deference paid to his Goodness and Vertue, as to a kind of Natural Authority, that the chief Rule, with Arbitration of their differences, by a tacit Consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his Uprightness and Wisdom: yet when time, giving Authority, and (as some Men would perswade us) Sacredness to Customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing Innocence of the first Ages began, had brought in Successors of another Stamp, the People finding their Properties not secure under the Government, as then it was, (whereas Government has no other end but the preservation of Property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in Civil Society, till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by his own Authority, avoid the force of the Law, when once made, nor by any pretence of Superiority, plead exemption, thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his Dependants. No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it. For if any Man may do, what he thinks fit, and there be no Appeal on Earth, for Redress or Security against any harm he shall do; I ask, Whether he be not perfectly still in the State of Nature, and so can be no part or Member of that Civil
1.1 John Locke, Second Treatise Society: unless any one will say, the State of Nature and Civil Society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a Patron of Anarchy as to affirm.
Chap. XI. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power. 134. The great end of Mens entering into Society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the Laws establish’d in that Society; the first and fundamental positive Law of all Commonwealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it. This Legislative is not only the supream power of the Commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and appointed. For without this the Law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a Law, the consent of the Society, over whom no Body can have a power to make Laws, but by their own consent, and by Authority received from them; and therefore all the Obedience, which by the most solemn Ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this Supream Power, and is directed by those Laws which it enacts: nor can any Oaths to any Foreign Power whatsoever, or any Domestick Subordinate Power, discharge any Member of the Society from his Obedience to the Legislative, acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige him to any Obedience contrary to the Laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any Power in the Society, which is not the Supream. 135. Though the Legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, tho’ it be the Supream Power in every Common-wealth . . . First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People. For it being but the joynt power of every Member of the Society given up to that Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a State of Nature before they enter’d into Society, and gave up to the Community. For no Body can transfer to
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another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own Life, or take away the Life or Property of another. A Man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another; and having in the State of Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or Possession of another, but only so much as the Law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the Common-wealth, and by it to the Legislative Power, so that the Legislative can have no more than this. Their Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects. The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society but only in many Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against it . . . 136. Secondly, The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a power to Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris’d Judges. For the Law of Nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of Men, they who through Passion or Interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no establish’d Judge: And so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the Rights, and fence the Properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is Judge, Interpreter, and Executioner of it too, and that in his own Case: And he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from Injuries, or to punish Delinquents. To avoid these Inconveniencies which disorder Mens Properties in the state of Nature, Men unite into Societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole Society to secure and defend their Properties, and may have standing Rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that Men give up all their Natural Power to the Society which they enter into, and the Community put the Legislative Power
54 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be govern’d by declared Laws, or else their Peace, Quiet, and Property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of Nature. 137. Absolute Arbitrary Power, or Governing without settled standing Laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of Society and Government, which Men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes; and by stated Rules of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute Arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates, and put a force into the Magistrates hand to execute his unlimited Will arbitrarily upon them: This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right against the Injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single Man, or many in Combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute Arbitrary Power and will of a Legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases. He being in a much worse condition who is exposed to the Arbitrary Power of one Man, who has the Command of 100000. than he that is expos’d to the Arbitrary Power of 100000 single Men: no Body being secure, that his Will, who has such a Command, is better, than that of other Men, though his Force be 100000 times stronger. And therefore whatever Form the Common-wealth is under, the Ruling Power ought to govern by declared and received Laws, and not by extemporary Dictates and undetermined Resolutions . . . 138. Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos’d to lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore in Society having Property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath a right to take their substance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; without this, they have no Property at all. For I have truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the
Subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be fear’d in Governments where the Legislative consists, wholly or in part, in Assemblies which are variable, whose Members upon the Dissolution of the Assembly, are Subjects under the common Laws of their Country, equally with the rest . . . 139. But Government into whatsoever hands it is put, being as I have before shew’d, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that Men might have and secure their Properties, the Prince or Senate, however it may have power to make Laws for the regulating of Property between the Subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a Power to take to themselves the whole or any part of the Subjects Property, without their own consent. For this would be in effect to leave them no Property at all . . . 140. ’Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and ’tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a Power to lay and levy Taxes on the People, by his own Authority, and without such consent of the People, he thereby invades the Fundamental Law of Property, and subverts the end of Government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take, when he pleases to himself? 141. Fourthly, The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others. The People alone can appoint the Form of the Commonwealth, which is by Constituting the Legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the People have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern’d by Laws made by such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands. 142. These are the Bounds which the trust that is put in them by Society, and the Law of God and Nature, have set to the Legislative Power of every Commonwealth, in all Forms of Government.
1.2 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies First, They are to govern by promulgated establish’d Laws, not to be varied in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough. Secondly, These Laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the People. Thirdly, they must not raise Taxes on the Property of the People, without the Consent of the People, given by themselves, or their Deputies. And this properly concerns only such Governments where the Legislative is always in being, or at least where the People have not reserv’d any part of the Legislative to Deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly, The Legislative neither must nor can transfer the Power of making Laws to any Body else, or place it any where but where the People have . . . 212. Besides this over-turning from without, Governments are dissolved from within. 1. First, When the Legislative is altered. Civil Society being a State of Peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the State of War is excluded by the Umpirage, which they have provided in their Legislative, for the ending all Differences, that may arise amongst any of them, ’tis in their Legislative, that the Members of a Commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living Body. This is the Soul that gives Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth: From hence the several Members have their mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion: And therefore when the Legislative is broken, or dissolved, Dissolution and Death follows. For the Essence and Union of the Society consisting in having one Will, the Legislative, when once established by the Majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that Will. The Constitution of the Legislative is the first and fundamental Act of Society, whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their Union, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws made by persons authorized thereunto, by the Consent and Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or number of Men, amongst them, can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make Laws, whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws without Authority, which the People are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may
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constitute to themselves a new Legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without Authority would impose any thing upon them. . . . Sources: The Founders’ Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document 5. Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. Available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ documents/v1ch17s5.html; and Locke, John. 1965. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Mentor Books, New American Library.
1.2 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies, July 4, 1776 In CONGRESS, July 4, 1776 The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.---That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,---That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.---Such has
56 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain [George III] is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
1.3 Articles of Confederation Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. The signers of the Declaration represented the new states as follows: New Hampshire Josiah Bartlett, William Whipple, Matthew Thornton
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Robert Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, John Morton, George Clymer, James Smith, George Taylor, James Wilson, George Ross Delaware Caesar Rodney, George Read, Thomas McKean Maryland Samuel Chase, William Paca, Thomas Stone, Charles Carroll of Carrollton Virginia George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Nelson, Jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton North Carolina William Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn South Carolina Edward Rutledge, Thomas Heyward, Jr., Thomas Lynch, Jr., Arthur Middleton Georgia Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, George Walton
1.3 Articles of Confederation To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting. Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusettsbay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
I.
Massachusetts John Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry
The Stile of this Confederacy shall be ‘‘The United States of America’’.
Rhode Island Stephen Hopkins, William Ellery
II.
Connecticut Roger Sherman, Samuel Williams, Oliver Wolcott
Huntington,
William
New York William Floyd, Philip Livingston, Francis Lewis, Lewis Morris New Jersey Richard Stockton, John Witherspoon, Hopkinson, John Hart, Abraham Clark Pennsylvania
Francis
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.
III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon
58 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.
IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.
V. For the most convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the States, and while they act as members of the committee of the States.
In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests or imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendence on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.
VI. No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or foreign State; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince or State, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress, to the courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State, or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgement of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of filed pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by
1.3 Articles of Confederation some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the Kingdom or State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.
VII. When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each State respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment.
VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.
IX. The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article---of sending and receiving ambassadors--entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as
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their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever---of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated---of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace---appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies commited on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following. Whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven, nor more than nine names as Congress shall direct, shall in the presence of Congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose