A History of the U.S. Political System 3 volumes : Ideas, Interests, and Institutions

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM Ideas, Interests, and Institutions VOLUME I

Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor Editors

Copyright 2010 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A history of the U.S. political system : ideas, interests, and institutions / Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor, editors. 3 v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-713-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) --- ISBN 978-1-85109-718-0 (ebook) 1. United States---Politics and government. I. Harris, Richard A., 1951- II. Tichenor, Daniel J., 1966JK31.H57 2010 320.973---dc22

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About the Editors

Richard A. Harris, PhD, is a professor at Rutgers University--Camden with a joint appointment in political science and public policy and administration. He directs the Senator Walter Rand Institute for Public Affairs. He has written and edited several books, including Coal Firms Under the New Social Regulation (Duke University Press), The Politics of Regulatory Change (Oxford University Press, coauthored), and Remaking American Politics (Westview Press, coedited). He has been a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and received the Mary Parker Follett Award and the Jack Walker Award from the American Political Science Association for best article (coauthored) in Politics and History and Political Organizations and Parties, respectively. Daniel J. Tichenor, PhD, is Philip H. Knight professor of social science senior faculty fellow at the Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon. In addition to numerous articles and chapters, he has published Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton University Press) and The Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press). He has been the recipient of fellowships from the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, the Brookings Institution, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Along with Dr. Harris, he has received the Follett and Walker awards. He also was awarded the Gladys Kammerer Prize by the American Political Science Association for best book in American public policy and politics.

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Contents Volume I Section 1: Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought, 1 Introduction, 1 The Enlightenment and Classic Liberalism Joseph Romance, 3 Political Thought in the Early Republic Brian Danoff, 14 The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Brian Stipelman, 26 Documents, 51 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15

John Locke, Second Treatise, 1689, 51 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies, July 4, 1776, 55 Articles of Confederation, 57 The Constitution of the United States, 61 James Madison, Federalist No. 10, 68 James Madison, Federalist No. 39, 71 James Madison, Federalist No. 48, 74 James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 76 Anti-Federalist No. 26, 79 Anti-Federalist No. 28, 80 Anti-Federalist No. 48, 82 Anti-Federalist No. 84, 83 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835, 86 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery, March 16, 1849, 88 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address, September 23, 1932, 91

Section 2: Religion and American Politics, 97 Introduction, 97 Religion and the American Founding Mark David Hall, 99 Church and State in American Political Development Paul R. Babbitt, 113

viii Contents Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics Michael Janson, 123 Documents, 135 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11

John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill, 1630, 135 The Maryland Toleration Act, 1649, 136 Roger Williams, A Plea for Religious Liberty, 1644, 138 Nathaniel Niles, Sermon, 1774, 141 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, June 20, 1785, 143 George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 3, 1789, 147 George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, August 1790, 147 Henry Ward Beecher, The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty, June 4, 1869, 148 Walter Rauschenbusch, On the Social Gospel, 1908, 149 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 151 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983, 156

Section 3: Cities, States, and American Federalism, 161 Introduction, 161 Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism John Dinan, 163 The City in American Political Development Richardson Dilworth, 175 Documents, 191 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15, 191 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21, 194 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 44, 197 Anti-Federalist No. 11, 200 Anti-Federalist No. 35, 202 McCulloch v. Maryland et al., 17 U.S. 316 (1819), 203 John Calhoun, Fort Hill Address, July 26, 1831, 207 John Peter Altgeld, On Municipal Government and Ownership, September 5, 1897, 211 W. D. Lawson, Letter to Lucius Clay on Eisenhower and States’ Rights, January 21, 1956, 214 Fiorello H. La Guardia, Speech on Tammany and the Spoils System, 1933, 215 William Jefferson Clinton, Executive Order No. 13132, August 4, 1999, 215

Section 4: The Congress, 221 Introduction, 221 The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 Gregory Koger, 223 The Making of the Modern Congress Richard A. Harris, 241 Documents, 259 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

James Madison, Federalist No. 52, James Madison, Federalist No. 54, James Madison, Federalist No. 62, James Madison, Federalist No. 64, Anti-Federalist No. 9, 268 Anti-Federalist No. 17, 270

259 261 263 266

Contents 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11

Anti-Federalist No. 55, 272 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885, 275 War Powers Resolution, November 7, 1973, 277 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), 280 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, December 1993, 285

Section 5: The Presidency, 291 Introduction, 291 Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 Michael J. Korzi, 293 Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR Saladin M. Ambar, 312 Lincoln and the Civil War State Avram Fechter, 325 Documents, 343 5.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 67, 343 5.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69, 345 5.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70, 348 5.4 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74, 351 5.5 Anti-Federalist No. 67, 352 5.6 Anti-Federalist No. 70, 354 5.7 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Albert G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, 355 5.8 Theodore Roosevelt on Presidential Power, 1913, 356 5.9 William Howard Taft on Presidential Power, 1916, 357 5.10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Fireside Chat, March 12, 1933, 359 5.11 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 361 5.12 Lyndon B. Johnson, Gulf of Tonkin Address, Message to Congress, August 5, 1964, 364 5.13 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, August 7, 1964, 364 5.14 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 1998, 365 5.15 George W. Bush, War on Terrorism Address, September 20, 2001, 367

Section 6: The Federal Bureaucracy, 371 Introduction, 371 Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy Deanna Malatesta, 373 Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview Stephan Lavertu, 391 Documents, 407 6.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74, 407 6.2 Anti-Federalist No. 24, 409 6.3 U.S. Supreme Court, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), 412 6.4 Chester Barnard, Functions of the Executive, 1938, 416 6.5 Administrative Procedures Act, 1949, 417 6.6 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), 418 6.7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 421 6.8 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), 424 6.9 Executive Order No. 12866, September 30, 1993, 427 6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council, October 8, 2001, 431

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Section 7: The Courts, 437 Introduction, 437 The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development G. Alan Tarr, 439 The Contemporary Supreme Court Michael Besso, 452 Documents, 465 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, 465 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80, 468 Anti-Federalist Nos. 78--79, 471 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), 473 Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in U.S., 1831, 476 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Court-Packing Plan Address, March 9, 1937, 480 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 483 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 486 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 488

Index, 493

Section 1 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought

Introduction

13 states. While first-generation Americans, particularly the educated and landed elites, shared a classical liberal ideology, there was a good deal of disagreement about what kind of political and governmental institutions would best guarantee the preservation of liberty and individual rights. This initial disagreement between the Federalists, who favored a strong central union, and the Anti-Federalists, who argued for a greater conservation of authority at the state level, set in motion a debate that continues to this day. Joseph Romance and Brian Danoff explore the critical intellectual underpinnings of U.S. liberal tradition and the emergent controversy between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Their essays demonstrate the extent to which liberalism frames and constrains political discourse in the United States, even discourse about transforming political processes and governing institutions. Brian Stipelman picks up this theme, explaining how the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt’s rhetoric brought about remarkable change, but did so by adapting liberal thought to pragmatic concerns. In many respects, New Deal liberalism was merely an iteration of the discourse begun in 1787, a struggle to remain true to U.S. liberal traditions while meeting new social and economic challenges. At the heart of this struggle, as Romance, Danoff, and Stipleman show, is the question of the national government’s role in the preservation of its commitment to liberty, including property rights and freedom from government control. On the

More than any other nation, the United States’ founding represents concerted action in the name of ideas. The ordinary history of nation-building involves narratives of war and conquest, or political ambition and intrigue. In such instances, ideas emerged to justify political action ex post facto, whether the political act in question was the creation of a new nation or, more often, the transformation of an existing one. Thus, John Locke’s famous treatise on government was a justification of the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Great Britain, a nation previously organized through nonideological struggle. To be sure, America was formed out of a violent revolution. That revolution, however, proceeded in the name of ideas rather than interests, albeit ideas that were imported from Europe rather than homegrown. The constellation of thought on which America was founded is classical liberalism, a powerful assertion of liberty and of the primacy of the individual in society. The founding documents, the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, both reflect these classical liberal intellectual origins of our nation---even though the former made the case for breaking a political arrangement, the U.S. colonial relationship with Great Britain, whereas the latter made the case for constituting a new political arrangement, the creation of an ‘‘extended republic,’’ as James Madison termed it, to supplant the original confederation among the

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2 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought one hand, the classical liberal view insists that the government that governs best is the government that governs least. On the other hand, if liberty in the form of laissez-faire leads to a situation in which concentrations of power are ‘‘free’’ to pursue particular interests

at the expense of both individual welfare and civic virtue, liberal ideals may call for federal regulation. These authors examine these questions in historical and philosophical perspective. ---Richard A. Harris

The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism Joseph Romance Professor of Political Science, Drew University

capitalism and is protected by clearly articulated rights. Finally, in a political sense, the ideal of freedom and individual rights was born of a belief in limited government and fear of tyranny. This fear of tyranny gave rise to skepticism about government power and a strong demand that only a balanced government, with separation of powers and checks and balances, could guarantee that freedom could be maintained. This skepticism about power is one of the key legacies that the Enlightenment bequeathed to what became classical liberal political theory.

The Enlightenment was, and continues to be, one of the most important intellectual, social, and political movements of the modern era. This movement reached its zenith in the 17th and 18th century in Europe and North America. Yet, whatever counter movements have emerged in the past 200 years---romanticism or postmodernism, to name two prominent movements---the Enlightenment remains an influential and vital source of political thought. In many ways, America (and later the United States) is the Enlightenment political project par excellent. Although the Enlightenment’s most prominent writers were based in Europe, what they taught was most pointedly expressed in America. This is most powerfully true in the realm of politics and political thought. Debates continue over the extent of America’s pervasive liberal tradition and how to appreciate the conservative forces that influence the nation’s history, but it is inarguable that to fully grasp the American political experience one must acknowledge and comprehend its Enlightenment roots. This is certainly true when considering how a European intellectual movement helped to shape to a significant degree political thinking in America and how that thinking shaped America’s founding documents---including the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. And in so doing, the Enlightenment laid the groundwork for fostering the classical liberalism that lies at the heart of the American political experience. This is a liberalism that values freedom above all else. Furthermore, this freedom finds prominent expression in the workings of

The Enlightenment’s Legacy To define the Enlightenment is a difficult task. This is because it was a movement that crossed areas of human experience and was widely adapted, in various guises, in different geographic locales. Thus, we now speak of the French, Scottish, English, and German Enlightenments. Each influenced the American experience in different ways and it is reasonable to say that eventually an American Enlightenment emerged. Each of the European enlightenments helped to shape the American experience. The roots of the Enlightenment can be traced back to ancient Greece, and the ideals of freedom and limited government---the hallmarks of classical liberalism---can be found in many ancient societies. Yet, despite the way writers pick and choose ways to reassemble ideas, something distinctive remains about the Enlightenment and the political theories it engendered.

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4 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought One way to comprehend the Enlightenment is to ascertain what its proponents believed in and what they attacked. Most of the writers who are associated with the movement endorsed reason, and this belief in reason would result in an expansion of human knowledge that would improve mankind and foster human happiness. Indeed, the idea of progress was an essential component to many of the movement’s thinkers. Finally, most proponents of the Enlightenment believed in the universal idea of the Enlightenment itself. Thus, universal human attributes and needs dictate fundamental truths about what it means to be human. The result of this belief was that, although differences existed between people and nations, these differences did not obliterate the use of human reason to realize political and social truths. It is in this light that we can understand how Joseph De Maistre, a critic of the Enlightenment, could say that he had never seen a human being acting only a Frenchman, or a German, or a Russian. To an Enlightenment thinker, this would be a heretical statement. To worry about some essential humanness and how humans use universal reason to further society was an important attribute to the Enlightenment and it deeply affected the political thought of many Americans. Even considering prominent reactions against this belief, it cannot be discounted when trying to understand the modern era and the modern era’s most representative nation---the United States. Standing in the way of this project were traditional religions and their institutional structures and what was perceived by Enlightenment writers as entrenched powers, superstitions, and reactionary forces that endorsed the status quo. For the Enlightenment to succeed in its goals of furthering human knowledge and political progress, it was a project that necessitated both a destructive and constructive act. The old order, to various degrees depending on the thinker and situation, had to be attacked. Whether this required political revolution and change or internal reforms was open to debate. But certain traditional ways of viewing the world had to be changed. If that was achieved, the way could be open to creating a new political world based on reason and dedicated to individual freedom. This dialectic goes far in explaining the Enlightenment, particularly with regards to its political implications. This would not be lost on the American experience or on its founders and later political leaders. This championing of reason complicates an understanding of the Enlightenment, because reason was applied to so many areas of human thought and endeavors. In so many intellectual areas, traditional approaches were rejected and replaced with a new emphasis on

Though a profoundly respected philosopher of the Enlightenment, David Hume is most remembered for his assault on reason as a reliable mode of philosophical inquiry. (Library of Congress)

rational thought and scientific inquiry. Thus, the Enlightenment had an immense influence on scientific thought: Sir Isaac Newton was a hero to other Enlightenment figures; philosophic inquiry, via Voltaire, Kant, Locke, and Hume; political thought, via Locke, Montesquieu, and Hume; and economic thought, most famously by Adam Smith. These names are just a few in a pantheon of people that could be expanded to include hundreds. This was a radical experiment that started with questioning the old ways. And, by throwing so much into question, politics would be transformed. For the purposes of this essay, we will focus on the political teachings of the Enlightenment. (We should not completely ignore the broader movement. Newton’s achievement in seeing a seamless interconnected universe has obvious political implications and gave heart to those who believed in universal political rules and natural rights and laws for politics.) Yet, even here there is much controversy. Profound disagreements emerged between many key thinkers, and the political solutions they suggested are not uniform. Yet, if we take Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and baron de Montesquieu as the key political thinkers of the age, we can begin to develop a working vocabulary that sets the

The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism parameters of political discussions. Each of these men contributed significantly to the development of what became known as liberalism. This is particularly true when we consider how American political thinkers talked about and shaped politics in the new nation. What were the key ways in which political thought was shaped and defined by Enlightenment thinking? First, by rejecting traditional political teachings, the Enlightenment gave to its descendents a powerful inquiry into human nature. This is not to say that earlier political thinkers cared little about this question. Rather, it is to suggest that the Enlightenment gave a new urgency to the question about how to reason about what was essential about human nature and, when that was reasoned through, how to conceive of politics. What this meant, in practice, was imagining what was essential about humans, and this meant starting political inquiry with the individual. This was something a bit radical in political thought. Earlier thinkers often started with the social nature of humanity---Aristotle’s idea of a political man in essence contrasts with the assumption that one could imagine man in isolation as a starting point for political thought. Politically this resulted in a fundamental belief in the individual as a starting point---and ultimately an ending point---for political goals. By placing the individual, and not, say, the community or city, as the starting point for political thought, the Enlightenment developed a strong appreciation for individual freedom. Starting with people imagining how they could think about themselves in isolation from the group significantly weakened any belief that virtue or the community or fraternity were the starting points of political thought. The idea of freedom is an ancient one, yet the Enlightenment insistence on individual freedom as a starting point lends itself to an insistence on rights as paramount to political discourse. Indeed, a case can be made that by starting with individuals as the key focus of political inquiry, a language of rights is implicit. Second, this discourse about individuals often began with an imagining of a state of nature---that is, what was the individual like without groups, the state, or society? What was man like removed from the trappings of society and the community created by his interactions with his fellow human beings? Numerous possible answers to these questions were considered; however, the most frequent political move was to next think about the social contract. The social contract was a thought experiment about what kind of agreement would be entered into by the numerous participants of a new society. This approach led to a series of interesting possible political questions, such as the following: What kind of

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laws, if any, existed before the creation of the state? And, did one have to obey them and why? What kinds of rights were natural and bound to be respected by the society created by free men? What would naturally free men give up to create society? Why would people be driven to leave the state of nature---the place of pure freedom before society---in the first place? Different thinkers gave vastly different answers to these questions. But these questions and the key terms they included provide a kind of Enlightenment vocabulary about politics. And in answering these questions, classical liberalism was born. In the end, the idea of natural man, natural rights, freedom, and how best to protect freedom in any created society function together as the common language of the era, even if individual thinkers could reason about these matters in significantly different ways. Despite the significant influence that European Enlightenment thinkers had on America, the relationship between the European intellectual movement and American political thought and practice is still ambiguous. As the contemporary historian Bernard Bailyn rightly points out, America was on the periphery of Western civilization. In many ways, this gave Americans like Jefferson, Madison, and Franklin more room and freedom to think about political reform. The distance from the center of political thought was vital in allowing these men to think more clearly and with dispatch about how to create a new government in the New World. In another sense, America’s distance from Europe was important in creating new and vital ways of the conceiving of politics. Thus, Americans experienced the Enlightenment as a practical matter---how to apply ideas to real-world political experiences. In Europe, for the most part, Enlightenment ideas were seen as theoretical abstractions that had to deal with entrenched political forces that were often powerful and hostile. The weight of doing things as had been done was bound to limit the political expression of these ideas. (Of course, this would radically change with the French Revolution and Europe’s own eventual effort to apply theory to practice.) The Enlightenment had an ambiguous relationship with America in another key way. It is certainly true that America has an Enlightenment ‘‘voice.’’ Indeed, Thomas Jefferson deserves credit among those in the Enlightenment pantheon. And the documents created by the American founding---namely, the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution---are significant practical applications of Enlightenment thought. Both revealed an underlying faith in reason and political freedom.

6 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought As many historians and political theorist have pointed out, however, America, also has a ‘‘second voice.’’ This second voice does not use the language of individualism, natural rights, and the state of nature or social contracts. This second voice, while believing in freedom, is more deeply concerned with individual responsibility to the broader community and is more attached to ideas about equality than normally are associated with the Enlightenment or liberalism. This second voice is best represented by strongly religious people, often influenced by the Puritan past of the country and a continuing influence of religion in the day-to-day life of most Americans. Politically, many of these ideas were expressed by the divergent writers we now call the Anti-Federalists---those opposed to the ratification of the Constitution. This voice, often buried or ignored in American political discourse, is more apt to champion the community, the common good, and local customs. While embracing communality as the children of God, these writers were more often apt to see ways in which experiences in localities shaped, in vital ways, U.S. customs and expectations about politics. Indeed, while these writers were just as committed to a belief in the dignity of man that Enlightenment figures championed, their belief was that such a dignity could be achieved only with a recognition of people as situated in some locality. This belief would throw into question the great faith that Enlightenment insisted was part of the use of reason in furthering the progress of human freedom. Furthermore, this second voice was, in many ways, more sympathetic to equality and democracy than Enlightenment thinkers were or classical liberal theory might insist. This second voice is less prominent in the American political experiment, but it is vital to our understanding of America and its founding documents. Indeed, American political history can be read, to a degree, as the dialectical encounter between the Enlightenment voice of universal reason, individual freedom, and rational governance, and the idea of local customs, collective equality, and traditional religion that insisted on human dignity found within a supportive community of believers. Neither voice has ever fully silenced the other. Neither voice has ever been fully triumphant.

Those Who Influenced America The Enlightenment and classical liberalism is really the story of many related movements in many fields of human thought involving numerous people. It would be impossible to discuss all the people who influenced American political discourse. The American

founders---Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, to name the most famous---were widely read and steeped in currents that flowed from Europe. Four thinkers, however, stand out as influencing the American founding and subsequent history: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and baron de Montesquieu. Thomas Hobbes probably had the least direct influence of any of these thinkers on American politics. In large measure, this is because of Hobbes’s dangerous and unpalatable reputation. His advocacy of a Leviathan (the title of his most famous, or infamous, book)---an all-powerful centralized state---was an anathema to many. Furthermore, his skepticism about religion caused great concern among many. Indeed, Hobbes could be quite scathing and sarcastic in discussions of religion. Yet, Hobbes cannot be ignored because of his huge influence on liberalism and Enlightenment political thinking. This influence was less about adopting his suggestions and more about the intellectual concepts that he used and that subsequently were used to different ends by others. Thus, because Hobbes was not an advocate of natural rights and because he did not champion human freedom, he was suspect. (In this regard, he stands outside the Enlightenment and liberal traditions.) Yet, his ideas about a state of nature and the social contract provide key concepts that were vital tools later employed by other thinkers to develop their political ideas. Hobbes was extremely individualistic in his approach to politics. Man may not have natural rights; however, when we think about politics, we start by thinking about what motivates an individual, how they would proceed in life, and what they are afraid of. Man, in Hobbes’s state of nature, was alone and free. This freedom was actually a problem because all would be free to harm others. Thus, freedom must be sacrificed to achieve order and stability. If the endpoint of Hobbes’s theory were antiliberal, his starting point was vintage classical liberal thinking. The second key thinker who influenced American political thought was John Locke. John Locke’s prominence stems from his philosophical and political works. Philosophically, in his Essay on Human Understanding, Locke developed the idea that man was a tabula rasa--a blank slate---and was thus shaped by his environment. Ideas are not innate, according to Locke. Locke’s epistemology was highly individualistic. People are thought about as individuals, not as members of some broader group. These ideas were central to the way liberals thought. Locke’s ideas about man and knowledge were linked to his political thought, which received its clearest expression in the Two Treatises on Government. In that work, Locke used much of the language of

The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism

John Locke was a 17th-century political philosopher who gave the Western world the first distinctly modern theory of human nature. (Library of Congress)

Hobbes, but made it more palatable to his readers through important differences. According to Locke, man was endowed with natural rights given to us by the creator, and man maintained these rights in the state of nature. Furthermore, all reasonable men can agree on a natural law. Thus, in the state of nature, people can acquire property, develop commerce, and form the basis of society. Indeed, a long chapter in the Treatise deals with how one acquires property and maintain it. This is a hallmark of classical liberalism--the acquisition and protection of property. We leave the state of nature, not because as Hobbes believed that the state of nature was brutal and unforgiving; rather, we leave the state of nature, via a social contract, to protect our lives, liberties, and estates. Thus, the government created by the social contract is less an act of desperation and more an act of reasonable, enlightened men. Once men form a society and create a government, Locke proceeds to discuss the proper way to organize that government. Locke champions popular sovereignty and the role of the legislature in deciding policy. Furthermore, he continually worries in that text about tyranny and the dangers of the usurpers of power.

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Even more important, in the American context, is that Locke developed a theory of justified revolution. If instituted governments engage in ‘‘a long train of abuses,’’ then men are justified in engaging in a revolution to overthrow a tyrant. However, those abuses do not put men back into the state of nature; rather, they force men to dissolve the government and to act as a group of men in a recognized society reconstituting a new government. In the American context, this becomes clearer. When Americans declared their independence, they did it as a corporate body, in a Continental Congress, against a tyrannical king. Many of these ideas and much of the language in the Declaration of Independence parallel Locke’s ideas and language. Although Locke’s influence on America has been downplayed, it remains true that his work was widely read and that his ideas did seep into the thought of American political actors. In recent years the importance of David Hume has been established. Hume was always an important European thinker, yet his centrality to American thought was less appreciated. We know that Hume, particularly through his essays, was widely read by many Americans. Hume does not fit neatly into the Enlightenment canon. His politics had a patina of conservatism to them, and he had a healthy skepticism about progress and the ability of people to use reason to reach perfect knowledge. In his essays, he argued that conflict was a central part of society and that this conflict existed because of the different material desires of people. Hume’s influence on James Madison is evident, and it has been established that Madison read Hume while at Princeton. In Madison’s contribution to the Federalist Papers, for example, Hume’s presence is clearly felt. In Federalist No. 10, his appreciation of the complexity of factions shows a familiarity with Hume’s ideas, passions, and opinions creating stubborn challenges to any stable and free society. And later in Federalist Nos. 37--39, in which Madison urges his readers to accept the difficulty of founding a Republic and the need to accept the Constitution, he uses language that can, at times, seem strikingly Humean. Finally, in writing the Constitution, many of the framers of the Constitution were influenced by Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu. In his work The Spirit of the Laws the importance of separation of powers and checks and balances are thoroughly discussed. The necessity for such concepts as central to forging any free society was not lost on the Americans. Montesquieu saw these principles embodied in the English political system; however, his analysis of the English system was vital in helping Americans think

8 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought through what they were doing. Although, in thinking about England’s influence on the Constitution, the framers did not speak with one voice. Alexander Hamilton thought the English Constitution was perfect, whereas others were more skeptical. The key animating principle was that each branch of government---legislative, executive, and judicial---should share political power and that each should be directed by different people.

The Declaration and the Constitution One of the problems in discussing the Enlightenment’s influence on America, and how we should think about classical liberalism, is that the U.S. founding and America’s subsequent history are shaped by two different documents: the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Both documents are clearly an expression of Enlightenment thinking and are considered key documents in classical liberalism, but they are not documents that seamlessly reflect the same thinking. They were written years apart and by different authors. The Declaration was largely, though not exclusively, the work of one man---Thomas Jefferson. The U.S. Constitution reflects the ideas of a team of men with, at times, vastly different approaches to politics. As a reflection of Enlightenment thinking and classical liberalism, the Declaration of Independence is the more problematic of the two. In many ways, Thomas Jefferson took a great deal of Lockean thought and incorporated it into the Declaration. Indeed, much of the language parallels Locke. What is most striking about the work is that it assumes the common sense of Locke’s ideas. Men are endowed with natural rights, government exists by the consent of the people, men are equal, and society is created by a kind of social contract. Furthermore, if the rights of the people are violated, then the people are allowed to engage in revolution. In this way, many of the ideas of Locke, and the era he reflected, had simply become part of the intellectual air in which people like Jefferson breathed. All Jefferson really had to do was take these ideas and distill them to their practical essence in language that resonates even today. Thus, he remarks, it is ‘‘selfevident’’ that ‘‘all man are created equal. Furthermore, taking a lesson from the latter half of The Treatise on Government, Jefferson justifies revolution. Locke’s idea of a ‘‘long train of abuses’’ is reflected in the extensive catalog of wrongs committed by the king against the colonies. Thus, the Declaration of Independence, and the revolution it justified, is reasonable---a cornerstone of Enlightenment thought. Finally, the Declaration

champions human freedom and demands that a selfconscious society of people forge their own way in the New World and not be shackled to a tyrannical regime. The document is problematic as well, which is apparent on at least two grounds. First, Jefferson never fully defines what he means by equality. This is one of the most difficult aspects of both the American experience and Enlightenment thought. Championing equality is hypocritical in a land that tolerated, even embraced, slavery. As Samuel Johnson rightly observed, ‘‘How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?’’ At a deeper philosophical level, equality is difficult for many Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, some Enlightenment thinkers, like Voltaire, endorsed the concept of philosophic kings---hardly an embrace of the concept of political equality. Furthermore, the more central concept of the Enlightenment and classical liberalism is the ideal of freedom. The freedom to create a new political world was a more vital part of the Declaration than the rhetoric of equality that it contained. On a second level, the Declaration of Independence was a document designed to appeal to as many people as possible. Thus, Jefferson needed to compose something that would appeal to those unaffected or unfriendly to Enlightenment thought. This might include many religious people or those less hostile to traditional society. As Jefferson later said, the Declaration was a ‘‘harmonizing document.’’ The Constitution is a more straightforward document in reflecting Enlightenment and liberal thinking, which is evident on many levels. The document is devoid of references to history, local or national customs, and religion. Earlier constitutions, going back to the Greek city states, were apt to make numerous references to the long history of the regime in question. But the framers of the U.S. Constitution were about starting the world anew---an Enlightenment ideal. In so doing, the framers used reason to write a rather spare, abstract work that includes the basic rules for governance. In fact, few, if any, specific policies are demanded in the document. (For instance, the German constitution specifically bans the Nazi Party.) Most central to the document is the concept of separation of powers and the defining of the three branches of government that separation demanded. The separation of powers, as Madison made clear in Federalist No. 51, was designed to make ‘‘ambition counteract ambition.’’ The protection of personal freedom is the animating principle of classical liberalism and is reflected in the separation of powers. A more apt phrase actually would be shared powers, because all three branches interact frequently on political decisions. Each branch is involved in the

First page of the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution was drafted by representatives of the original 13 states meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, between July and September 1787. (National Archives/Corbis)

10 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought working of government as policy is created. Each branch is selected in a different way, with constituencies, and each has different political time horizons. Thus, the president thinks in terms of four years, senators six years, house members two years, and the federal court a lifetime. Thus, the idea of balance is politically maintained---this is another Enlightenment ideal. This does not mean, however, that the three branches are of equal power. It is clear that the Congress was meant to be the preeminent branch of government, whatever history has foretold. And the judiciary was, as Hamilton said, ‘‘the least dangerous branch,’’ in part because it was the weakest. Even this quintessential Enlightenment document holds within it hidden traces of non-Enlightenment thinking. The document allows for, even if it does not embrace, that second voice of American politics. That is, the voice of locality over the nation, community over the individual, and equality paired with freedom. In important ways, this voice is more democratic and has a much greater faith in self-governance. This is found in a few places in the work. First of all, the states were not abolished, and we developed a Federalist system. This does not guarantee the ideas of locality, community, and equality. It does, however, make room for these ideas. States may be large entities, indeed, but they were and are closer to the people than the distant national government. Second, opponents of the Constitution---the Anti-Federalists---championed the ideas mentioned above. Although they failed to stop the ratification of the Constitution, they were able to raise serious questions and give pause to the process. And they did not lose outright. In their opposition, they were able to extract a promise for a series of amendments to the document---the Bill of Rights. On first glance, the Bill of Rights does not seem to be such an endorsement of locality, community, and equality. Yet, a more careful reading reveals just that. The First Amendment, for instance, allows for assembly and protects religious freedom. Implicit in the amendments is the idea of a limited national government. Not only is government power checked by the internal working of the government (checks and balances), but also the government is limited by the inherent rights of the people, which are partially articulated in the actual amendments. Localities and equality were fostered by the Bill of Rights in other more subtle ways. The right to juries, for instance, allowed local citizens to determine justice. As Forest McDonald points out, ‘‘In an everyday sense, juries were the government, and it was upon them that the safety of all rights to liberty and to property depended.’’ The First Amendment, while clearly

protecting individual liberty, also protects communal life by shielding religious practices and the right of the people to assemble. In the early 21st century, far-flung people can meet via the virtual reality of the Internet; however, most of us understand assembly, and certainly through most of American history the concept has been understood, to be people gathering face to face in their communities to express themselves. If Madison and Hamilton and the other framers wanted a national government that could touch citizens individually and directly, the Anti-Federalists wanted to ensure that the people could unite and find political ways to counter national power.

Political Destruction and Political Creation An inherent tension exists between these two documents. The Declaration of Independence is a largely destructive document, but not in any pejorative sense; rather, it is destructive in that it states a desire on the part of the colonists to sever the connection between America and Great Britain. And, in fact, it is usually the case that revolutions are naturally destructive. Furthermore, it is often difficult to construct a coherent and complete conception of governance from a revolutionary manifesto. Such writings tend to be open to the broadest possible interpretation, precisely to unite widely disparate groups under the banner of change. If specific constructive proposals are made, it might be difficult to unify the opposition. Thus, the Declaration of Independence is vague about natural rights in the very act of asserting their existence. Rights are ‘‘selfevident,’’ and the specifics of the document are about the abuses committed by the crown. Conversely, the U.S. Constitution is a constructive act of political creation. It outlines, if at times vaguely, the power of three precise branches of government. It lays out, in general terms, what these branches do and how they interact. And in the case of article one, it details a rather specific set of powers delegated to the legislative branch. Thus, it is not surprising that the U.S. Constitution, in its ratification phase, engendered a great deal of debate and criticism. In fact, coming on the heals of an overarching rejection of the Articles of Confederation, it is apparent how it would invite such criticism. (The Articles were adopted after the American Revolution and it was the governing document until it was superseded by the U.S. Constitution.) The Articles accepted a great deal more decentralization of power and allowed the states much more leeway and freedom in action. The Declaration of Independence required a simple affirmation or rejection of the Revolution itself.

The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism This admittedly posed a difficult, though not complex, choice. In many ways, this affirmation of the Revolution reflected Enlightenment thought, in general. For the Enlightenment was a destructive act of overthrowing the old intellectual order and a constructive act of creating a new way of thinking about the world. Thus, to take an example from Locke, the First Treatise systematically destroyed Robert Filmers theory of patriarchalism and the Second Treatise then created a theory of how government should be founded.

Continuing Influence The Enlightenment and the political documents it generated at the founding continue to influence American political thought and history. Indeed, the principles, rhetoric, and institutions created by the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution remain a set of lenses through which Americans perceive the political world. It is beyond the scope of this essay to illustrate all the ways in which each document influenced later political actions; nonetheless, a few key moments and individuals stand out in American politics and reflect their continuing influence. The Declaration of Independence, for the most part, lacks any constitutional force. Most Supreme Court justices do not recognize it as having any binding power. Yet, its rhetoric and underlying principles have inspired subsequent political actors. The most famous case is Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln always maintained that his political philosophy, and his understanding of the U.S. Constitution, was inspired and framed by the Declaration of Independence: Let us re-adopt the Declaration of Independence, and with it, the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it. Let north and south---let all Americans let all lovers of liberty everywhere---join in the great good work. If we do this, we shall not only save the Union; but we shall have saved it, as to make, and to keep it, forever worthy of the saving. For Lincoln, the Declaration was an inspiring reflection about the fundamental ideas of consent---we can be governed only by a regime to which we consent--and equality---that all are equal in the eyes of the government. What is central to any reading of the Declaration is that America is about equality. By claiming that people are inherently equal and that government can exist only by the consent of the people, the democratic elements of American society were reinforced. And, by interpreting the Constitution via an understanding of

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the Declaration, it was easier to see the possibility of a democratic Constitution. In point of fact, the Constitution created a republic with many nondemocratic practices. The president is not directly elected, senators were not elected until the 20th century, and federal judges serve lifetime tenures. Indeed, only the House of Representatives was always elected by a wide suffrage. And given the allowance of slavery that the Constitution did not forbid and the discrimination against women it upheld, at times, it can be difficult to see democracy flowing from the Constitution. But if the reader starts with the Declaration, and views the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration, then the democratic elements come to the forefront. A limited government allows people to live their lives as they please, elections are manifestly important, and the government is accountable to the people. These are vital elements to a democratic society. One cannot say that the Constitution, on its face, demands democracy. It does not preclude it and can, over time, lead to a fostering of a democratic culture that insists on the rule of the people. Furthermore, the Civil War, inspired in part by the rhetoric of the Declaration, led to the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Each of these amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, has been used by the Courts to strengthen the democratic process. In the 18th century, using the standards of the present day, it would be difficult to say that the United States was a democracy. Yet, through its history, the United States has become a full-fledged democracy. Furthermore, a culture that proudly embraced the rough equality about which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote so vividly has developed a set of institutional practices that are, at their heart, democratic. At the same time, the belief in private property and limited government, the touchstone ideals of classical liberalism remain integral parts of the American experiment. The Constitution, of course, has a more obvious influence on American political history. On the first level, the Constitution created the very institutions by which the national government functions. Even if the specific articles are, at times, vague, it is nonetheless true that the basic parameters of American political institutions are bounded by the rules created by the Constitution. And, indeed, one can point to many specific instances in American political history in which the Constitution, interpreted via the Supreme Court, was used to halt or channel the political evolution of the country. Thus, the Progressives in the early part of the 20th century believed that it was necessary to amend the Constitution to give the power of levying an income tax to the

12 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought federal government, via the Sixteenth Amendment, and to establish the direct election of senators, via the Seventeenth Amendment. At a deeper level, Americans have an innate belief in the Constitution as a defining document. Garry Wills, in A Necessary Evil, points out that even Americans opposed to the current state of politics look to the Constitution for inspiration and guidance in understanding the world. Nonetheless, we must recognize the tension that exists at the heart of the classical liberalism and that is revealed in the American political experience. This is the tension between equality and freedom. The Enlightenment championed both ideals. In practice, however, classical liberalism usually has sided with personal freedom at the expanse of equality, if these ideals come into conflict. On the one hand, the Enlightenment promised a newly found freedom that was necessary for the advancement of knowledge, the progress of humanity, and the delineation of natural law and natural rights. Intellectual and political freedoms were central to the Enlightenment project. And in political theory, these aspirations became central to liberal theory. Yet, the American experiment includes a strong penchant for democracy and this belief in democracy cannot exist without a healthy regard for equality. Classical liberalism has always championed political equality and equality before the law, but it has been less concerned with notions of economic and social equality. This concern has found a home in that second voice of American politics, and it goes a long way toward understanding how classical liberalism gave way, in some quarters, to contemporary liberalism. In many ways, this is reflected in the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers that was designed to create as much freedom as possible and still maintain a stable political world. As Madison argues in Federalist No. 10, it is ‘‘folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life.’’ In later American politics, this thinking was reflected in the Federalist Party and the political thought of such men as Alexander Hamilton. Custom and traditionally religious attitudes stood in the way of this freedom, and although we may now associate the Federalist with political conservatism, it is more accurate to see these men as devoted to creating a new political society dedicated to the idea of freedom. In this sense, America is and remains a product of the Enlightenment. The American faith in individual freedom, progress, and a general belief that all problems can be solved reveal us as children of the Enlightenment. The second part of the Enlightenment is the belief in equality. The Enlightenment, in its questioning of traditional order, opened up the possibility that seemingly

natural hierarchies were not, indeed, natural. By its embrace of natural rights and, in the case of John Locke, an equal access to the natural law, the idea of political equality is an open possibility. Even if the men of the Enlightenment did not fully live up to their rhetoric---after all, oppression of women and slaves persisted in the United States---the language employed by Enlightenment men like Jefferson created political tension. We all have rights and an equal understanding of the natural law. This reinforces a notion of equality that persists in America to this day. If we are all equal in this way, it is hard to accept any political inequality. In many ways, the Declaration of Independence represents this second strand of Enlightenment thought. And we cannot discount the way classical liberals thought, with their emphasis on the individual and her inherent rights, which fostered a kind of equality. Yet, classical liberalism, with its belief in the ability to acquire property and a suspicion of too strong a government, has much less to say about economic inequality. And, if one has any concerns about the way economic inequality can affect political power, then classical liberalism raises troublesome worries. The Enlightenment had an enormous influence on the United States---even before the founding of the Republic. Many of the writers of the Enlightenment and proto-Enlightenment---Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Montesquieu, were avidly read by the American founders. At a deeper cultural level, many of the idea of the Enlightenment---the faith in reason, the belief in progress, and fostering of science---are embedded in American culture. In the institutions created by the Constitution, the underlying principle of checks and balances, the rhetoric of equality, and the faith in freedom, we find abundant evidence of Enlightenment influence, and ultimately an expression of what we now identify as classical liberalism. This classical liberalism, with its starting point in the individual, represents a belief in rights and a skepticism about centralized political power that is a deeply American tradition. The Enlightenment influence was made all the more possible because America, at least the America created by European colonists, was a new world where new ideas and practices could receive their greatest expression. America was not burdened by a long history or a set of entrenched traditions that battled with new ideas and movements---as was the case in Europe. In the United States, people influenced by the Enlightenment did not have to do battle with any ancient regime or established church. In the political realm, the ideas of classical liberalism flourished.

The Enlightenment and Classical Liberalism Yet, this is only part of the American story. There was a second voice in American politics---that is, the voice of religion, the broader community, and the collective we over the individual. It is the voice of democracy, equality, and self-governance. In many ways, the U.S. story can be seen as a dialectical exchange between the ideas of the Enlightenment---a belief in freedom, the individual, and progress---and the belief in the community, tradition, and religious faith. To

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ignore either is to invite a misunderstanding of the American political experience.

References and Further Reading Staloff, Darren. Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding. New York: Hill and Wong, 2005. Wootton, David, ed. The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers. Indianapolis, IN: Hacckett Publishing Co. 2003.

Political Thought in the Early Republic Brian Danoff Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami University

laws would now be the ‘‘supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’’

The first constitution of the United States was the Articles of Confederation, ratified by all 13 states in 1781. The Articles of Confederation stated that its aim was to create a ‘‘league of friendship’’ in which ‘‘each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence.’’ The Articles thus created an alliance of sovereign states, as opposed to a powerful national government. By 1787, many American political leaders believed that the Articles had not created a sufficiently strong central government. As a result of this widespread belief, in February of 1787, the Confederation Congress called for a convention to meet at Philadelphia, ‘‘for the sole purpose of revising the articles of Confederation’’ in a way that would ‘‘render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.’’ In the summer of 1787, the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention eventually agreed to a plan for a new Constitution that would bring sweeping changes to the American political system. In contrast to the weak central government that existed under the Articles, this new national government would contain powerful executive and judicial branches. Moreover, a greatly strengthened legislative branch would be given a number of new powers, including the power to regulate interstate commerce, the power to maintain an army during peace time, and the power to tax individuals directly. Whereas under the Articles, the states were said to retain their sovereignty, Article VI of the new Constitution stated that the Constitution and all federal

Samuel Adams was a revolutionary and American statesman who is famous for organizing colonial resistance to British policies in Massachusetts. (National Archives)

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Political Thought in the Early Republic 15 It was declared by the Philadelphia Convention that the new Constitution would go into effect if nine of the 13 states chose to ratify it in special state conventions. During the fall of 1787 and the winter of 1788, as delegates to the special conventions were elected and then met to deliberate, a great debate raged across the United States over the question of whether the proposed Constitution should be ratified. The Constitution was endorsed by widely respected leaders such as Benjamin Franklin and George Washington. However, there was also a considerable amount of opposition to the Constitution, and this opposition came from such famous Revolutionary figures as Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry. The opposition also included a number of anonymous authors whose identity remains uncertain today. Writing under such pseudonyms as Brutus, the Federal Farmer, and Cincinnatus, these authors wrote essays in newspapers urging that the new Constitution be rejected. The opponents of the Constitution came to be known as the Anti-Federalists. The Anti-Federalists were a diverse group, and there was some disagreement among them regarding the Constitution’s flaws. And yet, while Anti-Federalists sometimes disagreed with one another on particular points, one can discern an underlying unity in their ideas; on the whole, the Anti-Federalists can be usefully understood as defenders of the political theory of republicanism. The republican tradition of political thought extends back to Aristotle, and was articulated, in different ways, in the work of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and other classical political theorists. As they sought to prevent what they perceived to be the dissolution of the 13 republics into one large state, the Anti-Federalists gave voice to this rich theoretical tradition of republicanism. The opponents of the Constitution were labeled ‘‘Anti-Federalists’’ by the proponents of the Constitution, who called themselves the ‘‘Federalists.’’ The opponents of the Constitution were not pleased to be labeled as ‘‘Anti-Federalists,’’ for in their view, it was they who were the true defenders of federalism. The Constitution’s opponents argued that federalism is a system of government in which sovereign states join together for limited purposes, such as common defense. In a federal system, the locus of political power and political activity should remain with the individual states, as opposed to the central government. According to this view, the Articles of Confederation created a genuinely federal system. The Anti-Federalists believed that the new Constitution, in contrast, did not create a federal form of government at all, but rather created a

single ‘‘consolidated’’ government, under which the 13 state governments would become irrelevant in practice, even if they still existed on paper. In the Anti-Federalist view, this effort to create a gigantic ‘‘consolidated’’ republic was destined to be disastrous. They believed that the end result of the Constitution would be the creation of a large empire, not a large republic at all. This empire would be ruled over by a small number of aristocratic elites, and the republican principles of self-government for which the American revolutionaries fought would be lost. The Anti-Federalists believed that under the Articles of Confederation, public liberty---the liberty of every citizen to participate in public affairs---was able to flourish within the 13 separate republics at the state and local levels. The Anti-Federalists feared that by destroying the power of the state and local governments, the new Constitution would crush public liberty, and thus crush republicanism, as political life would come to be monopolized by a small number of central government officials. Like the Anti-Federalists, the Federalists claimed that they were, in fact, sincere republicans, and they insisted that the Constitution was entirely consistent with republican principles. The Anti-Federalists, however, believed that the Federalists were trying to replace the classical republican tradition of political thought with a new science of politics. According to this modern science of politics, government should promote private liberty (the liberty to live one’s life as one sees fit), but not necessarily public liberty (the liberty to actively participate in public life). The Federalists’ departure from classical republicanism can be seen in Federalist No. 10. In this essay, Madison claims that the new national government will be a republic. However, he defines a ‘‘republic’’ simply as a ‘‘government in which the scheme of representation takes place’’ (Hamilton 1982, 55). For Madison, then, if the leaders of a regime are elected by the citizenry, then that regime can fairly be called a republic. For the Anti-Federalists, however, Madison’s definition of a ‘‘republic’’ is far too meager. The Anti-Federalists were attached to an older conception of republicanism, according to which a republic is not simply a regime in which the people are ruled over by elites of their choice. For the Anti-Federalists, a state can only be called a republic---and freedom can only be said to exist---if the state is made up of citizens who actively engage in self-rule, through direct participation in political life. The Anti-Federalists also believed that if a republic is to be preserved, it must succeed in cultivating citizens who have a certain kind of character;

16 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought specifically, a republic’s citizens must be passionately committed to public affairs, and they must be willing, at times, to sacrifice their own private interest for the sake of the common good. As we shall see, the AntiFederalists rejected the Constitution, because they believed that it would create a regime that would depart from these classical republican ideals.

Citizen Participation and the Constitution The Anti-Federalist emphasis on citizen participation can be discerned if one contrasts their understanding of representation with the understanding of the Federalists. In the modern science of politics favored by the Federalists, the device of representation plays a key role. In Federalist No. 10, Madison suggests that a representative republic is far superior to a ‘‘pure democracy’’ in which all citizens ‘‘assemble and administer the government in person.’’ Madison argues that under ‘‘pure’’ democracies, individual rights are inevitably trampled on by mob-like majorities, and the public good is ignored. In contrast, in a large representative republic, there is a good chance that the representatives will be wise citizens who can ‘‘refine and enlarge the public views’’ (Hamilton 1982, 55). Rather than simply enact into law whatever the masses desire, the representatives will make decisions on the basis of their own independent judgment. For the Federalists, then, representation provides protection against what Alexander Hamilton called (behind the closed doors of the Philadelphia Convention) ‘‘the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit’’ (Ketcham 1986, 76). In the view of the Federalists, the device of representation promises to create an enlightened government made up of elected elites, as opposed to an intemperate government made up of the people themselves. In contrast to the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists tended to celebrate the kind of direct democracy that flourished in the town-hall meetings of America. For instance, a Maryland farmer declared: ‘‘I feel unspeakable horror at every step, which removes power and rights, at a greater distance from the body of the people, to whom they belong, and confines them to the hands of the few’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 49). The AntiFederalists did concede that the device of representation would need to be used at the state and national levels, simply because these entities were too big to support direct democracy. However, although they accepted the device of representation as a practical necessity, they never joined the Federalists in celebrating representation as a positive good. Unlike the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists did not think of

representation as an indispensable method of filtering out the dangerous demands and passions of the masses. Whereas the Federalists wanted to insulate the representatives from public opinion through such devices as long terms of office, the Anti-Federalists sought to make representatives close to the people by having annual elections, small legislative districts, and mandatory rotation in office. The Anti-Federalists believed that all of these devices would enable the citizenry to carefully monitor and instruct their representatives. Moreover, as the historian Ralph Ketcham notes, ‘‘the [Anti-Federalist] ideal went beyond a close control of officials by the people. In a truly self-governing society, there would be such dialogue, empathy, and even intimacy that the very distinction between ruler and ruled would tend to disappear’’ (Ketcham 1986, 19). In the Anti-Federalist vision of representation, then, the people should engage actively in self-rule through their representatives. For the Federalists, in contrast, the representatives essentially rule in place of the people. The Anti-Federalists noted that the Constitution provided for only a small amount of legislators (26 senators and 65 house members). These legislators would not be elected annually, and there would be no limit on how many terms they could serve. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, this would tend to produce an aristocratic legislative body that would rule the people from above. In contrast, the Anti-Federalists hoped to create a legislative body that would help to facilitate---rather than replace---the rule of the people. The Anti-Federalists believed that the participation of the citizenry in government would be undermined not just by the Constitution’s scheme of representation, but also by its judicial system. The Anti-Federalists noted that while Article III of the Constitution declared that ‘‘the trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury,’’ it did not guarantee trial by jury in civil cases. The Anti-Federalists feared that the institution of the jury would thus decline under the Constitution. If the jury declined, the people would lose one of their most important means of participating in public life. Just as the town-hall meetings allow the direct participation of citizens in the making of the law, jury trials allow the direct participation of citizens in the administration of the law. The Anti-Federalists feared that the loss of this form of participation would rob the people of a crucial form of political education. If they are no longer able to serve frequently on juries, then ordinary Americans’ faculties of legal and moral reasoning would begin to atrophy. As a Maryland farmer noted in an essay on the jury system, ‘‘Men no longer cultivate, what is no longer useful---should every opportunity be taken

Political Thought in the Early Republic 17 away, of exercising their reason, you will reduce them to [a] state of mental baseness’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 39). According to the Anti-Federalists, the best way to educate people for self-rule is to allow them to practice self-rule. As a Maryland farmer put it, ‘‘Our people are capable of being made any thing, that human nature was or is capable of, if we would only have a little patience and give them good and wholesome institutions’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 30). The Anti-Federalists believed that the framers of the Constitution had failed to create ‘‘good and wholesome institutions’’ insofar as they abandoned the task of founding and maintaining institutions that would foster the political participation---and thus the political education--- of the people. In an influential essay, the historian Cecilia Kenyon (1955) called the Anti-Federalists ‘‘men of little faith,’’ partly because they were so deeply suspicious of governmental power. While Kenyon’s description of the Anti-Federalists is partly correct, it must be noted that the Anti-Federalists actually had a tremendous amount of faith in the ability of ordinary citizens to run their own affairs, as long as they were properly educated. From the Anti-Federalist view, it was the Federalists who had abandoned this ancient republican faith in the people. The Anti-Federalists believed, as the satirist Montezuma put it, that the authors of the Constitution were intent on ‘‘drawing a line between’’ those who are allegedly ‘‘ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any share in its administration’’ (Kenyon 1966, 61--62). According to this view, the Federalists had departed from the republican principles of the American Revolution. As one observer noted, during the Revolution it was believed that ‘‘the common people were good judges in the affairs of government,’’ and ‘‘their time was well spent when it was devoted to the study of politicks’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 202). In the view of Anti-Federalists such as the satirist Aristocrotis, the Federalists were now telling the common people to ‘‘mind their own business, and leave the affairs of government’’ to others (Storing 1981a, v. 3, 198). The Anti-Federalists were opposed to the notion of creating one enormous republic in part because a large state only allows a tiny percentage of the people to actively share in political rule. In a system of 13 confederated republics, a much higher proportion of citizens can participate at the local and state levels. One could argue that the new Constitution allows local and state politics to continue to flourish; however, the AntiFederalists believed, as Melancton Smith put it, that ratification will mean that the ‘‘state governments, without object or authority, will soon dwindle into

insignificance, and be despised by the people themselves’’ (Ketcham 1986, 353). Local governments would lose significance as well, because power under the new regime would be centralized in the nation’s capital. The only people who genuinely could experience public liberty, then, would be a small number of national officials.

Civic Virtue and the Constitution The Anti-Federalists feared that, ultimately, the Constitution would destroy the republican sprit of the people through its failure to generate civic virtue. In other words, the Anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution would create a regime that would fail to cultivate the kind of citizens that republican government requires. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists wanted citizens to actively engage in self-rule. But to rule themselves properly, they would need a proper moral education. According to the Anti-Federalists, the framers of the Constitution were too little concerned with creating institutions that could perform this crucial educative task. For instance, Denatus insisted that ‘‘the first, or second article’’ of the Constitution should have established academies ‘‘at every proper place throughout the United States for the education of youth in morality [and] the principles of the Christian religion’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 264). As this quote suggests, the Anti-Federalist belief that the framers had neglected schools often overlapped with their belief that the framers had dangerously ignored the importance of religion. The Anti-Federalists believed that a successful republic requires citizens who focus on the common good, and who seek to master the all-toohuman passions for power and luxuries. In the view of many Anti-Federalists, religion is crucial in forming this type of citizen. Charles Turner, for instance, argued that ‘‘without the prevalence of Christian piety, and morals, the best republican Constitution can never save us from slavery and ruin’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 221). In other words, even if a Constitution establishes republican institutions, the spirit of republicanism will die out if it is not cultivated and sustained by the moral principles that are inculcated by religion. According to Denatus, when ‘‘vanity, ambition, and the love of riches . . . overcome reason and conscience, they produce our misery. To guard against this misfortune, as much as human foresight could discover, ought to have been the chief business’’ of the Philadelphia Convention (Storing 1981a, v. 5, 263--264). But rather than make the moral education of the citizenry their ‘‘chief business,’’ the Federalists emphasized, as Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, ‘‘that neither moral

18 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control’’ over ‘‘the injustice and violence of individuals’’ (Hamilton 1982, 54). Madison is here addressing the problem of ‘‘faction,’’ which he defines as a group of citizens ‘‘who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community’’ (Hamilton 1982, 51). Boldly challenging the republican tradition’s emphasis on the small republic, Madison claims that large republics are superior to small ones, because in a large state, it is very difficult for any particular faction to form a tyrannical majority. Madison thus rejects the idea of using moral education to diminish the strength of selfinterested passions; instead, Madison argued that these passions could be effectively neutralized if given free rein in a large and diverse state. The Federalist attempt to solve the problem of faction is thus very different from the approach of the Anti-Federalists. For the Anti-Federalists, a republic should try to avoid self-interested factions from arising in the first place by trying to form citizens who are devoted to the common good. Whereas the Anti-Federalists strived to minimize selfish passions, the Federalists accepted the prevalence of these passions and tried to create institutions that either neutralized these passions or channeled them in constructive ways. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, the end result of the Federalist approach would be the cultivation of citizens who are ‘‘too selfish and avaricious’’ to preserve a republican government, as Mercy Warren put it (Storing 1981a, v. 6, 216). The Anti-Federalists feared that the citizens shaped by the Constitution would be focused excessively on commerce and the pursuit of luxuries. Under the Constitution, the federal government would now have the power to regulate interstate commerce. Most AntiFederalists actually agreed that this was one new power that Congress should be granted; at the same time, AntiFederalists feared that the new government would foster the desire to enrich oneself, at the expense of the desire to serve the public good. As a customer put it, under the new regime, Americans will spend their time on ‘‘the pursuit of wealth,’’ as opposed to the nobler activities of ‘‘politicks and religion’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 4, 202). Anti-Federalists believed that the new government would cultivate in its citizens not only dreams of private enrichment, but also dreams of military conquest. Patrick Henry asserted that Federalists were trying to create a ‘‘great and mighty empire’’ that would rival the large monarchical powers of Europe (Kenyon 1966, 250). Henry warned his fellow Virginians that, ‘‘those

Patrick Henry helped lead Virginia to independence and served as a wartime governor, but later opposed the Constitution. (Library of Congress)

nations who have gone in search of grandeur, power and splendor, have . . . been the victims of their own folly. While they acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their freedom’’ (Kenyon 1966, 243). In Henry’s view, the citizenry of a republic must be willing to die in defense of their homeland, but they should not be encouraged to chase after glorious dreams of empire, for empires are invariably ruled over by a monarch or an aristocracy. If republican liberty is to be preserved, the focus should be on cultivating a simple, virtuous, and peaceful life at home. This kind of virtuous and free life potentially could be cultivated within each of the 13 republics, but it would never be cultivated by a massive consolidated state that puts commerce and war at the center of its ambitions. The Anti-Federalist emphasis on the importance of civic virtue also can be seen in their response to Federalist claims that America in the late 1780s had entered a ‘‘critical period’’ that necessitated the creation of a powerful central government. The Federalists argued that America’s domestic economy and international standing were on the brink of ruin, and the country

Political Thought in the Early Republic 19 could be saved only by the new Constitution. Antifederalists sometimes responded that there was, in fact, no crisis, and that Federalists were merely attempting to scare Americans into embracing a powerful centralized state that would entail the end of republican selfrule. As Patrick Henry put it, Go to the poor man, and ask him what he does. He will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security. . . . Why, then, tell us of danger, to terrify us into an adoption of this new form of government? (Kenyon 1966, 251) Henry argued that if America did face domestic or foreign challenges, the country would be saved not by the central government, but rather by the republican spirit of the people. If America wanted to remain strong, the answer lay not in creating a more energetic government, but in cultivating the civic virtue of the citizenry, and this cultivation must take place primarily within the close-knit local communities that were found in the 13 separate republics. Some Anti-Federalists actually agreed with the Federalists that America was facing major economic and political crises in the late 1780s, and they believed that the Articles could thus use some reform. However, they believed that America’s problems were not primarily the result of problems with the Articles, or with the various state constitutions, but rather resulted from a decline in civic virtue. According to many AntiFederalists, the republican sprit was at its peak during the American Revolution, for this was a time when citizens focused on the common good rather than their own narrow interests. As the memory of the war started to fade, though, so, too, did the civic virtue of the people begin to decline, and it was this loss of virtue that was causing America’s economic and political problems. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution would simply exacerbate this corruption of the American character. At the Philadelphia Convention, Benjamin Franklin said, in support of the Constitution, that the newly created federal government is ‘‘likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic government, being incapable of any other’’ (Ketcham 1986, 176). The Anti-Federalists agreed with Franklin that the fate of liberty was dependent on whether or not the citizenry became corrupt. They would argue, though, that Franklin had apparently failed to perceive the ways in

which the Constitution itself was likely to bring about the corruption of the people’s character. In other words, while Federalists such as Franklin occasionally acknowledged that a republic cannot survive without a degree of civic virtue in the citizens, they refused to acknowledge that civic virtue might be undermined by the very regime that they sought to create. As Melancton Smith put it, ‘‘Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well as the spirit of the people operates upon it.. . . Our duty is to frame a government friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind, which will tend to cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among our citizens’’ (Kenyon 1966, 388). In the view of the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution would not, in fact, ‘‘cultivate a love of liberty,’’ or at least not a love of public liberty. Instead, the new regime would simply encourage Americans to focus on their own private pursuits, allowing elites to control public affairs.

The Constitution’s Three Branches and the Fate of Republicanism Anti-Federalists made arguments that each of the proposed Constitution’s three branches of government posed a threat to American republicanism. According to Cecilia Kenyon, when the Anti-Federalists criticized what they saw as the likely consequences of the Constitution, they offered nothing but a ‘‘parade of imaginary horribles’’ (1955, 15). While Kenyon claims that most of the fears of the Anti-Federalists were little more than paranoid fantasies, other political scientists have argued that the Anti-Federalists were actually quite prescient with many of their criticisms. Indeed, while some of the Anti-Federalists’ worst fears have never come to pass, one could argue that American political development under the Constitution has actually followed, to a considerable degree, the predictions of the Anti-Federalists. When considering the proposed executive branch, Patrick Henry argued that the Constitution ‘‘squints towards monarchy,’’ insofar as the ‘‘President may easily become King’’ (Kenyon 1966, 257). In the same vein, Cato noted that the language concerning presidential powers in Article II is ‘‘vague and inexplicit’’ (Kenyon 1966, 307). Given the ambiguity of the language relating to presidential power, the president might claim that virtually anything he desires to do is constitutionally permissible. As Young William Symmes put it, the president might think he is allowed to ‘‘reject the sense of the legislature, and establish his own,’’ rendering himself ‘‘to all intents and purpose absolute’’ (Storing 1981b, 49). In the worst-case

20 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought

George Washington presides over the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia. (National Archives)

scenario envisioned by Anti-Federalists, the president might even use his power as commander in chief to establish a military despotism over the nation. To reduce the chances that the president would gain monarchical powers, some Anti-Federalists suggested that there should be a plural executive. Others suggested that there should be an executive council, without whose support the president would be unable to act. Hamilton and other Federalists responded that it would be a terrible mistake to destroy the unity of the executive by creating either a plural executive or an executive council. To master foreign and domestic threats to the nation, the president must be capable of acting decisively, quickly, and, at times, secretly. In Federalist No. 70, Hamilton argued that a single executive leader is far more likely to be able to act in these requisite ways than is a group of people. To these arguments, the Anti-Federalists sometimes replied, as George Mason did during the Philadelphia Convention, that the best way to strengthen the nation is not to give the president great powers; instead, the best way to

strengthen the nation is to cultivate citizens who are deeply attached to their government. The Constitution will not produce civic virtue in the citizenry, and so the nation will end up weak, no matter how much power is given to the president. While the Anti-Federalists’ most awful fears about the executive branch may not ever have been realized, one could argue that the Anti-Federalists foresaw, in general terms, the development of what the historian Arthur Schlesinger (1973) called the ‘‘imperial presidency.’’ Schlesinger and many other scholars have argued that the modern executive has assumed powers that the framers did not intend it to have, particularly in the area of war-making. The Anti-Federalists would be troubled---but not at all surprised---by the expansion of power undergone by the modern presidency. Anti-Federalists such as Brutus would be unsurprised by the powerful role that the Supreme Court has played in American politics. The power of federal courts to strike down unconstitutional laws is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but Brutus

Political Thought in the Early Republic 21 accurately predicted that federal judges would strike down laws that they deem to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Brutus not only correctly foresaw the power of judicial review; he also correctly predicted that the courts would use this power to augment the power of the federal government as a whole. Brutus was particularly worried about the possibility that federal courts would point to such sweeping clauses as the ‘‘necessary and proper clause’’ as a way to ‘‘mould the government, into almost any shape they please’’ (Kenyon 1966, 342). And, indeed, Chief Justice Marshall would use the ‘‘necessary and proper clause’’ to bolster the power of the federal government at the expense of the states in the important case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). The Supreme Court at first resisted, but then eventually sanctioned, the further growth of federal power during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The Supreme Court cited the ‘‘interstate commerce clause’’ to determine the constitutionality of much of the economic legislation passed by Congress during the New Deal. Brutus did not anticipate the Court’s expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce clause, and Brutus was wrong when he suggested that the Court would utilize the broad language of the Constitution’s preamble to legitimate the growth of the central government. Even if he did not always accurately predict the exact legal reasoning of the Court, some have argued that Brutus was, on the whole, absolutely right in predicting that the Court’s decisions ‘‘may establish certain principles, which . . . will enlarge the sphere of [Congressional] power beyond all bounds’’ (Kenyon 1966, 343). The Rehnquist Court’s ‘‘New Federalism’’ decisions, such as U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000), can be seen as an attempt to roll back this expansion of power in a way that Brutus might have appreciated. Although the Anti-Federalists sometimes criticized the judicial and executive branches, most of their fears were centered on the legislative branch. AntiFederalists believed that, under the Articles, the people were allowed to rule themselves through their local and state governments; under the new constitution, in contrast, the Anti-Federalists feared that the people would be dominated by distant and aristocratic congressional representatives who would lack the people’s ‘‘confidence,’’ as the Anti-Federalists often put it. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, representatives can gain the people’s confidence only if the people know them well, ideally on a face-to-face basis. Given that the new constitution would create large legislative districts, few constituents would ever know their

representatives well enough to establish a genuine relationship of trust. Moreover, in a large legislative district, hard-working middle-class citizens were unlikely to be elected. Congress would be dominated by the wealthy, for only rich and prominent men would have the resources and the name recognition to win elections in districts of great size. A legislature composed of upper-class citizens would be able to represent the wealthy, but its members would not be able to really know, nor give voice to, the concerns of people who ‘‘walk in the plain and frugal paths of life,’’ as Melancton Smith put it (Kenyon 1966, 383). According to Smith, representatives should ‘‘resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people; possess a knowledge of their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests’’ (Kenyon 1966, 382). Under the new constitution, however, Congress would not ‘‘resemble’’ the people at all, since it would be dominated by ‘‘the rich and great,’’ as Brutus put it (Ketcham 1986, 326). For the Anti-Federalists, then, the legislative branch would not genuinely represent the people, which meant, in the words of Brutus, that it ‘‘will be a government, not according to the will of the people, but according to the will of a few’’ (Ketcham 1986, 325). To help resolve this problem, the Anti-Federalists often suggested that the size of the House of Representatives be increased beyond the proposed number of 65, which was based on an allotment of one representative per 30,000 people. The Anti-Federalists argued that if the size of the legislature were increased, the chance would be greater that the legislature would be made up of citizens from diverse walks of life. Increasing the size of the legislature would thus create a legislature that more accurately mirrored the people. An increase in the size of the legislature would decrease the size of the legislative districts, which would make it more likely that citizens and representatives could truly know one another well enough for the legislature to gain the confidence of the people. The Anti-Federalists believed that under the proposed constitution the representatives would be so distant---both literally and figuratively---from the people that they would not be trusted. Lacking the people’s trust, representatives would not be freely obeyed. And without the freely granted support of the people, the government would resort to force ‘‘to compel obedience,’’ as the federal farmer put it (Storing 1981a, v. 2, 384). For instance, as Brutus noted, if the American people were asked to pay taxes to a federal government from which they felt estranged, they would do so only

22 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought if forced. In the view of the Anti-Federalists, republics are based on ‘‘persuasion,’’ whereas despotic governments rest on ‘‘force’’ (Storing 1981a, v. 2, 264). Some Anti-Federalists claimed that the constitution allowed for the creation of a standing army precisely because the Federalists realized that their new regime would be a despotic one based on coercion. The Federalists responded that the new government would, in fact, gain the confidence of the people, even though the make-up of the legislature probably would not mirror the people. In Federalist No. 27, Hamilton claimed that, ‘‘It may be laid down as a general rule’’ that ‘‘confidence in and obedience to a government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration’’ (Hamilton 1982, 156). For Hamilton, then, people will be loyal to the government if it is efficient, competent, and useful to them. AntiFederalists noted that the logic of Hamilton’s argument would point to the conclusion that a monarchical or aristocratic government would be perfectly legitimate if it were administratively effective. Hamilton attempts to deny this in Federalist No. 68, when he writes that ‘‘we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: ‘For forms of government let fools contest--That which is best administered is best’’’ (Hamilton 1982, 416). Nevertheless, by emphasizing the quality of a government’s administration as the main criterion for its ability to attain the confidence of the people, Hamilton deemphasized the questions of democratic legitimacy that were so important to the Anti-Federalists. For the Anti-Federalists, a government will have only what Brutus called the ‘‘confidence, respect and affection’’ of the people if the representatives share the values, aspirations, and problems of their constituents (Ketcham 1986, 278). From today’s perspective, the worst nightmares of the Anti-Federalists regarding Congress have not been borne out, for---with the exception of the kind of fringe groups who make up the ‘‘militia movement’’--Americans tend to view the federal government as legitimate. Moreover, although many Americans only pay taxes because they fear the coercive powers of the IRS, a few Americans probably view the federal government as a police-state that rules solely by force. Finally, one could argue that the dire predictions of the Anti-Federalists were wrong insofar as opinion polls consistently reveal that most Americans believe that their own congress members are doing a good job of representing their districts. Conversely, Congress as an institution is often held in low regard by the American public, and in this case, the continuing relevance of Anti-Federalist fears about

the legislative branch is relevant. In opinion polls, large numbers (although not always a majority) of Americans consistently state that Congress is out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people, precisely as the AntiFederalists predicted. Americans often refer to ‘‘insidethe-beltway’’ politicians with disdain, suggesting that the federal government is made up of elites who neither know nor care about the problems of average citizens. National politicians thus often run for office claiming to be ‘‘outsiders,’’ for to be perceived as a Washington insider is to be seen as someone who is separated from the values and aspirations of middle-class Americans. The Anti-Federalist fear that the American people would not genuinely feel represented by Congress, then, is a concern that still remains highly salient in American politics today.

The Rights of Republican Citizens In addition to criticizing the structure of the Constitution’s three branches of government, the AntiFederalists also criticized the Constitution for what it left out---namely, a Bill of Rights. Anti-Federalists feared that without a federal bill of rights, the government would be more likely to try people without a jury, to establish a single state religion, to engage in cruel and unusual punishment, and to undertake unreasonable searches and seizures. Anti-Federalists also believed that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious exercise should all be guaranteed in a Bill of Rights. James Wilson and other Federalists claimed that while a Bill of Rights might be expedient for a state constitution, a Bill of Rights was unnecessary at the federal level. According to this argument, state governments are assumed to have broad police powers, and thus need to be restrained by a Bill of Rights. In contrast, the federal government under the Constitution would be a government of enumerated powers, which is to say that the federal government can act only in areas where it has been explicitly authorized to act by the Constitution. According to the Federalists, then, there is no need for a Bill of Rights stating that Congress cannot, for example, prohibit the free exercise of religion, because nowhere in the Constitution is Congress authorized to regulate religion in the first place. To take another example, because regulation of the press is not one of Congress’s enumerated powers, there is no need to state in a Bill of Rights that Congress may not abridge the freedom of the press. Indeed, such a statement might even be dangerous, because it could imply that Congress does have some role to play

Political Thought in the Early Republic 23 regarding the regulation of the press. As Wilson put it, ‘‘that very declaration might have been construed to imply that some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent’’ (Ketcham 1986, 185). Anti-Federalists were not at all satisfied by the argument that a Bill of Rights would be unnecessary. As noted earlier, the Anti-Federalists believed that the ‘‘necessary and proper’’ clause could easily expand government power beyond the powers specifically granted to it by the Constitution. Given that the government could assume powers that were not explicitly enumerated, a Bill of Rights was absolutely crucial. In addition to arguing that a Bill of Rights would be unnecessary, or even dangerous, Federalists sometimes argued that a Bill of Rights would be useless, because it would merely set up ‘‘parchment barriers.’’ According to the Federalists, whether rights are protected will not ultimately depend on the existence of a Bill of Rights; in the end, the protection of rights will ‘‘depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government,’’ as Hamilton put it (Hamilton 1982, 525). To this argument, the Anti-Federalists responded that the Federalists were absolutely correct that rights would be respected only if the people retained their republican spirit. What the Federalists failed to appreciate, though, was that a Bill of Rights actually would help maintain this spirit, for a Bill of Rights, known throughout the land, would serve as an important form of civic education. As the political theorist Michael Lienesch puts it, the Anti-Federalists considered the Bill of Rights to be ‘‘a symbol, a source of political education, or a reminder to future citizens, not only of their rights, but also of their responsibilities’’ (1988, 155).

The Defeat of the Anti-Federalists The Constitution was ratified only after the Federalists promised that it would quickly be amended to include a Bill of Rights. One important aspect of the AntiFederalists’ legacy is thus the Bill of Rights. Although the Anti-Federalists won the battle over the Bill of Rights, they lost the larger war over ratification. Given that Americans in the late-18th century tended to be highly suspicious of centralized power, why did the Anti-Federalists lose? They lost, in part, because virtually all Americans, including most Anti-Federalists, were in agreement that at least some strengthening of the central government was necessary. For instance, most Anti-Federalists agreed that the government needed some way to ensure that states contributed their fair share of tax revenue to the federal government;

and, as noted earlier, most Anti-Federalists agreed that the federal government should be able to regulate interstate commerce. Given that most Anti-Federalists conceded that some reform of the Articles was needed, it was difficult for them to stave off a proposal for change that was publicly defended with so much ingenuity by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and others. Many Americans felt that if reform did not happen now, then the moment might be lost forever, and they were willing to trust that great patriots like George Washington and Benjamin Franklin would never have supported a plan that would take away the liberties of the people. In short, at a moment that appeared to many to be a crisis, the Federalists were boldly able to set the agenda, as they put aside their differences and united behind a single plan for a more vigorous central government. In contrast, the Anti-Federalists were put on the defensive, and they were less united than their opponents, because they did not all rally behind one alternative plan for constitutional reform. The Anti-Federalists may have been disadvantaged by the fact that most newspapers supported the Federalists. Many Anti-Federalists believed that the media was not giving their side a fair hearing. Indeed, some Anti-Federalists believed that their opponents had not fought fairly from the start. According to many AntiFederalists, the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention had acted illegally, for the Confederation Congress had authorized the Convention only to revise the Articles, whereas the delegates proposed that the Articles be replaced with a totally different system of government. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation stated that amendment of the Articles can take place only if the states unanimously agree to changes; the Federalists therefore may have acted illegally when they suggested that the new constitution would go into effect after being ratified by nine of the 13 states, in special conventions that were nowhere mentioned in the Articles. The Anti-Federalists were troubled that the Convention met behind closed doors, without press coverage of their deliberations. Given what they perceived to be so much secrecy and illegality, some Anti-Federalists believed that the Federalists were engaged in a kind of coup d’etat aimed at replacing republican government with monarchical or aristocratic government. The legal complaints of the Anti-Federalists may appear to have considerable merit, but the Federalists suggested that an excess of legal formalism should not be allowed to prevent the people from considering, at a critical moment, a plan of action that they believed would create ‘‘a more perfect union.’’ Rather than

24 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought attempting a coup d’etat, the Federalists argued that they were trying to save republicanism, by embedding it in a stronger system of government that was based on the modern science of politics.

The Enduring Significance of the Anti-Federalists From today’s perspective, the Federalists and AntiFederalists both appear to have been patriotic Americans who had two different visions of the kind of regime that Americans should strive to create. While the Federalists may have won the war over the Constitution, the Anti-Federalist vision of politics has been of enduring significance, and Anti-Federalist ideas remain relevant to contemporary debates about American political life. The historian Saul Cornell has argued that while ‘‘the structure of American government was crafted by the Federalists, the spirit of American politics has more often been inspired by the Antifederalists’’ (1999, 1). Cornell notes that the AntiFederalist emphasis on the importance of local government has been echoed by a host of political actors across the political spectrum, throughout American history. With their criticisms of a powerful central government, both Jeffersonians and Jacksonians invoked Anti-Federalist themes. Later, in the 1960s, sharp critiques of the enervating effects of centralized government came both from conservatives such as Barry Goldwater, and New Left activists such as Students for a Democratic Society. Both the American Right and the American Left, then, have Anti-Federalist strands running through their respective ideas (Cornell 1999, 2, 304). Anti-Federalist ideas resonate with the concerns raised in recent years by a host of social scientists regarding the health of American civil society. The political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain defines ‘‘civil society’’ as ‘‘the many forms of community and association that dot the landscape of a democratic culture, from families to churches to neighborhood groups to trade unions to self-help movements to volunteer assistance to the needy’’ (1995, 5). In the view of Elshtain and many others, civil society is fraying, and this bodes ill for democracy in America. According to the political scientist Robert Putnam (2000), American communities are in danger of collapse, as Americans are joining together less and less. Putnam’s data suggest that Americans not only are participating in politics in low numbers, but also are connecting less often with their neighbors, friends, and even families. The sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues

(1985) argue that one can also discern the decline of American community in the very language that Americans use to talk about their lives. Bellah and his colleagues found that Americans are well-versed in the language of individualism, but they find it difficult to articulate themselves in the language of commitment and obligation to others. Clearly, the Anti-Federalists anticipated some of the problems with American civic life that have been identified by Elshtain, Putnam, and Bellah. The AntiFederalists feared that the Constitution would create a regime in which people would ignore public affairs, and instead focus solely on their own private pursuits. The Anti-Federalists would not be surprised by the decline in political and civic participation noted by Putnam, because they were convinced that the Constitution was not designed to facilitate or encourage active citizenship. Nor would the Anti-Federalists be surprised by the prevalence of individualism noted by Bellah, because the Anti-Federalists believed that the Federalists intended to create a regime that was built largely on the pursuit of self-interest rather than devotion to the common good. The Anti-Federalists believed that if people were to develop their potential for civic virtue, then they would need to be nurtured by local institutions such as town-hall meetings, schools, and churches. As we have seen, the Anti-Federalists feared that the Constitution did far too little to sustain these kinds of civil society institutions. The contemporary attempt to revive civil society can thus draw intellectual sustenance, and inspiration from the Anti-Federalist vision of the good life. This is not to say that Anti-Federalist ideas can simply be adopted today uncritically. For instance, it must be noted that some Anti-Federalists attacked the Constitution for prohibiting religious tests for office; in the view of some Anti-Federalists, political office should be restricted to Protestants. As this example suggests, in their desire to ground community in shared moral principles, the Anti-Federalists sometimes became intolerant of differences in a way that most Americans would today reject. According to some commentators, Anti-Federalist political thought is, on the whole, too nostalgic for a vanished world of small and homogenous communities to be of much use in contemporary times. The Anti-Federalists, then, may not offer us a perfect blueprint for American political and social life today. And yet, the Anti-Federalists undoubtedly were correct in their fundamental belief that republican government requires citizens who possess certain virtues, and they were equally correct that some political and social institutions foster, and others weaken, those virtues.

Political Thought in the Early Republic 25 Today, as we continue the crucial task of debating what kinds of virtues are necessary for our republic, and how they can best be cultivated, we would do well to carefully reflect on---even if we do not always fully embrace---the ideas of the Anti-Federalists.

References and Further Reading Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788--1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dry, Murray. 2003. ‘‘Anti-Federalist Political Thought: Brutus and The Federal Farmer.’’ In History of American Political Thought. Edited by Bryan-Paul Frost and Jeffrey Sikkenga, 216--229. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Duncan, Christopher. 1995. The Antifederalists and Early American Political Thought. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1995. Democracy on Trial. New York: Basic Books. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 1982. The Federalist Papers. New York: Bantam.

Kenyon, Cecilia. 1955. ‘‘Men of Little Faith: The Antifederalists on the Nature of Representative Government.’’ William and Mary Quarterly 12: 3--43. Kenyon, Cecilia, ed. 1966. The Antifederalists. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. Ketcham, Ralph, ed. 1986. The Antifederalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates. New York: Mentor. Lienesch, Michael. 1988. New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Main, Jackson Turner. 1961. The Antifederalists. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1980. ‘‘Democracy and the Citizen: Community, Dignity, and the Crisis of Contemporary Politics in America.’’ In How Democratic Is the Constitution? Edited by Robert A. Goldwin and William Schambra, 79--101. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Schlesinger, Arthur. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Storing, Herbert, ed. 1981a. The Complete Antifederalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ---------. 1981b. What the Antifederalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution. 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Brian Stipelman Assistant Professor of Political Science, Dowling College

works to prevent the expansion of the welfare state, but proves ineffective against entitlements Americans now take for granted. At best the legacy of the New Deal must be attacked from the margins.3 The New Deal is no longer radical, but neither are human rights or democracy. Time and success has always turned radicalism into the status quo. The New Deal in part is an effort for America to catch up to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Little can be found within it that had not already been theorized and implemented by Progressive European Liberals following John Stuart Mill4 or the social democratic tradition coming out of Karl Marx. The New Deal’s significance is found not in its originality, but in its ability to present Progressive ideas in a way that Americans would accept, to ground them in our native categories and traditions. Politically (and historically), what matters is less the pedigree of a philosophy than its widespread acceptance. Roosevelt understood and was able to work within our American boundaries. He was able to take old ideas, synthesize and popularize them, and link them to our American traditions. By doing so, he gave them permanence that far outlasted any previous (and arguably future) American reform movement. Although Roosevelt did not create an entirely new philosophy,5 he still changed American liberalism in a number of significant ways. Of primary importance was the new emphasis placed on security as a precondition of liberty. This idea could be traced back to the

The liberal party . . . believes that, as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes the duty of the government itself to find new remedies with which to meet them. The liberal party insists that the Government has the definite duty to use all its power and resources to meet new social problems with new social controls. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Goldman 1952, 368) The New Deal affected a permanent change in the way Americans think about government and their liberal tradition, moving classical liberals into the Libertarian and conservative camps while giving social democratic policy (if not philosophy) a degree of mainstream legitimacy that has lasted into the 21st century. The New Deal legacy determines the boundaries in which political life plays itself out. The Left fights to maintain and expand the welfare state---the services it provides and the people it provides them to. The Right curses the New Deal and bemoans a cumbersome, paternalistic government that interferes with human initiative and freedom, but the electorate will not allow them to overtly dismantle it. Americans may grumble about paying taxes, complain about incompetent government bureaucracy, and indulge in fantasies of unregulated free markets and a return to the glory days of laissezfaire liberalism,1 but they are not willing to abandon social security, minimum wages, or the right to unionize. The specter of communism and socialism2 still 26

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism proto-liberalism of Thomas Hobbes, but Hobbes’s arguments about physical security had largely ignored economic implications. Roosevelt’s central claim, one that the public at least somewhat accepted, was that our freedom to pursue happiness is freedom in name only when people are not free from doubt about their future. We cannot have meaningful freedom without conquering both the reality of necessity and our fear of it. Therefore, as Roosevelt responded to a Canadian journalist asking him about the social objectives of the New Deal, the state needs To try to increase the security and happiness of a larger number of people in all occupations of life and in all parts of the country; to give them more of the good things of life, to give them a greater distribution not only of wealth in the narrow terms, but of wealth in the wider terms; to given them places to go in the summertime---recreation; to give them assurances that they are not going to starve in their old age; to give honest business a chance to go ahead and make a reasonable profit, and to give everyone a chance to earn a living (Abbot 1990, 125). Society, acting through the machinery of the state, must provide the security (social insurance, wage and hours laws, and education assistance) necessary to make the pursuit of happiness genuinely possible for an everexpanding number of Americans. Related to this was a newfound emphasis on humanitarian public policy, inspired by Roosevelt’s simplistic, but heartfelt religious faith. ‘‘We call what we have been doing ‘human security’ and ‘social justice.’ In the last analysis all of those terms can be described by one word; and that is ‘Christianity’’’ (Informal Remarks to Visiting Protestant Ministers, January 31, 1938, quoted in Morone 2002, 354--355). Roosevelt’s Christianity is the Christianity of the Sermon on the Mount.6 Social justice trumps concerns about moral character. The brute fact of human need and suffering is given pride of place over predatory property rights and the longterm orientation of American economic thinking, which argued that charity today created want tomorrow. Harry Hopkins,7 a member of Roosevelt’s inner circle, railed that ‘‘people don’t eat in the long-run, they eat every day’’ (Goldman 1952, 332). There was government recognition that poverty has structural causes. Economists close to the New Deal could never quite agree on the cause of the Depression,8 but they all agreed that fault did not lie with the individual worker, who was a victim of events far beyond his ability to

27

master. This realization greatly affected attitudes toward poverty, at least at the national level. People affected by the Depression did not need to blame themselves. Poverty was the result not of personal or moral failure, but of powerful economic forces acting beyond their ability, or even the ability of their local and state government, to control. The challenge was to find a way to control those forces without sacrificing the individual. The New Deal created a set of entitlements for citizens, designed to protect them against the destructive variability of the market. The government need not guarantee happiness or success, but human decency requires that the costs of failure be minimized and that the basic tools for happiness be supplied. A powerful sense of moral obligation informed all Progressive New Deal policy; a sense that the community must provide the individual with the means necessary to pursue happiness, and the individual in turn must be willing to furnish the community with the resources it needs to meet its obligations. Roosevelt offered new (for America) criteria for judging the effectiveness of the state. Instead of its ability to balance the budget,9 or facilitate the growth of private fortunes, the state is to be judged by its ability to create conditions in which everyone is able to better their individual lives. The radical, ‘‘rugged’’ individualism that characterized America was to be replaced by a new morality that mixed an appreciation of individual rights with a utilitarian desire to guarantee those rights (above all the right to pursue happiness) for as many people as possible. This did not entail the subjugation of the individual to the greater good. Freedom would still remain more important than equality. It did mean that some Americans (the wealthy in particular) would find that property rights no longer enjoyed its previously sacrosanct status, especially if those rights significantly interfered with the freedom of others to pursue happiness. This new emphasis on utility and widespread happiness underscores the sense of community that categorized much of the New Deal. Roosevelt took seriously the idea that the president is the president of all the people, even those who lacked the money and organization to make their voices heard in American politics. This commitment was anchored in his fervent belief that underneath our disparate self-interests a public interest, a public good, could be shared by all Americans. The tensions between the rich and poor, capitalist and laborer, that color the Marxist analysis of political economy is absent here. Roosevelt believed that common ground could be found between competing

28 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought interests,10 that a ‘‘great community’’ of America was possible, and that the necessity of interdependence11 could create bonds of fellow feeling that united all Americans across boundaries of class, race, and gender.12 It was the job of the president ‘‘to find among many discordant elements that unity of purpose that is best for the nation as a whole’’ (Burns 1956, 182). This is one reason why the New Deal sought to shift economic discourse away from the battle between capitalists and workers, labor and finance, and instead emphasize our commonalties as consumers. Inclusion was always to be preferred to irreconcilable hostility. While the parallels are strong, the New Deal’s liberal economics differs from Marxism, largely through the absence of class. Workers did not see industrial society as their enemy. What they hated was their exclusion from it (McWilliams 1973, 542),13 their inability to reap

the rewards that hovered so tantalizingly close. The battle lines instead were between the selfish and the virtuous, those who would abuse their power versus those who use it to expand access to the American Dream. The lines between the two groups are moral, and fluid. There are no static class barriers, and no hopeless antagonisms. The poor were not members of a class with separate interests, but people who needed aid to facilitate their rise to the middle class where they could pursue their own unique vision of happiness. This made the New Deal vision inclusive, a vision of a genuinely middle-class society, while failing to understand that there are limits to the power of moral appeals to generosity and cooperation. Roosevelt never fully accepted the idea that capitalism might have imperatives that are irrevocably hostile to those of workers and consumers, and as a result, regulation was never

Members of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a key New Deal program to address the unemployment crisis, file past President Franklin D. Roosevelt to receive a cheery nod and ‘‘good work.’’ (Bettmann/Corbis)

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism strong enough to do more than constrain the worst excesses of business. Roosevelt hoped that the profit motive was capable of voluntary restraint by appeals to decency and self-control, but history has shown that the logic to capitalist accumulation will never respond to preaching.14 The New Deal’s attempts at social engineering were possible, and in many cases quite successful, for two reasons. The humanitarian instincts of the New Dealers (which for Roosevelt were synonymous with Christianity) demanded action, and their faith in progress and agency made this action possible. There was a belief, inherited from Progressives, that the world could be mastered by public power,15 and that our mastery would create an ever-rising standard of living. Economic forces could be made to serve our needs---we need not be at the mercy of the market. Related to that was a pragmatic sensibility unmatched by any administration before or afterward. While Roosevelt never wavered in the moral ends of the New Deal (humanitarian obligations, security as the basis of freedom, marshaling social energies to pursue a public good), the particular methods to be used were always flexible. The New Deal was profoundly undogmatic. Roosevelt listened to ideas from everyone, left and right, liberal and conservative, businessman and union organizer. While not a Socialist, he knew of the presence of radical elements within New Deal circles and never thought to purge them. He granted his own subordinates impressive leeway to experiment in their own domains, and wed himself to results rather than theories. Even beliefs that he felt a deep personal or political commitment to (like a balanced budget) could be challenged as circumstances dictated. This gave the New Deal unprecedented flexibility and a humility that was the source of its political strength, and, in hindsight, some of its weakness.

The American Context However ‘‘objective’’ the conditions for the Marxian apocalypse now became, what emerged to deal with the economic problem was a movement within the framework of the liberal faith. ---Hartz (1955, 259) The New Deal was grounded in America’s liberal tradition, but that tradition is broad and elastic, and Roosevelt stretched it in significant new ways. The hysteria that characterized the conservative opposition testifies to the power of the broadside challenge to American ideals the New Deal represented. Gen. Smedley Butler testified before the House of Representatives that

29

‘‘during the summer of 1934 a group of Wall Street brokers had urged him to lead a fascist march on Washington and overthrow the government in order to protect business interests’’ (Rauch 1944, 137). What is particularly remarkable here is that these brokers were organizing a coup not during the Populist Second New Deal, but during the First New Deal during which high commodity prices and business confidence were seen as the keys to escaping the Depression and industrial interests were writing the National Recovery Administration (NRA) regulatory codes. The equally hostile Chicago Tribune tried a more democratic approach to overthrowing Roosevelt. In the weeks leading up to the 1936 election, the switchboard operators at the Tribune’s offices were instructed to remind callers ‘‘that there are only X days to save your country’’---that is, from Roosevelt (Grafton 1999, 57). While he had strong support among rank-and-file journalists and workers he always faced tremendous opposition from the nations editors and business elite, to the point at which many refused to even say his name. Roosevelt became ‘‘that man in the White House.’’ The New Deal never really threatened the power of entrenched elites. Its most progressive measures were always watered down or defeated in Congress, and in its early stages, the New Deal was quite sympathetic to the practical needs of business, because recovery from the Depression depended on the recovery of private industrial strength. The New Deal did not affect a class revolution in the United States and never intended to. A liberal (as opposed to Marxist) movement to the core, class struggle never really entered into the picture. Instead, the New Deal sought to make good on the promise of the American Dream, where hard work could lead to a modestly comfortable existence for yourself and a reasonable inheritance for your children (and wealth, if you were blessed with a mixture of talent, discipline, and luck). Like Martin Luther King, 30 years later, Roosevelt held up a mirror to Depression-Era America and demanded a choice. Either abandon claims that America is a land of freedom and opportunity for all Americans, or create institutions that will make it so. Even Roosevelt’s most intractable foes on the right, if not the left, would have agreed that the preservation of the American Dream is a worthwhile goal. Elite hostility was a response to the existential threat the New Deal liberalism represented to the connection between wealth and worth. Although the United States was ostensibly an egalitarian and middle-class society, in reality, the rich enjoyed an honored place at the top of our social pyramid, not because of their money, but

30 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought because wealth had long been equated with personal virtue. The presence of wealth did not make you better, but the ability to accumulate wealth testified to the quality of your character. The New Deal sought to change this. The vehemence of the rightist revolt against Roosevelt can be explained only in terms of feelings of depravation and insecurity on the part of the business community. Roosevelt had robbed them of something far more important than their cliches and their money---he had sapped their self-esteem. The men who had been economic lords of creation found themselves in a world where political leaders were masters of headlines, of applause, and of difference. Men who felt that they had shouldered the great tasks of building the economy of the whole nation found themselves saddled with the responsibly for the depression (Burns 1956, 240). Once celebrated as the cornerstone of American prosperity, the businessman is now the cause of its greatest economic disaster. Our national heroes had become our great villains. A nameless mill worker knew exactly what was at stake when he said, ‘‘Mr. Roosevelt is the only man we ever had in the White House who would understand that my boss is a sonofabitch’’ (Goldman 1952, 345). This mill worker was not just blowing off steam. This attitude, apparently shared by the president, threatened to undermine the very fabric of our social tapestry. American mythology had long taught us that success in America was almost solely a function of hard work, determination, and ingenuity. The presence of wealth therefore indicated the presence of worthwhile virtues. The Horatio Alger myth of the self-made ‘‘rags to riches’’ millionaire, while greatly exaggerated (the vast majority of millionaires came from privileged or upper-middle-class backgrounds), was true enough to be emotionally resonant and legitimize the social standing of the powerful. This legitimation was not merely a form of social control that justified wealth and status, but something felt in an intensely personal, meaningful way. The flip side of the myth was that those who were unsuccessful had only themselves to blame. In a land of unlimited opportunity, the cause of failure was located in the individual’s character, not the environment or economic structure. The people at the bottom were responsible for their own shortcomings and had no recourse to ask anyone else for help, especially not the government. To do so was not only economically irresponsible16 but also morally illegitimate. The poor

deserved their lot as assuredly as the rich deserved theirs. Class was a moral, not an economic, category. Even the New Deal (and Roosevelt especially) could never fully embrace structural economic theories without introducing a moral component. Market forces might pressure a business to act in ways that run counter to the public interest, but its owners could take an ethical stand against those pressures and was worthy of condemnation when they failed to do so. American thinking about government had long been shaped by a unique combination of mutually reinforcing historical, intellectual, and geographic factors that made us hostile toward public inference in economic matters.17 The United States had always been a liberal country.18 The classical liberalism that had so influenced American political development assumed a world of abundance and opportunity, in fact depended on it. Next to the cluttered and static world of Europe, ours was a land of limitless possibility. Those who were unsuccessful in the east could always move west and start over. An unsuccessful entrepreneur could always find another investor to grant him the capital necessary to start over. We could call ourselves free because America was not bound by necessity. In such a world, the government is a source of restraint, a form of coercive power that interferes with our attempts to be free, to pursue happiness, which was almost always conflated with making money. With some notable exceptions, this view of American opportunity was accurate enough to serve as the foundation of our American gospel. However, material conditions always seem to change faster than our ability to make sense of them. Our understanding of government was frozen in a time that no longer existed. The Industrial Revolution created new concentrations of economic power, and after the Civil War, that power quickly overwhelmed a country that lacked the intellectual traditions and political tools to cope with, or even understand, the changes. When Americans looked into the mirror, their reflections still showed a land of small farmers and independent shopkeepers, masters of our own fate, long after the corporation, holding company, and trust subjected us all to the ‘‘freedom’’ of wage labor.19 Even those who felt the sting were reluctant to ask the government for help, because the version of classical liberalism worshiped in America taught us that the laws of capitalism are eternal and immutable. Any attempt by the government to interfere with those laws would damn our nation to an economic hell.20 If that were not bad enough, government aid to the poor and assistance to the downtrodden would create a nation of dependents and be the first step on an

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism inexorable road to tyranny. Welfare would destroy both our political and economic systems. Nor was welfare a moral necessity. Undeserved poverty was temporary, and permanent poverty was deserved and therefore no cause for public concern. Social Darwinism taught us that inequality and poverty, suffering and despair were evolutionary growing pains. Moral outrage was anachronistic, a reflection of ignorance about social biology. George Cutten, president of Colgate College, argued ‘‘Nothing could threaten the race as seriously as this [the New Deal]. It is begging the fit to be more unfit’’ (Fischer 2005, 491). This understanding of Darwin gelled nicely with the claims of economists who argued that the short-term selfishness of capitalism would produce prosperity in the long term. Americans believed this with the fervor and sincerity normally reserved for religion. In significant ways, it was their religion (for a fascinating discussion of this, see Arnold 1935, 2000 [1937]). The Progressive Era (and the Populists before them) represent our first grasping attempts to update American thinking about economics and government in modern conditions and connect that thought to a viable political movement. The origins of much New Deal political theory can be found here. Many Progressives opposed the New Deal, but all the New Dealers embraced at least some aspect of the Progressive tradition, in particular the possibility of public mastery of social problems like poverty. Their innovation was their newfound concern with security. Most Progressive reformers sought to level the playing field, but once you were allowed to play, little concern was shared for the losers. Edward Ross, a founding figure in the reform Darwinism movement that laid much of the groundwork for the New Deal, argued ‘‘security, as a goal, is essentially un-American because it implies a willingness to sacrifice the possibility of a great future for a safe present’’ (quoted in Goldman 1952, 370). Competing Progressive philosophies often found themselves reprising their old battles within the administration itself, which at times gave the New Deal the appearance of incoherence. The New Nationalism21 of Theodore Roosevelt, with its Hamiltonian acceptance of large-scale industrialization, found itself at odds with the New Freedom22 of Woodrow Wilson, with its attempts to limit the impact of industrialization in the name of old-fashioned Jeffersonian ideals. New Nationalism told us that we need only fear ‘‘bad’’ trusts, while the New Freedom claimed that size itself was the problem, because American democracy required a spirit of independence, responsibility, and self-reliance that could be fostered only by owning a small business or

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farm. Despite their differences, both philosophies believed that the best solution for economic and social ills were located in the federal government led by a strong and dynamic executive. Their understanding of executive power profoundly influenced Roosevelt, who came of age admiring his cousin Teddy and had his first position of national importance under Wilson.23 Drawing on the history of American political thought24 and immeasurably aided by the existential crisis created by worldwide depression and the rise of fascism, Franklin Roosevelt, and the collection of disparate advisors, politicians, and intellectuals that coalesced around him were able to redefine what liberalism means in America. The New Deal was a middle-class restoration, an attempt to provide the social services and government regulation necessary to limit the excesses of capitalism. It was meant to limit the power of oligarchic feudalism and create substantive democracy within our country. It short, it was an attempt to bring social conditions in line with our social ideals. In that respect, the New Deal can be said to be a conservative movement. Rather than breaking with the past, Roosevelt attempted to update the past to new conditions. Roosevelt offered the ‘‘forgotten man’’ of America a new deal, but he never offered to change the game, or even change the cards. There was never a rejection of traditional American values like minimal government or of the pursuit of happiness facilitated by a capitalist economic system. Even at its most radical stages, freedom remained more important than equality. The New Deal simply took steps to protect those values from the predatory and destructive tendencies of industrial capitalism. Roosevelt argued that ‘‘Liberalism becomes the protection for the far-sighted conservative . . . I am that kind of conservative because I am that kind of liberal’’ (quoted in Young 1996, 171). Francis Perkins, his secretary of labor and long-time member of his inner circle, declared Roosevelt to be just ‘‘a little left of center.’’ That is accurate, but lest we overstate this point, we also need to remember just how far to the right the center was located. We should bear this in mind as we take a deeper look into how the New Deal redefined the American understanding of liberalism.

New Deal Pragmatism Nothing in human judgment is final. One may courageously take the step that seems right today because it can be modified tomorrow if it doesn’t work well. ---Perkins, describing Roosevelt (1946, 164)25

32 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought It is common to describe the New Deal as pragmatic, but we should be careful. All people, especially political people, are pragmatic to a degree, weighing costs against benefits. Only the most committed ideologues refuse to bend. Pragmatism is a rigorous and sophisticated philosophy, one that privileges a process of inquiry in which beliefs are corrected in light of experience. It requires a degree of detachment and control that is not feasible in democratic politics. Instead, the New Deal represented a goal-oriented approach that was remarkably flexible (some say too flexible) about the methods used to pursue them, highly sympathetic to pragmatism but ultimately something different. Rather than looking to John Dewey, the great pragmatist, we can find the New Deal’s political sensibilities reflected in Machiavelli, who argued that effective leadership, while clear about its ends, must be willing to be completely flexible about the means used to pursue it. The ultimate mark of political virtue is that flexibility, and binding ourselves to a particular method (or ideological approach) ends up constraining the ability of the leader to react to changing political circumstances. It denies us the freedom necessary to avoid, or quickly shed, failure. In a world where social conditions are not static, our thinking about them must be dynamic. Effective princes, especially those who have to run for reelection, need to avoid becoming prisoners of their own preferred methods and ideologies. A refreshing honesty also characterized the New Deal’s experimental approach. Roosevelt freely admitted that he has ‘‘no expectation of making a hit every time I come to bat’’ (quoted in Goldman 1952, 324), and his second fireside chat warned Americans that some policies would fail.26 The history of the NRA provides an illustrative example. The NRA sought to bring about recovery through the creation and enforcement of industrial codes. These codes were to be designed by and reflect the interests of capitalists, workers, and consumers. The NRA would provide the administrative mechanism necessary for a concert of interests that would benefit all three groups. In reality, organized business interests overpowered inchoate consumer and labor groups, quickly capturing the NRA. There were various attempts to reform the NRA and make it more responsive to the needs of labor and consumers, but ultimately these were unsuccessful. When the Supreme Court ruled that the NRA’s codes were unconstitutional, Franklin Roosevelt endorsed independent labor, wage, and hours rules to meet the same goals, allowing the unsuccessful industrial codes to die. At times, his flexibility failed him, notably in his court-packing plan, but

this failure stands out precisely because it was such a departure from the administration Related to this flexibility was a keen appreciation of political possibilities. Franklin Roosevelt was fond of referring people to Carl Sandburg’s biography of Abraham Lincoln, in which Lincoln is presented as a sad, almost tragic figure whose sense of political responsibility required him to make ideological sacrifices and compromises that he found morally offensive. Given the reality of the Depression and the brute fact of people’s suffering, Roosevelt found himself forced to accept compromises he found distasteful and to shy away from taking stands he wished to take. For his critics on the left, these embodied failures of leadership and vision. From the standpoint of his governing philosophy, one he shared with Lincoln and Machiavelli, the willingness to make painful compromises to advance larger ends is the essence of leadership. It is the embodiment of courage, sacrifice, and responsibility. Roosevelt thought of himself as a political and moral, rather than philosophic, thinker. His humanitarianism and faith in American principles of freedom, opportunity, democracy, humanitarianism, and capitalism were grounded in emotion and experience instead of reasoned reflection. Despite, or perhaps because of, the unquestioning acceptance he granted them, he focused himself on practical questions of implementation instead of abstract questions of theory. What could work, practically and politically, served as his primary guide. Programs were not looked at in terms of their ideology; discussions about theories of government were dismissed as abstractions that a leader with political responsibly did not have the luxury of indulging. Action and strategy had to be looked at based on their impact on people---a balance between their short-term needs and long-term welfare. Policy was evaluated based on its potential effectiveness, not on its ability to fit into abstract categories of capitalism or socialism. His religious faith buttressed his practical humanitarianism, making him well aware of man’s sinful nature and limited capacities for goodness. We were to be forgiven for our imperfections and had to do the best we could with the tools we have been given. Moral, political, and economic utopias were never guideposts for the New Deal. Even policy discussions were subordinate to electoral considerations, however. If he failed to get reelected, or maintain control over a schizophrenic democratic coalition, no change was possible. Political realities served as a constant check on his ability to put his programs into practice. What people would accept

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism

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President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Social Security Act on August 14, 1935. Initially a New Deal program, Social Security today is a government program that provides retirement, death, and disability benefits to all eligible Americans. It is the largest federal entitlement program. (Library of Congress)

had to affect policy decisions as much as the policy itself. Here Roosevelt’s fundamental acceptance of American values and the way he tried to root himself in its traditions served him well. Policies that could be seen as organically American were easier for the electorate to digest. The Tennessee Valley Authority was an instance of genuine socialism, but it used the familiar guise of a corporation to hide it. Social Security dressed itself in the language and symbols of private insurance. Roosevelt’s emphasis on practicality affected his approach toward constitutional interpretation. Roosevelt (and especially for his legal advisors) rejected the notion that the Constitution embodied unchanging legal truths. Instead, the Constitution was a living document, designed to be flexible to the needs (not the arbitrary whims27) of the people. It was a gift from our founders, but the gift was a responsive tool, not a divine mandate. His Jacksonian attitude toward the

Constitution explains in part why he reacted so strongly to what he saw as the Supreme Courts obstruction of popular will and abuse of the founders’ gift. The courts were flouting the general desires of the people in the name of narrow and selfish interests. Members of his administration went a step further and took the position of the legal realist. The Constitution has no inherent meaning and the interpretation is subjected to the arbitrary whim of the judge doing the interpreting. They will find what they want to find, what their background has encouraged them to find. So the New Deal was not a pragmatist movement in the technical sense of the term. Instead it was a political movement consistently informed by moral ends. Political considerations were of paramount importance, but the goal was never power for its own sake. Power was needed to implement a Progressive agenda, which for Roosevelt was synonymous with humanitarianism.

34 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Power was needed to make life ‘‘decent’’28 for Americans. Elections made change possible, compromising on one policy cleared the space for another policy, and compromises were always balanced against each other to maximize the moral ends of the New Deal.

The ‘‘Liberalism’’ of the New Deal The deeper purpose of democratic government is to assist as many of its citizens as possible, especially those who need it most, to improve their conditions of life, to retain all personal liberty which does not adversely affect their neighbors, and to pursue the happiness which comes with security and an opportunity for recreation and culture. ---Roosevelt (State of the Union, January 6, 1937) Although the social aims of the New Deal were quite sympathetic to social democracy, these aims were pursued within a liberal framework, using liberal, rather than Marxist theory to justify policy.29 Some of this was a reflection of Roosevelt’s personal beliefs,30 and some of it was a calculated attempt to link new ideas to old traditions familiar and acceptable to Americans, an attempt to update classic liberal categories for a new era. Roosevelt’s self-conscious use of the word liberal to describe what had formally been called Progressivism, and to call classic liberals conservative (which infuriated them), is evidence of that attempt. Liberalism has a pedigree dating back to the American Revolution, whereas Progressivism could trace its roots back a mere 40 years. The historical links Roosevelt drew helped to legitimate the New Deal. In his September 23, 1932, address to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, originally entitled ‘‘Individualism, Romantic and Realistic,’’ Roosevelt explicitly grounds his philosophy in the liberal tradition. Since its origins in the European Wars of Religion, liberalism’s primary concern has been minimizing the impact of arbitrary power in the life of the individual. The original threat to individual liberty was the power of the unaccountable monarch, usually allied with a church and eager to use its power to enforce a particular form of religion, introducing social coercion into the most private of matters. Historically, then, liberalism was concerned with limiting the power of absolute political authority, through democratic forms, constitutional checks, and the use of economic power to counterbalance political power. Roosevelt provides his Commonwealth Club audience with a brief education in the history of political history and liberal thought, describing how national

governments grew out of a desire to have a central power protect weak individuals from the machinations of feudal barons. This desire for security justified centralized power, and while it undermined liberty for some (the barons), the vast majority of the people had no meaningful liberty to lose. Furthermore, the peace and security that the monarch provided created the space for individual liberty to flourish. The time eventually came when the powers granted to the monarch became onerous, no longer necessary to guarantee security and counterproductive to the well-being of individual citizens. A gradual introduction of checks on arbitrary power followed, through constitutional limitations, increased democratic participation, and the increasing power of a moral ideal---namely, that ‘‘a ruler bore a responsibly for the welfare of his subjects’’ (Grafton 1999, 19). These democratizing and liberalizing currents produced the American Revolution, and opposition to centralized authority formed the core of our political philosophy. Over time, however, we forgot why we were suspicious of government and why we prized economic freedom. Rather than serve as a means to liberty, these currents came to define it. By definition, government interference in economic affairs was tyrannical. A practical philosophy based on political and historical experience became a form of rigid and unsophisticated dogmatism. For the first half of our history, this was not a problem. A rural country with vast untapped stretches of land could afford to equate liberty with minimal government and unregulated economies,31 because those who were left behind could always go west. The Industrial Revolution soon offered us seductive visions of a newly mastered world, and this changed attitudes toward government and economics. It legitimated interference, but only of a certain type. As Roosevelt observes, the machine age dangled the possibility of ever-rising standards of living in front of our eyes, and the powers of the government were put into the service of the great industrial barons of the day. There the human cost often was spectacular, but such is the price of progress. So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. (Grafton 1999, 22) As long as our ‘‘financial Titans’’ were producing results, the republic could absorb their excesses, and

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism the open frontier was there to welcome those who were left behind.32 The end of the 19th century marked a reassessment of industry’s promise. The frontier had closed, and with it the opportunity of last resort it provided. This was accompanied by the rise of the trust, holding company, and great concentrations of economic power, constricting the possibilities of small business owners. Industrial agriculture did the same to small farms. Roosevelt’s response rejects the language and imagery of Marxism, seen as cold, alien, and offensive to American sensibilities. He instead harkens back to the early struggles for freedom that produced liberalism, using its familiar concepts. Just as Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, liberty in America were threatened by a new set of American ‘‘feudal barons’’ that undermined our economic freedom as surely as the European barons of old took away our political freedom.33 As Roosevelt toured the country in 1932, he noted that ‘‘we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already’’ (Grafton 1999, 24). Classical liberalism is in many ways a pre-Industrial philosophy. After the Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrial (later finance) capitalism, new forms of liberalism sought to deal with the impact of arbitrary economic power in people’s lives (particularly through the corporation).34 Despite the early warnings of Tocqueville, American political thought failed to keep pace with European innovation, so strong was our faith in our rugged individualism and the opportunities America presented to us. The attitude of Tocqueville and others spoke of limits in a land without them and threatened to undermine the rugged American individualism that was believed to be the source of our collective greatness. The Great Depression had called this faith into question, but it did not undermine it completely. America was ready to rethink its understanding of liberalism, but not abandon it. Change had to be understood within our liberal framework. Roosevelt, sensing this, was quick to point out that the crisis affecting individual American citizens is the same one that affected their Revolutionary forebears. The problem is the limitation of freedom and the rise of arbitrary power, and successful American reform movements have always made their appeals in these terms.35 As Roosevelt makes clear in the beginning of his Commonwealth address, ‘‘The issue of government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of government or economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve individual men and women’’ (Grafton

35

1999, 19). This was an old question for Americans, but Roosevelt gave it a new twist by placing economic systems alongside political systems as potential tyrants (and servants) of individual liberty. Immediately following this argument, he affirms his Progressive belief in progress and change, which opposes static faith in eternal constitutional and economic principles that left the government powerless to take proactive steps against the Depression. Mastery was an act of will. As long as people accepted a goal as ‘‘sound and moral,’’ (Perkins 1946, 476) a way to achieve it could be found. Roosevelt had a functional view of the state. It was not romanticized as the embodiment of the nation, nor was it demonized as an implacable enemy of individual liberty. Democracies need not fear the state, because the state ‘‘is but the machinery through which mutual aid and protection are achieved’’ (Grafton 1999, 10). It is a tool of organized society, designed to facilitate both the protection and well-being of its citizens. It is a servant of our collective will.36 Not only that, but society, acting through the state, has a moral obligation to care for people who find themselves victims of adverse circumstances, who are unable to survive, let alone prosper and seek happiness, without some kind of external aid. This, Perkins argued, was Roosevelt’s most important idea: [T]he idea that government had a positive responsibility for the general welfare. Not that government itself must do everything, but that everything practicable must be done. Whether government does it, or private enterprise, is an operating decision dependent on many factors---but government must insure that something is done (Perkins 1946, 476). Under normal circumstances private enterprise can be entrusted with meeting the needs of the general welfare. But when it fails to perform, the government must step in to ensure that basic needs are met. Early in his second inaugural, Roosevelt argues that through government we find ‘‘the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individuals the ever rising problems of a complex civilization’’ (Grafton 1999, 58). The government exists as a tool of democratic society, a servant of our will rather than a source of oppression. It enables us to master the world, working in tandem with private initiative and picking up the slack when private initiative fails. Other nations must grapple with the problem of necessity, but in America, the primary obstacle to mastery is our own fear, hesitation, and timidity---our unwillingness (bordering at times on superstition and reactionary stubbornness) to

36 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought use the tools at our disposal. There is also a reminder that our civilization is complex and interdependent and that only through collective action can meet its challenges. The day of the individuals solving problems on their own has ended. We now need to act collectively to solve the problems that impede the individual, because these impediments are beyond the ability of the individual to master. The democratic, and therefore accountable (ultimately in a way that private forms of economic power can never be), machinery of government is meant to aid us. Rather than being a necessary (and necessarily hostile) force existing outside of society, it was a tool that society could use to advance its own collective interests. What classical liberals (now called conservatives) miss is that we need not fear the power of government when that power is democratically controlled. Positive state intervention can help to create space in which individuals can come to empower themselves--by providing security and making capital accountable to the community and the individual consumer. In his Commonwealth address, Roosevelt takes pains to dispel the myth that America has traditionally tolerated no government interference in its economy.37 Business has always welcomed, and in many cases, demanded, aid from the government in the form of subsidies, tariffs, and even military aid when confronting workers movements. What they refused to tolerate was competition or even regulation from the government. This stubborn intolerance is not good public policy (as its proponents claimed), just narrow selfinterest. Roosevelt goes a step further and argues that no such thing as a business community with its own independent interests can be juxtaposed to the interests of workers. Instead there are narrow sectoral interests, and within those sectors competing firms, and each was concerned not with any larger common good, or even the good of the economy as a whole, but their own private agenda. This idea is not new, of course. In Federalist No. 10, Madison demonstrates how the U.S. government is designed to both accept the inevitability of these interests and deflect them toward a larger public ends. The problem that confronted America in the Depression was that these interests have overridden the checks designed to contain them. Instead of balance, there is domination and subservience. In his nomination acceptance speech in 1936, Roosevelt is much clearer about what is at stake. He reprises themes from the Commonwealth Club speech, especially the history of American and liberal thought as a struggle against freedom from ‘‘some restraining power’’ (Grafton 1999, 48) He ratcheted up the

language, however, and now that the immediate scare of the Depression was over, he more clearly defined the new threat to our freedom. For out of this modern civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties. New Kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things. Through new uses of corporations, banks and securities, new machinery of industry and agriculture, of labor and capital---all undreamed of by the fathers---the whole structure of modern life was impressed into his royal service (Grafton 1999, 48--49). Their power was not confined to the economic sphere alone. These new economic dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control over movement itself. They created a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction. In its service new mercenaries sought to regiment the people, their labor, their property. And as a result, the average man once more confronts the problem that faced the Minute Man of seventy six. The hours men and women worked, the wages they received, the conditions of their labor---these had passed beyond the control of the people, and were imposed by this new industrial dictatorship (Grafton 1999, 49). Tyranny is tyranny, and while economic freedom once created the space for political freedom by weakening political tyrants, today our democratic political freedom must be used to limit the arbitrary power of economic tyrants to achieve real economic democracy. For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor---other people’s lives. For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness (Grafton 1999, 49). Roosevelt links economic freedom to political freedom. No longer can we bracket the two and keep them separate. ‘‘Freedom is no half and half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal opportunity in the market

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism place’’ (Grafton 1999, 50). What ultimately matters is the expansion of human freedom, of creating larger spaces in which we can pursue our own understanding of what happiness is. Past laissez-faire economic policies were a way to guarantee political freedom. Now we must use our hard-won political liberty to guarantee our economic freedom. These goals are quite sympathetic to social democracy and are not new to the Western Hemisphere or even to American civilization. What is new is that these words are not coming from dissident intellectuals but the sitting (and exceedingly popular) president of the United States. What is also new is that the language avoids class antagonism. Proletariat and capitalist need not be at each other’s throat. Instead, the fight is between far-sighted and morally upright progressive people (rich and poor alike38) against the forces of shortsighted selfishness and reaction. The economic royalist squares off against the ‘‘forgotten man.’’ The common people have to rise up against this modern form of our ancient monarchical nemesis and reclaim their liberty one more time (Landy 2002, 80--81). The Liberty League, the great coalition of Roosevelt haters, tried to frame things differently. In their eyes, they were the great defenders of liberty (in particular, property rights) against the tyranny of Roosevelt. However, their classical understanding of liberalism was, at least temporarily, in decline. Property rights and the protection of profits were no longer sacrosanct. Liberty now meant something very different. There is no mention made here in these two things [property and profits] about the concern of the community, in other words, the government, to try and make it possible for people who are willing to work, to find work to do. For people who want to keep themselves from starvation, keep a roof over their heads, lead decent lives, have proper educational standards those are the concerns of Government, besides these points, and another thing which isn’t mentioned is the protection of life and liberty of the individual against the elements in the community which seek to enrich or advance themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens. They have just as much right to protection by government as anybody else (Burns 1956, 208). Roosevelt is not just directing his argument toward workers and farmers. Our economic royalty squeezes the small businessman as surely as the man on the assembly line. All of them are being denied the opportunity to use their own initiative to carve out their own private sphere

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of happiness. The tactics of the economic royalist should offend those who have won their fortunes through legitimate hard work and who defend it through competition. All of these groups can unite in the defense of American values against those who would pervert them, because the goal is not equality of outcome, but equality of opportunity. It is simultaneously a classless and completely middle-class vision, one shared by those who are living in and who aspire to it. Roosevelt argues that a ‘‘re-appraisal of values’’ is necessary if we desire a society based on opportunity. Just as the monarch’s privileges were no longer necessary once the feudal barons had been put down, the ‘‘financial Titan’’ no longer need be granted the same degree of leeway he once was. In fact, to continue to do so would only stifle the cause of liberty and the possibility of individual self-development. The world had been conquered, the industrial plant built. What is needed now is the administration of that plant for the good of the people as a whole, although the people are still understood to be a collectivity of individuals. This does not mean that capitalism, or even corporations, should be done away with. As Roosevelt reminded us at the start of the Commonwealth Club address, progress and change are always pushing us forward, and we cannot return to a world of small farms and independent shops, no more than the country could be divided back into 5039 self-sufficient states. Plus, Roosevelt has great admiration for the way in which capitalism can reward initiative and facilitate invention. Instead, what is needed is regulation, to ensure that concentrated corporate power serves the community as a whole instead of a narrow band of stockholders. Without that regulation, our very liberty and the democracy that protects it, cannot long survive. Because we cherished our system of private property and free enterprise and were determined to preserve it as the foundation of our traditional American system, we recalled the warning of Thomas Jefferson that ‘widespread poverty and concentrated wealth cannot long endure side by side in a democracy. . . . And so our job was to preserve the American ideal of economic as well as political democracy, against the abuse of concentration of economic power that had been insidiously growing up amongst us in the last fifty years, particularly during the twelve years of preceding Administrations. Free economic enterprise was being weeded out at an alarming pace (Grafton 1999, 53). Roosevelt recognizes that private property and free enterprise are now dependent on government regulation

38 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Banking Act of 1933, a part of which established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on June 16, 1933. At Roosevelt’s immediate right and left are Sen. Carter Glass of Virginia and Rep. Henry Steagall of Alabama, the two most prominent figures in the bill’s development. Repeal of this act was a prime mover in the finacial crisis of 2008. (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)

to protect them against concentrations of economic power. The connection between economic power and political democracy is clear. The problem is not merely that more and more wealth is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. It is that the wealth itself is in many cases illegitimate, as ‘‘this concentration of wealth and power has been built upon other people’s money, other people’s business, other people’s labor’’ (Grafton 1999, 54). This concentration of wealth is no longer justifiable in terms of efficiency (as many of the legal and financial ties that prop up these corporations have nothing to do with efficacy), and offers little benefit to the average investor or independent businessman, let alone a worker or small farmer. Concentrations of private economic power should exist at the sufferance of society, and only as long as they are providing a meaningful social benefit. This is not to say that the government should run those enterprises, but regulation and taxation guaranteeing that corporations serve a public purpose is

completely legitimate. Without regulation, private enterprise becomes ‘‘a kind of private government and is a power unto itself---a regimentation of other people’s money and other people’s lives’’ (Grafton 1999, 54). Again, the necessity of regulation and active government come back to the preservation of freedom. It is freedom for the individual, but that freedom can be guaranteed only by the community acting through its democratic institutions. The middle-class American ideal of owning a small business and succeeding in a competitive marketplace remains unchallenged. The New Deal is a restoration of sorts, an attempt to return the United States to a situation where that ideal actually exists. It is a rejection of our fictitious world, where industrial barons legitimate their power through a set of ideals that no longer correspond to reality: ‘‘The people of America have no quarrel with business. They insist only that the power of concentrated wealth shall not be abused’’ (Grafton 1999, 55). In this respect the New Deal manages to be

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism progressive and conservative at the same time. It is progressive in its recognition of changing circumstances and the proposal of new and comparatively innovative ways of dealing with those circumstances. In terms of policy, like public relief and social security, there are strong breaks with the past. But these breaks are made in the name of classical American values. We must modernize the present to preserve the past. It would be mistaken to call Roosevelt a conservative in the classical sense, although that argument has been made (Burns 1956, 234--238). Roosevelt, for example, did not emphasize hierarchy, nor did his New Deal articulate any meaningful forms of prejudice. He was aware of and had respect for tradition, but these traditions were to inform progress, rather than impede it. He placed an emphasis on community, but it is a warm and open, almost cosmopolitan sense of community, one that highlights regional and sectoral interdependence. He had an acceptance of individualism, but it is individualism that must be restrained by larger social questions. Echoing the harm principle of John Stuart Mill, Roosevelt says, I believe in individualism. I believe in it in the arts, the sciences and professions. I believe in it in business. I believe in individualism in all these things--up to the point where the individualist starts to operate at the expense of society. And the overwhelming majority of American businessmen do not believe in it beyond that point. We have all suffered in the past from individualism run wild---society has suffered and business has suffered (Grafton 1999, 55). We have left the world of the independent farmer, the small shopkeeper, and the frontier. We have been forced to abandon the world in which states could isolate themselves from one another, solving local problems as they see fit. Our world is complex and interdependent. It refuses to recognize artificial boundaries. The preservation of a healthy (as opposed to pathological) individualism requires both the recognition of interdependence and the recognition that certain forms of predation must be restrained to preserve individualism in others. We have long accepted that laws against murder, while violating the absolute freedom of the murder, are not tyrannical. Roosevelt asks us to accept that the same is true of our property rights. Our rights to dispose of our property may compete with the competing claims of others. These competing claims are to be resolved by referring them to the standard of maximizing individual freedom for the greatest number

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possible. In the end, minimum wage laws may take away the freedom of the employer to pay what he wishes, but the sacrifice is justified by the increased opportunities higher wages afford the worker.

Security and Liberty We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. ‘‘Necessitous men are not free men.’’ People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. ---Roosevelt (State of the Union, January 11, 1944) Staying firmly within the liberal tradition, Roosevelt frames the New Deal’s economic and social reforms as a question of rights. What are needed are a set of economic rights to parallel our political rights, to recognize that the emancipatory role unregulated economic power once played has ended, just as the absolute monarch eventually outlived his own usefulness. And, paralleling the development of political freedom, the first requirement of economic freedom is economic security. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argued that all political rights are dependent first on physical security, which the sovereign is expected to provide. When we fear for our lives, we cannot be free. Likewise, we cannot actively pursue happiness, our birthright as Americans, if we live in constant fear of economic uncertainty. As far back as his speech to the Commonwealth Club, Roosevelt set about addressing the need for economic rights as necessary preconditions for the pursuit of happiness---for him, the right to work justified a right to economic security. Roosevelt argues that the right to work matters for its ‘‘moral and spiritual values’’ as much as the wage it provides. Work inculcates a sense of responsibly, obligation, and agency. It enables us to contribute something positive to the community, to give back to the society from which we receive both tangible and intangible benefits. Without work, we feel that we lack value, that we are a drain on society.40 Perkins tells a story of a near deaf, elderly lawyer, trained at Harvard but unable to find work during the Depression. He was given a job with the Works Progress Administration acting as a caretaker at a small seaside park. He took great pride in his work and always tearfully asked Perkins to pass along his thanks to Roosevelt for ‘‘an honorable occupation that made him feel useful and not like a bum and derelict’’ (Perkins 1946, 187). His relief job kept

40 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought him off the dole, granting him dignity and a chance to serve his community in some fashion. The history of the New Deal abounds with similar stories. This social dimension of work is easy to miss, and the New Deal cannot be understood without it. Roosevelt loved to use the language of the pioneer, not because of the rugged individualism often associated with the frontier, but because of the sense of community, hard work, shared obligation, and responsibility that is often left out of our visions of the West. Without the active cooperation of friends, neighbors, and families, life on the frontier was difficult, if not impossible. The same holds true in modern, industrial America. The forces arrayed against the individual will easily overpower him without the active support of his larger community. Alongside work is the right to ‘‘a reasonable measure of security.’’ Work creates a sense of self-worth that makes happiness possible, but without security for our family and ourselves, we can never cast aside the anxieties standing in the way of happiness. Introducing security as an essential component of liberty and happiness is Roosevelt’s most important innovation in American liberal thought. We cannot truly be said to be free unless we are free from want and fear. Because freedom is a right, security becomes a right. Without a feeling of job security, without protection against arbitrary economic power, we cannot really be said to have any significant degree of freedom. The pursuit of happiness, always intimately linked with freedom, becomes meaningless. Roosevelt’s liberalism never guarantees happiness---in a society of individuals, there would be too many individual interpretations of happiness for that to be feasible. Society, however, has a moral obligation to provide the preconditions for a real attempt. Without certain basic material needs guaranteed (the right to have a job, the right to food and shelter, and later the right to health care and an education---first established with the G.I. Bill), the pursuit of happiness is pursuit in name only. This was a direct challenge to the older, laissez-faire understanding of liberalism, with its reactionary fear of any positive government involvement in economic life. The New Deal attempted to change our understanding of natural rights, to move beyond formal political rights and recognize that we can be tyrannized in the economic realm as surely as we could be in the political. The right to work becomes as important as the right to vote. Economic democracy serves as the precondition for political democracy, and political democracy is the only way to guarantee economic democracy. The two realms are intimately linked. Natural rights are expanded

to include the right to subsistence, food, shelter, and safety from the economic depredations of others. In the end, freedom was no longer something naturally conferred upon us. It was a right that needed to be guaranteed through collective social force checked by democratic and constitutional procedures. Society in turn was morally obligated to guarantee those rights for an ever-expanding number of its citizens.41 Some of his strongest statements on the issue came long after the active phase of the New Deal had ended, when ‘‘Dr. Win The War’’ had replaced ‘‘Dr. New Deal.’’ In his ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ State of the Union address of 1941, Roosevelt reminded an American audience what the New Deal stood for. Equal opportunity for youth and for others. Jobs for those who can work. Security for those who need it. The ending of special privileges for the few. The preservation of civil liberties for all. The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living (Grafton 1999, 98). A government is democratic to the extent it provides these benefits for all its citizens. Roosevelt moves from here to discuss his four freedoms. The first two, freedom of speech and freedom to worship, are classical liberal values that need no discussion. Freedom from want is something new. This goes beyond freedom of opportunity. Instead, it implies that freedom means knowing not only that our necessities are met, but also that we can all share in the abundance that is the promise of American life. Norman Rockwell’s famous ‘‘Freedom from Want’’ painting shows a happy, middle-class family sitting down to enjoy a large meal in comfort together. This painting captured the imagination of the American people and illustrated the promise of the New Deal---a society in which every family could enjoy such a meal, and whose government took active steps to make it possible. The final freedom is freedom from fear. His definition here, obviously colored by the war, revolves around reductions of arms and defense from militarism, but there are echoes of the psychic argument. Fear limits freedom, because it limits our sense of possibility. When we know fear, when we lack security, we are unable to take advantage of our human capacities to dream, to better ourselves, and to seek our own private version of happiness. When there is fear, there cannot be real freedom.

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism As the war began to approach its end, Roosevelt sought a return to the agenda of the Second New Deal in his 1944 State of the Union address. In this address, we find concrete recognition that while freedom may be an inalienable right, without protection, it means nothing. His second Bill of Rights is nothing short of a redefinition of the American social contract: We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all---regardless of station, race, or creed. These rights include: The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation; The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living; The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; The right of every family to a decent home; The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; The right to a good education (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 11, 1944 [author’s emphasis]).

As Roosevelt points out, all of these rights are designed to guarantee us security, for without that security, meaningful liberty and the pursuit of happiness are not possible. With his second Bill of Rights, the right to economic security becomes as essential to democracy as the rights to conscience and due process. The world had furnished Roosevelt with powerful examples of what happens when a democratic society can no longer guarantee the pursuit of happiness. Without it, we are not only unable to guarantee any kind of peace in the world, but we also cannot prevent the rise of fascism at home. Democracy, especially liberal democracy, functions only when it is able to provide for the material needs of its citizens. If it fails to do so, it breeds either the passivity of the servant or the anger and fear that breeds fascism.

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Roosevelt reaffirmed our right to property, but was careful to explain precisely what the right to property entails. It is again defined in terms of security, and when the rights of the speculator or financier come up against the need of people to have security against old age, sickness, and unemployment, the right of security trumps the freedom to speculate, for without that security meaningful expansions of liberty become impossible. It is important, of course, that every man and woman in the country be able to find work, that every factory run, that business as a whole earn profits. But government in a democratic nation does not exist solely, or ever primarily, for that purpose. . . . It is not enough that the wheels turn. They must carry us in the direction of a greater satisfaction in the life for the average man. The deeper purpose of democratic government is to assist as many of its citizens as possible---especially those who need it most---to improve their conditions of life, to retain all personal liberty which does not adversely affect their neighbors, and to pursue the happiness which comes with security and an opportunity for recreation and culture (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 6, 1937 [author’s emphasis]). Roosevelt’s use of the word ‘‘assist’’ is important. Ideally, Roosevelt wants to see private society and private imitative meet our needs. Like most liberals, he was never eager to have the government involve itself in anyone’s life. But, when needs cannot be met through private channels, society has a moral obligation to give people what they need to make their pursuit of happiness possible. That is the ‘‘deeper purpose of democratic government’’ (Roosevelt, State of the Union, January 6, 1937).

New Deal Humanitarianism The idea was that all the political and practical forces of the community should and could be directed to making lives better for ordinary people. ---Perkins (1946, 167) Roosevelt’s humanitarianism was most evident in his general attitude toward relief, heavily informed by his religious commitments. Poverty was a moral problem, a problem that focused on the alleviation of suffering, rather than the placing of blame. Recognizing that poverty was as much (if not more) the result of structural as well as personal failing, he devoted unprecedented sums to relief and administered it in ways that were

42 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought less judgmental and humiliating than in the past.42 Being downtrodden did not require one to surrender their dignity, and helping people maintain their sense of self-worth received nearly as much emphasis as making sure they did not go hungry. Significantly, Roosevelt uses the language of obligation: ‘‘To these unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by Government, not as a matter of charity, but as a matter of social duty’’ (Grafton 1999). Roosevelt attacks the idea that aid should be administered only through private charities, refuting the idea that public support is somehow illegitimate, or even harmful for those receiving it. Yet we must be careful not to push this idea too far. Roosevelt never fully abandoned the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. His heart and sympathies went out to those who wished to work but were unable to do so, either due to disability or larger economic forces. At first, his welfare policies privileged the out of work middle and working classes, but as the plight of the permanent underclass, those left stranded by society, came to his attention, he devoted energy to them.43 A noteworthy difference between the New Deal advocates and many Progressives was that, while both had a moral concern about the poor, the New Deal lost the moralizing and judgmental tone that characterized many Progressive viewpoints. ‘‘One began to see the poor as people with hopes, fears, virtues, and vices, as fellow citizens who were part of the fabric of American life, instead of a depressed class who would always be with us’’ (Perkins 1946, 18). The New Deal granted the people at the bottom a dignity they previously lacked. Your social status did not necessarily reflect your worth. Roosevelt always worried about the dole, both because of the social stigma attached to it, and because he believed much of the stigma itself. While he rejected the idea that poverty was a result of character flaws, he worried that receiving public assistance could have an enervating effect on the sense of worth and initiative of the recipient. This was why Roosevelt placed such a great emphasis on work relief and made sure that relief jobs paid better than dole jobs (and less than private industry). Work relief was superior because it allowed the recipient to do something active and constructive with his time, to both give back to his community and give back to himself. The Federal Art, Writing, and Theater projects reflect his commitment to this cause. Out-of-work artists and performers had their own set of skills and needed to eat as much as anyone else. The result was both a flourishing and democratization of art, moving it out of the mansion and into the Post Office and living room (for discussion of this trend, see

Abbot 1990, 82--84). Federal employment, however, should always be a last resort and was designed not to interfere with private industry. The government should function as an employer of last resort, but private employment was better because even beneficial government programs could not help but be paternalistic.44 Work relief provided security, but was not meant to be a permanent profession. The New Deal was always a liberal movement, and if people could provide for themselves without the government’s help, then that was to be preferred, both politically and philosophically.

The Economics of the New Deal [T]he responsible heads of finance and industry, instead of acting each for himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Grafton 1999, 26) If a job and a living wage are rights, and we wish to avoid excessive government involvement in our lives, those who control the ‘‘great industrial and financial combinations that dominate so large a part of our industrial life’’ have an obligation to ensure that those fundamental rights are met (Grafton 1999, 25--26). In Roosevelt’s eyes, corporations were a public trust, and while private industry was entitled to profit, that profit had to be balanced against the services they provided to the community. In particular, private industry had to provide our rights to a job and living wage. Failing to do so requires the government to step in and provide the regulation necessary to guarantee the public’s rights to a job and a wage---our natural right of security, as surely we would expect it to guarantee our rights to speech, assembly, or due process. The government, as an agent of the public, could intervene in economic affairs in the name of the public interest. The problem became how to determine what the public was---a task made especially difficult in a political system designed to foster competing private interests. The New Deal rejected traditional dichotomies between producer and nonproducer, as well as Marxist divisions based on class or employer versus employee. Roosevelt was concerned about the labor movement45 insofar as he saw it as a way to balance the power of corporations and increase the quality of life of workers, but he refused to categorically privilege their interests over those of business. The New Deal, concerned about inclusion and wanting to be a movement for all people, settled on the category of consumer.

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism The consumer seemed to be the ideal category. It was certainly broad enough to include all people---not everyone works for a wage, nor does everyone own a business, but we are all consumers. Few people could be stockholders, and even fewer could be stockholders of any consequence, but all Americans are united by a desire to spend. David Hackett Fisher has traced our fascination with material abundance back to the early days of the Republic, where it became ‘‘an artifact of liberty and freedom’’ (2005, 475). Given how Americans have long equated happiness with material possessions, any public philosophy encouraging consumption would seem a natural fit. Using the consumer as a test for public policy also enabled the New Deal to weight benefits toward the middle and working classes---the groups who spent a much greater percentage of their income and would benefit from plans designed to boost consumption. A focus on consumption also enabled Roosevelt to argue that consumer-friendly legislation served to fight the Depression, creating a demand for goods that would stimulate the economy and put people back to work. As a neutral category, the consumer enabled Roosevelt to bypass traditional class conflicts and offered a comparatively easy way to test the public usefulness of a company. Did it serve its clients efficiently and effectively? If the answer was no, government regulation was justified. This approach came to dominate New Deal policy, especially during its later trust-busting phase.46 This focus on consumption, as well as the increased power of unions,47 helped facilitate what Roosevelt hoped would be a redefinition of the profit motive, where the point of work is not unlimited acquisition, but the accumulation of enough money to live a decent life. When excessive profits threaten the ability of others to live decently, they should be reigned in. As Roosevelt noted in his 1935 State of the Union address, private enterprise is not rejected, but it is given a social democratic cast. By the profit motive we mean the right by work to earn a decent livelihood for ourselves and for our families. . . . We have . . . a clear mandate from the people. That Americans must forswear that conception of the acquisition of wealth which through excessive profits, creates undue private power over private affairs and, tour misfortune, over public affairs as well . . . the ambition of the individual to obtain for him and his a proper security, a reasonable leisure, and a decent living throughout life is an ambition to be preferred to the appetite for great wealth and great power (Rauch 1944, 156--157).

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This redefinition of the profit motive is central to understanding the economic philosophy of the New Deal. Capital is not rejected---in fact, individual initiative and the private profit motive are still the lynchpins of the economy. But Roosevelt expects those motives to be tempered by a sense of the public interest. We count, in the future as in the past, on the driving power of individual initiative and the incentive of fair private profit, strengthened with the acceptance of those obligations to the public interest which rest upon us all. We have the right to expect that this driving power will be given patriotically and wholeheartedly to our nation (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). The idea of a concert of interests, or a common public good, was a deep-seated belief of Roosevelt’s. While private interests could be intense, they could be overcome by intelligent, patriotic, moral, and farsighted public policy capable of binding disparate groups together. This was more than just simple Madisonianism, however. He fully expected all sides of an issue to be willing to put aside their own narrow interests and make sacrifices for the good of the society as a whole. Some would do it willingly, others might require appeals to their religious beliefs or their patriotism, but such sacrifices were expected. FDR’s optimism, and his personal sense of public spiritedness, made this type of thinking possible. In a land of plenty, people could afford to be generous. In a world of progress, cooperation will pay off in the long run. People are decent enough to look past their grasping, acquisitive nature and sacrifice for the good of society (typically embodied by the consumer). He would insist on moral and social responsibility for all the institutions of human life; for the school, for the family, for business and industry, for labor, for professional services, for money management, for government---yes, even for the Church. He would insist in his way of thinking that all of these institutions should accept and practice a moral responsibility for making the life of the individuals who make up the life of the common people ‘‘more decent,’’ and in the common people he included the rich and poor alike (Perkins 1946, 333). The justifications for all programs were to be found in these appeals to the national community. People were not asked to sacrifice for particular interests, but for the good of their friends and neighbors, whether those

44 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought neighbors are found in the east, west, north, south, farm, or city. Of course, Roosevelt was politically astute enough to follow these pleas with the observation that helping your neighbors would increase their ability to buy your own products. Interest was never far behind principle. Early New Deal programs like the NRA tried to achieve a harmony of interests among business, labor, and consumers. The working assumption was that all these needs could be fairly satisfied, or at the very least, no irreconcilable differences existed between the groups. There should be at least a full and fair trial given to these means of ending industrial warfare; and in such an effort we should be able to secure for employers and employees and consumers the benefits that all derive from the continuous, peaceful operation of our essential enterprises. . . . I shall not ask either employers or employees permanently to lay aside the weapons common to industrial war. But I shall ask both groups to give a fair trial to peaceful methods of adjusting their conflicts of opinion and interest, and to experiment for a reasonable time with measures suitable to civilize our industrial civilization (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). The NRA was supposed to represent a middle ground between a total public takeover of the private economy and the morally repugnant strategy of letting the depression solve itself.48 As Roosevelt noted in his 1936 acceptance speech, ‘‘Better the occasional faults of a Government that lives in a sprit of charity than the consistent omissions of a Government frozen in the ice of its own indifference’’ (Grafton 1999, 50). The government should do for us only what we are unable to do for ourselves, but it must do something. It acts in the interest of returning power to the individual, as a way of helping us find ways to expand our personal freedom by enhancing our security. In our efforts for recovery we have avoided on the one hand the theory that business should and must be taken over into an all-embracing Government. We have avoided on the other hand the equally untenable theory that it is an interference with liberty to offer reasonable help when private enterprise is in need of help. The course we have followed fits the American practice of Government---a practice of taking action step by step, of regulating only to meet concrete needs---a practice of courageous recognition of change. I believe with Abraham Lincoln, that ‘‘The

legitimate object of Government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done but cannot do at all or cannot do so well for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. I still believe in ideals. I am not for a return to that definition of Liberty under which for many years a free people were being gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer that broader definition of Liberty under which we are moving forward to greater freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has ever known before in the history of America (Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934). It is was this hope for cooperation that explains in part Roosevelt’s fierce and bitter anger toward implacable business interests that refused to sacrifice a small bit of their liberty to greatly expand the liberty of others. Even at his most militant, he never stopped believing that concentrations of private economic power can be harnessed for public ends. It is the role of political government to facilitate that self-denial, to make sure that ‘‘irresponsible’’ heads of finance and industry are required to toe the line. Corporations can and should be privately managed, but a corporation is a public trust and must serve the public interest. Government regulation is a legitimate response to private failure, but private regulation is always preferred to public regulation when it can demonstrably serve the public good.

A New Social Contract Faith in America, faith in our tradition of personal responsibility, faith in our institutions, faith in ourselves, demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract. ---Roosevelt (quoted in Grafton 1999, 26--27) Although what Roosevelt ultimately proposed and accomplished with the New Deal went far beyond the accomplishments of his progressive predecessors Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,49 he was careful to link himself to those traditions, legitimating the forward march of progress by establishing continuity with the past. This belief in progress is essential to understanding the New Deal and the liberalism that sustained it. The world is malleable, and capable of mastery. Not only can situations improve, they can and will improve only through human agency, through active involvement of the people through their machinery of government. There are no static or transcendent economic laws, just as we discovered that the power of kings was actually

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism sanctioned by the people instead of God. In his 1932 acceptance speech, Roosevelt said, ‘‘We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings’’ (Grafton 1999, 16). Laws made by humans can be made to serve them. Given his liberal faith in progress, it is not surprising that the five lines into his first inaugural address Roosevelt emphasized that ‘‘the only thing we have to fear is fear itself---nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance’’ (Grafton 1999, 29). In a land of abundance, human agency is limited only by its own self-doubt. In many ways, the crisis facing Americans during the Depression was an existential one. We had lost faith in our economic system, had lost faith in the American dream, and because these were such critical aspects of our identity, we had lost faith in ourselves. Progress would be indefinitely stalled without a restoration of that faith But while faith is essential, more than faith is necessary. Because economic laws are not static, the failure of the Depression was above all a human failure, an abdication of responsibility by the ‘‘rulers of exchange,’’ the ‘‘money changers’’ who were driven from ‘‘their high seats in the temple of our civilization’’ (Grafton 1999, 30). With their failure came opportunity; one Roosevelt knew would be brief. He was fond of quoting an insight of Woodrow Wilson’s: ‘‘It is only once in a generation that a people can be lifted above material things. That is why conservative government is in the saddle two-thirds of the time’’ (Burns 1956, 54). The crisis of the Great Depression gave the normally conservative American people a limited window50 through which they could cast off their old symbols, their old heroes, and adopt, however briefly, new ones that would privilege cooperation and social responsibility. As Roosevelt said in his 1933 inaugural address, ‘‘social values more noble than mere monetary profit’’ (Grafton 1999). The New Deal was a self-conscious attempt to deliberately fashion a new set of American values. Roosevelt’s rhetoric, which was always more progressive than New Deal policy, was a statement of these ideals. It was an attempt to use the position of the presidency to provide Americans a moral education. Individualism was not to be abandoned, but the ways in which individualism are rooted in a complex interdependent society could now be highlighted, and happiness could come to mean more than making money. Roosevelt explained: Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money; it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy and moral stimulation of work

45

no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits. These dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and our fellow men. (quoted in Grafton 1999, 30) This happiness was the ideal. In reality, most Americans would continue to define themselves as consumers---but at least policy oriented toward the consumer could expand the chances of most Americans to find some form of happiness. The New Deal was always a moral enterprise, but it was a moral enterprise that also recognized the connection between economic and moral conditions. We could only become better individuals if our society became more just. The actions of the government could create the conditions of social justice that might produce a more moral set of individual citizens. What that action required changed over time, as certain programs proved successful and others did not. Mistakes were made, and some, like the cutting of spending in the summer of 1937, play a major role in the derailment of the New Deal. But nonetheless, action, direct intervention, mastery of social conditions, was required. The limits to that action were primarily psychological, which Roosevelt recognizes when he argues that we must respond to the Depression like we would respond to a war. He is not calling for martial law or even martial virtues. Instead, he refers to the way in which war focuses our attention, concentrates our energies, and can override selfishness (in some) in the name of a larger public project. War also tends to generate feelings of patriotism and unity, which highlight our interdependence, and recognition of this interdependence is critical. As Roosevelt said, If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we can not merely take but we must give as well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger goal. This I propose to offer, pledging that the larger purposes will bind upon us all as a sacred obligation with a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife (quoted in Grafton 1999, 32).

46 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought This first inaugural address concludes by bringing us back to the essential liberal project, the desire for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The goal has never changed, but the conditions in which we find ourselves have. Just as we once recognized that freedom was meaningless in the face of arbitrary political power exercised by unaccountable barons and monarchs, today we must realize that arbitrary economic power poses the same threat to our freedom. Only by altering our expectations of what government can provide for us, and demanding that it meet those expectations, can we preserve our freedom. Perhaps remembering Wilson’s warning about the fleeting nature of Progressive movements, Roosevelt reminds America that with the return of prosperity also comes a return of the ‘‘ruthless self-interests’’ that caused the Depression in the first place. As the middle class returns to its long-accustomed routines, he also reminds us that we have obligations to those who have not yet made it that far, the one-third of the nation that remained ‘‘ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished’’ (Grafton 1999, 61). In practice, little ended up being done for this one-third. The fact that these people now were worthy of attention, however, was relatively new. Not merely beneficiaries of middle-class scraps, this group was entitled to its own New Deal. The president of the United States declared his determination to make every American citizens the subject of his country’s interest and concern; and we will never regard any faithful law-abiding group within our borders as superfluous. The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little (Grafton 1999, 61). These are remarkable sentiments, and although little was done for a variety of political reasons, the moral imperative was evident. The record of how little the New Deal had done for blacks, tenant farmers, and other excluded groups is clear, but what is less emphasized is that it was often New Dealers who raised these very concerns in the first place. The New Deal, like all political movements, was not perfect, and it failed to permanently defeat the attractiveness of classical laissez-faire liberalism---a liberalism whose roots are so deep they may be impossible to permanently remove. The New Deal introduced a tradition to counter it, however, one that privileges mutual obligation and responsibility, humanitarian decency, and a greater sense of social possibilities for government, and that recognizes the relationship between

economic opportunity and political democracy. Above all else, the New Deal introduced the idea of security into the American understanding of liberty.

References and Further Reading Abbot, Philip. 1990. The Exemplary President. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Arnold, Thurman. 1935. The Symbols of Government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Arnold, Thurman. 1980 [1937]. The Folklore of Capitalism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Badger, Anthony. 1989. New Deal: The Depression Years. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Brinkley, Alan. 1996. The End of Reform. New York: Vintage Books. Brinkley, Alan. 2003. ‘‘The New Deal Experiment.’’ In The Achievements of American Liberalism. Edited by William Chafe. New York: Columbia University Press. Burns, James MacGregor. 1956 Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York: Harcourt Brace & World. Conkin, Paul. 1975. The New Deal. Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing. Croly, Herbert. 1909. The Promise of American Life. New York: Macmillan Co. Edsforth, Ronald. 2000. The New Deal: America’s Response to the Great Depression. New York: Blackwell Publishing. Fischer, David Hackett. 2005. Liberty and Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Foner, Eric. 1998. The Story of American Freedom. New York: Norton. Freidel, Frank. 1990. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. New York: Little Brown and Co. Goldman, Eric. 1952. Rendezvous with Destiny. Chicago: Knopf. Grafton, John, ed. 1999. Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Great Speeches. New York: Dover Publications. Hamby, Alonzo. 1992. Liberalism and Its Challengers: From FDR to Bush. New York: Oxford University Press. Hamby, Alonzo, ed. 1981. New Deal: Analysis and Interpretation. New York: Longman Publishing. Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. Himmelberg, Robert. 2001. The Great Depression and the New Deal. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage Books. Humphrey, Hubert. 1970. The Political Philosophy of the New Deal. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970 Landy, Mark. 2002. ‘‘Presidential Party Leadership and Party Realignment: FDR and the Making of the New Deal Democratic Party.’’ In The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism. Edited by Sidney Milkis and Jerome Mileur, 80--81. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Leuchtenburg, William. 1995. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy. New York: Columbia University Press. McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1973. The Idea of Fraternity In America. Berkeley: University of California Press.

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism Milkis, Sid, and Jerome Mileur, eds. 2002. The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Miroff, Bruce. 2000. Icons of Democracy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Morone, James. 1998. The Democratic Wish. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Morone, James. 2003. Hellfire Nation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Perkins, Francis. 1946. The Roosevelt I Knew. New York: Viking Press. Plotke, David. 1996. Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930’s and 1940’s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rauch, Basil. 1944. The History of the New Deal 1933--1938. New York: Creative Age Press. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1934. Fireside Chat, September 30, 1934. Available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/chat6.html. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1937. State of the Union Address, January 6, 1937. Available at http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/ state-of-the-union/148.html. Roosevelt, Franklin. 1944. State of the Union Address, January 11, 1944. Available at http://www.feri.org/archives/ speeches/jan1144.cfm. Young, James. 1996. Reconsidering American Liberalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zinn, Howard, ed. 2003 [1966]. New Deal Thought. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

Notes 1. Not that laissez-faire liberalism ever actually existed. Even today, there are few authentic calls for genuine minimal government. Instead, calls for less government mean less government protection and patronage for projects and groups you oppose, and support for those you approve (for instance, less money spent on public housing and more for prisons or less government regulation for consumer protection and greater legal protections for corporations). 2. Marx’s analogy of communism as a specter is particularly apt in the American case. In Europe, Communist and Socialist movements were powerful political forces that had to be reckoned with. They had a real tangible weight that they lacked in America, even when the movements were at their most powerful. In the United States, the terms socialism and communism are thrown about without any real understanding of what the words mean, but they are not meant to be analytic categories. Instead they are vague and ephemeral horrors, malevolent shadows haunting a loosely defined but emotionally powerful American dream. 3. Early in his administration one of Ronald Reagan’s economic advisors came up with the strategy of ‘‘starving the beast’’ as a way to undermine the welfare state. If going after middle-class entitlement programs was political suicide, creating a deficit so great that we could no longer afford to maintain them becomes a viable way to dismantle it. While President Bush’s attempts to privatize part of Social Security proved to be unpopular, even at the height of its momentum supporters were able to

9.

10.

11.

12.

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challenge only the efficacy of Social Security, not its legitimacy. Public acceptance does not prevent the dismantling of entitlement programs by those with political power, but their methods and goals have to be obscured. The New Deal, as a liberal movement, would not be reflexively against the privatization of Social Security and other entitlement programs. What matters is that the appropriate services are guaranteed for all citizens. If privatization can meet that test (which thus far seems doubtful) there is no ideological reason to oppose it. Roosevelt once referred to Mill as ‘‘one of the father of all economists’’ (see Abbot 1990, 74). Roosevelt was the heart of the New Deal, but not its mind. Others wrote his speeches (although he stayed involved in the process) and New Dealers like Henry Wallace, Rexford Tugwell, Thurman Arnold, and his wife Eleanor (among others) were theorists in their own right and far more sophisticated than Roosevelt. Their various streams of thought collected in the person of Roosevelt, however, and had influence because he allowed them to. As such, Roosevelt could be said to embody the New Deal and we will use him as such. Roosevelt exhorted clergy to emphasize the Sermon on the Mount during his second term (quoted in Morone 1998, 354). Who felt that his job was to ‘‘feed the hungry, and god damned fast’’ (Goldman 1952, 332). The Depression was considered, in part, the result of a mixture of overproduction, underconsumption, irresponsible speculation, selfish and self-destructive business practices, and a weakened international economy. Time proved John Maynard Keynes to be correct, but at the time, he was just one voice in a crowded chorus. Roosevelt was a firm believer in budget balancing, to the point that it may have caused the 1937 recession that helped defeat the New Deal, but he was also clear that humanitarian needs had to trump fiscal policy. A common strategy used by Roosevelt when his advisors disagreed was to ‘‘Put them in a room tighter, and tell them no lunch until they agree!’’ (quoted in Burns 1956, 183). A theme he constantly hammered home whenever he campaigned. Local issues were always put into a larger national context. The plight of the small farmer who was not paid enough for his crops would be connected to the conditions of industrial workers who could not afford to buy them. Race and gender, which currently enjoy a privileged status that trumps class, were not top priorities for the New Deal. Compared with the progress made in later movements the New Deal did little, but to judge the New Deal too harshly on this score ignores both the political realities that confronted the New Deal and its universal language. Women and minority groups lacked the organizational power to beat the forces of reaction marshaled against them, and had FDR expended political capital to fight for them it would have destroyed the New Deal coalition that made other progressive change possible. Instead, Roosevelt gave women and minorities unprecedented access to positions of power and influence within his administration, and framed policy and

48 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought

13.

14.

15.

16.

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programs in an inclusive way that made their future expansion possible. The New Deal was not the civil rights movement, but the civil rights movement may not have been possible without the groundwork laid by the New Deal. McWilliams goes on to note that ‘‘This alone helps account for the consistent tendency of the unions to sacrifice every other good to the attainment of economic gain, a pattern made more compelling by the desperate need of members.’’ Frances Perkins, Roosevelt’s secretary of labor and the first women to ever hold a cabinet positioning the United States, has noted that Roosevelt was never able to get inside the mind of the capitalist. ‘‘Roosevelt never understood the point of view of the business community, nor could he make out why it didn’t like him. He did not hold that everything should be judged by whether or not it makes money, and this made the business people incomprehensible to him’’ (Perkins 1946, 155). Mastery of the world (its possibility and desirability) is a long-standing liberal tenet, but historically that mastery was a private, not public, undertaking. It cannot be overstated how prevalent this belief was in the United States when Roosevelt took over, especially amongst elite opinion makers. That the government could not hope but fail if it engaged in economic functions that private industry could provide was an article of faith believed with the same sincerity with which Christians believed Jesus was the son of God. And, like all forms of faith, contradictory evidence (such as the impressive performance of the War Industries Board in World War I that inspired so many New Dealers) was ignored or dismissed, the exception rather than the rule. Thurman Arnold does a wonderful job demonstrating the similarities (and consequences) between ideology and religious faith in The Symbols of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism (2000 [1937]). The latter work impressed some New Dealers so much that they made Arnold assistant attorney general. This is not the place to discuss them in any great detail, but suffice it to say the presence of our frontier offered the appearance of limitless opportunities necessary to justify laissez-faire capitalism, and the comparative ease with which (white men at least) were able to secure their political rights prevented the rise of class-based movements found in Europe, where the fight for economic and political democracy were inextricably linked. While there have been other traditions (republican, puritan, even feudal), it has always been a liberal framework that dominated our thinking about government and made space to incorporate these competing ideas. Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) is generally considered to be the definitive presentation of this argument, with more recent works like James Young’s masterful Reconsidering American Liberalism (1996) providing some needed nuance and counterpoint. Ironically southern apologists for slavery picked up on this right away, noting that a slaveholder at least had a vested interest in making sure their workers did not starve. An investment in a particular body was missing in a system of wage labor. A dead slave was expensive to

20.

21.

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23.

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27. 28. 29.

replace, whereas wages could go to whatever body was present on a particular day. The American understanding of classical liberalism was fairly unsophisticated, and did not grasp the nuance and complexity within it that could justify social reform. This in part is why the New Deal reformation of liberalism felt more philosophically groundbreaking than it actually was. The principal text of New Nationalism was Herbert Croly’s The Promise of American Life (1909). In it, he argued that the American promise (economic well-being, democratic politics, and spiritual peace) would not appear automatically. Instead it required active government intervention, especially in economic matters. Excessive economic individualism was destroying democracy while pretending to embody it. We could make good on the promise of American life only with an organized, efficient, and empowered national government capable of regulation and planning. The New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson and William Brandies represented a more Populist/Jeffersonian approach to the threats to American democracy that New Nationalism identified. Like New Nationalism, New Freedom would also require a great expansion of executive power to address these issues. However, Wilson wanted to use that power less to regulate large-scale industry and instead sought to preserve smaller farms and businesses, which were more authentically democratic. Local forms of participation (in economic and political life) were encouraged to counteract the centralizing and bureaucratic tendencies of modern life. He was appointed assistant secretary of the Navy, a position Roosevelt requested because it was the same post held by cousin Theodore. Outside of the progressive tradition FDR leaned heavily on the populism of Andrew Jackson (the people versus the interests) and the crisis rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln (for an excellent discussion of the ways Roosevelt drew from past presidents, see Abbot 1990). She goes on to note ‘‘it was this faculty which released him from the driven, frightened, psychosis of the period’’ (Perkins 1946, 164). Although Paul Conkin has pointed out that he rarely came out and ‘‘frankly admit the failure of one of his policies’’ (Conkin 1975, 11). Although how one tells the difference between the two is another matter. By decent Roosevelt meant ‘‘a proper, adequate, and intelligent way of living’’ (Perkins 1946, 332). The differences are not just tactical, however. The liberal critique of capitalism believes that it is capable of reformation, while the Marxist critique argues the differences between capitalist and worker are irreconcilable. So while the two traditions share many similar policy goals, their long-term orientation is quite different. One seeks to tame capitalism, the other to replace it. Perkins believed that ‘‘Roosevelt took the status quo in our economic system as much for granted as his family. . . . He felt that it ought to be humane, fair, and honest, and that adjustments out to be made so that the people would not suffer form poverty and neglect, and so that all would share’’

The New Deal and the Remaking of American Liberalism

30.

31.

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38. 39. 40.

(Perkins 1946, 328). If the Marxist critique is correct, what Roosevelt asks for is ultimately impossible through regulatory reform, but Roosevelt never failed to believe in that possibility. Roosevelt was too steeped in American traditions (as well as too politically aware) to ever seriously think about abandoning capitalism. Unregulated economies in theory. In practice, the business apostles of laissez-faire capitalism (as opposed to its philosophic apostles) used their considerable political clout to get favorable tariffs, land to develop railroads, and so on. Whether or not this option existed in practice was irrelevant. This type of thinking was supposed to provide moral and existential legitimacy for the status quo, not represent an accurate reflection of the world. This realization produced the antitrust laws, and the Progressive movement of the early 1900s, a movement that was derailed by World War I before it could reach its full potential. The Socialist tradition, on the other hand, also sought to replace capitalism with more democratic forms of ownership. The more radical edges of the New Deal, particularly its planned communities, flirted with these ideas but only the Tennessee Valley Authority achieved mainstream prominence. Fischer (2005) and Morone (1998) both make this argument at some length. Fischer observes that successful reformers are always the ones who can persuade the public that they are on the side of liberty and freedom. Morone argues that the most influential social movements in our history have appealed to our ‘‘democratic wish,’’ that is, our desire to restore democracy to our communities when political, social, and economic forces take it away. Again, it was the use of state power to deal with economic matters that is new here. As James Morone demonstrates so effectively in Hellfire Nation, the state had always been active in intensely personal matters. Religious blue laws had been with us from the beginning, and the state legislating on behalf and in opposition to slavery is intensely personal. The New Deal began at the tail end of the Prohibition experiment, which was a massive intrusion into private life. These intrusions were justified by appealing to our strong moral and religious sensibilities, even when there was an economic component to them. Roosevelt understood the power of the crusading mentality that was constantly simmering below the surface of the American people, waiting to be tapped. By making economic concerns moral concerns, the New Deal was able to expanded state power into previously forbidden areas. And, as he never tired of saying as relations between the two sides got increasingly hostile, the nations banking and business interests were begging for the government to do something about the depression when Roosevelt took office. Progressive members of the business community always had a voice in the New Deal. Forty-eight at the time. Marxists would argue that our dependency on work to feel value is an example of capitalism’s pathological

41.

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effect on workers’ sense of self. Roosevelt certainly would have rejected that critique, but as previously discussed, Roosevelt never critically questioned capitalism either. In this respect, he was no different than most Americans. Even American labor unions during the 1930s never challenged the connection between work and value in any serious way. There were real political limits to the groups the New Deal was able to help. Organized interests fared better than unorganized groups, as they have throughout time. The inchoate nature of the federal state meant that programs were often administered locally and reflected local prejudice. Southern influence in Congress was able to ensure that its hierarchical society suffered only minimal disruptions. Social Security originally excluded many forms of low-paying work, especially those dominated by women and blacks. However, the language of the New Deal was one that explicitly refused to draw distinctions between citizens, and its universal cast left the possibility of future expansion wide open. David Plotke observes, ‘‘If the administration rarely challenged images of the ‘people’ as white, openly racist themes declined. . . . The severely discriminatory character of the racial order meant that when new Federal programs were not explicitly racist they put elements of that order into question . . . [opening] political space for challenges to conventional racial practices’’ (Plotke 1996, 179). Poverty was treated as a condition bordering on criminality, attitudes the New Deal worked to alter. Perkins tells a story of a Public Employment Service office in New York, where applicants would wait for work in a room with no chairs, benches, or electric lights because ‘‘as the manager said, the men would steal the bulbs and would go to sleep if you gave them benches’’ (Perkins 1946, 92). Despite his strong words in his second inaugural address and periodic attempts to raise the issue after that by the time he began to focus on them much of his political capital was spent and what was left was being mustered towards the war effort, so while the actions fail to match the rhetoric here this reflected a real commitment, rather than political opportunism. These groups were not organized in any meaningful way and were more of a political liability than anything else. Roosevelt’s thinking here reflects his liberal biases. From a social democratic perspective, one could easily challenge the idea that private employment is more liberating, but Roosevelt’s thinking was already to the left of mainstream America in this regard. His support of private employment always went hand in hand with proposals for stronger laws on wages, hours, and working conditions. Roosevelt encouraged Perkins to represent labor interests early in his first term, telling her ‘‘I think the secretary of labor ought to be for labor’’ (Perkins 1946, 215). Thurman Arnold, author of The Folklore of Capitalism (2000 [1937]), was the New Deal’s chief trustbuster and laid out the logic behind its consumer friendly economic philosophy in The Bottlenecks of Business (1940). The rising political clout of labor helped give Roosevelt the electoral support he needed to move left during the Second

50 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought New Deal (1934--1935). However, that support existed because of the steps the New Deal took to revitalize a labor movement decimated by the depression. The most prominent example was the inclusion of section 7a in the NRA, guaranteeing labor a right to organize (and liberally interpreted by John L. Lewis to mean that the president wanted workers to join unions) and the efforts of the Department of Labor to compensate for ‘‘the fact that representation of working people through their own organizations was pathetically limited’’ in the early days of the New Deal (Perkins 1946, 214).

48. Historically, this was the way the United States had solved previous depressions. 49. The first two years of the New Deal saw more Progressive legislation than their four terms. 50. The regressive nature of Social Security taxation reflects this pessimism. Roosevelt feared that a future act of Congress could undo even the limited social security he was able to create. But if workers paid in now to receive benefits in the future, attempts to limit those benefits would entail enormous political risks.

Documents

necessarily follow from every Man’s being Judge in his own Case, by setting up a known Authority, to which every one of that Society may Appeal upon any Injury received, or Controversie that may arise, and which every one of the Society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an Authority to Appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so is every Absolute Prince in respect of those who are under his Dominion. 91. For he being suppos’d to have all, both Legislative and Executive Power in himself alone, there is no Judge to be found, no Appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with Authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any Injury or Inconveniency, that may be suffered from the Prince or by his Order: So that such a Man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please, is as much in the state of Nature, with all under his Dominion, as he is with the rest of Mankind. For where-ever any two Men are, who have no standing Rule, and common Judge to Appeal to on Earth for the determination of Controversies of Right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of Nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the Subject, or rather Slave of an Absolute Prince: That whereas, in the ordinary State of Nature, he has a liberty to judge of his Right, and according to the best of his Power, to maintain it; now whenever his Property is invaded by the Will and Order of his Monarch, he has not only no Appeal, as those in

1.1 John Locke, Second Treatise, 1689 Sections 89--94, 134--42, 212 89. Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only is a Political, or Civil Society. And this is done where-ever any number of Men, in the state of Nature, enter into Society to make one People, one Body Politick under one Supreme Government, or else when any one joyns himself to, and incorporates with any Government already made. For hereby he authorizes the Society, or which is all one, the Legislative thereof to make Laws for him as the publick good of the Society shall require; to the Execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own Decrees) is due. And this puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth, by setting up a Judge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies, and redress the Injuries, that may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth; which Judge is the Legislative, or Magistrates appointed by it. And whereever there are any number of Men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature. 90. Hence it is evident, that Absolute Monarchy, which by some Men is counted the only Government in the World, is indeed inconsistent with Civil Society, and so can be no Form of Civil Government at all. For the end of Civil Society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which 51

52 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his Right, and so is exposed to all the Misery and Inconveniencies that a Man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with Power. 92. For he that thinks absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods, and corrects the baseness of Humane Nature, need read but the History of this, or any other Age to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of America, would not probably be much better in a Throne; where perhaps Learning and Religion shall be found out to justifie all, that he shall do to his Subjects, and the Sword presently silence all those that dare question it. For what the Protection of Absolute Monarchy is, what kind of Fathers of their Countries it makes Princes to be, and to what a degree of Happiness and Security it carries Civil Society where this sort of Government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late Relation of Ceylon, may easily see. 93. In Absolute Monarchies indeed, as well as other Governments of the World, the Subjects have an Appeal to the Law, and Judges to decide any Controversies, and restrain any Violence that may happen betwixt the Subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared Enemy to Society and Mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true Love of Mankind and Society, and such a Charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt. For this is no more, than what every Man who loves his own Power, Profit, or Greatness, may, and naturally must do, keep those Animals from hurting or destroying one another who labour and drudge only for his Pleasure and Advantage, and so are taken care of, not out of any Love the Master has for them, but Love of himself, and the Profit they bring him. For if it be asked, what Security, what Fence is there in such a State, against the Violence and Oppression of this Absolute Ruler? The very Question can scarce be born. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves Death only to ask after Safety. Betwist Subject and Subject, they will grant, there must be Measures, Laws, and Judges, for their mutual Peace and Security: But as for the Ruler, he ought to be Absolute, and is above all such Circumstances: because he has Power to do more hurt and wrong, ’tis right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the Voice of Faction and Rebellion. As if when

Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions. 94. But whatever Flatterers may talk to amuze Peoples Understandings, it hinders not Men, from feeling: and when they perceive, that any Man, in what Station soever, is out of the Bounds of the Civil Society which they are of; and that they have no Appeal on Earth against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him, whom they find to be so; and to take care as soon as they can, to have that Safety and Security in Civil Society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this Discourse) some one good and excellent Man, having got a Preheminency amongst the rest, had this Deference paid to his Goodness and Vertue, as to a kind of Natural Authority, that the chief Rule, with Arbitration of their differences, by a tacit Consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his Uprightness and Wisdom: yet when time, giving Authority, and (as some Men would perswade us) Sacredness to Customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing Innocence of the first Ages began, had brought in Successors of another Stamp, the People finding their Properties not secure under the Government, as then it was, (whereas Government has no other end but the preservation of Property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in Civil Society, till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by his own Authority, avoid the force of the Law, when once made, nor by any pretence of Superiority, plead exemption, thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his Dependants. No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it. For if any Man may do, what he thinks fit, and there be no Appeal on Earth, for Redress or Security against any harm he shall do; I ask, Whether he be not perfectly still in the State of Nature, and so can be no part or Member of that Civil

1.1 John Locke, Second Treatise Society: unless any one will say, the State of Nature and Civil Society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a Patron of Anarchy as to affirm.

Chap. XI. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power. 134. The great end of Mens entering into Society, being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the Laws establish’d in that Society; the first and fundamental positive Law of all Commonwealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it. This Legislative is not only the supream power of the Commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and appointed. For without this the Law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a Law, the consent of the Society, over whom no Body can have a power to make Laws, but by their own consent, and by Authority received from them; and therefore all the Obedience, which by the most solemn Ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this Supream Power, and is directed by those Laws which it enacts: nor can any Oaths to any Foreign Power whatsoever, or any Domestick Subordinate Power, discharge any Member of the Society from his Obedience to the Legislative, acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige him to any Obedience contrary to the Laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any Power in the Society, which is not the Supream. 135. Though the Legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, tho’ it be the Supream Power in every Common-wealth . . . First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People. For it being but the joynt power of every Member of the Society given up to that Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a State of Nature before they enter’d into Society, and gave up to the Community. For no Body can transfer to

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another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own Life, or take away the Life or Property of another. A Man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another; and having in the State of Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or Possession of another, but only so much as the Law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the Common-wealth, and by it to the Legislative Power, so that the Legislative can have no more than this. Their Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects. The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society but only in many Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against it . . . 136. Secondly, The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a power to Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris’d Judges. For the Law of Nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of Men, they who through Passion or Interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no establish’d Judge: And so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the Rights, and fence the Properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is Judge, Interpreter, and Executioner of it too, and that in his own Case: And he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from Injuries, or to punish Delinquents. To avoid these Inconveniencies which disorder Mens Properties in the state of Nature, Men unite into Societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole Society to secure and defend their Properties, and may have standing Rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that Men give up all their Natural Power to the Society which they enter into, and the Community put the Legislative Power

54 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be govern’d by declared Laws, or else their Peace, Quiet, and Property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of Nature. 137. Absolute Arbitrary Power, or Governing without settled standing Laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of Society and Government, which Men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes; and by stated Rules of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute Arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates, and put a force into the Magistrates hand to execute his unlimited Will arbitrarily upon them: This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right against the Injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single Man, or many in Combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute Arbitrary Power and will of a Legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases. He being in a much worse condition who is exposed to the Arbitrary Power of one Man, who has the Command of 100000. than he that is expos’d to the Arbitrary Power of 100000 single Men: no Body being secure, that his Will, who has such a Command, is better, than that of other Men, though his Force be 100000 times stronger. And therefore whatever Form the Common-wealth is under, the Ruling Power ought to govern by declared and received Laws, and not by extemporary Dictates and undetermined Resolutions . . . 138. Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos’d to lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore in Society having Property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath a right to take their substance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; without this, they have no Property at all. For I have truly no Property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the Supream or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the

Subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be fear’d in Governments where the Legislative consists, wholly or in part, in Assemblies which are variable, whose Members upon the Dissolution of the Assembly, are Subjects under the common Laws of their Country, equally with the rest . . . 139. But Government into whatsoever hands it is put, being as I have before shew’d, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that Men might have and secure their Properties, the Prince or Senate, however it may have power to make Laws for the regulating of Property between the Subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a Power to take to themselves the whole or any part of the Subjects Property, without their own consent. For this would be in effect to leave them no Property at all . . . 140. ’Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and ’tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a Power to lay and levy Taxes on the People, by his own Authority, and without such consent of the People, he thereby invades the Fundamental Law of Property, and subverts the end of Government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take, when he pleases to himself? 141. Fourthly, The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others. The People alone can appoint the Form of the Commonwealth, which is by Constituting the Legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the People have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern’d by Laws made by such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands. 142. These are the Bounds which the trust that is put in them by Society, and the Law of God and Nature, have set to the Legislative Power of every Commonwealth, in all Forms of Government.

1.2 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies First, They are to govern by promulgated establish’d Laws, not to be varied in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough. Secondly, These Laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the People. Thirdly, they must not raise Taxes on the Property of the People, without the Consent of the People, given by themselves, or their Deputies. And this properly concerns only such Governments where the Legislative is always in being, or at least where the People have not reserv’d any part of the Legislative to Deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly, The Legislative neither must nor can transfer the Power of making Laws to any Body else, or place it any where but where the People have . . . 212. Besides this over-turning from without, Governments are dissolved from within. 1. First, When the Legislative is altered. Civil Society being a State of Peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the State of War is excluded by the Umpirage, which they have provided in their Legislative, for the ending all Differences, that may arise amongst any of them, ’tis in their Legislative, that the Members of a Commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living Body. This is the Soul that gives Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth: From hence the several Members have their mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion: And therefore when the Legislative is broken, or dissolved, Dissolution and Death follows. For the Essence and Union of the Society consisting in having one Will, the Legislative, when once established by the Majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that Will. The Constitution of the Legislative is the first and fundamental Act of Society, whereby provision is made for the Continuation of their Union, under the Direction of Persons, and Bonds of Laws made by persons authorized thereunto, by the Consent and Appointment of the People, without which no one Man, or number of Men, amongst them, can have Authority of making Laws, that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make Laws, whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws without Authority, which the People are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may

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constitute to themselves a new Legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without Authority would impose any thing upon them. . . . Sources: The Founders’ Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document 5. Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. Available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ documents/v1ch17s5.html; and Locke, John. 1965. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Mentor Books, New American Library.

1.2 The Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies, July 4, 1776 In CONGRESS, July 4, 1776 The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.---That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,---That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.---Such has

56 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain [George III] is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

1.3 Articles of Confederation Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. The signers of the Declaration represented the new states as follows: New Hampshire Josiah Bartlett, William Whipple, Matthew Thornton

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Robert Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, John Morton, George Clymer, James Smith, George Taylor, James Wilson, George Ross Delaware Caesar Rodney, George Read, Thomas McKean Maryland Samuel Chase, William Paca, Thomas Stone, Charles Carroll of Carrollton Virginia George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Nelson, Jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton North Carolina William Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn South Carolina Edward Rutledge, Thomas Heyward, Jr., Thomas Lynch, Jr., Arthur Middleton Georgia Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, George Walton

1.3 Articles of Confederation To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting. Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusettsbay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

I.

Massachusetts John Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry

The Stile of this Confederacy shall be ‘‘The United States of America’’.

Rhode Island Stephen Hopkins, William Ellery

II.

Connecticut Roger Sherman, Samuel Williams, Oliver Wolcott

Huntington,

William

New York William Floyd, Philip Livingston, Francis Lewis, Lewis Morris New Jersey Richard Stockton, John Witherspoon, Hopkinson, John Hart, Abraham Clark Pennsylvania

Francis

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon

58 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.

IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

V. For the most convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the States, and while they act as members of the committee of the States.

In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests or imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendence on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

VI. No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or foreign State; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince or State, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress, to the courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State, or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgement of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of filed pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by

1.3 Articles of Confederation some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the Kingdom or State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.

VII. When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each State respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment.

VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.

IX. The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article---of sending and receiving ambassadors--entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as

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their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever---of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated---of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace---appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies commited on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following. Whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven, nor more than nine names as Congress shall direct, shall in the presence of Congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names shall be so drawn or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons, which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgement and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence, or

60 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought judgement, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgement or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided that every commissioner, before he sits in judgement, shall take an oath to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the State, where the cause shall be tried, ‘well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgement, without favor, affection or hope of reward’: provided also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined as near as may be in the same manner as is before presecribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States. The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States---fixing the standards of weights and measures throughout the United States---regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated--establishing or regulating post offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office---appointing all officers of the land forces, in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers---appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States---making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations. The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’, and to consist of one delegate from each State; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction---to appoint one of their members to preside, provided that no

person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses---to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted---to build and equip a navy---to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men and cloath, arm and equip them in a solid-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so cloathed, armed and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled. But if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of circumstances judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, cloathed, armed and equipped in the same manner as the quota of each State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spread out in the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, cloath, arm and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men so cloathed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled. The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of

1.4 The Constitution of the United States 61

XI.

to authorize us to ratify the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union. Know Ye that we the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained: And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by the said Confederation are submitted to them. And that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual. In Witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Eight, and in the Third Year of the independence of America. Agreed to by Congress 15 November 1777. In force after ratification by Maryland, 1 March 1781.

Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.

1.4 The Constitution of the United States

six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgement require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is desired by any delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several States.

X. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of the nine States, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled be requisite.

XII. All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts contracted by, or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States, and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

Preamble We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Article I. The Legislative Branch XIII. Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State. And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in Congress, to approve of, and

Section 1 - The Legislature All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Section 2 - The House The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been

62 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. (Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.) [The previous sentence in parentheses was modified by the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2.] The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five and Georgia three. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section 3 - The Senate The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, (chosen by the Legislature thereof,) [The preceding words in parentheses were superseded by the Seventeenth Amendment, Section 1.] for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; (and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.)

[The preceding words in parentheses were superseded by the Seventeenth Amendment, Section 2.] No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section 4 - Elections, Meetings The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing Senators. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall (be on the first Monday in December,) [The preceding words in parentheses were superseded by the Twentieth Amendment, Section 2.] unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section 5 - Membership, Rules, Journals, Adjournment Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide. Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.

1.4 The Constitution of the United States 63 Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal. Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. Section 6 - Compensation (The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.) [The preceding words in parentheses were modified by the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.] They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. Section 7 - Revenue Bills, Legislative Process, Presidential Veto All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons

voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section 8 - Powers of Congress The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; To establish Post Offices and Post Roads; To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy;

64 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings; And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9 - Limits on Congress The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. (No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.) [Section in parentheses was clarified by the Sixteenth Amendment.] No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a

regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.

Section 10 - Powers Prohibited of States No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article II. The Executive Branch Section 1 - The President The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. (The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not lie an Inhabitant of the same State with

1.4 The Constitution of the United States 65 themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the VicePresident.) [This clause in parentheses was superseded by the Twelfth Amendment.] The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States. No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. (In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.) [This clause in parentheses was modified by the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments.] The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be

increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: ‘‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’’ Section 2 - Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. Section 3 - State of the Union, Convening Congress He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

66 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Section 4 - Disqualification The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Article III. The Judicial Branch Section 1 - Judicial Powers The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Section 2 - Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury Trials (The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.) [This section in parentheses was modified by the Eleventh Amendment.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Section 3 - Treason Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two

Article IV. The States Section 1 - Each State to Honor All Others Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. Section 2 - State Citizens, Extradition The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. (No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.) [This clause in parentheses is superseded by the Thirteenth Amendment.] Section 3 - New States New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State. Section 4 - Republican Government The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on

1.4 The Constitution of the United States 67 Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

Article V. Amendment The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article VI. Debts, Supremacy, Oaths All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Article VII. Ratification Documents The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same. Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and

Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names. Go Washington-President and deputy from Virginia New Hampshire-John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman Massachusetts-Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King Connecticut-Wm Saml Johnson, Roger Sherman New York-Alexander Hamilton New Jersey-Wil Livingston, David Brearley, Wm Paterson, Jona. Dayton Pennsylvania-B Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Robt Morris, Geo. Clymer, Thos FitzSimons, Jared Ingersoll, James Wilson, Gouv Morris Delaware-Geo. Read, Gunning Bedford jun, John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, Jaco. Broom Maryland-James McHenry, Dan of St Tho Jenifer, Danl Carroll Virginia-John Blair, James Madison Jr. North Carolina-Wm Blount, Richd Dobbs Spaight, Hu Williamson South Carolina-J. Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler Georgia-William Few, Abr Baldwin Attest: William Jackson, Secretary

The Amendments The following are the Amendments to the Constitution. The first ten Amendments collectively are commonly known as the Bill of Rights.

Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression. Ratified 12/15/1791. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Amendment 2 - Right to Bear Arms. Ratified 12/15/1791. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment 3 - Quartering of Soldiers. Ratified 12/15/1791. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

68 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure. Ratified 12/15/1791. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Amendment 6 - Right to Speedy Trial, Confrontation of Witnesses. Ratified 12/15/1791. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. Amendment 7 - Trial by Jury in Civil Cases. Ratified 12/15/1791. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. Amendment 8 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Ratified 12/15/1791. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Amendment 9 - Construction of Constitution. Ratified 12/15/1791. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People. Ratified 12/15/1791. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

1.5 James Madison, Federalist No. 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection To the People of the State of New York: AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing

1.5 James Madison, Federalist No. 10 69 distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously

contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to

70 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole. The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of

no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be,

1.6 James Madison, Federalist No. 39 71 they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. PUBLIUS. Source: New York Packet, November 23, 1787.

1.6 James Madison, Federalist No. 39 To the People of the State of New York: THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our

72 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought undertaking. The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for selfgovernment. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible. What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions. If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would

be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior. On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

1.6 James Madison, Federalist No. 39 73 Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter. ‘‘But it was not sufficient,’’ say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, ‘‘for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.’’ And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision. Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority. First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced. On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act. That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union,

nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution. The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features. The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the

74 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government. But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character. The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. PUBLIUS.

1.7 James Madison, Federalist No. 48 To the People of the State of New York: IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained. It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that

1.7 James Madison, Federalist No. 48 75 power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations. In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a

multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory, evidence, I will refer to the example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities. The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its constitution, that the three great departments ought not to be intermixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting ‘‘Notes on the State of Virginia.’’ All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised

76 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves. An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. BUT NO BARRIER WAS PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS. The judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly, IN MANY instances, DECIDED RIGHTS which should have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY, and THE DIRECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE, DURING THE WHOLE TIME OF THEIR SESSION, IS BECOMING HABITUAL AND FAMILIAR.’’ The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council of Censors, which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the constitution, was ‘‘to inquire whether the constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government had performed their duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the constitution.’’ In the execution of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances. A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed

for the consideration of the people; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against improper acts of legislature. The constitutional trial by jury had been violated, and powers assumed which had not been delegated by the constitution. Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination. Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads, may consult the journals of the council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an illconstituted government. It appears, also, that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECONDLY, in most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRDLY, the executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands. The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands. PUBLIUS.

1.8 James Madison, Federalist No. 51 To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of

1.8 James Madison, Federalist No. 51 77 power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each

department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be

78 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of

the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the

1.9 Anti-Federalist No. 26 79 latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. PUBLIUS.

1.9 Anti-Federalist No. 26 The Use of Coercion by the New Government (Part I) The time is nearly at hand, when you are called upon to render up that glorious liberty you obtained, by resisting the tyranny and oppression of George the Third, King of England, and his ministers. The first Monday in April is the day appointed by our assembly, for you to meet and choose delegates in each county, to take into consideration the new Federal Government, and either adopt or refuse it. Let me entreat you, my fellows, to consider well what you are about. Read the said constitution, and consider it well before you act. I have done so, and can find that we are to receive but little good, and a great deal of evil. Aristocracy, or government in the hands of a very few nobles, or RICH MEN, is therein concealed in the most artful wrote plan that ever was formed to entrap a free people. The contrivers of it have so completely entrapped you, and laid their plans so sure and secretly, that they have only left you to do one of two things-that is either to receive or refuse it. And in order to bring you into their snare, you may daily read new pieces published in the newspapers, in favor of this new government; and should a writer dare to publish any piece against it, he is immediately abused and vilified. Look round you and observe well the RICH MEN, who are to be your only rulers, lords and masters in future! Are they not all for it? Yes! Ought not this to put you on your guard? Does not riches beget power, and power, oppression and tyranny? I am told that four of the richest men in AnnArundel County [Maryland], have offered themselves candidates to serve in the convention, who are all in favor of the new Federal Government. Let me beg of you to reflect a moment on the danger you run. If you choose these men, or others like them, they certainly will do everything in their power to adopt the new government. Should they succeed, your liberty is gone

forever; and you will then be nothing better than a strong ass crouching down between two burdens. The new form of government gives Congress liberty at any time, by their laws, to alter the state laws, and the time, places and manner of holding elections for representatives. By this clause they may command, by their laws, the people of Maryland to go to Georgia, and the people of Georgia to go to Boston, to choose their representatives. Congress, or our future lords and masters, are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. Excise is a new thing in America, and few country farmers and planters know the meaning of it. But it is not so in Old England, where I have seen the effects of it, and felt the smart. It is there a duty, or tax, laid upon almost every necessary of life and convenience, and a great number of other articles. The excise on salt in the year 1762, to the best of my recollection, in England, was 4s. sterling per bushel, for all that was made use of in families; and the price of salt per bushel about 6s. sterling, and the excise 4s.6d. on every gallon of rum made use of. If a private family make their own soap, candles, beer, cider, etc., they pay an excise duty on them. And if they neglect calling in an excise officer at the time of making these things, they are liable to grievous fines and forfeitures, besides a long train of evils and inconveniences attending this detestable excise-to enumerate particularly would fill a volume. The excise officers have power to enter your houses at all times, by night or day, and if you refuse them entrance, they can, under pretense of searching for exciseable goods, that the duty has not been paid on, break open your doors, chests, trunks, desks, boxes, and rummage your houses from bottom to top. Nay, they often search the clothes, petticoats and pockets of ladies or gentlemen (particularly when they are coming from on board an East-India ship), and if they find any the least article that you cannot prove the duty to be paid on, seize it and carry it away with them; who are the very scum and refuse of mankind, who value not their oaths, and will break them for a shilling. This is their true character in England, and I speak from experience, for I have had the opportunity of putting their virtue to the test, and saw two of them break their oath for one guinea, and a third for one shilling’s worth of punch. What do you think of a law to let loose such a set of vile officers among you! Do you expect the Congress excise-officers will be any better-if God, in his anger, should think it proper to punish us for our ignorance, and sins of ingratitude to him, after carrying us through the late war, and giving us liberty, and now so tamely to give it up by adopting this aristocratical government?

80 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union according to their respective numbers. This seems to imply, that we shall be taxed by the poll again, which is contrary to our Bill of Rights. But it is possible that the rich men, who are the great land holders, will tax us in this manner, which will exempt them from paying assessments on their great bodies of land in the old and new parts of the United States; many of them having but few taxable by the poll. Our great Lords and Masters are to lay taxes, raise and support armies, provide a navy, and may appropriate money for two years, call forth the militia to execute their laws, suppress insurrections, and the President is to have the command of the militia. Now, my countrymen, I would ask you, why are all these things directed and put into their power? Why, I conceive, they are to keep you in a good humor; and if you should, at any time, think you are imposed upon by Congress and your great Lords and Masters, and refuse or delay to pay your taxes, or do anything that they shall think proper to order you to do, they can, and I have not a doubt but they will, send the militia of Pennsylvania, Boston, or any other state or place, to cut your throats, ravage and destroy your plantations, drive away your cattle and horses, abuse your wives, kill your infants, and ravish your daughters, and live in free quarters, until you get into a good humor, and pay all that they may think proper to ask of you, and you become good and faithful servants and slaves. Such things have been done, and I have no doubt will be done again, if you consent to the adoption of this new Federal Government. You labored under many hardships while the British tyrannized over you! You fought, conquered and gained your liberty-then keep it, I pray you, as a precious jewel. Trust it not out of your own hands; be assured, if you do, you will never more regain it. The train is laid, the match is on fire, and they only wait for yourselves to put it to the train, to blow up all your liberty and commonwealth governments, and introduce aristocracy and monarchy, and despotism will follow of course in a few years. Four-years President will be in time a King for life; and after him, his son, or he that has the greatest power among them, will be King also. View your danger, and find out good men to represent you in convention-men of your own profession and station in life; men who will not adopt this destructive and diabolical form of a federal government. There are many among you that will not be led by the nose by rich men, and would scorn a bribe. Rich men can live easy under any government, be it ever so tyrannical. They come in for a

great share of the tyranny, because they are the ministers of tyrants, and always engross the places of honor and profit, while the greater part of the common people are led by the nose, and played about by these very men, for the destruction of themselves and their class. Be wise, be virtuous, and catch the precious moment as it passes, to refuse this newfangled federal government, and extricate yourselves and posterity from tyranny, oppression, aristocratical or monarchical government. . . . A FARMER AND PLANTER Source: ‘‘A FARMER AND PLANTER,’’ Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, April 1, 1788.

1.10 Anti-Federalist No. 28 The Use of Coercion by the New Government (Part III) The Congress under the new Constitution have the power ‘‘of organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and of governing them when in the service of the United States, giving to the separate States the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.’’ Let us inquire why they have assumed this great power. Was it to strengthen the power which is now lodged in your hands, and relying upon you and you solely for aid and support to the civil power in the execution of all the laws of the new Congress? Is this probable? Does the complexion of this new plan countenance such a supposition? When they unprecedently claim the power of raising and supporting armies, do they tell you for what purposes they are to be raised? How they are to be employed? How many they are to consist of, and where to be stationed? Is this power fettered with any one of those restrictions, which will show they depend upon the militia, and not upon this infernal engine of oppression to execute their civil laws? The nature of the demand in itself contradicts such a supposition, and forces you to believe that it is for none of these causes---but rather for the purpose of consolidating and finally destroying your strength, as your respective governments are to be destroyed. They well know the impolicy of putting or keeping arms in the hands of a nervous people, at a distance from the seat of a government, upon whom they mean to exercise the powers granted in that government. They have no idea of calling upon or trusting to the party aggrieved to support and enforce their own grievances, (notwithstanding they

1.10 Anti-Federalist No. 28 81 may select and subject them to as strict subordination as regular troops) unless they have a standing army to back and compel the execution of their orders. It is asserted by the most respectable writers upon government, that a well regulated militia, composed of the yeomanry of the country, have ever been considered as the bulwark of a free people. Tyrants have never placed any confidence on a militia composed of freemen. Experience has taught them that a standing body of regular forces, whenever they can be completely introduced, are always efficacious in enforcing their edicts, however arbitrary; and slaves by profession themselves, are ‘‘nothing loth’’ to break down the barriers of freedom with a gout. No, my fellow citizens, this plainly shows they do not mean to depend upon the citizens of the States alone to enforce their powers. They mean to lean upon something more substantial and summary. They have left the appointment of officers in the breasts of the several States; but this appears to me an insult rather than a privilege, for what avails this right if they at their pleasure may arm or disarm all or any part of the freemen of the United States, so that when their army is sufficiently numerous, they may put it out of the power of the freemen militia of America to assert and defend their liberties, however they might be encroached upon by Congress. Does any, after reading this provision for a regular standing army, suppose that they intended to apply to the militia in all cases, and to pay particular attention to making them the bulwark of this continent? And would they not be equal to such an undertaking? Are they not abundantly able to give security and stability to your government as long as it is free? Are they not the only proper persons to do it? Are they not the most respectable body of yeomanry in that character upon earth? Have they not been engaged in some of the most brilliant actions in America, and more than once decided the fate of princes? In short, do they not preclude the necessity of any standing army whatsoever, unless in case of invasion? And in that case it would be time enough to raise them, for no free government under heaven, with a well disciplined militia, was ever yet subdued by mercenary troops. The advocates at the present day, for a standing army in the new Congress, pretend it is necessary for the respectability of government. I defy them to produce an instance in any country, in the Old or New World, where they have not finally done away the liberties of the people. Every writer upon government--Locke, Sidney, Hampden, and a list of others have uniformly asserted, that standing armies are a solecism in any government; that no nation ever supported them, that did not resort to, rely upon, and finally become a prey to them. No western historians have yet been

hardy enough to advance principles that look a different way. What historians have asserted, all the Grecian republics have verified. They are brought up to obedience and unconditional submission; with arms in their bands, they are taught to feel the weight of rigid discipline; they are excluded from the enjoyments which liberty gives to its votaries; they, in consequence, hate and envy the rest of the community in which they are placed, and indulge a malignant pleasure in destroying those privileges to which they never can be admitted. ‘‘Without a standing army,’’ (says the Marquis of Beccaria), ‘‘in every society there is an effort constantly tending to confer on one part the height and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness, and this is of itself sufficient to employ the people’s attention.’’ There is no instance of any government being reduced to a confirmed tyranny without military oppression. And the first policy of tyrants has been to annihilate all other means of national activity and defense, when they feared opposition, and to rely solely upon standing troops. Repeated were the trials, before the sovereigns of Europe dared to introduce them upon any pretext whatever; and the whole record of the transactions of mankind cannot furnish an instance, (unless the proposed constitution may be called part of that record) where the motives which caused that establishment were not completely disguised. Peisistratus in Greece, and Dionysius in Syracuse, Charles in France, and Henry in England, all cloaked their villainous intentions under an idea of raising a small body as a guard for their persons; and Spain could not succeed in the same nefarious plan, until thro’ the influence of an ambitious priest (who have in all countries and in all ages, even at this day, encouraged and preached up arbitrary power) they obtained it. ‘‘Caesar, who first attacked the commonwealth with mines, very soon opened his batteries.’’ Notwithstanding all these objections to this engine of oppression, which are made by the most experienced men, and confirmed by every country where the rays of freedom ever extended---yet in America, which has hitherto been her favorite abode; in this civilized territory, where property is so valuable, and men are found with feelings that win not patiently submit to arbitrary control; in this western region, where, my fellow countrymen, it is confessedly proper that you should associate and dwell in society from choice and reflection, and not be kept together by force and fear---you are modestly requested to engraft into the component parts of your constitution a Standing Army, without any qualifying restraints whatever, certainly to exist somewhere in the bowels of your country in time of peace. It is very true that Lawyer [James]

82 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought Wilson---member of the Federal Convention, and who we may suppose breathes in some measure the spirit of that body---tells you it is for the purpose of forming cantonments upon your frontiers, and for the dignity and safety of your country, as it respects foreign nations. No man that loves his country could object to their being raised for the first of these causes, but for the last it cannot be necessary. God has so separated us by an extensive ocean from the rest of mankind; he hath so liberally endowed us with privileges, and so abundantly taught us to esteem them precious, it would be impossible while we retain our integrity, and advert to first principles, for any nation whatever to subdue us. We have succeeded in our opposition to the most powerful people upon the globe; and the wound that America received in the struggle, where is it? As speedily healed as the track in the ocean is buried by the succeeding wave. It has scarcely stopped her progress, and our private dissensions only, at this moment, tarnish the lustre of the most illustrious infant nation under heaven. You cannot help suspecting this gentleman [James Wilson], when he goes on to tell you ‘‘that standing armies in time of peace have always been a topic of popular declamation, but Europe hath found them necessary to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquility.’’ This shows you his opinion--and that he, as one of the Convention, was for unequivocally establishing them in time of peace; and to object to them, is a mere popular declamation. But I will not, my countrymen---I cannot believe you to be of the same sentiment. Where is the standing army in the world that, like the musket they make use of, hath been in time of peace brightened and burnished for the sake only of maintaining an appearance of strength, without being put to a different use---without having had a pernicious influence upon the morals, the habits, and the sentiments of society, and finally, taking a chief part in executing its laws? . . . If tyranny is at all feared, the tyranny of the many is to be guarded against MORE than that of a single person. The Athenians found by sad experience, that 30 tyrants were thirty times worse than one. A bad aristocracy is thirty times worse than a bad monarchy, allowing each to have a standing army as unrestricted as in the proposed constitution. If the people are not in general disposed to execute the powers of government, it is time to suspect there is something wrong in that government; and rather than employ a standing army, they had better have another. For, in my humble opinion, it is yet much too early to set it down for a fact, that mankind cannot be governed but by force.

Source: The Freeman’s Journal (Philadelphia) or The North-American Intelligencer, January 16, 1788.

1.11 Anti-Federalist No. 48 No Separation of Departments Results in No Responsibility In the new constitution for the future government of the thirteen United States of America, the President and Senate have all the executive and two thirds of the Legislative power. This is a material deviation from those principles of the English constitution, for which they fought with us; and in all good governments it should be a fundamental maxim, that, to give a proper balance to the political system, the different branches of the legislature should be unconnected, and the legislative and executive powers should be separate. By the new constitution of America this union of the executive and legislative bodies operates in the most weighty matters of the state. They jointly make all treaties; they jointly appoint all officers civil and military; and, they jointly try all impeachments, either of their own members, or the officers appointed by themselves. In this formidable combination of power, there is no responsibility. And where there is power without responsibility, how can there be liberty? The president of the United States is elected for four years, and each of the thirteen states has one vote at his election; which vote is not of the people, but of electors two degrees from the people. The senate is a body of six years duration; and as in the choice of presidents, the largest state has but one vote, so it is in the choice of senators. Now this shows, that responsibility is as little to be apprehended from amenability to constituents, as from the terror of impeachment; for to the members of the senate it is clear, that trial by impeachment is nothing but parade. From such an union in governments, it requires no great depth of political knowledge to prophesy, that monarchy or aristocracy must be generated, and perhaps of the most grievous kind. The only check in favor of the democratic principle is the house of representatives; but its smallness of number, and great comparative disparity of power, render that house of little effect to promote good or restrain bad government. The power given to this ill-constructed senate is, to judge of what may be for the general welfare; and such

1.12 Anti-Federalist No. 84 83 engagements, when made the acts of Congress, become the supreme laws of the land. This is a power co-extensive with every possible object of human legislation. Yet there is no restraint, no charter of rights, no residuum of human privileges, not intended to be given up to society. The rights of conscience, the freedom of the press, and trial by jury, are at the mercy of this senate. Trial by jury has been already materially injured. The trial in criminal cases is not by twelve men of the vicinage, or of the county, but of the state; and the states are from fifty to seven hundred miles in extent! In criminal cases this new system says, the trial shall be by jury. On civil cases it is silent. There it is fair to infer, that as in criminal cases it has been materially impaired, in civil cases it may be altogether omitted. But it is in truth, strongly discountenanced in civil cases; for this new system gives the supreme court in matters of appeal, jurisdiction both of law and fact. This being the beginning of American freedom, it is very clear the ending will be slavery, for it cannot be denied that this constitution is, in its first principles, highly and dangerously oligarchical; and it is every where agreed, that a government administered by a few, is, of all governments, the worst. LEONIDAS Source: ‘‘LEONIDAS,’’ London Times and The Freeman’s Journal or The North-American Intelligencer, July 30, 1788. Note: ‘‘LEONIDAS’’ from London, obviously did not understand Article II Section I of the proposed new Constitution. But his works were welcomed.

1.12 Anti-Federalist No. 84 On the Lack of a Bill of Rights When a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid. The Constitution proposed to your acceptance is designed, not for yourselves alone, but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which the social compact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, and the most express and full declaration of rights to have been made. But on this subject there is almost an entire silence. If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America, from their own most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as self-evident, that all men are by

nature free. No one man, therefore, or any class of men, have a right, by the law of nature, or of God, to assume or exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society, then, is to be sought, not in any natural right which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in the united consent of those who associate. The mutual wants of men at first dictated the propriety of forming societies: and when they were established, protection and defense pointed out the necessity of instituting government. In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest; in this pursuit it frequently happened, that the possessions or enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and designs of another; thus the weak were a prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, every individual was insecure; common interest, therefore, directed that government should be established, in which the force of the whole community should be collected, and under such directions, as to protect and defend every one who composed it. The common good, therefore, is the end of civil government, and common consent, the foundation on which it is established. To effect this end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in order that what remained should be preserved. How great a proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individuals, when they submit to government, I shall not inquire. So much, however, must be given, as will be sufficient to enable those to whom the administration of the government is committed, to establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the community, and to carry those laws into effect. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, that individuals should relinquish all their natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they cannot be surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the right of enjoying and defending life, etc. Others are not necessary to be resigned in order to attain the end for which government is instituted; these therefore ought not to be given up. To surrender them, would counteract the very end of government, to wit, the common good. From these observations it appears, that in forming a government on its true principles, the foundation should be laid in the manner I before stated, by expressly reserving to the people such of their essential rights as are not necessary to be parted with. The same reasons which at first induced mankind to associate and institute government, will operate to influence them to observe this precaution. If they had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of immutable righteousness, government would not have been

84 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought requisite. It was because one part exercised fraud, oppression and violence, on the other, that men came together, and agreed that certain rules should be formed to regulate the conduct of all, and the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to them. But rulers have the same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power with which they are vested, for private purposes, and to the injury and oppression of those over whom they are placed, as individuals in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another. It is therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority, as that government should have at first been instituted to restrain private injuries. This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things, is confirmed by universal experience. Those who have governed, have been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and abridge the public liberty. This has induced the people in all countries, where any sense of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers. The country from which we have derived our origin, is an eminent example of this. Their magna charta and bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the security of that nation. I need say no more, I presume, to an American, than that this principle is a fundamental one, in all the Constitutions of our own States; there is not one of them but what is either founded on a declaration or bill of rights, or has certain express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of them. From this it appears, that at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high, and when an appeal was made to the people to form Constitutions for the government of themselves, it was their universal sense, that such declarations should make a part of their frames of government. It is, therefore, the more astonishing, that this grand security to the rights of the people is not to be found in this Constitution. It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declarations of rights, however requisite they might be in the Constitutions of the States, are not necessary in the general Constitution, because, ‘‘in the former case, every thing which is not reserved is given; but in the latter, the reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing which is not given is reserved.’’ It requires but little attention to discover, that this mode of reasoning is rather specious than solid. The powers, rights and authority, granted to the general government by this Constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any State government---it reaches to every thing which concerns

human happiness---life, liberty, and property are under its control. There is the same reason, therefore, that the exercise of power, in this case, should be restrained within proper limits, as in that of the State governments. To set this matter in a clear light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of the individual States, and apply them to the case in question. For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of most of the States have declared, that no man shall be held to answer for a crime until he is made fully acquainted with the charge brought against him; he shall not be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself---the witnesses against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be fully heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security of life and liberty, that trial of facts be in the vicinity where they happen. Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general government, as in that of a particular State? The powers vested in the new Congress extend in many cases to life; they are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exercise, save only, that ‘‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed.’’ No man is secure of a trial in the county where he is charged to have committed a crime; he may be brought from Niagara to New York, or carried from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for an offense supposed to be committed. What security is there, that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain description of the charges against him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor? That he shall see the witnesses against him face to face, or that he shall be fully heard in his own defense by himself or counsel? For the security of liberty it has been declared, ‘‘that excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted. That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or seize any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppressive.’’ These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that of the individual States; for the power of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing fines, inflicting punishments, granting search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, in certain cases, as the other. For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is declared by all the States, ‘‘that in all

1.12 Anti-Federalist No. 84 85 controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.’’ Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right under their national compact, as in that of the States? Yet nothing is said respecting it. In the bills of rights of the States it is declared, that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free government; that as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up, and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and controlled by, the civil power. The same security is as necessary in this Constitution, and much more so; for the general government will have the sole power to raise and to pay armies, and are under no control in the exercise of it; yet nothing of this is to be found in this new system. I might proceed to instance a number of other rights, which were as necessary to be reserved, such as, that elections should be free, that the liberty of the press should be held sacred; but the instances adduced are sufficient to prove that this argument is without foundation. Besides, it is evident that the reason here assigned was not the true one, why the framers of this Constitution omitted a bill of rights; if it had been, they would not have made certain reservations, while they totally omitted others of more importance. We find they have, in the ninth section of the first article declared, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion---that no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed---that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, etc. If every thing which is not given is reserved, what propriety is there in these exceptions? Does this Constitution any where grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus, to make ex post facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles of nobility? It certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that can be given is, that these are implied in the general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said, that all the powers which the bills of rights guard against the abuse of, are contained or implied in the general ones granted by this Constitution. So far is it from being true, that a bill of rights is less necessary in the general Constitution than in those of the States, the contrary is evidently the fact. This system, if it is possible for the people of America to accede to it, will be an original compact; and being the last wilt, in the nature of things, vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it. For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people,

all other forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption, must yield to it. This is expressed in positive and unequivocal terms in the sixth article: ‘‘That this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution, or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding.’’ ‘‘The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution.’’ It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the different State Constitutions are repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are inconsistent with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States. Of what avail will the Constitutions of the respective States be to preserve the rights of its citizens? Should they be pled, the answer would be, the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is the supreme law, and all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the General or State governments, are bound by oath to support it. No privilege, reserved by the bills of rights, or secured by the State governments, can limit the power granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. It stands, therefore, on its own bottom, and must receive a construction by itself, without any reference to any other. And hence it was of the highest importance, that the most precise and express declarations and reservations of rights should have been made. This will appear the more necessary, when it is considered, that not only the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, but alt treaties made, under the authority of the United States, are the supreme law of the land, and supersede the Constitutions of all the States. The power to make treaties, is vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of twothirds of the senate. I do not find any limitation or restriction to the exercise of this power. The most important article in any Constitution may therefore be repealed, even without a legislative act. Ought not a government, vested with such extensive and indefinite authority, to have been restricted by a declaration of rights? It certainly ought. So clear a point is this, that I cannot help suspecting that persons who attempt to persuade people that such

86 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought reservations were less necessary under this Constitution than under those of the States, are wilfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage. BRUTUS

1.13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835 How the Omnipotence of the Majority Increases, in America, the Instability of Legislation and Administration Inherent in Democracy. The Americans increase the mutability of law that is inherent in a democracy by changing the legislature year, and investing it with almost unbounded authority---The same effect is produced upon the administration---In America the pressure for social improvements is vastly greater, but less continuous, than in Europe. I HAVE already spoken of the natural defects of democratic institutions; each one of them increases in the same ratio as the power of the majority. To begin with the most evident of them all, the mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in a democratic government, because it is natural to democracies to raise new men to power. But this evil is more or less perceptible in proportion to the authority and the means of action which the legislature possesses. In America the authority exercised by the legislatures is supreme; nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes with celerity and with irresistible power, and they are supplied with new representatives every year. That is to say, the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to the most important objects, are here in full operation. Hence America is, at the present day, the country beyond all others where laws last the shortest time. Almost all the American constitutions have been amended within thirty years; there is therefore not one American state which has not modified the principles of its legislation in that time. As for the laws themselves, a single glance at the archives of the different states of the Union suffices to convince one that in America the activity of the legislator never slackens. Not that the American democracy is naturally less stable than any other, but it is allowed to follow, in the formation of the laws, the natural instability of its desires.

The omnipotence of the majority and the rapid as well as absolute manner in which its decisions are executed in the United States not only render the law unstable, but exercise the same influence upon the execution of the law and the conduct of the administration. As the majority is the only power that it is important to court, all its projects are taken up with the greatest ardor; but no sooner is its attention distracted than all this ardor ceases; while in the free states of Europe, where the administration is at once independent and secure, the projects of the legislature continue to be executed even when its attention is directed to other objects. In America certain improvements are prosecuted with much more zeal and activity than elsewhere; in Europe the same ends are promoted by much less social effort more continuously applied. Some years ago several pious individuals undertook to ameliorate the condition of the prisons. The public were moved by their statements, and the reform of criminals became a popular undertaking. New prisons were built; and for the first time the idea of reforming as well as punishing the delinquent formed a part of prison discipline. But this happy change, in which the public had taken so hearty an interest and which the simultaneous exertions of the citizens rendered irresistible, could not be completed in a moment. While the new penitentiaries were being erected and the will of the majority was hastening the work, the old prisons still existed and contained a great number of offenders. These jails became more unwholesome and corrupt in proportion as the new establishments were reformed and improved, forming a contrast that may readily be understood. The majority was so eagerly employed in founding the new prisons that those which already existed were forgotten; and as the general attention was diverted to a novel object, the care which had hitherto been bestowed upon the others ceased. The salutary regulations of discipline were first relaxed and afterwards broken; so that in the immediate neighborhood of a prison that bore witness to the mild and enlightened spirit of our times, dungeons existed that reminded one of the barbarism of the Middle Ages.

Tyranny of the Majority How the principle of the sovereignty of the people is to be understood---Impossibility of conceiving a mixed government---The sovereign power must exist

1.13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 87 somewhere---Precautions to be taken to control its action---These precautions have not been taken in the United States---Consequences. I hold it to be an impious and detestable maxim that, politically speaking, the people have a right to do anything; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in the will of the majority. Am I, then, in contradiction with myself? A general law, which bears the name of justice, has been made and sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind. The rights of every people are therefore confined within the limits of what is just. A nation may be considered as a jury which is empowered to represent society at large and to apply justice, which is its law. Ought such a jury, which represents society, to have more power than the society itself whose laws it executes? When I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not contest the right of the majority to command, but I simply appeal from the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of mankind. Some have not feared to assert that a people can never outstep the boundaries of justice and reason in those affairs which are peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may be given to the majority by which it is represented. But this is the language of a slave. A majority taken collectively is only an individual, whose opinions, and frequently whose interests, are opposed to those of another individual, who is styled a minority. If it be admitted that a man possessing absolute power may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should not a majority be liable to the same reproach? Men do not change their characters by uniting with one another; nor does their patience in the presence of obstacles increase with their strength. For my own part, I cannot believe it; the power to do everything, which I should refuse to one of my equals, I will never grant to any number of them. I do not think that, for the sake of preserving liberty, it is possible to combine several principles in the same government so as really to oppose them to one another. The form of government that is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me a mere chimera. Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a mixed government in the sense usually given to that word, because in all communities some one principle of action may be discovered which preponderates over the others. England in the last century, which has been especially cited as an example of this sort of government, was essentially an aristocratic state, although it comprised some great elements of democracy; for the laws and customs of the country were

such that the aristocracy could not but preponderate in the long run and direct public affairs according to its own will. The error arose from seeing the interests of the nobles perpetually contending with those of the people, without considering the issue of the contest, which was really the important point. When a community actually has a mixed government---that is to say, when it is equally divided between adverse principles---it must either experience a revolution or fall into anarchy. I am therefore of the opinion that social power superior to all others must always be placed somewhere; but I think that liberty is endangered when this power finds no obstacle which can retard its course and give it time to moderate its own vehemence. Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing. Human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion. God alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are always equal to his power. There is no power on earth so worthy of honor in itself or clothed with rights so sacred that I would admit its uncontrolled and all-predominant authority. When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws. In my opinion, the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States does not arise, as is often asserted in Europe, from their weakness, but from their irresistible strength. I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny. an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority and serves as a passive tool in its hands. The public force consists of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain states even the judges are elected by the majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which you complain, you must submit to it as well as you can. If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions, an executive so as to retain a proper share of authority, and a judiciary so as to remain independent of the other two powers, a

88 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought government would be formed which would still be democratic while incurring scarcely any risk of tyranny. I do not say that there is a frequent use of tyranny in America at the present day; but I maintain that there is no sure barrier against it, and that the causes which mitigate the government there are to be found in the circumstances and the manners of the country more than in its laws.

Effects of the Omnipotence of the Majority Upon the Arbitrary Authority of American Public Officers. Liberty left by the American laws to public officers within a certain sphere---Their power. A DISTINCTION must be drawn between tyranny and arbitrary power. Tyranny may be exercised by means of the law itself, and in that case it is not arbitrary; arbitrary power may be exercised for the public good, in which case it is not tyrannical. Tyranny usually employs arbitrary means, but if necessary it can do without them. In the United States the omnipotence of the majority, which is favorable to the legal despotism of the legislature, likewise favors the arbitrary authority of the magistrate. The majority has absolute power both to make the laws and to watch over their execution; and as it has equal authority over those who are in power and the community at large, it considers public officers as its passive agents and readily confides to them the task of carrying out its de signs. The details of their office and the privileges that they are to enjoy are rarely defined beforehand. It treats them as a master does his servants, since they are always at work in his sight and he can direct or reprimand them at any instant. In general, the American functionaries are far more independent within the sphere that is prescribed to them than the French civil officers. Sometimes, even, they are allowed by the popular authority to exceed those bounds; and as they are protected by the opinion and backed by the power of the majority, they dare do things that even a European, accustomed as he is to arbitrary power, is astonished at. By this means habits are formed in the heart of a free country which may some day prove fatal to its liberties. Source: Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1835. Democracy in America. Book I, Chapter 15. Available at http://xroads.virginia. edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html.

1.14 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery, March 16, 1849 The assertion which we made five weeks ago, that ‘‘the Constitution, if strictly construed according to its reading,’’ is not a pro-slavery instrument, has excited some interest amongst our Anti-Slavery brethren. Letters have reached us from different quarters on the subject. Some of these express agreement and pleasure with our views, and others, surprise and dissatisfaction. Each class of opinion and feeling is represented in the letters which we have placed in another part of this week’s paper. The one from our friend Gerrit Smith, represents the view which the Liberty party take of this subject, and that of Mr. Robert Forten is consistent with the ground occupied by a majority of the American AntiSlavery Society. Whether we shall be able to set ourselves right in the minds of those on the one side of this question or the other, and at the same time vindicate the correctness of our former assertion, remains to be seen. Of one thing, however, we can assure our readers, and this is, that we bring to the consideration of this subject no partisan feelings, nor the slightest wish to make ourselves consistent with the creed of either Anti-Slavery party, and that our only aim is to know what is truth and what is duty in respect to the matter in dispute, holding ourselves perfectly free to change our opinion in any direction, and at any time which may be indicated by our immediate apprehension of truth, unbiased by the smiles or frowns of any class or party of abolitionists. The only truly consistent man is he who will, for the sake of being right today, contradict what he said wrong yesterday. ‘‘Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.’’ True stability consists not in being of the same opinion now as formerly, but in a fixed principle of honesty, even urging us to the adoption or rejection of that which may seem to us true or false at the ever-present now. Before entering upon a discussion of the main question, it may be proper to remove a misapprehension into which Gerrit Smith and Robert Forten seem to have fallen, in respect to what we mean by the term, ‘‘strictly construed according to its reading,’’ as used by us in regard to the Constitution. Upon a second reading of these words, we can readily see how easily they can be made to mean more than we intended. What we mean then, and what we would be understood to man now, is simply this---that the Constitution of the United States, standing alone, and construed only in the light of its letter, without reference to the opinions of the men who

1.14 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery 89 framed and adopted it, or to the uniform, universal and undeviating practice of the nation under it, from the time of its adoption until now, is not a pro-slavery instrument. Of this admission we are perfectly willing to give our esteemed friend Gerrit Smith, and all who think with him on this subject, the fullest benefit; accompanied, however, with this explanation, that it was made with no view to give the public to understand that we held this construction to be the proper one of that instrument, and that it was drawn out merely because we were unwilling to go before the public on so narrow an issue, and one about which there could be so little said on either side. How a document would appear under one construction, is one thing; but whether the construction be the right one, is quite another and a very different thing. Confounding these two things, has led Gerrit Smith to think too favorably of us, and Robert Forten too unfavorably. We may agree with the Roman Catholic, that the language of Christ, with respect to the sacrament, if construed according to reading, teaches the doctrine of transubstantiation. But the admission is not final, neither are we understood by doing so, to sanction that irrational though literal doctrine. Neither Roman Catholic nor Protestant could attach any importance to such an admission. It would neither afford pleasure to the Catholic, nor pain to the Protestant. Hoping that we have now made ourselves understood on this point, we proceed to the general question.

The Constitutionality of Slavery The Constitution of the United States.---What is it? Who made it? For whom and for what was it made? Is it from heaven or from men? How, and in what light are we to understand it? If it be divine, divine light must be our means of understanding it; if human, humanity, with all its vice and crimes, as well as its virtues, must help us to a proper understanding of it. All attempts to explain it in the light of heaven must fail. It is human, and must be explained in the light of those maxims and principles which human beings have laid down as guides to the understanding of all written instruments, covenants, contracts and agreements, emanating from human beings, and to which human beings are parties, both on the first and the second part. It is in such a light that we propose to examine the Constitution; and in this light we hold it to be a most cunningly-devised and wicked compact, demanding the most constant and earnest efforts of the friends of righteous freedom for its complete overthrow. It was ‘‘conceived in sin, and shapen in iniquity.’’ But this will be called mere declamation, and assertion--mere ‘‘heat without light’’---sound and fury signify

nothing.---Have it so. Let us then argue the question with all the coolness and clearness of which an learned fugitive slave, smarting under the wrongs inflicted by this unholy Union, is capable. We cannot talk ‘‘lawyer like’’ about law---about its emanating from the bosom of God!---about government, and of its seat in the great heart of the Almighty!---nor can we, in connection with such an ugly matter-of-fact looking thing as the United States Constitution, bring ourselves to split hairs about the alleged legal rule of interpretation, which declares that an ‘‘act of the Legislature may be set aside when it contravenes natural justice.’’ We have to do with facts, rather than theory. The Constitution is not an abstraction. It is a living breathing fact, exerting a mighty power over the nation of which it is the bond of the Union. Had the Constitution dropped down from the blue overhanging sky, upon a land uncursed by slavery, and without an interpreter, although some difficulty might have occurred in applying its manifold provisions, yet so cunningly is it framed, that no one would have imagined that it recognized or sanctioned slavery. But having a terrestrial, and not a celestial origin, we find no difficulty in ascertaining its meaning in all the parts which we allege to relate to slavery. Slavery existed before the Constitution, in the very States by whom it was made and adopted.---Slaveholders took a large share in making it. It was made in view of the existence of slavery, and in a manner well calculated to aid and strengthen that heaven-daring crime. Take, for instance, article 1st, section 2d, to wit: ‘‘Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and including Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.’’ A diversity of persons are here described---persons bound to service for a term of years, Indians not taxed, and three-fifths of all other persons. Now, we ask, in the name of common sense, can there be an honest doubt that, in States where there are slaves, that they are included in this basis of representation? To us, it is as plain as the sun in the heavens that this clause does, and was intended to mean, that the slave States should enjoy a representation of their human chattels under this Constitution. Beside, the term free, which is generally, though not always, used as the correlative of slave, ‘‘all other persons,’’ settles the question forever that slaves are here included. Its is contended on this point by Lysander Spooner and others, that the words, ‘‘all other persons,’’ used in

90 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought this article of the Constitution, relates only to aliens. We deny that the words bear any such construction. Are we to presume that the Constitution, which so carefully points out a class of persons for exclusion, such as ‘‘Indians not taxed,’’ would be silent with respect to another class which it was meant equally to exclude? We have never studied logic, but it does seem to us that such a presumption would be very much like an absurdity. And the absurdity is all the more glaring, when it is remembered and the language used immediately after the words ‘‘excluding Indians are not taxed,’’ (having done with exclusions) it includes ‘‘all other persons.’’ It is as easy to suppose that the Constitution contemplates including Indians, (against its express declaration to the contrary,) as it is to suppose that it should be construed to mean the exclusion of slaves from the basis of representation, against the express language, ‘‘including all other persons.’’ Where all are included, none remain to be excluded. The reasonings of those who are likely to take the opposite view of the clause, appears very much like quibbling, to use no harsher word. One thing is certain about this clause of the Constitution. It is this---that under it, the slave system has enjoyed a large and domineering representation in Congress, which has given laws to the whole Union in regard to slavery, ever since the formation of the government. Satisfied that the view we have given of this clause of the Constitution is the only sound interpretation of it, we throw at once all those parts and particulars of the instrument which refer to slavery, and constitute what we conceive to be the slaveholding compromises of the Constitution, before the reader, and beg that he will look with candor upon the comments which we propose to make upon them. ‘‘Art. 5th, Sect. 8th.---Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections.’’ ‘‘Art. 1st, Sect. 9th.---The migration or importation of any such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed, not exceeding ten dollars each person.’’ ‘‘Art. 4th, Sec. 2nd.---No person held to service or labor in one State, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.’’ ‘‘Art. 4th, Sec. 4th---The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government; and shall protect each of them against

invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) against Domestic violence.’’ The first article and ninth section is a full, complete and broad sanction of the slavetrade for twenty years. In this compromise of the Constitution, the parties to it pledged the national arm to protect that infernal trade for twenty years. While all other subjects of commerce were left under the control of Congress, this species of commerce alone was Constitutionally exempted. And why was this the case? Simply because South Carolina and Georgia declared, through their delegates that framed the Constitution, that they would not come into the Union if this traffic in human flesh should be prohibited. Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, (a distinguished member of the Convention that framed the Constitution) said, ‘‘if the Convention thinks that North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain.’’ Mr. Pinckney said, South Carolina could never receive the plan, ‘‘if it prohibits the slavetrade.’’ In consequence of the determination of these States to sand out of the Union in case of the traffic in human flesh should prohibited, and from one was adopted, as a compromise; and shameful as it is, it is by no means more shameful than others which preceded and succeeded it. The slaveholding South, by that unyielding tenacity and consistency which they usually contend for their measures, triumphed, and the doughface North was brought to the disgraceful terms in question, just s they have been ever since on all questions touching the subject of slavery. As a compensation for their base treachery to human freedom and justice, the North were permitted to impose a tax of ten dollars for each person imported, with which to swell the coffers of the national treasury, thus baptizing the infant Republic with the bloodstained gold. Art. 4, Sec. 2.---This article was adopted with a view to restoring fugitive slaves to their masters---ambiguous, to be sure, but sufficiently explicit to answer the end sought to be attained. Under it, and in accordance with it, the Congress enacted the atrocious ‘‘law of ’93,’’ making it penal in a high degree to harbor or shelter the flying fugitive. The whole nation that adopted it, consented to become kidnappers, and the whole land converted into slave-hunting ground. Art. 4, Sec. 4.---Pledges the national arm to protect the slaveholder from domestic violence, and is the safeguard of the Southern tyrant against the vengeance of the outraged and plundered slave. Under it, the nation is bound to do the bidding of the slaveholder, to bring out

1.15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address 91 the whole naval and military power of the country, to crush the refractory slaves into obedience to their cruel masters. Thus has the North, under the Constitution, not only consented to form bulwarks around the system of slavery, with all its bloody enormities, to prevent the slave from escape, but has planted its uncounted feet and tremendous weight on the heaving hearts of American bondmen, to prevent them from rising to gain their freedom. Could Pandemonium devise a Union more inhuman, unjust, and affronting to God and man, than this? Yet such is the Union consummated under the Constitution of the United States. It is truly a compact demanding immediate disannulment, and one which, with our view of its wicked requirements, we can never enter. We might just here drop the pen and the subject, and assume the Constitution to be what we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially pro-slavery, in fact as well as in its tendency; and regard our position to be correct beyond the possibility of an honest doubt, and treat those who differ from us as mere cavilers, bent upon making the worse appear the better reason; or we might anticipate the objections which are supposed to be valid against that position. We are, however, disposed to do neither.---We have too much respect for the men opposed to us to do the former, and have too strong a desire to have those objections put in their most favorable light, to do the latter.---We are prepared to hear all sides, and to give the arguments of our opponents a candid consideration. Where an honest expression of views is allowed, Truth has nothing to fear. And now if our friend Gerrit Smith desires to be heard on the other side, the columns of the North Star are at his service. We can assure him that he cannot have a stronger wish to turn every rightful instrumentality against slavery, than we have; and if the Constitution can be so turned, and he can satisfy us of the fact, we shall readily, gladly and zealously, turn our feeble energies in that direction. The case which our friend Gerrit Smith put to us in his letter is a good one, but fails in a most important particular, and that is, analogy. The only likeness which we can see in the supposed case of a bargain with Brown, to that of the bargain entered into by the North and the South, is that there is gross dishonesty in both. So far, there is a striking similarity, but no further. The parties that made the Constitution, aimed to cheat and defraud the slave, who was no himself a party to the compact or agreement. It was entered into understandingly on both sides. They both designed to purchase their freedom and safety at the expense of the imbruted slave. The

North are willing to become the body guards of slavery---suppressing insurrection---returning fugitive slaves to bondage---importing slaves for twenty years, and as much longer as the Congress should see fit to leave it unprohibited, and virtually to give slaveholders three votes for ever five slaves they could plunder from Africa, and all this to form a Union by which to repel invasion, and otherwise promoted their interest. No, friend Smith, we are not asked to act the honorable part of ‘‘Judge Douglass’’ with respect to this ‘‘contract,’’ but to become a guilty party to it, and in reply we say---No! Source: The North Star, March 16, 1849.

1.15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address, September 23, 1932 San Francisco, California I count it a privilege to be invited to address the Commonwealth Club. It has stood in the life of this city and state, and it is perhaps accurate to add, the nation, as a group of citizen leaders interested in fundamental problems of government, and chiefly concerned with achievement of progress in government through nonpartisan means. The privilege of addressing you, therefore, in the heat of a political campaign, is great. I want to respond to your courtesy in terms consistent with your policy. I want to speak not of politics but of government. I want to speak not of parties, but of universal principles. They are not political, except in that larger sense in which a great American once expressed a definition of politics, that nothing in all of human life is foreign to the science of politics . . . The issue of government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of government of economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve individual men and women. This question has persistently dominated the discussion of government for many generations. On questions relating to these things men have differed, and for time immemorial it is probable that honest men will continue to differ . . . When we look about us, we are likely to forget how hard people have worked to win the privilege of government. The growth of the national governments of Europe was a struggle for the development of a

92 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought centralized force in the nation, strong enough to impose peace upon ruling barons. In many instances the victory of the central government, the creation of a strong central government, was a haven of refuge to the individual. The people preferred the master far away to the exploitation and cruelty of the smaller master near at hand. But the creators of national government were perforce ruthless men. They were often cruel in their methods, but they did strive steadily toward something that society needed and very much wanted, a strong central state, able to keep the peace, to stamp out civil war, to put the unruly nobleman in his place, and to permit the bulk of individuals to live safely. The man of ruthless force had his place in developing a pioneer country, just as he did in fixing the power of the central government in the development of nations. Society paid him well for his services and its development. When the development among the nations of Europe, however, has been completed, ambition, and ruthlessness, having served its term tended to overstep its mark. There came a growing feeling that government was conducted for the benefit of a few who thrived unduly at the expense of all. The people sought a balancing---a limiting force. There came gradually, through town councils, trade guilds, national parliaments, by constitution and by popular participation and control, limitations on arbitrary power. Another factor that tended to limit the power of those who ruled, was the rise of the ethical conception that a ruler bore a responsibility for the welfare of his subjects. The American colonies were born in this struggle. The American Revolution was a turning point in it. After the revolution the struggle continued and shaped itself in the public life of the country. There were those who because they had seen the confusion which attended the years of war for American independence surrendered to the belief that popular government was essentially dangerous and essentially unworkable. They were honest people, my friends, and we cannot deny that their experience had warranted some measure of fear. The most brilliant, honest and able exponent of this point of view was Hamilton. He was too impatient of slow moving methods. Fundamentally he believed that the safety of the republic lay in the autocratic strength of its government, that the destiny of individuals was to serve that government, and that fundamentally a great and strong group of central institutions, guided by a small group of able and public spirited citizens could best direct all government.

But Mr. Jefferson, in the summer of 1776, after drafting the Declaration of Independence turned his mind to the same problem and took a different view. He did not deceive himself with outward forms. Government to him was a means to an end, not an end in itself; it might be either a refuge and a help or a threat and a danger, depending on the circumstances. We find him carefully analyzing the society for which he was to organize a government. ‘‘We have no paupers. The great mass of our population is of laborers, our rich who cannot live without labor, either manual or professional, being few and of moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families and from the demand for their labor, are enabled to exact from the rich and the competent such prices as enable them to feed abundantly, clothe above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their families.’’ These people, he considered, had two sets of rights, those of ‘‘personal competency’’ and those involved in acquiring and possessing property. By ‘‘personal competency’’ he meant the right of free thinking, freedom of forming and expressing opinions, and freedom of personal living each man according to his own lights. To insure the first set of rights, a government must so order its functions as not to interfere with the individual. But even Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism but to protect it. You are familiar with the great political duel which followed, and how Hamilton, and his friends, building towards a dominant centralized power were at length defeated in the great election of 1800, by Mr. Jefferson’s party. Out of that duel came the two parties, Republican and Democratic, as we know them today. So began, in American political life, the new day, the day of the individual against the system, the day in which individualism was made the great watchword of American life. The happiest of economic conditions made that day long and splendid. On the Western frontier, land was substantially free. No one, who did not shirk the task of earning a living, was entirely without opportunity to do so. Depressions could, and did, come and go; but they could not alter the fundamental fact that most of the people lived partly by selling their labor and partly by extracting their livelihood from the soil, so that starvation and dislocation were practically impossible. At the very worst there was always the possibility of climbing into a covered wagon and moving west where the untilled prairies afforded a haven for men to whom the East did not provide a place. So great

1.15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address 93 were our natural resources that we could offer this relief not only to our own people, but to the distressed of all the world; we could invite immigration from Europe, and welcome it with open arms. Traditionally, when a depression came, a new section of land was opened in the West; and even our temporary misfortune served our manifest destiny. It was the middle of the 19th century that a new force was released and a new dream created. The force was what is called the industrial revolution, the advance of steam and machinery and the rise of the forerunners of the modern industrial plant. The dream was the dream of an economic machine, able to raise the standard of living for everyone; to bring luxury within the reach of the humblest; to annihilate distance by steam power and later by electricity, and to release everyone from the drudgery of the heaviest manual toil. It was to be expected that this would necessarily affect government. Heretofore, government had merely been called upon to produce conditions within which people could live happily, labor peacefully, and rest secure. Now it was called upon to aid in the consummation of this new dream. There was, however, a shadow over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the talents of men of tremendous will, and tremendous ambition, since by no other force could the problems of financing and engineering and new developments be brought to a consummation. So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. The history of the last half century is accordingly in large measure a history of a group of financial Titans, whose methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who were honored in proportion as they produced the results, irrespective of the means they used. . . . As long as we had free land; as long as population was growing by leaps and bounds; as long as our industrial plants were insufficient to supply our needs, society chose to give the ambitious man free play and unlimited reward provided only that he produced the economic plant so much desired. During this period of expansion, there was equal opportunity for all and the business of government was not to interfere but to assist in the development of industry. This was done at the request of businessmen themselves. The tariff was originally imposed for the purpose of ‘‘fostering our infant industry’’, a phrase I think the older among you will remember as a political

issue not so long ago. The railroads were subsidized, sometimes by grants of money, oftener by grants of land; some of the most valuable oil lands in the United States were granted to assist the financing of the railroad which pushed through the Southwest. A nascent merchant marine was assisted by grants of money, or by mail subsidies, so that our steam shipping might ply the seven seas. Some of my friends tell me that they do not want the Government in business. With this I agree; but I wonder whether they realize the implications of the past. For while it has been American doctrine that the government must not go into business in competition with private enterprises, still it has been traditional particularly in Republican administrations for business urgently to ask the government to put at private disposal all kinds of government assistance. The same man who tells you that he does not want to see the government interfere in business---and he means it, and has plenty of good reasons for saying so---is the first to go to Washington and ask the government for a prohibitory tariff on his product. When things get just bad enough---as they did two years agohe will go with equal speed to the United States government and ask for a loan; and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is the outcome of it. Each group has sought protection from the government for its own special interest, without realizing that the function of government must be to favor no small group at the expense of its duty to protect the rights of personal freedom and of private property of all its citizens. In retrospect we can now see that the turn of the tide came with the turn of the century. We were reaching our last frontier; there was no more free land and our industrial combinations had become great uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power within the state. Clearsighted men saw with fear the danger that opportunity would no longer be equal; that the growing corporation, like the feudal baron of old, might threaten the economic freedom of individuals to earn a living. In that hour, our antitrust laws were born. The cry was raised against the great corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, the first great Republican progressive, fought a Presidential campaign on the issue of ‘‘trust busting’’ and talked freely about malefactors of great wealth. If the government had a policy it was rather to turn the clock back, to destroy the large combinations and to return to the time when every man owned his individual small business. This was impossible; Theodore Roosevelt, abandoning the idea of ‘‘trust busting‘‘, was forced to work out a difference between ‘‘good’’ trusts and ‘‘bad’’ trusts. The Supreme Court set forth the famous ‘‘rule of

94 Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Reform in American Political Thought reason’’ by which it seems to have meant that a concentration of industrial power was permissible if the method by which it got its power, and the use it made of that power, was reasonable. Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, saw the situation more clearly. Where Jefferson had feared the encroachment of political power on the lives of individuals, Wilson knew that the new power was financial. He saw, in the highly centralized economic system, the depot of the twentieth century, on whom great masses of individuals relied for their safety and their livelihood, and whose irresponsibility and greed (if it were not controlled) would reduce them to starvation and penury. The concentration of financial power had not proceeded so far in 1912 as it has today; but it had grown far enough for Mr. Wilson to realize fully its implications. It is interesting, now, to read his speeches. What is called ‘‘radical’’ today (and I have reason to know whereof I speak) is mild compared to the campaign of Mr. Wilson. ‘‘No man can deny,’’ he said, ‘‘that the lines of endeavor have more and more narrowed and stiffened; no man who knows anything about the development of industry in this country can have failed to observe that the larger kinds of credit are more and more difficult to obtain unless you obtain them upon terms of uniting your efforts with those who already control the industry of the country, and nobody can fail to observe that every man who tries to set himself up in competition with any process of manufacture which has taken place under the control of large combinations of capital will presently find himself either squeezed out or obliged to sell and allow himself to be absorbed.’’ . . . A glance at the situation today only too clearly indicates that equality of opportunity as we have know it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem just now is whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by cultivating their own property. There is no safety valve in the from of a Western prairie to which those thrown out of work by the Eastern economic machines can go for a new start. We are not able to invite the immigration from Europe to share our endless plenty. We are now providing a drab living for our own people. . . . Recently a careful study was made of the concentration of business in the United States. It showed that our economic life was dominated by some six hundred odd corporations who controlled two-thirds of American industry. Ten million small business men divided the other third. More striking still, it appeared that if the

process of concentration goes on at the same rate, at the end of another century we shall have all American industry controlled by a dozen corporations, and run by perhaps a hundred men. Put plainly, we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already. Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere builder of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad systems, and organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger as a help. The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted anything if only he would build, or develop, is over. Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has come. Just as in older times the central government was first a haven of refuge, and then a threat, so now in a closer economic system the central and ambitious financial unit is no longer a servant of national desire, but a danger. I would draw the parallel one step farther. We did not think because national government had become a threat in the 18th century that therefore we should abandon the principle of national government. Nor today should we abandon the principle of strong economic units called corporations, merely because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we dealt with the problem of an unduly ambitious central government by modifying it gradually into a constitutional democratic government. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic units. As I see it, the task of government in its relation to business is to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman and business man. It is the minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things. Every man has a right to life; and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living. He may by sloth or crime decline to exercise that right; but it may not be denied him. We have no actual famine or death; our industrial and agricultural mechanism can produce enough and to spare. Our government formal and informal., political and economic, owes to every one an avenue to possess himself of a portion of that plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work.

1.15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address 95 Every man has a right to his own property; which means a right to be assured, to the fullest extent attainable, in the safety of his savings. By no other means can men carry the burdens of those parts of life which, in the nature of things afford no chance of labor; childhood, sickness, old age. In all thought of property, this right is paramount; all other property rights must yield to it. If, in accord with this principle, we must restrict the operations of the speculator, the manipulator, even the financier, I believe we must accept the restriction as needful, not to hamper individualism but to protect it. These two requirements must be satisfied, in the main, by the individuals who claim and hold control of the great industrial and financial combinations which dominate so large a pert of our industrial life. They have undertaken to be, not business men, but princesprinces of property. I am not prepared to say that the system which produces them is wrong. I am very clear that they must fearlessly and competently assume the responsibility which goes with the power. So many enlightened business men know this that the statement would be little more that a platitude, were it not for an added implication. This implication is, briefly, that the responsible heads of finance and industry instead of acting each for himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. It is here that formal government-political government, if you choose, comes in. Whenever in the pursuit of this objective the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter, the Ishmael or Insull whose hand is against every man’s,

declines to join in achieving and end recognized as being for the public welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a state of anarchy, the government may properly be asked to apply restraint. Likewise, should the group ever use its collective power contrary to public welfare, the government must be swift to enter and protect the public interest. The government should assume the function of economic regulation only as a last resort, to be tried only when private initiative, inspired by high responsibility, with such assistance and balance as government can give, has finally failed. As yet there has been no final failure, because there has been no attempt, and I decline to assume that this nation is unable to meet the situation. The final term of the high contract was for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We have learnt a great deal of both in the past century. We know that individual liberty and individual happiness mean nothing unless both are ordered in the sense that one man’s meat is not another man’s poison. We know that the old ‘‘rights of personal competency’’---the right to read, to think, to speak to choose and live a mode of life, must be respected at all hazards. We know that liberty to do anything which deprives others of those elemental rights is outside the protection of any compact; and that government in this regard is the maintenance of a balance, within which every individual may have a place if he will take it; in which every individual may find safety if he wishes it; in which every individual may attain such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying responsibility . . .

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Section 2 Religion and American Politics

Introduction

Declaration of Independence enshrined human rights with ‘‘theological lucidity’’ as inalienable gifts from God. Despite the clear separation of church and state, if not because of it, religion from the start has been deeply entwined with American politics. John Winthop’s 1630 vision that ‘‘we shall be as a city upon a hill’’ reverberates, inspires, and rankles centuries later. At the time of its founding, the United States was overwhelmingly Christian and predominantly Protestant. In the early 21st century, it is home to Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, atheists, and others. How has the relationship between religion and politics in America evolved over time, from the colonial and founding periods to the contemporary era? What role did religion play at the founding, and how did the nation’s architects resolve the most compelling and controversial issues concerning church and state? To what extent have religious traditions and ideas informed American political thought? How has the renewed mobilization and ascendancy of evangelical Protestantism in recent decades recast American politics? The essays that follow by Mark David Hall, Paul R. Babbitt, and Michael Janson help us answer these compelling questions. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The First Amendment to the Constitution states that ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.’’ This establishment clause was originally designed to prevent the new American government from privileging any denomination over others and from sponsoring an official national church. The meaning of this provision has been hotly debated over time, as contemporary secularists contend that ‘‘the first liberty’’ prohibits not only specific religious preferences but also broader government endorsements of religion that violate the freedom to have no religion. Yet the separation of church and state did nothing to weaken the influence of religion on American society. Indeed, churches and clergy developed into powerful and independent forces in national life, while religious freedom and traditions richly inform American liberalism and democracy. During the Jacksonian era, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that religious faith in America nurtured civic virtue and political community. Nearly a century later, the English author G. K. Chesterton described the United States as ‘‘a nation with the soul of a church.’’ If the First Amendment protects individuals against the coercion of dominant or state-sponsored religious orders, Chesterton was quick to observe that the

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Religion and the American Founding Mark David Hall Herbert Hoover Distinguished Professor of Political Science, George Fox University

among them. Beginning in 1620, Puritans, Protestant Christians who gained their name because of their desire to purify the Church of England, formed colonies dedicated to, in the words of the Mayflower Compact (1620), ‘‘the glory of God, and the advancement of the

Religion and politics have been intimately connected in America from its earliest colonial settlements to the most recent elections. Although some frown on this relationship and have argued that the two should be separate, this ideal has never characterized mainstream American politics. Americans have furiously debated how religion and politics should be connected, and political actors and activists have appealed to religious convictions to support a wide variety of laws and policies. This is particularly true with respect to arguments over the scope of religious liberty and the proper relations between church and state. Over the last 60 years, the views of America’s founders have come to play an increasingly significant role in defining the proper relationship between religion and politics---particularly with respect to interpreting the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This essay focuses on religion and politics in the American founding era (roughly 1776--1800); but the story cannot begin there. Before 1776, Americans had up to 150 years of experience in governing themselves. For most of this time, the American colonies were part of the British Empire, but the king and parliament largely left Americans alone when it came to the colonies’ internal politics.

Religion in Colonial America New England

Governor John Winthrop was one of the most powerful political leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony during its formative years. His vision of America laid the foundation for the role of religion in public life. (Library of Congress)

Immigrants came to America for a variety of reasons, but for New England’s earliest settlers, faith was chief 99

100 Religion and American Politics Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 86). According to Jonathan Winthrop, governor or deputy governor of Massachusetts Bay colony during the 1630s and 1640s, these thoroughly Christian societies would serve as examples to the world and would help speed Christ’s Second Coming and establish his millennial reign on Earth. This doctrine of ‘‘millennialism’’ would come to play an important role in encouraging the idea that Americans are a special people chosen by God to promote His purposes on Earth. Puritans believed that church and state were separate institutions, but thought that they should work together closely. Clergy were often banned from holding political office, and European practices such as ecclesiastical (church) courts were never permitted in America. The state, however, was to be a ‘‘nursing father’’ to the church (a reference taken from Isaiah 49:23). Early legal codes, such as the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639) and the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), reflect the influence of Christianity on the political system. Throughout New England, the Congregational Church was supported financially by the state. Colonies adopted religious tests for voters and officials, and the laws were often derived from the Bible. Indeed, in some cases, lengthy biblical passages were incorporated wholesale into legal codes. Protestant dissenters in New England were tolerated if they remained quiet and did not disturb the public order. However, vocal and disorderly dissenters such as the Quakers and individuals like Anne Hutchinson (1638) and Roger Williams (1636) were banned or exiled from the colony.

Rhode Island After Williams was exiled in 1636, he was able to gain a charter for a new colony---Rhode Island. Williams had come to Massachusetts Bay in support of the Puritan cause, but he was banished because of his radical separatist views. Rhode Island soon became known as a bastion of religious toleration. In a 1644 essay explaining his views of church-state relations, he famously suggested that there should be a ‘‘hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 147). Although fairly radical for its time, it is instructive to note that Williams and the founders of Rhode Island were motivated by their fervent pursuit of religious purity---not a fear of religion---and that even this tolerant colony had religious tests for office and laws against practices deemed to be ungodly or immoral such as adultery and witchcraft.

The South Few historians doubt the significance of Christian beliefs for the settlers of New England. However, there is a tendency among scholars to deemphasize the importance of religion in the southern colonies, which they often characterize as commercial colonies. While there is truth in this generalization, Christianity still played an important role in southern society and politics. The leaders of these colonies tended to be members of the Church of England, and this church was established throughout the South. As in New England, these colonies had religious tests for office-holders and vocal dissenters were banned. The religious character of the southern colonies is suggested by the Virginia Articles, Laws, and Orders (1610--1611). The document begins: Whereas his Majesty, like himself a most zealous prince, has in his own realms a principal care of true religion and reverence to God and has always strictly commanded his generals and governors, with all his forces wheresoever, to let their ways be, like his ends, for the glory of God. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 84) This preface is followed by 37 articles, of which the first requires colonists to attend religious services twice a day, the second prohibits them from speaking ‘‘impiously or maliciously against the holy and blessed trinity,’’ and the third outlaws blasphemy. Moreover, the penalty for violating the second or third article is death. Although this constitution was later modified to make it less harsh, Christianity’s influence remained strong throughout the South.

Maryland Roman Catholics were banned in many early colonies, but Maryland was founded by Lord Baltimore as a haven for them. In 1649, Maryland’s legislature passed ‘‘An Act concerning Religion’’ to protect and promote religious toleration. After the Glorious Revolution (1688), the statute was repealed and, eventually, the Church of England was established in the colony, and Catholics were denied the right to vote, hold office, and worship publicly. Nevertheless, the law remains an important early attempt to protect religious minorities.

Pennsylvania The most significant colony founded by religious dissenters was Pennsylvania. Under the leadership of the Quaker William Penn, the colony is justly noted for its toleration of religious minorities. Even here, however,

Religion and the American Founding office-holders were required to be Protestant Christians, and the state was assumed to have the responsibility of punishing ungodly and immoral behavior. For instance, Article 37 of the ‘‘Charter of Liberties and Frame of Government of the Province of Pennsylvania’’ (1681) states: [t]hat as a careless and corrupt administration of justice draws the wrath of God upon magistrates, so the wildness and looseness of the people provoke the indignation of God against a country: therefore, that all such offences against God, as swearing, cursing, lying, prophane talking, drunkenness, drinking of healths, obscene words, incest, sodomy, rapes, whoredom, fornication, and other uncleanness (not to be repeated) all treasons, misprisions, murders, duels, felony, seditions, maims, forcible entries, and other violences, to the persons and estates of the inhabitants within this province; all prizes, stage-plays, cards, dice, May-games, gamesters, masques, revels, bull-battings, cock-fightings, bearbattings, and the like, which excite the people to rudeness, cruelty, looseness, and irreligion, shall be respectively discouraged, and severely punished, according to the appointment of the Governor and

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freemen in provincial Council and General Assembly; as also all proceedings contrary to these laws, that are not here made expressly penal. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 119) The above passage, from the charter of one of the most tolerant of the American colonies, represents well the colonial (and European) view that the state may justifiably enforce Christian morality. Moreover, every colony except Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and, arguably, New Jersey, had an established church. Even where no church was established, colonies enacted religious tests for political offices. In sum, although there was institutional separation between the church and the state in colonial America, the two worked closely together to protect and promote Protestant Christianity.

The Religious Views of America’s Founders At the beginning of the 18th century, most Americans of European descent were Congregationalists/Presbyterians or Anglicans, but religious minorities were scattered throughout the colonies. In addition to Catholics

Depiction of an early evangelical Christian revival. Evangelism emerged in the American colonies in the 1730s, finding a wide audience in the instability of a prerevolutionary society. (Library of Congress)

102 Religion and American Politics and Quakers (discussed above), immigration from Germany and elsewhere brought Mennonites, Brethren, Moravians, Lutherans, and others. Moreover, splinter groups such as the Shakers were tolerated in the colonies, and new sects like Baptists and Methodists were given room to flourish. Notably, Baptists began to increase in number rapidly during the First Great Awakening, a series of religious revivals that swept across America in the 1730s and 1740s. A central characteristic of the Great Awakening was its emphasis on individuals having a conversion experience. Revivalists such as George Whitefield consciously adopted innovative preaching styles and messages aimed at encouraging such conversions. In doing so, these revivalists challenged old hierarchies and encouraged a more egalitarian understanding of Christianity. Closely connected with these revivals was the increasingly prevalent association of millennialism with America. Scholars such as Alan Heimert have argued that the Great Awakening’s egalitarianism and millennialism helped pave the way for the American Revolution. In spite of the presence of a variety of religious minorities, in 1776, virtually all Americans of European descent remained associated with Protestant churches. According to Sydney Ahlstrom, approximately threefourths of all Americans participated in churches heavily influenced by the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition (Ahlstrom 1975, 426). In denominational terms, 20.4 percent of Americans were Congregationalists, 19 percent were Presbyterian, 16.9 percent were Baptists, 15.7 percent were Anglicans, and 2.5 percent were Methodists (Finke and Stark 1992, 55). The only major nonProtestant group among Americans of European descent were Roman Catholics, who constituted 1.8 percent of the population. The only openly non-Christian group among these Americans was the approximately 1,500 Jews (about 0.0005 percent of the population), most of whom were concentrated in Providence, Rhode Island; New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Charleston, South Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia. Some students of religion in the founding era have emphasized the rise of deism among Americans in the late-18th century (for example, Holmes 2006). There is no single definition of deism, and it was not represented by an institution until the rise of Unitarian churches in the very late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Generally, deists affirm the existence of God and the importance of virtuous living, but deny traditional Christian doctrines about the trinity, the incarnation, and miracles. Some definitions of deism

also insist that God is not active in history. There is little evidence that more than a handful of Americans were deists by the narrowest definition, but if one defines deism to allow for a God who is active in history, several of the most prominent founders were probably deists. By all accounts, deism was most popular among elite, well-educated Americans. The most prominent supposed deists were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Ethan Allen, and Thomas Paine. Some scholars put George Washington and James Madison in this camp as well. With the exception of Allen and Paine, deists remained members of traditional denominations and were quiet about their heterodox beliefs. The vast majority of Americans, both elites and nonelites, left little evidence of embracing deism.

Religion and the American Revolution From their inception, Great Britain’s colonies in North America were largely self-governing with respect to their internal affairs. Parliament’s attempts in the 1760s and 1770s to assert control over the colonies and, particularly, to institute various taxes without their consent, led to an increasingly violent series of clashes between American patriots and British officials. After the Boston Tea Party of 1773, Parliament passed a series of repressive measures that became known in America as the ‘‘Coercive’’ or ‘‘Intolerable’’ Acts. When attempts to reconcile with Great Britain failed, the Second Continental Congress approved Richard Henry Lee’s resolution ‘‘[t]hat these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 220). Two days later, on July 4, 1776, Congress approved the Declaration of Independence. On the surface, at least, the American Revolution should have posed a dilemma for the vast majority of Americans---especially for those in the Reformed tradition---who adhered to the doctrine of sola scriptura (scripture alone). This doctrine holds that the Bible (as opposed to church tradition or ecclesiastical pronouncements) is the only true guide to faith and religious practice. Historically, Christians had taken biblical texts such as Romans 13 to prohibit revolution. The first two verses in this chapter seem quite clear: Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be

Religion and the American Founding are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 14) Although these and other biblical passages appear to leave little room for revolution, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, some Christian scholars began to allow for the possibility of inferior magistrates overthrowing evil kings. These ideas were developed and significantly expanded by the Protestant Reformers, as illustrated by Stephen Junius Brutus’s Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (1579). By the American Revolution, many Americans in this tradition were convinced that rebellion against evil rulers was not merely a right; it was a duty. This view is represented well in John Witherspoon’s influential 1776 sermon ‘‘The Dominion of Providence Over the Passions of Men.’’ Witherspoon, the Presbyterian president of Princeton University, also served in the Continental Congress and was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Not all Reformed Protestants supported the Revolution, and not all revolutionaries were Reformed Protestants. Indeed, many of the Revolution’s most famous leaders were members of the Church of England (for example, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Patrick Henry, and George Mason). Yet they, like their Reformed cousins, often justified the Revolution in religious terms. Indeed, the central arguments of the foremost document of the American Revolution rely on Christian premises. Most notably, the Declaration of Independence begins, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. Central to the Declaration’s argument is the premise that there is a Creator who endows men with rights. Some scholars argue that this claim is not to be taken seriously, and as evidence point out that Thomas

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Jefferson, who drafted the document, was a deist. While Jefferson was not an orthodox Christian, Congress revised and ultimately authorized the document, and Jefferson himself later stated that that the object of the Declaration ‘‘was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day’’ (Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, in Koch and Peden 1993, 656--657). There is little reason to doubt that most Americans took the Declaration’s premises quite seriously. The debate over the theological claims in the Declaration points to a larger disagreement over the intellectual origins of the American Revolution. Some scholars consider the political theory of John Locke (sometimes referred to as ‘‘Lockean liberalism,’’ or simply ‘‘liberalism’’) to be the most important intellectual influence. It is indisputable that well-educated Americans in this era read and were influenced by Locke’s ideas. Moreover, they indisputably drew from classical ideas, the Scottish Enlightenment, and the common law (British legal) tradition. It is difficult to quantify the relative influence of these traditions, but there is little doubt that Americans were heavily influenced by Christianity and that the Bible played an important part in political debates. The latter point is demonstrated well by Donald Lutz who, in a classic study of 15,000 pamphlets, articles, and books on political subjects in this era, showed that Americans were far more likely to appeal to the Bible than any other work. Indeed, they cited it more than the works of all Enlightenment authors (a group that includes Locke) combined. The impact of Christianity on American leaders during the Revolution is illustrated in part by the national government’s actions during this era.

Religion and the Continental and Confederation Congresses The Second Continental Congress convened on May 10, 1775. It remained the only national governing body in America until the new government established by the U.S. Constitution assumed power in 1789. Although it was a continuation of the same body, after the states ratified the Articles of Confederation in 1781, the Second Continental Congress became known as ‘‘the Congress of the Confederation’’ or ‘‘the Confederation Congress.’’ The powers of this body were extremely limited as most Americans believed that state or local governments should exercise most civil authority. Congress, however, did have the power to pass laws and

104 Religion and American Politics resolutions on a few national and international issues. Some of these acts reveal how America’s political leaders approached church-state issues within the context of a limited national government. During the course of the Revolutionary War, Congress issued 13 calls for prayer and fasting or thanksgiving. These proclamations, and similar ones issued by state governments, are explicitly, and often narrowly, Christian. Illustrative of these calls is one issued by Congress after the surrender of British Gen. John Burgoyne in New York. Congress appointed a committee consisting of Samuel Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and Daniel Roberdeau to write the proclamation. The following resolution was approved by Congress on November 1, 1777, and is reprinted in full below: Forasmuch as it is the indispensable duty of all men to adore the superintending providence of Almighty God; to acknowledge with their gratitude their obligation to him for benefits received, and to implore such farther blessings as they stand in need of; and it having pleased him in his abundant mercy not only to continue to us the innumerable bounties of his common providence, but also smile upon us in the prosecution of a just and necessary war, for the defence and establishment of our unalienable rights and liberties; particularly in that he hath been pleased in so great a measure to prosper the means used for the support of our troops and to crown our arms with most signal success: It is therefore recommended to the legislative or executive powers of these United States, to set apart Thursday, the eighteenth day of December next, for solemn thanksgiving and praise; ’that with one heart and one voice the good people may express the grateful feelings of their hearts, and consecrate themselves to the service of their divine benefactor; and that together with their sincere acknowledgments and offerings, they may join the penitent confession of their manifold sins, whereby they had forfeited every favor, and their humble and earnest supplication that it may please God, through the merits of Jesus Christ, mercifully to forgive and blot them out of remembrance; that it may please him graciously to afford his blessings on the governments of these states respectively, and prosper the public council of the whole; to inspire our commanders both by land and sea, and all under them, with that wisdom and fortitude which may render them fit instruments, under the providence of Almighty God, to secure for these United States the greatest of all blessings, independence and peace; that it may please him to prosper

the trade and manufactures of the people and the labor of the husbandman, that our land may yield its increase; to take school and seminaries of education, so necessary for cultivating the principles of true liberty, virtue and piety, under his nurturing hand, and to prosper the means of religion for the promotion and enlargement of that kingdom which consisteth ‘‘in righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.’’ And it is further recommended, that service labor, and such recreation as, though at other time innocent, may be unbecoming the purpose of this appointment, be omitted on so solemn an occasion. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 14) In addition to passing resolutions, Congress authorized a variety of laws drawing from or promoting Christianity. For instance, the Second Continental Congress convened by inviting the Rev. Jacob Duche to initiate its proceedings in prayer, and it retained a congressional chaplain throughout its existence. Congress also provided for military chaplains, and a 1775 statute regulating the Continental Army encouraged officers and soldiers to ‘‘diligently attend Divine Service’’ and penalized the use of profane oaths. Congress’s view of religious liberty and church-state relations is perhaps best illustrated by passages in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which governed federal territories and guaranteed that ‘‘[n]o person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory’’ and proclaimed that ‘‘Religion, Morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, Schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 236, 238).

New Views of Religious Liberty In May 1776, the Continental Congress approved a resolution recommending that states adopt new constitutions. Most states followed this advice, writing new constitutions and, over the next decade, significantly revising their statutory laws to reflect the principles of the Revolution. The exact content of these principles, and how they should be reflected in constitutional or statutory law, was the subject of much disagreement. This was particularly true with respect to religious liberty and religious establishments. Debates over these issues occurred in every state, but those in Virginia have become the most famous and influential. Accordingly, this section of the essay draws heavily from debates and decisions made there.

Religion and the American Founding With respect to religious liberty, consensus was virtually complete among state leaders that individuals should be free to believe what they want and to worship God as their consciences dictate. This conviction was often based on the theological principle that humans should be free to fulfill their duties to God. For instance, in 1776 George Mason proposed a draft of what became Article XVI of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights. It reads: That as Religion, or the Duty which we owe to our divine and omnipotent Creator, and the Manner of discharging it, can be governed only by Reason and Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore that all Men shou’d enjoy the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of Conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the Magistrate, unless, under Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, the Happiness, or Safety of Society, or of Individuals. And that it is the mutual Duty of all, to practice Christian forbearance, Love and Charity towards Each other. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 241) In his first significant public act, James Madison objected to using the word ‘‘toleration’’ in the article, believing that it implied that religious liberty was a grant from the civil state that could be revoked at will. The Virginia Convention agreed, and Article XVI, which had profound influence on subsequent state constitutions, declarations of rights, and the national bill of rights, was amended to make it clear that ‘‘the free exercise of religion’’ is a natural right, not a privilege granted by the state. By the end of the Revolutionary Era every state constitution offered significant protection of religious liberty. Although there was general consensus on the necessity of religious liberty, there was significant debate throughout the states concerning whether and/or how religion should be supported by the civil authorities. These debates are sometimes described as a struggle between intolerant establishmentarian Christians wanting to retain oppressive practices and Enlightenment rationalists who desired complete religious liberty and the strict separation between church and state. However, this characterization obscures more than it illuminates. Notably, it suggests that advocates of state support for religion were far more intolerant than they tended to be, and that opponents of establishment were against religion, in general, or any state support of religion, more specifically.

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During the Revolutionary Era, most states either disestablished their official church, particularly states where the Church of England was previously established, or moved to a system of ‘‘plural’’ or ‘‘multiple’’ establishments. Under the latter system, clergy from a variety of Protestant denominations were supported by state funds. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed for such a system, and defended it with language used widely by proponents of such establishments: As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality; and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of the public worship of God, and of the public instructions in piety, religion, and morality: Therefore, to promote their happiness, and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 246). Note that this provision allows for the financial support of ministers from different denominations and does not require state involvement if ministers are supported voluntarily by their congregations. It does, however, limit support to Protestants and provides no protection for nonbelievers who do not want to support a local church. Attempts to abolish or amend religious establishments provoked significant public debate. In Virginia, the legislature received hundreds of petitions supporting and opposing proposals to provide financial aid for churches. For instance, in response to Patrick Henry’s 1784 general assessment bill (which would have provided support to ministers from different denominations), a group of citizens from Westmoreland County petitioned the legislature in favor of the bill, contending that Religion is absolutely requisite for the well ordering of Society and the aid of Government: and that its Pastors should be comfortably provided for: It being

106 Religion and American Politics highly unreasonable to suppose that any set of men could devote their time of Fortune to the Attainment of Education unless they should Expect to be enabled to preserve a decent and respectable rank in life. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 307) Much as the public school teachers of the 21st century have argued that competitive salaries are necessary to attract the best candidates into the profession, these 18th-century citizens believed that state funds are necessary to attract the best young men into the ministry--and both groups thought that such state support would pay great dividends. However, not all citizens agreed. On the same day that the Virginia legislature received the abovenoted petition, a second one arrived from the same county opposing Henry’s assessment bill. These citizens did not question the benefits of religion, but they objected to the bill because they believed that state support harmed religion. They argued that such assessments were against ‘‘the spirit of the Gospel,’’ that ‘‘the Holy Author of our Religion’’ did not require state support, and that Christianity was far purer before ‘‘Constantine first established Christianity by human laws’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 308). Rejecting their fellow petitioners’ arguments that government support was necessary to attract good candidates to the ministry, they argued that clergy should manifest to the world ‘‘that they are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon them that Office,’’ that they seek the good of Mankind and not worldly Interest. Let their doctrines be scriptural and their Lives upright. Then shall Religion (if departed) speedily return, and Deism be put to open shame, and its dreaded Consequences removed. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 308) Most Americans who opposed state establishments did so for religious reasons. Leading opponents of establishments included ministers such as John Leland and Isaac Backus. Moreover, many petitions opposing multiple establishments were members of churches or denominations that could have benefited from such establishments. Even opponents of Patrick Henry’s assessment bill who were most influenced by Enlightenment ideas framed their arguments in terms of the beneficial effects disestablishment would have for religion. For instance, Madison’s famous ‘‘Memorial and Remonstrance’’ contended that the bill erred by interfering with religious liberty---a right that is unalienable

‘‘because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 309). As well, he argued that ‘‘ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation’’ and ‘‘the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 312). Henry’s general assessment bill was never enacted. Instead, in 1786 the Virginia state legislature passed a bill drafted by Thomas Jefferson entitled ‘‘A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.’’ Commonly referred to as ‘‘The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,’’ it justified removing all financial support for religion: Almighty God hath created the mind free, that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do, that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world and through all time: That to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 250) Not all states immediately followed Virginia in removing state support from churches. For instance, New Hampshire retained its system of multiple establishments until 1819, and Massachusetts retained its until 1833. Moreover, many states kept in place religious tests for office, laws against blasphemy, laws prohibiting work on the Sabbath, and other such laws. However, the Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty does reflect a sentiment that would become dominant in the 19th century---the idea that state should not provide financial support to churches.

Religion and the American Founding

Religion and the Constitution The U.S. Constitution differs significantly from earlier colonial and state constitutions by the almost complete absence of God or religion from the document. Some provisions implicitly assume a Christian society---such as a pocket veto taking effect 10 days after a bill is passed by Congress, Sundays excepted. Yet these hints are more than balanced by Article VI’s requirement that ‘‘no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.’’ In fact, the only specific mention of God in the Constitution is found in the date it was presented to the states: ‘‘In the Year of our Lord 1787.’’ Some scholars have argued that the lack of references to God in the Constitution demonstrates that the founders intended to create a secular commonwealth (for example, Kramnick and Moore 1996). However, this claim neglects the reality that the founders were creating a national government for the limited purposes enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. To the extent to which civil governments should promote religion or morality, most founders believed that this should be done at the state or local level. Because the federal government was not to be concerned with these issues, they were not addressed in the Constitution. The Constitution contains virtually no references to God, but scholars such as Barry Shain (1994) and Michael Novak (2002) have argued that Christian ideas had an important impact on it. For instance, they suggest that the founders’ belief that humans are selfinterested is best explained in terms of their religious faith. This commitment led them to avoid utopian experiments favored by some Enlightenment thinkers. Recognizing, as James Madison put it in Federalist No. 51, that ‘‘men are not angels,’’ they designed a constitutional system characterized by separated powers, checks and balances, and federalism. Shain, Novak, and others also argue that the founders’ moral views are best understood in light of Christianity. Almost without exception, the founders believed that God established moral standards and that legislation should be made in accordance with them. This conviction manifests itself in their abstract reflections, such as James Wilson’s law lectures, parts of which read like Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, and practical actions, for example, all but one Supreme Court justice before John Marshall argued publicly that the Court could strike down an act of Congress if it violated natural (moral) law. Of particular significance, the founders’ understanding of liberty is difficult to comprehend outside of their

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Christian cultural context. Shain identifies eight different ways in which the word was used in the 18th century. Only one of these is related to the excessively individualistic way the term is commonly used today. Instead, the founders were far more likely to see liberty as the freedom to do what is morally correct, as illustrated by Wilson’s statement that ‘‘[w]ithout liberty, law loses its nature and its name, and becomes oppression. Without law, liberty also loses its nature and its name, and becomes licentiousness’’ (Hall 1997, 53). Finally, and perhaps most critically, the founders believed that humans were created in the image of God. In part, this means that men and women are rational beings. Accordingly, the people, as opposed to merely the elite, are capable of ordering their public lives together through politics rather than force. This idea owed virtually nothing to Enlightenment thought, which tended to favor government by educated elites, and a great deal to the founders’ Christian faith. As well, this conviction underlay their belief that all humans should be treated with dignity. Of course this did not immediately translate into equal treatment in all respects, but it arguably set the groundwork for the abolition of slavery, the equal treatment of women, penal reform, and so on. This list of ways in which Christianity may have influenced the authors of the Constitution could be extended, but the above examples are representative. One might agree that America’s founders adhered to these ideas but conclude that they did so for other reasons. And it is almost certainly the case that various founders arrived at similar conclusions for different reasons. These issues are complicated, but at a minimum, it should be clear that it is unwise to conclude that the Constitution is ‘‘godless’’ simply because it contains little religious language.

The First Amendment After the Constitution was proposed, it was sent to conventions in each state for ratification. Anti-Federalists opposed ratification for a number of reasons, but most significantly was their objection that it did not contain a bill of rights. Federalists responded that one was unnecessary because the federal government possessed only limited, enumerated powers. They argued, for instance, that Congress could not restrict religious liberty or speech because it had no power to regulate either. The Anti-Federalists were unconvinced, and supporters of the Constitution eventually agreed to add a bill of rights. James Madison, newly elected to the House of Representatives, took the lead in drafting the Bill of Rights.

108 Religion and American Politics In 1789, Congress passed 12 proposed amendments, 10 of which were ratified shortly thereafter. The beginning of the First Amendment contains the provisions most concerned with religion: ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 433). Some scholars argue that these words constitute one clause aimed at protecting religion, but most treat it as containing two clauses: the free exercise clause and the establishment clause. As noted above, consensus was significant among the founders that religious liberty should be protected. Most scholars agree that the free exercise clause (‘‘Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’’) guarantees the right of men and women to believe whatever they want. There is also a general consensus that it was intended to protect religious practices. The chief question concerning the clause is the extent to which the founders intended it to require exemptions from generally applicable laws. For example, if Congress passes a law prohibiting polygamy, does the free exercise clause mean that an exemption must be made for members of a religious sect who believe that polygamy is required by their faith? By the founding era, colonial statutes banning religious minorities such as Quakers and Roman Catholics had been repealed. Religious dissenters generally were tolerated, and state legislatures sometimes even made accommodations for their unique practices. For instance, many states allowed men who were pacifists for religious reasons to hire a substitute to meet their military obligations. In a similar fashion, Article VI of the Constitution accommodates persons who object to taking oaths by permitting them to ‘‘affirm’’ their support for the Constitution. Although anyone can take advantage of this provision, the founders primarily had in mind Quakers and other religious minorities who have religious objections to taking oaths. Yet in spite of these special provisions for religious minorities, little evidence supports the idea that the founders intended the First Amendment to require exemptions from generally applicable laws---a position the Supreme Court affirmed in Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Legislatures are clearly permitted to make exemptions, however, and most of the founders apparently favored them, when feasible. As with the free exercise clause, there has been a tremendous amount of debate concerning the exact meaning of the establishment clause (‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’’). No one denies that this provision prohibits Congress

from creating a national church similar to the Church of England. But does it forbid anything else? Advocates of a strict separation between church and state (often referred to as separationists) contend that it prohibits all government support for religion. Accordingly, they oppose practices such as prayer in public school, government subsidies to religious schools, and holiday displays on public land. On the other hand, accommodationists believe that governments may encourage and support religion as long as they do not create official state churches or force citizens to engage in religious practices. Nonpreferentialists, a subset of accommodationists, also insist that governments may not favor one denomination or faith. As long as these criteria are met, practices like prayer in public schools, government subsidies to religious schools, and holiday displays on public land are constitutionally permissible. Advocates for both of these interpretations of the establishment clause rely heavily on the views of the founders to support their positions. Separationists tend to focus on Madison and Jefferson, citing the former’s ‘‘Memorial and Remonstrance’’ and ‘‘Detached Memoranda’’ (c. 1817) and the latter’s ‘‘Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty’’ (1786) and 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists as evidence that the founders wanted the strict separation between church and state. Jefferson’s letter to the Baptists has played a particularly important role in debates over the establishment clause. Written in response to a letter by the Danbury Baptist Association congratulating him upon his election, Jefferson wrote: To messers. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, & Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of Connecticut. Gentlemen The affectionate sentiments of esteem and approbation which you are so good as to express towards me, on behalf of the Danbury Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. my duties dictate a faithful and zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, & in proportion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those duties, the discharge of them becomes more and more pleasing. Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should

This letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802 provides insight into his views of the importance of the separation of church and state. Included in the letter is an explanation of why, as president, Jefferson did not follow the example of his predecessors and proclaim national days of prayer and thanksgiving. (Library of Congress)

110 Religion and American Politics ‘‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties. I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the common father and creator of man, and tender you for yourselves & your religious association, assurances of my high respect & esteem. Th Jefferson Jan. 1. 1802. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 528) Separationists have been particularly attracted to Jefferson’s metaphor of a ‘‘wall’’ of separation. To them, it summarizes the founders’ desire to completely ban government aid to religious organizations or participation in religious practices. Accommodationists contend that relying on this letter and its famous metaphor is problematic for multiple reasons. They point out that Jefferson played no role in writing or ratifying the First Amendment and that he used the phrase only one time in a political letter. As well, they suggest the metaphor does not accurately reflect Jefferson’s practices with respect to church-state relations. As governor of Virginia, Jefferson issued calls for prayer and fasting, and in his revision of Virginia’s statutes, he drafted bills stipulating when the governor could appoint ‘‘days of public fasting and humiliation, or thanksgiving’’ and to punish ‘‘Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers’’ (Dreisbach 2002). As a member of the Continental Congress, he proposed that the nation adopt a seal containing the image of Moses ‘‘extending his hand over the sea, caus[ing] it to overwhelm Pharaoh’’ and the motto ‘‘Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 229). He closed his second inaugural address by encouraging all Americans to join him in seeking ‘‘the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our forefathers, as Israel of old’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 530). Moreover, two days after completing his letter to the Danbury Baptists, he attended church services in the U.S. Capitol, where he heard John Leland, the great Baptist minister and opponent of religious establishments, preach. Even if Jefferson was a consistent separationist, accommodationists point out that most of the founders were not. One way to illustrate this point is to look at

the actions of the First Congress---the Congress that wrote the First Amendment. One of its first acts was to hire a congressional chaplain. Shortly after doing so, it reauthorized the Northwest Ordinance, which, as we have seen, declared that ‘‘Religion, Morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, Schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged’’ (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 238). As well, this Congress requested that President Washington issue a thanksgiving proclamation, a request with which he complied. Washington penned: Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor; and Whereas both Houses of Congress have, by their joint committee, requested me ‘‘to recommend to the people of the United States a DAY OF PUBLICK THANSGIVING and PRAYER, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness:’’ NOW THEREFORE, I do recommend and assign THURSDAY, the TWENTY-SIXTH DAY of NOVEMBER next, to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be. That we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks, for His kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of tranquility, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed;---for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enable to establish Constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately instituted;---for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge;---and, in general, for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to confer upon us. And also, that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions;---to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to

Religion and the American Founding perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render our National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly being a Government of just and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide all sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shown kindness unto us); and to bless them with good governments, peace, and concord; to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the increase of science among them and us; and, generally to grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best. GIVEN under my hand, at the city of New-York, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 453--454) Washington’s proclamation is similar to those issued by other American presidents, although recent ones are less distinctively Christian. Only a few founders thought that such proclamations were prohibited by the establishment clause. For instance, Jefferson refused to issue proclamations as president, although his reason for doing so may have been motivated at least in part by concerns over federalism. After Madison retired from the presidency, he wrote in his unpublished Detached Memoranda (c. 1817) that he thought calls for prayer were constitutionally problematic. As president, however, Madison issued three such calls in response to requests from Congress. Washington and most of his colleagues viewed religion as critical to the success of America’s constitutional experiment. He articulated this idea well in his influential farewell address (1796): Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness---these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined

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education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. (Dreisbach and Hall 2009, 468) Because religion is necessary for morality, and morality is necessary for political prosperity, accommodationists contend that Washington and his colleagues did not object to the national government encouraging religion within its constitutional boundaries. In their minds, the establishment clause merely prohibited Congress from establishing a national religion and outlawed coercive laws in matters of religion.

Conclusion The founders assumed that the federal government would have limited powers, and that if any government was going to support religion that it would be at the state or local level. Moreover, they all viewed the First Amendment as restricting only the national government---a constitutional reality that remained in place until the religion clauses were applied to the states by the Supreme Court in the 1940s. America’s founders lived in a different time and a different cultural context. They almost certainly did not imagine that the nation would become as religiously diverse as it has become in the 21st century. Accordingly, while their views on religious liberty and church-state relations are worthy of respect, they may not translate into good public policy for Americans in the 21st century. Nevertheless, they remain an important starting point for contemporary discussions about these vexing issues.

References and Further Reading Ahlstrom, Sydney E. 1975. A Religious History of the American People. Vol. 1. New York: Image Books. Buckley, Thomas E., S.J. 1977. Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776--1787. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Davis, Derek H. 2000. Religion and the Continental Congress, 1774--1789: Contributions to Original Intent. New York: Oxford University Press. Dreisbach, Daniel L. 2002. Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State. New York: New York University Press. Dreisbach, Daniel L., Mark D. Hall, and Jeffry H. Morrison, ed. 2004. The Founders on God and Government. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Dreisbach, Daniel L., Mark D. Hall, and Jeffry H. Morrison, 2009. The Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Dreisbach, Daniel L., and Mark David Hall. 2009. The Sacred Rights of Conscience: Selected Readings on Religious Liberty

112 Religion and American Politics and Church-State Relations in the American Founding. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 1992. The Churching of America: 1776--1990. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Frohnen, Bruce. 2002. The American Republic: Primary Sources. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Hall, Mark David. 1997. The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742--1798. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Hall, Mark David. 2006. ‘‘Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in Religion Clause Cases.’’ Oregon Law Review 85: 563--614. Hatch, Nathan O. 1977. The Sacred Cause of Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Heimert, Alan. 1966. Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hutson, James H. 2003. Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Holmes, David L. 2006. The Faiths of the Founding Fathers. New York: Oxford University Press.

Koch, Adrienne, and William Peden. 1993. The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson. New York: Random House. Kramnick, Isaac, and R. Laurence Moore. 1966. The Godless Constitution: The Case against Religious Correctness New York: Norton. Lutz, Donald. 1984. ‘‘The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought.’’ American Political Science Review 78: 189--197. Novak, Michael. 2002. On Two Wings: Humble Faith and Common Sense at the American Founding. San Francisco: Encounter Books. Sandoz, Ellis, ed. 1991. Political Sermons of the American Founding Era: 1730--1805. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press. Shain, Barry Alan. 1994. The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Thorpe, Francis Newton. 1909. The Federal and State Constitutions. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Wilson, John F., and Donald L. Drakeman, eds. 1987. Church and State in American History: The Burden of Religious Pluralism. 2nd ed. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Church and State in American Political Development Paul R. Babbitt Associate Professor of History, Southern Arkansas University

together is something of an oversimplification. However, this metaphor indicates a key element necessary to understand the American religious liberty---it was not a necessary consequence of a unifying American ideology. It emerged as a contingent solution to specific religious and political problems. The milestones of development are easily summarized. The Puritans founded New England as a refuge from persecution, though they did not grant religious liberty to anyone else. Subsequently, Roger Williams founded Rhode Island as a haven from the persecution by the Massachusetts Puritans, granting extensive religious toleration to all. The Carolina Constitutions, while maintaining the establishment of the Church of England, granted religious toleration to dissenters. Maryland was a haven for English Catholics. William Penn’s Holy Experiment in Pennsylvania explicitly rejected the notion of an established church and was explicitly founded as a refuge for any persecuted Christian, regardless of sect. Madison and Jefferson led the fight to eliminate the established church in Virginia, passing the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, and the Bill of Rights later promised the individual freedom to practice any religion at the same time as it forbade the establishment of a national church. Over time, state and national governments became increasingly neutral toward religious sects and some even became secular, although public observance of religion remains an important element in America’s social and political life. Presenting the milestones in this fashion is misleading,

Religious liberty in the United States is based on two complementary clauses of the First Amendment: ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’’ Interpretation of the free exercise clause has been relatively straightforward. Disputes have centered over the extent or nature of activities to which free exercise applies and balancing free exercise with the needs of the government authority. The nonestablishment clause, on the other hand, presents ongoing debates regarding its meaning. It describes the relationship between church and state. Those who support the notion of separation of church and state point to this clause. However, not all agree that constitutional nonestablishment and separation are the same thing. Many analyses of the issue of church and state in American politics begin with the premise that understanding its origins can help understand what lies at the heart of these conflicts. However, the story of the clause, and of religious liberty in general, is not straightforward. It is better understood as several stories, the strands of which developed in parallel, until circumstances made it necessary that those stories began to take one another into account. At the point that the stories begin to intersect, one of two things can be seen to have happened. Either one of the arrangements came to dominate the others, or a synthesis of the various arrangements occurred. Evidence can be brought to bear to support either of these narratives, and there are ways in which the narratives can be blended. Even the metaphor of several strands coming 113

114 Religion and American Politics however, as if the development of religious liberty proceeded in an evolutionary fashion from less to more freedom. It imposes a narrative structure that neglects the varieties of accommodations, and fails to capture the debate over religion and government that in some respects continues to this day. While all of these events are significant, one did not lead to or entail the other. Furthermore, this presentation suggests a kind of American consensus regarding religious freedom where none really existed. Not even the ratification of the First Amendment established a consensus. To be sure, by the end of the 18th century, most Americans believed in something like religious liberty. But there was little agreement regarding what religious liberty meant. Though a set of doctrines would emerge from a serious of legal and legislative decisions that provided some specification regarding what free exercise and nonestablishment would mean, and thus a particular interpretation can be said to have triumphed, these issues remain contentious. If anything, the disagreements persist, not consensus. As the nation has developed and changed, especially by welcoming immigrants who did not share the Protestantism of the founding era, new accommodations had to be reached. Accommodating new groups required questioning the assumptions that had served the nation when the first amendment was enacted. These adjustments were always accompanied by a greater or lesser degree of controversy and political dispute. The history of religious liberty in the United States has its origins in religious beliefs and practices. That is, the people who demanded religious liberty were motivated by profound religious beliefs and a desire to practice their religion. They demanded that the government not interfere with those beliefs and practices. Furthermore, some demanded that the state not favor any particular religious organization with the designation of state church. Failure to acknowledge and understand its religious content is to misunderstand the history and development of religious liberty in the United States. What early promoters of religious liberty sought was to protect religious associations from interference by the government and disestablishment of religion was one of the tools they used. Defenders of the separation of church and state were not necessarily motivated by a desire to secularize society, nor were they seeking to eliminate public religious practice and recognition. To understand the debate of the early republic, one must pay attention to the religious beliefs (and, in a few cases, the lack of them) that generated this debate. The judicial branch in the controversy over religious liberty does not get involved until the 20th century.

Debates on religious liberty in the early American republic were for the most part political rather than legal debates. That is, the debate was over what the law should say rather than the meaning of the law. The debate took place in legislative sessions and in public forums, not in courtrooms. The historical question is not how we should interpret the first amendment, but how the first amendment came to be. The second historical question is the extent to which the states guaranteed religious liberty to their citizens. The First Amendment when ratified in 1789 applied to the federal government; not the states, and can be seen as merely making explicit a limitation on federal powers already implicit in the Constitution. No one opposed denying the federal government the power to make laws concerning religion. For states, however, the matter was different. Every state had its own arrangements for dealing with the question of church and state, and the debates in state government could be intense. To be sure, there were some basic points of agreement. During the federal period, most Americans favored religious liberty. Americans opposed the idea of established churches where establishment meant paying taxes to religious institutions that the individual did not support (Feldman 2005, 41). Beyond that there was a considerable amount of disagreement over what religious liberty actually meant. It was not terribly difficult to obscure these differences in the ambiguous language of the First Amendment. At the same time, states had in general only slightly less ambiguous statements regarding religious establishment and free exercise. The development of religious liberty took place in a context of limited religious diversity. While debates would often refer to Hindus, Muslims, and other nonChristian religions as well as other faiths not practiced in the Western Hemisphere, these references were theoretical---no one anticipated that members of these faiths would ever be a significant population. Atheism was barely mentioned. The fact of the matter was that religious liberty meant liberty for Protestant Christians. Many people who would be willing to tolerate other Protestants would be reluctant to apply the same level of liberty to adherents of other religions (Kidd 1999, 1017). Catholics were few in number and not perceived as a threat. Otherwise, there were hardly any nonChristian congregations at the time of the American Revolution (Hutchison 2003, 21--22). At the local level, even the diversity among the Protestant sects that prevailed nationally often disappeared. A few colonies, such as Pennsylvania, may have had a number of sects, but more often than not, there was little, if any, diversity at the community level. This fact was an important

Church and State in American Political Development element in understanding how many localities had no real reason to question an established church---local establishment simply described a reality that many Americans took for granted, especially those in the majority. That many prominent Americans were deists or in some other way unconventional in their religious faith and practice does complicate this picture somewhat. However, even those states associated with having the most extensive liberty, such as Pennsylvania and Delaware, had clauses requiring adherence to beliefs in things like the trinity and heaven and hell (Kidd 1999, 1020) A second issue to keep in mind is that opponents of religious liberty most often cited consequential, not religious, arguments (Kidd 1999, 1026). The basic idea was that religion was a necessary element for maintaining social order. For some, a true belief would be essential to public order, but for others, it only mattered that there was a belief. This idea has roots in the political philosophy of John Locke, a philosopher who had great influence on American political thinking in the 18th century. It was assumed and observed that religious institutions would play a critical role in educating people, both in the conventional sense and especially in the moral sense. The question was which set of arrangements would do this most effectively. For instance, while Jefferson and other founders may have expressed a desire for secular institutions to serve this function, few existed, and religious institutions dominated this function throughout the federal period (Howe 2002, 2). The connection between the education function of religion and establishment was complicated. What many seemed to recognize, even if only vaguely, was that these two notions were related. The passage of the Bill of Rights did not end all religious establishment in the United States. It simply stated that the federal government would not establish a national church. Privileges were granted to specific denominations in some states and colonies. By the passage of the Bill of Rights, states that had established churches all had established more than one denomination (Levy 1994, 10). Many states had nonpreferential establishments---this is a situation in which more than one denomination is recognized as official, and members of those sects share the privileges of being a member. In addition, these sects typically received some form of financial support from the government. Citizens were required to support and attend one of several ‘‘approved’’ churches. The foundation of religious establishment was the idea that religious worship, as a public activity, required public involvement manifested by the state. Religion, like commerce, needed to be

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regulated, because it was a central activity of all colonists. The experience of social and political disruption caused by radical religious sects during the English Civil War was enough of a threat to many colonists that they were wary of granting too much liberty to religious enthusiasts. The argument concerning the disruptive potential of independent religious organizations was an important element in the religious regulations in Massachusetts (Murphy 2001, 37). It was commonly asserted that religion was necessary for the moral instruction and development of the citizens. Since the state had an interest in the moral character of the people, it was to be expected that the state would have some involvement in religious institutions. The position held that state support of religion was to promote virtue to make good citizens (Miller 1988, 45).

Religious Liberty in the Colonial Period While independence from Britain left the United States completely free to work out its own arrangement for the relation between church and state, the colonial period had been characterized by considerable latitude in how they dealt with religion and government. Though the British government theoretically had ultimate authority, the basic story during the colonial period was one of noninterference by the British government. Thus, the colonies had a variety of arrangements, and these arrangements shifted over time. In most cases, the basic framework for these arrangements was spelled out in colonial charters and constitutions. Nearly every such charter referred to God, and most had clauses dealing with religion and government. Massachusetts was hostile to religious dissenters, driving them out of the colony and occasionally persecuting them in more severe ways. The Puritans of New England came not to escape religious persecution, but to practice a purer form of Christianity in the American wilderness, building a city on a hill to serve as an example to the rest of Christendom. The religious nature of the enterprise had implications for the arrangements of church and state. In Massachusetts, leaders (there could really be no distinction between religious and political leaders) used a variety of means to preserve religious unity and conformity, though they could never completely eliminate religious dissent. The official position, especially in the early history of the colony, opposed toleration (Murphy 2001, 30). Though that stance would moderate over the course of the 18th century, New England states, with the prominent exception of Rhode Island, had established churches well into the 19th century. The degree of control the

116 Religion and American Politics established church would have over the spiritual life of the colonists would recede during the 17th and 18th century. At first, religious dissenters could be punished severely, with banishment and even death. Following the Revolution, Massachusetts adopted its 1780 Constitution, which remains its current constitution, and still had an established church. All residents were required to pay taxes that supported the established church of the community. In addition, the state had the authority to compel attendance at religious services. The transformation of Massachusetts reflects a transformation in the religious orientation of the colony. Its origins were a religious settlement---the pilgrims came to America for religious reasons. As the colony grew, its religious spirit became diluted. Nevertheless, at the time of the Revolution, it was still a widely held belief that the government ought to encourage and assist religious institutions in material ways. Toleration had emerged, and indeed, religious liberty as a principle had support. But there was still no doctrine of separation: If the greatest part of the people, coincide with the public authority of the State in giving the prefference to any one religious system and creed, the dissenting few, though they cannot conscientiously conform to the prevailing religion, yet ought to acquiesce and rest satisfied that their religious Liberty is not diminished (Worcestriensis 1983 [1776], 453). Religious liberty was preserved as long as the established church was supported by a majority. That is, freedom of religion was a communal right, not an individual liberty. This reflects the idea that religious practice was a communal, not an individual, practice. Furthermore, it was not seen as an issue of private conscience, or not only of private conscience, but also one of public ritual. Similar patterns can be found in other New England colonies, with of course one notable exception. The history of New England includes the break-away colony of Rhode Island, founded by Roger Williams. Williams was motivated by a desire to practice according to the dictates of his conscience. His impact on the shape of religious liberty in the United States is one of considerable dispute (Curry 1986, 15; Noonan 1998, 54). At the very least, this story illustrates the complexities and paradoxes of the relations between church and state during this period. Williams sought religious liberty because it was necessary for his religious life. That is, his belief in religious liberty was theological, not

Cover of the Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, written by Roger Williams of Rhode Island in 1644. The colonial document is one of the earliest defenses for the separation of church and state, an important foundation of the United States system of government. (Library of Congress)

political (Miller 1953, 27). Williams sought separation between church and state because only that relationship offered Williams the liberty he needed to satisfy his spiritual desires. The complexities of Williams’s arguments about the relation between church and state are especially difficult to untangle because his thought is in so many ways at odds with modern liberal doctrines of religious liberty, and yet his conclusions seem familiar. Shared conclusions may seem to imply common premises, but that implication would be false. Taken out of context, his views on the relation seem compatible with familiar expressions of these views. However, the intellectual context of religious liberty was very different from our own. Williams came to uncompromising support of religious liberty as a religious belief itself. To live a

Church and State in American Political Development religious life as he understood it demanded religious freedom because the essence of religious life for Williams was spiritual exploration. That this specific account of religious life failed to have much of an impact on American religious life in general probably has to do with Williams’s difficulty with institutionalized religions in general. A man who could not settle into any one church’s doctrine would not want to have that doctrine tied to an institution of government. Williams saw separating church and state as the only way to preserve the purity of the church. Separation was about protecting religion from government, not vice versa (Hamburger 2002, 38). Williams found himself in Massachusetts along with other Puritans in 1631. His dissatisfaction with the colony occurred when its religious commitment was at its most vigorous. His problem with the Puritans was not that their society was too restrictive. Rather, the religious life of the colony was not pure enough. The problem with Massachusetts was that the established church allowed in the unrepentant. Salvation was possible only in a separate, exclusive church. Far from desiring a more moderate religious life, Williams believed that Massachusetts had not gone far enough in purifying its religious practices. Williams saw a contradiction between universal church membership and a pure church. This was only one of the ways that the establishment of religion led to the government corrupting religious institutions. Williams’s reasoning shows that he was not a modern liberal in any sense of the word. His commitment to religious liberty needs to be understood in a context. He reached the conclusion by taking the ideas of the Massachusetts Puritans to their logical conclusion---from Williams’s point of view, they were too much like the Anglicans Williams despised. The problem with the Massachusetts Puritans was that they did not go far enough. Even so, his commitment to religious liberty was as uncompromising as his religious views, which should not be surprising because, for him, religious liberty was a religious belief. His belief in religious liberty was not due to his moderate or liberal views of Christianity, rather it was a product of his extremism, and thus it was an extreme view as well. Persecution was evil and against God’s will. Religious faith did not provide Williams with a certainty that justified any form of religious coercion. Instead, religious faith demanded self-reflection that challenged a ‘‘righteous crusade’’ (Miller 1988, 173). Theologically, Williams was a Calvinist, not a prophet of the Enlightenment. The difference between Williams and the Massachusetts Calvinists was his belief that the state could not be an agent of

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God’s kingdom. The source of the split between Williams and the Calvinists was not so much in the content of the doctrine, but in Williams’s more extreme version of it and his unwillingness to compromise. More than just a separation, church and state operated in separate realms with separate concerns. Contrasted with absolute spiritual liberty, the civil magistrate was entitled to absolute authority in civil affairs (Murphy 2001, 59). The only liberty promised was religious liberty, and the purpose of religious liberty was to prevent the corruption of the state from infecting the church. Even so, the case of Roger Williams also shows how the demand for freedom of conscience could be disruptive. From the perspective of Massachusetts officials, the problem with Williams was not just that he was a dissenter, but the way his dissenting activities interfered with the stability and order of the colony. To an extent, the disruption was a function of the way churches in the colony were organized. Organized by congregation, there was no religious body that had authority over Williams’s activities as a minister. Leaders in Massachusetts sought to banish him, but found it difficult to find legal grounds on which to do so. After a lengthy controversy, a civil court banished Williams for subverting its authority (Winship 2005, 29--30). At its heart, the disruption had its roots in religious disputation. Had Williams not engaged in religious dissent, the controversy would never have arisen. It was his conscience that led him to challenge the authorities of Massachusetts. Williams has received more attention from 20thcentury historians than William Penn, founder of Pennsylvania and another colonial champion of religious liberty. Why this is so is difficult to say. Williams was a compelling figure to be sure, and he spent a great deal of time fighting for his cause in America---Penn never needed to do much to defend religious liberty in his colony. Though Penn did fight tirelessly for the cause of religious freedom in England, spending time in the Tower of London for his troubles, his story in America is not one of fighting persecution. It is the less exciting story of instituting a government committed to religious liberty. The consequence of this is to miss how important Penn’s accomplishment really was. For Penn, religious liberty was not simply an added feature of a government, but an integral part of it. His colony was a ‘‘holy experiment’’ to see whether religious principles could succeed in forming the basis of a prosperous and happy colony. Religious liberty was just one of several important modern political principles Penn established through the government he designed for Pennsylvania.

118 Religion and American Politics Even so, Penn’s government did not entirely do away with laws concerning the religious beliefs of the colonists: That all Persons living in this Province, who confess and acknowledge the One Almighty and Eternal God, to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World, and that hold themselves obliged in Conscience to live peaceably and justly in Civil Society, shall in no wayes be molested or prejudiced for their Religious Perswasion or Practice in matters of Faith and Worship, no shall they be compelled at any time to frequent or maintain any Religious Worship, Place, or Ministry whatever (Penn 1981 [1682]). There was a lack of any religious establishment, so religious divisions would not be a matter of political debate. The required belief in God was viewed as necessary for maintaining civil peace and was consistent with widespread beliefs among those who supported religious liberty---John Locke would make similar comments in the Letter Concerning Toleration. Though only Christians could hold office, Pennsylvania granted an exceptional degree of religious liberty for its time. If Williams’s account of religious liberty proved disruptive in Massachusetts, Penn believed that it was enforcing religious establishment that was disruptive. As early as 1670, Penn wrote: ‘‘Unity (not the least, but the greatest End of Government) is lost for by seeking an Unity of Opinion (by the Ways intended) the Unity requisite to uphold us, as a Civil Society, will be quite destroy’d’’ (Penn 2002 [1670], 99). Penn argued that religious toleration was reasonable---it did not necessarily depend on a particular religious view (Murphy 2001, 174). Though Penn, like Williams, was profoundly religious and derived his views on religious liberty from his religious beliefs, he was more concerned with political and social order than Williams was. There were other important differences as well. First, those religious beliefs themselves were radically different. Penn, as a Quaker, believed that God revealed himself directly to the conscience through an inner light, which was at odds with Williams’s Biblical Christianity. Moreover, Penn’s political philosophy had much more in common with Enlightenment liberalism than that of Williams. While Williams was motivated almost entirely by his religious beliefs, Penn had other, more prosaic concerns in his government. His venture was commercial and political as well as religious. Pennsylvania was founded as a haven for members of any persecuted Christian sect. Because of their numbers and wealth, Quakers would dominate the politics of

William Penn was an English Quaker who advocated religious and civil liberty. Penn founded Pennsylvania as a ‘‘Holy Experiment’’ where these liberties could exist. (Library of Congress)

early Pennsylvania, but they had no constitutional or legal privileges. In fact, their political dominance waned as members of other religious sects came to outnumber them. The Pennsylvania arrangement of nonestablishment was intended to avoid the kinds of problems Roger Williams caused in Massachusetts. Furthermore, Penn’s philosophy on religion and politics has proven to be much more compatible with modern pluralistic democracy than that of Williams. Penn did not believe that religious liberty prevented the government from regulating behavior. While belief was not regulated, conduct most certainly was. Pennsylvania had laws prohibiting, among other things, lying, stage-plays, dice, cock-fighting, and bear-baiting ([Penn] 1981 [1682], 225). The emphasis on regulating behavior sprang from the common notion that government was to regulate behavior of the body. Conscience, distinct from the body, was to be unregulated. Penn, as a dissenter, was more sensitive than many of his time to the problem that conscience and behavior could not be so easily separated when the issue was religious practice. However, the laws of Pennsylvania imposed certain assumptions regarding what could be

Church and State in American Political Development considered a legitimate act of worship and what was not. In doing so, Pennsylvania was no different than any other society that had to grapple with religious diversity. Its did so by grounding its assumptions in Protestant Christian conventions, adding allowances for the peculiarities of Quaker practice. Penn’s attempt to exclude religious controversy from politics met with only limited success. Religious pluralism was often aggravated political divisions. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania demonstrated that religious liberty accompanied by religious pluralism could in fact lead to a stable and prosperous government. Pennsylvania may have been the most deliberate attempt to separate church and state in America, but it was far from unique. Generally, religious liberty had its deepest roots in the middle colonies: Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Even here, however, the stories of the various colonies differ. Maryland was founded as a haven for English Catholics and granted toleration to others. Over time, it did not maintain its commitment to religious liberty. Anglicans gained political control and Catholics lost the right to hold office in the first century of the colony’s existence. (Noonan 1998, 54). New Jersey, originally divided into East and West Jersey, founded in part by Quakers, had no established church from its beginning. Lacking a charismatic founding figure, it never received the same attention as Rhode Island or Pennsylvania for its comprehensive religious liberty. The Fundamentals of West New Jersey, its basic law from 1681, provided That liberty of conscience in matters of faith and worship shall be granted to all people within the Province aforesaid; who shall live peaceably and quietly therein; and that none of the free people of the said Province shall be rendered uncapable of office in respect of their faith and worship. (‘‘The Fundamentals of West New Jersey’’ 1998 [1681], 265) New York had various arrangements over its long colonial history. As a Dutch colony, the Dutch Reformed Church was the state church. When the English took over the colony, it established Protestantism, giving no privileges to any specific denomination. Each town was required to support a church. At various points, England attempted to establish the Anglican Church, but was met with passive, but effective, resistance (Levy 1994, 12--14). New York did not do as England asked. In general, the southern colonies represented a third arrangement of church and state found in America.

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During the colonial period, Virginia and the Carolina colonies provided religious toleration for its colonists, but also established the Anglican Church. As such, it enjoyed numerous privileges such as the ability to perform marriages denied to other churches. Furthermore, all preachers were normally required to have a license. In essence, the founders of the southern colonies simply transplanted the British arrangement to the New World. The domination of the Anglican elite prevented significant conflict until the middle of the 18th century and the First Great Awakening, which challenged the Anglican elite’s dominance of religious life. As the Revolution approached, southern colonies moved toward religious freedom. Because this move, led by Virginia, is associated with the architects of religious liberty, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, its example sheds light on American religious in general. The political debate over church and state in Virginia, because it occurred during the American founding, encapsulates the debate on the national level. Jefferson and Madison, in moving from the colonial concerns of Virginia to the concerns of a new nation, applied the same beliefs, values, and rhetoric they had acquired in fighting for religious liberty in Virginia. Most important, they saw disestablishment, expressed in the nonestablishment clause of the First Amendment, as a necessary element for religious liberty to prevail. While Madison and Jefferson are rightly credited with providing both the intellectual and political force for disestablishment in Virginia, the campaign received widespread support not because the populace of Virginia had embraced secular Enlightenment ideals, but because many had embraced the dissenting Baptist faith. In some ways, reminiscent of Williams’s struggles in New England, the driving force for religious liberty in the southern colonies was profound and radical religious enthusiasm. An alliance between religious radicals and Enlightenment moderns such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison pushed a recognizably modern arrangement of church and state in Virginia. The philosophical and political origins of doctrines concerning church and state remain a historical and a political controversy to this day. The issues were complicated by issues of economic status and political power. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 is seen by many historians as the model for the provisions regarding church and state in the Bill of Rights. Understanding how it came about, how Madison and Jefferson worked to disestablish religion in Virginia, is important not only because it was yet another step toward disestablishing religion throughout the nation,

120 Religion and American Politics but also because it was a direct ancestor to the arrangement in the Bill of Rights. The Virginia Declarations granted religious toleration to all inhabitants of Virginia. However, Madison did not believe that toleration was sufficient, and he attempted to amend the Declaration. Rather than mere toleration, Madison was able to ensure that the Virginia Declaration of Rights guaranteed that ‘‘all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience’’ (Miller 1988, 5). The Anglican Church, however, maintained its status as the established church. Religious liberty would be extended in Virginia with its Statute for Religious Freedom, which though written in 1776 by Jefferson, did not became law until 1786. In 1784, Madison wrote his ‘‘Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,’’ which created public support for this extension. This document, then, stands as one of the most important statements of religious liberty in American political development. Madison’s Remonstrance was written to oppose a provision for the use of public money to support ‘‘Teachers of the Christian Religion.’’ In this document, Madison argued that spending public money, that is, money raised through taxes, for the support of religion, amounted to a violation of the principle of religious liberty. It not only argues for disestablishment, but argues against specific provisions of establishment. Madison held that any religious establishment violated the conscience of dissenters. Madison was responding to complaints by Baptists and others who, for religious reasons, would not accept public support, even if it had been available. The position of the Baptists was crucial in arguing against inclusive multiple establishments. That is, Madison argued against religious establishment of any kind, from both a secular and a Christian perspective.

The Arguments for Religious Liberty Religious liberty in the United States was supported by two generally distinct arguments. Though in certain respects these arguments are complementary and overlap, these arguments reflected distinct agendas, and in some ways, continue to lie at the source of much of the controversy today. Understanding this history can help unravel the issues at the center of this controversy (Carter 1994, 116). Both arguments supported disestablishment of religion at the national and state level, and also would be used to support the free exercise of

religion. However, there would be sharp disagreements about the role of religion, religious institutions, and clergy in politics and the state. Even among allies in the campaign for nonestablishment, there were significant disagreements about the role of religion and faith in public life. Although not everyone who supported the general cause of antiestablishment agreed about what they expected to follow from it, to make strict distinctions risks oversimplifying the issue. It was common to find people like James Madison making both kinds of arguments, often in the same text. In fact, the degree of overlap between the two arguments suggests that in America, at least, Protestantism and Enlightenment philosophy were not nearly as antagonistic as they would one day become, and indeed, may be understood as complementary. In fact, at the political level, the degree to which various factions came together to support disestablishment suggests that what would become two separate traditions were in fact bound together by a set of assumptions regarding the nature of conscience and the proper way to persuade others. By itself, neither approach could command the political support necessary for success. Religious minorities by definition lacked numbers and in many cases lacked political and social status. Those who were likely to support an approach based on an Enlightenment framework also lacked numbers, but they could count among their supporters many prominent men. The Enlightenment argument is associated with John Locke. However, in evaluating this claim, Locke’s argument in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1983 [1685]) referred to common notions of conscience and the nature of God common to Protestants. Locke’s letter relies on scripture to build its argument. This argument was likely to be influential, especially considering Locke contributed to Jefferson’s thinking in the Declaration of Independence. Locke demonstrates that the Enlightenment argument was not necessarily secular. Additionally, adherence to Enlightenment principles did not automatically advocate religious liberty. Many argued that religion was important not because it was true, but because it had a positive influence on human behavior. This reasoning, for instance, can be found in Pennsylvania’s requirement of belief in heaven and hell for office-holding. The reasoning was not to insist on religious orthodoxy. Instead, it reflected the idea that a belief in eternal rewards and punishments was necessary to ensure good behavior. Benjamin Franklin, among others, made this argument in his autobiography. In fact, even Locke argued that atheists ought to be excluded from religious toleration: ‘‘Those are not at

Church and State in American Political Development all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold up an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all’’ (Locke 1983 [1685], 51). This consequential thinking was compatible with much of the Enlightenment tradition. Many advocates of religious liberty did so for religious reasons. In its simplest form, many people held, as a religious conviction, that the state had no business interfering with religion in any way, even if the interference was supportive of religious activity. This tradition goes back to the earliest colonial experiments with religious liberty. That these arguments were powerfully persuasive to many religious Americans should not be surprising, because only the devout tend to suffer from persecution. This argument was used by revivalists like Isaac Backus and theologians like Jonathan Edwards who sought liberty for Christians to be Christians, and who argued that religious liberty was to be treated like the political and economic liberty championed by the American Revolution (Noll 2002, 161). A related argument had to do with the Protestant understanding of conscience. This was a tradition that was well developed in Protestant Christianity by the late-18th century. In America, arguments laid out not only by Locke but also by Roger Williams and William Penn figured importantly in this tradition. Neither Williams nor Penn represented mainstream religious thinkers; however, their arguments were compatible with mainstream Protestant thought. In short, an individual’s conscience is not subject to the state or any other entity. God is the sole sovereign of conscience. This argument also demonstrates the way in which the argument from reason is complementary with the argument from religion. That is, it is also a matter of human psychology that coercion may be effective in forcing someone to say he or she agrees with a particular doctrine, even if it has no bearing on what the individual actually believes. As noted above, holders of both positions needed to find common ground for political reasons. Madison’s Remonstrance, discussed above, demonstrates that this was accomplished not by a philosophical synthesis, but by deploying both arguments simultaneously. Given its importance in the development of religious liberty in the United States, it makes sense to examine Madison’s Remonstrance more closely. Though addressed to the particular arrangement found in Virginia, it also was part of a rough consensus that had emerged. Madison made use of both of the broad traditions of religious liberty found in the United States. In laying out

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15 reasons to oppose legislation providing public support for religious education, he couched this argument in a broader argument against religious establishment. The argument depended on political and religious premises widely held by Americans, that religious belief was an individual, rather than social, matter. It also held that any preference for a specific denomination or religion ‘‘violates the equality which ought to be the basis of very law’’ (Madison 1999 [1785], 31). Madison also saw introducing religious establishing as likely to cause political, and possibly violent, conflict among religious sects. Many of the secular reasons for opposing state sponsored religion had solid religious analogues, and Madison did not hesitate to point them out. For instance, Madison made an anticlerical argument. This line of argument is often associated with the more radical approach to church and state promoted by Enlightenment figures in France, which influenced Jefferson. It could also be found in The Independent Reflector, a journal published during the mid-18th century by William Livingston of New Jersey (Kidd 1999, 1,018). Madison’s argument had more in common with the anticlericalism common among Protestants who associated the temporal power of priests and the church with Roman Catholicism: ‘‘Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest luster; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy’’ (Madison 1999 [1785], 32--33). This expresses the notion that separation of church and state is intended to protect the church from the corrupting influence of worldly affairs. This was consistent with Madison’s arguments that religious establishment were superfluous to leading others to Christian conversion and even detrimental to that cause: ‘‘The establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion’’ (Madison 1999 [1785], 32). Madison was doing more than reaching out to religious Virginians; he was proposing a solution to the problem posed by religious pluralism combined with profound religious belief.

Conclusion: Disestablishment and Free Exercise When seen in this context, the religious clauses found in the Bill of Rights are not a radical departure from past arrangements, but a national resolution to a debate that had been going on for more than a century in

122 Religion and American Politics America. Moreover, it should not be understood as a victory of secularists over the devout, but rather as a way for religious people who differed in their particular outlooks to live with one another in relative harmony. Religious liberty was seen by many advocates as something that would enrich, not impoverish, religious life in the United States. Regional variations would persist for several decades after ratification of the Bill of Rights, but the days of official church establishments were clearly numbered at that point. Even if one could read the First Amendment as protecting established churches in the states, by 1789, few were left to protect. Nevertheless, debates about the relationship between church and state were far from settled. By the beginning of the 19th century, the Republican Party began to agitate for a separation of church and state. The election of 1800 essentially marks the first time that the rhetoric of separation was used to indicate a desirable outcome. The issue, however, is better seen as an element of political strategy than as a response to religious persecution or intolerance (Hamburger 2002, 110). What the Constitution did, rather than resolve those debates once and for all, was instead to establish a framework for conducting those debates in such as way that they would not threaten the fundamental unity of the Republic. New issues would emerge, especially as immigration changed the religious complexion of the United States. While the framework remained, its endurance was a product of its flexibility. The infamous ‘‘separation of church and state’’ can be seen as a dividing line, with Enlightenment thinkers such as Jefferson on one side, and religious dissenters on the other. That is, Enlightenment thinkers like Jefferson sought this separation while dissenters did not (Hamburger 2002, 162). However, the question of the relation between religion and politics was very much a 19th-century debate that continues into the 21st century. The institutional arrangement of disestablishment had been widely accepted by that point. What remained, and is still evolving, is the role religion plays in public life. Some argue that any role for religion amounts to establishment, while others argue that as long as government itself avoids providing material or legal preference for one religious institution that it denies to others, the constitutional demands for nonestablishment are satisfied.

References and Further Reading Carter, Stephen L. 1994. The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion. New York: Anchor. Curry, Thomas J. 1986. The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Feldman, Noah. 2005. Divided By God. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. ‘‘The Fundamentals of West New Jersey.’’ 1998 [1681]. In Colonial Origins of the American Constitution. Edited by Donald S. Lutz, 263--265. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Hamburger, Philip. 2002. Separation of Church and State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Howe, Daniel Walker. 2002. ‘‘Church, State, and Education in the Young American Republic,’’ Journal of the Early Republic 22: 1--24 . Hutchison, William R. 2003. Religious Pluralism in America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kidd, Colin. 1999. ‘‘Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America.’’ The Historical Journal 42: 1007--1026. Levy, Leonard W. 1994. The Establishment Clause. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Locke, John. 1983 [1685]. Letter Concerning Toleration. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Madison, James. 1999 [1785] ‘‘A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.’’ In James Madison: Writings. Edited by Jack Rakove, 29--36. New York: Library of America. Miller, Perry. 1953. Roger Williams. New York: Bobbs Merrill. Miller, William Lee. 1988. The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic. New York: Paragon House. Murphy, Andrew. 2001. Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Noll, Mark. 2002. America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Noonan, John T. 1998. The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom. Berkeley: University of California Press. Penn, William. 1981 [1682]. ‘‘Laws Agreed Upon in England.’’ In The Papers of William Penn v. II. Edited by Mary Maples Dunn and Richard Dunn, 220--227. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Penn, William. 2002 [1670]. ‘‘The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience.’’ In The Political Writings of William Penn. Edited by Andrew Murphy, 79--119. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. Winship, Michael P. 2005. The Times and Trials of Anne Hutchison. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Worcestriensis. 1983 [1776]. ‘‘Number IV.’’ In American Political Writings of the Founding Era: 1760-1805 v I. Edited by Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, 449--454. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics Michael Janson PhD, Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

and the federal government. Each helped push evangelical activists, deeply concerned with the moral direction of the country, to align themselves with the Republican Party in the later decades of the 20th century and to increase electoral mobilization. The first rupture was the New Deal; the second was the school prayer decisions of the 1950s and 1960s; the third rupture was the reproductive rights decisions on the 1960s and 1970s. Each rupture institutionalized certain ideas, alliances, and strategies within conservative evangelical circles.1 The net result was that conservative evangelical activists were skeptical of the welfare state and organized labor, and were opposed to further expansion of federal power concerning individual moral behavior. Since these activists were opposed to state intervention into the market and into local social policy, an alliance emerged between promarket forces seeking less economic regulation and social conservatives seeking to avoid federal intervention into local moral prescriptions. This was, from the outset, an uneasy alliance. Business interests were no more committed to maintaining traditional forms of community life than were social conservatives dedicated to allowing free access to all ideas and products, regardless of their cultural content. But seemingly with few other options, conservative religious activists maintained and renewed the alliance throughout the 1990s and into the early years of the 21st century. The origins of this alliance have often been misunderstood. In August 1980, the New York Times ran a

On September 13, 2001, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson spoke on national television about the meaning of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Robertson agreed with Falwell’s indictment of the ‘‘the abortionists and the feminists and the gays’’ as responsible for ‘‘God lifting His protection over this nation’’ (quoting from Naparstek 2001, 5, 27; see also Morone 2003, 494). Falwell was roundly criticized for his statements, and he soon apologized. But despite his admission of being off target, Falwell’s comments were expressive of the intense frustration that some conservative evangelicals felt about the moral and spiritual direction of the nation. If one believed that America’s sins were vast and that God played an active role in our lives, then it was not far-fetched to think that the events of September 11 were divine retribution for the sins of the American people. But such a conclusion would not emerge merely from the supposed moral failings of the Clinton presidency in the 1990s or just the legacy of cultural division from the 1970s. Such intense frustration and moral disapproval would have had a much longer and more complicated legacy. Likewise, Falwell’s initial statements drew on frustrations, moral judgments, and lost political battles over the course of 20th-century American history. As such, the key to understanding evangelical mobilization and late-20th-century American politics is to recognize the key religious-political conflicts that occurred across the century and their institutional legacies. The genesis of Falwell’s comments was three distinct political ruptures between conservative evangelicals 123

124 Religion and American Politics

Jerry Falwell was one of the most prominent of the fundamentalist preachers to have come out of the southern United States. The founder of the Moral Majority and Liberty University, he advocated for evangelical positions in public policy. (AP/Wide World Photos)

series of articles about the growing political mobilization of conservative evangelicals. The Times noted a ‘‘growing new force’’ in American politics influencing national and local electoral outcomes (Herbers 1980). The presidential election that November was seen by many Americans as clear proof that this ‘‘growing new force’’ was to be reckoned with as thousands of churches contributed to Ronald Reagan’s lopsided victory over Jimmy Carter (Frankel and Barker 1980, C1; Herbers 1980, A27). Many 21st-century commentators follow suit and accept the 1970s as the key period of religious mobilization in the latter half of the 20th century and believe they can fully understand the mobilization by focusing on this period (see, for example, Bruce 1988; Rieder 1989; Plotke 2002; Bivins 2003). Disagreements among academics tend to accept this periodization, and debate centers around what precisely

occurred in the 1970s that drove religious voters into the Republican camp. Were the excesses of the countercultural movement decisive? Was it the emergence of identity politics? Or was it simply the continuing defection of white voters from the Democratic Party in the wake of the civil rights movement? The most basic problem with this debate is that it mistakes an effect for a cause; the political mobilization of religious conservatives in the 1970s and onward was the effect of a series of political ruptures that occurred in previous decades. Certainly, particular policies and events in the 1970s spurred enhanced mobilization; this was a period of war, intense social change, and continued growth of evangelical denominations. But the rise to power of conservative religious activists was deeply intertwined with large-scale political changes in American politics that spanned the entire

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics 125 century. Moreover, it was never just a ‘‘cultural war’’; it was always about the state’s substantive policies. The second problem with studies that focus on the 1970s is that they suggest that religious influence on American politics is inconsistent. Instead of seeing long-term evolutionary development of religious activism throughout the 20th century, these studies posit religious mobilization that is, at base, merely a reaction to cultural change. According to this view, it is to be expected that religious activists, ever clinging to tradition, would protest loudly in an intense period of chance such as the 1960s and 1970s. But this perspective, besides harboring the prejudice that religion is inherently traditional, misses the broad story by not recognizing that those protests that came out of the 1970s were influenced, constrained, and guided by preceding periods of political development in which there was intense religious-political activism. Likewise, the religious activism of the 1980s and 1990s was not merely a response to the events of those decades. Rather, it drew on understandings and convictions reached during previous generations. Accordingly we can better understand late20th-century religious mobilization by taking a long view and considering how interactions across the century between religious activists and the state created institutions and political dynamics that encouraged escalation and partisan realignment. By centering our analysis on interactions between religious and political institutions, we can grasp why certain ideas became central organizing strategies, why certain organizations were founded at key junctures, and why activists adopted certain partisan allegiances. This approach is clearly not the only way that we can explain religious activism and these issues can be thought about in many other ways. For instance, we can try to explain these patterns of behavior through broad social or economic analysis instead of strictly political terms. But if we chalk up religious mobilization solely to social or economic forces, then we have great difficulty explaining the politics, rather than merely the intensity or timing, of this mobilization. For example, consider the following two sets of questions to see whether economic and social analysis provides the desired political explanations. First, if the social anxieties of the Cold War fostered a renewed evangelical politics that was born out of feelings of existential insecurity (Rossinow 1998), then why did it become antistatist? Why did it not proceed to develop a social gospel that called for increased state intervention into the market and society to assuage social anxieties and cure supposed social sins as previous religious

mobilizations had done (for example, Prohibition)? Second, if economic instability fostered conservative mobilization (Norris and Inglehart 2004), then why was there intense mobilization in the 1950s---a period of relative economic prosperity---around issues like prayer in school that ostensibly had little to do with the political economy? The answers to these questions become clearer by putting aside broad social and economic analysis, although it provides context, and focusing instead on the political. This is because it is in the realm of the political that we are able to account for the partisan content of phenomena that may, and most likely do, have underlying social and economic correlations. The partisan direction of late20th-century evangelical activism was driven by political institutions that had formed in earlier battles and that were influenced by political strategies spanning across the previously identified issues and periods. The continuing alliance between conservative religious activists and business interests within the Republican Party has been seen as stemming from such recent events as the moral equivocations of Bill Clinton’s presidency. Clinton’s election was certainly taken as evidence of further moral decay for many conservative religious activists. Aside from his draft record and alleged drug use, Clinton supported, at least rhetorically, New Deal policies, organized labor, the separation of church and state, and was pro-choice. Moreover, Clinton deftly courted religious organizations for support by combining some socially liberal views with strong conservative stances (for example, support for the death penalty, opposition to gay marriage, school uniforms, curfews), much to the frustration of conservative religious activists (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). But the underlying issues that drove religious activism in the 1990s had little to do with Bill Clinton’s political strategy or his personal character. The most basic denominator among conservative religious activism was distrust of the federal government, regardless of the current inhabitant of the White House. Assessing these times, Jason Bivins uses the term ‘‘Christian antiliberalism’’ to describe the disparate religious forces that protested against state action as illegitimate (Bivins 2003, 3). At one time in American history, religious institutions fostered a ‘‘civil religion’’ that bestowed an almost sacred legitimacy upon the state. Robert Bellah, who popularized this idea in the 1960s, was concerned that religion might have bestowed too much legitimacy upon the state such that dissent was marginalized (Bellah 1967).

126 Religion and American Politics In contrast in the 1990s, Bivins found religious ideas fueling a legitimation crisis in the state, encouraging cynicism and apathy among the population, and decreasing support for state-based solutions to the problems of modern life (Bivins 2003, 6). The result was increased political mobilization, using religious ideas, around personal issues that were, in some sense, offended by the actions of the state. Some activists went so far as to declare that the state was irredeemable and that the only hope was to form isolated communities of resistance (Bivins 2003, 12). The roots of this trend, Bivins argued, were in the breakdown of the New Deal political order. Liberalism, shored up by the political-economic reforms of the 1930s, depended on growth for stability because expansion was the key to maintaining mass prosperity. As economic insecurity increased, confidence was lost in the central government and a variety of religious campaigns sprung up to fill the void. These campaigns, predictably, used Populist methods, but they did not seek to extract economic concessions from the state; instead, they sought state contraction and moral concessions (Bivins 2003, 27--28). Alternatively, the renewed religious activism of the 1990s can be viewed as the cyclical reemergence of old themes and tactics. James Morone, in Hellfire Nation, argues, ‘‘The redeemer nation is back,’’ and that our current moralistic politics are merely a reformulation of old evangelical demands for righteousness that reemerge from time to time (2003, 494). But there is something new about contemporary mobilizations, as noted above: religious mobilization today is often deeply skeptical of the state. Instead of religious activism leading to calls for regulation of private life as a means of moderating the freedoms provided by liberal society, 21st-century religious activism is often imbued with antigovernment ideas. There are, of course, important exceptions to this general trend. Conservative religious activists recently have supported strong state action in foreign affairs and often support strong local government regulation of individual behavior. Exploring religious support for expansive foreign policy, Kevin Phillips, in his recent American Theocracy: the Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century, argues that a significant realignment has taken place within the last several decades (2006).2 Phillips, like many others, did not take religion seriously in the 1970s when he first started writing about national politics and in the early 21st century now expresses considerable surprise at the influence of religion on the current administration (Phillips 2006, xii--xiii). Unfortunately, commentators such as Phillips repeat a common

mistake. They see the current influence of religion as emerging in the last few decades of the 20th century. As such, their explorations of the increased influence and prominence of religious activists focus on recent events and end up being primarily descriptive rather than explanatory. We can explain the increased frustration, mobilization, and partisan alignment by thinking politically and long term. In doing so, we can see that contemporary alliances are built on previous political engagements in complicated and distinct ways that will be discussed below.

Approaching the Question of Religion and American Politics Discussing religion and American politics can be difficult because of the passionate beliefs involved. Scholarly study of the subject is likewise challenging, but in some ways it is even more difficult because social scientists, noting the passions involved, have often simply avoided the subject entirely, preferring safer pastures. When academics have waded into such debates, these challenges have often produced scholarship that is short-sighted, condescending, and incomplete. Part of the problem is that intellectuals only occasionally take religion in America seriously even though it is a constant force. As Gary Wills wryly noted, ‘‘Every time religiosity catches the attention of intellectuals, it is as if a shooting star had appeared in the sky. . . . Religion does not shift or waiver; the attention of its observers does’’ (1990, 15--16). Religion is often slighted by secular social scientists as being unworthy of serious academic study. This bias has several origins (Smith 1996, 2--5). First, social science from its earliest incantations often sought knowledge free from revelation and accordingly developed skepticism toward religion. Second, modernization theory, which was popular among social scientists, predicated that religion would fade away as industrialization brought wealth and education to more people; the idea was that religion was a vestige of an era of scarcity in which individuals sought solace from penury in mysticism (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007, 4--6). Third, social scientists tend to be more secular than not and as such tend to downplay the influence of religion on social and political outcomes. In the past 30 years, this bias has faded as more academics have begun studying religion in the wake of international events like the Iranian Revolution and the Solidarity Movement of Poland, and the election of born-again Christians Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to the American presidency (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007, 1--8,

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics 127

President George W. Bush acknowledges the crowd as he arrives to deliver remarks at the White House National Conference on faith-based and community initiatives in Washington, D.C., on March 9, 2006. (Jim Young/Reuters/Corbis)

206--207). Most recently, President George W. Bush often spoke fondly and passionately about the influence of religion on his political thinking, and his administration pursued a series of ‘‘faith-based’’ initiatives in which religious organizations are subsidized to provide social services. Regardless of how one comes to an interest in this subject, the question remains as to why religious political mobilization took the turn that it during the late 20th century. One way to begin a dispassionate conversation about this subject is to step back and consider how we ought to study American politics in the first place. Bearing in mind a few different approaches, I suggest that historical institutionalism is a powerful and effective way to study this subject (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996). By focusing on long-term political consequences, we can isolate our inquiry to objective

manifestations of secular power; we need not consider the correctness of any particular religious perspective nor the proper distance between church and state to make such an inquiry. Moreover, we need not reach any theological conclusions. This approach is different from three that I mention now briefly. First, American politics is often studied through the prism of individual attitudes accessed via mass polling data or sometimes through discourse analysis. The aggregation of this data provides a snapshot of what Americans are thinking about a particular issue. Along this vein, we could consider what percentage of Americans believed in prayer in schools and then look for correlations to demographics to try to get a sense of why certain individuals supported and opposed such policies. Second, another way to study politics is through the relative prominence (or lack

128 Religion and American Politics thereof) of certain ideas in the polity. In this regard, one would look at the salience of political ideologies like liberalism and socialism to understanding enduring patterns and disruptions of political behavior. For example, a scholar could study the ways in which the separation between church and state interacts with American political ideas over time. Lastly, a final approach is the lens of political economy; social scientists can look at aggregate economic data and correlate economic trends with political results and religious beliefs. For instance, one could investigate whether demands for outward demonstrations of religious piety by the state are more frequent during periods of economic decline or if they are relatively constant throughout economic cycles. Each of these approaches has benefits and drawbacks. The individual approach, while providing useful data at a certain point in time, often provides little in the way of explaining long-term shifts in political behavior and organizational development. It also almost inevitably leads to discussions of whether or not individual religious beliefs are ‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘false.’’ The ideological approach provides useful heuristic devices for understanding American politics but often struggles to explain why certain policies succeed and fail, why change occurs when it does, and how religion, which can incorporate incredibly varied political ideologies, influences American political culture. The economic approach similarly provides useful context, but also has difficultly explaining specific policy outcomes and the direction and scope of religious mobilization. The method of historical institutionalism sheds light on conservative religious mobilization in the latter half of the 20th century by attempting to synthesize and utilize the findings of the three approaches mentioned above, while focusing on how institutions affect political outcomes over time. This approach is justified because changes in American culture are never brought about overnight; they are always many decades in the making. Moreover, political change is moderated by enduring sources of macropolitical authority (for example, the state, Protestantism, labor, business). While individual action and belief is always important, political change is the result of aggregations of interests and individuals that are institutionalized such that they can wield power sufficient to augur significant changes in the state (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Simply put, religion in America is not merely a matter of individual beliefs or aggregate interests; it is simultaneously personal and political. A powerful way to understand this interaction is through the religious-political organizations that influence state policies and the institutions

that define the boundaries between church and state. Studying these factors, we can get a comprehensive picture of the politics of religion, how these politics developed over the century, and how they are manifested today.

The First Rupture: The New Deal The New Deal was a period of intense policy innovation that reformulated the political economy of the United States. We often think of this time as driven by economic forces and consequently our focus is on economic actors (for example, business interests, organized labor). From this perspective, we see a reluctant state hovering above a vast economic crisis for which it was ill-equipped. Spurred by mass desperation and enabled by decisive elections, the state expanded rapidly into areas of the economy heretofore largely left to selfregulation. However, this narrative misses the centrality of moral interests and religious actors in shaping the New Deal. Moreover, it fails to grapple with the religious consequences of the New Deal that were manifested in institutional developments that affected American politics for the rest of the century. In short, the New Deal encouraged antistatist religious mobilization that influenced succeeding generations of conservative religious activists to eschew federal solutions to social problems. The limited state that entered the 1930s was informed by an individualistic ethics that had roots in Protestantism; it was not supportive of collective bargaining, comprehensive industrial regulation, or welfare benefits (Weber 1958). The general idea was that individuals, through their own merits, should strive for economic security. The government’s proper role was not to ensure that competition resulted in just outcomes, but merely to ensure order. However, the preceding decades were not laissez-faire periods when it came to moral regulations. Post--civil war reconstruction was a time of intense moral reconstruction as religious actors pressed the state to intervene in the marketplace on numerous fronts (for example, Sunday closing laws, pornography restrictions, gambling prohibitions, and so on) (Foster 2002). Moreover, the cardinal achievement of Protestant activism, Prohibition, was enacted in 1920. Even though Prohibition was repealed in 1933, it involved an enormous expansion of the government’s purview into individual’s lives with concordant growth of bureaucracies for enforcement of the ‘‘dry laws.’’ Prohibition was encouraged by and drew on a rising sense among Protestant ministries that churches had not only to save individuals, but also to save society.

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics 129 This development was known as the Social Gospel movement and it took special interest in matters of political economy. Walter Rauschenbusch, social gospel thinker par excellence, wrote in his Christianity and the Social Crisis that Protestant ministries needed to combine with labor to build a more just society (Rauschenbusch 1909). Rauschenbusch believed that the key to the democratization of Europe in the preceding centuries was the alliance forged between the middle classes and churches in a unified drive for individual rights. In the 20th century, church alignment with the labor movement would force the democratization of the economy and augur the creation of a new more cooperative society. Many Protestant institutions heeded Rauschenbusch’s call and began advocating for labor law reform. These efforts peaked in 1935 when the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the largest Protestant advocacy organization, advocated for the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). At the hearings in the Senate, the Federal Council assembled an interdenominational group of religious leaders to make the moral case for collective bargaining. When the NLRA passed, many liberal Protestants celebrated an achievement many decades in the making. However, the NLRA and related economic regulation was not accepted by all of Protestant America. There was an immediate rupture, and neoconservative evangelicals began organizing quickly to deal with what they saw as an ill-conceived and immoral expansion of government power. Each of these organizations took a slightly different perspective on the New Deal and each adopted its own particular method, but all were united in the sense that America was morally adrift and that it had to return to God lest it be overwhelmed by subversive forces, both within and without. The International Council for Christian Leadership (ICCL), which continues to lead the national prayer breakfast movement, had its origins in 1935 in Seattle in the context of labor strife. It adopted a cellular method of organizing elites to bring the nation back to God. It developed a subcommittee on labor issues that sought to orientate labor issues around Christian principles to avoid strikes. Attempting to bring Christ to the bargaining table, the ICCL sought to bolster free enterprise and stanch radicalism. Whether or not the ICCL was particularly effective at shaping industrial policy at this time is not important for our analysis; what is important is that institutional development was stemming in part from political-economic changes and that the perspective---that the New Deal was misguided and that America needed to return to God---was

generated, deployed, and utilized by conservative evangelical activists in the 1930s. This strategy was effective in garnering support from leading politicians and achieved national prominence when Dwight D. Eisenhower attended the first Presidential Prayer Breakfast in 1953 (Grubb 1962; Sharlet 2003; Lindsay 2006).3 Another organization that was particularly concerned about political economy was Moral Re-Armament (MRA). MRA, which has since changed its name and curtailed its activities, was an interdenominational mass movement led by Frank Buchman that sought to save the world from labor strife. Over the years, MRA was supported in varying degrees by Presidents Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. One of MRA’s first big events was at Constitution Hall in Washington, D.C., on June 4, 1939. Sen. Harry Truman kicked off the meeting with an introductory note from President Roosevelt. The program emphasized that God was necessary to solve America’s problems and that class conflict was detrimental to the nation (‘‘National Meeting for Moral ReArmament’’ n.d.). MRA sponsored plays across the country that emphasized labor-management cooperation and dispatched teams of organizers to try to bring labor leaders to God to avert strikes and other disruptions in industry. While professing to be neither prolabor nor antilabor, MRA did not support organizing drives. Its focus was on the reduction of conflict by bringing God into industrial settings. Similarly, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), which represents millions of evangelicals and fundamentalists, began a program to bring God into industry in the 1940s to maintain industrial peace. Seeking to replicate the model of military chaplains, the NAE set up a Commission on Industrial Chaplaincies to train and place chaplains in factories. The point was to reduce industrial conflict by bringing workers to Christ (Minutes of the Board of Administration 1946). Like ICCL and MRA, NAE perceived the 1930s as a period of spiritual weakness; Americans had turned to the state for political and economic solutions to what were individual moral and spiritual problems. The only true salvation was realized through individual religious commitment, not through an expanding welfare state and especially not through increased corporatism with an expanding labor movement. As the initial political interests of these three conservative evangelical organizations attests, the New Deal was a political rupture that manifested itself in the birth of a new set of religious-political organizations that from the outset were deeply skeptical, if not hostile, to the idea of the welfare state. They were

130 Religion and American Politics concerned, rightly or wrongly, with the rapid expansion of labor power, and they believed that bringing America back to God would ameliorate demands for state expansion. These organizations would combine with other movements later in the century, but they would not forsake their skepticism of welfare policies and organized labor. To understand why later evangelical mobilizations would align themselves with business, one must recognize that core conservative evangelical institutions were developed in a period of intense labor conflict and they choose to align themselves with the business community because they had similar perspectives on the New Deal: it was an immoral expansion of federal power that violated the Constitution. Although this calculus was somewhat altered later in the century, the antistatist alliance between neoconservative evangelical activists and business within the Republican Party began in the early 1940s. The central government’s enforcement of individualistic economic principles favored by conservative evangelicals ended with the New Deal. The organizations that formed in response articulated a message that became a cornerstone of conservative evangelical efforts for the rest of the century. Instead of some new-fangled policy to solve a supposed social problem, the nation needed to return to God.

The Second Rupture: The School Prayer Decisions The second rupture was the ‘‘school prayer decisions’’ that began in the late 1940s with Everson v. Board of Education. Education was deeply important to religious activists because it allowed religious actors to shape norms of behavior even when the state would not uphold similar moral convictions. After the devastating debacle of the Scopes trial and the repeal of Prohibition, many religious activists put renewed emphasis on education because it seemed like the only arena in which morality could be preserved given an immoral state and a debauched society (Carpenter 1997). Catholics were more advanced in providing primary education than Protestants because Protestants assumed that American public schools would naturally propagate Protestant morality and not be hostile to Protestant influence. Following World War II, the Supreme Court moved against religion in education settings and a significant political rupture occurred between conservative evangelicals and the federal government. During World War II, the Supreme Court considered a set of cases concerning required flag salutes and sanctions against students that declined to participate

for religious reasons. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis [1940], a student who was a Jehovah’s Witness was expelled from a Pennsylvania school for refusing to salute the flag while pledging allegiance. The court, in the context of war, refused to see the requirement as violating the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which stated, ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’’ The court found the salute, despite the student’s beliefs, was required for the ‘‘promotion of national cohesion’’ and thus was constitutional (310 U.S. 586 1940). However in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette [1943], the court overturned Gobitis and refused to uphold a law requiring a mandatory salute that involved raising an extended right arm straight out with the palm upward. The court reasoned that such coercion for the sake of unity was bound to backfire and that ‘‘compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.’’ At the very core of the Constitution was the ‘‘right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order’’ (319 U.S. 624 [1943]). While the decision in Barnette revolved around the proper interpretation of the free exercise clause, it was a significant step away from allowing coercion for the sake of unity in education. Barnette portended a longterm shift toward protecting individual students from the possibility of moral or spiritual coercion because official actions constituted something like an ‘‘establishment’’ of religion, which was barred by the establishment clause of the First Amendment. In the short term, Barnette was followed by Everson v. Board of Education [1947] in which the court upheld financial assistance for busing to parochial schools. However, the court held that the establishment clause of the First Amendment applied to state as well as federal actions. The court held, Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion (330 U.S. 1 [1947]). Putting these words into practice 15 years later, the court struck down compulsory prayer in New York public schools in Engel v. Vitale [1962]. The prayer that was to read by school officials was general, but it did invoke God: ‘‘Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics 131 us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.’’ The court noted that many Americans had left England for religious liberty, and the court argued that religion was too sacred to be enforced by the crude hands of government (370 U.S. 421 [1962]). Shortly afterward, the court in Abington v. Schempp [1963] while noting that religion had ‘‘an exalted’’ place in American life struck down forced Bible readings and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer (374 U.S. 203 [1963]). These decisions were controversial; religious ‘‘conservatives reacted angrily,’’ and the court was deluged with letters of protest from evangelicals who felt the country was turning away from God (Ahlstrom 2004). Part of the frustration for conservative Protestants was that American Protestantism was divided; liberal Protestants greeted the court decisions as proper demarcations between church and state. Now conservative Protestants wrestled with frustrations born of two ruptures: the New Deal expansion, which was feared to have corrupted American values by introducing a socialistic and atheistic element that was antithetical to traditional Protestant individualism, and the curtailment of religion in education, which was thought to be a last redoubt of Christian values. In both cases, conservative evangelicals saw the federal government as breaching established political covenants and forsaking the moral principles that had made America great. To these activists, both ruptures seemed to portend the advance of secular humanism, the diminution of Christian values in America, and to demonstrate the ineffectiveness (if not outright complicity) of the federal government in stopping these trends. Protest against both the New Deal and the school prayer decisions were easily combined into calls for America to return to God and for restraint of the federal government. If Americans could rejuvenate their moral strength and the federal government could return to its pre--New Deal limits, then perhaps the country could still be saved. However, federal intervention into state policies would soon increase in another area dear to conservative activists’ hearts: sex. The result was a third rupture.

The Third Rupture: The Reproductive Health Decisions Sex is a traditional focus of religious advocacy in the United States. In the late 1800s, religious activists protested against abortions, prostitution, and pornography. In response, dozens of states passed laws banning commercial abortions in the 1860s and 1870s. This wave of policy innovation and subsequent trials for violations of these laws ended ‘‘abortion as a commercial

enterprise’’ until the 1970s (Morone 2003, 251--252). In 1973, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark Roe v. Wade decision that affirmed a woman’s limited constitutional right to have an abortion. States were prevented from barring abortion entirely. The decision in Roe built on the decision eight years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut [1965]. In Griswold, the court struck down Connecticut’s prohibition of contraception. The court found a right of privacy in the ‘‘penumbras’’ of the Constitution that was ‘‘older than the Bill of Rights.’’ The dissents, authored by Justices Black and Stewart, argued that while Connecticut’s law was ‘‘uncommonly silly,’’ it was nevertheless not prohibited by the Constitution; there simply was no right of privacy in the Constitution (381 U.S. 479 [1965]). Upon Griswold, the court decided in Roe v. Wade that states could not prohibit abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy because abortion fell within a woman’s constitutional right to privacy (410 U.S. 113 [1973]). For conservative religious activists, the decision in Roe seemed like the school prayer decisions and even like the New Deal: once again, the federal government had intervened in what had been a state concern and it had done so in a way in which many religious activists believed to be entirely immoral, as well as unconstitutional. Building on the frustrations from the first two ruptures, this third rupture generated intense opposition. All of these extensions of federal power seemed to be further proof that America was sliding downward, that reverence for God was absent, and that something drastic had to be done. In this context, it is neither surprising that rhetoric and tactics were intense, nor that it maintained an antistatist stance. Jerry Falwell formed Moral Majority in 1979 to combat ‘‘moral decline’’ and restore the principles of the Bible to the federal government (Ahlstrom 2004, 1101). Pat Robertson, the televangelist, coordinated a rally at the capital entitled, ‘‘Washington for Jesus,’’ in 1980 and then ran for president on a protest platform in 1988 (Ahlstrom 2004, 1101). After his inauguration, Ronald Reagan spoke to the NAE and denounced moral drift. Returning to themes developed by conservative activists in the 1930s, Reagan ‘‘scorned the Social Gospel and its political progeny---the New Deal, the Great Society’’ (Morone 2003, 455). America did not need a new political or economic program; America needed God. Frustrated with the Grand Old Party (GOP) and unable to secure legislative victories, religious activists turned to more direct tactics. Operation Rescue, founded in 1988, pioneered mass blockades of reproductive health clinics (Williams and Blackburn 1996,

132 Religion and American Politics 168).4 In 1989, Pat Robertson founded the Christian Coalition to mobilize conservative evangelicals to realized evangelical objectives via electoral politics (Ahlstrom 2004, 1,101). During this period of mobilization, conservative evangelicals relied on ideas, strategies, and organizations forged in response to previous ruptures. The most basic denominator was a moralistic attack on government social programs as misguided, ineffective, and antithetical to American values. These arguments were often paired with the notion, developed in response to the New Deal government expansion, that social problems could be saved through individual moral decisions (for example, abstinence, ‘‘just say no’’ to drug use) and, most important, by bringing God back into our lives (for example, prayer in school). When the desired outcome was curtailment of established federal power, the ideas used were those that had been forged in response to the school prayer and reproductive rights decisions: the federal government had overstepped its proper role and misinterpreted the Constitution.

The Current Interregnum Foreign commentators have tended to recognize the pervasive influence of religion on American politics. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his Democracy in America, argued that religion should be considered as ‘‘the first of their political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof’’ (Tocqueville 2000 [1835], 292). Tocqueville argued that religion provided the necessary moral consensus to maintain order and freedom when political obligations were relaxed. Similarly, James Bryce in The American Commonwealth, argued that churches in the United States were ‘‘as thoroughly popular, in the best sense of the word, as any of the other institutions in the country’’ (1924). Like de Tocqueville, Bryce saw religion as providing the virtues necessary to allow a republic to function properly. American scholars, for the reasons mentioned above, have tended to shy away from such broad considerations of religion’s place in American society, instead preferring to see American government as fundamentally secular. Religion, if important at all, is only epiphenomenal. But this is a deep underestimation of the influence of religion on American politics over time, and it leads scholars to reach hasty judgments when they, from time to time, take a renewed interest in the subject. Religion has always been deeply important to the American people, and it constantly influences their government. Since it is an enduring force, we can only

truly understand religious politics by thinking long term and evaluating how political changes, over time, have led to certain alignments. The late-20th-century alignment between conservative religious activists and business interests within the Republican Party is best understood as emerging from three distinct political ruptures beginning in the 1930s with the New Deal, followed by the school prayer and reproductive right decisions. These ruptures left conservative religious activists with an abiding skepticism of the federal government that coupled easily with business interests seeking to reduce federal supervision of economic matters. Viewed in this light, George W. Bush’s campaign for the presidency in 2000, packaged as a bid to restore honor to the White House and implement a probusiness agenda, was neither particularly novel nor bold, although it did rely on an intense mobilization fostered by multiple disappointments. As one might expect, the campaign drew on old frustrations, hopes, and alliances and Bush made sure to signal his support for renewed emphasis on religion in American life. Likewise, the unfolding political consequences of recent expansions of federal power are likely to follow a predictable path. In 2003, the Supreme Court struck down Texas’ prohibition on homosexual sodomy in the case of Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558 [2003]). Before this decision, states were relatively free to regulate homosexual sodomy as they saw fit, and some states chose to outlaw such activity even when in private and between consenting adults. In Lawrence, the court continued on the path that it began with its 1965 decision in Griswold prohibiting states from banning contraception. This path, which continued through Roe in 1973, was toward increasing the right of privacy such that states were restrained further in their attempts to regulate sexual behavior. For conservative evangelicals, the Lawrence decision seemed awfully familiar. Once again, the federal government was expanding its power to affect changes that were regarded as wholly immoral by conservative activists and in violation of basic American values. The response to the Lawrence decision is not yet fully manifested, and it is not clear whether it will constitute a distinct fourth rupture between conservative evangelicals and the federal government. If new political organizations form and individual denominations begin to splinter on the question of homosexuality, then it is more likely that Lawrence will constitute a fourth rupture that will build on frustrations welling up from three previous periods of political development. As each has increased in intensity, this fourth rupture

Evangelical Mobilization and Late-20th-Century American Politics 133 would do the same, and it would rely on ideas and strategies from previous mobilizations. The basic line of argument would be that America needs to return to God and the government has overstepped its constitutional limits. The compounding of frustrations could lead to a level of conservative evangelical mobilization greater than anything seen previously in electoral politics. Alternatively, it could lead to conservative evangelicals finally forsaking the federal government as hopelessly incorrigible and retreating into ever more isolated communities in pursuit of righteousness. The Lawrence decision will affect American politics through the institutional legacies of previous conflicts. To understand the mobilization and alliance of religious activists in recent years and to make predictions about the future, one must look beyond the 1970s or even the 1950s and begin tracing the development of a distinct set of rhetorics, institutions, and ideas from the 1930s onward. Initially frustrated with the New Deal, neoconservative evangelical activists began trying to contain the labor movement and the welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s. The school prayer decisions in the early 1960s further alienated this base as the federal government once again appeared to be moving in an immoral direction. The reproductive health decisions culminating in Roe v. Wade in 1973 further frustrated conservative activists and spurred additional organizational development. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 provided some symbolic relief, but the basic frustrations with the post--New Deal federal government continued and were exacerbated in the 1990s with the election of Bill Clinton. George W. Bush drew from these distinct, although complementary, wells of support to win the presidency in 2000. Today, these three periods of political rupture remain key for understanding late-20th-century conservative evangelical mobilization and grasping why someone like Jerry Falwell could possibly suggest what he did about the attacks of September 11, 2001.

References and Further Reading Ahlstrom, Sydney. 2004. A Religious History of the American People. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bellah, Robert. 1967. ‘‘Civil Religion in America.’’ Daedalus 96 (Winter): 1--21. Bivins, Jason. 2003. The Fracture of Good Order: Christian Antiliberalism and the Challenge to American Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Bruce, Steve. 1988. The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics 1978--1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bryce, Viscount James. 1924. The American Commonwealth. New York: MacMillan Company. Carpenter, Joel. 1997. Revive Us Again: the Reawakening of American Fundamentalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Foster, Gaines M. 2002. Moral Reconstruction: Christian Lobbyists and the Federal Legislation of Morality, 1865--1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Frankel, Glenn, and Karlyn Barker. 1981. ‘‘Now More Eager For ’81 Election; Landslide Improves Virginia Republicans’ Prospects for Next Year.’’ Washington Post, November 6, C1. Grubb, Norman. 1962. Modern Viking: The Story of Abraham Vereide, Pioneer in Christian Leadership. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House. Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. ‘‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.’’ Political Studies XLIV: 936--957. Herbers, John. 1980. ‘‘Once Democratic South: An Era Ends.’’ New York Times, November 6, A27. Herbers, John. 1980. ‘‘Ultraconservative Evangelicals a Surging New Force in Politics.’’ New York Times, August 17. Lindsay, D. Michael. 2006. ‘‘Is the National Prayer Breakfast Surrounded by a ‘Christian Mafia’? Religious Publicity and Secrecy within the Corridors of Power.’’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 (June): 390--419. Mead, Walter. 2006. ‘‘God’s Country?’’ Foreign Affairs (September/October): 24. Minutes of the Board of Administration. 1946. Belmont Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, October 1--2, Box 66, Collection 20. Wheaton, IL: Billy Graham Center Archives. Morone, James. 2003. Hellfire Nation: the Politics of Sin in American History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Naparstek, Michael. 2001. ‘‘Falwell and Robertson Stumble.’’ Religion in the News 4 (Fall): 5, 27. ‘‘National Meeting for Moral Re-Armament.’’ n.d. Records of Moral Rearmament, Box 147. Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press. Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 1994. ‘‘Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a New Institutionalism.’’ In The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations. Edited by Larry C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. The Search for American Political Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. Phillips, Kevin. 2006. American Theocracy: the Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century. New York: Penguin Group. Plotke, David. 2002. ‘‘The Success and Anger of the Modern American Right.’’ In The Radical Right. Edited by Daniel Bell, lxii--lxiv. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Rauschenbusch, Walter. 1909. Christianity and the Social Crisis. London: Macmillan Company. Rieder, Jonathan. 1989. ‘‘The Rise of the ‘Silent Majority.’’’ In The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order. Edited by Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

134 Religion and American Politics Rossinow, Doug. 1998. The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America. New York: Columbia University Press. Sharlet, Jeffrey. 2003. ‘‘Jesus Plus Nothing: Undercover among America’s Secret Theocrats.’’ Harper’s Magazine (March): 53--64. Smith, Christian. 1996. ‘‘Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In.’’ In Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism. Edited by Christian Smith, 2--5. New York: Routledge. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000 [1835]. Democracy in America. Translated by George Lawrence and edited by J. P. Mayer. New York: Perennial Classics. Wald, Kenneth D., and Allison Calhoun-Brown. 2007. Religion and Politics in the United States. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Weber, Max. 1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Williams, Rhys, and Jeffrey Blackburn. 1996. ‘‘Many Are Called but Few Obey: Ideological Commitment and Activism in Operation Rescue.’’ In Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism. Edited by Christian Smith. New York: Routledge.

Notes 1. The notion of rupture is developed in this essay to denote breakdowns in the relationship between conservative evangelicals and the federal government such that institutional development had enduring political consequences. 2. Walter Mead, writing in Foreign Affairs, expresses similar interest in the rising influence of religion on contemporary foreign policy, although he is quick to note, ‘‘Religion has always been a major force in U.S. politics’’ (Mead 2006, 24). 3. The name ICCL is used here because, although the organization altered its name multiple times, this title most clearly expressed the ambitions of the organization. 4. The response to the reproductive rights decisions, drawing on frustrations from previous decades and a growing sense of desperation, was intense and violent. Between 1977 and 2006, dozens of reproductive health clinics were bombed, hundreds blockaded, and tens of thousands arrested in civil disobedience. Moreover, 7 doctors were murdered, 17 were victims of attempted murder, and 153 were victims of of assault and battery (National Abortion Foundation, ‘‘NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics,’’ http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/violence_statistics.html, accessed November 12, 2006).

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deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have undertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a byword through the world, wee shall open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill of the wayes of god and all professours for Gods sake; wee shall shame the faces of many of gods worthy servants, and cause theire prayers to be turned into Cursses upon us till wee be consumed out of the good land whether wee are going: And to shutt upp this discourse with that exhortacion of Moses that faithfull servant of the Lord in his last farewell to Israell Deut. 30. Beloved there is now sett before us life, and good, deathe and evill in that wee are Commaunded this day to love the Lord our God, and to love one another to walke in his wayes and to keepe his Commaundements and his Ordinance, and his lawes, and the Articles of our Covenant with him that wee may live and be multiplyed, and that the Lord our God may blesse us in the land whether wee goe to possesse it: But if our heartes shall turne away soe that wee will not obey, but shall be seduced and worshipp other Gods our pleasures, and proffitts, and serve them, it is propounded unto us this day, wee shall surely perishe out of the good Land whether wee passe over this vast Sea to possesse it;

2.1 John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill, 1630 Now the onely way to avoyde this shipwracke and to provide for our posterity is to followe the Counsell of Micah, to doe Justly, to love mercy, to walke humbly with our God, for this end, wee must be knitt together in this worke as one man, wee must entertaine each other in brotherly Affeccion, wee must be willing to abridge our selves of our superfluities, for the supply of others necessities, wee must uphold a familiar Commerce together in all meekenes, gentlenes, patience and liberallity, wee must delight in eache other, make others Condicions our owne rejoyce together, mourne together, labour, and suffer together, allwayes haveing before our eyes our Commission and Community in the worke, our Community as members of the same body, soe shall wee keepe the unitie of the spirit in the bond of peace, the Lord will be our God and delight to dwell among us, as his owne people and will commaund a blessing upon us in all our wayes, soe that wee shall see much more of his wisdome power goodnes and truthe then formerly wee have beene acquainted with, wee shall finde that the God of Israell is among us, when tenn of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies, when hee shall make us a prayse and glory, that men shall say of succeeding plantacions: the lord make it like that of New England: for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us; soe that if wee shall

Therefore lett us choose life, that wee, and our Seede, may live; by obeyeing his voyce, and cleaveing to him,

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for hee is our life, and our prosperity. The civil magistrate either respecteth that religion and worship which his conscience is persuaded is true, and upon which he ventures his soul; or else that and those which he is persuaded are false. Concerning the first, if that which the magistrate believeth to be true, be true, I say he owes a threefold duty unto it: First, approbation and countenance, a reverent esteem and honorable testimony, according to Isa. 49, and Revel. 21, with a tender respect of truth, and the professors of it. Secondly, personal submission of his own soul to the power of the Lord Jesus in that spiritual government and kingdom, according to Matt. 18 and 1 Cor. 5. Thirdly, protection of such true professors of Christ, whether apart, or met together, as also of their estates from violence and injury, according to Rom. 13. Now, secondly, if it be a false religion (unto which the civil magistrate dare not adjoin, yet) he owes: First, permission (for approbation he owes not what is evil) and this according to Matthew 13. 30 for public peace and quiet’s sake. Secondly, he owes protection to the persons of his subjects (though of a false worship), that no injury be offered either to the persons or goods of any. . . . . . . The God of Peace, the God of Truth will shortly seal this truth, and confirm this witness, and make it evident to the whole world, that the doctrine of persecution for cause of conscience, is most evidently and lamentably contrary to the doctrine of Christ Jesus the Prince of Peace. Amen.

2.2 The Maryland Toleration Act, 1649 An Act Concerning Religion. Forasmuch as in a well governed and Christian Common Weath matters concerning Religion and the honor of God ought in the first place to bee taken, into serious consideracion and endeavoured to bee settled, Be it therefore ordered and enacted by the Right Honourable Cecilius Lord Baron of Baltemore absolute Lord and Proprietary of this Province with the advise and consent of this Generall Assembly: That whatsoever person or persons within this Province and the Islands thereunto helonging shall from henceforth blaspheme God, that is Curse him, or deny our Saviour Jesus Christ to bee the sonne of God, or shall deny the holy Trinity the father sonne and holy

Ghost, or the Godhead of any of the said Three persons of the Trinity or the Unity of the Godhead, or shall use or utter any reproachfull Speeches, words or language concerning the said Holy Trinity, or any of the said three persons thereof, shalbe punished with death and confiscation or forfeiture of all his or her lands and goods to the Lord Proprietary and his heires. And bee it also Enacted by the Authority and with the advise and assent aforesaid, That whatsoever person or persons shall from henceforth use or utter any reproachfull words or Speeches concerning the blessed Virgin Mary the Mother of our Saviour or the holy Apostles or Evangelists or any of them shall in such case for the first offence forfeit to the said Lord Proprietary and his heirs Lords and Proprietaries of this Province the summe of five pound Sterling or the value thereof to be Levyed on the goods and chattells of every such person soe offending, but in case such Offender or Offenders, shall not then have goods and chattells sufficient for the satisfyeing of such forfeiture, or that the same bee not otherwise speedily satisfyed that then such Offender or Offenders shalbe publiquely whipt and bee imprisoned during the pleasure of the Lord Proprietary or the Lieutenant or cheife Governor of this Province for the time being. And that every such Offender or Offenders for every second offence shall forfeit tenne pound sterling or the value thereof to bee levyed as aforesaid, or in case such offender or Offenders shall not then have goods and chattells within this Province sufficient for that purpose then to bee publiquely and severely whipt and imprisoned as before is expressed. And that every person or persons before mentioned offending herein the third time, shall for such third Offence forfeit all his lands and Goods and bee for ever banished and expelled out of this Province. And be it also further Enacted by the same authority advise and assent that whatsoever person or persons shall from henceforth uppon any occasion of Offence or otherwise in a reproachful manner or Way declare call or denominate any person or persons whatsoever inhabiting, residing, traffiqueing, trading or comerceing within this Province or within any the Ports, Harbors, Creeks or Havens to the same belonging an heritick, Scismatick, Idolator, puritan, Independant, Prespiterian popish prest, Jesuite, Jesuited papist, Lutheran, Calvenist, Anabaptist, Brownist, Antinomian, Barrowist, Roundhead, Separatist, or any other name or terme in a reproachfull manner relating to matter of Religion shall for every such Offence forfeit and loose the somme of tenne shillings sterling or the value thereof to bee levyed on the goods and chattells of every such

2.2 The Maryland Toleration Act 137 Offender and Offenders, the one half thereof to be forfeited and paid unto the person and persons of whom such reproachfull words are or shalbe spoken or uttered, and the other half thereof to the Lord Proprietary and his heires Lords and Proprietaries of this Province. But if such person or persons who shall at any time utter or speake any such reproachfull words or Language shall not have Goods or Chattells sufficient and overt within this Province to bee taken to satisfie the penalty aforesaid or that the same bee not otherwise speedily satisfyed, that then the person or persons soe offending shalbe publickly whipt, and shall suffer imprisonment without baile or maineprise [bail] untill hee, shee or they respectively shall satisfy the party soe offended or greived by such reproachfull Language by asking him or her respectively forgivenes publiquely for such his Offence before the Magistrate of cheife Officer or Officers of the Towne or place where such Offence shalbe given. And be it further likewise Enacted by the Authority and consent aforesaid That every person and persons within this Province that shall at any time hereafter prophane the Sabbath or Lords day called Sunday by frequent swearing, drunkennes or by any uncivill or disorderly recreacion, or by working on that day when absolute necessity doth not require it shall for every such first offence forfeit 2s 6d sterling or the value thereof, and for the second offence 5s sterling or the value thereof, and for the third offence and soe for every time he shall offend in like manner afterwards 10s sterling or the value thereof. And in case such offender and offenders shall not have sufficient goods or chattells within this Province to satisfy any of the said Penalties respectively hereby imposed for prophaning the Sabbath or Lords day called Sunday as aforesaid, That in Every such case the partie soe offending shall for the first and second offence in that kinde be imprisoned till hee or shee shall publickly in open Court before the cheife Commander Judge or Magistrate, of that County Towne or precinct where such offence shalbe committed acknowledg the Scandall and offence he hath in that respect given against God and the good and civill Governement of this Province, And for the third offence and for every time after shall also bee publickly whipt. And whereas the inforceing of the conscience in matters of Religion hath frequently fallen out to be of dangerous Consequence in those commonwealthes where it hath been practised, And for the more quiett and peaceable governement of this Province, and the better to preserve mutuall Love and amity amongst the Inhabitants thereof, Be it Therefore also by the Lord Proprietary with the advise and consent of this

Assembly Ordeyned and enacted (except as in this present Act is before Declared and sett forth) that noe person or persons whatsoever within this Province, or the Islands, Ports, Harbors, Creekes, or havens thereunto belonging professing to beleive in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof within this Province or the Islands thereunto belonging nor any way compelled to the beleife or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent, soe as they be not unfaithfull to the Lord Proprietary, or molest or conspire against the civill Governement established or to bee established in this Province under him or his heires. And that all and every person and persons that shall presume Contrary to this Act and the true intent and meaning thereof directly or indirectly either in person or estate willfully to wrong disturbe trouble or molest any person whatsoever within this Province professing to beleive in Jesus Christ for or in respect of his or her religion or the free exercise thereof within this Province other than is provided for in this Act that such person or persons soe offending, shalbe compelled to pay trebble damages to the party soe wronged or molested, and for every such offence shall also forfeit 20s sterling in money or the value thereof, half thereof for the use of the Lord Proprietary, and his heires Lords and Proprietaries of this Province, and the other half for the use of the party soe wronged or molested as aforesaid, Or if the partie soe offending as aforesaid shall refuse or bee unable to recompense the party soe wronged, or to satisfy such fyne or forfeiture, then such Offender shalbe severely punished by publick whipping and imprisonment during the pleasure of the Lord Proprietary, or his Lieutenant or cheife Governor of this Province for the tyme being without baile or maineprise. And bee it further alsoe Enacted by the authority and consent aforesaid That the Sheriff or other Officer or Officers from time to time to bee appointed and authorized for that purpose, of the County Towne or precinct where every particular offence in this present Act conteyned shall happen at any time to bee committed and whereupon there is hereby a forfeiture fyne or penalty imposed shall from time to time distraine and seise the goods and estate of every such person soe offending as aforesaid against this present Act or any part thereof, and sell the same or any part thereof for the full satisfaccion of such forfeiture, fine, or penalty as aforesaid, Restoring unto the partie soe offending the Remainder or overplus of the said goods or estate after such satisfaccion soe made as aforesaid. The freemen have assented.

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2.3 Roger Williams, A Plea for Religious Liberty, 1644 First, that the blood of so many hundred thousand souls of Protestants and Papists, spilt in the wars of present and former ages, for their respective consciences, is not required nor accepted by Jesus Christ the Prince of Peace. Secondly, pregnant scriptures and arguments are throughout the work proposed against the doctrine of persecution for cause of conscience. Thirdly, satisfactory answers are given to scriptures, and objections produced by Mr. Calvin, Beza, Mr. Cotton, and the ministers of the New English churches and others former and later, tending to prove the doctrine of persecution for cause of conscience. Fourthly, the doctrine of persecution for cause of conscience is proved guilty of all the blood of the souls crying for vengeance under the altar. Fifthly, all civil states with their officers of justice in their respective constitutions and administrations are proved essentially civil, and therefore not judges, governors, or defenders of the spiritual or Christian state and worship. Sixthly, it is the will and command of God that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or antichristian consciences and worships, be granted to all men in all nations and countries; and they are only to be fought against with that sword which is only (in soul matters) able to conquer, to wit, the sword of God’s Spirit, the Word of God. Seventhly, the state of the Land of Israel, the kings and people thereof in peace and war, is proved figurative and ceremonial, and no pattern nor president for any kingdom or civil state in the world to follow. Eighthly, God requireth not a uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state; which enforced uniformity (sooner or later) is the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls. Ninthly, in holding an enforced uniformity of religion in a civil state, we must necessarily disclaim our desires and hopes of the Jew’s conversion to Christ. Tenthly, an enforced uniformity of religion throughout a nation or civil state, confounds the civil and religious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh.

Eleventhly, the permission of other consciences and worships than a state professeth only can (according to God) procure a firm and lasting peace (good assurance being taken according to the wisdom of the civil state for uniformity of civil obedience from all forts). Twelfthly, lastly, true civility and Christianity may both flourish in a state or kingdom, notwithstanding the permission of divers and contrary consciences, either of Jew or Gentile. . . . TRUTH. I acknowledge that to molest any person, Jew or Gentile, for either professing doctrine, or practicing worship merely religious or spiritual, it is to persecute him, and such a person (whatever his doctrine or practice be, true or false) suffereth persecution for conscience. But withal I desire it may be well observed that this distinction is not full and complete: for beside this that a man may be persecuted because he holds or practices what he believes in conscience to be a truth (as Daniel did, for which he was cast into the lions’ den, Dan. 6), and many thousands of Christians, because they durst not cease to preach and practice what they believed was by God commanded, as the Apostles answered (Acts 4 & 5), I say besides this a man may also be persecuted, because he dares not be constrained to yield obedience to such doctrines and worships as are by men invented and appointed. . . . Dear TRUTH, I have two sad complaints: First, the most sober of the witnesses, that dare to plead thy cause, how are they charged to be mine enemies, contentious, turbulent, seditious? Secondly, shine enemies, though they speak and rail against thee, though they outrageously pursue, imprison, banish, kill thy faithful witnesses, yet how is all vermilion’d o’er for justice against the heretics? Yea, if they kindle coals, and blow the flames of devouring wars, that leave neither spiritual nor civil state, but burn up branch and root, yet how do all pretend an holy war? He that kills, and he that’s killed, they both cry out: ‘‘It is for God, and for their conscience.’’ ’Tis true, nor one nor other seldom dare to plead the mighty Prince Christ Jesus for their author, yet (both Protestant and Papist) pretend they have spoke with Moses and the Prophets who all, say they (before Christ came), allowed such holy persecutions, holy wars against the enemies of holy church. TRUTH. Dear PEACE (to ease thy first complaint), ’tis true, thy dearest sons, most like their mother, peacekeeping, peacemaking sons of God, have borne and still must bear the blurs of troublers of Israel, and turners of the world upside down. And ’tis true again, what Solomon once spake: ‘‘The beginning of strife is as when

2.3 Roger Williams, A Plea for Religious Liberty one letteth out water, therefore (saith he) leave off contention before it be meddled with. This caveat should keep the banks and sluices firm and strong, that strife, like a breach of waters, break not in upon the sons of men.’’ Yet strife must be distinguished: It is necessary or unnecessary, godly or Ungodly, Christian or unchristian, etc. It is unnecessary, unlawful, dishonorable, ungodly, unchristian, in most cases in the world, for there is a possibility of keeping sweet peace in most cases, and, if it be possible, it is the express command of God that peace be kept (Rom. 13). Again, it is necessary, honorable, godly, etc., with civil and earthly weapons to defend the innocent and to rescue the oppressed from the violent paws and jaws of oppressing persecuting Nimrods (Psal. 73; Job 29). It is as necessary, yea more honorable, godly, and Christian, to fight the fight of faith, with religious and spiritual artillery, and to contend earnestly for the faith of Jesus, once delivered to the saints against all opposers, and the gates of earth and hell, men or devils, yea against Paul himself, or an angel from heaven, if he bring any other faith or doctrine. . . . PEACE. I add that a civil sword (as woeful experience in all ages has proved) is so far from bringing or helping forward an opposite in religion to repentance that magistrates sin grievously against the work of God and blood of souls by such proceedings. Because as (commonly) the sufferings of false and antichristian teachers harden their followers, who being blind, by this means are occasioned to tumble into the ditch of hell after their blind leaders, with more inflamed zeal of lying confidence. So, secondly, violence and a sword of steel begets such an impression in the sufferers that certainly they conclude (as indeed that religion cannot be true which needs such instruments of violence to uphold it so) that persecutors are far from soft and gentle commiseration of the blindness of others. . . . For (to keep to the similitude which the Spirit useth, for instance) to batter down a stronghold, high wall, fort, tower, or castle, men bring not a first and second admonition, and after obstinacy, excommunication, which are spiritual weapons concerning them that be in the church: nor exhortation to repent and be baptized, to believe in the Lord Jesus, etc., which are proper weapons to them that be without, etc. But to take a stronghold, men bring cannons, culverins, saker, bullets, powder, muskets, swords, pikes, etc., and these to this end are weapons effectual and proportionable. On the other side, to batter down idolatry, false worship, heresy, schism, blindness, hardness, out of the soul and spirit, it is vain, improper, and unsuitable to bring those weapons which are used by persecutors,

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stocks, whips, prisons, swords, gibbets, stakes, etc. (where these seem to prevail with some cities or kingdoms, a stronger force sets up again, what a weaker pull’d down), but against these spiritual strongholds in the souls of men, spiritual artillery and weapons are proper, which are mighty through God to subdue and bring under the very thought to obedience, or else to bind fast the soul with chains of darkness, and lock it up in the prison of unbelief and hardness to eternity. . . . PEACE. I pray descend now to the second evil which you observe in the answerer’s position, viz., that it would be evil to tolerate notorious evildoers, seducing teachers, etc. TRUTH. I say the evil is that he most improperly and confusedly joins and couples seducing teachers with scandalous livers. PEACE. But is it not true that the world is full of seducing teachers, and is it not true that seducing teachers are notorious evildoers? TRUTH. I answer, far be it from me to deny either, and yet in two things I shall discover the great evil of this joining and coupling seducing teachers, and scandalous livers as one adequate or proper object of the magistrate’s care and work to suppress and punish. First, it is not an homogeneal (as we speak) but an hetergeneal commixture or joining together of things most different in kinds and natures, as if they were both of one consideration. . . . TRUTH. I answer, in granting with Brentius that man hath not power to make laws to bind conscience, he overthrows such his tenent and practice as restrain men from their worship, according to their conscience and belief, and constrain them to such worships (though it be out of a pretense that they are convinced) which their own souls tell them they have no satisfaction nor faith in. Secondly, whereas he affirms that men may make laws to see the laws of God observed. I answer, God needeth not the help of a material sword of steel to assist the sword of the Spirit in the affairs of conscience, to those men, those magistrates, yea that commonwealth which makes such magistrates, must needs have power and authority from Christ Jesus to fit judge and to determine in all the great controversies concerning doctrine, discipline, government, etc. And then I ask whether upon this ground it must not evidently follow that: Either there is no lawful commonwealth nor civil state of men in the world, which is not qualified with this spiritual discerning (and then also that the very commonweal hath more light concerning the church of Christ than the church itself). Or, that the commonweal and magistrates thereof must judge and punish as they are persuaded in their

140 Religion and American Politics own belief and conscience (be their conscience paganish, Turkish, or antichristian) what is this but to confound heaven and earth together, and not only to take away the being of Christianity out of the world, but to take away all civility, and the world out of the world, and to lay all upon heaps of confusion? . . . PEACE. The fourth head is the proper means of both these powers to attain their ends. First, the proper means whereby the civil power may and should attain its end are only political, and principally these five. First, the erecting and establishing what form of civil government may seem in wisdom most meet, according to general rules of the world, and state of the people. Secondly, the making, publishing, and establishing of wholesome civil laws, not only such as concern civil justice, but also the free passage of true religion; for outward civil peace ariseth and is maintained from them both, from the latter as well as from the former. Civil peace cannot stand entire, where religion is corrupted (2 Chron. 15. 3. 5. 6; and Judges 8). And yet such laws, though conversant about religion, may still be counted civil laws, as, on the contrary, an oath cloth still remain religious though conversant about civil matters. Thirdly, election and appointment of civil officers to see execution to those laws. Fourthly, civil punishments and rewards of transgressors and observers of these laws. Fifthly, taking up arms against the enemies of civil peace. Secondly, the means whereby the church may and should attain her ends are only ecclesiastical, which are chiefly five. First, setting up that form of church government only of which Christ hath given them a pattern in his Word. Secondly, acknowledging and admitting of no lawgiver in the church but Christ and the publishing of His laws. Thirdly, electing and ordaining of such officers only, as Christ hath appointed in his Word. Fourthly, to receive into their fellowship them that are approved and inflicting spiritual censures against them to that end. Fifthly, prayer and patience in suffering any evil from them that be without, who disturb their peace. So that magistrates, as magistrates, have no power of setting up the form of church government, electing church officers, punishing with church censures, but to see that the church does her duty herein. And on the

other side, the churches as churches, have no power (though as members of the commonweal they may have power) of erecting or altering forms of civil government, electing of civil officers, inflicting civil punishments (no not on persons excommunicate) as by deposing magistrates from their civil authority, or withdrawing the hearts of the people against them, to their laws, no more than to discharge wives, or children, or servants, from due obedience to their husbands, parents, or masters; or by taking up arms against their magistrates, though he persecute them for conscience: for though members of churches who are public officers also of the civil state may suppress by force the violence of usurpers, as Iehoiada did Athaliah, yet this they do not as members of the church but as officers of the civil state. TRUTH. Here are divers considerable passages which I shall briefly examine, so far as concerns our controversy. First, whereas they say that the civil power may erect and establish what form of civil government may seem in wisdom most meet, I acknowledge the proposition to be most true, both in itself and also considered with the end of it, that a civil government is an ordinance of God, to conserve the civil peace of people, so far as concerns their bodies and goods, as formerly hath been said. But from this grant I infer (as before hath been touched) that the sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the people (whom they must needs mean by the civil power distinct from the government set up). And, if so, that a people may erect and establish what form of government seems to them most meet for their civil condition; it is evident that such governments as are by them erected and established have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the civil power or people consenting and agreeing shall betrust them with. This is clear not only in reason but in the experience of all commonweals, where the people are not deprived of their natural freedom by the power of tyrants. And, if so, that the magistrates receive their power of governing the church from the people, undeniably it follows that a people, as a people, naturally consider (of what nature or nation soever in Europe, Asia, Africa, or America), have fundamentally and originally, as men, a power to govern the church, to see her do her duty, to correct her, to redress, reform, establish, etc. And if this be not to pull God and Christ and Spirit out of heaven, and subject them unto natural, sinful, inconstant men, and so consequently to Satan himself, by whom all peoples naturally are guided, let heaven and earth judge. . . .

2.4 Nathaniel Niles, Sermon 141 PEACE. Some will here ask: What may the magistrate then lawfully do with his civil horn or power in matters of religion? TRUTH. His horn not being the horn of that unicorn or rhinoceros, the power of the Lord Jesus in spiritual cases, his sword not the two-edged sword of the spirit, the word of God (hanging not about the loins or side, but at the lips. and proceeding out of the mouth of his ministers) but of an humane and civil nature and constitution, it must consequently be of a humane and civil operation, for who knows not that operation follows constitution; And therefore I shall end this passage with this consideration. Source: Roger Williams, 1867. The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution. Vol. III. Providence, RI: Publications of the Narragansett Club.

2.4 Nathaniel Niles, Sermon, 1774 Art thou called being a servant? Care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. I. Corrinth. Chap. VII Ver. 21 At first glance, it is certain, this text refers to a state of personal servitude, and extends to every instance of the same kind. It is also as clear that the Apostle exhorts the servant to prefer liberty. This proves that the inspired writer himself, preferred liberty to a state of servitude; for he would not exhort another to prefer what was not preferable in his own esteem. Now, if Paul esteemed personal liberty a valuable inheritance, he certainly esteemed the liberty of a community a far ricer inheritance; for if one man’s enjoyment of it was a good, the enjoyment of two must be a greater good, and so on through the whole community. From the same manner of reasoning, the slavery of a community appears to be a proportionably greater evil than the slavery of a community appears to be a proportionably greater evil than the slavery of an individual. Hence, we may observe from the text, that civil liberty is a great good. This is the proposition to which I ask your present hour’s attention, and if it should appear in the sequel to contain an important truth, you will not esteem it below the gospel preacher’s duty to explain and support it in public, especially at such a time as this, a time, at the very prospect of which, our generous forefathers would have wept in bitterness of soul. If civil liberty is a great good, it ought to be deemed one of the blessings of Heaven; these it is the preacher’s duty

to illustrate, that we may feel the obligations they bring us under---that we may enquire whether we have improved them for the glory of the giver, and that we may know how to conduct toward them for the future. Be pleased then to give your candid, close, and serious attention, while I endeavor to explain the nature of civil liberty and prove that is a great good. That subject may be fairly elucidated, I will endeavor to remove some mistakes by which it has been obscured. In doing this, I observe that liberty does not consist in persons thinking themselves free. The Jews could say we were never in bondage to any man though they wore the Roman yoke at the very same time. Again, though a certain constitution should be contended for and supported by a majority of voices; yet this would be no sure evidence that it is free: because a hundred may as truly tyrannize over one, as one over a hundred; or otherwise, the majority may be in favor of licentiousness. What but love of licentiousness of tyranny, or both can induce the heathen nations to approve of their several systems of government? What but these could induce Saul and the men of Israel to persecute David and his handful? What but one or both of these drew down the fury of Sodom on Lot---of the Jews on the prophets---on Jesus Christ---on his apostles and their followers. What but these ever raised any one of the many terrible persecutions under which the peaceable disciples of Jesus Christ have fallen from time to time? In all these instances the majority have been unfriendly to liberty. Civil liberty consists, not in any inclinations of the members of a community; but in the being and due administration of such a system of laws, as effectually tends to the greatest felicity of state. Herein consists of civil liberty, and to live under such a constitution, so administered, is to be the member of a free state; and he who is free from the censure of those laws, may full enjoy all the pleasures of civil liberty, unless he is prevented by some defect, not in the constitution, but in himself. If liberty consists in the being and administration of a civil constitution, different from such as one as has been mentioned, I must confess, my inference from the Apostle’s exhortation is not just. For certain it is, that so far as a constitution doth not tend, in the highest degree, to the greatest felicity of the state, collectively considered; it is a comparative evil and not a good. Where there is no system of laws, not liberty, but anarchy, takes place. Some degree of liberty may, indeed, exist where neither the constitution nor the administration of it is perfect. But in order to perfect freedom, the law must extend to every member of the community

142 Religion and American Politics alike, both in its requisitions and prohibitions. Every one must be required to do all he can that tends to the highest good of the state: For the whole of this is due to the states, from the individuals of which it is composed. Every thing, however trifling, that tends, even in the lowest degree, to disserve the interest of the state must also be forbidden. . . . Let us then, for once, imagine a state whose members are all of a free spirit; and then attend to the glory and pleasures of liberty. The individuals are all of one mind. They unite in the same grand pursuit, the highest good of the whole. Only suppose all the members of such a state to be acquainted with the best means of promoting their general end; and we shall seem them all moving imperfect concert. The good of the body will be their first aim. And in subservience to this, they will impartially regard the particular interests of individuals. You and I shall perfectly unite in our regard for your interests and for mine. Your interest will not be the more dear to you, nor the less so to me, because it is yours. In these circumstances, there would be no room for the emotions of any of the angry painful passions; but, on the contrary, every soft and pleasing affection of every soul, would be called forth into vigorous and harmonious exercise. Every individual would choose to move in his proper sphere, and that all others should move in theirs. This would at once constitute pure felicity, and exalted beauty. How good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity: Such a state of things, in the little community of a single family must be productive of great good. But should it take place through a nation, each family would enjoy the same good from its own domestic circumstances, beside the far greater pleasure which would accrue to each individual from a consideration of the same happy condition of the whole. Should it be said, that such a scheme as has been mentioned is merely chimerical and romantic; because there never has been, nor ever will be such a general state of mind on earth; I would say, the same objection is equally strong against the worth of a state of perfect holiness. Such a state has never taken place, in perfection, in this world, nor will it hereafter; but must we therefore suppose that holiness is of no worth? The reason why we do not experience all the pleasures of liberty, that have been mentioned, is, not any defect in liberty, but the perverseness of our selfish hearts, which prevents our pursuits and enjoyments of the delights of perfect liberty. Liberty still remains a blessing too great to be compared with any other earthly good. The thoughts that have been suggested in this discourse, open to use the nature of good government in

its several branches. A legislature is denominated good, from the goodness of its laws, or, from the tendency of the laws made by it to produce the highest good of the community. In exact proportion to this tendency of the laws, is the legislature to be esteemed good:---the goodness of executive government consists in its due administration of the laws already made. It is for the good of the community alone, that laws are either to be made executed. So that, Good government is not inconsistent with liberty. Perfect liberty and perfect government are perfectly harmonious, while tyranny and licentiousness are inconsistent with both. Yea further, Good government is essential to the very being of liberty. Remove good government and you remove liberty. Abridge the former and you abridge the latter. Let good government increase and you increase liberty. These can never be separated in any degree. Their rise and fall is exactly uniform. Hence, The impropriety of saying of a person, that he is a friend to government, but not to liberty; and of another that he is a friend to liberty, but not to government, appears to be very gross, Indeed on many may be a friend to tyranny and not to liberty, but then he is as truly an enemy to government. Another may be a friend to licentiousness and not to government; but then he is as truly an enemy to liberty; and both for this plain reason that good government in a state, and the liberty of that state, are one and the same thing., This suggests another idea, which is, that He who infringes on liberty rebels against good government, and ought to be treated as a rebel. It matters not what station he fills’ he is a traitor; his treachery is, however, more or less aggravated in proportion to his state and condition. He that fills an elevated station is proportionably more criminal in the same rebellion, than those in a lower state’ and where a man proves false to confidence reposed in him, his treachery is still more vase and detestable, Because his exaltation puts it into his power to do greater injury to the state than could possibly be done by inferior. . . . Ages are composed of seconds, the earth of sands, and the sea of drops, too small to be seen by the naked eye. The smallest particles have their influence. Such is our state, that each individual has a proportion of influence on some neighbor at least; he, on another, and so on’ as in a river, the following drop urges that which is before, and every one through the whole length of the stream has the like influence. We know not, what individuals may do. We are not at liberty to lie dormant until we can, at once, influence the whole. We must begin with the weight we have. Should the

2.5 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance little springs neglect to flow till a general agreement should take place, the torrent that now bears down all before it, would ever be formed. These might floods have their rise in single drops from the rocks, which, uniting, creep along till they meet with another combination so small that it might be absorbed by the travelers foot. Let us receive instruction from the streams, and without discouragement, pursue a laudable plan. But, Is it not to be feared, that an appetite for the leeks and onions, is the source of our difficulty? The ungenerous language of the objector seems to be, ‘‘I could wish to seem my country happy, but if the fates have determined its destruction I will not forgo my share of the booty.’’ It is great, it is glorious, to espouse a good cause, and it still more great and glorious in such a cause to stand alone. It is great and glorious to outbrave the reproach of the base. Should all our countrymen forsake us, perseverance would be an honor, and the honor will rise as the number of our adherents is diminished. Let us, therefore, vigorously pursue prudent measures in the present alarming state of things. Then, should it please the righteous disposer of all, to reduce us to the most abject slavery, we shall at least, have the consolation to think, that we are in no part chargeable with having riveted chains on our country, and the blessing of a clear conscience is incomparably better than the greatest temporal interest and worldly applause. This has been a land of liberty. We have enjoyed that blessing in a great degree for a long time. It becomes us now to reflect on our ingratitude to the giver. When he was wrought salvation for us, on one occasion and another, how have we expressed our thankfulness? By bonfires, illuminations, revellings, gluttony and drunkenness. Would not a stranger have thought us worshipers of the whole race of the heathen deities, rather than of that God, who is a spirit, and who seeketh such to worship him, as do it in spirit and in truth? We have boasted of our liberty and free spirit. A free spirit is no more inclined to enslave others than ourselves. If then it should be found upon examination that we have been of a tyrannical spirit in a free country, how base must our character appear! And how many thousands have been plunged into death slavery by our means? When the servant had nothing to pay, and his master had frankly forgiven him all, and he had gone and cast his fellow servant into prison, there to remain till

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he should pay the last farthing; the master justly punished his ingratitude and severity with the like imprisonment. Hath not our conduct very nearly resembled the conduct of that servant? God gave us liberty, and we have enslaved our fellow-men. May we not fear that the law of retaliation is about to be executed on us? What can we object against it? What excuse can we make for our conduct? What reason can we urge why our oppressions shall not be repaid in kind? Should the Africans see God Almighty subjecting us to all the evils we have brought on them, and should they cry to us, O daughter of America who are to be destroyed, happy shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us; happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones; how could we object? How could we resent it? Would we enjoy liberty? Then we must grant it to others. For shame, let us either cease to enslave our fellow-men, or else let us cease to complain of those that would enslave us. Let us either wash our hands from blood, or never hope to escape the avenger. To conclude, unless we adopt some prudent decisive measures in humble dependence on God; we have reason to fear some almost unparalleled calamity. If we do not exert ourselves: it would not be strange, should a military government be established, and popery triumph in our land. Then, perhaps, those, who now want fortitude to deny themselves some of the superfluities of life, may see their husbands and sons slain in battle, their daughters ravished, their wives ript up their children dashed against the wall, and their pious parents put to the rack for the religion of Jesus. Now is the decisive moment. Gods sets before us life and death, good and evil, blessing and cursing, and bids us choose. Let us therefore choose the good and refuse the evil, that we may live and not die.

2.5 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, June 20, 1785 To the Honorable the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia A Memorial and Remonstrance We the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having taken into serious consideration, a Bill printed by order of the last Session of General Assembly, entitled ‘‘A Bill establishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,’’ and conceiving that the same if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a dangerous abuse of power, are bound as faithful members of a free State to remonstrate against it, and

144 Religion and American Politics to declare the reasons by which we are determined. We remonstrate against the said Bill, 1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘‘that religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.’’ The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considerd as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no other rule exists, by which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority. 2. Because Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard to the constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be invariably maintained; but more especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and

are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves. 3. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever? 4. Because the Bill violates the equality which ought to be the basis of every law, and which is more indispensible, in proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached. If ‘‘all men are by nature equally free and independent,’’ all men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an ‘‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.’’ Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered. As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions. Are the quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a compulsive support of their Religions unnecessary and unwarrantable? can their piety

2.5 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance alone be entrusted with the care of public worship? Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others with extraordinary privileges by which proselytes may be enticed from all others? We think too favorably of the justice and good sense of these demoninations to believe that they either covet pre-eminences over their fellow citizens or that they will be seduced by them from the common opposition to the measure. 5. Because the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation. 6. Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them, and not only during the period of miraculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence and the ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have preexisted and been supported, before it was established by human policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it to its own merits. 7. Because experience witnesseth that eccelsiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of

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every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a restoration of this primitive State in which its Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of their flocks, many of them predict its downfall. On which Side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when against their interest? 8. Because the establishment in question is not necessary for the support of Civil Government. If it be urged as necessary for the support of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting Religion, and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot be necessary for the former. If Religion be not within the cognizance of Civil Government how can its legal establishment be necessary to Civil Government? What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just Government instituted to secure & perpetuate it needs them not. Such a Government will be best supported by protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another. 9. Because the proposed establishment is a departure from the generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an Asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The maganimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions,

146 Religion and American Politics must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due extent, may offer a more certain respose from his Troubles. 10. Because it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens. The allurements presented by other situations are every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive to emigration by revoking the liberty which they now enjoy, would be the same species of folly which has dishonoured and depopulated flourishing kingdoms. 11. Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among its several sects. Torrents of blood have been split in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious disscord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion. Time has at length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assauge the disease. The American Theatre has exhibited proofs that equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it, sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and prosperity of the State. If with the salutary effects of this system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the bounds of Religious freedom, we know no name that will too severely reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at the first fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of the Bill has transformed ‘‘that Christian forbearance, love and charity,’’ which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and jeolousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not be dreaded, should this enemy to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law? 12. Because the policy of the Bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity. The first wish of those who enjoy this precious gift ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind. Compare the number of those who have as yet received it with the number still remaining under the dominion of false Religions; and how small is the former! Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen the disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of revelation from coming

into the Region of it; and countenances by example the nations who continue in darkness, in shutting out those who might convey it to them. Instead of Levelling as far as possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of Truth, the Bill with an ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it with a wall of defence against the encroachments of error. 13. Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to go great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the case, where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority? 14. Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy ought not to be imposed, without the clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority of citizens, and no satisfactory method is yet proposed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be determined, or its influence secured. The people of the respective counties are indeed requested to signify their opinion respecting the adoption of the Bill to the next Session of Assembly.’’ But the representatives or of the Counties will be that of the people. Our hope is that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the dangerous principle of the Bill. Should the event disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence, that a fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties. Because finally, ‘‘the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience’’ is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot be less dear to us; if we consult the ‘‘Declaration of those rights which pertain to the good people of Vriginia, as the basis and foundation of Government,’’ it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather studied emphasis. Either the, we must say, that the Will of the Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and sacred: Either we must say, that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish

2.7 George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport the Trial by Jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary Powers of the State; nay that they may despoil us of our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no authority to enact into the law the Bill under consideration. We the Subscribers say, that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority: And that no effort may be omitted on our part against so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it, this remonstrance; earnestly praying, as we are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their Councils from every act which would affront his holy prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other, guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing, may re]dound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the prosperity and the happiness of the Commonweath.

2.6 George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 3, 1789 City of New York Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor, and Whereas both Houses of Congress have by their Joint Committee requested me ‘‘to recommend to the People of the United States a day of public thanks-giving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness.’’ Now therefore I do recommend and assign Thursday the 26th. day of November next to be devoted by the People of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be. That we may then all unite in rendering unto him our sincere and humble thanks, for his kind care and protection of the People of this country previous to their becoming a Nation, for the signal and manifold mercies, and the favorable interpositions of his providence, which we experienced in the course and conclusion of the late war, for the greatest degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty, which we have since enjoyed, for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national One now

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lately instituted, for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge and in general for all the great and various favors which he hath been pleased to confer upon us. And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations and beseech him to pardon our national and other transgressions, to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually, to render our national government a blessing to all the People, by constantly being a government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executived and obeyed, to protect and guide all Sovereigns and Nations (especially such as have shown kindness unto us) and to bless them with good government, peace, and concord. To promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the encrease of science among them and Us, and generally to grant unto all Mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best.

2.7 George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, August 1790 Gentlemen: While I received with much satisfaction your address replete with expressions of esteem, I rejoice in the opportunity of assuring you that I shall always retain grateful remembrance of the cordial welcome I experienced on my visit to Newport from all classes of citizens. The reflection on the days of difficulty and danger which are past is rendered the more sweet from a consciousness that they are succeeded by days of uncommon prosperity and security. If we have wisdom to make the best use of the advantages with which we are now favored, we cannot fail, under the just administration of a good government, to become a great and happy people. The citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy---a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States,

148 Religion and American Politics which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their effectual support. It would be inconsistent with the frankness of my character not to avow that I am pleased with your favorable opinion of my administration and fervent wishes for my felicity. May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants---while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree and there shall be none to make him afraid. May the father of all mercies scatter light, and not darkness, upon our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in His own due time and way everlastingly happy.

2.8 Henry Ward Beecher, The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty, June 4, 1869 Plymouth Sermon Series (Second Series) While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the servants of corruption: for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought into bondage. 2 Peter 11:19 This is a true delineation of the fact that animalism leads to despotism, and necessitates it; and the whole chapter, which I read as the opening service of the evening, illustrates that important and fundamental idea. This day, which is our National Anniversary, will very naturally suggest my subject this evening. There are two essential conditions of civil liberty: first, self-government, and second, the civil machinery of free national life. And in importance they stand in the order in which I have mentioned them. Self-government is a better term than liberty. We are in the habit of speaking of certain nations as free people. It would be better to speak of them as selfgoverning people. There is no such thing as absolute liberty. It is quite inconsistent with the very creative notion which we express. There is no such thing as absolute liberty in one’s self; because there is an order of faculty in every man, by the observance of which he can reap happiness, and by the disregard of which he will entail on himself misery. That this is so of the body, we all know. That we are obliged to obey the

laws of the ear, of the eye, of the mouth, and of the hand, in order to reap the benefits of these organs, we all know. We can not go backward upon the organization of the body, and have health and comfort. We gain strength and bodily ease and comfort in proportion as we obey law. We are not, therefore, free physically, in regard to the body; and just as little are we free mentally; for there is an order within, which is as real, and the observance of which is as indispensable to comfort and liberty, as the order of the body and its physical organization. Nor are we absolutely free in our relations to the material world. Physical laws round about us are more potent than walls in a prison are round about the prisoner. Do, obey, and live: disobey, and die. A man is hedged up in his own nature; and he is hedged up just as much in the world in which he was born, and in which he moves. The laws of society---not enacted and voluntary laws, but inevitable civil laws; those laws which existed prior to all human thought about law, and compelled men to think as they did think; the laws which regulate the act of living together in great masses---these laws can not be set at naught, or be disregarded. Society is not a voluntary compact. You might as well say that men are born on compact, as to say that society is the result of agreements among men. The nature of the individual man could never have been developed except by his position in society. Men are necessary to each other. The faculties would grow dumb and dead, if it were not for that help which they get in the expression of themselves by the fact of civil society. This state of things is the design of God; it is the constituted nature of human life; and the laws that regulate it are imperious. So that man is a creature standing in a circle, once, twice, thrice repeated round about him--laws in his own organization, laws in the material world, and laws in the physical world, which demark the bounds beyond which he can not pass---and all his liberty lies in the small space that remains in the centre. There is a certain liberty which a man can exercise; but the extent of that liberty is very small. It is choosing among imperative things. All these restraints would seem to be restraints upon the sum of life and individual power; but if you analyze it, if you look at it in the root, it will be found that, while there is no such thing as absolute liberty, these restraints all work primarily against the animal nature. All these laws, whether in a man’s own self, in his physical relations, or in his relations to his fellows in civil society, are laws which diminish the liberty, primarily and principally, of the passions and the appetites. And by as much as you diminish the power and dominancy of

2.9 Walter Rauschenbusch, On the Social Gospel these elements in man, you give power and liberty to the other parts---to his reason, affections, and moral sentiments. So that while a man is restricted at the bottom, he spreads out at the top, and gains again, with amplitude and augmentation, in the higher realms of his being, all that he loses by the restrains and restrictions which are imposed by great cardinal laws upon his lower nature. He, then, who is self-governed---that is who accepts his condition, obeys all these laws, and holds himself willingly subject to them---is free; not in the points in which he is restricted, but in other and equivalent directions, in which a man’s life is more to him than his basilar life can be. All these restraints, therefore, in an intelligent and virtuous society, will be found to fall on the animal propensities, and to set free, by their very limitation, the other part of human nature---its manhood, its divinity. The more effectually, then, these lower elements are repressed, the more liberty is given to the affections. The degree of liberty attainable by an individual depends upon the restraint which he puts upon the lower nature, and the stimulus which he gives to the higher. The liberty which is attainable by masses of men living together depends on the training that the society which they constitute has had in keeping down the animalism and exalting the true manhood of the citizens in the community. If each man, and all men, have learned self-restraint, then there will be need of but very little restraint on the part of the government; but if self-restraint does not exist in the body of citizens, it must be supplied from without. If men govern the animal that is in them, on which the soul sits astride, like the rider upon his steed, then they are governed. If they will not govern it, it must be governed for them. Government there must be, in some way, if men are going to live together. Society would break up in uproar; it would be like a den of tigers and lions; it would be but a bestial wallow of swine quarreling for their food, and quarreling for their warmth of a winter’s night, and quarreling evermore, if there were no government. To live together as men, and in such a way that men can exercise their higher prerogatives, the lower elements of the human organization must be governed. If men would govern these lower elements themselves, there would be no need of bringing in any other instrument of government; but if they will not do it, it must be done by some other agency. Despotism is the inevitable government of ignorant and savage natures. It is not that the monarch, seeing his power, takes it upon himself to govern the rude in their helplessness; it is this, that the men who represent in themselves only animal qualities are properly

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governed by absolute government. The animal nature in men must be governed by force, unless they govern it by their own intelligent and free will. Therefore a low and animal condition of national life is properly crowned and dominated by despotism. Under such circumstances it is not a usurpation; it is not a mischief; it is precisely adapted to the work that is to be done. And an indispensable work it is. Society can not be free, then, except as the reason and the moral sentiments have a sufficient ascendancy. You have often heard it said that a free government depends upon the intelligence and virtue of the citizens. This is an empirical fact. It is in accordance with the radical nature of man that it should be so. The first and most important condition of liberty, psychologically stated, is that men should learn how to restrain their lower, basilar, passional natures, and should be willing to restrain them, and so give liberty.

2.9 Walter Rauschenbusch, On the Social Gospel, 1908 In the agricultural stage of society the chief means of enrichment was to gain control of large landed wealth; the chief danger to the people lay in losing control of the great agricultural means of production, the land. Since the industrial revolution the man-made machinery of production has assumed an importance formerly unknown. The factories, the machines, the means of transportation, the money to finance great undertakings, are fully as important in the modern process of production as the land from which the raw material is drawn. Consequently the chief way to enrichment in an industrial community will be the control of these factors of production; the chief danger to the people will be to lose control of the instruments of industry. That danger, as we saw in our brief sketch of the industrial revolution, was immediately realized in the most sweeping measure. The people lost control of the tools of industry more completely than they ever lost control of the land. Under the old system the workman owned the simple tools of his trade. To-day the working people have no part nor lot in the machines with which they work. In capitalistic production there is a cooperation between two distinct groups: a small group which owns all the material factors of land and machinery; a large group which owns nothing but the personal factor of human labor power. In this process of cooperation the propertyless group is at a fearful disadvantage. No attempt is made to allot to each workman his share in the profits of the joint work Instead he is paid

150 Religion and American Politics a fixed wage. The upward movement of this wage is limited by the productiveness of his work; the downward movement of it is limited only by the willingness of the workman to work at so low a return. His willingness will be determined by his needs. If he is poor or if he has a large family, he can be induced to take less. If he is devoted to his family, and if they are sick, he may take still less. The less he needs, the more he can get; the more he needs, the less he will get. This is the exact opposite of the principle that prevails in family life, Where the child that needs most care gets most. In our family life we have solidarity and happiness; in our business life we have individualism and---well, not exactly happiness. . . . The existence of a large class of population without property rights in the material they work upon and the tools they work with, and without claim to the profits resulting from their work, must have subtle and farreaching effects on the character of this class and on the moral tone of the people at large. A man’s work is not only the price he pays for the right to fill his stomach. In his work he expresses himself. It is the output of his creative energy and his main contribution to the common life of mankind. The pride which an artist or professional man takes in his work, the pleasure which a housewife takes in adorning her home, afford a satisfaction that ranks next to human love in delightsomeness. One of the gravest accusations against our industrial system is that it does not produce in the common man the pride and joy of good work. In many cases the surroundings are ugly, depressing, and coarsening. Much of the stuff manufactured is dishonest in quality, made to sell and not to serve, and the making of such cotton or wooden lies must react on the morals of every man that handles them. There is little opportunity for a man to put his personal stamp on his work. The mediaeval craftsman could rise to be an artist by working well at his craft. The modern factory hand is not like to develop artistic gifts as he tends his machine. It is a common and true complaint of employers that their men take no interest in their work. But why should they? What motive have they for putting love and care into their work? It is not theirs. Christ spoke of the difference between the hireling shepherd who flees and the owner who loves the sheep. Our system has made the immense majority of industrial workers mere hirelings. If they do conscientious work nevertheless, it is a splendid tribute to human rectitude. Slavery was cheap labor; it was also dear labor. In ancient Rome the slaves on the country estates were so wasteful that only the strongest and crudest tools could be given them. The more the

wage worker approaches their condition, the more will the employer confront the same problem. The finest work is done only by free minds who put love into their work because it is their own. When a workman becomes a partner, he ‘‘hustles’’ in a new spirit. Even the small bonus distributed in profit-sharing experiments has been found to increase the carefulness and willingness of the men to such an extent that the bonus did not diminish the profits of the employers. The lowest motives for work are the desire for wages and the fear of losing them. Yet these are almost the only motives to which our system appeals. It does not even hold out the hope of promotion, unless a man unites managing ability to his workmanship. The economic loss to the community by this paralysis of the finer springs of human action is beyond computation. But the moral loss is vastly more threatening. . . . Industry and commerce are good. They serve the needs of men. The men eminent in industry and commerce are good men, with the fine qualities of human nature. But the organization of industry and commerce is such that along with its useful service it carries death, physical and moral. Frederick Denison Maurice, one of the finest minds of England in the Victorian Age, said, ‘‘I do not see my way farther than this, Competition is put forth as---the law of the universe that is a lie.’’ And his friend Charles Kingsley added, ‘‘Competition means death; cooperation means life.’’ Every joint-stock company, trust, or labor union organized, every extension of government interference or government ownership, is a surrender of the competitive principle and a halting step toward cooperation. Practical men take these steps because competition has proved itself suicidal to economic welfare. Christian men have a stouter reason for turning against it---; because it slays human character and denies human brotherhood. If money dominates, the ideal cannot dominate. If we serve mammon, we cannot serve the Christ. . . . Nations do not die by wealth, but by injustice. The forward impetus comes through some great historical opportunity which stimulates the production of wealth, breaks up the caked and rigid order of the past, sets free the energies of new classes, calls creative leaders to the front, quickens the intellectual life, intensifies the sense of duty and the ideal devotion to the common weal, and awakens in the strong individuals the large ambition of patriotic service. Progress slackens when a single class appropriates the social results of the common labor, fortifies its evil rights by unfair laws, throttles the masses by political centralization and suppression, and consumes in luxury what it has taken in covetousness. Then there is a gradual loss of

2.10 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp 151 productive energy, an increasing bitterness and distrust, a waning sense of duty and devotion to country, a paralysis of the moral springs of noble action. Men no longer love the Commonwealth, because it does not stand for the common wealth. Force has to supply the cohesive power which love fails to furnish. Exploitation creates poverty, and poverty is followed by physical degeneration. Education, art, wealth, and culture may continue to advance and may even ripen to their mellowest perfection when the worm of death is already at the heart of the nation. Internal convulsions or external catastrophes will finally reveal the state of decay. It is always a process extending through generations or even centuries. It is possible that with the closely knit nations of the present era the resistive vitality is greater than in former ages, and it will take much longer for them to break up. The mobility of modern intellectual life will make it harder for the stagnation of mind and the crystallization of institutions to make headway. But unless the causes of social wrong are removed, it will be a slow process of strangulation and asphyxiation. In the last resort the only hope is in the moral forces which can be summoned to the rescue. If there are statesmen, prophets, and apostles who set truth and justice above selfish advancement; if their call finds a response in the great body of the people; if a new tide of religious faith and moral enthusiasm creates new standards of duty and a new capacity for self-sacrifice; if the strong learn to direct their love of power to the uplifting of the people and see the highest self-assertion in self-sacrifice-then the intrenchments of vested wrong will melt away; the stifled energy of the people will leap forward; the atrophied members of the social body will be filled with a fresh flow of blood; and a regenerate nation will look with the eyes of youth across the fields of the future. The cry of ‘‘Crisis! crisis!’’ has become a weariness. Every age and every year are critical and fraught with destiny. Yet in the widest survey of history Western civilization is now at a decisive point in its development. Will some Gibbon of Mongol race sit by the shore of the Pacific in the year A.D. 3000 and write on the ‘‘Decline and Fall of the Christian Empire’’? If so, he will probably describe the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the golden age when outwardly life flourished as never before, but when that decay, which resulted in the gradual collapse of the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries, was already far advanced. Or will the twentieth century mark for the future historian the real adolescence of humanity, the great emancipation from barbarism and from the paralysis of

injustice, and the beginning of a progress in the intellectual, social, and moral life of mankind to which all past history has no parallel? It will depend almost wholly on the moral forces which the Christian nations can bring to the fighting line against wrong, and the fighting energy of those moral forces will again depend on the degree to which they are inspired by religious faith and enthusiasm. It is either a revival of social religion or the deluge. Source: Christianity and the Social Crisis. 1908. New York: The MacMillan Company.

2.10 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania, et al. v. Schempp et al. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. No. 142. Argued February 27--28, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. Once again we are called upon to consider the scope of the provision of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which declares that ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .’’ These companion cases present the issues in the context of state action requiring that schools begin each day with readings from the Bible. While raising the basic questions under slightly different factual situations, the cases permit of joint treatment. In light of the history of the First Amendment and of our cases interpreting and applying its requirements, we hold that the practices at issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

I. The Facts in Each Case: No. 142. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa. Stat. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that ‘‘At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such

152 Religion and American Politics Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian.’’ The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are, have been, and will continue to be violated unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions of the First Amendment. They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children attend school, and its officers and the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in the public schools of the district pursuant to the statute. A three-judge statutory District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the statute is violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and directed that appropriate injunctive relief issue The appellees Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, Roger and Donna, are of the Unitarian faith and are members of the Unitarian church in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they, as well as another son, Ellory, regularly attend religious services. The latter was originally a party but having graduated from the school system pendente lite was voluntarily dismissed from the action. The other children attend the Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated by appellant district. On each school day at the Abington Senior High School between 8:15 and 8:30 A.M., while the pupils are attending their home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises are conducted pursuant to the statute. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the school building through an intercommunications system and are conducted under the supervision of a teacher by students attending the school’s radio and television workshop. Selected students from this course gather each morning in the school’s workshop studio for the exercises, which include readings by one of the students of 10 verses of the Holy Bible, broadcast to each room in the building. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, likewise over the intercommunications system, but also by the students in the various classrooms, who are asked to stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison. The exercises are closed with the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as are of interest to the students. Participation in the opening exercises, as directed by the statute, is voluntary. The student reading the verses from the Bible may

select the passages and read from any version he chooses, although the only copies furnished by the school are the King James version, copies of which were circulated to each teacher by the school district. During the period in which the exercises have been conducted the King James, the Douay and the Revised Standard versions of the Bible have been used, as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures. There are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made and no interpretations given at or during the exercises. The students and parents are advised that the student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises. It appears from the record that in schools not having an intercommunications system the Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer were conducted by the home-room teacher, who chose the text of the verses and read them herself or had students read them in rotation or by volunteers. This was followed by a standing recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, together with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag by the class in unison and a closing announcement of routine school items of interest. At the first trial Edward Schempp and the children testified as to specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible ‘‘which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching.’’ 177 F. Supp. 398, 400. The children testified that all of the doctrines to which they referred were read to them at various times as part of the exercises. Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having Roger and Donna excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several reasons, including his belief that the children’s relationships with their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected. Expert testimony was introduced by both appellants and appellees at the first trial, which testimony was summarized by the trial court as follows: ‘‘Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified that there were marked differences between the Jewish Holy Scriptures and the Christian Holy Bible, the most obvious of which was the absence of the New Testament in the Jewish Holy Scriptures. Dr. Grayzel testified that portions of the New Testament were offensive to Jewish tradition and that, from the standpoint of Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was ‘practically blasphemous.’ He cited instances in the New Testament which, assertedly, were not only sectarian in nature but tended to bring the Jews into

2.10 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp 153 ridicule or scorn. Dr. Grayzel gave as his expert opinion that such material from the New Testament could be explained to Jewish children in such a way as to do no harm to them. But if portions of the New Testament were read without explanation, they could be, and in his specific experience with children Dr. Grayzel observed, had been, psychologically harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the social media of the school. ‘‘Dr. Grayzel also testified that there was significant difference in attitude with regard to the respective Books of the Jewish and Christian Religions in that Judaism attaches no special significance to the reading of the Bible per se and that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are source materials to be studied. But Dr. Grayzel did state that many portions of the New, as well as of the Old, Testament contained passages of great literary and moral value. ‘‘Dr. Luther A. Weigle, an expert witness for the defense, testified in some detail as to the reasons for and the methods employed in developing the King James and the Revised Standard Versions of the Bible. On direct examination, Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was non-sectarian. He later stated that the phrase ‘non-sectarian’ meant to him non-sectarian within the Christian faiths. Dr. Weigle stated that his definition of the Holy Bible would include the Jewish Holy Scriptures, but also stated that the ‘Holy Bible’ would not be complete without the New Testament. He stated that the New Testament ‘conveyed the message of Christians.’ In his opinion, reading of the Holy Scriptures to the exclusion of the New Testament would be a sectarian practice. Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was of great moral, historical and literary value. This is conceded by all the parties and is also the view of the court.’’ 177 F. Supp. 398, 401--402. The trial court, in striking down the practices and the statute requiring them, made specific findings of fact that the children’s attendance at Abington Senior High School is compulsory and that the practice of reading 10 verses from the Bible is also compelled by law. It also found that: ‘‘The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance. The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immediately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord’s Prayer.

The fact that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from attendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony for . . . Section 1516 . . . unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the statute requires the reading of the ‘Holy Bible,’ a Christian document, the practice . . . prefers the Christian religion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of . . . the Commonwealth . . . to introduce a religious ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth.’’ 201 F. Supp., at 819.

II. It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and government. As we said in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962), ‘‘The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And . . . since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that ‘More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of. . . . The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself. This background is evidenced today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, ‘‘So help me God.’’ Likewise each House of the Congress provides through its Chaplain an opening prayer, and the sessions of this Court are declared open by the crier in a short ceremony, the final phrase of which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship. Indeed, only last year an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (83d ed. 1962), 48, while less than 3% profess no religion whatever. Id., at p. 46. It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are ‘‘earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing. . . .]’’ Memorial

154 Religion and American Politics and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1947) (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.). This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears, see Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 8-11, could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage. It is true that this liberty frequently was not realized by the colonists, but this is readily accountable by their close ties to the Mother Country. However, the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States. This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them a diversity of religious opinion . . .

over another.’’ And Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed: ‘‘There is no answer to the proposition . . . that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers’ expense. . . . This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers’ minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity.’’ Id., at 26. While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.

IV. III. Almost a hundred years ago in Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, Judge Alphonso Taft, father of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of ‘‘absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and sects . . . The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.’’ Before examining this ‘‘neutral’’ position in which the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment place our Government it is well that we discuss the reach of the Amendment under the cases of this Court. First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment’s mandate that ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’’ has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in Everson, supra, at 15, the Court said that ‘‘[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion

The interrelationship of the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses was first touched upon by Mr. Justice Roberts for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, where it was said that their ‘‘inhibition of legislation’’ had ‘‘a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.’’ A half dozen years later in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 14-15, this Court, through MR. JUSTICE BLACK, stated that the ‘‘scope of the First Amendment . . . was designed forever to suppress’’ the establishment of religion or the prohibition of the free exercise thereof. In short, the Court held that the Amendment ‘‘requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.’’ Id., at 18.

2.10 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp 155 And Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, declared that public schools are organized ‘‘on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.’’ Id., at 23-24. Moreover, all of the four dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, agreed that ‘‘Our constitutional policy . . . does not deny the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the twofold protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private.’’ Id., at 52.

V. The wholesome ‘‘neutrality’’ of which this Court’s cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two clauses may overlap. As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the

advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Everson v. Board of Education, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442. Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find that the States are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. The trial court in No. 142 has found that such an opening exercise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the trial court’s finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause. The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and petitioners. Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 430. Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, ‘‘it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.’’ Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson, supra, at 65. It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a ‘‘religion of secularism’’ is established in the schools. We agree of course that the State may not establish a ‘‘religion of secularism’’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.’’ Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 314. We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect. In addition, it might well be

156 Religion and American Politics said that one’s education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion. Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority’s right to free exercise of religion. While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.

2.11 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983 Those of you in the National Association of Evangelicals are known for your spiritual and humanitarian work. And I would be especially remiss if I didn’t discharge right now one personal debt of gratitude. Thank you for your prayers. Nancy and I have felt their presence many times in many years. And believe me, for us they’ve made all the difference. The other day in the East Room of the White House at a meeting there, someone asked me whether I was aware of all the people out there who were praying for the President. And I had to say, ‘‘Yes, I am. I’ve felt it. I believe in intercessionary prayer.’’ But I couldn’t help but say to that questioner after he’d asked the question that---or at least say to them that if sometimes when he was praying he got a busy signal, it was just me in there ahead of him. I think I understand how Abraham Lincoln felt when he said, ‘‘I have been driven many times to my knees by the overwhelming conviction that I had nowhere else to go.’’ From the joy and the good feeling of this conference, I go to a political reception. Now, I don’t know why, but that bit of scheduling reminds me of a story---which I’ll share with you.

An evangelical minister and a politician arrived at Heaven’s gate one day together. And St. Peter, after doing all the necessary formalities, took them in hand to show them where their quarters would be. And he took them to a small, single room with a bed, a chair, and a table and said this was for the clergyman. And the politician was a little worried about what might be in store for him. And he couldn’t believe it then when St. Peter stopped in front of a beautiful mansion with lovely grounds, many servants, and told him that these would be his quarters. And he couldn’t help but ask, he said, ‘‘But wait, how---there’s something wrong---how do I get this mansion while that good and holy man only gets a single room?’’ And St. Peter said, ‘‘You have to understand how things are up here. We’ve got thousands and thousands of clergy. You’re the first politician who ever made it.’’ But I don’t want to contribute to a stereotype. So I tell you there are a great many God-fearing, dedicated, noble men and women in public life, present company included. And yes, we need your help to keep us ever mindful of the ideas and the principles that brought us into the public arena in the first place. The basis of those ideals and principles is a commitment to freedom and personal liberty that, itself, is grounded in the much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought and humbly accepted. The American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by William Penn when he said: ‘‘If we will not be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants.’’ Explaining the inalienable rights of men, Jefferson said, ‘‘The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.’’ And it was George Washington who said that ‘‘of all the disposition and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supporters.’’ And finally, that shrewdest of all observers of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, put it eloquently after he had gone on a search for the secret of America’s greatness and genius---and he said: ‘‘Not until I went into the churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness did I understand the greatness and the genius of America . . . America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great.’’ Well, I’m pleased to be here today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work and prayers and those of millions of others cans we hope to survive this perilous century

2.11 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals 157 and keep alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man. I want you to know that this administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, here people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities---the institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God. Now, I don’t have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a prevailing attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they’re freeing us from superstitions of the past, they’ve taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation. Sometimes their voices are louder than ours, but they are not yet a majority. An example of that vocal superiority is evident in a controversy now going on in Washington. And since I’m involved I’ve been waiting to hear from the parents of young America. How far are they willing to go in giving to government their prerogatives as parents? Let me state the case as briefly and simply as I can. An organization of citizens, sincerely motivated and deeply concerned about the increase in illegitimate births and abortions involving girls well below the age of consent, some time ago established a nationwide network of clinics to offer help to these girls and, hopefully, alleviate this situation. Now, again, let me say, I do not fault their intent. However, in their wellintentioned effort, these clinics have decided to provide advice and birth control drugs and devices to underage girls without the knowledge of their parents. For some years now, the federal government has helped with funds to subsidize these clinics. In providing for this, the Congress decreed that every effort would be made to maximize parental participation. Nevertheless, the drugs and devices are prescribed without getting parental consent or giving notification after they’ve done so. Girls termed ‘‘sexually active’’--and that has replaced the word ‘‘promiscuous’’---are given this help in order to prevent illegitimate birth or abortion. Well, we have ordered clinics receiving federal funds to notify the parents such help has been given. One of the nation’s leading newspapers has created the term ‘‘squeal rule’’ in editorializing against us for doing this, and we’re being criticized for violating the privacy of young people. A judge has recently granted

an injunction against an enforcement of our rule. I’ve watched TV panel shows discuss the issue, seen columnists pontificating on our error, but no one seems to mention morality as playing a part in the subject of sex. Is all of Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological harm? And isn’t it the parents’ right to give counsel and advice to keep their children from making mistakes that may affect their entire lives? Many of us in government would like to know what parents think about this intrusion in their family by government. We’re going to fight in the courts. The right of parents and the rights of family take precedence over those of Washington-based bureaucrats and social engineers. But the fight against parental notification is really only one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy. Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged. When our Founding Fathers passed the First Amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself. The evidence of this permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. ‘‘In God We Trust’’ is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. And the members of Congress open their sessions with a prayer. I just happen to believe the schoolchildren of the United States are entitled to the same privileges as Supreme Court justices and congressmen. Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this session, there’s growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act speedily to pass it and to let our children pray. Perhaps some of you read recently about the Lubbock school case, where a judge actually ruled that it was unconstitutional for a school district to give equal treatment to religious and nonreligious student groups, even when the group meetings were being held during the students’ own time. The First Amendment never intended to require government to discriminate against religious speech. Senators Denton and Hatfield have proposed legislation in the Congress on the whole question of prohibiting discrimination against religious forms of student speech.

158 Religion and American Politics Such legislation could go far to restore freedom of religious speech for public school students. And I hope the Congress considers these bills quickly. And with your help, I think it’s possible we could also get the constitutional amendment through the Congress this year. More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of fifty states statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the lives of up to one and a half million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this tragedy will someday pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected. You may remember that when abortion on demand began, many, and indeed, I’m sure many of you, warned that the practice would lead to a decline in respect for human life, that the philosophical premises used to justify abortion on demand would ultimately be used to justify other attacks on the sacredness of human life; infanticide or mercy killing. Tragically enough, those warnings proved all too true. Only last year a court permitted the death by starvation of a handicapped infant. I have directed the Health and Human Services Department to make clear to every health care facility in the United States that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects all handicapped persons against discrimination based on handicaps, including infants. And we have taken the further step of requiring that each and every recipient of federal funds who provides health care services to infants must post and keep posted in a conspicuous place a notice stating that ‘‘discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is prohibited by federal law.’’ It also lists a twenty-fourhour, toll-free number so that nurses and others may report violations in time to save the infant’s life. In addition, recent legislation introduced in the Congress by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois not only increases restrictions on publicly financed abortions, it also addresses this whole problem of infanticide. I urge the Congress to begin hearings and to adopt legislation that will protect the right of life to all children, including the disabled or handicapped. Now, I’m sure that you must get discouraged at times, but you’ve done better than you know, perhaps. There’s a great spiritual awakening in America, a renewal of the traditional values that have been the bedrock of America’s goodness and greatness. One recent survey by a Washington-based research council concluded that Americans were far more religious than the people of other nations; 95 percent of

those surveyed expressed a belief in God and a huge majority believed the Ten Commandments had real meaning in their lives. And another study has found that an overwhelming majority of Americans disapprove of adultery, teenage sex, pornography, abortion, and hard drugs. And this same study showed a deep reverence for the importance of family ties and religious belief. I think the items that we’ve discussed here today must be a key part of the nation’s political agenda. For the first time the Congress is openly and seriously debating and dealing with the prayer and abortion issues; and that’s enormous progress right there. I repeat: America is in the midst of a spiritual awakening and a moral renewal. And with your biblical keynote, I say today, ‘‘Yes, let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream.’’ Now, obviously, much of this new political and social consensus I’ve talked about is based on a positive view of American history, one that takes pride in our country’s accomplishments and record. But we must never forget that no government schemes are going to perfect man. We know that living in this world means dealing with what philosophers would call the phenomenology of evil or, as theologians would put it, the doctrine of sin. There is sin and evil in the world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too, has a legacy of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war, is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-Semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country. I know that you’ve been horrified, as have I, by the resurgence of some hate groups preaching bigotry and prejudice. Use the mighty voice of your pulpits and the powerful standing of your churches to denounce and isolate these hate groups in our midst. The commandment given us is clear and simple: ‘‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’’ But whatever sad episodes exist in our past, any objective observer must hold a positive view of American history, a history that has been the story of hopes fulfilled and dreams made into reality. Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world. And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as president, in answer to a

2.11 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals 159 direct question, I pointed out that, as good MarxistLeninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas---that’s their name for religion---or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat. Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates a historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today. This doesn’t mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes a 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles. At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the socalled nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some. The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength. I would agree to freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze. A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested

would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions. A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people’s minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, ‘‘I love my little girls more than anything---’’ And I said to myself, ‘‘Oh, no, don’t. You can’t---don’t say that.’’ But I had underestimated him. He went on: ‘‘I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God.’’ There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important. Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness---pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world. It was C. S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable Screwtape Letters, wrote: ‘‘The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid ‘dens of rime’ that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do no need to raise their voice.’’ Well, because these ‘‘quiet men’’ do not ‘‘raise their voices,’’ because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they’re always making ‘‘their final territorial demand,’’ some would have us accept them as their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom. So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I’ve always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of

160 Religion and American Politics pride---the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil. I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration’s efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals and one day, with God’s help, their total elimination. While America’s military strength is important, let me add here that I’ve always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith. Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western world exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism’s attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for

Marxism-Leninism is actually the second-oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, ‘‘Ye shall be as gods.’’ The Western world can answer this challenge, he wrote, ‘‘but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism’s faith in Man.’’ I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: ‘‘He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength . . . But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary . . .’’ Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, ‘‘We have it within our power to begin the world over again.’’ We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself. God bless you, and thank you very much.

Section 3 Cities, States, and American Federalism

Introduction

interstate commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, the tension between states’ rights and national power has been an animating force in American political development. As the essays in this section show, despite periodic concessions to decentralization and state authority, the arc of political development has traced the ascension of the nation at the expense of the state government. In a sense, this course was set when supporters of constitutional ratification triumphed over their Anti-Federalists critics. The concession to states’ rights embodied in the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding, Hamilton, Madison, and their supporters carried the day in asserting the inadequacy of the governing system based on state sovereignty. As John Dinan shows, this initial victory was rooted in the fact that even the Anti-Federalists essentially conceded the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

‘‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,’’ so says the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in the final provision of the Bill of Rights. From the inception of the nation, the relationship between the states and the central government has been a question of paramount importance in the design of U.S. government institutions. This relationship of shared sovereignty also has been a central theme in the political development of the United States. From the historic Great Compromise that protected popular sovereignty in the House of Representatives while maintaining state sovereignty in the Senate, and the ignominious Three-fifths Compromise that allowed slaveholding states to count African Americans as three-fifths of a person for census purposes while denying their essential humanity, to the national supersession of state regulatory authority via the

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Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism John Dinan Associate Professor of Political Science, Wake Forest University

At times, changes in the balance of power in the U.S. federal system have been a product of confrontations between individuals and groups whose primary concern has been to advocate centralization or decentralization of power. For the most part, though, the development of American federalism---which has in general been characterized by a steady increase in federal power relative to the states---has been driven by ideas and interests that are not rooted primarily in a concern with the virtues of centralization or decentralization. My purpose is to analyze the development of American federalism in a way that takes account of these ideas and interests, as well as the institutions through which the resulting changes were implemented. In particular, I consider the main periods in the American political regime that have brought changes in the balance of federal and state power, and in each period, I identify the principal ideas that influenced the development of the federal system, the various interests arrayed against each other in regard to federal power, and the primary institutions through which changes in federalism were achieved.

widespread dissatisfaction with the inability under the Articles to overturn irresponsible state legislation, prevent states from imposing excessive taxes and regulations on interstate commerce, and provide for a common defense. Thus, delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were concerned about the tendency of certain states (none was more guilty than Rhode Island) to enact hasty and ill-conceived legislation, for partial rather than public purposes, and in such a way as to threaten property rights. These convention delegates therefore sought to create a federal government that could overturn factious legislation, and though Madison was repeatedly rebuffed in his efforts to permit Congress to veto state laws, it was widely expected that the Supreme Court would inevitably undertake such a task, and the supremacy clause made clear that federal legislation would prevail over conflicting state laws. Delegates were troubled by the taxes and regulations that states were imposing on commerce among the states; therefore, they empowered the federal government to create an economic common market. The convention took steps, finally, to create a central government that would possess powers adequate to provide for a common defense and a unified foreign policy. The principal interests arrayed against each other in the lead-up to the convention and the ratification debates were cosmopolitan, commercial interests, on the one hand, and localist, agrarian interests, on the other hand. Cosmopolitans, many of whom had

The Development of American Federalism The Adoption of the Constitution The replacement of the Articles of Confederation with a Constitution that was described by James Madison in Federalist No. 39 as ‘‘neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both,’’ was due to 163

164 Cities, States, and American Federalism traveled extensively both inside and outside of the new American continent, were the principal supporters of a Constitution that would be sufficiently national to remedy the deficiencies of the Articles. Localists, by contrast, were intent on retaining as many of the confederal features of the Articles as possible. And they were able to muster enough support to make the ratifying votes close in the key states of New York and Virginia but were unable to prevent ratification in the nine states needed for the Constitution to take effect. The principal institution through which advocates of a more powerful federal government secured their goals was, of course, the Constitutional Convention. AntiFederalist opponents of the Constitution raised questions, to which Madison in the Federalist Papers was forced to respond, about whether it was legitimate for the Convention of 1787 to replace, rather than merely revise and alter, the Articles of Confederation. However, delegates to the Convention were convinced that such a step was necessary to meet their charge of ‘‘render[ing] the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.’’ The work of the convention was submitted for ratification by state conventions and, with belated approvals in North Carolina and Rhode Island, eventually was approved by all 13 states.

The Antebellum Period The first seven decades under the Constitution saw several important instances of centralizing developments, such as Congress’s creation of a national bank (in 1791) and its rechartering (in 1816), and the Supreme Court’s subsequent upholding of its constitutionality (in 1819), before the veto of its reauthorization by President Andrew Jackson (in 1832). The period was also marked by state government efforts to defy the federal government. These state efforts, each of which was ultimately unsuccessful, took the form, initially, of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Madison and Jefferson sought to respond to the federal Alien and Sedition Acts by making good on the expectation in Federalist No. 46 that ‘‘ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of State governments would not excite the opposition of a single State,’’ but would lead to the opening of ‘‘correspondence’’ and to ‘‘[p]lans of resistance’’ among the states. However, other states responded to these resolutions by declaring that the constitutionality of congressional legislation was not to be determined by states, but rather was the province of the Supreme Court. Assertions of state sovereignty were also taken up by New

England states, which sent representatives to the Hartford Convention in 1814, in an effort to oppose federal acts pursuant to the War of 1812, but whose actions came too late to have any effect. From this point onward, the doctrine of state sovereignty was advanced by southern states, whether in the form of disputes between the Virginia Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court about whether the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction extended to the review of state court judgments; or the invocation by South Carolina (led by John Calhoun) of the doctrine of nullification in response to the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832; or the decision on the part of 11 southern states to secede from the Union in 1860 and 1861. The principle of state sovereignty was therefore asserted during the antebellum period by a variety of interests (in both southern and northern states) and on multiple issues (regarding federal court jurisdiction, tariffs, internal improvements, and slavery), and thus its defense was not confined to a particular region, party, or issue. Nevertheless, as the years progressed, it became possible to identify tendencies in regard to groups that were generally supportive of state sovereignty (southern states, Democrats, and defenders of slavery) and groups that were generally supportive of federal power (northern states, Whigs, and critics of slavery). Patterns are evident in the institutions through which these groups advanced their respective cases for state sovereignty or federal power in the antebellum period. Defenders of state sovereignty contended that state officials were quite capable of assessing the legitimacy of federal acts, and, toward that end, state legislatures made use of a number of institutional mechanisms, including the issuance of resolutions seeking to organize resistance to federal encroachments, the invocation of the doctrine of nullification, and, finally, the calling of conventions for the purpose of seceding from the Union. States also gained power--at least for a short time---from their legislatures’ ability to instruct senators and then censure and force the resignations of senators who failed to represent state interests. Presidents committed to strict construction of the Constitution sometimes used vetoes to constrain congressional power, such as Madison’s 1817 veto of the Bonus Bill, James Monroe’s 1822 veto of the Cumberland Road bill, Jackson’s 1830 veto of the Maysville Road bill and 1832 veto of the national bank, and James Polk’s vetoes in 1846 and 1847 of harbors-andrivers-improvement bills. Conversely, the Supreme Court played a crucial role in rebuffing state challenges to federal power and ensuring federal supremacy, at

Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism least for much of Chief Justice John Marshall’s tenure (1801--1835). In leading cases, the Marshall court upheld the constitutionality of a national bank and prevented states from taxing its branches in McCulloch v. Maryland [1819], asserted the power of the Supreme Court to review state supreme court decisions in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee [1816] and Cohens v. Virginia [1821], and offered a broad reading to the dormant commerce clause and thereby permitted federal invalidation of state regulations that interfered with interstate commerce, as in Gibbons v. Ogden [1824].

The Civil War and Post--Civil War Amendments The North’s decision to fight a war and then push for adoption of the post--Civil War amendments was motivated by a desire not only to preserve the Union in the face of southern secession but also, in the war’s aftermath, to empower the federal government to secure the rights of African Americans who had been enslaved in southern states. Thus, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia to the Army of the Potomac at Appomattox Courthouse in 1865 essentially resolved on the battlefield several constitutional questions concerning the legitimacy of the doctrines of nullification and secession. And the illegitimacy of these doctrines was further confirmed when state conventions, which were called to revise southern constitutions pursuant to the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, were required to adopted provisions foreswearing any resort to the doctrine of secession, affirming the supremacy of the federal government, and declaring fealty to the Union. Meanwhile, the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 gave the federal government ultimate responsibility for securing the civil rights of African Americans. Supporters and opponents of maintaining the Union and then adopting the post--Civil War amendments were, of course, divided by region, but also by party, with the divisions most evident in the 1860 presidential election. Northern and western states were responsible for the election of the Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln, who supported a federal ban on the expansion of slavery into the territories and whose election precipitated the secession of South Carolina and, ultimately, the Civil War itself. Meanwhile, southern and border states split their votes among the southern Democrats (who sought to permit slavery in the territories), the northern Democrats (who wanted the question of slavery in the territories to be resolved by popular sovereignty), and the Constitutional Union Party (which did not want the issue of slavery to split the Union).

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The principal institutions that brought about these radically centralizing changes in the 1860s were, first, the U.S. armed forces under the command of President Lincoln as their constitutional commander in chief, and second, the constitutional amendment process. Regarding military force, for the seven decades before the Civil War, debates had been waged in Congress, state legislatures, and among the citizenry as to how much sovereignty the states had retained upon entering the Union. And although each effort on the part of particular states to actually invoke the doctrine of nullification or to persuade other states to engage in concerted resistance to federal power had been unsuccessful, whether due to the lack of support from other states or the steadfast opposition to these doctrines by officials such as President Jackson, the legitimacy of these doctrines remained open to debate. Lincoln’s willingness to go to war in response to southern secession, along with the hard-won victory of the Union Army, resolved these longstanding debates. The constitutional amendment process then served as the vehicle---although a controversial one in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose ratification was required of southern states as a condition of their rejoining the Union---by which control over the civil rights of African Americans was transferred to the federal government.

The Progressive Era and the New Deal The late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the passage of numerous congressional statutes that increased federal regulation of business and the provision of social welfare in cases in which states were seen as incapable of regulating these issues, either because these matters crossed state lines or because state legislatures were unduly influenced by large corporate interests. Thus, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Hepburn Act of 1906, Clayton Act of 1914, and Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 were adopted in the early part of this period to regulate railroads and corporate trusts whose operations stretched across state lines. And the AntiLottery Acts of 1890 and 1895, Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Meat Inspection Act of 1906, Mann Act of 1910, and Child Labor Act of 1916 were intended to prohibit interstate trafficking in various products and services. Meanwhile, numerous federal laws were enacted during the Progressive Era to secure the rights of workers engaged in interstate commerce, including the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 (regulating the working conditions of railroad employees), Erdman Act of 1898 (prohibiting railroad workers from having to sign

166 Cities, States, and American Federalism

Under orders of the U.S. Marshal, worm-infested currants and raisins seized from Washington, D.C., bakeries under provisions of the Pure Food and Drug Act are destroyed on November 20, 1909. (Library of Congress)

yellow-dog contracts that prohibited their joining a union), and Employers’ Liability Acts of 1906 and 1908 (rendering unavailable the fellow-servant and contributory-negligence doctrines by which railroads had avoided liability for workplace injuries). Then, in the midst of the Great Depression, during President Franklin Roosevelt’s first term, Congress enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935, and Social Security Act of 1935 (whose old-age insurance provision was a purely federal program, but whose other provisions, including unemployment compensation and Aid to Dependent Children,

were shared by the federal and state governments). And during Roosevelt’s second term, Congress revised and reenacted several of these laws in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions and then enacted additional centralizing statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Supporters and opponents of a greater federal regulatory role during this period were divided primarily by partisan attachment and their alignment with business or labor. Thus, the main proponents of federal legislation in these areas, especially as the years progressed, were labor unions and the Democratic Party, which in the early and mid-19th century generally had been opposed to an active federal role, but by the late-19th

Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism century had come to view federal legislation as necessary to regulate business and provide assistance to workers, the poor, the elderly, and the unemployed. Meanwhile, the chief opponents of an active federal role, as was made particularly clear during the latter part of this era, were business groups and the Republican Party, which from the immediate post--Civil War period up through Teddy Roosevelt’s administration was still the party of nationalism, although it had become firmly entrenched in its new position by the New Deal. The expansion of federal power during the Progressive and New Deal Eras was achieved to a great extent through Congress, often in response to the leadership of presidents; and although several of these efforts were blocked by federal courts, these rulings were in nearly all cases eventually overcome, whether through changes in judicial doctrine or the amendment process. To consider each of these institutions in turn, it is significant that Congress was the principal vehicle for the centralization of power, given that it previously had not played such a role in a sustained fashion, particularly in regard to the regulation of business and commerce. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt departed from 19thcentury conceptions of the presidency and embraced roles as leaders of public opinion and legislative action. They encouraged Congress to enact regulatory and social welfare legislation, and, in the case of Roosevelt’s New Deal program, were largely responsible for initiating and securing passage of such measures. Meanwhile, federal courts on several occasions played just the opposite role. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. [1895], as well as the first Federal Employers’ Liability Act in The Employers’ Liability Cases [1908], a portion of the Erdman Act in Adair v. U.S. [1908], and the Child Labor Act in Hammer v. Dagenhart [1918], and it adhered to a limited interpretation of congressional power to regulate monopolistic trade practices, most notably in U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co. [1895]. It is true that the federal courts also struck down numerous state laws that sought to protect workers’ rights and regulate business, and therefore the principal effect of federal court decisions during this period was to prevent any level of government from regulating these areas. In certain cases, however, the Supreme Court’s decisions did have the effect of delaying for a time the passage of federal legislation, especially regarding the income tax (ultimately secured through the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913), regulation of child labor (eventually upheld by the Court in 1941), and a host of New Deal programs (most of which were

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eventually sustained in a series of decisions between 1937 and 1942). And as the case of the income tax amendment makes clear, the amendment process also served as an occasional vehicle for the expansion of federal power during this period, with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 (direct senatorial election) and the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 (authorizing national prohibition) standing as the other two examples.

The 1960s Although the 1960s brought the adoption of additional social insurance legislation, including Medicare (a purely federal program) and Medicaid (where funding and responsibility are shared by federal and state governments) among other Great Society programs, the distinctive aspect of this period was the enactment of congressional legislation and the issuance of federal court rulings dedicated to securing equality of rights, both in the sense of guaranteeing the civil rights of African Americans and achieving a uniform level of protection of civil liberties for citizens across the country. The Brown v. Board of Education cases of 1954 and 1955 were the first major federal efforts to respond to state-sponsored racial discrimination in southern states, in this case, regarding elementary and secondary education, but these decisions were met with widespread resistance from southern governors and other public officials. It was not until the mid-1960s that any real progress was achieved in eliminating racial segregation and discrimination in education, voting, and employment. This progress came about through congressional statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in combination with federal executive enforcement and federal court decisions that placed increasing pressure on states to desegregate, and eventually integrate, their public schools. As for the nationalization of civil liberties, this project had begun in the 1920s, with the incorporation of the federal free speech clause into the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it continued in the 1940s, with the application of the federal religion clauses to state acts. Once again though, it was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court acted in a widespread fashion to interpret most provisions of the federal Bill of Rights as enforceable against state governments, thereby providing in such cases as Mapp v. Ohio [1961], Gideon v. Wainwright [1963], and Miranda v. Arizona [1966] for a uniform understanding of the rights of criminal defendants. This move toward greater federal responsibility for securing civil rights and liberties was driven to a great

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President Lyndon B. Johnson moves to shake hands with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the capitol rotunda following the signing of the Voting Rights Act on August 6, 1965. The law was the first national legislation to guarantee all Americans the right to vote. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

extent by increasing support for the Madisonian view that minority rights are better secured in a large republic than in small communities, as well as by a growing appreciation for a modern view of equality that refuses to tolerate different conceptions of liberty in such communities. However, these ideas were not supported in a uniform fashion across the country; rather, they were promoted with particular intensity by certain parties and interests and strongly opposed by others. The strongest supporters were northern Democrats (who were joined on occasion by a significant number of Republicans) and African Americans. The principal opponents were southern Democrats, and, as the decade progressed, a growing portion of the Republican Party, particularly after Barry Goldwater’s capture of the Republican presidential nomination in 1964 and the ascendancy of conservatives within the party in subsequent years. The centralizing acts of the 1960s were embraced by Congress (as in the Progressive and New Deal Eras), at the urging of the president (with Lyndon Johnson

playing a role similar to Wilson and the two Roosevelts). In an important departure from the previous era, however, the Supreme Court did not serve as a brake on centralization originating in the political branches; rather, the court was itself responsible for the nationalization of civil rights and liberties. To take up these institutions in turn, Congress was responsible for a number of the centralizing acts of the decade, and although southern Democrats tried to make use of their power in the senate (by virtue of equal state representation in that body), as well as the senate rules (particularly the filibuster), to block civil rights measures, by the 1960s they were no longer successful in doing so. And this was partly due to the influence of President Johnson, who had served previously as senate majority leader, and who took the lead role in pushing for the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, contributed to the centralization of power in two main ways. First, in a continuation of its post-1937 trend of deference to congressional determinations of the reach of federal

Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism power, the Court during the 1960s was willing to sustain congressional expansions of power that previously would have been questioned, as in the case of the Civil Rights Act (sustained in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. [1964]), and Voting Rights Act (upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach [1965]). Second, and more important, the Court in the 1960s issued a number of constitutional rulings that had independent centralizing effects. Some of these decisions were grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, as with the one-man, one-vote mandate announced in Reynolds v. Sims [1964]. Many other rulings were grounded in the due process clause, and thus continued the Court’s project of enforcing provisions of the federal Bill of Rights against the states and thereby requiring state courts and legislatures to comply with uniform understandings of the rights of criminal defendants, as in Mapp, Gideon, and Miranda, among other cases.

The Contemporary Era The contemporary era (post-1960s) has been characterized by conflicting trends regarding federalism. The dominant trend has been a continuing accretion of power by the federal government, due in large part to a citizenry that now conceives of itself as comprising a national community and expects that policy issues will be addressed at the national rather than state level, and due also to the willingness of Congress and the federal courts to respond to these desires by nationalizing issues that previously would have been viewed as the responsibility of states. Thus, whereas grants-in-aid were once viewed primarily as a means of offering assistance to states, Congress increasingly has begun to view such grants, and particularly their accompanying conditions, as a way of achieving national goals. Meanwhile, Congress increasingly has begun to preempt state laws and, in fact, has issued as many preemptions in the period since 1969 as in all previous years. In addition, Congress has enacted an increasing number of mandates to state and local governments, and has federalized many areas of criminal law that once were viewed as the province of states. Finally, whereas public policy regarding controversial issues such as abortion and the death penalty had previously remained solely within the control of states, the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions that temporarily removed some of these issues from state control (as in Furman v. Georgia [1972], which outlawed the death penalty for the next four years), and effectively withdrew other issues from state control (as in Roe v. Wade

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[1973], which required states to allow abortions in the first trimester and also limited the restrictions that could be imposed in the second trimester). Running alongside these centralizing developments over the last several decades have been devolutionary trends that have been supported at various times by Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan and by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, each of whom cautioned against the inefficiency and loss of popular control associated with the growth of federal power. Although this devolutionary trend has been far overshadowed by the continuing centralization of power, it has led to the enactment of several notable congressional statutes, including the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995, which sought to restrain Congress from imposing mandates on states and localities, and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which gave the states somewhat more discretion in regard to the administration of welfare policy. Moreover, beginning in the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed limits on congressional power through its interpretations of the commerce clause, enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment. These conflicting centralizing and devolutionary trends generally have been supported by distinct constituencies, but the current era, no less than previous eras, has been marked by the willingness of groups and parties to take different positions at different times regarding federalism, depending on the particular issue at hand. In general, centralization has been most ardently supported by the Democratic Party, which in the post-1968 partisan alignment is home to nearly all liberals and receives strong support from labor unions (including public employee unions such as teachers), minorities, pro-choice advocates, and the plaintiffs’ bar. Meanwhile, devolution has been the project of the Republican Party, which is now home to most conservatives and generally is supported by business groups, evangelical Christians, low-tax advocates, pro-life supporters, and gun owners. However, one can also find these parties and groups reversing these general positions on federalism when it comes to particular policy issues. Thus many Democrats, liberals, and gay rights supporters have been enthusiastic advocates of state autonomy on the issue of same-sex marriage, whereas many Republicans, conservatives, and evangelicals have supported a federal constitutional amendment to limit state power in this area. At the same time, Republicans and business groups have been quite willing to support federal tort-reform legislation that would limit

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Republican representative of Georgia and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich announces on the Capitol steps the ‘‘Contract with America,’’ August 1, 1995. The Contract with America was a Republican party platform consisting of a list of legislative items Republicans promised to vote for as the majority party in Congress. The key goals of the original ten-point plan included cutting taxes for the middle class, reforming social welfare policies and increasing state power. (Erik Freeland/Corbis)

local jury awards and require more cases to be heard in federal court, whereas Democrats and trial lawyers have been opposed to federal action in this area. It is possible to identify general trends, along with important exceptions, in the patterns of institutional support for the centralizing acts of recent decades and the occasional moves toward decentralization. Congress has been the vehicle for many of the centralizing acts in the contemporary era, whether by federalizing crime policy, preempting state and local law, achieving national goals via conditions on grants-in-aid, and issuing mandates to state and local governments. However, at times, such as during the 104th Congress (1995--1996), which followed the Republicans’ ascendancy to majority status in the 1994 elections, Congress has taken steps to stem the centralization of power and, in some respects, to devolve power to the states, namely through the passage of mandate-reform and welfare-reform legislation. Meanwhile, post-1960s presidents, four of whom were former governors, have

been among the chief advocates for decentralization, although their federalism initiatives have met with mixed success in Congress. Thus Nixon proposed a series of bold ‘‘New Federalism’’ initiatives, but the only ones that were successful were a General Revenue Sharing (GRS) program that was adopted in 1972 (though later eliminated in 1986), and the consolidation of categorical programs into two block grants: the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program of 1974. A decade later, Reagan sought to consolidate categorical grants into block grants, and he succeeded in creating 10 new block grants in the first two years of his administration; moreover, he issued a 1987 executive order (Executive Order No. 12612) requiring federal agencies to conduct federalism assessments for regulations that would preempt state or local laws. Finally, the record of the U.S. Supreme Court during this period has been quite mixed. In some respects, the Court has been just as

Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism strong a force for centralization as in the previous era, but in other respects, has been a driving force for decentralization. The Court has been a centralizing force by continuing to rely on the due process and equal protection clauses to remove from state discretion a number of contentious policy issues, such as abortion and the death penalty, among numerous other issues. However, after a period in which the Court continued its post-1937 pattern of sustaining expansive exercises of congressional power, and even went so far as to offer an unprecedented defense of such a deferential approach in Garcia v. SAMTA (1985), during the 1990s, the Court reversed course and began to enforce numerous limits on congressional power. Such rulings were based on interpretations of the Commerce Power (beginning with U.S. v. Lopez [1995]), enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (beginning with Boerne v. Flores [1997]), Tenth Amendment (beginning with New York v. U.S. [1992]), and Eleventh Amendment (beginning with Seminole Tribe v. Florida [1996]). The actual import of these decisions imposing limits on congressional power remains unclear. But there is no denying the dramatic change in the Court’s approach to these federalism cases.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Perspective Although changes in the U.S. federal system have been shaped by numerous forces, including long-term developments such as an increasingly transient citizenry, the growth of national media outlets, and the country’s mobilization for several sustained wars, it is also possible, as we have seen, to view these changes as the product of a series of ideas that have been advanced by various interests through assorted institutions.

Ideas For many years, certainly until the passage of the post--Civil War amendments, federalism debates revolved around the fundamental question of the locus of sovereignty in the federal system. In the founding era, delegates to the federal constitutional convention and state ratifying conventions were persuaded of the need to move from a confederal to a federal system, primarily out of a desire to eliminate factious legislation, build an economic common market, and secure the common defense. Then, in the antebellum era, questions were raised as to the precise extent to which sovereignty had been transferred to the federal government, as various states contended that they retained the

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rights of concerted resistance, nullification, and secession, and that any contrary understanding would result in an illegitimate consolidation of power. With disputes about the locus of sovereignty largely resolved after the Civil War in favor of the federal government, the main questions in subsequent years have concerned the degree to which the citizenry prefers to vest responsibility for policy making in state or federal governments, and these questions have been increasingly resolved in favor of the federal government. This preference for federal responsibility has been driven, in part, by a belief that state officials are ill-positioned to regulate economic behavior that crosses state lines. The federal government has been entrusted with additional power because state officials have been viewed as more susceptible to being overwhelmed by powerful corporate interests, and therefore ill-suited to regulate these interests. Power has been transferred to the federal government because states (particularly southern states before the civil rights movement) were shown to be overt violators of the rights of African Americans. Still another impetus for the centralization of power has been a growing intolerance of differences among states and a desire to achieve uniformity, particularly regarding the means of defining and guaranteeing civil liberties. Contrary arguments have been advanced as to why centralization should be avoided. Democratic theorists dating back to Alexis de Tocqueville have argued that centralization of power allows fewer avenues for meaningful citizen participation in governance. And in an oft-quoted judicial opinion, Louis Brandeis wrote that federal control over policy making reduces opportunities for policy experimentation. State and local officials have pointed out that centralization makes it more difficult to administer policies, especially in view of the dramatic differences in the conditions and needs of local communities across the country. And publicchoice scholars have warned that centralization limits the sort of interstate competition for residents and businesses that redounds to the benefit of the citizenry. Although these ideas have in certain respects and at certain times been influential, this influence has generally declined through the years.

Interests Federalism rarely has been a primary concern for political parties and groups throughout American history. Rather, the positions that individuals and groups have taken regarding the benefits of centralization or decentralization generally have been shaped by their estimation of which level of government would best advance

172 Cities, States, and American Federalism their policy goals. And this holds true even in the founding era and decades before the Civil War, at times when fundamental questions regarding the federal system were at stake. Even during these periods, Federalist and Anti-Federalist support for a stronger or weaker central government was driven largely by concerns about the anticipated consequences for agrarian or commercial interests, among other interests and regions. And the various groups pitted against each other in the battles over nullification and secession in the antebellum era were most concerned with the effects of federal tariff and slavery policies. Given that parties and groups have been primarily committed to securing various policy goals, and only secondarily interested in supporting a certain balance of state and federal power, it is no surprise that certain individuals and groups have taken different positions regarding federalism at different times in American history. Thus even John Calhoun had no problems early in his career with the assertion of federal power, particularly in regard to tariff policy, and it was only later, once tariffs were enacted that were harmful to the South, that he was led to oppose federal tariffs and to invoke the doctrine of nullification. And, in an example that stretches over a longer time frame, the Democratic Party was throughout the 19th century generally opposed to the centralization of federal power, in part because federal power was seen as primarily advancing business interests. During the 20th century, however, once federal power came to be used to restrain business interests and create social insurance programs, Democrats became leading supporters of centralization. And the Republican Party has undergone a similar evolution in its views on federalism, just in the opposite direction. In fact, it is not uncommon, and not at all surprising, to find the same individual or group simultaneously holding dramatically different positions on the benefits of centralization or decentralization, depending on the policy issue. In the early 21st century, this is seen in cases in which Democrats and liberal groups are generally supportive of centralization, but not in regard to certain issues such as same-sex marriage, and in which Republicans and conservative groups are generally supportive of state autonomy, although not in regard to certain issues such as tort reform.

Institutions In assessing the role played in the development of federalism by various governing institutions---namely, the constitutional amendment and revision process,

Congress, the presidency, the federal judiciary, and state governments themselves---it is helpful to begin by taking stock of the range of ways in which an institution could have an influence on the balance of power between state and federal governments. First, an institution can be responsible for promoting centralization, by encouraging or serving as a vehicle for enactment of policies that increase federal power or reduce state autonomy. Second, an institution can have the effect of stemming or limiting the pace of centralization, by blocking or delaying attempted increases in federal power. Third, an institution can bring about decentralization, by devolving authority or policy-making responsibility from the federal government to the states. The amendment and revision process has been, with only a few exceptions, a vehicle for promoting centralization. This was certainly the case with the federal constitutional convention and post--Civil War amendments, each of which were transformative moments in the development of the federal system. And the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Amendments brought important increases in federal power during the Progressive Era regarding taxation, senatorial election, and prohibition. One could also point to the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which enfranchised women, abolished the poll tax in federal elections, and lowered the voting age to eighteen in state and federal elections. The lone exceptions to this centralizing trend are the Tenth Amendment, which confirmed that the federal government possesses only enumerated powers; the Eleventh Amendment, which reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) by immunizing nonconsenting states against federal suits by citizens of other states; and the Twenty-First Amendment, which reversed the Eighteenth Amendment and thereby returned power over liquor regulation to state governments. Congress has also been a frequent agent of centralization, particularly from the Progressive Era to the present. It is true that the founders expected Congress to play a different role, and that the senate, in particular, was designed to represent state interests. However, the Seventeenth Amendment brought a formal end to any sense in which senators conceived of themselves as representatives of state legislatures (state legislatures had long ceased to exercise any effective control over the senators they appointed). Although members of Congress are still tied to state or local constituencies, both representatives and senators have proved increasingly responsive to national interest groups (which provide an increasing share of the funding for their campaigns) and to the national media (which provide

Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and the Development of American Federalism an increasing share of the news that informs their constituents) and to their preference for national responses to various problems. As a result, with the exception of legislation such as UMRA (which seeks to stem the pace of centralization) and PRWORA (which in certain respects actually devolves power to the states), Congress generally has been a centralizing force from the turn of the 20th century onward, not only during key moments such as the Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society Eras, but also, and increasingly, on a routine basis. Presidents have a mixed record when it comes to accelerating or stemming the pace of centralization. At times, presidents have acted to block or at least delay centralizing acts, such as when various early 19thcentury presidents wielded the veto power to limit federal involvement in banking and internal improvements, and when late-20th-century presidents issued executive orders requiring federal agencies to weigh the effects of regulations on state and local governments in the rulemaking process. At other times, particularly during much of the 20th century, presidents have been leading agents of centralization, in the sense that Wilson with his New Freedom, Roosevelt with his New Deal, and Johnson with his Great Society, each proposed legislative programs that increased federal power, and each president exerted significant influence to secure passage of these initiatives. The Supreme Court also has played different roles at different times in regard to accelerating or delaying centralization. In one respect, many Supreme Court rulings---including the Marshall Court ruling in McCulloch and numerous rulings from 1937--1985 upholding expansive congressional interpretations of the commerce power---have not themselves had an independent effect on centralization; rather, they have merely sustained congressional acts that brought about expansions of federal power. In two respects, though, Court rulings have had independent effects on centralization, and in quite different directions. First, at times, the Court has overturned state legislation and thereby increased the degree of federal supervision or responsibility for certain policy areas. Decisions of this kind are found throughout American history---more than 1,200 state laws have been invalidated by the Supreme Court, as compared with only 150 federal laws---but they were particularly notable in the Marshall Court (particularly its dormant commerce clause rulings) and then in the Warren and Burger Courts (particularly their interpretations of the due process and equal protection clauses). Second, at other times---during the New Deal and Progressive Eras and then again during the Rehnquist

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Court---the Supreme Court has stemmed the pace of centralization by invoking clauses such as the commerce clause and the Tenth Amendment to invalidate congressional efforts at expanding federal power. Although in retrospect it might well have been expected that these institutions of the federal government would have done more to promote than retard centralization, and thus the above trends could be viewed as unsurprising, state officials might still have made use of various other institutions to promote decentralization or at least limit the pace of centralization, including in the manner foreseen by Madison in Federalist No. 46. After an initial period when states did try to make use of such institutions---the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions are the best known, but far from the only, state resolutions that sought to gain support for state-concerted resistance---the defeat of the confederacy in the Civil War was viewed as rendering illegitimate not only the doctrines of secession and nullification but also any idea of concerted state resistance to federal sovereignty. State governments are still represented in the policy process through organizations such as the National Governors’ Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, and Conference of State Governments. And, on occasion, these intergovernmental groups have worked with members of Congress to prevent adoption of centralizing legislation or to secure enactment of devolutionary legislation, most notably in the case of welfare-reform legislation. But, on balance, it has been easier for these groups to gain consensus from their members on projects such as securing additional federal funds than on pressing for decentralizing acts, and so lobbying of the former sort now attracts much of their energy. In general, then, the dominant trend throughout American history has been centralization of power, and this has been achieved through various institutions, including through the constitutional amendment process, through Congress with the support of 20th-century presidents, and through the federal courts, particularly in the early nineteenth and late-twentieth centuries. Several institutions have occasionally served as a vehicle for limiting or stemming the pace of centralization, as in the case of occasional congressional acts of selfrestraint, presidential vetoes and executive orders, and judicial limitations on congressional expansions of power. As for actual decentralization of power, this has been quite rare, and to the extent that it has been achieved, it has come through the constitutional amendment process and on occasion through congressional acts.

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References and Further Reading Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1984. Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform. Washington, DC: ACIR. Ames, Herman V. 1970 [1906]. State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States. New York: Da Capo Press. Beer, Samuel. 1973. ‘‘The Modernization of American Federalism.’’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism 3: 49--95. Conlan, Timothy. 1998. From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Derthick, Martha. 2001. Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Greve, Michael S. 1999. Real Federalism: Why it Matters, How it Could Happen. Washington, DC: AEI Press. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 1999. The Federalist Papers. New York: Mentor. Kelly, Alfred H., Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz. 1991. The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development. 7th ed. 2 vols. New York: W. W. Norton.

Kincaid, John, ed. 1990. ‘‘American Federalism: The Third Century.’’ Special Edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509 (May). McDonald, Forrest. 2000. States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1870. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Nagel, Robert F. 2001. The Implosion of American Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Nathan, Richard P. 1990. ‘‘Federalism---The Great ‘Composition.’’’ In The New American Political System, 2nd ver. Edited by Anthony King, 231--261. Washington, DC: AEI Press. Riker, William H. 1955. ‘‘The Senate and American Federalism.’’ American Political Science Review 49 (June): 452-469. Walker, David B. 2000. The Rebirth of Federalism. 2nd ed. New York: Chatham House. Wechsler, Herbert. 1955. ‘‘The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government.’’ In Federalism: Mature and Emergent. Edited by Arthur W. MacMahon, 97--114. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

John Dinan

The City in American Political Development Richardson Dilworth Associate Professor of Political Science, Drexel University

one between citizens and the state. Intermediary organizations such as cities or political parties that possessed more power than mere individuals but had no formal authority were conceived as grave threats to individual freedom and the common good; James Madison famously referred to them as ‘‘factions’’ in his Federalist 10, ‘‘united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’’ Yet much like the political parties that flourished despite George Washington’s denunciation of them, at least twenty-five towns became chartered municipal corporations between 1775 and 1789. Beyond any theoretical discrepancies over their role in social contract theory, many citizens of the new republic were evidently either highly suspicious or openly hostile to big cities. The wealthy Virginians who figured so prominently in the founding period shared with many Americans an almost innate antiurbanism and a belief in the inherent virtue of an agricultural society, an attitude evident in one letter from Thomas Jefferson to physician and statesman Benjamin Rush, in which he noted, ‘‘I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man’’ (Bergh 1907, 173). Jefferson was one of the driving forces behind locating the capitol in the marshland along the Potomac, yet he certainly was not alone in his opinion that the nation should be headquartered outside a major city. At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787, for instance, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry commented

The history of the United States is characterized paradoxically by both rapid urbanization and a political culture ambivalent if not hostile to large cities. This ambivalence is in some ways perplexing given the seeming propinquity between a national government clearly created to foster commercial development and early cities that functioned as commercial associations. The origins of the modern city reside, as Max Weber put it, in the ‘‘fusion of market and fortress.’’ Castles provided protection and peace within which market activity could flourish, resulting in permanently settled populations whose livelihoods were increasingly dependent on trade and who increasingly demanded new rights from their rulers. Membership in early modern cities was based on freeman status, which included the right to trade and often the right to participate politically in the municipal corporation, and which often did not require living within the geographic boundaries of the city. In both the old and new worlds these early municipal corporations served such functions as regulating entry into vocations, setting up penalties for various forms of profiteering, maintaining marketplaces, hosting annual fairs, and financing docks and warehouses. While they would thus seem to fit well in a commercial republic, there was little space for cities in the social contract theory of government that served as the chief legitimating device for the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution. The notion of social contract that inspired the founding documents of American government was of

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176 Cities, States, and American Federalism (according to the notes kept by James Madison) that he ‘‘conceived it to be the genel. sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Genl. Govt’’ (Madison 1787) More so than the location of the capitol, many of the compromises struck in the drafting of the Constitution can be seen to include an anti-urban bias. The compromise between the Virginia and New Jersey plans, for instance, provided for a powerful Senate with representation based on statehood rather than population, thus providing disproportionately greater representation to rural areas. The three-fifths compromise likewise provided greater representation to agricultural regions in the South, the least urban region of the new country. Americans certainly had good reasons to hold their cities suspect. First, cities were national anomalies in an overwhelmingly rural country. Of the 3,929,214 people living in the United States in 1790, only 5 percent of them (or 201,655 people) lived in the 24 communities that had populations greater than 2,500. Second, cities were remarkably dangerous places for a variety of reasons. They were giant fire hazards, and when they did not nearly burn to the ground---as did Charleston in 1740, Boston in 1760, and New York City in 1776---there were constant conflagrations that took down single houses or public buildings, such as Boston’s Faneuil Hall in 1761. Cities were also centers for disease epidemics, the most famous of the eighteenth century being the 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia that killed approximately 4,000 people and brought the federal government (then located in the city) to a standstill. Cities were also perceived as centers of moral depravity for several reasons. First, rampant and open prostitution made possible by urban poverty and population density threatened traditional notions of female virtue and thus threatened the established moral order. Second, cities were centers of the emergent American medical profession, a suspicious practice that, much like prostitution, threatened the moral sanctity of the body. Indeed, in the largest American riot in the eighteenth century, the New York City ‘‘Doctors’ Riot’’ of 1788, hundreds if not thousands of residents stormed a medical school and adjacent hospital in response to rumors that the school had been robbing graves to gain cadavers. Two subsequent riots in New York, the ‘‘bawdyhouse riots’’ of 1793 and 1799, were aimed at houses of prostitution. The instability engendered by such riots was yet another strike against early American cities. City government evolved to address new problems brought about by population growth. Even before the

Revolution, cities were beginning to shed their commercial functions, and in doing so they followed the lead of New England. Unlike Mid-Atlantic municipalities that followed institutional forms from the Old World, the New England town reflected a conscious effort to avoid what were seen as unfair restrictions on trade. In Boston, for instance, voting rights were based not on one’s status as a freeman or freeholder, as they were in Philadelphia and New York, but on payment of a poll tax. Whereas New York and Philadelphia raised revenues primarily by various taxes on trade, Boston’s local government raised money through a property tax. The Boston town government concerned itself primarily with issues of public health and safety, including street cleaning and control of wild dogs and pigs, and it had no control over vocations, no public market, and established no common weights and measures, which were all functions of the more traditional municipal corporations. Throughout the eighteenth century, American municipalities gradually relinquished their authority over commerce and took greater responsibility for maintaining public health and safety. Larger populations---Philadelphia is estimated to have grown from 5,000 people in 1720 to 30,000 people by the eve of the American Revolution---forced cities by necessity to take on greater public responsibilities and also made it increasingly difficult to enforce restrictive trade privileges. Commercial restrictions were in any case falling out of favor by the late eighteenth century, as evidenced by such celebrations of free trade as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776. The revolution and establishment of an independent republic was a further stimulus toward the transformation of cities from commercial associations to local providers of residential public services. Republican rhetoric was deployed in every city where membership was open only to freemen and government was conducted by a board of aldermen often appointed to lifetime terms. By the first decade of the nineteenth century white male taxpayers in every city had been granted the right to vote, and in many cities the board of aldermen had been stripped of judicial and executive powers, which, aping the Constitution, were vested in other branches. The increasing threat of fires, disease epidemics, street crime, prostitution, and increasingly violent riots, were all at least in part a function of increasing population size and density in American cities. At the first Census in 1790 only five cities had populations greater than 10,000 people: New York (33,131 people), Philadelphia (28,522), Boston (18,320), Charleston (16,359), and Baltimore (13,503). By 1800 the populations of New York City, Baltimore, and Boston had all nearly

The City in American Political Development doubled. City populations were not only growing, but were doing so more rapidly than the country overall, with the result that, by 1800, the 33 communities with populations over 2,500 accounted for more than 6 percent of the nation’s people, up by 1 percent from 1790. Persistent and devastating fires and disease epidemics led cities to support technological innovation, most notably in the case of waterworks. In 1798 yellow fever epidemics struck most major American cities. Based on miasmatic theories that attributed the causes of disease to generally dirty conditions---as Benjamin Rush noted in the case of Philadelphia, the fever hit especially hard ‘‘in places where there was the greatest exhalation from foul gutters and common sewers’’ (Rush 1805)---the 1798 epidemic elicited a general call for ample supplies of water for the purposes of street cleaning and for residential use. The Philadelphia common council engaged the expertise of a young engineer, Benjamin Latrobe, to design and oversee the construction of an innovative system that utilized two technologically advanced steam engines to pump water from the Schuylkill River into a distributing system of wooden pipes, construction of which began in the spring of 1799. The project

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was completed in 1801, giving Philadelphia the distinction of having the first municipal waterworks in the United States. In contrast to Philadelphia, New York City opted for a privatized water system. New York’s common council initially sent a bill to the legislature in Albany requesting authority to raise money for building an aqueduct from the Bronx River in northern Westchester County. In Albany, state senator Aaron Burr redrafted the bill to provide for the creation of a private corporation, the Manhattan Company, whose ostensible mission was to supply the city with water, but which included a clause giving the company the right to use its ‘‘surplus capital’’ in any way it saw fit. Thus the Manhattan Company, whose name survived until 2000 in the form of the Chase Manhattan Corporation, could also serve as a bank. Burr directed his bill successfully through the state legislative process and thus created a bank with the most generous and expansive charter that had ever been passed in New York State up to that time. The Manhattan Company was to serve both commercial and political purposes; its expansive charter all but

Depiction of the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelpia in 1793. Stephen Girard, a leading citizen, banker, and advocate for the indigent is shown on an errand of mercy. (Bettmann/Corbis)

178 Cities, States, and American Federalism guaranteed that it would be profitable, but it was also designed to assist the emergent Democratic-Republican Party. At the time of the Manhattan Company’s incorporation, Federalist and New Yorker Alexander Hamilton was Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, in which capacity he had significant sway over New York state banks. The Manhattan Company would be independent of the power of Hamilton and could provide financing for merchants who wanted to support the DemocratRepublicans. The Manhattan Company could also lend money to tontine associations, collectives set up to purchase property in part to qualify for the right to vote in the city and state. If Philadelphia’s waterworks reflects a functional government response to an obvious problem, the Manhattan Company---which was never very successful at supplying the city with water---shows how urban policy might be perverted for the sake of individual political and financial gain. It is notable as well that Burr has been credited as the first ‘‘boss’’ of the country’s first ‘‘machine,’’ the Society of Saint Tammany, better known as Tammany Hall, a fraternal order founded by revolutionary veteran William Mooney in 1789, the original purpose of which was to have a republican organization as a counter to more upper-class societies that threatened to establish an American aristocracy, such as the Society of the Cincinatti, whose first presidents were George Washington and Alexander Hamilton. Within the first decade of its existence Tammany became an almost explicitly partisan, republican organization, serving as the organizing vehicle for Burr and playing an important role in the coalition with Jefferson that would eventually result in the modern Democratic party. Beyond New England and the Mid-Atlantic, the role of cities in the more Southern states was transformed by the Revolution, prior to which the Southern elite were based in plantations and relied for much of their intercourse with the civilized world on agents in London---‘‘factors’’---who represented the planters in trading their farm products on the international market, and who also operated as purchasing agents for things that were needed back at the plantations. After the break with England, a new industry of such agents grew in the Southern cities, which thus increased in commercial importance, though political power in the South remained based in the countryside. Still, population data shows the growing relative importance of Southern cities. In 1790 Charleston and Baltimore were the only Southern cities to rank among the ten largest cities in the country, while five of the largest cities were in New England (Boston, Salem, Newport,

Providence, and Marblehead). By 1820, four out of the ten largest American cities were located in the South (Baltimore, Charleston, Washington, and New Orleans), while only two of the top ten (Boston and Salem) were in New England. Large Southern cities in the early nineteenth century were a diverse lot. Washington was relatively unique as the capitol; New Orleans dominated commerce in the ‘‘cotton belt’’; Baltimore had greater connection to trade in wheat; and Charleston, the traditional eastern port for Southern agriculture, was the ‘‘old South’’ city of the lot. All Southern cities were also distinct from the region in that they were centers for free blacks, especially New Orleans and Baltimore. By 1820 the number of communities with populations greater than 2,500 had increased to 61, the residents of which made up a small (less than 7 percent) though increasingly significant proportion of the country’s population. As cities increased in number and size, their hazy legal status required clarification, one of the first steps coming with the 1819 Supreme Court decision Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, in which chief justice John Marshall argued that private corporations were protected from state legislative interference by the contract clause of Article I, section 10 of the Constitution, whereas public corporations, which included cities, were not. Though still somewhat murky, Marshall’s clarification of the differences between public and private corporations would serve as the basis by which cities would eventually be understood as appendages to state government. The 1820s marked the greatest increase yet of the nation’s urban population. Between 1820 and 1830, the number of communities with populations over 2,500 increased from 61 to 90, and the proportion of the national population living in those communities jumped to 8.8 percent. The populations of Philadelphia and Baltimore increased by roughly a quarter during the 1820s, both reaching approximately 80,000 people by 1830, while Boston’s population increased by more than 40 percent during the same period, reaching more than 60,000 people. New York City, by contrast, increased in population by 64 percent during the 1820s, reaching a population of more than 200,000 by 1830. The dramatically different growth trajectory of New York City compared to other Eastern seaboard cities is most likely explained by the completion of the Erie canal in 1825, which revolutionized transportation and commercial trade between the seaboard and the interior, and which made New York City the premier commercial port in the country. Reflecting as well the greater penetration of the economy into the interior of

The City in American Political Development the continent, the 1830 Census records the first time that a western city, Cincinnati, joined the ranks of the nation’s ten largest cities. Unlike the relatively modest population growth of most eastern cities, Cincinatti’s population had increased 157 percent between 1820 and 1830, from 9,642 to 24,831 people. By 1830, Boston was the only New England town to rank among the ten largest urban places in the country, and as it distinguished itself by its rapid growth in the 1820s, it also found the town meeting to be an increasingly cumbersome and disorderly way of making public decisions. Attendance became erratic, with either low turnout or high turnout with disruptive crowds, and the town had already shifted to ward-based elections for some offices. Thus in 1822 Boston became the first town in New England to adopt a municipal charter authorizing a representative form of government. Nine years after Boston’s incorporation as a municipality the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville traveled through the United States. In the classic book he wrote about his trip, Democracy in America, Tocqueville made a special point of praising the virtues of the New England town, which he said was ‘‘to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within people’s reach; they teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it’’ (Lawrence and Mayer 1966, 63). He was somewhat less generous in describing the country’s major cities, calling them a real danger threatening the future of the democratic republics of the New World, and I should not hesitate to predict that it is through them that they will perish, unless the government succeeds in creating an armed force which, while remaining subject to the wishes of the national majority, is independent of the peoples of the towns and capable of suppressing their excesses. (Lawrence and Mayer 1966, 278n1) Augur that he was, Tocqueville correctly predicted that increasing urban populations would ultimately require new institutions to maintain public order, namely professional police forces, the first of which was established in Boston in 1837. Law enforcement was traditionally handled by sheriffs and constables who worked mostly on a fee basis, and the night watch, a duty that at least in theory was the responsibility of all able men over the age of 18. All of these forms of law enforcement and order maintenance had proven themselves relatively ineffective during the first half of the nineteenth century, and thus the new form of police

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force involved men paid a flat salary, whose job was to patrol the streets, with the explicit purpose of preventing crime. New York City established a similar police force in 1845, and Philadelphia followed suit in 1854. Notably different events in each of the nation’s largest cities served as the catalysts for establishing modern, professional police forces. In Boston, it was the ‘‘Broad Street Riot’’ of June 1837 that started with a fight between volunteer firemen and members of an Irish funeral procession and ended with numerous badly injured and thousands of dollars in property damage; in New York, it was the brutal, widely publicized, and ultimately unsolved murder of a young woman in 1841 that sparked public concern over the system of constables and sheriffs; in Philadelphia, the prevalence of gang violence combined with the citycounty consolidation of 1854 provided the opportunity for institutional change in law enforcement that established a modern police force. The backdrop against which all these events occurred was a noticeable increase in urban violence during the 1830s and 1840s, a function of the early stages of industrialization, the beginnings of massive European immigration, and a more strident abolitionist movement. During the 1830s, 599,125 immigrants came to the United States, more than a fourfold increase from the 1820s. More than one-third of these new arrivals came from Ireland and more than onequarter of them came from Germany. Most landed and settled in the large seaboard cities such as New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, where they were met with strong anti-immigrant sentiment and, with the Irish in particular, anti-Catholic sentiment (especially among Protestant Irish). The panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression, when approximately a quarter of the country’s banks closed and businesses suffered, hit urban working classes particularly hard, just at the point when they had to contend with the influx of labor from immigration. Finally, the 1830s witnessed the rise of a new, more strident abolitionist movement that called for an immediate end to slavery and denounced Southern slaveholders in strong terms, thus raising the specter of freed slaves coming north to compete for jobs, and of a loosening of the ties between Southern agriculture and Northern urban industry. Immigration, depression, and abolitionism proved to be a potent mix that led to a notable increase in public disorder by the mid-1830s. At least 24 major riots erupted throughout the United States in 1834 and at least 24 more in 1835. Race riots and labor riots broke out in relatively small towns in Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania, yet the majority

180 Cities, States, and American Federalism occurred in the big cities---twice in Baltimore, once in New Orleans, five times in New York City, and three times in Philadelphia. In Boston, the most dramatic anti-Catholic upheaval occurred in 1834, when a crowd of thousands burned a convent to the ground. The following year a mob broke up an anti-slavery meeting, and, discovering the famous abolitionist and publisher of the Liberator William Lloyd Garrison, dragged him through the streets until he was nearly dead. In New York City, riots often began in theaters where the audience took a dislike to an English actor, such as happened at the Bowery Theater in 1834, where the crowd went on to sack the house of the well-known abolitionist Lewis Tappan, and over the next few days also damaged an African American church. A similar disturbance at the Astor Opera House in 1849 drew a crowd of some ten thousand, with the result that the police called the state militia, who opened fire, killing eighteen people. One New York newspaper mentioned in 1840 that there had been 19 riots over the previous ten months. In Philadelphia in 1838, anti-abolitionist mobs set fire to a black orphanage and succeeded in burning to the ground an abolitionists’ meeting hall. A race riot between blacks and Irish in 1842, in which Irish rioters attacked and severely beat the city’s sheriff among others, precipitated a shift in the focus of violence, away from abolitionists and blacks, toward more recent immigrants. Public order collapsed entirely in the summer of 1844. In what still rank as the most violent attacks upon the American Catholic community, large crowds fought with the state militia as they attempted to burn down Catholic churches or bombard them with cannon fire. Rioting and violence in rapidly growing cities threatened the political stability of the new nation. In reference to a black man chained to a tree and burned to death by a mob in 1838 in Saint Louis---whose population had increased more than 330 percent between 1830 and 1840, from 4,977 to 16,469 people---a young Abraham Lincoln spoke ominously in one of his earliest speeches of ‘‘the increasing disregard for law which pervades the country; the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober judgment of Courts; and the worse than savage mobs, for the executive ministers of justice’’ (Basler 1953). Similar to Saint Louis, San Francisco experienced explosive growth during the 1840s, and in particular was inundated by tens of thousands of new residents as a result of the 1849 gold rush, creating massive disorder. Haphazard buildings burned down during six large fires between 1849 and 1851, capped

off by a crime epidemic that resulted in the establishment of the 1851 Committee of Vigilance, created under a constitution signed by 777 city residents who effectively seized by coup control of the city and carried out public executions by hanging until they deemed the place cleaned up, and then disbanded. A similar vigilance committee formed five years later. Cities also viewed education as an important means of maintaining a peaceful populace, and thus urban public schools systems began to emerge around the same time as the establishment of municipal police forces. Reflecting the more traditional public orientation of its towns, public schools had long been a mainstay in New England, the earliest and most famous likely being Boston Latin, founded in 1665. Massachusetts was also the first state to make school attendance compulsory, in 1852. Philadelphia’s civic leaders have been credited with establishing the first public high school, Philadelphia Central, in 1836, under the auspices of an 1834 state law that required local communities to establish free school systems, and Pennsylvania passed a compulsory school attendance law in 1895. Other cities established free primary schools in the antebellum period, at times notably coincident with rising public disorder. In San Francisco, for instance, the common council established a system of free schools funded in part through property taxes in the same year, 1851, as the establishment of the first Committee of Vigilance. While the beginnings of modern municipal government are thus evident before the Civil War, the American city was still in its institutional infancy. The early public school systems were often relatively haphazard collections of district schools with little in the way of standard curriculum. The early police forces and volunteer fire companies were often indistinguishable from street gangs, and the street gangs themselves were often adjuncts of warring party factions. Early infrastructural development such as the construction of municipal waterworks---after Philadelphia, public water supplies were established in Columbia, South Carolina (1823), Pittsburgh (1826), Wilmington, Delaware (1827), and Richmond, Virginia (1830)---were often used just as much to consolidate political power through kick-backs to contractors and other forms of corruption as they were used for fire protection and sanitation. Indeed, the most impressive of the public water supply systems built in the antebellum years, New York’s Croton Aqueduct system (which began supplying water in 1842), was both an engineering marvel and a lucrative enough source of graft that the city and state government were constantly battling for control over construction.

The City in American Political Development Demand for increasingly comprehensive infrastructure systems, especially public water, gas street lighting, and street pavements, increased with the pace of urban population growth. The 1840s witnessed the most dramatic growth in urbanization the country had yet seen. The number of places with 2,500 or more people more than doubled, from 131 in 1840 to 237 in 1850, and the percentage of the country’s population living in those places increased by 4.6 percent, to 15.4 percent. New York’s population grew much faster than other cities, and indeed much of this population growth had spilled over into neighboring Brooklyn, which was first listed as one of the nation’s ten largest cities in 1840, with a population of 36,233, and which had a population of 96,838 by 1850. By the 1850s, cities were also gaining populations through annexation. Brooklyn, for instance, annexed the neighboring towns of Williamsburgh and Bushwick in 1855, which caused it to jump from being the seventh largest American city in 1850, to the third largest city in 1860, with a population of 266,661. The city of Philadelphia consolidated with its county in 1854, causing its land size to increase from 2 to 130 square miles and its population to increase from 121,376 in 1850 to 565,529 in 1860. A city-county consolidation that expanded the size of San Francisco in 1856 resulted in the peninsular city vaulting from total obscurity to become the 15th largest city in the country in 1860. St. Louis nearly tripled its land size in the same year, as did Boston, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh during the 1850s and 1860s. As a result of all this expansion, by 1860, nearly

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one-fifth of the American population lived in places with populations over 2,500. The rapid urbanization of the country and the expansion of cities posed a threat to state governments, where rural interests almost always predominated, in part because the ‘‘one person, one vote’’ principal of electoral districting had not yet been established (and wouldn’t be for another century) and thus rural counties often had as many representatives in the legislature as did highly populated cities. A telling example of how states curbed the power of their cities comes from New York, where in 1857 the state legislature passed a new charter for the city that shifted much of what had been local patronage resources---including the port, construction of the new city hall, Central Park, and street improvements---to state-appointed, non-elective commissions. In a separate act passed the same year, the legislature also created a metropolitan police force, governed by a state-appointed board, and disbanded the municipal police force that had been controlled by the mayor. In retaliation, New York City’s mayor, Fernando Wood, sued the metropolitan police commissioner, Simeon Draper, on the grounds that the commissioner had no right to assume an office that violated the state constitution. The resulting case, People v. Draper is significant for embodying in its decision and dissent the conflict over the powers of cities that would come to define later legal opinion. While one dissenting judge argued that the state was an ‘‘aggregate’’ of local governments and thus exercised coeval powers with them, the court decided that the state

Frederick Olmsted and Calvert Vaux’s winning entry in the competition to design Central Park in New York, about 1858. (Archive Photos/Getty Images)

182 Cities, States, and American Federalism had the authority to establish a metropolitan police commission, and that such a commission did not threaten the existence of any local government even as it altered its powers. Fernando Wood is perhaps the best known of New York City’s antebellum mayors, primarily for three things. First, he spearheaded the creation of Central Park, which some contemporaries referred to as his ‘‘one creditable act.’’ Second, he resisted the metropolitan police by re-establishing the municipal police as a personal force within the mayor’s office, with the result that, for much of 1857 New York City had two separate police forces, who fought a famous battle outside City Hall. Finally, Wood is also well known for his proclamation to the city council in January 1861 that New York join South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas in seceding from the Union, so as to continue its lucrative trade with the southern states. Wood’s comments regarding secession certainly had some popular support, indicated not only by violence against abolitionists, but also in the strong support for the Democratic Party, which was true of most other Northern cities. Indeed, the Free-Soil party found the vast majority of its electoral support in the rural areas of the Northeastern and Midwestern states, as did the Republican Party. Certainly the devastating draft riots in New York City were additional evidence that Fernando Wood’s sentiments had some popular support. While government spending precipitated an economic boom early in the war, by 1863 inflation was rapidly eroding working class incomes, just at the time the national government also authorized a lottery for mandatory service in the Union Army. When the draftees reported for service in mid-July of 1863, the city’s monolithically Democratic working class marched to the marshal’s office and burned it down. The insurrection spread, and thousands of rioters, mostly Irish, beat and murdered police, any African Americans that could be found, and trashed the homes of wealthy Republicans, among other structures. The riot lasted four days, resulting in at least 119 dead, thousands more injured, and millions of dollars in damage to property and city infrastructure. Reaction to the 1863 conscription act in American cities varied and New York City is somewhat unique. Second only to New York were the draft riots in Detroit, which was by 1860 the 19th largest city in the country with a population that had more than doubled over the previous decade, from 21,019 in 1850 to 45,619 in 1860, and which probably contained more than 50,000 people by 1863. The Detroit riot lasted one

day, resulted in two deaths, and at least 30 destroyed properties. The Boston draft riot began with a crowd of women attacking two marshals. Learning from New York’s earlier draft riot, Boston’s police were more prepared, and the riot was more successfully repressed, lasting for only one day. There was no riot in Philadelphia, in part because of an effective police response that limited the impact of any small skirmishes resulting from the draft law, but also because Philadelphia was more supportive of the Republican cause; the city had, after all, hosted the first Republican national convention, in 1856. Cities continued to expand dramatically during the Civil War. Even the largest Southern cities showed no signs of slowing. Baltimore’s population increased by approximately one quarter from 1860 to 1870, as did the populations of smaller Southern cities, such as Charleston and Savannah. And while New Orleans increased in population at the slowest rate of the nation’s ten largest cities, its growth was comparable to New York City’s. The really dramatic growth was in the West. Saint Louis nearly doubled in population while the number of people residing in both Chicago and San Francisco increased by more than 160 percent. It was the period immediately after the Civil War that saw the firm legal foundations laid for state control over cities in what came to be known as ‘‘Dillon’s rule.’’ As a member of the Iowa Supreme Court, Judge John F. Dillon, in deciding a case regarding the City of Clinton’s challenge to a state law that granted the Missouri River Railroad the right to seize city streets without compensation, stated in 1868 his famous opinion that municipal corporations had no rights independent of state law, and thus no property rights. Four years later (by which time he had become a federal circuit court judge) Dillon’s Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations appeared, and remains today probably the most important treatment of the legal status of American cities. At the same time as Dillon was clarifying the legal powerlessness of cities, city government was actually reaching a new level of functional maturity. First, it was during the decades after the Civil War that cities began to adopt on a large scale the technological systems of service delivery that still define them today. By 1907, of the 158 American cities with populations over 30,000, 74 percent had municipal water supply systems. The average year that those cities either built or otherwise acquired their water systems is 1871. A few cities, such as Brooklyn and Jersey City, had enough foresight to build combined water and sewerage systems. For most cities, the demand for better sewerage

The City in American Political Development came after the introduction of a waterworks and the resultant increase in wastewater overwhelmed cesspools and privy vaults. In New York City, for instance, the city council authorized the financing and construction of a comprehensive sewerage system in 1865, twenty three years after completion of its waterworks. It was after the Civil War as well that cities began to experiment with new types of street pavement, including asphalt and creosote-soaked woodblock. The new capital projects were financed largely through municipal debt, which grew tremendously after the Civil War, especially in smaller cities. Municipal bond issues hit a new high in the late 1860s and early 1870s, followed by large scale defaults as a result of the financial panic of 1873 and the resultant depression. While there had been only three municipal bond defaults in the United States up to 1854, there was at least one default a year every year after that, save for 1867 and 1869. Along with the technical maturity of cities came the functional maturity of city government. Mayors gained increasing powers of veto and appointment. Other administrative officers, notably comptrollers and city solicitors, also became more important offices, less likely to be staffed by party loyalists than by trained professionals. Yet at the same time as the administrative offices of city government were gaining new responsibilities and becoming more professional, so were the political parties. It was the period after the Civil War that saw the emergence of genuine political machines. Much as the industrial machinery that obliterated craft production was a dehumanizing force, so did the mass-based political ‘‘machine’’ dehumanize the more elite-driven politics of earlier decades (at least to the elites). And both industry and the political machine were helped significantly by the onset of mass immigration from Europe. The 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s saw a relatively steady stream of immigrants, between 2.3 and 2.8 million per decade. The new arrivals still came mostly from Germany, Ireland, and England, though there were increasing numbers from Eastern Europe, Austria-Hungary, Norway, Sweden, and China. After the 1870s there was a veritable explosion in the number of new arrivals: 5,246,613 during the 1880s, 3,687,564 during the 1890s, 8,795,386 during the 1900s, 5,735,811 during the 1910s, and 4,107,209 during the 1920s. The most dramatic increases in terms of places of origin were Eastern Europeans and especially Italians, whose numbers increased from 651,893 in the 1890s to 2,045,877 during the 1900s. The new arrivals settled overwhelmingly in cities and thus contributed mightily to the urbanization of

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the nation. The 1880 Census was the first to provide a specific definition of urban areas, namely any incorporated area with a population of 8,000 or more. By this definition, a bit less than one-quarter of the population qualified as urban. By 1910, reflecting the broadening footprint of these urban areas, the Census invented ‘‘metropolitan districts,’’ defined as central cities with populations over 200,000 and all ‘‘minor civil divisions’’ with population densities greater than 150 people per square mile, lying within a 10 mile radius of the central city. Increasingly broader definitions of ‘‘metropolitan’’ increased the number of these areas from 29 in 1920 to 96 in 1930 and 140 in 1940. Going by the traditional measure of ‘‘urban’’ being people living in communities of 2,500 or more, the United States become a majority urban nation in 1920. Immigrants fed the increasing need for a low-wage industrial workforce whose increasingly wretched living conditions were documented by the likes of Upton Sinclair, Jacob Riis, and Jane Addams. They also fed the new political machines, which had them rapidly naturalized so they could vote, and which bought their votes with free turkeys at Christmas, free drinks on election days, and financial support for funerals. Reform-minded writers as diverse as Jane Addams and the British scholar and statesman James Bryce agreed that the political machines preyed upon the new immigrants, who had come predominantly from the European countryside and whose poverty and ignorance meant that they could be placated with small favors. Though he didn’t coin the terms, Bryce provided the definitive definitions of ‘‘machine,’’ ‘‘ring’’ and ‘‘boss’’ in his classic 1888 treatise American Commonwealth. The ‘‘machine’’ referred to the web of interlocking managing and nominating committees that defined the national party structure, and which were immensely democratic in nature since they provided, in form at least, all rank-and-file members of the parties a say in the nomination of candidates. Yet the large number of candidates to be nominated, the frequency of elections, and the general absence of interesting issues deterred most people from participating, and the nominating process was thus left in most instances to regular party workers. In small towns, these party workers were kept honest by the fact that everyone knew who they were and would notice if particularly odious people were nominated for office. In large cities, where people didn’t know one another, there were less informal social controls, especially because the ‘‘leading men’’ were all preoccupied with business and paid little attention to government, and thus the party workers could form an invidious ‘‘ring,’’ led by a ‘‘boss’’ and rely on

184 Cities, States, and American Federalism their manipulation of the ‘‘vast population of ignorant immigrants’’ to maintain electoral control. Later authors questioned Bryce’s contention that the failure of city government lay in the preoccupation of ‘‘leading men’’ with business. Indeed, Lincoln Steffens’s popular Shame of the Cities (1904) argued that it was precisely business interests, rather than immigrants, that corrupted cities. Yet the political machines have always been associated with ethnic groups, most notably the Irish, and for some good reason. By the 1890s Irish politicians dominated political systems in San Francisco, Buffalo, New York, Brooklyn, Albany, and Jersey City. Irish bosses formed alliances with business interests, but they still presented the notably ethnic face of urban politics by the turn of the twentieth century. Ethnic political machines only further differentiated cities from the countryside and provided state legislatures more excuses to infringe on municipal powers. Utility companies, railroads, and real estate investors, lobbied legislators in the hopes of gaining special advantages in the city. Legislatures then established such boondoggles as ‘‘improvement commissions’’ that had the authority to issue bonds for the purposes of grading, paving, and laying pipes in the streets of a certain section of a city. Legislators would get to appoint the commissioners while the municipality was made to secure the bonds---a practice that proved disastrous for many cities during the economic downturn of the 1870s. Cities retaliated against state interference with home rule charters. While first adopted as state laws in Iowa in 1858, the first state to establish municipal home rule as a constitutional principle was Missouri, in 1875, authorizing cities with populations greater than 100,000 (making only Saint Louis eligible at the time) the right to draft a city charter which, once approved by the voters in a referendum, could only be altered by approval of a three-fifths majority vote in subsequent elections. California adopted a similar constitutional provision for its cities in 1879, mostly at the behest of representatives from San Francisco. Similar home rule charters were passed during the nineteenth century in Washington State, at the behest of Seattle, and in Minnesota, at the behest of Minneapolis. These early home rule charters effectively protected cities from state interference, but they also locked the cities themselves into legal structures that restricted their ability to respond to increasing growth. The next wave of home rule provisions to state constitutions, starting around 1900, made it easier for cities to amend their charters.

Home rule was part of the progressive reform movement’s commitment to preventing corruption by changing the institutional structure of local government, which included as well promotion of the commission system (first adopted in Galveston in 1901, it created a government of commissioners each elected at-large, with no city council), civil service laws, primary elections, voter registration, and city planning. Good government groups proliferated in cities across the country during the early 1890s, with two hundred of them linking together nationally through the National Municipal League, founded in 1894, which survives today as the National Civic League. There was clearly something of the remnants of the nativist movement in the reform politicians who campaigned against the ethnic machines---politicians such as Seth Low in New York, Hazen Pingree in Detroit, William Thompson in Cleveland, and James Phelan in San Francisco. The nativist sympathies simmering in the early reform period began to find expression in a series of laws in the first decades of the twentieth century that severely restricted immigration. By 1910, nearly 15 percent of the country’s population was foreign born, a fact alarming enough to the United States Senate that they established a study commission in 1907, and a decade later passed the Immigration Act, establishing a literacy test for immigrants, and later the National Quota Law (1921), limiting the number of immigrants from any country to 3 percent of their total population already in the United States; and then the National Origins Act (1924), lowering the number of allowable immigrants from any country to 2 percent of the population already in the country at the time of the 1890 Census. Even before the 1917 Immigration Act, the flow of newcomers from abroad had been abruptly curtailed by the blockade of Europe during World War I. Thus, while more than 1 million newcomers landed on American shores in 1914, less than 400,000 came in 1915. The decrease in the labor supply provided a new opportunity for African Americans in southern states where the agricultural economy had been hit hard by the boll weevil and then by devastating floods in 1916. Between 1900 and 1910, every major northern city experienced significant growth in their black populations, from a 17 percent increase in Boston to more than a 50 percent increase in New York City. Still, by 1910 African Americans made up only small fractions of the populations of Northern cities---a bit more than 5 percent in Philadelphia, and 2 percent in both Chicago and New York. During the 1910s, however, the ‘‘great migration’’ of Southern blacks to northern cities began in earnest.

The City in American Political Development Between 1916 and 1920 an estimated half million African American southerners moved to northern and western cities. They were met in many instances with violence. Between 1917 and 1921 there were major race riots in at least fourteen cities. The best evidence suggests that those cities that had experienced the most recent population growth (whether of whites or blacks), which had attracted the most skilled black workers, and which had the highest homeowner rates, were most likely to have a riot. Prospects for blacks in both northern and southern cities were actually more influenced by peaceful forms of racism such as racial covenants in deeds prohibiting the sale of a house to a non-Caucasian. Racial covenants built upon the foundations of urban residential racial policy established by segregationist zoning, which had been adopted in several southern cities during the 1910s (Baltimore, Richmond, Winston-Salem, Atlanta, Louisville, Saint Louis, and Dallas) but which had been declared an unconstitutional infringement on property rights in the 1917 Supreme Court case Buchanan v. Warley. Racial covenants were especially predominant in white neighborhoods nearest to black neighborhoods, and in newer suburbs. Thus the increasing number of black newcomers to northern and western cities---estimates are that close to 1 million emigrated from the south during the 1920s and some 1.6 million moved from the south during World War II alone---were funneled into only a few neighborhoods that were thus increasingly defined by race. In New York, by 1930 more than 60 percent of all black residents lived in Harlem. One result of residential segregation was the changing nature of race riots, from white violence against blacks to black violence against signs of white domination in black neighborhoods. And increasingly the official response to such riots was not so much to quell the rioters as to contain the riot to the black neighborhood. Thus in Harlem major riots broke out in 1935 and 1943, in both cases sparked by rumors of police abuse, and in both cases the response of the police was to keep the riot in Harlem. The irony that confronted the massive migration of African Americans from the South was that they moved to the big cities at precisely the time that other people were leaving. This was in part no coincidence. As the African American population of cities swelled in the 1950s---Washington DC’s population went from 35 to 54 percent black; Chicago’s from 13.6 to 23 percent, and Detroit’s from 16.2 to 28.9 percent---and as the Supreme Court began to chip away at institutionalized racism---banning enforcement of racial covenants in

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Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) and most importantly declaring school segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education (1954)---white residents responded by moving out to racially homogeneous suburbs in increasing numbers. Yet despite the fact that it came to be known as ‘‘white flight’’ race was only one of a constellation of factors that came together to create the exodus from cities to suburbs that marks American urbanization after World War II. Suburbs in the United States have been around as long as their neighboring cities and they have been promoted at least since the late nineteenth century as pastoral enclaves offering proximity to urban life without suffering its noise, industry, crime, or racial and ethnic diversity. Yet it was only after World War II that suburbs began to grow at the expense of cities. The populations of most major cities either stagnated or declined slightly during 1930s, yet they all made up for it in the 1940s, with the result that the 1950 Census recorded their largest populations ever---7,891,957 people in New York, 3,620,962 in Chicago, 2,071,065 in Philadelphia, 1,970,358 in Los Angeles, 1,849,568 in Detroit, and 949,708 in Baltimore. It turned out, however, that 1950 marked the high point of population for most cities. Except for New York which had a brief gain in population during the 1960s, and Los Angeles which has gained in population every decade of the twentieth century---a harbinger of the growing Sunbelt---every major American city continued to lose population into the 1980s. While cities were declining in population, the metropolitan regions of which they were a part were actually still growing. In 1940, nine of the ten largest American cities contained the majority of the populations within the larger metropolitan districts. The one exception was Boston, a uniquely small city in terms of land size which was surrounded with far denser outlying communities, such as Cambridge and Somerville. Despite Boston, of the 140 metropolitan districts in 1940, the Census counted 42,796,170 people living in central cities and 20,169,603 people living in what might reasonably considered the suburbs. In 1950, under new measurement guidelines established by the Census Bureau and other federal agencies, within the nation’s 168 ‘‘standard metropolitan areas,’’ 49,412,792 people lived in central cities and 35,087,888 people lived in the suburbs. By the time the 1970 Census recorded that the majority of the nation’s metropolitan dwellers lived in the suburbs, central cities had descended into a crisis of increasing poverty and crime, decreasing employment and retail sales, and devastating riots---a set of pathologies known collectively as the ‘‘urban crisis.’’

186 Cities, States, and American Federalism The urban crisis had deep roots that only began to become visible during the Depression and World War II. First, in order for city residents to abandon their cities, more residential suburbs had to be built that could remain viably independent of central cities that would otherwise annex them. Technological developments in service delivery infrastructure during the latter half of the nineteenth century in sewerage, street pavement, and waterworks provided increasingly smaller communities the means to become independent municipal service providers, and thus reduced their need to join with the city to receive services. By the 1890s, suburban developments came with comprehensive, modern water and sewerage systems pre-installed. Second, the Depression brought about changes in home financing that made it relatively easier for people to buy homes in the suburbs rather than in cities. In response to massive defaults on home loans, the federal government established the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933. In the process of refinancing more than 1 million at-risk mortgages, the HOLC also established new lending standards by increasing the typical repayment period to twenty years and instituting standardized appraisal criteria that consistently downgraded notably non-Caucasian central city neighborhoods while favorably evaluating the newer outlying, and more uniformly white, suburbs. The HOLC was disbanded in 1936, and in its place the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) became the federal government’s premier agency for homeowners though its massive mortgage guarantee program. The standard 30-year mortgage was established under the FHA, as was a rating system that made mortgages relatively cheaper for newly constructed homes, most notably in the newer suburbs. Third, the dispersion of the city’s population into outlying suburbs required increased means of transportation. As early as the 1950s some companies were beginning to relocate in the suburbs, starting possibly with the General Foods Corporation, which moved its central headquarters from Manhattan to White Plains in 1954. Yet downtown was still the commercial hub of the metropolitan region and new suburban residents needed to get to work everyday, not to mention go shopping at the department stores and go out to the theater at night. Since at least the end of the Civil War elite suburban residents could travel into the city on railroads that traveled along the tracks that extended out from every major city. By the end of the nineteenth century the electric trolley provided a more affordable means of transit to and from work and thus hastened outlying housing development and

population dispersion. Yet the real revolution lay with the automobile, and especially the introduction of mass produced affordable cars such as the Model T, of which more than 15 million were produced from 1908 to 1927. Like horses, cars freed their owners from dependence on the fares and schedules of train and trolley operators. Yet the car was better than the horse since it didn’t succumb to fatigue, it cost less to fuel, and it didn’t pollute the city with manure and the flies that followed. The popularity of the automobile is evident in its rapid diffusion: In 1905 there were 8,000 cars and trucks registered in the United States, in 1935 there were 22,567,827 registered, and in 1955, 52,135,583. Along with the rise of the automobile came the rise of Detroit, the center of automobile production. The city ranked as the ninth largest in the country 1910 and the fourth largest in 1930. With increasing automobility came an increasing demand for more and smoother roads that connected more places. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, cities and states built increasing numbers of limited access ‘‘parkways’’ restricted to cars. At the federal level, the Highway Act of 1916 provided funds for road building but prohibited the use of those funds for road construction in cities with more than 2,500 people. Congress lifted the population limit during the Depression for the sake of providing money to urban areas. The Highway Act of 1944 provided that urban areas be granted 25 percent of all highway appropriations, and authorization of the interstate system in 1956 really brought the highway to the city, in large part because heavily traveled urban roads provided the gas tax revenues necessary to finance rural parts of the system. Finally, the traditional industrial American cities were also losing ground due to national shifts in population growth and industrial development away from the Mid-Atlantic and toward the Southwest, resulting in the rise of the Sunbelt cities---most notably Los Angeles, San Diego, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix, all of which were among the ten largest cities in the United States by 1990. Part of the increasing popularity of these emergent big cities lay in lower tax rates, non-unionized workers, and less visibly corrupt government. Indeed, while reformers were always battling entrenched machines in the Rustbelt cities, it was reform government that became entrenched in the Sunbelt, where progressive staples such as commission governments and city managers flourished. The post-World War II institutional transformation of metropolitan regions wrought by automobility and

The City in American Political Development the suburban housing boom in the context of suburban municipal autonomy was captured by the economist Charles Tiebout’s suggestion in the 1950s that local government provision of public services could overcome what other economists had claimed was a ‘‘dilemma’’ in government-supplied goods and services. Governments typically provide services, such as national defense, that are ‘‘public’’ in the sense that no one can be excluded from their benefits once they have been supplied. Because everyone will realize their benefits regardless of whether or not they paid for them, everyone has an incentive to avoid paying, and thus government services are undersupplied or governments run budget deficits trying to meet demand. Tiebout suggested that this dilemma could be resolved by local governments. The residents of institutionally fragmented metropolitan areas have a range of choices of municipalities where they could conceivably live, and each municipality provides a somewhat different mix of public services, such as more police or better schools. When residents choose to live in a specific municipality they are signaling their ‘‘true’’ preferences

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for public services and they can thus be taxed accordingly. Ironically, Tiebout conceived of the proliferation of municipalities in metropolitan areas as a way of privatizing otherwise public services during an era of unprecedented federal support for cities. It was the period after the Depression that city officials began organizing nationally for the purpose of lobbying the federal government for support, starting with the organization of the United States Conference of Mayors (USCM) in 1933, which lobbied Congress and the Hoover Administration to approve a relief package for cities, resulting in $1.5 billion worth of federal loans for that purpose. It was also with the help of the USCM that cities got a generous portion of the funds administered by such New Deal agencies as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Civil Works Administration, and the Public Works Administration. The success of the USCM inspired other urban associations, most notably the National League of Cities and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, to also become active lobby groups at the national level.

Civil Works Administration (CWA) workmen cleaning and painting the gold dome of the Denver Capitol, 1934. (National Archives and Records Administration)

188 Cities, States, and American Federalism Reflecting the partisan composition of its membership, the ‘‘urban lobby,’’ as it came to be known, tended to do better during the administrations of Democratic presidents. During the Truman Administration their major achievement was the 1949 Housing Act, the chief provisions of which were for ‘‘slum clearance’’---providing cities the authority to clear land and sell it to developers, with the federal government making up the difference between the cost of clearing land and the sale price to developers---and for public housing construction. Indeed, it was the 1949 Housing Act that provided the initial money for many of the high-rise public housing projects that later appeared to exacerbate the problems of geographically concentrated poverty and which were later razed, starting with the demolition of Saint Louis’s Pruitt-Igoe homes in 1972. After the interregnum of the Eisenhower Administration, the urban lobby gained unprecedented access and attention during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, culminating in the 1966 Model Cities program, part of Johnson’s larger War on Poverty initiative. Based in part on dissatisfaction with earlier redevelopment programs that involved little community participation while displacing entire neighborhoods of poor city residents, Model Cities incorporated the principle of ‘‘maximum feasible participation,’’ meaning that money spent on urban development and social services programs were required to involve community input in the planning process. The unfortunate coincidence of the implementation of Model Cities with the riots that hit most cities during the ‘‘long hot summers’’ of the late 1960s and early 1970s, combined with dissatisfaction on the part of city officials who had lost some of their control to citizen participation, resulted in the program being widely perceived as a failure, and conceivably played some role in legitimizing the emergent ideological position of the Republican party that government intervention in social problems often creates more problems than it solves. By the 1970s, at just the moment the federal government was beginning to roll back its involvement in urban issues, a critique of Tiebout’s model of local service provision emerged in the form of the ‘‘social stratification-government inequality’’ thesis, which made the point that metropolitan residents didn’t just choose to live in municipalities based on public services; they also chose to live in communities composed nearly exclusively of people from their own economic class and racial groups. Metropolitan fragmentation turned not only public services, but also race and class, into commodities. As a result, government fragmentation led to greater social stratification, where some

cities, often outlying suburban municipalities, became middle- and upper-class enclaves, while other cities, often the older ones that form the central core of a metropolitan region, became repositories of the lowerclass. By the 1990s the negative effects of metropolitan fragmentation found a new voice in a wide-ranging ‘‘new regionalist’’ literature by authors such as former Albuquerque mayor David Rusk and former Minnesota state legislator Myron Orfield. Unlike the previous literature that focused more exclusively on the notion that metropolitan fragmentation exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, the regionalist literature since the 1990s has focused more on local interdependencies within metropolitan regions, the metropolitan-wide effects of geographically concentrated poverty, and the possibilities for interlocal metropolitan cooperation. As much as the discussion of the American city’s proper role and functions has evolved over the past few centuries, the views of Tiebout and the new regionalists still reflect the conflict inherent in the coming together of the New England town and the commercial association. Embedded in the new regionalist view of metropolitan fragmentation as the institutional and spatial expression of larger socioeconomic inequalities is a sense of civic responsibility that harkens back to the New England town---when, for instance, towns were responsible for the care of their poorer residents, even when those residents had moved to other towns. Yet the Tiebout model also has a Puritan hue, even as it casts local governments as vehicles of privatization and thus harkens back to their role as commercial associations. Tiebout shared with Tocqueville the belief that local government---and in particular the New England town---was an important building block for a free nation. For Tocqueville, local government was important because it taught the practices and principles of democratic participation and self-governance. For Tiebout local government was important because it provided consumer choice and thus economic freedom. Residents don’t express their preferences through public participation; they participate in the public sphere by making private consumer choices.

References and Further Reading Bergh, Albert Ellery, ed., 1907. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Washington, DC: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, vol. 10, p. 173. Bridges, Amy. 1999. Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest. Princeton, NJ: Princteon University Press. Bryce, James. 1995. American Commonwealth: Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

The City in American Political Development Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dilworth, Richardson (Ed.). 2009. The City in American Political Development. New York: Routledge. Dilworth, Richardson. 2005. The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Erie, Steven P. 1990. Rainbow’s End: Irish Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840--1985. Berkeley: University of California Press. Frug, Gerald E. 1999. City-Making: Building Communities without Building Walls. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gelfand, Mark I. 1975. A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America. New York: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Kenneth T. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Jefferson, Thomas. 1800. ‘‘Letter to Benjamin Rush, September 23, 1800.’’ In Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, DC: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907), vol. 10. Katznelson, Ira. 1982. City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Classes in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lincoln, Abraham. 1838. ‘‘Address before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois.’’ In The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy P. Basler, 1953. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Madison, James. 1787. Notes of Debates in the Federal Constitution of 1787. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ subject_menus/debcont.asp.

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Madison, James. 1788. No. 10. in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist. Philadelphia: J. and A. M’Lean. Orfield, Myron. 2002. American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Peterson, Paul E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rush, Benjamin. 1805. Medical Inquiries and Observations. Philadelphia: J. Conrad & Company. Stone, Clarence N. 1989. Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946--1988. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Teaford, Jon C. 2006. The Metropolitan Revolution: The Rise of Post-Urban America. New York: Columbia University Press. Teaford, Jon C. 1990. The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940--1985. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Teaford, Jon C. 1984. The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870--1900. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Teaford, Jon C. 1975. The Municipal Revolution in America: Origins of Modern Urban Government, 1650--1825. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. ‘‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.’’ Journal of Political Economy 64 (October): 416--424. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1966. Democracy in America (in one volume). George Lawrence, trans., and J.P. Mayer, ed. New York: Harper and Row. Trounstine, Jessica. 2008. Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Documents

3.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the ‘‘insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union.’’ It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union. We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union To the People of the State of New York: IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch. 191

192 Cities, States, and American Federalism and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to

influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity. It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric. The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option. It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found the

3.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15 193 bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy. There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion. If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,---the only proper objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are

194 Cities, States, and American Federalism composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity. In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect goodhumor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature. If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the illinformed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times, and

under different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits. In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins. PUBLIUS.

3.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation To the People of the State of New York: HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

3.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 21 195 The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which it is declared, ‘‘that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.’’ There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world. The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws. Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government

could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York? The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community. The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively

196 Cities, States, and American Federalism proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three lastmentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of King’s County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion! The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression. This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small

proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions. There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised. It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, ‘‘in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four.’’ If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them. Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation

3.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 44 197 of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large. PUBLIUS. Source: The Constitution Society. http://www.constitution.org.

3.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 44 To the People of the State of New York: A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States: 1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-postfacto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility. The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible. The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value

depended on the general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the federal head; and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority. The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency. Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact,

198 Cities, States, and American Federalism and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of Confederation and needs no comment. 2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark

further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. The SIXTH and last class consists of the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest. 1. Of these the first is, the ‘‘power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the provision is improper. But have they considered whether a better form could have been substituted? There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms ‘‘necessary and proper’’; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference. Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the second article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term ‘‘EXPRESSLY’’ with so much rigor, as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever, or

3.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 44 199 with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted. Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS, which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same. Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made. Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the

government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate the irrespective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed. 2. ‘‘This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the

200 Cities, States, and American Federalism contrary notwithstanding.’’ The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had been left complete by a saving clause in their favor. In the first place, as these constitutions invest the State legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors. In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution. In the third place, as the constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or national law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society every where subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members. 3. ‘‘The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution.’’ It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State constitutions. Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the

federal government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws, of the States. 4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved. PUBLIUS.

3.4 Anti-Federalist No. 11 Unrestricted Power Over Commerce Should Not Be Given the National Government It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that when this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering justice between man and man, it debases the character of individuals, and renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty consists in the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by political liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in the government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires which are commonly called despotic, and which comprehend by far the greatest part of the world, the government is most fluctuating, and property least secure. In those countries insults are

3.4 Anti-Federalist No. 11 201 borne by the sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governors, would fill us with horror, and we should think the government dissolving. The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one, that we must then separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be true if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power. Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are, therefore, in a situation to supply each other’s wants. Carolina, for instance, is inhabited by planters, while Massachusetts is more engaged in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of deciding their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce; and commerce, where there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces friendship. The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the west. Many supplies they want, for which they must look to the older settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables them to make payments. Here, then, we have a bond of union which applies to all parts of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended all America. We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republic. Each part has within its own limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while some of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of the deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two articles. They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a complete regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each of these complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify the clamor which has been raised. . . . The second article of complaint against the present confederation . . . is that Congress has not the sole power to regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends not only to war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last article ought never to be given them; for though most of the states may be willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would come there. Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point of morals, education, [or] energy, is equal to any of the eastern states; the small state of Rhode Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a century has acquired her present extent and

population at the expense of religion and good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the course of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion and morals. They have also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for rendering them respectable in war, and industrious in peace. The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to me to be essentially necessary to preserve that equality of rights to the states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by treaty or otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of the legislature. 2nd. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to give any legal preference to one part above another. 3rd. They ought to be restrained from creating any monopolies. . . . The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to regulate trade. Though this power under certain limitations would be a proper one for the department of Congress, it is in this system carried much too far, and much farther than is necessary. This is, without exception, the most commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive coasts, cold climate, small estates, and equality of rights, with a variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in this respect at the head of the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a point which so nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new constitution not only prohibits vessels, bound from one state to another, from paying any duties, but even from entering and clearing. The only use of such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its own resources. It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the custom house, and the expense is too small to be an object. The unlimited right to regulate trade includes the right of granting exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is considered as one principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in Europe which has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the exercise of it farther than any other state, and the reason why that country has felt less evil from it is, that the territory is very small, and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and West Indies. In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a trading company, having exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in proportion to the parent state; so that, upon the whole, the latter may gain by such a system. We are also to take into consideration the

202 Cities, States, and American Federalism industry which the genius of a free government inspires. But in the British islands all these circumstances together have not prevented them from being injured by the monopolies created there. Individuals have been enriched, but the country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches of trade being granted to companies, who transact their business in London, that city is, perhaps, the place of the greatest trade in the world. But Ireland, under such influence, suffers exceedingly, and is impoverished; and Scotland is a mere by-word. Bristol, the second city in England, ranks not much above this town [Boston] in population. These things must be accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if they are felt so severely in countries of small extent, they will operate with tenfold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense tract; and living towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, without retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to procure redress. There ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining clause which might prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because they consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship which is the great stimulus to industry. . . . There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. AR the estimates for the present year, let them be made by what party they may, suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favor. The credit of our merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This is a sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find out that channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, therefore, to be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of difficulties, do not, at first glance, discover the proper relief. The last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced many honest people to agree to a tender act, and many others, of a different description, to obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only increased the evil they were intended to cure. Experience has since shown that, instead of trying to lesson an evil by altering the present course of things, that every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the course of law, and thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the citizens, which increases the resources of them all, and renders easy the payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the States. Pennsylvania, with one port and a large

territory, is less favorably situated for trade than Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly a much larger proportion of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an interest. It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved. No man when he enters into society does it from a view to promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more than another, and is subverting the foundation of a free government. The Philadelphians would be shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and the unlimited right to regulate trade in Massachusetts. There can be no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, always originate in folly, and not in generosity. AGRIPPA Source: The Constitution Society. http://www.constitution.org. Note: Scholars regard James Winthrop of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to be the ‘‘AGRIPPA’’ who contributed the series to the Massachusetts Gazette from November 23, 1787, to February 5, 1788. This is a compilation of excerpts from ‘‘AGRIPPA’s’’ letters of December 14, 18, 25, and 28, 1787.

3.5 Anti-Federalist No. 35 Federal Taxing Power Must Be Restrained George Mason of Virginia opposed the Constitution because it lacked a Bill of Rights and because it centralized powers further than he felt it necessary. Mason delivered the following speech before the Virginia ratifying convention, June 4, 1788. Mr. Chairman, whether the Constitution be good or bad, the present clause [Article 1, Section 2] clearly discovers that it is a national government, and no longer a Confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the general government laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of laying direct taxes does, of itself, entirely change the confederation of the states into one consolidated government. This power, being at discretion, unconfined, and without any kind of control, must carry every thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly a confederation

3.6 McCulloch v. Maryland et al. to a consolidated government is totally subversive of every principle which has hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to annihilate totally the state governments. Will the people of this great community [Virginia] submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harassed? These two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the other. The general government being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter must give way to the former. . . . Requisitions [under the Articles of Confederation] have been often refused, sometimes from an impossibility of complying with them; often from that great variety of circumstances which retards the collection of moneys; and perhaps sometimes from a wilful design of procrastinating. But why shall we give up to the national government this power, so dangerous in its nature, and for which its members will not have sufficient information? Is it not well known that what would be a proper tax in one state would be grievous in another? The gentleman who has favored us with a eulogium in favor of this system [Wilson C. Nicholas], must, after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge that our federal representatives must be unacquainted with the situation of their constituents. Sixty-five members cannot possibly know the situation and circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent. When a certain sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they will lay the tax on that article which will be most productive and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real circumstances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, they cannot be sufficiently acquainted. The mode of levying taxes is of the utmost consequence; and yet here it is to be determined by those who have neither knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow-feeling for us. The subject of taxation differs in three fourths, nay, I might say with truth, in four fifths of the states. If we trust the national government with an effectual way of raising the necessary sums, it is sufficient: everything we do further is trusting the happiness and rights of the people. Why, then, should we give up this dangerous power of individual taxation? Why leave the manner of laying taxes to those who, in the nature of things, cannot be acquainted with the situation of those on whom they are to impose them, when it can be done by those who are well acquainted with it? If, instead of giving this oppressive power, we give them such an effectual alternative as will answer the purpose, without

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encountering the evil and danger that might arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce; and would it not be far more eligible? I candidly acknowledge the inefficacy of the Confederation; but requisitions have been made which were impossible to be complied withrequisitions for more gold and silver than were in the United States. If we give the general government the power of demanding their quotas of the states, with an alternative of laying direct taxes in case of non-compliance, then the mischief would be avoided. And the certainty of this conditional power would, in all human probability, prevent the application, and the sums necessary for the Union would be then laid by the states, by those who know how it can best be raised, by those who have a fellow-feeling for us. Give me leave to say, that the sum raised one way with convenience and case, would be very oppressive another way. Why, then, not leave this power to be exercised by those who know the mode most convenient for the inhabitants, and not by those who must necessarily apportion it in such manner as shall be oppressive? . . . An indispensable amendment . . . is, that Congress shall not exercise the power of raising direct taxes till the states shall have refused to comply with the requisitions of Congress. On this condition it may be granted; but I see no reason to grant it unconditionally, as the states can raise the taxes with more case, and lay them on the inhabitants with more propriety, than it is possible for the general government to do. If Congress hath this power without control, the taxes will be laid by those who have no fellow feeling or acquaintance with the people. This is my objection to the article now under consideration. It is a very great and important one. I therefore beg gentlemen to consider it. Should this power be restrained, I shall withdraw my objections to this part of the Constitution; but as it stands, it is an objection so strong in my mind, that its amendment is with me a sine qua non of its adoption. I wish for such amendments, and such only, as are necessary to secure the dearest rights of the people. . . .

3.6 McCulloch v. Maryland et al., 17 U.S.C. 316 (1819) MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legislature of that state. The constitution

204 Cities, States, and American Federalism of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the Union and of its members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially influence the great operations of the government. No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps, of hostility of a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On the supreme court of the United States has the constitution of our country devolved this important duty. The first question made in the cause is has congress power to incorporate a bank? It has been truly said, that this can scarcely be considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation . . . The power now contested was exercised by the first congress elected under the present constitution. The bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being resisted, first, in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards, in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law. The original act was permitted to expire; but a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity, to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no countenance. These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the impression, that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the constitution. In discussing this question, the counsel for the state of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not as emanating from the people, but as the act

of sovereign and independent states. The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the states, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the states, who alone possess supreme dominion. It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the state legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing congress of the United States, with a request that it might ‘‘be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification.’’ This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the convention, by congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several states and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the state governments. From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘‘ordained and established,’’ in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, ‘‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.’’ The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties. It has been said, that the people had already surrendered all their powers to the state sovereignties, and had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy of the general government be doubted, had it been created by the states. The powers delegated to the state sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not by a

3.6 McCulloch v. Maryland et al. distinct and independent sovereignty, created by themselves. To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the state sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, ‘in order to form a more perfect union,’ it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the general and state governments must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be settled. If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is willing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying, ‘this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof,’ ‘shall be the supreme law of the land,’ and by requiring that the members of the state legislatures, and the officers of the executive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the oath of fidelity to it. The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘‘anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’’

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Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word ‘‘expressly,’’ and declares only, that the powers ’not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people;’ thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. The men who drew and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the articles of confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those embarrassments. A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Why else were some of the limitations, found in the 9th section of the 1st article, introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted, by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . The creation of a corporation, it is said, appertains to sovereignty. This is admitted. But to what portion of sovereignty does it appertain? Does it belong to one more than to another? In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other . . . But the constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of

206 Cities, States, and American Federalism powers is added, that of making ‘‘all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof.’’ The counsel for the state of Maryland have urged various arguments, to prove that this clause, though, in terms, a grant of power, is not so, in effect; but is really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers. In support of this proposition, they have found it necessary to contend, that this clause was inserted for the purpose of conferring on congress the power of making laws. That, without it, doubts might be entertained, whether congress could exercise its powers in the form of legislation. But could this be the object for which it was inserted? A government is created by the people, having legislative, executive and judicial powers. Its legislative powers are vested in a congress, which is to consist of a senate and house of representatives. Each house may determine the rule of its proceedings; and it is declared, that every bill which shall have passed both houses, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the president of the United States. The 7th section describes the course of proceedings, by which a bill shall become a law; and, then, the 8th section enumerates the powers of congress. Could it be necessary to say, that a legislature should exercise legislative powers, in the shape of legislation? After allowing each house to prescribe its own course of proceeding, after describing the manner in which a bill should become a law, would it have entered into the mind of a single member of the convention, that an express power to make laws was necessary, to enable the legislature to make them? That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate, is a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned . . . But the argument which most conclusively demonstrates the error of the construction contended for by the counsel for the state of Maryland, is founded on the intention of the convention, as manifested in the whole clause. To waste time and argument in proving that, without it, congress might carry its powers into execution, would be not much less idle, than to hold a lighted taper to the sun. As little can it be required to prove, that in the absence of this clause, congress would have some choice of means. That it might employ those which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished. That any means adapted to the end, any means which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional

powers of the government, were in themselves constitutional. This clause, as construed by the state of Maryland, would abridge, and almost annihilate, this useful and necessary right of the legislature to select its means . . . The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble. We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional . . . After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and decided opinion of this court, that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land . . . It being the opinion of the court, that the act incorporating the bank is constitutional; and that the power of establishing a branch in the state of Maryland might be properly exercised by the bank itself, we proceed to inquire 2. Whether the state of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch? That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the states; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments are truths which have never been denied. But such is the paramount character of the constitution, that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the action of even this power, is admitted. The states are expressly forbidden to lay any duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing

3.7 John Calhoun, Fort Hill Address 207 their inspection laws. If the obligation of this prohibition must be conceded if it may restrain a state from the exercise of its taxing power on imports and exports the same paramount character would seem to restrain, as it certainly may restrain, a state from such other exercise of this power, as is in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union. A law, absolutely repugnant to another, as entirely repeals that other as if express terms of repeal were used. On this ground, the counsel for the bank place its claim to be exempted from the power of a state to tax its operations. There is no express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds. This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them. From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, other propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or error of which, and on their application to this case, the cause has been supposed to depend. These are, 1st. That a power to create implies a power to preserve: 2d. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve: 3d. That where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme . . . The power of congress to create, and of course, to continue, the bank, was the subject of the preceding part of this opinion; and is no longer to be considered as questionable. That the power of taxing it by the states may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute power, which acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the constitution, and like sovereign power of every other description, is intrusted to the discretion of those who use it. But the very terms of this argument admit, that the sovereignty of the state, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and may be controlled by the constitution of the United States. . . . All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced self-evident . . . If we apply the principle for which the state of Maryland contends, to the constitution, generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally the character of that

instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the states. The American people have declared their constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in fact, to the states. If the states may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the customhouse; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states. If the controlling power of the states be established; if their supremacy as to taxation be acknowledged; what is to restrain their exercising control in any shape they may please to give it? Their sovereignty is not confined to taxation; that is not the only mode in which it might be displayed. The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the right of the states to tax the means employed by the general government be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, is empty and unmeaning declamation . . . The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared. We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void.

3.7 John Calhoun, Fort Hill Address, July 26, 1831 On the Relation Which the States and General Government Bear to Each Other The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other is not of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it had divided public sentiment. Even in the convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there

208 Cities, States, and American Federalism were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained;---on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legislature;---and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other States. These Resolutions and this Report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M’Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail. As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this reference to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately connected with this deeply-important subject; but as there are many who may not have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however clear they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state, summarily, the doctrines which I conceive they embrace. The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character already described; and that the several States, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, ‘‘to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.’’ This right of interposition, thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may,---State-right, veto, nullification, or by any other name,---I conceive to be the fundamental

principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions. I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of our selves and our posterity; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and, so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the States, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make ‘‘its discretion and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers;’’ and that, ‘‘in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.’’ Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher authority be adduced. . . . It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to protect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents,---a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the interests of the whole, may encroach on the States, which represent the

3.7 John Calhoun, Fort Hill Address 209 peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former. In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the Government, through all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents; and that the power which really controls, ultimately, all the movements, is not in the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To understand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents to this high controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compounded of the majority of the States, taken as political bodies, and the majority of the people of the States, estimated in federal numbers. These, united, constitute the real and final power which impels and directs the movements of the General Government. The majority of the States elect the majority of the Senate; of the people of the States, that of the House of Representatives; the two united, the President; and the President and a majority of the Senate appoint the Judges: a majority of whom, and a majority of the Senate and House, with the President, really exercise all the powers of the Government, with the exception of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a majority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legislative or executive representative; and to confide the power to the Judiciary to determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated and what reserved, would be, in reality, to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways; and, of course, to subject (against the fundamental principle of our system and all sound political reasoning) the reserved powers of the States, with all the local and peculiar interests they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority. But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this point would have been long since settled for ever by the State of Virginia. The report of her Legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my

opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says: ‘‘It has been objected’’ (to the right of a State to interpose for the protection of her reserved rights) ‘‘that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the Constitution could never draw within the control of the Judicial Department; secondly, that, if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the Judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with the decision of that department. ‘‘But the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases, in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the Judicial Department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the grant of the Constitution, and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by another,---by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or legislative.’’ Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected that, if one of the parties has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other; and that, consequently, in cases of contested powers between a State and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts; and that, of course, it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption that the General Government is a party to the constitutional compact. The States, as has been shown, formed the compact, acting as sovereign and independent communities. The General Government is but its creature; and though, in reality, a government, with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government, within the orbit of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact between sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and object, of the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which all are jointly concerned; but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power than if it did not exist.

210 Cities, States, and American Federalism To deny this would be to deny the most incontestable facts and the clearest conclusions; while to acknowledge its truth is to destroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed. For, if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of government, the final cognizance of a question of contested power would be in the States, and not in the General Government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in all similar cases of a contest between one or more of the principals and a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are the plain dictates of both reason and analogy. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cognizance, as against the principals, much less to use force against them to maintain their construction of their powers. Such a right would be monstrous, and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases. That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the States and the General Government, we have the authority, not only of reason and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after long experience and mature reflection, says, ‘‘With respect to our State and Federal Governments, I do not think their relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former are subordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate departments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask, ’If the two departments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to decide between them?’ In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground; but, if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the States must be called to ascribe the doubtful power to that department which they may think best.’’ It is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode of making them, has, by a simple contrivance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes effectually the necessity, and even the pretext for force: a power to which none can fairly object; with which the interests of all are safe; which can definitely close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual, and, at the same time, consistent with what are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two

great departments of our Government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations; but, if not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that, where the majority rules without restriction, the minority is the subject; and that, if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclusive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, between the sovereign and subject, under such a government, no Constitution, or, at least, nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument. How the States are to exercise this high power of interposition, which constitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from a federal into a consolidated Government, is a question that the States only are competent to determine. The arguments which prove that they possess the power, equally prove that they are, in the language of Jefferson, ‘‘the rightful judges of the mode and measure of redress.’’ But the spirit of forbearance, as well as the nature of the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of dangerous infractions of the Constitution; and then only in the last resort, when all reasonable hope of relief from the ordinary action of the Government has failed; when, if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative would be submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the other. That our system should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate point between these dire alternatives, by which the Government may be brought to a pause, and thereby an interval obtained to compromise differences, or, if impracticable, be compelled to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment, through an appeal to the States themselves, is an evidence of its high wisdom: an element not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength; not of anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recognition would of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exercise, by impressing on the movements of the Government that moderation and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country

3.8 John Peter Altgeld, On Municipal Government and Ownership of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours; and would, if controversy should come, turn the resentment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers (a point all-important), and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution or overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute,---where the alternative would be force,---tending to prevent, and, if that fails, to correct peaceably the aberrations to which all systems are liable, and which, if permitted to accumulate without correction, must finally end in a general catastrophe. In thus placing my opinions before the public, I have not been actuated by the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive, on a question so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest, would argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the human heart. To avoid, as far as possible, the imputation of either, I have confined my statement, on the many and important points on which I have been compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispensable to the full understanding of my views. And if they should, on any point, be thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from any desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustrations to maintain positions, which so abound in both, that it would require a volume to do them any thing like justice. I can only hope the truths which, I feel assured, are essentially connected with all that we ought to hold most dear, may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in which I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them. With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have, to escape the imputation of improper motives; though I have, without reserve, freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate public favor, but the opposite, which I greatly regret, as I have ever placed a high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it may, I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have formed my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examination, with all the aids which my reason and experience could furnish. I have expressed them honestly and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which, however interesting to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken into the estimate,

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where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally involved.

3.8 John Peter Altgeld, On Municipal Government and Ownership, September 5, 1897 Speech in Philadelphia on Labor Day ASIDE from the money question, the most serious problem that confronts the people of America to-day is that of rescuing their cities, their States and the federal government, including the federal judiciary, from absolute control of corporate monopoly. How to restore the voice of the citizen in the government of his country; and how to put an end to those proceedings in some of the higher courts which are farce and mockery on one side, and a criminal usurpation and oppression on the other. Corporations that were to be servants and begged the privilege of supplying cities with conveniences, or of serving the country at large, have become masters. We have had thirty years of colorless politics in which both of the political parties were simply conveniences for organized greed. There was nothing to arouse the deep, slumbering patriotism of the masses and a race of politicians came to the front, most of whom had no convictions and many of whom straddled every proposition and then waited to be seduced. They were men who made every promise to the laborer, and then betrayed him. These men became the instruments through which the corporations worked. Having learned what vast sums can be extorted from the American people, the monopolies used a part of the wealth they got from this source to corrupt the people’s representatives, and thus obtained unlimited privileges of plunder, until almost every great city in this country is tied and gagged, and can not even enter a protest while being robbed. All of this falls with crushing force on the laborer, for his hands must earn the taxes the landlord pays---he is forced to depend on the public conveniences, and always suffers under bad government. An individual rarely has interest enough or money enough, to bribe a city council or buy a legislature. But the corporations have both, and, as the money all comes off the public, they offer temptations that are too strong for the average man to resist. In as much as no government can endure in which corrupt greed not only makes the laws, but decides who shall construe them, many of our best citizens are beginning to despair of the republic. Others urge that

212 Cities, States, and American Federalism we should remove the bribe-givers---that is, destroy this overwhelming temptation by having the government take all these monopolies itself and furnish the service which they now furnish, and thus not only save our institutions, but have the great profits which now go into the pockets of private corporations turned into the public treasury. But the corruptionists, the monopolists, and all men who are fattening on the existing rottenness and injustice, cry angrily, ‘‘Why, that would be socialism, rank socialism, and we are opposed to it!’’ Some of these men know the meaning of socialism and some do not, but they control all those men who cling to the skirts of wealth. Socialism has been as a system of government in which the competitive system is entirely abolished and the principle of associated effort is applied to everything. According to the standard authorities, socialism is an ideal state founded on justice, and in which the benefits of modern invention and of monopoly shall be shared by all the people instead of being controlled by the few and used by these few to make themselves the absolute masters of the many. The word ‘‘socialism’’ is used as a term of derision only by the ignorant or the servile. During the former administration of Lord Salisbury as premier of England it was once charged that the tendency of the government was socialistic; that there was a tendency for the government to do those things which always had been left, and should be left, to the individual; that most of the great cities of the Empire had not only assumed the functions of supplying their inhabitants with water, gas, electric light and street railway service, but that they were going a great deal farther and were even building and renting houses and doing a host of other things that were not within the province of government. He was reported as saying in answer to this criticism, that it was not a question of socialism at all, but simply a question of business; a question whether a given community can secure certain advantages or in a more satisfactory manner when acting collectively, than by leaving everything to individual effort; that a collective body has the same right to pursue the best business methods, and do all things necessary to its welfare, or the welfare of its members, that an individual has; that the best interest of the community must be the criterion by which to decide each case; that there was a time when private individuals carried mails and charged what they pleased, there being no government postoffice; but as the world advanced, every government took the postal business into its own hands,

and no intelligent man would have turned it over to a private corporation. Let us see what civilized man is doing elsewhere. Take the cities of Great Britain first, for they have the same power of self-government that American cities have. In all that pertains to the comfort and enterprise of the individual we are far in the lead; but in the government of cities we are far behind. Glasgow has today nearly one million inhabitants and is one of the great manufacturing and commercial cities of the world. Thirty years ago there was scarcely a city that was in a worse condition. Private corporations furnished it a poor quality of water, taken from the Clyde River, and they charged high rates for it. The city drained into the Clyde, and it became horribly filthy. Private corporations furnished a poor quality of gas, at a high price; and private companies operated the street railroads. Private companies had the same grip on the people there that they have in most American cities. Owing to the development of great shipbuilding and other industries in the valley of the Clyde, the laboring population of Glasgow became very dense and the means of housing the people were miserable. Poorly lighted, poorly ventilated, filthy houses brought high rents. In many cases two families lived in one room. Cleanliness was impossible; the sanitary conditions were frightful and the death rate was high. As for educational facilities, there were none worth mentioning for these people. The condition of the laboring classes was one of degradation and misery; children were growing up mentally, morally and physically diseased; a generation was coming which threatened to be an expense and a menace to the country. It was a great slum city. But patriotic and public-spirited men came to the front and gave the city the benefit of their services free. In fact, none of the highest city officials in Great Britain received any pay other than the well being of humanity and the good opinions of their country. The city rid itself of the private companies by buying them and then brought fresh water from the highlands, a distance of sixty miles. It doubled the quantity of water furnished the inhabitants, and reduced the cost to consumers by one-half. And yet the department now yields over $200,000 a year net income over all fixed charges. The municipality, after much difficulty, bought the private gas plants and gradually reduced the price of gas from $1.14 to 58 cents, and it now illuminates not only the streets and public places, but all passageways and stairways in flat buildings, experience having shown that a good lamp is almost as useful as a

3.8 John Peter Altgeld, On Municipal Government and Ownership policeman. The total debt of the city for plants, extensions, etc., to perfectly illumine all the city had reached nearly five and a half millions of dollars. Notwithstanding the low price at which gas is sold, this sum has gradually been reduced to less than two and a half millions of dollars out of the earnings of the system, and it will soon be wiped out and the entire revenue go into the city treasury. The street railways were owned by the city, but, until 1894, they were leased out under an arrangement which paid the city full cost of construction, with interest, besides a yearly income of $750 per street mile. In 1894 the city began to operate the lines itself. The fares were reduced 33 per cent., besides special tickets to laborers, so that the average is under two cents, and over one-third of all fares are one cent each. The private company had worked its men twelve and fourteen hours a day and paid irregular and unsatisfactory wages. The city at once reduced the number of hours to ten, and fixed a satisfactory scale of wages. And, compared with what it formerly was, the service has been greatly improved. In spite of all these acts for the benefit of the public, the roads which had cost the city nothing, now net over all charges for improvements, etc., one-fourth of a million annually. In 1892 the city bought out a private electric light company, and now has the monopoly of furnishing electric light and power. This promises to be a source of enormous revenue for the city. For sanitary reasons, the city built a number of public wash-houses, with all modern conveniences, so that a woman living in a small apartment can take a basketful of clothes to a public wash-house and for four cents an hour can have a stall and use all the machinery for washing and drying, and at the end of an hour take her basket of clothes home, washed and dried. For the same reasons, public baths and parks or pleasure grounds were established; and the city condemned a large amount of poor tenement property and tore the houses down and built whole rows of apartments, airy and well lighted, which it now rents to laborers, and which, in time, will pay for themselves and will then be a great source of revenue. The city had become filled with cheap lodging houses which were overcrowded and were filthy and prolific of both disease and crime. On sanitary and police grounds combined, the municipality built a number of airy and well-lighted lodging houses, some for men and some for women, where, for from six to nine cents, a person can get a bed in a small, separate room, with the use of a large sitting room and the privilege of cooking his own food at the kitchen range.

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The city has acquired all the docks and dock privileges and furnishes all the labor in managing them. It also has the exclusive ownership of all the markets and slaughter-houses and derives a large income from them. Instead of draining into the Clyde, large works have been established, in which the solid matter is all taken out of the sewage and is pressed into cakes and loaded automatically on cars and then taken to the country, where it is used as manure on a farm belonging to the city, and where all the food for the city’s horses is raised, while the liquid sewage is run through filtering beds and made clear and odorless. Manchester has within its narrow limits only a little over half a million people, but within a radius of twenty miles from her city hall there are over three million inhabitants. These have to be considered in discussing Manchester, which is essentially a manufacturing and commercial city. Its history is in many respects a parallel of that of Glasgow. It seemed to be a great city of slums, degradation and misery, and was in the grip of private monopolies. To-day the city furnishes all the service that is furnished here by private corporations, and does it at about one-half cost. It furnishes gas at fifty-six cents a thousand, and after deducting all that is used to perfectly illuminate the streets and after applying $200,000 a year on the original cost of plants, etc., it still turns $300,000 a year into the public treasury, altho the aim in nearly all English cities is not to make money, but to serve the public. The city constructed an aqueduct ninety miles to secure pure water and furnishes this for a little more than half what the private company had charged for a poor quality of water. It owns the street railways, and besides giving greatly reduced rates and giving halffare tickets to workingmen, the city derives a large revenue from this source. Like Glasgow and Birmingham, the city owns large cemeteries in which there are separate sections for the different religious denominations, and prices are so arranged that while those who desire to do so can get lots costing from ten to thirty dollars, yet ‘‘a decent burial with inscription on stone over a grave can be had at about four dollars for adults and three dollars for children. This charge includes all cemetery fees and expenses.’’ The city owns the markets and slaughter-houses. It has provided parks and swimming baths and, like Birmingham and Glasgow, it maintains large technical schools in which thousands of young men are instructed in the industrial arts and sciences, so as to be able to maintain Manchester’s greatness.

214 Cities, States, and American Federalism Birmingham has over half a million people, and its experience resembles that of Glasgow and Manchester. Formerly private corporations controlled almost everything and charged very high rates for very poor service, and the sanitary conditions were frightful. But here again municipal statesmen came to the front, the most prominent among whom was the Honorable Joseph Chamberlain, who has since been in the British government. He gave his time free and was three times elected mayor. Under his guidance the gas works were purchased of the private companies for $10,000,000. There are about two thousand men employed in connection with the gas works; they work only eight hours a day; the price of gas has been reduced to fifty-eight cents; the streets have been better lighted than ever before; and the net amount now annually turned into the city treasury, after deducting all fixed charges, is over $300,000. The water-works were purchased of the private companies for $6,750,000. The system was greatly extended, the supply doubled and the cost to consumers very much reduced. This city has condemned the worst section of the slums and thus acquired the ground at a cost of about $8,000,000, and upon this ground it has built modern houses which it rents, and the death rate in the section has been reduced from an average of eighty to the thousand persons down to an average of twenty, and it has now been demonstrated that in the end this property will pay for itself and thereafter go far toward defraying the annual expenses of the city. Not going further into detail, let me say there are at present in the United Kingdom 185 municipalities that supply their inhabitants with water, with gas and electric light, and one-third of the street railway mileage of Great Britain is owned by the municipalities. Leaving out London, it amounts to two-thirds. And in most instances in which they do not own the street railways, they have compelled the companies to grant low fares and divide profits. While these things are taking place in Europe the private corporations in America are bribing legislatures and city councils, reducing wages, charging higher rates, and collecting dividends on millions and millions of watered stock. According to legislative investigation, the stock in the Boston Street Railroad is over half water; in New York, in Brooklyn and in Philadelphia the ratio is 4 to 1. Every business reason applicable to the municipalities and governments of Europe is applicable here. We want as pure water, as good drainage, as cheap service as they have, and we want the same privilege of

supplying ourselves as they exercise; and when it is apparent that, by acting collectively, we can do business more successfully, can serve ourselves better in every way, and can secure for the public treasury these millions which now go into the pockets of grasping individuals, have we not a right to do it? If we find that, in this manner, we can give steadiness to labor, and can elevate its standard and improve the conditions of all our people, dare we not do it? Every one of the reforms carried out in England and on the continent met with fierce opposition from the same classes that oppose them here, but the business sense and patriotic impulse of the people prevailed, and I believe, will prevail here.

3.9 W. D. Lawson, Letter to Lucius Clay on Eisenhower and States’ Rights, January 21, 1956 General Lucius D. Clay Citizens for Eisenhower 45 East 47th Street New York 17, New York Dear General Clay: I am in receipt of your letter of January 17th regarding the reactivation of ‘‘The Citizens for Eisenhower’’ movement. It is true that many of us in the South contributed a good deal of our time and money to the election of President Eisenhower in 1952. It was our thought by so doing we would revert to our original constitutional form of government. President Eisenhower and his Attorney General have pressed for changes in the educational system of our section, which many of us think are as unconstitutional as anything done under the new deal. I think I speak for many of President Eisenhower’s former followers when I say that the central government in Washington has no authority to tell us who shall, or who shall not, attend the schools which have been erected and whose teachers are paid wholly by the citizens of this state. Being an independent voter, I had hoped that the large vote cast for President Eisenhower in the South presaged a two party system for it. The complete disregard of states rights by the present administration, in my opinion, has killed all chances of this improvement in our political situation. While many of us still hold President Eisenhower in the highest esteem, and shall vote for him, you may be sure that the above facts have cooled our enthusiasm

3.11 Executive Order No. 13132 215 considerably. I am sorry that I cannot associate myself wholeheartedly with another movement seeking his reelection. Very truly yours, W. D. Lawson

3.10 Fiorello H. La Guardia, Speech on Tammany and the Spoils System, 1933 Mayoral Election Campaign Speech Let’s get down to brass tacks on this question of Tammany and the spoils system. Tammany is giving high salaries to its own favorites because it has the power to take the money out of your pocket. Maybe you think that a Tammany leader’s high salary does not concern you. If you do, let me put a test to you. How many people in this audience get $11,000 a year? Won’t you raise your hands, please. All right; you can put them down now---I don’t see anybody. McCooey himself, you know, is the Boss of Brooklyn, and he is so well-to-do that he does not need any city salary at present. For many years he got $10,000 a year as Chief Clerk of the Surrogate’s Court. Then he acquired a family tree and other people made money for him. His sister, Margaret McCooey, is Associate Superintendent of schools and she gets $11,265. His son, John H. McCooey, Jr., is a judge of the Supreme Court and gets $22,500. One of his other sonse, Herbert McCooey, sells bonds to Public Works contractors---and how! He has a new firm and it broke into the big money recently by underwriting 20 per cent of the sixty-seven million dollar fire insurance for the B.M.T. It pays to be the son or a relative of a Tammany district leader.

departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies, and to further the policies of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a) ‘‘Policies that have federalism implications’’ refers to regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. (b) ‘‘State’’ or ‘‘States’’ refer to the States of the United States of America, individually or collectively, and, where relevant, to State governments, including units of local government and other political subdivisions established by the States. (c) ‘‘Agency’’ means any authority of the United States that is an ‘‘agency’’ under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5). (d) ‘‘State and local officials’’ means elected officials of State and local governments or their representative national organizations. Section. 2. Fundamental Federalism Principles. In formulating and implementing policies that have federalism implications, agencies shall be guided by the following fundamental federalism principles:

3.11 William Jefferson Clinton, Executive Order No. 13132, August 4, 1999

(a) Federalism is rooted in the belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are most appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the people.

Federalism

(b) The people of the States created the national government and delegated to it enumerated governmental powers. All other sovereign powers, save those expressly prohibited the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to guarantee the division of governmental responsibilities between the national government and the States that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution, to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the executive

(c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and national, is inherent in

216 Cities, States, and American Federalism the very structure of the Constitution and is formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. (d) The people of the States are free, subject only to restrictions in the Constitution itself or in constitutionally authorized Acts of Congress, to define the moral, political, and legal character of their lives. (e) The Framers recognized that the States possess unique authorities, qualities, and abilities to meet the needs of the people and should function as laboratories of democracy. (f) The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public policies adopted by the people of the several States according to their own conditions, needs, and desires. In the search for enlightened public policy, individual States and communities are free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues. One-size-fits-all approaches to public policy problems can inhibit the creation of effective solutions to those problems. (g) Acts of the national government---whether legislative, executive, or judicial in nature---that exceed the enumerated powers of that government under the Constitution violate the principle of federalism established by the Framers. (h) Policies of the national government should recognize the responsibility of---and should encourage opportunities for---individuals, families, neighborhoods, local governments, and private associations to achieve their personal, social, and economic objectives through cooperative effort. (i) The national government should be deferential to the States when taking action that affects the policymaking discretion of the States and should act only with the greatest caution where State or local governments have identified uncertainties regarding the constitutional or statutory authority of the national government.

formulating and implementing policies that have federalism implications: (a) There shall be strict adherence to constitutional principles. Agencies shall closely examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and shall carefully assess the necessity for such action. To the extent practicable, State and local officials shall be consulted before any such action is implemented. Executive Order 12372 of July 14, 1982 (‘‘Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs’’) remains in effect for the programs and activities to which it is applicable. (b) National action limiting the policymaking discretion of the States shall be taken only where there is constitutional and statutory authority for the action and the national activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national significance. Where there are significant uncertainties as to whether national action is authorized or appropriate, agencies shall consult with appropriate State and local officials to determine whether Federal objectives can be attained by other means. (c) With respect to Federal statutes and regulations administered by the States, the national government shall grant the States the maximum administrative discretion possible. Intrusive Federal oversight of State administration is neither necessary nor desirable. (d) When undertaking to formulate and implement policies that have federalism implications, agencies shall: (1) encourage States to develop their own policies to achieve program objectives and to work with appropriate officials in other States; (2) where possible, defer to the States to establish standards;

Section 3.

(3) in determining whether to establish uniform national standards, consult with appropriate State and local officials as to the need for national standards and any alternatives that would limit the scope of national standards or otherwise preserve State prerogatives and authority; and

Federalism Policymaking Criteria. In addition to adhering to the fundamental federalism principles set forth in section 2, agencies shall adhere, to the extent permitted by law, to the following criteria when

(4) where national standards are required by Federal statutes, consult with appropriate State and local officials in developing those standards.

3.11 Executive Order No. 13132 217 Section 4. Special Requirements for Preemption. Agencies, in taking action that preempts State law, shall act in strict accordance with governing law. (a) Agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only where the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or where the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.

(b) attach to Federal grants conditions that are not reasonably related to the purpose of the grant; or (c) preempt State law, unless preemption is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles set forth in section 2, and unless a clearly legitimate national purpose, consistent with the federalism policymaking criteria set forth in section 3, cannot otherwise be met. Section 6. Consultation.

(b) Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law (as addressed in subsection (a) of this section), agencies shall construe any authorization in the statute for the issuance of regulations as authorizing preemption of State law by rulemaking only when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute or there is clear evidence to conclude that the Congress intended the agency to have the authority to preempt State law.

(a) Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications. Within 90 days after the effective date of this order, the head of each agency shall designate an official with principal responsibility for the agency’s implementation of this order and that designated official shall submit to the Office of Management and Budget a description of the agency’s consultation process.

(c) Any regulatory preemption of State law shall be restricted to the minimum level necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regulations are promulgated.

(b) To the extent practicable and permitted by law, no agency shall promulgate any regulation that has federalism implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs on State and local governments, and that is not required by statute, unless:

(d) When an agency foresees the possibility of a conflict between State law and Federally protected interests within its area of regulatory responsibility, the agency shall consult, to the extent practicable, with appropriate State and local officials in an effort to avoid such a conflict. (e) When an agency proposes to act through adjudication or rulemaking to preempt State law, the agency shall provide all affected State and local officials notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation in the proceedings.

Section 5. Special Requirements for Legislative Proposals. Agencies shall not submit to the Congress legislation that would: (a) directly regulate the States in ways that would either interfere with functions essential to the States’ separate and independent existence or be inconsistent with the fundamental federalism principles in section 2;

(1) funds necessary to pay the direct costs incurred by the State and local governments in complying with the regulation are provided by the Federal Government; or (2) the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation, (A) consulted with State and local officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation; (B) in a separately identified portion of the preamble to the regulation as it is to be issued in the Federal Register, provides to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a federalism summary impact statement, which consists of a description of the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with State and local officials, a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency’s position supporting the need to issue the

218 Cities, States, and American Federalism regulation, and a statement of the extent to which the concerns of State and local officials have been met; and (C) makes available to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget any written communications submitted to the agency by State and local officials. (c) To the extent practicable and permitted by law, no agency shall promulgate any regulation that has federalism implications and that preempts State law, unless the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation, (1) consulted with State and local officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation; (2) in a separately identified portion of the preamble to the regulation as it is to be issued in the Federal Register, provides to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a federalism summary impact statement, which consists of a description of the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with State and local officials, a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency’s position supporting the need to issue the regulation, and a statement of the extent to which the concerns of State and local officials have been met; and (3) makes available to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget any written communications submitted to the agency by State and local officials. Section 7. Increasing Flexibility for State and Local Waivers. (a) Agencies shall review the processes under which State and local governments apply for waivers of statutory and regulatory requirements and take appropriate steps to streamline those processes. (b) Each agency shall, to the extent practicable and permitted by law, consider any application by a State for a waiver of statutory or regulatory requirements in connection with any program administered by that agency with a general view toward increasing opportunities for utilizing flexible policy approaches at the State or local level in cases in which the proposed waiver is consistent with applicable Federal policy objectives and is otherwise appropriate.

(c) Each agency shall, to the extent practicable and permitted by law, render a decision upon a complete application for a waiver within 120 days of receipt of such application by the agency. If the application for a waiver is not granted, the agency shall provide the applicant with timely written notice of the decision and the reasons therefor. (d) This section applies only to statutory or regulatory requirements that are discretionary and subject to waiver by the agency.

Section 8. Accountability. (a) In transmitting any draft final regulation that has federalism implications to the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, each agency shall include a certification from the official designated to ensure compliance with this order stating that the requirements of this order have been met in a meaningful and timely manner. (b) In transmitting proposed legislation that has federalism implications to the Office of Management and Budget, each agency shall include a certification from the official designated to ensure compliance with this order that all relevant requirements of this order have been met. (c) Within 180 days after the effective date of this order, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs shall confer with State and local officials to ensure that this order is being properly and effectively implemented.

Section. 9. Independent Agencies. Independent regulatory agencies are encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order.

Section 10. General Provisions. (a) This order shall supplement but not supersede the requirements contained in Executive Order 12372 (‘‘Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs’’), Executive Order 12866 (‘‘Regulatory Planning and Review’’), Executive Order

3.11 Executive Order No. 13132 219 12988 (‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’), and OMB Circular A--19. (b) Executive Order 12612 (‘‘Federalism’’), Executive Order 12875 (‘‘Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership’’), Executive Order 13083 (‘‘Federalism’’), and Executive Order 13095 (‘‘Suspension of Executive Order 13083’’) are revoked. (c) This order shall be effective 90 days after the date of this order. Sec. 11. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is

not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. THE WHITE HOUSE, August 4, 1999. [FR Doc. 99--20729 Filed 8--9--99; 8:45 am] Source: Presidential Documents, Federal Register 64, no. 153 (August 10, 1999).

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Section 4 The Congress

Introduction

The shift of the legislature from a starring role suggested in the founding period to a supporting role in the legislature, a role with which we are now familiar, was driven, as Gregory Koger argues in his essay, by Congress standing as an impediment to democratic demands for policy change. When, in the 19th century, Congress was perceived as a defender of the status quo and inadequate to the necessities of change on issues of commerce, slavery, or labor, democratic advocates naturally turned their attention and their support to that branch of government that was popularly elected by the whole nation, the president. At each turn, with the national bank crisis under Andrew Jackson, the Civil War under Abraham Lincoln, and trust busting under Theodore Roosevelt, the position of the legislature was weakened and the people became more accustomed to presidential preeminence. The forces of democratic change not only brought about the ascendancy of the executive at the expense of the legislature, but also drove institutional changes within Congress itself. The second essay in this section, along with Koger’s, documents how, at the dawn of the 20th century, centralized control of Congress impeded the Progressive agenda and bred a revolt that devolved power from the conservative Old Guard leadership to committees, where Democrat and Progressive Republican legislators more in tune with popular demands for change, wielded influence. Similarly, in the 1960s, Southern Conservative control of committees impelled a revolt against the seniority system on committees

A visitor to Washington, D.C., with an eye for architecture and city planning will notice immediately the striking symbolism of the legislature’s dominant position atop Capitol Hill. The design of the capital city with the House and Senate overseeing the other edifices of government is a fitting testimony to the founders’ vision of the legislature as the most powerful of the three branches of government and their devotion to republican politics. Reinforcing this conception of legislative primacy, Article I of the Constitution is devoted to legislative power and asserts that ‘‘All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives’’ [emphasis added]. As with the other two branches of the federal government, the history of the U.S. Congress reveals significant departures from the original constitutional vision. Not only has the national government evolved in such a manner that the executive now eclipses the legislature in policy and political significance, but congressional power itself has devolved from more centralized leadership to committee and even subcommittee authority. These changes, of course, are part and parcel of the overall developmental pattern of American politics in which decision making shifted from the states and legislature to the presidency and the bureaucracy, with the Supreme Court and the Congress functioning as junior partners exercising influence over an essentially executive-driven national state. 221

222 The Congress and devolved power down to the subcommittee level where, again, more progressive legislators held sway. In each of these instances, Congress was essentially remade to overcome its institutional resistance to more democratic policy. These shifts, along with the historical waning of legislative dominance, occurred in response to the institutional inertia of the original Madisonian system in which it was exceedingly

difficult for majority factions to succeed. Congress was conceived as an arena in which factional interests would collide and only rarely achieve transformational change. This institutional design proved incompatible with demands for policy response in a modern industrial and later postindustrial society. ---Richard A. Harris

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 Gregory Koger Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Miami

outcomes, and reshape the legislative process to suit their own preferences. Popularity, on the other hand, stems from behavior in a manner that is pleasing to politically relevant external actors---voters, party leaders, presidents, the news media, and interest groups. There is a tension between these sources of power: autonomy requires legislative independence from electoral rewards and sanctions so that members can make unpopular choices. Conversely, the more legislators trade off their autonomy to achieve personal, partisan, and institutional popularity, the more dependent Congress becomes on external actors. This tension increases over the course of the congressional era and culminates in the decline of Congress.

This essay summarizes the history of Congress from 1789 to 1911, also called the Congressional era. During this period, Congress was the dominant institution of American national politics. This essay ends with major events in the development of both chambers: a revolt against majority party leadership in the House and the adoption of direct elections for senators. The era of congressional supremacy also ends in the early 20th century, followed by an era of presidential dominance. This essay traces the arc of congressional dominance from beginning to demise, explaining how key events and procedural reforms are linked to a broader narrative of institutional status. Of necessity, this essay devoted limited attention to explaining exactly when, why, and how legislators adopt internal reforms. This has recently been the focus of several interesting works (for example, Adler 2002; Binder 1997; Dion 1997; Rohde 1991; Schickler 2001; Theriault 2005) that build on a classic literature on congressional development (for example, Cooper 1970; Cooper and Brady 1981). While the reforms themselves are interesting, this essay focuses on the relationships between reform and function, between actions and environment. Congressional power, I hypothesize, stems from two sources: autonomy and popularity. Autonomy means the ability of members of Congress to set their own agenda, develop their own proposals, and make their own choices. Congress loses autonomy to the extent that external actors set the legislative agenda, influence

Autonomy and Popularity: The Founding Era The authors of the Constitution expected that Congress would dominate the national political scene with its popularity. Federalist No. 49 states, for example, ‘‘The tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.’’1 The source of this primacy---particularly for the House of Representatives---is direct elections: while presidents, judges, and senators were all chosen indirectly by other elites (at least in theory), House members gain familiarity and voters’ allegiance by directly competing for office. In addition to the checks and balances imposed by other actors, House members 223

224 The Congress can only serve two-year terms and (like senators) must publicize their actions and votes in a public journal. The Constitution also provided Congress with a great deal of autonomy. Members of both chambers serve fixed terms without the threat of recall elections or the strategic timing of elections by the majority party. Constituents and state legislators were free to communicate their legislative requests and political views to Congress, but they had no power to ‘‘instruct’’ (or command) congress members how to vote. Congress was empowered to regulate congressional elections (see Federalist Nos. 59, 60, and 61) to safeguard against corruption and intimidation. Most important for this essay, each chamber was empowered to choose its own rules, including full discretion over setting their agendas and developing proposals. Each chamber could thus adapt its rules as its needs changed, and was insulated from external actors trying to force or prevent action on some issue. One additional source of autonomy---probably unintended by the authors of the Constitution---was the congressional schedule. A House member elected in the fall of an even-numbered year would ordinarily not start his job until December of the following (odd-numbered) year unless the president called an earlier ‘‘special’’ session. The ‘‘long’’ session that began in December of the odd year would last until the spring or summer of the following year. Congress would then break for harvest and elections and return for a ‘‘short session’’ from December (even year) to early March (odd). This schedule ensured that 6 to 15 months passed between elections and governing, and that 4 months of governing usually followed members’ reelection contests. While the House was expected to be a popular institution, the Senate would be a bedrock of congressional autonomy (see Federalist Nos. 62 and 63; Swift 1996; Wirls and Wirls 2004). Selection by state legislatures would ensure that talented statesmen would be chosen for the Senate, while senators’ six-year terms would shield senators from the excesses of public opinion and give them time to acquire policy expertise. The small size of the Senate (26 members in 1789) would also make senators more individually accountable for collective outcomes, because they cannot claim to have been unaware or uninvolved in key policy decisions. The Federalist Papers also warn that Congress can lose its supreme status. One source of danger is, of course, opposing institutions, particularly the president. Presidents may attempt to drive the congressional agenda, determine legislative outcomes, or deny congressional authority. In these contests, the most popular

institution is likely to win in the end (see Federalist Nos. 49 and 50). Contrary to the founders’ expectations, the presidency soon became the object of national elections, and the winner of these contests often enjoyed a strong base of support in Congress and some claim to a national mandate. Presidents thus became powerful rivals. Second, Congress was likely to be the crucible of ‘‘factions,’’ that is, the place where groups of self-interested citizens would go to obtain government benefits. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison clearly anticipates that factions will exist but predicts that they will not succeed because America is too diverse for any one group to form a majority. Soon, however, national ‘‘factions’’---parties---developed as coalitions of discrete groups. These parties were active in congressional elections so that nomination by a party became a necessary condition for election to office. Furthermore, individuals, businesses, and small groups lobbied Congress for material benefits. As Madison predicted, they often found it difficult to persuade Congress to enact major laws to benefit specific groups, but they did find members of Congress more amenable to small requests for favors, jobs, and targeted spending. Parties and organized interests offered increasingly powerful incentives for members of Congress to trade autonomy for popularity. Third, the size of the House presented an acute trade-off between popularity and autonomy. The larger the chamber, the closer the bonds between citizens and representatives as each legislator represents fewer constituents and a smaller district. Thus, a large House is likely to be popular to the extent it echoes public sentiment well. On the other hand, Madison warns that legislatures can be too large. In Federalist No. 55, Madison warns that large legislatures are susceptible to rash impulses: ‘‘In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.’’ As the legislatures grow, odious procedural limits must be imposed to keep them functioning: [I]n all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings . . . the countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 225

Figure 1. Members in the U.S. House and Senate, 1789--1899 Source: Clerk of the U.S. House

Madison’s concerns were well founded. Over the course of the next century, the House did grow from 65 members to 435 in 1910. Figure 1 traces the size of both chambers from 1789 to 1899. While both chambers grew over time, the House was always several times larger than the Senate. Over the course of the Congressional era, the House did restrain debate and centralize power in accordance with Madison’s prediction, while the Senate retained the informality and egalitarianism of a small legislature. Finally, Congress must possess enough collective wisdom to understand the policy problems of the day

and formulate credible solutions. In the beginning, this was an easy task. The federal government was expected to focus on a small set of tasks, which would be easy for Congress to understand (Federalist No. 56). Furthermore, Congress would be composed of wellqualified elites who would possess---or easily acquire---the knowledge to govern effectively (Federalist Nos. 2, 3, 10, 27). As the size and responsibilities of the federal government increased over the next century, however, it became increasingly difficult for members of Congress to understand issues and monitor agencies. As a rough measure of the growing

Figure 2. Presidential Policy Requests by Congress, 1789--1899 Source: Database of Congressional Historical Statistics

226 The Congress responsibilities of the federal government, Figure 2 illustrates the number of formal presidential policy requests transmitted to Congress. The series peaks in the 1880s, but for our interests, the more interesting pattern is the steady growth over time. As the Congressional era unfolds, Congress is asked to address an ever-increasing set of domestic and foreign policy problems.

Congress in the First Party Era, 1789--1829 The U.S. House and Senate first met in New York City to lay the foundations for a new nation. To do so, members had to organize their chambers. Thus both chambers began by writing rules of procedure and discussing the finer points of protocol---for example, what titles should be used for the president and vice president? How should bills and messages be transmitted between chambers? The rules of both chambers embodied a simple system of agenda setting and decision making. Topics for legislation were suggested by legislators themselves, presidents and their cabinet members, or citizens petitioning for government action. Each legislative suggestion, in theory, would be discussed by the entire House or Senate. If the chamber desired to pass a bill on a topic, the members would form a general agreement and then delegate the task of researching and writing the bill to an ad hoc committee chosen by the speaker (House) or by ballot (Senate) (Cooper 1970; Remini 2006, 19). During the first Congress, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton was a vigorous legislative leader on behalf of his plans to take responsibility for state and national Revolutionary War debt and to establish a national bank. Over the next two decades, presidents continued to exert influence in Congress by working with a designated advocate in the House (Remini 2006, 24--110; Swift 1998). While Congress was preeminent, it accepted a great deal of presidential guidance. Hamilton’s financial plans began a schism in the ranks of Federalists who had supported the Constitution. Over the next six years, members of Congress began to cluster into two coalitions, one supporting the administration and the other opposing (Aldrich 1995). Other issues divided the members---for example, the Jay Treaty with Britain---but beneath the issues lurked questions about what sort of society they were building. Would America be a hierarchical or egalitarian nation? It is noteworthy that, while these coalitions eventually engaged in some campaigning activity, the Federalist and Republican parties that formed were

initiated in Congress (Cunningham 1957). Thus, members were largely independent of instructions or coercion by leaders of local party organizations. During the 1790s, Americans took a keen interest in the growing party divide. In 1789, the House decided to open its doors and allow anyone who wished to observe the proceedings (Remini 2006, 16). Newspaper editors soon began taking notes on debates in the House and distributing their accounts around the country. This added greatly to the House’s constitutional advantage as the ‘‘people’s House,’’ because, like a contemporary president, House members were at the center of the news cycle. The Senate continued to meet in private sessions until 1795, when the public was permitted to view its legislative meetings.2 Nonetheless, the House continued to dominate the news: ‘‘[T]hough the papers of the time generally contained daily accounts of the proceedings of the House when Congress was in session, it is only rarely that those of the Senate were referred to’’ (Kerr 1895, 40). Congressional preeminence was most apparent during the march to the War of 1812. Beginning in 1807, President Jefferson and Congress responded to trade interdictions by Britain and France with a series of self-imposed trade limits in an attempt to punish the belligerent countries, to no avail. During the buildup to war, members of the House began to use ‘‘filibustering’’ tactics to slow down bills they abhorred. Filibustering is the use of parliamentary tactics to prevent a decision for strategic purposes. Legislators often filibuster by making long speeches, and they had done so since 1789.3 They can also obstruct bills by forcing endless votes on procedural questions (adjourning for the day, taking a recess, raising points of order) or even by refusing to vote at all. If less than half of a chamber participates in a vote, then no quorum is present and no legislative decisions can be made.4 When some members are absent for innocent reasons, then legislators who are present and on the losing side of a question may refuse to vote in the hope of breaking a quorum. During the 19th century, the typical response to a filibuster was patience. Legislators would simply wait for the obstructionist members to grow tired or to make a mistake, then the majority could call for a vote after the minority gave up. Filibustering has several implications for the autonomy and popularity of Congress, depending on how members use the power to delay. On one hand, filibustering may make Congress less popular if a minority is able to prevent action on a pressing national problem. However, members have often filibustered to block measures supported by presidents and powerful

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 227 interest groups but opposed by silent, intimidated majorities in Congress. In such cases, legislators filibuster to protect the autonomy of their institutions. By 1811, however, House members had had enough. During a particularly lengthy debate on opening trade with Britain, filibustering members called for votes on eight motions to adjourn (all rejected) and most Federalists refused to participate in six votes. In the early morning hours of February 28, 1811, House members voted to transform one of its rules into a tool for cutting off debate. This rule, the ‘‘previous question,’’ had previously been used to decide whether to continue debating or not. After some fierce parliamentary rulings, however, the majority of the House redefined the rule to prevent debate if the previous question was approved (Alexander 1916; Luce 1922). In the next (12th) Congress, a coalition of War Hawks led by Speaker Henry Clay took control of the House. Unlike preceding speakers, Clay aggressively stacked key House committees with allies to obtain the results he wanted (Remini 2006, 91). Soon, prodded by the War Hawks, Madison sent a message requesting a declaration of war. House members opposed to war began a filibuster that lasted for weeks. Then one late night, a slow speech was interrupted by the sudden clanging of spittoons tumbling in the aisles of the House chamber. Cries for order rang out and the filibustering member retreated to his seat. Then, quickly, a Clay ally moved the previous question and (with Clay’s help) obtained a vote on the declaration of war. Cutting off debate on the declaration of war infuriated the war’s opponents, however, and the previous question fell into disrepute for many years (Binder 1997, 89). Behind these events was a slow process by which the House and Senate became more complex organizations. While the Senate continued to operate informally, the House was forced to adapt its rules to its growing size. The first House had 65 members. In 1793 it grew to 105 members, in 1803 it grew again to 141, and by 1813 the House had almost tripled to 182 members. This growth reflected the desire of House members to remain close to their constituents, but members also considered their states’ interest in not losing representatives. In 1811, House members adopted a formal schedule for each day: approving the Journal (that is, the record of the previous day’s events), petitions, committee reports, and then bills previously scheduled (Cooper and Young 1989, 72). This schedule was frequently superseded, however, by motions to suspend (that is, ignore) the rules, which only required a majority to pass (Binder 1997, 88). In 1822, the threshold for suspending the rules was raised to a twothirds majority in an effort to keep to the daily schedule.

Even more important, however, was the institutionalization of permanent committees in both the House and Senate. This process has been the subject of excellent research (see Cooper 1970; Cooper and Young 1989; Gamm and Shepsle 1989; Jenkins and Stewart 2002; McConachie 1898). In the early years, both chambers created a new committee for each bill. If a member developed expertise on a particular topic (say, trade), there was no guarantee that he would be assigned to work on that topic, nor even that any committee would be formed on that topic. This arrangement was well suited to ensure that all the members of a chamber made decisions and shared responsibility jointly. Over time, however, both chambers decided that some topics deserved permanent committees. These permanent, or ‘‘standing,’’ committees had fixed membership and automatic claim to all bills on a specific topic. For example, the first standing committee in the House was an Elections Committee to determine who should be admitted as members of the chamber. In the Fourth Congress, the House created a permanent committee on ‘‘Ways and Means,’’ that is, raising and spending tax revenue. By 1897 the House had four standing committees; by 1809, eight; by 1817, 18; and by 1829, 25 (Jenkins and Stewart 2002). By 1825 it appeared that most work in the House was done in committees (McConachie 1898, 306). The Senate developed its committee system concurrently (see Haynes 1938, from which this paragraph is drawn). At the beginning of the 14th Congress (1815-1817), the Senate had just four standing committees, and two of these were joint committees with the House: Enrolled Bills (joint) (created 1789), Enrolled Bills (Senate) (1806), Joint Committee on the Library (1806), and Senate Contingent Expenses (1807). All four committees were focused on the internal functions of the Senate and Congress. Most policy work was done by temporary three-person committees; during the first half of the 14th Congress, 90 to 100 such committees were formed. In December 1816, however, the Senate created 11 standing committees: Foreign Relations, Finance, Commerce and Manufactures, Military Affairs, Militia, Naval Affairs, Public Lands, Claims, Judiciary, Post Office, and Pensions. In 1821, the Senate debated and rejected a proposal to eliminate these committees; committees were now a permanent fixture in the Senate. In the House, members delegated the responsibility for making assignments to temporary and permanent committees to the speaker. This system was more efficient than electing committee members every time a new committee was formed, but over time, it made the position of speaker a prize sought by competing parties (Swift 1998). In the Senate, members initially chose the

228 The Congress members of every committees by voting, then experimented with delegating the choice to committee chairs or the presiding officer, and eventually developed an informal tradition of parties making their own committee assignments (Gamm and Smith 2000; Kerr 1895, 27--31; Haynes 1938, 273--277). The gradual creation of a permanent committee system had tremendous implications for the U.S. Congress. Committees became an essential source of congressional autonomy because each chamber developed a system for gathering information and drafting legislation. Instead of trying to master every topic, individual members were able to apply themselves to studying a particular set of issues with the expectation that they would be particularly influential on those topics. Eventually, committees also served a powerful role as gatekeepers deciding which bills deserved consideration by the entire legislature. Why did both chambers develop committee systems? Since standing committees were created one (or a few) at a time, we can tell a plethora of stories. Individual additions can be attributed to ambitious politicians (Gamm and Smith 1989) or to wars and other events (Jenkins and Stewart 2002; McConachie 1898). The underlying force, however, was the growing workload of Congress as the nation grew, as well as the increased size of the House (Cooper 1970, 43). As congressional workload increased, members increasingly viewed it as a waste of time to discuss an issue before a committee drafted a bill, especially since these prebill conversations often meandered into the specific phrasing of asyet-unwritten bills. In the Senate, the primary reason stated for forming standing committees in 1816 was to escape the tedium of voting on assignments to dozens of committees. Finally, committees were increasingly valued as a source of expertise separate from the executive branch. In the decades to come, Congress would need all the autonomy it could muster.

The Age of Jackson in Congress, 1829--1861 By the late 1820s, Congress was clearly the dominant institution in American politics. When the admission of Missouri to the Union sparked a national debate on the expansion of slavery (1819--1820), for example, it fell to Congress to devise the compromises that kept the country together at the price of allowing new slave states into the Union (Moore 1895, 222--227). After decades as the quiet chamber, the Senate was well on its way to becoming the more popular chamber of Congress. One reason for the ascendance of the Senate was

leadership (Swift 1996); a vanguard of senators chose to transform the Senate into a forum for deliberation and statesmanship. Another was acoustics. Since 1807 the House had been meeting in a great room on the south side of the Capitol (present-day Statuary Hall). Though lavish, the room had awful acoustics, so the House provided less enjoyable viewing than the Senate (Remini 2006, 86). The growing size of the House (213 members in 1823, 240 members in 1833) made it difficult for talented orators to stand out, and the rules of the House imposed increasing constraints on the length of speeches and the amount of time devoted to simple debate. Beginning in 1829, congressional dominance was challenged by a new breed of president and a powerful brand of party competition. Within a decade, Congress was severely diminished in stature. The election of Andrew Jackson was not the sole cause of this shift. Instead, Jackson’s election symbolized a shift in American politics from elite leadership to democratic control aided by the emergence of mass parties. Andrew Jackson, the general and ‘‘hero’’ who won the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, was a candidate for president in 1824 against John Quincy Adams, William Crawford, and Henry Clay. Jackson won a plurality of the electoral vote, but Adams won the election in the U.S. House with the support of Henry Clay. Jackson suspected that a ‘‘corrupt bargain’’ had been struck between Adams and Clay: Clay supports Adams for the presidency, and Adams makes Clay his secretary of state. Jackson’s suspicions were fed when Adams named Clay to that post. Jackson and his allies spent the next four years insinuating that the Adams presidency was inherently corrupt.5 Jackson’s anti-Adams propaganda occurred against the backdrop of rising antielite sentiment. The economic panic of 1819 had fanned doubts about the political elites, while the attempt of a congressional caucus to nominate Crawford as the official Republican candidate in 1824 fed these doubts. Since the election of 1800, a number of states had reduced or eliminated the property requirements for voting, allowing more low-income men to vote. Jackson was especially popular among these newly enfranchised voters, and his advisors and allies worked to develop a national coalition that could turn out Jackson supporters in key states in the 1828 election (Aldrich 1995). While this coalition included members of Congress, for example, Martin Van Buren, it was primarily a network of state parties (Remini 1963). The new Jackson protoparty used new mass campaigning techniques to generate enthusiasm for Jackson and turn out voters to the polls---for

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 229 example, commissioning pro-Jackson songs and promoting the use of hickory sticks, trees, and poles to celebrate their candidate, ‘‘Old Hickory.’’ Once in office, Jackson began using federal jobs to reward his supporters. The practice of putting supporters on the public payroll was not new, but Jackson and his coalition used this strategy much more extensively than ever. The campaign machinery of the Jackson coalition was not cheap, and once victorious, they sought jobs as subsidies. The salaries helped party workers to make ends meet, while the party leaders ‘‘taxed’’ the salaries of patronage employees to pay for campaigns. Moreover, a party that controlled government functions could find ways to reward supporters---for example, understating tariff charges for importers who contributed to the party. Jackson supporters in Congress became advocates for campaign workers who wanted federal jobs in the White House. The emergence of a popular and strong-willed president backed by an effective electoral coalition was a tremendous challenge to congressional supremacy. The House elected a Jackson supporter, Andrew Stevenson, as speaker, and Stevenson used the powers of his office to push Jackson’s agenda: ‘‘Stevenson had slight respect for the rules and precedent of the assembly, violating them constantly, whenever it suited his purpose, to promote purely partisan interests’’ (Fuller 1909, 63; see also Alexander 1916). Senators put up more resistance. John Calhoun, who resigned as vice president to represent South Carolina in the Senate, investigated Andrew Jackson’s dismissal of federal employees to give their jobs to his supporters. The Senate rejected several of Jackson’s nominations, including Andrew Stevenson’s bid to be ambassador to Great Britain (Haynes 1938, 793--799). These actions were simply skirmishes, however, compared with the war over the Bank of the United States (BUS). The BUS was a single bank chartered to manage the government’s finances and to serve as the center of the banking system (see Feller 2004, from which this account is drawn). Jackson opposed the Bank as a Hamiltonian institution and source of corruption. In 1832, Jackson vetoed a bill to extend the Bank’s charter, and this veto was a central issue in his reelection campaign. After the election, Jackson began severing the federal government’s relationship with the BUS by removing federal deposits and distributing them to friendly state-chartered banks. The Senate resisted this action as an unwarranted and unconstitutional exercise of power. In March 1834, the Senate formally censored President Jackson for his actions. Jackson responded with a lengthy message defending

Daniel Webster’s advocacy of Northern sectional politics held him back from his dream of winning the presidency. Instead of holding the nation’s highest office, Webster distinguished himself as a lawyer, orator, U.S. representative, U.S. senator, and secretary of state. (Library of Congress)

his actions and denying the Senate’s authority. The Senate refused to accept the message. Sen. Thomas Hart Benton, a Jackson ally from Missouri, began a campaign to remove the censure from the Senate record. Over the next two years, Jackson allies in state capitals elected senators sworn to ‘‘expunge’’ the censure from the record and sent formal instructions to sitting senators to vote for expunging the record. These instructions had no legal weight, but several senators like John Tyler of Virginia felt honor bound to resign rather than deny the express wishes of his constituents. By January 1837, the Jackson coalition had enough votes to succeed. They overcame a mild filibuster to pass a resolution, 24--19, cleansing the censure from the Senate record. Late in the evening of January 16, the secretary of the senate dutifully retrieved the Senate Journal and drew a black box around the offending passage as spectators in the Senate galleries groaned and booed (Haynes 1938, 977-979; Koger, forthcoming). Jackson had defeated the last citadel of congressional autonomy.

230 The Congress From this defeat, however, was born a new mass party. The leaders of the Senate opposition---Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster---began organizing an opposition party that could compete with the Jackson coalition’s mass appeal. They called this party the ‘‘Whigs’’ to highlight their opposition to the ‘‘kingly’’ ways of Andrew Jackson. Both parties, however, utilized applied the principle of rotation in office to members of Congress. That is, parties ensure that congress members are truly representative of the local party by allowing them to serve only a limited number of terms before nominating someone else. In this system, politicians saw the party---not Congress---as their career, and congressional service was simply one stop along a series of positions chosen by party leaders (Price 1977). By shortening congressional careers and reducing members’ interest in the institution of Congress, rotation significantly reduced the effectiveness and autonomy of Congress. One rarely noted innovation during this era was the adoption of open elections for House officers in 1839. Prior to that time, elections of speakers, clerks, and other officers were considered internal matters done by private balloting rather than roll call votes. This switch was generally in accord with the public mood: private voting invites corruption while public voting ensures accountability. Behind the switch, however, was another dispute between Jackson and Congress over government patronage. In this case, the plum jobs were the contracts for House and Senate printers. Printing congressional documents was lucrative work that a newspaper editor could use to subsidize a party newspaper and the printing of campaign flyers. Jackson helped establish a newspaper, the Globe, to advocate his views to citizens and other pro-Jackson newspapers across the country. Jackson pressured his cabinet leaders to steer their departments’ printing to the Globe’s editors and encouraged his followers in each chamber to choose the Globe’s editors as congressional printers. Behind the veil of secrecy, however, so-called Jackson men continued to vote for rival printers. Finally, House Democrats managed to change House rules so that all elections were public; no longer could members call themselves Democrats while voting to deny essential patronage to their party. A side effect of this choice, of course, is that the choice of a speaker became a public spectacle (Jenkins and Stewart 2003). Over the next two decades the House deadlocked over the selection of a speaker on four occasions. In 1839, the balance of power hinged on five contested New Jersey seats; if the Whigs were seated, they could elect the speaker and choose the rules, if not the

A 19th-century Whig cartoon brands President Andrew Jackson as a king. The Whig Party was composed primarily of opponents of Jackson, who viewed him as a tyrannical despot. (Library of Congress)

Democrats would dominate the House. The House clerk, a Democrat, refused to acknowledge the five contested members, or to allow a vote on the question. The House eventually ignored the clerk, elected a Whig as speaker, and organized itself after 20 days (Fuller 1909, 73--79). In 1849, the balance of power lay with 13 Free Soil members who would not vote for a speaker candidate unless he agreed to assign antislavery majorities to key committees. In the end, their strategy backfired and a pro-slavery Democrat was elected after 63 votes (Fuller 1909, 94--99). This was a prelude to the contest for control of the 34th Congress (1855--1857). The Democrats were divided into factions supporting and opposing the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, while the rest of the House was a mix of Whigs, Republicans, and nativist Know-Nothings. After 133 ballots, the House narrowly elected an antislavery speaker, Nathaniel Banks (Fuller 1909, 101--119). An innovative analysis of these 133 votes reveals the gradual development of the

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 231 Republican coalition out of antislavery members from all parties (Jenkins and Nokken 2000). Finally, in 1859--1860, 44 ballots were required to choose William Pennington as speaker; Pennington was a compromise candidate serving his first term in the House (Fuller 1909, 124--146). These contests highlighted both the influence of third parties and the difficulty of uniting diverse antebellum parties behind a single candidate in public. During this era, the rules of the House continued to evolve. In 1822, 1837, and 1860, House members made broad reforms in their rules to make the chamber more manageable. The House also continued the practice of readopting its rules at the beginning of each Congress, while the Senate simply treated its rules as if they were continued from Congress to Congress.6 This practice made it easier to revise House rules, since it was normal to debate and amend rules every two years. One key change was the adoption of a one-hour limit on House speeches in 1841. This rule change, like the broader pattern of reform, was attributable to the growing size of the House and its workload. While the 52 members of the Senate could speak as long as they wanted without causing inconvenience, allowing the 242 members of the House to make unlimited speeches could easily paralyze the chamber. Indeed, during the previous Congress, there were eight filibusters in the House (Koger forthcoming).7 Subsequently, in 1842, Congress voted to reduce the size of the House from 242 to 223. While the Senate led this effort, House members agreed their chamber may have grown too large. Meanwhile, northern opposition to slavery resurfaced in the form of citizen petitions urging various antislavery measures. Southern members of both chambers demanded that, since northern acceptance of slavery was a necessary condition for the existence of the Union, Congress should refuse to hear the petitions. This was accomplished quietly in the Senate, but in the House, the petitions sparked an eight-year debate over slavery and the right to petition. Starting in 1836, the House adopted a series of temporary bans on slavery petitions, and then a permanent ban in 1840. John Quincy Adams, now a representative, continued to submit petitions in defiance of the ban. In 1844, Adams succeeded in removing the ban from the House rules (Ludlum 1941; Moore 1895, 336--337; Remini 2006, 127--130). As Remini concludes, however, ‘‘the net result of this unseemly conflict was the decline of the prestige of the House, and of Congress generally’’ (2006, 130). Despite this loss of prestige and competition with presidents and parties, Congress remained the preeminent institution during the era of the second-party

system. As slavery and sectional friction rose on the national agenda, members of Congress gave full vent to the frustrations of their constituents. Often debates were laced with the raw feelings of the age---threats of secession, moral condemnation, accusations of aristocratic sympathies. Fistfights and duels were not uncommon. One famous incident was the 1856 caning of Massachusetts senator William Sumner by Preston Brooks of South Carolina on the floor of the Senate. Brooks was retaliating for Sumner’s alleged insults against Brooks’ uncle, Andrew Butler, also a South Carolina senator. Sumner was severely injured and did not return to the Senate until 1860; Brooks resigned from the House, was reelected heartily by his constituents, and returned to the House (Moore 1895, 361--363). Congress members, however, also tried to design compromises that would allow the country to survive its conflict over slavery. The recurring challenge was to create territories and bring states into the Union on terms that were acceptable to both the North and South. The Missouri Compromise faltered after the Mexican-American War, when it was clear that much of the land seized from Mexico was not slave territory and would not become so. Henry Clay and other senators engineered a new compromise in 1850 for the admission of California while allaying Southern fears. However, the great triumvirate of Senate leaders---Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun---died soon afterward. In 1853--1854 the peace bought by Clay’s compromise was broken by an effort to repeal the Missouri Compromise: the Kansas-Nebraska Act. This bill, passed with the support of President Pierce and Sen. Stephen Douglas (D-Ill.), left it to each territory to decide whether slavery would be allowed or not, thus making it possible for Kansas to become a slave state (Remini 2006, 143--150). The Kansas-Nebraska Act contributed to the demise of the Whigs and the rise of the Republican and Know-Nothing parties. For the next six years, the fate of Kansas transfixed the nation, while Congress was ineffective at addressing the crisis.

Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861--1877 The Civil War brought great changes to Congress. Most notably, the legislators from the seceding states left, leaving smaller chambers and a large Republican majority. When the 37th Congress met on July 4, 1861, the Republicans had a 106--42 majority in the House, with 28 third-party members, and a 31--11 majority in the Senate. Like most wartime Congresses, the 37th Congress faced a busy workload of raising revenue and enlarging the military establishment. In addition, the

232 The Congress 37th Congress made progress on a Republican agenda that had been stymied by Southern leaders, for example, the 1862 Homestead Act, abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, the Morrill Land Grant College Act, and the Pacific Railroad Act (Neely 2004; Remini 2006, 164--189). The war also highlighted the limits of legislative power. Most of the important actions of the war were executive actions: suspending habeas corpus, selecting commanding generals, setting war strategy, and determining the standards for readmission to the Union. Congress tried to assert itself with a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War and the 1864 Wade-Davis bill to raise the standards for reconstruction, which Lincoln pocket vetoed (Remini 2006). The real struggle began when Andrew Johnson became president and began to swiftly impose his own lenient policy. Over the next three years, Congress---led by ‘‘radical’’ Republicans seeking thorough renovation of Southern society---and President Johnson engaged in a dramatic game of institutional warfare. Johnson vetoed several reconstruction-related bills, only to be overridden by Congress. Johnson then personally campaigned against Republican candidates in the election of 1866. Congress responded by extending its own schedule so one Congress began immediately after the previous one; passed the Tenure in Congress Act banning the president from firing Senate-approved officials without the Senate’s consent; reduced the size of the Supreme Court to deny Johnson the chance to make appointments; and passed its own Military Reconstruction acts. In February

1868, this dispute led to a formal House impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Johnson survived the effort, but he was severely weakened for the last few months of his term (Remini 2006; Simpson 2004). He was replaced by Ulysses S. Grant, a much more pliable president. Notably, Congress---especially senators---regained the upper hand in the distribution of federal jobs and became more powerful. There was little procedural development during this era. The House had thoroughly renovated its rules in 1860 and then shrunk in size during the war. Furthermore, the Republicans dominated the chamber until 1875, typically with large majorities. The Republicans often used a process known as ‘‘suspending the rules’’ to get things done with a minimum of parliamentary snares. A two-thirds supermajority is required to suspend House rules. Figure 3 illustrates the number of roll call votes from 1861 to 1895, with motions that pass in white and failed motions in black. Figure 3, of course, illustrates only the visible portion of the iceberg. Many motions were made and accepted without a formal roll call vote. Several of the procedural innovations adopted during this era made these motions easier and more effective, including limiting attempts to adjourn after a suspension motion is made (1867), suspending the rules to pass a bill immediately (1868), and suspending the rules to forbid dilatory motions (1875) (Binder 1997; Koger 2002). The Senate also made small reforms to keep up with the workload brought on by the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Industrial Revolution. During the war, the

Figure 3. House Votes on Suspension Motions, 1861--1895 Source: United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 233 Senate adopted a five-minute limit on speaking, but only on war-related matters debated in secret session (Haynes 1938, 395). Afterward, the Senate eliminated debate on motions to take up a new bill (1870) and on motions to table amendments to appropriations bills; in 1881, this was expanded to apply to amendments to any bill. In 1872--1873, the Senate began limiting speeches on appropriations bills to five minutes (Haynes 1938). At the same time, the Senate in 1872 decided against requiring debate on any bill to be germane; for the most part, senators can talk about whatever they want whenever they want. One of the most important innovations was the Anthony Rule, named after the Republican leader of the Senate. The Anthony Rule allowed senators to dispose of simple and uncontroversial legislation quickly. Under this rule, senators go through the ‘‘calendar,’’ or list of legislation waiting for floor consideration, skipping any bill to which any senator objects. If no senator objects to a specific bill, then that bill is debated with a five-minute limit per speech, one speech per senator. The Senate began experimenting with this rule around 1870 and, after several successful trials, formally adopted the rule in 1880 (Haynes 1938, 395; Kerr 1895, 62-63). Senators appreciated the Anthony Rule because it helped reduce the backlog of bills on the calendar---many of which were uncontroversial---while preserving their right to deliberate. During this era, lobbying of Congress by corporations and interest groups seems to have increased. While it is difficult to document this pattern (but see Tichenor and Harris 2002/2003) and Congress had long been the focus of lobbying and organized groups, most contemporaneous and historical works suggest an increase in the intensity with which businesses lobbied Congress for favors and citizens’ groups organized on a regional or national basis. One example of aggressive business lobbying was the Credit Mobilier scandal, in which several members of Congress---including the speaker of the House---were implicated in a scheme to sell or give stock to members of Congress at belowmarket prices and thus tie their interests to a railroad company (Remini 2006, 219--221). The underlying problem was that members of Congress were underpaid, but historically, legislators had paid an electoral price for raising their own pay. On March 3, 1873---the last day of the 42nd Congress---Congress passed a law increasing congressional pay from $5,000 a year to $7,500. This law became known as the Salary Grab, however, because it was retroactive and sitting members reaped a huge bonus (Moore 1895, 447--448). Congress repealed the raise in January 1874, but the

financial needs of congress members continued to make them amenable to outside offers.

The Gilded Age, 1877--1895 Northern enthusiasm for reconstructing the South seemed to dwindle after Congress’s contest with Andrew Johnson and the passage of constitutional amendments freeing the slaves and guaranteeing them equal rights and the right to vote (Remini 2006, 207; 229). Republicans in Congress still attempted to protect African Americans’ voting rights in the South, if only to gain a few seats and presidential electors. These efforts came to an end, however, as Democrats became a competitive party once more. Between 1866 and 1870, all 11 states of the Confederacy regained the right to congressional representation. White Southerners associated the Republican Party with the war and reconstruction and strongly favored the Democratic Party while trying to reduce African Americans’ access to the ballot box. The combination of Southern restoration, a financial panic in 1873, and the Salary Grab helped the Democrats gain control of the House in 1874; they went from an 88-203 minority to a 181--107 majority. In the presidential election of 1876, the Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, won the popular vote over Rutherford Hayes by about 250,000 votes. The outcome of this election, however, hinged on the returns from Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Vote fraud and intimidation was so rampant in these states that it was essentially impossible to determine who had won. Although Congress was divided, with Democrats controlling the House and Republicans controlling the Senate, they managed to agree on a special commission of representatives, senators, and Supreme Court justices to investigate the election. The commission voted on party lines to name Hayes the winner of all three contested states and thus the election. The Senate quickly approved this decision but House Democrats filibustered the commission’s recommendation. The deadlock was broken when a small group of congress members from both chambers negotiated the Compromise of 1877: Hayes became president, but Democrats received some patronage jobs, reconstruction money, and the final withdrawal of federal troops from the South (Remini 2006, 214--217). While the resolution of the 1876 election crisis suggested that Congress was quite capable of autonomous action, one chink in congressional supremacy appeared during Hayes’ presidency. In 1879, the House attempted several times to attach a rider on the Army

234 The Congress

The electoral votes are counted in the Rutherford B. Hayes-Samuel J. Tilden election. The presidential election of 1876 was notable in that the winner of the popular vote did not win in the electoral college. Different outcomes were reported by Democrats and Republicans in each state, and when the confusion was finally settled by the efforts of the special electoral commission, Hayes became president by a margin of one vote in the electoral college. (North Wind Picture Archives)

Appropriations Bill preventing the president from deploying U.S. troops in the South. Each time, Hayes vetoed the bill. The Democrats finally backed down after suffering a blow to their collective reputation (Remini 2006, 232). During this contest, the Senate Republicans engaged in one of the few blatant Senate filibusters of this era by refusing to vote on the Army Appropriations Bill (Burdette 1940; Koger forthcoming). A second weakness developed soon after James Garfield became president in 1881. Garfield successfully challenged the senior senator and political leader of New York, Roscoe Conkling, over appointments to the New York City customs house. This position was a crucial source of graft for Conkling and his allies. Both New York senators resigned in protest with the expectation that the New York legislature would reelect them. They were wrong, and some of the power over appointments that Congress had jealously guarded since the days of Andrew Johnson passed to the president. Garfield, of course, was soon assassinated by a disappointed job-seeker, which contributed to the

passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 (Theriault 2003). The Pendleton Act had a minor short-term effect, since it only affected a small percentage of federal jobs at the outset (Skowronek 1982). However, civil service reform coincided with broader changes in congressional campaigns. While both parties continued the popular campaigning of the Jackson era, they also began to reach out to independent, issue-oriented voters who made up a swing group in presidential elections (James 2000). An increasing number of House members were breaking free of local party control and making a career out of House service. They were assisted by electoral reforms that made it easier for politicians to defy local party elites and cultivate a personal following. The Australian ballot system allowed voters to privately choose among the candidates for each race, rather than picking all the candidates of one party. Later, primary elections allowed the voters of each party to choose congressional candidates rather than party elites. These reforms made it easier for incumbents to win.

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 235 During an era when most Americans were increasingly focused on money-making, members of Congress sought to make their chamber more ‘‘business-like.’’ For the House, the combination of an ever-growing country and a rapidly growing chamber created a crisis in agenda setting. Members became frustrated at the House’s general inability to efficiently consider bills reported out of committee and, in particular, to focus the House’s attention on the most important issues. The ‘‘calendar’’ system put in place decades earlier was still in place: unless otherwise ordered, bills were considered in the order they emerged from committee. What if it was essential to consider a newly reported bill as soon as possible? Members could try to suspend the rules to bring the bill up immediately, but only if they could garner a two-thirds majority. To decrease the need to suspend the rules, in 1880 a bipartisan team of party leaders renovated the rules of the House to make the chamber more efficient. Speaker Samuel Randall, one of the members of the committee, hoped to streamline the rules so that bills were considered soon after they were reported, and it would not be necessary to circumvent the calendar system. The rules of the House recognized that debating appropriations bills in a timely fashion was especially important. The House designated appropriations bills as high-priority legislation in 1837. In 1879, the House voted to allow the Commerce Committee to directly report the appropriations bill for rivers and harbors spending. This was a favorite form of excess spending for House members, and House members expected that the Commerce Committee would propose a more generous bill than the Appropriations Committee (Alexander 1916, 236--237; Stewart 1989, 90--106). During the 1880 debate over rules reform, the Agricultural Committee also gained the right to report its own appropriations bill. A more dramatic revolt occurred in 1885, when the Rules Committee recommended dispersing five appropriations bills to their respective standing committees: Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Post Office, and Indian Affairs. Samuel Randall, chair of the Appropriations Committee, opposed this proposal against a curious coalition of Republicans (then the minority party) and low-tariff Democrats. The motives for this action apparently included retaliation against Randall for leading the opposition to tariff reductions (Alexander 1916, 241--250) and general dissatisfaction with the Appropriation Committee’s fiscal conservatism (Robinson 1930, 118--123).8 A third strategy for setting the agenda was to let the Rules Committee propose new ‘‘rules’’ for individual

bills. That is, the Rules Committee makes a proposal known then as a ‘‘special order’’ and known now as a ‘‘special rule.’’ These proposals make a bill privileged (that is, it can be called up at any time) and define the process for debate on that bill. This tactic is used for almost all major legislation in the contemporary House. It was first used in 1883 to go to conference on a tariff bill while avoiding a difficult vote on accepting the Senate’s low-tariff bill (McCown 1927). The 1880 rules imposed no new restrictions on filibustering in the House even though members were becoming a little more likely to slow down the chamber or even block a bill. When the Republicans gained a slender majority in the 47th Congress (1881--1883), the Democratic minority made ample use of their right to obstruct. House members filibustered a tariff bill, the Pendleton Act, and a rules change, but the sharpest conflicts were over contested elections. In several elections, both major party candidates claimed to be the rightful winner, and the House was obliged to determine who the rightful winner was. During the Gilded Age, there was a remarkable correlation between members’ party affiliation and their views on who won these controversial races, and the Democrats often felt that the majority was trying to steal their seats. Four election cases sparked filibustering, including three fairly intense contests over South Carolina seats (Koger forthcoming). Later, rampant filibustering led to the 50th Congress (1887--1889) going down in history as one of the least effective ever. Obstruction in the House had become a real threat to congressional effectiveness.

The Reed Precedents and the Aftermath From 1883 to 1889, Thomas Reed (R-Maine) was a most unusual member of the House. As a member of the House minority party, he argued that the minority party had too much power and the rules of the House should be amended to restrict minorities. When the Republicans regained control of the House in 1889 and made Reed Speaker, he had a chance to follow through on his convictions. In late January 1890, Reed made his move. When Democrats refused to vote during debate on a contested election case, Reed instructed the clerk of the House to note the presence of nonvoting Democrats. Democrats protested vociferously; who was Reed to suggest that they were present? Furthermore, Reed ignored the Democrats’ procedural motions, which, Reed stated, were simply being used to waste time. After a three-day stalemate, Reed’s parliamentary rulings were upheld by the Republican majority. Two

236 The Congress weeks later, the House codified these rules and added several innovations to make the House more efficient, for example, allowing members to turn their bill drafts into the clerk rather than requesting the permission of the House to introduce a bill. The Republicans then went on to pass an ambitious agenda, including raising tariffs, increasing pensions, buying silver, admitting Idaho and Wyoming as states, and enforcing federal election laws in the South (Bates 1935, 300--305). In the election of 1890, voters did not reward the House Republicans for suppressing obstruction and passing their party agenda. The Republicans went from a 173--156 majority to an 88--231 minority. The new Democratic majority promptly reinstated the right to filibuster, using the classic tactics of refusing to vote and making dilatory motions (Schickler 2001). In the 53rd Congress (1893--1895), the Democratic majority had shrunk to 220--126. Beginning in September 1893, the Republicans accepted the Democrats’ ‘‘offer’’ by filibustering almost nonstop. After almost five months, the Democrats agreed to restrain minority filibustering. The Republicans had lost their right, but they had gained a moral and political victory (Schickler 2001). The suppression of filibustering in the House marked a turning point in the history of the lower chamber. As Madison had predicted, the members of the House had traded chaos for highly centralized order. By the 1890s, the House had 357 members, and it would be impossible for the House to allow each of them to participate in debate and exercise procedural rights as fully as congress members had a century earlier. Once Thomas Reed became speaker again in 1895, a new order emerged in the House. The leaders of both parties were assigned to the Rules Committee, which granted ‘‘special’’ rules to important legislation at their discretion. Appropriations bills continued to come on the floor as soon as possible, but it was increasingly difficult to bring up other pieces of legislation using the calendar system. The majority party had taken over the House. Why didn’t the Senate follow the same course? The short answer is that they lacked the motive to delegate power to strong party leaders. By the end of the 1890s, the Senate had grown to 90 members, but this was still fewer members than the House had in 1793. The Senate adopted minor limits on debate and filibustering over the years and the Anthony Rule helped limit frustration by keeping the calendar clear of easy-to-pass bills. Senators overhauled their rules in 1884 to streamline their decision-making process. Of course, filibusters did occur in the Gilded Age Senate as well. were well-publicized filibusters in 1881 as both parties jockeyed for

control of the Senate, in 1891 as the Democrats blocked a last attempt by the Republicans to ensure fair voting in the South, and in 1893 as President Cleveland pushed through a bill to stop the government purchase of silver (Burdette 1940). These incidents, however, did not convince senators to take the same drastic steps required to suppress filibustering in the House. Nor, as discussed below, did the Senate empower their party leaders with formal legislative powers during this era.

Centralized Party Government, 1895--1911 The period from Reed’s return to the speakership to the revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon in 1910 are typically considered the high point of party influence in Congress. Conventional measures of party strength based on roll call votes confirm this claim: on votes that pitted most of one party against most of the opposing party from 1897 to 1909, Republicans and Democrats voted with their parties about 80 percent of the time, with a low of 77 percent for the Republicans during the 59th Congress (1905--1907). This apparent unity was due, in part, to the power wielded by party leaders. By this time, the speaker of the House had (1) complete control over committee assignments; (2) the prerogative to choose who he would call on to make speeches or motions; and (3) the leadership position on the Rules Committee. Thus the speaker could suppress issues that divided or embarrassed the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 2005), or induce members to vote with the party despite their misgivings. Nonetheless, Reed was forced by revolts within his own party to bring up measures declaring war on Spain and annexing Hawaii; Reed subsequently resigned rather than lead a party with which he disagreed (Strahan 1998). The House Republicans then chose David B. Henderson of Iowa as speaker. This choice is generally viewed as a shift toward a more conciliatory speaker, and perhaps also the result of meddling by politically strong senators (Schickler 2001). Henderson resigned after four years, and Joseph Cannon took his place. By choosing Cannon, the House Republicans voted for a stronger assertion of the House agenda to the Senate and president (Strahan 1998). Cannon was also thoroughly conservative, he was reluctant to spend federal dollars or add new regulations on the free workings of the market, and he aggressively used the power of the speakership to advance these views (Fuller 1909; Rager 1998; Remini 2006, 267--275).9 Joseph Cannon was speaker from 1903 to 1911. During this period, the nation and the Republican Party

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 237 became increasingly Progressive, that is, they sought openness in government, decentralized party organization, and active government regulation of the economy and provision of social welfare. While President Roosevelt advocated some Progressive reforms, Cannon and his allies resisted them; their opposition doomed inheritance and income taxes, workers’ compensation, and an eight-hour day. Joe Cannon became a national symbol of the status quo, making the House Republicans the target of popular disdain (Remini 2006, 271--72). Roosevelt experimented with a more public style of presidency by inviting press coverage of himself and his proposals. On occasion, he ‘‘went public’’ to pressure Congress, for example, to adopt the Hepburn Act regulating railroads (Tulis 1987). Cannon increased the majority party leaders’ grip on the House in response to filibustering by House Democrats. During the 60th Congress (1907--1909), the Democratic leader began forcing votes at every opportunity (and many remained even after Reed’s crackdown) with the goal of inducing the Republican majority to bring up legislation on campaign finance publicity, to argue the use of injunctions, and to eliminate tariffs on print paper. The Republicans responded by drastically limiting votes on appropriations bills and, temporarily, allowing motions to suspend the rules and pass a bill by majority vote any day of the week. This action drastically curtailed any debate or amendments and gave the speaker complete control over the chamber’s agenda (Fuller 1909, 258--259; McCall 1911, 88--90). Fuller states, ‘‘The methods of legislation to-day in the House of Representatives are quite the most arbitrary of any legislative body in the world’’ (1909, 259). At about the same time, the Senate Republicans were led by four senators: Nelson Aldrich, William Allison, Orville Platt, and John Spooner. These senators held a variety of party and committee leadership positions, including the chairs of the Appropriations, Finance, and Rules Committee, which they used to influence committee assignments and the floor schedule (Rothman 1966; Schickler 2001).10 Like the House, the appearance of party homogeneity does not mean the absence of intraparty strife; instead, disagreements were discussed and resolved in party meetings rather than on the Senate floor (Schickler 2001, 57--58). Furthermore, there was a fundamental difference between party government in the House and Senate: House party leaders enjoyed extraordinary formal powers and hence the ability to manipulate the legislative process and reward their allies. Senate party leaders, in contrast, led through the force of personality and favor-

trading with little formal power; their fellow Republicans could defy them and win with comparative ease.

The Revolt against Cannon From 1909 to 1911, the House significantly reduced the power of the speaker in several steps. The first reform, enacted on March 1, 1909, set aside Wednesday as the day for considering bills reported out of committee but not favored by a special rule from the Rules Committee. Two weeks later, the House set up a special process for passing bills by unanimous consent; like the Senate’s Anthony Rule, this was a quick process for passing uncontroversial bills. These were both limited reforms accepted by Cannon and his allies to head off more drastic proposals. In March 1910, George Norris (R-Neb.) succeeded in forcing a vote on a proposal to expand the Rules Committee, remove the speaker from the Rules Committee, and make appointments to the Rules Committee by majority vote. Norris and his fellow insurgent Republicans combined with the Democratic minority to push the reform through. In June 1910, the House adopted a committee discharge process so any member could try to extract a bill out a committee that refused to report on the bill. Finally, in March 1911, the new Democratic majority stripped the power to appoint committees from the speaker altogether and gave each party the right to make its own assignments subject to approval by a majority of the House (Binder 1997; Rager 1998; Schickler 2001). Why did the House adopt these radical changes? Scholars have highlighted several factors, for example, members’ dissatisfaction with their committee assignments. The strongest answer, suggested above, is that Cannon had become a lightning rod for public disapproval of congressional conservatism. House members found it politically rewarding to take a stand against Cannon: insurgent Republicans sought to distance themselves from Cannon, while Democrats hoped to highlight his unpopularity (Rager 1998; Schickler 2001). The cumulative effect of the anti-Cannon reforms was to decentralize agenda-setting powers within the House and party power within each party. Parties would continue to be primary actors in the House for the next decade, but instead of being directed by the will of a single leader, the emphasis was on collective governance and action (see Green 2002). At the same time, the anti-Cannon reforms mark a significant change in the autonomy of the House. To the extent that the reforms were driven by negative news coverage of Cannon, House members allowed media-generated

238 The Congress public opinion to drive purely internal choices. Clearly, however, House members were sincerely frustrated with Cannon’s tight grip on the House floor, and allowing one person and a few allies to set the agenda was an unstable system. The new path to the House floor, however, also made it easier for organized interests to circumvent the judgment of committee and party leaders.

Direct Elections for Senators Despite the success of Jackson supporters at erasing the Senate’s censure of Jackson, the practice of selecting senators in state legislatures did seem to insulate senators from voters (see Haynes 1938, 81--117, from which this section is drawn). However, legislative selection was also fraught with uncertainty and sordidness. In some cases, state legislatures simply deadlocked; no candidate could gain the support of a majority in both chambers. In 1866, Congress passed a law regulating Senate elections providing that if no senator was selected within a few days of the state legislature’s opening, the members of both the state house and senate must meet at noon every day and vote for a new senator. Nonetheless, deadlocks continued to occur. A related problem was that, in the effort to elect a senator, legislatures could agree on a dark horse candidate who was not necessarily qualified for the job. Another recurring problem with state legislative elections was that candidates or key economic interests in a state sometimes bribed state legislators to sway the outcome. From 1909 to 1911, the Senate debated and eventually rejected the election of William Lorimer of Illinois due to charges that his election was the result of bribery; this coincided with the Senate finally agreeing to a constitutional amendment providing for direct election of the Senate. Above all, media reporting highlighted the ability of a core group of Republican senators---Aldrich, Allison, Platt, and Spooner---to delay popular bills while serving the interests of bankers, trusts, and other business interests (Byrd 1988). For voters eager to see their lives change, it was frustrating that they were impeded by politicians who (they believed) were out of touch and out of reach. Senators were reluctant to switch to direct elections. From 1893 to 1902, the House voted for a direct election constitutional amendments five times, only to see the Senate ignore the proposal. On the sixth try in February 1911, senators voted the amendment down 54-33. A new Congress convened weeks later and, after some debate, approved the amendment for ratification.

Senators’ acceptance of this change was due to the continuing (and well-publicized) difficulties of legislative selection, the fact that many of them had were the winners of de facto popular elections,11 and the threat that states would call their own constitutional convention to craft their own direct election amendment. The amendment was ratified by May 1913. As in the House, the years 1909 to 1911 marked an important transition in the Senate. By 1911 the last of the leading Republicans, Nelson Aldrich, had retired and the Senate had accepted direct elections. The nature of the House and Senate reforms differed, but both reduced the autonomy of Congress. The House became less effective without a strong, centralized leadership structure to push legislation through a complex system. The Senate changed more subtly. While scholars have debated the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the partisan composition of the Senate and senators’ voting patterns, there were subtle shifts in senators’ behavior. Senators were less focused on legislating and more focused on position-taking; by 1918, senators complained that their colleagues’ interest in speaking on the topic of the day was sapping the time of the chamber and detracting from discussion of actual legislation. In any event, the Senate had allowed popular resentment of its autonomy to fester and been forced to accept a fundamental change in its elections.

Conclusion In both chambers, major changes were provoked by public disenchantment with the effects of congressional autonomy on public policy. Both the revolt against Cannon and the imposition of direct elections had their roots in the perception that key members of Congress were using their discretion to block legislation that the country needed. Whether their obstruction was due to sincere convictions or sinister corruption, the reluctance of these key members to respond to public preferences motivated a desire for institutional change. While it is difficult to pick the moment that epochs end, it is fair to consider these changes the end of the era of congressional supremacy. In 1913, members of Congress would face a president who embraced Teddy Roosevelt’s bully pulpit and used it more enthusiastically than ever: Woodrow Wilson (Tulis 1987). Members of Congress eventually would overcome Wilson’s aggressive tactics, but Congress had lost the combination of autonomy and popularity that made it the dominant branch.

The Era of Congressional Dominance, 1789--1911 239

References and Further Reading Adler, E. Scott. 2002. Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Alexander, De Alva Stanwood. 1916. History and Procedure of the House of Representatives. Boston: Riverside Press. Bates, Ernest S. 1936. Story of Congress: 1789--1935. New York: Harper & Brothers. Binder, Sarah A. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Burdette, Franklin L. 1940. Filibustering in the Senate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Byrd, Robert. 1988. The Senate: 1789--1989: Addresses on the History of the United States Senate. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Cooper, Joseph. 1970. ‘‘The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.’’ Rice University Studies 56: 1--167. Cooper, Joseph, and Cheryl D. Young. 1989. ‘‘Bill Introduction in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of Institutional Change.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 14: 67--105. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cunningham, Noble. 1957. The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789--1801. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dion, Douglas. 1997. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Feller, Daniel. 2004. ‘‘The Bank War.’’ In The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian Zelizer. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Fuller, Hubert Bruce. 1909. The Speakers of the House. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. Gamm, Gerald, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. ‘‘Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810--1825.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 14: 39--66. Gamm, Gerald, and Steven S. Smith. 2000. ‘‘Last Among Equals: The Senate’s Presiding Officer.’’ In Esteemed Colleagues: Civility and Deliberation in the U.S. Senate, ed. Burdette A. Loomis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Gamm, Gerald, and Steven S. Smith. 2006. ‘‘The Rise of Floor Leaders in the United States Senate, 1890--1915.’’ Presented at the 2006 Party Effects in the Senate Conference, Duke University. Green, Matthew N. 2002. ‘‘Institutional Change, Party Discipline, and the House Democratic Caucus, 1911--1919.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (4): 601--633. Haynes, George H. 1938. The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. James, Scott. 2000. Presidents, Parties, and the State. New York: Oxford University Press. Jenkins, Jeffrey A., and Charles Stewart. 2002. ‘‘Order From Chaos: the Transformation of the Committee System in the House, 1816--22.’’ In Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress,

ed. David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jenkins, Jeffrey A., and Charles Stewart. 2003. ‘‘Out in the Open: The Emergence of Viva Voce Voting in House Speakership Elections.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 28: 481-508. Jenkins, Jeffrey A., and Timothy P. Nokken. 2000. ‘‘The Institutional Origins of the Republican Party: A Spatial Voting Analysis of the House Speakership Election of 1855--6.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly XXV: 101--130. Kerr, Clara Hannah. 1895. The Origin and Development of the United States Senate. Ithaca, NY: Andrus & Church. Koger, Gregory. 2002. Obstruction in the House and Senate: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Choice. PhD dissertation, UCLA. Koger, Gregory. Forthcoming. Going to the Mattresses: Filibustering in Congress, 1789--2004. Luce, Robert. 1922. Legislative Procedure. Boston: Riverside Press. Ludlum, Robert P. 1941. ‘‘The Antislavery ‘Gag-Rule’: History and Argument.’’ The Journal of Negro History 26: 203--243. McCall, Samuel W. 1911. The Business of Congress. New York: Columbia University Press. McConachie, Lauros G. 1898. Congressional Committees. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. McCown, Ada C. 1927. The Congressional Conference Committee. New York: Columbia University Press. Moore, Joseph West. 1895. The American Congress. New York: Harper and Brothers. Neely, Mark E. Jr. 2004. ‘‘The Civil War.’’ In The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian Zelizer. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Price, Douglas. 1977. ‘‘Careers and Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change.’’ In The History of Parliamentary Behavior, ed. William Ayderlott. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rager, Scott William. 1998. ‘‘Uncle Joe Cannon: The Brakeman of the House of Representatives, 1903--11.’’ In Masters of the House, ed. Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Remini, Robert V. 1963. The Election of Andrew Jackson. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Remini, Robert V. 2006. The House: The History of the House of Representatives. New York: Smithsonian Books. Robinson, William A. 1930. Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co. Rothman, David J. 1966. Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869--1901. New York: Atheneum. Schickler, Eric. 2001. Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schickler, Eric, and John Sides. 2000. ‘‘Intergenerational Warfare: The Senate Decentralizes Appropriations.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 35: 551--575. Simpson, Brooks D. 2004. ‘‘Reconstruction.’’ In The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian Zelizer. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building A New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877--1920. New York: Cambridge University Press.

240 The Congress Stewart, Charles H., III. 1989. Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865--1921. New York: Cambridge University Press. Strahan, Randall. 1998. ‘‘Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise of Party Government.’’ In Masters of the House, ed. Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Swift, Elaine K. 1996. The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change in Congress, 1787--1841. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Swift, Elaine K. 1998. ‘‘The Start of Something New: Clay, Stevenson, Polk, and the Development of the Speakership, 1789--1869.’’ In Masters of the House, ed. Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Theriault, Sean M. 2003. ‘‘Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People.’’ Journal of Politics 65: 50--68. Theriault, Sean M. 2005. Power of the People: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Tichenor, Daniel J., and Richard A. Harris. 2002/2003. ‘‘Organized Interests and American Political Development.’’ Political Science Quarterly 117: 587--612. Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wilson, Woodrow. 1885. Congressional Government. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Wirls, Daniel, and Stephen Wirls. 2004. The Invention of the United States Senate. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Notes 1. The Federalist Papers can be read at http://thomas.loc. gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html. 2. The Senate continued to meet privately on treaties and nominations until 1929; now a vote is required to meet in secrecy (Haynes 1938, 670).

3. In 1790, for example, House members filibustered by speaking during debate on the location of the capital (Remini 2006, 46). 4. This was the common interpretation of the ‘‘majority quorum’’ clause in Article 1 of the Constitution. As we shall see, interpretations can change. 5. This included congressional efforts to undermine Adams. At the session that began in 1827, ‘‘The President’s message fell on deaf ears, the executive recommendations were ignored. . . . The entire six months [of the 1827-1828 session] were devoted to the cause of partisan politics’’ (Fuller 1909, 60). 6. The Senate’s tendency to treat its rules as permanent unless changed became a key issue in efforts to reform the Senate cloture rule and pave the way for civil rights bills in the mid-20th century. 7. These occurred on appropriations and financial bills, the New Jersey elections debate, and the slavery petition rule discussed below. Note, however, that these filibusters were waged with dilatory motions and quorum-breaking as well as long speeches. 8. The Senate decentralized its appropriations bills in 1897; this change highlighted tension between junior and senior senators (Schickler and Sides 2000). 9. Fuller notes, ‘‘It has well been said that had [Cannon] attended the caucus on Creation he would have remained throughout loyal to Chaos’’ (1909, 252). 10. The Senate Rules Committee never became the agendasetting organ like its House counterpart. A large part of its function is dispensing internal favors and patronage, for example, unlabeled rooms in the Capitol known as ‘‘hideaways’’ where a senator can relax in private. 11. In 1906 Oregon adopted a preferential primary vote---that is, voters could express whether they would prefer Smith or Jones---combined with a system by which state legislative candidates pledged to obey the results of the preferential ballot. The Oregon system was soon adopted in several states. Additionally, several southern states had primary elections that were the equivalent of a direct election since the Democrats were the dominant party in those states.

The Making of the Modern Congress Richard A. Harris Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Administration, Rutgers University--Camden

Introduction While the constitutional design of our founding fathers still shapes the contemporary Congress of the United States, the legislature has undergone profound changes in both its structure and processes and, more important, in its relation to the executive branch of government. It is clear that the founding vision of American government placed Congress in the primary policy-making role and bestowed the veto power on the president so that the office could check and balance the democratic force with which the legislature was imbued. As that great observer of American Democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, noted in evaluating the American presidency, ‘‘Hitherto, no citizen has cared to expose his honor and his life in order to become the President of the United States, because the power of that office is temporary, limited, and subordinate’’ (1966, 128). Tocqueville saw the president, as the founders intended, as subordinate to the Congress. By the middle of the 20th century, however, these roles were essentially reversed and the Congress acted as a restraint on the power of the executive. This role reversal between the Congress and the president is a central storyline in American political development and provides a window into the way that historical forces of nationalization and industrialization transformed the Congress, along with the rest of the U.S. government, from the nation’s founding to the early 21st century. If any of the founders who labored on crafting the Constitution were alive today, they surely would recognize salient features of the Congress that they created

such as bicameralism, the longer terms of office and broader electoral constituencies in the Senate than in the House of Representatives, the predominance of the Senate in foreign affairs, and the origination of appropriations funding in the House. Moreover, visible vestiges of their commitment to legislative primacy in the early republic are evident even today. Any observant visitor to Washington, D.C., will notice that the U.S. Capitol, the seat of the national legislature, sits atop a hill overlooking all of the other government buildings save the Supreme Court, which is situated behind the houses of Congress. The Constitution itself begins in its first article with an articulation of the powers of Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary being described respectively in Articles II and III, respectively. The bicameral structure of Congress, in fact, was deemed a necessity to constrain the power of the legislature, the branch of government most directly coupled to the source of legitimate power in America, ‘‘we the people.’’ Given the architectural symbolism of Congress’s location on the national mall as well as its centrality in the constitutional scheme and its closer electoral ties to the people, it is beyond question that the founding generation viewed the legislative department, to use their terminology, as the most important, the most powerful, and the most democratic branch of government. In the 21st century, though, those attributes are commonly associated with the office of the president and the occupant of that office in particular. The founders would be deeply perplexed by the diminished role of the Congress relative to the president in contemporary

242 The Congress America. Whereas today the public and the mass media look to the White House as the source of budgetary and programmatic initiatives, Americans in the early republic viewed Congress as the prime mover in domestic politics and policy making. Even more mystifying for the founders would be the quasi-legislative authority exercised by executive agencies pursuant to their regulatory and rulemaking powers. The notion of a vast array of executive agencies wielding lawmaking authority delegated to them by the Congress itself would have been viewed by the founders as a grotesque perversion of the constitutional separation of powers. Yet, from the vantage point of the present-day American politics, this enhanced role of the executive appears to be a pragmatic response to modern socioeconomic conditions rather than a radical departure from the founders’ original intent. The development first of an industrial and subsequently a postindustrial society in America outstripped the capacity of the original constitutional design and focused popular attention on the national government, generally, and on the presidency, specifically, for remedies to emergent policy problems (Bensel 2000). The diminution of Congress in relation to the executive is more than a little ironic, because it occurred principally as a result of the historical shift in the locus of policy making from the states to the national government, and the constitutional basis for the expansion of the national role in public policy rests in large measure on the powers of the legislature as set forth in Article I, section 8: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. . . . And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. [Emphasis added] The authorization of Congress to provide for the general welfare, of course, leaves it for each generation to define the ‘‘general welfare’’ and the scope of government activity necessary to craft legislation for that purpose. It is indisputable that Americans’ conception of the government’s role in providing for the general welfare has expanded significantly in 200 years. Federal government responsibility for reducing pollution,

contributing to elementary and secondary education, ensuring workplace safety and the purity of foods and drugs are all tasks we readily accept today. It is inconceivable that the founders contemplated these activities as falling within the ambit of section 8. In addition, the necessary and proper language in this section, often referred to as the elastic clause of the Constitution, has served, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, to provide a wide berth for legislative action in pursuit of the general welfare. Section 8 also contains the so-called commerce clause granting Congress the power ‘‘To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.’’ This particular provision, similarly, has provided a basis for creation of federal authority limited only by our capacity to (re)define ‘‘interstate commerce.’’ In a 1977 case, Philadelphia v. New Jersey (430 U.S. 141) for example, the Supreme Court went so far as to deny New Jersey the right to ban the importation of solid waste, ruling that trash disposal constitutes interstate commerce and its importation lies beyond the regulatory reach of any state. Beyond providing for amusing conversation, this case does illustrate how the constitutional bases of legislative authority have aided in the transfer of policy making from states and municipalities to Washington, D.C. As this change unfolded in the early 20th century and the national government took on a more active role, Congress increasingly found itself at a disadvantage in relation to the presidency with respect to communications, expertise, and ability to address national issues (Mowry 1947; Tulis 1988). Moreover, as legislators adapted to their new policy-making responsibilities, they instituted organizational and procedural changes in Congress that devolved and divided legislative authority, ultimately frustrating democratic demands for change and undermining its governing primacy that the founders had envisioned. As the essay by Gregory Koger suggests, the period of the late-19th and early 20th century, the epoch of the Populist movement and the Progressive Era in American politics, constituted a watershed in the transformation of Congress. Until the late-19th century, Americans, with the notable exception of slavery and the concomitant issue of admitting new states to the Union, viewed state and local government rather than Congress as a primary source of domestic policy making. Leading up to the Civil War, Congress was the political battleground in which supporters of slavery clashed with abolitionists, and the critical policy question was whether new states would enter as slave or free. The Missouri Compromise (1820) and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) constituted the key

The Making of the Modern Congress ‘‘achievements’’ of Congress in this ignominious history of trying to accommodate the ‘‘peculiar institution’’ of slavery’’ (Stampp 1956).1 Following the Civil War, though, the emergence of a national economy gave rise to large industrial and financial enterprises that destabilized established patterns of commerce, fomented socioeconomic upheavals, and compelled Americans to reexamine the adequacy and the efficacy of their 18thcentury constitutional arrangements governing the relationship among the people, the economy, and government (Keller 1994; Sklar 1988). Initially, Americans looked to their state legislatures to control corporate power. However, this approach began to shift radically with the crystallization of the U.S. Supreme Court’s view that the new transcontinental economic system existed beyond the scope and jurisdiction of state regulation. The Court removed railroads corporations, the primary object of Populist and Progressive criticism from the purview of state regulatory authority. In its landmark Wabash Railroad decision, the Supreme Court argued, It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right of continuous transportation from one end of the country to the other is essential in modern times to that freedom of commerce from the restraints which the State might choose to impose upon it, that the commerce clause was intended to secure. (Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 [1886]) In other words, since railroads were national corporations engaged in interstate commerce, the Constitution required that any attempt to regulate their activity must emanate from the Congress rather than any state capital. As a consequence, new demands emerged for Washington, D.C., to directly address policy problems that previously had been handled at lower levels of government. Most notably, Americans sought government restraint of the monopolistic power of trusts and large corporations, which had widespread political as well as economic ramifications. In a three-year span, Congress did respond first with enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) in 1887, the year after the Wabash Railroad decision, and then with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The Court, however, continued to oppose strong federal regulatory authority both through a narrow interpretation of the ICA and a tortured application of the Sherman Act in which it was asserted, seemingly at odds with the implications of Wabash, that the federal government could not regulate manufacturing firms because their operations were not interstate commerce even if they

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sold in a national market. As the justices sought to maintain in the Sugar Trust case, the Sherman Act did not apply to a manufacturing monopoly because [t]hat which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State. . . . Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary and not the primary sense . . . Commerce succeeds manufacture, and is not a part of it. (United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 [1895]) Thus, federal efforts to control big business foundered and new demands were thrust upon Congress to rectify perceived economic injustices that the Court perpetuated. Ironically, the more policy concerns shifted upward from the states and localities to Washington, D.C., the more Congress was diminished in the public eye as it proved unresponsive to persistent demands for change articulated through Populist and Progressive legislators elected from the Midwest and the West. Agrarian Populist leaders such as William Jennings Bryan (D-Neb.) and Progressive reformers such as Robert Lafollette (R-Wis.) alike railed against the deleterious impacts of corporations and trusts and advocated for Congress to enact stronger legislation to protect farmers, workers, and small businessmen from the alleged predations of corporate leaders whom Theodore Roosevelt characterized as ‘‘malefactors of great wealth.’’ The concerted efforts of Roosevelt and bipartisan reform forces in Congress did result in the enactment of the Hepburn Act in 1906, an attempt by Populists and Progressives to improve railroad regulation by putting more teeth into the Interstate Commerce Act. The Hepburn Act proved to be a pyrrhic victory, however. Unfortunately for reformers, both in and out of Congress, the legislature as well as the courts had become inhospitable arenas for pursuing additional federal regulation. Stymied as they were by a highly centralized legislative process under the control of conservative ‘‘Old Guard Republicans’’ in league with the federal judiciary intent on defending a laissez-faire economy, Democrats imbued with Populist’s ambitions and Republicans of a Progressive persuasion found no recourse within the institutional architecture and power arrangements of the Congress. Accordingly, reformers advocating a more robust federal regulatory posture recognized that, as a first step on the road to policy change, Congress itself

244 The Congress

Members of the congressional Shipping Board Committee convene before a hearing, between 1910--1920. Following the ‘‘House Revolt of 1910,’’ committees enjoyed more independence from party leadership. (Library of Congress)

required reforming to make it more responsive to democratic demands. Their work at institutional reform essentially restructured Congress and laid the foundation for the growth of government in the Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society eras. Just as important, though, this watershed period led to the transformation of Congress from an institution characterized by strong, centralized, partisan control and significant turnover among legislators to one in which legislators could carve out long-term careers and their own power bases, independent of party leadership in either the House or

Senate. Ultimately, the intransigence of congressional leadership, especially in the House of Representatives, led to a revolt in 1910 against centralized legislative authority and the establishment of committee government and the seniority system, both of which developed into cornerstones of the career model of legislative service. Paradoxically, as congressional careers became more stable and individual legislators became better positioned to deliver programs or create federal agencies in response to external political demands, the more Congress, as an institution, declined in the public’s

The Making of the Modern Congress estimation versus the executive. At the heart of this decline, throughout the 20th century, lay two interrelated developments set in motion by the 1910 revolution: (1) the devolution of congressional authority from party leadership to senior members of congressional committees and eventually subcommittees (Polsby 1968); and (2) the delegation of quasi-legislative authority to administrative agencies charged with implementing new laws to control corporate behavior or redistribute resources to key constituencies (Dodd and Schott 1979; Fiorina 1989). The decline of Congress from its original constitutional position may be attributed largely to its own institutional devolution of decision making and balkanization of leadership, which emerged initially in response to popular demands for government action against corporate power, but which, over time, accentuated the natural advantages of the presidency. This process of devolution began with the so-called House Revolt of 1910.

The House Revolt of 1910 and the Seventeenth Amendment Popular outrage with large corporations and the trusts followed on the post--Civil War industrial transformation of the American political economy. Agrarian interests as well as small businesses agitated vigorously for Congress to enact government regulation to rein in the monopolistic power exercised by these new enterprises that seemed to operate outside of the discipline of the free market and with the complicity of the courts. After the unhappy experience of the Supreme Court undermining the intent of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act, new legislative efforts resulted in passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906 to invigorate the ICA. However, these democratic demands were generally frustrated not only by the Court, but more important by conservative Republican control of the Congress. The level of frustration was exacerbated by the rising cost of living in the early 20th century, which reformers attributed not only to the unbridled economic power of big manufacturing firms that kept prices high, but also to their political influence that seemed to sustain high tariffs, thereby driving up prices for consumers as well as farmers and merchants. High tariffs, long the foundation of Republican economic policy, increasingly alienated midwestern and western Republican legislators along with Democratic legislators representing the South who historically had favored low tariffs. These representatives, however, confronted a congressional leadership controlled by Old Guard Republicans who were as opposed to

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lowering tariffs as they were to regulating large corporations. The frustration level of reform-minded legislators and their constituents grew as turnover rates in Congress declined during the late-19th and early 20th century and even relatively senior legislators were checkmated in their efforts to enact stronger regulatory policy or lower tariffs. Before the Civil War, turnover rates in the House of Representatives hovered in the 50 percent range, meaning that from one Congress to the next approximately half of the membership changed.2 By the late-19th century turnover rates had settled into the 35 percent range and many of the legislators who were being reelected represented regions that demanded lower tariffs and increased regulation. The procedures and legislative processes in the House, however, ensured that the reform agenda, even if supported by a bipartisan majority, could not succeed. The House at that time was organized with a strong speaker system under which, the speaker of the House chaired the Rules Committee and appointed the members as well as chairs of all standing committees. Thus, a single individual exercised effective control over the policy agenda as well as the voting procedures of the lower body. With respect to tariff policy, this meant absolute control of the legislative process as the Constitution mandates that all revenue bills must originate in the House. This system depended on a candidate for speaker building a supportive coalition by promising committee appointments, including chairmanships, to various individuals within his party. Since, for obvious reasons, the initial vote to organize committees and elect House leadership took place along strictly partisan lines, once a speaker had assembled his coalition, the leadership of the bodies was a foregone conclusion. As the conservative Old Guard of the Republican Party reliably supported pro-business (that is, minimal regulation and low tariff) policies, and as Progressives in the GOP (Grand Old Party) sided with the party on organizational votes, their agenda remained doomed despite the majority they formed along with Democrats favoring reform. Party loyalty for the Progressive Republicans, therefore, amounted to a suicide pact with respect to their policy goals. The final straw came in 1909 with the enactment of the infamous Payne-Aldrich Tariff, which increased levies yet again. Adding injury to insult, Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon and his Old Guard comrades proceeded to target for defeat in the next election insurgents in their own party who had opposed the new tariff law. The resulting House Revolt of 1910 saw Progressive Republicans from the Midwest break ranks on the vote organizing the new House and join forces with

246 The Congress Democrats to overturn the strong speaker system, which they both recognized as the critical impediment to their legislative agenda. While the House Revolt is historically significant in its own rights, its importance from the perspective of American political development and the evolution of Congress is that it replaced the strong speaker system with a system of committee government based on the seniority rule. Republican insurgents and their Democratic allies stripped the speaker of the Rules Committee chairmanship and the power to appoint committee members and chairs. Instead, members of Congress would accede to membership on a committee by virtue of their seniority in the chamber; the longer one’s tenure, the sooner one was selected the committees on which he or she preferred to serve. In addition, the most senior member of the majority party would serve as chair. Legislative authority, then, devolved from a single individual, the speaker of the House, to the various chairs and most senior members of standing committees. In a sense the ‘‘monarchy’’ of a strong speaker ruling with untrammeled authority was replaced with a ‘‘feudal’’ system in which committee chairs functioned as barons ruling their policy fiefdoms, albeit in consultation with senior colleagues from both parties. The Senate, in short order, followed the lead of the House in adopting the seniority rule, thereby establishing the committee government in both houses of the Congress. Popular displeasure with the functioning of Congress, however, was not limited to the role of conservative leadership in blocking regulation and lower tariffs. The Senate drew the ire of reform advocates who questioned the constitutional mechanism of electing senators through the state legislatures. Even as House leadership was criticized as being in the thrall of corporate interests, the Senate was attacked by muckraking journalists of the early 20th century. Political cartoonist Thomas Nast famously depictured senators as contributing $1 million to state legislatures in exchange for election to the Senate. The more insidious allegation was that business and financial interests that could afford to raise such sums entered an unholy alliance with political machines such as Tammany Hall in New York or the Pendergast Gang in Kansas City, providing princely sums of cash to party bosses or even bribes to individual state legislators for the assurance of electing friendly senators. These accounts reinforced the storyline that plutocrats rather than the people ruled the American republic. Calls for the direct election of senators date back to the platform of the 1892 Peoples Party, but gathered momentum concomitantly with the push to overthrow the speaker system. A year after the

1910 Revolt, the House of Representatives passed a resolution for the Seventeenth Amendment mandating the direct election of senators, and the final ratification by Connecticut was achieved in 1913. By Woodrow Wilson’s first term as president, then, the Congress had been transformed in it structure, its procedures, and its mode of electing senators. This amendment, like the House Revolt of 1910, was in keeping with the reform program of changing the institution of Congress, not so much as an end in itself but rather as a means to achieving thwarted policy objectives. Arguments for the inherent value of overthrowing the speaker or the popular election of senators emerged more as a post hoc rationalization than as a primary line of reasoning. As with many major political reforms, though, short-term victories led to unintended long-term consequences. Rather than holding any innate advantage for generating sound public policy, the virtue of committee government lay in the fact that it was not the strong speaker system. In addition, the institution of this new process of legislation, although ostensibly an attempt to give voice to democratic demands long suppressed by oligarchic economic forces, soon came to serve the electoral interests of the legislators. As senior members of Congress, especially committee chairs, assumed the critical role of gatekeepers to the legislative process, they could exact tribute or at least deference policy advocates, fellow legislators, or even presidents. Indeed, just as the speaker was able to appoint committee members and chairs prior to 1910, committee chairs held the prerogative of appointing subcommittee members and chairs under committee government. In this position, they could and at times did advance policy goals and democratic demands. Conversely, however, powerful senior members of Congress could use their chairmanships to block legislative initiatives. These policy impacts notwithstanding, committee government served, in the first instance, as a means of maintaining and developing congressional careers. The demands for national policy making and decline in turnover help provide the essential impetus for the construction of committee government, but once in place, that system created a positive feedback loop, reinforcing national over state policy making and further driving down turnover rates to under 15 percent at the end of the 20th century. By that time, political scientists were concerned about undue incumbency advantages and the lack of responsibility or leadership in Congress as legislators developed stable political careers based on their institutional capability to serve constituencies and mount election campaigns independently from party organizations.

The Making of the Modern Congress

Congress, Committee Government, and Devolution The emergence of professional legislators with longterm careers was a direct result of the interplay between the centralization of policy making at the national level and the devolution of authority under the seniority system and committee government. Centralization attracted individuals to serve in Congress so they might shape government responses to the socioeconomic challenges presented by the new economy. Seniority emerged as a basis for achieving leadership positions in response to the frustration Populist and Progressive legislators experienced when their repeated efforts to enact more robust regulatory laws were thwarted by conservative, Republican leaders who sided with corporate interests. Seniority provided legislators, once elected, with the means not only to advance a policy agenda free from the tight control of party leaders, but also to carve out stable and predictable congressional careers as long as they were reelected. This transformation of Congress which began, as we have seen, at the turn of the 20th century, reflected the great shift in America from a political culture in which government was viewed as a potential threat to individuals and liberty to one in which an active government was viewed by citizens and their elected representatives as necessary to guaranteeing individual rights and the general welfare. This shift from classical to modern liberalism set the nation and the Congress on a course of increasing numbers of federal programs for regulation or wealth distribution and a concomitant expansion of a federal bureaucracy to administer these programs. As the modern administrative state unfolded through the New Deal and the Great Society, the seniority system and committee government promoted policy specialization among legislators who pragmatically chose to serve on committees that maximized their opportunities to benefit constituents. In turn, the standing committees that both authorized the new programs and established the bureaucratic agencies necessary to implement them quite naturally developed expertise in the laws and budgets of those agencies. On the one hand, this specialization and expertise ensured the continuity and deep knowledge essential for sound legislation as well as effective congressional oversight, in keeping with the notion of Congress providing a check and balance on the executive branch. On the other hand, the interaction of committees and agencies opened up opportunities for senior members of Congress to exploit their oversight and appropriation authority to secure and advance their legislative

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careers. As the political scientist Theodore Lowi sardonically observed, this relationship ‘‘raised conflict of interest to a principle of governance’’ (Lowi 1969, 85-97). Political scientists, by the 1940s, had identified the institutional hallmark of this purported conflict of interest as the ‘‘subgovernment,’’ an ongoing interaction among the following: (1) a congressional committee with legislative jurisdiction over a policy area; (2) a set of organized interests with a stake in that policy area; and (3) a bureaucratic agency with programmatic authority over that policy area. Innumerable such subgovernment or ‘‘policy subsystems’’ developed in the 20th century as government took on an ever-expanding role in providing for the general welfare, attracting client or policy advocacy groups to coalesce around relevant committees and agencies. This system, which Lowi labeled interest group liberalism, led him to conclude that modern liberalism, ironically, had taken on a conservative cast because the narrow set of participants in each subgovernment had every incentive to develop and maintain a modus vivendi that served their common interests rather than the public interest and that restricted participation in policy decisions to those already engaged. While he was concerned with the grand question of how these multiple subgovernments undermined the legitimacy of the larger political regime, his insight has particular resonance for our understanding of Congress under committee government. In the post-1910 Congress, senior members of the House and Senate were well positioned to preside over the emergent subgovernments inasmuch as the standing committees they chaired served at once as the primary access point for stakeholders to policy making and the patrons for relevant bureaucratic agencies. From this position, legislators could serve key constituencies and organized interests both by proposing and enacting specific programs and by interceding with federal agencies if issues arose in the course of implementing those programs. In a sense, legislators could have their cake and eat it too: in the first instance, they could claim credit for creating programs and agencies to meet the needs of constituents and stakeholders, while subsequently they could intervene with the agencies on behalf of citizens or organizations aggrieved by administrative actions. Both sets of activities served legislators’ reelection interests. Over time, this system became more entrenched as the devolution of authority, originally sought to free reformers from the control of a conservative congressional leadership, created barriers to effective participation for the broad public. Without specialized policy knowledge and the

248 The Congress professional capacity to engage on a regular basis, ordinary citizens and others outside the world of subgovernmental politics could not participate effectively. The new regime of interest group liberalism empowered political and economic elites at the expense of the public more than ever before and generated powerful inertial forces to sustain the status quo, including the careers of senior legislators (Schattschneider 1975). This regime, moreover, lent itself to a highly balkanized and even contradictory policy process in which House or Senate leadership deferred to committee chairs (Dodd and Schott 1979). Congress spoke with many voices as each subgovernment catered to its own stakeholders and the constituencies, especially those dear to committee chairs. Committee government clearly made congressional politics an insider’s game. Reform forces and the public at large therefore turned their attention to the president, exacerbating Congress’s disadvantage in relation to the executive. Whether liberal reformers and the broad public were interested in changing policy, creating new programs that might challenge the existing order, or making regulatory agencies more responsive, they found Congress under committee government an unfriendly arena in which to pursue their goals because legislators, lobbyists, and bureaucrats preferred control and predictability to democracy and change. By the 1950s, political scientists began referring to subgovernments as ‘‘iron triangles,’’ suggesting their obduracy and impenetrability. Although senior committee chairs clearly sat at the apex of these iron triangles, students of subgovernmental politics in the 1940s and 1950s showed that these committees and the agencies, particularly those charged with regulating particular industries they oversaw, were essentially ‘‘captured’’ by the very organized interests whose activity they were charged with controlling (Bernstein 1956). The standing committees that authorized legislation lay at the heart of the conservative impetus of committee government, but congressional commitment to the status quo received additional support from senior members’ control over other types of committees as well. In both the House and the Senate, appropriations committees control the funding of programs and agencies. The chairs of the various appropriations subcommittees charged with drafting funding bills for particular areas of the federal budget were highly coveted posts through which senior members of Congress could reward friends and punish foes. The Senate Committee on Revenue and Taxation and the House Ways and Means Committee controlled the tax code as well as the federal government’s ability to raise revenue

essential to funding programs or agencies, placing their senior members in similarly advantageous positions. In the House a specialized body, the Rules Committee, determines which bills will make it to the floor, their priority, and the procedures under which they are considered. For obvious reasons, the chairs of each of these committees, also determined by the seniority rule, wielded extraordinary power. Without appropriations or revenue streams, programs to support or regulate manufacturers, retailers, consumers, seniors, schools, police, transportation, and so on would exist only on paper and the agencies charged with implementing these programs would not have the capacity to do so. The Rules Committee constitutes an important institutional mechanism to provide an orderly legislative process in the House of Representatives, a body with 435 members; it also provides a choke point and therefore a power position for its chair. All of the committees in Congress offered incumbents, especially senior incumbents, the opportunity to leverage their positions in furtherance of their electoral interest by providing programs and funding for favored stakeholders and constituencies and foreclosing opportunities for those out of favor. As the cost of television advertizing and political consultants drove the price of congressional campaigns to unheard of heights in the late-20th century, chairing a key committee proved to be an invaluable fund-raising asset. This system of seniority and committee government explains much about the declining turnover rates in Congress, as well as the extraordinary difficulty advocates of popular regulatory or redistribution proposals such as national health care faced. It also explains the proliferation of committees and, by extension, the increase and added complexity of subgovernments, as more and more senior members sought the electoral advantages that went along with chairmanships. In fact, by the end of the New Deal Era, there were 33 committees in the Senate and 48 in the House. These committees frequently had overlapping or competing jurisdictions and, despite the longevity of senior members, they often lacked the mastery of technical knowledge that organized interests and bureaucracies brought to the table. Congress was unable to address these issues until the end of World War II, but in 1945 it appointed a special committee to examine the legislative process under committee government. The following year saw the enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which sought to reduce the number and increase the capabilities of committees in both houses of Congress. The Act cut the number of standing committees in the Senate from 33 to 15 and in the House from

The Making of the Modern Congress 48 to 19, with the twin objectives of rationalizing committee jurisdictions and improving accessibility for the public. The law authorized professional staff for committees to increase their capacity in interactions with lobbyists and bureaucrats. As a further measure to improve policy coherence and overcome the atomization of the legislative process, the 1946 Act authorized the creation of party-based policy committees to vet legislative goals and set committee agendas; only the Senate, however, availed itself of this option. As wellintentioned as the Reorganization Act was, it fundamentally failed in its objectives because it addressed merely the symptoms of committee government’s pathologies rather than their underlying cause, the seniority rule. In fact, the enhanced capabilities and staff of committees served to strengthen the hand of senior committee chairs. By the middle of the 1950s, committee government was at its height, although political storm clouds were gathering as the Populist and Progressive forces, now subsumed by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, found themselves blocked at every turn by conservative committee chairs---much as reformers at the beginning of the century found themselves thwarted by conservative leaders in the House and Senate.

Congress and Its Second Procedural Revolution: The Revolt of 1970 In the 1950s, liberal legislators with a sense of history would have seen the great paradox that the procedural revolution their Progressive progenitors executed in 1910 to topple conservative control of Congress ultimately resulted in a conservative restoration. The fact that the decentralized structure of committee government instead of centralized party control permitted a new conservatism to hold sway in Congress mattered little to legislators and their supporters who pursued a modern liberal vision of government. The liberal agenda of the post--World War II period had shifted from the early 20th century economic issues of control over monopolies and legitimating collective bargaining for labor to contemporary social concerns with civil rights, health care, and a stronger federal role in education, all of which were suppressed by the new institutional conservatism of committee government and seniority. In fact, the status quo character of committee government was accentuated by virtue of the fact that conservative Democrats from the ‘‘solid South’’ had accumulated the most seniority and therefore chaired critical committees in both houses of Congress. Even though Dwight Eisenhower was elected twice in the

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1950s and partisan control of the Congress seesawed back and forth between Republicans and Democrats, conservative legislators continued to control Congress. By virtue of their seniority, southern conservatives assumed control of committees whenever the Democrats were in the majority and made common cause with Republicans to impede further expansion of the national government. The Southerners chairing critical committees sought to sustain states’ rights to block federal civil rights and school desegregation policy, while the Republicans, largely stripped of their Progressive base after Franklin Roosevelt forged the New Deal coalition, generally resisted any further expansion of federal authority in business regulation, education, health care, or labor policy. Together, they formed a nearly impregnable barrier to liberal legislation regardless of which party controlled Congress, although the complicity of their southern colleagues was particularly galling for liberal Democrats when their party held the majority. In the House of Representatives, Howard Smith (DVa.) was an implacable foe of civil rights legislation and, when Democrats controlled the House, he wielded his power as chair of the Rules Committee ruthlessly in opposition to civil rights and other liberal initiatives, often refusing to call committee meetings or keeping proposed bills off the Committee’s agenda. He proved to be no less a roadblock to Progressive social policy in his position as Rules Committee chair than Joseph Cannon was a barrier to Progressive regulatory policy in his position as speaker of the House. On the Senate side, James Eastland (D-Miss.) chaired the Judiciary Committee through which all civil rights legislation had to pass, and he was as staunch a supporter of segregation and white supremacy as Smith; in his committee, more than 100 civil rights bills died. Another notorious southern conservative, Graham Barden (D-N.C.), chaired the House Education and Labor Committee where, like Howard Smith, he employed the most egregious parliamentary chicanery to obstruct liberal legislation, especially if it had implications for school desegregation. In addition to declining to appoint subcommittees where education or labor policy could be drafted, he infamously refused to appoint an African American member of his committee, Adam Clayton Powell (D-N.Y.), to chair a subcommittee, a post to which Powell was entitled under the very seniority rule that afforded Barden his position. Through most of the 1950s, southern Democratic control of committee chairmanships combined with Republican hostility to enhancing federal domestic power created a stable conservative alliance that liberal Democrats and

250 The Congress reform advocates could not overcome. Congress stood at a stalemate over a Progressive agenda because, as in 1910, its rules and procedures empowered conservative forces. As in 1910, therefore, advocates of liberal policy concluded that they had to reform Congress to reform policy. Much as the House Revolt of 1910 culminated decades of Populist and Progressive legislators’ frustration with conservative rule by the strong speaker system, what might be termed the Congressional Revolution of 1970 was an expression of liberal legislators’ exasperation with committee government and seniority dating back to the 1950s. Just as in 1910, major procedural reforms were effected in 1970 to free advocates of greater government action from conservative congressional constraints. The forces that led to these modern reforms were set in motion by the midterm election of 1958. The natural tendency is for midterm elections to swing against the party in control of the White House, but 1958 witnessed an extraordinary influx of Democrats in both the House and the Senate, and the vast majority of them were liberal heirs of the Populist and Progressive traditions. The convergence of four important factors account for this dramatic electoral shift: (1) voter irritation with the conservative domination in Congress; (2) the unnerving effect of the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite; (3) an economy in the grip of recession; and (4) the mobilization of union voters in response to the Eisenhower administration and in league with a conservative congressional coalition, which aggressively supported right-to-work legislation. The electoral results were catastrophic for the Republicans, laying the groundwork for continuous Democratic control of Congress for a generation. In the Senate, Democrats added 13 new legislators by unseating 10 Republicans, while claiming three open seats in California, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Among this freshman class of senators were individuals destined to become liberal icons: Philip Hart (D-Mich.), Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.), and Edmund Muskie (D-Maine). Democrats held a 65--35 margin, a mere two votes short of a filibuster-proof majority.3 In the House of Representatives, Democrats picked up 49 seats from the Republicans and brought in 14 new Democrats for a total of 63 freshman legislators, the overwhelming majority of whom supported the liberal agenda. Thus, liberal Democrats who had chafed under the restrictions of the conservative coalition in Congress were joined by significant reinforcements and quickly began to orchestrate the pursuit of their policy agenda. In the House, they acted to create the Democratic Study Group (DSG), a caucus for liberal members to

share ideas and strategize about how to combat the senior southern Democrats who controlled committees. With respect to civil rights, for example, the chair of the Judiciary Committee, Emanuel Celler, a liberal Democrat who had represented Brooklyn, New York, since the 1920s, received a bill from the Eisenhower administration that would have maintained the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Commission (created in 1957) and empowered the attorney general to inspect state and local election records for federal offices. Celler and his liberal Democratic allies knew that they would have to overcome conservative Southerners and their Republican fellow travelers first on the Judiciary Committee and subsequently on Howard Smith’s Rules Committee. Celler worked with the DSG to devise a strategy that included creation of a special subcommittee to craft the legislation, a subcommittee which he chaired and carefully appointed. The new body, dubbed Subcommittee No. 5, reported a bill to the full Judiciary Committee, now infused with additional liberal legislators, and the bill was approved for consideration by the Rules Committee. Predictably, Howard Smith delayed consideration in the hope of killing the

Emanuel Celler was a liberal Democrat who represented Brooklyn, New York, during 1923--1973. Celler’s career typified the era of powerful committee chairs dominating the Congress. (Library of Congress)

The Making of the Modern Congress legislation. However, Celler and his DSG supporters had anticipated that strategy and called for a discharge vote, a parliamentary maneuver through which a petition signed by 50 percent of the House membership could force the Rules Committee to release the proposed legislation to the floor for a vote in the Committee of the Whole.4 After the 1958 election, liberals had sufficient numbers to successfully push a discharge petition, and Smith eventually (and bitterly) relented, a pattern that would be repeated with subsequent civil rights and voting rights laws. This bill was enacted by the Senate as well and became the Civil Rights Act of 1960. On another liberal policy issue, health care, 64-year-old Aime Forand (D-R.I.) and a member of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced a bill that bore her name and sought to establish an increase in social security taxes to fund health coverage for those receiving old-age and survivor benefits. Unlike the civil rights bill, this forerunner of Medicare and Medicaid did not enjoy White House support. In addition, the Ways and Means Committee, unlike the Judiciary Committee, was chaired by a southern conservative, Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.), who was as recalcitrant toward the liberal agenda as his counterpart, Emanuel Celler, was supportive. Ultimately, the Forand bill failed. Nevertheless, the fact that the bill was introduced at all served notice that the liberal Democratic would be challenging the conservative coalition vigorously in the coming years. The conservative coalition, however, continued to vigorously defend its policy positions, bolstered by the established principles of committee government and seniority. Moreover, the organizational cultures that formed in both the Senate and the House after 1910 reinforced the committee government model. In the Senate, the norm of apprenticeship socialized junior members to show deference to senior members, especially committee chairs, and assimilate the protocols and procedures that sustained that body to advance their legislative careers. In turn, senior members were expected to mentor junior colleagues to perpetuate committee government and assure its smooth functioning. In his credo, ‘‘You’ve got to go along to get along,’’ highly respected Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) famously summed up how representatives should behave for the greater good of the body as well as their own self-interest. Rayburn acceded to the speakership in 1940, holding it through the 1950s, and his style of accommodation combined with respect for seniority epitomized the approach of committee government legislator.5 The arrival of the congressional class of 1958, though, swelled the ranks of liberal Democrats in both houses and set the party’s liberal junior

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legislators on a collision course with the more conservative senior legislators who had become accustomed to exercising tight control over their committee fiefdoms. Through the 1960s, the liberal Democrats began to enjoy significant policy success with the enactment of landmark legislation under the Great Society program of Lyndon Johnson. They broke new ground with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, and the expansion of federal aid for education and myriad social programs. Energized by the 1958 election and the traction they were gaining on their policy agenda, liberal Democrats by the mid-1960s again turned their attention to institutional reform. This time they found allies, particularly in the House of Representatives, with younger Republicans who felt similarly constrained by the legislative process. In 1965, the DSG in cooperation with some Republicans led by then Rep. Donald Rumsfeld (R-Ill.) succeeded in creating the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to assess committee government and propose reforms. All of the liberal policy successes, however, were attributable in large measure to Johnson’s consummate political skills and his landslide electoral victory following the assassination of President Kennedy. Once Johnson as well as the nation became mired in the Vietnam War, presidential leadership and the public appetite for pursuing an asyet-unfinished liberal domestic agenda dissipated. Johnson was so wounded politically that he withdrew from the presidential race before the Democratic Convention. The election of 1968 resuscitated conservative committee government. Women’s rights, environmental policy, consumer protection, and additional equal opportunity measures would continue to founder on the shoals of committee government and seniority even as polling indicated that the country was receptive to progress on these fronts. Liberal frustration mounted and provided a renewed sense of urgency to the work of the Joint Committee. The 120 recommendations of the Committee shaped the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, which proved to be the opening act in a five-year drama that reformed Congress by curtailing the prerogatives of committee chairs and weakening the seniority rule. Just as in 1910, the ‘‘solution’’ for aggrieved reformers of both parties was further devolution of congressional authority and more autonomy for individual legislators from conservatives leadership. The 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act took direct aim at the seniority rule by mandating that the Democratic Caucus, which officially appointed committee chairs based on recommendations from the party’s recently created Steering and Policy Committee, must

252 The Congress hold a secret ballot for the selection of individual committee chairs. By instituting the Australian ballot in the Caucus, a more representative body, liberal junior members could have a say in leadership decisions while minimizing the chances of retaliation or retribution by senior members who might object to decisions. House Republicans and both parties in the Senate adopted the parallel procedures. Over the course of the next five years, this new appointment process resulted in Democrats ousting conservative Southerners Edward Hebert (D-La.) and William Poage (D-Tex.) from their respective chairmanships of the powerful Armed Services and Agriculture committees. The clear message that liberal Democrats were exercising significant influence on their party’s legislative agenda through these new procedures ultimately convinced conservative Phil Gramm (D-Tex.) to resign his seat and run as a Republican, as the party rapidly became a more congenial home for southern conservatives. The 1970 Act further curtailed the power of senior members by imposing limits on their leadership posts: each member of the Congress would be permitted to chair only one important standing committee and one authorization subcommittee; and no member could serve on more than two full committees.6 With this measure, the Act sought to democratize the legislative process by ensuring that a small number of senior members did not monopolize critical decision points. For liberal legislators, limiting the number of chairs one could hold also had the salutary effect of increasing the likelihood that they would chair subcommittees, if not full committees. A favorite tactic of senior chairs had been to appoint themselves as chair of multiple subcommittees to control the development of legislation even before it reached their full committee, and these reforms eliminated that gambit. Finally, committees with 20 or more members were required to maintain a minimum of four subcommittees, thus providing more opportunities for junior members to exercise independent leadership and judgment. Following the 1970 reforms, the House appointed another committee, the Democratic Committee on Organization, Study, and Review, chaired by Julia Hansen (D-Wash.), to consider further reform measures. The Hansen Committee proposed another round of changes that further weakened committee government and seniority (Rieselbach 1995). These measures freed subcommittees from senior domination through adoption of the so-called Subcommittee Bill of Rights. In 1973, as the Hansen Committee recommended, the House established fixed substantive jurisdictions for subcommittees, thereby ensuring

that senior chairs could not arbitrarily assign consideration of important legislative initiatives to subcommittees that reflected their own ideological or policy predispositions. The House Democrats also empowered subcommittees to convene at the pleasure of a majority of their members rather than at the discretion of the full committee chair, to hire subcommittee staff, and manage their budget. The House Republicans and the Senate essentially adopted these measures as well. If the reforms of 1910 generated a proliferation of committees, the reforms of the early 1970s caused an expansion in the number of subcommittees; by the 96th Congress in 1979, the House had 27 full committees and 157 subcommittees, while the Senate had 20 committees and 101 subcommittees. Indeed, one could argue that the Congress shifted from committee government to ‘‘subcommittee government.’’ This further devolution of leadership and legislative authority maintained and even exacerbated the balkanization of Congress. The complexity of this system meant that only organized interests and professional lobbyists could participate effectively in the development of legislation. Even after the Hansen Committee, the institutional reform impulse was still not exhausted. Indeed the post-Watergate election of 1974 brought an additional wave of liberal Democrats to Congress, and they helped enact a further set of reforms that, interestingly, promoted more centralized control of legislation. The speaker was empowered to nominate the members of the Rules Committee, including the chair, thereby removing a traditional conservative bottleneck in the legislative process. In addition, the authority to make committee assignments was removed from the Ways and Means Committee and given over to the Steering and Policy Committee, chaired by the speaker. In addition, the procedure of Democratic Caucus approval of committee chairs by secret ballot was extended to include chairs of appropriations subcommittees. Although these centralizing measures seemed contradictory to the devolutionary thrust of the Hansen Committee reforms, they served the same policy end of promoting a liberal, Progressive agenda and constraining senior conservatives largely from the South. In effect, liberals squeezed senior conservative members from two directions. On the one hand, devolution of authority provided junior members positions on subcommittees from which they could drive their policy agenda and have a formal say in the approval of committee chairmanships. On the other hand, the top leadership of the Democratic Party in the House

The Making of the Modern Congress of Representatives, now thoroughly dominated by liberals, allowed centralized control mechanisms to further suppress conservative influence. The Senate, in the 1970s, developed along the same lines as the House in terms of devolving authority to empower and liberate individual legislators from the constraints of committee government. Like the House, the Senate increased the number of committees and subcommittees. In the Senate, subcommittees were given more staff and increased budgets as well as greater autonomy from committee chairs, in much the same manner as in the lower legislative body. One additional important change specific to the Senate was the amendment of Rule 22, the procedure governing cloture on filibusters. Long an effective tool of the conservative coalition, the mere threat of a filibuster allowed a minority to derail Progressive legislation. Under the original cloture rule, a vote to cut off debate and proceed to consideration of a bill on the Senate floor, required a supermajority of two-thirds, or 67 senators. In 1975, after two decades of failed efforts, the total vote required for cloture was reduced to threefifths, that is, 60 members.7 As important as this formal achievement was, the Senate’s tradition of comity---that is, the extraordinary level of deference and formal civility among individual members---provided the basis for a significant shift in the behavior of the Senate as a result of a shift in its cultural norms. Being a smaller, more intimate body as the founders intended, the Senate operated with longer debates than the House as well as more latitude for individual members. Individual senators always exercised greater degrees of freedom in crafting legislation than their counterparts in the House, particularly with respect to offering amendments to a bill under consideration. In an era of reform and devolution, many senators, even relatively junior ones, adopted the role of ‘‘policy entrepreneur’’ working in a highly public ways often in cooperation with organized interests to craft legislation that served their reelection interests while simultaneously advancing a group’s policy agenda. A good deal of the environmental and consumer legislation in this period originated with individual senators championing a cause in collaboration with environmental or consumer advocates (Harris and Milkis 1989). Unlike the House, the Senate (owing to its own traditions) never experienced a return to centralization or empowerment of party leadership. Whereas the House superimposed party discipline on subcommittee government to produce a highly partisan hybrid model, the Senate experienced the devolutionary trends of subgovernment politics without a countervailing centralizing effort.

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The Resurgence of Partisanship and the ‘‘Contract with America’’ The liberal triumph in the early 1970s laid the foundation for a spate of policy changes, including the creation of new federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Safety Administration, and the Department of Education8 as well as a panoply of new regulatory programs the national government was charged with implementing. In addition, Congress took up the cause of women’s rights directly with the passage of the bill to send an Equal Rights Amendment to the states for ratification. The institutional reform of Congress, thus, had the desired effect of sweeping away the conservative roadblocks that had been established by committee government and seniority. Liberals controlled the development of legislation by chairing subcommittees and by restraining conservative chairs through the enhanced party leadership posts that now were driven more by an impulse of ideology than a spirit of accommodation. In the House, Speakers Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill (D-Mass.), followed by James Wright (D-Tex.), neither brooked opposition nor sought advice from conservative Democrats or Republicans, a radical change from the ways of their predecessors, Sam Rayburn and John McCormick (D-Mass.). In the Senate, legislators used their new autonomy and resources in subcommittees to spearhead liberal legislation. Using the media and alliances with newly formed public interests groups, they helped to transform subgovernments from tightly knit, closed systems serving to prop up the socioeconomic status quo to more open permeable complexes of stakeholders, legislators, and bureaucrats; the ‘‘iron triangles’’ of the 1950s and 1960s became the ‘‘issue networks’’ of the 1970s (Heclo 1978). The politics of issue networks injected more activist and Progressive participants into the policy-making process and further marginalized conservatives. In politics as in physics, however, actions ordinarily cause equal and opposite reactions. Not surprisingly, in the 1970s, even as liberals were ascendant in the Congress, the seeds of a conservative reaction were beginning to take root. What animated this reaction was not opposition to increased regulation to protect the environment and consumers or any deep commitment to free market principles. Indeed, these policies attracted solid majorities of the voting public. Rather what galvanized conservative resistance was the liberal agenda on social issues, especially affirmative action policies and women’s issues, most particularly abortion rights. In a memorable quip, Ronald Reagan once

254 The Congress remarked, in response to the question of why he abandoned the Democratic Party, ‘‘I didn’t leave the Democrat Party, the Democrat Party left me.’’ While Reagan had long ago turned away from the Democrats and his years as a labor leader in the Screen Actors’ Guild to serve as a spokesperson for corporations, his terse response effectively summed up the sentiments of many voters in the old New Deal coalition who were economic liberals but social conservatives. Southern and rural voters from religiously fundamentalist or evangelical regions were particularly aggrieved by the Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 [1973]) decision legalizing abortion and genuinely outraged by liberal support for federal funding of women’s reproductive rights. As the liberal Democrats in Congress continued to expand federal programs to assist minorities and women and adopted a more secular stance not only on policy in general but also on marriage, sexuality, and the family, traditional Democrats from northern blue collar and Catholic areas found common ground with southern conservatives who continued to shift toward the Republican standard. When Ronald Reagan won the election of 1980, he was able to appeal to these voters, so-called Reagan Democrats, while retaining economic conservatives and independent voters from the burgeoning white, middle-class suburbs who were drawn to his platform of lower taxes and deregulation. As the Democratic turn to liberal social issues caused the party to hemorrhage traditional supporters in presidential elections, and as population shifts swelled the ranks of suburban independents in the South and the Sunbelt, the character of Congress began to change as well. Reagan was able to reconstitute and expand the conservative coalition, by allying Republicans with fiscally and socially conservative Democrats, both ‘‘boll weevils’’ from the South, and representative districts or states in which the electorate was uncomfortable with liberal social policy.9 During the subsequent presidency of George H. W. Bush, who adopted less strident rhetoric and a much more centrist policy orientation than Reagan, congressional Republicans who had come to Washington, D.C., to help make the Reagan Revolution felt betrayed and publically chastised President Bush for collaborating with Democrats on a tax hike to reduce the federal deficit, an action that reneged on candidate Bush’s ‘‘no new taxes’’ pledge at the 1988 Republican National Convention. From that point on, a conservative Republican insurgency formed and, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), congressional Republicans attacked both their moderate party colleagues and their liberal Democratic rivals. Their tepid support of Bush

contributed to the victory of William Jefferson Clinton in the election of 1992. Gingrich and his allies clearly sought to reclaim and purify the conservative agenda that Reagan had articulated. In addition to promoting their policy agenda, they set about undermining liberal leadership in the Congress through a scorched earth strategy that attacked the integrity not only of Democratic leaders, but also of the House of Representatives as an institution. Their aggressive and highly public tactics, including the use of the House Ethics Committee to investigate individual representatives shined a spotlight on abuses by members of both parties, but Republican casualties were collateral damage in attacks aimed at liberal Democratic leaders. In perhaps the most audacious gambit employed by the conservative insurgents, Gingrich in 1989 filed ethics charges against James Wright (D-Tex.), then speaker of the House. The Ethics Committee investigation exposed the fact that Wright had used sales of his autobiography, Reflections of a Public Man, to arrange speaking fees that exceeded the limits established by the House. Eventually, Wright resigned the speakership as the fallout from the investigation undermined his effectiveness. Less than three years later another investigation urged by the conservative Republicans exposed a check-kiting scandal in which 22 representatives, three of whom were Republicans, were cited by the Ethics Committee for overdrafting personal checks against the House Bank. Appearing on the list were several senior liberal Democrats, including the House whip and chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Tony Coelho (D-Calif.). These partisan assaults seriously weakened liberal Democrats and shook the already fragile public confidence in the Congress. More important, they prepared the way for a conservative Republican landslide in the 1994 midterm election, a victory the scope of which far overshadowed the 1958 liberal Democratic triumph. While the Senate too took on a more partisan cast after 1980, the prerogatives of individual members along the remnants of the upper body’s traditions of comity and collegiality prevented the level of partisan contentiousness that developed in the House. Nevertheless, the abrasive, ideological brand of politics practiced by Gingrich and his supporters generated a conservative tide that swept the Senate along, too. The 1994 conservative victory was defined by Gingrich’s Contract with America, a manifesto enunciating the policy agenda of the conservative Republicans. In effect, the document served as a national party platform in a midyear election and nationalized the congressional races. The Contract shifted the election from

The Making of the Modern Congress a series of judgments on the performance of individual legislators, a framework that favored incumbents, into a national referendum on the liberal establishment in Congress. The strategy was a smashing success. Republicans won a majority of the vote for Congress for the first time since the 1946 postwar election. Even more tellingly, they won a majority of Southern congressional seats for the first time since Reconstruction. Adding insult to injury, immediately after the Republicans gained eight seats in the Senate, conservative Democrat Richard Shelby of Alabama switched parties. On the House side, Republicans picked up 54 seats, including the one held by the serving speaker, Thomas Foley (D-Wash.). In addition to calling for greater fiscal responsibility and more transparency in the legislative process, the contract called for important changes in social policy, including a Family Reinforcement Act that would require parental consent for any minor to participate in any federally funded activity; in other words, parents would have to be involved in all decisions regarding abortions and sex education. The Personal Responsibility Act would have cut off Aid to Families and Dependent Children (AFDC) funding for all mothers of children born out of wedlock. The Taking Back Our Streets Act would have instituted a death penalty applicable in all states under the Constitution’s full faith and credit clause. Following their victory, Gingrich acceded to the post of speaker and proceeded to oversee the pursuit of the new conservative agenda. Many observers of Congress, even those who disagreed with Gingrich and his allies on questions of policy, saw his strategy of nationalizing the 1994 election around a clearly articulated set of issues as a positive development in American politics. Perhaps the greatest failing of committee and subcommittee government was that its balkanized structure diffused not only power but also responsibility, thereby undermining popular sovereignty; how could the people demand accountability of their representatives if it was unclear which representatives were responsible for what. The Contract with America and Gingrich’s new assertion of leadership in the House promised to remake the legislative process into one in which the people could truly hold parties responsible. While it was clear that the House would never return to the ‘‘halcyon days’’ of Reed’s rules, the new Republican majority did promise a more coherent policy process. Indeed, the 104th Congress began with the enactment of almost all of the Contract with America, but did so on a highly partisan vote. Moreover, exhilarated by their victory, House Republicans adopted a combative style in both rhetoric and lawmaking, a style perhaps befitting their effort to

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reclaim the revolutionary zeal of the early Reagan years, but which left little room for compromise. Their aggressive partisanship, of course, could not be sustained in the Senate where individual prerogative and the culture of comity drove the upper body to a more conciliatory tone, if not more even-handed outcomes. In fact, only two of the House bills from the contract survived in the Senate and were signed into law by President Clinton. Most frustrating for the young Turks in the House, none of their priorities for reining in the federal budget or the size of government succeeded. Their proposals to eliminate the Departments of Commerce, Education, and Energy along with their programmatic cuts, including more than 20 percent reductions for environmental and housing programs, ran aground on the shoals of seniority and committee government in the Senate. Angered, but undaunted, the conservative House leadership turned its attention to the budget process itself to effect a return to Reaganism. The ensuing confrontation demonstrated unequivocally how far the political pendulum had swung from the Congress to the president. Speaker Gingrich and his conservative leadership calculated that the constitutional centrality of the House in revenue legislation would allow them to fight on favorable terrain. They severely misjudged, however, the advantages of the modern presidency. It is surely ironic that Gingrich, a student of history and the history of Congress in particular, would misread the secular decline of the legislative branch in relation to the executive branch. The resources of Congress, especially one house of the Congress, pale in comparison to those of the modern presidency. Gingrich was able to maintain party discipline in the House through the regular budget process and although his unyielding insistence on fiscal constraint pushed the Congress past its September deadline for a budget reconciliation bill, a final compromise in the Joint Budget Committee produced much of what the conservatives wanted by November and a budget bill was delivered to President Clinton.10 Animated by a combination of genuine policy differences and the political pressure of core Democratic constituencies, Clinton vetoed the budget bill and the battle was joined. From his position in the House, Gingrich was able to hold up any revenue legislation and he forced a ‘‘shutdown’’ of the government under which a continuing resolution sustained funding only for essential services. Essentially the conservative republican leadership of the House decided to go eyeball to eyeball with the president, gambling that he would blink. He did not. In the subsequent confrontation, President Clinton was able to

256 The Congress coordinate an effective response, marshaling cabinet department resources to show the potential impacts on Social Security and Medicare and to document the immediate effect on veterans benefit programs, and connecting media with some of the 800,000 furloughed federal workers to tell their stories. Clinton effectively used White House press briefings and public appearances to shift the discussion from fiscal responsibility, the preferred republican narrative, to a tale of policies that would eviscerate social programs for children and the aged while benefiting wealthy citizens and corporate interests. All the rhetorical, media, and information advantages the modern executive enjoys over Congress came into play, and Gingrich eventually backed down. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole poised to run against Clinton in the upcoming 1996 election, eventually appealed to fellow republicans to solve the crisis, and in January, the Congress produced a budget Clinton agreed to sign. In addition to damaging both his own reputation and Dole’s presidential prospects, Gingrich’s budget battle with Clinton clearly demonstrated that the founders’ conception of congressional primacy was gone, and it was not coming back. The place of Congress in a modern administrative state cannot rival that of the executive either in practice or in the public’s affection.

Conclusion The evolution of the U.S. Congress is a narrative of institutional transformation set in the larger context of the political development of a modern administrative state. Whereas the original constitutional design envisioned the legislature as the most important branch of government, certainly with respect to designing and enacting policy, the advent of modern liberalism and the attendant emergence of a more active and positive role for the national government in socioeconomic affairs necessitated the growth of government, a process which inevitably enhanced the executive relative to the legislature. As legislators adapted to the public’s demand for a larger national policy role, they came to understand that their reelection interests would be best served if they could exercise greater autonomy in promoting or opposing legislation. This realization in the early 20th century led to the creation of the seniority system and committee government, and Congress came to be driven, quite naturally, by programmatic rather than partisan considerations. Rather than taking direction from partisan leadership in the House or Senate, legislators became comfortable functioning at the center of subgovernments in which they could interact with policy stakeholders and bureaucrats to manage

programs and ensure the flow of resources to constituents as well as organized interests. Even with the resurgence of partisanship in the 1980s, intense legislative conflict revolved around broad budget priorities, hot-button social issues, and national security, leaving the majority of Congress’s business, regulation and defense spending, and entitlement programs under the control of subcommittees, lobbyists, and agencies. Party discipline remains circumscribed by the necessity of careerist legislators to ‘‘bring home the bacon’’ to states and congressional districts, to tend the needs of organized interests and campaign donors, and to provide constituent service to ensure dollars and votes for reelection. The new partisanship in Congress was essentially superimposed on the decentralized system of subgovernment politics. Congress, therefore, remained a highly reactive institution, wedded to the status quo of long-established programs and spending patterns. Moreover, although modern liberalism provided the rationale for an administrative state, conservatives as well as liberals in Congress embraced distributive policy whereby legislators ensured that resources flowed to engaged interests and their constituents to maintain their political careers. Under these conditions, the natural advantages of the presidency in terms of media, rhetoric, connectivity with the people, and capacity to act in a more interconnected global environment were accentuated by Congress’s inability to organize itself for independent action. Whereas the founders bestowed the veto on the presidency to provide a meaningful check on the powerful legislature, the modern Congress functions as a counterweight to the energy and resources of the executive, intervening in bureaucratic action, amending presidential programs, and seeking a voice in foreign and national security policy that is driven by the president.

References and Further Reading Bensel, Richard F. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859--1877. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bernstein, Marver H. 1977. Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Dodd, Lawrence C., and Richard L. Schott. 1979. Congress and the Administrative State. New York: Wiley Press, Inc. Fiorina, Morris P. 1989. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Harris, Richard A., and Sidney M. Milkis 1989. The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies. New York: Oxford University Press. Heclo, Hugh. 1977. A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

The Making of the Modern Congress Keller, Morton. 1990. Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900--1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. 2nd ed. New York: Norton & Co. Polsby, Nelson W. 1969 ‘‘The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives.’’ American Political Science Review 62 (March), 144--168. Rieselbach, Leroy N. 1994. Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Sklar, Martin J. 1988. The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890--1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics. New York, Cambridge University Press. Stampp, Kenneth M. 1956. The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-bellum South. New York: Vintage Press. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1966. Democracy in America. Ed. J. P. Mayer and Max Lerner. New York: Harper & Row.

Notes 1. ‘‘Our peculiar institution’’ was a common euphemism for slavery and was adopted as the title of a seminal treatment of slavery by Kenneth Stampp in 1956. 2. Turnover is calculated as follows: Turnover ¼ [No. of Members  No. of New Seats] / [No. of Seats  No. of New Seats]  100.

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3. In 1958, a cloture vote still required a two-thirds majority, 67 votes. 4. The ‘‘Committee of the Whole’’ refers to the full membership of the House or Senate organizing itself for debate and a vote on proposed legislation. 5. Rayburn did not serve as speaker in the 1947--1948 and 1953--1954 sessions of Congress when Republicans held House majorities. 6. Authorization committees are those that propose legislation, as opposed to appropriations committees which fund programs. 7. The precise rule required a vote of two-thirds of all senators present and voting. Sixty-seven represents two-thirds of the total number of senators. The two-thirds vote was retained for bills to change the rules of the Senate. 8. The Department of Education, was spun off from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, indicating the importance liberals accorded education policy. 9. ‘‘Boll weevil’’ historically refers to conservative southern Democrats who remained in the Democratic Party after the New Deal. Under Reagan, they voted consistently with Republicans on fiscal and defense policy and supported measures to restrict federal funding of abortion. 10. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 created a process in which the federal fiscal year was set to run from October 1 through September 30. The Act created a new Joint Budget Committee and required both houses to pass a budget resolution in April that would frame the work of appropriation and standing committees. In September, the Congress is to adopt a reconciliation bill that finalizes the budget, which is sent along to the president for signature.

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Documents

4.1 James Madison, Federalist No. 52

established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution. The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith. The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of

To the People of the State of New York: FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be 259

260 The Congress it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found. The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II, that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term ‘‘frequently,’’ which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the

degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves. Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper

4.2 James Madison, Federalist No. 54 261 enlargement This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other. PUBLIUS.

4.2 James Madison, Federalist No. 54 To the People of the State of New York: THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its

members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. ‘‘We subscribe to the doctrine,’’ might one of our Southern brethren observe, ‘‘that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his

262 The Congress liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend, that the government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain? It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. This objection is repelled by a single abservation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal

rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands. For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence

4.3 James Madison, Federalist No. 62 263 over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes. Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established. In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in

a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

4.3 James Madison, Federalist No. 62 To the People of the State of New York: HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate. I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and tability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.

264 The Congress II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems. III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but ‘‘of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.’’ A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the

advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic. Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation. IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution. First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would

4.3 James Madison, Federalist No. 62 265 otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government. Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration. Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate? A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to

assert, that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first. Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions. To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others. In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so

266 The Congress incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed? Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY. In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy. But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability. PUBLIUS.

4.4 James Madison, Federalist No. 64 To the People of the State of New York: IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things

only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it. The second section gives power to the President, ‘‘BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR.’’ The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive to both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors. As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will

4.4 James Madison, Federalist No. 64 267 always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged. Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information will be preserved. There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws. It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be

obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest. They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other. But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged. Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be

268 The Congress made only by men invested with legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected. Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of government. However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their

conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties? As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention, and the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter. As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations. With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments. PUBLIUS.

4.5 Anti-Federalist No. 9 A Consolidated Government Is a Tyranny We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many inconveniences to which the late

4.5 Anti-Federalist No. 9 269 confederation subjected the well-born, the better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the rabble---and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill of rights, ‘‘that all men are born equal’’--beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between such as we think were ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, aristocratical democracy. 1st. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more readily led than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby prove the ‘‘weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of every fashionable gale,’’---for we have not yet to learn that little else is wanting to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make him somewhat independent of his political creators. We have taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us---that grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they would have come charged on re-election. 2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims and prejudices. For the assertion ‘‘that evil communications corrupt good manners,’’ is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. We hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause---for what matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine, this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive influence---from their being chosen out of the genteeler class. . . . It is true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the

good old way, the young members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of our brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was provided, only that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on the important business of their country. We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the happy discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could not bring the states into it individually, we have determined . . . and have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else than yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to annihilate state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence (as a board of electors) necessary to ours. This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we alone, have the power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them, in order more effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a president at our head who is captain---general of the army, navy and militia of the United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or

270 The Congress refuse reprieves or pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and other continental courts---in short, who will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular insurrection? But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and will ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every question which can arise in law or equity, under this constitution and under the laws of ‘‘the United States’’ (which laws will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting ambassadors or other public ministers, ‘‘and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.’’ Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases---and if so, how fallen are state judicatures---and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? Our constitution answers yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built, still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as a lock chain to the wheels of government---though, by the way, as we have not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. We have for some time considered the freedom of the press as a great evil---it spreads information, and begets a licentiousness in the people which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our president and senate---for these and many other reasons we have said nothing with respect to the ‘‘right of the people to speak and publish their sentiments’’ or about their ‘‘palladiums of liberty’’ and such stuff. We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people---the right to

demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of what is rebellion. . . . Our friends we find have been assiduous in representing our federal calamities, until at length the people at large---frightened by the gloomy picture on one side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the other---are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without the delay or forms of examination---which was the more to be wished, as they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of the LOWER CLASS---to draw that discrimination we have so long sought after; to secure to our friends privileges and offices, which were not to be . . . [obtained] under the former government, because they were in common; to take the burden of legislation and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will be much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private business; to destroy that political thirteen headed monster, the state sovereignties; to check the licentiousness of the people by making it dangerous to speak or publish daring or tumultuary sentiments; to enforce obedience to laws by a strong executive, aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the public and private interests of the better kind of people---we submit it to your judgment to take such measures for its adoption as you in your wisdom may think fit. Signed by unanimous order of the lords spiritual and temporal. MONTEZUMA

Source: ‘‘MONTEZUMA’’ (regarded as a Pennsylvanian), Independent Gazetteer, October 17, 1787.

4.6 Anti-Federalist No. 17 Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority This is the fameous BRUTUS. This [new] government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable powers, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section eighth, article first, it is declared, that the Congress shall have power ‘‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other

4.6 Anti-Federalist No. 17 271 powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.’’ And by the sixth article, it is declared, ‘‘that this Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’’ It appears from these articles, that there is no need of any intervention of the State governments, between the Congress and the people, to execute any one power vested in the general government, and that the Constitution and laws of every State are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this Constitution, or the laws made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the United States. The government, then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as much one complete government as that of New York or Massachusetts; has as absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offenses, and annex penalties, with respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world. So far, therefore, as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is still left to the States; but a little attention to the powers vested in the general government, will convince every candid man, that if it is capable of being executed, all that is reserved for the individual States must very soon be annihilated, except so far as they are barely necessary to the organization of the general government. The powers of the general legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance---there is nothing valuable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is within its power. It has the authority to make laws which will affect the lives, the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the Constitution or laws of any State, in any way prevent or impede the full and complete execution of every power given. The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;---there is no limitation to this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which those taxes and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation. But this is no restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but the legislature have authority to contract

debts at their discretion; they are the sole judges of what is necessary to provide for the common defense, and they only are to determine what is for the general welfare. This power, therefore, is neither more nor less than a power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure; not only the power to lay taxes unlimited as to the amount they may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise them in any mode they please. No State legislature, or any power in the State governments, have any more to do in carrying this into effect than the authority of one State has to do with that of another. In the business, therefore, of laying and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, and that of one entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that the authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or at least will in process of time draw all others after it; it is the great mean of protection, security, and defense, in a good government, and the great engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this Constitution, to the State governments, on this article of raising money. No State can emit paper money, lay any duties or imposts, on imports, or exports, but by consent of the Congress; and then the net produce shall be for the benefit of the United States. The only means, therefore, left for any State to support its government and discharge its debts, is by direct taxation; and the United States have also power to lay and collect taxes, in any way they please. Everyone who has thought on the subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can he collected in any country, by direct tax; when the federal government begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to raise monies to support their governments. Without money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle away, and, as before observed, their powers be absorbed in that of the general government. It might be here shown, that the power in the federal legislature, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and their control over the militia, tend not only to a consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty. I shall not, however, dwell upon these, as a few observations upon the judicial power of this government, in addition to the preceding, will fully evince the truth of the position. The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and

272 The Congress establish. The powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same State; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution. One inferior court must be established, I presume, in each State, at least, with the necessary executive officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away from the respectability, of the State courts. These courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the States, deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human events it is to be expected that they will swallow up all the powers of the courts in the respective States. How far the clause in the eighth section of the first article may operate to do away with all idea of confederated States, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general government, it is impossible to say. The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for aught I know, be exercised in such manner as entirely to abolish the State legislatures. Suppose the legislature of a State should pass a law to raise money to support their government and pay the State debt; may the Congress repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general welfare of the United States? For all laws made, in pursuance of this Constitution, are the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of the different States to the contrary notwithstanding. By such a law, the government of a particular State might be overturned at one stroke, and thereby be deprived of every means of its support. It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the Constitution would warrant a law of this kind! Or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting that the Federal legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the Constitution, than that of an individual State, further than they are less responsible to the people. But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontrollable powers of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming,

and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers; and are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the State governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual States, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter, therefore, will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over everything that stands in their way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the Federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the State authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the Federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident, then, that what this Constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise in operation. BRUTUS Note: The necessary and proper clause, from the beginning, has been a thorn in the side of those seeking to reduce federal power, but its attack by ‘‘BRUTUS’’ served to call attention to it, leaving a paper trail of intent verifying its purpose was not to give Congress anything the Constitution ‘‘forgot,’’ but rather to show two additional tests for any legislation Congress should attempt: to wit---that the intended actions would be both necessary and proper to executing powers given under clauses 1--17 of Article I Section 8.

4.7 Anti-Federalist No. 55 Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 1) Following are four essays by ‘‘THE FEDERAL FARMER’’ . . . It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government. In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion. In forming this

4.7 Anti-Federalist No. 55 273 branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to. It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition. It must afford security against interest combinations, corruption and influence. It must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people. I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled. Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative branch. . . . The representation is insubstantial and ought to be increased. In matters where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid, and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer. I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no feature in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been less understood, and no one that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers. The ephori in Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the representation in Great Britain is unequal and insecure. In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles, than, perhaps, all the world besides. Yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements in representation may be made. In fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed, and the number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that situation. When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve them in their happy condition. A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people. A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures. Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable

they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute of the people. However the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in society an undue ascendancy over others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves. It is the first of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of these classes. We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people. Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in forming a genuine representation, and seen that idea considered as chimerical, I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the Marquis Beccaria’s treatise. This sentence was quoted by Congress in 1774, and is as follows:---‘‘In every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.’’ Add to this Montesquieu’s opinion, that ‘‘in a free state every man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.’’ It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, mercantile, mechanics etc., and perceived the efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others. Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently. It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can choose their legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things, choose men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves. I wish you to take another idea along with you. We are not only to balance these natural efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased. To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupation and politically. The first class is the aristocratical. There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country---the first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the United States in our common

274 The Congress acceptation of the word. Montesquieu, it is true, observes that where part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy. This, according to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government. The second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement. The existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be guarded against. The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary. We may place men on one side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are, or ought to be. In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, etc., and men of large property. The other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this includes in general, the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men. It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expenses, salaries, taxes, etc. Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge; men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty; their dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labor, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices of government. Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other. Yet such are

their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favorable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers. The farmers alone would act on like principles; the former would tax the land, the latter the trade. The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies; buyers make every exertion to lower prices; and sellers to raise them. Men who live by fees and salaries endeavor to raise them; and the part of the people who pay them, endeavor to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them. Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined. Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property. They contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies. Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy. The yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits; the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable---honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for supporting free governments; the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions, give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it. It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty. It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government. Gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, etc., probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that of all the other descriptions of men. If we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more the representatives are increased, the more of the farmers, merchants, etc., will be found to be brought into the government. These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes, and the general scope of my ideas, when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature. We may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the government by the

4.8 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the combination and full representation. A small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people. The members of it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them. A representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions to their representatives. Where there is but one representative to 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents. Even double the general representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented. On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one representative each. There can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and the people at large of either of those districts. It has been observed that mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best information and ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favorable to their purposes particularly. . . . Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts, to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain. I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations. The tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of the few. It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them. . . . THE FEDERAL FARMER

4.8 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885 Congress always makes what haste it can to legislate. It is the prime object of its rules to expedite law-making.

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Its customs are fruits of its characteristic diligence in enactment. Be the matters small or great, frivolous or grave, which busy it, its aim is to have laws always amaking. Its temper is strenuously legislative . . . The political philosopher of these days of self-government has, however, something more than a doubt with which to gainsay the usefulness of a sovereign representative body which confines itself to legislation to the exclusion of all other functions. Buckle declared, indeed, that the chief use and value of legislation nowadays lay in its opportunity and power to remedy the mistakes of the legislation of the past; that it was beneficent only when it carried healing in its wings; that repeal was more blessed than enactment. And it is certainly true that the greater part of the labor of legislation consists in carrying the loads recklessly or bravely shouldered in times gone by, when the animal which is now a bull was only a calf, and in completing, if they may be completed, the tasks once undertaken in the shape of unambitious schemes which at the outset looked innocent enough. Having got his foot into it, the legislator finds it difficult, in not impossible, to get it out again. ‘‘The modern industrial organization, including banks, corporations, joint-stock companies, financial devices, national debts, paper currency, national systems of taxation, is largely the creation of legislation (not in its historical origin, but in the mode of its existence and in its authority), and is largely regulated by legislation. Capital is the breath of life to this organization, and every day, as the organization becomes more complex and delicate, the folly of assailing capital or credit becomes greater. At the same time it is evident that the task of the legislator to embrace in his view the whole system, to adjust his rules so that the play of the civil institutions shall not alter the play of the economic forces, requires more training and more acumen. Furthermore, the greater the complication and delicacy of the industrial system, the greater the chances for cupidity when backed by craft, and the task of the legislator to meet and defeat the attempts of this cupidity is one of constantly increasing difficulty.’’ Legislation unquestionably generates legislation. Every statute may be said to have a long lineage of statutes behind it; and whether that lineage be honorable or of ill repute is as much as question as to each individual statute as it can be with regard to the ancestry of each individual legislator. Every statute in its turn has a numerous progeny, and only time and opportunity can decide whether its offspring will bring it honor or shame. Once begin the dance of legislation, and you must struggle through its mazes as best you can to its breathless end,---if any end there be.

276 The Congress It is not surprising, therefore, that the enacting, revising, tinkering, repealing of laws should engross the attention and engage the entire energy of such a body as Congress. It is, however, easy to see how it might be better employed; or, at least, how it might add others to this overshadowing function, to the infinite advantage of the government. Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration; and even more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion. There is no similar legislature in existence which is so shut up to the one business of law-making as is our Congress. As I have said, it in a way superintends administration by the exercise of semi-judicial powers of investigation, whose limitations and insufficiency are manifest. But other national legislatures command administration and verify their name of ‘‘parliaments’’ by talking official acts into notoriety. Our extraconstitutional party conventions, short-lived and poor in power as they are, constitute our only machinery for that sort of control of the executive which consists in the award of personal rewards and punishments. This is the cardinal fact which differentiates Congress from the Chamber of Deputies and from Parliament, and which puts it beyond the reach of those eminently useful functions whose exercise would so raise it in usefulness and in dignity. An effective representative body, gifted with the power to rule, ought, it would seem not only to speak the will of the nation, which Congress does, but also to lead it to its conclusions, to utter the voice of its opinions, and to serve as its eyes in superintending all matters of government,---which Congress does not do. the discussions which take place in Congress are aimed at random. They now and again strike rather sharply the tender spots in this, that, or the other measure; but, as I have said, no two measures consciously join in purpose or agree in character, and so debate must wander as widely as the subjects of debate. Since there is little coherency about the legislation agreed upon, there can be little coherency about the debates. There is no one policy to be attacked or defended, but only a score or two of separate bills. To attend to such discussions is uninteresting; to be instructed by them is impossible. There is some scandal and discomfort, but infinite advantage, in having every affair of administration subjected to the test of constant examination on the part of the assembly which represents the nation. The chief use of such inquisition is, not the direction of those affairs in a way with which the country will be

satisfied (though that itself is of course all-important), but the enlightenment of the people, which is always its sure consequence. Very few men are unequal to a danger which they see and understand; all men quail before a threatening which is dark and unintelligible, and suspect what is done behind the screen. If the people could have, through Congress, daily knowledge of all the more important transactions of the governmental offices, an insight into all that now so often shaken, would, I think, be very soon established. Because dishonesty can lurk under the privacies now vouchsafed our administrative agents, much that is upright and pure suffers unjust suspicion . . . Congress is fast becoming the governing body of the nation, and yet the only power which it possesses in perfection is the power which is but a part of government, the power of legislation. Legislation is but the oil of government. It is that which lubricates its channels and speeds its wheels; that which lessens the friction and so eases the movement. Or perhaps I shall be admitted to have hit upon a closer and apter analogy if I say that legislation is like a foreman set over forces of government. It issues the orders which others obey. It directs, it admonishes, but it does not do the actual heavy work of governing. A good foreman does, it is true, himself take a hand in the work which he guides; and so I suppose our legislation must be likened to a poor foreman, because it stands altogether apart from that work which it is set to see well done. Members of congress ought not to be censured too severely, however, when they fail to check evil courses on the part of the executive. They have been denied the means of doing so promptly and with effect. Whatever intention may have controlled the compromises of constitutionmaking in 1787, their result was to give us, not government by discussion, which is the only tolerable sort of government for a people which tries to do its own governing, but only legislation by discussion, which is no more than a small part of government by discussion. . . . It is even more important to know how the house is being built than to know how the plans of the architect were conceived and how his specifications were calculated. It is better to have skillful work---stout walls, reliable arches, unbending rafters, and windows sure to ‘‘expel the winter’s flaw’’---than a drawing on paper which is the admiration of all the practical artists in the country. The discipline of an army depends quite as much upon the temper of the troops as upon the orders of the day. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and

4.9 War Powers Resolution the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be even to its legislative function. The argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient administration, but, more than that, that the only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration. The talk on the part of Congress which we sometimes justly condemn is the profitless squabble of words over frivolous bills or selfish party issues. It would be hard to conceive of there being too much talk about the practical concerns and processes of government. Such talk it is which, when earnestly and purposefully conducted, clears the public mind and shapes the demands of public opinion.

4.9 War Powers Resolution, November 7, 1973 Public Law 93--148 93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542 November 7, 1973 Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President. Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Short Title Section 1.

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situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. (b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. (c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Consultation Section 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

Reporting Section 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced---

This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘War Powers Resolution’’.

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

Purpose and Policy

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

Section 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to

278 The Congress the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth--(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. (d) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad (e) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

Congressional Action

Congressional Priority Procedures for Joint Resolution or Bill

Section 5.

Section 6.

(a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section. (b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant

(a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. (b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

4.9 War Powers Resolution (c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

Congressional Priority Procedures for Concurrent Resolution Section 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. (b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be

279

voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Interpretation of Joint Resolution Section 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred--(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

280 The Congress (2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution. (a) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date. (b) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term ‘‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’’ includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities. (c) Nothing in this joint resolution--(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provision of existing treaties; or (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

Separability Clause Section 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

Effective Date Section 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment. CARL ALBERT Speaker of the House of Representatives. JAMES O. EASTLAND President of the Senate pro tempore.

In the House of Representatives, U.S. November 7, 1973 The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution (H. J. Res 542) entitled ‘‘Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President’’, returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same. Attest: W. PAT JENNINGS Clerk. I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives. W. PAT JENNINGS Clerk.

In the Senate of the United States November 7, 1973 The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled ‘‘Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President’’, returned by the President of the United States with his objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originate, it was Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative. Attest: FRANCIS R. VALEO Secretary.

4.10 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha et al. Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit No. 80-1832. Argued February 22, 1982 Reargued December 7, 1982 Decided June 23, 1983 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

4.10 INS v. Chadha

I Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for having ‘‘remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted.’’ App. 6. Pursuant to 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation under 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1), at the time in question, provided: ‘‘As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and--‘‘(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United [462 U.S. 919, 924] States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.’’ After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the Immigration Judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha’s deportation be suspended. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha met the requirements of 244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer ‘‘extreme hardship’’ if deported. Pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(1), the Immigration Judge suspended Chadha’s deportation

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and a report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides: ‘‘Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the [462 U.S. 919, 925] facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session.’’ Once the Attorney General’s recommendation for suspension of Chadha’s deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c) (2), to veto the Attorney General’s determination that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides: ‘‘(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsection--‘‘if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien’s voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.’’ [462 U.S. 919, 926] The June 25, 1974, order of the Immigration Judge suspending Chadha’s deportation remained outstanding as a valid order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was the final session in which Congress, pursuant to 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General’s determination that Chadha should not be deported. The session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Cong. Rec. 42014, 42277 (1975). Absent congressional action, Chadha’s deportation proceedings

282 The Congress would have been canceled after this date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien. See 8 U.S.C. 1254(d). On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing ‘‘the granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six] aliens,’’ including Chadha. H. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; 121 Cong Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121 Cong. Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and was not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on Representative Eilberg’s statement from the floor that ‘‘[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution [Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended.’’ Ibid. [462 U.S. 919, 927] The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. Since the House action was pursuant to 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Art. I legislative act; it was not [462 U.S. 919, 928] submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action . . .

G Political Question It is . . . argued that these cases present a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress’ authority under the Naturalization Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress’ Art. I power ‘‘To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’’ combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is [462 U.S. 919, 941] challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976): ‘‘Congress has plenary

authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.’’ Id., at 132. A brief review of those factors which may indicate the presence of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that our assertion of jurisdiction over these cases does no violence to the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the following circumstances is present: ‘‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.’’ Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha’s claim is ‘‘an assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2).’’ Brief for Petitioner in No. 802170, p. 48. But if this turns the question into a political question virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political question. Chadha indeed argues that one House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General’s decision to allow him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine [462 U.S. 919, 942] suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts. Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this case. As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the ‘‘judicially discoverable and manageable standards’’ of Baker for resolving the question presented by these cases. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial ‘‘policy determinations’’ or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha’s arguments are accepted, 244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of ‘‘multifarious pronouncements’’ on this question . . .

4.10 INS v. Chadha

III

‘‘Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States. . . .’’ Art. I, 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added.)

A We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained:

‘‘Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) [462 U.S. 919, 946] shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.’’ Art. I, 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added.)

‘‘Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.’’ TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-195 (1978). By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives---or the hallmarks---of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies: ‘‘Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940--49, nineteen statutes; between 1950--59, thirty--four statutes; and from 1960--69, forty-nine. From the year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions [462 U.S. 919, 945] were included in eighty-nine laws.’’ Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977). Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides: ‘‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.’’ Art. I, 1. (Emphasis added.)

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These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently noted that ‘‘[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.’’ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 124. Just as we relied on the textual provision of Art. II, 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of separation of powers in Buckley, we see that the purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral requirement of Art. I, 1, and 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of the important question presented in these cases. The very structure of the Articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers, and we now turn to Art. I . . .

IV The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. Although not ‘‘hermetically’’ sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 121, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as

284 The Congress defined in Art. II. And when, as here, [462 U.S. 919, 952] one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively acting within its assigned sphere. Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, 7, apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. See infra, at 955, and nn. 20, 21. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon ‘‘whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.’’ S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897). Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, 8, cl. 4, to ‘‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’’ the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under 244. The one-House veto operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha’s deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha’s status. The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in 244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively [462 U.S. 919, 953] delegated authority, had determined the alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged provision in 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only [462 U.S. 919, 954] by legislation requiring deportation. Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I. The nature of the decision implemented by the oneHouse veto in these cases further manifests its

legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation---that is, Congress’ decision to deport Chadha---no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the [462 U.S. 919, 955] President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. Finally, we see that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action. There are four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President’s veto: (a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, 2, cl. 5; (b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. Art. I, 3, cl. 6; (c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove Presidential appointments. Art. II, 2, cl. 2; (d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, 2, cl. 2. Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. [462 U.S. 919, 956] These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged

4.11 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress here. On the contrary, they provide further support for the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto provided for in 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch. Since it is clear that the action by the House under 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally [462 U.S. 919, 957] clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President’s veto, and Congress’ power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those [462 U.S. 919, 958] checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. The veto authorized by 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut; the ‘‘sharing’’ with the Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is crystal [462 U.S. 919, 959] clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process. The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the

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Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579(1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.

4.11 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, December 1993 Historical Overview . . . The House acted first to create permanent committees, the earliest of which coexisted with ad hoc committees. The First Congress created a standing Committee on Enrolled Bills (1789). Other early committees included the Committee on Elections and the Committee on Claims, both created in 1794; two others were added in 1795: the Committee on the Revision of the Laws and the Committee on Commerce and Manufacturers, predecessor to today’s Energy and Commerce Committee. By 1810 the House had 10 standing committees. During the administration of President Monroe (1817091825) the system expanded considerably. Between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the House increasingly relied on standing committees to debate and amend measures. As this reliance on standing committees steadily expanded, the House’s relationship with standing committees changed: measures were first referred to committee for consideration and only after being reported by committee were they debated by the full House. In contrast, during its first quarter century, the Senate created only four permanent committees. Two were joint House and Senate panels and all were chiefly administrative. The Senate established 12 permanent committees in 1816, including the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Foreign Relations. The system grew steadily thereafter, and the number of committees more than doubled by 1844. No additional committees were created until 1863; in fact, the Senate abolished several committees in 1857. Despite their permanence, prior to the Civil War committees did not play a dominant role in the Senate. In the antebellum period, often Senate decision making was based on House-passed measures; legislation was not referred to committee, or was amended little if referred; and party leaders managed many of the important measures on the floor.

286 The Congress Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that by the Civil War congressional committee systems of both Chambers had become institutional fixtures; at that time the House had 39 standing committees, and the Senate had 22. In the years after the Civil War, the number of committees increased dramatically, and the growth of the system mirrored the growth of the Nation. Structural complexity was added with the emergence of subcommittees. Although the creation of standing committees generated little attention, their development radically changed the structure of the Congress, its method of policy making, and its internal authority. During the latter part of the 19th century committees acquired much of their present day authority and powers. They became substantive policymaking bodies and agenda setters as opposed to merely technical aids of the Chambers. They were authorized to legislate exclusively in particular issue areas, although committee jurisdictions were not codified and defined in writing until many years later. They acquired the right to kill legislation they did not support, rather than having to report all measures. Woodrow Wilson, writing his doctoral dissertation in 1885, described this prerogative, ‘‘When [a bill] goes from the clerk’s desk to a committee-room it crosses a parliamentary bridge of sighs to dim dungeons of silence whence it will never return’’ (Wilson, 63). By the turn of the century committees were fairly independent of chamber and party control and committee chairmen had tremendous power over committee business. In fact, Woodrow Wilson characterized congressional government in 1885 as ‘‘a government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress’’ (Wilson, 82). . . . In contrast with the 19th century, the 20th century has been one of retrenchment of the committee system. The House cut six minor committees in 1909, and another six in 1911, when it also took away the power of the Speaker to appoint Members to committees. Subsequently, House committee members and leaders would be elected by the full House. The House again reduced its committees in 1927 by combining 11 expenditure committees into one Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Senate reform was more far-reaching. In 1921, the Senate eliminated 40 minor, superfluous, or moribund standing committees including the anachronistic Committee on Revolutionary Claims. Subsequent events of the 20th century profoundly affected all branches of government and strained the Nation’s governing capacities. The Great Depression and World War II produced an overwhelming legislative agenda, causing severe stress in Congress. As George

Galloway, staff director of the first Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, explained: ‘‘Still functioning for the most part with the machinery and facilities inherited from the simpler days of the mauve decade, its calendars and committees became increasingly congested, its councils confused, and its members bewildered and harassed by multiplying technical problems and local pressures’’ (Galloway 1946, 43).

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 The initial congressional response to the changing environment of the 1930s was to defer to presidential leadership; vast delegations of authority were made to the executive agencies. Yet when the country became fully engaged in World War II and a massive government apparatus was put in place, the Congress began to rethink this executive deference, and question its future place in the constitutional scheme. As California Democrat Jerry Voorhis asserted in 1942, ‘‘I believe Congress must realize that only Congress can restore Congress to its proper place’’ (Congressional Record 1942, 4442). At the same time, a chorus of criticism of the Congress by scholars, reporters, commentators, and Members themselves arose. The critics saw a tradition-bound institution incapable of governing in the second half of the 20th century. These external and internal pressures caused Congress to take an introspective look at itself. A host of reform proposals were introduced; ultimately the Congress passed legislation that established in 1945 the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. Subsequently, the Congress enacted the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which is widely regarded as the blueprint of the contemporary Congress . . . The 1946 Act was the first, and still the most ambitious, effort to restructure the standing committee system. Since the origin of the system, committees were established, dissolved, or consolidated in a nonsystematic fashion, and were retained long after their need. The 1946 Act changed this haphazard system into a simple, rational design; in this transformational process, the number of standing committees in the House decreased from 48 to 19, and in the Senate they likewise decreased from 33 to 15. Jurisdictions were for the first time codified and made part of Chamber rules. Committees were eliminated, others were consolidated, and jurisdictional conflicts were minimized. However, an unintended consequence of the 1946 Act with profound ramifications was the proliferation of subcommittees. While the Act had established a set number of committees, it did not limit the number of

4.11 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress subcommittees that could be created. Another of the Act’s features---equalizing and stabilizing committee sizes---proved to be an easy target for alteration; prior to electing Members to committees at the outset of a Congress, the House often adopted a resolution to amend the committee sizes listed in the rules. Other unforeseen outcomes can be summarized as follows: ‘‘by reducing the number of standing committees and hardening their jurisdictional lines, the act tended to strengthen the seniority system, reinforce committee autonomy, and inhibit the ability of the two Chambers to recast its work groups in response to new configurations of public problems’’ (Davidson 1990, 367).

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 . . . By the mid-1960s . . . It seemed appropriate to create another joint committee to reexamine congressional problems comprehensively and to effect further reorganization. The fact that Senator Mike Monroney (D-OK) offered the proposal in early 1965 added to its luster; as a Representative, he had been Vice Chairman of the first joint committee and the 1946 Act’s floor manager in the House. By March both Chambers had agreed to the resolution . . . The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 revised committee procedures. Specifically, the law encouraged open committee meetings, required that committees have written rules, required that all committee roll call votes be made public, allowed radio and television coverage of committee hearings, and safeguarded the rights of minority party members on the committee. The statute also prohibited general, but not specific, proxies for committee votes in an attempt to prevent their indiscriminate use by committee chairmen and other members. The Act further provided a more equitable distribution of committee assignments and chair positions in the Senate. Specifically, with safeguards for current assignments, three categories of committees were created and Senators were allowed two committees in the first category and one in each of the other categories. Senators were prohibited from holding more than one committee chairmanship and more than one subcommittee chair on any major committee. The 1970 Act is widely believed to be a more modest accomplishment than its 1946 predecessor because it did not generally change the organization of Congress in fundamental ways. However, its legacy is notable. The Act alleviated a wide range of procedural and institutional strains; further, it marked a turning point in the reform movement, signalling an end to an era when committee chairmen and senior members were

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considered autonomous with little constraint and the beginning of nearly a decade of change.

House Committee Reform Efforts Party Caucus Reforms, 1971--1975. Changes in the Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference dramatically affected committee organization and assignment procedures. Although Republican party changes paralleled, and often preceded, Democratic changes, those of the Democratic majority party had the greatest impact on House committee operations. Activist, reform-minded Members in the House soon concluded that the 1970 Act did not go far enough in curtailing the allegedly abusive and autocratic behavior of certain chairmen. Spearheading an effort to change Democratic party rules in the House, the Democratic Study Group was successful in prevailing upon the Democratic Caucus to create a special party committee---the Committee on Organization, Study, and Review, chaired by Representative Julia Butler Hansen (D-WA). In January 1971, the Caucus accepted the first set of proposals put forth by the Hansen Committee. Henceforth, Democrats would be limited to one subcommittee chairmanship, and each subcommittee chair would be entitled to one staffer. Perhaps more important, nominations for committee chairmanships and memberships were not required to be based on seniority. Also, on the request of ten Members, nominations could be separately debated and voted on by the Caucus. Another set of seniority reforms was adopted in 1973. A secret ballot vote on any committee chair was permitted at the demand of 20 percent of the Caucus. To give party leaders more control over committee assignments, the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Caucus Chairman became members of the committee on committees; previously only the Democrats serving on the Ways and Means Committee comprised the members of the committee on committees. The Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee was stripped of his role as chair of the committee on committees, which would be held henceforth by the Speaker. Also, the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, chaired by the Speaker, was created in an effort to promote party policy and unity. Perhaps most significantly, in 1973 the control of committee chairmen over committee business was limited by the Caucus’s approval of the so-called Subcommittee Bill of Rights. The measure forced committee chairmen to share power, and authorized each subcommittee to meet, hold hearings, and act. It empowered the ‘‘democratic caucus’’ on each committee to establish subcommittee jurisdictions; set party ratios on

288 The Congress subcommittees; and choose subcommittee members and chairmen, guaranteeing all members a major subcommittee slot where possible. Subcommittees were guaranteed independent budgets, and committee chairmen were required to refer measures to subcommittees in accordance with their written jurisdictions. Further changes to assignment procedures and seniority were made in 1974. In part to diminish its power, the Ways and Means Committee was stripped of its role as the committee on committees; the authority to make Democratic committee assignments was transferred to the newly reconstituted Steering and Policy Committee. Democrats also began requiring automatic secret ballot votes on committee chairmen and allowed for additional nominations for chairman if the first nominee was rejected. The new procedures were used to oust three sitting chairmen at the outset of the next Congress. The Select Committee on Committees, 1973--1974. With profound changes made to the seniority system, House reformers turned their sights to a committee system in serious disarray. Some of the problems were external: committee jurisdictions and emerging public issues were mismatched, and the dispersed committee system often failed to aggregate related pieces of a policy. Internal stress was evident as well, such as jurisdictional rivalries and scheduling conflicts. Legislators themselves professed to be deeply dissatisfied with the committee structure. A 1973 survey of 101 House and Senate Members ‘‘discovered that 81 percent were dissatisfied with committee jurisdictions and the way they are defined in Congress.’’ Only 1 percent of the legislators was ‘‘very satisfied’’ (Davidson 1981, 112). In 1973 the House established a bipartisan Select Committee on Committees (chaired by Richard Bolling, D-MO) on which Democrats and Republicans were equally represented. The Bolling Committee sought to amend House Rules, unlike the Hansen Committee, which had amended Democratic Caucus rules. The report of the Bolling Committee, presented in March 1974, called for 15 exclusive and seven nonexclusive committees in a major jurisdictional realignment plan. The report triggered intense opposition from committee leaders who opposed changes to their jurisdictions, as well as from those alliances known as ‘‘iron triangles,’’ composed of committee members and staff, lobby groups, and executive agencies. They feared that structural shifts would unwire their mutually beneficial alliances. The Democratic Caucus, to which the Bolling Plan had been referred for review, sent the plan to the Democratic Committee on Organization, Study and Review

(the Hansen Committee) for further consideration. This committee hastily drafted a much narrower, alternative reorganization plan. Ultimately, the Bolling plan, the Hansen plan, and a Republican package drafted by Representative David Martin (R-NE), former Vice Chairman of the Bolling Committee, were sent to the floor together under an open rule. After a 6-day debate the Hansen proposal was accepted; it took effect with the 94th Congress (1975--1976). Although the final reorganization mainly retained the existing committee structure and was, therefore, less comprehensive than what the Bolling Committee had recommended, some noticeable jurisdictional changes were made. Major categories of transportation (except railroads) were consolidated in the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. The then Science and Technology Committee assumed overall responsibility for government research and development programs. Foreign Affairs began to operate under new broadly worded jurisdictional language. Most health responsibilities were concentrated in the then Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, although Ways and Means retained most of its leverage on medical financing through payroll taxes. However, energy, environmental, and other issues remained scattered. The Hansen plan did retain certain Bolling Committee recommendations in the nonjurisdictional area. For example, the Speaker was given the power of multiple referral as well as the power to create ad hoc committees to process bills falling within the purview of two or more standing committees. Commission on Administrative Review, 1976--1977. Out of the House’s rejection of much of the Bolling Committee’s package came the suggestion by Representative Bolling for a commission to study House operations. More commonly called the Obey Commission after its chairman, David R. Obey (D-WI), the Commission was established when the House agreed to H. Res. 1368 on July 1, 1976. The Commission’s charge was ambitious: to study any matter pertaining to the operations of the House. After a year of prodigious research, the Commission developed 42 recommendations. Although most addressed administrative reorganization and workload management, several proposals dealt with committee and personal staff and committee operations. Further, one recommendation called for the appointment of a new select committee to study committee jurisdictions and assignments. The House refused to consider the 42 recommendations submitted as H. Res. 766, by rejecting on October 12, 1977, the rule to proceed to the consideration of the resolution . . .

4.11 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress

Sources: Roger Davidson, ‘‘Two Avenues of Change: House and Senate Committee Reorganization,’’ in Congress Reconsidered, 2nd ed. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981; Roger Davidson, ‘‘The

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Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly XV (August 1990): 367; George Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads. New York: Crowell, 1946; Congressional Record (May 21, 1942): 4442; Wilson, 63; and Wilson, 82.

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Section 5 The Presidency

Introduction

government. ‘‘The President is the political leader of the nation, or has it in his choice to be,’’ Woodrow Wilson proclaimed. ‘‘The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. . . . Its instinct is for unified action, and it craves a single leader.’’ In this view, other political actors---legislators, bureaucrats, party officials, lobbyists, and others--represent only partial or selfish interest. Champions of broad executive power argue that presidential leadership is both crucial for advancing the democratic will and critical for guarding the public good, particularly during times of national security crisis. The essays by Michael J. Korzi, Saladin M. Ambar, and Avram Fechter trace the origins and development of the American presidency, from early executives alternately stretching or limiting the executive powers laid out so vaguely in Article II of the Constitution, to Lincoln’s unprecedented ‘‘prerogative presidency’’ during the Civil War, to the rise of a modern presidency shaped by enormous resources and still greater expectations. Each of these essays analyzes the presidency as an institution, while remaining attentive to the importance of its individual occupants, and each reminds readers of the inherent and compelling tensions between executive power and liberal democracy. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The American presidency is perhaps the most visible office in the U.S. political system, but it remains poorly understood in many respects. Ordinary citizens tend to personalize the executive office by thinking of the presidency as the president. In the process, critical features of the presidency as an institution are routinely obscured. Moreover, it is often assumed that executive leadership and democracy are complementary, a view promulgated by Progressives like Woodrow Wilson and Henry Jones Ford and extended by influential presidential scholars such as James MacGregor Burns and Richard Neustadt. Yet committed democrats long have viewed presidential power with dread, because it has the potential to make citizens passive, dependent, and deferential---qualities illsuited for self-government. Thomas Paine, for instance, warned that public faith in a powerful executive represents a ‘‘slavish custom’’ that elevates the beliefs and decisions of one over the many. During major crises, defenders of civil liberties and the Madisonian system of ‘‘separate institutions sharing power’’ have worried that executive ‘‘prerogative’’ or emergency powers profoundly threaten deliberative government and individual freedom. Over time, however, presidents presented themselves as the only elected representative of the whole people, the true embodiment of popular will, and a primary source of energy and direction in American

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Development of the Presidency, 1787---1945 Michael J. Korzi Associate Professor of Political Science, Towson University

opposed to or at least critical of the new Constitution, objecting strongly to some of the powers and duties of the new presidency. Although we can only briefly discuss the constitutional period here, it is worth noting that by the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Americans, especially those elite Americans assembled in Philadelphia, had modified their views of political philosophy and governance. Many who in 1776 had rejected monarchy and with it institutions that faintly resembled a strong executive, by 1787 were at least open to a strengthened executive office to remedy the instability and lack of ‘‘energy’’ under the Articles.1 Furthermore, where most wanted states to have substantial power after the Revolution, by 1787, many observers saw fortification of national power as a key to the success of the United States. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that even in 1787, with the creation of this new presidential office, fears of monarchy were still strong and legislatures were held in generally higher esteem than executives. It is not fortuitous that the first and longest Article of the Constitution (Article I) lays out Congress’s structures and duties, not the president’s. What the founders created in 1787 is an office with relatively straightforward features, but less defined powers. The office is a unitary one, meaning that one person occupies the office rather than multiple individuals (such as in the Congress and the federal courts). This person must be 35 years of age, a natural-born citizen (unless a citizen at the time of the ratification of the Constitution), and a resident of the United States

From the standpoint of the early 21st century, the American presidency seems a settled office, with a set of duties and expectations associated with it. However, at the time of the Constitutional Convention and for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the office itself, its powers, and particularly the expectations of the office changed markedly. This essay will look at the development of the presidency from 1787 to 1945, highlighting significant events, trends, and presidencies. Most important, it will chart the evolution of an office largely restrained and balanced in origin but that became the central engine of the American political system and thoroughly modern in character.

The Constitution and the Presidency Trivia aficionados enjoy revealing the shocking truth that the first president of the United States was not George Washington. In fact, the first president was John Hanson. Hanson, you see, was the first presiding officer (called ‘‘president’’) of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation, our first constitution, which was rejected and replaced in 1787. However, because of the weakness not only of the Continental Congress but also its presiding officer, Hanson and the other ‘‘presidents’’ before George Washington are properly subjects only of trivia and footnotes. The office created under the Constitution of 1787 was a fundamentally different and stronger office than the nearly ceremonial office of president under the Articles. In fact, it provoked considerable debate at the time of ratification, with Anti-Federalists, those

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294 The Presidency for 14 years. The president is elected through an ‘‘electoral college,’’ serves a four-year term, and (until the Twenty-Second Amendment) is eligible to seek reelection an unlimited number of times. The veto power is reasonably straightforward, but the president’s role in foreign policy (through treaties, appointing and receiving ambassadors, and war-making) is left rather underdeveloped and ambiguous in the Constitution. Also underdeveloped is the president’s management of the executive branch (administration) and wielding of executive power. Much of the history of the presidency can be told through the evolution of these inchoate presidential powers. Interestingly, characteristics of the presidency that we consider second nature today were very much up in the air and hotly debated in 1787: the unitary nature of the office, the four-year term, the electoral college, and the veto power, to name just a few. Many opponents of the Constitution believed that a ‘‘plural’’ executive (more than one president)---or at the very least an executive council (a body that would oversee and possibly veto presidential actions)---was needed to restrain the office. A single man being elected president smacked of monarchy to many observers, that which the Americans had rejected just a little over 10 years prior. The four-year term has become an ingrained part of American politics, but there was much disparity in plans for term length, from one- or two-year terms to six- or seven-year terms to a life term with ‘‘good behavior.’’ A unique creation born of compromise, the electoral college reflected the very strong conflicts between those who supported legislative selection of the president, thus subsuming the president to Congress’s will, and those who wanted popular election and thus a more powerful office anchored in the esteem and support of the people. The resulting compromise produced a presidency largely independent of Congress and the public.2 And the veto, also a compromise in that it was not ‘‘absolute’’ and could be overridden by the Congress, engendered many comparisons to the English monarchy and raised fears of excessive power in the office. But many of the worries and questions about the new Constitution, and particularly the presidency, were mitigated by the knowledge that the respected and admired George Washington in all likelihood would become the first president.

Washington and the Power of Precedent It is nearly impossible in such short space to capture the legacy of George Washington (and that of his chief deputy, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, who

would have a great influence on Washington’s presidential decisions). By merely taking actions, the first president would establish baselines and precedents. However, Washington’s actions were informed generally by a prudent but firm tone that would be a strong model to subsequent presidents. For instance, in the realm of foreign affairs, Washington established the president as a main player, indeed the leader in foreign affairs. With his Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, offered in the midst of a war between France and England, Washington established that presidents could decide, unilaterally if necessary, what obligations the United States had to other nations. Similarly, the ‘‘recognition power’’ was claimed by Washington with his reception of Citizen Genet (Revolutionary France’s new ambassador) in 1793. That Washington considered refusal of Genet and that he did not weigh this decision in concert with the Senate or the House of Representatives suggests that Washington clearly intended this power for the presidency, despite the ambiguity of the Constitution and James Madison’s argument that receiving ambassadors was never meant to entail foreign policy prerogatives.3 In the domestic realm, Washington also established a number of important benchmarks. Through the able work of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, one of the leading financial experts in the country at the time, Washington’s presidency saw the assumption of state debts and the development of a national bank and a program to support and sustain public credit. Washington here helped to put the nation on the course of economic stability and prosperity, strengthening the powers of the national government and also the presidency as a key player in the development of economic policy. Moreover, with Washington’s strong response to the Whiskey Rebellion---an uprising in western Pennsylvania caused by taxes levied by the national government on whiskey---he affirmed the supremacy of the federal government over the states or localities. Washington requested that Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia provide militia to suppress the uprising. They provided an army that Washington himself (and Hamilton) accompanied into Pennsylvania. The strong display of force ended the rebellion quickly and established the supremacy of the federal government over lower governments. However, Washington also showed his reserve and magnanimity by pardoning those convicted of treason for their parts in the rebellion.4 Washington left important legacies in terms of his legislative leadership and managing the executive branch. Hamilton had provided in Federalist No. 73 a

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 295 robust conception of the veto, suggesting that a president should wield it frequently to keep the legislature and the people in their places (Lodge 1888). Washington, however, took a limited view of the veto power, preferring only to veto legislation that was unconstitutional, not legislation he simply disagreed with on policy grounds (for a discussion of Washington’s vetoes, see Phelps 1989, 266--269). During his eight years in office, Washington only wielded the veto twice. This reserve with respect to the veto would be observed by Washington’s more immediate successors, although after Andrew Jackson presidents would be more likely to veto legislation on policy grounds. Beyond the veto, Washington did not actively lead the Congress through public statements or recommendations or even private persuasion. Nevertheless, while generally allowing Congress the initiative in the legislative arena, he also permitted his deputies, particularly Alexander Hamilton, to wield important persuasive influence over Congress (for a discussion of Hamilton’s relations with Congress through his Treasury Reports, see Chernow 2004, 295--306). Despite the perception of Washington’s critics, Washington was always fully in charge of his subordinates; he encouraged their opinions and provided them sometimes much leeway (particularly Hamilton), but ultimately he accepted or rejected their views or advice as he thought fit. In other words, he had a finely attuned sense of how to manage the executive branch (on Washington’s leadership of the first presidential cabinet, see Warshaw 2000, 116--118). Washington was also rather protective of the executive branch as an institution. This can be seen clearly from his deliberation and thoughtfulness in setting precedents, but perhaps best in his establishment of ‘‘executive privilege,’’ or the ‘‘right of the president and high-level administration officials to refuse to divulge information’’ to Congress and sometimes courts and special prosecutors (for Washington’s specific influence on the power, see Rozell 2000, 36--39). Two of Washington’s most important actions came with his retirement from office. Although not necessarily wishing to establish a ‘‘two-term tradition,’’ Washington’s decision not to seek a third term in 1796 helped to engrain a tradition of two terms of service, even though the Constitution permitted unlimited terms (Cronin 1989, 76--77). Until Franklin Roosevelt’s successful pursuit of a third term in 1940, no president would serve more than two terms, in large part deferring to the precedent set by Washington (and then reinforced by Jefferson). The Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, would place into the Constitution the two-term tradition. Equally important, with his exit

from the national stage Washington offered his now famous Farewell Address. Crafted with the help of his chief aide Hamilton, the Farewell Address is, as it sounds, a goodbye to the American people. Significantly, Washington offers two key pieces of advice. First, he warns ‘‘against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party,’’ arguing that party is ‘‘a fire not to be quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume’’ (Washington 1997, 969--970). Although admitting that party may be useful to keep government in check, he believed that it was much more likely to produce ill effects, such as promoting bitterness among those in government, and particularly diminishing the respect of the people for their government. Washington was clearly reacting to the divisions in his own government between Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state until 1793, and his key advisor and Secretary of Treasury Hamilton. These divisions, by the time Washington left office, were growing into fullblown political parties, with Hamilton (and Washington reluctantly) leading the Federalist Party and Jefferson and James Madison leading the Democratic-Republican Party. Second, Washington warned against becoming too involved in the politics of Europe: ‘‘a passionate attachment of one Nation for another produces a variety of evils’’ (Washington 1997, 973). He had in mind particularly the ongoing war between France and England, which in the United States had promoted much bitterness, with the Federalist Party generally being pro-British and the Democratic-Republicans being Francophiles. This is the rhetorical beginning of U.S. policies of neutrality and isolationism, which would govern the foreign policy of the nation until the early 20th century. Even in his leaving office, Washington would exercise considerable influence over American political ideas. In his eight years in office, Washington provided a model of firm and decisive leadership, principally in foreign affairs and executive administration. Washington was also a strong protector of the office of the presidency, concerned about congressional challenges to presidential power and the independence of the executive in general. But Washington was also aware of the limits on presidential authority and he assiduously avoided dominating the legislative agenda and shunned partisanship and appeals to the people to anchor his leadership; his was independent or ‘‘constitutional’’ leadership. Although his precedents would be important and guide many of his successors in the 19th and 20th centuries, subsequent presidents would substantially shape the office as well.

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Jefferson and the ‘‘Republican’’ Presidency Since Washington was virtually the unanimous choice for president in 1788 and 1792, the 1796 election was the first truly competitive presidential election in American history. With John Adams as the candidate of the Federalists and Thomas Jefferson as the DemocraticRepublican candidate, the competition was close, but Adams prevailed in the electoral college tally. Yet, because of a split among Federalists, who could not unify on a second choice candidate (that is, the vice presidential slot), Jefferson emerged in second place and hence became Adams’ vice president.5 This inauspicious beginning is emblematic of the Adams presidency in general: Adams was throughout his presidency besieged and challenged not only by the opposition DemocraticRepublicans but by his own Federalist Party. Two key events highlight the Adams presidency and the rocky transition between Washington’s ‘‘nonpartisan’’ presidency and the more popular and partisan presidency that commenced with Jefferson’s election in 1800. The first is the so-called XYZ Affair, which revolved around foreign relations between the United States and France in 1797--1798. The Jay Treaty, a treaty between the United States and Britain ratified during Washington’s administration, was thought by the French (and Democratic-Republicans in America) to be too generous toward England. Attempting to smooth relations, Adams sent officials to negotiate with the French. However, during the course of negotiations, it emerged that the French diplomats had expected ‘‘tribute’’ or bribes from the Americans merely to merit serious discussions or negotiations. The news of these actions by the French caused a great uproar in the United States and put the United States and France in a near condition of war. Not surprisingly, DemocraticRepublicans, being Francophiles, doubted the legitimacy of the story or blamed the Federalists and Adams for poor negotiating. Adams, though, also disappointed Hamilton and many Federalists by not being more aggressive in his stance toward France (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 88--89). The second event was the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, particularly the Sedition Act. Both acts were passed in the wake of the standoff with the French, the former act allowing the deportation of individuals hostile to the interests of the United States and the latter allowing punishment of those individuals who brought ‘‘false, scandalous, and malicious’’ accusations against the government (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 90). The Sedition Act brought the most criticism,

and deservedly so, as it amounted to a tool of the ruling Federalist Party to punish their political enemies, Democratic-Republicans. Not only this but it was undoubtedly unconstitutional, as it punished individuals for their speech against the government, in blatant violation of the Constitution’s First Amendment (although the Sedition Act was never reviewed by the Supreme Court). Jefferson’s election in 1800 would spell the end of the Alien and Sedition Acts, but it is instructive to highlight their importance to the Adams presidency and the presidency in general. Although rather misguided, the Acts showed that ‘‘political opposition’’ was not yet acceptable in American politics. There was rarely outright opposition to Washington, but Adams was not so fortunate. It was difficult for Federalists to accept that the Democratic-Republicans, while critical of the administration, were loyal Americans with different views on governing, instead of corrupt Francophiles intent on subordinating U.S. to French interests. Democratic-Republicans, for their part, were intensely distrustful of Federalists and their ostensible ‘‘monarchical’’ tendencies, and the Alien and Sedition Acts did nothing to change their minds. The party battle raged, but neither side accepted the other as legitimate. In this political environment, the independent-minded Adams had little hope for success: his partisan actions were decried by his opponents and thought not to be strong enough by his supporters, and his nonpartisan actions were interpreted by his opponents as half-hearted and by his supporters as betrayal. Despite Washington’s warning against parties in his Farewell Address, by the 1800 election, they were in full flower. Federalists reluctantly sided with the incumbent Adams, while Democratic-Republicans supported their leader, Thomas Jefferson. With party unity much stronger than in 1796, electors were organized and committed to their men, Democratic-Republicans voting for Jefferson and Aaron Burr and Federalists voting for Adams and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. With 73 electoral votes each, Jefferson and Burr prevailed over Adams (65) and Pinckney (64); Federalist John Jay received one electoral vote. A close election, but nonetheless a victory for Jefferson and Burr. But which man would become president, as they were tied and the Constitution prescribed that the House of Representatives would decide on a president if no candidate received a majority of votes or if there was a tie? It was obvious to nearly all observers that Jefferson was the intended president (and Burr the vice president) but the Federalists controlled the House and flirted with elevating Burr to the top position, thinking him perhaps more amenable to their positions than Jefferson.

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 297 Ultimately, they voted for Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president, but the unclear result of the election would prompt the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. The Twelfth Amendment represents a major development in presidential politics; it most importantly provided for separate electoral votes for president and vice president, thereby enshrining the idea of a ‘‘presidential ticket’’ and thus political parties in the constitutional fabric. Jefferson’s presidency represents an important moment in American history for several reasons. First, the 1800 election was the first election contested (sometimes bitterly) by organized political parties. That the opposition party won and took office without bloodshed represented a victory for the republican system of government. It would set a precedent for the peaceful transference of power between the parties for the next two centuries. Moreover, the precedent would be set for political parties to influence and shape the presidency, even if this role would not become fully developed until the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Second, Jefferson’s decision to step down after two terms, despite his supporters’ wishes that he serve longer, elevated the inchoate two-term tradition to the level of a political credo. Most important, Jefferson’s approach to the presidency and governance in general transformed the office of presidency substantially. As a Democratic-Republican, Jefferson brought a number of beliefs about the presidency and governance to office. In terms of protocol, he believed that the presidency should avoid the trappings of monarchy and thus did he reduce the ceremonial aspects of the office; for instance, Jefferson discontinued the practice of delivering the annual State of the Union message orally to Congress, preferring to send a written copy of his message (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 103). This republican practice would be followed by subsequent presidents until Woodrow Wilson dramatically broke with the precedent in 1913. In terms of policy and actions, Jefferson sought to reduce the scope of the federal government and (seemingly) the role of the presidency. As a Democratic-Republican, Jefferson favored states’ rights and a limited federal government, and he was strongly opposed to standing armies (a temptation to war mongering according to Democratic-Republicans). He was also suspicious of the federal courts, as they were removed largely from public control, and he attempted an ultimately unsuccessful assault on the judicial branch, including the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase (McDonald 1976, 89--94).6 But Jefferson’s influence on the presidency itself is ambiguous and somewhat contradictory. Without

Thomas Jefferson of Virginia served in the Second Continental Congress and drafted the Declaration of Independence. Later he was governor of Virginia, minister to France, and president of the United States. (Library of Congress)

question he ‘‘popularized’’ the presidency, especially through his elections in 1800 and 1804, as each was a ‘‘contest of opinion,’’ to use Jefferson’s own words from his first inaugural address (Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents 1974, 14). The people, even if a small electorate at this time, decided the policy direction of the presidency through elections and especially the support of political parties. What is more, through his largely backroom management of Congress, he carved out a strong role for presidential party leadership. The ‘‘independent’’ executive envisioned by Washington was substantially challenged by the popular, partisan Jeffersonian executive. At the same time, Jefferson himself often disdained political parties and never fully embraced the partisan executive office that he helped to develop. Indeed, his successors---especially James Monroe---at times would hark back in their rhetoric and actions to the nonpartisan model of Washington. Additionally, as a critic of a strong central government, Jefferson did work to roll back taxes and reduce the size of the army that the Federalists had built up, but he did not challenge the national bank (as Andrew Jackson later would), understanding that it was

298 The Presidency necessary to the prosperity of the United States.7 Finally, even though often working to curtail the powers of the federal government, including the presidency, Jefferson purchased unilaterally the Louisiana Territory from the French, knowing that his actions were not likely supported by the Constitution (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 104). Ultimately, Jefferson gave us a more republican presidency, one that was more tied to the public and political parties but was also restrained and limited, especially in terms of protocol and public actions. At times, however, Jefferson wielded strong, if behindthe-scenes, executive authority and leadership. Jefferson’s immediate successors, James Madison and James Monroe, would not differ notably from the Jeffersonian course, even though Madison presided when the nation was at war with Great Britain in the War of 1812 and Monroe held office during the self-proclaimed ‘‘Era of Good Feelings,’’ a time of relative peace and prosperity. Importantly, during the tenure of Madison, the Federalist Party disintegrated, largely over the war with England, and they virtually would disappear during Monroe’s presidency. The Era of Good Feelings, a period of one party domination, however, would be short-lived and in-fighting among Democratic-Republicans would characterize the 1824 election.

Political Parties and the Presidency in the Jackson Era Observing the two-term tradition, Monroe did not stand for reelection again in 1824. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams---son of former president John Adams--and other notable leaders, such as the famous general Andrew Jackson and Speaker of the House Henry Clay, would vie for the presidency. The outcome, however, would not be clear, as no candidate received a majority of electoral votes. The House of Representatives, as per the Constitution, with some changes wrought by the Twelfth Amendment, was charged with selecting a president from the top three vote getters. Jackson and his supporters expected he would prevail, as he also won more popular votes than Adams,8 but the vote in the House, with Henry Clay leading the way, went to John Quincy Adams and he thus became president. When Adams later named Clay to be secretary of state, Jackson and his supporters were convinced that a ‘‘corrupt bargain’’ had been struck between Adams and Clay and this galvanized the Jacksonians for the 1828 election, which Jackson handily won. John Quincy Adams’s presidency was thus embattled from the beginning, and for our purposes, is more

notable for its beginning and its end than much of what transpired in between. It is important to note, though, that the Adams presidency revealed real disagreements between two main factions within the Democratic-Republican Party---that is, the more nationalist (and hence, neo-Federalist) Democratic-Republicans, represented by Adams and Clay, and the more states’ rights faction, represented most notably by Jackson. Adams would during his presidency act more along the lines of the nationalist faction and his defeat in 1828 by Jackson would bring to dominance the states’ rights perspective. The Jackson presidency represents more, though, than the dominance of states’ rights in the philosophy of the Democratic Party (dropping ‘‘Republican’’ from its name during these years). Jackson’s presidency is important for three intertwined reasons: (1) the establishment, for good this time, of political parties in the American political system; (2) the solidification of a popular connection between the presidency and the people; and (3) the articulation of a new conception of presidential authority that saw a more activist presidency vying with Congress for leadership of the nation. Jackson’s presidency came at a time of rapid expansion of the electorate, with many states loosening their restrictions on voting, especially property restrictions on voting. Jackson was not only a beneficiary of but a spur to these developments. The rapidly expanding electorate needed to be harnessed or managed somehow and this role was assumed by the previously dormant political parties. Whereas the parties of Jefferson and Hamilton had been largely elite-based parties, those of the 1830s were mass-based parties and connected the newly enfranchised mass public with their government. The parties acted as intermediaries between the people and their leaders, including the president. Although there would be bitter debates between the Jacksonian Democratic Party and the opposition Whig Party, unlike in the earlier era, these parties ultimately would come to be accepted, if not embraced, by political leaders and the mass public (for more on these trends, see Silbey 1991). The parties would shape the presidency in key ways. They brought a popular character to the presidency at odds with the original conception of an office largely independent of the people. Jackson clearly tapped into this new source of power, seeing himself as ‘‘tribune of the people,’’ and challenging Congress for leadership of the nation. Before Jackson, although some like Jefferson did see a connection between themselves and the American people, presidents deferred to Congress, especially on matters of domestic public policy.

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 299 Jackson, however, not only challenged Congress over rechartering the federal bank but also through his vetoes of federal spending on projects in the states (called ‘‘internal improvements’’), which Jackson believed undercut the rights of the states. While communication limitations prevented Jackson from speaking directly to the people, as modern presidents do, Jackson was able to reach and rally the people through his formal messages and through the influence of a developing party press. Jackson consolidated his party support through the emerging practice of party ‘‘patronage,’’ or placing loyalists and supporters in appointive---and, importantly, paying---positions in the executive department of government. Although much criticized, this practice would become firmly entrenched and govern the appointment process for much of the 19th century (for more on the Jacksonian style, see Meyers 1960). The heads of the major executive departments, the cabinet, thenceforth often would be chosen with the diverse constituencies of the political party in mind (see Warshaw 2000, 120--122). With Jackson, then, comes a new vision of the president as ‘‘representative of the people,’’ not merely an officer or protector of the Constitution. This new model of presidential leadership, though, did not reject ‘‘constitutional’’ leadership as much as augment or enrich it. Jackson saw himself as an instrument of the Constitution, protecting the powers of the federal government and the presidency, despite the public’s opinions or his party’s philosophy. For instance, his bold challenge to South Carolina in 1832---which had claimed to ‘‘nullify’’ two federal tariff laws, those of 1828 and 1832, that were oppressive to the South---represented a strong assertion of federal authority and a stinging rebuke to the excessive states’ rights philosophy of South Carolina. Observing the two-term tradition, Jackson would not seek a third term in 1836. His vice president, Martin Van Buren, however, would win the 1836 election and thus further confirm Jackson’s popularity and influence. With Van Buren’s presidency comes the full birth of the mass-based two-party system in American politics. Somewhat disorganized during Jackson’s tenure, his opponents, the Whigs, would gather strength and unity during Van Buren’s presidency---a presidency marked by an economic depression and waning popularity for the Democratic Party---enough to win the election of 1840 with Gen. William Henry Harrison. Until they collapsed in the 1850s over the divisive issue of slavery, the Whigs would be an important force in antebellum politics, also winning the presidency in 1848. Whigs started off as reluctant partisans, united

by an opposition to Jackson and his policies and also to the growing popular nature of politics. Initially preferring a founding vision of politics as a nonpartisan pursuit, the Whigs embraced the style and tactics of the Democrats, even if sometimes half-heartedly. By the 1840s, the Whigs campaigned openly for the people’s vote, drew up platforms to submit to the people, and acted as unified partisans once in government. The presidency would thenceforth rarely be a nonpartisan office. The Democrats and Whigs battled during the antebellum period over mainly economic issues---tariffs, internal improvements, and national banking, to name the most prominent. Inherent in the conflicts was a disagreement over the power of the federal government, with Democrats adopting a states’ rights philosophy and Whigs being more amenable to federal power. Relatedly, they argued over the scale of presidential power, with Whigs preferring congressional dominance and Democrats supporting the Jackson model. Whigs, in fact, supported a one-term presidency and sparing use of the veto power, among other executive restraints. With the exception of James Polk, a Democrat elected president in 1844, presidents between Jackson and Lincoln---Whig or Democrat---generally were reserved in their conduct and did not exercise strong executive leadership. Still, all were decidedly more ‘‘democratic’’ in nature than the early presidencies, as the parties provided an important link between public opinion and the executive office (on the Whig Party and the Jacksonian era in general, see Holt 1999). Polk’s presidency deserves brief mention by itself, though. Polk followed Jackson’s model quite closely upon assuming office. Polk clearly saw himself, as much as Congress, as a ‘‘representative of the people’’ leading his party to make good on their promises in the 1844 election. Polk, like Jackson, wielded the veto for policy reasons and used it as a tool of party leadership. Polk also used the partisan press to gain support for his positions. Even more, Polk engaged the United States in a war with Mexico that many Whigs saw as the result of an aggressive executive agenda aiming to acquire more lands for the United States (Holt 1999, 233). Whether justified or not, the important point is that Polk was a bold president on par with Jackson; still, Polk only went so far. Like Jackson, Polk did not speak directly to the people, did not openly campaign for election, and although challenging and confronting it, did not dominate Congress; moreover, unlike Jackson, Polk refused to stand for reelection, out of respect for ‘‘republicanism’’ and the need for executive deference to the political party and the public.

300 The Presidency As much as they tried to keep the issue of slavery out of our national discourse, the Democrats and Whigs could hold it off only so long. The War with Mexico brought new lands into the United States’ possession and also opened up debates about slavery in these new lands. From the early 1850s on, Democrats and Whigs had to engage the issue with the admission of new states, and the Whigs ultimately could not hold themselves together, putting up their last presidential candidate in 1856. Democrats increasingly became the party of the South and supporters of slavery, either directly or tacitly in their support of states’ rights and state control over ‘‘domestic’’ affairs, that is, slavery. The Republican Party---a party opposed to the extension of slavery into the new territories---formed in 1854 and grew very quickly into a major party, helping to hasten the demise of the Whigs, many of whom, like Abraham Lincoln, joined the new party. A modern observer might ask why the presidents of the 1850s, Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan, did not engage in bold leadership to help the country avoid civil war. Surely we would chastise a president today if he or she failed to avert a crisis. However, we must not succumb to the anachronistic temptation---that is, we should judge these presidents by the standards of their day. Notwithstanding the somewhat ‘‘modern’’ actions of Jackson and Polk, presidents generally deferred to Congress and blame should be placed equally if not more on Congress, which passed the Kansas-Nebraska Acts in 1854, often thought to be a major catalyst in the lead up to the Civil War. The Supreme Court also bore considerable blame given the incendiary Dred Scott v. Sanford decision in 1857. At any rate, as the 1860 election approached, the country was on the verge of civil war.

Lincoln and Wartime Executive Power Lincoln is undoubtedly considered to be one of the United States’ greatest presidents, if not its greatest president. Yet, Lincoln’s background and the beginning of his presidency did not suggest the bold leader that emerged during the war and, in fact, it is important to note that Lincoln’s strong leadership was almost exclusively in the service of the war, an emergency situation. As David Donald has written, Lincoln was a rather consistent ‘‘Whig’’ in his leadership on domestic and nonemergency matters (1969, chapter 10). Prior to his joining the Republican Party, Lincoln had been a Whig. As a good Whig, he was suspicious of executive power and thought of Congress as the engine of domestic policy leadership. When nominated by the Republicans in

1860, Lincoln pledged allegiance to the party platform and expressed deference to the party in general. Moreover, in obedience to the conventions of the time, he did not actively campaign before the public, allowing Republican partisans to campaign for him. Upon his election, in his inaugural address, Lincoln appealed to the Republican platform of 1860 and the campaign promises of Republicans to make his case that he would not touch slavery where it currently existed and to convince Southerners to rejoin the Union (seven states had seceded by the time of the inaugural). This rather conventional appeal, anchored as it was in the language of the party system and thus a presidency hemmed in by party commitments and platforms, did not suggest the unilateral and dramatic actions that Lincoln would later take. Despite Lincoln’s seemingly moderate inaugural address, the Civil War commenced a little over a month later with the firing on Fort Sumter. From Lincoln’s standpoint, once the war was begun, he thenceforth would be authorized to take unprecedented, even unconstitutional actions to preserve the Union. In a now famous 1864 letter to Albert C. Hodges, a Kentucky newspaper editor, Lincoln laid out his modus operandi during the war: Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it (Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992, 419--420). And clearly Lincoln often acted in ways that departed sharply from past practices, carving out a robust conception of the ‘‘executive power’’ vested in the office. In a message to Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln explained what had transpired since Sumter and how he viewed the war, which he preferred to see as a ‘‘rebellion.’’ As David Donald has put it, in the July 4 message and his proclamations on the war, Lincoln made clear ‘‘that he considered the prosecution of the war primarily a function of the Chief Executive, to be carried out with minimal interference from the other branches of government and without excessive respect for constitutional niceties protecting individual rights’’ (Donald 1995, 303). For instance, Lincoln ordered a blockade of the South, expanded the army, and suspended the writ of habeas

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 301 corpus, all without the prior approval of Congress (Donald 1995, 303). But Congress and the Court generally accepted Lincoln’s decisions. A notable exception is the case of Ex Parte Mulligan (1866), in which the Court challenged the president’s use of military tribunals; but this case was decided after Lincoln’s death and the conclusion of the war (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 156). Most historians have viewed these violations of rights and the prerogatives of the Congress and Courts as necessary to the situation and not the manifestation of a president committed to expanding and consolidating his power. In other ways, Lincoln was often much more moderate and conservative in his actions than Republicans in Congress expected of him. Although Lincoln was opposed to slavery, he did not believe that the war gave him the authority to free the slaves. In fact, he believed that the Constitution undoubtedly had allowed slavery and that the war aim was to preserve the Union, not eradicate slavery. In an 1862 letter to the newspaperman Horace Greeley, Lincoln bluntly asserted: My paramount objective in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that (Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992, 343). Lincoln therefore resisted attempts by Republicans and abolitionists to emancipate all slaves throughout the North and South and only moved toward his limited emancipation policy once he deemed it militarily necessary. When the Emancipation Proclamation finally came on January 1, 1863, it was greeted with mixed reactions, some seeing it as incomplete: it only freed slaves in the Confederacy, and only then in areas not controlled by Union soldiers. Others saw it is a grave mistake, opening the door for equality between the races. Ultimately it would be revolutionary because ‘‘the step that Lincoln had taken changed fundamentally the nature of much of the nation’’ (Paludan 1994, 187). But it was unquestionably an important military maneuver, as more than ‘‘100,000 former slaves became Union soldiers’’ (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 159). And it would not so subtly change the war aim from restoring the Union alone to also eradicating slavery, as Lincoln himself would confirm in his second inaugural address during which Lincoln discusses the Civil War as punishment for the sin of slavery (see Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992, 449--450).

Unless forced to act to preserve the Union, then, Lincoln’s decision-making style was often reserved, pragmatic, and prudential, especially when it came to matters not directly connected with the war effort. As Donald has provocatively phrased it, ‘‘the same president who so drastically expanded the scope of his office by the assertion of his war powers under the Constitution was an executive who had singularly little impact either upon Congress or upon his own administrative aides’’ (Donald 1969, 195--196).9 Lincoln’s reserve and respect for constitutionalism and balance are especially evident in his decision to allow regular elections during the war. Surely Lincoln could have justified suspending or postponing elections through appeals to the war effort or public safety. Even more to the point, Lincoln did not meddle with the elections of 1864, even though he thought it likely he might lose to Democratic candidate and former Union commander Gen. George McClellan. Indeed, Lincoln wrote in his ‘‘Memorandum on Probable Failure of Re-election,’’ in August 1864, ‘‘This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected’’ (Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992, 431). Of course, Lincoln won the election handily but was resigned to letting the people decide the question, even though he believed the victory of McClellan would jeopardize the Union immeasurably (Donald 1995, 529). Although Lincoln’s second term would be cut tragically short in April 1865 with his assassination by John Wilkes Booth, his shadow looms large across the American political landscape. In fact, his untimely death likely ensured a more robust legacy, as Reconstruction of the South after the war would have substantially challenged Lincoln’s reputation and authority. Lincoln had intended a more moderate path on Reconstruction, which would have put him at odds with Republicans in Congress, as vice president Andrew Johnson would find out after succeeding Lincoln. While Lincoln’s assertions of executive power are a key legacy, the presidency reverted back to its more reserved and constrained form after Lincoln’s presidency and until the early 20th century, when events again would prompt bold presidential leadership. Lincoln’s equally important legacy was that of ‘‘democratic’’ leader and ‘‘educator’’ (for a fuller discussion of Lincoln as a democratic leader, see Miroff 1993, 83--124). Through the rhetoric of the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln encouraged Americans to see the Declaration of Independence (with its promises of ‘‘liberty’’ and particularly ‘‘equality’’) as a guiding force for national reform and reconciliation (‘‘a new birth of freedom’’). Clearly he had in mind an extension, at least

302 The Presidency

A crowd watches President Abraham Lincoln’s second inauguration on March 4, 1865. Inscribed on the walls of the Lincoln Memorial, his second inaugural address is widely recognized as a outstanding example of presidential rhetoric. (Library of Congress)

down the road, of equality for black Americans. Moreover, the soaring rhetoric of the Second Inaugural Address, with its biblical view of slavery and punishment showed the courageous and visionary side of Lincoln. Among the memorable lines is ‘‘It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces; but let us judge not that we be not judged’’ (Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992, 450). Despite his protestations, Lincoln was standing in judgment. Lincoln was a compromiser and trimmer when he needed to be, but could be a moral leader and educator as well. Still, Lincoln’s democratic leadership was modest by modern standards. His connection with the public came through formal addresses and speeches and was more generally mediated by his political party.

The Weakened Post--Civil War Presidency Andrew Johnson, being elevated to the presidency upon Lincoln’s death, had an extremely contentious

presidency, culminating in his impeachment by Congress on 11 articles in early 1868. Although he would be acquitted by the Senate (by a mere one vote), Johnson’s power would be diminished for the rest of his presidency and 19th-century presidents after Johnson generally would be modest in their assertions of executive authority. The main source of disagreement between Congress and Johnson was Reconstruction, especially which branch would lead the Reconstruction effort. Johnson had been placed on the ticket in 1864 because he was not only a Democrat but also strongly committed to the Union effort. This move was intended to bring a nonpartisan flavor to Lincoln’s reelection in 1864. But it quickly became a recipe for disaster when Johnson assumed the presidency, as Johnson believed in a policy of Reconstruction even more moderate and conciliatory to the South than Lincoln. Congress and Johnson battled bitterly, with Congress eventually stripping Johnson of much of his control over Reconstruction. The key battle came over

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 303 the Tenure of Office Act, which Congress passed in 1867 over Johnson’s veto. This act provided that a president could not fire his executive appointees without first getting Senate approval. This would prevent Johnson from assuming control over Reconstruction through executive agencies charged with the implementation of Reconstruction policies. Johnson’s subsequent firing of Secretary of War Stanton, in blatant defiance of the act, ensured impeachment. The impeachment of Johnson was a key moment in American history. If Johnson had been convicted of the charges against him and thus removed from office, the presidency as an institution would have suffered considerable damage. Most scholars have assessed the impeachment of Johnson as predominantly motivated by partisan disagreements between Congress and the president. Had Johnson been removed, a precedent would have been laid down that presidents could be impeached by Congress over policy disagreements. This would have seriously eroded the independence of the presidency and placed subsequent presidents in a position of subordination to the Congress. Even still, it would be some time before presidents would again exert strong and bold leadership. Republican Ulysses S. Grant, Johnson’s immediate successor, came to the office committed to a more constrained view of executive power. But some, such as the American writer Henry Adams, saw it in a harsher light: ‘‘the whole executive system has become the avowed plaything of the legislature’’ (Adams 1963, 105). Grant did at times lead Congress or at least stand up to them, notably through his use of the veto, but he was usually content to play the part of an administrative officer, deferring to Congress and giving his executive agencies considerable leeway. A major aspect of the Grant era was the rule of party bosses, with Grant generally bowing to Republican bosses in his assignments of political positions, especially Republican senators who had voting control over appointments. A man of integrity, Grant made poor choices in his associates and some of them brought a taint of corruption to the administration (Coolidge 1917, 428). Despite a lackluster presidency, Grant was still the popular war hero and thus won two terms and even for a while flirted with a third-term pursuit in 1880. The election of 1876 proved to be one of the nation’s most controversial. Not only was a commission selected to adjudicate disputed results in several states, but also the eventual electoral college winner and thus president, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, lost the popular vote to Democrat Samuel Tilden (51 percent to 48 percent). There was no great unrest, however,

because a crass deal had been worked out between Democrats and Republicans: if Hayes were to be elevated to the presidency, Reconstruction would be ended. Reconstruction was indeed discontinued early on in the Hayes administration, removing a federal presence in the South and thereby ensuring that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution (equal protection and the right to vote, respectively) would have no force for black Southerners. Ironically, although brought to office through the bargaining of partisans, Hayes proved to be an advocate of civil service reform and challenged the power of Republican Party bosses and senators during his term in office (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 180--183). Republicans would continue to dominate the presidency with the election of James Garfield in 1880. Garfield’s presidency was cut very short by an assassin’s bullet in 1881. What is more, Garfield was shot by a disgruntled office seeker, that is, a man who expected a patronage appointment but did not get one. While many were critical of the excessive partisanship that reigned after the Civil War, the assassination of Garfield scandalized the country. Even though Garfield’s vice president, Chester Arthur, was himself tied to the Republican Party bosses, upon his succession to the office, he became an advocate of civil service reform. His leadership aided the passage of the 1883 Pendleton Act, a major first step in civil service reform (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 185--186). The battles between party bosses and presidents would not end in 1884 with the election of the first Democrat since the Civil War. Grover Cleveland rose quickly to office, predominantly because he was known as a reformer who was independent of partisans. But Cleveland also wanted to reward his Democratic supporters and the Republican-controlled Senate tried to stymie this by appeal to the Tenure of Office Act. Cleveland stood strong against the senators and with public support ultimately gained from the Congress a repeal of the act in 1887 (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 188). In addition to this notable example of strong executive leadership, Cleveland would wield the veto to an extent not matched again until Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency.10 Furthermore, Cleveland would boldly lead his party on tariff reform. In his third annual message, in 1887, with his position on tariff reform, Cleveland saw himself as making the Democratic Party ‘‘stand for something’’ (Welch 1988, 85). Although he would lose the election of 1888 to Republican Benjamin Harrison (Cleveland winning the popular vote, but losing the electoral college), the reemergence of the presidency as a position of powerful leadership can be seen in

304 The Presidency Cleveland’s first term. Although to a lesser extent, this trend line would continue during Harrison’s term in office. Harrison would attempt to lead his Republican colleagues in Congress by making strategic appointments, threatening to use the veto, and undertaking a somewhat unprecedented campaign, in 1890, for congressional Republicans in midterm elections (for a detailed discussion of Harrison’s oft-neglected presidency, see Korzi 2004, 163--177). In the 1892 election, a rematch between Cleveland and Harrison, Cleveland would prevail, becoming the first (and so far only) president to serve nonconsecutive terms. Cleveland had won the election, from his standpoint, largely on the basis of his position on tariff reform. He therefore moved to lead his fellow Democrats on the issue, even at times using public opinion and the newspapers to drum up support. But Cleveland would face an economic downturn in his second term and would be disappointed by the tariff bill finally produced by the Congress, allowing it to become law without his signature. The Democratic Party itself would split apart over the proper response to the economic turmoil and Cleveland would have no realistic shot at even winning the Democratic nomination in 1896, regardless of the limitations of the two-term tradition. Nonetheless, with Cleveland’s strong leadership of the Democratic Party---even if in a losing cause---through control over patronage, lobbying of Congress, continued use of the veto, and even some public appeals, he cut a model for presidential leadership that was in many ways ‘‘modern’’ in character. But it was not fully so, as Cleveland proved a reluctant leader (for more on Cleveland’s second term, see Korzi 2004, 177--193). His successors, William McKinley and especially Theodore Roosevelt, would be more comfortable with the increasing demands on the presidency.

The Beginnings of the Modern Presidency Parties had begun democratizing the presidency already in the antebellum period and this continued after the Civil War. With parties acting as the mediators between the people and the presidency, however, presidents were somewhat constrained in their claims to leadership and most, as we have seen, did not aspire to positions of bold leadership. But while parties would maintain an important place in the political system in the post--Civil War period, they lost some of their status and power, because of widespread disgust at their corruption and because they would be increasingly less necessary---due to developments in travel and communication---as mechanisms to link the president and the

public. Gradually, presidents and presidential candidates started campaigning in a more direct way, and presidents increasingly turned to the thriving newspaper industry to reach the public (for a rich examination of changes in campaigns across the 19th century, see Troy 1996). The presidency, in turn, began competing with the parties and the Congress for prominence in the political system. The industrialization of the country and the economic anxiety of the 1890s in particular would also drive the increasing focus on the presidency as the source of policy leadership (for more on these developments, see Silbey 1991). These trends can be seen in the election of 1896 and in the presidency of the winner, William McKinley. The election was a face-off between the Republican McKinley, a venerable congressman and governor from Ohio and the Nebraska Democrat, William Jennings Bryan, a 36-year-old maverick within the party. Bryan campaigned vigorously and cast the choice as an economic one between the simple folk of the West and the wealthy elites of the East. But Bryan’s somewhat radical rhetoric would be unsettling to many and McKinley would win the election handily. In fact, the Republicans thereafter would dominate national politics until the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. McKinley’s presidency, like that of Cleveland, would show flashes of the modern presidency. Upon assuming office, McKinley would call Congress into special session and lead tariff reform, which Republicans and Democrats had yet again battled over in the recent election. McKinley would use the press more effectively than his predecessors to influence public opinion and the fortunes of his Republican Party (Gould 1980, 137). In fact, McKinley was the first president to provide space in the White House for ‘‘the exclusive use of reporters’’ (Kumar 1997, 95). Still, McKinley would by no means dominate the legislative scene or public opinion in the manner of later presidents. But it would be foreign policy and McKinley’s reelection in 1900 that would fundamentally change his, and to some extent the country’s, outlook on the presidency. Initially reluctant to confront Spain militarily in an 1898 dispute over Cuban independence, McKinley would be pressured by Congress and the public (fueled by a warmongering press) to go to war. The war would be quick and successful with President McKinley playing a major role in its leadership and management (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 195). Most important, McKinley’s popularity would soar and the office of presidency would similarly grow in the public confidence. McKinley himself would note after the war that ‘‘I can no longer be called the President of a party; I am now

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 305 the President of the whole people’’ (Olcott 1972 [1916], 295). This would be a theme he would repeat after his overwhelming reelection in 1900 (Gould 1980, 231). McKinley, with his reelection in 1900, was poised to claim a greater role for the presidency in the American political system. It would be left to his vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, to carry through on this legacy, when McKinley was felled by an assassin’s bullet early in his second term. Teddy Roosevelt, or TR as he is often called, embodied a new type of leader in the White House. Despite McKinley’s innovations, TR embraced the office and especially its connection to the public in a much more fundamental way. A Progressive Republican, he thereby was concerned with using the federal government to break up monopolies, to promote conservation, and to reform the civil service, among other things. Most important, Roosevelt saw the president as a key actor in promoting these actions of the federal government. As he would elaborate later in his career, TR brought a new conception of leadership to the presidency, often referred to as the ‘‘stewardship’’ theory of the presidency: My view was that every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by the president unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or the laws (Roosevelt 1958, 197--198). Essential to this new notion of presidential leadership was the presidency’s connection to the public. To reach the public, Roosevelt campaigned across the country, speaking directly to the people. He did this not only when campaigning for election, but also in between elections and in support of policies pending in Congress.11 What is more, TR would cultivate the newspaper press corps much more fully than his predecessors (Kumar 1997, 96--97). TR would also act boldly in foreign policy, particularly with regard to the creation of the Panama Canal, at one point declaring that he would seize the Colombian territory---over that government’s objections--to ensure America’s interest, despite the dubious legality of such a maneuver (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 215). A

revolution would lead to an independent Panama, which would then sign over to the United States the right to build the canal, making Roosevelt’s promised seizure of the territory unnecessary. Roosevelt’s actions would be the beginning of a much more involved policy for the United States not only in the world at large, but especially in Latin America, with the American president in the lead (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 216). TR was easily elected on his own accord in 1904 and enjoyed popular support throughout his presidency. In fact, Roosevelt was so popular that had he stood for a third term in 1908, he surely would have prevailed, despite the two-term tradition.12 Nevertheless, Roosevelt stepped aside (temporarily), allowing his protege William Howard Taft to win the Republican nomination and then the general election in 1908. Taft’s presidency would be a contentious one, the Progressive movement gaining power within the Republican and Democratic parties and the country. Taft was open to some Progressive policies, but once president he became allied more closely with the conservative forces within the Republican Party. It did not help Taft that his former mentor, TR, started to come out against the administration by 1910. While Taft had some notable accomplishments during his term in office---for instance, breaking up more monopolies or ‘‘trusts’’ than his predecessor--his presidency is remembered more for the conflicts between himself and Roosevelt and the bitter partisan wrangling of the times. The conflict between Taft and Roosevelt merits fuller attention as it highlights important developments in the presidency and expectations of presidential leadership. Taft was guided in office by a model of the presidency much at odds with that of TR and even in some ways McKinley. Taft embraced a ‘‘Whig’’ model of presidential leadership that counseled a reserved and constrained presidency. It was a model that accepted political parties and the need for presidents to be tied to the public will (particularly through elections). But it saw the president as one key actor within a network of actors---mainly party leaders in Congress and the country---and was skeptical of bold executive action and especially strong appeals to public opinion as a basis of leadership (for a fuller development of these ideas, see Korzi 2003). Obviously, this model of the presidency was at odds with Roosevelt’s ‘‘stewardship’’ theory, and Roosevelt would become so disappointed with Taft’s leadership that he would challenge Taft for the Republican nomination in 1912. This would put Roosevelt in somewhat of a bind, as the two-term tradition had long prevented presidents from seeking third terms and Roosevelt himself had seemed to bow to this tradition

306 The Presidency in retiring after two terms. Roosevelt himself cleared matters up: ‘‘I said I would not accept a nomination for a third term under any circumstances, meaning, of course, a third consecutive term. The precedent which forbids a third term has reference only to a third consecutive term’’ (quoted in Stein 1943, 186). Despite the disingenuous nature of Roosevelt’s appeal, he was still extremely popular in the country and only lost the nomination to Taft because Republican Party leaders and bosses threw their weight behind Taft. A number of states held primary elections to select party delegates---and Roosevelt did extremely well in these popular contests---but the bulk of delegates sent to the nominating convention were still controlled by party leaders. Disgusted by what he perceived as party corruption subverting the will of the people, Roosevelt bolted from the Republican Party. He and his supporters formed a third party, the Bull Moose or Progressive Party, which Roosevelt led in the 1912 election. Taft would be alarmed at the radical nature of Roosevelt’s campaign, not only the breaching of the third-term rule and bolting from the party, but also the somewhat grandiose claims that Roosevelt made during the campaign about himself and his conception of the presidency. Taft would later critique the Roosevelt vision of the presidency as aspiring to play ‘‘the part of a Universal Providence and set all things right’’ (Taft 1925, 144). But Taft’s vision would be rejected in the election of 1912, with the Progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson winning the presidency and Roosevelt placing second, the incumbent president a distant third, winning only the electoral votes of Utah and Vermont. And Wilson would push the presidency even further in the direction of modern presidential leadership during his two terms in office. Woodrow Wilson was a noted political scientist and then president of Princeton University before he won the governorship of New Jersey in 1910. After numerous ballots at the Democratic Convention in 1912, Wilson would be nominated as candidate for the presidency. Not as well known as other Democrats, particularly William Jennings Bryan, Wilson was nevertheless a strong choice. A Progressive in many ways, his was nonetheless a moderate Progressivism. Although Wilson would not win a majority of popular votes in the election---given the three-person nature of the race--he would win a solid electoral college majority, placing himself as the moderate choice between the conservative Taft and the radical Roosevelt. Upon assuming office, it was obvious that Wilson saw the presidency as a powerful source for popular leadership, along the lines of Theodore Roosevelt. But Wilson pushed TR’s

view of presidential leadership even further, articulating a style of leadership called the ‘‘rhetorical presidency,’’ a cornerstone of the modern presidency (Tulis 1987, 132--137). As a political scientist, Wilson brought an unusually theoretical approach to the presidency. Committed to moving a slow and divided system, Wilson saw the presidency as the source of direction and energy in the American political system. Most important, the presidency would derive this energy from a strong connection with the American people and public opinion; this connection would be established through rhetoric. While the changing nature of campaigns and presidency-press relations already had brought the presidency closer to the public, Wilson would expand on this connection, particularly through formal rhetoric, that is, official communications and speeches. For instance, Wilson would dramatically break from precedent in 1913 when he delivered the State of the Union message orally in front of Congress.13 Wilson, capitalizing on the rhetorical potential of the office, boldly changed the practice and used the occasion to focus Congress and the nation on the priorities and policies of the president. Like TR, who labeled his policies the ‘‘Square Deal,’’ Wilson packaged his legislative priorities as the ‘‘New Freedom,’’ and he assiduously worked to move Congress on this front. Indeed, Wilson would achieve great success, passing many of the policies laid out by the Democratic Party in their 1912 platform, including tariff and trust reform (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 236). As revolutionary as was Wilson’s approach to leading Congress and the country, however, it was also restrained in one key way. Wilson worked closely with his Democratic Party in Congress and did moderate his viewpoints when necessary to unify his partisans around the legislative agenda (Stid 1998). Nevertheless, Wilson could push Congress when necessary, as when, by rallying the people against Congress in 1917, he forced the Senate to limit the filibuster (a delaying tactic that had prevented passage of Wilson’s wartime policies). Wilson’s foreign policy leadership was as bold as his domestic agenda and style. Like Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson supported an activist and sometimes even aggressive American policy in foreign affairs. Wilson also saw the president as the preeminent actor in foreign affairs. However, whereas TR saw his actions guided by American national interest, Wilson was motivated by lofty, grandiose aims, particularly bringing peace and democracy to the world through American intervention. This approach to foreign policy is

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 307 now known as Wilsonian Idealism. Nowhere is this policy more obvious than in Wilson’s advocacy of a League of Nations in the peace negotiations of World War I. The League battle also illustrates the limitations of rhetorical leadership and the continuing power of the Congress---in this case the Senate---in relation to the presidency. The United States entered World War I in 1917---after the 1916 election in which Wilson campaigned that ‘‘He Kept Us Out of War’’---and Wilson assumed strong direction and leadership of the war effort. With the Allied victory imminent, Wilson outlined in early 1918 his ‘‘Fourteen Points,’’ a visionary program for peace and stability after the war. Although a number of the points would not be included in the Treaty of Versailles---the treaty that ended the war--Wilson, a main player in the peace negotiations, would see his beloved League of Nations included in the final draft. Wilson believed the League was essential to world peace and he would campaign vigorously throughout the country to force Senate ratification of the treaty. He would encounter considerable resistance in the Senate (which now had a Republican majority after the 1918 elections) and the country at large, which had isolationist inclinations. Wilson ultimately could not convince the Senate to ratify the treaty, and the League would take shape without the participation of the United States. Wilson would expend such considerable energy in promoting the treaty that he would become incapacitated by a stroke in 1919. There is some indication that he may have pursued a third term had he not been stricken. Wilson’s failure on the treaty would illustrate the limits to rhetorical leadership--clearly Wilson had not failed by lack of effort---and also the limits to an uncompromising style in a system that mandates compromise (for a fuller look at the Wilson presidency, see Clements 1992). Republican senator and opponent of the League, Warren Harding, would win the election of 1920 and usher in a ‘‘return to normalcy.’’ Harding’s campaign had offered this slogan (‘‘normalcy’’) as a critique of the internationalist aspirations of the Wilson administration and government activism in general. Harding and his Republican successors of the 1920s, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, largely would make good on this promise. These Republicans believed in a less interventionist foreign policy; a smaller, less activist federal government; and a presidency of reduced scope and power. The administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover represented a return in many ways to Taft’s vision of the presidency. Hoover’s unwillingness to bring the power of the presidency or the federal government to bear on the problems of the Great

Depression is well known, but this was a theme of the 1920s in general. But even still, the presidency could not be scaled back so easily after the Roosevelt and Wilson presidencies. It was during Harding’s presidency that Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act which, among other things, gave to the president the power to set the budgetary agenda each year. This is a formidable power in the arsenal of the modern president. During Coolidge’s administration, radio became the new medium of communication and Coolidge employed this device to great effect; he even started to ‘‘broadcast a monthly radio program in 1924’’ (Kumar 1997, 98). In fact, Coolidge was so popular he could easily have run for a ‘‘third’’ term in 1928; yet, he declined.14 Even still, the leadership of these Republican presidents was restrained and anchored by the party system and partisans in Congress. Hoover offered his view of parties in his inaugural address: In our form of democracy the expression of the popular will can be effected only through the instrumentality of political parties. . . . It follows that the government both in the executive and the legislative branches must carry out in good faith the platforms upon which the party was intrusted with power (Inaugural Addresses 1974, 232). What is more, the conservative philosophy that guided these presidents also kept them from assuming the bold leadership of Roosevelt and especially Wilson. Hoover is considered one of our least effective presidents in large part because he was hobbled by this conservative philosophy of government and his restrained view of presidential power. When Hoover did finally start acting boldly in response to the Great Depression, he no longer had a Republican Congress to deal with and his legitimacy had all but disappeared (for discussions of Hoover and FDR and their differing contexts of legitimacy, see Skowronek 1993, chapters 6 and 7).

FDR and the Modern Presidency Franklin Delano Roosevelt (or FDR), along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, is almost universally considered one of our greatest presidents. This is largely attributed to the strong leadership he offered during the Great Depression and World War II. While Washington set many precedents and fundamentally shaped the new office and Lincoln offered a model of strong, at times inspirational, leadership during wartime, FDR transformed the office and presidential

308 The Presidency leadership in arguably more fundamental ways, fully developing the ‘‘modern’’ presidency that was incipient in the presidencies of Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. FDR carved out a model of presidential leadership that the public thereafter would expect and by which later presidents would be judged. FDR’s campaign for the presidency in 1932 indicated what was to come. Breaking precedent, Roosevelt appeared in person at the Democratic National Convention to accept his nomination. A dramatic gesture, it symbolized the transfer of leadership from the party to the presidency that would take place under FDR (Landy and Milkis 2000, 157). Even as Woodrow Wilson challenged his own party for leadership, he just as often compromised with major party leaders, especially in Congress. Although FDR would also compromise when necessary, it would be obvious who was in charge of the Democratic Party once he took office. The centerpiece of Roosevelt’s first term was a bold legislative program to deal with the Great Depression; called the New Deal, the proposals and policies largely originated in the White House not the halls of Congress (for a discussion of the early days of FDR’s first term, see Burns 1956, 161--182). The New Deal would dramatically increase the role and powers of the federal government through the creation of programs such as Social Security. Although Roosevelt’s New Deal represented a departure from traditional American values, values that generally supported a smaller government and private initiative, Roosevelt deftly persuaded the American people that these programs were necessary to confront the perils of Depression. FDR notably gained the confidence of the people through his famous ‘‘fireside chats,’’ a series of radio addresses during which the president explained to the American people his reasons for actions and asked for their support. FDR’s bold program and leadership would be validated in their own right in his landslide reelection in 1936.15 The New Deal did not initially receive validation from one important source, however: the Supreme Court. In fact, during 1935 and 1936, the Court struck down a number of the legislative pieces of Roosevelt’s New Deal. In early 1937, triumphant in reelection, an emboldened FDR decided to take on the Court with a legislative reform of the Court, a plan that would come to be known as the ‘‘Court-packing’’ plan. This bill would have mandated that the president add a justice to the Supreme Court for every justice on the Court who refused to retire within six months of turning 70 years old. A crass, political bill, it would have allowed FDR to place enough New Dealers on the Court to switch the balance of support to Roosevelt’s policies.

The bill would not pass Congress, despite Roosevelt’s attempts to persuade Congress and the American people. Nevertheless, the Court would shift its course and uphold the previously vetoed New Deal legislation, causing Roosevelt to believe that he lost the battle, over Court-packing, but won the war, over Court support of his programs (for a good discussion of the Court-packing plan, see Burns 1956, 291--315). While the Court may have supported the New Deal, FDR’s prestige suffered considerably. Another significant failure in the second term, born out of the same triumphal arrogance, was FDR’s attempted ‘‘purge’’ of key Democratic opponents to the New Deal in the primary elections of 1938. Roosevelt appealed directly to the public to support New Deal Democrats instead of the more conservative incumbent Democrats whom he had targeted. Few of the targeted incumbents lost, reinforcing, not long after the Court battle, that there were decided limits to the power of the presidency, even that of a popular incumbent (or a fuller discussion of the relationship between FDR and the Democratic Party--indeed, the party system in general---see Milkis 1993). The beginning of 1939 would bring new developments and challenges. Upon recommendation of the Brownlow Commission that the ‘‘President needs help,’’ Congress passed the Executive Reorganization Act. This act, implemented by FDR through executive order, would provide for a fundamental overhaul of the executive branch and create an ‘‘institutional’’ presidency. Most significant, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) was created to help the president manage adequately the multifaceted tasks of the office, particularly the job of administering the growing executive branch. This is the beginning of what some have referred to as the ‘‘administrative presidency,’’ an inclination by presidents to use their control over the executive branch, strengthened as it was by the Executive Reorganization Act, to influence policy rather than going through the normal process of proposing legislation to Congress (this concept is fully developed in Nathan 1983). Perhaps more concerning, in recent years, presidents have tended to rely too much on EOP officials and not on their own cabinet officials.16 At any rate, the creation of this office illustrated the growing job of the presidency and how it required a professional staff to adequately discharge its responsibilities (for more on these institutional developments, see Burke 1992). The other major development in 1939 was the beginning of World War II with Germany’s invasion of Poland. Although the United States would not formally enter the war until late 1941---after the Pearl Harbor

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 309 attack---the war even at this time made the pursuit of a third term for Roosevelt easier and more likely. A Gallup Poll in January 1938 revealed that 67 percent of the American public were opposed to a third term by FDR (see Stein 1943, 320--321). By May 1940, 57 percent of the American public supported a third term for Roosevelt, no doubt influenced by the war in Europe (Spangler 1977, 103). The venerable two-term tradition would be successfully challenged in 1940 and Roosevelt would begin his unprecedented third term in January 1941. Roosevelt’s third term would be consumed mainly by the war in Europe. He would yet again demonstrate his knack for leadership through his gradual persuasion of Congress and the American people to abandon their strict stance of neutrality. In a strong assertion of executive power, FDR in 1940 sent 50 naval destroyers to Great Britain without the agreement of Congress (for a discussion of this agreement, see Landy and Milkis 2000).17 And by 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the president to aid the British war effort through the transfer of war supplies. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States was undoubtedly no longer neutral and Congress would declare war against Japan the day after the attack. Germany would days later declare war on the United States and thus would the United States be brought into the European theater of the war as well. Roosevelt would find a previously divided nation now united, and he would strongly lead the nation through the war years. He would also engage in some controversial actions, key among them in 1942 ‘‘authoriz[ing] the military to uproot thousands of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast and relocate them in concentration camps in the interior’’ (Burns 1956, 463). Although upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944), the internment has come to be viewed harshly, as an overreaction on the part of Roosevelt, even if in the midst of war, and an action inconsistent with the values of a democratic nation. By early 1944, the Allied victory was likely and Roosevelt would thenceforth dedicate himself to establishing and influencing the postwar peace (Burns 1956, 464). But first, Roosevelt would have to secure a fourth term. In the summer of 1944, the war had not yet ended and part of the justification for the third term was that you ‘‘did not want to change horses midstream’’ as the old saw propounded. And this justification was still relevant: Why would Americans want to replace a leader (and one who exercised admirable leadership) in the midst of a crisis? Because of these concerns, Roosevelt would win a fourth term in 1944.

But the decision to pursue a fourth term would prove problematic. The decision brought a backlash from Republicans, and they would respond in 1947 with an amendment to the Constitution to limit presidents to two terms (becoming the Twenty-Second Amendment with the requisite number of states ratifying it in 1951). More important, pursuing a fourth term given Roosevelt’s obvious ill health in 1944 smacked of opportunism on the part of Roosevelt’s supporters or at the very least suggested a lack of perspective and forbearance on the part of FDR. Indeed, some have questioned whether Roosevelt’s failing health contributed to his underwhelming performance in the Yalta peace negotiations with Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill in early 1945 (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 285). In April 1945, only three months into his fourth term, Franklin Roosevelt died. Harry S. Truman would assume the presidency and face major domestic and foreign policy decisions, including employing nuclear weapons to bring the war with Japan to a close. Most significant, Truman and subsequent presidents would face the challenge of living in the shadow of FDR. The presidency of FDR saw the full flowering of what we now call the ‘‘modern presidency.’’ This model of leadership puts the presidency at the center of the political system leading Congress and the American people in domestic and foreign policy. Modern presidents are expected to move Congress on domestic policies, be the nation’s voice in the international arena and, most important, identify and connect with the American public. Taft’s quip about Teddy Roosevelt’s model of leadership might well be applied to the contemporary president, and only partly in jest: he or she is expected to play ‘‘the part of a Universal Providence and set all things right.’’

References and Further Reading Adams, Henry. 1963. The Great Secession Winter of 1860--61 and Other Essays. Ed. George Hochfield. New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc. Adler, David Gray. 1996. ‘‘The President’s Recognition Power.’’ In The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy. Ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Burke, John P. 1992. The Institutional Presidency. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Burns, James MacGregor. 1956. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Chernow, Ron. 2004. Alexander Hamilton. New York: Penguin. Clements, Kendrick A. 1992. The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

310 The Presidency Coolidge, Louis A. 1917. Ulysses S. Grant. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Cronin, Thomas, E., ed. 1989. Inventing the American Presidency. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Donald, David Herbert. 1969. Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era. 2nd ed., enlarged. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Donald, David Herbert. 1995. Lincoln. London: Simon & Schuster. Gould, Lewis L. 1980. The Presidency of William McKinley. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Henderson, Phillip G., ed. 2000. The Presidency Then and Now. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Holt, Michael F. 1999. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington to Richard Nixon. 1974. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Korzi, Michael J. 2004. A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Government. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Korzi, Michael J. 2003. ‘‘Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: A Reconsideration of William Howard Taft’s ‘Whig’ Theory of Presidential Leadership.’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (June), 305--324. Kumar, Martha Joynt. 1997. ‘‘The President and the News Media.’’ In The President, the Public, and the Parties. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Landy, Marc, and Sidney M. Milkis. 2000. Presidential Greatness. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Lincoln: Selected Speeches and Writings 1992. New York: First Vintage Books/The Library of America Edition. Lodge, Henry Cabot, ed. 1888. The Federalist. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. McDonald, Forrest. 1976. The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Meyers, Marvin. 1960. The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Milkis, Sidney M. 1993. The President and the Parties. New York: Oxford University Press. Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. 2003. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776---2002. 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Miroff, Bruce. 1993. Icons of Democracy. New York: Basic Books. Nathan, Richard. 1983. The Administrative Presidency. New York: Wiley. Olcott, Charles S. 1972 [1916]. American Statesman: William McKinley. Vol. 2. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin. Paludan, Phillip Shaw. 1994. The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Phelps, Glenn A. 1989. ‘‘George Washington: Precedent Setter.’’ In Inventing the American Presidency. Ed. Thomas E. Cronin. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Roosevelt, Theodore. 1958. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Scribner. Rozell, Mark J. 2000. ‘‘Executive Privilege: From Washington to Clinton.’’ In The Presidency Then and Now. Ed. Phillip G. Henderson. The Presidency Then and Now. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Silbey, Joel. 1991. The American Political Nation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Spangler, Earl. 1977. Presidential Tenure and Constitutional Limitation. Washington, DC: University Press of America. Stein, Charles W. 1943. The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Stid, Daniel. 1998. ‘‘Rhetorical Leadership and ‘Common Counsel’ in the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson.’’ In Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective, ed. Richard J. Ellis. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Taft, William Howard. 1925. Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers. New York: Columbia University Press. Troy, Gil. 1996. See How They Ran: The Changing Role of the Presidential Candidate. Rev. and expanded ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Warshaw, Shirley Anne. 2000. ‘‘The Formation and Use of the Cabinet.’’ In The Presidency Then and Now, ed. Phillip G. Henderson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Washington, George. 1997. Writings. New York: Library of America. Welch, Richard E., Jr. 1988. The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Notes 1. The term ‘‘energy’’ is most associated with Alexander Hamilton, especially his defense of the presidency in The Federalist, a series of essays (co-written with James Madison and John Jay) to persuade New Yorkers to approve the Constitution. See, for instance, Federalist No. 70, in The Federalist (Lodge 1888). 2. Electoral college members were intended to be independent in their votes for presidents, that is, selected for their own judgment and not pledged to particular candidates. Despite this intention, elector independence quickly succumbed to the developing party system. 3. Madison would write an essay under the pseudonym ‘‘Helvidius’’ questioning the Neutrality Proclamation and would articulate this important critique of the ‘‘recognition power’’ falling entirely into the president’s powers (see Adler 1996). 4. See Chernow (2004) for extended discussions of the economic programs of the Washington administration (291-361) and of the Whiskey Rebellion (468--478). 5. Electoral college members would cast two votes for president. After the votes were tallied, the first place winner (if having more than a majority of votes) would be president and the second place finisher would be vice president. In the event of no candidate receiving a majority, the decision would fall to the House of Representatives. Not until the Twelfth Amendment (1804) were separate votes cast for president and vice president. 6. Chase was impeached by the House of Representatives but not convicted by two-thirds of the Senate, as per the

Development of the Presidency, 1787--1945 311

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

procedures of the Constitution. The unsuccessful impeachment of Chase represented a victory for the federal courts and their independence from Congress, as the impeachment was a veiled political attack by the Democratic-Republicans against the Federalist Chase. Interestingly, however, Jefferson had opposed the creation of the national bank when he was secretary of state during the Washington administration. The popular vote in 1824 is a questionable measure for a number of reasons, but mainly because not all states elected their members of the electoral college through popular vote, with some state legislatures still selecting electors. An important exception would be Lincoln’s strong leadership on what would become the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 160). Many of Cleveland’s vetoes were of Civil War pension claims, but he also vetoed important pieces of regular legislation. Tulis (1987) has noted the innovations in the Roosevelt presidency with regard to rhetoric and speaking to the public. Although Roosevelt had served nearly two full terms, he had been elected only once and likely could have made a persuasive case for a ‘‘third’’ term.

13. As noted earlier, Jefferson had discontinued this practice in 1801 and since then presidents had submitted written communications to Congress annually. 14. Third term is not quite right, as Coolidge did not serve two full terms, coming to office at Harding’s death in 1923 and then winning election on his own in 1924. Even more than TR, Coolidge could have easily claimed that he was pursuing his ‘‘second’’ term in 1928. 15. The 1932 election in many ways was more a rejection of Hoover than a prescriptive vote for the policies of FDR. 16. The evolution of the president’s cabinet is an interesting one. A device in the 19th century to reward the diverse elements in the party, cabinet members were often strong and independent voices. FDR’s cabinet, conversely, was composed of men personally loyal to Roosevelt. Presidents after FDR have tended to either choose loyalists or, if they do reward partisans, diminish the influence of the cabinet relative to other presidential advisors (for a full discussion of cabinet evolution, see Warshaw 2000). 17. This action was in part legitimated by the Supreme Court decision of 1936, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, which articulated a vast role for the president in foreign policy, unchecked by congressional involvement.

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR Saladin M. Ambar Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Africana Studies, Lehigh University

Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions: they want to be led and they wish to remain free. ---Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835

central motivating forces was the fear that the Revolutionary generation had possibly carved out all that was worthwhile for storage in the national lore of greatness.2 In this regard, Lincoln was more visceral than abstract in his earthy desire to belong to history (or ‘‘the ages,’’ as Edwin Stanton had it) (for the most recent treatment on Lincoln’s pseudo-religious aspiration for political immortality, see Goodwin 2005). Indeed, part of the executive energy in government desired by Hamilton was assumed to be natural, rather than structural. It was rooted in the belief that, while ‘‘ambition must be made to counteract ambition’’ in government, it was unfettered ambition that was the problem, not the desire itself (Federalist No. 51). It was this aspiration that connected Kennedy to Lincoln, and perhaps all presidents to one another. And it is this interplay of the personal and the political that makes the modern American presidency the source of deep expectations and inevitable disappointment. Since the first presidential election in the nuclear age in 1948, it may rightly be said that there are no longer trivial elections (despite persistent invocations to anoint ‘‘this one’’ as really important). Ironically, this fact has in some ways diminished the aura of presidential greatness. If every day is an ‘‘emergency,’’ than where is distinction to be made? ‘‘The only power I’ve got is nuclear,’’ lamented Lyndon Johnson, ‘‘and I can’t

This is the night I should go to the theater. ---President John F. Kennedy, October 28, 1962

President Kennedy’s quip at the successful conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis is instructive beyond the irony of its gallows humor. Despite his now wellknown propensity for academic and personal shortcuts, Kennedy was nothing if not an astute student of presidential history. He understood that he, and likely no other future president, would be able to boast of a more substantial feat than averting the very real possibility of nuclear holocaust. The endemic desire of presidents for the immortality of national memory---perhaps yearned for most by Lincoln---was something the framers of the Constitution had in mind when conceiving the powers and limitations of America’s chief executive (Schlesinger 1965, 80). What kind of man should aspire to the presidency? In Federalist No. 72, Alexander Hamilton hoped for someone who would serve the public good in exchange for the rewards of ‘‘fame’’ (Kramnick 1987).1 One of Abraham Lincoln’s

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Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR use that!’’ (Hodgson 1980, 14). Since Franklin Roosevelt, the presidency has been in turn strengthened, enlarged, and emboldened. Yet, in many ways today’s presidents are simply less able. The public expects greatness, presidents necessarily believe it to be their calling, and yet the constraints of democratic government and the complexity of modern life frustrates all. It is this paradox that Kennedy’s dark remark captures, and that this essay seeks to clarify. In the age of superpower, presidential options are no less limited. In an era of far-flung executive agencies, the president frequently relies on fewer people. And in a period of democratic global ascendancy, the domestic and international wiles of presidential action are no less subject to the misuse of presidential prerogative than when they were debated in theory and practice during the times of America’s Pacificus and Helvidius.3 The life of America’s presidency does not come to a natural halt at obvious intervals. It is a continuum with atavistic tendencies and new trajectories launched from old themes. While new executive philosophies took shape under Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, invigorating the presidency with new life, the nature of this turn, while more dramatic than subtle, was not drawn from a new well. Washington, Jackson, and Lincoln, respectively built powerful presidencies around what would be seen as more contemporary notions of presidential prerogative and ‘‘executive privilege.’’ What Roosevelt and Wilson did was theorize a 90degree turn in the office away from earlier Virginiadynastic presidencies anchored by more limited interpretations of the Constitution, to a more progressive, and Hudson-oriented style of executive leadership. New York--and New Jersey--based governors-turnedpresidents Grover Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and finally Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), rode antimachine politics into the White House, defining prima facie old executive leadership styles as overly weak and passe. Canal rings, Tweedism and municorruption would not wither without the might of a steadfast executive. At the state level, if this required being ‘‘an unconstitutional governor,’’ as Wilson threatened when he won election as New Jersey’s chief executive, he was more than willing to do so. This is the edge of Tocqueville’s knife referenced at the outset. Citizenship in a democratic polity requires leadership and the security it brings. Yet, it also demands freedom and, implicitly, a freedom from government’s overreach. Craftily, Wilson painted the presidency as a ‘‘big governorship,’’ preparing the way for new national executive might based on then-accepted realities. Ultimately, Wilson’s turn away from Congress’

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preeminence in America’s constitutional constellation to presidential leadership, helped define what is at the heart of what is now called the ‘‘modern presidency’’ (Erenhalt 2006). Franklin D. Roosevelt punctuated this turn in executive philosophy. It is a philosophy that has not been stemmed by either traditional or neoconservatism. ‘‘I don’t think you want a weak president,’’ remarked George W. Bush regarding the role of the executive in fighting the war on terrorism. Indeed, when Ronald Reagan argued that ‘‘government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem,’’ it wasn’t a call to limit the power of the president.4 If anything, the president stood outside of government, if not above it for Reagan. This is Wilsonian ‘‘unconstitutional’’ executive leadership with wings. Whatever the modern presidency is, for better or worse, it surely does not include William Howard Taft’s aversion to presidential power. It was Taft who contended, ‘‘The president can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise’’ (Mayer 2001, 51). More muscular interpretations have generally won the day. As we shall see, the de facto expanded authority of the president since FDR highlights the paradox of an office in many respects nonetheless reduced. The president’s office is bigger. He is more involved and successful in shaping legislation. He has an unprecedented arsenal of media-based opportunities for command of personal and policy image-making. The president’s authority in foreign policy tends to be newsworthy only when the Court or Congress attempts to establish some semblance of limitation. He is the unquestioned leader of his party and widely viewed as the most powerful leader in the world. And yet in all this, the presidency remains bound in a complexity that simple power alone cannot apprehend. And in wrestling through this web, the president is frequently only as powerful as his ability to serve sometimes less heroic virtues as ‘‘prudence,’’ or the equally humble laurels of compromise and centrism. As was asked about the turn from the 19th-century clerkship presidency to that of imperium, how did this happen?5

The Modern Presidential Office While Woodrow Wilson conceived of the president as a ‘‘big governor,’’ Alexander Hamilton reasoned the new executive would be no more powerful than New York’s chief executive. Hamilton’s plea was that of a political

314 The Presidency theorist operating in an age of generally weak executive authority---an argument for the strongest possible conception of what was then an understandably minimalist view of executive power (on the difficulties in constructing a powerful national executive postindependence, see Thach 1969). Wilson built his case, however, in an age when state executives had in many respects become more representative of the type of executive energy called for by Hamilton, than those late19th-century presidents that predated him. Governors like Samuel Tilden, Grover Cleveland, Teddy Roosevelt (TR), Hiram Johnson, and Robert La Follette seemed to be more potent than their national counterparts---at least until TR and Wilson came on the presidential scene. It was La Follette’s practice while Wisconsin’s governor that may well have served as Wilson’s model for reinstituting presidential messages delivered to Congress in person (Kallenbach 1966, 335--336). Part of what made state executives (and later presidents) more powerful were progressive changes in administrative and electoral structures. As Ballard C. Campbell notes, legislative excesses and corruption fueled ProgressiveEra changes in executive authority on every level: ‘‘After 1900 reformers repeatedly urged the expansion of executive authority as a counterweight to these charges of legislative irresponsibility. Their specific solutions envisioned giving all chief executives budget-making prerogatives and governors the right to appoint the heads of departments arranged like Washington’s cabinet offices’’ (Campbell 1995, 210--211). Whether it was fighting corruption in New York’s Customs House or the wayward railroad practices of Southern Pacific, state executives groped for and inevitably won administrative authorities that grew their offices and capabilities. ‘‘We should not like to have had Prussia’s history,’’ wrote Woodrow Wilson in an 1887 article in Political Science Quarterly, ‘‘for the sake of having Prussia’s administrative skill’’ (see Campbell 1995, 25). Yet, after the national dramas of Grant’s administration’s scandals, the transparently cynical outcome of the 1876 presidential election (decided along partisan lines by committee), and the assassination of President James Garfield by a spurned office seeker, Prussian ‘‘history’’ seemed close at hand. Reformers wanted executives to stand in the gap as popular protectors of the citizenry. As John P. Burke recalled, when asked ‘‘what is your weakness?’’ after his 1936 presidential victory, Franklin Roosevelt responded with a one word answer: ‘‘Administration’’ (see Burke 2006, 385). It was administrative efficiency and control that reformers had wanted to build around the executive for decades. It was their central hope for

‘‘clean government.’’6 They would achieve their ultimate success during FDR’s years in the White House. It was the Committee on Administrative Management, or the Brownlow Committee that famously intoned, ‘‘the president needs help.’’ This committee’s recommendations later became the basis for the creation of the modern presidential office in the form of the Reorganization Act of 1939.7 The revolutionary aspect of the presidency’s transformation under FDR was, in the words of Sidney M. Milkis, in ‘‘moving the political system from a governmental order based on constitutionalism to one emphasizing public administration. Or more accurately, FDR hoped to transmute constitutionalism, so that it was less legalistic and more open to centralized planning’’ (1993, 110). Despite some brakes put on reorganization’s scope by Congress, Roosevelt headed a new order of presidential centrism in American politics. The political scientist Donald Devine, Ronald Reagan’s director of the office of personnel management, chronicled the physical embodiment of this change---the growth of executive agencies: ‘‘As of 1923, there were 175 [federal agencies]. Between 1924 and 1973, some 246 new units were established and 27 were eliminated bringing the total to 394. Between 1974 and 1992, approximately 385 units were established and only 12 dropped, making a total of an estimated 767’’ (McDonald 1994, 328--329). Put differently, presidential administrative ‘‘capacity’’ under Grant consisted of all of one private secretary, one stenographer, two executive clerks, one steward and one messenger (Hodgson 1980, 100). This was a Washington far different than the one made over by the age of FDR. The number of federal employees alone nearly doubled from 1931 to 1941, from 600,000 to 1.4 million (Genovese 2001, 130). While the White House staff grew before the Roosevelt administration, it exploded fivefold in the Truman years alone. Lewis L. Gould expressed the significance of this change well: ‘‘[b]y the time Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, the presidency had been transformed. Though it had not yet become the huge bureaucracy that it later reached, the White House reflected the principle that in Washington power now flowed toward the Oval Office and away from Capitol Hill’’ (Gould 2003, 98). What has all this change meant for the presidency? As James Q. Wilson notes, the changes that occurred during the Roosevelt administration were couched in the language of ‘‘improving efficiency’’ and ‘‘good management,’’ but in fact were inspired by deeper political convictions. The goal was not simply to tidy up the

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR machinery of government but to make the president the effective head of government (Wilson 1989, 258). Yet few recent presidents have left the office with the laurels of personal victory. Truman’s famous remark about Eisenhower has put it best for decades now. ‘‘He’ll sit right here and he’ll say ‘Do this, do that!!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike---it won’t be a bit like the Army’’ (Neustadt 1990, 10). For all the administrative ‘‘help’’ from Brownlow on down, the burdens of the White House seem to only have grown on its occupants. In many respects, the modern presidency marked by bureaucratic largesse, has mocked the ability of presidents to cut through the morass of layered government to serve the very public that early Progressive models favored. Richard Nixon’s approach to the bureaucracy that had grown within a generation of FDR was one of calculated indifference. ‘‘All you need is a competent Cabinet to run the country at home. You need a President for foreign policy; no Secretary of State is really important; the President makes foreign policy,’’ he said. Concerning department heads, Nixon aide John Ehrlichman remarked wryly, ‘‘We only see them at the annual White House Christmas party; they go off and marry the natives’’ (Wilson 1989, 338). In contrasting the access to the White House enjoyed by the Democratic opposition during George H. W. Bush’s presidency to that of his son, Congressman Jack Murtha remarked ‘‘[Bush Senior] would listen to all the bitching from everybody, Republicans and Democrats, and then he would do what he thought was right’’ (Thomas and Wolffe 2005). Maybe, but, the broad public (and to a great degree, journalistic) perception of Bush Senior was that of a man locked in an insular Washington world, presumably for most of his adult life. He may have talked with insiders, but the sense outside the Beltway was that he talked to few ‘‘ordinary’’ Americans (admittedly, a tortured term that hazards definition). Likewise, the roundabout policy discussions held by Bill Clinton in the White House and admired by many insiders for their sense of inclusiveness, could not resolve the fact that during the ultimate crisis in the White House that led to impeachment, the President had effectively become an island to himself (for an account of the path to impeachment, see Johnson 2001). As Richard Neustadt wrote in Presidential Power, ‘‘no President can spread himself across the whole of post-Rooseveltian government’’ (Neustadt 1990, 135). Such is the personal dimension to the most decidedly human construction within the Constitution. It cannot

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be emphasized enough that the effectiveness of FDR’s famously adroit, if not quixotically manipulative management style, worked for him when he was president. Asking more than this level of political expertise of today’s presidents is unfair and equally unrealistic. FDR biographer William E. Leuchtenburg has offered sound assessment here: It has not always been sensible, either, to instruct FDR’s successors to apply his prescriptions to the solution of contemporary difficulties. . . . In bypassing the traditional departments to set up emergency agencies, Roosevelt had resorted to a strategy that proved effective in the 1930s, maintained one writer. ‘‘But Roosevelt left his successors a much bigger government, and in due course, the iron law of organization began to transform what had served as brilliant expedients for FDR into dead weight’’ (1983, 245). In arguing against the concept of the modern presidency, some have suggested that Roosevelt’s nonreplicability is an indication of the office’s continuity rather than a break with former constitutionally based understandings of presidential power (Nichols 1994, 4). In some ways what Roosevelt experienced---the nascent compounding of layered government, admittedly in the hands of a political master, is what truly cannot be replicated. As Averill Harriman warned, ‘‘A large staff around a president can waste rather than save [the President] time, and its simple existence can lessen, rather than increase, the hours he has for quiet thought and independent work’’ (Schlesigner 1999, 334). Given that First Lady Nancy Reagan’s staff was larger than President Roosevelt’s at the height of the Depression, as Arthur M. Schlesinger noted, the possibilities of presidential mastery of personnel must be necessarily rethought in terms commensurate with the simple realities of time and space. In short, ‘‘the bloated staffs of modern times withdraw the President from the real world’’ (Schlesinger 1999, 334). The President may be ‘‘all things to all men,’’ as the British journalist Godfrey Hodgson suggested; but he cannot be everywhere for everyone. Since FDR, the great paradox of the presidency has been its ascent into international prominence, command of media attention and expansion of bureaucratic size and complexity---while succumbing to decreased public prestige and personal power.8 It is simply frequently beyond the president’s ability to orchestrate events and people as was the case three quarters of a century ago. The ambivalence of this reality is rooted

316 The Presidency in an equally deep fear of creeping bureaucratic incompetence at best, or tyranny at worst. As Wilson Carey McWilliams illustrated, ‘‘what we fear most is the shadowy power of administrative agencies, so often covert and faceless, speaking in whispers and monotones, adroit at the use of insinuation and terror’’ (McWilliams 2000, 115). Yet the lessons from Vietnam, Watergate, and more recently the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina and the war in Iraq, continue to perplex the imperatives for democratic energy in government. What is the source of government’s ills---is it the incompetence of nebulous agencies lacking direction, or the potentially dangerous leadership of a president whose command of events is less disputed than the benevolence of his intentions? Do we need rescue from leadership or liberty?

Party and Policymaking since FDR ‘‘I know I can pass a sweeping package of legislation during the first hundred days of my administration. It will be the most productive period in modern history’’ (Burns and Sorenson 1999, 105). This was the sentiment of candidate Bill Clinton in the heady summer days leading to the presidential election of 1992. Nearly 60 years after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous flurry of legislation passed in his first 100 days in office, Clinton, like all presidents who came before, was aspiring to what had become the one meaningful and yet, nearly impossible marker to match as chief executive. He too, was operating under what William E. Leuchtenburg called ‘‘The Shadow of FDR.’’ Taken literally, the Second Article of the Constitution places a formidable harness on the president’s

Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas waves to supporters in Miami during a political rally after winning the Georgia presidential primary on March 3, 1992. (Reuters/Bettmann/Corbis)

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR ability to shape legislation. His seemingly reactionary authority to ‘‘execute’’ (section 1, 8) the laws renders him a seeming afterthought in lawmaking. He is to keep Congress informed through an annual address (‘‘The State of the Union,’’ section 3). He may ‘‘make recommendations’’ (section 3) and veto legislation proposed by Congress (Article I, section 7, 2). Yet few presidents before FDR exercised their veto power regularly. As Forrest McDonald notes, ‘‘After [Grover] Cleveland’s veritable orgy of vetoes, exercise of the power returned to a lower level until the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt’’ (1994, 353). Since FDR, presidents have been imbued with the expectation to carry the mantle as ‘‘Legislator-in-Chief.’’ ‘‘The more I learn about Andy Jackson,’’ Roosevelt wrote in 1934, ‘‘the more I love him’’ (Skowronek 1997, 292). Jackson was nothing if not the consummate party leader whose legislative leadership (and defiance) defined the age. Interestingly enough, Jackson mused admiringly about Roosevelt’s political lineage. ‘‘I am not a politician,’’ Jackson once declared, ‘‘but if I were, I would be a New York politician.’’ As Wilson Carey McWilliams explained, this is defined as political ‘‘devotion beyond private ambition.’’ And it likewise meant the disciplined use of party mechanisms and loyalty to accomplish public goals---the seaminess of backroom dealing notwithstanding.9 What Roosevelt loved was executive power supra private interests. What Jackson loved, was how party could make that power relevant. Roosevelt had taken note of how the hand of party had to be played amid intermittent public attentiveness, legislative backlash, and available political resources. As Lewis L. Gould explains, [FDR] recognized that Theodore Roosevelt, while a masterful leader of public opinion from 1901 to 1909, had sometimes provided too much of a good thing in his relations with the institutions of government. He had overdone the practice of submitting congressional messages to an unreceptive Congress, and he had waged too many public battles with opposing lawmakers. Franklin Roosevelt recognized as TR had not, that a president had to select those occasions when he would confront Congress, and he was careful not to bore the American people with constant calls to action, as his relative had done. . . . Two gubernatorial terms in Albany had also honed Roosevelt’s approach to executive leadership. Working with the legislature to battle the onset of the depression and communicating with the population of a large and diverse state helped him develop the skills that he transferred to the White House (2003, 81--82).

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Jacksonian will and TR’s combativeness gained a skill and finesse under FDR that helped make him the model for modern executive leadership in legislation. Roosevelt helped launch the routinization of executive leadership in setting the nation’s legislative agenda. The afterthought of ‘‘proposing’’ legislation has now become a veritable part of presidential expectations, if not obligations. When Eisenhower failed to submit a legislative agenda in 1953, it went over badly with both parties (Nelson 2006, 18). As Andrew Rudalevige notes, ‘‘the shift in the burden of legislative agenda setting matters for presidential-congressional relations, in part because it elevates the importance of the legislative aspect of the presidency’’ (Rudalevige 2002, 3). If legislating has become synonymous with governing, than executive party leadership has become all the more important. Yet the president must contend with the legislative interests of both his own party and that of the opposition. He must do so in the face of events that often compete with the attention his favored programs demand. As Richard Neustadt observed, ‘‘in most years since the Second World War, there has been no ‘main’ drama like recovery with Roosevelt. Instead, there have been half a dozen shows onstage at once, all running simultaneously and interminably and respectively, act after act, with Presidents assigned a leading role in each’’ (Neustadt 1990, 87). Without question Lyndon B. Johnson’s (LBJ) legislative program of civil rights initiatives and antipoverty legislation came the closest to approximating the breakthrough of FDR’s New Deal executive leadership. And this is why Johnson’s presidency may best reflect the ‘‘tragic’’ nature of the modern presidency. If 1965 was the high-water mark of the Great Society, it was also the pivotal year for the Vietnam War’s emergence as the object of Johnson’s demise. While FDR was able to bifurcate his tenure into ‘‘Dr. New Deal’’ and ‘‘Dr. Win-the-War,’’ LBJ tried to fuse the overwhelming imperatives of his domestic and foreign policy agenda together (Freidel 1990, chapter 36). ‘‘There is no need to halt progress in the great and vital Great Society Programs in order to finance the cost of our efforts in Southeast Asia,’’ Johnson promised (Skowronek 1997, 353). What would become known as the ‘‘credibility’’ gap over U.S. prospects for victory in Vietnam had become cemented with what all modern presidents would confront---the expectations gap in what they could deliver. As Gould notes, ‘‘Once skepticism about the legitimacy of the modern presidency was introduced into the American political system, it proved impossible to restore the credibility that had once attached to the office’’ (2003, 147).

318 The Presidency Jeffrey Tulis is right to instruct that executive leadership in Congress is not altogether new. We are reminded that ‘‘in fact, our first president George Washington---with Hamilton’s guidance---fashioned a legislative program,’’ for example (Tulis 1987, 7--8). What has changed in the modern era is the virtual attachment of legislative initiative to the president’s political, if not constitutional obligations. The stakes of executive legislative leadership are also higher and carry greater risks in failing to produce a modicum of success. The political scientist Morris Fiorina has argued that ‘‘great presidencies’’ do not appear in eras of divided government, a hallmark of the post--New Deal Era (Fiorina 1992, 10). Yet the power of political parties has dissipated since the early 20th-century Progressive reforms that led to direct primaries and mid- and late-century changes that created candidatecentered elections. Post-1968 Democratic National Convention reforms likewise built an aura around individuals, rather than the seemingly corrupt political machines that selected them (Bibby 2003). Parties were invariably diminished somewhat by this process. Stephen Skowronek has contended that a ‘‘pluralist’’ model of government operations has been defining of 20th-century presidential politics. This has led to ‘‘an expanding executive establishment attending to newly nationalized interests and America’s rise to world power’’ (Skowronek 1997, 53). In short, presidential leadership of party is the order of the day; yet Fiorina and Skowronek are not necessarily at odds. Presidential primacy does not beget executive excellence. It only guarantees its anticipation.10 The dichotomy of party leadership and presidential success has been recently applied to the presidency of George W. Bush. Bert A. Rockman has argued that The American political system requires compromise and bargaining in the absence of conclusive majorities. It is a testament to George W. Bush’s agility as a political leader that his agenda dominates and that much of it has come to pass. At the same time, if we judge leaders by the extent to which they struggle to create a different reality---not taking the path most easily traveled, but the one less so---Bush must be reckoned a successful party leader but a failed national leader. In view of the unusual opportunities [post-September 11] he was given to do what he said he would do---reduce the partisan distemper in Washington, create conditions of political civility, and promote national cohesion---his failure on these matters has been profound, but also apparently intended (Rockman 2004, 353).

Whether attempting to govern from the right or left, or seeking to plow legislation through a partisan but majority Congress, or an oppositional one, executive leadership since the New Deal offers no easy pattern for presidential success. What abides is the central role of the president in establishing the policy agenda for Congress. This is a task that carries pitfalls equal to or greater than the rewards. Even as hard as it is to ‘‘get what the president wants,’’ as Neustadt argued, legislative victories far from guarantee ultimate success. This is in part what Rockman suggests in his analysis of George W. Bush’s presidency. It is likewise at the center of Andrew Rudalevige’s perspective on policy formation. ‘‘Making policy’’ in the White House (among administrative staffers as opposed to developing it through Congress) in a highly centralized fashion may ultimately spell doom for not only the legislation in question, but also for broader prospects for favorable executive-legislative relations.11 As we shall explore, the modern presidency has been marked by appeals for popular support by presidents seeking to speak directly to the people. ‘‘They [the people] have made me the present instruments of their wishes,’’ said FDR in his first inaugural address (Campbell 1995, 213--214). Woodrow Wilson’s view of his authority went one better, by far. ‘‘I owe you nothing,’’ Wilson told the Democratic national party chairman the day after being elected. ‘‘Remember that God ordained that I should be the next President of the United States’’ (McDonald 1994, 359--360). Yet such messianic views have been dashed by the multitude of forces that have made the president such an instrumental figure in modern politics to begin with. ‘‘The most significant and enduring bias of the American political system is its hostility toward nonincremental reform,’’ writes Daniel J. Tichenor (2006, 336). It may be among the most difficult of lessons for modern presidents to learn as they have been invited ever since FDR, to flaunt the possibilities, to give life to what Stephen Skowronek has called the presidency’s ‘‘order-shattering’’ potential. The presidency is indeed a powerful battering ram as Skowronek suggests; but it is risky business, this battering, and modern presidents have taken as much as they have given (Skowronek 1997, chapter 2). FDR’s improvisational skill during the first 100 days came at a price, Fred Greenstein reminds. His later puffed-up attempt to remake the Supreme Court in his own image ‘‘consumed political energies that might have been better expended and mobilized a bipartisan conservative coalition that continued to block liberal policy departures long after Roosevelt left the political stage’’ (Greenstein 2000, 21).

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR When I. F. Stone wrote of Jimmy Carter ‘‘There’s no music in him,’’ it was a rebuff to Carter’s centrism, incrementalism, and seeming aversion to the farreaching legislative model of Franklin Roosevelt (Leuchtenburg 1998, 10). Yet in fairness to Carter, Vietnam, Watergate, and a diminished world of economic possibilities had been as much to blame for the muting of the euphoric presidency as anything else. In that 1976 presidential campaign, Democrat Gary Hart had declared, ‘‘The New Deal has run its course. The party is over. The pie cannot continue to expand forever’’ (Fink and Davis 1998, p.18). What Hart’s realism juxtaposed however, was the continuing popular hope if not belief, in an heroic presidency. For all of the diminished legislative possibilities confronting modern presidents, the die had already been cast. The expectation for greatness remained---and the people would not be denied it---even if it could not be delivered. Such are the perils of a ‘‘presidential republic.’’12

Imaging the Modern President: Power and Prerogative since FDR Two realities remain the unshakeable foundation for any understanding of modern political discourse. First, for the past 60 years, the world has been marked by the unprecedented possibility for the violent annihilation of the entire human species. Second, the United States has emerged as the most powerful state in the world, drawing increasingly commonplace, and less disputed comparisons to imperial Great Britain and Rome, among others (for example, see James 2006). Indeed, the Pentagon raised eyebrows (and a few guffaws) when it commissioned a pre-9/11 study of the empires of Macedonia, Rome, and the Mongols (Dowd 2001). Beyond these two features of American politics, much else pales. And at the epicenter of these two overarching developments is the president of the United States. The individual character of the American president and the Constitution’s executive dictates were at the fore of debate over the nature of the new government proposed in the summer of 1787. It is likely, for instance, that Thomas Jefferson fabricated a story about Alexander Hamilton, seeking to build an aura of antirepublicanism around his late political adversary. As Garry Wills relates, Hamilton purportedly visited Jefferson’s Philadelphia home while the Virginian was secretary of state in 1791: The room being hung around with a collection of the portraits of remarkable men, among them those of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, Hamilton asked me

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[Jefferson] who they were. I told him they were my trinity of the three greatest men the world had ever produced, naming them. He paused for some time. ‘‘The greatest man,’’ he said, ‘‘that ever lived was Julius Caesar’’ (Wills 2001, 84--85). Jefferson’s slight was intended to cut to the bone. Caesar’s connection with tyranny and Rome’s slide from republicanism was meant not simply for Hamilton (who was dead at the time), but namely, his progeny of wouldbe usurpers of democratic authority (that is, the Federalists). Few Americans today are familiar with Cincinnatus, the Roman model of republicanism that George Washington was best seen as embodying; but there is clearly near-universal familiarity today with Julius Caesar. Restrained executive power lacks the popular fascination it once held, particularly since the 19th century, which largely eschewed Roman imperial models for neo-Greco revivals of popular democracy. It is a stretch to suggest that FDR ushered in an American caesarist model, but the tendency toward executive unilateralism in foreign affairs and in war contains today far less of the republican strain popularized by Jefferson than nearly any other facet of American political life. In United States v. Curtiss Wright Corp. [1936], Justice George Sutherland, quoting John Marshall argued that ‘‘[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’’ The impact of the case has been a veritable tilt if not acquiescence to executive power in foreign affairs. As Louis Fisher argues, Even though Sutherland’s opinion is filled with historical and conceptual inaccuracies, Curtiss-Wright became a popular citation for Court decisions (and academic commentary) upholding presidential power. The case is frequently cited to support not only broad delegations of legislative power to the President but also the existence of independent, implied, and inherent powers for the President (Fisher 2004, 73). While some have blanched at the past and present implications of such authority, others have been less fearful, and otherwise triumphal. Notwithstanding the occasional abuse of presidential power, Forrest McDonald has described the American presidency as ‘‘responsible for less harm and more good, in the nation and the world, than perhaps any other secular institution in history’’ (McDonald 1994, 481). It is such abiding faith in not only the presidency’s greatness, but also its goodness, that has been shared by so many Americans that complicates

320 The Presidency assessments of the fierce executive swing in government power since FDR. In an age of constant emergencies, or anxieties as put by Haynes Johnson (2005), the president is seen as the chief bulwark against democratic slothfulness and legislative incompetence. That the president is seen this way does not ensure his ability to bring crises to a conclusion, nor satisfy popular desires for a sense of national security. The image of the president, shaped by rhetoric and orchestrated through the national media, has become perhaps the crucial feature of presidential activity if not policy. As presidential historian Michael Beschloss puts it: The strong presidency of the twentieth century also gained power by acquiring new symbols, mystique, and ways to influence the public that it had never had before. . . . When Truman’s aides advised him that it was a valuable asset in fighting the Cold War, he authorized them to design a new presidential flag and mount a presidential seal in his lectern wherever he spoke. Kennedy had the presidential plane---once blandly labeled MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE---repainted by the industrial designer Raymond Loewy (who also designed radios and kitchen blenders) in regal blue and white with the sweeping legend UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2003, 12). When Rutherford B. Hayes earned the moniker, ‘‘Rutherford the Rover’’ (a decidedly ho-hum appellation as far as they go) for his habit of traveling about the country to take his message directly to the people instead of Congress, it was a relatively new feature in presidential behavior.13 Yet Hayes was also the president that hosted a late-night presentation by Thomas A. Edison, featuring the first-ever demonstration of a phonograph in the White House.14 For all of Hayes’ ‘‘roving,’’ the technological era he was in simply did not afford him and his contemporaries the scope of presidential presence and aura of those who came in the modern era. On one level, there is nothing new in the President’s role as national ‘‘shaman.’’15 Since George Washington ordered a resplendent canary yellow presidential inaugural carriage with white horses to help give the presidency a degree of pomp and awe, all presidents have used symbols in their efforts to define meaning for the public. What is new since FDR is the ubiquity of the imagemaking and the gravity of presidential possibilities. The challenges of presidential image-making, through and in crises, is manifold. The temptation to overreach rhetorically is great and the possibility of delivering nearly impossible. As George H. W. Bush’s

director of European affairs at the National Security Council put it in his account of the end of the Cold War, there was considerable difficulty with the president’s articulation of a ‘‘new world order.’’ [The phrase] was a complex set of ideas---too complicated for a twenty minute speech. Perhaps the most difficult was the linkage between democracy and international relations. . . . The problems with the ‘‘new world order’’ were several. Most obviously, it was caught up in the euphoria of a unique moment in democratic ascendancy in the wake of the Cold War, in which it was all too easy to mistake the transitory for the permanent. It was hard to resist the Wilsonian temptation to believe that the principles themselves were so compelling that no one dared flout them . . . [yet] when it came to assuming new burdens, the ‘‘new world order’’ conflicted with public expectations of a handsome post-Cold War ‘‘peace dividend’’ (Hutchings 1997, 148--149) [Emphasis added]. The desire to deliver ‘‘permanence’’ runs almost classically opposed to that of ‘‘expectations.’’ In many ways, the modern presidency is marked by the end of endings. Conclusiveness is an illusion since World War II. Korea, Vietnam, and the war on terrorism all share a sense of suspended animation rather than finality. Even the end of the Cold War---a conflict that by definition lacked popular apprehension---holds a sense of ambiguity as far as its attendant meanings and implications. For all the executive prerogatives won or taken over the decades, particularly in the president’s ability to dispatch troops and ‘‘make war,’’ the nature of the ever-shifting international order is such that the leadership’s call for finitude is disproportionate to its ability to win it. As Stephen Skowronek put it, ‘‘The resources of modern presidents dwarf those of their predecessors. But modernity has not altered our presidents’ political purposes correspondingly. Lacking new premises, they adopt leadership projects and political stances that modern developments would seem to render obsolete’’ (Skowronek 1997, 409). In defining ‘‘down’’ the constitutional prerogatives available to him, Lincoln was able to wage war on a scale then unprecedented in modern times. By suggesting he was ‘‘trapped’’ by the Constitution, Lincoln used his status as commander in chief with tremendous severity; but it was for a time, not posterity. In issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, he was ‘‘Commanderin-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and government of the United States’’ (Wills 1992, 135-136). Such a formally legalistic approach to executive

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR power reads today more like the fine print in an insurance policy than the assertions of some dictatorial parvenu. Whereas Lincoln qualified his role as commander in chief, he was able to preserve his own power and that of necessity. In going beyond the strictures of constitutional prerogative, more recent presidents have achieved less with more. As Louis Fisher explains: Unlike Truman, Bush I, and Clinton, Lincoln never claimed that he possessed full authority to act as he did. In fact, he admitted to exceeding the constitutional boundaries established for the President and thus needed the sanction of Congress. When Congress returned he explained his actions, ‘‘whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them’’ (Fisher 2004, 48). Conversely, George H. W. Bush’s comments serve as a fair indicator of how views of presidential prerogative have changed in the modern era. ‘‘I didn’t have to get permission from some old goat in the United States

President George H. W. Bush (shown here in 1989), assembled the highly successful international coalition that drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. An economic downturn cost him reelection in 1992. (Department of Defense)

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Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait,’’ he said (Fisher 2004, 172). In rebuffing the ‘‘irrelevance’’ of Congress to the point of assuming presidential prerogative to engage in illegality, Richard Nixon argued ‘‘Well when the President does it, that means it is not illegal. . . . If the President, for example, approves something because of the national security . . . then the President’s decision in that instance is one that enables those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law’’ (McDonald 1994, 384). Again, this view is neither demonstrably liberal nor conservative. It is an executive tool fashioned out of Rooseveltian (initiated under Teddy) and Wilsonian democratic messianism and militant progressivism. If leadership requires the suspension of liberty, how are we to resolve Tocqueville’s conundrum? In his classic work, The American Presidency, Clinton Rossiter was generous in his assessment of the modern presidency. ‘‘If there is any one point I have hammered on in this book,’’ he wrote, ‘‘it is that the Presidency is an essentially democratic office’’ (1987, 108). Nothing calls this hopeful note more into question than the past 60 years of presidential action that has invoked the president’s prerogative in using his national security and emergency powers. As Jeffrey Tulis warned, ‘‘It can be readily seen that leadership as prerogative is dangerous’’ (Tulis 1987, 202). Coupled with the rhetoric of emergency and necessity, the distillation of fear as a political tactic cannot be seen as beyond the pale of any president’s inclination. This is particularly so given that journalists tend to favor ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘decisive’’ presidential action---without essential regard to the democratic implications of the act (Nelson 2006, 10).16 The star quality of the modern presidency made possible by the new media, coupled with a less contested field for command power than ever before, has made the modern presidency a virtual invitation to the application of unilateral force. As Ballard C. Campbell has written, ‘‘Normally the certainty of public approval combined with congressional impotence in diplomacy, and a professional military establishment groomed for action and confident of its ability held out immense temptation for presidents to exercise power unilaterally in foreign affairs. Nearly all of them since FDR succumbed to this seduction’’ (Campbell 1995, 213). It is hard to imagine the modern presidency outside of this fundamental state of affairs.

Conclusion: Tocqueville’s Ledger As Alexis de Tocqueville recognized, the dilemma of authoritative leadership is not purely one of

322 The Presidency institutional developments, but also one of citizenship. How are we to square the fundamental need and desire for people and communities to be led and to feel secure, with the equally overwhelming desire to be free? Who would not grant the president virtually any power to avoid the possibility of the nuclear annihilation referenced at the outset of this essay? There is good reason why in hindsight Lincoln seems more angelic than Stalinist---we understand the stakes too well today, and we are too far removed. Yet, both the Civil War and the Cold War conflict---one of blood, the other of precipice---reveal something startlingly fundamental about Tocqueville’s juxtaposition of leadership and liberty. When imbued with great moral and practical restraint, presidential action can sustain both. It is the absence of restraint---personal and constitutional---that renders the modern presidency a force of questionable democratic merit at times. The Hamiltonian ‘‘fame’’ bequeathed to Lincoln and Kennedy, it would be well learned, is less the product of incaution and avarice, than that of sober and at times somber realism. In this light, FDR’s presidency produced warring twins---that of democratic experimentation, vision and leadership, against that of narrow force and teetering arrogance. Roosevelt’s place within the national pantheon of ‘‘marble’’ presidents is secure because of the former, not the latter. It cannot be probable that the ‘‘heroic’’ presidency is over. The intermittent awfulness and unpredictability of modern life will undoubtedly present more opportunities than any rational person could hope for. But we may do well to reconsider the nature of that heroism. With a modern presidency more insulated than ever before, in an age in which upon election a president likely will never have to open another car or hotel door again, it is all the more important to assess the connection between the president and the people. The sense of disappointment and disconnect of citizens from their government, let alone their president, is testament to the irony that with more communicative options and personalized ether-worlds available to citizens, there is a ‘‘technology gap’’ between flesh and image. The spontaneity of politics is what captures the electorate more than anything else, and it is this fact, purportedly antithetical to being elected or governing, that holds real resonance with voters. Overcoming the scripted presidency is part and parcel of making the modern presidency not only less distant, but also less potentially authoritarian. Inevitably, after scandal, foolheartedness, and shame have all encircled the office, the presidency still holds unparalleled stature, if not dignity. In the end, presidential command and power

are not so much to be feared as is the sense that good, honest women and men are none-too-prolific to exercise restraint in governing, and to demand it in being governed.

References and Further Reading Barilleaux, Ryan J., and Mark J. Rozell. 2004. Power and Prudence: The Presidency of George H. W. Bush. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Beschloss, Michael. 2003. The Presidents. New York: ibooks. Bibby, John F. 2003. Presidential Nominating Politics, in Politics, Parties, and Elections in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Burke. 2006. ‘‘The Institutional Presidency.’’ In The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Burns, James MacGregor, and Georgia J. Sorenson. 1999. Dead Center: Clinton-Gore Leadership and the Perils of Moderation. New York: Scribner. Campbell, Ballard C. 1995. The Growth of American Government: Governance from the Cleveland Era to the Present. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Cannon, Lou. 2000. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Public Affairs. Cronin, Thomas E. 1980. The State of the Presidency. Boston: Little, Brown. Dowd, Maureen. 2001. ‘‘What Would Genghis Do?’’ New York Times, March 5. Erenhalt, Aaron. 2006. ‘‘The Unconstitutional Governor.’’ In Governing, Congressional Quarterly (May). Fink, Gary M., and Hugh Davis Graham, eds. 1998. The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Fiorina, Morris. 1992. Divided Government. New York: Macmillan. Fisher, Louis. 2004. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas. Foer, Franklin. 2005. ‘‘The Joy of Federalism.’’ The New York Times, March 6. Freidel, Frank. 1990. ‘‘Doctor Win-the-War.’’ Chapter 36 in Franklin Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny. New York: Little Brown and Co. Genovese, Michael A. 2001. The Power of the American Presidency: 1789---2000. New York: Oxford University Press. Goodwin, Doris Kearns. 2005. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York: Simon and Schuster. Gould, Lewis L. 2003. The Modern American Presidency. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Greenstein, Fred I. 2000. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton. New York: The Free Press. Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Thiess-Morse. 1999. Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Towards American Political Institutions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Hodgson, Godfrey. 1980. All Things to All Men: The False Promise of the Modern American Presidency from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Leadership or Liberty? The Modern American Presidency since FDR Hoogenboom, Ari. 1995. Rutherford B. Hayes: Warrior and President. Lawrence: University of Kansas. Hutchings, Robert L. 1997. American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989---1992. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. James, Harold. 2006. The Roman Predicament: How the Rules of International Order Created the Politics of Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Johnson, Haynes. 2001. The Best of Times: America in the Clinton Years. Orlando, FL: Harcourt. Johnson, Haynes. 2005. The Age of Anxiety: McCarthyism to Terrorism. Orlando, FL: Harcourt. Kallenbach, Joseph E. 1966. The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship. New York: Harper and Row. Leuchtenburg, William E. 1983. In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Leuchtenburg, William E. 1998. ‘‘Jimmy Carter and the Post-New Deal Presidency.’’ In The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era, eds. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Mayer, Kenneth R. 1990. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McDonald, Forrest. 1994. ‘‘President in Administration.’’ In The American Presidency: An Intellectual History. Lawrence: University of Kansas. McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 2000. The Politics of Disappointment: American Elections, 1980---1998. New York: Chatham House. Milkis, Sidney M. 1993. The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal. New York: Oxford University Press. Nelson, Michael, ed. 2006. The Presidency and the Political System. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. Nichols, David K. 1994. The Myth of the Modern Presidency. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press. Rockman, Bert A. 2004. ‘‘Presidential Leadership in an Era of Party Polarization: The George W. Bush Presidency.’’ In The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Rossiter, Clinton. 1987. The American Presidency. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1965. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1999. ‘‘After the Imperial Presidency.’’ In The Cycles of American History. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.

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Thach, Charles. 1969. The Creation of the Presidency: 1775--1789. New York: Da Capo Press. Thomas, Evan, and Richard Wolffe. 2005. ‘‘Bush in the Bubble.’’ Newsweek, December 19. Tichenor, Daniel J. 2006. ‘‘The Presidency and Interest Groups.’’ In The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson Washington, DC: CQ Press. Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wills, Garry. 1992. Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America. New York: Simon and Schuster. Wills, Garry. 2001. Explaining America: The Federalist. New York: Penguin.

Notes 1. The framers’ use of ‘‘man’’ was hardly that of the Edenic variety incorporating ‘‘male and female.’’ For this essay’s purposes, ‘‘he’’ refers to those presidents we have had, not without regard to those who will undoubtedly come. 2. ‘‘This field of glory is harvested, and the crop is already harvested,’’ said Lincoln in his Young Men’s Lyceum address in Springfield in 1838 (see Will 1992). 3. These were the pseudonyms for Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, respectively, who debated in 1793 the authority of George Washington to authorize his Proclamation of Neutrality, keeping America out of war in Europe. The question of the abuse of presidential power took no hiatus even during the great Washington’s tenure in office. The eloquence of such dynamic political discourse, unfortunately, since has. 4. As Reagan biographer Lou Cannon noted, Reagan’s inaugural address in 1981 in some ways paid homage to FDR’s economic warnings--but this time with government action, rather than inaction as the source of the nation’s woes (see Cannon 2000, 75). 5. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s ‘‘imperial president’’ was notable ‘‘not for what President’s did but in what Presidents believed they had the inherent right to do’’ (1999, 297). 6. Progressive state governments, whether of the Hudson variety of TR or La Follette’s ‘‘Wisconsin Idea,’’ were in many respects the ramp up to what FDR’s administration would come to epitomize (on the ‘‘Wisconsin Idea’’ and state progressive administration, see Foer 2005). 7. It was the Reorganization Act of 1939 that moved the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, created in 1921, to an executive office (now the Office of Management and Budget, or OMB) (see Campbell [1995, 211]). 8. While public perceptions of the presidency have fared better than Congress, the overall trend has been downward, and this apparently predates Watergate (see Hibbing and Thiess-Morse1999, chapter 2). 9. The Jackson citation and McWilliams reference are found at ‘‘Values and Politics: Alliance for Citizen Education,’’ Institute for the Study for Civic Values, http://www.iscv.org/ Civic_Idealism/McWilliams/ValuesPolitics/valuespolitics. html. 10. George H. W. Bush may have suffered a political price paid by any number of presidents in attempting to ‘‘lower public expectations of what the president could achieve,’’ by avoiding ‘‘overexposure and credit claiming’’ (see Barilleaux and Rozell 2004).

324 The Presidency 11. At the very least, centralization is ‘‘a drag on legislative success,’’ says Rudalevige (2002, 156). 12. The phrase is from Thomas E. Cronin, The State of the Presidency (Little, Brown: Boston, 1980), cited in Genovese (2001, 138). 13. Hayes dwarfed his predecessors in the number of speeches given on tour, giving more than the prior six presidents combined, including the 60 delivered by Andrew Johnson alone (see Tulis 1987, 64).

14. The novelty was so great apparently that Edison was unable to pull himself away until 3:30 A.M. (see Hoogenboom 1995, 346). 15. The term is here borrowed from Genovese (2001, 138). 16. Here Michael Nelson recounts a study that attests to the bias of military action in reporter’s assessments of strength--appearing decisive and military strength are linked together as ‘‘favorable’’ correlates.

Lincoln and the Civil War State Avram Fechter

Opening Section

law firm. The president-elect had entered the Capitol in disguise to foil rumors of planned assassination attempts on his life, were he to have entered the District in broad daylight. His election as president had precipitated nine states to break off from the United States and claimed themselves to be a separate, sovereign nation. Seven more states seemed to be on the brink of joining them. More than 200 federal troops were under siege at Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, surrounded by thousands of armed rebel forces. There were only 17,500 troops in the entire Union Army, and one-third of the officer corps had already or would soon violate their oath’s to preserve and protect the Constitution and defect to the rebellion. The lame-duck President Buchanan had not lifted a finger to stop the brewing rebellion and was not organizing an expedition to save Fort Sumter. He seemed content to let the Southern states go peaceably. By the time of President Lincoln’s assassination four years and one month later at Ford’s Theater, the nation would be unrecognizable from its condition on March 4, 1861. More than 2 million Union soldiers and seaman had successfully crushed the rebellion. For the first time in American history, the federal government was directly collecting income taxes from its citizens and had financed a war by selling bonds to ordinary Americans. Debate over the need for a national bank had exited from the stage of American politics, its continued operation seemingly assured. The Republican Party had changed from an unruly amalgamation of free soilers and abolitionists to the most dominant

It is early morning and a man in a Keppel hat and what looks like a long shawl is walking off the last train from Baltimore into Washington, D.C.’s newly built Union Station. He can see the Capitol illuminated by torches rising faintly out of the darkness and mist blanketing what is now the Mall. A voice calls to him, ‘‘Hey, you can’t pass that outfit off on me.’’ The two bodyguards accompanying the man reach for their guns. Before they can draw them, their charge recognizes the face behind the voice and gives him a strong embrace. The man, accompanied by his bodyguards, gets into the horse carriage of his friend and is taken to the Willard Hotel at 1400 Pennsylvania Avenue. The man takes off his Keppel hat as he chats with his friend as he is taken down Pennsylvania Avenue, replacing it with a long stovepipe hat. After exiting the carriage at 6:00 A.M., the man heads straight to the front desk of the hotel to check-in. Name: Abraham Lincoln. Date: February 20, 1861. The front desk clerk looks at the man again, realizing that he is now staring at the next president of the United States. No one could have imagined on that evening that President-elect Lincoln would go on to fundamentally alter the course and nature of America’s politics for the next century. Lincoln had never held executive office before his election as president of the United States. He had never supervised a staff of larger than three at his

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326 The Presidency political force in American politics, and it would continue its supremacy virtually uninterrupted into the next century. In an ominous precedent for future wartime administrations, the federal government had infringed on civil liberties at a scale never before seen in American history. For the first time, the federal government suspended the writ of habeaus corpus and arrested American citizens without bringing charges for weeks and months at a time. However, Lincoln had also offered a model of restraint that future wartime administrations would ignore. The causes of the war had been eradicated. Federal supremacy over state governments was no longer a matter of debate but a matter of commonly accepted fact. No state would ever again even dare to threaten to nullify a federal law. Every presidential electoral dispute following the Civil War, including the 2000 presidential elections, would be settled at the ballot box and in the courts, not on the battlefield. More important, in four years, an overwhelming number of Northerners had gone from being indifferent about the continuation of slavery to supporting its immediate, outright extinction with the use of the full weight and power of the federal government. Some 180,000 black Union soldiers had helped win the war, which ensured that slavery had gone from being the lifeblood of more than one-third of America’s economy to being dead and buried. Almost every major issue of political contention before and during the election of 1860 had been won by Lincoln’s Republican Party, most never to return again as serious matters of debate in national politics. Lincoln altered the course of America’s political development forever. This is the story of how.

The First 100 Days President Lincoln did more in the first three months of his presidency to save the Union than he did in the next three years of his presidency. When Lincoln delivered his inaugural address, seven slave states (Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware) teetered on the brink of secession and Fort Sumter was under a virtual siege. Lincoln’s handling of these twin, interrelated crisis would determine the Union’s ability to win the war. If all seven border-states joined the rebellion, the white population of the rebel states would equal, if not exceed, that of those remaining in the Union. Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Iowa would be vulnerable to being cut off from the rest of the country by

a quick offensive north out of Kentucky. The Ohio River would be inaccessible for trade. The nation’s capital itself would be isolated from the rest of the country. Foreign nations such as Britain and France would probably quickly recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy and ultimately intervene on its behalf. Some of the border states had to stay in the Union if the Union was to be preserved. Lincoln also had to unify northern public opinion behind the use of force to prevent secession. He had been elected with only 40 percent of the popular vote and a bare majority of the vote in the free states. Lincoln needed the support of a unified, bipartisan northern population if he was to muster the overwhelming force needed to hold the Union together. A rebel assault on the Union flag could be the catalyst for a groundswell of bipartisan support for the use of force. Like Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) in 1940 and 1941, Lincoln would attempt maneuver events and public opinion to generate a public consensus in favor of a war that he knew would have to be fought. Lincoln’s efforts to engineer a Southern ‘‘first shot’’ began more than three months before taking the oath of office. Southern politicians had been voicing threats of seceding if Lincoln won the presidential contest, and their threats only increased in urgency and number throughout the weeks following his victory. Many Northerners, even many Republicans, urged Lincoln to extend an olive branch to the South following his victory. President Buchanan even questioned the federal government’s ability to prevent Southern states from seceding, stating in his last message to Congress that while the Union ‘‘was intended to be perpetual . . . Our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish’’ (Van Der Linden 1998, 112). Senator Crittenden (Whig-Ky.) offered a compromise intended to prevent war. Crittenden proposed a series of congressional resolutions that would extend the old Missouri Compromise line across the width of the continent, baring slavery from new territories north of the line and allowing it in new territories south of the line. A Committee of Thirteen was appointed to debate the proposals and issue a recommendation to Congress. Following the passage of South Carolina’s ordinance of the secession, Senator Douglass (D-Ill.), Lincoln’s opponent in the recently completed presidential contest, delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate endorsing the Crittenden Compromise, asking ‘‘Why cannot you Republicans accede to the re-establishment

Lincoln and the Civil War State 327 are either attempting to play us, or they are in dead earnest. Either way, if we surrender; it is the end of us, and of the government. They will repeat the experiment upon us ad libitum. A year will not pass, till we shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they will stay in the Union. They now have the Constitution, under which we have lived over seventy years, and acts of Congress of their own framing, with no prospect of their being changed; and they can never have a more shallow pretext for breaking up the government, or extorting a compromise, than now (Gienapp 2002, 87).

President Abraham Lincoln in 1865. Lincoln’s leadership redefined the presidency and elevated popular expectations. In addition to successful prosecution of the Civil War and Emancipation, he inaugurated the public land grant system of higher education with the Morrill Act. (Chaiba Media)

of the old Missouri Compromise line?’’ (Van Der Linden 1998, 156). This was hardly the bipartisan support Lincoln so desperately needed. Lincoln never wavered. While refusing to comment publicly, Lincoln fired off a number of letters to Republican senators and congress members stating his position. To Senator Trumball (R-Ill.) Lincoln wrote, ‘‘Let there be no compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and ere long, must be done again. The dangerous ground---that into which some of our friends have a hankering to run---is popular sovereignty. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come, and better now, than any time hereafter. (Gienapp 2002, 85) To Congressman Hale (R-Pa.), Lincoln wrote, What is our present condition? We have just now carried an election day on principles fairly stated to the people. We are told in advance, the government shall be broken up, unless we surrender to those we have beaten, before we take the offices. In this they

Lincoln would not compromise the platform upon which he was democratically elected to avert war. Following instructions from the leader of their party, Republicans in Congress formed a solid wall of opposition to the Crittenden Compromise and similar proposals. As the crises mounted, Lincoln finally broke his public silence during his extended trip to Washington in February 1861. Lincoln’s goal was to use the power of the presidential bully pulpit to unite Northerners, both Republicans and Democrats, behind the potential use of force to preserve the Union. At every stop, he insisted on bipartisan welcoming committees. In one of the early speeches of his tour, Lincoln stated that ‘‘[w]hile some of us may differ in political opinions, still we are all united in one feeling for the Union. We all believe in the maintenance of the Union, of every star and every stripe of the glorious flag’’ (Donald 1995, 274). Shortly thereafter, in another speech, Lincoln questioned the South’s definition of the word ‘‘coercion.’’ He asked, ‘‘If an army marched into South Carolina without the prior consent of its people, that would admittedly constitute ‘coercion.’ But would it be coercion if the Government, for instance, but simply insists upon holding its own forts, or retaking those forts which belong to it?’’ If that was coercion, ‘‘the Union, as a family relation, would not be anything like a regular marriage at all, but only as a sort of free-love arrangement’’ (MacCartney 1931, 308). Lincoln would repeat these twin messages throughout his two-week journey to Washington, delivering so many speeches that he lost his voice. Tens of thousands gathered to hear him at every stop along the way. Lincoln’s message was clear, unlike President Buchanan, Lincoln believed he had the legal authority, moral responsibility, and the support of northern public opinion to prevent secession, by force if necessary. It was a theme that would be repeated in his first inaugural address, with a twist designed to place the

328 The Presidency onus of firing the first shot upon the South. After repeating his opposition to the extension of slavery, his insistence upon upholding his oath of office, and repeating his oft-stated pledge not to interfere with slavery where it already existed, Lincoln declared in your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to ‘‘preserve, protect, and defend’’ it (Gienapp 96). Northern newspapers from across the political spectrum praised Lincoln’s inaugural address as striking the right tone between conciliation and resoluteness. Even Senator Douglass offered words of praise. Following his inauguration, Lincoln acted quickly to unify his party and send a positive message to the border states. He appointed a cabinet representing every faction within the Republican Party, including four of Lincoln’s rivals for the Republican nomination. Lincoln’s cabinet also included two prominent borderstate politicians (one from Missouri, one from Maryland). Lincoln’s willingness to include all elements of the Republican Party ensured a united Republican Party, at least for the time being, behind the policies of Lincoln’s administration. The united support of his party was not enough, however. Lincoln needed substantial bipartisan support. Northern Democrats still questioned the need for armed conflict---even as Major Anderson’s men remained surrounded at Fort Sumter and were quickly running out of supplies. President Lincoln was notified on the day of his inauguration, March 4, that Anderson would be out of food and water by the middle of April. General Scott, commander in chief of the U.S. Army, bluntly told the new president that it would take an army of 25,000 men to relieve Sumter by land, an army that did not exist. Lincoln would have to send a relief expedition by sea or order the fort abandoned. With Sumter fast running out of supplies and the Rebels promising to fire on any relief expedition, Democrats and even members of Lincoln’s own cabinet urged the president to order the fort’s evacuation. Douglass stated in a speech on the floor of the Senate less than two weeks after Lincoln’s swearing in, Are we prepared for civil war, with all its horrors and calamities? I proclaim boldly, the policy of

those with whom I act: We are for peace! The President of the United States holds the destiny of this country in his hands. . . . What man in all America, who knows the facts connected with Fort Sumter, can hesitate in saying that duty, honor, patriotism, and humanity require that Anderson and his gallant band should be instantly withdrawn? (Van Der Linden 236) After agonizing about the situation for nearly a month, Lincoln acted. On April 4, 1861, Lincoln ordered a naval expedition to bring food to Fort Sumter. Unarmed ships would carry rations to the Fort. Armed warships would accompany the expedition, but would not enter Charleston Harbor, and would fire only if the unarmed ships were fired upon. If Rebel batteries fired on the unarmed supply ships, the South would have fired the first shot of the war. If the ships resupplied the Fort, the status quo could be preserved at Sumter and Lincoln’s administration would have won an important symbolic victory (McPherson 271). Lincoln sent Davis a public notice that a fleet sailing toward Sumter carried only food and water, not weapons, and that Davis could even inspect the ship’s cargo if he were to let them provision the garrison peaceably. Davis refused Lincoln’s offer. On April 11, the Union fleet appeared off Charleston Harbor. Davis and his cabinet authorized rebel batteries to open fire on Fort Sumter. After 20 hours of continuous bombardment, Sumter surrendered. Jefferson Davis had chosen war. By firing the first shots of the war and seizing Fort Sumter, Jefferson Davis had won a pyrrhic victory. He had won a strategically insignificant military outpost, but had unified northern public opinion behind Lincoln’s administration. Davis’s order to fire on Sumter persuaded Stephen Douglass and the vast majority of northern Democrats to do the same. Douglass told a cheering crowd in Chicago, ‘‘There are only two sides to the question. Every man must be for the United States or against it. There can be no neutrals in this war, only patriots or traitors’’ (McPherson 274). Northern reaction was swift and unified. It was rage. President Lincoln issued an immediate call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the revolt. In the days and weeks immediately after Lincoln’s call for volunteers, governors in states all across the North telegraphed Washington with the news that they were doubling and tripling their recruitment quotas. By maneuvering Davis into firing the first shot, Lincoln had gained the bipartisan northern support he so desperately needed.

Lincoln and the Civil War State 329

Fort Sumter is bombarded by Confederate shells at the start of the American Civil War, April 12, 1861. (Ridpath, John Clark, Ridpath’s History of the World, 1901)

Border States Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas responded to Lincoln’s call for troops by seceding from the Union. Kentucky’s governor responded ‘‘Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states.’’ Missouri’s governor stated that the troop call up was ‘‘illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman, and diabolical.’’ On April 18, Maryland’s governor telegraphed the president, ‘‘The excitement is fearful. Send no troops here’’ (Donald 1995, 297). The shots at Sumter had unified northern public opinion, but Lincoln’s call for troops to suppress the revolt had also pushed Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri to the brink. If they joined the revolt, the three states would add 45 percent to the white population and military manpower of the other seceding states, 80 percent to its manufacturing capacity, and 40 percent to its supply of horses and mules (McPherson 284). It

was probably impossible to defeat a revolt of such size and magnitude. Lincoln could not adopt a one-size fits all approach to each state. Maryland was too strategically important to the defense of Washington to allow it to remain outside federal control. Kentucky was too large to conquer with the meager forces at Lincoln’s disposal. Missouri was rapidly descending into guerrilla warfare. In the first year of his presidency, Lincoln would use a combination of patience, restraint, and when necessary, overwhelming force to keep these three states from joining the revolt.

Maryland: Force Despite Governor Hick’s plea, Lincoln had to send troops through Maryland to protect the capital. On April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts regiment marched through the streets of Baltimore as it changed trains. A

330 The Presidency mob of rebel sympathizers attacked the troops as they marched. Several soldiers and civilians were attacked in the ensuing melee. For nearly a week, Washington was under a virtual siege; roving mobs cut telegraph lines into the capital and burned the railroad bridges heading south out of Baltimore. Rumors ran rampant of Virginia regiments and Maryland mobs preparing to storm the capital. Finally, General Butler arrived in Washington, D.C., on April 25 at the head of the Seventh New York and Eighth Massachusetts Infantry regiments. The capital was safe (McPherson 286; Donald 1995, 298). Maryland, however, was still in play. Maryland’s governor had, despite death threats, for months successfully resisted calls for a special session of the Maryland legislature. For the Maryland legislature to vote on an ordinance of secession, it had to be in session. Refusing to call a special session was tantamount to siding with the Union. Following the riot of April 19, Governor Hicks finally bowed to pressure and called a special session of the legislature. The first day of the legislative session was scheduled for April 26, and no one knew for certain which way the legislature would vote. General-inChief Scott requested Lincoln’s permission to arrest the entire legislature to prevent them from voting the state out of the Union. Lincoln responded, The Maryland legislature assembles tomorrow, and, not improbably, will take action to arm the people of that State against the United States. The question has been submitted to, and considered by me, whether it would not be justifiable, upon the ground of necessary defense, for you, as Commander-InChief of the United States Army, to arrest, or disperse the members of that body. I think it would not be justifiable; nor, efficient for the desired object. First, they have a clearly legal right to assemble and we can not know in advance, that their action will not be lawful, and peaceful. And if we wait until they have acted, their arrest, or dispersion, will not lesson the effect of their action. Secondly, we can not permanently prevent their action. If we arrest them, we can not long hold them as prisoners; and when liberated, they will immediately re-assemble, and take their action. And, precisely the same if we simply disperse them. They will immediately re-assemble in some other place. I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding General to watch, and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt, and

efficient means to counteract, even if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities---and in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeaus corpus (Gienapp 98--99). Historians tend to overlook the significance of Lincoln’s April 26 letter to Scott. Most of the letter illustrates Lincoln’s restraint, refusing to allow Scott to preemptively arrest the legislature. However, the last sentence swings in a very different direction. Less than two weeks after Fort Sumter, Lincoln was already willing to wage total war to preserve the Union. Within two months of becoming president, Lincoln ordered the leveling of Baltimore and Annapolis, if required to keep Maryland within the Union. Lincoln would stop at nothing to reunite the Union. Sherman’s March to the Sea would cut a swath of devastation through Georgia and South Carolina, crippling the economy of the rebellion, more than three years later. Lincoln proved that he was also willing to infringe on civil liberties if necessary. The Constitution authorized the suspension of the writ of habeaus corpus in times of war or national emergency. However, the Constitution was silent on which branch of government was empowered with the ability to suspend the writ. The section authorizing the writ’s suspension is in Article I, the article that deals with the powers entrusted to Congress. Most legal scholars of the time believed only Congress could suspend the writ. Before becoming president, Lincoln had become one of the most successful lawyers in Illinois history. However, as president, Lincoln was not interested in parsing legal hairs. Lincoln believed that the fate of Maryland, and therefore, the Union, was at stake. The Constitution clearly stated that the federal government had the power to suspend the writ in times of national emergency. The Constitution did not prohibit the president from suspending the writ. That was all the legal authorization Lincoln needed. With federal troops now in Washington and more on the way, Lincoln felt he had the military power with which to hold Maryland by force. Acting on Lincoln’s authority, General Scott ordered Union troops to fan out along the railroad lines between Baltimore and Washington, and to arrest persons suspected of attempting to disrupt repair efforts and hold them without charge. The telegraph and railroad lines to the capital were quickly repaired. On May 13, General Butler arrived in Baltimore with more than a thousand men and placed Union batteries on Federal Hill, dominating Baltimore. Word had already leaked out of Lincoln’s order to bombard Maryland cities if necessary. The

Lincoln and the Civil War State 331 guns on Federal Hill were within easy artillery range of most of Baltimore. They served as a daily reminder of Lincoln’s order. The roving gangs of Rebel saboteurs faded away. Union troops moved without hindrance throughout Maryland. Lincoln had used the unrestrained power of the federal government to put Maryland firmly in the Union camp by the end of May.

Missouri and Kentucky: Restraint, Patience, and Force The struggle for Missouri and Kentucky would take longer to win and would demand more than just military force. Within days of Fort Sumter, pro-Union and pro-Rebel forces began mustering and fighting in Missouri, largely without direction. Frank Blair Jr., son of a member of Lincoln’s cabinet, forced the pro-Rebel forces organizing outside of St. Louis to surrender. Union troops from outside the state would arrive faster than Rebel troops from outside the state. By the end of May, Union troops had ostensible control of the state, but internecine conflict raged throughout most of the countryside. For three years a bloody guerrilla war would rage in Missouri’s countryside---but Missouri would never again be seriously on the verge of joining the rebellion. Meanwhile Kentucky vowed to take ‘‘sides not with the Administration or with the seceding States, but with the Union against them both.’’ Kentucky’s governor vowed to enter the conflict against whichever side sent armed troops into Kentucky first. Kentucky’s population and land area were more than twice that of Maryland. Union forces had not mobilized in enough strength to hold the state by force. Lincoln held back, telling a former Kentucky congressman, ‘‘if Kentucky made no demonstration of force against the United States, he would not molest her’’ (Donald 1995, 300). Instead of sending in Union troops, Lincoln had his agents distribute 5,000 muskets to Union supporters throughout the state while placing Kentucky native Robert Anderson, hero of Fort Sumter, in command of the military district that included Kentucky. Anderson positioned federal troops at three places along the Ohio River, ready to cross into the state at a moment’s notice. Lincoln ordered Union commanders in the field to wait for Rebel troops to violate Kentucky’s neutrality first before sweeping into Kentucky. As the war in the west settled into a stalemate, the first major battle of the war was fought in the east, at Bull Run on July 21, 1861. The Union Army was routed from the field after hours of hard fighting. The northern public, which had been expecting a short and

relatively easy conflict, now realized that the war would be long and that the human and financial toll would be dear. In the wake of Bull Run, Lincoln continued his political policy of attempting to maintain the unified support of his own party for the war while also attracting substantial support from Democrats as well. Lincoln appointed prominent Republicans and Democrats alike with military experience to high-profile commands. By reaching out to Democrats who supported a war to restore the Union, but not a war for emancipation, Lincoln risked alienating the more radical members of his own party. Within weeks of Bull Run, prominent Republicans began pressuring Lincoln to free the slaves. Lincoln knew that any movement on the part of his administration to free slaves would not only lose him the support of most ‘‘War Democrats,’’ but also risked losing Missouri and Kentucky. Lincoln had appointed the Republican Party’s 1856 presidential nominee, John C. Fremont, to command the Union Army in Missouri. Fremont was a radical Republican who supported immediate emancipation. In late August, Fremont used a Rebel invasion of southwestern Missouri and the continuing guerrilla warfare throughout the state as the pretext to issue a proclamation, without consulting Lincoln. Fremont’s proclamation proclaimed marshal law throughout the state, announced that civilians caught bearing arms would be tried by court-marshal and shot if convicted, and ordered that slaves of persons who aided the rebellion be emancipated. Fremont’s order drew enthusiastic editorial praise from not only traditionally Republican newspapers throughout the North, but many independent and Democratic papers as well. There was bipartisan support for harsh punishment of person’s proven to have aided the rebellion. In many ways Fremont’s proclamation resembled Lincoln’s order to General Scott to suspend the writ and bombard Baltimore. It used overwhelming force in an attempt to preserve Missouri for the Union. It worked in Maryland, why not Missouri? Fremont was lionized as a hero within the Republican Party and among War Democrats throughout the North. From Kentucky, General Anderson and others reported to Lincoln that ‘‘if the proclamation is not immediately disavowed, and annulled, Kentucky will be lost to the Union’’ (Donald 1995, 316). While Lincoln had authorized the use of unprecedented federal power to preserve Maryland, he had not ordered the emancipation of slaves or the trial of civilians by military tribunals. The use of those two measures in Missouri,

332 The Presidency while extremely popular in the North, threatened the Union’s tenuous hold on Kentucky. Lincoln ordered Fremont to rescind his proclamation. Fremont refused. Lincoln revoked the proclamation himself and eventually fired Fremont. Lincoln’s actions provoked a storm of outrage and protest from all parts of the Republican Party, including Lincoln’s former law partner. However, Lincoln stood firm.1 He was not going take his eyes off the prize. To win the war, Lincoln had to keep Kentucky. And to keep Kentucky, Lincoln could not keep Fremont’s proclamation. The political genius from Lincoln was that he would never let a wound fester in interparty relations. To appease the radical wing of the party, once the border states were secure, Lincoln would reappoint Fremont to an independent command in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Stonewall Jackson would rout Fremont’s army less than two months later. The new Union commander in Missouri managed to repel the rebel invasion and restore some order to the countryside, without Fremont’s proclamation. In November, Rebel troops entered Kentucky, violating Kentucky’s neutrality and prompting the state legislature to take Kentucky permanently into the Union camp. Anderson’s troops swept southward across the Ohio River and within a month most of the state was firmly under federal control. Through a combination of force, restraint, and patience, Lincoln had managed to secure all three remaining border states by the end of 1861.

Emancipation With the border states secure, Lincoln could allow steps toward emancipation to move forward. However, a majority of Northerners in early 1862 were still for a war to restore the Union as it was, not for a war of emancipation. Lincoln realized that he had to cast moves toward emancipation as military necessities, not as social policy initiatives. In May 1862, General Hunter, Union commander in the South Carolina coastal region, issued an edict declaring all slaves in his three state jurisdiction forever free. The Radical wing of the party rejoiced. Again, Lincoln ignored them, revoking Hunter’s order. Lincoln firmly believed that he and he alone should control the timing of the emancipation decision. By early summer of 1862, most of the Union high command recognized that slaves were providing valuable aid and comfort to the rebel armies. They were digging fortifications, cooking rations, raising crops, and picking cotton. Every slave engaged in these activities was one less white male needed on the home front and

organizing logistics and one more rifle in the Rebel armies killing Union soldiers. Rank-and-file Union soldiers noticed as well, reporting the same to their families and home towns. Throughout 1862 more and more Northerners were becoming convinced that removing the manpower provided by slaves might save the lives of Union soldiers on the frontlines. Public opinion was moving, slowly. A few months after General Hunter’s order, Lincoln began to tip his hand. Radical Republicans rammed a bill through Congress emancipating all slaves of persons aiding the rebellion. The bill was poorly drafted, containing no enforcement or adjudication mechanisms. Rumor swirled around Washington in early July that Lincoln was tempted to veto the bill. He did not. Two weeks later Lincoln summoned his cabinet for a formal meeting at the White House. Lincoln rarely called formal cabinet meetings; the various cabinet members must have sensed something momentous was afoot. Lincoln opened a general discussion of various options the administration had in dealing with runaway slaves. The discussions dragged on. Lincoln was forced to schedule a follow-up meeting the next day. At the follow-up meeting, Lincoln read his draft Emancipation Proclamation and asked for the cabinet’s input. He got a divided response. Secretary of War Stanton fully endorsed Lincoln’s decision. Postmaster General Blair worried that it would harm the Union cause in the border states and cause Republican candidates to lose in the midterm elections. The one suggestion Lincoln took from his cabinet came from Secretary Seward. Seward advised Lincoln to delay the proclamation until the Union Army had won a victory in the field. That way the proclamation would appear to be issued from a position of strength, not desperation. Lincoln told his cabinet that he would take Seward’s advice. On July 23, 1862, Lincoln had decided to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. One month later Horace Greeley published an open letter to the president entitled ‘‘The Prayer of Twenty Millions’’ in his newspaper, the New York Tribune. The Tribune was one of the most widely read newspapers in the country. Greeley implored Lincoln to realize that ‘‘all attempts to put down the Rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause [slavery] are preposterous and futile’’ (Goodwin 471). Seizing an opportunity to shape public opinion in advance of issuing his Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln decided to issue a public response, writing, My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy

Lincoln and the Civil War State 333 slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all of the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because it helps save the Union (Goodwin 471). In September 1862, General McClellan drove General Lee’s Rebel Army out of Maryland. That was the victory Lincoln was waiting for. Less than a week after McClellan’s victory, Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. For the next two years Lincoln would continue to characterize the Emancipation Proclamation, his subsequent measures to arm black troops, and the Thirteenth Amendment all as measures designed to reunite the Union---never allowing his political opponents to differentiate between emancipation and reunion. Lincoln fundamentally changed the purpose of the war less than 18 months after it began.

Lincoln and Congress Lincoln could not muster federal resources without congressional authorization. Lincoln needed Congress to legislatively grant him the authority to raise armies and navies, and the monies with which to pay them. Lincoln needed Congress to at least tacitly endorse most, if not all, of his war measures. The president could not vigorously apply the use of force without sustaining congressional support for his war policies. Fortunately for Lincoln, Republicans had majorities in both Houses throughout the Civil War. Lincoln used his intraparty skills to steer passage of his legislative agenda. Lincoln’s relations with Congress represented retail politics at its best. Most, if not all, pardon requests made by Republican congress members on behalf of Union soldiers were granted. Not a single patronage appointment was made without the senators from that state and the congress member from that district signing off on the appointment. In cases in which the state politicians could not agree on a series of appointments, Lincoln would split the difference and give both sides some of the patronage. Because Lincoln was always willing to do business with Congressional republicans, they were generally willing to do business with him.2 Lincoln’s legislative agenda was never too specific. He would leave it to his cabinet to negotiate the details of legislation with the relevant congressional committees. Lincoln only asked Congress to take action in specific areas, while not detailing exactly what that action

would be. On his way to Washington in 1861, Lincoln wrote that By the constitution, the executive may recommend measures which he may think proper; and he may veto those he thinks improper; and it is supposed he may add to these, certain indirect influences to affect the action of Congress. My political education strongly inclines me against a free use of any of these means, by the Executive, to control the legislation of the country. As a rule, I think it better that Congress should originate, as well as perfect its measures, without external bias (Bogue 1989, 45). The president did not believe that the executive branch should be immersed in the details of enacting legislation. Lincoln would ask for more money, but not specify exactly where he wanted that money to be raised from. He left that detail to Secretary of the Treasury Chase and Congress to work out. Lincoln would ask for a draft, but not detail how that draft should structured. Secretary of War Stanton and Congress would work the details out. Lincoln would ask for a national banking law, and let Secretary of the Treasury Chase and Congress work out the details of that law. Lincoln only made 39 specific requests of Congress while he was president. Congress enacted 28 of those into law. This represents an astonishingly high 72 percent success rate. Lincoln only cracked the whip a few times in support of specific legislative proposals. Lincoln never demanded loyalty to the administration on issues in which he knew he would lose. He never demanded loyalty to the administration on issues that clearly would pass. He saved his battles for the few times that demanding loyalty to the administration would make the difference--and without those victories, the nation would look different today. Lincoln’s mastery of the legislative process enabled him to marshal the military and financial resources necessary to win the war.

Banking One example is the manner in which Lincoln secured passage of his banking legislation. Lincoln desperately wanted enactment of a national banking policy. It had been a cause for which he had fought for his entire political career. The issue of a national bank had spurred the creation of the Whig Party that Lincoln had joined when he first entered politics. President Jackson vetoed the rechartering of the national bank. Whigs organized themselves into an opposition and attempted

334 The Presidency to overturn the president’s veto. Democrats felt that banks only served the interests of the mercantile classes. Whigs felt a national bank was critical to the economic development of the nation. Lincoln had based his entire 1840 presidential stump speech on behalf of ‘‘Tippicanoe’’ Harrison on the issue of the bank. In the 1860s, the bank issue stirred the blood among politicians and the electorate almost as much as in 1840. Republicans who had previously been Democrats would have a hard time supporting a new round of banking legislation---even if it was wrapped in the cloak of being an essential war measure. Passage of the enabling legislation was not guaranteed. However, the war had changed the economic realities of the nation. The North could not finance a prolonged, costly war without a firm national banking system. Secretary of the Treasury Chase---who as a former Democrat had once opposed a national bank, now saw the military necessity of one---ironed out the policy details, but it seemed that only Lincoln’s political muscle could ensure a bank bill’s enactment into law. Majority Leader Fessenden controlled the Senate schedule, and also was chair of the Senate Finance Committee. If the bill was ever going to see the light of day, Fessenden had to report it out of committee and then schedule it for a floor vote. Fessenden was a former Democrat and had spent most of his career fighting national banks. The bill was not his ‘‘favorite’’ piece of legislation to say the least. For the first time, Lincoln issued a special message to Congress with the sole purpose of requesting enactment of a single piece of legislation. Lincoln wanted a bank bill. The administration was, for the first time, going to the well of party loyalty. The Republican Senate majority leader could not publicly buck his president when the issue was given such a high profile. Fessenden reported the bill out of committee and scheduled it for floor action. The bill was going for a final showdown vote on the Senate floor. An initial Whip count of the Senate revealed that the bill would fail 21--23. Lincoln dispatched his personal secretary, William O. Stoddard, to speak with two senators on the Hill. Senator Howard of Michigan had spoken against the bill on the Senate floor. However, when the final roll call came, Howard’s vote was in the yea column. He explained that he had changed his mind, reluctantly, and only to support the administration. Senator Howe of Wisconsin had also expressed his reluctance to see the federal government meddling with banks. Stoddard explained that the president ‘‘felt very deeply about the pending bill’’ and surely mentioned several favors the president had done for the senator. Howe voted yea. The bill passed 23--21

(Boritt 1978, 201--202). The House Republican leadership, former Whigs all, naturally supported a national banking system. Lincoln kept the pressure on, the House leadership cracked the whip, and the bill was railroaded through and onto the president’s desk. Lincoln had to personally intervene twice to secure passage of the national bank Bill. Without a national bank, the Union would have found it incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to finance the war effort. By 1865, the rebellion was broke and the federal treasury was stronger than ever. Lincoln’s political skills ensured that the federal government had the financial ability to win the war.

Reconstruction The numerous disagreements that took place over Reconstruction provide another case study in how Lincoln managed relations with Congress. Lincoln victory wanted states to be readmitted into the Union if 10 percent of the state’s voting population swore an oath of allegiance to the United States. The president would issue pardons to almost any Southerner who took such an oath. Most Republicans in Congress wanted the number to be set at 50 percent and a much stricter oath to be taken. Lincoln organized Reconstruction governments in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana. He granted pardons under the conditions that he had set, something that the Constitution gave him the power to do. However, for the three Reconstruction delegations to have their electoral votes counted and their congressional delegations seated, Congress would have to acquiesce. In December 1862, Republicans were looking at ruling with an incredibly slim majority in the House of Representatives. Lincoln was able to sell seating the Louisiana delegation as a measure of strengthening the party’s hand in the House. The Louisiana delegation was seated. However, two years later, Republicans had won overwhelming victories and had safe majorities in the electoral college and in both houses of Congress. Republicans in Congress did not need to seat Lincoln’s delegations on Lincoln’s terms. Lincoln knew that and did not press for Louisiana’s electoral votes to be counted in the presidential election or for the seating of the Arkansas delegation. In 1864, Radical Republicans wanted to institute their Reconstruction Plan over the objection of the president. The president did not want to adopt any one individual Reconstruction Plan through legislation. Lincoln wanted to experiment for awhile, see what worked, and then work out a Reconstruction Plan for the South. Most moderate Republicans agreed with the

Lincoln and the Civil War State 335 president, but they were a minority of the Republican caucus in Congress. For most of the year, the issue was moot. The Radicals could not get any floor time in the Senate. Majority Leader Fessenden was a loyal administration supporter and effectively sat on the radical Wade-Davis Reconstruction Plan. When Lincoln appointed Fessenden as treasury secretary the cork came off the bottle. The Wade-Davis Bill reached the Senate floor and was sent to the president’s desk. However, the bill had been sent to the president’s desk near the end of Congress. Lincoln could prevent the bill from being enacted into law without risking a showdown veto override vote. He could simply pocket veto the bill and avoid a politically damaging and costly veto override battle on the eve of his presidential election. That is exactly what he did. Radical Republicans were furious, but most Republicans breathed a sigh of relief. When Congress reassembled in December, there were only seven Republican senators who voted for the bill (down from more than 20). The president’s kid-glove handling of the issue had enabled congressional Republicans to show flexibility on the issue. Many Republicans who had been leading the charge for enactment of Wade-Davis were now leading the fight against it. Six months is a long time in politics. Administration loyalists had purged Congressman Davis, one of the most violent critics of the Lincoln administration from within the Republican Party, from his congressional seat in Maryland. General Sherman was marching through Georgia. Last, but not least, most political observers credited the president’s coattails with winning a landslide Republican victory in both houses of Congress. The election of 1864 had showed that Lincoln was the most popular and effective politician in the nation. No one wanted a showdown with him.3

The Thirteenth Amendment The overwhelming Republican victory in the 1864 elections guaranteed that the Thirteenth Amendment would become law. But Lincoln was determined to eradicate slavery immediately. Republicans did not have twothirds of the vote in the outgoing House of Representatives. No one thought the votes could be mustered. The same house had rejected the amendment only six months before. Lincoln went to work, telling his operatives I am President of the United States, clothed with great power. The abolition of slavery by constitutional

provision settles the fate, for all coming time, not only of the millions now in bondage, but of unborn millions to come---a measure of such importance that those votes must be procured. I leave it to you to determine how it shall be done; but remember that I am President of the United States, clothed with immense power, and I expect you to produce those votes. Administration operatives were able to turn six New York Democrats from no votes to yes votes. But that would not be enough. Lincoln then leaned heavily on a number of lameduck Democrats to make themselves absent from the final roll call. If Lincoln could not persuade the Democrats to vote for the amendment, maybe he could persuade them not to show up to vote against it. Some Democrats were promised judgeships. Others were promised patronage for friends. Every tool in the presidential arsenal of patronage was used to pick off each of the Democrats, one by one. When the vote finally came, all targeted Democrats were absent. The Thirteenth Amendment became law, with just two votes to spare (Rawlins 170--171). Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison stated to a crowd in Boston, ‘‘And to whom is the country more immediately indebted for this vital and saving amendment of the Constitution than, perhaps, to any other man? I believe I may confidently answer---to the humble railsplitter of Illinoisto the Presidential chainbreaker for millions of the oppressed---to Abraham Lincoln’’ (Goodwin 689--690).

The Great Communicator: Lincoln and Civil War Elections Lincoln was able to achieve a high success rate in the passage of his administration’s legislative agenda because his party controlled both Houses of Congress. Lincoln’s ability to lead the Republican Party to victory at the polls was critical to the overall prosecution of the war. In 1860, Republicans had swept to power in the face of a divided Democratic Party. In 1861, Republicans had ridden a wave of patriotic sentiment to win on Election Day. The war dragged on for more than a year. The Army of the Potomac had been forced to fall back into Maryland to repel General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of the Tennessee had been forced to retreat into Kentucky to repulse General Bragg’s invasion. The Army of the Mississippi had been forced to retreat into Missouri to repel General Van Dorn’s invasion. For a time in late August and early September 1862, not a

336 The Presidency

President Abraham Lincoln with members of his cabinet, in council adopting the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862. From left: Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy; Salmon P. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury; Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General; William Seward, Secretary of State; Caleb Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Edward Bates, Attorney General and Edwin Stanton, Secretary of State for War. (Library of Congress)

single Union army was participating in offensive operations on Rebel soil. The northern Republican majority in 1860, while impressive on paper, was uncomfortably slim on closer examination. Lincoln had carried a number of northern states, including New York, because Unionist candidate Bell had siphoned off enough votes from Senator Douglass to enable Lincoln to carry the state. In the 1862, 1863, and 1864 elections, the Republicans would have to face a united Democratic Party. Most Democrats had gone to war to save the Union, not to end slavery. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation would create a sizeable block of ‘‘War Democrats’’ that supported the war but opposed emancipation. Republican victories in 1862, 1863, and 1864 were not a fore-gone conclusion. The outcome of these three elections would determine whether emancipation would remain an objective of the war, and, in some cases, whether the war would continue at all.

1862: Democratic Resurgence With no federal troops engaging in offensive operations on Rebel soil, many Republican editors began to hammer the president’s conduct of military affairs and issued increasingly heated calls for action on the emancipation issue. Despite the malaise, Lincoln continued to reach for every lever of force in his arsenal. In August, the War Department issued its first draft order, baring anyone who would be eligible for the draft from leaving the country. On September 22, Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Two days later, the President declared martial law throughout the entire country. The midterm elections in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio were only two weeks away. Lincoln’s emancipation order had settled the slavery argument within the Republican Party, silencing his more radical critics. But it had been issued too late in the campaign cycle for it to change the tune of the

Lincoln and the Civil War State 337 party newspaper editors. Meanwhile, the proclamation, draft, and suspension of the writ had given the Democrats potent campaign issues to hammer Republicans with on the stump. The campaign was about those issues, not about preserving the Union. President Lincoln had handed the Democratic Party three tools with which to regain the political initiative. The October elections saw Democrats sweep all three bellwether states, electing majorities in their state legislatures and a majority of their congressional delegations. Republicans had carried all three states in the 1860 elections. November came with more of the same. A Democratic tide swept over New York, New Jersey, and Illinois. Republicans held onto control of the Senate by a narrow margin, but Republican control of the House of Representatives was placed in jeopardy. The balance of power rested on the outcome elections in states that elected their representatives in 1863. Republicans had to win a majority of those seats to keep the speakership. The Republican Party had been fortunate that only a handful of governships were up for election in 1862. Governors were largely responsible for raising, provisioning, and training regiments for military service. Peace Democrats could effectively withdraw states from the Union war effort by being elected governor and then refusing to provide additional manpower to the Union Army. In 1863, the Republican governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Indiana were all up for reelection. The internal dynamics of the Democratic Party in all three states made it seem inevitable that Peace Democrats would be nominated to oppose them. If Democrats in those states won, three of the largest states remaining in the Union would effectively be withdrawn from the war effort. Lincoln had not played an active role in the 1862 campaign. He had made few public appearances and even fewer public statements of note. He had devoted most of his time to military affairs. Politics had been a secondary priority. Lincoln had mostly let events control his fate, instead of controlling events himself. He had not put the full weight and power of his administration into the political field of battle. He had devoted almost all of his time to directing the military campaign, and almost none of his time toward directing the political one. He would not make the same mistake twice. Failure to win on the political battlefield would cripple the president’s ability to win on the military battlefield.

1863: Lincoln Strikes Back Shortly after the election, President Lincoln wrote to political ally and prominent German-American Carl Schurz,

Three main causes told the whole story (of the Republican’s defeat at the polls). 1. The democrats were left in a majority by our friends going to the war. 2. The democrats observed this and determined to re-instate themselves in power, and 3. Our newspapers, by vilifying and disparaging the administration (about the confiscation bill, emancipation, Democratic generals, etc), furnished them with all the weapons to do it with. Certainly, the ill-success of the war had much to do with this (Basler IV, 493). Lincoln certainly realized that he had been too lax in his oversight of the political campaign. His Emancipation Proclamation had come too late to unify the party, but early enough for the Democrats to use it as a weapon. Republican state legislators had failed to provide opportunities for the overwhelmingly Republican Union Army to vote from the field. Renegade Republican newspaper editors had hammered Lincoln in the press, depressing Republican voter turnout, and had not been brought back into line. Last, but not least, the campaign had not been cast as a referendum on the Union itself. Lincoln knew he had to fix the problem. His first move was to refocus political discourse back to the fundamental issues at stake in the war. Lincoln began his public relations campaign with his Annual Message to Congress on December 1. He did not back away from emancipation. Instead, Lincoln spent more then two paragraphs at the close of the message describing how emancipation would severely damage the rebel war effort while greatly bolstering the Union one. Then, he defined what was at stake. Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration, will be permanently remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world knows that we do know how to save the Union. We---even we here---hold the power, and bear the responsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free---honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best, hope of earth. Other means may succeed, this could not fail (Basler IV, 537). Lincoln next turned his attention to the party machinery. In 1862 he had not closely supervised its operations. But 1863 would be different. He fired off a

338 The Presidency number of telegrams to his three senior political lieutenants throughout the country: Weed (New England), Cameron (Pennsylvania), and Blair (Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) in a coordinated effort to mobilize the full weight and power of the party. Lincoln took great pains to keep his lieutenants focused on the upcoming campaign; bending over backward to not give offense to the men he needed the most. For example, Lincoln constantly reassured Weed that he was not displeased with him in the wake of the Republican losses in New York (Basler V, 83). In February 1863, Weed and Lincoln worked together to raise $16,000 from 17 different sources in support of the Republican campaign in Connecticut. Their efforts were rewarded with a gubernatorial victory of 2,000 votes and a sweep of the congressional delegation (Basler V, 112). The political tide began to turn. Lincoln wasted no time in deploying the full weight and power of the administration behind the Republican Party. Government printing contracts were denied to Republican newspaper editors who went too far in criticizing the administration. Editors were allowed to criticize individual policies, but not the administration’s fundamental conduct of the overall war effort. Patronage positions were allocated solely on a person’s ability to produce votes for Republican candidates at the polls. Once appointed, all federal employees were required to ‘‘donate’’ 10 percent of their paychecks to the Republican Party. Republican state legislatures were ordered to provide for absentee balloting by soldiers in the field. Government clerks were given free railroad passes to go home and vote. Soldiers in states without absentee ballot laws were furloughed home. No detail was too small. Lincoln had appointed himself politician-in-chief of the Republican Party.4 In that role, Lincoln was determined to set the tone for the 1863 election. Events seemed to careen out of his control in the summer of 1863. Without receiving approval from the White House, the military commander for the Ohio District arrested the Democratic candidate for governor in Ohio, Clement Vallandigham, for inciting desertion. This brought the issue of Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus back onto center stage. The military front provided no cover for the political front. General Grant was bogged down in front of Vicksburg. General Lee invaded Pennsylvania. This time, however, Lincoln was in control. He sacked the Union commander of the Army of the Potomac and appointed General Meade to take his place. Four days later, Meade defeated Lee at Gettysburg. Lincoln ordered substantial reinforcements to Grant’s

army in front of Vicksburg. On July 4, Vicksburg and a Rebel Army of more than 30,000 men, surrendered. Lee the invincible had been defeated and Union forces now controlled the entire length of the Mississippi River. The Union war effort was clicking into gear. As the Union war effort gained momentum, so too did Lincoln’s political counteroffensive. Lincoln’s goal was to completely eliminate the habeas corpus topic as a viable political issue and refocus political debate upon the fate of the Union. On June 12, Lincoln replied to a series of resolutions that had been presented him by a group of New York Democrats. Lincoln routinely received resolutions, petitions, and interrogatories from various groups on various issues. Normally, one of his secretaries would draft a routine response. This time, Lincoln wrote the response himself and leaked copies of his reply to Republican editors across the North. It was his opening salvo in his public relations war on the Democratic Party. The resolutions had asked for the release of Vallandigham and attacked the president’s suspension of the writ. Lincoln justified his suspension of the writ and arrest of Vallandigham by replying, Of how little value the constitutional provision I have quoted (the writ) will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. Gen. John C. Breckenridge, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston . . . were all within the power of the government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them if arrested would have to be discharged on Habeas Corpus, were the writ allowed to operate (Basler VI, 265). Turning to Vallandigham in particular Lincoln stated that, Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it (Basler VI, 266). Referring to the commonly accepted practice of shooting deserters, Lincoln asked, ‘‘Must I shoot a

Lincoln and the Civil War State 339 simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wilely agitator who induces him to desert?’’ (Basler VI, 266). It was the sound-bite of the campaign cycle. Lincoln had found ground on which all Republicans could stand. The party rallied behind the president’s ‘‘simple-minded soldier boy’’ message. On June 29, with Vicksburg about to fall and General Meade placed in charge of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln kept the spotlight on the critical question he had asked. The Ohio Democratic Party had submitted resolutions to Lincoln protesting the suspension of the writ and the arrest of Vallandigham. The Ohio Democrats had simply given Lincoln another opportunity to sound off on the habeas corpus issue. In a reply that Lincoln leaked to the press, Lincoln reminded them that ‘‘your nominee for Governor (Vallandigham), in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you, and to the world, to declare himself against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion’’ (Basler VI, 305). Lincoln was subtly calling Vallandigham and his supporters traitors. Lincoln in these two letters was attempting to make the election of 1863 a referendum on the Union. The president was saying a vote for the Democratic candidates would be a vote for disunion. A vote for the Republicans would be a vote for the Union. It was the keynote message of the Republican Party throughout the remainder of the campaign cycle. Lincoln’s two letters were the central message of the Republican campaign. More than 15 million copies of Lincoln’s letters were distributed throughout the North through various mediums. Most Republican operatives credited Lincoln’s letters with putting Democrats on the defensive throughout the 1863 campaign. With habeaus corpus neutralized, Democrats still could play the race card. Democratic stump speakers ranted against a war to free the Negro (they used a different N word). ‘‘Black Republicanism’’ was denounced throughout the Midwest. The Emancipation Proclamation was savaged. Democrats appealed to the prejudices of northern voters by conjuring images of armed blacks ravaging white women. Lincoln struck back. On August 26, less than two months before the critical Indiana and Ohio elections, Lincoln unleashed his third major public letter in two months. Lincoln declined an invitation to speak in Illinois to a pro-war rally, and sent the text of a speech to be read in his place. The sole subject of the speech was emancipation and the arming of black troops. Lincoln defended the proclamation’s constitutionality, showed its utility, and then reminded the public of the string of Union military successes that had occurred in 1863. Lincoln stated that,

The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us, since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know as fully as one can know the opinion of others, that some of our commanders of our armies in the field who have given us our most important successes (Grant), believe the emancipation policy, and the use of colored troops, constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion; and that, at least one of those important successes (the capture of Port Hudson), could not have been achieved when it was, but for the aid of black soldiers (Basler VI, 408--409). Lincoln commonly used the rhetorical technique of addressing his opponents in his speeches and writings, this was no exception. He took the race-baiter head on: You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union . . . I thought that in your struggle to save the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do, in saving the Union (Basler VI, 409). Once again, Lincoln had obliterated the logic of his political opponents. To put it baldly, how could a racebaiter argue against arming blacks to fight and die instead of whites? Lincoln had found an effective strategy for neutralizing the race issue. Republicans were elated with Lincoln’s message. The Republican Party organization turned out large numbers of Republicans who had stayed home in 1862. The soldier vote went solidly for the Republican Party. In Ohio alone soldiers gave the Republican ticket a 40,000 vote majority.5 Republicans carried the state as a whole by 100,000 votes. The Republican governors of Ohio and Pennsylvania were reelected. Republicans in New York won by comfortable margins. Vallandigham and the Peace Democrats lost at the ballot box. Republicans would maintain control of the House of Representatives and had denied Peace Democrats the ability to withdraw entire states from the war effort. Many political observers credited Lincoln’s public letters, backed by military successes in the field, for turning the tide. Following the elections, Lincoln’s popularity was so great among the rank-and-file party faithful that Secretary of State Seward, who had been Lincoln’s principal political opponent and now was Lincoln’s principal political ally, became the first

340 The Presidency high-ranking party figure to call for Lincoln’s renomination and reelection. Seward was a shrewd enough politician to not have made such a move if rank-and-file Republicans were not already clamoring for it (Rawley 118).

1864: A War for Freedom? Lincoln would go on to manage the campaign of 1864 in much the same manner that he had conducted the 1863 campaign. Lincoln made numerous public statements, all of which focused on the war effort, reminding the North what they were fighting for. Most of those public statements were brief and were to regiments departing for the front. They were all on message. The Gettysburg Address would become the foundation for the Republican general election campaign. A Republican administration headed by Lincoln would continue to fight for ‘‘a new birth of freedom.’’ A convention dominated by Lincoln loyalists endorsed passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, banning slavery throughout the country, as part of the party platform. Lincoln never wavered from his ‘‘new birth of freedom’’ message, even when all seemed lost in August 1864. General Grant was stalled in front of Petersburg, General Sherman was stalled in front of Atlanta. More than 100,000 Union soldiers had died in less than three months of fighting. Northern Democrats and even the chairman of the Republican Party urged Lincoln to abandon his commitment to emancipation if the South would return to the Union. Lincoln steadfastly refused to even consider reversing the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln knew that his generals and admirals in the field, well supplied, well armed, and provided with a steady stream of fresh soldiers, would eventually deliver like they had a year before. The Democratic Party was divided. One part of the party thought that the war could be won, should be won, but was being waged ineptly and should not be fought to eradicate slavery. The other part wanted the war to end, with or without a Union. As the Union Army bogged down and the casualty lists grew, the Peace wing of the Democratic Party grew in strength. By August, the Peace Democrats were strong enough to force the Democratic Convention to accept a plank in the Democratic Platform that declared the Union war effort ‘‘a failure.’’ The Democrats were going to run a war candidate, General McClellan, on a peace platform. Within a month of the Democratic Convention, Union generals and admirals in the field won a string of spectacular victories. By never wavering from the unconditional victory message, Lincoln and the Republicans were able to pounce upon the ‘‘war failure’’

plank of the Democratic platform and use it to bludgeon the Democrats into defeat. The Democratic platform called the war a failure, yet in September, Union forces captured Atlanta and Mobile, and destroyed the Rebel Army in the Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln remembered the lessons of 1862 and took steps to ensure that the rival factions of the Republican Party would not war against each other or against him once the campaign began in earnest. When a radical third-party candidate, General Fremont, offered to drop out of the race in the middle of September in return for Lincoln purging a conservative member of his cabinet, Lincoln took the deal. Lincoln did exactly what he had said needed to be done in his letter to Schurz in the fall of 1862. He successfully united the party, ensured that soldiers could vote in the field, and ensured that the campaign would be a referendum on the war (not emancipation or civil liberties). The formula was, once again, a smashing success. Eight out of 10 soldiers in the western armies voted for Lincoln. Seven out of 10 in the eastern armies chose Lincoln over their beloved former commander, General McClellan. Republicans took more then twothirds of the House and Senate. Republican candidates took control of almost every state house in the North. Lincoln was reelected with 54 percent of the vote.6 Lincoln successfully employed a few basic principles in the conduct of both the 1863 and 1864 campaigns. By rigidly adhering to those principles, Lincoln was able to lead his party to victory. The Republican Party was divided in 1862 and lost. Lincoln made sure that a united party fought the 1863 and 1864 elections. Lincoln had been largely missing in action during the 1862 election campaign. Lincoln personally managed the Republican campaigns of 1863 and 1864, making numerous public statements over the course of the campaign. The full weight of the administration had not been employed in 1862. In 1863 and 1864, Lincoln made sure that all efforts were made by the federal government to ensure that soldiers could vote, that all federal employees donated to the Republican Party, and that all government contracts went to not just Republicans, but Republicans who stayed loyal to the administration. Most important, Lincoln made sure that the Republican campaigns of 1863 and 1864 stayed on message. The elections of 1860 and 1861 had been about preserving the Union, and the Republicans had won. The election of 1862 was about emancipation and civil liberties, not preserving the Union. Republicans lost. In the 1863 and 1864 elections, Lincoln prominently tied the emancipation and civil liberty issues back into the larger issue of preserving the Union. Republicans won.

Lincoln and the Civil War State 341 Lincoln’s victories at the ballot box ensured final victory on the battlefield.

Changing War Aims Many historians have overlooked what could be coln’s greatest accomplishment. In February and March of 1861, northern Democrats and even some Republicans were urging Lincoln to avoid conflict. Lincoln ignored them, forcing the South to fire the first shots of the war, thereby galvanizing northern public opinion, including the very politicians who had been urging peace less than a month before. In 1861, however, the border states, most northern Democrats, and even many Republicans would not support a war to free the slaves. Marrying emancipation with the war in 1861 might have sent Kentucky out of the Union and would have significantly eroded northern support for the measures necessary to prosecute the war. Only after Congress had provided Lincoln with the legislative authority to raise the financial and human resources necessary to win the war and only after Kentucky was firmly in the Union camp did Lincoln issue the Emancipation Proclamation. Even when he did, he portrayed it as a war measure, arguing that it was one of the most effective tools available to win the war. By September 1862, many soldiers in the Union Army, Republican and Democrat alike, were writing home, telling their loved ones about the logistical support slaves were providing to the rebel armies. That, however, was not enough. A reunited Democratic Party won the 1862 elections upon a platform of opposition to emancipation and the administration’s policies on civil liberties. Lincoln’s greatest political achievement is probably the change in public opinion he helped engineer between the 1862 and 1863--1864 elections. In 1862 a majority of Northerners voted against an administration supporting emancipation and against an administration willing to suspend the writ of habeaus corpus. Lincoln’s repeated public statements linked his administration’s war effort with both issues. Even in August 1864, with the chairman of his own party urging him to abandon emancipation as a war aim, Lincoln refused to budge. In 1863 and again in 1864, a majority of Northerners voted to support an administration that pledged to not only fight to reunite the country, but also to eradicate slavery in the process. Because of Lincoln’s steadfast support for emancipation as a war aim, there was no other way to interpret his administration’s electoral victories. The ‘‘new birth of freedom’’ promised in the Gettysburg Address is now what history remembers as being the objective of the war---not

simply the ‘‘war to save the union’’ that Lincoln described in his first message to Congress in 1861. Never before, or since, has an American president so successfully changed public opinion about a war’s objectives in the middle of that war.

Summary Imagine American political development in the wake of a Southern victory. Imagine American political development with a federal victory that continued to allow slavery in the South. At numerous critical junctures through the Civil War, it was only Lincoln’s unparalleled political skills and dogged determination that prevented these alternate histories from occurring. What if Lincoln had yielded to pressure and compromised with the South in early 1861? What if Lincoln had not forced Davis to fire the first shot of the war? What if Lincoln had lost Maryland or Kentucky? What if Lincoln had failed to obtain authorization from Congress to raise the money and men to fight the war? What if Lincoln had failed to win the elections of 1863 and 1864? Fortunately for our nation, history does not know the answers to these questions.

References and Further Reading Bogue, Allan G. 1989. The Congressman’s Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Boritt, Gabor S. 1978. Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream. Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press. Donald, David Herbert. 1995. Lincoln. London: Simon & Schuster. Gienapp, William, ed. 2002. This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln. New York: Oxford University Press. MacCartney, Clarence. 1931. Lincoln and His Cabinet. New York: Scribner and Sons. McPherson, Jane. 2003. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press. Neely, Mark E. 1993. The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawley, James. 1974. The Politics of Union: Northern Politics During the Civil War. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press. Robertson, John. 1966. Lincoln and the Congress. PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin. Van Der Linden, Frank. 1944. Lincoln: The Road to War. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Books. Waugh, John. 1997. Reelecting Lincoln: The Battle for the 1865 Presidency. New York: Crown Publishers.

Notes 1. President Truman, an avid reader of history, might have drawn comfort from this story as he endured the firestorm that broke out once he fired General McArthur.

342 The Presidency 2. Robertson’s Lincoln and the Congress and Bogue’s The Congressman’s Civil War (1989) both contain extended discussions of Lincoln’s relations with the legislative branch. 3. Detailed accounts of the struggles over Reconstruction can be found in Donald’s Lincoln (1995), Neely’s The Last Best Hope of Earth (1993), Robertson’s Lincoln and the Congress (1966), Waugh’s Reelecting Lincoln (1997), and Bogue’s The Congressman’s Civil War (1989).

4. Detailed descriptions of Lincoln’s preparations can be found in Donald’s Lincoln (1995), Rawley’s Politics of Union, and Robertson’s Lincoln and the Congress. 5. Ohio regiments in the field were allowed to establish polling stations in the field and vote. 6. The definitive account of the 1864 election is Waugh’s Reelecting Lincoln.

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all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio. Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or, it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, propagated. In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to treat with seriousness, the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients

5.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 67 To the People of the State of New York: THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment. Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny, of that detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates, in

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344 The Presidency which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition. In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate. This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party; and who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact, and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth and to the rules of fair dealing. The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers the President of the United States ‘‘to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other OFFICERS of United States whose appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW.’’ Immediately after this clause follows another in these words: ‘‘The President shall have power to fill up VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION.’’ It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable. The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a mode for appointing such officers, ‘‘whose appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW’’; of course it cannot extend to the appointments of senators, whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION, and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly be contested. The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing

officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen IN THEIR RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, SINGLY, to make temporary appointments ‘‘during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.’’ Secondly. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the ‘‘officers’’ described in the preceding one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within which the power is to operate, ‘‘during the recess of the Senate,’’ and the duration of the appointments, ‘‘to the end of the next session’’ of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments; and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary appointments; and as the national Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President. But lastly, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article, not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides, that ‘‘the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for six years’’; and the latter directs, that, ‘‘if vacancies in that body

5.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69 345 should happen by resignation or otherwise, DURING THE RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such vacancies.’’ Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy. I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America. PUBLIUS.

5.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69 To the People of the State of New York: I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it. The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York. That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United

States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State. The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware. The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown’s having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the

346 The Presidency chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied. The President is to be the ‘‘commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the United States.’’ In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most material points of difference are these: First. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. The governor of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly. The power of the President, in

respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of treason is limited ‘‘to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort’’; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes. The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification, of

5.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69 347 Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utomst plentitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative. The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor. The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of

nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the council should be divided, the governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination. If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union. Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative. The one would have a right to

348 The Presidency command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism. PUBLIUS.

5.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70 To the People of the State of New York: THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened wellwishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how

often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome. There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government. Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention? The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers. The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due responsibility. Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished. This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to

5.3 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70 349 him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction. The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic. But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever. Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office,

in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy. Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable vice, in the human character. Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no

350 The Presidency point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality. It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness. But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. ‘‘I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to

obtain any better resolution on the point.’’ These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties? In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars. It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department, an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

5.4 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74 351 But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself. The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be ‘‘deep, solid, and ingenious,’’ that ‘‘the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE’’; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America

would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution. PUBLIUS.

5.4 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74 To the People of the State of New York: THE President of the United States is to be ‘‘commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the United States.’’ The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. ‘‘The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective officers.’’ This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office. He is also to be authorized to grant ‘‘reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT

352 The Presidency IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT.’’ Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men. The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret

sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt. PUBLIUS.

5.5 Anti-Federalist No. 67 Various Fears Concerning the Executive Department I shall begin with observations on the executive branch of this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as arranged therein, yet being the chief, is perhaps entitled by the rules of rank to the first consideration. The executive power as described in the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-president, who are to hold their offices during the term of four years; the same article has marked the manner and time of their election, and established the qualifications of the president; it also provides against the removal, death, or inability of the president and vice-president; regulates the salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly, declares the causes for which the president and vicepresident shall be removed from office.

5.5 Anti-Federalist No. 67 353 Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who composed the convention, it may be here remarked with deference, that the construction of the first paragraph of the first section of the second article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves the mind in doubt as to the election of a president and vicepresident, after the expiration of the election for the first term of four years; in every other case, the election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is no explicit provision for their election which is to set this political machine in motion; no certain and express terms as in your state constitution, that statedly once in every four years, and as often as these offices shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed, an election shall be held as follows, etc.; this inexplicitness perhaps may lead to an establishment for life. It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that in all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year would be dangerous. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelligent mind to account why great power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power connected with considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of a republic. The deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of dependents. This tempts his ambition, which in a republican magistrate is also remarked, to be pernicious, and the duration of his office for any considerable time favors his views, gives him the means and time to perfect and execute his designs; he therefore fancies that he may be great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens, and raising himself to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country. And here it may be necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president, together with his continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine-his eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and he will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers. His power of nomination and influence on all appointments; the strong posts in each state comprised within his superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his direction; his control over the army, militia, and navy; the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt; his duration in office for four years---these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth of the position, that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has power and time sufficient to ruin his country.

Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional council in their recess. He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites, or a council of state will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the most dangerous council in a free country. . . . The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them from the rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it; and in being remarked for a behavior that shows they are not meanly born, and in adulation to people of fortune and power. The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is made president of the senate, thereby blending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one state, from which he is to come, an unjust pre-eminence. It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be of their immediate choice; but by the manner in which the president is chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth or fifth hand. Nor does the highest vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice---for it is only necessary that he should be taken from the highest of five, who may have a plurality of votes. . . . And wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain (save as to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial incidents, the offspring of absurdity and locality)? The direct prerogatives of the president, as springing from his political character, are among the following: It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the compensation for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince. He has the power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on their appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, which when made becomes the supreme law of land. He is a constituent part of the legislative power, for every bill which shall pass the House of Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation. If he approves of it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative; and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace, coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed or implied in this

354 The Presidency Constitution. For though it may be asserted that the king of Great Britain has the express power of making peace or war, yet he never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament, from whom be is to derive his support---and therefore these powers, in both president and king, are substantially the same. He is the generalissimo of the nation, and of course has the command and control of the army, navy and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of the union---he may pardon all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, and the principal fountain of all offices and employments. Will not the exercise of these powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on the share or proportion they have in the government; but experience ought to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government invested with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what circle appointments will be made; by which means an imperfect aristocracy bordering on monarchy may be established. You must, however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates of this new system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance between it and your own state government [New York] which you so much prize; and, if you examine, you will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your immediate choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the people, divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will be convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel of Light. CATO Source: The ‘‘CATO’’ letters of George Clinton, New-York Journal, November 8, 1787.

5.6 Anti-Federalist No. 70 The Powers and Dangerous Potentials of His Elected Majesty . . . In the first place the office of president of the United States appears to me to be clothed with such powers as are dangerous. To be the fountain of all honors in the United States-commander in chief of the army, navy, and militia; with the power of making treaties and of granting pardons; and to be vested with

an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of both houses shall persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays for that purpose---is in reality to be a king, as much a king as the king of Great Britain, and a king too of the worst kind: an elective king. If such powers as these are to be trusted in the hands of any man, they ought, for the sake of preserving the peace of the community, at once to be made hereditary. Much as I abhor kingly government, yet I venture to pronounce, where kings are admitted to rule they should most certainly be vested with hereditary power. The election of a king whether it be in America or Poland, will be a scene of horror and confusion; and I am perfectly serious when I declare, that, as a friend to my country, I shall despair of any happiness in the United States until this office is either reduced to a lower pitch of power, or made perpetual and hereditary. When I say that our future president will be as much a king as the king of Great Britain, I only ask of my readers to look into the constitution of that country, and then tell me what important prerogative the king of Great Britain is entitled to which does not also belong to the president during his continuance in office. The king of Great Britain, it is true, can create nobility which our president cannot; but our president will have the power of making all the great men, which comes to the same thing. All the difference is, that we shall be embroiled in contention about the choice of the man, while they are at peace under the security of an hereditary succession. To be tumbled headlong from the pinnacle of greatness and be reduced to a shadow of departed royalty, is a shock almost too great for human nature to endure. It will cost a man many struggles to resign such eminent powers, and ere long, we shall find some one who will be very unwilling to part with them. Let us suppose this man to be a favorite with his army, and that they are unwilling to part with their beloved commander in chief---or to make the thing familiar, let us suppose a future president and commander in chief adored by his army and the militia to as great a degree as our late illustrious commander in chief; and we have only to suppose one thing more, that this man is without the virtue, the moderation and love of liberty which possessed the mind of our late general---and this country will be involved at once in war and tyranny. So far is it from its being improbable that the man who shall hereafter be in a situation to make the attempt to perpetuate his own power, should want the virtues of General Washington, that it is perhaps a chance of one hundred millions to one that the next age will not furnish an example of so disinterested a use of great power. We

5.7 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Albert G. Hodges 355 may also suppose, without trespassing upon the bounds of probability, that this man may not have the means of supporting, in private life, the dignity of his former station; that like Caesar, he may be at once ambitious and poor, and deeply involved in debt. Such a man would die a thousand deaths rather than sink from the heights of splendor and power, into obscurity and wretchedness. We are certainly about giving our president too much or too little; and in the course of less than twenty years we shall find that we have given him enough to enable him to take all. It would be infinitely more prudent to give him at once as much as would content him, so that we might be able to retain the rest in peace, for if once power is seized by violence, not the least fragment of liberty will survive the shock. I would therefore advise my countrymen seriously to ask themselves this question: Whether they are prepared to receive a king? If they are, to say so at once, and make the kingly office hereditary; to frame a constitution that should set bounds to his power, and, as far as possible, secure the liberty of the subject. If we are not prepared to receive a king, let us call another convention to revise the proposed constitution, and form it anew on the principles of a confederacy of free republics; but by no means, under pretense of a republic, to lay the foundation for a military government, which is the worst of all tyrannies. AN OLD WHIG Source: ‘‘AN OLD WHIG,’’ New-York Journal, December 11, 1787.

5.7 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Albert G. Hodges, April 4, 1864 Abraham Lincoln April 4, 1864 Executive Mansion Washington, D.C. A. G. Hodges, Esq Frankfort, Ky. My dear Sir: You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day, in your presence, to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows: ‘‘I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel. And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act official upon this judgment and feeling. It was in

the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand however, that my oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government---that nation---of which that constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the constitution, if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together. When, early in the war, Gen. Fremont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When a little later, Gen. Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, Gen. Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March, and May, and July 1862 I made earnest, and successive appeals to the border states to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation, and arming the blacks would come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition; and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it, the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this, I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force,--no loss by it any how or any where. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand

356 The Presidency soldiers, seamen and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men; and we could not have had them without the measure. [‘‘]And now let any Union man who complains of the measure, test himself by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the rebellion by force of arms; and in the next, that he is for taking these hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he can not face his case so stated, it is only because he can not face the truth.[’’] I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years struggle the nation’s condition is not what either party, or any man devised, or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God. Yours truly A. Lincoln

5.8 Theodore Roosevelt on Presidential Power, 1913 The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view was that every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done many

things not previously done by the President and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition. I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the substance. . . . The course I followed, of regarding the executive as subject only to the people, and, under the Constitution, bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution does not explicitly forbid him to render the service, was substantially the course followed by both Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln. Other honorable and well-meaning Presidents, such as James Buchanan, took the opposite and, as it seems to me, narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people, and can do nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action. Most able lawyers who are past middle age take this view, and so do large numbers of well-meaning, respectable citizens. My successor in office took this, the Buchanan, view of the President’s powers and duties. . . . I acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestry, for water-power sites, for irrigation, and other public purposes. Without such action it would have been impossible to stop the activity of the land thieves. No one ventured to test its legality by lawsuit. My successor, however, himself questioned it, and referred the matter to Congress. Again Congress showed its wisdom by passing a law which gave the President the power which he had long exercised, and of which my successor had shorn himself. Perhaps the sharp difference between what may be called the Lincoln--Jackson and the Buchanan--Taft schools, in their views of the power and duties of the President, may be best illustrated by comparing the attitude of my successor toward his Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ballinger, when the latter was accused of gross misconduct in office, with my attitude towards my chiefs of department and other subordinate officers. More than once while I was President my officials were attacked by Congress, generally because these officials did their duty well and fearlessly. In every such case I stood by the official and refused to recognize the right of Congress to interfere with me excepting by impeachment or in other Constitutional manner. On the other

5.9 William Howard Taft on Presidential Power hand, wherever I found the officer unfit for his position I promptly removed him, even although the most influential men in Congress fought for his retention. The Jackson-Lincoln view is that a President who is fit to do good work should be able to form his own judgment as to his own subordinates, and, above all, of the subordinates standing highest and in closest and most intimate touch with him. My secretaries and their subordinates were responsible to me, and I accepted the responsibility for all their deeds. As long as they were satisfactory to me I stood by them against every critic or assailant, within or without Congress; and as for getting Congress to make up my mind for me about them, the thought would have been inconceivable to me. My successor took the opposite, or Buchanan, view when he permitted and requested Congress to pass judgment on the charges made against Mr. Ballinger as an executive officer. These charges were made to the President; the President had the facts before him and could get at them at any time, and he alone had power to act if the charges were true. However, he permitted and requested Congress to investigate Mr. Ballinger. The party minority of the committee that investigated him, and one member of the majority, declared that the charges were well founded and that Mr. Ballinger should be removed. The other members of the majority declared the charges ill founded. The President abode by the view of the majority. Of course believers in the Jackson-Lincoln theory of the Presidency would not be content with this town meeting majority and minority method of determining by another branch of the Government what it seems the especial duty of the President himself to determine for himself in dealing with his own subordinate in his own department. Source: Theodore Roosevelt. 1913. The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt. New York: MacMillan

5.9 William Howard Taft on Presidential Power, 1916 The true view of the executive functions is, as I conceive it, that the president can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in

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the public interest. . . . The grants of executive power are necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the executive within the field of action plainly marked for him, but his jurisdiction must be justified and vindicated by affirmative constitutional or statutory provision, or it does not exist. There have not been wanting, however, eminent men in high public office holding a different view and who have insisted upon the necessity for an undefined residuum of executive power in the public interest. They have not been confined to the present generation. We may learn this from the complaint of a Virginia statesman, Abel P. Upshur, a strict constructionist of the old school, who succeeded Daniel Webster as secretary of state under President Tyler. He was aroused by Story’s commentaries on the Constitution to write a monograph answering and criticizing them, and in the course of this he comments as follows on the executive power under the Constitution: The most defective part of the Constitution beyond all question, is that which related to the Executive Department. It is impossible to read that instrument without being struck with the loose and unguarded terms in which the powers and duties of the President are pointed out. So far as the legislature is concerned, the limitations of the Constitution are, perhaps, as precise and strict as they could safely have been made; but in regard to the executive, the convention appears to have studiously selected such loose and general expressions as would enable the President, by implication and construction, either to neglect his duties or to enlarge his powers. We have heard it gravely asserted in Congress that whatever power is neither legislative nor judiciary is, of course, executive, and, as such, belongs to the President under the Constitution. How far a majority of that body would have sustained a doctrine so monstrous and so utterly at war with the whole genius of our government it is impossible to say, but this, at least, we know, that it met with no rebuke from those who supported the particular act of executive power, in defense of which it was urged. Be this as it may, it is a reproach to the Constitution that the executive trust is so ill-defined as to leave any plausible pretense even to the insane zeal of party devotion for attributing to the President of the United States the powers of a despot, powers which are wholly unknown in any limited monarchy in the world. The view that he takes as a result of the loose language defining the executive powers seems exaggerated. But one must agree with him in his condemnation of the view of the executive power which he says was advanced in Congress. In recent years there has been

358 The Presidency put forward a similar view by executive officials and to some extent acted on. Men who are not such strict constructionists of the Constitution as Mr. Upshur may well feel real concern if such views are to receive the general acquiescence. Mr. Garfield, when secretary of the interior under Mr. Roosevelt, in his final report to Congress in reference to the power of the executive over the public domain, said: Full power under the Constitution was vested in the executive branch of the government and the extent to which that power may be exercised is governed wholly by the discretion of the executive unless any specific act has been prohibited either by the Constitution or by legislation. In pursuance of this principle, Mr. Garfield, under an act for the reclamation of arid land by irrigation which authorized him to make contracts for irrigation works and incur liability equal to the amount on deposit in the Reclamation Fund, made contracts with associations of settlers by which it was agreed that if these settlers would advance money and work, they might receive certificates from the government engineers of the labor and money furnished by them, and that such certificates might be received in the future in the discharge of their legal obligations to the government for water rent and other things under the statute. It became necessary for the succeeding administration to pass on the validity of these government certificates. They were held by Attorney General Wickersham to be illegal on the ground that no authority existed for their issuance. He relied on the Floyd acceptances in 7th Wallace, in which recovery was sought in the Court of Claims on commercial paper in the form of acceptances signed by Mr. Floyd when secretary of war and delivered to certain contractors. The Court held that they were void because the secretary of war had no statutory authority to issue them. Mr. Justice Miller, in deciding the case, said: The answer which at once suggests itself to one familiar with the structure of our government, in which all power is delegated, and is defined by law, constitutional or statutory, is that to one or both of these sources we must resort in every instance. We have no officers in this government, from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the President, the legislature, and the judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them

are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law. In the light of this view of the Supreme Court, it is interesting to compare the language of Mr. Roosevelt in his Notes for a Possible Autobiography on the subject of ‘‘Executive Powers,’’ in which he says: The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my administration, next to insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers. My view was that every executive officer and, above all, every executive officer in high position was a steward of the people, bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people and not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt this view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for the common well-being of all our people whenever and in whatever measure was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition. I may add that Mr. Roosevelt, by way of illustrating his meaning as to the differing usefulness of Presidents, divides the Presidents into two classes and designates them as ‘‘Lincoln Presidents’’ and ‘‘Buchanan Presidents.’’ In order more fully to illustrate his division of Presidents on their merits, he places himself in the Lincoln class of Presidents and me in the Buchanan class. The identification of Mr. Roosevelt with Mr. Lincoln might otherwise have escaped notice, because there are many differences between the two, presumably superficial, which would give the impartial student of history a different impression. It suggests a story which a friend of mine told of his little daughter Mary. As he came walking home after a business day, she ran out from the house to greet him,

5.10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Fireside Chat 359 all aglow with the importance of what she wished to tell him. She said, ‘‘Papa, I am the best scholar in the class.’’ The father’s heart throbbed with pleasure as he inquired, ‘‘Why, Mary, you surprise me. When did the teacher tell you? This afternoon?’’ ‘‘Oh, no,’’ Mary’s reply was, ‘‘the teacher didn’t tell me---I just noticed it myself.’’ My judgment is that the view of Mr. Garfield and Mr. Roosevelt, ascribing an undefined residuum of power to the President, is an unsafe doctrine and that it might lead under emergencies to results of an arbitrary character, doing irremediable injustice to private right. The mainspring of such a view is that the executive is charged with responsibility for the welfare of all the people in a general way, that he is to play the part of a universal Providence and set all things right, and that anything that in his judgment will help the people he ought to do, unless he is expressly forbidden not to do it. The wide field of action that this would give to the executive, one can hardly limit. . . . There is little danger to the public weal from the tyranny or reckless character of a President who is not sustained by the people. The absence of popular support will certainly in the course of two years withdraw from him the sympathetic action of at least one House of Congress, and by the control that that House has over appropriations, the executive arm can be paralyzed, unless he resorts to a coup d’etat, which means impeachment, conviction, and deposition. The only danger in the action of the executive under the present limitations and lack of limitation of his powers is when his popularity is such that he can be sure of the support of the electorate and therefore of Congress, and when the majority in the legislative halls respond with alacrity and sycophancy to his will. This condition cannot probably be long continued. We have had Presidents who felt the public pulse with accuracy, who played their parts upon the political stage with histrionic genius and commanded the people almost as if they were an army and the President their commander in chief. Yet, in all these cases, the good sense of the people has ultimately prevailed and no danger has been done to our political structure and the reign of law has continued. In such times when the executive power seems to be all prevailing, there have always been men in this free and intelligent people of ours who, apparently courting political humiliation and disaster, have registered protest against this undue executive domination and this use of the executive power and popular support to perpetuate itself. The cry of executive domination is often entirely unjustified, as when the President’s commanding influence only grows out of a proper cohesion of a party

and its recognition of the necessity for political leadership; but the fact that executive domination is regarded as a useful ground for attack upon a successful administration, even when there is no ground for it, is itself proof of the dependence we may properly place upon the sanity and clear perceptions of the people in avoiding its baneful effects when there is real danger. Even if a vicious precedent is set by the Executive and injustice done, it does not have the same bad effect that an improper precedent of a court may have; for one President does not consider himself bound by the policies or constitutional views of his predecessors. Source: William H. Taft. 1916. Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers. New York: Columbia University Press. chapter 6.

5.10 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Fireside Chat, March 12, 1933 I want to talk for a few minutes with the people of the United States about banking---with the comparatively few who understand the mechanics of banking but more particularly with the overwhelming majority who use banks for the . making of deposits and the drawing of checks. I want to tell you what has been done in the last few days, why it was done, and what the next steps are going to be. I recognize that the many proclamations from State capitols and from Washington, the legislation, the Treasury regulations, etc., couched for the most part in banking and legal terms, should be explained for the benefit of the average citizen. I owe this in particular because of the fortitude and good temper with which everybody has accepted the inconvenience and hardships of the banking holiday. I know that when you understand what we in Washington have been about I shall continue to have your cooperation as fully as I have had your sympathy and help during the past week. First of all, let me state the simple fact that when you deposit money in a bank the bank does not put the money into a safe deposit vault. It invests your money in many different forms of credit---bonds, commercial paper, mortgages and many other kinds of loans. In other words, the bank puts your money to work to keep the wheels of industry and of agriculture turning around. A comparatively small part of the money you put into the bank is kept in currency---an amount which in normal times is wholly sufficient to cover the cash needs of the average citizen. In other words, the total amount of all the currency in the country is only a small fraction of the total deposits in all of the banks.

360 The Presidency What, then, happened during the last few days of February and the first few days of March? Because of undermined confidence on the part of the public, there was a general rush by a large portion of our population to turn bank deposits into currency or gold---a rush so great that the soundest banks could not get enough currency to meet the demand. The reason for this was that on the spur of the moment it was, of course, impossible to sell perfectly sound assets of a bank and convert them into cash except at panic prices far below their real value. By the afternoon of March 3d scarcely a bank in the country was open to do business. Proclamations temporarily closing them in whole or in part had been issued by the Governors in almost all the States. It was then that I issued the proclamation providing for the nationwide bank holiday, and this was the first step in the Government’s reconstruction of our financial and economic fabric. The second step was the legislation promptly and patriotically passed by the Congress confirming my proclamation and broadening my powers so that it became possible in view of the requirement of time to extend the holiday and lift the ban of that holiday gradually. This law also gave authority to develop a program of rehabilitation of our banking facilities. I want to tell our citizens in every part of the Nation that the national Congress---Republicans and Democrats alike---showed by this action a devotion to public welfare and a realization of the emergency and the necessity for speed that it is difficult to match in our history. The third stage has been the series of regulations permitting the banks to continue their functions to take care of the distribution of food and household necessities and the payment of payrolls. This bank holiday, while resulting in many cases in great inconvenience, is affording us the opportunity to supply the currency necessary to meet the situation. No sound bank is a dollar worse off than it was when it closed its doors last Monday. Neither is any bank which may turn out not to be in a position for immediate opening. The new law allows the twelve Federal Reserve Banks to issue additional currency on good assets and thus the banks which reopen will be able to meet every legitimate call. The new currency is being sent out by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in large volume to every part of the country. It is sound currency because it is backed by actual, good assets. A question you will ask is this: why are all the banks not to be reopened at the same time? The answer is simple. Your Government does not intend that the history of the past few years shall be repeated. We do not

want and will not have another epidemic of bank failures. As a result, we start tomorrow, Monday, with the opening of banks in the twelve Federal Reserve Bank cities---those banks which on first examination by the Treasury have already been found to be all right. This will be followed on Tuesday by the resumption of all their functions by banks already found to be sound in cities where there are recognized clearing houses. That means about 250 cities of the United States. On Wednesday and succeeding days banks in smaller places all through the country will resume business, subject, of course, to the Government’s physical ability to complete its survey. It is necessary that the reopening of banks be extended over a period in order to permit the banks to make applications for necessary loans, to obtain currency needed to meet their requirements and to enable the Government to make common sense checkups. Let me make it clear to you that if your bank does not open the first day you are by no means justified in believing that it will not open. A bank that opens on one of the subsequent days is in exactly the same status as the bank that opens tomorrow. I know that many people are worrying about State banks not members of the Federal Reserve System. These banks can and will receive assistance from member banks and from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. These State banks are following the same course as the National banks except that they get their licenses to resume business from the State authorities, and these authorities have been asked by the Secretary of the Treasury to permit their good banks to open up on the same schedule as the national banks. I am confident that the State Banking Departments will be as careful as the national Government in the policy relating to the opening of banks and will follow the same broad policy. It is possible that when the banks resume a very few people who have not recovered from their fear may again begin withdrawals. Let me make it clear that the banks will take care of all needs---and it is my belief that hoarding during the past week has become an exceedingly unfashionable pastime. It needs no prophet to tell you that when the people find that they can get their money---that they can get it when they want it for all legitimate purposes---the phantom of fear will soon be laid. People will again be glad to have their money where it will be safely taken care of and where they can use it conveniently at any time. I can assure you that it is safer to keep your money in a reopened bank than under the mattress.

5.11 Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer The success of our whole great national program depends, of course, upon the cooperation of the public--on its intelligent support and use of a reliable system. Remember that the essential accomplishment of the new legislation is that it makes it possible for banks more readily to convert their assets into cash than was the case before. More liberal provision has been made for banks to borrow on these assets at the Reserve Banks and more liberal provision has also been made for issuing currency on the security of these good assets. This currency is not fiat currency. It is issued only on adequate security, and every good bank has an abundance of such security. One more point before I close. There will be, of course, some banks unable to reopen without being reorganized. The new law allows the Government to assist in making these reorganizations quickly and effectively and even allows the Government to subscribe to at least a part of new capital which may be required. I hope you can see from this elemental recital of what your Government is doing that there is nothing complex, or radical, in the process. We had a bad banking situation. Some of our bankers had shown themselves either incompetent or dishonest in their handling of the people’s funds. They had used the money entrusted to them in speculations and unwise loans. This was, of course, not true in the vast majority of our banks, but it was true in enough of them to shock the people for a time into a sense of insecurity and to put them into a frame of mind where they did not differentiate, but seemed to assume that the acts of a comparative few had tainted them all. It was the Government’s job to straighten out this situation and do it as quickly as possible. And the job is being performed. I do not promise you that every bank will be reopened or that individual losses will not be suffered, but there will be no losses that possibly could be avoided; and there would have been more and greater losses had we continued to drift. I can even promise you salvation for some at least of the sorely pressed banks. We shall be engaged not merely in reopening sound banks but in the creation of sound banks through reorganization. It has been wonderful to me to catch the note of confidence from all over the country. I can never be sufficiently grateful to the people for the loyal support they have given me in their acceptance of the judgment that has dictated our course, even though all our processes may not have seemed clear to them. After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, and that is the confidence of

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the people. Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan. You people must have faith; you must not be stampeded by rumors or guesses. Let us unite in banishing fear. We have provided the machinery to restore our financial system; it is up to you to support and make it work. It is your problem no less than it is mine. Together we cannot fail.

5.11 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No. 744. Argued May 12--13, 1952. Decided June 2, 1952. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. The Government’s position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The issue emerges here from the following series of events: In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between the steel companies and their employees over terms and conditions that should be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees’ representative, United Steelworkers of America, C. I. O., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaining agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then intervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree. This failing, the

362 The Presidency President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. This Board’s report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a.m. April 9. The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel. Reciting these considerations for his action, the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, post, p. 589. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued his own possessory orders, calling upon the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the Secretary. The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action. Cong. Rec., April 9, 1952, p. 3962. Twelve days later he sent a second message. Cong. Rec., April 21, 1952, p. 4192. Congress has taken no action. Obeying the Secretary’s orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the District Court. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions. The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining their enforcement. Opposing the motion for preliminary injunction, the United States asserted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had ‘‘inherent power’’ to do what he had done---power ‘‘supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions.’’ The Government also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued because the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from seizure would be irreparable. Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from ‘‘continuing the seizure and possession of the plants . . . and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340.’’

103 F. Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s injunction. 90 U.S. App. D.C. ___, 197 F.2d 582. Deeming it best that the issues raised be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and set the cause for argument on May 12. 343 U.S. 937. Two crucial issues have developed: First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the President’s order be made in this case which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Second. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power of the President?

I. It is urged that there were non-constitutional grounds upon which the District Court could have denied the preliminary injunction and thus have followed the customary judicial practice of declining to reach and decide constitutional questions until compelled to do so. On this basis it is argued that equity’s extraordinary injunctive relief should have been denied because (a) seizure of the companies’ properties did not inflict irreparable damages, and (b) there were available legal remedies adequate to afford compensation for any possible damages which they might suffer. While separately argued by the Government, these two contentions are here closely related, if not identical. Arguments as to both rest in large part on the Government’s claim that should the seizure ultimately be held unlawful, the companies could recover full compensation in the Court of Claims for the unlawful taking. Prior cases in this Court have cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public use as these properties were alleged to have been. See e. g., Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-336; United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333. But see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-702. Moreover, seizure and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound to result in many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement. Viewing the case this way, and in the light of the facts presented, the District Court saw no reason for delaying decision of the constitutional validity of the orders. We agree with the District Court and can see no reason why that question was not ripe for determination on the record presented. We shall therefore consider and determine that question now.

5.11 Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer

II. The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure. There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions. However, the Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of the statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (201(b) of the Defense Production Act) as ‘‘much too cumbersome, involved, and timeconsuming for the crisis which was at hand.’’ Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Apparently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining. Consequently, the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the plan sought to bring about settlements by use of the customary devices of mediation, conciliation, investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports. In some instances temporary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling-off periods. All this failing, unions were left free to strike after a secret vote by employees as to whether they wished to accept their employers’ final settlement offer. It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that ‘‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .’’; that ‘‘he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’’; and that he ‘‘shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’’ The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander in

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Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though ‘‘theater of war’’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that ‘‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . . .’’ After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may ‘‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.’’ The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress---it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President. The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out reasons why the President believes certain policies should be adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution. The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.

364 The Presidency It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution ‘‘in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof.’’ The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.

5.12 Lyndon Johnson, Gulf of Tonkin Address, Message to Congress, August 5, 1964 Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action. After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia. These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955. This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states. Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 19554. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us. 3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area. 4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations---all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962. In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening . . . As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom. As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos . . .

5.13 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, August 7, 1964 Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

5.14 Clinton v. City of New York That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

5.14 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 1998 MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Line Item Veto Act was enacted in April 1996 and became effective on January 1, 1997 . . . [In June] the President exercised his authority to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Appellees, claiming that they had been injured by two of those cancellations, filed these cases in the District Court. That Court again held the statute invalid, and we again expedited our review. We now hold that these appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act and, reaching the merits, we agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, §7, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to ‘‘cancel in whole’’ three types of provisions that have been signed into law: ‘‘(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.’’ It is undisputed that the New York case involves an ‘‘item of new direct spending’’ and that the Snake River case

365

involves a ‘‘limited tax benefit’’ as those terms are defined in the Act. It is also undisputed that each of those provisions had been signed into law pursuant to Article I, §7, of the Constitution before it was canceled. The Act requires the President to adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other relevant information about the items. He must determine, with respect to each cancellation, that it will ‘‘(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest.’’ Moreover, he must transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled provision. It is undisputed that the President meticulously followed these procedures in these cases. A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the special message from the President. If, however, a ‘‘disapproval bill’’ pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the cancellations set forth in that message become ‘‘null and void.’’ The Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of a ‘‘disapproval bill,’’ but no such bill was passed for either of the cancellations involved in these cases. A majority vote of both Houses is sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, but he does, of course, retain his constitutional authority to veto such a bill. The effect of a cancellation is plainly stated in §691e [of the Line Item Veto Act] which defines the principal terms used in the Act. With respect to both an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit, the cancellation prevents the item ‘‘from having legal force or effect.’’ Thus, under the plain text of the statute, the two actions of the President that are challenged in these cases prevented one section of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and one section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ‘‘from having legal force or effect.’’ The remaining provisions of those statutes, with the exception of the second canceled item in the latter, continue to have the same force and effect as they had when signed into law. In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. ‘‘[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.’’ INS v. Chadha (1983). There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the

366 The Presidency President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President ‘‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. . . . ’’ Art. II, §3. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals. Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but ‘‘before it become[s] a Law,’’ it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, ‘‘he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.’’ Art. I, §7, cl. 2. His ‘‘return’’ of a bill, which is usually described as a ‘‘veto,’’ is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House. There are important differences between the President’s ‘‘return’’ of a bill pursuant to Article I, §7, and the exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes. There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only ‘‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.’’ INS v. Chadha. Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either ‘‘approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.’’ What has emerged in these cases from the President’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the ‘‘finely wrought’’ procedure that the Framers designed. . . . The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in Article I, §7. The fact that Congress intended such a

result is of no moment. Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, §7, without amending the Constitution. . . . If the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the President to create a different law--one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the President for signature. Something that might be known as ‘‘Public Law 105---33 as modified by the President’’ may or may not be desirable, but it is surely not a document that may ‘‘become a law’’ pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, §7, of the Constitution. . . . JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting. I may note, to begin with, that the Line Item Veto Act is not the first statute to authorize the President to ‘‘cancel’’ spending items. In Bowsher v. Synar, (1986), we addressed the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which required the President, if the federal budget deficit exceeded a certain amount, to issue a ‘‘sequestration’’ order mandating spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General. The effect of sequestration was that ‘‘amounts sequestered . . . shall be permanently cancelled.’’ We held that the Act was unconstitutional, not because it impermissibly gave the Executive legislative power, but because it gave the Comptroller General, an officer of the Legislative Branch over whom Congress retained removal power, ‘‘the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made, functions . . . plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms.’’ The President’s discretion under the Line Item Veto Act is certainly broader than the Comptroller General’s discretion was under the 1985 Act, but it is no broader than the discretion traditionally granted the President in his execution of spending laws. Insofar as the degree of political, ‘‘law-making’’ power conferred upon the Executive is concerned, there is not a dime’s worth of difference between Congress’s authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress’s authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President’s discretion. And the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation. From 1789--1791, the First Congress made lump-sum appropriations for the entire Government---‘‘sum[s] not exceeding’’ specified amounts for broad purposes. From a very early date Congress also made permissive individual appropriations, leaving the decision whether to spend the money to the President’s unfettered discretion. . . .

5.15 George W. Bush, War on Terrorism Address 367 The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to ‘‘decline to spend’’ any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act does instead---authorizing the President to ‘‘cancel’’ an item of spending---is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President’s action it authorizes in fact is not a line-item veto and thus does not offend Art. I, §7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union. . . .

5.15 George W. Bush, War on Terrorism Address, September 20, 2001 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans: . . . My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union--and it is strong. (Applause.) Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. (Applause.) I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing ‘‘God Bless America.’’ And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military. Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country. (Applause.) And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never

forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America. Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. (Applause.) Once again, we are joined together in a great cause---so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. (Applause.) On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars---but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war--but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks---but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day---and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world---and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics---a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader---a person named Osama bin Laden---are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There

368 The Presidency are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized---many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan---after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid---but we condemn the Taliban regime. (Applause.) It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. (Applause.) Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. (Applause.) Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. (Applause.) The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical

network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. (Applause.) Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (Applause.) Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber---a democratically elected government. Their leaders are selfappointed. They hate our freedoms---our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions---by abandoning every value except the will to power---they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. (Applause.) Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war---to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to

5.15 George W. Bush, War on Terrorism Address 369 make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me--the Office of Homeland Security. And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend---Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge. (Applause.) He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come. These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows. (Applause.) Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I’ve called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud. (Applause.) This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded---with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it

can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what---we’re not going to allow it. (Applause.) Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith. (Applause.) I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it. I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle. I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today. (Applause.) And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead . . . Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom---the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time---now depends on us. Our nation---this generation---will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (Applause.) It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We’ll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass.

370 The Presidency Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We’ll remember the moment the news came---where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever . . . I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. (Applause.) Fellow citizens, we’ll meet violence with patient justice---assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America. Thank you.

Section 6 The Federal Bureaucracy

Introduction

Deanna Malatesta’s essay examines the competing views of public administration espoused by Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson, showing how each brought a particular value perspective to his understanding of administrative institutions (that is, bureaucracy). Hamilton revealed a preference for what might be termed the Weberian view of bureaucracy, stressing expertise, effectiveness, and a duty implement with dispatch. Madison, an ally of Hamilton’s in arguing for a more energetic government than the Articles of Confederation provided, left us a legacy of concern that bureaucracy and public administrators were part of the great government enterprise of regulating the interplay of factions and, therefore, that it ought to be responsive institutions. Jefferson, for his part, preferred a central government apparatus that was minimal and held the protection of individual rights as its paramount mission. Perhaps more important, his views on the necessity of citizen participation (rather than elite, especially commercial elites) in policy making and decision making have informed generations. All of these views have carried weight in U.S. political development, but they are not entirely compatible; and the tension among these views underlies our ambivalence. This legacy of ambivalence has become all the more significant, as Steven Lavertu illustrates, since the triumph of modern liberalism in the New Deal Era. An active national government seeking to address a myriad of social and economic challenges means, in practice, a robust bureaucracy that operates in a

Americans are notoriously schizophrenic about government: they loathe the legislature but love legislators; they decry the size of government but demand more government programs; they hate bloated defense contracts but honor their military. Nowhere, perhaps, is this Janus-faced perspective more evident than in the U.S. view of bureaucracy. Problems of red tape, accountability, and responsiveness are de rigueur for conversations around the water cooler or opinion pieces in leading newspapers. Scholarly studies have explored the ‘‘bureaucracy problem’’ from the perspectives of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inequality, and incestuous financial relationships. Nonetheless, bureaucracy is the hallmark of modern policy response to public issues. Critical observers are fond of pointing out that the Constitution does not mention a federal bureaucracy (although it may be discernable in what Justice Douglas termed the ‘‘penumbras’’ of the Constitution) and that it has become what, in a report to Franklin Roosevelt, Louis Browlow termed, ‘‘a headless fourth branch of government.’’ Many of these same observers, however, demand to know of political candidates what they will do to preserve and defend existing bureaucratic programs or what new agencies and programs they proposed to address any number of concerns. This ambivalence about administrative agencies may be a more prominent theme in contemporary political discourse, but its origins date to the founding era.

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372 The Federal Bureaucracy basically Madisonian model while striving to meet Hamiltonian standards and paying continual lip service (usually in election season) to Jeffersonian ideals. If not a recipe for schizophrenia, this situation is at least a prescription for deep political frustration. Perhaps most disturbing, the centrality of bureaucracy in national government advantages organized interests and mastery of information over democratic demands and normative

debate. All the criticism and frustration, notwithstanding, as Malatesta and Lavertu suggest, the relevant questions are: ‘‘What is the alternative to bureaucracy?’’ and ‘‘Has the modern bureaucratic state been a force for improving the general welfare?’’ The answers appear to be: ‘‘None.’’ and ‘‘On balance, yes.’’ ---Richard A. Harris

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy Deanna Malatesta Assistant Professor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis

Introduction

to key events in American history. The main point is that the U.S. government structure, its bureaucracy, has been the driving engine for American progress since the nation’s birth. It describes key features of the bureaucracy and attempts to explain the factors that influence its output. Finally, there is a rich literature on the subject of bureaucracy, including primary sources for statistics, theoretical expositions, empirical works, and calls for reform, defenses, and polemics; that literature is categorized at the end of the essay for further reading.

Even ancient societies recognized that, without bureaucracies, we could not accomplish most of the large-scale tasks that we take for granted (Blau and Meyer 1971). Projects such as the construction of roads and water systems could not have been possible without the basic characteristics of bureaucracies, including delimited areas of responsibility, rules to guide and hold workers and managers accountable, and the hierarchical arrangement of positions for efficient production. In fact, as duly noted by Max Weber,1 the subject’s foremost theorist, bureaucracy is the more rational and efficient form of organization and the key to modernity. The attributes of a modern bureaucracy include its impersonality, concentration of the means of administration, a leveling effect on social and economic differences, and an almost indestructible system of authority. Without bureaucracy, there could be no civilized society. Despite its association with advanced societies, the essential role the American bureaucracy has played in the development of this nation is often overshadowed by the negative image associated with the word. Today, the term often suggests an overuse of rules and regulations (red tape), excessive use of authority (big brother), and inefficiency. Thus, the term bureaucracy is often used in a pejorative sense, which does not do it justice. This essay explains the emergence of the American federal bureaucracy in the context of the views of the founders. It provides a by-the-numbers picture of the expansion of the bureaucracy and relates that expansion

The Founders’ Views It is often noted that the U.S. Constitution does not mention public administration (O’Toole 1987). There is ample evidence, however, that the founders gave considerable thought to the subject. The Federalist Papers in particular provide valuable insights on the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson on the role of the bureaucracy within America’s tripartite system of government. The Federalist Papers, a series of 85 articles, was originally published serially in New York City newspapers between October 1787 and May 1788. A compilation, called The Federalist, was published in 1788. The Federalist Papers continue to be a mainstay of political thought. Also, as Leonard White (1948) points out, The Federalist provided the first systematic treatment of the field of public administration. Moreover, the founder’s views as contained in these writings have not gone unnoticed by political science and public administration scholars,

373

374 The Federal Bureaucracy a number of which have examined the influences on predominant theories and practices in the field (cf. Caldwell 1976; Green 1990, 1993, 2002; O’Toole 1987; Rohr 1990; Rossiter 1961; Stillman 2004; Van Riper 1983).

Alexander Hamilton Alexander Hamilton’s influence on the American bureaucracy is unmistakable. He is unique among the founders for his attention to the details of public administration. Finding fault in the Articles of Confederation, particularly the weak national government, Hamilton called for the states to attend the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. The enduring legacy of the Convention is of course, the U.S. Constitution. Hamilton is responsible for writing two-thirds of the Federalist Papers and these essays represent some of his key thoughts on how to run a government. Hamilton, the first U.S. secretary of the treasury, envisioned a strong national government and an expansive activist bureaucracy in American society overall. Hamilton advocated setting up a national bank, a national university, a professional army, and a public school system. In Federalist No. 68, Hamilton argued that ‘‘we may safely pronounce that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce good administration.’’ In Federalist Nos. 70--77, Hamilton proclaimed that ‘‘energy in the executive’’ is a leading character in the definition of good government (Rossiter 1961) and essential to liberty, security, justice, and the protection of property. A century later, Woodrow Wilson adopted Hamilton’s point of view in ‘‘The Study of Administration,’’ an essay appearing in Political Science Quarterly. The Wilson essay, which appeared in June 1887, is often considered the beginning of American administrative theory. In addition to his writing, Hamilton’s public life spoke volumes. According to White, Hamilton’s aptitude for leadership, organization, and system remains unmatched (1948, 478). White refers to Hamilton as an ‘‘administrative genius’’ and ‘‘one of the great administrators of all time’’ (1948, 125--126). Hamilton also believed constitutional arrangements could provide ‘‘the superstructure of public administration.’’ Hamilton supported the idea of separation of powers, although his conceptualization is not entirely clear. His views on the subject are contained in Federalist No. 72, wherein he states the administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body

politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department among the branches. Some scholars argue Hamilton was not suggesting that all public administration should reside within the executive branch (Rossiter 1961; Green 1990, 2002). According to Green’s interpretation, through what Hamilton called ‘‘partial agency,’’ each branch would share some functions in such a manner to provide the administrator with special competencies as well as to check against encroachments of power (Green 1990, 499). In Federalist Nos. 70--77, Hamilton’s reveals a model for an energetic executive with four components (Rossiter 1961). Notably, each element bears resemblance to what German sociologist Max Weber’s considered the ideal type bureaucracy. Green outlines Hamilton’s four-part model, consisting of unity of power, duration in office, adequate provision and support, and competency (2002, 541--559). The first component, unity of power by a single hand, refers to a central authority and unified command, which Hamilton considered essential to ‘‘decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’’ The second component is duration, or tenure in office. In Hamilton’s own words, he thought tenure was ‘‘necessary to give the officer an inclination and resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits.’’ (Federalist No. 72) Extended time in office would permit long-range planning, allow for the development of expertise, and ensure that appointees are not by design aligned with the ideology of one particular president. Instead, appointees would remain in office beyond that of the appointing president. The third element, adequate provision for support, refers to an executive role not subordinated to the legislature by power of his compensation, because, as Hamilton argued, ‘‘power over support [Salary] is power over will.’’ (Federalist No. 79) And, fourth, Hamilton argued that the executive should have competent powers, inferring the need for a professional bureaucratic staff. Similarly, Max Weber noted the principle of office hierarchy and a firmly ordered system of monocratic authority found in all advanced bureaucracies, whether public, private, or ecclesiastic. Weber also called for office holding as a ‘‘vocation,’’ where officials were not considered the personal servant of the rulers. Likewise, Weber’s concept of a modern administration presupposes specialization and expert training.

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 375 From Hamilton’s design for a U.S. bank, we can infer his vision of a flexible relationship between government and the private sector. Specifically, the controlling board for the bank included both private and public officials. It was the board’s responsibility to oversee the provision of credit to the government, to foster the value of the dollar, and to encourage sound financial practices by the states and private entities. This was to be accomplished by fostering trust and confidence of wealthy private citizens and foreign states, and by uniting ‘‘public authority and faith with private credit’’ (Hammond 1957). This passage is particularly interesting in the context of today’s many hybridized public-private arrangements. Notwithstanding Hamilton’s obvious emphasis on the dominant role of the executive branch, the passage suggests that he was open to various organizational forms and that more than one form might be considered consistent with the Constitution. It also suggests that Hamilton did not view public and private interests as necessarily conflicting, an interpretation shared elsewhere (Green 2002, 548). The intellectual and normative foundations of Hamilton’s theory of administration are also important to scholars of government. Overall, Hamilton’s view of man was skeptical, an assessment that adhered to the writings of utilitarian philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), whom Hamilton often quoted. Hume’s Philosophical Essays (1817) suggest man’s most common motives are ambition, materialism, and quest for power. Following this premise, the role of government would include restraining man’s corrupt urges with laws and institutions that ensure the triumph of public good. Hamilton was also influenced by English philosopher John Locke (1632--1704). Much of Locke’s writing is characterized by antiauthoritarianism, both at the individual level (antislavery) and at the institutional level (government). Locke’s natural rights doctrine argues that man exists in a state of nature and is endowed by God with inalienable rights of life, freedom, and property. Following this view, governments are formed for the purpose of protecting individual rights. Hamilton’s normative underpinnings are perhaps best expressed by public administration scholar Richard Stillman (2004), who affirms that Hamilton’s view of the place for a bureaucracy within a democracy as containing seven elements: (1) broad discretionary and activist roles for public agencies, characterized by strong decisive leadership; (2) emphasis on responsible undivided public organizations with administrative action preferably concentrated in one individual (as opposed to a committee-based system); (3) administrative power

allocated to individuals and governmental units in a measure appropriate for tasks assigned; (4) adequate tenure in office to ensure administrative effectiveness, long-term planning, and stable implementation of policies; (5) preference for paid and competent trained professional as opposed to part-time volunteers; (6) emphasis on centralized national planning, sound fiscal management, and creative and accountable public leadership; and (7) popular control of public organizations achieved by elections of responsible capable chief executives with sufficient political power and support to ensure the sound execution of tasks.

James Madison Like Hamilton, Virginian James Madison (1751--1836), was also a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. James Madison was the foremost architect of the U.S. Constitution and a leading theorist of republican government. Madison had his own vision of the American bureaucracy. At the Philadelphia convention, Madison was a persuasive advocate of an independent federal judiciary, a strong executive, and a bicameral legislature with differing terms and representation reflecting the population. Some years earlier at the Virginia Convention of 1776, Madison had made his mark as a defender of the free exercise of religion. Madison also made significant contributions to the Federalist Papers in an effort to convince New York voters of his positions and to get the Constitution ratified. As a congressman, Madison spent much of his time opposing the viewpoints of Alexander Hamilton on the plans for the new republic. Divisions developed around the views of the two men, eventually culminating in the formation of the Federalist and Republican parties. During the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, Madison took on the responsibility of the State Department and oversaw foreign affairs. Madison eventually became president (1809--1817). Madison was chiefly concerned with the influence of interest groups on the bureaucracy, which he referred to as ‘‘factions . . . united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens . . . that had tainted public administrators’’ (Federalist No. 10). According to Madison, there were two ways to deal with factions: the first was to strip them of their liberty, a cure that was worse than the disease; the second was to control their effects. The latter was the lesser of evils, impractical but necessary due to the nature of man (Federalist No. 10). Madison believed men had a natural urge to form factions: ‘‘so strong is this tendency that it divided mankind into

376 The Federal Bureaucracy parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.’’ Factions were inevitable, growing of necessity in civilized societies, and automatically springing up according to circumstances in society. According to the Madisonian viewpoint, factions could never be eliminated entirely but could be checked by a system that allowed interests to compete with one another (Federalist No. 51). Madison argued that ‘‘the regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation’’ (Federalist No. 10 and No. 51). He also believed a process that reduced factional influence would foster public accountability. Richard Stillman (2004) interprets Madison’s views from the passages in the Federalist that are noted above as well as from other writings. He concludes that although Madison did not directly address the role of public administration in a democracy, we can deduce his sentiments from his writings, especially from his conceptions of interest group politics therein. Stillman summarizes the Madisonian normative model of bureaucracy as including the following: (1) public organizations that interacted with competing, divergent, and dynamic interests; the pluralistic ever-changing shifts in political power required a required flexible administration; (2) bureaucracies that are political and share in policy making with other branches of government; (3) public agencies that may be formally separate bodies yet in practice share power with the judicial, executive, and legislative branches to operate effectively and to operate within a complex vertical systems of checks and balances; that share power with the (4) public agencies that work in a complex set of horizontal power arrangements with other federal, state, and local units of government; (5) public administrators exercising the ‘‘art of the possible’’ in dealing with fragmented political authority, political negotiation, compromise, and bargaining; (6) social consensus and equilibrium as the primary aim of public officials rather than organizational efficacy or accountability to ‘‘an abstract will of the people’’; and (7) administrative power is neither top down nor bottom up, but it must be picked up piecemeal by public administrators from the top, bottom, and sides of government agencies with a politically fragmented, ever-changing environment.

Thomas Jefferson Thomas Jefferson wished to be remembered for only three achievements in his public life and asked that they be placed on his tombstone. Jefferson’s tombstone

reads: ‘‘Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia.’’ Notwithstanding, Jefferson’s achievements far exceeded those noted on his epitaph, including public service as governor of Virginia, U.S. minister to France, secretary of state under George Washington, vice president to John Adams, and president of the United States from 1801 to 1809. Considered an Anti-Federalist, Jefferson feared the tendency of the bureaucracy to interpret laws in their own interest and called for a liberal construction in the interest of the public. In contrast to Hamilton’s advocacy for a strong national government and Madison’s desire for a government design that could guard against factions, Jefferson’s notion of administration emphasized his concerns for the average citizen. Throughout Jefferson’s writings there exists a commitment to the values of individual liberty and the personal pursuit of happiness. Jefferson stressed individual rights and liberty and called for a government that was ‘‘frugal and simple’’ and that maximized citizen participation (Stillman 2002, 318). From the Jeffersonian viewpoint, a strong degree of separation between politics and administration was as important to public accountability as was decentralization. Jefferson also stressed volunteerism as a means to increase government capacity. Leonard White (1948) notes Jefferson was not interested in the day-to-day processes of government, yet it is clear that Jefferson took the administration of government seriously. Jefferson believed that the executive branch should possess the necessary resources to get the job done, and he saw the Constitution as providing the general authority for the executive. According to Jefferson, the aptitude of means to the end of law are necessary, otherwise government would be impractical (Hart 1947). Ostensibly, Jefferson anticipated instances in which public administrators would have to use their own judgment in carrying out their duties. In a letter written after his retirement, Jefferson said that common sense and honest intentions could steer through any administrative problem (Chandler 1984). Public administration scholar and historian Lynton Caldwell (1996) tells us that Jefferson’s views of the state followed Niccolo Macchiavelli’s conviction that government institutions should be flexible. Machiavelli believed the ruin of states was caused by the failure to modify institutions (Caldwell citing 1940 trans of The Prince). Accordingly, Jefferson opined that no one axiom can be laid down for all times and all purposes (citing letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Kercheval in 1804). Thus, a

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 377 defensible argument can be made that Jefferson would not have considered the exercise of bureaucratic discretion to be at odds with his vision for the constitution (Stillman 2002). The Jeffersonian normative model of public administration, according to Stillman, would consist of the following: (1) extensive participation by the people, especially volunteers (as opposed to staffing an administration with high-paid career professionals); (2) the highest degree of decentralization, to bring government as close to the people as possible to ensure accountability; (3) operational simplicity, so government could be understood by the layperson; (4) strict legal limitations to protect human rights; (5) weak leadership role for public administrators by defining functional specialists; (6) lack of concern for national planning; (7) a focus on private initiatives and free market alternatives to the performance of tasks by government; voluntary citizen participation; (8) free market alternatives to the performance of public tasks; and (9) and bottom-up administrative power to restrain government output and ensure public accountability. At least three points are evident from the preceding discussion. First, when one considers that the federal bureaucracy was intended to reflect the values of the founders, it is clear that efficiency was not the primary goal of institutional design. In fact, it seems almost impossible to avoid inefficiency, the most common complaint about the bureaucracy, while incorporating all of the founders’ values. Put in this light, many pejorative statements about the bureaucracy are oversimplified at best and plain incorrect at worst. Second, any institutional system that combines all of the values of the founders’ will necessarily be faced with conflicting goals. For example, how can a system combine both top-down administration with authority concentrated at the federal level (Hamilton), while at the same time emphasize the value of a bottom-up administration with significant public participation at the local level (Jefferson)? As some have suggested, maybe we have come to expect the impossible from the bureaucracy (for example, Goodsell 1984). Third, as pointed out by Stillman, the American opinion about the proper role of government can be described as a complex mix of the founders’ values. For example, the desire for an energetic and active role of government aligns one with Hamilton, whereas the opinion that government rules are necessary to keep interest groups in check is consistent with Madison. On the other hand, the preference for market-based solutions is more Jeffersonian. The opinions of most Americans share some elements of all three. Third, there is a trade-off in our pursuit of

these values. No one value can entirely eclipse all others, and we cannot maximize the attainment of all simultaneously. In day-to-day practice, government agencies must try to balance competing values. What is most important for citizens and public officials to appreciate is that important costs and benefits are associated with each value (Rosenbloom, Stillman 2004).

The Cold Hard Facts The statistics about the makeup of the federal bureaucracy according to the Office of Management Budget (OMB) may surprise many people: the American federal bureaucracy consists of 2.7 million civilian employees. Approximately 85 percent of the federal workforce is full time and about 33 percent of that number is defense related; this count does not include state or local government civil servants; it also does not account for government contract services, an increasingly prominent aspect of the federal bureaucratic system. The federal bureaucracy is just one slice (about 15 percent) of the overall bureaucracy in the United States and it accounts for approximately $3 trillion or about 30 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). About 57 percent of all federal employees are male and 43 percent are female. Only about 10 percent work in the Washington, D.C., area, 90 percent work in other parts of the United States. The average age of the federal workforce is 42. Contrary to popular belief, the number of federal employees per 1,000 people in the U.S. population has decreased from more than 14 in the early 1970s to a little over 10 by the late 1990s. The federal bureaucracy includes thousands of occupational categories. It is a significant source employment for Americans, providing opportunities for professionals and persons with a variety of other skill levels. Moreover, the makeup of the federal bureaucracy closely resembles the demographic makeup of the U.S. population. The American bureaucracy is an essential part of American life responsible for policy issues of four kinds deemed: regulative, distributive, redistributive, and constituent (Lowi 1979). As an American institution, the bureaucracy is held in careful check by several mechanisms, including constitutional constrains, the Federalist nature of the U.S. government, oversight by Congress, the judiciary, special interests, and watch groups. The federal bureaucracy is located in cabinet departments, independent agencies, government corporations, and the executive office of the president. Fifteen cabinet departments represent about 60 percent of the federal workforce. The oldest cabinet departments are the

378 The Federal Bureaucracy Department of State and the Department of Treasury, both created in 1789. The Department of State performs the critical task of promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest. The Treasury is the steward of U.S. economic and financial systems and an influential participant in the global economy. The largest departments are the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services. The cabinet as it is often called collectively, has evolved as one of the most powerful government bodies. Cabinet heads are appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate. They serve at the pleasure of the president and report directly to him. The president can dismiss them at any time, without Senate approval. The federal bureaucracy also consists of more than 60 independent commissions created by Congress outside of cabinet departments (with the exception of the Food and Drug Administration, which remains inside the cabinet). These agencies include such bodies as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulate businesses associated with specific areas of commerce deemed critical to the American economy. Congress empowers these bodies to enact rules and regulations on its behalf and to serve in a quasi-judiciary capacity in such matters as compliance. The oldest independent regulatory agency is the Interstate Commerce Commission, created by Congress in 1887. Perhaps the most important as well as the most independent of all the federal agencies is the Federal Reserve System, which regulates the U.S. money supply. The chairman of the FCC serves a four-year term concurrent with the president and its governing board members are appointed with 14-year terms. The president appoints members but cannot remove them. Presidential appointments to the commissions are subject to Senate approval. The federal bureaucracy also includes government corporations. In some respects, government corporations operate more like private enterprises than public entities. Examples include the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The president appoints a head to direct these corporations, which are funded by appropriations and in some cases sales from operations, such as electricity sales in the case of the TVA and postal stamps in the USPS. They are headed by a chief executive officer and board of directors, and perform services would not be adequately provided for in the private sector. In the case of the USPS, the corporation competes with private businesses for delivery services and is permitted to generate profits. The

establishment of postal services is one of the activities of federal government specifically provided for in the Constitution. Until just before World War I, the postal service operated near breakeven, but it generated a surplus during the war. The remaining bureaucratic forms include independent executive agencies responsible for much of the federal administrative tasks; boards and councils that perform advisory functions; foundations such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), which conducts critical research; and other institutes such as the Smithsonian, which conducts research and preserves the nation’s past with the help of government grants and private donations.

Factors Shaping Modern Bureaucracy Like all complex organizational forms, the contours of the federal bureaucracy are shaped by a number of factors. One of the most significant forces influencing the emergence and growth of all formal organizations, including the American federal bureaucracy is the money economy (Weber 1947; Blau and Meyer 1971).

President George Washington (right) with his first Cabinet: (from left) Henry Knox, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph. (Library of Congress)

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 379 A money economy lays the basis for a sophisticated form of social organization. As the economy takes shape, the bureaucracy must change to accommodate new demands. Government institutions emerge to make our interactions with other members of society as well as interactions with government predictable and orderly and so our exchanges are legitimized. This is what we expect in a sophisticated society. The very essence of an institution is the ability to reduce uncertainty in recurring structural relations by fostering predictable patterns of behavior (North 1990, 1994). Thus, bureaucracies and institutions come about to provide the framework for development. If bureaucracies and institutions are inevitable, what determines what they look like? To answer this question, it is helpful to distinguish between organizations and institutions. Douglass North (1990, 1994) explains one way to think out it. Using the metaphor of a sports team, North describes organizations as the players in the game and institutions as the rules in the game. Institutions are both formal and informal. Players conduct themselves according to a rulebook and also according to acceptable standards. In the government context, formal institutions include the constitution, the branches of government, and common law, to name just a few examples. Informal institutions include such intangibles as collective values, cultural expectations, and a general understanding of what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Described this way, the federal bureaucracy can be thought of as an organization with policy actors, stakeholders, and the like. These are the players in the game. Formal and informal institutions, the rules of the game, determine and characterize the shape, size, location, and scope of activity associated with the organization. The bureaucracy is shaped by the fundamental force of institutions. Institutions are the reasons for the specific characteristics and patterns of growth of the bureaucracy (North 1990). Moreover, the forces that account for the fundamental growth in the American federal bureaucracy are the same as those that underlie the growth of government in all developed economies. As Douglass North (1990) explains the phenomenon, technological changes alter the way goods and services are produced and distributed. Such factors as population size and makeup, economic trends, and the like change the needs of society. These factors are accompanied by changes in convictions about the role of government. As distributions shift, so too do institutional needs. Thus, the growth of government is a function of demands arising from redistributions. The characteristics of the institutions that come about reflect societal values. Also factored

into the equation is the inability of voluntary organizations to satisfactorily meet the new demands (referred to as the collective action problem or free-rider problem). Thus, we rely on government to meet our needs through new institutional forms. As an example, the distribution of wealth in the early part of the 20th century led to the perception, if not the reality, of market failure and the need for government intervention. Wealth became concentrated in a small upper class. The ensuing Great Depression altered perceptions about the adequacy of the existing government role and provided force for the advocates of reform (North 1985). Voluntary associations did not offer adequate solutions. In fact, many saw private market transactions as part of the problem not the solution. Of course this view was not shared by all. Nevertheless, the view was popular enough to gain support. In addition to the growing appetite for government solutions, an increasingly diverse population also factored in to the emerging characteristics of the American bureaucracy. To meet the increasingly diverse needs, an ever-more-sophisticated system of management emerged. Finally, the formal institutional context, including the federal system, the independent judiciary, elections, committee structures, and interest groups, all combined to shape the contours of government growth and to determine the timing of that growth. As a result of these combined forces, the federal bureaucracy stands today as a complex layered system of diverse organizational forms that continues to change as new institutions take shape.

Major Periods of Bureaucratic Growth Some general observations are noteworthy regarding the changes in the federal bureaucracy since the birth of the country. The first is the overall growth of government, which is customarily measured by government expenditures as a proportion of gross national product (GNP). Because of the increasing use of contractors, the number of federal employees over the years, especially over the last decade, projects a slightly different picture. Nevertheless, the important point is that government has gradually taken on a more active role in society. The growth of government is more accurately described as fluctuating and marked by responses to various perturbations, rather than steady and consistent. Changes can be described by several eras of government.

The Early Years In the nation’s formative years, the demand for services was mainly in the form of chief government functions

380 The Federal Bureaucracy necessary for any new nation. The federal bureaucracy was born when, in 1789, Congress created the Department of State to aid Thomas Jefferson in his duties as the new secretary of state. In these early years, the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Justice were formed. The makeup of the federal workforce at the time is noteworthy. Core function government jobs were based on kinship and class status, which meant that the bureaucracy consisted of only upper-class white males. This changed in 1829 when President Andrew Jackson initiated a system of employment based on party loyalty, called the spoils system. As Table 1 shows, by 1851, the size of the federal workforce was over 26,000. With a population of approximately 17 million people, there were approximately 1.5 federal employees for every 1,000 people. In 1861, the population swelled to just over 23 million and the federal workforce grew to 36,672. Overall, the federal government had relatively limited powers in the formative years. What government activity there was occurred at the state and local level. This was largely a result of a Supreme Court under John Marshall (1801--1835), which interpreted the Constitution to impose limitations on the power of the federal government. During the Civil War, from 1861--1865, any measure of government size is subject to dispute, because opinions differed about who the legitimate government was. The definition of government depended on whether you resided in the North or South, as the Confederate States proclaimed their own center of government power. During the post--Civil War period, the picture becomes clearer. This time period was marked by various reconstruction efforts and public works projects. By 1871, civilian employment had grown to 51,000 and, by 1881, employment was just over 100,000. In

Table 1 The Size of the Federal Workforce, 1861--1911 Year

No. of Federal Employees

1816 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911

4,837 6,914 11,491 18,038 26,274 36,672 51,020 100,020 157,442 239,476 395,905

Source: Johnson and Libecap 1994a, 61.

1881, President Garfield was assassinated by a begrudged office seeker, leading to yet another change in the character of the federal workforce. After calls for hiring reforms, in 1883 Congress passed the Pendleton Act, which initiated the Civil Service Commission with a merit-based hiring system. Two groups now existed within the federal labor force: classified (merit) and unclassified (patronage). When the new system was initiated, only 10 percent of federal jobs were covered, but over time, more and more jobs came under civil service. The federal government’s power was expanded in 1887 when President Grover Cleveland created the Interstate Commerce Commission. This was the first of the Fourth Branch agencies, so called because it had powers on the level of those of the traditional three branches---executive, legislative, and judicial. Its creation was a result of the 1886 U.S. Supreme Court case of Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, which severely limited the rights of states to control interstate commerce. A series of similar acts followed setting up independent agencies or executive departments with extensive regulatory authority. These changes represented a clear shift from state power to federal power. By the turn of the century, approximately 50 percent of the total federal civilian labor force would be under merit provisions. The classified service positions were those for which performance was especially important in specific federal units, including positions in Customs, the Postal Service, and Washington, D.C.--based departmental services that often required specific expertise. As time passed, the United States became increasingly industrialized and urbanized. In 1887, Woodrow Wilson wrote his famous essay, the ‘‘Study on Administration,’’ wherein he called for a more educated, skilled, and businesslike government. As the federal bureaucracy increased in size, so did the proportion of merit-based employees. Figure 1 details the rise in the share of the merit labor force. Also in the late-19th century demands from farmers, labor, and other business groups led to government assistance and the creation of various clientele departments, including the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce. This was also the time when some businesses were perceived as exploiting government authority to maintain monopolies and reduce competition at the expense of the public. In response, Theodore Roosevelt emerged as the ‘‘trust buster’’ (1901--1908) by forcing the dissolution of a great railroad combination in the Northwest. Other antitrust suits under the Sherman Act followed. As President,

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 381

Figure 1. The Rise in the Share of Merit Employees Source: Johnson and Libecap 1994a, 61.

Teddy Roosevelt believed government should be the great arbiter of the conflicting economic forces in the nation, especially between labor and capital. The Progressive presidency of William Howard Taft (1909-1913) followed Teddy Roosevelt. Woodrow Wilson (president from 1913--1921) considered himself to be a great advocate of the people. Woodrow Wilson continued a program of Progressive reform and asserted himself as an international leader in building a new world order. In 1917, America entered World War I, the war to end all wars and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. New antitrust laws and the formation of various regulatory agencies including the Federal Trade Commission to protect the public interest were also part of this era. These independent agencies were designed with some autonomy to insulate the bureaucracy from interest group influence. The Progressive Era also ushered in the formation of various public corporations, reflecting the call for public entities to adopt such private-sector values efficiency and a profit orientation. All of this laid the groundwork for the next major era of government, the New Deal Period.

The New Deal Period In the aftermath of World War I, the American government faced a number of problems. Many nations were in debt to the United States after the war, protectionist policies negatively affected exports, and the banking structure was in need of reform. Many Americans were out of work. The American economy largely depended on the success of relatively few corporations. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was elected president in

November 1932, to the first of four terms. By March, there were 13 million unemployed, and almost every bank was closed. FDR promised the Americans a ‘‘New Deal’’ to get the country back on its feet. The New Deal was a series of fiscal, regulatory, and relief programs pursued by the federal government to get Americans back to work and to aid agricultural and industrial recovery. In the first 100 days, of his presidency, Roosevelt passed, among other programs, the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Act), which was designed to help American farmers by stabilizing prices and limiting output; formed the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), a public works project operated under the U.S. Army, which was designed to promote environmental conservation while getting young, unemployed men off city street corners; established the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), which proposed building dams and power plants along the Tennessee River to bring electric power to rural areas in seven states; and established the NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act to stimulate production and competition by having American industries set up a series of codes designed to regulate prices, industrial output, and general trade practices. In all, these programs represented a radical departure in the nature and form of the role of the federal government. The character of the federal bureaucracy again changed in this period. In 1939, Congress passed the Hatch Act to prohibit the use of federal employees as political campaign workers, candidates, or fund-raisers. The Act required that executive branch employees below the policy-making level abstain from any active part in political campaigns. In one sense, the Hatch Act grew out of a general tradition of electoral reform. But

382 The Federal Bureaucracy another significant influence, affecting both its timing and its content, was the widespread allegation that Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds had been misused by federal employees. There was also change in the relative importance of federal, state, and local government. Before 1932, government expenditures were approximately 30 percent federal, 20 percent state, and 50 percent local. After 1940, government expenditures were approximately 46 percent federal, 24 percent state, and 30 percent local. These proportions remained relatively stable until the 1980s. Figure 2 depicts the punctuated changes in total federal employment numbers during the period from 1910 to 1940. Teddy Roosevelt’s presidency (1901--1908) represents the time period just before the figure’s starting point. The figure includes data from the Progressive presidency of William Howard Taft (1909--1913); Woodrow Wilson’s presidency (1913--1921), which encompasses World War I (1914--1918); the presidency of Warren G. Harding (1921--1923); the term of Calvin Coolidge (1923--1929); Herbert Hoover (1929--1933); and Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal period (1933--1945). From 1910 to 1915, during the Taft presidency, employment numbers appear relatively steady. Wilson’s early presidency is marked by a continuation of only marginal increases, but from the middle of his first term to near the end of his term, there is a steep increase in the size of government. Much of that period coincided with World War I. A decline is evident from 1920 to 1925---that is, from the Harding presidency and continuing through part of Coolidge’s term. This period is followed by a steady but modest increase from 1925 to 1930, including the Depression Era and throughout Harding’s term. There is an increase in government size during the early part of the FDR presidency but an evident decrease in the later years.

World War II through the Cold War: New Layers of Bureaucracy to Plan, Coordinate, and Manage As Table 2 and Figure 3 show, much of the growth in government in the 1940s and 1950s can be tied to the nation’s defense needs. In 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The war ended in 1945. In 1947, the War and Navy Departments merged, the Air Force was formed, and the Department of Defense (DoD) was born. The National Security Act, which created the DoD also created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to collect intelligence deemed essential to America’s security needs. Cold War defense concerns also led to a number of new programs, including the Manhattan Project, which created the atomic bomb; the Atomic Energy Commission; the National Science foundation; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA’s birth reflected the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Defense concerns were also behind a number of federal government projects, including the National Defense Highway Act (1955). The Highway Act of 1956 provided funding of $26 million, the largest public works expenditure in U.S. history. The act established the interstate highway system and added more than 41,000 miles of roads.2 At the same time, the staff bureaucracies in each of the 14 executive departments grew. The number of employees steadily declined, however, from the end of the war through the 1950s.

The Great Society The Great Society Programs of the 1960s were intended to be the next great expansion period for the federal bureaucracy. President Lyndon Johnson (1963--1969) initiated a number of social programs in response to civil unrest largely believed to result from the failure of government and market structures to provide decent

Table 2 Total Federal Employees, 1940--1950

Year

Total Federal Employees (excluding postal workers) in thousands

Figure 2. Total Federal Employment, 1910--1940

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950

699 1,081 1,934 2,935 2,930 3,370 2,212 1,637 1,569 1,573 1,439

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 383

Figure 3. Total Federal Employees, 1940--1950

housing, steady employment, safe neighborhoods, social support systems, and citizen opportunities for millions of Americans living in poor communities. Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Transportation, Head Start Programs, and Medicare all came out of this time period. Additionally, maintaining the goal of collective security, Johnson carried on and increased the American presence in the Vietnam War. The Great Society, modeled after FDR’s New Deal was never fully funded because of the war. ‘‘According to Joseph A. Califano, Jr. From the early part of the Johnson administration (1963), until 1970, as the impact of his Great Society programs were felt, the portion of Americans living below the poverty line dropped from 22.2 percent to 12.6 percent, a sharp

Table 3 Total Federal Employees, 1951--1969

Year

Total Federal Employees (excluding postal workers) in thousands

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

1,974 2,066 2,026 1,875 1,860 1,864 1,869 1,817 1,805 1,808 1,825 1,896 1,911 1,884 1,901 2,051 2,251 2,289 2,301

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

decline over such a brief period in this century.’’ (Stillman 2004) As Table 3 shows, federal employment numbers rose and fell from 1951 through 1969. The trend during the Great Society era is further highlighted in Figure 4. As the figure illustrates, the federal employment numbers did not sharply increase during the Great Society years, as would have been expected. Although an increase is evident, it is modest and there is no punctuated period.

The Era of Deregulation The Great Society program was partially overturned by President Reagan (1981--1989). The overturning of the program was largely the product of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981, which cut funding for many welfare programs. Deregulation became a popular movement during the Reagan era in the 1980s, although credit for first abolishing a major regulatory agency goes to Jimmy Carter, who ended the Civil Aeronautics Board over industry objections in 1978. The nation’s first regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887 amid

Figure 4. Total Federal Employees during the Great Society Era, 1963--1969

384 The Federal Bureaucracy the Populist movement, was stripped of most of its power in the 1980s and was abolished in 1995, leading to reductions in freight services. As of the early 21st century, counter currents are calling for re-regulation of the airline industry in the face of congestion and air travel delays, and for tighter control over the financial industry following the $200 billion ‘‘bail out’’ of savings and loans. Table 4 shows federal employment during the period from 1970 through 1989. An inconsistent trend is evident throughout this period, with a marked low point in 1973 and punctuated increases in 1978 and 1995. The Gerald Ford presidency (1974--1977) shows a modest increase in numbers. The Jimmy Carter presidency (1977--1981) is marked by both increases and decreases; overall, however, the federal workforce declined from 2.18 million to 2.14 million under Carter. During the Reagan term, both increases and decreases are evident, but overall Reagan increased the federal workforce from 2.14 million to 2.38 million.

During the George H. W. Bush presidency (1989-1993), federal employment modestly declined from 2.238 million to 2.157 million employees. In contrast, a significant decline is evident for the term of President William Jefferson Clinton presidency (1993--2001) when the federal employment number declines from 2.157 million to 1.798 million. Looking at the changes in federal workforce numbers from another perspective, during the 15 years between 1986 and 2000, the federal government experienced a net decrease of about 430,000 civilian workers, or 19 percent---the total fell from 2.3 million workers to 1.8 million. Most of this is attributed to the Clinton administration. Those figures exclude the 170,000 temporary employees hired for the 2000 decennial census. However, even when those employees are taken into account, data still show a decrease in employment over the 15-year period of about 260,000, or 11 percent of the workforce. Overall, if measured by shear employment numbers, Clinton reversed the

President Lyndon B. Johnson and his wife, Lady Bird, leave the Inez, Kentucky, home of Tom Fletcher, a father of eight who had been unemployed for nearly two years when the Johnsons visited on April 24, 1964. After touring the Appalachian area of eastern Kentucky and experiencing firsthand the economic distress of the area, Johnson declared the nation’s War on Poverty from the front porch of Fletcher’s home. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 385

Table 4 Total Federal Employees, 1970--1989

Year

Total Federal Employees (excluding postal workers) in thousands

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

2,203 2,144 2,117 2,083 2,140 2,149 2,157 2,182 2,224 2,161 2,161 2,143 2,110 2,157 2,171 2,252 2,175 2,232 2,222 2,238

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

growth of government, which had expanded under both Presidents Reagan and Bush.

The Changing Face of the Federal Bureaucracy According to Senior Fellow Paul Light of the Brookings Institute, the period from 1995 to 2000 marked the most significant reshaping of the federal workforce. If measured by the total number of full-time-equivalent federal employees, government has clearly shrunk in size. Under President Clinton a total of 272,900 positions were cut. However, none of the cuts represented presidential appointees or senior executives. Significant changes occurred, however, in the number of middlemanagement federal government employees. In 1998,

Table 5 Total Federal Employees, 1990--2001 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source: U.S. Census Bureau

2,250 2,243 2,225 2,157 2,085 2,012 1,934 1,872 1,856 1,820 1,784 1,798

the federal government employed 126,000 middle managers, down from 161,000 in 1993, dropping the total to its lowest level in 15 years. Nearly every department lost mid-level supervisors. Only the Departments of Justice (up 2,000) and State (up 18) expanded middlemanagement ranks. The number of employees in the lower grades of the federal general employment schedule dropped by more than 170,000 between 1993 and 1997, while the number of blue-collar jobs fell an additional 90,000. At the same time, the average employment grade of the lower-level employees who remained on the job actually increased by its largest margin in a decade, meaning that more jobs were removed at the bottom most levels than anywhere else. Conversely, the number of layers between the top and bottom of the federal hierarchy has increased. This changing shape means that government staff and our elected officials have become more distant from the average American citizen. The additional layering of government is most evident at the top of the pyramid. Since 1993, the 14 government departments have created 16 new titles at the top, including a stunning number of new alter-ego deputy posts. Government’s top tier may not be getting wider, but it is most certainly getting taller. Step back from all the numbers and layers, and one simple fact emerges: the federal hierarchy is shifting from a traditional bureaucratic pyramid into a circular, ultimately elliptical, shape. For the first time, in 1998, the number of middle-level federal employees outnumbered the lower-level employees. In 1993, there were 1.2 lower-level employees (General Schedule 1--10) for each middle-level employee (General Schedule 11--15). In 1998, the lower-level numbers had fallen to 0.93 for every middle-level employee. If current trends hold, the federal government’s last frontline employee will retire sometime in 2030---his or her job finally contracted out or downsized forever. The rest of the pyramid will still exist in this circular future. It will just reside outside of the federal headcount in the millions of people who will work for contractors, grantees, and state and local governments delivering services on the federal government’s behalf. As long as this trend continues, the faithful work of the government will rely more on writing careful contracts, grants, and mandates than on the traditional chain of command between elected representatives and the career workforce. That observation reflects neither a liberal nor a conservative political position. It simply describes the way government must operate given the pressure to do more with less. As Figures 5 and 6 illustrate, the composition of federal spending has changed, reflecting a change in

386 The Federal Bureaucracy

Figure 5. Composition of Federal Spending, 1980 Source: U.S. Census Bureau

(starting in 2001), the government has expanded in both height and width. According to Paul Light (2004), there have never been more layers at the top of government or more occupants at each layer. Part of the growth under the Bush administration is due to the newly created Department of Homeland Security, which grew from just 3 layers and 3 people at the end of 2003 to 21 layers and 146 people by mid-2004. The federal hierarchy is ‘‘taller’’ than ever according to Light (2004). In 1992, 33 different titles were open for occupancy across the executive departments. In 1998, the number grew to 51, and as of 2004, there were 64 open titles. Roughly half of the titles are career appointments and the other half are for political appointments not subject to Senate approval. The federal bureaucracy also is wider than in previous years. The number of senior executives increased from 2,385 persons in 1998 to 2,592 persons in 2004, an increase of approximately 8 percent. According to Light, the increase in numbers at the senior level to the trend in using promotion in lieu of pay increases. The overall increase in numbers, he says, reflects an expanding federal agenda (Lights 2004).

Continued Increases in Outsourcing and Privatization

Figure 6. Composition of Federal Spending, 2000 Source: U.S. Census Bureau

government’s overall priorities. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis, in 1980, defense spending accounted for 23 percent of the federal spending, social security for 20 percent, net interest for 9 percent, Medicaid and Medicare for 8 percent, and all other categories for 40 percent. In 2000, defense spending accounted for 16 percent of the federal spending, social security for 23 percent, net interest for 12 percent, Medicaid and Medicare for 18 percent, and all other categories for 31 percent.

The Continued Thickening of Government The federal government has grown since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and that growth has been in such diverse areas as the Department of Health and Human Services and the General Services Administration (GSA)---not just in areas such as homeland security and defense. A 2004 analysis of jobs federal jobs shows that under the administration of George W. Bush

Goods and services traditionally produced by the federal bureaucracy are also increasingly produced outside civil-service channels. Government is outsourcing more services than ever before. According to the Federal Times, which features news and information for federal managers, federal spending on professional services increased 57 percent between 2001 and 2004, and the steady growth in the partnership between the publicand private-sector technical base is expected to continue (Adelsberger 2004).

Survey of Literature on Bureaucracy There is a rich and varied literature in sociology, political science, and public administration on the subject of bureaucracy. Primary sources for government statistics can be found in . . . The sociological perspective is typified by Max Weber’s Bureaucracy (published posthumously); H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946); Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer Bureaucracy in Modern Society (1971); and Robert K. Merton et al. Reader in Bureaucracy (1952). The earliest writings in public administration encourage the adoption of private-sector practices in public bureaucracies, most notably Woodrow Wilson’s essay

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 387

President George W. Bush greets a few of the new employees of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in Washington, D.C., on February 28, 2003. (Reuters/Corbis)

‘‘The Study of Administration’’ (1887). Other early scholars that had a profound influence in the field of public administration include Frank Goodnow, Politics and Administration (1900); Frederick Taylor, Principles of Administration (1911); and L. Gulick, Papers on the Science of Administration (1937). For the first textbook on American public administration, see Leonard White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926). One ongoing debate concerns the extent to which management in private organizations can be carried over to public organizations. Scholars of the opinion that private and public organizations are distinguishable in important respects include Graham Allison (1975), James Perry, and Hal Rainey. Scholars considered to be of the opposite generic tradition include Max Weber, cited above, and Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (1947). Scholars emphasizing the democratic context of the American bureaucracy include Dwight Waldo, Administrative State (1948); Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (1982); and Laurence O’Toole,

‘‘Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers, the Politics-Administration Ministration Dichotomy, and the Rise of the Administrative State,’’ Public Administration Review 47 (1987): 17--25. A notable review of the Hamiltonian, Madisonian, and Jeffersonian influences on the values in public administration is David Rosenbloom ‘‘Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers,’’ Public Administration Review 43 (1983): 219--227. Some of the harshest critics of the American bureaucracy include William Niskanen, Bureaucracy (1971) and George Roche, America by the Throat (1983). Some of the most ardent defenders of the American bureaucracy are Charles Goodsell, The Case for Bureaucracy (1983) and John Rohr, To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administration State (1986). Similarly, Richard Stillman calls for the dispel of various myths related to the bureaucracy in The American Bureaucracy: The Core of Modern Government (2004). Notable and diverse contributions from discipline of political science include Anthony Downs, Inside

388 The Federal Bureaucracy Bureaucracy (1967); Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (1971); Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World (1973); David Beetham, Bureaucracy (1987); Harold Seidman, Politics Position and Power (1997); Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy (1996); Donald Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy (1975); Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy (1977); Gary Wamsley and Mayer Zald, The Political Economy of Public Organizations (1973); Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and the Bureaucracy (1979); David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, Bureaucratic Government USA (1980); James Q. Wilson, Inside Bureaucracy (1979); Judith Gruber, Controlling Bureaucracies (1987); Jack H. Knott and Gary Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy (1987); Dennis Riley, Controlling the Federal Bureaucracy (1987); Bernard Rosen, Holding Bureaucrats Accountable (1998); William T. Gormley, Taming the Bureaucracy (1989); Michael Barzelay, Breaking through the Bureaucracy (1992); Gerald Garvey, Facing the Bureaucracy (1993); and B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy (1994). Writings concerned with the relationship between interest groups and the bureaucracy include Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (1979). A sampling of some recent writings concerned with legislative and other controls on the bureaucracy include Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott, ‘‘Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of MultiInstitutional Policy Making,’’ Journal of Law Economics and Organization 12 (1996): 119--166; William West Controlling the Bureaucracy. Institutional Constraints in Theory and Practice (1991); and Laurence Hill, ‘‘Who Governs the American Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance,’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1 (1991): 261--294. The classic debate on the appropriate amount of discretion in the American bureaucracy is found in Carl J. Friedrich, ‘‘Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,’’ Public Policy (1940); and Harold Finer ‘‘Administrative Responsibility in Democratic-Government,’’ Public Administration Review 1 (1941): 335--339. A review of some of the classics in public administration are in Schafritz and Hyde, Classics of Public Administration (1997); an overview of the theories in this field is found in H. George Frederickson and Kevin B. Smith, Public Administration Theory Primer. Essentials of Public Policy and Administration (2003). The discipline of economics has also had a profound influence on the study of government, including the work of Ronald Coase and George J. Stigler, ‘‘The Theory of Economic Regulation,’’ Bell Journal of

Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 3--21. An overview of the application of various economic theories in the study of public administration is found in Terry Moe, ‘‘The New Economics of Organizations,’’ American Journal of Political Science (1984): 739--777. For a general commentary on the influence of other disciplines and the repositioning of American public administration, see H. George Frederickson (1999). One of the most fervent arguments of privatizing the work of the federal bureaucracy is found in work by Savas. For concerns about the danger of compromising constitutional and administrative law norms in the process, see David H. Rosenbloom and Suzanne Piotrowski, ‘‘Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms,’’ American Review of Public Administration 35, no. 2 (2005). For the newer characterizations of the work of the bureaucracy---that is, a tradition of governance---see Laurence Lynn, Carolyn Heinrich, and Carolyn Hill, ‘‘Studying Governance and Public Management. Challenges and Prospects,’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10, no. 2 (2000): 233--241; and a book by the same authors, Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Work (2001). Various aspects of the reform movements include Osborne and Gaebler, Reinventing Government (1993); Christopher Hood, Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre, ‘‘Governance without Government Rethinking Public Administration,’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8, no. 22 (1998): 223--244; Brinton Milward and Keith Provan, ‘‘The Hollow State. Private Provision of Public Services,’’ in Public Policy for Democracy, edited by H. Ingram and S. R. Smith; and Lester Salamon, ‘‘Rethinking Public Management. Third Party Government and the Changing Forms of Public Action,’’ Public Policy 29 (1981): 255--275. For a comparison between the American and European reform movements, see Don Kettl, The Global Public Management Revolution A Report on the Transformation of Governance (2000); and Kettl, The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for the Twenty-First Century (2002).

References and Further Reading Allison, Graham T. 1984. ‘‘Public and Private Administrative Leadership: Are They Fundamentally Alike in all Unimportant Respects? In Leadership and Organizational Culture: New Perspectives on Administrative Theory and Practice, edited by T. J. Sergiovanni and J. E. Corbally, 214--239. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Barzelay, Michael, and Babak J. Armajani. 1992. Breaking through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy 389 Blau, Peter M., and Marshall W. Meyer. 1971. Bureaucracy in Modern Society, 2nd ed., New York: Random House. Box, Richard C. 2004. Public Administration and Society: Critical Issues in American Governance. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Caldwell, Lynton. K. 1976. ‘‘Novus ordo seclorum: The Heritage of American Public Administration.’’ Public Administration Review 36(5): 476--488. Califano, Joseph A. 1999. ‘‘What Was Really Great about the Great Society.’’ Washington Monthly 31 (October): 13--20. Carter, Susan B. 2006. Historical statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/toc/ showTablePdf.do?id=Ea827-869 Chandler, Ralph C. 1984. ‘‘The Public Administrator as Representative Citizen: A New Role for the New Century.’’ Public Administration Review, 44: 196--206. Crawley, V., and B. Adelsberger. 2004. ‘‘Abu Ghraib Reports Fault Contracting, Leadership.’’ Federal Times, (August 30): 12. Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown. Finer, Herman. 1941. ‘‘Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government.’’ Public Administration Review 1 (4): 335--350. Frederickson, H. George. 1999. ‘‘The Repositioning of American Public Administration.’’ Political Science and Politics, 32 (4): 701--711. Frederickson, H. George, and Kevin B. Smith. 2003. The Public Administration Theory Primer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Friedrich, Carl J. 1940. ‘‘Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility. In Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Goodsell, Charles T. 1983. The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers. Gormley, William T. 1989. Taming the Bureaucracy: Muscles, Prayers, and other Strategies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Green, Richard T. 1990. ‘‘Alexander Hamilton and the Study of Public Administration.’’ Public Administration Quarterly 13(4): 46--68. Green, Richard T. 1993. ‘‘Prudent Constitutionalism: Hamiltonian Lessons for Responsible Public Administration.’’ International Journal of Public Administration 16(2): 165--186. Green, Richard T. 2002. ‘‘Alexander Hamilton: Founder of the American Public Administration.’’ Administration & Society 34 (5): 541--559. Hammond, Bray. 1957. Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hart, David K. 1984. ‘‘The Virtuous Citizen, the Honorable Bureaucrat, and ‘Public’ Administration.’’ Public Administration Review 44:111--119. Hart, James. 1947. ‘‘Some Notes on Public Administration and Administrative Law by Thomas Jefferson. The Journal of Politics 9:1--9. Johnson, Ronald N., and Gary D. Libecap. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Knott, Jack. H., and Gary. J. Miller. 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Light, Paul. 2004. ‘‘Fact Sheet on the Continuous Thickening of Government.’’ Brookings Institution, July 23, 2004. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/0723governance_ light.aspx. Light, Paul. 2006. ‘‘The New True Size of Government.’’ NYU Wagner Organizational Performance Initiative: Research Brief 2, New York University, August. http://wagner.nyu. edu/performance/files/True_Size.pdf. Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. New York: Norton. Meier, Kenneth J. 1979. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers. Mosher, Frederick C. Democracy and the Public Service. 1982. New York: Oxford University Press. Niskanen, William A. 1968. ‘‘The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy.’’ The American Economic Review 58 (2): 293--305. Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine, Atherton. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. North, Douglass C. 1994. ‘‘Economic Performance through Time.’’ The American Economic Review 84 (3): 359--368. O’Toole Jr., Laurence. 1987. ‘‘Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers, the Politics-administration Dichotomy, and the Rise of the Administrative State.’’ Public Administration Review 47 (1): 17--25. Perry, James L., and Hal G. Rainey. 1988. ‘‘The Public-Private Distinction in Organization Theory: A Critique and Research Strategy.’’ Academy of Management Review 13 (2):182--201. Rohr, John A. 1990. ‘‘The American Constitutional Tradition.’’ American Political Science Review 84 No. 2: 654--655. Rosenbloom, David H., and Suzanne J. Piotrowski. 2005. ‘‘Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms.’’ The American Review of Public Administration 35 (2):103. Rossiter, Clinton, ed. 1961. The Federalist Papers: Hamilton, Madison, Jay. New York: New American Library. Savas, Emanuel S. 2000. Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York: Chatham House. Seidman, Harold. 1998. Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization. New York: Oxford University Press. Simon, Herbert A. 1945. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. New York: Free Press. Stillman, Richard J. 2004. The American Bureaucracy: The Core of Modern Government. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2007. ‘‘Poverty Status of People 1959 to 2006.’’ Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements---Historical Tables, http://www. census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1982. ‘‘Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances & Employment.’’ 1982 Census of

390 The Federal Bureaucracy Governments, No. 4, Tables 6 and 7 (1982): 230--231; and data on public employment (for various years) obtained directly from the Census of Governments. U.S. Office of Personnel Management. 2009. ‘‘Employment and Trends.’’ Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics. Bimonthly and unpublished data. http://www.opm.gov/feddata/HistoricalTables/index.asp Van Riper, Paul P. 1983. ‘‘The American Administrative State: Wilson and the Founders---An Unorthodox View.’’ Public Administrative Review 43 (6): 477--490. Van Riper, Paul P. 1999. ‘‘Why Public Administration: When Not to Privatize.’’ Administrative Theory & Praxis 21 (3): 362--370. Waldo, Dwight. 1948. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. New York: Ronald Press Co. Wamsley, Gary L., and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. The Political Economy of Public Organizations: A Critique and Approach to the Study of Public Administration. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Warwick, Donald P., Marvin Meade, and Theodore Reed. 1975. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality,

and Organization in the State Department. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weber, Max. 1974. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1974. White, Leonard D. 1926. Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. New York: Macmillan. Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books

Notes 1. Max Weber (1864--1920) published Bureaucracy, in 1920, a statement on the distinguishing features of bureaucracies, an institution he considered necessary to all advanced societies. Although not translated until the 1940s, Weber’s writings are considered the starting point for analysis and critique on the subject. 2. See the U.S. Department of State Web site at http:// usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/history/ch11.htm.

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview Stephan Lavertu

Introduction

Federal, state, and local governments possess their own bureaucratic organizations. For example, your local school district is a bureaucracy, and its teachers are local bureaucrats. But the focus here is on the federal bureaucracy---particularly those organizations within the executive branch of the national government. For the purposes of this essay, bureaucracy should be taken to mean federal public bureaucracy. Simply put, the bureaucracy is a government apparatus that elected officials employ to implement policies that they enact, and one that elected officials empower to make and enforce policies of its own. It is impossible to synthesize accurately the role of American bureaucracy in one sentence, however. The following pages should make apparent that although this description provides an acceptable starting point, it fails to capture the bureaucracy’s multifaceted and contested role in contemporary America. This discussion is meant to elucidate the current role of the bureaucracy in the United States---the nature and scope of its responsibilities, its behavior, and its potential influence on American democracy. We begin by surveying the basics: what the bureaucracy does, what it looks like, and its size. Then, we consider how much and by what means Congress is able to control the behavior of bureaucrats. In turn, the yield from that analysis drives a discussion of whether or not the bureaucracy is accountable to American citizens. Finally, we discuss the ever-salient issues of bureaucratic inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and reform.

The term bureaucracy carries a tremendous amount of baggage in the United States. It often conjures up images of ‘‘red tape,’’ inept bureaucrats, and ‘‘big government.’’ It evokes such strong antipathy among some individuals that it is tempting to entertain the idea of avoiding the term altogether---to ensure that the following discussion be as objective and fruitful as possible. Doing so, however, is neither practicable nor appropriate, as the purpose of this essay is to reflect and gain some perspective on the role of bureaucracy itself. Hopefully, the problematic aspects of the term can be avoided by anchoring the discussion with a definition to ensure a shared understanding of what is meant by bureaucracy in the context of this essay. Bureaucracy is often shorthand for federal public bureaucracy, which is the definition used here. Generally speaking, a bureaucracy is an organization, private or public, that employs a hierarchical authority structure, division of labor, and rules and procedures to guide its operations. Firms such as Microsoft and WalMart are as much bureaucracies as are the Department of Defense and the Department of Education. So, the first distinction to make is that the topic of discussion is public, as opposed to private, bureaucracy. That a bureaucracy is public means that it is owned and operated by government, as opposed to private citizens. (The potential implications of this feature are significant and are discussed at length later in the essay.) The second distinction to make is with regard to the level of government at hand.

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Overview of Responsibilities, Organization, and Size Responsibilities The U.S. government is charged with maintaining order, protecting private property, and providing goods and services---particularly those goods and services the U.S. market economy cannot adequately supply. The bureaucracy performs these administrative duties and, therefore, is an essential part of American government.1 These tasks range from the relatively simple and repetitive, such as issuing social security checks and delivering mail, to the relatively complex and specialized, such as regulating pharmaceutical drugs, administering a space program, and providing homeland security. The need to fulfill these considerable responsibilities, which often requires a high degree of expertise and coordination, is why bureaucratic organizational form is indispensable for a government to operate effectively. Bureaucracy is characterized by a division of labor, which allows for expertise, as well as rules and procedures, which are necessary for coordination between numerous specialized organizational units. More specifically, bureaucratic organizations may implement policies enacted from above, make rules of their own, or adjudicate disputes. The first, implementation, is the function that people typically attribute to the federal bureaucracy. The president and Congress enact policies, and the bureaucracy translates them into practice. When laws that Congress passes are specific or prescriptive, then characterizing the bureaucracy’s job as ‘‘implementation’’ is accurate. For example, Congress recently mandated through law that the states implement education testing programs. In accordance with this legislative directive, the Department of Education is monitoring states’ compliance with the law. However, policies handed down from Congress are not always specific and their intent is not always clear, leaving the bureaucratic agent with discretion in their interpretation and implementation. When such ambiguity exists, bureaucratic organizations are implicitly given the authority to make policy---sometimes intentionally so. For example, it was not always clear in the No Child Left Behind law which students could be exempted from taking the exams. The Department of Education had some discretion in making additional specifications to clarify the law that states had to follow. Legislators sometimes write laws in an ambiguous manner for the very purpose of granting agencies this sort of policy discretion; but ambiguity often is simply a way of facilitating the passage of a bill, because

specifics often lead to more disagreement and inhibit the timely passage of legislation. In addition, Congress and the president may explicitly delegate policy-making authority to executive agencies---especially when expertise or objectivity are particularly important, as well as when they wish to distance themselves from controversial policy issues. For example, rulemaking authority is given to regulatory agencies and commissions. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) makes rules that have the force of law regarding how much pollution companies may emit (in accordance with a notice and comment procedure). The EPA also has the power to charge companies with violating those rules, judge whether or not the rules were violated, and dole out punishments. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) performed similar functions in response to Janet Jackson’s 2004 Super Bowl halftime show. The FCC launched an investigation, charged subsidiaries of Viacom with violating its indecency standard, and doled out a fine of $550,000. So, the FCC fulfills its legislatively mandated obligation to define the indecency rules, determines the culpability of parties it believes violated those rules, and issues punishments through fines (implementation, policy making, and adjudication). Depending on the policy area, bureaucratic agencies may have the power to make and implement policy, as well as adjudicate disputes---in other words, they may possess executive, legislative, or judicial powers.

Organization The organizations that often come to mind when one thinks about the bureaucracy are the 15 departments operating under the auspices of the president’s cabinet. Homeland Security, State, and Defense are the cabinet departments that probably have received the most publicity as of late. But bureaucracy extends across all branches of government and comes in many different forms. The focus here is on bureaucracy in terms of executive agencies. But as Figure 1 shows, the Office of the President, Congress, and the judicial branch all rely on bureaucratic organizations to fulfill their functions---such as the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, respectively. The executive agencies outside of the Office of the President---the bureaucracy of concern in this essay--may be divided into the following three categories: (1) cabinet departments, (2) independent agencies, and (3) government corporations. The 15 cabinet departments at the center of the above diagram are the classic

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview

Mel Karmazin (right), president of Viacom Inc., owner of both CBS and MTV, and National Football League Commissioner Paul Tagliabue testify before the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on the ‘‘Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004’’ on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on February 11, 2004. The hearing was prompted by complaints after singer Janet Jackson exposed her breast on television during the halftime show of the 2004 NFL Super Bowl. (Luke Frazza/ AFP/Getty Images)

bureaucratic organizations. The president’s cabinet is part of the Office of the President, and includes the secretaries of these fifteen departments---all of whom the president appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate. Ostensibly, these departments are directly accountable to the president because agency heads serve at the pleasure of the president. One noteworthy development is that legislative and judicial authority increasingly is being placed in these executive departments through the creation of Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs). Examples of such agencies include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), within the Department of Transportation. The independent agencies and government corporations are intermingled in the large box at the bottom of Figure 1. They reside outside the department hierarchy and enjoy more autonomy than the cabinet departments, although the president still appoints and may

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exercise considerable authority over their heads. Notable examples of independent agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 Some of these independent agencies have the rulemaking and judicial authority mentioned earlier, while others do not. Government corporations, on the other hand, are essentially government-run businesses that charge for their services. The most notable example is the United States Postal Service (USPS). There are few public corporations in the United States, however. For the most part, Americans entrust the market to run industry and charge government with regulating it, which is why the United States relies more heavily on regulatory organizations than other industrial countries. A type of independent agency long considered to be unique is the Independent Regulatory Commission (IRC). Like DRAs, IRCs have legislative and judicial authority over their respective jurisdictions. They may be involved in economic regulation, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or social regulation, such as the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). Unlike DRAs and the other agencies reviewed above, however, IRCs are not run hierarchically by an appointed agency head. Instead, these commissions utilize pluralistic leadership arrangements. Leadership is shared among multiple, bipartisan board members or commissioners (although the president’s party enjoys a plurality of leadership positions), and decisions are made by majority-rule voting. For example, the FCC voted on its indecency standard, as well as on its decision to punish Viacom for Janet Jackson’s halftime show. Moreover, those in the leadership, although still appointed by the president, serve long, staggered, and fixed terms and therefore enjoy substantial autonomy from the president. These organizational structures are meant to isolate commissions from political pressures and allow for objective, expert decision making. As mentioned, however, such regulatory commissions increasingly come in the form of DRAs, which are less independent and more susceptible to presidential influence. The structural differences between the types of agencies just reviewed pose consequences for bureaucratic behavior and accountability---topics which we touch on later in the essay.

Size Whether the federal executive bureaucracy is ‘‘big’’ is a matter of personal judgment, but the bureaucracy is nonetheless more expansive than Figure 1 suggests. Many of the above offices, agencies, and departments

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Figure 1. Organizational Chart of the U.S. Government Source: Adapted from the U.S. Government Manual: 2004--2005 edition. It and other organizational charts can be accessed on the U.S. General Printing Office Web site at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/browse-gm-04.html#independent.

are themselves intricate hierarchical organizations, consisting of equally intricate bureaus and offices with an array of responsibilities. For instance, the Department of Justice contains a number of offices, divisions, and bureaus---including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, just to name a few. The organizational chart of the Department of Homeland Security exemplifies the sometimes complex organizational hierarchy characteristic of federal bureaucracy. The size of the bureaucracy can be measured in a number of ways---each suggesting different notions of small and large. Generally, one can measure the size of the bureaucracy by (1) counting its employees or (2) tallying expenditures. Both of these methods are not as straightforward as they appear, however. Let us first consider the number of federal employees. One can either count the number of full-time civil servants (or bureaucrats) in executive agencies, or one can count the number of ‘‘employees’’ that produce goods for the federal government. This distinction is particularly

important in the United States, where a comparatively large number of government functions are contracted out to private entities or mandated to state and local governments. For example, in 1996 President Clinton boasted that the number of full-time civilian employees was 1.9 million, down by 400,000 since the end of the Vietnam War. However, if one instead were to count the number of full-time-equivalent employees that performed all government functions, one could add 12.7 million full-time-equivalent jobs to the count. Moreover, if one adds postal workers and military personnel, the number of full-time-equivalent employees grows to 17 million. In other words, the number of federal employees in 1996 may be estimated to be 17 million (about 12.7 percent of the 1996 U.S. labor force) instead of 1.9 million (about 1.4 percent of the U.S labor force) if this ‘‘shadow government’’ is included (data on and the term ‘‘shadow government’’ are taken from Light 1999). In addition to including ‘‘shadow government,’’ there are different ways to gauge how small or large the federal bureaucratic workforce actually is. One way

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Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Source: Adapted from the U.S. Government Manual: 2004--2005 edition. It and other organizational charts can be accessed on the U.S. General Printing Office Web site at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/browse-gm-04.html#independent.

is to compare the size of this workforce over time--with an increase in the absolute number of employees indicating a larger government. However, the size of the federal workforce may be more appropriately measured as a percentage of the overall American labor

force. Figures 3 and 4 display the size of the federal workforce in absolute numbers (see Figure 3) and as a percentage of the labor force (see Figure 4). The dark area represents total in-house civilian employees and excludes ‘‘shadow government’’ and military personnel.

Figure 3. The Federal Workforce in Absolute Numbers Source: The federal employment figures are taken from the Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2005 (although data from 1971--1979 and 1981--1984 are interpolated). It is available on the Office of Management and Budget Web site at http://www. whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/.

396 The Federal Bureaucracy

Figure 4. Percentage of the Labor Force Source: Data on the size of the U.S. labor force are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004- 2005 published by the U.S. Census Bureau. It is available at http:// www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html. The estimates of ‘‘shadow government’’ are taken from Light (1999).

This is the head count that the federal government typically reports. The lighter area represents total executive employment, including uniformed personnel employed through the Department of Defense. Finally, the dotted lines indicate the 1984, 1990, and 1996 estimates when one includes the portion of the shadow government consisting of contract-created jobs, grantcreated jobs, and U.S. postal workers.3 Another way to gauge the size of the bureaucracy--or, more precisely, the size of government---is to measure government spending (which also includes the spending on the staffs of all three federal branches and program costs that are above and beyond employee costs). Some may consider this measure a bit crude because it includes nondiscretionary spending such as Social Security and Medicare, whose rapidly rising costs arguably may be out of contemporary policy makers’ hands and questionable measures of the size of the federal bureaucracy. On the other hand, government outlays, the amount of

money spent by the Department of the Treasury each year, do not present the problem of ‘‘hidden’’ government employees as the head counts do. As with the employee count, one may standardize the estimates. Figure 5 presents government outlays in constant dollars to control for inflation, as well as government outlays as a percentage of the size of the U.S. economy, as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP). It is no longer clear whether the size of the American bureaucracy remains smaller than that of other industrial nations when one includes estimates of contracted, state, and local government employees. Contemporary estimates seem to indicate that some foreign governments are shrinking and that the American government is growing---at least relative to each other. The size of government seems to be constant as a percentage of the size of the U.S. economy, and the number of civil servants is actually decreasing as a percentage of the labor force. But one can argue that standardizing in this way

Figure 5. Government Outlays in Constant Dollars Source: Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2005. It is available on the Office of Management and Budget Web site at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ fy2005/. The figures include off-budget expenses, such as Medicare, Social Security, and funding for the U.S. Postal Service.

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview is inappropriate. The U.S. bureaucracy is taking on ever more responsibilities and is growing in size, as government spending trends make apparent. Moreover, conventional wisdom suggests that the number of contracted workers and other less visible federal employees has risen since 1970, even though recent estimates suggest that these numbers have also leveled off. Clearly, whether or not the U.S. bureaucracy is large depends on one’s perspective. The data can be made to bolster either case. Americans have long been suspicious of big government. And although a majority of Americans view government programs and employees in a generally positive light, they tend to think that the bureaucracy operates ineffectively and inefficiently. In the 1990s, this general sentiment led both Republicans and Democrats to make calls for smaller yet more effective government, and President Clinton’s Reinventing Government initiative was a product of this sentiment. Public pressure to do more with less may be forcing elected officials to implement government programs in a less visible fashion through ‘‘shadow government’’---by contracting out work to less visible employees (Light 1999).

Control and Discretion Now that we have laid out the bureaucracy’s general duties, organization, and scope, we can delve into the ‘‘so what?’’ question. In other words, we can elaborate on these characteristics and begin to consider their implications. Perhaps the most essential concept to consider in drawing these implications is that of control, as it lies at the very heart of the controversy over the accountability and responsiveness of the bureaucracy---the ultimate topic addressed in this essay. Specifically, the question of interest is the following: Does Congress, the central representative body of American democracy, indeed control the bureaucracy? Ostensibly, Congress controls bureaucratic behavior. Legislators make the laws and the president implements them via the bureaucracy. However, earlier in this essay, we established that this is not necessarily so. Bureaucrats themselves may have the power to make laws, either because the legislative intent behind certain laws is ambiguous, or because Congress gives them this power explicitly. In other words, bureaucrats often possess considerable discretion in how they implement laws, and they are sometimes given explicit power to make laws of their own by means of rulemaking. Moreover, even if the law is clear and the legislature does not explicitly give bureaucrats policy-making authority, bureaucrats may exercise considerable discretion in

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their duties, as it is debatable whether Congress possesses the necessary tools to impose its will. At first glance it appears that Congress’s means for controlling bureaucratic behavior are overwhelming. Congress can exercise control via its budgetary power, its power over presidential appointments, and of course, its ability to legislate. Congress’s budgetary power---its power of the purse---enables it to cut the budgets of recalcitrant agencies, if necessary. As most agencies rely on yearly budget reauthorizations, this is a potentially effective means of oversight and control. In addition, Congress has the authority to confirm or reject presidential appointments to key leadership positions throughout the bureaucracy. This power in theory enables it to make sure that agency leaders share its policy preferences and administrative priorities. Finally, Congress can control bureaucratic behavior by passing laws. Congress creates agencies through legislation and in so doing can build in rules, procedures, and incentives that guide bureaucratic behavior in the appropriate direction. And if bureaucrats exercise discretion in a manner that is out of step with the preferences of legislators, members of Congress can pass new laws to curtail this discretion. So, if Congress sees problems with bureaucratic behavior, it appears to possess the tools necessary to correct them. If Congress indeed has such effective control mechanisms at its disposal, then how could it be that bureaucrats exercise discretion in a way that conflicts with congressional wishes? One reason is that the bureaucracy has an informational advantage over Congress. Political scientists often characterize this as a ‘‘principal-agent’’ problem. In our case, Congress is the principal and bureaucrats are the agents. The principal employs an agent to perform a task---oftentimes because the agent possesses the expertise necessary to complete the task. The problem with this arrangement is that the agents (bureaucrats) are better informed as to what services they are performing and the true cost of those services. Many people encounter such a situation when taking their car to a mechanic, for example. The customer (principal) employs a mechanic (agent) to diagnose and fix his or her car---presumably because the mechanic possesses the time and expertise to fix the car. In this case, only the mechanic knows what is wrong with the car and the customer is dependent on the mechanic’s word when it comes to the cost. A mechanic can conceivably charge the customer for work that he or she completed inadequately, or perhaps did not complete at all. Moreover, the mechanic may perform work that the customer would not have opted to purchase had he or she possessed enough information to make his or her own

398 The Federal Bureaucracy assessment. In other words, the principal is at a disadvantage when attempting to monitor the agent because the agent possesses superior information. Likewise, Congress’s ability to monitor agency compliance and control agency behavior via its lawmaking and budgetary powers is seriously curtailed because Congress is at an informational disadvantage in relation to the bureaucracy. Another reason that bureaucrats may have considerable discretion is that legislators neither have the inclination nor the resources to monitor bureaucratic behavior constantly. Many political scientists argue that monitoring agency compliance typically has low electoral payoff for legislators and that their efforts are better directed elsewhere until there is some controversy that makes focusing on agency compliance more electorally rewarding. Moreover, constantly monitoring all aspects of agency behavior can be costly and inefficient---perhaps requiring staff to produce detailed reports and taking time away from legislators’ other responsibilities. Seeing as Congress and the bureaucracy are already perceived to be unproductive and highly inefficient, respectively, constantly monitoring agency behavior may be doubly undesirable. The customer-mechanic analogy extends to this point as well. The customer could recruit knowledgeable friends to look over the mechanics work, or he or she could learn enough about cars to personally evaluate the mechanic’s performance. At some point, however, this oversight is not worth the cost to the customer. The larger the bureaucracy becomes, and the more expertise its responsibilities require, the greater this problem becomes. The principal-agent problem is characteristic of all manager-employ relationships, and it is of consequence to varying degrees within the executive branch as well. Presumably, the president and Congress exert influence over bureaucrats via their appointments of top-level agency managers. But even cabinet secretaries, the agency heads that arguably are the most susceptible to presidential influence, may enjoy considerable discretion because of their informational advantages. The president is dependent on them for information regarding budget, policy, and other matters, and agency heads have the opportunity to exploit that relationship to achieve their own ends. In turn, these agency heads experience a principal-agent problem with their subordinates---especially because their subordinates, unlike them, are often career employees and therefore may have substantial informational advantages. Some bureaucratic organizations develop strong organizational cultures and are said to become resistant to change,

with little regard for directives from their political principals. This phenomenon is often described as bureaucratic inertia. As mentioned earlier, different types of agencies enjoy different levels of independence from the president, with IRCs perhaps enjoying the most independence due to the manner in which their leadership is appointed. The principal-agent problem is most pronounced with these type of agencies, at least when the president is the principal of concern. This arguably lends Congress more control over the agency relative to the president. Again, however, regulatory agencies established as of late tend to be DRAs, often placed within the cabinet departments and more susceptible to presidential authority. This, in turn, presents more opportunity for the president and the bureaucratic apparatus to exercise discretion in a manner that undermines congressional influence. It is import to remember that the principal-agent relationship and the discretionary powers that agencies may enjoy are not always problematic. The relationship exists because government needs the bureaucracy to administer programs. Bureaucratic experts are often purposefully given discretion over issues that demand expertise and objectivity---issues too important to be left to politicians whose goals may lead to suboptimal policies. The Federal Reserve Board and its chairman enjoy significant discretion precisely because politicians do not trust themselves to act objectively on monetary matters. Moreover, as I mention above, completely ridding ourselves of the principal-agent problem may not be cost-effective. One way of controlling bureaucrats is to impose specific rules and procedures to ensure that they act in accordance with the preferences of their political principals. In other words, imposing ‘‘red tape,’’ those rules and procedures that Americans loathe and attribute to bureaucratic inefficiency, is often the cost of exerting more control over bureaucrats. Sometimes discretion is intended, and sometimes it is not. Sometimes it is desirable, and sometimes it is not. What is safe to say, however, is that the principal-agent problem---where discretionary powers are not intentionally given---should be expected to grow as the scope of bureaucratic responsibilities and the expertise necessary to fulfill them increase. These developments exacerbate Congress’s informational disadvantage and inability to monitor. Finally, it is also worth noting that Congress is not helpless in the face of this increasing informational imbalance. Beyond the mechanisms of control we reviewed earlier (such as budgetary, legislative, and appointment powers), Congress has adapted its own organization in increase its control over the bureaucracy.

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview Congress has enhanced its ability to oversee and investigate bureaucratic activities by bulking up its own staff and alleviating its informational disadvantage---in other words, by increasing its ability to acquire information of its own. For example, it employs the GAO and the OTA (Office of Technology Assessment) to undertake research and evaluate the efficacy of the bureaucracy.4 Not only has Congress enhanced its monitoring capabilities, but some political science scholars think that a focus on monitoring leads one to underestimate the level of congressional control. One can liken such monitoring to police patrols---where police constantly patrol the streets in an effort to prevent and uncover crimes. However, the most effective control mechanism at Congress’s disposal may come from ‘‘fire alarm’’ oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Firefighters do not roam the streets looking for fires---they wait for an alarm to sound and then jump in their trucks. Likewise, some political scientists believe that legislators need not constantly monitor agency behavior, as their constituents and other interested groups will make them aware if agencies behave in a problematic manner. Moreover, the very threat of a ‘‘fire alarm’’

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going off may be sufficient to keep bureaucratic behavior in line with legislator preferences. Although Congress can exercise only a limited amount of ‘‘police patrol’’ oversight because of cost considerations, the existence of ‘‘fire alarm’’ oversight may be sufficient to effectively direct bureaucratic behavior. So, then who controls bureaucrats? The answer is that it depends. Traditional notions of bureaucratic control place the preponderance of power in the hands of Congress, but it appears that the relationship is not so clear-cut. In fact, at various times, scholars have deemed ultimate control to reside in the hands of Congress, unrepresentative congressional committees, bureaucrats themselves, interest groups, or a combination of these. Moreover, although bureaucrats often have the theoretical opportunity to exercise discretion, as just discussed, this does not mean that discretion is exercised in an undermining fashion, if at all. Bureaucrats’ policy preferences may not conflict with Congress’s, and it appears that their personal preferences may not be so consequential anyhow. Research indicates that although bureaucrats tend to be more liberal than their political principals, most take moderate

House Budget Chairman John M. Spratt Jr. (D-SC), and Senate Budget Chairman Kent Conrad (D-ND), during a news conference on the Congressional Budget Office’s January budget and economic outlook. (Scott J. Ferrell/Congressional Quarterly/Getty Images)

400 The Federal Bureaucracy positions and attempt to implement mandated policy--even if they are in disagreement. All one can say for sure is that, although Congress has many tools of control at its disposal, there is opportunity for its wishes to be undermined. Those opportunities arguably have increased as Congress delegates ever more authority to bureaucrats, and different groups take advantage of those opportunities to varying degrees.

Democratic Accountability Democracy is premised on the notion that government must be accountable to its citizens and responsive to their changing needs and wishes. In other words, government should do what its citizens want and be held responsible when it fails to do so. But defining citizen preferences is difficult on many levels. The principalagent relationship we reviewed above assumes that citizen preferences are expressed through elected congress members and that the bureaucracy, therefore, ought to be accountable and responsive to the wishes of Congress. Bureaucrats exercise discretion when they are able to make and enforce policy without being accountable to Congress---and this may result in bureaucrats behaving in an unresponsive manner. From the perspective of this top-down relationship, bureaucratic discretion undermines government accountability--especially since bureaucrats are not themselves elected. Top-down accountability arguably has become increasingly tenuous over the years. The world has become more complex, and the bureaucratic apparatus has had to grow and contain an increasing amount of expertise as a result. The growth of bureaucracy and its increasing informational advantage has required legislators to delegate evermore policy-making authority to bureaucrats, as well as private companies, nonprofit organizations, and state and local levels of government (the ‘‘shadow government’’ referenced earlier). In addition, government reformers have made a conscious effort to devolve power to bureaucrats working at the local level. The hope has been to make government more effective and efficient by making it more responsive to local needs. Again, from this top-down perspective, one can argue that bureaucracy---in other words, the American government---is becoming less and less accountable to its citizens. Yet some would argue that the appropriate citizen preferences to consider when thinking about accountability are not always those translated through Congress. There are groups in society that have a vested interest in certain policies areas---often because they are more directly affected by those policies. For

example, companies regulated by the EPA or the states that must implement the No Child Left Behind testing program have a large stake in the policies made by federal bureaucrats. Congress has passed laws over the years to enfranchise these groups---to make certain that the bureaucracy is accountable and responsive to groups that have the largest stake in their actions. For example, the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 requires that rulemaking agencies publicize proposed rules and that they allow interested parties to comment on them before they take effect. Moreover, court decisions in the 1970s make it easier for interested groups to contest bureaucratic rules and decisions through the courts. These measures are consistent with top-down accountability in the sense that they make bureaucratic actions more visible and allow for more congressional oversight. But when this sort of responsiveness to groups is extended to local citizens or the ‘‘customers’’ of bureaucratic programs and services, and when local bureaucrats are awarded the discretion to meet those needs as they see fit, then one is headed toward a ‘‘bottom-up’’ notion of accountability. The bottom-up perspective suggests that accountability may actually be enhanced by devolving power and increasing bureaucratic discretion. In fact, some scholars suggest that the very reason that American bureaucracy has been able to grow and develop such autonomy and influence in policy making is because of its responsiveness to its constituencies---the networks of individuals and groups that interact with bureaucratic organizations on a regular basis. For example, public schools consistently receive high approval ratings from students’ parents. The American public tends to believe that public schools as a whole are in need of reform, but they think highly of their children’s schools and teachers---the bureaucracies and bureaucrats with whom they interact on a regular basis. Presumably, local school districts have been responsive enough to their local constituents to earn this positive reputation. Many advocate involving citizens in bureaucratic decisions and devolving power not just to bureaucrats, but to local bureaucrats, to bring government closer to the people---and to make American government more responsive to the needs of local constituencies. An obvious tension exists between top-down and bottom-up notions of accountability. Top-down accountability ensures that policies are applied to everyone according to the wishes of Americans as they are expressed through Congress; whereas bottom-up accountability seeks to make policies more responsive to the preferences of local constituencies, which means that policies may not be implemented consistently throughout

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview the country. On the whole, the focus still remains on topdown accountability. Congress imposes countless rules and procedures (‘‘red tape’’) on bureaucrats to ensure that they implement policies fairly and as intended. The notion of fairness in particular deserves to be emphasized. It is a concept that many consider to be fundamental to an accountable democratic government. This focus on fairness and the related concept of equity helps explain why bureaucratic organizations perform as they do. Although politicians want bureaucracy to be efficient and accountable to local constituents, they also want it to treat and provide service to all Americans in a consistent fashion. The red tape imposed on bureaucratic organizations is there to ensure top-down accountability and meet democratic ideals of equity. If one views accountability in these terms, bureaucracy can be seen as having become less accountable as it has grown, acquired more policy-making power, and delegated more of its responsibilities to lower-level governments and nongovernment employees. If one is partial to the bottom-up perspective, however, these developments may be seen as leading to more democratic accountability.

Efficiency and Effectiveness The introduction to this essay asserts that private organizations such as Microsoft and Wal-Mart are just as much bureaucracies as the organizations within the federal public bureaucracy. They utilize a division of labor, and rely on hierarchical authority structures and rules and procedures to direct and coordinate the tasks of their organizational units. Like public bureaucracies, these private organizations also are constrained by rules and procedures and suffer from the principle-agent problem. Then what is it that makes them so different? Why do people perceive private bureaucracy to be more efficient and effective than public bureaucracy? The short answer is that public bureaucracy is often perceived to be less efficient and less effective than private bureaucracy because it often probably is---at least in terms of providing the most effective and least costly solutions to our nation’s problems. But before examining why that may be, it is worth noting that it often cannot be known whether a public organization is efficient or effective because government tasks are usually difficult to measure in these terms. These concepts beg the question: efficient and effective compared to what? Private firms produce goods that the market values in monetary terms. It is relatively easy to determine the marginal cost of these goods and then observe whether or not that cost exceeds the market price. In theory, one knows whether a firm is efficient and effective

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depending on whether or not it turns a profit. But few public bureaucracies produce goods or services that are quantifiable in monetary terms. For example, how does one measure how efficient and effective the Department of State is in lowering the threat of terrorism? Its outputs are difficult to measure, and the outcomes that these outputs produce are perhaps impossible to measure. The Department’s diplomatic efforts are only some of many tactics employed by government to curb terrorism, so positive outcomes are not easily attributed to its efforts. Moreover, it is difficult to measure gains in domestic safety in the first place, as that would require knowing what would have happened had the Department of State not performed its functions. Finally, even though the cost of its operations can be determined by looking at the department budget, it is impossible to know whether another organization could have performed them at lower cost, because there is no market to make such comparisons. Measuring efficiency and effectiveness is difficult even if one looks at a government corporation such as the USPS. One can measure the volume of mail delivered, how much it cost to deliver it, and how often mail is lost or delivered to the wrong address. In this case, the cost and output can be identified and linked to outcomes. But whether or not the USPS is effective and efficient is a matter of comparison, and for the most part, there are no other mail delivery corporations to which one can compare it. Moreover, government corporations such as the USPS are rare, as the American government tends to let the private sector produce such goods and services (and opts for regulating the industry if markets are believed to produce the goods in a suboptimal manner). The point is that it is usually impossible to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of public bureaucratic organizations. Typically, however, it is reasonable to assume that government organizations are less efficient and less effective than they could be. One reason is that although efficiency is often the sole goal of private firms, it is seldom the sole goal of public organizations. As discussed earlier with regard to accountability, Congress often mandates that equity be a primary concern of government organizations. For example, the USPS arguably is inefficient because it provides its services to all citizens for the same price. Operating a post office in a small, remote town may be less cost-effective than operating an office in a large city. A private firm would either charge more for its services in that remote town or neglect it altogether. The USPS, however, does not have that luxury. It is forced to pursue equity goals. Basically, public bureaucracy is often less efficient than private

402 The Federal Bureaucracy bureaucracy because it is pursuing goals unrelated to efficiency.5 Moreover, these goals are imposed on them from a multitude of political principals---and, like equity and efficiency, these goals often conflict with one another. Inefficiency and ineffectiveness may also result because public bureaucracies lack the incentive structure that organizations in the private sector possess. Managers in private bureaucracies often have incentives to improve service and limit costs. Their jobs depend on whether or not the firm can compete in the market place. If the firm does not perform well, then managers may be replaced or the firm may go out of business. Either way, whether or not managers bring home paychecks is often dependent on their performance. Moreover, managers in private bureaucracy often have incentives to excel, as opposed to just survive. Managers’ pay may be tied to performance. Through bonuses and other monetary incentives, managers stand to make more money if the organization yields a larger profit. In other words, managers of private bureaucracy have an incentive to work hard and monitor and motivate their employees to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of their organization---thereby increasing their personal well-being. In turn, their subordinates have the same sort of incentives, and on down the hierarchical authority structure. Public bureaucrats typically lack these incentives. For all practical purposes, public bureaucracies are monopolies. Bureaucrats often lack a financial incentive to maximize efficiency and effectiveness because the financial well-being of their organizations is not at stake. The budgets of government agencies are seldom cut, let alone removed altogether. Americans want to limit government spending in theory, but they also want their government programs and are rarely willing to give them up once they exist. Maintaining agency funding therefore rarely serves as an incentive for bureaucratic performance. Moreover, agency managers typically do not have the discretion to retain cost-savings and distribute them to employees to encourage good performance. In turn, bureaucrats do not stand to maximize their financial well-being by maximizing their performance on the job, as their salaries remain fixed (all else being equal). Finally, existing rules often make it difficult to dismiss career civil servants. Again, public bureaucracies are constrained by rules meant to ensure fairness, and such rules exist with regard to hiring and firing. Americans are leery of cronyism in government---they believe that jobs should be doled out in terms of merit, as opposed to ideology, race, gender, or any other factor unrelated to one’s

ability to effectively perform one’s job. One could argue that some of these rules may in fact benefit government services, as public bureaucracies’ monopoly position makes them especially susceptible to jobs being allocated on a basis unrelated to competence. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that due to their incentive structures, public bureaucrats are more likely than private bureaucrats to underperform, which may lead to ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Not only are managers of public bureaucracies disallowed to redistribute savings to encourage good performance, but budget surpluses at the end of the fiscal year are typically taken from agencies. Essentially, money is taken away from those agencies that are able to cut costs. Moreover, spending less than the amount allotted by Congress may send a signal to legislators that an agency does not need as large a budget during the following fiscal year. This may create a perverse incentive to spend more than necessary. Scholars sometimes point to other incentives for bureaucracies to spend more than necessary. For example, legislators benefit from pleasing their constituents and they may require bureaucracies to overproduce certain goods or services to do so. Congress members may secure funding for public works projects in their districts, such as building roads or highways. Doing so may be unnecessary and therefore inefficient. Incentives exist that motivate bureaucrats not only to perform necessary tasks inefficiently and ineffectively, but also to provide what may be unnecessary services---which is inefficient in a different sense. Issues of efficiency and effectiveness are difficult to evaluate because the terms are difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. The incentive structures of public bureaucracies suggest that they have the potential to perform inefficiently and ineffectively in comparison with private bureaucracies. Public bureaucrats also pursue inherently inefficient goals, such as equity; and the numerous, often-conflicting rules that a multitude of political principals impose on them may render bureaucratic processes even less efficient and effective. For example, the volume of constraints imposed on bureaucrats slows down its operations and impedes its ability to react to changing conditions. It is important to recognize, however, that many public bureaucracies in fact may not operate less efficiently. Some public bureaucracies actually may be more efficient than their private counterparts. Monopolistic behavior also occurs in the private sector, and the Enron and Worldcom scandals show how corruption can result in highly inefficient outcomes. The set of rules that Americans currently want to impose on the

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview private sector to curb Enron-like corruption is regulation---that is, it is ‘‘red tape.’’ The accountability rules imposed on the bureaucracy are often meant to prevent such corruption. In this sense, sometimes more careful monitoring of agents (bureaucrats) by principals (legislators, bureaucratic managers or citizens) is not entirely inefficient. Moreover, many bureaucrats are professionals who are motivated not by their salaries, but by the norms of their professions and a general desire to perform well. So, although there are reasons to believe that public bureaucracy has the potential to be less efficient, this is not necessarily so. Besides, when Americans consider the additional, socially desirable goals that bureaucracies pursue, many may feel that this inefficiency is entirely justified.

Reforming Bureaucracy American public opinion regarding the federal bureaucracy is complicated.6 It appears that a strong majority of Americans support the federal programs that bureaucrats administer. And in 1997, toward the tail end of a prominent and longtime campaign of publicizing bureaucratic waste and ineffectiveness, about 70 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of government workers. The prominent federal agencies scored very well. For example, the USPS and the FDA drew favorable ratings of 89 and 75 percent, respectively. In addition, as of 1997, about two-thirds of Americans thought that the federal government had the right amount of power or needed more power to meet societal needs. Nevertheless, although Americans approve of the government’s programmatic scope and its employees, they still tend to think that everything the government does is inefficient and ineffective, and they doubt that government can take on additional responsibilities. In other words, they feel favorably toward government but do not believe that it performs well. If one combines these findings with the old maxim that Americans tend to feel more favorably toward local government, then it is understandable that the United States possesses a ‘‘shadow government.’’ The size of government must expand to provide the services that citizens demand, but it also must appear to remain the same---it may need to be hidden by contracting out services to nongovernmental entities and by placing more responsibility in the hands of local and state bureaucracies. The attempt to ‘‘reinvent government’’ during the Clinton years is consistent with the public sentiments enumerated above. In 1993, President Clinton charged

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Vice President Al Gore with administering the National Performance Review (NPR), an initiative meant to get at the source of perceived bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Basically, the vice president’s findings suggested that much ‘‘red tape’’ should be removed, that power should be decentralized, and that federal agencies should be more customer-driven. In other words, reformers wanted to move away from top-down accountability and all the constraints that such an arrangement entails, toward a framework in which bureaucratic managers could act with discretion and citizens could serve as principals to these bureaucrats. The belief was that decentralizing bureaucracy---giving bureaucratic managers more discretion in administering programs---would make public bureaucracy more efficient and effective. In theory, government would be more efficient and effective because expert managers that are closer to the target populations of government programs are better poised to make management decisions. This reform effort is part of a larger trend in industrial nations that involves introducing market mechanisms in government operations. It entails contracting out government services to nongovernment entities, privatizing or deregulating industry, and devolving power to local-level governments. Not only is this ‘‘new public management’’ often seen as more efficient, but it is also consistent with the desire of Americans to accomplish more with less. The move toward such arrangements, which can be traced back several decades, does not come without its risks. Indeed, as discussed throughout this essay, there are costs to lending bureaucratic organizations discretion and devolving power to local levels of government. Moreover, government in large part exists to address issues and pursue goals that cannot always be left to markets. The perfect balance between efficiency and equity, as well as conflicting notions of accountability, is difficult to strike. The appropriate balance depends on the political climate of the times. The desire of Americans to curb government growth and critique its performance comes in waves, although these waves ride an underlying trend of government growth.

Summary and Conclusion The essay began with a definition of bureaucracy that likened government agencies to private corporations. Like government organizations, private organizations may be considered bureaucracies when they are organized hierarchically and employ a division of labor, rules, and procedures to manage their operations. Our

404 The Federal Bureaucracy focus then narrowed to the federal public bureaucracy. To ground and hint at the analysis to come, we reviewed the purpose, layout, and size of the federal public bureaucracy that resides within the executive branch. Bureaucracy is charged with providing the goods and services that Americans have deemed cannot or should not be provided by private markets. The organizational chart of the U.S. government, as well as the chart for the Department of Homeland Security, illustrated the breadth of these government responsibilities and the need for bureaucratic organization to coordinate them. Bureaucratic agencies can be categorized according to the types of functions they perform and the amount of control the president has on their operations. The cabinet departments are theoretically the most responsive to presidential authority, as the president has significant formal power over them via appointments, as well as other methods. Outside of the cabinet departments, agencies enjoy more, yet varying degrees of, autonomy from the president. And there are differences between those agencies that perform functions analogous to those of private corporations and those that do not, as well as those that possess explicit rulemaking authority. Agencies within these rough categories, however, may have the power to make and enforce policies of their own. In contrast to conventional wisdom, which suggests that bureaucracy serves only to implement policies enacted by politicians, Congress often delegates authority to bureaucratic agencies to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The size of the federal public bureaucracy, an especially salient topic in American politics, came next. We reviewed different methods of gauging the size of the federal bureaucracy. The first method, counting the number of full-time civil servants, suggests that the size of the federal bureaucracy has remained steady over the last 30 years. Including estimates of ‘‘shadow government’’ drastically increases the size of government, but the estimates do not go far enough back to see how much government has increased in size when one includes all potential, full-time-equivalent employees. The second method of measuring the size of government involves measuring spending. When measured as a percentage of GDP, the size of government indeed appears to be steady over the last 30 years. However, measuring government spending in current dollars (adjusted for inflation) suggests bureaucratic growth. Clearly, whether the numbers presented are large or not is a matter of interpretation. Depending on which statistics one focuses, the interpretation may change.

After laying this groundwork, we delved into issues of control and accountability. Using the principal-agent relationship as a lens, we reviewed the problems that Congress and bureaucratic leaders and managers may have in controlling what bureaucrats do. Bureaucrats are sometimes able to exercise considerable discretion in their work due to their informational advantages. This discretion, however, may be good or bad depending on the preferences of bureaucrats and the way they approach their jobs. Moreover, whether this relationship is problematic depends on how one conceptualizes accountability. The traditional top-down notion of accountability suggests that bureaucrats should be accountable to legislators and perhaps the president, as they are responsible for translating the preferences of the American people into policy. On the other hand, some believe that bottom-up accountability should be emphasized. In this case, the increasing discretion of bureaucrats may be seen as a positive development because the ‘‘customers’’ of government programs are the individuals to whom bureaucrats should be accountable. Finally, we dealt with the ever-controversial issues of bureaucratic inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and reform. Although organizationally similar, there are many reasons why private bureaucracies are probably more efficient than public bureaucracies. Basically, public bureaucracies have goals that extend beyond efficiency (such as equity) and the incentives that guide bureaucratic behavior may promote, or at least fail to hinder, inefficient and ineffective behavior. Moreover, we observed that these issues are inextricably linked to issues of accountability and government responsiveness. There is an inherent tension between efficiency, equity, and the related concept of accountability. Reforms as of late have sought to decentralize bureaucracy in the hopes of promoting efficiency and effectiveness, as well as a bottom-up view of accountability. This discussion illustrated the complex role that the bureaucracy occupies in contemporary American politics. Whether or not the bureaucracy as the operating arm of the American government is performing in a way that is consistent with democratic ideals is difficult to decipher, as it necessarily depends on one’s conception of accountability. Similarly, whether or not the government is too large and operates in an ineffective and inefficient manner is not only difficult to measure, but it too is a matter of perspective and judgment. For example, are the potential inefficiencies of government bureaucracy justifiable when one considers the reasons for these inefficiencies? In a way, the discussion clouds the picture more than it crystallizes it. But this may be an especially productive

Contemporary Bureaucracy: An Overview outcome when one considers the topic at hand. Debates regarding the American bureaucratic apparatus evoke simplistic assertions from all concerned. Perhaps framing our debates in the terms here employed will help prevent our talking past one another.

References and Further Reading Light, Paul C. 1999. The True Size of Government. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. ‘‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.’’ American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 165--179. Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Book.

Notes 1. The authoritative book on bureaucratic behavior is James Q. Wilson’s Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989). It provides an exhaustive look at American bureaucracy and is recommended to anyone interested in the topic. 2. Although the EPA is an independent executive branch agency, it is considered a Dependent Regulatory Agency (DRA) because it is not run like an Independent Regulatory Commission (IRC). 3. The earlier estimate of the shadow workforce included local and state government employees fulfilling federal

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functions. However, those estimates are unavailable for years other than 1996. Moreover, it is worth noting that although similar estimates of shadow government did not exist before 1984, conventional wisdom is that the size of this hidden government workforce has grown dramatically since 1970. 4. The staff of the Office of the President has grown as well. Most notably, the president has the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to observe bureaucratic activity and control resource allocation within the bureaucracy. The creation of OMB was countered with the creation of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Some believe that this back-and-forth game between the branches occurs because both are attempting to gain informational advantages over the other by adding staff. 5. Through regulation, Congress and agencies sometimes impose such goals on private industry as well. They may regulate the prices that firms charge, as well as the scope of services that firms must provide. For example, the airline industry has been deregulated to a significant degree. Some estimate that this deregulation has led to aggregate cost-savings. But these efficiency gains undoubtedly came at the expense of equity, as many smaller cities receive lower levels of service and often at a higher cost. Regulation of the airline industry may have kept prices at an inefficient level, but one could argue that it was a more equitable level. 6. The public opinion data in this paragraph are drawn from a 1997 survey administered by The Pew Research Center for The People & The Press (Light 1999, 48--50).

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receive for his services a compensation WHICH SHALL NEITHER BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED DURING THE PERIOD FOR WHICH HE SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED; and he SHALL NOT RECEIVE WITHIN THAT PERIOD ANY OTHER EMOLUMENT from the United States, or any of them.’’ It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been more eligible than this. The legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act. He can, of course, have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution. The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States. The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills with objections, to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by two

6.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 74 To the People of the State of New York: THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that a power over a man’s support is a power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of the legislative body. It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided that ‘‘The President of the United States shall, at stated times,

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408 The Federal Bureaucracy thirds of each of the component members of the legislative body. The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of selfdefense. But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body. The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body. But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon

the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them. It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones. Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exercised.

6.2 Anti-Federalist No. 24 409 If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican? It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents, who, though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard. But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those

to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason, it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counterposing weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared. This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its declared admirers. I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the Executive. PUBLIUS.

6.2 Anti-Federalist No. 24 Objections to a Standing Army (Part I) . . . Standing armies are dangerous to the liberties of a people. . . . [If] necessary, the truth of the position might be confirmed by the history of almost every nation in

410 The Federal Bureaucracy the world. A cloud of the most illustrious patriots of every age and country, where freedom has been enjoyed, might be adduced as witnesses in support of the sentiment. But I presume it would be useless, to enter into a labored argument, to prove to the people of America, a position which has so long and so generally been received by them as a kind of axiom. Some of the advocates for this new system controvert this sentiment, as they do almost every other that has been maintained by the best writers on free government. Others, though they will not expressly deny, that standing armies in times of peace are dangerous, yet join with these in maintaining, that it is proper the general government should be vested with the power to do it. I shall now proceed to examine the arguments they adduce in support of their opinions. A writer, in favor of this system, treats this objection as a ridiculous one. He supposes it would be as proper to provide against the introduction of Turkish Janizaries, or against making the Alcoran a rule of faith. A citizen of America [Noah Webster], An Examination Into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution proposed by the late Convention held at Philadelphia. With Answers to the Principal Objections Raised Against the System (Philadelphia, 1787), reprinted in Ford (ed.), Pamphlets pp. 29-65. From the positive, and dogmatic manner, in which this author delivers his opinions, and answers objections made to his sentiments---one would conclude, that he was some pedantic pedagogue who had been accustomed to deliver his dogmas to pupils, who always placed implicit faith in what he delivered. But, why is this provision so ridiculous? Because, says this author, it is unnecessary. But, why is it unnecessary? Because, ‘‘the principles and habits, as well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion.’’ It is admitted then, that a standing army in time of peace is an evil. I ask then, why should this government be authorised to do evil? If the principles and habits of the people of this country are opposed to standing armies in time of peace, if they do not contribute to the public good, but would endanger the public liberty and happiness, why should the government be vested with the power? No reason can be given, why rulers should be authorised to do, what, if done, would oppose the principles and habits of the people, and endanger the public safety; but there is every reason in the world, that they should be prohibited from the exercise of such a power. But this author

supposes, that no danger is to be apprehended from the exercise of this power, because if armies are kept up, it will be by the people themselves, and therefore, to provide against it would be as absurd as for a man to ‘‘pass a law in his family, that no troops should be quartered in his family by his consent.’’ This reasoning supposes, that the general government is to be exercised by the people of America themselves. But such an idea is groundless and absurd. There is surely a distinction between the people and their rulers, even when the latter are representatives of the former. They certainly are not identically the same, and it cannot be disputed, but it may and often does happen, that they do not possess the same sentiments or pursue the same interests. I think I have shown [in a previous paper] that as this government is constructed, there is little reason to expect, that the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same. Besides, if the habits and sentiments of the people of America are to be relied upon, as the sole security against the encroachment of their rulers, all restrictions in constitutions are unnecessary; nothing more is requisite, than to declare who shall be authorized to exercise the powers of government, and about this we need not be very careful---for the habits and principles of the people will oppose every abuse of power. This I suppose to be the sentiments of this author, as it seems to be of many of the advocates of this new system. An opinion like this, is as directly opposed to the principles and habits of the people of America, as it is to the sentiments of every writer of reputation on the science of government, and repugnant to the principles of reason and common sense. The idea that there is no danger of the establishment of a standing army, under the new constitution, is without foundation. It is a well known fact, that a number of those who had an agency in producing this system, and many of those who it is probable will have a principal share in the administration of the government under it, if it is adopted, are avowedly in favor of standing armies. It is a language common among them, ‘‘That no people can be kept in order, unless the government have an army to awe them into obedience; it is necessary to support the dignity of government, to have a military establishment. And there will not be wanting a variety of plausible reasons to justify the raising one, drawn from the danger we are in from the Indians on our frontiers, or from the European provinces in our neighborhood. If to this we add, that an army will afford a decent support, and agreeable employment to the young men of many families, who are too indolent to follow occupations

6.2 Anti-Federalist No. 24 411 that will require care and industry, and too poor to live without doing any business, we can have little reason to doubt but that we shall have a large standing army as soon as this government can find money to pay them, and perhaps sooner. A writer, who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution, has taken great pains to show, that this power was proper and necessary to be vested in the general government. He sets out with calling in question the candor and integrity of those who advance the objection; and with insinuating, that it is their intention to mislead the people, by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings. The man who reproves another for a fault, should be careful that he himself be not guilty of it. How far this writer has manifested a spirit of candor, and has pursued fair reasoning on this subject, the impartial public will judge, when his arguments pass before them in review. He first attempts to show, that this objection is futile and disingenuous, because the power to keep up standing armies, in time of peace, is vested, under the present government, in the legislature of every state in the union, except two. Now this is so far from being true, that it is expressly declared by the present articles of confederation, that no body of forces ‘‘Shall be kept up by any state, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such state.’’ Now, was it candid and ingenuous to endeavour to persuade the public, that the general government had no other power than your own legislature have on this head; when the truth is, your legislature have no authority to raise and keep up any forces? He next tells us, that the power given by this constitution, on this head, is similar to that which Congress possess under the present confederation. As little ingenuity is manifested in this representation as in that of the former. I shall not undertake to inquire whether or not Congress are vested with a power to keep up a standing army in time of peace; it has been a subject warmly debated in Congress, more than once, since the peace; and one of the most respectable states in the union, were so fully convinced that they had no such power, that they expressly instructed their delegates to enter a solemn protest against it on the journals of Congress, should they attempt to exercise it. But should it be admitted that they have the power, there is such a striking dissimilarity between the

restrictions under which the present Congress can exercise it, and that of the proposed government, that the comparison will serve rather to show the impropriety of vesting the proposed government with the power, than of justifying it. It is acknowledged by this writer, that the powers of Congress, under the present confederation, amount to little more than that of recommending. If they determine to raise troops, they are obliged to effect it through the authority of the state legislatures. This will, in the first instance, be a most powerful restraint upon them, against ordering troops to be raised. But if they should vote an army, contrary to the opinion and wishes of the people, the legislatures of the respective states would not raise them. Besides, the present Congress hold their places at the wilt and pleasure of the legislatures of the states who send them, and no troops can be raised, but by the assent of nine states out of the thirteen. Compare the power proposed to be lodged in the legislature on this head, under this constitution, with that vested in the present Congress, and every person of the least discernment, whose understanding is not totally blinded by prejudice, will perceive, that they bear no analogy to each other. Under the present confederation, the representatives of nine states, out of thirteen, must assent to the raising of troops, or they cannot be levied. Under the proposed constitution, a less number than the representatives of two states, in the house of representatives, and the representatives of three states and an half in the senate, with the assent of the president, may raise any number of troops they please. The present Congress are restrained from an undue exercise of this power; from this consideration, they know the state legislatures, through whose authority it must be carried into effect, would not comply with the requisition for the purpose, [if] it was evidently opposed to the public good. The proposed constitution authorizes the legislature to carry their determinations into execution, without intervention of any other body between them and the people. The Congress under the present form are amenable to, and removable by, the legislatures of the respective states, and are chosen for one year only. The proposed constitution does not make the members of the legislature accountable to, or removable by the state legislatures at all; and they are chosen, the one house for six, and the other for two years; and cannot be removed until their time of service is expired, let them conduct ever so badly. The public will judge, from the above comparison, how just a claim this writer has to that candor he asserts to possess. In the mean time, to convince him, and the advocates for this system, that I possess some

412 The Federal Bureaucracy share of candor, I pledge myself to give up all opposition to it, on the head of standing armies, if the power to raise them be restricted as it is in the present confederation; and I believe I may safely answer, not only for myself, but for all who make the objection, that they will [not] be satisfied with less. BRUTUS

Humphrey never acquiesced in this action, but continued thereafter to insist that he was still a member of the commission, entitled to perform its duties and receive the compensation provided by law at the rate of $10,000 per annum. Upon these and other facts set forth in the certificate, which we deem it unnecessary to recite, the following questions are certified:

Source: Taken from the ninth letter of ‘‘BRUTUS,’’ NewYork Journal, January 17, 1788.

1. Do the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, stating that ‘‘any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’, restrict or limit the power of the President to remove a commissioner except upon one or more of the causes named?

6.3 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States. Rathbun v. Same. No. 667. Argued May 1, 1935. Decided May 27, 1935. Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court . . . William E. Humphrey, the decedent, on December 10, 1931, was nominated by President Hoover to succeed himself as a member of the Federal Trade Commission, and was confirmed by the United States Senate. He was duly commissioned for a term of seven years, expiring September 25, 1938; and, after taking the required oath of office, entered upon his duties. On July 25, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed a letter to the commissioner asking for his resignation, on the ground ‘‘that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively with personnel of my own selection,’’ but disclaiming any reflection upon the commissioner personally or upon his services. The commissioner replied, asking time to consult [295 U.S. 602, 619]his friends. After some further correspondence upon the subject, the President on August 31, 1933, wrote the commissioner expressing the hope that the resignation would be forthcoming, and saying: ‘‘You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have a full confidence.’’ The commissioner declined to resign; and on October 7, 1933, the President wrote him: ‘‘Effective as of this date you are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.’’

2. If the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, then3. If the power of the President to remove a commissioner is restricted or limited as shown by the foregoing interrogatory and the answer made thereto, is such a restriction or limitation valid under the Constitution of the United States?’’ The Federal Trade Commission Act, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 718, 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. 41, 42 (15 USCA 41, 42), creates a commission of five [295 U.S. 602, 620] members to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and section 1 provides: ‘‘Not more than three of the commissioners shall be members of the same political party. The first commissioners appointed shall continue in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively, from the date of the taking effect of this Act (September 26, 1914), the term of each to be designated by the President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of seven years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. The commission shall choose a chairman from its own membership. No commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. Any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency. neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. . . .’’ Section 5 of the act (15 USCA 45) in part provides that: ‘‘Unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful. The commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.’’

6.3 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States 413 In exercising this power, the commission must issue a complaint stating its charges and giving notice of hearing upon a day to be fixed. A person, partnership, or corporation proceeded against is given the right to appear at the time and place fixed and show cause why an order to cease and desist should not be issued. There is provision for intervention by others interested. If the commission finds the method of competition is one prohibited by the act, it is directed to make a report in writing stating its findings as to the facts, and to issue and cause to be served a cease and desist order. If the order is disobeyed, the commission may apply to the appropriate Circuit Court of [295 U.S. 602, 621] Appeals for its enforcement. The party subject to the order may seek and obtain a review in the Circuit Court of Appeals in a manner provided by the act. Section 6 (15 USCA 46), among other things, gives the commission wide powers of investigation in respect of certain corporations subject to the act, and in respect of other matters, upon which it must report to Congress with recommendations. Many such investigations have been made, and some have served as the basis of congressional legislation. Section 7 (15 USCA 47), provides that: ‘‘In any suit in equity brought by or under the direction of the Attorney General as provided in the antitrust Acts, the court may, upon the conclusion of the testimony therein, if it shall be then of opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer said suit to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree therein. The commission shall proceed upon such notice to the parties and under such rules of procedure as the court may prescribe, and upon the coming in of such report such exceptions may be filed and such proceedings had in relation thereto as upon the report of a master in other equity causes, but the court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or in part, and enter such decree as the nature of the case may in its judgment require.’’ First. The question first to be considered is whether, by the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act already quoted, the President’s power is limited to removal for the specific causes enumerated therein. The negative contention of the government is based principally upon the decision of this court in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535, 537. That case involved the power of the President to remove a general appraiser of merchandise appointed under the Act of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 131. Section 12 of the act provided for the appointment by the President, by and with the advice and con- [295 U.S. 602, 622] sent of the Senate, of nine general appraisers of merchandise, who ‘‘may

be removed from office at any time by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’’ The President removed Shurtleff without assigning any cause therefore . . . with the exception of judicial officers provided for by the Constitution, no civil officer had ever held office by life tenure since the foundation of the government, points out that to construe the statute as contended for by Shurtleff would give the appraiser the right to hold office during his life or until found guilty of some act specified in the statute, the result of which would be a complete revolution in respect of the general tenure of office, effected by implication with regard to that particular office only . . . In the face of the unbroken precedent against life tenure, except in the case of the judiciary, the conclusion that Congress intended that, from among all other civil officers, appraisers alone should be selected to hold office for life was so extreme as to forbid, in the opinion of the court, any ruling which would produce that result if it reasonably could be avoided. The situation here presented is plainly and wholly different. The statute fixes a term of office, in accordance with many precedents. The first commissioners appointed are to continue in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively; and their successors are to be appointed for terms of seven years---any commissioner being subject to removal by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The words of the act are definite and unambiguous. The government says the phrase ‘‘continue in office’’ is of no legal significance and, moreover, applies only to the first Commissioners. We think it has significance. It may be that, literally, its application is restricted as suggested; but it, nevertheless, lends support to a view contrary to that of the government as to the meaning of the entire requirement in respect of tenure; for it is not easy to suppose that Congress intended to secure the first commissioners against removal except for the causes specified and deny like security to their successors. Putting this phrase aside, however, the fixing of a definite term subject to removal for cause, unless there be some countervailing provision or circumstance indicating the contrary, which here we are unable to find, is enough to establish the legislative intent that the term is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause. But if the intention of [295 U.S. 602, 624] Congress that no removal should be made during the specified term except for one or more of the enumerated causes were not clear upon the face of the statute, as we think it is, it would be made clear by a consideration of the character of the commission and the legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage of the act.

414 The Federal Bureaucracy The commission is to be nonpartisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi judicial and quasi legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts ‘‘appointed by law and informed by experience.’’ Illinois Cent. &c. R.R. v. Inter. Com. Comm., 206 U.S. 441, 454, 27 S.Ct. 700, 704; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235, 238, 239 S., 51 S.Ct. 429 . . . The debates in both houses demonstrate that the prevailing view was that the Commission was not to be ‘‘subject to anybody in the government but . . . only to the people of the United States’’; free from ‘‘political domination or control’’ or the ‘‘probability or possibility of such a thing’’; to be ‘‘separate and apart from any existing department of the government---not subject to the orders of the President.’’ More to the same effect appears in the debates, which were long and thorough and contain nothing to the contrary. While the general rule precludes the use of these debates to explain the meaning of the words of the statute, they may be considered as reflecting light upon its general purposes and the evils which it sought to remedy. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 650, 51 S.Ct. 587, 79 A.L.R. 1191 Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service; a body which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official [295 U.S. 602, 626] or any department of the government. To the accomplishment of these purposes, it is clear that Congress was of opinion that length and certainty of tenure would vitally contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the members of the commission continue in office at the mere will of the President, might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress sought to realize by definitely fixing the term of office. We conclude that the intent of the act is to limit the executive power of removal to the causes enumerated, the existence of none of which is claimed here; and we pass to the second question. Second. To support its contention that the removal provision of section 1, as we have just construed it, is an unconstitutional interference with the executive

power of the President, the government’s chief reliance is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21. That case has been so recently decided, and the prevailing and dissenting opinions so fully review the general subject of the power of executive removal, that further discussion would add little of value to the wealth of material there collected. These opinions examine at length the historical, legislative, and judicial data bearing upon the question, beginning with what is called ‘‘the decision of 1789’’ in the first Congress and coming down almost to the day when the opinions were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of the volume in which they are printed. Nevertheless, the narrow point actually decided was only that the President had power to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by act of Congress. In the course of the opinion of the court, expressions occur which tend to sustain the government’s contention, but these are beyond the point involved and, therefore, do not come within the rule of stare decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with the views here set forth, these expressions are disapproved. A like situation was [295 U.S. 602, 627] presented in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264, 399, in respect of certain general expressions in the opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137. Chief Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion in the Marbury Case, speaking again for the court in the Cohens Case, said: ‘‘It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision . . . ‘‘and he added that these general expressions in the case of Marbury v. Madison were to be understood with the limitations put upon them by the opinion in the Cohens Case. See, also, Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll et al., 16 How. 275, 286-287; O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 550, 53 S.Ct. 740. The office of a postmaster is so essentially unlike the office now involved that the decision in the Myers Case cannot be accepted as controlling our decision here. A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the performance of executive functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to either the legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in the Myers Case finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is . . .

6.3 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States 415 The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control. In administering the provisions of the statute in respect of ‘‘unfair methods of competition,’’ that is to say, in filling in and administering the details embodied by that general standard, the commission acts in part quasi legislatively and in part quasi judicially. In making investigations and reports thereon for the information of Congress under section 6, in aid of the legislative power, it acts as a legislative agency. Under section 7, which authorizes the commission to act as a master in chancery under rules prescribed by the court, it acts as an agency of the judiciary. To the extent that it exercises any executive function, as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense, it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi legislative or quasi judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government. [295 U.S. 602, 629] If Congress is without authority to prescribe causes for removal of members of the trade commission and limit executive power of removal accordingly, that power at once becomes practically all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception of the judiciary provided for by the Constitution. The Solicitor General, at the bar, apparently recognizing this to be true, with commendable candor, agreed that his view in respect of the removability of members of the Federal Trade Commission necessitated a like view in respect of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Court of Claims. We are thus confronted with the serious question whether not only the members of these quasi legislative and quasi judicial bodies, but the judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising judicial power (Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565-567, 53 S.Ct. 751), continue in office only at the pleasure of the President. We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers of the character of those just named. The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite evident

that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will. The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in [295 U.S. 602, 630] the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential coequality. The sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master there. James Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a former justice of this court, said that the independence of each department required that its proceedings ‘‘should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers.’’ Andrews, The Works of James Wilson (1896), vol. 1, p. 367. And Mr. Justice Story in the first volume of his work on the Constitution (4th Ed.) 530, citing No. 48 of the Federalist, said that neither of the departments in reference to each other ‘‘ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers.’’ And see O’Donoghue v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. 516, at pages 530-531, 53 S.Ct. 740. The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within this principle, since its coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission, which is not only wholly disconnected from the executive department, but which, as already fully appears, was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation legislative and judicial powers, and as an agency of the legislative and judicial departments. In the light of the question now under consideration, we have re- examined the precedents referred to in the Myers Case, and find nothing in them to justify a conclusion contrary to that which we have reached. The socalled ‘‘decision of 1789’’ had relation to a bill proposed by Mr. Madison to establish an executive Department of Foreign Affairs. The bill provided that the principal officer was ‘‘to be removable [295 U.S. 602, 631] from office by the President of the United States.’’ This clause was changed to read ‘‘whenever the principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States,’’ certain things should follow, thereby, in connection with the debates, recognizing and confirming, as the court thought in the Myers Case, the sole power of the President in the matter. We shall not discuss the subject further, since it is so fully covered by the opinions

416 The Federal Bureaucracy in the Myers Case, except to say that the office under consideration by Congress was not only purely executive, but the officer one who was responsible to the President, and to him alone, in a very definite sense. A reading of the debates shows that the President’s illimitable power of removal was not considered in respect of other than executive officers. And it is pertinent to observe that when, at a later time, the tenure of office for the Comptroller of the Treasury was under consideration, Mr. Madison quite evidently thought that, since the duties of that office were not purely of an executive nature but partook of the judiciary quality as well, a different rule in respect of executive removal might well apply. 1 Annals of Congress, cols. 611-612. In Marbury v. Madison, supra, 1 Cranch, 137, at pages 162, 165-166, it is made clear that Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion that a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia was not removable at the will of the President; and that there was a distinction between such an officer and officers appointed to aid the President in the performance of his constitutional duties. In the latter case, the distinction he saw was that ‘‘their acts are his acts’’ and his will, therefore, controls; and, by way of illustration, he adverted to the act establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, which was the subject of the ‘‘decision of 1789.’’ The result of what we now have said is this: Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power of the President [295 U.S. 602, 632] alone to make the removal, is confined to purely executive officers; and as to officers of the kind here under consideration, we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute.

‘‘informal organization is indefinite and rather structureless . . . unconscious processes of society . . . a shapeless mass of quite varied densities. Areas of special density are informal organizations as distinguished from social organizations in its informal aspects.’’ ‘‘[I]nformal organization compels a certain amount of formal organization and probably cannot persist without it . . . even purely social interaction requires a considerable concentration on definite purpose or ends of action to maintain the association.’’ Informal organization can be exhausted when individuals are placed in a social vacuum, producing a feeling and also objective behaviors of being lost . . . or when conflicting obligations create a paralysis of social action or anomie.’’ ‘‘The relation of a person to a large organization is through those whom he is in immediate contact . . . comradeship is more powerful than patriotism . . . purposeful cooperation is the chief source of logical faculties . . . rational action is chiefly a purposive cooperative action . . . uniform states of mind can crystallize into mores and customs’’

The Brownlow Committee on Administrative Management (1937) ‘‘Management in Democracy’’ ‘‘[C]anons of efficiency require the establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction and administrative management; the systematic organization of all activities in the hands of qualified personnel . . . and appropriate staff agencies. There must also be provision for planning, a complete fiscal system and means for holding the executive accountable for his program.’’ We do not need new principle but, rather, a modernizing of our managerial equipment. Specifically; 1) expand White House staff

6.4 Chester Barnard, Functions of the Executive, 1938 ‘‘[I]nformal organization is indispensable in the operation of formal organization because; 1) basis of communication 2) cohesiveness through willingness to serve and stability of authority 3) maintaining feeling of personal integration and self respect’’

2) strengthen managerial agencies as arms of chief executive . . . Civil Service Administration, Bureau of the budget and National Resources Board should be part and parcel of the Executive office.’’ 3) extend merit system 4) reorganize the 100þagencies into a few large departments 5) revise fiscal system in light of private practices, particularly records, audit and accountability to Congress.

6.5 Administrative Procedures Act 417 ‘‘We know that bad management may spoil good purposes, and that without good management democracy itself cannot achieve its highest goals.’’ ‘‘The White House staff should be small in number, remain in the background, issue no orders, make no decisions, make no public statements . . . they should have a passion for anonymity . . . ‘‘The true place of the expert is on tap, not on top. . . . History shows that the common man is a better judge of his own needs in the long run than any cult of experts.’’

6.5 Administrative Procedures Act, 1946 Rulemaking-Adjudication-Judicial Review Section 553. Rulemaking (informal rulemaking) (a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved--(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. (b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include---

(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection. (d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date, except--(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction; (2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or (3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule. (e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

5 U.S.C. § 554. Adjudications (formal rulemaking) (a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved---

(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;

(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in a court;

(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and

(2) the selection or tenure of an employee, except a administrative law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title;

(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply--(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.

(3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections; (4) the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions; (5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; or (6) the certification of worker representatives. (b) Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of--(1) the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and

418 The Federal Bureaucracy (3) the matters of fact and law asserted. When private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law; and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive pleading. In fixing the time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives. (c) The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for--(1) the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit; and (2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title. (d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not--(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency. An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply--(A) in determining applications for initial licenses; (B) to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers; or

(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency. (e) The agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.

§ 704. Actions reviewable Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.

6.6 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York v. Kelly et al. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 62. Argued October 13, 1969 Decided March 23, 1970 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This action was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York by residents of New [397 U.S. 254, 256] York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State’s general Home Relief program. Their complaint alleged that the New York State and New York City officials administering these programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and

6.6 Goldberg v. Kelly hearing, thereby denying them due process of law. At the time [397 U.S. 254, 257] the suits were filed there was no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. However, the State and city adopted procedures for notice and hearing after the suits were brought, and the plaintiffs, appellees here, then challenged the constitutional adequacy of those procedures. The State Commissioner of Social Services amended the State Department of Social Services’ Official Regulations to require that local social services officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient’s financial aid do so according to a procedure that conforms to either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of 351.26 of the regulations as amended. The City of New York [397 U.S. 254, 258] elected to promulgate a local procedure according to subdivision (b). That subdivision, so far as here pertinent, provides that the local procedure must include the giving of notice to the recipient of the reasons for a proposed discontinuance or suspension at least seven days prior to its effective date, with notice also that upon request the recipient may have the proposal reviewed by a local welfare official holding a position superior to that of the supervisor who approved the proposed discontinuance or suspension, and, further, that the recipient may submit, for purposes of the review, a written statement to demonstrate why his grant should not be discontinued or suspended. The decision by the reviewing official whether to discontinue or suspend aid must be made expeditiously, with written notice of the decision to the recipient. The section further expressly provides that ‘‘[a]ssistance shall not be discontinued or suspended prior to the date such notice of decision is sent to the recipient and his representative, if any, or prior to the proposed effective date of discontinuance or suspension, whichever occurs later.’’ Pursuant to subdivision (b), the New York City Department of Social Services promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. A caseworker who has doubts about the recipient’s continued eligibility must first discuss them with the recipient. If the caseworker concludes that the recipient is no longer eligible, he recommends termination [397 U.S. 254, 259] of aid to a unit supervisor. If the latter concurs, he sends the recipient a letter stating the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifying him that within seven days he may request that a higher official review the record, and may support the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other person. If the reviewing official affirms the determination of ineligibility, aid is stopped immediately and the recipient is

419

informed by letter of the reasons for the action. Appellees’ challenge to this procedure emphasizes the absence of any provisions for the personal appearance of the recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and crossexamination of adverse witnesses. However, the letter does inform the recipient that he may request a posttermination ‘‘fair hearing.’’ This is a proceeding before an independent [397 U.S. 254, 260] state hearing officer at which the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and have a record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevails at the ‘‘fair hearing’’ he is paid all funds erroneously withheld. HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6200-6500; 18 NYCRR 84.2-84.23. A recipient whose aid is not restored by a ‘‘fair hearing’’ decision may have judicial review. N. Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules, Art. 78 (1963). The recipient is so notified, 18 NYCRR 84.16.

I The constitutional issue to be decided, therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits. The District Court held [397 U.S. 254, 261] that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy the constitutional command, and rejected the argument of the state and city officials that the combination of the post-termination ‘‘fair hearing’’ with the informal pre-termination review disposed of all due process claims. The court said: ‘‘While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets. . . . Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of . . . ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it.’’ Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 (1968). The court rejected the argument that the need to protect the public’s tax revenues supplied the requisite ‘‘overwhelming consideration.’’ ‘‘Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual’s over-powering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance. . . . While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.’’ Id., at 901. Although state officials were

420 The Federal Bureaucracy party defendants in the action, only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U.S. 971 (1969), to decide important issues that have been the subject of disagreement in principle between the three-judge court in the present case and that convened in Wheeler v. Montgomery, No. 14, post, p. 280, also decided today. We affirm. Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits. [397 U.S. 254, 262] Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are ‘‘a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’’’ Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6 (1969) . . . It is true, of course, that some governmental benefits may be administratively terminated without affording the recipient a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. [397 U.S. 254, 264] But we agree with the District Court that when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337(1969). For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 239(1967). Thus the crucial factor in this context---a factor not present in the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended---is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. Moreover, important governmental interests are promoted by affording recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the Nation’s basic [397 U.S. 254, 265] commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by

meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‘‘promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’’ The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pretermination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end . . . The requirement of a prior hearing doubtless involves some greater expense, and the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment-proof. But the State is not without weapons to minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pretermination hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities. Indeed, the very provision for a post-termination evidentiary hearing in New York’s Home Relief program is itself cogent evidence that the State recognizes the primacy of the public interest in correct eligibility determinations and therefore in the provision of procedural safeguards . . .

II We also agree with the District Court, however, that the pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial. We bear in mind that the statutory ‘‘fair hearing’’ will provide the recipient [397 U.S. 254, 267] with a full administrative review. Accordingly, the pre-termination hearing has one function only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department’s grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343(1969) (HARLAN, J., concurring). Thus, a complete record and a comprehensive opinion, which would serve primarily to facilitate judicial review and to guide future decisions, need not be provided at the pre-termination stage. We recognize, too, that both welfare authorities and recipients have an interest in relatively speedy resolution of questions of eligibility, that they are used to dealing with one another informally, and that some welfare departments have very burdensome

6.7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council 421 caseloads. These considerations justify the limitation of the pre-termination hearing to minimum procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be resolved. We wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize the importance of not imposing upon the States or the Federal Government in this developing field of law any procedural requirements beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process . . . The city’s procedures presently do not permit recipients to appear personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines continued eligibility. Thus a recipient is not permitted to present evidence to that official orally, or to confront or crossexamine adverse witnesses. These omissions are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the [397 U.S. 254, 269] capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or secondhand through his caseworker. Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. The secondhand presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker has its own deficiencies; since the caseworker usually gathers the facts upon which the charge of ineligibility rests, the presentation of the recipient’s side of the controversy cannot safely be left to him. Therefore a recipient must be allowed to state his position orally. Informal procedures will suffice; in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence. Cf. HEW Handbook, pt. IV, 6400 (a). In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department . . . Affirmed.

6.7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit No. 82-1005. Argued February 29, 1984 Decided June 25, 1984 MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, Congress enacted certain requirements applicable to States that had not achieved the national air quality standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to earlier legislation. The amended Clean Air Act required these ‘‘nonattainment’’ States to establish a permit program regulating ‘‘new or modified major stationary sources’’ of air pollution. Generally, a permit may not be issued for a new or modified major stationary source unless several stringent conditions are met. The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this permit requirement allows a State to adopt a plantwide definition of the term ‘‘stationary source.’’ Under this definition, an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from the plant. The question presented by these cases is whether EPA’s decision to allow States to treat all of the pollutionemitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘‘bubble’’ is based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term ‘‘stationary source.’’

I The EPA regulations containing the plantwide definition of the term stationary source were promulgated on October 14, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 50766. Respondents filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7607(b) (1). The Court of Appeals set aside the regulations. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 268, 685 F.2d 718 (1982). The court observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean Air Act ‘‘does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary source, to which

422 The Federal Bureaucracy the permit program . . . should apply,’’ and further stated that the precise issue was not ‘‘squarely addressed in the legislative history.’’ Id., at 273, 685 F.2d, at 723. In light of its conclusion that the legislative history bearing on the question was ‘‘at best contradictory,’’ it reasoned that ‘‘the purposes of the nonattainment program should guide our decision here.’’. . . Since the purpose of the permit program-its ‘‘raison d’etre,’’ in the court’s view-was to improve air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was inapplicable in these cases under its prior precedents. Ibid. It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the bubble concept as contrary to law. We granted certiorari to review that judgment, 461 U.S. 956 (1983), and we now reverse . . .

We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations ‘‘has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190; Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793; Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194; Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344. ‘‘. . . If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’’ United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961).

II When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. ‘‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’’ Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.

In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is ‘‘inappropriate’’ in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one. Based on the examination of the legislation and its history which follows, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress did not have a specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases, and conclude that the EPA’s use of that concept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make . . .

IV The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 are a lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major social issue. A small portion of the statute---91 Stat. 745-751 (Part D of Title I of the amended Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7508)---expressly deals

6.7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council 423 with nonattainment areas. The focal point of this controversy is one phrase in that portion of the Amendments. Basically, the statute required each State in a nonattainment area to prepare and obtain approval of a new SIP by July 1, 1979. In the interim those States were required to comply with the EPA’s interpretative Ruling of December 21, 1976. 91 Stat. 745. The deadline for attainment of the primary NAAQS’s was extended until December 31, 1982, and in some cases until December 31, 1987, but the SIP’s were required to contain a number of provisions designed to achieve the goals as expeditiously as possible. Most significantly for our purposes, the statute provided that each plan shall

or the question whether a plantwide definition of a stationary source is permissible under the permit program. It does, however, plainly disclose that in the permit program Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality. Indeed, the House Committee Report identified the economic interest as one of the ‘‘two main purposes’’ of this section of the bill. It stated: ‘‘Section 117 of the bill, adopted during full committee markup establishes a new section 127 of the Clean Air Act. The section has two main purposes: (1) to allow reasonable economic growth to continue in an area while making reasonable further progress to assure attainment of the standards by a fixed date; and (2) to allow States greater flexibility for the former purpose than EPA’s present interpretative regulations afford. ‘‘The new provision allows States with nonattainment areas to pursue one of two options. First, the State may proceed under EPA’s present ‘tradeoff’ or ‘offset’ ruling. The Administrator is authorized, moreover, to modify or amend that ruling in accordance with the intent and purposes of this section. ‘‘The State’s second option would be to revise its implementation plan in accordance with this new provision.’’ H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 211 (1977). The portion of the Senate Committee Report dealing with nonattainment areas states generally that it was intended to ‘‘supersede the EPA administrative approach,’’ and that expansion should be permitted if a State could ‘‘demonstrate that these facilities can be accommodated within its overall plan to provide for attainment of air quality standards.’’. . .

‘‘(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources in accordance with section 173. . . .’’ Id., at 747. Before issuing a permit, 173 requires (1) the state agency to determine that there will be sufficient emissions reductions in the region to offset the emissions from the new source and also to allow for reasonable further progress toward attainment, or that the increased emissions will not exceed an allowance for growth established pursuant to 172(b)(5); (2) the applicant to certify that his other sources in the State are in compliance with the SIP, (3) the agency to determine that the applicable SIP is otherwise being implemented, and (4) the proposed source to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER). The 1977 Amendments contain no specific reference to the ‘‘bubble concept.’’ Nor do they contain a specific definition of the term ‘‘stationary source,’’ though they did not disturb the definition of ‘‘stationary source’’ contained in 111(a)(3), applicable by the terms of the Act to the NSPS program. Section 302(j), however, defines the term ‘‘major stationary source’’ as follows: ‘‘(j) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the terms ‘major stationary source’ and ‘major emitting facility’ mean any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant (including any major emitting facility or source of fugitive emissions of any such pollutant, as determined by rule by the Administrator).’’ 91 Stat. 770.

V The legislative history of the portion of the 1977 Amendments dealing with nonattainment areas does not contain any specific comment on the ‘‘bubble concept’’

VI As previously noted, prior to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA had adhered to a plantwide definition of the term ‘‘source’’ under a NSPS program. After adoption of the 1977 Amendments, proposals for a plantwide definition were considered in at least three formal proceedings . . . In 1981 a new administration took office and initiated a ‘‘Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities.’’ 46 Fed. Reg. 16281. In the context of that review, the EPA reevaluated the various arguments that had been advanced in connection with the proper definition of the term ‘‘source’’ and

424 The Federal Bureaucracy concluded that the term should be given the same definition in both nonattainment areas and PSD areas. In explaining its conclusion, the EPA first noted that the definitional issue was not squarely addressed in either the statute or its legislative history and therefore that the issue involved an agency ‘‘judgment as how to best carry out the Act.’’ Ibid. It then set forth several reasons for concluding that the plantwide definition was more appropriate. It pointed out that the dual definition ‘‘can act as a disincentive to new investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to existing facilities’’ and ‘‘can actually retard progress in air pollution control by discouraging replacement of older, dirtier processes or pieces of equipment with new, cleaner ones.’’ Ibid. Moreover, the new definition ‘‘would simplify EPA’s rules by using the same definition of ‘source’ for PSD, nonattainment new source review and the construction moratorium. This reduces confusion and inconsistency.’’ Ibid. Finally, the agency explained that additional requirements that remained in place would accomplish the fundamental purposes of achieving attainment with NAAQS’s as expeditiously as possible. These conclusions were expressed in a proposed rulemaking in August 1981 that was formally promulgated in October. See id., at 50766 . . .

VII Policy The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties’ briefs create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency and in the 32 jurisdictions opting for the ‘‘bubble concept,’’ but one which was never waged in the Congress. Such policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges. In these cases the Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.

Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices---resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges - who have no constituency---have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘‘Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’’ TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). We hold that the EPA’s definition of the term ‘‘source’’ is a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth. ‘‘The Regulations which the Administrator has adopted provide what the agency could allowably view as . . . [an] effective reconciliation of these twofold ends. . . .’’ United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S., at 383. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

6.8 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit No. 82-354. Argued April 26, 1983 Decided June 24, 1983

6.8 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. 425 MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. The development of the automobile gave Americans unprecedented freedom to travel, but exacted a high price for enhanced mobility. Since 1929, motor vehicles have been the leading cause of accidental deaths and injuries in the United States. In 1982, 46,300 Americans died in motor vehicle accidents and hundreds of thousands more were maimed and injured. While a consensus exists that the current loss of life on our highways is unacceptably high, improving safety does not admit to easy solution. In 1966, Congress decided that at least part of the answer lies in improving the design and safety features of the vehicle itself. But much of the technology for building safer cars was undeveloped or untested. Before changes in automobile design could be mandated, the effectiveness of these changes had to be studied, their costs examined, and public acceptance considered. This task called for considerable expertise and Congress responded by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 80 Stat. 718, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The Act, created for the purpose of ‘‘reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents,’’ 15 U.S.C. 1381, directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor vehicle safety standards that ‘‘shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.’’ 15 U.S.C. 1392(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to consider ‘‘relevant available motor vehicle safety data,’’ whether the proposed standard ‘‘is reasonable, practicable and appropriate’’ for the particular type of motor vehicle, and the ‘‘extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes’’ of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). The Act also authorizes judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, of all ‘‘orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard,’’ 15 U.S.C. 1392(b). Under this authority, we review today whether NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the requirement in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that new motor vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped with passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in the event of a collision. Briefly summarized, we hold that the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and that the agency must either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines which its analysis supports.

I The regulation whose rescission is at issue bears a complex and convoluted history. Over the course of approximately 60 rulemaking notices, the requirement has been imposed, amended, rescinded, reimposed, and now rescinded again . . .

II In a statement explaining the rescission, NHTSA maintained that it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977, that the automatic restraint requirement would produce significant safety benefits. Notice 25, id., at 53419. This judgment reflected not a change of opinion on the effectiveness of the technology, but a change in plans by the automobile industry. In 1977, the agency had assumed that airbags would be installed in 60% of all new cars and automatic seatbelts in 40%. By 1981 it became apparent that automobile manufacturers planned to install the automatic seatbelts in approximately 99% of the new cars. For this reason, the lifesaving potential of airbags would not be realized. Moreover, it now appeared that the overwhelming majority of passive belts planned to be installed by manufacturers could be detached easily and left that way permanently. Passive belts, once detached, then required ‘‘the same type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of manual belts.’’ Id., at 53421. For this reason, the agency concluded that there was no longer a basis for reliably predicting that the Standard would lead to any significant increased usage of restraints at all. In view of the possibly minimal safety benefits, the automatic restraint requirement no longer was reasonable or practicable in the agency’s view. The requirement would require approximately $1 billion to implement and the agency did not believe it would be reasonable to impose such substantial costs on manufacturers and consumers without more adequate assurance that sufficient safety benefits would accrue. In addition, NHTSA concluded that automatic restraints might have an adverse effect on the public’s attitude toward safety. Given the high expense and limited benefits of detachable belts, NHTSA feared that many consumers would regard the Standard as an instance of ineffective regulation, adversely affecting the public’s view of safety regulation and, in particular, ‘‘poisoning . . . popular sentiment toward efforts to improve occupant restraint systems in the future.’’ Id., at 53424. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions for review of NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint Standard. The United States Court of

426 The Federal Bureaucracy Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the agency’s rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious. 220 U.S. App. D.C. 170, 680 F.2d 206 (1982). While observing that rescission is not unrelated to an agency’s refusal to take action in the first instance, the court concluded that, in this case, NHTSA’s discretion to rescind the passive restraint requirement had been restricted by various forms of congressional ‘‘reaction’’ to the passive restraint issue. It then proceeded to find that the rescission of Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious for three reasons. First, the court found insufficient as a basis for rescission NHTSA’s conclusion that it could not reliably predict an increase in belt usage under the Standard. The court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain NHTSA’s position on this issue, and that, ‘‘only a well justified refusal to seek more evidence could render rescission non-arbitrary.’’ Id., at 196, 680 F.2d, at 232. Second, a majority of the panel concluded that NHTSA inadequately considered the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install nondetachable rather than detachable passive belts. Third, the majority found that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to give any consideration whatever to requiring compliance with Modified Standard 208 by the installation of airbags. The court allowed NHTSA 30 days in which to submit a schedule for ‘‘resolving the questions raised in th[e] opinion.’’ Id., at 206, 680 F.2d, at 242. Subsequently, the agency filed a Notice of Proposed Supplemental Rulemaking setting forth a schedule for complying with the court’s mandate. On August 4, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued an order staying the compliance date for the passive restraint requirement until September 1, 1983, and requested NHTSA to inform the court whether that compliance date was achievable. NHTSA informed the court on October 1, 1982, that based on representations by manufacturers, it did not appear that practicable compliance could be achieved before September 1985. On November 8, 1982, we granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 987, and on November 18, the Court of Appeals entered an order recalling its mandate.

III . . . The Department of Transportation accepts the applicability of the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ standard. It argues that under this standard, a reviewing court may not set aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute. We do not disagree with this formulation. The scope of review

under the ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’’ Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). In reviewing that explanation, we must ‘‘consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’’ Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., supra, at 285; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 416. Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). We will, however, ‘‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’’ Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., supra, at 286. See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-143 (1973) (per curiam). For purposes of these cases, it is also relevant that Congress required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U.S.C. 1394, and intended that agency findings under the Act would be supported by ‘‘substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.’’ S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966).

V The ultimate question before us is whether NHTSA’s rescission of the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that it was. We also conclude, but for somewhat different reasons, that further consideration of the issue by the agency is therefore required. We deal separately with the rescission as it applies to airbags and as it applies to seatbelts.

A The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission arbitrary and capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying

6.9 Executive Order No. 12866 427 the Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized. Standard 208 sought to achieve automatic crash protection by requiring automobile manufacturers to install either of two passive restraint devices: airbags or automatic seatbelts. There was no suggestion in the long rulemaking process that led to Standard 208 that if only one of these options were feasible, no passive restraint standard should be promulgated. Indeed, the agency’s original proposed Standard contemplated the installation of inflatable restraints in all cars. Automatic belts were added as a means of complying with the Standard because they were believed to be as effective as airbags in achieving the goal of occupant crash protection. 36 Fed. Reg. 12859 (1971). At that time, the passive belt approved by the agency could not be detached. Only later, at a manufacturer’s behest, did the agency approve of the detachability feature - and only after assurances that the feature would not compromise the safety benefits of the restraint. Although it was then foreseen that 60% of the new cars would contain airbags and 40% would have automatic seatbelts, the ratio between the two was not significant as long as the passive belt would also assure greater passenger safety . . . Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons given for its abandonment. But the agency not only did not require compliance through airbags, it also did not even consider the possibility in its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sentence of its rulemaking statement discusses the airbags-only option . . . We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner . . . Affirmed

6.9 Executive Order No. 12866, September 30, 1993 Federal Register Title 3---The President Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993 Regulatory Planning and Review

The American people deserve a regulatory system that works for them, not against them: a regulatory system that protects and improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being and improves the performance of the economy without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society; regulatory policies that recognize that the private sector and private markets are the best engine for economic growth; regulatory approaches that respect the role of State, local, and tribal governments; and regulations that are effective, consistent, sensible, and understandable. We do not have such a regulatory system today. With this Executive order, the Federal Government begins a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory process. The objectives of this Executive order are to enhance planning and coordination with respect to both new and existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process more accessible and open to the public. In pursuing these objectives, the regulatory process shall be conducted so as to meet applicable statutory requirements and with due regard to the discretion that has been entrusted to the Federal agencies. Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles. (a) The Regulatory Philosophy. Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential

428 The Federal Bureaucracy economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach. (b) The Principles of Regulation. To ensure that the agencies’ regulatory programs are consistent with the philosophy set forth above, agencies should adhere to the following principles, to the extent permitted by law and where applicable: (1) Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency action) as well as assess the significance of that problem. (2) Each agency shall examine whether existing regulations (or other law) have created, or contributed to, the problem that a new regulation is intended to correct and whether those regulations (or other law) should be modified to achieve the intended goal of regulation more effectively. (3) Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public. (4) In setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall consider, to the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed by various substances or activities within its jurisdiction. (5) When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing so, each agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities, and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity.

technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended regulation. (8) Each agency shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and shall, to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt. (9) Wherever feasible, agencies shall seek views of appropriate State, local, and tribal officials before imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect those governmental entities. Each agency shall assess the effects of Federal regulations on State, local, and tribal governments, including specifically the availability of resources to carry out those mandates, and seek to minimize those burdens that uniquely or significantly affect such governmental entities, consistent with achieving regulatory objectives. In addition, as appropriate, agencies shall seek to harmonize Federal regulatory actions with related State, local, and tribal regulatory and other governmental functions. (10) Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its other regulations or those of other Federal agencies. (11) Each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities (including small communities and governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations. (12) Each agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and easy to understand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from such uncertainty.

(6) Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.

Section 2. Organization. An efficient regulatory planning and review process is vital to ensure that the Federal Government’s regulatory system best serves the American people.

(7) Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific,

(a) The Agencies. Because Federal agencies are the repositories of significant substantive expertise

6.9 Executive Order No. 12866 429 and experience, they are responsible for developing regulations and assuring that the regulations are consistent with applicable law, the President’s priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive order. (b) The Office of Management and Budget. Coordinated review of agency rulemaking is necessary to ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law, the President’s priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive order, and that decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another agency. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shall carry out that review function. Within OMB, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues, including methodologies and procedures that affect more than one agency, this Executive order, and the President’s regulatory policies. To the extent permitted by law, OMB shall provide guidance to agencies and assist the President, the Vice President, and other regulatory policy advisors to the President in regulatory planning and shall be the entity that reviews individual regulations, as provided by this Executive order. (c) The Vice President. The Vice President is the principal advisor to the President on, and shall coordinate the development and presentation of recommendations concerning, regulatory policy, planning, and review, as set forth in this Executive order. In fulfilling their responsibilities under this Executive order, the President and the Vice President shall be assisted by the regulatory policy advisors within the Executive Office of the President and by such agency officials and personnel as the President and the Vice President may, from time to time, consult . . . Section 4. Planning Mechanism. In order to have an effective regulatory program, to provide for coordination of regulations, to maximize consultation and the resolution of potential conflicts at an early stage, to involve the public and its State, local, and tribal officials in regulatory planning, and to ensure that new or revised regulations promote the President’s priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive order, these procedures shall be followed, to the extent permitted by law:

(a) Agencies’ Policy Meeting. Early in each year’s planning cycle, the Vice President shall convene a meeting of the Advisors and the heads of agencies to seek a common understanding of priorities and to coordinate regulatory efforts to be accomplished in the upcoming year. (b) Unified Regulatory Agenda. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘agency’’ or ‘‘agencies’’ shall also include those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10). Each agency shall prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review, at a time and in a manner specified by the Administrator of OIRA. The description of each regulatory action shall contain, at a minimum, a regulation identifier number, a brief summary of the action, the legal authority for the action, any legal deadline for the action, and the name and telephone number of a knowledgeable agency official. Agencies may incorporate the information required under 5 U.S.C. 602 and 41 U.S.C. 402 into these agendas. (c) The Regulatory Plan. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘agency’’ or ‘‘agencies’’ shall also include those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10). (1) As part of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, beginning in 1994, each agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan (Plan) of the most important significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonably expects to issue in proposed or final form in that fiscal year or thereafter. The Plan shall be approved personally by the agency head and shall contain at a minimum: (A) A statement of the agency’s regulatory objectives and priorities and how they relate to the President’s priorities; (B) A summary of each planned significant regulatory action including, to the extent possible, alternatives to be considered and preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits; (C) A summary of the legal basis for each such action, including whether any aspect of the action is required by statute or court order; (D) A statement of the need for each such action and, if applicable, how the action

430 The Federal Bureaucracy will reduce risks to public health, safety, or the environment, as well as how the magnitude of the risk addressed by the action relates to other risks within the jurisdiction of the agency; (E) The agency’s schedule for action, including a statement of any applicable statutory or judicial deadlines; and (F) The name, address, and telephone number of a person the public may contact for additional information about the planned regulatory action. (2) Each agency shall forward its Plan to OIRA by June 1st of each year. (3) Within 10 calendar days after OIRA has received an agency’s Plan, OIRA shall circulate it to other affected agencies, the Advisors, and the Vice President. (4) An agency head who believes that a planned regulatory action of another agency may conflict with its own policy or action taken or planned shall promptly notify, in writing, the Administrator of OIRA, who shall forward that communication to the issuing agency, the Advisors, and the Vice President. (5) If the Administrator of OIRA believes that a planned regulatory action of an agency may be inconsistent with the President’s priorities or the principles set forth in this Executive order or may be in conflict with any policy or action taken or planned by another agency, the Administrator of OIRA shall promptly notify, in writing, the affected agencies, the Advisors, and the Vice President.

confer any unclaimed benefits on the public, should be directed to the issuing agency, with a copy to OIRA. (d) Regulatory Working Group. Within 30 days of the date of this Executive order, the Administrator of OIRA shall convene a Regulatory Working Group (‘‘Working Group’’), which shall consist of representatives of the heads of each agency that the Administrator determines to have significant domestic regulatory responsibility, the Advisors, and the Vice President. The Administrator of OIRA shall chair the Working Group and shall periodically advise the Vice President on the activities of the Working Group. The Working Group shall serve as a forum to assist agencies in identifying and analyzing important regulatory issues (including, among others (1) the development of innovative regulatory techniques, (2) the methods, efficacy, and utility of comparative risk assessment in regulatory decision-making, and (3) the development of short forms and other streamlined regulatory approaches for small businesses and other entities). The Working Group shall meet at least quarterly and may meet as a whole or in subgroups of agencies with an interest in particular issues or subject areas. To inform its discussions, the Working Group may commission analytical studies and reports by OIRA, the Administrative Conference of the United States, or any other agency.

(6) The Vice President, with the Advisors’ assistance, may consult with the heads of agencies with respect to their Plans and, in appropriate instances, request further consideration or inter-agency coordination.

(e) Conferences. The Administrator of OIRA shall meet quarterly with representatives of State, local, and tribal governments to identify both existing and proposed regulations that may uniquely or significantly affect those governmental entities. The Administrator of OIRA shall also convene, from time to time, conferences with representatives of businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and the public to discuss regulatory issues of common concern.

(7) The Plans developed by the issuing agency shall be published annually in the October publication of the Unified Regulatory Agenda. This publication shall be made available to the Congress; State, local, and tribal governments; and the public. Any views on any aspect of any agency Plan, including whether any planned regulatory action might conflict with any other planned or existing regulation, impose any unintended consequences on the public, or

Section 5. Existing Regulations. In order to reduce the regulatory burden on the American people, their families, their communities, their State, local, and tribal governments, and their industries; to determine whether regulations promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances; to confirm that regulations are both compatible with each other and not duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the

6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council aggregate; to ensure that all regulations are consistent with the President’s priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive order, within applicable law; and to otherwise improve the effectiveness of existing regulations: (a) Within 90 days of the date of this Executive order, each agency shall submit to OIRA a program, consistent with its resources and regulatory priorities, under which the agency will periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater alignment with the President’s priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive order. Any significant regulations selected for review shall be included in the agency’s annual Plan. The agency shall also identify any legislative mandates that require the agency to promulgate or continue to impose regulations that the agency believes are unnecessary or outdated by reason of changed circumstances . . . Section 7. Resolution of Conflicts. To the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that cannot be resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at the request of the President, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other interested government officials). Vice Presidential and Presidential consideration of such disagreements may be initiated only by the Director, by the head of the issuing agency, or by the head of an agency that has a significant interest in the regulatory action at issue. Such review will not be undertaken at the request of other persons, entities, or their agents . . . At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice President acting at the request of the President, shall notify the affected agency and the Administrator of OIRA of the President’s decision with respect to the matter. Section 8. Publication. Except to the extent required by law, an agency shall not publish in the Federal Register or otherwise issue to the public any regulatory action that is subject to review under section 6 of this Executive order until (1) the Administrator of OIRA notifies the agency that OIRA has waived its review of the action or has completed its review without any requests for further consideration, or (2) the applicable time period in section 6(b)(2) expires without OIRA having notified

431

the agency that it is returning the regulatory action for further consideration under section 6(b)(3), whichever occurs first. If the terms of the preceding sentence have not been satisfied and an agency wants to publish or otherwise issue a regulatory action, the head of that agency may request Presidential consideration through the Vice President, as provided under section 7 of this order. Upon receipt of this request, the Vice President shall notify OIRA and the Advisors. The guidelines and time period set forth in section 7 shall apply to the publication of regulatory actions for which Presidential consideration has been sought. The White House, September 30, 1993 Source: Federal Register, 58 FR 51735.

6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council, October 8, 2001 By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Establishment. I hereby establish within the Executive Office of the President an Office of Homeland Security (the ‘‘Office’’) to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Section 2. Mission. The mission of the Office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission, including the functions specified in section 3 of this order. Section 3. Functions. The functions of the Office shall be to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. (a) National Strategy. The Office shall work with executive departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private entities to ensure the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from

432 The Federal Bureaucracy terrorist threats or attacks within the United States and shall periodically review and coordinate revisions to that strategy as necessary. (b) Detection. The Office shall identify priorities and coordinate efforts for collection and analysis of information within the United States regarding threats of terrorism against the United States and activities of terrorists or terrorist groups within the United States. The Office also shall identify, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, priorities for collection of intelligence outside the United States regarding threats of terrorism within the United States. (i) In performing these functions, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, as appropriate, to: (A) facilitate collection from State and local governments and private entities of information pertaining to terrorist threats or activities within the United States; (B) coordinate and prioritize the requirements for foreign intelligence relating to terrorism within the United States of executive departments and agencies responsible for homeland security and provide these requirements and priorities to the Director of Central Intelligence and other agencies responsible collection of foreign intelligence; (C) coordinate efforts to ensure that all executive departments and agencies that have intelligence collection responsibilities have sufficient technological capabilities and resources to collect intelligence and data relating to terrorist activities or possible terrorist acts within the United States, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as appropriate; (D) coordinate development of monitoring protocols and equipment for use in detecting the release of biological, chemical, and radiological hazards; and (E) ensure that, to the extent permitted by law, all appropriate and necessary intelligence and law enforcement information relating to homeland security is disseminated to and exchanged among appropriate executive departments and

agencies responsible for homeland security and, where appropriate for reasons of homeland security, promote exchange of such information with and among State and local governments and private entities. (ii) Executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, make available to the Office all information relating to terrorist threats and activities within the United States. (c) Preparedness. The Office of Homeland Security shall coordinate national efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to: (i) review and assess the adequacy of the portions of all Federal emergency response plans that pertain to terrorist threats or attacks within the United States; (ii) coordinate domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack within the United States and coordinate programs and activities for training Federal, State, and local employees who would be called upon to respond to such a threat or attack; (iii) coordinate national efforts to ensure public health preparedness for a terrorist attack, including reviewing vaccination policies and reviewing the adequacy of and, if necessary, increasing vaccine and pharmaceutical stockpiles and hospital capacity; (iv) coordinate Federal assistance to State and local authorities and nongovernmental organizations to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats or attacks within the United States; (v) ensure that national preparedness programs and activities for terrorist threats or attacks are developed and are regularly evaluated under appropriate standards and that resources are allocated to improving and sustaining preparedness based on such evaluations; and (vi) ensure the readiness and coordinated deployment of Federal response teams to

6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council respond to terrorist threats or attacks, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, when appropriate. (d) Prevention. The Office shall coordinate efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to: (i) facilitate the exchange of information among such agencies relating to immigration and visa matters and shipments of cargo; and, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ensure coordination among such agencies to prevent the entry of terrorists and terrorist materials and supplies into the United States and facilitate removal of such terrorists from the United States, when appropriate; (ii) coordinate efforts to investigate terrorist threats and attacks within the United States; and (iii) coordinate efforts to improve the security of United States borders, territorial waters, and airspace in order to prevent acts of terrorism within the United States, working with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, when appropriate. (e) Protection. The Office shall coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to: (i) strengthen measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical facilities; other utilities; telecommunications; facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material; and other critical infrastructure services and critical facilities within the United States from terrorist attack; (ii) coordinate efforts to protect critical public and privately owned information systems within the United States from terrorist attack;

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senior officials to have national significance are protected from terrorist attack; (v) coordinate efforts to protect transportation systems within the United States, including railways, highways, shipping, ports and waterways, and airports and civilian aircraft, from terrorist attack; (vi) coordinate efforts to protect United States livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food for human use and consumption from terrorist attack; and (vii) coordinate efforts to prevent unauthorized access to, development of, and unlawful importation into the United States of, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, or other related materials that have the potential to be used in terrorist attacks. (f) Response and Recovery. The Office shall coordinate efforts to respond to and promote recovery from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. In performing this function, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as appropriate, to: (i) coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of transportation systems, energy production, transmission, and distribution systems; telecommunications; other utilities; and other critical infrastructure facilities after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack; (ii) coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of public and private critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack; (iii) work with the National Economic Council to coordinate efforts to stabilize United States financial markets after a terrorist threat or attack and manage the immediate economic and financial consequences of the incident; (iv) coordinate Federal plans and programs to provide medical, financial, and other assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and their families; and

(iii) develop criteria for reviewing whether appropriate security measures are in place at major public and privately owned facilities within the United States;

(v) coordinate containment and removal of biological, chemical, radiological, explosive, or other hazardous materials in the event of a terrorist threat or attack involving such hazards and coordinate efforts to mitigate the effects of such an attack.

(iv) coordinate domestic efforts to ensure that special events determined by appropriate

(g) Incident Management. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall be the

434 The Federal Bureaucracy individual primarily responsible for coordinating the domestic response efforts of all departments and agencies in the event of an imminent terrorist threat and during and in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack within the United States and shall be the principal point of contact for and to the President with respect to coordination of such efforts. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as appropriate. (h) Continuity of Government. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, shall review plans and preparations for ensuring the continuity of the Federal Government in the event of a terrorist attack that threatens the safety and security of the United States Government or its leadership. (i) Public Affairs. The Office, subject to the direction of the White House Office of Communications, shall coordinate the strategy of the executive branch for communicating with the public in the event of a terrorist threat or attack within the United States. The Office also shall coordinate the development of programs for educating the public about the nature of terrorist threats and appropriate precautions and responses. (j) Cooperation with State and Local Governments and Private Entities. The Office shall encourage and invite the participation of State and local governments and private entities, as appropriate, in carrying out the Office’s functions. (k) Review of Legal Authorities and Development of Legislative Proposals. The Office shall coordinate a periodic review and assessment of the legal authorities available to executive departments and agencies to permit them to perform the functions described in this order. When the Office determines that such legal authorities are inadequate, the Office shall develop, in consultation with executive departments and agencies, proposals for presidential action and legislative proposals for submission to the Office of Management and Budget to enhance the ability of executive departments and agencies to perform those functions. The Office shall work with State and local governments in assessing the adequacy of their legal authorities to permit them to detect,

prepare for, prevent, protect against, and recover from terrorist threats and attacks. (l) Budget Review. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the ‘‘Director’’) and the heads of executive departments and agencies, shall identify programs that contribute to the Administration’s strategy for homeland security and, in the development of the President’s annual budget submission, shall review and provide advice to the heads of departments and agencies for such programs. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall provide advice to the Director on the level and use of funding in departments and agencies for homeland security-related activities and, prior to the Director’s forwarding of the proposed annual budget submission to the President for transmittal to the Congress, shall certify to the Director the funding levels that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security believes are necessary and appropriate for the homeland security-related activities of the executive branch. Section 4. Administration. (a) The Office of Homeland Security shall be directed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. (b) The Office of Administration within the Executive Office of the President shall provide the Office of Homeland Security with such personnel, funding, and administrative support, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, as directed by the Chief of Staff to carry out the provisions of this order. (c) Heads of executive departments and agencies are authorized, to the extent permitted by law, to detail or assign personnel of such departments and agencies to the Office of Homeland Security upon request of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff. Section 5. Establishment of Homeland Security Council. (a) I hereby establish a Homeland Security Council (the ‘‘Council’’), which shall be responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect

6.10 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council to all aspects of homeland security. The Council shall serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies. (b) The Council shall have as its members the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President may from time to time designate. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior officials shall be invited to attend Council meetings when appropriate. (c) The Council shall meet at the President’s direction. When the President is absent from a meeting of the Council, at the President’s direction the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall be responsible, at the President’s direction, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording Council actions and Presidential decisions. Section 6. Original Classification Authority. I hereby delegate the authority to classify information originally as Top Secret, in accordance with Executive Order 12958 or any successor Executive Order, to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.

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Section 7. Continuing Authorities. This order does not alter the existing authorities of United States Government departments and agencies. All executive departments and agencies are directed to assist the Council and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security in carrying out the purposes of this order. Section 8. General Provisions. (a) This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person. (b) References in this order to State and local governments shall be construed to include tribal governments and United States territories and other possessions. (c) References to the ‘‘United States’’ shall be construed to include United States territories and possessions. Section 9. Amendments to Executive Order 12656. Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows: (a) Section 101(a) is amended by adding at the end of the fourth sentence: ‘‘, except that the Homeland Security Council shall be responsible for administering such policy with respect to terrorist threats and attacks within the United States.’’ (b) Section 104(a) is amended by adding at the end: ‘‘, except that the Homeland Security Council is the principal forum for consideration of policy relating to terrorist threats and attacks within the United States.’’ (c) Section 104(b) is amended by inserting the words ‘‘and the Homeland Security Council’’ after the words ‘‘National Security Council.’’ (d) The first sentence of section 104(c) is amended by inserting the words ‘‘and the Homeland Security Council’’ after the words ‘‘National Security Council.’’ (e) The second sentence of section 104(c) is replaced with the following two sentences: ‘‘Pursuant to such procedures for the organization and management of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council processes as the President may establish, the

436 The Federal Bureaucracy Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency also shall assist in the implementation of and management of those processes as the President may establish. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency also shall assist in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with the other Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments, and by providing periodic reports to the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council on implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy.’’

(f) Section 201(7) is amended by inserting the words ‘‘and the Homeland Security Council’’ after the words ‘‘National Security Council.’’ (g) Section 206 is amended by inserting the words ‘‘and the Homeland Security Council’’ after the words ‘‘National Security Council.’’ (h) Section 208 is amended by inserting the words ‘‘or the Homeland Security Council’’ after the words ‘‘National Security Council.’’ GEORGE W. BUSH White House October 8, 2001.

Section 7 The Courts

Introduction

The American Supreme Court, Robert McCloskey concluded in 1960 the American judiciary has been most successful when ‘‘it has operated near the margins of rather than in the center of political controversy, when it has nudged and gently tugged the nation, instead of trying to rule it.’’ During the past four decades, the courts have been anything but timid in addressing a broad array of explosive controversies over public welfare, civil rights, civil liberties, interbranch struggles, and even the outcome of a national election. The expansion of individual rights over the course of the 20th century played a particularly important role in making the courts more powerful, and they have emerged as one of the most important forces in American politics. The increased activism and influence of the courts over time has sparked an intense debate over the proper role of a branch not subject to electoral accountability. The following essays by G. Alan Tarr and Michael Besso offer a compelling and nuanced view of the courts as an important force in American political development. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The Constitution says precious little about the proper role of the federal courts, and its framers explicitly acknowledged that the powers of the national judiciary would be dramatically overshadowed by those of the two elected branches. Alexander Hamilton, a strong proponent of a vigorous federal judiciary, reassured critics in Federalist No. 78 that the judiciary was ‘‘the least dangerous branch.’’ Whereas the legislature was to control the purse and the executive was to control the sword, he observed, the courts’ only weapon was its judgment. During its early history, the authority of the federal courts was often in peril and high levels of judicial turnover were the norm. The Supreme Court’s power of judicial review, enabling it to determine the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions, was never explicitly granted by the Constitution and thereby required Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues later to claim and defend this power through deft and careful means. Yet there is scarcely an issue of major consequence in U.S. history that the courts have not sought to engage and resolve. In his classic work,

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The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development G. Alan Tarr Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University--Camden

This transformation of political questions into legal ones means that the cases appealed to the Supreme Court largely reflect the current political agenda of the nation. Before the Civil War, the key political issue was the distribution of political power between nation and state, with slavery or property rights underlying many disputes. So the constitutional cases coming to the Court during that era typically required it to define the respective spheres of the federal and state governments. Following the Civil War, the Court confronted various issues arising out of the war, Reconstruction, and their aftermath. During the latter half of the 19th century, the nation also underwent rapid industrialization and saw the rise of large corporations wielding substantial economic power. When the federal and state governments introduced economic regulations, disputes about their constitutionality became a central political issue and dominated the Supreme Court’s constitutional agenda until the late 1930s. In response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt inaugurated the New Deal, dramatically expanding federal involvement in economic regulation. The Supreme Court initially opposed this expansion in the scope of government, but under pressure, it relented and accorded federal and state officials broad discretion in regulating economic activity. This expansion in government activity, however, multiplied the situations in which government actions impinged on individual rights, and conflicts over civil rights and civil liberties thus became the primary agenda item for the Supreme Court. In recent years, renewed concern about the scope of

Article III of the federal Constitution provides for a Supreme Court, whose members are appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. Originally there were six justices, but the size of the Court is not specified in the Constitution, and Congress altered the number several times before setting it at nine in 1867. The justices hold office during ‘‘good behavior’’---only one justice (Samuel Chase in 1804) was ever impeached by the House of Representatives--and the Senate failed to convict. Those appointed to the Supreme Court generally remain on the bench until death or retirement, and increasing life expectancy has meant that recent justices have served for long periods. During the latter half of the 20th century, the average tenure for justices was almost 20 years. Although the Supreme Court has a limited‘‘original jurisdiction’’(cases coming directly to the Court), most cases come on appeal from federal or state courts. In the early 21st century, more than 7,000 cases were appealed to the Court annually, and the justices decided fewer than 100 per year. In choosing which cases to hear, the justices exercise almost complete discretion, and they generally select cases likely to have a national impact. Often these cases involve politically contentious issues because Americans tend to transform their policy disagreements into legal disputes and to seek their resolution in the courts. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America (1835),‘‘there is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.’’ 439

440 The Courts government has brought additional issues to the Court, involving the distribution of power between nation and state and the relation between economic rights and government regulation. Tocqueville’s observation about the transformation of political disputes into legal disputes also makes clear that the Supreme Court is both a legal institution and a political body. Like other courts, it resolves legal disputes by interpreting and applying law---as Chief Justice John Marshall put it in Marbury v. Madison [1803], the Court is to ‘‘say what the law is.’’ Yet because the disputes it resolves often concern the extent, distribution, and uses of government power, the Supreme Court necessarily participates in governing. Most Court rulings have consequences far beyond the particular disputes they resolve, because in deciding cases, the Court establishes legal standards that will guide future rulings and thus affect the validity of laws and policies not directly before the Court. Moreover, political officials may factor the Court’s rulings---or the likely response of the Supreme Court to their actions---into their calculations about what policies they will pursue. Yet the Supreme Court’s power is hardly unlimited. As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 78, courts do not control ‘‘either the sword or the purse’’ and must ‘‘ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.’’ Thus, the effectiveness of the Supreme Court ultimately depends on the willingness of the people to accept its rulings and on the willingness of other officials to support and enforce them. Put differently, the Supreme Court is a participant in a system of divided power rather than a dominant institution in American politics. The most important power exercised by the Supreme Court is the power of judicial review, that is, the power to rule on the constitutionality of actions taken by other branches of the federal government or by the states. This power extends not only to the laws enacted by Congress or state legislatures but also to actions taken by other government officials, ranging from presidents to police officers. Perhaps surprisingly, the Constitution does not expressly confer the power of judicial review on the Supreme Court (or on other federal courts). Courts rather have found this power implicit in the system of limited government established by the founders. The creation of this power and its exercise by the Supreme Court provide the focus for this essay.

The Supreme Court, 1790--1861 Initially, the Supreme Court seemed doomed to insignificance. Several leading political figures refused

As the first chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, delegate to both Continental Congresses, diplomat, and Federalist governor of New York, John Jay helped to shape the government of the United States. (Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States)

appointments to the Court, and during its first decade five justices---including John Jay, the first chief justice---resigned to assume other government posts. Jay subsequently rejected President John Adams’ offer to reappoint him as chief justice, concluding that the Court would never ‘‘obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due support to the national government’’ (Hazelton 1914, 141). There were reasons for Jay’s pessimism. The Court could not participate directly in political affairs. When President George Washington in 1793 requested the justices’ legal advice, the Court felt obliged to demur, believing such advisory opinions inconsistent with its constitutional responsibility to resolve legal disputes. Yet few legal disputes came to the Court in its early years: between 1790 and 1799, the Supreme Court heard only about 50 cases, most of them insignificant. Even its most important decision, Chisholm v. Georgia [1793], revealed the weakness of the Court. In Chisholm, the Court ruled that citizens of one state could sue the government of another state in federal court. Enraged advocates of states’ rights, who saw in Chisholm a threat to state sovereignty, promptly amended the

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development Constitution (the Eleventh Amendment) to overturn the Court’s ruling. The appointment of John Marshall as chief justice in 1801 transformed the Supreme Court. Marshall recognized that the Court’s authority depended on it speaking with a single voice, so he eliminated the practice of each judge explaining his position in a separate written opinion, replacing it with a single opinion announcing the decision and reasoning of the Court. Often Marshall wrote these opinions himself---he presented the opinion of the Court in 40 of the 64 constitutional law cases decided during his tenure. Justices remained free to dissent from the majority opinion, but the force of Marshall’s reasoning and the power of his personality encouraged unanimity. By the time he retired in 1835, the Supreme Court had secured its major role in American government. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘‘if American law were to be represented by a single figure, skeptic and worshipper alike would agree without dispute that the figure could be one alone, and that one, John Marshall’’ (Holmes 1952, 270). Chief Justice Marshall’s first significant ruling was in Marbury v. Madison (1803). The issue in Marbury--could the Court compel Secretary of State James Madison to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia?---was not of great moment. But the case was political dynamite. President John Adams had appointed Marbury and other judges during the waning hours of his administration, hoping to pack the federal judiciary with Federalists before the inauguration of his political rival, Thomas Jefferson. That Marbury deserved his commission was clear. However, if the Marshall Court ordered the commission delivered, Jefferson was unlikely to comply, and he might use the ruling to seek the impeachment of the justices. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion responding to the situation was a masterpiece of indirection. On the one hand, it asserted that Marbury was entitled to his commission, lecturing the Jefferson administration on its illegal conduct. On the other hand, it conceded that the Supreme Court could not order Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury. The reason, Marshall argued, was that section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized Marbury to bring his complaint directly to the Supreme Court, was unconstitutional. Thus, in denying itself the power to require delivery of Marbury’s commission, the Court claimed a much more important power, namely, the power to rule on the constitutionality of congressional enactments. Although the Supreme Court under Marshall never again invalidated an act of Congress, Marbury established that the Court could determine the constitutionality of federal statutes.

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Chief Justice John Marshall (1755--1835). (Library of Congress)

In cases involving the relations between nation and state, the Marshall Court interpreted the Constitution as a strongly nationalist document. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States and invalidated a Maryland tax on it, illustrates Marshall’s approach. Although the Constitution did not expressly authorize the federal government to charter the Bank, Marshall insisted that this was not decisive. The enumerated powers granted to Congress, he argued, should be understood as means for achieving broad national ends and therefore had to be interpreted expansively to afford Congress the necessary flexibility to achieve those ends. The necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact all laws ‘‘necessary and proper for carrying out’’ its enumerated powers, provided textual support for Marshall’s claim of implied powers for Congress. Marshall dismissed concerns that his broad interpretation of federal powers might imperil the powers of the states, noting that under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the federal government is supreme within its sphere, and its policies must prevail. He concluded: ‘‘We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs’’ (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407).

442 The Courts What this broad interpretation of congressional powers might mean became clear in Gibbons v. Ogden [1824], which provided Marshall his first opportunity to expound on Congress’s power to ‘‘regulate commerce among the several states’’ (U.S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 8, para.3). The commerce clause, he argued, empowered Congress to regulate not only the exchange of goods but also their production and transportation to market. This power extended beyond interstate commerce to include all ‘‘that commerce which affects more states than one’’ (Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194). Congress did not immediately respond to this implicit invitation for vigorous national action, but when it did so in the 20th century, McCulloch and Gibbons provided the constitutional justification for its initiatives. Complementing the Marshall Court’s vindication of national power was its enforcement of constitutional limits on the states. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee [1816] and Cohens v. Virginia [1821], the Court confirmed its authority to review state court decisions to ensure that they accorded with the Constitution. ‘‘The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the Constitution or laws of the United States,’’ Marshall maintained, ‘‘is essential to the attainment of [the] objects’’ of the Constitution (Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 415). Advocates of state prerogatives were outraged---but they could not persuade Congress to revoke the Court’s authority to review state court rulings. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward [1819], Marshall transformed the contract clause of the Constitution into a powerful guarantee of property rights against state invasion, holding that the corporate charters issued by state legislatures qualified as contracts and were thus protected from subsequent infringement by those legislatures. Dartmouth College, announced at the very time that business corporations were proliferating, encouraged economic development by ensuring corporations of protection against interference by state legislatures. The effects of this precedent were dramatic: During the remainder of the 19th century, the contract clause provided the basis in almost half of the instances in which the Supreme Court invalidated state laws. Under Marshall’s successor, Chief Justice Roger Taney (1836--1864), the Court tempered but did not repudiate the constitutional nationalism of the Marshall Court. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens [1852], for instance, the Taney Court upheld state power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, so long as these regulations did not interfere with the operation of a national market. The Taney Court also protected property rights but did so with a changing understanding of

what that entailed. Thus, in Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co. [1837], it rejected the claim that a charter to build and operate a toll bridge carried with it by implication protection against the building of a nearby competing bridge under a later grant. Speaking for the Court, Taney acknowledged that ‘‘the rights of property are sacredly grounded’’ but insisted that ‘‘the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation’’ (Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 420, 548). He emphasized the public interest in promoting a dynamic rather than a static economy, noting that equal opportunity for the acquisition of property would promote creativity and entrepreneurship and release energies that would benefit the whole society. This was a popular theme, and the Taney Court---unlike the Marshall Court---largely escaped controversy, at least until its ill-fated attempt in Dred Scott v. Sandford [1857] to resolve the conflict over slavery. The case arose when Dred Scott, who had been born a slave, sued in federal court for his freedom. Scott had resided in Illinois, a free state, and in the Wisconsin Territory, where Congress had prohibited slavery, and he argued that his residence in each of these locations made him a free person. The Supreme Court disagreed. Chief Justice Taney, who wrote the opinion of the Court, concluded that Scott could not bring his suit in federal court, because he was not a citizen of the United States. In fact, Taney insisted, African Americans could never be citizens and, whether free or enslaved, ‘‘had no rights which the white man was bound to respect’’ (Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407). Although treatment of the citizenship issue sufficed to dispose of the case, Taney also addressed the substantive arguments raised by Scott. He concluded that the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which established the Wisconsin Territory as free territory, was unconstitutional, because Congress had no power to outlaw slavery in the territories. This marked the first time that the Supreme Court had invalidated a major piece of congressional statute. It also suggested that a key principle of the emerging Republican Party--‘‘no slavery in the territories’’ (Gould 2003)---was at odds with the Constitution. Instead of resolving the slavery issue, Dred Scott inflamed sectional animosities, with Southerners applauding Taney’s opinion and Northerners denouncing it. The election of 1860 brought the Republican Party to power, and the secession of the Southern states plunged the nation into civil war. The ‘‘self-inflicted wound’’ (O’Brien 2008, 117) of Dred Scott created a distrust of the Supreme Court that would be slow to heal.

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development

Dred Scott v. Sandford decision announcement. The Dred Scott decision inflamed abolitionist sentiment leading up to the Civil War. (Library of Congress)

The Supreme Court, the Civil War, and Its Aftermath The Civil War, Reconstruction, and their aftermath brought new constitutional issues to the Court. During the Civil War, President Lincoln undertook several

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controversial actions, including suspending the writ of habeas corpus for all persons ‘‘guilty of any disloyal practice’’ and authorizing their trial and punishment by courts martial. The Supreme Court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of Lincoln’s actions while the war raged, but afterward the justices in Ex Parte Milligan [1866] unanimously concluded that Lincoln had exceeded his authority. Five justices maintained, in addition, that even Congress could not have authorized the military trial of civilians outside of a combat zone. This claim appeared to threaten the validity of the military governments that had been temporarily established in the South in the aftermath of the Civil War. To preclude a constitutional challenge to its Reconstruction policies, Congress passed a law withdrawing the Supreme Court’s power to hear certain cases that might have raised such issues. In Ex Parte McCardle [1869] the Court bowed to Congress’s authority to regulate its appellate jurisdiction, thus defusing a potential conflict between Court and Congress. The adoption of three constitutional amendments in the wake of the Civil War raised fundamental issues. The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship on all persons born within the United States, thereby overruling Dred Scott, which had limited citizenship to whites. It also prohibited states from ‘‘enforc[ing] any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ The Fifteenth Amendment forbade abridgement of the right to vote ‘‘on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’’ All three amendments changed the distribution of power between nation and state, giving Congress the power to enforce their provisions ‘‘by appropriate legislation.’’ But the question remained as to how great a change they introduced. During the 19th century, the Supreme Court read these amendments narrowly. Ironically, the Court’s first opportunity to construe the Fourteenth Amendment came in a case involving economic rights, not racial discrimination. In The Slaughterhouse Cases [1873], a group of butchers claimed that the Louisiana Legislature, by granting to one firm a monopoly on the slaughterhouse business in New Orleans, had denied them their right to practice their trade in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A closely divided Court disagreed. According to the Court majority, the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected few rights, and its due process clause dealt with the fairness of state procedures, not with the

444 The Courts substance of state policies. In part, the Court’s reluctance to interpret the amendment’s protections broadly reflected a concern for federalism. The justices feared that a broad interpretation would alter radically ‘‘the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments to each other’’ (The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78). In part, too, the justices’ reluctance stemmed from a belief that the amendment was confined to safeguarding the rights of those who had previously been enslaved. Yet when the Court did address the rights of African Americans, it found that the Reconstruction amendments offered little support. In The Civil Rights Cases [1883], the Court struck down congressional legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in theaters, restaurants, and other public accommodations, insisting that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments protected only against government, not private, discrimination. Thirteen years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Court concluded that even statemandated racial segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as the separate facilities were equal. Plessy confirmed that the Supreme Court would not vindicate the rights guaranteed by the post---Civil War amendments and, in fact, encouraged the very sorts of racial discrimination that the amendments were designed to prevent.

The Supreme Court and the Economy, 1865--1937 In assessing the constitutionality of economic regulations, the Supreme Court during this period pursued two aims. First, it endeavored to maintain a balance of power between nation and state. To accomplish this, it interpreted various grants of power to the federal government, such as the commerce power and taxing power, so that their exercise would not unduly impinge on state power. In United States v. E. C. Knight Company (1895), for example, the Court read the commerce power as extending only to the exchange of goods and not to their production. And in Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1935), the justices concluded that Congress could regulate only those intrastate commercial activities that had a ‘‘direct,’’ not an ‘‘indirect,’’ effect on interstate commerce. As the Court explained in Knight: ‘‘If the national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state control’’ (United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16). Even when the Constitution clearly granted powers to the federal

This cover of the July 1922 Labor Herald shows the Supreme Court looking down upon emaciated child laborers, referring to the court’s ruling in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company (1922). The Progressive movement of the early 20th century attempted to regulate, if not eliminate, child labor in the United States. In 1916 the Keating-Owen Act prohibited the interstate transfer of goods produced by child labor in an attempt to discourage the practice, but in 1918 the Supreme Court ruled this act to be in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Congress then passed the Revenue Act of 1919, which levied a 10 percent tax on goods produced by child labor, but the Supreme Court ruled this law unconstitutional in Bailey. (Library of Congress)

government, the Court insisted that the federal government could not use these powers to invade state prerogatives. Thus, in Hammer v. Dagenhart [1918] it invalidated a congressional ban on the interstate shipment of items produced by child labor, concluding that even though the law only dealt with interstate commerce, it invaded state power over employment practices. And in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company [1923], it struck down a federal tax on the profits of businesses employing children, insisting that the tax was merely a pretext to regulate an area assigned to state authority.

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development Second, the Court sought to ensure that when the states regulated, they did so for valid ‘‘police power’’ purposes---that is, to protect the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the population---rather than merely to advance the interests of politically powerful groups. In assessing the purposes of state legislation, the justices did not accept the claims of the states at face value, but undertook their own independent analysis of whether the state policies served their asserted purposes. Thus, in the infamous case of Lochner v. New York (1905), the Court struck down a New York law that limited the number of hours that a baker could work in a bakery, concluding that the law served no valid health purpose and unreasonably interfered with the ‘‘freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment’’ (198 U.S. 45, 64). And in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) it struck down a minimum-wage law for women and children as ‘‘the product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power’’ (261 U.S. 525, 559). In invalidating state legislation, the Court relied on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbade states from ‘‘depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’’ In The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court had held that this provision required only that states observe proper procedures---for example, that they provide defendants a fair trial before sentencing them. By the conclusion of the 19th century, however, the justices had reconsidered, concluding that the clause had a substantive dimension as well, that laws depriving persons of liberty or property without good reason likewise violated the due process clause. This recognition of ‘‘substantive due process,’’ as it came to be called, did not mean that the Court always struck down state regulations---it did not. But the ultimate touchstone for constitutionality became whether or not a majority of the justices (rather than state legislators) believed that the state regulations were reasonable. The Court’s rulings on federal and state regulatory power put it at odds with those who favored more active government intervention in the market to safeguard the interests of workers and the public interest. Yet so long as Congress exercised the commerce power sparingly, collisions between the Court and Congress remained intermittent. With the advent of the Great Depression, however, more active government intervention in the economy under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt made confrontation almost inevitable. In 1935--1936, the Court struck down a series of important New Deal measures, including the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural

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Adjustment Act, and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. The bases for the Court’s rulings presaged the invalidation of further New Deal measures. In 1937, following his landslide reelection, President Roosevelt proposed a plan to expand the membership of the Supreme Court. Although the measure was portrayed as necessary to help the Court with its workload, its aim was clearly to give the president an opportunity to appoint justices more sympathetic to New Deal legislation. While the Court-packing bill was before Congress (where it ultimately died), the Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937) upheld the National Labor Relations Act, signaling a new approach to the interpretation of the commerce clause. In West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (1937), it also repudiated substantive due process in reviewing economic legislation, noting that ‘‘even if the wisdom of the policy is regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment’’ (West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399). The Court thus abandoned its efforts to subject federal and state economic legislation to constitutional scrutiny, and the retirement of several justices gave President Roosevelt the opportunity to reconstitute the Court and cement his victory.

The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 1900--1953 The Supreme Court’s withdrawal from policing constitutional limits on congressional and state economic regulations left unclear what direction the Court would pursue. Yet some hints of the rights-focused jurisprudence that would define the Court in ensuing decades were apparent even before 1937. A few pre-1937 rulings used the legal vocabulary of the era to address civil-liberties concerns. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the justices struck down an Oregon law that required all children to attend public (rather than parochial) schools, concluding that it violated not religious liberty but the right of those who ran the schools to pursue their profession. Even more important were cases arising out of Word War I and its aftermath, in which the Court for the first time considered constitutional challenges to laws restricting speech. The Court initially rejected these First Amendment claims, upholding convictions of antiwar protestors and political radicals in Schenck v. United States (1919), Gitlow v. New York (1925), and other cases. Nevertheless, these cases provided the impetus for defining the standards, such as the ‘‘clear-and-present-danger test’’ announced

446 The Courts in Schenck, which would guide its rulings in future free speech cases and lead to more rights-protective results. In addition, in Gitlow the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech to the states, thus beginning a process (eventually labeled ‘‘selective incorporation’’) of applying the protections of the Bill of Rights to limit state infringements on rights. Because most of the Court’s most famous civil-liberties rulings have involved the invalidation of state laws, this was a crucial development. Yet after the constitutional revolution of 1937, a key question remained: Why should the Court not defer to legislative judgment on issues of civil liberties, just as it did on issues involving the economy and claims of property rights? This question split on the Court, as shown in the Court’s two flag-salute cases--Minersville School District v. Gobitis [1940] and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette [1943]. In Gobitis Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for an eightmember majority, upheld a law under which Jehovah’s Witnesses children were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag. The Constitution gave the legislature, not the courts, responsibility for determining how best to inculcate patriotism, Frankfurter cautioned, and doubts about the wisdom of the law did not justify its invalidation. Three years later, however, in Barnette, the Court reversed course, emphasizing the justices’ special responsibility to protect minorities from majority tyranny. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson declared that ‘‘the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities’’ (West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638). These contrasting views---judicial deference to the results of the democratic process versus judicial activism in support of rights---would be debated into the 21st century. Barnette was a shining example of protecting rights against patriotic excesses during wartime. However, the Supreme Court’s overall record during World War II (as in World War I) left much to be desired. Particularly serious was the Court’s failure in responding to the forced evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and their detention in ‘‘relocation camps.’’ In a series of cases, the justices upheld the removal and detention, despite the fact that those removed were selected on the basis of ethnicity and were never charged with an offense or convicted in court. Speaking for the Court in Korematsu v. United States [1944], Justice Hugo Black denied that the program was based on racial prejudice

and concluded that ‘‘hardships are a part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.’’ After the war ended in 1948, a presidential commission condemned the forced evacuation, and in 1988, Congress enacted legislation extending an official apology and awarding compensation to those who had been victimized. The outbreak in the late 1940s of the Cold War with the Soviet Union intensified concern about Communist influence and subversion within the United States. The federal government responded with legislation aimed at the Communist Party and its leaders, a program inquiring into the loyalty of government employees, and legislative investigations---particularly by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)---focusing on the extent of Communist influence in universities, motion pictures, and other fields. When constitutional challenges to these measures came before the Supreme Court, the justices initially upheld the government programs. In Dennis v. United States [1951], the Court ruled that the Smith Act, which made it unlawful to teach or advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence, did not violate the First Amendment and sustained the convictions of 11 leaders of the American Communist Party under the act. The Court also sustained against a First Amendment challenge a requirement that labor union officials swear that they were not members of the Communist Party (American Communications Association v. Douds [1950]). It upheld the power of the attorney general to prepare a list of organizations considered subversive (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath [1951]) and a state law providing for the firing of public school teachers who belonged to listed organizations (Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York [1952]). When the Supreme Court attempted to restrict the reach of the Smith Act in Yates v. United States [1957] and rein in the investigations by HUAC in Watkins v. United States (1957), its rulings produced an uproar in Congress. Bills were introduced to limit the Court’s power to hear domestic-security cases, and although they were never enacted, the Court retreated. It upheld HUAC’s inquiries into witnesses’ political beliefs and affiliations (Barenblatt v. United States [1959]); affirmed the dismissal of public employees who invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about membership in the Communist Party (Beilan v. Board of Education [1958]); and affirmed inquiries into the political affiliations of those seeking admission to the legal profession (Konigsberg v. State Bar [1961]). Only after the concern about domestic subversion abated would the justices again venture an expansive interpretation of political speech.

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development

The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 1953--1986 President Dwight Eisenhower’s appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice in 1953 ushered in a new era for the Supreme Court. The initial challenge facing the Warren Court was racial segregation in public schools. This long-standing practice, mandated throughout the South and found in several northern states as well, had its legal basis in Plessy v. Ferguson [1896], in which the Court had upheld ‘‘separate but equal’’ facilities. Since the 1930s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP’s) Legal Defense Fund had conducted a legal campaign against segregation in education, winning a series of narrow victories in the Supreme Court without directly challenging ‘‘separate but equal.’’ In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), however, the Legal Defense Fund mounted a frontal assault, claiming that racial segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ (Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301). In a unanimous opinion written by the new chief justice, the Court agreed, concluding that ‘‘in the field of education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.’’ A year later, in Brown II (Brown v. Board of Education [1955]), the Court addressed how to implement its ruling. It told local school districts to solve the administrative problems of transition and to admit students on a nondiscriminatory basis ‘‘with all deliberate speed.’’ This proved counterproductive. By exaggerating the administrative problems involved in desegregation, as well as refusing to set deadlines for starting or completing the process, the Court appeared to encourage delay. Brown II authorized federal district courts to oversee the process of desegregation and to use their powers to ensure compliance if local official deviated from the mandate of Brown. Desegregation proceeded smoothly in northern and border states, but in the South, evasion---sometimes accompanied by violence---was the norm. Years after Brown was decided, only 1.2 percent of African American students in the South attended school with whites. Lacking ‘‘the word or the purse,’’ the Court required forceful intervention by Congress and the president. The adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed federal funding to school districts that discriminated, together with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which promised substantial infusions of federal funds to poorer districts, accomplished what the Court had been unable to do on its own. By 1973, 91.3 percent of African American children in the South attended integrated schools.

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The Court’s egalitarianism was not confined to the racial sphere. In Baker v. Carr [1962] the court overturned existing precedent, announcing that it would scrutinize the apportionment of state legislative districts. Reynolds v. Sims [1964] required that legislative districts in both houses of the state legislature be of equal population, arguing that equality required not merely that each person have representation in the state legislature but that the votes of all citizens have equal weight. This ‘‘one man, one vote’’ standard sharply reduced the influence of rural areas in state legislatures---Chief Justice Warren considered the reapportionment rulings the most important of his tenure--but the shift benefited suburbs more than it did urban areas. The civil rights movement and protests against the Vietnam War, together with other societal developments, provided the Warren Court ample opportunity to develop First Amendment law. In Brandenburg v. Ohio [1969], the court announced a stringent new standard: government could only ban ‘‘incitement to imminent lawless action’’ (395 U.S. 444, 447). In New York Times v. Sullivan Co. [1964] the justices made it extremely difficult for public officials to obtain libel judgments against the press, proclaiming a ‘‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen’’ (376 U.S. 254, 270). Several cases involved symbolic speech, that is, conduct (such as sit-ins and demonstrations) used to convey a message. The Court concluded that not all expressive conduct was entitled to First Amendment protection---in United States v. O’Brien [1968], for example, it upheld a congressional ban on burning draft cards---but it generally restricted government efforts to prosecute the new forms of dissent. The Warren Court also broke new ground in the area of church and state. In Sherbert v. Verner [1963], it expanded protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, concluding that government must exempt believers when a law required them to perform or refrain from actions in violation of their religious convictions, unless it had a compelling reason for not doing so. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp [1963], the Court ruled that religious observances in public schools, such as prayers and Bible reading, violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. This latter ruling produced a reaction---some white Southerners complained that the justices had ‘‘let blacks into our schools and now have kicked God out’’ (Powe 2000, 363)---but efforts to

448 The Courts amend the Constitution to overrule Schempp failed in Congress. Even more controversial were the Warren Court’s rulings on criminal justice. Most criminal prosecutions occur in state courts, and so the Bill of Rights, which restricts only the federal government, initially did not apply. The Fourteenth Amendment mandated that states provide ‘‘due process of law’’; however, absent egregious violations of rights, the Court traditionally accorded states considerable leeway in structuring their institutions and procedures. This changed under the Warren Court. Invoking the doctrine of ‘‘selective incorporation,’’ the Court from 1953 to 1969 made newly applicable to the states 10 guarantees of the Bill of Rights affecting criminal procedure, including the right against self-incrimination (Malloy v. Hogan [1964]), the exclusion of illegally seized evidence (Mapp v. Ohio [1961]), the right to a jury trial (Robinson v. Louisiana [1968]), and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment (Robinson v. California [1962]). Accompanying this emphasis on national uniformity of procedures was an expansion in the scope of protection. Thus, in Trop v. Dulles [1958], the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibited not only penalties deemed cruel when the amendment was adopted but also punishments inconsistent with the ‘‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of an evolving society’’ (356 U.S. 86, 101). In Gideon v. Wainwright [1963], it held that indigent defendants could not receive a fair trial if they lacked legal representation and thus mandated that states must provide an attorney to defendants too poor to hire one. And in Miranda v. Arizona [1966], it ruled that before suspects in custody could be questioned by police, they had to be informed of their right to counsel and their right to remain silent---the famous ‘‘Miranda warnings.’’ These rulings extending the rights of defendants were announced in a period of rising crime rates, and not surprisingly, many members of the public concluded that the Court’s rulings had contributed to the societal disorder. Political candidates also denounced the Court, with the Republican nominee in 1968, Richard Nixon, proclaiming that ‘‘some of the courts have gone too far in weakening the peace forces against the criminal forces’’ (Stephenson 1999, 181) and pledging, if elected, to appoint ‘‘strict constructionist’’ judges who would interpret the law rather than make it. When Earl Warren submitted his resignation in 1968 and President Nixon appointed Warren Burger as his successor, it appeared to signal a fundamental shift in the orientation of the Supreme Court.

The anticipated transformation never occurred. The Burger Court quite quickly displayed its independence of President Nixon, refusing the administration’s request in New York Times v. United States [1971] to halt publication of the classified ‘‘Pentagon Papers.’’ In United States v. Nixon [1974] the justices unanimously rejected President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege during the Watergate scandal, leading to his resignation weeks later. Although the Burger Court refused to extend Warren Court initiatives in some areas and tempered its rulings in others, it repudiated no major precedents. Moreover, on issues such as abortion, gender equality, and affirmative action, it demonstrated a willingness to make new law. The Burger Court inherited the issue of school desegregation, but the issue’s character changed as the success of desegregation in the South led civil rights groups to shift their focus. They targeted the racial segregation found in urban districts in the North, arguing that even without laws mandating segregation, school officials had contrived to maintain racial separation. When federal district courts found merit in these claims, they prescribed various remedies, including busing of students within the school district, to achieve racial integration. Initially, in Swann v. Mecklenburg Board of Education [1971] the Burger Court endorsed these aggressive remedies. But the public response to such judicial intervention was decidedly negative. Congress cut off federal funds for busing in 1972, and in 1978, it forbade termination of federal funds to segregated school districts when desegregation required busing. In the face of political opposition and evidence that busing merely accelerated ‘‘white flight’’ from school districts, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley [1974] curtailed the power of district judges to use busing to combat segregation. The Burger Court also faced new equality claims. In Reed v. Reed [1971], the justices for the first time struck down under the equal protection clause, a law that discriminated against women. This ruling encouraged groups to bring gender-discrimination claims before the Court. Although the justices upheld many of these claims, it refused to require gender classifications to survive the same ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ that it required for racial classifications. In part, the justices’ reluctance stemmed from concern about preempting the Equal Rights Amendment banning gender discrimination, which was under consideration by the states. (The amendment was never ratified.) In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke [1976], the Court also for the first time addressed so-called reverse discrimination---whether racial classifications that disadvantaged

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development

Warren Burger’s tenure as chief justice of the Supreme Court is recalled chiefly for his efforts to streamline and modernize the operations of the federal court system. (Robert S. Oakes, National Geographic Society, Courtesy of the Supreme Court of the United States)

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death penalty violated the ban on cruel or unusual punishments. In response, 37 states adopted new death penalty statutes designed to curtail jury discretion, and the Court in Gregg v. Georgia [1976] upheld capital punishment as a constitutionally permissible punishment. Finally, in Roe v. Wade [1973], the Court ruled that the right to privacy initially recognized by the Warren Court in Griswold v. Connecticut [1965], ‘‘is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.’’ In striking down Texas’s restriction on abortion in Roe and Georgia’s restriction in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton [1973], the Court in effect invalidated the abortion laws in 46 states, and it enunciated detailed guidelines as to how states could regulate abortion in the future. Abortion opponents unsuccessfully sought a federal constitutional amendment overturning Roe. They enjoyed greater success in state legislatures, requiring the Court in the years following Roe to strike down numerous laws designed to increase the difficulty of obtaining an abortion. Only government refusals to fund abortions and a requirement that parents be notified before a minor received an abortion survived the Court’s scrutiny. Instead of reducing conflict over abortion, Roe and its progeny aggravated it. Before Roe, abortion was proceeding in various states with a minimum of fanfare and political conflict. Roe activated both pro-life and pro-choice political forces, nationalized the issue, and intensified the conflict over it. This conflict would remain central for the Rehnquist Court as well.

The Supreme Court, 1987--2009 whites were subject to the same ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ as those that disadvantaged racial minorities. In Bakke a badly divided Court, concluding that ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ applied regardless of the victim of the racial classification, struck down an affirmative action program at the University of California---Davis. But it also indicated that some affirmative action programs could survive ‘‘strict scrutiny,’’ and thus Bakke had little effect on the use of racial preferences. The Burger Court did narrow somewhat the Warren Court’s landmark criminal justice rulings, recognizing for example in New York v. Quarles [1983] a ‘‘public safety’’ exception to the Miranda rules and in United States v. Leon [1984] a ‘‘good faith’’ exception to the exclusionary rule. Yet in Furman v. Georgia [1972], it rendered invalid every state death penalty statute then in operation, arguing that the uncontrolled discretion available to jurors in deciding who should receive the

President Ronald Reagan’s elevation of William Rehnquist to lead the Court appeared once again to herald a transformation of the Court’s jurisprudence. The Rehnquist Court did demonstrate renewed concern for protecting state prerogatives against federal invasion. In United States v. Lopez [1995] and United States v. Morrison [2000], the Court invalidated federal statutes as exceeding congregational power under the commerce clause, the first sustained effort to curtain this power since the New Deal. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), it struck down a federal law as exceeding congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Other rulings limited the federal government’s authority to waive the sovereign immunity of state governments from lawsuit (for example, Seminole Tribe v. Florida [1996]) or to require state and local governments to carry out federal policy (for example, Printz v. United States [1997]).

450 The Courts

Opponents of the California Supreme Court’s decision in the Bakke case march to a rally in San Francisco, California, on April 29, 1978. The protest was aimed at the decision that Alan Bakke, a white student, was unfairly discriminated against by the University of California, Davis Medical School when they refused him admission. The court found that the school’s affirmative action admission program was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruling in the case was controversial; a divided court held that the admissions policy was unconstitutional but allowed for affirmative action programs to exist in principle. (Bettmann/Corbis)

The Rehnquist Court also pursued new directions regarding individual rights. In some instances it demonstrated a willingness to reconsider precedent. Thus, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith [1990], the Court overruled Sherbert v. Verner, insisting that the free exercise clause did not require the government to accommodate believers in designing legislation. And in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris [2002], it overruled several precedents in sustaining a state system of tuition vouchers that enable students to attend the school of their choice, whether the school was religious or not. In other instances, the Rehnquist Court rejected tenuous extensions of earlier precedents. For example, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health [1990], and Washington v. Glucksberg [1997], it declined invitations to recognize a ‘‘right to die’’ as part of the right to privacy, noting that its holdings ‘‘permitted [the public] debate to continue, as it should in a democratic

society’’ (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735). Finally, the Rehnquist Court showed a renewed interest in property rights, relying on the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to safeguard property owners against intrusive government regulations (for example, Nolan v. California Constitutional Commission [1987] and Dolan v. City of Tigard [1994]). Yet the Rehnquist Court did not initiate a constitutional counterrevolution. Its rulings on congressional power, religious liberty, and property rights were limited in scope. Moreover, it unexpectedly affirmed several controversial precedents. In Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey [1992], for example, a five-member majority reaffirmed the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy, and in Stenberg v. Carhart [2000], a five-member majority struck down a state law banning later term abortions. The key justices in Casey emphasized the need to adhere to established precedent, lest a perception be created that the justices had bowed

The U.S. Supreme Court in American Political Development to political expediency, which could undermine the rule of law and the institutional position of the Court. Likewise surprising was the Court’s validation in Grutter v. Bollinger [2003] of an affirmation action program at the University of Michigan Law School. Although emphasizing that racial classifications remained subject to strict scrutiny, a five-member majority concluded that diversity within a student body was a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the use of racial criteria. Finally, in some instances, the Rehnquist Court went beyond existing precedent in recognizing rights not closely tied to the text or original understanding of the Constitution. The Burger Court in Bowers v. Hardwick [1986] had upheld a Georgia law outlawing sodomy, stressing the need to avoid ‘‘judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.’’ But in Romer v. Evans [1996], the Rehnquist Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that made it more difficult to enact laws barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and in Lawrence v. Texas [2003], it overruled Bowers, insisting that the Constitution protected against laws intruding on ‘‘the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.’’ The complexity of the Rehnquist Court’s record reflects in part shifting coalitions on the Court, with ‘‘swing’’ justices such as Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy supplying the votes to move the Court sometimes in a liberal direction, other times in a conservative one. However, three aspects of its jurisprudence stand out. First, the Rehnquist Court was unusually willing to police the political process. It intervened to strike down the use of racial gerrymanders in legislative districting (for example, Shaw v. Reno [1993]); to uphold the use of partisan gerrymanders in Hunt v. Cromartie [2001]; and in its most famous---or infamous---ruling, to reverse the judgment of

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the Florida Supreme Court ordering a recount of contested ballots in the 2000 presidential election. Second, the Court was unusually willing to challenge the constitutional determinations of Congress, striking down 30 provisions of federal law from 1995 to 2001 alone. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court on average invalidated fewer state and local enactments than either the Warren Court or the Burger Court.

References and Further Reading Gillman, Howard. 1993. The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Decline of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Gillman, Howard, and Cornell W. Clayton, eds. 1999. The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Gould, Lewis L. 2003. Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans. New York: Random House. Hazelton, George. 1914. The National Capitol: Its Art, Architecture, and History. New York: J. F. Taylor. Holmes, Oliver Wendell. 1952. ‘‘John Marshall,’’ Collected Legal Papers. New York: Peter Smith. Keck, Thomas M. 1995. The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leuchtenburg, William. 1995. The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt. New York: Oxford University Press. McCloskey, Robert G. 1994. The American Supreme Court. 3rd rev. ed. Ed. Sanford Levinson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. O’Brien, David M. 2008. Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics. 8th ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Powe, Lucas A. Jr. 2000. The Warren Court and American Politics. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 2010. American Constitutional Law. 8th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview. Stephenson, Donald Grier, Jr. 1999. Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections. New York: Columbia University Press.

The Contemporary Supreme Court Michael Besso, JD, PhD

this discrimination. Regarding abortion, a majority of states had laws to prohibit or restrict the procedure, which the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade in effect rendered unconstitutional. Debate about Bush v. Gore supports this view as well: to the extent that many believed that the Court had acted in a partisan manner, they made their accusations of partisanship against an assumed view that the Court regularly does (and ought to) render principled and legal rulings rather than partisan and political edicts. The Supreme Court in fact exists as an essentially and thoroughly political institution. It sits neither above nor apart from other political institutions or the world of politics generally. It operates, in other words, as an integral element of our political system. A more complete study of the political context within which the Court renders its decisions---including seminal rights-protecting decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade---illustrates its political nature. And because the Court exists as a political institution, it in turn becomes necessary to understand that it both reflects and affects the broader forces of political society. U.S. judicial systems range from the federal to the state and local levels. The Supreme Court is merely the most prominent of all the courts throughout the nation. The scope of judicial actions also ranges widely, from private lawsuits (Jones sues Smith because of a car accident) to civil actions (New York sues Wall Street firms for state securities law violations) to criminal prosecutions (the United States prosecutes Timothy McVeigh for murder). All of these aspects of the

The place of the U.S. Supreme Court in the story of American political development is significant, if not as obvious as that of the federal government’s two other branches, the president and Congress. The standard image of the Court is that of an institution that decides legal questions and, in so doing, often regulates and checks government power---the powers exercised by Congress, the president and executive agencies, and the states. This is especially so when the Court resolves issues of constitutional rights and liberties on behalf of persons against government. A classic example of the Court in action is Brown v. Board of Education, the mid-20th century case that ordered the end of statesanctioned segregated schooling. Roe v. Wade, which is both equally prominent and today still controversial, constitutionalized the basic right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy. And in Bush v. Gore--despite the partisan political context within which the Court intervened in the 2000 presidential election---the Court explained its decision as necessary to protect individual voting rights. Fundamental to this image of the Supreme Court is the belief that the Court sits as an insular institution, separated from the rest of our government and politics by a duty to interpret the law and to render justice. Brown v. Board of Education, in particular, serves as the exemplar that supports this belief. According to this view, strong political forces had long ensured the continuation of the Jim Crow system of segregation laws that targeted African Americans throughout southern states. It took the Court to declare, finally, an end to the ‘‘separate but equal’’ rationalization that permitted 452

The Contemporary Supreme Court judicial process---and this is certainly not an exhaustive list---are subjects of regular study, as a means to understand the role of courts in our society. An examination of any of these would reveal the essential political nature of the judicial branches of our federal, state, and local governments. The discussion of the Court that follows focuses on an extremely small part of this broad field---for example, compared with the 100 million legal cases filed across the country each year, the Court itself hears and issues decisions in about 100 only. It is perhaps needless to add, though, that it is a very significant ‘‘small part.’’ The insights provided by a political approach to the study of the Court require modification of the standard view. Furthermore, because the two images of the Court---as a ‘‘legal’’ institution and as a ‘‘political’’ institution---entail different understandings about the place of the Court in the American political order, these same insights will clarify the place of the Court in the broader course of American political development.

The Supreme Court as a Legal Institution The image of the Supreme Court as a legal institution holds that the Court functions outside of politics. Even according to this view, though, the Court does have an effect on politics, insofar as it renders decisions that declare constitutional meaning that binds political actors. For example, these decisions might rule unconstitutional the actions undertaken by government entities, as in the Brown decision’s invalidation of many state laws that mandated school segregation. This view of the Court has long invited questions, however, about whether the Court, because of its separation from politics, ought to rule on the constitutional validity of actions engaged in by political actors. This part briefly elaborates and assesses the view of the Court as a ‘‘legal’’ institution; it also suggests the significance of this view in the context of American political development. The Supreme Court image as an apolitical forum for the legal resolution of disputes depends, in large part, on supporting evidence from both the structural design regarding the justice’s tenure and historical debates. As a matter of design, each justice holds her office ‘‘during good behavior,’’ which amounts to a lifetime appointment. That is, a justice does not serve a set term that then requires regular reappointment to the Court; nor does a justice face popular election to secure or maintain her seat. Although political demands might affect decision making by congressional representatives or senators or by the president, a justice remains insulated from these demands and can consider and decide cases

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without influence from direct case-related pressure (such as lobbying) or concern about retaining her appointment (such as through reelection). Debates from history suggest the intention of constitutional drafters that the Supreme Court would function as an institution outside of politics. At the 1787 constitutional convention, Oliver Ellsworth---a Connecticut delegate and future Supreme Court chief justice---noted that federal judges ‘‘are to be made independent,’’ so as ‘‘to secure their impartiality.’’ During the ratification period, this view received its strongest expression in arguments by Alexander Hamilton. In 1788, writing in Federalist No. 78 to support the proposed Constitution, Hamilton defended the tenure provision because it allowed justices the necessary independence to function as an ‘‘excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.’’ Accordingly, he could assert that the ‘‘permanency’’ provided by the ‘‘during good behavior’’ standard ‘‘may . . . be justly regarded . . . as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.’’ It was expected that the Supreme Court (and lower federal courts) would review and, if necessary, strike down the actions of political majorities. Justices could fulfill this function only if free from both political influence and retribution. That the Supreme Court was intended to function outside of politics---and, for still many today, that it ought to work in this manner---raises an important question about the operation of our form of democratic government. Accepting that justices decide cases while insulated from political majorities, it follows that the Court can and does interfere with the democratic processes through which these majorities express their will. To the extent that the Court invalidates actions by Congress or the presidency, for example, this seems to undermine our fundamental commitment to democracy. Stated in extreme terms, the Court itself is nothing less than undemocratic. The principal response regarding this role for the Supreme Court in the American political system accepts the apolitical, legal view of the Court and defends the Court’s ‘‘countermajoritarian’’ rulings. Insofar as the Court strikes down only those laws that contravene the Constitution, according to this defense, the Court acts to enforce the intent of the superior majority that ratified the Constitution’s provisions. That is, the Court enforces a fundamental, constitutional popular will of the people against the fleeting, political majority. This response in turn depends on a reconceptualization of ‘‘democracy.’’ Our democratic form of government does not mandate that each branch of

454 The Courts government operate on simple majoritarian principles. Rather, it depends on multiple filtering institutions that affect the expression of majoritarian impulses through government. It is certainly not the case that the legislative and executive branches are entirely ‘‘democratic,’’ given, for example, institutions such as the electoral college. The constitutional design also incorporates the related institutional features of separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances. On this understanding of our form of government, Court action that invalidates unconstitutional legislative and executive actions is to be celebrated, not criticized. Both the attack on and defense of Supreme Court rulings that declare unconstitutional certain actions by legislative and executive bodies presume a Supreme Court insulated from the political world. They both presume, then, that the Court does serve as a relatively countermajoritarian institution within the broader governmental system. Regardless of whether these actions are condemned or praised, on this view the Court functions to check what it determines to be the government’s excesses and to corral political majorities within the Constitution’s bounds. No subject of Supreme Court decision making appears to exemplify this more vividly than cases concerning constitutional rights and liberties. The subject of rights and liberties has a long pedigree in this country, given its centrality to debates at the dawn of the American Revolution and during the Constitution’s ratification period. Adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791---constitutional amendments that explicitly articulated a wide range of protections for persons through prohibitions on governmental conduct---would in time entail the Court’s active engagement in defining the meaning of these ‘‘rights.’’ Despite the prominence of the Bill of Rights, during the 18th and 19th centuries rights and liberties issues were not a major subject of Court attention. Disputes involving, on the one hand, the exercise of government power, and on the other, a person’s claim of constitutional protection against that power became more significant in the 20th century. Today, rights and liberties cases represent the most prominent of the categories of case that the Court decides. It is the 20th-century rise in importance of rights and liberties disputes and attendant judicial rulings that largely animates the Court’s image as an interpreter of the law---the Constitution---and dispenser of justice---that is, the vindicator of rights. Of the major cases already mentioned above---Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. Gore---each involved the question of constitutional rights and liberties. In Brown v. Board of Education, the

Court interpreted the ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect school pupils from state-sanctioned racial segregation. The Court later depended on the same constitutional rights basis that it used in Brown when, in Bush v. Gore, it ruled that the planned Florida vote recount would have denied the ‘‘equal protection of the laws’’ for voters. Roe v. Wade recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision that ‘‘no state shall deprive a person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law’’ afforded women certain rights regarding governmental restrictions on the personal decision to terminate a pregnancy. These examples appear to validate the general view of the Supreme Court. Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, in particular, rendered unconstitutional numerous duly enacted laws of governments at both the federal and state levels. On two of the most contentious public issues of the last half-century---race and abortion---the Court has intervened on behalf of personal rights and liberties and forced the restructuring of public policy. In this important, but limited, way the Court thereby shapes the broader course of American political development. It functions primarily as an apolitical institution, but from time to time its decisions direct other political institutions, such as Congress and the president, to ensure that they perform their government functions within constitutional bounds. This view can be maintained, though, only because of a focus on the Supreme Court itself and its decisions. Consideration of the Court’s rulings in a broader political and social context demonstrates that, despite the standard image, the Court does not exist as an apolitical institution that checks government power through rulings that enforce constitutional rights and liberties. The judicial selection process, for example, requires nomination and confirmation by political branches of government---by the president and the Senate, respectively. Few would doubt, furthermore, that justices (or judges at any level, for that matter) maintain attitudes and opinions about a wide range of political and social issues. These attitudes cannot be easily set aside, of course. The appointing authorities do consider the attitudes of potential appointees and anticipate that justices will continue to vote according to these attitudes once on the bench. There should be little surprise, then, when justices’ votes and decisions in fact do appear to reflect these attitudes and opinions. This example of the Supreme Court’s reflection of political and social factors undermines, at least in part, the popular image of the Court. This image suffers further, however, by the reality that forces beyond the Court often determine both the types and range of

The Contemporary Supreme Court

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Supporters of Vice President Al Gore and Texas governor George W. Bush face off against one another December 11, 2000, in front of the U. S. Supreme Court. The sides are fighting over whether the continuation of the vote recount ordered by Florida’s state supreme court on December 8 was legal and constitutional. (Reuters/Corbis)

cases that, through litigation, even reach the Court in the first instance. Powerful groups, especially those with significant financial resources, are not only able to affect policy issues through ‘‘normal’’ politics--whether elections, lobbying, or similar activities---but also are able to develop, oversee, and fund legal cases that can result in Court attention. And, similar forces shape the effect of the Court’s decision, once the decision is announced. For example, following Brown v. Board of Education, the facts of the broader political and social context were that, for 10 years, southern states ignored the decision and undertook no meaningful desegregation. The Court itself possessed no ability to bring about changes at the state and local level. On its own, the Court could not function as the apolitical protector of individual rights and liberties.

These brief observations suggest shortcomings in the standard Supreme Court image. The balance of this essay expands on these observations to demonstrate that the Supreme Court is not isolated from and opposed to ostensibly more political agencies of government, such as Congress, the president, or the states. It is, instead, affected by political factors and, in turn, is actively engaged in governing politics. To be clear, this does not mean that the study of Court decisions, especially regarding rights and liberties, is an empty exercise. Rhetoric---including Court decisions--regarding government power and constitutional rights and liberties can have both great power and important effects. These effects must not be understood through a narrow focus on the ‘‘legal’’ Court, though, but rather through a broad political and social analysis. The full

456 The Courts story of the Supreme Court’s place in American political development must depend, then, on this more complete understanding.

The Supreme Court as a Political Institution: How the Court Is Affected by American Political Development The Supreme Court’s decision-making function is not separate from but firmly dependent on broader political forces, and, accordingly, it is affected by the broader course of American political development. Each of three phases of the Court’s involvement in cases shows this. First, before the Court’s involvement, political forces often determine which types of cases come to the Court’s attention for action. Second, political factors often shape the way in which the Court, through the justices, rules on these cases. Third, following a decision, political forces often shape the implementation and ultimate impact of the decision. Major Supreme Court cases often mirror existing political divisions in society. It is because of these divisions that persons and groups will at times invoke the court system as one means to achieve a preferred outcome. This was illustrated recently by Bush v. Gore, where the competing factions quickly turned to the Florida state courts and, ultimately, to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve disputes about the vote count for presidential electors. Persons, groups, and government agencies have sought Supreme Court rulings on matters ranging from the control of the country’s waterways and domestic food production to the Vietnam War and abortion. Political forces do more than generate disputes that, from time to time, go to the courts. They also affect which types of cases are more likely than others to involve sustained litigation and, eventually, which are more likely to reach the Supreme Court. As noted already, about 100 million court cases move through all of the national and state courts; the Supreme Court selects only about 100 to 200 cases for its consideration. It is rare that cases take the path, for example, of that pursued by Clarence Gideon. Gideon, whose case became the famous Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), was an indigent facing criminal ‘‘breaking and entering’’ charges in Florida. Unable to afford a lawyer, he attempted to defend himself, but the jury convicted him. Gideon appealed his conviction, relying on handwritten petitions to argue his claim. The Court accepted his case for review and then ruled in his favor. Gideon’s ‘‘against all odds’’ success before the Supreme Court--states must now provide legal counsel to those who

face serious criminal charges---became a national story through the book Gideon’s Trumpet, by Anthony Lewis, and the subsequent movie of the same name, which starred Henry Fonda as Clarence Gideon. The Gideon case seems, then, to represent the ideal of one individual’s successful quest for justice before the Supreme Court. Most major Supreme Court cases do not follow from the perseverance of a solitary party to ‘‘take the case all the way to the Supreme Court.’’ Rather, because the major cases that the Court will more likely select for review often involve prominent disputes across the nation, states, and society, political actors with interests in the outcomes of these disputes invest great effort and large sums of money to litigate the cases to reach the Court’s attention. A case before the Court, decided in 2005, illustrates this fact. In Kelo v. New London, the Court upheld the effort by the city of New London, Connecticut, to exercise its power of ‘‘eminent domain.’’ Specifically, the city sought to ‘‘take’’ residential property from Susette Kelo (and others) for the ‘‘public purpose’’ of creating a private, corporate development zone that would, in the end, generate tax benefits for the city that were greater than the existing residential use of the property. Although government ‘‘taking’’ of property is recognized by the federal constitution, Kelo objected to the exercise of this power for the benefit of a private, corporate development. She received extensive support in her legal battle to retain her property from the ‘‘Institute for Justice,’’ a Libertarian organization that describes its mission as ‘‘litigating for liberty.’’ Created in 1991 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., the Institute publicly promotes its attorney staff for the purpose of assisting persons and groups in their claims against government. To this end, the Institute also engages in extensive fund-raising to pay for litigation campaigns. It had been involved in many property rights cases before Kelo, and this Supreme Court case marked the recent culmination of the Institute’s efforts for a decision that (it had hoped) would favor persons and groups over government. Among the factors that affect which types of cases receive Supreme Court attention is the existence of ‘‘support structures’’ for legal mobilization to litigate and bring cases to the Court. A support structure consists of willing and able lawyers, advocacy organizations, and sufficient, long-term financing. The types of cases---in other words, the issues and disputes---that do reach the Court, in the first instance, often depend on major, existing support structures. That is, without support structures, certain types of cases likely will not receive Court attention. The several

The Contemporary Supreme Court ‘‘rights revolutions’’ during the 20th century--regarding race equality, sex equality, and criminal process---each succeeded in bringing major changes across political society because of several support structures that shaped litigation before the Court. At least one of these is well know: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund, headed at one time by Thurgood (later justice) Marshall. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund had existed and been litigating racial equality cases for decades before its major success in Brown v. Board of Education. Another significant support structure, regarding sex equality, was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project, which also was once headed by a future Supreme Court justice: Ruth Bader Ginsburg. This organizultimateation supported successful litigation in many cases, most notably in the 1970s. How the many persons and groups in society decide to use available resources---such as time and money---in the pursuit of favorable dispute outcomes is an important factor that can affect the very types of cases that receive Supreme Court attention. This is especially so when prominent or broad political and social movements, to advance their respective policy agendas, include litigation as a way to achieve their goals. Organized groups will sometimes sponsor litigation, as described above. They will sometimes participate through amicus curiae (‘‘friend of the court’’) status, which provides another important means for these groups to shape the judicial agenda. Cases that concern abortion---described in more detail below---regularly attract many dozens of groups, all of which file briefs with the Court urging rulings on one side or the other of the issue. In other ways, as well, the Court’s function can depend on broader political and social forces that shape which types of disputes rise to prominence and reach the Court’s docket. In the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, there were debates across the country on poverty and the attendant Great Society ideal. At the center of the Great Society was the commitment by government to provide social welfare programs for the needy and indigent. Among the programs was the Legal Services Program (LSP), which represented these persons in legal disputes, at both the trial and appellate levels, related to the availability and scope of government social welfare benefits. The LSP operated, in effect, as an important ‘‘support structure,’’ similar to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU Women’s Rights Project. But, more important, the general political and social climate during the 1960s and early 1970s supported both judicial attention to and decisions favorable of claims for expansive rather than limited

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provisions of benefits. During these years, the Great Society’s war on poverty ultimately affected the Court’s decision making: the Court accepted a large number of these types of cases for review and decided a large number favorably for benefit claimants. The political climate, outside of the Court, created the conditions for this court action. Political factors affect not only the types of cases that reach the Supreme Court, but also the way in which the Court’s justices vote on these cases. Recall that the idealized image of the Court presumes that the life tenure (during ‘‘good behavior’’) results in justices who will decide cases without fear of retaliation and, accordingly, justices who will resist and ignore outside pressures, including political pressures. Justices, by the time of selection to the Court, nevertheless possess opinions, attitudes, and preferences regarding a wide range of political or social policy issues. These opinions, attitudes, and preferences can range from those about interpreting the U.S. Constitution---should the meaning of the equal protection clause (or other constitutional provisions) depend on historical understanding from the time of enactment?---to those about enforcing morality---is abortion the killing of a person? We expect that justices retain their respective opinions, attitudes, and preferences, but the concern becomes how these then affect their votes in cases. Studies of judicial behavior reveal important insights about the role that opinions, attitudes, and preferences play in decision making. Some of these studies suggest that justices vote in cases to pursue, or at least to maximize, their respective personal policy preferences. For example, it is argued that Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas possess ‘‘conservative’’ preferences, and their votes on cases strongly tend to ‘‘conservative’’ outcomes; alternatively, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall held ‘‘liberal’’ preferences, and their votes on cases strongly tended to the ‘‘liberal’’ end of the spectrum. Personal politics, in other words, drives justices’ voting. Consider Justice Scalia’s voting in cases that involve the intersection of government and religion. The Constitution’s First Amendment, in part, proscribes any law ‘‘respecting the establishment of religion.’’ Justice Scalia, who is Catholic and personally advocates the importance of religion in public life, uniformly votes to permit government to allow prayer in school settings or, more recently, to display copies of the Ten Commandments. Some scholars conclude that Justice Scalia’s votes are little more than the expression of his personal desire to advance a stronger role for religion in society.

458 The Courts Not all political scientists and legal scholars agree with this description of judicial behavior. Some instead maintain that justices such as Scalia and Thomas are not pursuing personal policy preferences at all. Rather, they are attempting authentic interpretations of constitutional text, and it so happens that their views regarding constitutional interpretation produce what others might deem ‘‘conservative’’ outcomes. Regarding religion there do exist strong reasons, rooted in the constitutional text and history, to conclude that the prohibition on ‘‘establishment’’ does not necessarily bar either school prayer or other recognition of the strong presence of religion throughout society. Justice Scalia’s votes (as well as the similar votes on this issue from others, such as Chief Justice William Rehnquist) can be explained as the application of an authentic interpretation of the Constitution’s First Amendment. The justices do not, then, act politically at all. The debate about the character of decision making need not be resolved to appreciate that politics affects judging. Regardless of whether justices approach the task of decision making with a goal to achieve preferred policy results or to engage in authentic constitutional interpretation, each justice is often consistent over time in voting for similar outcomes. For example, regardless of which competing explanation of motive better describes Justice Scalia’s votes in cases in religious establishment clause cases, there exists little disagreement about the consistency in the generally ‘‘conservative’’ outcomes that result from his votes. Consistency in judging is significant because the political actors who choose and confirm which persons sit on the Supreme Court presume this consistency as a means to shape the Court’s overall decision making through their selection of justices. A justice receives nomination and confirmation as a result of political processes: the president nominates and the Senate confirms the nomination. Not surprisingly, both the president and Senate strive to select justices whose opinions, attitudes, and preferences accord with their political agenda and policies. Collected data of appointments to federal courts confirm this general tendency, when measured in terms of party affiliations of appointing presidents and appointed judges: presidents have appointed judges with the same party affiliation at a rate more than 90 percent. The recent appointment of Chief Justice John Roberts to the Supreme Court confirms this tendency. Following Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s death in 2005, President George W. Bush nominated, and the Republicancontrolled Senate confirmed, John Roberts as the next justice. Before this selection, Chief Justice Roberts had

served as an attorney in the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations and then as a federal judge for the United States Court of Appeals. He had relatively established views on important issues that matched the position of the Republican Party, such as the scope of executive power regarding national security. His nomination was trumpeted not only by the Bush administration, but hailed by the nationwide Republican establishment. On occasion, a justice does vote on an issue in a way that appears to frustrate the expectations of the president and Senators. A major recent example of this is the voting by Justices O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter, in the 1992 abortion rights case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. During the 1980s and 1990s, Republican presidents, each of whom disagreed with the existing Roe v. Wade decision, had nominated these justices---O’Conner and Kennedy by Reagan; Souter by Bush---in the hope that these justices would vote to overturn the Roe precedent. Casey, which involved a wide range of restrictions that the state of Pennsylvania had imposed on the availability of abortion services, presented the opportunity. These three instead joined together to reaffirm Roe and the core constitutional protection for a woman’s right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. To the extent that the justices who are selected share the politics and policies of the governing administration---Casey notwithstanding---it is not surprising that their decisions will likely accord with that regime’s political agenda. Because of the appointment and nomination processes, in other words, the Court as a whole necessarily functions as a partner of the national regime. The Court’s decision making over time demonstrates that the Court does not usually act in a ‘‘countermajoritarian’’ manner, opposed to the other branches of government. Instead, the Court more often upholds government action. Accordingly, broader currents of American political development affect Court decision making. That is, broader currents shape the direction of national politics, including the rise and fall of ruling regimes. Those political forces and the attendant ruling regimes in turn determine the Court’s membership and, ultimately, the Court’s decisions on issues that matter to these ruling regimes. The appointment process produces a Supreme Court that, through the justices, acts as a political partner of other branches of government. This description runs counter to the classic view, in which the Court functions as a check on the government. Consider the preeminent instance that seems to support the classic view: the Court during the 1950s and 1960s, under the direction of Chief Justice Earl Warren. During that

The Contemporary Supreme Court period, the Court issued major decisions on matters from racial equality to criminal procedure. A focus not simply on the Court but also on the president and Congress shows, however, that the decisions from those years often comported with broader national policy. During the 1940s and 1950s, many political elites, both in and out of government, believed that the time was coming for the end of Jim Crow segregation. Administrations, before Brown v. Board of Education, had implemented measures to this end. President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration, for example, took initial steps to enhance the judiciary as a vehicle for redressing the race problem. Considered in this context, Brown functioned as the Court’s concurrent effort to advance a national agenda on race, even if it meant ruling in favor of minority-race individuals and overruling the authority of states in the relatively localized South. The Supreme Court during Warren’s years as chief justice in fact exemplifies not an insulated Court, but an engaged Court, attuned to broader political developments. The justices who sit on the Supreme Court do possess opinions, attitudes, and preferences, and these often manifest in decisions that support the ruling regimes that place justices on the Court. But justices are not immune to political and social developments that continue in the years following their respective appointments. An important factor that affects Court decision making is general public opinion---in other words, justices do pay attention to ‘‘which way the wind blows.’’ The ‘‘public opinion’’ factor helps to explain the perseverance of the Roe precedent, despite committed attempts by Republican administrations to see the case overruled. For many years a significant majority of the public has expressed support for Roe---polling over the course of recent decades has established that a regular majority are in favor of the decision. It should not be surprising, then, that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter used their votes in Casey to affirm the basic right first pronounced in Roe. Although appointments to the Court do shape case outcomes in ways that favor ruling regimes, over time the strong connection between regime and appointment can diminish, as other factors become more significant. Regardless of the relative strength of these factors, however, they both illustrate that major political movements, which manifest either in the rise and fall of regimes or in public opinion, affect Court decision making. Finally, following a Supreme Court ruling, political and social forces continue to operate to shape the implementation and ultimate impact of the Court’s decision. Legal victories in prominent cases before the Court can receive significant public attention. Narrow

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focus on decisions, however, can mask the reality that often the Court’s pronouncements do not finally resolve disputes. Especially in cases that involve prominent political and social issues, decisions merely mark the transition to a new phase, as parties and other political actors contend over the meaning and effect of the decisions. At the creation of the nation’s governmental institutions, it was recognized that the Court had little power beyond the simple use of its ‘‘judgment’’ to render its opinion on disputes before it. Hamilton, in the same Federalist No. 78 in which he argued on behalf of judicial independence, observed that the judiciary, compared with the president and Congress, is ‘‘the least dangerous’’ of the three. Congress writes the laws and controls the ‘‘purse’’---money in the form of revenues and expenditures; the president controls the ‘‘sword’’--principal power and authority to execute laws. The Court’s real power, in other words, is limited to its ability to persuade compliance by parties. According to design, the Court must depend on others for enforcement of its decisions. The two major 20th-century Supreme Court decisions discussed above, Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, also illustrate the sometimes tenuous relationship between Court decisions, on the one hand, and implementation and impact, on the other. At the time of its decision in 1954, Brown was recognized as a landmark in the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision making. It declared the end to the ‘‘separatebut-equal’’ system that had, in effect, justified discriminatory and harsh treatment for African Americans in the southern states with Jim Crow laws. The Court itself understood the problem of compliance with the declaration, however. Brown would require states with segregated schools to change laws and policies and to integrate the pupils in nonsegregated schools. The concern, then, was whether these states would follow the Court’s command. Given the political reality of the long-established segregated system, the Court struggled to develop an order that would move the states toward compliance but that would not produce a political crisis, if not also violent resistance. To address this concern, the Court reserved for additional argument the question of what orders it should enter regarding the relief to afford pupils in segregated schools. It subsequently issued (one year later, in 1955) an order that states comply with the initial Brown decision with ‘‘all deliberate speed.’’ Southern state resistance to Brown was widespread. Responsibility for compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision fell to state and local government officials.

460 The Courts These officials made little effort to move toward integrated schooling. A full decade after the Court decision, less than 2 percent of all southern schools had been integrated. Political and social forces that controlled state and local governments in areas that retained segregation worked to render the Brown decision essentially meaningless. A notorious example of this was the actions by the State of Arkansas and Governor Orval Faubus, in 1957 and 1958, to block the planned integration of Little Rock’s Central High School. Arkansas argued that the Brown precedent did not bind it and its schools. The Court responded in the 1958 decision of Cooper v. Aaron and firmly declared that it, and not Arkansas or the state’s governor would interpret the Constitution and determine its meaning. Actual integration of the school, however, required intervention by President Eisenhower. In 1957, Eisenhower had sent federal troops to Little Rock and also federalized the state’s national guard to enforce integration. This presence remained into 1958. Integration of Central High followed in the wake of this executive action, then, and not solely because of the Court’s declaration, whether in Brown or Cooper. Integration of these schools did proceed, beginning in the mid-1960s. A relatively broad movement to condemn and eliminate the Jim Crow system grew and gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. Important facets of this movement included the nationally prominent Montgomery bus boycott, lunch counter sit-ins across southern states, increasingly regular protest marches and, ultimately, Martin Luther King’s ‘‘I Have a Dream’’ speech as part of the 1963 March on Washington. The following year, the Congress and President Lyndon Johnson joined to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which included provisions regarding school integration. Analyses of factors that led to integration of schools---studies today show that schools across the southern states are among the most integrated in the country---demonstrate that the adoption and enforcement of this national legislation, rather than the Court’s decisions, had the direct effect of bring states into compliance with Brown. The Brown example shows that Supreme Court decisions can have real meaning to the extent that political actors choose to reject or embrace them. This is very apparent when the political actors are government officials---whether state and local officials, who refused to abide by Brown, or Congress and the president, who enacted laws and marshaled the national government’s executive power to bring states into compliance with the Court’s decisions. Events following the decision in Roe v. Wade reveal similar forces at work. Since Roe,

the federal government and many state governments have enacted laws that attempt to limit or narrow the availability of abortion, even if they profess to comply with Roe’s central guarantee. Politically mobilized religious organizations---dominated by Catholic and Evangelical Protestant sects---act through the political system to eliminate or restrict the availability of abortions. Parental notification requirements for minors who seek abortions and medical procedure bans for doctors who perform abortions are prominent among these restrictions. For a full three decades since Roe, parties continue to litigate and to bring to the Supreme Court disputes about these government attempts to qualify (if not overturn) the decision. The political and social response to Roe also shows that nongovernment forces also affect the realization of these decisions. In Roe, the Court declared that the Constitution’s prohibition on the deprivation of ‘‘liberty’’ without due process of law protected from government sanction a woman’s right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. The compliance issue for Roe, then, differs from that for Brown: for the latter, the decision required affirmative government action to remedy unconstitutional practices; for the former, the decision simply enjoined government action to interfere with a medical procedure otherwise available to women. Because Roe did not require any affirmative government action, it would seem that the decision simply cleared the way for women to exercise the right to terminate pregnancies. Even if governments did not attempt to restrict or limit access to abortion services, a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy depends on the availability of medical services that will perform the procedure. In the wake of Roe, however, many potential providers elected not to offer abortion services. The reasons for this varies. Catholic hospitals refuse to provide abortions because of religious tenets. But other hospitals do not provide the service to avoid entanglement in a politically and socially divisive issue---the ongoing political and social debates about abortion create a ‘‘chilling’’ effect on potential service providers. The number of abortions performed in the United States has risen to significant numbers following Roe, but only did so because of the emergence of a network of specialized clinics. Still, in many parts of the country that lack either hospitals or clinics that are willing to provide abortion services, the constitutional right guaranteed by Roe remains an empty right. The issue of abortion remains a politically and socially divisive issue and animates ongoing political, social, and legal battles, and Court pronouncements depend on these broader debates for their real meaning.

The Contemporary Supreme Court The Supreme Court operates as an institution embedded in a political context that shapes all of the major phases of the Court’s decision-making processes. To the extent that this context itself reflects broader forces of political development, then the Court in turn also reflects this broader development. Important national political trends, such as the advancement of race and sex equality, the War of Poverty, and even the more recent conservative trend in politics across the nation, shape the Court and its decision making. Political and social disputes that first arise outside the judiciary shape the types of issues that likely will lead to legal action and, ultimately, Court attention. Once the Court decides which cases it will review---especially those cases of national significance---the justices’ voting often accords with the ruling regime’s policy agenda or, equally often, with current public opinion. Finally, significant political and social forces also affect the extent to which the Court’s decisions are followed and, ultimately, realized beyond the Court’s chambers. Little, if anything, remains of the ‘‘classic’’ image of an independent Supreme Court that resolves legal disputes, insulated from the world of politics.

The Supreme Court as a Political Institution: How the Court Affects American Political Development The broader forces of American political development do affect the Supreme Court, but this does not mean that the Court merely reflects these forces and is, itself, inconsequential. Court decisions do matter. This is true in individual cases: Clarence Gideon won reversal of his conviction and sentence for ‘‘breaking and entering’’; George W. Bush secured Florida’s electoral votes and thereby won the presidency in the wake of Bush v. Gore. This is also true when the Court issues rulings that touch on major political and social positions and policies. In other words, even though compliance with and implementation of decisions depend largely on political and social forces, the Court’s decisions in turn become important factors that affect how these political and social forces embrace, debate, or contest the decisions. The history of American political development provides important examples of Supreme Court decisions that create effects that shape this development. Early in the 19th century, under the direction of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court regularly issued decisions that strengthened federal power over state power, especially in commercial (Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824) and financial (McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819) matters. While

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unchallenged federal supremacy did not follow directly from this series of decisions, federal government authority did increase during this period. At the very least, the Court’s decisions served as important initial efforts to bolster and entrench national power. Slavery provides another, more telling, historical example. In several decisions in the 1840s and 1850s, the Court, under the direction of Chief Justice Roger Taney, rendered pro-slavery rulings. The Court upheld laws that supported slavery, such as the Fugitive Slave Act, but invalidated laws that restricted the practice, such as the Missouri Compromise. Most infamously, in 1857 the Court decided Scott v. Sandford---the Dred Scott case. Scott, a slave living in Missouri, had for a time resided in the Wisconsin Territory, which Congress had deemed a ‘‘free’’ or nonslave territory. In Missouri, he sued for his freedom under a principle of law that, ‘‘once free, always free,’’ and depended, in part, on his stay in the Wisconsin Territory to support his claim. Scott lost in the lower courts and the Supreme Court accepted the case for review. The Court ruled against Scott, and used decidedly pro-slavery language in its decision. It declared that Scott was in no way a citizen of the United States, entitled to use the federal court system for redress. It also declared that Congress had no power to declare that such territories as Wisconsin would be ‘‘free.’’ This decision and others ignited passionate responses on both sides of the slavery debate. Many of these responses involved violence. Most significantly, they contributed to conditions that led, in relatively short time, to the Civil War. One important effect that the Supreme Court brings about through its decisions is the ratification of the ruling regime’s policy agenda. The Court often operates, as described in the preceding section, as an integral element of the national ruling regime; its decisions often will accord with the regime’s agenda. While the ruling regime has this effect on the Court, the Court’s decisions in turn serve as important public pronouncements that support the regime. This makes the Court as much a policy maker as an arbiter of disputes. Court decision making at times of national security concern, for example, supports this conclusion. During and immediately after World War I and during the 1950s Cold War, the Court upheld government prosecutions of persons for violations of laws that banned varieties of subversive speech (Schenck v. United States, 1919; Dennis v. United States, 1950). Recently, the Court has issued decisions regarding the current war on terrorism that suggest that it will not completely ratify the administration’s policies (for example, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004), but the existing record in this area demonstrates

462 The Courts that the Court usually permits the governing administration to proceed with few, if any, restrictions. In other areas as well, such as race equality, the Court not only reflects political developments but contributes to them by issuing decisions that advance the ruling regime’s agenda. Supreme Court decisions also can spark increases in political and social activity beyond the government, as outside groups respond to these decisions. While the Court can rarely have a direct effect that causes either compliance with or opposition to a decision, it does create indirect effects that can produce lasting political consequences. This describes the aftermath of the slavery cases, and it also describes an important facet of Roe v. Wade. Before the Roe decision, the issue of abortion had been debated across the country, particularly because of various state-level political movements to amend or repeal the many restrictive laws. The Court’s pronouncement regarding the abortion right, however, ignited a passionate ‘‘backlash’’ by groups that opposed the procedure. Political stakes escalated at both the

federal and state levels. Studies of post-Roe developments establish two important effects. First, the decision created a notable polarization in public opinion on either side of the issue, a polarization that previously did not exist. Second---and related to the polarization---the decision sparked the rise of prominent, competing political advocacy movements, which include pro-life and pro-choice organizations, such as Operation Rescue and National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) Pro-Choice America. Public opinion, for years now, has supported the basic principle from Roe, but the effects of the decision remain as groups at opposing ends of the spectrum wage public campaigns to influence electoral politics, judicial appointments, and policy making. The debate about Roe and abortion rights continues as a major feature of national politics today. Perhaps the most important study of the effect of Supreme Court decisions focuses on Brown v. Board of Education. The consensus among scholars is that the decision had little, if any, direct impetus toward

Thirty five years after the Roe v. Wade decision, the debate over legalized abortion continues. This Planned Parenthood billboard from 2008 criticizes the Supreme Court’s historically anti-abortion justices. From left to right: Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Harold Blackmun, and Clarence Thomas. (Henry Diltz/Corbis)

The Contemporary Supreme Court desegregation. Political activities of a number of groups and organizations, especially those aligned with Martin Luther King, do appear to have had more of an effect, insofar as these activities helped to inspire the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An issue that continues to concern scholars of the Court and its Brown ruling has been whether the Court nevertheless still had an indirect effect on the eventual integration of southern schools. Two versions of the ‘‘indirect effect’’ attribute a role to the Supreme Court and, accordingly, recognize that the Court does shape broader political development. On one account, anecdotal evidence exists that leaders of early civil rights protests felt emboldened by the Court’s Brown ruling. At the beginning of the 1955--1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott---an event that many mark as the watershed event that launched the civil rights movement---at a speech in Montgomery, Alabama, King famously invoked the Court and its Brown ruling: ‘‘If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, God almighty is wrong! . . . And we are determined here in Montgomery to work and fight until justice runs down like water and righteousness like a mighty stream.’’ Civil rights action, including protests, did precede Brown; and the decision did not always receive such prominent mention during the growing movement. It did, however, in Montgomery and across the southern states, work to inspire and embolden the persons and organizations that spearheaded the civil rights movement. On a second account, Brown also had an indirect effect, but one very different from the inspirational support for civil rights advocates. Not unlike the difficulties that followed the Roe decision nearly two decades later, the Court’s pronouncement in Brown generated a severe backlash. Southern whites reacted strongly to enforce every aspect of their system of segregation. Attempts to integrate schools, although few, generated enormous opposition from white communities---a prominent example being Little Rock’s Central High School episode. Reactions also included excessive violence that targeted otherwise peaceful civil rights events. Most notoriously, in 1963 the Birmingham, Alabama, police on several occasions used attack dogs and wielded fire hoses against protestors, including children, to disperse their peaceful marches. And, that same year, Alabama Governor George Wallace, in his inauguration speech, announced to the state and country that, ‘‘I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.’’ Each of these episodes (and many others) received nationwide media coverage. The 1963 Birmingham incidents were broadcast through television news

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coverage. Throughout the non-southern states, the public began to react in horror to the events that they witnessed. The white majority that resisted the mandate from Brown and desegregation generally, in time, became the impetus for congressional action in the form of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Ironically, then, Brown moved the nation toward the most important civil rights milestone---the 1964 Act---not because of the force of its pronouncement, but because of the white backlash. Whether because of this backlash, or because of the inspiration that Brown provided to civil rights advocates, post-Brown events reveal the important role that the Court does play in shaping the course of the nation’s political history.

Conclusion The Supreme Court does not function independently of the American political system and politics. The dominant, standard image of an insular, rights-protecting Court depends on a narrow view of cases such as Brown. According to this view, the Court functions primarily as an apolitical institution, which engages the political system only from time to time. It does so when its decisions direct other political institutions, such as Congress and the president, to ensure that they perform their government functions within constitutional bounds. Not only is the standard image narrow, then, but the attendant role of the Court in American political development is, similarly, too narrow. A broader study of all aspects of major decisions--not only Brown, but also Roe and many other cases--reveals a fuller and more accurate view of the Supreme Court as an institution. As the episodes in decision making described here illustrate, political factors do affect the Court and the meaning of decisions in cases that come before it. These factors function to affect which types of cases arrive at the Court, how the Court decides these cases, and, finally, how the government and private persons and groups respond to, comply with, or oppose the decisions. To the extent that broader forces of American political development shape the political factors that operate on the Court at each of these phases, then, the Court itself reflects this development. The Supreme Court is not merely a reflection of underlying inputs, but also an important contributor to the nation’s political development. The Court’s rulings directly address and decide specific cases, of course. They also affect the broader political system, whether by reinforcing government policy, shaping relations among political actors, highlighting issues

464 The Courts that then reach a nationwide political agenda, and even prompting political behaviors that, in time, produce significant effects of their own. In these ways, then, the Court is not only the product of but also a contributing factor in the interplay of institutions and politics. A full appreciation of the Supreme Court’s place in American political development extends beyond the relatively few, although major, episodes described here. Not unlike the stories about other institutions, such as the president and Congress, that of the Court is rich and, accordingly, is not easily summarized. These highlights of the Court and political development nevertheless demonstrate that the Court operates as an institution central to the processes that shape the course of national politics.

References and Further Reading Baum, Lawrence. 1998. The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2nd ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d. 2:196.

Epp, Charles R. 1998. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The Federalist. 2005. Edited by J. R. Pole. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Gillman, Howard, and Cornell W. Clayton, eds. 1999. The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Lawrence, Susan E. 1990. The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McMahon, Kevin J. 2004. Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCloskey, Robert G. 2005. The American Supreme Court. 4th rev. ed. Edited by Sanford Levinson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Patterson, James T. 2001. Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Powe, Lucas A., Jr. 2009. The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789--2008. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Rosenberg, Gerald N. 2008. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tushnet, Mark V. 2005. NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925--1950. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Documents

According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR; which is conformable to the most approved of the State constitutions and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws. Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and

7.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 To the People of the State of New York: WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined. The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: 1st. The mode of appointing the judges. 2d. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. 3d. The partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other. First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is the same with that of appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which would not be useless repetition. Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places; this chiefly concerns their duration in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsibility.

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466 The Courts can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that ‘‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’’ And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in

all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their WILL to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole

7.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 467 or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an EQUAL authority, that which was the last indication of its will should have the preference. But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former. It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body. If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty. This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals

from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies, in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community. But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our governments, than but few may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and

468 The Courts moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as no man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress. That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws. There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of the judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite

knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the government can have no great option between fit character; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the subject. Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the convention acted wisely in copying from the models of those constitutions which have established GOOD BEHAVIOR as the tenure of their judicial offices, in point of duration; and that so far from being blamable on this account, their plan would have been inexcusably defective, if it had wanted this important feature of good government. The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution. PUBLIUS.

7.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80 To the People of the State of New York: To JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects. It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union; 3d, to all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, to all those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, to all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased. The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional

7.2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80 469 method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States. As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed. Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum. The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the

footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical, whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties, involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals. The power of determining causes between two States, between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union than that which has been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissensions and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the empire. This was a court invested with authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the Germanic body. A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held together. But there are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed Constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of those instances which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which produced them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal superintendence and control. It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that ‘‘the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.’’

470 The Courts And if it be a just principle that every government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS OWN AUTHORITY, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded. The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction. The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies between different States and their citizens. And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this description. The courts of neither of the granting States could be expected to be unbiased. The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged. And even where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government. Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend ‘‘all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties

made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands and grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, and subjects.’’ This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is, then, to extend: First. To all cases in law and equity, ARISING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION and THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. This corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been asked, what is meant by ‘‘cases arising under the Constitution,’’ in contradiction from those ‘‘arising under the laws of the United States’’? The difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emited, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the Constitution and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole. It has also been asked, what need of the word ‘‘equity What equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of FRAUD, ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants of different States, may afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the

7.3 Anti-Federalist Nos. 78--79 471 federal courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this State, where it is exemplified by every day’s practice. The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend: Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evident connection with the preservation of the national peace. Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts. Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. These constitute the third of those classes. Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last. Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State, CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF DIFFERENT STATES. These fall within the last class, and ARE THE ONLY INSTANCES IN WHICH THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION DIRECTLY CONTEMPLATES THE COGNIZANCE OF DISPUTES BETWEEN THE CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE. Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national judicature. From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial inconviences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such EXCEPTIONS, and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general advantages. PUBLIUS.

7.3 Anti-Federalist Nos. 78--79 The Power of the Judiciary (Part 1) The supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no control. The business of this paper will be to illustrate this, and to show the danger that will result from it. I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible. Certain it is, that in England, and in the several states, where we have been taught to believe the courts of law are put upon the most prudent establishment, they are on a very different footing. The judges in England, it is true, hold their offices during their good behavior, but then their determinations are subject to correction by the house of lords; and their power is by no means so extensive as that of the proposed supreme court of the union. I believe they in no instance assume the authority to set aside an act of parliament under the idea that it is inconsistent with their constitution. They consider themselves bound to decide according to the existing laws of the land, and never undertake to control them by adjudging that they are inconsistent with the constitution-much less are they vested with the power of giv[ing an] equitable construction to the constitution. The judges in England are under the control of the legislature, for they are bound to determine according to the laws passed under them. But the judges under this constitution will control the legislature, for the supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of the powers of the Congress. They are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above them to set aside their judgment. The framers of this constitution appear to have followed that of the British, in rendering the judges independent, by granting them their offices during good behavior, without following the constitution of England, in instituting a tribunal in which their errors may be corrected; and without adverting to this, that the judicial under this system have a power which is above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power before given to a judicial by any free government under heaven. I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I suppose it a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible. But I say, this system has followed the English government in this, while it has departed from almost every other principle of their jurisprudence, under the idea, of

472 The Courts rendering the judges independent; which, in the British constitution, means no more than that they hold their places during good behavior, and have fixed salaries . . . [the authors of the constitution] have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controlled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself. Before I proceed to illustrate the truth of these reflections, I beg liberty to make one remark. Though in my opinion the judges ought to hold their offices during good behavior, yet I think it is clear, that the reasons in favor of this establishment of the judges in England, do by no means apply to this country. The great reason assigned, why the judges in Britain ought to be commissioned during good behavior, is this, that they may be placed in a situation, not to be influenced by the crown, to give such decisions as would tend to increase its powers and prerogatives. While the judges held their places at the will and pleasure of the king, on whom they depended not only for their offices, but also for their salaries, they were subject to every undue influence. If the crown wished to carry a favorite point, to accomplish which the aid of the courts of law was necessary, the pleasure of the king would be signified to the judges. And it required the spirit of a martyr for the judges to determine contrary to the king’s will. They were absolutely dependent upon him both for their offices and livings. The king, holding his office during life, and transmitting it to his posterity as an inheritance, has much stronger inducements to increase the prerogatives of his office than those who hold their offices for stated periods or even for life. Hence the English nation gained a great point, in favor of liberty, when they obtained the appointment of the judge, during good behavior. They got from the crown a concession which deprived it of one of the most powerful engines with which it might enlarge the boundaries of the royal prerogative and encroach on the liberties of the people. But these reasons do not apply to this country. We have no hereditary monarch; those who appoint the judges do not hold their offices for life, nor do they descend to their children. The same arguments, therefore, which will conclude in favor of the tenure of the judge’s offices for good behavior, lose a considerable part of their weight when applied to the state and condition of America. But much less can it be shown, that the nature of our government requires that

the courts should be placed beyond all account more independent, so much so as to be above control. I have said that the judges under this system will be independent in the strict sense of the word. To prove this I will show that there is no power above them that can control their decisions, or correct their errors. There is no authority that can remove them from office for any errors or want of capacity, or lower their salaries, and in many cases their power is superior to that of the legislature. 1st. There is no power above them that can correct their errors or control their decisions. The adjudications of this court are final and irreversible, for there is no court above them to which appeals can lie, either in error or on the merits. In this respect it differs from the courts in England, for there the house of lords is the highest court, to whom appeals, in error, are carried from the highest of the courts of law. 2nd. They cannot be removed from office or suffer a diminution of their salaries, for any error in judgment [due] to want of capacity. It is expressly declared by the constitution, ‘‘That they shall at stated times receive a compensation for their services which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.’’ The only clause in the constitution which provides for the removal of the judges from offices, is that which declares, that ‘‘the president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.’’ By this paragraph, civil officers, in which the judges are included, are removable only for crimes. Treason and bribery are named, and the rest are included under the general terms of high crimes and misdemeanors. Errors in judgment, or want of capacity to discharge the duties of the office, can never be supposed to be included in these words, high crimes and misdemeanors. A man may mistake a case in giving judgment, or manifest that he is incompetent to the discharge of the duties of a judge, and yet give no evidence of corruption or want of integrity. To support the charge, it will be necessary to give in evidence some facts that will show, that the judges committed the error from wicked and corrupt motives. 3d. The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I have showed, in a former paper, that this court will be authorised to decide upon the meaning of the constitution; and that, not only according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words, but also according to the spirit and intention of it. In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above the legislature. For all the

7.4 Marbury v. Madison 473 departments of this government will receive their powers, so far as they are expressed in the constitution, from the people immediately, who are the source of power. The legislature can only exercise such powers as are given them by the constitution; they cannot assume any of the rights annexed to the judicial; for this plain reason, that the same authority which vested the legislature with their powers, vested the judicial with theirs. Both are derived from the same source; both therefore are equally valid, and the judicial hold their powers independently of the legislature, as the legislature do of the judicial. The supreme court then have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their power is superior to that of the legislature. In England the judges are not only subject to have their decisions set aside by the house of lords, for error, but in cases where they give an explanation to the laws or constitution of the country contrary to the sense of the parliament---though the parliament will not set aside the judgment of the court---yet, they have authority, by a new law, to explain the former one, and by this means to prevent a reception of such decisions. But no such power is in the legislature. The judges are supreme and no law, explanatory of the constitution, will be binding on them. When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate to the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of it. Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to some superior power. Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government is, to frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in the government, are made accountable to some superior for their conduct in office. This responsibility should ultimately rest with the people. To have a government well administered in all its parts, it is requisite the different departments of it should be separated and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legislative power should be in one body, the executive in another, and the judicial in one different from either. But still each of these bodies should be accountable for their conduct. Hence it is impracticable, perhaps, to maintain a perfect distinction between these several departments. For it is difficult, if not impossible, to call to account the several officers in government,

without in some degree mixing the legislative and judicial. The legislature in a free republic are chosen by the people at stated periods, and their responsibility consists, in their being amenable to the people. When the term for which they are chosen shall expire, who [the people) will then have opportunity to displace them if they disapprove of their conduct. But it would be improper that the judicial should be elective, because their business requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge, which is acquired only by a regular education; and besides it is fit that they should be placed, in a certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness and steadiness in their decisions. As the people therefore ought not to elect the judges, they cannot be amenable to them immediately, some other mode of amenability must therefore be devised for these, as well as for all other officers which do not spring from the immediate choice of the people. This is to be effected by making one court subordinate to another, and by giving them cognizance of the behavior of all officers. But on this plan we at last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is no power to control but the people themselves. This supreme controlling power should be in the choice of the people, or else you establish an authority independent, and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to the principles of a free government. Agreeable to these principles I suppose the supreme judicial ought to be liable to be called to account, for any misconduct, by some body of men, who depend upon the people for their places; and so also should all other great officers in the State, who are not made amenable to some superior officers. . . . BRUTUS Source: Part one is taken from the first part of the ‘‘BRUTUS’s’’ 15th essay, New-York Journal, March 20, 1788. Part two is part one of his 16th essay, New-York Journal, April 10, 1788.

7.4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 5 U.S. 137 (Cranch) WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States. February Term, 1803 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

474 The Courts At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the secretary of state to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia. No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. These principles have been, on the side of the applicant, very ably argued at the bar. In rendering the opinion of the court, there will be some departure in form, though not in substance, from the points stated in that argument. In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided. 1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? 2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? 3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court? The first object of inquiry is, 1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? His right originates in an act of congress passed in February 1801, concerning the district of Columbia. After dividing the district into two counties, the eleventh section of this law enacts, ‘that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years. It appears from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the county of Washington was signed by John Adams, then president of the United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out. In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five

years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property. The second section of the second article of the constitution declares, ‘the president shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.’ The third section declares, that ‘he shall commission all the officers of the United States.’ An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, ‘to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States to be appointed by the president, by and with the consent of the senate, or by the president alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the president of the United States . . . The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States. In the distribution of this power it is declared that ‘the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction.’ It has been insisted at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction to the supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give

7.4 Marbury v. Madison 475 this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction made in the constitution, is form without substance. Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all. It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it. If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction. When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the obvious meaning. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the

delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised. The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it. That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

476 The Courts If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject. If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,

notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions-a written constitution, would of itself be sufficient, in America where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection. The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey . . . It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.

7.5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in U.S., 1831 Judicial Power in the United States, and its Influence on Political Society THE ANGLO-AMERICANS have retained the characteristics of judicial power which are common to other nations---They have, however, made it a powerful political organ---How---In what the judicial system of the Anglo-Americans differs from that of all other nations---Why the American judges have the right of

7.5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in U.S. 477 declaring laws to be unconstitutional---How they use this right---Precautions taken by the legislator to prevent its abuse.

I HAVE thought it right to devote a separate chapter to the judicial authorities of the United States, lest their great political importance should be lessened in the reader’s eyes by merely incidental mention of them. Confederations have existed in other countries besides America; I have seen republics elsewhere than upon the shores of the New World alone: the representative system of government has been adopted in several states of Europe; but I am not aware that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power in the same manner as the Americans. The judicial organization of the United States is the institution which a stranger has the greatest difficulty in understanding. He hears the authority of a judge invoked in the political occurrences of every day, and he naturally concludes that in the United States the judges are important political functionaries; nevertheless, when he examines the nature of the tribunals, they offer at the first glance nothing that is contrary to the usual habits and privileges of those bodies; and the magistrates seem to him to interfere in public affairs only by chance, but by a chance that recurs every day. When the Parliament of Paris remonstrated, or refused to register an edict, or when it summoned a functionary accused of malversation to its bar, its political influence as a judicial body was clearly visible; but nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States. The Americans have retained all the ordinary characteristics of judicial authority and have carefully restricted its action to the ordinary circle of its functions. The first characteristic of judicial power in all nations is the duty of arbitration. But rights must be contested in order to warrant the interference of a tribunal; and an action must be brought before the decision of a judge can be had. As long, therefore, as a law is uncontested, the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it, and it may exist without being perceived. When a judge in a given case attacks a law relating to that case, he extends the circle of his customary duties, without, however, stepping beyond it, since he is in some measure obliged to decide upon the law in order to decide the case. But if he pronounces upon a law without proceeding from a case, he clearly steps beyond his sphere and invades that of the legislative authority. The second characteristic of judicial power is that it pronounces on special cases, and not upon general principles. If a judge, in deciding a particular point,

destroys a general principle by passing a judgment which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, he remains within the ordinary limits of his functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a particular case in view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to confine his authority; he assumes a more important and perhaps a more useful influence than that of the magistrate, but he ceases to represent the judicial power. The third characteristic of the judicial power is that it can act only when it is called upon, or when, in legal phrase, it has taken cognizance of an affair. This characteristic is less general than the other two; but, notwithstanding the exceptions, I think it may be regarded as essential. The judicial power is, by its nature, devoid of action; it must be put in motion in order to produce a result. When it is called upon to repress a crime, it punishes the criminal; when a wrong is to be redressed, it is ready to redress it; when an act requires interpretation, it is prepared to interpret it; but it does not pursue criminals, hunt out wrongs, or examine evidence of its own accord. A judicial functionary who should take the initiative and usurp the censureship of the laws would in some measure do violence to the passive nature of his authority. The Americans have retained these three distinguishing characteristics of the judicial power: an American judge can pronounce a decision only when litigation has arisen, he is conversant only with special cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the court. His position is therefore exactly the same as that of the magistrates of other nations, and yet he is invested with immense political power. How does this come about? If the sphere of his authority and his means of action are the same as those of other judges, whence does he derive a power which they do not possess? The cause of this difference lies in the simple fact that the Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted them not to apply such laws as may appear to them to be unconstitutional. I am aware that a similar right has been sometimes claimed, but claimed in vain, by courts of justice in other countries; but in America it is recognized by all the authorities; and not a party, not so much as an individual, is found to contest it. This fact can be explained only by the principles of the American constitutions. In France the constitution is, or at least is supposed to be, immutable; and the received theory is that no power has the right of changing any part of it. In England the constitution may change continually, or

478 The Courts rather it does not in reality exist; the Parliament is at once a legislative and a constituent assembly. The political theories of America are more simple and more rational. An American constitution is not supposed to be immutable, as in France; nor is it susceptible of modification by the ordinary powers of society, as in England. It constitutes a detached whole, which, as it represents the will of the whole people, is no less binding on the legislator than on the private citizen, but which may be altered by the will of the people in predetermined cases, according to established rules. In America the Constitution may therefore vary; but as long as it exists, it is the origin of all authority, and the sole vehicle of the predominating force. It is easy to perceive how these differences must act upon the position and the rights of the judicial bodies in the three countries I have cited. If in France the tribunals were authorized to disobey the laws on the ground of their being opposed to the constitution, the constituent power would in fact be placed in their hands, since they alone would have the right of interpreting a consituation of which no authority could change the terms. They would therefore take the place of the nation and exercise as absolute a sway over society as the inherent weakness of judicial power would allow them to do. Undoubtedly, as the French judges are incompetent to declare a law to be unconstitutional, the power of changing the constitution is indirectly given to the legislative body, since no legal barrier would oppose the alterations that it might prescribe But it is still better to grant the power of changing the constitution of the people to men who represent (however imperfectly) the will of the people than to men who represent no one but themselves. It would be still more unreasonable to invest the English judges with the right of resisting the decisions of the legislative body, since the Parliament which makes the laws also makes the constitution; and consequently a law emanating from the three estates of the realm can in no case be unconstitutional. But neither of these remarks is applicable to America. In the United States the Constitution governs the legislator as much as the private citizen: as it is the first of laws, it cannot be modified by a law; and it is therefore just that the tribunals should obey the Constitution in preference to any law. This condition belongs to the very essence of the judicature; for to select that legal obligation by which he is most strictly bound is in some sort the natural right of every magistrate. In France the constitution is also the first of laws, and the judges have the same right to take it as the ground of their decisions; but were they to exercise this

right, they must perforce encroach on rights more sacred than their own: namely, on those of society, in whose name they are acting. In this case reasons of state clearly prevail over ordinary motives. In America, where the nation can always reduce its magistrates to obedience by changing its Constitution, no danger of this kind is to be feared. Upon this point, therefore, the political and the logical reason agree, and the people as well as the judges preserve their privileges. Whenever a law that the judge holds to be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influence. In truth, few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power for any length of time, for there are few that are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and none that may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties or by the necessity of the case. But as soon as a judge has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law immediately loses a portion of its moral force. Those to whom it is prejudicial learn that means exist of overcoming its authority, and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. The alternative, then, is, that the people must alter the Constitution or the legislature must repeal the law. The political power which the Americans have entrusted to their courts of justice is therefore immense, but the evils of this power are considerably diminished by the impossibility of attacking the laws except through the courts of justice. If the judge had been empowered to contest the law on the ground of theoretical generalities, if he were able to take the initiative and to censure the legislator, he would play a prominent political part; and as the champion or the antagonist of a party, he would have brought the hostile passions of the nation into the conflict. But when a judge contests a law in an obscure debate on some particular case, the importance of his attack is concealed from public notice; his decision bears upon the interest of an individual, and the law is slighted only incidentally. Moreover, although it is censured, it is not abolished; its moral force may be diminished but its authority is not taken away; and its final destruction can be accomplished only by the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries. It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a

7.5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Judicial Power in U.S. 479 real want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as the basis of a prosecution. I am inclined to believe this practice of the American courts to be at once most favorable to liberty and to public order. If the judge could attack the legislator only openly and directly, he would sometimes be afraid to oppose him; and at other times party spirit might encourage him to brave it at every turn. The laws would consequently be attacked when the power from which they emanated was weak, and obeyed when it was strong; that is to say, when it would be useful to respect them, they would often be contested; and when it would be easy to convert them into an instrument of oppression, they would be respected. But the American judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own will. He judges the law only because he is obliged to judge a case. The political question that he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interests of the parties, and he cannot refuse to decide it without a denial of justice. He performs his functions as a citizen by fulfilling the precise duties which belong to his profession as a magistrate. It is true that, upon this system, the judicial censorship of the courts of justice over the legislature cannot extend to all laws indiscriminately, inasmuch as some of them can never give rise to that precise species of contest which is termed a lawsuit; and even when such a contest is possible, it may happen that no one cares to bring it before a court of justice. The Americans have often felt this inconvenience; but they have left the remedy incomplete, lest they should give it an efficacy that might in some cases prove dangerous. Within these limits the power vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers that have ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies. OTHER POWERS GRANTED TO AMERICAN JUDGES. In the United States all the citizens have the right of indicting the public before the ordinary tribunals--How they use this right--Art. 75 of the French Constitution of the year VIII---The Americans and the English cannot understand the purport of this article. It is hardly necessary to say that in a free country like America all the citizens have the right of indicting public functionaries before the ordinary tribunals, and that all the judges have the power of convicting public officers. The right granted to the courts of justice of punishing the agents of the executive government when they violate the laws is so natural a one that it cannot be looked upon as an extraordinary privilege. Nor do the springs of government appear to me to be weakened in the United States by rendering all public

officers responsible to the tribunals. The Americans seem, on the contrary, to have increased by this means that respect which is due to the authorities, and at the same time to have made these authorities more careful not to offend. I was struck by the small number of political trials that occur in the United States, but I had no difficulty in accounting for this circumstance. A prosecution, of whatever nature it may be, is always a difficult and expensive undertaking. It is easy to attack a public man in the journals, but the motives for bringing him before the tribunals must be serious. A solid ground of complaint must exist before anyone thinks of prosecuting a public officer, and these officers are careful not to furnish such grounds of complaint when they are afraid of being prosecuted. This does not depend upon the republican form of American institutions, for the same thing happens in England. These two nations do not regard the impeachment of the principal officers of state as the guarantee of their independence. But they hold that it is rather by minor prosecutions, which the humblest citizen can institute at any time, that liberty is protected, and not by those great judicial procedures which are rarely employed until it is too late. In the Middle Ages, when it was very difficult to reach offenders, the judges inflicted frightful punishments on the few who were arrested; but this did not diminish the number of crimes. It has since been discovered that when justice is more certain and more mild, it is more efficacious. The English and the Americans hold that tyranny and oppression are to be treated like any other crime, by lessening the penalty and facilitating conviction. In the year VIII of the French Republic a constitution was drawn up in which the following clause was introduced: ‘‘Art. 75. All the agents of the government below the rank of ministers can be prosecuted for offenses relating to their several functions only by virtue of a decree of the council of state; in which case the prosecution takes place before the ordinary tribunals.’’ This clause survived the Constitution of the year VIII and is still maintained, in spite of the just complaints of the nation. I have always found a difficulty in explaining its meaning to Englishmen or Americans, and have hardly understood it myself. They at once perceived that, the council of state in France being a great tribunal established in the center of the kingdom, it was a sort of tyranny to send all complainants before it as a preliminary step. But when I told them that the council of state was not a judicial body in the common sense of the term, but an administrative council composed of men dependent on the crown, so that the king,

480 The Courts after having ordered one of his servants, called a prefect, to commit an injustice, has the power of commanding another of his servants, called a councillor of state, to prevent the former from being punished. When I showed them that the citizen who has been injured by an order of the sovereign is obliged to ask the sovereign’s permission to obtain redress, they refused to credit so flagrant an abuse and were tempted to accuse me of falsehood or ignorance. It frequently happened before the Revolution that a parliament issued a warrant against a public officer who had committed an offense. Sometimes the royal authority intervened and quashed the proceedings. Despotism then showed itself openly, and men obeyed it only by submitting to superior force. It is painful to perceive how much lower we are sunk than our forefathers, since we allow things to pass, under the color of justice and the sanction of law, which violence alone imposed upon them.

7.6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, CourtPacking Plan Address, March 9, 1937 Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary MY FRIENDS, last Thursday I described in detail certain economic problems which everyone admits now face the nation. For the many messages which have come to me after that speech, and which it is physically impossible to answer individually, I take this means of saying thank you. Tonight, sitting at my desk in the White House, I make my first radio report to the people in my second term of office . . . The American people have learned from the depression. For in the last three national elections an overwhelming majority of them voted a mandate that the Congress and the president begin the task of providing that protection---not after long years of debate, but now. The courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and economic conditions. We are at a crisis, a crisis in our ability to proceed with that protection. It is a quiet crisis. There are no lines of depositors outside closed banks. But to the farsighted it is far-reaching in its possibilities of injury to America. I want to talk with you very simply tonight about the need for present action in this crisis---the need to

meet the unanswered challenge of one-third of a nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed. Last Thursday I described the American form of government as a three-horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course, the three branches of government---the Congress, the executive, and the courts. Two of the horses, the Congress and the executive, are pulling in unison today; the third is not. Those who have intimated that the president of the United States is trying to drive that team, overlook the simple fact that the president, as chief executive, is himself one of the three horses. It is the American people themselves who are in the driver s seat. It is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed. It is the American people themselves who expect the third horse to fall in unison with the other two. I hope that you have re-read the Constitution of the United States in these past few weeks. Like the Bible, it ought to be read again and again. It is an easy document to understand when you remember that it was called into being because the Articles of Confederation under which the original thirteen states tried to operate after the Revolution showed the need of a national government with power enough to handle national problems. In its Preamble, the Constitution states that it was intended to form a more perfect union and promote the general welfare; and the powers given to the Congress to carry out those purposes can best be described by saying that they were all the powers needed to meet each and every problem which then had a national character and which could not be met by merely local action. But the framers of the Constitution went further. Having in mind that in succeeding generations many other problems then undreamed of would become national problems, they gave to the Congress the ample broad powers ‘‘to levy taxes . . . and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.’’ That, my friends, is what I honestly believe to have been the clear and underlying purpose of the patriots who wrote a federal Constitution to create a national government with national power, intended as they said, ‘‘to form a more perfect union . . . for ourselves and our posterity.’’ For nearly twenty years there was no conflict between the Congress and the Court. Then in 1803 Congress passed a statute which the Court said violated an express provision of the Constitution. The Court claimed the power to declare it unconstitutional and did so declare it. But a little later the Court itself

7.6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Court-Packing Plan Address 481 admitted that it was an extraordinary power to exercise and through Mr. Justice Washington laid down this limitation upon it: he said, ‘‘It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.’’ But since the rise of the modern movement for social and economic progress through legislation, the Court has more and more often and more and more boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed by the Congress and by state legislatures in complete disregard of this original limitation which I have just read. In the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasonable doubt has been cast aside. The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policymaking body. When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these acts of the Congress---and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws. That is not only my accusation. It is the accusation of most distinguished justices of the present Supreme Court. I have not the time to quote to you all the language used by dissenting justices in many of these cases. But in the case holding the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional, for instance, Chief Justice Hughes said in a dissenting opinion that the majority opinion was ‘‘a departure from sound principles,’’ and placed ‘‘an unwarranted limitation upon the commerce clause.’’ And three other justices agreed with him. In the case of holding the AAA unconstitutional, Justice Stone said of the majority opinion that it was a ‘‘tortured construction of the Constitution.’’ And two other justices agreed with him. In the case holding the New York minimum wage law unconstitutional, Justice Stone said that the majority were actually reading into the Constitution their own ‘‘personal economic predilections,’’ and that if the legislative power is not left free to choose the methods of solving the problems of poverty, subsistence, and health of large numbers in the community, then ‘‘government is to be rendered impotent.’’ And two other justices agreed with him. In the face of these dissenting opinions, there is no basis for the claim made by some members of the Court that something in the Constitution has compelled them regretfully to thwart the will of the people.

In the face of such dissenting opinions, it is perfectly clear that, as Chief Justice Hughes has said, ‘‘We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.’’ The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions has improperly set itself up as a third house of the Congress---a super-legislature, as one of the justices has called it---reading into the Constitution words and implications which are not there, and which were never intended to be there. We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution and not over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men. I want---as all Americans want---an independent judiciary as proposed by the framers of the Constitution. That means a Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as written, that will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of judicial power---in other words by judicial say-so. It does not mean a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of facts which are universally recognized. How then could we proceed to perform the mandate given us? It was said in last year’s Democratic platform, and here are the words, ‘‘if these problems cannot be effectively solved within the Constitution, we shall seek such clarifying amendments as will assure the power to enact those laws, adequately to regulate commerce, protect public health and safety, and safeguard economic security.’’ In their words, we said we would seek an amendment only if every other possible means by legislation were to fail. When I commenced to review the situation with the problem squarely before me, I came by a process of elimination to the conclusion that, short of amendments, the only method which was clearly constitutional, and would at the same time carry out other much needed reforms, was to infuse new blood into all our courts. We must have men worthy and equipped to carry out impartial justice. But, at the same time, we must have judges who will bring to the courts a present-day sense of the Constitution - judges who will retain in the courts the judicial functions of a court, and reject the legislative powers which the courts have today assumed . . . What is my proposal? It is simply this: whenever a judge or justice of any federal court has reached the age of seventy and does not avail himself of the

482 The Courts opportunity to retire on a pension, a new member shall be appointed by the president then in office, with the approval, as required by the Constitution, of the Senate of the United States. That plan has two chief purposes. By bringing into the judicial system a steady and continuing stream of new and younger blood, I hope, first, to make the administration of all federal justice, from the bottom to the top, speedier and, therefore, less costly; secondly, to bring to the decision of social and economic problems younger men who have had personal experience and contact with modern facts and circumstances under which average men have to live and work. This plan will save our national Constitution from hardening of the judicial arteries. The number of judges to be appointed would depend wholly on the decision of present judges now over seventy, or those who would subsequently reach the age of seventy . . . The statute would apply to all the courts in the federal system. There is general approval so far as the lower federal courts are concerned. The plan has met opposition only so far as the Supreme Court of the United States itself is concerned. But, my friends, if such a plan is good for the lower courts, it certainly ought to be equally good for the highest Court, from which there is no appeal. Those opposing this plan have sought to arouse prejudice and fear by crying that I am seeking to ‘‘pack’’ the Supreme Court and that a baneful precedent will be established. What do they mean by the words ‘‘packing the Supreme Court?’’ Let me answer this question with a bluntness that will end all honest misunderstanding of my purposes. If by that phrase ‘‘packing the Court’’ it is charged that I wish to place on the bench spineless puppets who would disregard the law and would decide specific cases as I wished them to be decided, I make this answer: that no president fit for his office would appoint, and no Senate of honorable men fit for their office would confirm, that kind of appointees to the Supreme Court. But if by that phrase the charge is made that I would appoint and the Senate would confirm justices worthy to sit beside present members of the Court, who understand modern conditions, that I will appoint justices who will not undertake to override the judgment of the Congress on legislative policy, that I will appoint justices who will act as justices and not as legislators---if the appointment of such justices can be called ‘‘packing the Courts,’’ then I say that I and with me the vast

majority of the American people favor doing just that thing---now . . . It is the clear intention of our public policy to provide for a constant flow of new and younger blood into the judiciary. Normally every president appoints a large number of district and circuit judges and a few members of the Supreme Court. Until my first term practically every president of the United States in our history had appointed at least one member of the Supreme Court. President Taft appointed five members and named a chief justice; President Wilson, three; President Harding, four, including a chief justice; President Coolidge, one; President Hoover, three including a chief justice. Such a succession of appointments should have provided a Court well balanced as to age. But chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Supreme bench have now given us a Court in which five justices will be over seventy-five years of age before next June and one over seventy. Thus a sound public policy has been defeated. So I now propose that we establish by law an assurance against any such ill-balanced Court in the future. I propose that hereafter, when a judge reaches the age of seventy, a new and younger judge shall be added to the Court automatically. In this way I propose to enforce a sound public policy by law instead of leaving the composition of our federal courts, including the highest, to be determined by chance or the personal decision of individuals . . . Like all lawyers, like all Americans, I regret the necessity of this controversy. But the welfare of the United States, and indeed of the Constitution itself, is what we all must think about first. Our difficulty with the Court today rises not from the Court as an institution but from human beings within it. But we cannot yield our constitutional destiny to the personal judgment of a few men who, being fearful of the future, would deny us the necessary means of dealing with the present . . . Two groups oppose my plan on the ground that they favor a constitutional amendment. The first includes those who fundamentally object to social and economic legislation along modern lines. This is the same group who during the recent campaign tried to block the mandate of the people. And the strategy of that last stand is to suggest the time-consuming process of amendment in order to kill off by delay the legislation demanded by the mandated. To those people I say, I do not think you will be able long to fool the American people as to your purposes. The other group is composed of those who honestly believe the amendment process is the best and who

7.7 Gideon v. Wainwright

483

The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case. The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by Counsel.

made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument ‘‘emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case.’’ The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights ‘‘guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government.’’ Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, ‘‘upon consideration thereof’’ but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, we granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following: ‘‘Should this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady, be reconsidered?’’ The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicted for robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, crossexamined the State’s witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief, and, on review, this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, for reasons given, the Court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said:

Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He

Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That

would be willing to support a reasonable amendment if they could agree on one. To them I say, we cannot rely on an amendment as the immediate or only answer to our present difficulties. When the time comes for action, you will find that many of those who pretend to support you will sabotage any constructive amendment which is proposed. Look at these strange bedfellows of yours. When before have you found them really at your side in your fights for progress? And remember one thing more. Even if an amendment were passed, and even if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would depend upon the kind of justices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench. For an amendment, like the rest of the Constitution, is what the justices say it is rather than what its framers or you might hope it is . . . During the past half-century the balance of power between the three great branches of the federal government has been tipped out of balance by the courts in direct contradiction of the high purposes of the framers of the Constitution. It is my purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will accept my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make American democracy succeed. You and I will do our part.

7.7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel for him, whereupon the following colloquy took place:

484 The Courts which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial. Treating due process as ‘‘a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights,’’ the Court held that refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not so ‘‘offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness’’ as to amount to a denial of due process. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding, if left standing, would require us to reject Gideon’s claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration, we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.

II The Sixth Amendment provides, ‘‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.’’ We have construed this to mean that, in federal courts, counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived. Betts argued that this right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid down no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered [r]elevant data on the subject . . . afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date. On the basis of this historical data, the Court concluded that ‘‘appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.’’ It was for this reason the

Betts Court refused to accept the contention that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, ‘‘made obligatory upon, the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was ‘‘a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,’’ it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court. We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama (1932), a case upholding the right of counsel, where the Court held that, despite sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v. California(1884), the Fourteenth Amendment ‘‘embraced’’ those ‘‘ ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,’ ’’ even though they had been ‘‘specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution.’’ In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States. Explicitly recognized to be of this ‘‘fundamental nature,’’ and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances. For the same reason, though not always in precisely the same terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s command that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Eighth’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. On the other hand, this Court in Palko v. Connecticut(1937), refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment made the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment obligatory on the States. In so refusing, however, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, was careful to emphasize that immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states,

7.7 Gideon v. Wainwright and that guarantees ‘‘in their origin . . . effective against the federal government alone’’ had, by prior cases, been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared that ‘‘the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.’’ Powell v. Alabama(1932). While the Court, at the close of its Powell opinion, did, by its language, as this Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable. Several years later, in 1936, the Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel in this language: We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution. Grosjean v. American Press Co., (1936). And again, in 1938, this Court said: [The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that, if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘‘still be done.’’ Johnson v. Zerbst (1938). In light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that ‘‘one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State,’’ conceded that ‘‘[e]xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument. . . .’’ The fact is that, in deciding as it did---that ‘‘appointment of counsel is not

485

a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial’’---the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own well considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder, we believe, than the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents, but also reason and reflection, require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendant’s need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at

486 The Courts every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court’s holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was ‘‘an anachronism when handed down,’’ and that it should now be overruled. We agree. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.

7.8 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. . . . Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed . . . the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of

the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. . . . The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. . . . The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. . . . [T]his warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interests. . . . . . . [W]e hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. . . . No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead: Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right. If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. . . . The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. . . . The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system

7.8 Miranda v. Arizona 487 which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at this point. . . . . . . [W]e hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. . . .

Mr. Justice Harlan, with Justices Stewart and White joining, wrote the main dissenting opinion. I believe the decision of the Court represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for the country at large. How serious these consequences may prove to be only time can tell. But the basic flaws in the Court’s justification seem to me readily apparent now once all sides of the problem are considered. . . . The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers. Rather, the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all. The aim in short is toward ‘‘voluntariness’’ in a utopian sense, or to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with a vengeance. . . . Without at all subscribing to the generally black picture of police conduct painted by the Court, I think it must be frankly recognized at the outset that police questioning allowable under due process precedents may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses. . . . The Court’s new rules aim to offset . . . minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation. The rules do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant coercion since . . . they do nothing to contain the policeman who is prepared to lie from the start. The rules work for reliability in confessions almost only in the . . . sense that they can prevent some from being given at all. In short, the benefit of this new regime is simply to lessen or wipe out the inherent compulsion and inequalities to which the Court devotes some nine pages of description. What the Court largely ignores is that its rules impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law enforcement that has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid

for it. There can be little doubt that the Court’s new code would markedly decrease the number of confessions. To warn the suspect that he may remain silent and remind him that his confession may be used in court are minor obstructions. To require also an express waiver by the suspect and an end to questioning whenever he demurs must heavily handicap questioning. And to suggest or provide counsel for the suspect simply invites the end of the interrogation. How much harm this decision will inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accuracy. . . . We do know that some crimes cannot be solved without confessions, that ample expert testimony attests to their importance in crime control, and that the Court is taking a real risk with society’s welfare in imposing its new regime on the country. The social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation. . . . Though at first denying his guilt, within a short time Miranda gave a detailed oral confession and then wrote out in his own hand and signed a brief statement admitting and describing the crime. All this was accomplished in two hours or less without any force, threats or promises and . . . without any effective warnings at all. Miranda’s oral and written confessions are now held inadmissible under the Court’s new rules. One is entitled to feel astonished that the Constitution can be read to produce this result. These confessions were obtained during brief, daytime questioning conducted by two officers and unmarked by any of the traditional indicia of coercion. They assured a conviction for a brutal and unsettling crime, for which the police had and quite possibly could obtain little evidence other than the victim’s identifications, evidence which is frequently unreliable. There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice in the interrogation. Yet the resulting confessions, and the responsible course of police practice they represent, are to be sacrificed to the Court’s own finespun conception of fairness which I seriously doubt is shared by many thinking citizens in this country. . . . Nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. The foray which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr. Justice Jackson in Douglas v. Jeannette: ‘‘This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.’’

488 The Courts

7.9 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039; 94 S. Ct. 309 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

IV. The Claim of Privilege A. Having determined that the requirements of Rule 17(c) were satisfied, we turn to the claim that the subpoena should be quashed because it demands ‘‘confidential conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce.’’ The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of privilege. The second contention is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum. In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The President’s counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison (1803) that ‘‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’’ No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). In a series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on Members of the House and Senate by the Speech or Debate Clause, U. S. Const. Art. I, Section 6. Doe v. McMillan (1973); Gravel v. United States (1972). . . . Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.

Our system of government ‘‘requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.’’ Powell v. McCormack. And in Baker v. Carr [1962], the Court stated: ‘‘Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’’ Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the ‘‘judicial Power of the United States’’ vested in the federal courts by Art. III, Section 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. . . . We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court ‘‘to say what the law is’’ with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison.

B. In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President’s counsel urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decision making process.1 Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers. The protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings. The second ground asserted by the President’s counsel in support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on

7.9 United States v. Nixon 489 the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935); Kilbourn v. Thompson (1881), insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications. However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III. In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. ‘‘While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.’’ Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. (Jackson, J., concurring). To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of ‘‘a workable government’’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III. C. Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is

necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch. The right and indeed the duty to resolve that question does not free the judiciary from according high respect to the representations made on behalf of the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (1807). The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and added to those values the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. In Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that such Presidential communications are ‘‘presumptively privileged,’’ and this position is accepted by both parties in the present litigation. We agree with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s observation, therefore, that ‘‘[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the President as against an ordinary individual.’’ United States v. Burr. But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that ‘‘the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’’ Berger v. United States [1935]. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. . . . In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production

490 The Courts of materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of confidential communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities. In [Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp. (1948), dealing with Presidential authority involving foreign policy considerations, the court said: ‘‘The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.’’ In United States v. Reynolds (1953), dealing with a claimant’s demand for evidence in a damage case against the Government the Court said: ‘‘It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.’’ No case of the Court, however, has extended this high degree of deference to a President’s generalized interest in confidentiality. Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based. The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right ‘‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’’ and ‘‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’’ Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced. In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair

administration of criminal justice.2 The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect. However, we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. . . . Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President’s broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Note: When seven burglars were caught breaking into the Democratic Headquarters of the Watergate Building in Washington, D.C., on June 17, 1972, events were set in motion that led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon from office on August 9, 1974. As various investigative bodies pushed responsibility for the break-in, or at least its subsequent cover-up, closer and closer to the president, crucial evidence turned on tape recordings routinely kept by President Nixon of conversations in the Oval Office. When these tapes were subpoenaed by Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, President Nixon resisted on grounds that the president retained a right to confidentiality in his decision-making process and also on the grounds that the subpoena violated constitutional separation of powers. The Court concluded that these grounds were inadequate when the subpoena was for use in a criminal trial.

Notes 1. There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete privacy. M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of

7.9 United States v. Nixon 491 1787, xi--xxv (1911). Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30 years after the Convention. Most of the framers acknowledged that without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution, 134--139 (1937). The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the Constitution for a Presidential privilege as to the President’s communications corresponding to the privilege of Members of Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause. But the silence of the Constitution on this score is not dispositive. ‘‘The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in McCulloch v. Maryland [1819] that which was reasonably appropriate and relevant to the

exercise of a granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so universally applied that it suffices merely to state it.’’ Marshall v. Gordon (1917). 2. We are not here concerned with the balance between the president’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information, nor with the president’s interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the president’s assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.

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Index

Abington v. Schempp, 131, 151Doc abolitionist movement, 179 abortion rights, 131, 253, 449, 452, 458 accommodationists, 108, 110--111 An Act concerning Religion, 100, 136Doc Adair v. U.S., 167 Adams, Henry, 303 Adams, John Quincy, 102, 228, 231, 296, 298 Adams, Samuel, 14--15, 104 presidency, 296, 298 Addams, Jane, 183 adequate provision for support, 374 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 445 Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 446 administrative efficiency, 314 Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, 392 administrative presidency, 308 Administrative Procedures Act, 400, 417Doc African Americans, 165, 168, 184--185, 452 children, 447 civil rights of, 165, 167 immigration of, 185 agrarian interests, 163, 172, 245 Agrarian Populists, 243 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 166, 381, 445 Agriculture Committee, 235, 252 Ahlstrom, Sydney, 102 Air Force, 382 Albany, 177 Aldrich, Nelson, 237--238

Alien Act, 164, 296 Allen, Ethan, 102 Allied victory, 309 Altgeld, John Peter, on Municipal Government and Ownership, 211Doc American Civil Liberties Union, 457 American Communications Association v. Douds, 446 American Communist Party, 446 American Dream, 28, 29, 45 American federalism. See federalism American founding, 6 and religion, 99 American political experience, 3 American politics Enlightenment influence on, 11 history, 11 individual study approach, 127 late-20th-century, 123 political economy study approach, 128 relative prominence study, 127 second voice of, 10, 12 American practice of government, 44 American Protestantism, 131 American Revolution, 34, 102 and religion, 102 The American Supreme Court, 437 American Theocracy, 126 Americans, first-generation, 1 Anderson, Robert, 328, 331 Anglican Church, 120 Anglicans, 101--102, 119 Anthony Rule, 233, 236

493

anticlericalism, 121 Anti-Federalist No. 9, 268Doc Anti-Federalist No. 11, 200Doc Anti-Federalist No. 17, 270Doc Anti-Federalist No. 24, 408Doc Anti-Federalist No. 26, 79Doc Anti-Federalist No. 28, 80Doc Anti-Federalist No. 35, 202Doc Anti-Federalist No. 48, 82Doc Anti-Federalist No. 55, 272Doc Anti-Federalist No. 67, 352Doc Anti-Federalist No. 70, 354Doc Anti-Federalist No. 78, 471Doc Anti-Federalist No. 79, 471Doc Anti-Federalist No. 84, 83Doc Anti-Federalists, 1, 6, 10, 15--25, 79--85, 107, 161, 200--202, 268--274, 293, 352--354, 376, 409--411 defeat of, 23 opposition to Constitution ratification, 107 significance of, 24 Anti-Lottery Acts, 165 antirepublicanism, 319 antislavery measures, 231 antistatist alliance, 130 appropriations bills, 234, 235--236 Appropriations Committee, 235 Aquinas, 107 Aristocrotis, 17 Aristotle, 5, 15 Arkansas, 326, 329, 460 Armed Services Committee, 252 Army Appropriations Bill, 233, 234 Army of the Potomac, 339

494 Index Arthur, Chester, 303 Article III, of Constitution, 16, 437 Article VI, of Constitution, 108 Articles of Confederation, 14--15, 23, 57Doc, 103, 163--164, 293 Astor Opera House, 180 atheism, 114, 121 Atomic Energy Commission, 382 Australian ballot system, 234 authoritative leadership dilemma, 321 automobile, 186 autonomy, of Congress, 223 Backus, Isaac, 106, 121 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, 444 Baker v. Carr, 447 balkanized structure, 255 Baltimore, 178, 185 Lord, 100 Bank of the United States (BUS), 204, 206--207, 229, 439 banking, 333 Banking Act, 38 Banks, Nathaniel, 230 Baptists, 102, 120 Barden, Graham, 249 Barenblatt v. United States, 446 Barnard, Chester, Functions of the Executive, 1938, 416Doc bawdyhouse riots, 176 Beecher, Henry Ward, The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty, 148Doc Beilan v. Board of Education, 446 Bellah, Robert, 24, 125 Benten, Thomas Hart, 229 Beschloss, Michael, 320 Bible, 102--103 bicameralism, 241 Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 106 Bill of Rights, 10, 22--23, 113, 115, 167, 169, 446, 448, 454 second, 41 bipartisan, 318, 327 Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 445 Bivins, Jason, 125, 126 Black, Hugo, 446 Black Republicanism, 339 Blair, Frank, 338 Blair, Frank, Jr., 331 Blair, General, 332 Blau, Peter M., 386 block grants, 170 Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, 116 Boerne v. Flores, 171 Bonus Bill, 164 Booth, John Wilkes, 301

‘‘boss,’’ definition of, 183 Boston, 176, 178--179, 181, 185 draft riot in, 182 Boston Latin, 180 Boston Tea Party, 102 Bowers v. Hardwick, 451 Bowery Theater, 180 Brandeis, Louis, 171 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 447 Brennan, William, 457 Brethren, 102 bribery, in election, 238 Britain, and United States, relationships, 296 Broad Street Riot, 179 Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, 393 Bronx River, 177 Brooklyn, 181--182 Brooks, Preston, 231 Brown v. Board of Education, 167, 185, 447, 452, 454, 457, 459 Brownlow Committee, 308, 314--315 Brutus, Stephen Junius, 20--21, 103 Bryan, William Jennings, 243, 304, 306 Bryce, James, 132, 183 Buchanan, James, 300, 325--326 Buchanan v. Warley, 185 Buchman, Frank, 129 budget, 255 Budget and Accounting Act, 307 budget balancing, 47 Bull Moose Party, 306 bureaucracy, 315--316, 371, 373, 382, 391 changing face of, 385 cold hard facts, 377 control and discretion of, 397 definition of, 391 democratic accountability, 375, 400 during deregulation era, 383 during Great Society period, 382 early years, 379 efficiency and effectiveness, 401 founders’ view, 373 Hamilton’s influence on, 374 Madison’s influence on, 375 modern, shaping factors, 378 in New Deal period, 381 normative model of, 376 organizations, 392 outsourcing and privatization, 386 reforming, 403 responsibilities, 392 size of, 393 survey of literature on, 386 from World War II through Cold War, 382 bureaucratic agencies, 247 bureaucratic inertia, 397 Burger, Warren, 448--449

Burger Court, 173, 448, 451 Burgoyne, John, 104 Burke, John P., 314 Burns, James MacGregor, 291 Burr, Aaron, 177, 296, 297 BUS. See Bank of the United States (BUS) Bush, George W., 127, 132--133, 254, 313, 318, 321, 384, 386, 458 War on Terrorism Address, 367Doc Bush v. Gore, 452, 454 Bush’s presidency, 315, 318 Bushwick, 181 business, 42, 44, 380 and government aid, 36 business interests, 123, 172 and corrupted cities, 184 Butler, Andrew, 231 Butler, General Smedley, 29, 330 cabinet, 378, 392--393 cabinet departments, 392 Caldwell, Lynton, 376 Calhoun, John, 172, 229, 230 Fort Hill Address, 207Doc Calvinists tradition, 102 Cambridge, 185 Cameron, General, 338 Campbell, Ballard C., 314, 321 Cannon, revolt against, 237 Cannon, Joseph, 236, 237, 245 capitalism, 3, 28, 31, 37 Capitol Hill, 221 Carolina colonies, 119 Carolina Constitutions, 113 cars, 186 Carter, Jimmy, 124, 319, 383--384 Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 444 Catholics, 114, 119, 130 CATO, 19 Celler, Emanuel, 250, 251 central government, 15, 23, 163 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 382, 393 Central Park, 181--182 central union, 1 centralization of power, 23, 34, 167, 169, 171, 247 centralized party government, 236 centralizing acts, 168 Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 442 Charleston, 178 Chase, Samuel, 297 Chesterton, G. K., 97 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421Doc Chicago, 181, 185 Chicago Tribune, 29 child labor, 442 Child Labor Act, 165, 167

Index Chisholm v. Georgia, 172, 440 Christian anti-liberalism, 125 Christian Coalition, 132 Christian ideas, impact on Constitution, 107 Christian societies, 100 Christianity, 100, 103--104, 106, 121 egalitarian understanding of, 102 Christianity and the Social Crisis, 129 Christ’s Second Coming, 100 church, 97 financial aids for, 105 and state, separation, 97, 105, 108 Church of England, 99, 105, 113 Churchill, Winston, 309 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Cincinnati, 179, 319 cities, 175 central, 185 during Civil War, 182 home rules, 184 moral depravity, 176 populations dispersion, 186 riots in, 180, 185 sewerage system, 182 suspects, 176 citizen participation, and U.S. Constitution, 16 citizenship, 313 City of Boerne v. Flores, 449 City of Clinton, 182 City Upon a Hill, 135Doc civic virtue, 19--20, 24 and Constitution, 17 Civil Aeronautics Board, 383 civil liberties, 439 and Supreme Court, 445 civil religion, 125 civil rights, 78, 168, 249--251, 394--395, 437, 439, 463 Civil Rights Act, 167--169, 251, 447, 460 civil rights bills, 249 Civil Rights Cases, 444 Civil Rights Commission, 250 civil rights movement, 447 Civil Service Commission, 380 civil society, 24 Civil War, 11, 30, 173, 221, 232, 243, 291, 300,322, 326, 329, 439 border states, 329 cities during, 182 and Congress, 231 and emancipation, 332 government size during, 380 and Kentucky, 331 and Maryland, 329 and Missouri, 331 Senate reforms, 232 Civil Works Administration (CWA), 187

Civilian Conservation Corps, 28 Claims Committee, 227 classes, 28--30, 42 classical liberalism, 1, 5--6, 12, 30 classical liberals, 36 Clay, Henry, 227--228, 230--231, 298 Clayton Act, 165 clergy, 100, 105--106 Cleveland, Grover, 181, 184, 236, 303, 313--314, 317, 380 Clinton, William Jefferson, 125, 133, 254--256, 315--316, 384 presidency, 123 Clinton v. City of New York, 365Doc cloture rule, 253 Coelho, Tony, 254 Cohens v. Virginia, 165, 442 Cold War, 320, 322, 446 collective action problem, 379 collective actions to solve problems, 36 Commerce and Manufactures Committee, 227 commerce clause, 242 Commerce Committee, 235 commerce power, 171 commercial interests, 163, 172 Commission on Industrial Chaplaincies, 129 committee government, 246, 247, 248, 251, 256 Committee of the Whole, 251 Committee of Thirteen, 326 Committee of Vigilance, 180 Committee on Administrative Management, 314 common law, 103 common public good, 43 Commonwealth Club Address, FDR, 91Doc communality, 6 communism, 47 communist, 446 Communist Party, 446 community, 6 and individual, relationship between, 27 isolated, 126 concert of interests, 43 Conduct of the War, 232 confederation, 1 Confederation Congress, 14, 23, 103 Conference of State Governments, 173 conflict of interest, 247 Congregational Church, New England, 100 Congregationalists, 101, 102 Congress, 10, 18, 22, 173, 221 bicameralism, 241 budgetary power, 397 and bureaucratic organizations, 399 and centralization of power, 167

495

centralized party government, 236 centralizing acts, 168, 170 and Civil War, 231 committee government, 247 compromises, 231, 233 decline of, 245 devolution of authority, 247 direct election of senators, 223, 238 and executive branch, 242 factions, 224 in First Party era, 226 founding era, 223 in Gilded Age, 233 House Revolt of 1910, 245 institutional reform, 253 and Jackson, 228 and Lincoln, 333 modern liberalism, 247 oversight, 399 popularity, 223 and president, 241 Reed precedents, 235 second procedural revolution, 249 seniority considerations, 246 and slavery abolishment, 242 subcommittee government, 252 subgovernment, 248 versus president, 224 Congress of the Confederation, 103 Congressional Budget Office, 391 Congressional era, 223 congressional Republicans, 254 Congressional Revolution, 250 Conkling, Roscoe, 234 Conrad, Kent, 399 conservative religious activism, 125--126 conservative Republican insurgency, 254 conservatives, 36 constables, 179 The Constitution and Slavery, 88Doc Constitutional Convention, 163--164, 293 Constitutional Union Party, 165 constitutionalism, 314 Consumer Product Safety Commission, 253 consumers, 28, 42--43 and New Deal, 43 consumption, 43 New Deal’s focus on, 43 contemporary bureaucracy, 391 Continental Army, 104 Continental Congress, 104, 293 contract clause, 178 Contract with America, 170, 253, 254--255 contracts, social, 5 contributory-negligence doctrines, 166 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 440

496 Index Coolidge, Calvin, 307 Coolidge’s administration, 307 Cooper v. Aaron, 460 Cornell, Saul, 24 Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), 378 corporations, 30, 33, 35--38, 42, 44, 47, 93--94, 205, 211, 233, 243, 254, 275, 378, 412--413, 442 private, 178 public, 178 cosmopolitan, 163 Court-packing bill, 308, 445 Courts, 435 See also Supreme Court CPB. See Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) Crawford, William, 228 Credit Mobilier scandal, 233 criminal laws, 169 crisis, urban, 185--186 Crittenden, Senator, 326 Crittenden Compromise, 326--327 Croton Aqueduct system, 180 Crow, Jim, 459--460 segregation laws, 452 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 450 Cuban independence, 304 Cuban Missile Crisis, 312 Cumberland Road Bill, 164 Curtiss-Wright decision, 319 Cutten, George, 31 CWA. See Civil Works Administration (CWA) Dallas, 186 Danbury Baptist Association, 108 Danoff, Brian, 1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 442 Davis, Jefferson, 328 De Maistre, Joseph, 4 decentralization, 376 advocates for, 170 Declaration of Independence, 1, 3, 8, 55Doc, 103 as destructive document, 10 theological claims in, 103 Declaration of Rights, 119--120 Article XVI, 105 declaration of war, 227 deism, 102, 115 Delaware, 326 democracy, 6, 11--13, 16, 24--25, 32, 35--37, 41, 47--48, 70--71, 75, 86--87, 239, 306--307, 375--376, 387--388, 453 political, 40 social, 34

Democracy in America, 86Doc, 132, 179, 439 democratic accountability, of bureaucracy, 400 Democratic Caucus approval of committee chairs, 252 Democratic Committee on Organization, 252 Study and Review, 252 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 254 Democratic National Convention, 308, 318 Democratic Party, 124, 166, 169, 172, 233, 252, 304, 340--341 Democratic-Republican Party, 178, 295, 296, 298 democratic resurgence, 336 democratization, 129 Democrats, 235, 243, 250, 299--300 and Kansas-Nebraska Act, 230 support to centralization, 172 Denatus, 17 Dennis v. United States, 446, 461 denominations, 106 Department of Defense (DoD), 378, 382 Department of Education, 253, 392 Department of Health and Human Services, 378, 386, 393 Department of Homeland Security, 386 Department of Justice, 250 Department of State, 378 Department of Transportation, 383, 393 Department of Treasury, 378 Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs), 393 Detroit, 181, 185 riots in, 182 Devine, Donald, 314 devolutionary trends, 169 dignity, 6, 42 Dillon, John F., 182 Dillon’s rule, 182 Dinan, John, 161 direct election, of senators, 246 disestablishment, of religion, 121--122 Doctors’ Riot, 176 Doe v. Bolton, 449 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 450 Dole, Robert, 256 Donald, David, 300 Douglas, Stephen, 231, 326, 328 Draper, Simeon, 181 DRAs. See Dependent Regulatory Agencies (DRAs) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 300, 442 decision announcement, 443 Duche, Jacob, 104 duration in office, 374 Dutch Reformed Church, 119

Eastland, James, 249 ecclesiastical courts, 100 economic democracy, 40 economic dynasties, 36 economic freedom, 36, 39 and political freedom, 36 economic laws, 44--45 economic rights and political rights, 39 economic royalty, 37 economics American thinking about, 31 and government, 34 economy, and Supreme Court, 442 Edison, Thomas A., 320 education, 17, 130 federal aid for, 251 moral, 18 racial discrimination in, 167 religion in, 131 and religious institutions, 115 role in maintaining peace, 180 and self-rule, 17 Edwards, Jonathan, 121 effective leadership, 32 egalitarianism, 102 Ehrlichman, John, 315 Eighteenth Amendment, 167, 172 Eighth Amendment, 448 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 129, 249, 317, 447, 460 Eisenhower Administration, 188, 250 elastic clause, 242 Elections Committee, 227 electoral college, 294 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 167, 447 Eleventh Amendment, 169, 171--172, 441 Ellsworth, Oliver, 453 Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 24 Emancipation Proclamation, 301, 320, 332, 341 Employers’ Liability Acts, 166 Employers’ Liability Cases, 167 employment, 380 federal, 42, 384 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 450 Engel v. Vitale, 130 English political system, 7 Enlightenment, 3, 106 influence on America, 6 legacy of, 3 Enlightenment argument, for religious liberty, 120, 122 Enrolled Bills (joint) Committee, 227 Enrolled Bills (Senate) Committee, 227 Enron scandal, 403 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 253, 378, 392--393, 400

Index Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, 393 equal protection clauses, 169, 171 Equal Rights Amendment, 253, 448 equality, 8, 11--12, 37, 168 of rights, 167 Era of Good Feelings, 298 Erdman Act, 165, 167 Essay on Human Understanding, 6 established church, 12, 113--116 establishment clause, 108, 130, 447 Ethics Committee, 254 ethnic political machines, 184 European intellectual movement, and American political thought, 5 evangelical mobilization, 123 evangelicalism, 123 evangelicals, 123, 131 conservative, 123--124 Evangelism, 101 Everson v. Board of Education, 130 Ex Parte McCardle, 443 Ex Parte Milligan, 301, 443 executive, competent powers, 374 executive agencies, 242 executive branch, 8, 19, 21, 228, 241, 255, 295 of government, 19 executive dictates, 319 executive leadership, 291, 317--318 routinization of, 317 executive legislative leadership, 318 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council, 431Doc Executive Order No. 12612, 180 Executive Order No. 12866, 427Doc Executive Order No. 13132, 215Doc executive power, 458 in foreign affairs, 319 Executive Reorganization Act, 308 factions, 18, 175, 224, 375--376 Fair Labor Standards Act, 166 faith-based initiatives, 127 Falwell, Jerry, 123--124, 131 Family Reinforcement Act, 255 far-flung executive agencies, 313 Faubus, Orval, 460 FCC. See Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FDA. See Food and Drug Administration (FDA) FDR. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) fear, freedom from, 40 federal agencies, 247 Federal Art, Writing, and Theater projects, 42 federal bureaucracy. See bureaucracy

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 378, 392 Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 129 federal courts, 20, 167 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 38 Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 187 Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 167 federal employment, 42, 380, 382, 395 federal free speech clause, 167 federal government, 111, 123, 132, 163, 226 growth, 386 and religious liberty, 114 supremacy of, 294 federal religion clauses, 167 Federal Reserve Board, 398 Federal Reserve System, 378 federal supremacy, 326 Federal Times, 386 Federal Trade Commission, 381 Federal Trade Commission Act, 165 federal workforce, 42, 380, 382, 395 federalism, 15, 163 in 1960s, 167 antebellum period, 164 Civil War amendments, 165 Constitution adoption, 163 contemporary era, 169 and ideas, 171 and institutions, 172 and interests, 171 post--Civil War amendment, 165 Progressive and New Deal Eras, 165 The Federalist, 373 Federalist Papers, 7, 164, 224, 373 Federalist Party, 12, 226, 295--296, 298 Federalists, 1, 7--8, 12, 15--20, 22--24, 68--78, 107, 163--164, 191--199, 223--227, 259--267, 296--297, 310, 343--351, 373--376, 465-470 Federalist No. 2, 225 Federalist No. 3, 225 Federalist No. 10, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 36, 68Doc 224, 225, 375, 376 Federalist No. 15, 191Doc Federalist No. 21, 194Doc Federalist No. 27, 22, 225 Federalist No. 37, 7 Federalist No. 38, 7 Federalist No. 39, 7, 71Doc, 163 Federalist No. 44, 197Doc Federalist No. 46, 164, 173 Federalist No. 48, 74Doc Federalist No. 49, 223, 224 Federalist No. 50, 224 Federalist No. 51, 8, 76Doc, 312, 376 Federalist No. 52 (House), 259Doc

497

Federalist No. 54 (House), 261Doc Federalist No. 55, 224 Federalist No. 56, 225 Federalist Nos. 59--63, 224 Federalist No. 67, 343Doc Federalist No. 68, 22, 374 Federalist No. 69, 345Doc Federalist No. 70, 20, 348Doc, 374 Federalist Nos. 71--77, 374 Federalist No. 74, 351Doc, 407Doc Federalist No. 78, 437, 440, 453, 459, 465Doc Federalist No. 80, 468Doc Fessenden, William, 335 feudal barons, 34--35 Fifteenth Amendment, 11, 165, 303, 443 Fifth Amendment, 446, 450 filibustering, 226--227, 236 restriction on, 235 Fillmore, Millard, 300 Final Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 285Doc Finance Committee, 227, 334 financial panic (1873), 183, 233 Fiorina, Morris, 318 First Amendment, 10, 97, 107, 114, 119, 130, 296, 446--447, 458 First Congress, 110 First Great Awakening, 102, 119 First Treatise, 11 Fisher, David Hackett, 43 Fisher, Louis, 319, 321 Foley, Thomas, 255 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 378, 393 Forand, Aime, 251 Ford, Gerald, 384 Ford, Henry Jones, 291 foreign policy prerogatives, 294 Foreign Relations Committee, 227 Fort Sumter, 300, 326, 328--329 Fourteenth Amendment, 11, 161, 165, 167, 169, 171, 303, 443--449 France, 296 and United States, relationships, 296 Frankfurter, Felix, 444 Franklin, Benjamin, 15, 19, 23, 102, 120 free enterprises, 37 free exercise clause, 108, 120, 113, 114, 120, 121, 130, 447 freedom, 12, 27 of conscience, 117 from fear, 40 from government control, 1 individual, 5 from want, 40 free-rider problem, 379 Free-Soil party, 182, 230

498 Index Fremont, John C., 331, 340 Fuller, H. B., 237 Functions of the Executive, 1938, 414Doc Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, 100 Fundamentals of West New Jersey, 119 Furman v. Georgia, 169, 449 Gallup Poll, 309 GAO. See Government Accountability Office (GAO) Garcia v. SAMTA, 171 Garfield, James, 234, 303, 314, 380 presidency, 303 Garrison, William Lloyd, 180, 335 GDP (gross domestic product), 377 general assessment bill, 105--106 General Foods Corporation, 186 General Services Administration (GSA), 386 general welfare, 242, 247 government’s role in, 35 Genet, Citizen, 294 German immigrants, 102 Germany, 308--309 Gerry, Elbridge, 175 Gibbons v. Ogden, 165, 442 Gideon v. Wainwright, 167, 448, 456 Gideon’s Trumpet, 456 Gilded Age, Congress in, 233 Gingrich, Newt, 169--170, 254--255 Contract with America, 254 Gitlow v. New York, 445 Glass, Carter, 38 the Globe, 230 Glorious Revolution, 1, 100 God, 129, 131 gold rush, 180 Goldwater, Barry, 24, 168 Gore, Al, 404 Gould, Lewis L., 314, 317 government American thinking about, 30--31 branches of, 8, 221 limited, 3 Government Accountability Office (GAO), 386, 399 government corporations, 378, 392--393, 402 government power, 3 Gramm, Phil, 252 Grant, Ulysses S., 232, 303, 338 Grant administration’s scandals, 314 grants, 314 grants-in-aid, 169--170 Great Awakening, 102 Great Britain, 102 Great Compromise, 161

Great Depression, 27, 29--30, 32, 35--36, 39, 43--47, 49--50, 92--93, 179, 183, 275, 307--308, 315, 317, 379, 480 and suburban development, 186 Great Society programs, 167, 173, 247, 251, 317, 457 Greece, 3 Greeley, Horace, 332 Green, R. T., 374 Greenstein, Fred, 318 Gregg v. Georgia, 449 Griswold v. Connecticut, 131, 449 Grutter v. Bollinger, 451 GSA. See General Services Administration (GSA) Gulf of Tonkin Address, Message to Congress, 364Doc Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 364Doc Hale, James, 327 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 459 Hamilton, Alexander, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 20, 23, 178, 189, 191--199, 226, 294--295, 309--310, 312--314, 319, 343--351, 389, 407--408, 464--470 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 167, 444 Hansen, Julia, 252 Hanson, John, 293 happiness, 27, 37, 40--41, 45 and material possessions, 43 Harding, Warren, 307 presidency, 307 Harlem, 185 riots in, 185 Harriman, Averill, 315 Harrison, Benjamin, 303, 304 Harrison, William Henry, 299 Hart, Gary, 319 Hart, Philip, 250 Hartford Convention, 164 Hatch Act, 381 Hayes, Rutherford, 233, 303, 320 Head Start Programs, 383 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 169 Hebert, Edward, 252 Heimert, Alan, 102 Helvidius, 313 Henderson, David B., 236 Henry, Patrick, 15, 18--19, 105 Hepburn Act, 165, 237, 243, 245 heroic presidency, 322 Hicks, Governor, 329, 330 Highway Act, 186 historical institutionalism, 127--128 Hobbes, Thomas, 4, 6, 27, 39 Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 441 Holy Experiment in Pennsylvania, 113 home rule charters, 184 Homeland Security, 392

Homestead Act, 232 homosexual sodomy, 132 Hoover, Herbert, 129, 307 Hoover Administration, 187 Hopkins, Harry, 27 Horatio Alger myth, 30 House and Senate printers, 230 House Bank, 254 House Democrats, 237, 252 House Education and Labor Committee, 249 House Ethics Committee, 254 House of Representatives, 21, 221, 226, 252 calendar system, 235 open election for officers, 230 party leaders power, 237 passage of bills, 235 rules, 231, 235 schedule, 227 seniority rule, 246 size of, 224, 227 speaker, 236, 245--246 standing committees, 227, 248 revolt in 1910, 244 turnover rates, 245 House Republicans, 236, 252, 255 House Un-American Activities Committee, 446 House Ways and Means Committee, 248, 251, 252 Housing Act, 188 Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 383 Houston, 186 Howard, Senator, 334 Howe, Senator, 334 HUD. See Housing and Urban Development (HUD) human agencies, 44, 45 humanitarianism, 27, 29, 41, 47 humanity, social nature of, 5 Hume, David, 4, 6--7, 375 influence on James Madison, 7 Hunt v. Cromartie, 451 Hunter, General, 332 Hutchinson, Anne, 100 ICA. See Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) idea of balance, 10 Illinois, 326 Immigration Act, 184 immigration/immigrants, 93--94, 99, 102, 122, 179, 183, 282, 433 imperial presidency, 20 income taxes, 167 independent agencies, 391, 392 Independent Reflector, 121 Indiana, 326 individual freedom, 5, 39, 113, 291 individual liberty, 34--35

Index individual responsibility, 6 individualism, 39, 45 rugged, 35 industrial agriculture, 35 industrial codes, 32 Industrial Revolution, 30, 34--35 Senate reforms, 232 industrial war, 44 Institute for Justice, 456 institutional conservatism, 249 institutional presidency, 308 institutional structures, Enlightenment view, 4 institutions and American federalism development, 172 social responsibility, 43 interest group liberalism, 247--248 Internet, 10 interstate commerce, regulation of, 23 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 165, 243, 245 Interstate Commerce Commission, 378, 380, 383 Iowa, 184, 326 IRCs (Independent Regulatory Commission), 393 Irish politicians, 184 isolated communities of resistance, 126 Jackson, Andrew, 164, 221, 228, 297, 380 presidency, 298 Jackson, Janet, 392--393 Jackson, Robert, 446 Jacksonian Democratic Party, 298 Japan, 309 Jay, John, 23, 296, 438 Jay Treaty, 226, 296 Jefferson, Thomas, 6, 8, 37, 102--103, 106, 108, 110, 113, 119, 175, 295, 296, 297, 319, 376, 378 letter to Danbury Baptist Association, 108, 109 presidency, 297 Jersey City, 182 Jews, 102 job security, 40, 173, 251 Johnson, Andrew, 232, 301--302 belief in Reconstruction, 302 Johnson, Haynes, 320 Johnson, Hiram, 314 Johnson, Lyndon B. (LBJ), 168, 251, 312, 382, 384 administration, 188 Gulf of Tonkin Address, Message to Congress, 364Doc legislative program, 317 presidency, 317 Johnson, Samuel, 8

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 446 Joint Budget Committee, 255 Joint Committee on the Library, 227 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 251 judicial selection process, 454 judiciary, 8, 10, 21 Judiciary Act, 441 Judiciary Committee, 227, 249--251 jury, 16 jury system, 16 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 230--231, 242, 300 Kant, Immanuel, 4 Karmazin, Mel, 393 Keating-Owen Act, 444 Kelo v. New London, 456 Kennedy, Anthony, 312--313, 451 Kennedy Administration, 188 Kentucky, 326, 329, 341 during Civil War, 331 Kentucky Resolution, 164, 173 Kenyon, Cecilia, 17, 19 Keynes, John Maynard, 47 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 168 knowledge, 110 Know-Nothings, 230 Knox, Henry, 378 Koger, Gregory, 221, 242 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 446 Korea, 320 Korematsu v. United States, 309, 446 La Follette, Robert, 243, 314 La Guardia, Fiorello H., Speech on Tammany and the Spoils System, 215Doc Labor Herald, 444 labor movement, 42, 133 labor unions, 166 support to centralization, 169 laissez-faire economy, 37, 243 laissez-faire liberalism, 26, 46--47 Latrobe, Benjamin, 177 law enforcement, 179 Lawrence v. Texas, 132--133, 451 Lawson, W. D., Letter to Lucius Clay on Eisenhower and States’ Rights, 214Doc league of friendship, 14 League of Nations, 307 Lee, General Robert E., 338 Lee, Richard Henry, 102, 104 Legal Defense Fund, 447, 457 Legal Services Program, 457 legislation, federal, 167 legislative branch, 8, 21 legislative department, 241

499

legislative power, 221 Legislative Reorganization Act, 248, 251, 252 Legislator-in-Chief, 317 legislators, 247, 397 policy-making responsibilities, 242 legislature, 19 Leland, John, 106 Lend-Lease Act, 309 Letter Concerning Toleration, 118, 120 Leuchtenburg, William E., 315--316 Leviathan, 6, 39 Lewis, Anthony, 456 liberal Democrats, 251--252, 254 institutional reform, 251 liberal legislators, 252 liberalism, 1--6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 28, 30--32, 34--36, 40, 44, 46--48, 388--389 modern, 256 Roosevelt’s contribution, 26 liberty, 44 national government’s role in preserving, 1 and New Deal, 39 private, 15 public, 15 Liberty League, 37 Lienesch, Michael, 23 Light, Paul, 385--386 limited government, 3 Lincoln, Abraham, 11, 44, 165, 180, 221, 300, 312, 320, 322, 332, 336, 443 1862 campaign, 337 1863 strike back, 337 1864 campaign, 340 banking legislation, 333 bipartisan support, 328 changing war aims, 341 and Civil War elections, 335 and Civil War state, 325 as commander in chief, 321 and Congress, 333 on Declaration of Independence, 11 and democratic resurgence, 336 and eradication of slavery, 301 first 100 days, 326 letter to Greeley, 301 letter to Hale, 327 letter to Hodges, 300, 355Doc letter to Scott, 330 letter to Trumball, 327 and Reconstruction, 301, 334 Second Inaugural Address, 302 slavery eradication, 328 and wartime executive power, 300 Livingston, William, 121 local governments, 188 localist, 163--164 Lochner v. New York, 445

500 Index Locke, John, 1, 4, 6--7, 103, 115, 118, 120, 375 Second Treatise (1689), 51Doc Lockean liberalism, 103 Lorimer, William, 238 Los Angeles, 185--186 Louisiana Territory, 298 Low, Seth, 184 low tariffs, 245 Lowi, Theodore, 247 Lutherans, 102 Lutz, Donald, 103 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 32, 376 ‘‘machine,’’ definition of, 183 Madison, James, 1, 6, 10, 12, 16--17, 23, 102, 105, 106, 107, 111, 113, 119, 163, 294--295, 298, 375 factions, 375 Hume’s influence on, 7 influence on bureaucracy, 375 Madisonian system, 222, 291 Malloy v. Hogan, 448 managers, in private bureaucracies, 401 Manhattan Company, 177--178 Manhattan Project, 382 Mann Act, 165 Mapp v. Ohio, 167, 446 Marblehead, 178 Marbury v. Madison, 440--441, 473Doc market force, 29, 30 Marshall, Chief Justice John, 21, 107, 165, 178, 437, 441 Marshall, Thurgood, 457 Marshall Court, 173, 441 Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 165, 442 Marx, Karl, 26, 47 Maryland, 113, 326 during Civil War, 329 religion in, 100, 119 Maryland Toleration Act, 136Doc Mason, George, 20, 105 Massachusetts, 106, 115--117 Massachusetts Body of Liberties, 100 Massachusetts Calvinists, 117 Massachusetts Constitution, 105 Massachusetts Puritans, 113, 117 Mayflower Compact, 99 Maysville Road Bill, 164 McCarthy, Eugene, 250 McClellan, George, 301, 333, 340 McCloskey, Robert, 437 McCormick, John, 253 McCulloch v. Maryland, 21, 165, 203Doc, 441 McDonald, Forrest, 10, 317, 319 McKinley, William, 304 presidency, 304--305 McWilliams, Wilson Carey, 316, 317

Meade, General, 338, 339 Meat Inspection Act, 165 Medicaid, 167, 251 Medicare, 167, 251, 256, 383, 396 Memorandum on Probable Failure of Re-election, 301 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, 120, 143Doc Mennonites, 102 Methodists, 102 metropolitan districts, 183 metropolitan fragmentation, 188 metropolitan police forces, 181, 182 Mexican-American War, 231 Michigan, 326 Microsoft, 391, 401 Mid-Atlantic, 186 municipalities, 176 middle-class, 31, 38 Military Affairs Committee, 227 Military Reconstruction acts, 232 Militia Committee, 227 Milkis, Sidney M., 314 Mill, John Stuart, 26, 39 millennialism, 100, 102 Milliken v. Bradley, 448 Mills, C. Wright, 386 Mills, Wilbur, 251 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 130, 446 minimum wage laws, 39 minority rights, 168 Minute Man, 36 Miranda v. Arizona, 167, 448, 486Doc Missouri, 184, 326, 329 admission to the Union, 228 during Civil War, 331 Missouri Compromise, 231, 242, 326, 442 Missouri River Railroad, 182 Model Cities program, 188 Model T cars, 186 modern cities, 175 modern liberalism, 247 modern presidency, 304, 313, 318, 320 FDR and, 307 tragic nature of, 317 modern president, imaging, 319 modern presidential office, 313 modernization theory, 126 monarch, 34 money economy, 378--379 Monroe, James, 164, 297--298 Montesquieu, Baron De, 4, 6, 7 Mooney, William, 178 moral education, and self-interest, 18 Moral Majority, 131 Moral Re-Armament (MRA), 129 The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty, 148Doc

morality, 110 Moravians, 102 Morone, James, 126 Morrill Land Grant College Act, 232 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 422Doc MRA. See Moral Re-Armament (MRA) municipal government, modern, 180 Murtha, Jack, 315 Muskie, Edmund, 250 Nast, Thomas, 246 National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), 460 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 382 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 457 National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), 129 National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 187 national bank, 164, 221, 226, 294, 297, 333 National Civic League, 184 National Conference of State Legislatures, 173 National Defense Highway Act, 382 national government, 221, 253, 294 National Governors’ Association, 173 National Highway Safety Administration, 253 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 393 National Industrial Recovery Act, 166, 381, 445 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 129, 166, 445 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 445 National League of Cities, 187 National Municipal League, 184 National Origins Act, 184 National Performance Review (NPR), 402 National Quota Law, 184 National Recovery Administration (NRA), 29, 32, 44 National Science Foundation (NSF), 378, 382 National Security Act, 382 National Security Council, 320 nationalization of civil liberties, 167 of civil rights, 168 nativist movements, 184 natural rights, 7, 375 and New Deal, 40 nature, state of, 7, 51 Naval Affairs Committee, 227

Index A Necessary Evil, 12 Neustadt, Richard, 291, 315, 317, 318 Neutrality Proclamation, 294 New Deal, 1, 26, 123, 126, 133, 173, 247, 308, 319 American context, 29 and American federalism, 165 bureaucracy during, 381 and consumers, 43 economics of, 42 flexibility, 29 humanitarianism, 41 liberalism of, 34 and natural rights, 40 obligations to public interest, 43 and poverty, 42 pragmatism, 31 profit motive, 43 Progressives opposition, 31 and religion, 128 security and liberty, 39 social contracts, 44 social objective, 27 and Supreme Court, 437 New England, 176 religion in, 99, 115--116 New Federalism initiatives, 170 New Freedom, 31, 173, 306 New Hampshire, 106 New Jersey, religion in, 119 New Nationalism, 31 New Orleans, 178 New World, 5 new world order, 320 New York City, 176, 178--179, 182, 185 draft riots, 182 religion in, 119 riots, 180 water system, 177 New York Times, 123 New York Times v. Sullivan Co., 447 New York Times v. United States, 448 New York Tribune, 332 New York v. Quarles, 449 New York v. U.S., 171 Newport, 178 Newton, Sir Isaac, 4 NHTSA. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Niles, Nathaniel, sermon (1774), 141Doc Nineteenth Amendment, 172 Nixon, Richard, 169, 170, 315, 321, 448 NLRA. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) No Child Left Behind, 392, 400 Nolan v. California Constitutional Commission, 450 non-Caucasian central city, 186 nonestablishment clause, 113, 114, 122

nonpreferential establishments of churches, 115 Nonpreferentialists, 108 Norris, George, 237 North, Douglass, 379 North Carolina, 329 northern Democrats, 165, 168, 328 Northern Virginia Army, 165 Northerners, 341 Northwest Ordinance, 104, 110 Novak, Michael, 107 NPR. See National Performance Review (NPR) NRA. See National Recovery Administration (NRA) NSF. See National Science Foundation (NSF) nullification doctrine, 164--165, 172 OBRA. See Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) O’Connor, Sandra Day, 451, 458 Office of Management and Budget, 391, 405 Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 405 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 399 Office of the President, 393 Ohio Democratic Party, 339 Old Guard Republicans, 243, 245 Olmsted, Frederick, 181 OMB (Office of Management Budget), 377 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 383 O’Neill, Thomas P., 253 Operation Rescue, 131, 462 OPM. See Office of Personnel Management (OPM) opportunity, equality of, 37 Oregon v. Smith, 108 Orfield, Myron, 188 organizational charts of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 395 of U.S. government, 394 organized labor, 123 OTA. See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) outsourcing, 386 Pacific Railroad Act, 232 Pacificus, 313 Paine, Thomas, 102, 291 Panama Canal, 305 partisanship, 253, 256 party leadership, and presidential success, 318 party-based policy committees, 249

501

Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 245 Peace Democrats, 337, 340 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 309, 382 Pendergast Gang, 246 Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, 234, 235, 303, 380 Penn, William, 100, 113, 117 Pennington, William, 231 Pennsylvania, religion in, 100, 118--119 Pensions Committee, 227 Pentagon Papers, 446 People v. Draper, 181 Peoples Party, 246 Perkins, Frances, 31, 35, 39, 48 permanent committees, 227, 228 Personal Responsibility Act, 255 Phelan, James, 184 Philadelphia, 176, 179, 185 municipal waterworks, 177 riots in, 180 waterworks, 178 Philadelphia Central, 180 Philadelphia Convention, 14--15, 17, 19, 23, 175, 375 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 242 Phillips, Kevin, 126 Philosophical Essays, 375 Phoenix, 186 Pierce, Franklin, 300 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 445 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, 296 Pingree, Hazen, 184 Pittsburgh, 181 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 450, 458 Platt, Orville, 237 A Plea for Religious Liberty, 138Doc Plessy v. Ferguson, 447 pluralism, religious, 119 Poage, William, 252 policy making, 253, 318 political democracy, 40 political equality, 12, 36 political freedom, 36, 39 and economic freedom, 36 political machines, 184 political parties, and presidency, 298 Political Science Quarterly, 314, 374 political virtue, 32 politics, modern science of, 24 Polk, James, 164, 299 presidency, 299 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co, 167 population growth, 176--179, 181, 185--186 Populist and Progressive legislators, 243 Populist movement, 242, 384 pornography, 131 Post Office Committee, 227 post--Civil War amendments, 165

502 Index post--Civil War Reconstruction, 128 post-modernism, 3 Potomac Army, 165 poverty, 27, 31, 41--42, 49 and New Deal, 42 Powell, Adam Clayton, 249 powers balance of, 230, 442 unity of, 374 The Prayer of Twenty Millions, 332 Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 336 Presbyterian, 101, 102 presidency, 291, 313, 319 Adams’, 296, 298 administrative, 308 Bush’s, 315, 318 Civil War, 302 Clinton’s, 123 and Constitution, 293 FDR’s, 307, 317 Garfield’s, 303 Harding’s, 302 heroic, 322 imperial, 20 institutional, 308 Jackson’s, Andrew, 298 Jefferson’s, 297 Johnson’s (LBJ), 317 Lincoln’s, 300 McKinley’s, 304--305 modern, 304, 313 modern presidency, 304, 307, 313, 318, 320 order-shattering potential, 318 Polk’s, 299 prerogative, 291 Republican, 296 Rhetorical, 306 stewardship theory of, 305 Taft’s, 305 Van Buren’s, 299 Washington’s, 294 Wilson’s, 306 president, 221, 224, 241, 256, 291, 320 authority in foreign policy, 313 mastery of personnel, 315 veto power, 294 presidential centrism, 314, 319 presidential elections, 165 presidential image-making, 320 presidential leadership, 299, 305, 308, 313 presidential office, modern, 313 presidential power, 19--20 Presidential Power, 315 presidential prerogative, 313, 321 presidents, and centralization pace, 173 press, regulation of, 22--23 previous question, 227 principal-agent problem, 397--398 Printz v. United States, 449

privacy, right of, 132 private bureaucracy, 401--402, 404 private charities, 42 private enterprises, 43 private industry, 42 and rights to job and wages, 42 private interests, 43 private liberty, 15 private organizations, 402 private property, 37 privatization, 386 professional police forces, 179 profit motive, 43 Progressive Era, 31, 314, 381 and American federalism, 165 and American politics, 242 and centralization, 172 Progressive European Liberals, 26 Progressive ideas, 26 Progressive movement, fleeting nature of, 46 Progressive New Deal policy, 27 Progressive Party, 306 Progressive reformers, 243 Progressives, 11, 29, 237, 245 opposition to New Deal, 31 and poverty, 42 Progressivism, 34, 306 prohibition, 128, 172 property rights, 1, 39, 41, 185, 450 prostitution, 131 Protestant, understanding of conscience, 121 Protestant activism, 128 Protestant dissenters, in New England, 100 Protestant Reformers, 103 Protestants, 99, 130 conservative, 131 liberal, 131 providence, 178 Pruitt-Igoe homes, demolition of, 188 Prussia, 314 public administration, Jeffersonian normative model, 377 public administrator, 376 public bureaucracy, 401--402, 404 public interest, New Deal obligation to, 43 Public Lands, 227 Public Lands Committee, 227 public liberty, 15 public opinion, 238, 305--306, 341, 459 public powers, 29 public religious practices, 114 public school system, 180 Public Works Administration, 187 Pure Food and Drug Act, 165--166 Puritans, 6, 99--100, 113, 117 on church and state relationship, 100 Puritans of New England, 115 Putnam, Robert, 24

Quakers, 100, 108, 118--119 racial covenants, 185 racial discrimination, in education, 167 Radical Republicans, 334, 335 railroad regulations, 243 Ralph, Ketcham, 16 Randall, Samuel, 235 Randolph, Edmund, 378 rational thought, 4 Rauschenbusch, Walter, 129 on the Social Gospel, 149Doc Rayburn, Sam, 251, 253 Reagan, Ronald, 47, 124, 131, 133, 169, 170, 253--254, 313--314, 449 Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, 156Doc Reagan Democrats, 254 Reagan Revolution, 254 reapportionment rulings, 447 reason, 4 belief in, 4 rebel, against evil rulers, 103 Reconstruction, 303, 334, 439 Reconstruction Acts, 165 Reed, Thomas, 235 Reed v. Reed, 446 Reflections of a Public Man, 254 Reformed tradition, 102 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 448--449 regulation, on corporations, 38, 44 Rehnquist, William, 449, 458 Rehnquist Court, 21, 449--451 reinvent government, 403 Reinventing Government, 397 religion, 17, 34, 110 and American founding, 99 and American politics, 126 and American Revolution, 102 and Continental and Confederation Congresses, 103 current interregnum, 132 in education, 130--131 Enlightenment view, 4 establishment clause for, 97, 113 financial support for, 106 free exercise of, 375 in Maryland, 100 and New Deal, 128 in New England, 99, 115--116 in Pennsylvania, 100 regulation of, 22, 115 in Rhode Island, 100 in the South, 100 study value, 126 and U.S. Constitution, 107 religious activism, 125--126 religious beliefs, 114, 117 religious establishments, 114--115

Index religious institutions and education, 115 government aid to, 116 religious liberty, 104, 113--114, 117 arguments for, 120 in colonial period, 115 Enlightenment argument, 120 religious life, 117 religious minorities, 100--102, 108 religious mobilization, 124--125 late-20th-century, 125 religious organizations, 127 religious pluralism, 119 religious-political conflicts, 123 religious political mobilization, historical institutionalism study method, 128 religious practices, government aid to, 110 religious tolerance, 100, 101, 113, 118--119 Remini, R. V., 231 Remonstrance, 121 Reorganization Act, 249, 314 representative republic, 16 representatives, 16, 21, 61--65, 70--73, 79--80, 199--200, 239--241, 244--246, 248--251, 253--255, 259--263, 269, 272--275, 277-284, 409--411, 466--467 reproductive health decisions, 131 reproductive rights decisions, 123 republic large, 18 small, 18 republican citizens, rights of, 22 Republican coalition, 231 Republican National Convention, 254 Republican Party, 122--123, 125, 132, 167--169, 172, 226, 300, 325, 338 and devolution, 169 opposition to centralization, 172 and separation of church and state, 122 Republican presidency, 296 republicanism, 15 Republicans, 230, 232--233, 243, 250, 255, 334 rank-and-file, 340 residential segregation, 185 Revenue Act, 444 reverse discrimination, 448 revivalists, 102, 121 Revolution, 1, 17, 119 affirmation/rejection of, 10 justified, 7 and transformation of cities, 178 Revolutionary Era, 105 Revolutionary War, 104 Reynolds v. Sims, 169, 445 rhetorical leadership, 307

rhetorical presidency, 306 Rhode Island, 113, 116 religion in, 100, 115 right to work, 39 rights revolutions, 457 Riis, Jacob, 183 ‘‘ring,’’ definition of, 183 riots, 179 in cities, 179 Roberdeau, Daniel, 104 Roberts, John, 458 Robertson, Pat, 123, 131 Robinson v. California, 448 Robinson v. Louisiana, 448 Rockman, Bert A., 318 Rockwell, Norman, 40 Roe v. Wade, 131, 133, 169, 254, 449, 452, 454 roll call votes, 236 Roman Catholicism, 100, 102, 121 Romance, Joseph, 1 romanticism, 3 Romer v. Evans, 451 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (FDR), 1, 21, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 47, 129, 166--167, 173, 237, 313--315, 318, 381, 445 attitude toward Constitution, 33 Commonwealth Club Address, 91Doc Court-Packing Plan Address, 480Doc and European war, 309 executive power, 317 First Fireside Chat, 359Doc humanitarianism, 41 on individualism, 39 and modern presidency, 307 nonreplicability, 315 optimism of, 43 party and policymaking since, 316 religious belief, 32 Roosevelt, Theodore (TR), 31, 44, 167, 221, 238, 243, 304, 313, 380, 381 foreign policy leadership, 306 presidency, 317 on Presidential Power, 356Doc Ross, Edward, 31 Rossiter, Clinton, 321 Rudalevige, Andrew, 317--318 Rule 22 amendment, 253 Rules Committee, 235, 237, 245, 248, 250 Rumsfeld, Donald, 251 Rush, Benjamin, 175, 177 Rusk, David, 188 Rustbelt cities, 186 Safety Appliance Act, 165 Saint Louis, 180--181 Salary Grab, 233 same-sex marriages, 169 San Antonio, 186 San Diego, 186

503

San Francisco, 180--181, 184 free schools, 180 riots in, 180 Scalia, Antonin, 457, 458 Schenck v. United States, 445--446, 461 Schlesinger, Arthur M., 20, 315 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 447 school prayer decisions, 123, 130, 133 Schurz, Carl, 337, 340 Schuylkill River, 177 scientific inquiry, 4 Scott, General, 328, 330 Scott v. Sandford, 461 Scottish Enlightenment, 103 Screen Actors’ Guild, 254 secession doctrine, 165 Second Article of the Constitution, 316 second Bill of Rights, 41 Second Continental Congress, 102--104, 297 Second New Deal, 41 Second Treatise, 11, 51Doc Secondat, Charles Louis de, 7 second-party system, 231 Secretary of the Treasury Chase, 334 Section 8, 242 secular commonwealth, 107 secularism, 113, 126 Securities and Exchange Commission, 392--393 security, 26--27, 31, 34, 36, 39--44, 52, 71, 75, 77--78, 84--85, 264--265, 351, 361, 365, 386, 408 and New Deal, 39 right to, 40 Sedition Acts, 164, 296 selective incorporation, 448 self-development, 37 self-doubt, 45 self-government, 10, 13, 15, 72, 79, 148, 188, 212, 275, 291 self-incrimination, 446, 448, 486--487 self-regulation, 128 self-rule, 15--17, 19 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 171, 449 Senate, 62--63, 65, 72--73, 209, 224--229, 231--233, 235--236, 238--241, 246, 248--257, 263--264, 267--268, 277--287, 306--307, 344--347, 412--414 Anthony Rule, 233 devolutionary trend, 253 and Jackson, 229 party leaders power, 237 rules, 231 seniority rule, 246 size of, 225 standing committees, 227, 248

504 Index Senate Committee on Revenue and Taxation, 248 Senate Contingent Expenses, 227 Senate Republicans, 234, 237 senators direct elections for, 172, 238 freshman class, 250 seniority rule, 221, 244, 246--249, 251, 256, 287--288 separation of church and state, 113--114, 116--117, 121--122, 125 of powers, 3, 7--8, 12, 283, 285, 374, 488--489 separationists, 108, 110 September 11 attacks, 123 Seventeenth Amendment, 12, 62, 167, 172, 238, 245, 246 Seward, William, 332, 339--340 shadow government, 394, 397, 403 shadow of FDR, 309, 316 Shain, Barry, 107 Shakers, 102 Shame of the Cities, 184 Shaw v. Reno, 451 Shelby, Richard, 255 Shelley v. Kraemer, 185 Sherbert v. Verner, 447, 450 sheriffs, 179 Sherman, General, 335 Sherman Antitrust Act, 165, 243, 245, 380 Shipping Board Committee, 244 Sinclair, Upton, 183 Sixteenth Amendment, 12, 64, 167, 172 Skowronek, Stephen, 133, 318, 320 Slaughterhouse Cases, 443--445 slavery, 8, 11, 17, 48--49, 88--91, 141, 164--165, 231, 242--243, 257, 299--302, 326, 332--333, 335--336, 340--341, 355 emancipation, 179, 232, 331, 340--341 slum clearance, 188 small businesses, 245 Smith, Adam, 4, 21, 108, 126, 134, 176, 228, 240, 249, 251, 388, 450, 452 Smith, Howard, 249--250 Smith, Melancton, 17 Smith Act, 444 social contract, 5, 7, 41, 44 cities in, 175 Social Darwinism, 31 social democracy, 37 social engineering, 29 Social Gospel movement, 129 social science, 126 social security, 33, 47, 256, 308, 395 Social Security Act, 33, 166

social stratification-government inequality thesis, 188 social values, 45 socialism, 47 society, 4, 27, 40, 42 self-conscious, 8 Society of Saint Tammany, 178 Society of the Cincinnati, 178 sola scriptura doctrine, 102 Somerville, 185 South, religion in, 100, 119 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 169 Southern cities, 178 Southern Conservative, 221, 252 southern Democrats, 168 Southern restoration, 233 Southerners, 233 sovereign states, 15 Soviet Union, 446 Spain, 304 speaker system, in House, 246, 250 special rule/order, 235 The Spirit of the Laws, 7 spoils system, 380 Spooner, John, 237 Spratt, John M., Jr., 399 Square Deal, 306 Stalin, Josef, 309 standing committees, 227, 247 Stanton, Edwin, 303, 312, 332, 333, 336 state control, 169 State Executive, 314 state laws, 169, 445 state sovereignties, 164 Statute for Religious Freedom, 120 Steagall, Henry, 38 Steering and Policy Committee, 251--252 Steffens, Lincoln, 184 Stenberg v. Carhart, 450 Stevenson, Andrew, 229 Stillman, Richard, 375--376 Stipelman, Brian, 1 Stoddard, William O., 334 Stone, I. F., 319 Students for Democratic Society, 24 Study of Administration, 374, 380 Subcommittee Bill of Rights, 252 subcommittees, 252--253 subgovernment, 247 suburbs, 185 Sugar Trust case, 243 Summa Theologica, 107 Sumner, William, 231 Sunbelt cities, 186 Supreme Court, 11, 20--21, 32, 130--131, 163--164, 167--168, 243, 308, 318, 437, 439, 452 1790 to 1861, 440 1978 to 2009, 449

and centralization pace, 173 and civil liberties (1900 to 1953), 445 and civil liberties (1953 to 1986), 447 countermajoritarian ruling, 453 during and after Civil War, 443 and economy (1865 to 1937), 444 as legal institution, 453 and New Deal, 439 as political institution, 456, 461 power of judicial review, 440 size of, 439 suspending the rules, 232 Sutherland, George, 319 Swann v. Mecklenburg Board of Education, 448 symbolism, 221 Symmes, Young William, 19 Taft, William Howard, 305, 313, 381 presidency, 305 on Presidential Power, 357Doc Tagliabue, Paul, 393 Taking Back Our Streets Act, 255 Tammany Hall, 246 Taney, Roger, 442 Taney Court, 442 Tappan, Lewis, 180 Tariff Acts, 164 tariff policies, 172 taxation, 38, 172 Taylor, Zachary, 300 Teachers of the Christian Religion, 120 Tennessee, 326, 329 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 33, 378, 381 Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 166 Tenth Amendment, 161, 169, 172--173 Tenure in Congress Act, 232 Tenure of Office Act, 303 terrorist attacks, 123 Thirteenth Amendment, 11, 66, 165, 311, 333, 335, 340, 443--444 Thomas, Clarence, 457--458 Thompson, William, 184 Three-fifths Compromise, 161 Tichenor, Daniel J., 318 Tiebout, Charles, 187 Tiebout model, 188 Tilden, Samuel, 233, 303, 314 The Times, 124 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 11, 35, 97, 132, 171, 179, 241, 439 Democracy in America, 86Doc, 132, 179, 439 Judicial Power in U.S., 474Doc Tocqueville’s Ledger, 321 TR. See Teddy Roosevelt (TR) Treatise, 7 Treatise on Government, 8 Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 182

Index Treaty of Versailles, 307 Trop v. Dulles, 448 Truman, Harry S., 129, 309 Truman Administration, 188 Trumball, Senator, 327 trust busting, 221, 380 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 178 Tulis, Jeffrey, 318, 321 Turner, Charles, 17 TVA. See Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Twelfth Amendment, 297--298 Twenty-First Amendment, 172 Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 172 Twenty-Second Amendment, 295, 309 Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 172 Two Treatises on Government, 6 Tyler, John, 229 tyranny, 3, 7, 31, 316 unconstitutional executive leadership, 313 Union, 165, 232, 300, 326 Union Army, 182, 340--341 Union war effort, 338, 340 unions, 43 Unitarian churches, 102 United States Postal Service (USPS), 378, 393, 401 United States v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 319 United States v. E. C. Knight Company, 444 United States v. Leon, 449 United States v. Lopez, 21, 449 United States v. Morrison, 21, 449 United States v. Nixon, 448, 488Doc United States v. O’Brien, 447 universal reason, 4 urban areas, 183 urban crisis, 185--186 urban lobby, 188 urban violence, 179 urbanization, 181 U.S. Constitution, 1, 3, 5, 8, 61Doc and citizen participation, 16 and civic virtue, 17 as constructive document, 10 first page of, 9 opposition to, 15 and presidency, 293 and religion, 107 U.S. v. Lopez, 171 U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 167 U.S. Supreme Court, Gideon v. Wainwright, 483Doc U.S. Supreme Court, Goldberg v. Kelly, 418Doc

U.S. Supreme Court, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 412Doc U.S. Supreme Court, INS v. Chadha, 280Doc USPS. See United States Postal Service (USPS) usurpers of power, 7 utilitarianism, 27 Vallandigham, Clement, 338 Van Buren, Martin, 228, 299 presidency, 299 Vaux, Calvert, 181 veto power, 295 Viacom Inc., 391 Vicksburg, 338--339 Vietnam, 320 Vietnam War, 251, 317, 383, 393, 447 Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, 103 Virginia, 119, 326, 329 Declaration of Rights, 105 religious liberty and establishment, 104 Statute for Religious Freedom, 120 Virginia Articles, Laws, and Orders, 100 Virginia Convention, 105, 375 Virginia Court of Appeals, 164 Virginia Declaration of Rights, 119--120 Virginia Resolution, 164, 173 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, 106, 113 Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty, 106 Voltaire, 8 volunteerism, 376 Voting Rights Act, 167--168, 251 Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois, 380 Wabash Railroad decision, 243 Wade-Davis bill, 232, 335 Wal-Mart, 391, 401 Wallace, George, 463 War Hawks coalition, 227 War of 1812, 226 war on poverty, 188, 384, 457 war on terrorism, 320 War Powers Resolution, 277Doc Warren, Earl, 447--448, 458 Warren, Mercy, 18 Warren Court, 173, 447 wartime executive power, Lincoln and, 300 Washington, D.C., 221 Washington, George, 15, 23, 102, 178, 221, 294, 295, 319, 329, 378 letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, 147Doc and precedent power, 294 proclamation, 110--111 Thanksgiving Proclamation, 147Doc

505

Washington v. Glucksberg, 450 Watergate scandal, 448 wealth, 30, 38, 379 Wealth of Nations, 176 Weber, Max, 175, 373--374 Webster, Daniel, 229--230 Weed, Thurlow, 338 welfare state, 26, 47, 123, 133 West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 445 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 130, 446 Whig Party, 230, 298, 333 Whigs, 230, 299--300 Whiskey Rebellion, 294 White, Leonard, 373, 376, 387 white flight, 185, 457 White House, 242 Whitefield, George, 102 Williams, Roger, 100, 113, 116--117 A Plea for Religious Liberty, 138Doc Williamsburgh, 181 Wills, Garry, 12, 126, 319 Wilson, James Q., 22--23, 107, 173, 314 Wilson, Woodrow, 31, 44, 167, 238, 246, 291, 297, 306, 313, 318, 380--381 Congressional Government, 275Doc foreign policy leadership, 306 presidency, 306 Wilsonian Idealism, 307 Winthrop, John, 99, 100, 135 City Upon a Hill, 135Doc Wisconsin Territory, 326, 442 Witherspoon, John, 103 women’s rights, 253 Women’s Rights Project, 457 Wood, Fernando, 181--182 work, social dimension of, 40 work relief, 42 workforce, federal, 380, 384 Works Progress Administration (WPA), 382 World War I, 184, 307, 381 World War II, 130, 185--186, 308, 320 Worldcom scandal, 402 WPA. See Works Progress Administration (WPA) Wright, James, 253--254 XYZ Affair, 296 Yalta peace negotiations, 309 yellow fever, 177 yellow-dog contracts, 166 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 361Doc Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 450

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM Ideas, Interests, and Institutions VOLUME II

Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor Editors

Copyright 2010 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A history of the U.S. political system : ideas, interests, and institutions / Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor, editors. 3 v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-713-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) --- ISBN 978-1-85109-718-0 (ebook) 1. United States---Politics and government. I. Harris, Richard A., 1951- II. Tichenor, Daniel J., 1966JK31.H57 2010 320.973---dc22

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

About the Editors

Richard A. Harris, PhD, is a professor at Rutgers University--Camden with a joint appointment in political science and public policy and administration. He directs the Senator Walter Rand Institute for Public Affairs. He has written and edited several books, including Coal Firms Under the New Social Regulation (Duke University Press), The Politics of Regulatory Change (Oxford University Press, coauthored), and Remaking American Politics (Westview Press, coedited). He has been a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and received the Mary Parker Follett Award and the Jack Walker Award from the American Political Science Association for best article (coauthored) in Politics and History and Political Organizations and Parties, respectively. Daniel J. Tichenor, PhD, is Philip H. Knight professor of Social Science and senior faculty fellow at the Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon. In addition to numerous articles and chapters, he has published Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton University Press) and The Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press). He has been the recipient of fellowships from the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, the Brookings Institution, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Along with Dr. Harris, he has received the Follett and Walker awards. He also was awarded the Gladys Kammerer Prize by the American Political Science Association for best book in American public policy and politics.

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Contents Volume II Section 1: Political Parties, 1 Introduction, 1 Development of U.S. Political Parties to Franklin D. Roosevelt Hal Bass, 3 The Rise of Mass Democracy in America Jerome M. Mileur, 11 The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 Marc D. Weiner, 22 Documents, 41 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6

James Madison on Parties, January 23, 1792, 41 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, 41 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Parties in the United States,’’ Chapter 10 in Democracy in America, 1835, 43 Democratic Party Platform, 1840, 46 Republican Party Platform, June 17, 1856, 47 Senator Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft, 1905, 48

Section 2: Elections, 51 Introduction, 51 Elections in American Political Development Andrew J. Polsky, 53 The Revolution of 1800 Jeremy D. Bailey, 66 The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 Daniel J. Tichenor and Daniel Fuerstman, 78 Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections William Field, 88 Documents, 101 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 60, 101 Anti-Federalist No. 52, 103 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Election of the President,’’ Chapter 8 in Democracy in America, 1835, 105 Susan B. Anthony, On Woman’s Right to Suffrage, 1873, 110 Carrie Chapman Catt, Speech before Congress, 1917, 110

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Contents 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 [1962], 112 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 [1964], 115 Voting Rights Act, 1965, 118 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 [1976], 118 Vice President Al Gore, Concession Speech, December 13, 2000, 121 Gov. George W. Bush, Response to Gore’s Concession, December 13, 2000, 122

Section 3: Interest Groups, 125 Introduction, 125 The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins Daniel J. Tichenor and Richard A. Harris, 127 Interest Group Development since 1950 McGee Young, 148 Documents, 161 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Anti-Federalist No. 60, 161 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Public Associations in Civic Life,’’ Chapters 5 and 6 in Democracy in America, 1835, 162 Ida Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company, 1904, 166 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, 1904, 167 Henry D. Lloyd, The Lords of Industry, 1884, 168

Section 4: Social Movements, 171 Introduction, 171 Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias: Collective Action in American Political Development from the Revolution to the New Deal Elisabeth Clemens, 173 U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 Brian Glenn, 186 The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development Carol Nackenoff, 195 Contemporary Social Movements Ann Marie Szymanski, 210 Documents, 227 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12

Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience,’’ 227 William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, December 16, 1859, 236 Mark Twain, Women’s Temperance Movement, 1873, 237 Terence Powderly, The Plea for Eight Hours, 1890, 238 James E. Doom, The Principles of Populism, January 1895, 240 Emma Goldman, A New Declaration of Independence, July 1909, 242 Martha Gruening, Two Suffrage Movements, September 1912, 242 Anna Howard Shaw, The Fundamental Principle of a Republic, 1915, 245 Marcus Garvey, Aims and Objects of the Movement for Solution of Negro Problem, 1923, 246 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, April 16, 1963, 249 Proclamation of the Delano Grape Workers for International Boycott Day, May 10, 1969, 254 National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, Equal Rights Amendment, 1978, 255 4.13 Pat Robertson, Citizens of Character Must Get Involved, 1986, 256

Contents

Section 5: The Media and Public Opinion, 259 Introduction, 259 The Media in American Political Development Dianne Garyantes, 261 Media and Public Opinion: Contemporary Perspectives Susan Sherr, 270 Documents, 281 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

John Peter Zenger, Trial Record, 1736, 281 Walter Lipmann, Public Opinion, 1922, 284 Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), 287 Calvin Coolidge, The Press under a Free Government, January 17, 1925, 288 Edward R. Murrow and Joseph McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate, 1954, 291 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), 297

Section 6: The Policy-Making Process, 303 Introduction, 303 Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process David Brian Robertson, 304

Section 7: Domestic Policy, 319 Introduction, 319 Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology, 1890--1925 Chris Ziegler-McPherson, 321 Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies Melissa Buis Michaux, 338 Truman and the Fair Deal Sean Savage, 350 Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Patrick McGuinn, 365 Environmentalism and Conservatism: An Ideational and Institutional Analysis Richard A. Harris, 380 Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue Daniel J. Tichenor, 399 Documents, 415 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7

Horace Mann, On Education and National Welfare, 1848, 415 Theodore Roosevelt, On Americanism, 1915, 416 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message to the Congress on Social Security, January 17, 1935, 418 Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address, January 5, 1949, 419 Cliff Humphrey, Thomas Jefferson, and Friends, Ecology Action, 1969, 423 Ash Council on EPA 1970, April 29, 1970, 424 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, May 15, 2006, 426

Section 8: Making Foreign Policy, 431 Introduction, 431 After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic Jeffrey S. Selinger, 433 Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 Paul McCartney, 449

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x Contents Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States Clark Kent Ervin, 468 Documents, 483 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7

George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality, April 22, 1793, 483 Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823, 483 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, 484 Neutrality Act, August 31, 1935, 486 Sen. Robert A. Taft, Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, July 26, 1949, 489 George Ball, Cutting Our Losses in South Vietnam, 1965, 490 President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point (The Bush Doctrine), 2002, 492

Index, 497

Section 1 Political Parties

Introduction

developed and flourished along with the expansion of suffrage. Over time, the relative strength of parties in the polity has waxed and waned, just as their nature, functions, and relationship with voters and politicians have dramatically evolved. For all the scorn that the framers and contemporary Americans have expressed toward parties, the United States boasts the longest continuing political party system in the world. The essays in this section capture the birth of American political parties, the decentralized, mass-based character of the traditional party system, the rise of modern parties and candidate-centered campaigns, and the enduring centrality of parties to U.S. elections and government. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

Although political parties are among the most important political institutions in any democratic nation, the historian Richard Hofstadter aptly noted that the United States has a ‘‘Constitution-against-parties.’’ The framers were generally hostile to parties, viewing them as driven by majority factions that placed their particular interests and ambitions before that of the common good. Yet elite parties emerged early in the American republic as late-18th-century conflicts between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans over political economy and foreign relations played out in the formation of governing coalitions, the policy-making process, and elections. In subsequent decades, political parties

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Development of U.S. Political Parties to Franklin D. Roosevelt Hal Bass Dean, School of Social Sciences, Ouachita Baptist University

been Democrats and Republicans. In the shadow of the two major parties, minor parties have been recurrent phenomena, but they have not been able to establish themselves as enduring institutions. The two major parties themselves have been alliances of interests. These interests have been rooted in class, region, residence, religion, culture, issues, and ideology. Over time, some interests have shifted their loyalties from one party to another. Newly emergent interests locating themselves under a party umbrella ostensibly enhance a party’s fortunes, but possibly undermine them as well. Party factions vie for power within the party, and the coalitions vary in their coherence and cohesion. Typically, one party has maintained a decided competitive advantage over its opposition for an extended period. On occasion, two parties have competed on a relatively even basis. Even here, national balance has usually masked clear regional domination by one party. The abiding two-party character of American politics can be attributed primarily to electoral arrangements. Prominent among them are single-member legislative districts and the electoral college. The latter requires a majority vote for presidential election, and most states choose electors by popular vote on a winner-take-all basis. These electoral rules clearly discourage minor parties to the benefit of major ones who can aggregate the substantial electoral support required to hold elective office.

A political party is an organization that seeks electoral authorization for its nominees to hold public offices and to make public policies in accordance with party preferences. Political parties fitting this description were an American invention, and they have become characteristic features of political orders around the world. Political parties serve as central, integrating institutions in the body politic. As intermediaries, they link citizens with government. Furthermore, they connect branches and levels of a government built on constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism. As such, considerations of political development require attention to political parties. National political parties emerged in the United States shortly after the onset of the government authorized by the 1787 Constitution. To be sure, that document made no provision for political parties; and its drafters viewed the very idea of political parties with disfavor. For them, parties, or factions, undermined national unity and civic virtue. Nevertheless, within a decade, two political parties had become vital, compelling components of the political order. Since then, two-party competition has remained a normal feature of American politics. Two major parties have routinely contested elections to advance party causes. The party labels have changed over time. In the 1790s, Federalists began battling DemocraticRepublicans. In the 1830s, Democrats clashed with Whigs. Since the 1850s, the party combatants have 3

4 Political Parties In turn, historical factors help account for the initial emergence of two major parties. The conflicts in the quarter-century preceding the onset of the new national government in 1789, from Revolution to Constitution, tended to be dualistic: patriots versus loyalists, nationalists versus states’ rights supporters, Federalists versus Anti-Federalists. Two parties carried forward this dualistic pattern. Finally, two-party competition flows from features of American culture. Americans traditionally favor pragmatism over ideology. The United States is a large, diverse society that generally has embraced norms of compromise and accommodation in collective decision making. As such, competing interests have proved willing and able to pursue their objectives within a major party umbrella, rather than going it alone. Emerging interests have found the major parties inclined to invite them to join their coalitions. This willingness of the major parties to address and accept rising issues and interests has undermined the capacity of minor parties to sustain popular support. Minor parties have long been part of the fabric of party competition, but they have operated on its fringes. Founded on personalities and issues, they typically have been incorporated into the two-party mainstream or have become irrelevant to the political dialogue. Noteworthy shifts in the structure and character of interparty competition have occurred on several occasions. The first came with the election of 1800. Others emerged in the 1820s, 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s. Historians and political scientists use such terms as critical elections and party realignments in marking these transformations, while such terms as party systems and party eras characterize the ensuing periods of party competition. Partisans, those who identify with a political party, can be differentiated across three analytical categories. These components are potential rivals for party power. The party in office, or party in government, refers to those individuals who hold public office, either elected or appointed, under the banner of their political party. Party organization is the machinery of the party, its headquarters operations. In the United States, party organization parallels government organization. In accordance with the principle of federalism, party organization is present at national, state, and local levels. Finally, the party in the electorate labels those individuals with varying degrees of commitment who identify with and support the party, its policies, and its nominees for public office. Competition among these intraparty units typically has focused on processes for party nominations for

public office. Early on, the party in office dominated, via the nominating caucus, a legislative institution. In the 1830s, the nominating convention, representing the party organization, arrived on the scene. The national party convention persists for presidential nominations; but since the latter years of the 19th century, nominating primaries, empowering the party in the electorate, have come to prevail in the state- and local-level nominations. Furthermore, in the early decades of the 20th century, primaries emerged as potential vehicles for designations of state delegations to national party conventions. Political parties originated as government factions during the administration of the first president, George Washington, spilling over from the executive to the legislature. A variety of overlapping factors account for their appearance on the scene, including personality, demography, socioeconomic class, and philosophy. The competing protagonists in this process were Alexander Hamilton, the secretary of the treasury, and Thomas Jefferson, the secretary of state. Virtually from the outset of Washington’s presidency, they found themselves in conflict. Each viewed himself as Washington’s heir apparent, but their rivalry transcended mere personal ambition. They represented distinct socioeconomic and regional constituencies, and they articulated and advanced different interpretations of the constitutional order. Hamilton spoke for the rising urban manufacturing and financial sectors of the economy, centered in the northern states. Jefferson advocated the interests of the rural agricultural sector, planter and yeoman farmer alike, that prevailed in the southern states. Hamilton’s vision called for a strong, dynamic central government aggressively advancing the cause of his constituents. Within that central government, he enthusiastically promoted executive power. Jefferson favored limitations on a central government that he feared would imperil the hard-won liberties of the citizenry. He was suspicious of executive power and preferred deference to the legislature. Executive policy making provided a forum for the expression of these differences. In that arena, Hamilton typically prevailed, with President Washington endorsing his policy proposals. The constitutional structure called for congressional consent, so the controversies quickly embroiled members of the legislative branch. In each arena, Hamilton and Jefferson attracted enthusiastic supporters and detractors. These government factions provided the foundations for partisan conflict that initially favored the Hamiltonians.

Development of U.S. Political Parties to Franklin D. Roosevelt Hamilton and his supporters claimed the label Federalists, astutely associating themselves with the identically named group that had supported the ratification of the 1787 Constitution. They represented the merchants, financiers, and manufacturers who typically resided in the urban areas of the North and enjoyed relative affluence, and they sought to establish and utilize the power the central government to advance these interests. In turn, Jefferson and his followers styled themselves Republicans, implicitly suggesting monarchist inclinations on the part of the Federalists. Subsequently, in an effort to associate themselves with the rank-and-file citizenry and to characterize their adversaries as elitists, they broadened their title to Democratic-Republicans. Their primary constituency was agrarian. Regionally, their roots were in the South, but they had a strong presence in New York as well, where Aaron Burr allied with Jefferson. They preferred legislative over executive claims to power, and they were suspicious of national government, placing greater trust in the several states. During the Washington and Adams presidencies, the Federalists usually prevailed, and did so in the face of spirited opposition within the government. However, Jefferson and his supporters seized the opportunity afforded by the elections of 1800 to unseat their rivals. They did so by expanding the arena of partisan conflict beyond the government to the electorate, via party organization. This establishment of party organization directed toward electoral mobilization transformed parties from their historical antecedents as government factions into their modern incarnations. The electoral success achieved by the Democratic-Republicans in 1800 brought Jefferson to the White House and established the Democratic-Republicans as the majority party in the Congress. The Federalists never recovered from this devastating electoral defeat. In power, Jefferson proved more accommodating to executive and national power than his previous rhetoric and record would have suggested, effectively blurring once-clear partisan differences. With Jefferson passing the two-term presidential torch sequentially to his partisan lieutenants James Madison and James Monroe, the Democratic-Republicans expanded their partisan coalition and firmly maintained their control over both branches for two decades. By 1820, the Federalists had disintegrated, inaugurating an ephemeral ‘‘era of good feelings’’ absent party competition in the early years of that decade. This initial era of party competition had significant consequences for American political development. Most

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notably, it established the pattern of two-party competition that has persisted ever since. In turn, the presence of only two major parties restructured political conflict in the new nation. Partisan rivalries transcended statebased ones. Thirteen states, and counting, would have found it difficult to attain and sustain majoritarian governance. Two parties heightened expectations for that outcome. The class and regional bases of initial partisan conflict have persisted. Since then, one party has typically favored the economic elites, and the other the less affluent. Each party has demonstrated sustained dominance within particular regions. In the notable instance of the electoral college, the emergence of two political parties transformed the framers’ vision of the role and responsibility of that representative body. The successful efforts to the parties to affect the selection of electors pledged to a party ticket, president and vice president, shifted the status of electors from trustees, exercising disinterested wisdom and judgment, to partisans, loyally voting for their party nominees. Furthermore, the emergence of parties necessitated a constitutional amendment to alter the balloting arrangements within the electoral college. The Constitution originally called for each elector to cast a single ballot with two names written on it, only one of whom could be from the elector’s state. The nominee receiving the most votes would become president, if the number of votes constituted a majority. The nominee with the next largest number of votes would become vice president. However, the designation of electors pledged to a party ticket manifested itself in the 1800 outcome of a tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both DemocraticRepublican nominees. The Constitution provided a means of resolution: majority vote by state delegations in the House of Representatives, which eventually elected Jefferson president. Lest this pattern become the norm, reform of electoral college balloting was initiated. The Twelfth Amendment provided for each elector henceforth to case two ballots, clearly differentiating the presidential from the vice presidential vote. This shift had important consequences for the role and status of the vice president in the constitutional order. The framers envisioned the vice president as the electors’ second choice for president. When the nominating institutions began proposing presidential tickets, the role of the vice presidential nominee came to involve advancing the electoral prospects of the presidential nominee and balancing and reconciling party factions. The view of the vice president as next-best president receded in significance.

6 Political Parties The Jeffersonians also introduced the concept of presidential party leadership. Their well-documented distrust of executive power proved problematical in the wake of their electoral successes in 1800 and afterward. They dealt with this challenge by encouraging deference by the legislative majority to the like-minded partisan in the White House, elected at the head of the party ticket. This development enabled the president to leverage his constitutional status as chief executive into a claim to be head of government, with the idea and organization of party bridging the separated branches of government. Jefferson embodied this role quite effectively. His successors fell well short of his high standard. The controversial election of 1824 that brought John Quincy Adams to the presidency laid the foundations for a new era of party competition that spanned three decades. This second party system emerged when the dominant Democratic-Republican Party divided into irreconcilable factions. Within a decade, the factions had transformed themselves into political parties, Democrats and Whigs, that competed for another 20 years. Interparty competition developed on familiar foundations: personality, class, region, and ideology. First and foremost, the polarizing personality of Andrew Jackson promoted division of the body politic into approving and disapproving camps. The Jackson faction of the Democratic-Republican Party reconstituted itself as the Democratic Party. The National Republicans and later the Whigs stood in opposition to Jackson. The Democrats clearly claimed the Jeffersonian legacy of support for and from the common folk. Shades of difference between the new party and its Democratic-Republican antecedent were grounded in geography, demography, and philosophy. The Democrats added a distinctly Western component to the old North-South political alliance that Jefferson and Madison had fostered with Burr. In addition, they drew support from the urban workers emerging with the industrial advance, while maintaining their southern agrarian base. Industrialization concurrently brought substantial numbers of European immigrants into the party coalition. Many of them were Roman Catholic, and they uneasily integrated into what remained a predominately Protestant domain. Like the Jeffersonians, the Democrats uneasily accommodated both states’ rights and nationalist sentiments. Where the Democratic-Republican heritage featured distrust of executive authority, the Democrats followed Jackson’s lead in openly and enthusiastically embracing it.

The anti-Jackson faction of the Democratic-Republican Party initially reconstituted itself as the National Republican Party in mounting unsuccessful presidential campaigns against Jackson in 1828 and 1832. In 1836, it adopted the Whig Party label, under which it competed against the Democrats for another two decades. The Democratic commitment to an enlarged executive role provided perhaps the clearest point of philosophical differentiation with the emerging Whigs. The very name, ‘‘Whig,’’ evoked historical memories of the 17th-century British opponents of efforts by the Stuart kings to expand royal prerogatives. These defenders of Parliament styled themselves Whigs, and they came to constitute an enduring and potent partisan force in British politics. Similarly, 18th-century American colonists who personified expansive British imperialism with King George III referred to themselves as Whigs. Thus, this label naturally appealed to Jackson’s opponents in the 1830s. More positively, the Whigs rallied to the cause of national improvements, primarily pertaining to transportation. Democrats were less enthusiastic, owing to philosophical concerns regarding the power of the central government in relation to the states. Opposition to Jackson on additional grounds brought other groups into the Whig coalition, but it also generated some internal inconsistencies and divisions that became increasingly disruptive following Jackson’s retirement and an attendant cooling off of the passions he inspired. For example, Jackson’s pro-Union stance in response to South Carolina’s Ordinance of Nullification pushed some states’ rights Southerners into the Whig camp, where they coexisted uneasily amid nationalists and abolitionists. Socioeconomically, the Whigs inherited from the Federalists the support of elites. The Democrats’ outreach efforts to immigrants shifted nativists into the Whig camp. Similarly, the expanding Catholic component of the Democratic coalition contrasted with the Protestant homogeneity of the Whigs. The aforementioned abolitionists were a noteworthy group who saw the Whigs as responsive to public policy perspectives rooted in moral, religious values. The underdog Whigs prevailed in presidential contests in 1840 and 1848. On both occasions, they relied on the popular appeal of military heroes, William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor, respectively. Unfortunately for them, both died shortly after assuming office, and their successors proved incapable of advancing the party’s prospects via presidential incumbency.

Development of U.S. Political Parties to Franklin D. Roosevelt The accession of Vice President John Tyler to the presidency following Harrison’s death effectively resolved a constitutional ambiguity. Did a presidential vacancy result in the vice president becoming president, or merely acting as president? Tyler’s initiatives in taking the oath of office and moving into the White House clearly established the precedent that a vacancy resulted in the vice president becoming president. In light of the mortality of their two successful presidential nominees, the national leadership of the Whigs appropriately resided on Capitol Hill, where such luminaries as Henry Clay and Daniel Webster held forth. On the legislative front, the Whigs were similarly disadvantaged throughout this era. The exceptions were the 27th Congress (1841--1843) when they controlled both chambers, the 28th (1843--1845), when they maintained their majority in the Senate, and the 30th (1847--1849), wherein they governed the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the Democrats ruled the Capitol. One noteworthy legacy of the second-party system was the institution of divided party government, wherein one party controls the presidency while the other has a majority in at least one legislative chamber. Divided party government reinforces constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances in structuring policy conflict between the president and Congress. Another was the emergence of new institutions and processes for presidential nominations. During the era, the national party convention established itself as the authorizing agent of presidential nominations, empowering party organization. A minor party, the AntiMasons, pioneered this innovation in 1831, but the National Republicans and the Democrats immediately followed suit. Competing for the presidency for the first time in 1836, the Whigs did not host a national convention, but they came on board in preparation for the 1840 campaign. The national party convention advanced the cause of democratization and federalism in the political process, by granting to delegates designated by state parties the authority to nominate the party’s presidential ticket and proclaim the party’s issue positions via the party platform. Democratization also resulted from state-level suffrage reforms in the 1820s. Property requirements were eliminated and the electoral ranks expanded. In exercising their constitutionally granted discretion in choosing presidential electors, the states shifted decisively to popular election. Furthermore, a ‘‘winnertake-all,’’ process, wherein parties ran slates of electors as units, and the slate receiving the most votes would

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cast that state’s electoral votes, came to prevail. All this enhanced the role of the common people in the political process, at the expense of traditional elites. Yet another key feature of the Jacksonian era was the spoils system, wherein government positions were claimed and dispensed as patronage by party organizations. Jackson and his followers did not originate the practice. Indeed, it was rooted in antiquity; its name was derived from an old Roman saying, ‘‘to the victors belong the spoils.’’ The Federalists and then the Democratic-Republicans informally practiced patronage. Jackson’s innovation was to advocate it openly and justify it in the name of a responsive, accountable, democratic government. As president, Jackson perceived himself to be the tribune of the people. An affirmative public response effectively invested the executive office with a popular connection it had heretofore lacked. This understanding advanced Jefferson’s innovation of presidential party leadership. It continued the accretion of extraconstitutional enhancements of the power position of the president in the political order. Jackson and his successors began claiming a popular representative role that rivaled, indeed transcended, that of members of Congress. Following Jackson’s retirement from the presidency in 1837, and his death in 1845, contradictions within the Whig party intensified, rendering it increasingly ineffectual. In turn, the rising intensity of the slavery controversy divided the Democrats as well, along apparently irreconcilable regional lines. By the middle of the 1850s, this second-party system was in disarray, and the outlines of new one were emerging. With the Whigs disintegrating, and the Democrats bitterly divided, a new party, the Republicans, moved into the breach. It rose from the ashes of the Whigs, unifying small business interests, workers, and farmers in the North under an antislavery banner. Lacking a southern presence, it nevertheless captured control of the House in the 34th Congress (1855--1855), and regained it in the 36th (1859--1861). In the 1860 presidential election, with Abraham Lincoln as their standard-bearer, Republicans captured the White House as well, sweeping the more populous North and thus securing a clear electoral vote majority. They retained their House majority, and also took over the Senate. Their triumph ushered in both the Civil War and a third party era. This system established Democrats versus Republicans as the enduring participants in partisan competition. Throughout the Civil War, the Democrats were denied their potent southern base, leaving them with

8 Political Parties fragile footholds in the major urban centers of the North, where they continued to find support among the rising tides of European immigrants. After the war and Reconstruction, the return of the southern states to the national political arena fortified the Democrats’ cause, but heightened intraparty factionalism. The postwar Democrats continued the party’s Jefferson-Jackson pattern of featuring a northern urban wing and a southern rural wing. The Roman Catholic presence was increasingly pronounced in the North, while Protestantism continued to hold sway below the Mason-Dixon Line. The rising Prohibition issue reinforced these existing divisions. Within the party, the rural, Protestant Southerners tended to be more ‘‘dry,’’ or supportive of government prohibition of the sale and consumption of beverage alcohol, while the urban, Catholic Northerners were reliably ‘‘wet,’’ or opposed to Prohibition. The postwar Democrats found themselves overshadowed by the Republicans, who basked in the nationalistic glow of the successful prosecution of the Civil War and Lincoln’s martyrdom. Postwar Republicans effectively expanded their electoral coalition to include the ‘‘big business’’ interests that were to dominate the Gilded Age, and they continued to prevail in rural regions outside the South. Business and commercial interests found themselves exercising more influence over national policy than had been the case since Hamilton’s day. The Republicans retained substantial support among the moralistic reformers who were latter-day heirs of the abolitionist movement that had operated within the Whig coalition. The postwar Republicans also benefited from the electoral enfranchisement of the freed slaves in the South. Demonstrating their gratitude for emancipation, these new voters flocked to the Republican banner. However, with the end of Reconstruction in 1876, the dominant Democrats in the region initiated policies that substantially suppressed African American voting. Outside the South, African Americans constituted a small but reliable and symbolically significant component of the Republican coalition. After the war, up to the century’s end, tight national electoral competition typically favored the Grand Old Party (GOP), as the Republicans now styled themselves. In presidential contests, Grover Cleveland was the only Democrat to break the Republican stranglehold on the White House, winning divided terms in 1884 and 1892. The Republicans were similarly dominant on the Senate side of Capitol Hill, where the Democrats had majorities in only the 46th (1879--1881) and 53rd (1893--1895) Congresses. On the House side, Republican control was

less well established, with the Democrats managing majorities in six Congresses between 1875 and 1895. During this era, national party power emanated more from Capitol Hill and the party organizations than from the White House. With electoral outcomes in doubt, the state and local party organizations proved very effective in mobilizing voters under party banners. However, critics of corruption in the party machines were successful in instituting noteworthy political reforms. These Progressives emerged as noteworthy factions in both major parties, and they constituted themselves as a notable minor party as well. Their reform agenda attacked the spoils system, advocating a merit-based civil service instead of patronage appointments. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1882, also known as the Pendleton Act, initiated a merit system. At the state level, they secured the enactment of enduring electoral reforms, including the Australian ballot and the nominating primary. In addition to the Progressives, several other minor parties flourished during this era. The presidential election of 1896, in which William McKinley prevailed over William Jennings Bryan, tipped the competitive balance more decisively toward the Republicans, who went on to win six of the next eight presidential contests. The most significant issue dividing the parties that year was economic: the monetary system. The Republicans embraced ‘‘hard’’ money, firmly backed by stores of gold. The Democrats called for ‘‘free silver,’’ which would expand the money supply and empower debtors against creditors. Following McKinley’s reelection in 1900, subsequent presidential victories by Theodore Roosevelt and then William Howard Taft consolidated the GOP advantage. An intraparty split in 1912 enabled the minority Democrats to capture the presidency, with Woodrow Wilson as their standard-bearer. Wilson narrowly won reelection in 1916, amid international unrest, but the end of World War I presaged a ‘‘return to normalcy’’ that sent Republicans back to the White House with comfortable margins of victory in the next three elections. Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, the Republicans controlled the House from 1895 until 1911, and again from 1919 until 1931. Their domination of the Senate was even more pronounced with the Democrats holding majorities in only three Congresses, 1913--1919, until 1933. This post-1896 expansion of Republican power warrants recognition as a separate era of party competition. During this period, the regional bases of the two parties became more pronounced. The Republicans consolidated their control over the Northeast and the Midwest, although the Democrats remained a significant

Development of U.S. Political Parties to Franklin D. Roosevelt presence in the urban centers. The South remained solidly Democratic, and that party found rising favor in the West. Class differences between the parties also intensified. The Republicans tightened their hold on the more affluent, outside the South, while the Democrats did likewise among those who were less affluent. During this era, three related trends in American political development advanced. One was the emergence of the United States as a major world power, demonstrated most notably by belated participation in World War I and assumption of a leading role in the ensuing peace negotiations. This larger world role coincided with more activist national government on the domestic front as well. Accompanying these transformations, the president came to occupy an expanded and more prominent role in the constitutional order. Republican President Theodore Roosevelt (1901--1909) and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson (1913--1921) were the protagonists in these developments. On the more narrowly partisan front, two additional transitions merit mention. African American migration from the rural South to the urban North was accompanied by some erosion in the traditional group support for the Republicans in favor of the Democrats. The Democratic Party continued to appeal to the immigrant communities, both newcomers and their native-born children when they reached voting age, and the rising tides of immigrants swelled the party’s ranks. Both parties had to accommodate rival factions. The Progressive movement established a presence each party coalition, pitting itself against a more traditional element, the Old Guard Republicans and the Democratic urban machines. Democrats continued to be divided by the issue of prohibition into ‘‘wet’’ and ‘‘dry’’ camps, clearly coinciding with urban and rural locales, along with Catholic and Protestant religious affiliations. The Great Depression brought this era of party competition to an end. The dramatic economic downturn devastated the Republican electoral hegemony, ushering in a new era in which the Democrats became the clearly dominant party. Franklin Roosevelt played the leading role in this transformation. In the 1932 presidential campaign, Roosevelt proposed a New Deal for the American people. In power, he delivered on his promise, building on and dramatically expanding the Progressives’ interpretation of the role and responsibility of the national government in addressing economic and social inequalities. To do so, Roosevelt assembled a formidable electoral coalition. The Democrats retained their traditional bases in the urban North and the rural South. They found new support in the Midwest, especially among the

9

farmers, whose economic standing had deteriorated substantially. Prevailing ‘‘Jim Crow’’ laws in the southern states severely restricted electoral participation by African Americans. Outside the South, however, African Americans increasingly gravitated toward the Democrats. Roman Catholics continued to flock to the Democratic banner, as did a smaller religious minority, Jews. Finally, those who embraced progressive, or liberal values, whether from religious or secular foundations, came to consider the Democratic Party generally more hospitable to their ideological perspectives. This New Deal coalition proved sufficiently strong to reelect Roosevelt for three more terms. In 1948, despite significant defections from southern whites and Leftists, it nevertheless carried Harry Truman to victory in his own right. The Democrats held majorities in both houses of Congress from 1933 until 1947, and again from 1949 to 1953. The Republicans triumphed across the board in 1952, but the Democrats recaptured both congressional chambers in 1954, and they retook the White House as well in 1960. By the late 1960s, the New Deal coalition was clearly in decline. White Southerners were increasingly breaking ranks, a development attributable not only to the volatile civil rights issue but also to economic development in the region. Meanwhile, outside the South, blue collar workers and rural residents found themselves cross-pressured by their commitments to economic liberalism and social conservatism. However, deterioration of the Democratic coalition did not result in a new era of unquestioned Republican dominance. Rather, the post--New Deal party competition saw Republicans gain a decided advantage in presidential contests that they rarely sustained beyond two elections, while the Democrats maintained the upper hand on the congressional front into the 1990s during an era in which divided party government became the norm. Thus, two-party competition in the United States featured five phases from its outset in the 1790s through the New Deal. The first party era pitted the Federalists against the Democratic-Republicans in the decades between 1790 and 1820. The Federalists initially prevailed, but the Democratic-Republicans held the upper hand after 1800. The second party era found Democrats competing with Whigs in contests from 1832 through 1852. The Democrats won the bulk of these contests. Since 1856, Democrats have battled Republicans. The Republicans seized the advantage in 1860 and held it until 1932. A critical midpoint, 1896, differentiated two distinct eras: the third and fourth party eras. In the third, the Republican advantage was narrow; in the fourth, it was substantial. Finally, 1932

10 Political Parties marked the onset of a fifth party system, in which the Democrats reasserted their primacy. Popular accounts of these eras often personify them, attributing primary significance to presidential party leaders: Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, and Franklin Roosevelt. Beyond personalities, each era featured governmental, organizational, and electoral party coalitions rooted in class, region, residence, occupation, and ideology, with religion and ethnicity looming large as well. Critical transforming events, such as the Civil War and the Great Depression, alter the patterns of party competition, as do emerging issues and interests in the political process. Political parties stand at the center of American political development beyond the founding into the New Deal. Parties have been forces and factors for both stability and change. In particular, they have contributed significantly to nationalization, democratization, presidential ascendancy, and an expanded economic and social role for government.

References and Further Reading Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Anderson, Kristi. 1979. Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1828--1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Brown, Stuart Gerry. 1954. The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton. Chambers, William Nisbet. 1963. Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776--1809. London: Oxford University Press. Chambers, William Nisbet, and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. 1975. The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Charles, Joseph. 1956. The Origins of the American Party System. Williamsburg, VA: Institute of Early American History and Culture. Chhibber, Pradeep, and Kenneth W. Kollman. 2004. The Formation of National Party Systems. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cunningham, Noble, Jr. 1957. The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789--1801. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Cunninghan, Noble, Jr. 1963. The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801--1809. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Cunninghan, Noble, Jr. ed. 1965. The Making of the American Party System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gienapp, William E. 1987. The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852--1856. New York: Oxford University Press. Hoadley, John F. 1986. Origins of American Political Parties, 1789--1803. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR. New York: Random House. Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Holt, Michael F. 1992. Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Holt, Michael F. 1999. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. Kleppner, Paul. 1981. Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893--1928. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Kleppner, Paul. 1979. The Third Electoral System, 1853-1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kleppner, Paul, Walter Dean Burnham, Ronald P. Formisano, Samuel P. Hays, Richard Jenson, and William G. Shade. 1981. The Evolution of American Electoral Systems. Westport, CI: Greenwood Press. LaPalomara, Joseph, and Myron Weiner, eds. 1966. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Marcus, Robert D. 1971. Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age. New York: Oxford University Press. McCormick, Richard P. 1986. The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era. New York: Oxford University Press. McCormick, Richard P. 1966. The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. New York: W. W. Norton. Morgan, H. Wayne. 1969. From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877--1896. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Nichols, Roy F. 1967. The Invention of American Political Parties: A Study of Political Improvisation. New York: Free Press. Remini, Robert V. 1959. Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party. New York: Columbia University Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the American Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America Jerome M. Mileur Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

By 1820, 11 new states had entered the Union since the first presidential election in 1789, 6 of them after 1812. Politically, the constitutions and laws of these new states mirrored the growing egalitarianism in American life in a number of ways. The ‘‘most important’’ of these, Richard McCormick observes, was ‘‘the gradual change . . . in the method of choosing presidential electors.’’ In 1800, electors were chosen by state legislatures in all but two states; by 1825, 18 of the 24 states chose electors by popular vote, and 5 of the remaining 6 would make this change by 1840. This popularized the election of the president. The right to vote and to hold office was also expanded as property qualifications were abandoned. The ‘‘western’’ states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri all adopted constitutions that guaranteed white manhood suffrage, and by 1824, all but three of the older eastern states had followed suit. In addition, more offices were made elective and voting districts were made smaller so that casting ballots was easier. ‘‘The sum effect of new conditions,’’ McCormick writes, ‘‘was to give an increasingly popular tone to politics. Campaigns and elections assumed the aspect of folk festivals. Candidates and voters indulged themselves in a moving, engrossing, and satisfying dramatic experience.’’ McCormick concludes, ‘‘The opportunity to participate in spectacular election contests gave the humble citizen a sense of identification that was intensely important to him’’ (McCormick 1966, 28--30). The new democratic spirit in America transformed the political system of the framers. They had written a

A new spirit of egalitarianism took root in American life in the second and third decades of the 19th century following the War of 1812. This egalitarianism led to a new mass-centered democracy in society and politics in the second and third decades of the 19th century. It was, Robert Remini writes, ‘‘an age of change, an age of innovation, an age of reform.’’ He adds that ‘‘many of the characteristics commonly thought of today as being typically American developed during this ‘revolutionary’ era’’ (Remini 1976, 3). Americans were on the move, crossing the Appalachians in growing numbers, settling the frontier areas along the Mississippi River and beyond, ambitious to make money and get ahead. The War of 1812 had produced a significant expansion in the nation’s manufacturing industries and agriculture production, as well as in the modes and ease of transportation from east to west.1 For those moving west, the familiar social ties of family and community were broken, and artificial social distinctions disappeared, which together brought a new moral tone to their lives centered on the freedom of enterprise and the ability to make money. These new ‘‘westerners’’ abhorred the special privileges that worked to the financial advantage of some and disadvantage of others. For them, ‘‘democracy,’’ Remini writes, meant ‘‘the removal of every political and economic barrier blocking the progress of all citizens in their quest for personal freedom and material happiness,’’ and they believed it was the function of government to ensure an equality in opportunity for all (Remini 1976, 16).

11

12 Political Parties Constitution that established a republican form of government that drew its authority from the consent of the governed, but one in which the people acted indirectly through representatives to chart the course of government. In the final decades of the 18th century and into the 19th, the style of the nation’s politics was deferential, as a succession of the nation’s founding generation passed through the presidency from George Washington to James Madison. Political parties, though decried as ‘‘factions,’’ had arisen as early as the election of 1796, after which two-party competition between Democratic-Republicans and Federalists continued until the presidency of James Monroe in the second decade of the 19th century. In this first party system, elected officials dominated in the selection of candidates for president through congressional caucuses that put forth the party choices, and the contest for the presidency concentrated on party control of state legislatures, where the great majority of presidential electors was chosen, and not on mobilizing support in the mass electorate. In 1816, with the War of 1812 in the past, James Monroe, the last of the revolutionary generation of presidents, won the presidency, carrying all but three states. He won reelection in 1820, carrying all of the states and winning all but one vote in the electoral college. The Federalist Party had been tarred with disloyalty during the War of 1812 and was no longer a credible opposition to the Democratic-Republicans, the party of Jefferson. Monroe, in this so-called era of good feelings, tried to bring everyone into a single party, and thereby erase party conflict and create a perfect republican government. By the second decade of the 19th century, a new generation of American leaders was emerging on the national scene: Henry Clay of Kentucky, Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, and William H. Crawford of Georgia, to which in the 1820s would be added John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Martin Van Buren of New York, Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, whose name would become history’s label for the era: the Age of Jackson. Marked by a new sense of nationalism as well as a new spirit of popular democracy that celebrated the ‘‘common man,’’ this new generation disagreed among themselves on an old question---the proper role of the national government. As a result, soon after Monroe’s departure from the White House, a competitive twoparty system began to take shape, which built on and institutionalized the new democratic spirit in the land. This spirit took a second institutional form: a social protest movement that culminated in a third-party challenge to the major parties. Thus, the institutional

forms that popular democracy would take in America were born in the first third of the 19th century: a masscentered two-party system, moderate in character, and a third-party protest, Populist in character that commonly took the form of a social movement as well.

Invention of a Mass-Based Party Democracy The first party system in America, which emerged in the 1790s and disappeared after the War of 1812, was controlled by elected officials and provided only a limited role for the electorate in the selection of the president. In the 1820s, a new mass-based party system was invented, managed by elected officials but with the decisive role now played by the voters. In 1824, the old machinery for nominating candidates for president--the congressional caucus---failed to produce a consensus candidate for president. Fewer than one-quarter of the members attended the caucus, which nonetheless endorsed William H. Crawford of Georgia for the office. Three other candidates entered the field---John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Henry Clay of Kentucky, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee---all of whom were nominated by their respective state legislatures. All of those put forward by their legislatures ‘‘repudiated the

Henry Clay was U.S. secretary of state under John Quincy Adams, as well as a congressman, senator, and presidential candidate. (Library of Congress)

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America 13 archaic caucus,’’ Remini observes, ‘‘and justified their action by claiming adherence to more democratic procedures’’ (1963, 17). In the general election, Jackson won a plurality of the popular vote, trailed by Adams, Crawford, and Clay, but he fell 32 votes short of the number needed to win in the electoral college. The presidential election therefore went to the House of Representatives, where the constitutional requirement that the president be chosen from among the top three in the popular vote eliminated Clay from consideration. Jackson had every reason to expect victory, but in the end lost when Clay, ignoring instructions from the Kentucky legislature to support Jackson, cast his lot with Adams. In addition, house members from four other states in which Jackson had won a plurality of the popular vote---Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, and North Carolina---ignored the preferences of their constituents and cast their electoral votes for Adams (Brands 2005). Outwardly, Jackson appeared to accept this outcome, but inwardly he was seething. When Adams named Clay to be secretary of state, seen at the time as the stepping-stone to the presidency, Jackson became publicly outraged, denouncing the choice of Adams as a ‘‘corrupt bargain’’ that flouted the clear will of the people. Jackson seized on an opportunity to resign from the Senate and headed home to Tennessee, railing against the illegitimacy of the Adams administration at every stop along his way to Nashville. Adams’s vice president, John C. Calhoun, was also alarmed by the appointment of Clay, who he saw as a threat to his presidential ambitions. The political environment became yet more contentious when, in his inaugural address, the new president offended those devoted to the Jeffersonian principles of limited government by embracing Clay’s ‘‘American System,’’ which called for an expansion of the role of the national government in financing ‘‘internal improvements’’ in the states, including among other things the use of federal revenues for the construction of highways, bridges, and canals. The result, Remini writes, was that, ‘‘within three days of his inauguration, John Quincy Adams, had performed the stupendous feat of creating an opposition bent on destroying his Administration and denying him, like his father, a second term in office’’ (1963, 28).2 While the Adams and Clay supporters in Congress would remain loyal, the Calhoun and Van Buren factions did not. They began to work together and soon coalesced in an organized opposition to Adams. Later, a western faction led by Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri would ally with the Calhoun--Van Buren

As U.S. President Andrew Jackson’s campaign manager, political confidant, secretary of state, vice president, and finally, handpicked successor, Martin Van Buren played a major role in national politics and the establishment of Jacksonian democracy as a significant political force. (Library of Congress)

opposition. Once returned to Nashville, Jackson undertook what would become a voluminous correspondence with political leaders around the nation. By the fall of 1825, his campaign for the presidency in 1828 was well under way. The Calhoun, Van Buren, and Benton forces eventually united behind the candidacy of Andrew Jackson and brought a cadre of professional politicians with them in support of ‘‘Old Hickory,’’ as Jackson came to be known. Jackson’s strong performance in the 1824 election had surprised many of these veteran politicians, who recognized that it was attributable largely to the popularity he had gained from his military victory over the British at New Orleans in the War of 1812 and his later triumph over the Seminole Indians and the Spanish in Florida. Personality and name recognition in the general public had taken on a new importance in the nation’s new democratic politics. Van Buren, however, believed that, while Jackson might win the presidency merely on his reputation as a general, real success in 1828---the ability to govern---required the formation of a political party to support Jackson, one that would conduct the campaign for election but also

14 Political Parties enable him to govern afterward. ‘‘Riding and channeling the wave of resentment against Adams and enthusiasm for the hero of New Orleans,’’ Michael Holt writes, ‘‘the supremely talented Jacksonian managers organized the Democratic party from the top down’’ (1973, 503). Not merely a new political party, the Democratic Party was more importantly a new kind of national party, different from any that had preceded it, built in ways consistent with the new democratic spirit of the times. It redefined the idea of ‘‘popular’’ government by drawing the common man into politics in vast numbers and making the mass electorate, its vote divided still by states, the decisive factor in presidential elections. The Jacksonian party was organized around the election of the president, was more pragmatic than principled, and focused primarily on winning election. The party was a coalition of convenience, an organization of more or less like-minded men, who embraced broadly the Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty and limited government, but who were unified in the moment by their antipathy to Adams and by the likelihood of winning with Jackson---a unity that would be sustained over time by their success. The party was hierarchical in structure but federal in its allocation of power, with the national organization providing oversight and significant financial support, leaving state organizations with a high degree of autonomy over the actual conduct of the campaign. In a remarkably short period of time, the Jacksonians built the modern American party system, whose principal features and characteristics were almost fully developed by 1828. The serious work of party building began in Nashville in the spring of 1827 when Jackson established a Central Committee to advance his candidacy. It distributed materials on his views and qualifications for the presidency, answered criticisms and corrected falsehoods, raised money, and sent advocates across the country to represent him and to oversee the operations of state committees. Jackson continued an extensive correspondence with congressional leaders, newspaper editors, and state leaders, met with visiting delegations, and also supervised the work of the Central Committee.3 For him, the new party was a reconstruction of Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party, but republican was dropped from the party’s name because the purpose of his party was to democratize the nation’s politics. ‘‘I have labored to reconstruct this great party,’’ he said, ‘‘and to bring the popular power to bear with full influence upon the Government, by securing its permanent ascendancy’’ (Watson 1990, 173). The democratic tone of the campaign thus came directly from Jackson, who, Remini notes, ‘‘regarded himself as

the candidate of the people, as the man ‘taken up’ by the electorate to defend justice and virtue, as a popular champion sent against an entrenched elite who viewed government as a private operation restricted to certified gentlemen’’ (Remini 1963, 67). Several months after the Nashville committee was formed, Martin Van Buren and other Jackson supporters in Congress organized a Central Committee with 24 members, some of whom were not members of Congress.4 This committee raised substantial sums of money and, working with state committees, spent much of it to support a great number of pro-Jackson newspapers across the country, many of which were created during the campaign by the committee, that were to carry the Jackson story to individual voters at the grassroots level in all of the competitive states. The Central Committee also coordinated a strategy in the Congress and encouraged members to use their free mailing privileges to distribute volumes of pro-Jackson literature across the country at government expense. In addition, the Central Committee produced buttons, banners, and other campaign materials for display by individuals on their person or in their homes and also for use in public rallies in support of Jackson.5 All of the activities of the Washington committee were coordinated closely with the committee in Nashville and aimed primarily at promoting the candidate, not a party program. The work of the two ‘‘national’’ committees was prerequisite to the task of building the party. This required finding and enlisting leaders for the Jackson party in each state who would put together an effective campaign organization for their states. The Nashville and Washington committees led together in this search. The state party organizations they formed, as well as subordinate county and local levels of party, did their work through myriad committees, which ensured that large numbers of people would be involved in the campaign and thereby invested in both the candidate and the party. By the end of 1827, not only was there a Jackson committee in every state, but also, as Remini notes, ‘‘virtually every county, city, and town of importance in the United States had a functioning ‘Jackson Committee’ of one type or another, sponsoring ‘Jackson meetings’ as part of a coordinated drive to expel John Quincy Adams from the White House’’ (1963, 87.). Local committees arranged most of a campaign’s public events, which were spectacles unlike anything in the American political experience. For the first time, a campaign for the presidency reached out to bring the mass of ordinary citizens into the contest as active participants. Through public rallies, parades, dinners,

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America 15 barbecues, tree-plantings, and entertainments of varied sorts, many of these campaign events were scheduled to coincide with local festivals or other public events, the local committees reached out to multitudes of Americans for whom the presidency had been, at most, a remote office of little apparent importance in their daily lives. Newspapers, many of them financed by the Washington committee, pamphlets, and other printed materials, brought the campaign’s message directly to the people, while the wide distribution of buttons, ribbons, hats, and other items of clothing personalized Jackson’s candidacy and afforded public display of support. The contest, which H. W. Brands describes as the ‘‘longest, bitterest, ugliest campaign in American history’’ and that Glyndon Van Dusen says relied ‘‘chiefly upon misrepresentation and personal abuse,’’ was one of emotional appeals to the voters, through both symbols that evoked memories of Jackson’s military heroism and scurrilous charges of corruption or depravity emanating from both sides (Van Dusen 1959, 26; Brands 2005, 389).6 It was, Remini writes, ‘‘the first election in which ‘gimmicks’ were extensively employed to arouse and maintain popular interest in the activities of the party.’’ Songs, slogans, shouts, and cartoons became a regular part of rallies and parades in support of the candidate. With the arrival of a mass democracy, Remini notes, ‘‘all presidential contests would include a large dose of ballyhoo to amuse and delight an otherwise ‘lethargic’ public’’ (Remini 1963, 102). But it was this that enabled the campaign to bring a new energy and immediacy to voters that in turn gave a new importance to the ‘‘common man,’’ all consistent with the new democratic spirit in the nation’s politics. After 1828, all candidates for the presidency would have to court the people directly. The campaign, however, was not a spontaneous eruption of popular support for Jackson, but rather was a carefully managed and orchestrated effort. ‘‘The real revolution,’’ Remini writes, ‘‘came from the politicians; it moved in one direction only---from the top down’’ (Remini 1963, 87). The county committees coordinated activities at the local level, convened meetings with local leaders, and elected delegates to the state conventions. The state central committees oversaw the activities of the county committees, maintained close contact with one another as well as with the Nashville committee, and issued a general address to the people of their states setting forth party principles and programs. For the first time, a majority of the states convened state conventions, involving thousands of ordinary citizens directly into the selection of a candidate for president. These conventions also chose

delegates to the electoral college, a function that had been primarily a responsibility of state legislatures, All of these activities brought people into the political process in far greater numbers than had previously been the case in presidential elections, made the national contest and their candidate more immediate to them, and forged a new link between the mass electorate and their political party, one that encouraged greater discipline and loyalty. In the White House, President Adams seemed wholly indifferent to the opposition organizing against him, refusing to sanction any activities to blunt the assault on his administration by the coalition of Jackson forces. It fell to Secretary of State Clay and antiJackson allies in Congress like Daniel Webster to mount a campaign for the president’s reelection. Campaigning as the National Republican Party, they raised sizeable sums of money and eventually put together an organization in northeastern and western states, as well as in the northernmost southern states, that was similar in structure to that of the Jackson party. They also campaigned in much the same way as the Jacksonians; however, as champions of Clay’s ‘‘American System,’’ they offered a more certain program of government than the vague neo-Jeffersonian conservatism of Jackson. Two themes dominated the Jackson campaign, as Watson notes, ‘‘the moral unfitness of John Quincy Adams to be President and the undemocratic character of his elevation to the office’’ (Watson 1990, 91). In the end, however, the election turned on organization, not party programs, and the National Republicans could not match the new Democratic Party in this regard. Jackson won with 56 percent of the popular vote and by a 178--83 vote in the electoral college. He lost New England, New Jersey, and Delaware, and split New York and Maryland, but won everything else. More impressive---and a measure of the new popular democracy in the nation upon which the Jackson campaign was built---the popular vote for president in 1828 increased more than three times over what it had been in 1824, as 1,148,018 ballots were cast as compared to just 365,833 four years earlier (Congressional Quarterly 1828, 429). ‘‘In a greater sense than before,’’ Jules Witcover writes, ‘‘citizens felt a larger personal stake in the presidential election, especially with Jackson’s own well-promoted appeal as a man of the people amid what came to be called ‘the rise of the common man’’’ (Witcover 2003, 136.). The inauguration of Jackson was a testament both to the new democratic spirit alive in the nation and to the intense and personal identification of the mass public with Jackson himself. Together, these factors produced

16 Political Parties a great outpouring of Americans who came to Washington to witness the swearing in ceremony, which, for the first, was held in public so that the people could see the event firsthand. And witness it they did. Thousands came to the nation’s capital, and after the ceremony, they descended on the White House where they turned what had in previous inaugurals been a sedate and formal reception into a near riot. ‘‘Never,’’ Remini writes, ‘‘had there been such an inauguration of a President. Never before had the ordinary citizen---the common man---so spontaneously expressed his enthusiasm for a new administration.’’ He adds, ‘‘Here was the beginning of truly popular government in America---at least in spirit’’ (Remini 1976, 33--34). In 1832, Jackson won a second term in an election that saw the people’s involvement in the nation’s politics expand further. It was the first election in which national party conventions were convened to nominate the presidential candidates, which was seen as a more inclusive and democratic process.7 It was also the first time the people were asked, in their choice of candidates, to decide a question of public policy, namely, whether the charter of the national bank should be renewed by the federal government. Jackson, who opposed the national bank, made this the central issue in the campaign. In addition, the election saw a new second party, at least in name, as the Whig party---a name associated in British politics with stronger national governance---replaced the National Republicans. The Whigs continued as the principal opposition party to the Democrats until 1860, when they were replaced by the Republican Party.8

Rise of Populist Democracy In the 1820s, another manifestation of the new spirit of democracy took the novel form of a third party, the first in the nation’s history: the Anti-Masonic Party. In the reconstruction of the party system in the 1820s, both the Democrats of Jackson and the National Republicans of Adams and Clay were organized around national questions, namely, the proper role of the federal government and of the presidency in the American constitutional frame. Anti-Masonry, on the other hand, sprang from a distinctly local issue that became a national concern. Unlike the Jackson campaign, which had been orchestrated from the top down and was a testament to political organization (so too the efforts of Clay and Webster), Anti-Masonry was a spontaneous and authentic grassroots movement that turned into a political party. It was Populist in character, moralistic in tone, and tied closely to evangelical Protestantism.

It was built on an urgent emotional appeal to ordinary citizens to regain control of their government by taking it away from an aristocratic organization, alien to nation’s republican ideals (Vaughn 1983). Freemasonry was a fraternal organization based on the Enlightenment idea of reason that had been brought to America from England in the third decade of the 18th century (on Masonry, see Bullock 1996). Primarily a social and charitable organization, it was hierarchical in structure with secret rituals, passwords, and oaths that included a vow of silence. In the mid1920s, Masonic lodges were to be found in almost all of the states, with members drawn from the social and political elites in the various communities that included prominent national figures such as Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson.9 The Anti-Masonic movement arose from an incident in western New York when a disenchanted Mason, William Morgan, threatened to reveal the secrets of Masonry. He was kidnapped by members of the organization, taken to the Niagara Falls area, and never seen again. It was widely believed that he had been killed. An official investigation into the matter stalled when local Masons refused to cooperate with authorities. Local citizens petitioned the state legislature to conduct a special inquiry into Morgan’s disappearance, but it declined to do so. The foot-dragging and obstructionism of public officials, Michael Holt writes, ‘‘convinced the incipient Antimasons that they faced not just the crime of a few zealous individuals but a gigantic conspiracy to subvert the rule of law through Masonic control of newspapers, the legislature and the judiciary’’ and that, to restore sovereignty to the people, ‘‘they must take political action to overthrow Masonry’’ (1973, 577). In 1827, Anti-Masonic activity was apparent throughout the western part of New York. Making use of popular conventions ‘‘to an unprecedented extent,’’ Lee Benson observes, they nominated and elected town and county officials throughout the region (1961, 21). In the presidential year of 1828, the Anti-Masons moved into statewide politics. At the time, two factions dominated New York politics, one led by Martin Van Buren, supporting Jackson, and the other led by Governor DeWitt Clinton, supporting Adams. Neither faction was willing to reject Masonry, which led Anti-Masonic leaders, whose aim was to rid state government of control by the Masons, to form a third party and run their own candidate for governor and other state offices. The party had limited success: its gubernatorial candidate received only 12 percent of the vote, but it did elect several of its candidates to the state assembly and senate. The defeat of Adams, however, left the Clinton

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America 17 faction in such disarray that the Anti-Masonic Party emerged from the election as the principal alternative in New York to the Jackson Democrats. At the same time, Anti-Masonry was spreading beyond New York to other northern states where New England Puritan and evangelical Protestant values were dominant---east to Connecticut, Massachusetts, and

Vermont in New England; west across the Great Lakes states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan; and south to New Jersey---all of which had organized parties by 1829. Anti-Masonic candidates enjoyed impressive success in local elections that year, in addition to which the party did well in a number of state contests, capturing well over 40 percent of the gubernatorial vote in

Cartoon attacking the Anti-Mason Party, produced shortly after their September national convention in Baltimore, about 1831. The ‘‘apron’’ symbolically contrasts the Masons (on the right is a ‘‘Rock of Ages’’ on which stands a pyramid with steps labeled Free Masonry, Peace & Plenty, Equal Rights, etc.) with the Anti-Masons (on the left is a three-headed ‘‘Hydra of Antimasonry,’’ from the mouths of which issue ‘‘Blackness of Darkness’’ and a list of evils, including Persecution, Intolerance, Hypocrisy etc.). (Library of Congress)

18 Political Parties several of them and winning 150 of 490 state legislative seats in Massachusetts. In these races, the AntiMasons adopted the electioneering methods of the major parties, which were joined with the techniques and appeals of a religious revival. ‘‘By combining Populist methods with an evangelical agenda,’’ Watson writes, ‘‘they were successful in driving established Masonic politicians from office and totally changing the tone of local politics. The new activists and officeholders,’’ he continues, ‘‘were no longer the patriarchs of long-standing upper-class families, but ambitious professionals who owed their positions to a democratic mass movement rather than to elitist connections and social clout’’ (Watson 1990, 183). Indeed, ‘‘contrary to assumptions underlying Jacksonian Democracy,’’ Benson writes, ‘‘Antimasonry represented an impassioned, leveling attack by members of the ‘lower classes’ against village and urban ‘aristocracy’ ’’ (Benson 1961, 24). To be sure, the new party benefited from the disorder of the party system nationally, but more than that, Holt writes, it seemed to ‘‘reveal fears and hopes about the course of American Society.’’ Drawing from AntiMasonic rhetoric, he details its apocalyptic views: Imbued with values of individual liberty, the rule of law, equal rights and equal opportunity, and selfadvancement restrained only by the dictates of a Christian conscience, Antimasons viewed Masonry as an unnatural power above the law---a ‘‘Monster,’’ a ‘‘Beast with several seven heads and ten horns,’’ ‘‘an organized kingdom within the limits of the Republic,’’ consisting of ‘‘irresponsible bodies controlled by their own interest and, in effect, answerable to no tribunal.’’ . . . ‘‘These obligations,’’ Antimasons warned constantly, ‘‘strike at the very existence of our government---at the very foundation of our rights---and at the impartial administration of our laws.’’ (1973, 580--81) Thus, like the Populist Parties that would follow them in American politics, the Anti-Masons cast their opponents as a great conspiracy, hostile to democracy, claiming special privileges for a narrow elite, as may be seen in an address by an Anti-Masonic partisan: On the one side is an aristocratic nobility, composed of men bound together by the most terrific oaths, which conflict with the administration of justice, with private rights, and with the public security; a privileged order, claiming and securing to its members unequal advantages over their fellow-citizens . . .

On the other side, a portion of your fellow-citizens ask for equal rights and equal privileges among the freemen of this country. They say it is in vain that this equality of rights and privileges is secured in theory by our constitution and laws, if by a combination to subvert it, it is in fact no longer enjoyed (Benson 1961, 19--20). Also like later Populist movements, the anti-Masonic party challenged the idea of representative democracy and celebrated instead the people as the source of all authority and wisdom. In a true democratic republic, as one Anti-Mason put it, public opinion ‘‘must properly govern everything, which is properly subject to governmental power,’’ and the ‘‘proper judges’’ of that which was subject to government was the people. As Benson notes, ‘‘the Antimasonic Party caused all aspects of American life to become grist to the political mills. Whatever impurities existed in America---more precisely, whatever impurities the majority thought existed---could now be quickly removed by that perfect sifting machine, the electoral process’’ (Benson 1961, 24). The Anti-Masons thus put themselves forward as ordinary citizens, as authentic representatives of the common man, not politicians serving special interests (Kazin 1995). Yet the ‘‘real appeal’’ of Anti-Masonry, Holt concludes, ‘‘probably lay not in its exposure of heinous conspiracies or in its egalitarian rhetoric but, at a time when suffrage was expanding, in its exaltation of what the people, the majority, could accomplish at the ballot box.’’ Anti-Masonry, he concludes, ‘‘vented the popular democratic faith of the age’’ (1973, 582). The people could and should be able to do whatever they desired. The Populist democracy of the Anti-Masonic movement took its cause from politics but drew its moral intensity from evangelical Protestant faiths---Baptist, Methodist, rural Presbyterian, and Congregational--widespread then as now in rural America. They burned with a religious zeal and sought to abolish not just political inequality but social immorality as well. ‘‘Only if one understands that Antimasonry was at base a religious crusade against sin,’’ Holt argues, ‘‘can he fathom the intensity of the movement.’’ He continues, ‘‘Evangelical Antimasons condemned Masonry as ‘an infidel society at war with true Christianity’ because it interposed oaths and pagan rituals between a man and his conscience’’ (1973, 587). But they were anguished as well by the larger society---by the growth of cities, the secularization of American life, and the desecration of the Sabbath. They saw the Democrats of Jackson as a party of irreligion and the National Republicans as

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America 19 the party of militant Protestantism. Andrew Jackson’s popularity notwithstanding, Holt concludes that AntiMasonry was ‘‘the first political movement to capture and exploit the feeling of boundlessness that seized Americans after the War of 1812.’’

Conclusion

William Wirt, Anti-Mason Party candidate for U.S. president in 1832. (Chaiba Media)

urban aristocrats. ‘‘The only recourse for rural Protestants who hoped to restore morality to American society,’’ Holt writes, ‘‘was the Antimasonic crusade’’ (1973, 588). In 1832, the Anti-Masonic Party entered national politics, convening a national party convention to nominate a candidate for president.10 Ten states sent delegates. It chose William Wirt, who had been attorney general in the Adams administration. But the entry into national politics, and in particular the nomination of Wirt who was and remained a Mason, exposed divisions within the party between pragmatists concerned with winning elections and purists concerned with conscience, as well as between those concerned primarily with state elections and those focused on the national contest. Wirt ran poorly, winning less than 8 percent of the popular vote, and although Wirt did carry Vermont, Jackson was easily reelected. After 1832, the AntiMasonic Party continued to do well in Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts for a time, but by 1836 its members had begun to drift toward one of the major parties. Some, especially in New England, joined the Democratic Party, but most moved into the ranks of the Whigs, which in some states like Michigan, became

By the late 1840s, the optimism about the possibilities of mass democracy that spread through the nation’s politics in the second decade of the century had run its course. Massive immigration late in that decade and the return of slavery to center stage in national politics raised new questions about both the meaning and application of the democratic idea in America. But in the decades after the War of 1812, in response to a new spirit of democracy in the American people, the Jacksonians built the institutions for a mass-centered democracy that characterize American politics to this day: the two-party system, the nominating convention, the candidate-centered campaign, and the focus on winning rather than program. And they adopted campaign methods whose features are with us still as well: the long campaign (the Jackson campaign began more than three years before the 1828 election), the cost of the campaign (estimates vary, but there is general agreement that several million dollars were spent on the campaign), and the negativity of the campaign (the personal and scurrilous charges that were exchanged between the campaigns). Indeed, as Remini observes, ‘‘the election of Andrew Jackson marked the beginning of those practices and procedures which have remained the distinguishing features of American politics,’’ especially the restoration of the ‘‘active competition between two national parties through which democracy works best in America.’’ In addition, he continues, ‘‘the earnest endeavor of politicians in both parties to bid for mass support . . . stimulated the habit of democracy’’ (Remini 1963, 203). As president, Jackson popularized the office itself, never more clearly than in a message to Congress that declared, ‘‘The President is the direct representative of the American people,’’ adding that he is ‘‘elected by the people and responsible to them’’ (quoted in Remini 1976, 165). His opponents in Congress were outraged by what they saw as an affront to the Constitution, but in 1832 the American people seemed to embrace this new and more democratic conception of the president as their representative. The 1820s also saw the birth of a Populist style of democracy that would become associated primarily with social movements and third parties. At the core of

20 Political Parties the new democracy was the mantra ‘‘trust the people,’’ to which Jacksonians responded by building a stable and pragmatic party organization in the belief, Watson notes, that ‘‘the natural majority needed some institution by which it could find itself, learn its own mind, unite behind a single slate of candidates, and drive all ‘aristocratic’ schemers to defeat’’ (Watson 1990, 172). Embodying the Populist spirit of democracy, the AntiMasonic Party was as much a social movement as a party organization, built on emotion around a single issue framed as a conspiracy indifferent to the true interests and rights of the people. As public officials reacted by dropping membership in the Masons, the issue cooled and the party members were absorbed by one of the two major parties, primarily the Whigs, which they found a more expedient way to pursue their moralistic goals. This was to be the history of all third parties in American politics, with the exception of the Republican Party, which displaced the Whigs in the late 1850s as the nation’s second major party. There were limits to the reach of the new spirit of democracy in the first half of the 19th century. It did not extend to women or blacks, and in some states--New York, Tennessee, North Carolina---the vote was taken away from free blacks in the 1820s and 1830s (Watson 1990, 53). There was anti-Catholicism as well in the evangelical Protestantism of the Anti-Masonic Party, which in some states, Michigan, led to efforts in the 1830s to deny the ballot to Roman Catholics. Yet it was the idea of democracy as embedded in a mass electorate that subsequently led to the enfranchisement of blacks and women, and also to the vote for 18 year olds. Moreover, the idea that the people---the ‘‘common man’’---should be directly involved in politics, novel in its time, came to be the hallmark of American democracy, from the ‘‘popular sovereignty’’ of Stephen Douglas in the run-up to the Civil War to the ‘‘direct democracy’’ of the Progressives at the turn of the 20th century and the ‘‘participatory democracy’’ of the New Left in the 1960s. So too the notion that the people should be directly involved in their own governance has been a distinctive feature of American democracy from the patronage system of the Jacksonians to the open meeting laws and environmental impact statements with their requirement for public review and commentary of the early 21st century. Thus, the rise of a popular politics in the years following the War of 1812 that was grounded in the mass electorate not only democratized the founders’ Constitution, but also gave a distinctive character to the nation’s politics and governance that continues to define the idea of democracy in America.

References and Further Reading Benson, Lee. 1961. The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brands, H. W. 2005. Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times. New York: Doubleday. Bullock, Steven C. 1996. Revolutionary Brotherhood: Freemasonry and the Transformation of the American Social Order, 1730--1840. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Ceaser, James W. 1979. Presidential Selection: Theory and Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Holt, Michael F. 1973a. ‘‘The Antimasonic and Know Nothing Parties.’’ In History of U.S. Political Parties: Vol. I, 1789-1860. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Chelsea House. Holt, Michael F. 1973b. ‘‘The Democratic Party, 1828--1860.’’ In History of U.S. Political Parties: Vol. I, 1789--1860. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Chelsea House, 1973. Holt, Michael F. 1999. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University. Kazin, Michael. 1995. The Populist Persuasion: An American History. New York: Basic Books. McCormick, Richard F. 1966. The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. Meyers, Marvin. 1957. The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Moore, John Leo, et al. 2001 Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Remini, Robert V. 1951. Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party. New York: Columbia University Press. Remini, Robert V. 1963 The Election of Andrew Jackson. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. Remini, Robert V. 1976. The Revolutionary Age of Andrew Jackson. New York: Harper & Row. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1953. The Age of Jackson. Boston: Little, Brown. Van Deusen, Glyndon G. 1959. The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1846. New York: Harper & Brothers. Vaughn, William Preston. 1983. The Antimasonic Party in the United States, 1826--1843. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Watson, Harry L. 1990. Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America. New York: Farrar, Stauss and Giroux. Witcover, Jules. 2003. Party of the People: A History of the Democrats. New York: Random House.

Notes 1. On the nature of the times, social and cultural as well as political, see Van Deusen 1959; Schlesinger 1953; and Meyers 1957. 2. Remini quotes Sen. Rufus King of New York as observing that, right before the eyes of congress members, ‘‘a Party is forming itself here to oppose Mr. Adams’ administration’’ (1963, 26).

The Rise of Mass Democracy in America 21 3. In the political culture of the 1820s, presidential candidates were not expected to campaign actively for election but rather were to remain silent and removed from public view while others promoted their candidacy. Jackson was far more actively involved in the direction and management of his campaign than was the custom, but even he was hesitant to make public appearances and declined most invitations to do so. His most notable public appearance was at New Orleans in January 1828 on the anniversary of his great military victory there. 4. On Van Buren’s contributions, both practical and theoretical, to building the Democratic party, see Remini 1951. 5. The democratic character of the campaign may be measured by the volume and variety of materials that were put into the hands and homes and onto the clothing of individuals so that they might identify personally with Jackson and show their support for all to see.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

Subsequently, these campaign items became a commonplace in presidential campaigns, but they were a novelty in 1828. Many local Jackson committees were called ‘‘Hickory Clubs’’ and the use of hickory at rallies was became commonplace, all in recognition of Jackson’s military nickname, ‘‘Old Hickory.’’ On the personal and negative aspects of the campaign, see Remini 1963 151--65. On the advent of the convention system, see Ceaser 1979, chapter 3. On the Whig Party, see Holt 1999. Estimates are that, in the mid-1820s, the Masons had as many as 20,000 members organized into some 450 lodges (see Watson 1990, 180). The Anti-Masonic Party had convened a national convention in 1830, which was the first in the nation’s history.

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 Marc D. Weiner Associate Director, Bloustein Center for Survey Research, Rutgers University

electorate to competently and rationally participate in elections. In this essay, I argue that two sets of changes have diminished the effect of these obstacles. A change in the key motivation to participate in elite politics--from material gain to advancing ideology---has resulted in a difference-in-kind of the type of people who participate in political parties as activists and office seekers. In addition, changes in the technological and, in turn, cultural environment have dramatically increased the capacity for the delivery of political information. Together, these changes have largely neutralized the impact of constitutionalism on the development of coherent party ideologies and on the capacity and desire of political elites to act cohesively within and across political institutions and jurisdictions. The change in nature of political elites, coupled with the parties’ adaptation to the changing environment, has resulted in the development of sharper, more readily perceived political cues so that voters can now make low-information, yet rational, self-interested choices at the polls. Two old chestnuts of 20th-century American politics are still relevant, Tip O’Neil’s claim that ‘‘all politics is local’’ and Jesse Unruh’s observation that ‘‘money is the mother’s milk of politics.’’ No doubt, the sheer magnitude and cultural regionalism of the American landscape still support some truth in the former, and the capital-driven nature of our economic system still energizes the latter. As we have moved into the computerdriven information age, a third aphorism---Marshall

This essay describes the current condition of political parties in America and speculates on how things developed as they did. The analysis begins in 1950, the year that a committee of political scientists and public administration specialists sponsored by the American Political Science Association published a report entitled ‘‘Toward a More Responsible Two Party System.’’ In the most formal way so far, that report argued that in time the United States could benefit from ‘‘political responsibility.’’ The idea, in theory, is eminently simple--under a responsible party system political parties would be competitive, offering the electorate true, clear, and easily comprehensible choices. These simplified policy alternatives would be expressed in campaigns by a party’s candidates and carried out by a party’s officeholders in government. The electorate, in turn, would respond to these clearer voting cues and cast their votes on the basis of a party’s policies and positions. Because political officeholders would be held to their campaign promises and parties could be held collectively responsible, the political accountability at the heart of electoral democracy would be served. From its birth in 1950, to its adolescence in 1980, to its maturation in 2000, it appears now that political responsibility, so conceived, best characterizes the current state of political parties in America. When the 1950 report was issued, two challenges to American political responsibility were raised: constitutionalism in the form of the separation of powers and federalism, and the incapacity of the American 22

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 23 McLuhan’s assertion that ‘‘the medium is the message’’---has also become relevant. No doubt, media delivery mechanisms and political competition are now, as they have always been, intimately interrelated. As the sectional and regional newspapers of the 19th and early 20th century crafted political content to the advantage of one party, so too do contemporary technologically advanced information delivery systems now broadcast partisan messages virtually nonstop from coast to coast. The advent of 24-hour television, cable, and Internet specialized-content delivery has resulted in a supersaturation of political information. A consequence of that media hyperactivity has been a dramatic increase in the parties’ need for financial resources to fuel public political competition. Moreover, from about 1980 forward, the two major American political parties have become more internally coherent and more externally differentiated; in turn, what the media reports reflects that increased coherence and differentiation. These developments have altered how the mass public receives and processes political information in a way that has amplified the impact of political competition. These changes have had dramatic implications for the contemporary condition of the party system. Viewed in positive terms, the greater dissemination of more differentiated party policy positions has brought us back to the simplification of policy alternatives that sits at the heart of political responsibility. What follows is an overview of the 1950 to 2005 trends in institutional and individual-level political responsibility followed by a discussion of the conditions that have facilitated these trends.

The Parties as Responsible Organizations Over the last 50 years, the most prominent structural change in American political parties has been institutionalization in the form of continuous, well-funded organizations. Rather than ebbing and flowing with the electoral cycle as the national parties historically tended to do, since 1950, the two-major American parties have been permanent, year-round fixtures on the political scene. Although this dynamic has taken place predominantly at the national level, its effects have been felt throughout all levels of American politics. As early as 1984, scholars suggested that parties have ‘‘[e]xperienced an institutional rebirth, an increase in the bureaucratization of the formal institutions of the party at the state and national levels.’’ Additional examples of institutionalization-related party resurgence include ‘‘the strengthening of the parties’ national committee structure,’’ the development of ‘‘an

extensive campaign-oriented services apparatus that provides fund raising, candidate training, and campaign strategy,’’ and the strengthening of national ‘‘ties with state committees’’ (Monroe 2001, 6, 4). In a nutshell, over the past 50 years, the two major American parties have developed a greater permanent capacity than ever before to promulgate their policy messages. Money is a key index of that capacity and to the extent that money is power, the parties’ financial conditions are proxies for their organizational strength. Two rough-and-ready financial measures powerfully demonstrate that the parties have tremendously expanded their capacities. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the gross financial activity of the major parties for, respectively, presidential election years from 1980 to 2000, and midterm election years from 1978 to 2002. The trend lines in these graphs represent the amounts in millions of dollars that the major parties raised and spent within each election years’ reporting requirement. These figures, which are federal activity only, have all been normalized to 2003 dollars.1 The explosion in fund-raising and campaign spending is nothing short of overwhelming. While the most notable feature in both charts is a profound spike in Republican activity during the Reagan era, the overall trend is one of more, more, more. For Democrats, presidential year financial activity nearly tripled, from just under $100 million in 1980 to just under $300 million in 2000. The change in midterm year activity was even more pronounced, nearly quadrupling, from just over $50 million in 1978 to more than $200 million in 2002. Even controlling for the Reagan spike, the trend for Republicans is even more awe inspiring, from about $375 million for 1980 to about $450 million in 2000, and from about $200 million in 1978 to nearly $450 million in 2002. But there’s more---in addition to the hard money reflected in figures 1(a) and (b), there was ‘‘soft’’ money, and lots of it. Figure 2 shows soft money (contributions not regulated by federal election laws) for two-year periods from 1992 through 2002, in 2003 adjusted dollars. By and large both parties raised and spent roughly the same amount, which trends steeply from around $50 million to 1992 to a fivefold increase in the next 10 years, to $250 million in 2002. Despite the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which was intended to eliminate soft money after the 2002 midterm election, this trend continued unabated into the 2004 election cycle. From January 1, 2003, to the day before the 2004 election, the Democratic National Committee raised $389.8 million and the Republican National Committee raised

24 Political Parties

Figure 1(a). Source: The source data for 1980 and 1984 are from Table 4-12, ‘‘Financial Activity of the National Political Parties, 1977--1986 (millions)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 1988, 117), and for 1988 through 2000 are from Table 2-8, ‘‘Financial Activity of the National Political Parties, 1987--2000 (millions)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 99).

Figure 1(b). Source: The source data for 1978 through 1986 are from Table 4-12, ‘‘Financial Activity of the National Political Parties, 1977--1986 (millions)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 1988, 117), and for 1988 through 2002, are from Table 2-8, ‘‘Financial Activity of the National Political Parties, 1987--2000 (millions)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 99).

$385.3 million (Edsall 2004). Moreover, during the 2004 primary season, the unchallenged incumbent president broke the record by raising $274 million (Justice 2004). From these vast fortunes raised and spent, one fact is indubitable: the parties have become much more affluent. The national party organizations are now much more flush with the resources necessary to research, publicize, and campaign on their own and their opponents’ policy records. The claim of political responsibility, however, requires more than just the

organizational capacity to deliver differentiated messages. It requires true ideological differentiation so that the electorate will have a meaningful choice between policies. Evidence of ideological differentiation between the parties can be seen by examining party activists and the content of the major parties’ platforms. The role of party activists has changed dramatically over the last half century. While activists were once deeply involved in party mobilization, that duty now falls to other more efficient mechanisms. Party scholar Sandy Maisel captured this change well:

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 25

Figure 2. Source: Table 2.10, ‘‘National Party Nonfederal Receipts (‘Soft Money’), 1991--2002 (millions)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 101).

One hundred years ago parties mobilized their followers through personal contact at the precinct, ward, or, in rural areas, town level. Party workers knew all of the voters and knew their preferences. The job of the party workers was to get their supporters to the polls. . . . Social networks and peer pressure also led citizens to vote; civic participation was expected and was a clear societal norm. Today political communication is through the mass media or through computerized, impersonal mailings. Citizens do not know local party workers. . . . Politics no longer provides the social network for many citizens (Maisel 2001, 109). Rather, the mobilization and information role of activists in social networks has been replaced largely by interest groups. Now, specific interest groups ally with one or the other of the major parties on ideological grounds, and in so doing increase the public profile of the parties’ issue positions on the group’s policy of interest. To illustrate, the public surely perceives policy cues from the wellreported fact that NARAL (formerly known as the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League) or Moveon.org are more closely allied with the Democratic Party and the Traditional Values Coalition or the National Rifle Association are more closely allied with the Republican Party. Moreover, when groups such as these stimulate electoral activity, it is on behalf of one or the other major party. In many ways, the public face of party activism is now largely interest-group generated. Still, even though activists play less of a role now in electorate mobilization, their importance to the public

spirit and image of a political party cannot be overstated. Indeed, party activists reflect, if not generate, the true ideological attitudes of the party. Scholars correctly note that party ‘‘activists are less concerned with winning elections than with maintaining the ideological stance of the party’’ and that as a result, they, and not candidates, play the primary role in creating the public’s perception of a party’s policy and issue positions. While they do not interact with the general electorate as they used to, in the 21st-century party environment, activists---who are most likely to constitute the bulk of a primary electorate---still play a major role in selecting the party candidate and in providing that candidate with a continuing stream of money, time, and effort (Miller and Schofield 2003, 250--51). Party activists, however, are not representative of the party’s supporters in the electorate. National party nominating convention delegates ‘‘from both parties are unrepresentative ideologically of both their own party’s rank-and-file voters and the total adult population. Democratic delegates are substantially more liberal than their party rank-and-file and the general public, whereas Republican delegates are more conservative than their party’s voters and the general public’’ (Bibby 2003, 229--30). John Bibby calls this phenomenon ‘‘the distinctiveness of the activists’’ and other scholars, using surveys of national convention delegates over the 1992 to 2004 presidential elections, make the relevant point that because the two major parties’ activities are ‘‘sharply polarized along liberalconservative lines, and with a few exceptions became more so in the 1990s . . . the major parties have moved toward the ‘responsible party’ model, a shift that

26 Political Parties

Former Democratic vice president Al Gore delivers a speech on the environment and global warming, organized by MoveOn.org. In the speech he criticized the Bush administration for its lack of effort on environmental issues. (Ramin Talaie/Corbis)

appears to be part of a broader change in American politics’’ (Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2003, 76--77). So although the external role of party activists has changed over the last 50 years, their internal importance to the development of the parties’ ideologies and the selection of the parties’ standard-bearers has been relatively stable. Similar to party activists, the parties’ platforms have consistently manifested genuine ideological polarization. In plain language, the platform ‘‘tells you what the party stands for; it defines in explicit terms why partisans deserve to be elected’’ (Maisel 1993, 671). No other document is ‘‘quite so comprehensive . . . and no other is so authoritatively and formally endorsed as a statement on behalf of the whole party’’ (Budge 1993, 699). Platforms, however, generally are not considered by the mass public; rather, they are something of a ‘‘‘contract’ between the candidate and the many constituent groups that support the candidate’’ (Shaw 1998, 45). Thus, while platforms typically remain below the radar screen in the sense that few in the general

public ever read them, they do serve as meaningful indicators of policy differentiation between the parties, and link attitudes of party activists and financial supporters to the policy actions of the parties in government. Party scholars have long argued that ‘‘platforms were meaningful statements and . . . good forecasts of government policy,’’ and that they manifest vital differences between the parties that have long been extant and have sustained through the 1990s. An empirical analysis of party platforms from 1950 through 1990 concluded that ‘‘American Democrats and Republicans . . . consistently differentiated themselves from each other on such matters as support for welfare, government intervention, foreign aid, [and] defense. . . . Indeed, they remain as far apart as many European parties . . . and more so than many.’’ A 1992 to 2000 extension of the earlier analyses found that those later platforms also ‘‘show a familiar and continuing difference between the two parties’’ (Pomper 2003, 269, 271).

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 27

The Parties as Responsible Officeholders On one hand, these organizational changes and ideologically differentiated continuities are vitally important to understanding how the parties and party system have changed over the last 50 years. On the other hand, the evolution in the American party system over the last half-century is best described though the parties’ performance in government. These changes can be effectively summarized by examining various longstanding measures of party-elite behavior both in and between the politically elected branches of government. Three basic measures yield a relatively refined picture of the performance of the parties in government, which, in turn, reveals a great deal about changes in the comparative level of political responsibility over the last 50 years: 1. attitudes---that is, ideology, reflecting both the parties’ internal coherence at the legislative policy-making level, and their differentiation in terms of policy priorities; 2. behavior---that is, legislative voting, demonstrating both the parties’ internal cohesiveness at the policy-making level, and their differentiation in terms of intraparty coalition building; and 3. relationships---that is, interbranch discipline, demonstrating the parties’ cohesiveness (and, by

implication, coherence) in government crossinstitutionally. Trends in the ideological positions of the party coalitions in both chambers are shown in figure 3. The trumpet-like shape generated by the four main trend lines shows that the Republican and Democratic coalitions in both chambers underwent a common liberalization from the birth of American style political responsibility in 1950 to its adolescence in about 1980, the advent of the Reagan era. At that time, an ideological divergence began that has continued, unabated, through 2000. Both parties have moved steadily away from the centrist midpoint: Republicans in both chambers have become more conservative in the extreme, while at the same time Democrats have become more liberal. It clearly appears, then, that over the last halfcentury the ideological differences between the two major parties have become more pronounced. Figure 3 also illustrates the net effect these changes have had on the chambers as a whole. The center two trend lines are the per chamber net ideological scores, generated as the simple sum of the competing parties’ values. The fact that both net scores have trended in a conservative direction reflects both greater extremism on the part of conservative Republicans (compared with the somewhat less extreme liberal ideology of congressional Democrats), in combination with the slow, steady

Figure 3. Source: The source data are from Table 8-9, ‘‘Ideological Positions of House Party Coalitions, 80th--106th Congresses, 1947--2000,’’ and Table 8-10, ‘‘Ideological Positions of Senate Party Coalitions, 80th--106th Congresses, 1947--2000’’ (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2002, 181--182). Note: These data, which range from --0.5 to þ0.5 and have a zero standard deviation, are the now generally accepted Poole and Rosenthal ideological scores for which a positive score is conservative, a zero score is centrist, and a negative score is liberal.

28 Political Parties increase in Republican dominance of both chambers. In other words, there are more Republicans in Congress now, and they are, on average, more extreme in their conservative ideology than Democrats are in their liberal ideology. The next question is whether those ideologies translate into legislative voting behavior. On the one hand, the trends in figure 3 are derived from legislators’ votes, and so they inherently reflect public position-taking on the part of individual lawmakers. However, to translate that behavior to a feature of the party system, we need to know the degree to which those individual positions combine into the collective behavior that would be reflective of a cohesive responsible party. The first place to look for this type of party engagement is the Congressional Quarterly proportion of partisan roll call scores. A partisan roll call vote is one on which a majority of Democrats voted against a majority of Republicans; the proportion indicates in relative terms over time how often such an ‘‘us-against-them’’ vote occurred within a legislative session. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, respectively, the proportion of partisan roll call votes for the means of twoyear Congresses ending in presidential election years and midterm election years. Figure 4(a) shows that since 1968, for two-year Congresses ending in presidential election years, there has been a steady increase in the House and a less-steady-but-still-present increase in the Senate in the number of these polarization votes. There is a drop-off in both chambers for 2000, which for the House returned the value to slightly below its 1960 level; for the Senate, however,

Figure 4(a).

even with the year 2000 decline, the proportion of ‘‘usagainst-them’’ votes is 10 points higher than 40 years earlier. Figure 4(b), showing the same measure for twoyear Congresses ending in midterm election years, is substantially less pronounced. In fact, the trend is fairly flat except for a slight spike for the Congress ending in 1994, the year of the Republican Contract with America and the advent of the Gingrich revolution. However, it is the presidential year trend that is more important; owing to the increased public activity and media salience of the presidential election, it is much more likely that the electorate will absorb facts about congressional behavior during presidential election years than during midterm years. While figures 4(a) and (b) speak to interparty voting, that is, they show us how the party coalitions voted in relation to each other, figures 5(a) and 5(b) show intraparty voting by demonstrating how individual party members voted in relation to their own parties. These figures are composed of two measures, the Congressional Quarterly average party unity support score, and the average party unity opposition score. The support score indicates the percentage of the time that members voted in agreement with a majority of their party on party unity votes (those roll call votes on which a majority of voting Democrats opposed a majority of voting Republicans). Similarly, the opposition score reveals the percentage of the time that members voted against a majority of their party on party unity votes.2 Thus, while figures 4(a) and 4(b) showed the level of opportunity for members to vote with or against a majority of their own party, figures 5(a) and 5(b) show us how members actually used those opportunities.

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 29

Figure 4(b). Source: The source data are from Table 5-7, ‘‘Party Unity and Polarization in Congressional Voting, 1954--2002 (percent)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 216).

These figures firmly make the point that over the last half-century the parties in Congress have become substantially more cohesive. The support scores show that, when given the opportunity, the majority of legislators have over time expressed greater party support, with proportions in both chambers moving from about 80 percent in 1960, through the antipartyism of the 1970s, to about 90 percent in 2000. Similarly, the same pattern holds for opposition scores: over time, members have steadily declined the opportunity to vote against a majority of their own party, moving from about 20 percent of the time in about 1960, through a predictable increase in party opposition during the 1970s, to a

Figure 5(a).

low of about 10 percent in 2000. As figure 5(b) shows, virtually the identical pattern appears for two-year Congresses ending in midterm election years that we saw for presidential election years in Figure 5(a). Together, these two figures keenly demonstrate that even at the early end of the time frame under analysis legislative parties had high unity and low opposition scores, and that over time the parties in both chambers have manifested even greater internal support and less internal opposition. Taken together, figures 3, 4(a) and 4(b), and 5(a) and 5(b) provide strong evidence that in Congress ‘‘today the two parties are more homogenous internally and

30 Political Parties

Figure 5(b). Source: The source data for the party unity support scores are from Table 5.8, ‘‘Party Unity in Congressional Voting, 1954--2002 (percent)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 217). The data for the party unity opposition scores are from the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs for the relevant years---for 5(a): (1960, 139), (1964, 741), (1968, 851), (1972, 61), (1976, 998), (1980, 30-C), (1984, 28-C), (1988, 37-B), (1992, 25-B), (1996, C-21), and (2000, B-18); and for 5(b): (1986, 31-C), (1990, 34), (1994, 35-C), (1998, B-19), and (2002, B-20).

farther apart from each other than was the case for much of the 20th century.’’ However, merely examining the parties in Congress is insufficient for a comprehensive party system analysis. It is important that American parties need to bridge a structural separation of powers. After all, ‘‘[b]ecause the power to make national policy in the United States is shared between Congress and the president, conflict is expected---even intended’’ (Fleisher and Bond 2000, 189, 192). Thus, to fully assess the levels of unity of the parties in government, we need to understand how those parties deal with that constitutionally structured interbranch conflict; and to do this, we need to explore how the parties in the legislature relate to the president. Evidence that the parties in government are more internally coherent cross-institutionally is provided by Congressional Quarterly’s congressional average presidential support and opposition scores. These scores indicate, by chamber and party, the percentage of times that members voted in agreement with, or in opposition to, legislation on which the president has taken a public position.3 To best capture this dynamic, we present two composite measures that show presidential support by the in-party and presidential opposition by the outparty. In this way, rather than tracking the individual parties’ trends, we can see on one simple graph the systemic trends in presidential support by every president’s party in Congress, and presidential opposition by every president’s opposing congressional party.

Figure 6(a) shows these trends for two-year Congresses ending in presidential election years. For the 1960 to 1988 period, presidential support was relatively stable at around 75 percent, except for a curious downward spike in 1988, the tail end of Reagan’s tenure. However, from that point to 2000, there is a steady 12point climb. The most interesting aspect of this figure, however, is the out-party presidential opposition trend. From a low of about 37 percent in 1968, there is a steady eight electoral cycle climb to about 65 percent in 2000. It may be that congressional in-parties always showed a fair deference to their president, but from the end of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency to the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, there has been a steady increase in the cohesiveness of the out-party’s opposition during two-year Congresses ending in presidential election years. As figure 6(b) shows, this trend is less obvious for those two-year periods that end in midterm election years. In fact, except for the period ending in 2002, those trends are notable only for a step-change increase, apparently in support of the Clinton presidency by congressional Democrats. The 2002 spikes, up for support and down for opposition, most likely reflect the effect on governance from the attacks of September 11, 2001, after presidential popularity spiked tremendously. The twin institutional indicators of a responsible party are coherence and cohesion; the former is the ‘‘similarity of views among party members’’; the latter

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 31

Figure 6(a).

In-party Presidential Support

Figure 6(b). Source: The source data for the presidential support scores are from Table 6.8, ‘‘Congressional Voting in Support of the President’s Position, 1953--2002 (percent)’’ Stanley and Niemi 2003, 258--59). The data for the presidential opposition scores are from the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs for the relevant years---for 6(a): (1960, 107), (1964, 792), (1968, 832), (1972, 43), (1976, 992), (1980, 19-C), (1984, 21-C), (1988, 24-B), (1992, 9-B), (1996, C-15), and (2000, B-12); and for 6(b): (1986, 24-C), (1990, 26), (1994, 29-C), (1998, B-13), and (2002, B-14).

is ‘‘manifested in a disciplined and effective organization.’’ Thirty years ago, party scholar Gerald Pomper wrote, ‘‘The evidence indicates that coherence has increased, while cohesion has decreased. The ideological underpinnings of a responsible party system have been developed, but the organizational framework remains unbuilt’’ (Pomper 1972, 956). Now, thirty years later, it seems that both of those required characteristics of political responsibility are evident in the

measures of the performance of the parties in government. It is likely that congressional party organizational cohesion and ideological coherence are intimately intertwined. For example, it is a reasonable inference that the legislative voting trends shown in figures 1 through 6 reflect the greater power of party leaders within Congress to set the floor agenda and to enforce party discipline through added control over committee chairmanships and appointments.

32 Political Parties The evidence supporting the assumption that the party in government is more coherent and more cohesive provides the operational foundation for the next claim: that the mass public’s political behavior is inspired by the words and deeds---the positions and votes---of the parties’ office-holding elites. To this point, more than 50 years ago, early public opinion survey researchers recognized that ‘‘people who identify themselves with either of the two parties tend, to greater or less degree, to express opinions which parallel the positions taken by the leadership of that party’’ (Belknap and Campbell 1952, 608). We now examine the mass public’s response to these elite and institutional conditions. To do so, we examine partisanship in the most recent presidential election, followed by an analysis of the role of partisanship, examined through trends in split-ticket versus straight-ticket voting over the last 52 years.

The Politically Responsible Electorate As one observer wrote, ‘‘The 2004 election was a highstakes contest with clear differences between the

parties’’ (Mellow 2005, 69). Leading this story is the increase in the proportion of the American public perceiving ‘‘important differences in what the parties stand for.’’ In 2004, as figure 7 shows, 78 percent of survey respondents perceived important differences, 11 points higher than in 2000 and overall the highest it has been since the National Election Study (NES) took its first measurement 52 years ago. Corroborating that finding is the July 4, 2004, CBS News/New York Times Poll, which reported---four months before the election---that 74 percent of registered voters responded ‘‘yes’’ to the party differences question.4 By all accounts party identification in 2004 was fairly evenly split between the two major parties, with Democrats having a slight edge.5 For example, taking into account 37,330 individual telephone interviews from its 2004 national polling efforts, the Gallup Organization found self-reported party identification split at 48 percent Democrat to 45 percent Republican, with the remaining 7 percent true independents (Jones 2004, 1--2). With the distribution relatively even, the critical question is whether those respondents cast presidential

Figure 7. Source: 2004 National Election Study (NES) postelection sample, using the NES self-weighted (i.e., not post-stratified-weighted) values. Note: Applying the Current Population Study--determined poststratification adjustment weight does not materially change the results; as weighted, the estimate of the perceiving proportion drops by 1.8 points to 75.8 percent, which does not affect the trend analysis. Because this question was not asked in 1956, that year’s value is imputed as the simple mean of the point estimates for 1952 and 1960. Given that the mid-1950s was a relatively stable political period, and given that the 1952 to 1960 spread is exactly one point (from 49.86 to 50.86), this imputation is both theoretically and empirically justifiable.

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 33

Table 1. 2004 Presidential Election Two-Party Vote by Party Identification Cross-Tabulation N ¼ 804; Chi-square ¼ 530.414 (p ¼ 0.000) Self-Reported Party Identification

Two-party Vote

Kerry Bush Total

Strong Dem.

Wary Dem.

True Ind.

Wary Rep.

Strong Rep.

Total

96.7% 3.3% 100.0%

85.1% 14.9% 100.0%

53.3% 46.7% 100.0%

10.8% 89.2% 100.0%

1.8% 98.2% 100.0%

49.4% 50.6% 100.0%

Source: The 2004 National Election Study [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].

votes consistent with their party identification. As table 1 shows, they did so in overwhelming percentages. As table 1 shows, 97 percent of strong and 85 percent of wary Democrats voted Democratic, while an even more dramatic 98 percent of strong and 89 percent of wary Republicans voted for their party’s candidate. Next, however, we need to examine the nature of that partisanship---is it meaningful? Do these respondents---who overwhelmingly perceived important differences in what the parties stand for, and voted consistently with their self-reported party identification---base their perceptions and votes on political reality? If so, it is a fair preliminary inference that those partisan votes are ‘‘rational,’’ at least in the sense that they were based on accurate perceptions of policy differences between the parties. We can address this question by assessing the public’s knowledge of some basic threshold facts about the parties at the national scale. For this, we can use the NES question set on the ideologies of the national parties. Just before the 2004 election, 87 percent of survey respondents indicated that, yes, one party is more conservative than the other; of those 925 respondents, 80 percent correctly reported that it was the Republican Party. An even more telling use of these data examines those 925 respondents on the basis of their perception of important party differences. After all, a minimum determination of mass political competence should require a sustainable link between the proportion of those who perceive important differences in what the parties stand for and the proportion who can correctly place those parties on an ideological spectrum. Table 2 makes the point quite clearly: an overwhelming percentage (83 percent) of those who report perceiving important party differences correctly placed the national Republican Party as more conservative than the Democratic Party. It appears, then, that the 2004 electorate perceived important differences between the two major parties and adequately understood the relative ideological positions of those parties.

As seen, that electorate voted their self-reported party identification in overwhelming percentages. In short, as predicted by many scholars, pundits, and politicians, mass partisanship played an overwhelming role in determining the 2004 vote (Fiorina 2002, 537; Nagourney 2003). The issue now is whether 2004 is the latest data point in a secular trend toward responsible mass voting or the anomalous result of election-specific conditions. To address this question, we now analyze the last half-century of trends in straight-ticket versus-split ticket voting. Ticket splitting between presidential and house votes in the 2004 election---at 17 percent---was the lowest it has been in 36 years; for presidential-year Senate race votes, the split rate of 14 percent was essentially the lowest it has been in 40 years. The question is whether we can infer anything about responsible mass partisanship from these trends. Early on, some scholars suggested that there was a ‘‘tendency toward least effort [and that] in the absence of relevant political motivation . . . people . . . vot[ed] a straight ticket because the peculiarities of the voting system make a straight ticket vote the easiest.’’ At the same time, though, they found three relevant predictors---party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue partisanship---‘‘all clearly

Table 2. 2004 NES Sample Correct Party Ideology by Perception of Important Party Differences N ¼ 925; Chi-square ¼ 28.776 (p ¼ 0.000) Perceives Party Differences

Correct Party Ideology

No Yes Total

No

Yes

37.1%

17.4%

62.9% 100.0%

82.6% 100.0%

Source: The 2004 National Election Study [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].

34 Political Parties related to the two-party nature of American politics’’ and concluded that when they combine in a mutually supportive manner the[se factors] increase the pressure toward full support of one of the parties. . . . Straight ticket voting is lowest among voters for whom none of these motives is present and highest among those whose party, candidate, and issue motives all impel them to support the same party (Campbell and Miller 1957, 311). Later scholars, however, found that incumbency affected whether people split their tickets by voting the president from one party and their representative or senator from the other: Strong incumbents in the House and Senate frequently scare off serious challengers, leaving voters to choose between a popular, well-known incumbent and an obscure challenger. It should hardly be surprising that under such conditions, proincumbent voting tends to occur, creating a pattern of splitticket voting in many districts (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 19). As a story of continuity, however, incumbency begs the question of how the incumbent got that way in the first place. To this, these same scholars write that it is [m]ore telling . . . how voters behave when a seat is vacated and two challengers square off. [The data show] that partisan attachments come to the fore, regardless of whether one looks at data from the 1950s or the 1990s. . . . Partisanship is by no means a weak predictor of vote choice in congressional races, and rates of party loyalty in the late 1990s do not differ markedly from those of the late 1950s (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 19). Indeed, the more interesting analysis is of change, and the 1994 midterm upheaval that displaced 52 house Democrats with Republicans is an interesting illustration, not only because it ran contrary to the expectations of incumbency, but also because it runs parallel to a finding of an increasingly responsible electorate. Mid-20th-century party scholar Austin Ranney summarized the theoretical mechanics that equate modern straight-ticket voting with responsible politics and, retrospectively, frames the 1994 outcome. Ranney wrote that to the extent that a responsible party system ‘‘would establish popular control of government by

making the group of rulers in power collectively responsible to the people, [citizens should think in terms of the collective responsibility of an organized and unified group of public officials to the entire electorate]’’ (Ranney 1954, 14). Writing about three years later, two early party researchers empirically supported this theoretical claim by finding that ‘‘[d]eviations across party lines are least common among those voters who identify with their party, prefer its presidential candidate, and approve its issue positions.’’ These authors concluded their analysis with a final note [that t]he concepts with which we have been concerned . . . are not peculiar to any particular election situation. We would expect them to apply with equal validity in any presidential election in this country and we are confident that subsequent research will demonstrate this to be the case (Campbell and Miller 1957, 311--12). Given these early theoretical and empirical analyses, we can hypothesize that as the two major parties become more coherent and cohesive at the institutional and organizational levels and, in turn, as the parties simplify alternatives by advancing more clearly formed campaign and legislative agendum with which the public can readily identify, voters will respond in kind. In plainer terms, as the party system becomes more responsible, the incidence of split-ticket voting should decline. And indeed, it does: from 1972 to 2004, the incidence of straight-ticket voting is up, and the trend in split-ticket voting is down. It seems, then, that straight-ticket voting is, indeed, an ‘‘indicator of partycentric attitude’’ (Hetherington 2001, 621). A simple time-series of two long-standing NES measures, split-ticket votes between president and the House and split-ticket votes between president and the Senate, makes the point. These proportion-of-sample measures, which are derived from the survey respondents’ selfreports of party of presidential vote and by-chamber party of congressional vote, are displayed graphically (along with the trend in the proportion the sample perceiving important party differences) in figure 8. Over the last 52 years, presidential-by-chamber trends in split-ticket and straight-ticket voting have been highl y correlated. There is a relatively slow but steady sevenpoint increase from 1952 to 1968, which spikes dramatically for the lopsided 1972 Nixon-McGovern contest (in which McGovern took only 17 electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 23.2 points). With the exception of a small spike for the somewhat-less-but-still-quite-lopsided 1980 Carter-Reagan contest (in which Carter took only

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 35

Figure 8. Source: The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). The 1948--2004 ANES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE [dataset]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers and distributors], 2005.

49 electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 9.7 points), both by-chamber trends decrease from 1972 to 2004, ending up only about 2.5 to 4 points over their 1952 values. Moreover, from 1972 on, there is a powerful inverse relationship between both by-chamber split-ticket voting trends and the secular trend in the proportion of the sample perceiving important differences in what the parties stand for. While it may be true that ‘‘[a]nything that creates more balanced competition between the parties is likely to inhibit ticket splitting’’ (Roscoe 2004, 1161), the more refined explanation of this trend is as evidence of an increasingly responsible party system. As one contemporary scholar recently suggested, [t]he rise and fall of ticket splitting can be understood in terms of a fall and rise in the salience of party labels. . . . When the parties converge to the ideological center, voters rely less on party and policy considerations [and] produce more ticket splitting. Public perceptions of the parties indeed respond to party movement at the national level. Voters who see important differences between the parties rely more heavily on party and ideology and thus are less likely to cause split ballots’’ (Kimball 2001, 25--26). In essence, the history of split-ticket versus straightticket voting analysis moved from explaining the prevalence of split-ticket voting from 1956 to 1972, to explaining the dominant trend in straight-ticket voting from 1972 to 2004. It certainly seems credible, then,

that the 1972 to 2004 trend in straight-ticket voting is a part of systemic changes that drive the ‘‘normal’’ vote, rather than responses to the short-term conditions of any given election (Converse 1966). Ultimately, the empirical evidence and theoretical explanations for split-ticket versus straight-ticket voting ended up describing a functionally responsible system, one in which the parties are genuinely differentiated so that party labels are meaningful in terms of ideology and policy considerations.

Why Responsible Parties? The empirical evidence shows increasing party ideological coherence and organizational cohesiveness over the last half century. While those characteristics permit us to dub the current party system ‘‘responsible,’’ they do not speak to why the party system has come to be this way. To address this question, we need to explain two related phenomenon: the increasing ideological coherence and organizational cohesiveness of party elites, and the increasing responsiveness of the mass public to those elites. By and large, the first issue is explained by shifts in the motivation to participate in politics at the elite level and the changed nature of the campaign-governance cycle. Given the changes in the parties themselves, the second issue can be accounted for by changes in the technology that have altered the economies of scale in the media’s delivery of political information. The Progressive Era’s energy for comprehensive civil service reform and the resulting dismantling of the

36 Political Parties patronage system shifted the traditional bases for activists’ and candidates’ participation from reward for loyalty and service to support by social movements and interest groups (Fiorina 2002, 527). One historian wrote that ‘‘[p]eople in the nineteenth century could smell and taste the material benefits in politics; in the twentieth century, increasingly, self-interest in political life became more of an imaginative leap’’ (Schudson 1998, 185). As a result, the type of person attracted to elite participation changed. In 21st-century politics, participation ‘‘is the province of those who feel strongly about an issue or candidate, either because they have particularly extreme views or because they are directly affected in a way that others are not and this tends to make them hold particularly extreme views.’’ Those folks are ‘‘more reluctant to compromise their positions, and more willing to sacrifice electoral victory for principles’’ (Fiorina 2002, 527, 534). Now, for many more office-holding elites than in the past, virtually all policy positions and management decisions reflect some larger guiding ideological worldview. This is a dramatic difference from the instrumental utilitarian approach of those attracted to the good works of politics for material gain for self and others. From the negative perspective, these new elites are less likely to bargain and compromise in the traditionally American legislative manner. Political scientist Morris Fiorina well-captures the refusal of the true believer to compromise: ‘‘If I participate because of the rightness of my cause, then opposition is illegitimate. Society must be forced to recognize my cause whether anything tangible follows from that or not.’’ (Fiorina 2002, 535). Political historian James Morone articulates the impact this repopulation of elite politics with ideological extremists has had on how politics is conducted: Moral politics transform the political process itself. They draw fierce partisans into the fray and blow right past the usual checks-and-balances, deals and compromises. Who logrolls with evil-doers? . . . [Ideological extremists] scoff at politics as usual, they will not compromise. After all, they see a nation teetering between right and wrong, salvation and perdition (Morone 2003, 10, 11). From the positive perspective, however, these participants are likely to share ideological perspectives and to cooperate in a disciplined and cohesive manner toward common party goals. This is the critical point--because it is in the interest of their principle-driven policy goals, this new breed of political elite is more

likely to be collectively ideologically coherent and organizationally cohesive within the framework of the two major parties. When put into motion, these characteristics frame the parameters of a responsible twoparty system. Before moving to a discussion of shifts in the campaign-governance cycle, two observations about the current responsible party system are necessary---that responsible politics is but a vessel, open to any particular ideology, and, as developed, the Republican Party has taken greater advantage of that vessel. The responsible party doctrine, the theory that describes a responsible party system, prescribes only a political process rather than any substantive political perspective. Thus, a responsible party system can be conceived of as a vessel that can host alternative ideologies. In fact, in the past 55 years it has hosted two radically different ideologies, New Deal progressivism followed by conservative antigovernmentalism. Originally, the doctrine---expressed through the 1950 American Political Science Association---hosted New Deal progressivism and ‘‘reflected the spirit of its times. In its reformist impulse, it was thoroughly at home with the key elements of the Progressive movement’’ (White and Mileur 2002, 15; also see David 1992). Scholars who were active at the drafting of the American Political Science Association’s 1950 report confirm that the drafters’ ‘‘common motivation was to keep the new Deal legislation of the day in place and growing [and] strengthen the New Deal wing of the Democratic Party’’ (Goldman 2000). Most, but not all, mid-20th-century Republicans were critical of the progressive New Deal ideology that drove the drafting of the report. Indeed, it was not the case that ‘‘liberal Democrats were the only advocates of the responsible parties doctrine in 1950. A few Republicans [were] on the Committee on Political Parties, and some Republican members of Congress probably shared their views’’ (Epstein 2002, 202). As things unfolded, though, the early slight Republican appreciation for a coherent and cohesive party blossomed with a vengeance to an affinity for political responsibility’s instrumental utility. As early as 1982, scholars recognized that Republican elites were making significant inroads toward increasing their party’s ideological coherence and organizational cohesiveness. To be sure, the seeds of the Reagan revolution and the current Republican majority were sown in responsible party fields. From the post-Nixon era on, Republicans focused extensively on ‘‘making their party an effective instrument of technical services and fund-raising assistance for their candidates. While the Democrats were arguing about [participation] quotas, mandating procedures for

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 37 state and local parties, and working on a national charter, the Republicans were developing methods to aid their state and local affiliates.’’ Indeed, the two parties followed ‘‘‘quite different paths toward greater party nationalization and integration.’ The Republican party strengthened national party capabilities without major rule changes, while the Democrats have reformed procedure, strengthening the national committee by vesting it with legal authority’’ (Christman 1982, 444--445). Apparently, while Democrats more or less believed that the doctrine would aid them in maintaining political dominance, Republicans actually deployed the prescriptions of the doctrine to achieve political dominance. Given its electoral success from 1980 on, it would seem that the Republican Party has, indeed, been more effective at making the responsible party model work than the Democrats have. In addition to changes in the motivation to participate in elite politics, the nature of the political process itself has changed in a way that facilitates party coherence and cohesiveness. The phrase ‘‘permanent campaign’’ was coined by former White House journalist Sidney Blumenthal: The permanent campaign is the political ideology of our age. It combines image-making with strategic calculation. Under the permanent campaign governing is turned into a perpetual campaign. Moreover, it remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected official’s public popularity (Blumenthal 1980, 7). Blumenthal posited that the political environment had changed in a way that ‘‘[f]or a president to remain credible, he must be powerful, at least powerful enough to win renomination. He must campaign early and often. And the easiest way to do that is to turn governing into a campaign; there is no line of separation’’ (Blumenthal 1980, 9). Under the permanent campaign, the distinction between campaigning and governance is blurred and the public is unable to readily distinguish ordinary from electoral politics. As a result, the claims, missions, and intentions of elites are obscured and it is difficult for mass participants to easily appreciate what motivates any particular elite conflict. Thus, all political activity becomes contestation---all elite efforts, whether in government or at the polls, are cast in terms of competition and elites tend to line up in a way that underscores the differences between the parties whether there is a campaign on or not. The final piece in the puzzle explains why over the past 55 years the mass public has become more

responsive to the policy positions of the major parties. This dynamic builds on all the basic changes previously described. As we have seen, party elites---particularly federal officeholders---are more ideological than before and more differentiated between the parties and across the legislative and executive branches of government. The campaign-governance cycle has morphed into a permanent campaign in which virtually all political activity is cast in terms of policy contestation. The institutionalization of party organization coupled with enormous increases in fiscal resources has lead to dramatic increases in the parties’ capacity to promulgate their messages. Thus, the raw material of politics is now more likely than in the past to generate sharper more readily perceived cues about the parties’ policy positions. In addition, there have been cultural, market, and technological developments that have lead to a radical change in the nature of the public and private media. In plain, politics itself is more sharply contested and the mechanisms that deliver information about that contestation have become more efficient. As one historian has noted, ‘‘radio, cable TV, and the capacity to print and distribute national daily newspapers have made possible far more niche marketing than ever before, while maintaining the economies (and profits) of a mass market’’ (Keller 2005, 8). Changes to the economy of scale, mostly technological, now permit extensive and specialized content delivery of political information. The contests of highly differentiated major political parties now permeate national, regional, and even local news through multiple media outlets. It is virtually impossible in our postmodern age for the mass public to avoid the elite policy contests of the two major American political parties.

Conclusion The evidence shows that after the party malaise of the 1970s, electoral incentives pushed the Republican Party to greater political responsibility in the forms of greater ideological coherence among both elites and the rankand-file, party discipline within government, and organizational centralization. Though lagging, the Democratic Party has followed suit. At the same time, incentives to participate in elite politics shifted from a more material to a more ideological basis and the character of activists and officeholders evolved accordingly. The changing basis of elite participation has recast the parties’ collective personalities in such a way that the traditional approach of collective bargain and compromise has given way to a more rigid politics in which

38 Political Parties the party label is a meaningful predictor of a candidate’s policy positions. In addition, from the late 1970s, we have seen the blurring of the lines between electoral and ordinary politics as the result of institutionalization of the permanent campaign. More externally, campaign resources such as money and electioneering energy increasingly come from sources with an ideological bent. As a consequence of these changes, the parties have become more internally homogenous and more externally differentiated. While on their own, these trends have helped voters to see more clearly the policy differences between the parties, increased capacity in the media has been instrumental in helping the mass public to better appreciate these policy differences and to identify with, and vote for, parties on the basis of those differences.

References and Further Reading Belknap, G., and Campbell, A. 1952. ‘‘Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly, 15(4): 601--623. Bibby, J. F. 2003. Politics, Parties, and Elections in America. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Blumenthal, S. 1980. The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Elite Political Operatives. Boston: Beacon Press. Budge, I. 1993. ‘‘Parties, Programs and Policies: A Comparative and Theoretical Perspective.’’ The American Review of Politics, 14, 695--716. Campbell, A., and Miller, W. E. 1957. ‘‘The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting.’’ The American Political Science Review, 51(2): 293--312. Christman, R. B. 1982. ‘‘A Review of Party Reform Literature. The Western Political Quarterly, 35(3): 442--448. Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 2002. 2002 Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Converse, P. E. 1966. ‘‘The Concept of a Normal Vote.’’ In A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, eds., Elections and the Political Order, 9--39. New York: Wiley. David, P. T. 1992. ‘‘The APSA Committee on Political Parties: Some Reconsiderations of Its Work and Significance.’’ Perspectives on Political Science, 21(2): 70--79. Edsall, T. B., and Willis, D. December 3, 2004. ‘‘Fundraising Records Broken by Both Major Political Parties. The Washington Post, A-7. Epstein, L. D. 2002. ‘‘A persistent Quest.’’ In J. C. Green and P. S. Herrnson, eds., Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American Political Parties since 1950 (pp. 201-215). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Fiorina, M. P. 2002. ‘‘Parties, Participation, and Representation in America: Old Theories Face New Realities.’’ In Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Edited by I. Katznelson and H. V. Milner, 511--541. New York, Washington, DC: Norton; American Political Science Association. Fleisher, R., and Bond, J. R. 2000. ‘‘Congress and the President in a Partisan Era’’; and, ‘‘Polarized Politics: Does It

Matter?’’ In J. R. Bond and R. Fleisher, eds., Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, 1--8; 186--200. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Goldman, R. M. September 2000. Comments on the Committee on Political Parties Report. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. Green, J. C., and R. Farmer, eds. 2006--2007. The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties. 5th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Green, J. C., and P. S. Herrnson, eds. 2002. Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American Political Parties since 1950. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Green, D. P., Palmquist, B., and Schickler, E. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hetherington, M. J. 2001. ‘‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.’’ American Political Science Review, 95(3): 619--631. Jackson, J. S., Bigelow, N. S., and Green, J. C. 2003. ‘‘The State of Party Elites: National Convention Delegates, 1992-2000.’’ In J. C. Green and R. Farmer, eds., The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, 4th ed., pp. 54--78. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Jones, J. M. 2004. Country Tilts Republican Post-Election. Washington, DC: The Gallup Organization. Justice, G. December 3, 2004. ‘‘Both Parties Say Fund-raising Was Big and Nearly Equal.’’ The New York Times. http:// www.nytimes.com. Keller, Morton. 2005. ‘‘The Media: What They Are Today, and How They Got That Way.’’ The Forum, 3(1). Key, V. O., and M. C. Cummings. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936--1960. New York: Random House. Kimball, D. C. October 14, 2001. ‘‘A Temporary Return to Unified Government and the Increasing Salience Of Party Labels.’’ Paper presented at the Mershon Center Conference on Assessing the Vitality of Electoral Democracy in the U.S.: The 2000 Election, Columbus, OH. Maisel, L. S. 1993. ‘‘The Platform-Writing Process: CandidateCentered Platforms in 1992.’’ Political Science Quarterly, 108(4): 671--698. Maisel, L. S. 2001. ‘‘American Political Parties: Still Central to a Functioning Democracy?’’ In J. E. Cohen, R. Fleisher, and P. Kantor, eds. American Political Parties: Decline or Resurgence, 103--121. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Maisel, L. S., ed. 2002. The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Mellow, Nicole. 2005. ‘‘Voting Behavior: The 2004 Election and the Roots of Republican Success,’’ in The Elections of 2004, edited by M. Nelson. Washington: CQ Press, Inc. Miller, G., and Schofield, N. 2003. ‘‘Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States. The American Political Science Review, 97(2): 245--260. Monroe, J. P. 2001. The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization. Albany: State University of New York Press. Morone, J. A. 2003. Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History. New Haven, CI: London: Yale University Press.

The Party’s Still On: American Political Parties from 1950 to 2005 39 Nagourney, A. September 1, 2003. ‘‘Political Parties Shift Emphasis to Core Voters. The New York Times, p. A-1. Ornstein, N. J., Mann, T. E., and Malbin, M. 2002. Vital Statistics on Congress 2001--2002. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. Pomper, G. M. 1972. The author responds. The Journal of Politics, 34(3): 955--957. Pomper, G. M. 2001. ‘‘Party Responsibility and the Future of American Democracy.’’ In American Political Parties: Decline or Resurgence. Edited by J. E. Cohen, R. Fleisher, and P. Kantor, 162--183. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pomper, G. M. 2003. ‘‘Parliamentary Government in the United States: A New Regime for a New Century?’’ In The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, 4th ed. Edited by J. C. Green and R. Farmer, 267--286. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ranney, A. 1954. The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government, Its Origin and State. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Roscoe, D. D. 2003. ‘‘The Choosers or the Choices? Voter Characteristics and the Structure of Electoral Competition as Explanations for Ticket Splitting. The Journal of Politics, 65(4): 1147--1164. Schudson, M. 1998. The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. New York: Martin Kessler Books. Shaw, C. 1998. ‘‘President Clinton’s First Term: Matching Campaign Promises with Presidential Performance. Congress & The Presidency, 25(1): 43--65. Stanley, H. W., and Niemi, R. G. 1988. Vital Statistics on American Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Stanley, H. W., AND Niemi, R. G. 2003. Vital Statistics on American Politics 2003--2004. Washington, DC: CQ Press. White, J. K., and J. M. Mileur, eds. 1992. Challenges to Party Government. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. White, J. K., and Mileur, J. M. 2002. ‘‘In the Spirit of Their Times: Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System and Party Politics.’’ In J. C. Green and P. S. Herrnson, eds., Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American Political

Parties Since 1950, 13--35. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Notes 1. The data from the 2003 table were already adjusted to 2003 dollars; the data from the 1988 table were adjusted using Consumer Price Index conversion factors developed by Robert C. Sahr (http://oregonstate.edu/dept/pol_sci/ fac/sahr/sahr.htm#_Conversion_Factor_Tables). 2. Both the party unity support and party unity opposition scores ‘‘are calculated to eliminate the impact of absences as follows: unity ¼ (unity)/(unity þ opposition)’’ and opposition ¼ (opposition)/(unity þ opposition) (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 217). Congressional Quarterly further explains that ‘‘party switchers are accounted for’’ (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, B-20). 3. These scores are percentages that ‘‘indicate [the] number of congressional votes supporting the president divided by the total number of votes on which the president took a position. The percentages are calculated to eliminate the effects of absences as follows: support ¼ (support)/ (support þ opposition)’’ (Stanley and Niemi 2003, 259). Congressional Quarterly further explains that ‘‘support shows the percentage of time the members voted in agreement with the president’’ and ‘‘opposition shows the percentage of time members voted against the president’s position’’ (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2002, B-14). 4. The question wording for this survey administration was identical to the National Election Study’s; nationwide random sample, n=1,053; order of ‘‘Republican’’ and ‘‘Democrat’’ in question text randomized; survey fielded June 23--27, 2004; sampling error ¼ þ/3 percent. 5. Standing along both sets of numbers shown here predict a Kerry presidential victory; however, Gallup succinctly explains that ‘‘Republicans were more likely to turn out in the 2004 elections, wiping out the . . . Democratic advantage in party support among all adults’’ (Jones 2004, 2).

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and maintain the equilibrium. This is as little the voice of reason, as it is that of republicanism. From the expediency, in politics, of making natural parties, mutual checks on each other, to infer the propriety of creating artificial parties, in order to form them into mutual checks, is not less absurd than it would be in ethics, to say, that new vices ought to be promoted, where they would counteract each other, because this use may be made of existing vices.

1.1 James Madison on Parties, January 23, 1792 In every political society, parties are unavoidable. A difference of interests, real or supposed, is the most natural and fruitful source of them. The great object should be to combat the evil: 1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort. 4. By abstaining from measures which operate differently on different interests, and particularly such as favor one interest at the expence of another. 5. By making one party a check on the other, so far as the existence of parties cannot be prevented, nor their views accommodated. If this is not the language of reason, it is that of republicanism. In all political societies, different interests and parties arise out of the nature of things, and the great art of politicians lies in making them checks and balances to each other. Let us then increase these natural distinctions by favoring an inequality of property; and let us add to them artificial distinctions, by establishing kings, and nobles, and plebeians. We shall then have the more checks to oppose to each other: we shall then have the more scales and the more weights to perfect

Source: The Papers of James Madison. Edited by William T. Hutchinson et al., vol 14, 197--98. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1962--1977 (vols. 1-10); Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977 (vol. 11).

1.2 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801 Friends and Fellow-Citizens Called upon to undertake the duties of the first executive office of our country, I avail myself of the presence of that portion of my fellow-citizens which is here assembled to express my grateful thanks for the favor with which they have been pleased to look toward me, to declare a sincere consciousness that the task is above my talents, and that I approach it with those anxious and awful presentiments which the greatness of the charge and the weakness of my powers so justly

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42 Political Parties inspire. A rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions of their industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye---when I contemplate these transcendent objects, and see the honor, the happiness, and the hopes of this beloved country committed to the issue and the auspices of this day, I shrink from the contemplation, and humble myself before the magnitude of the undertaking. Utterly, indeed, should I despair did not the presence of many whom I here see remind me that in the other high authorities provided by our Constitution I shall find resources of wisdom, of virtue, and of zeal on which to rely under all difficulties. To you, then, gentlemen, who are charged with the sovereign functions of legislation, and to those associated with you, I look with encouragement for that guidance and support which may enable us to steer with safety the vessel in which we are all embarked amidst the conflicting elements of a troubled world. During the contest of opinion through which we have passed the animation of discussions and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the Constitution, all will, of course, arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression. Let us, then, fellow-citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others, and should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are

all Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government can not be strong, that this Government is not strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear that this Government, the world’s best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest Government on earth. I believe it the only one where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern. Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this question. Let us, then, with courage and confidence pursue our own Federal and Republican principles, our attachment to union and representative government. Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too highminded to endure the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation; entertaining a due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our own industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow-citizens, resulting not from birth, but from our actions and their sense of them; enlightened by a benign religion, professed, indeed, and practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man; acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence, which by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here and his greater happiness hereafter---with all these blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow-citizens---a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities. About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable

1.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Parties in the United States’’ to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against antirepublican tendencies; the preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people---a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burthened; the honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety. I repair, then, fellow citizens, to the post you have assigned me. With experience enough in subordinate offices to have seen the difficulties of this, the greatest of all, I have learned to expect that it will rarely fall to the lot of imperfect man, to retire from this station with the reputation and the favor which brought him into it. Without pretensions to that high confidence you reposed in our first and greatest revolutionary

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character, whose preeminent services had entitled him to the first place in his country’s love, and destined for him the fairest page of the volume of faithful history, I ask so much confidence only as may give firmness and effect to the legal administration of your affairs. I shall often go wrong through defect of judgment. When right, I shall often be thought wrong by those whose positions will not command a view of the whole ground. I ask your indulgence for my own errors, which will never be intentional; and your support against the errors of others, who may condemn what they would not, if seen in all its parts. The approbation implied by your suffrage is a great consolation to me for the past; and my future solicitude will be to retain the good opinion of those who have bestowed it in advance, to conciliate that of others, by doing them all the good in my power, and to be instrumental to the happiness and freedom of all.

1.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Parties in the United States,’’ Chapter 10 in Democracy in America, 1835 Parties in the United States Great Distinction to be made between parties---Parties that are to each other as rival nations---Parties properly so called---Difference between great and small parties--Epochs that produce them---Their characteristics---America has had great parties---They are extinct---Federalists--Republicans---Defeat of the Federalists---Difficulty of creating parties in the United States---What is done with this intention---Aristocratic or democratic character to be met with in all parties---Struggle of General Jackson against the Bank of the United States. A great distinction must be made between parties. Some countries are so large that the different populations which inhabit them, although united under the same government, have contradictory interests, and they may consequently be in a perpetual state of opposition. In this case the different fractions of the people may more properly be considered as distinct nations than as mere parties; and if a civil war breaks out, the struggle is carried on by rival states rather than by factions in the same state. But when the citizens entertain different opinions upon subjects which affect the whole country alike, such, for instance, as the principles upon which the government is to be conducted, then distinctions arise that may correctly be styled parties. Parties are a

44 Political Parties necessary evil in free governments; but they have not at all times the same character and the same propensities. At certain periods a nation may be oppressed by such insupportable evils as to conceive the design of effecting a total change in its political constitution; at other times, the mischief lies still deeper and the existence of society itself is endangered. Such are the times of great revolutions and of great parties. But between these epochs of misery and confusion there are periods during which human society seems to rest and mankind to take breath. This pause is, indeed, only apparent, for time does not stop its course for nations any more than for men; they are all advancing every day towards a goal with which they are unacquainted. We imagine them to be stationary only when their progress escapes our observation, as men who are walking seem to be standing still to those who run. But however this may be, there are certain epochs in which the changes that take place in the social and political constitution of nations are so slow and imperceptible that men imagine they have reached a final state; and the human mind, believing itself to be firmly based upon sure foundations, does not extend its researches beyond a certain horizon. These are the times of small parties and of intrigue. The political parties that I style great are those which cling to principles rather than to their consequences; to general and not to special cases; to ideas and not to men. These parties are usually distinguished by nobler features, more generous passions, more genuine convictions, and a more bold and open conduct than the others. In them private interest, which always plays the chief part in political passions, is more studiously veiled under the pretext of the public good; and it may even be sometimes concealed from the eyes of the very persons whom it excites and impels. Minor parties, on the other hand, are generally deficient in political good faith. As they are not sustained or dignified by lofty purposes, they ostensibly display the selfishness of their character in their actions. They glow with a factitious zeal; their language is vehement, but their conduct is timid and irresolute. The means which they employ are as wretched as the end at which they aim. Hence it happens that when a calm state succeeds a violent revolution, great men seem suddenly to disappear and the powers of the human mind to lie concealed. Society is convulsed by great parties, it is only agitated by minor ones; it is torn by the former, by the latter it is degraded; and if the first sometimes save it by a salutary perturbation, the last invariably disturb it to no good end.

America has had great parties, but has them no longer; and if her happiness is thereby considerably increased, her morality has suffered. When the War of Independence was terminated and the foundations of the new government were to be laid down, the nation was divided between two opinions---two opinions which are as old as the world and which are perpetually to be met with, under different forms and various names, in all free communities, the one tending to limit, the other to extend indefinitely, the power of the people. The conflict between these two opinions never assumed that degree of violence in America which it has frequently displayed elsewhere. Both parties of the Americans were agreed upon the most essential points; and neither of them had to destroy an old constitution or to overthrow the structure of society in order to triumph. In neither of them, consequently, were a great number of private interests affected by success or defeat: but moral principles of a high order, such as the love of equality and of independence, were concerned in the struggle, and these sufficed to kindle violent passions. The party that desired to limit the power of the people, endeavored to apply its doctrines more especially to the Constitution of the Union, whence it derived its name of Federal. The other party, which affected to be exclusively attached to the cause of liberty, took that of Republican. America is the land of democracy, and the Federalists, therefore, were always in a minority; but they reckoned on their side almost all the great men whom the War of Independence had produced, and their moral power was very considerable. Their cause, moreover, was favored by circumstances. The ruin of the first Confederation had impressed the people with a dread of anarchy, and the Federalists profited by this transient disposition of the multitude. For ten or twelve years, they were at the head of affairs, and they were able to apply some, though not all, of their principles; for the hostile current was becoming from day to day too violent to be checked. In 1801 the Republicans got possession of the government: Thomas Jefferson was elected President; and he increased the influence of their party by the weight of his great name, the brilliance of his talents, and his immense popularity. The means by which the Federalists had maintained their position were artificial, and their resources were temporary; it was by the virtues or the talents of their leaders, as well as by fortunate circumstances, that they had risen to power. When the Republicans attained that station in their turn, their opponents were overwhelmed by utter defeat. An immense majority declared itself against the retiring party, and the Federalists found

1.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Parties in the United States’’ themselves in so small a minority that they at once despaired of future success. From that moment the Republican or Democratic Party has proceeded from conquest to conquest, until it has acquired absolute supremacy in the country. The Federalists, perceiving that they were vanquished, without resource, and isolated in the midst of the nation, fell into two divisions, of which one joined the victorious Republicans, and the other laid down their banners and changed their name. Many years have elapsed since they wholly ceased to exist as a party. The accession of the Federalists to power was, in my opinion, one of the most fortunate incidents that accompanied the formation of the great American Union: they resisted the inevitable propensities of their country and their age. But whether their theories were good or bad, they had the fault of being inapplicable, as a whole, to the society which they wished to govern, and that which occurred under the auspices of Jefferson must therefore have taken place sooner or later. But their government at least gave the new republic time to acquire a certain stability, and afterwards to support without inconvenience the rapid growth of the very doctrines which they had combated. A considerable number of their principles, moreover, were embodied at last in the political creed of their opponents; and the Federal Constitution, which subsists at the present day, is a lasting monument of their patriotism and their wisdom. Great political parties, then, are not to be met with in the United States at the present time. Parties, indeed, may be found which threaten the future of the Union; but there is none which seems to contest the present form of government or the present course of society. The parties by which the Union is menaced do not rest upon principles, but upon material interests. These interests constitute, in the different provinces of so vast an empire, rival nations rather than parties. Thus, upon a recent occasion the North contended for the system of commercial prohibition, and the South took up arms in favor of free trade, simply because the North is a manufacturing and the South an agricultural community; and the restrictive system that was profitable to the one was prejudicial to the other. In the absence of great parties the United States swarms with lesser controversies, and public opinion is divided into a thousand minute shades of difference upon questions of detail. The pains that are taken to create parties are inconceivable, and at the present day it is no easy task. In the United States there is no religious animosity, because all religion is respected and no sect is predominant; there is no jealousy of rank,

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because the people are everything and none can contest their authority; lastly, there is no public misery to serve as a means of agitation, because the physical position of the country opens so wide a field to industry that man only needs to be let alone to be able to accomplish prodigies. Nevertheless, ambitious men will succeed in creating parties, since it is difficult to eject a person from authority upon the mere ground that this place is coveted by others. All the skill of the actors in the political world lies in the art of creating parties. A political aspirant in the United States begins by discerning his own interest, and discovering those other interests which may be collected around and amalgamated with it. He then contrives to find out some doctrine or principle that may suit the purposes of this new association, which he adopts in order to bring forward his party and secure its popularity: just as the imprimatur of the king was in former days printed upon the title page of a volume and was thus incorporated with a book to which it in no wise belonged. This being done, the new party is ushered into the political world. To a stranger all the domestic controversies of the Americans at first appear to be incomprehensible or puerile, and he is at a loss whether to pity a people who take such arrant trifles in good earnest or to envy that happiness which enables a community to discuss them. But when he comes to study the secret propensities that govern the factions of America, he easily perceives that the greater part of them are more or less connected with one or the other of those two great divisions which have always existed in free communities. The deeper we penetrate into the inmost thought of these parties, the more we perceive that the object of the one is to limit and that of the other to extend the authority of the people. I do not assert that the ostensible purpose or even that the secret aim of American parties is to promote the rule of aristocracy or democracy in the country; but I affirm that aristocratic or democratic passions may easily be detected at the bottom of all parties, and that, although they escape a superficial observation, they are the main point and soul of every faction in the United States. To quote a recent example, when President Jackson attacked the Bank of the United States, the country was excited, and parties were formed; the well-informed classes rallied round the bank, the common people round the President. But it must not be imagined that the people had formed a rational opinion upon a question which offers so many difficulties to the most experienced statesmen. By no means. The bank is a great establishment, which has an independent existence; and the people, accustomed to make and unmake

46 Political Parties whatsoever they please, are startled to meet with this obstacle to their authority. In the midst of the perpetual fluctuation of society, the community is irritated by so permanent an institution and is led to attack it, in order to see whether it can be shaken, like everything else.

Remains of the Aristocratic Party in the United States Secret opposition of wealthy individuals to democracy---Their retirement---Their taste for exclusive pleasures and for luxury at home---Their simplicity abroad---Their affected condescension towards the people. IT sometimes happens in a people among whom various opinions prevail that the balance of parties is lost and one of them obtains an irresistible preponderance, overpowers all obstacles, annihilates its opponents, and appropriates all the resources of society to its own use. The vanquished despair of success, hide their heads, and are silent. The nation seems to be governed by a single principle, universal stillness prevails, and the prevailing party assumes the credit of having restored peace and unanimity to the country. But under this apparent unanimity still exist profound differences of opinion, and real opposition. This is what occurred in America; when the democratic party got the upper hand, it took exclusive possession of the conduct of affairs, and from that time the laws and the customs of society have been adapted to its caprices. At the present day the more affluent classes of society have no influence in political affairs; and wealth, far from conferring a right, is rather a cause of unpopularity than a means of attaining power. The rich abandon the lists, through unwillingness to contend, and frequently to contend in vain, against the poorer classes of their fellow citizens. As they cannot occupy in public a position equivalent to what they hold in private life, they abandon the former and give themselves up to the latter; and they constitute a private society in the state which has its own tastes and pleasures. They submit to this state of things as an irremediable evil, but they are careful not to show that they are galled by its continuance; one often hears them laud the advantages of a republican government and democratic institutions when they are in public. Next to hating their enemies, men are most inclined to flatter them. . . .

1.4 Democratic Party Platform, 1840 1. Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers, derived solely from the constitution, and

the grants of power shown therein, ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of the government, and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers. 2. Resolved, That the constitution does not confer upon the general government the power to commence and carry on, a general system of internal improvements. 3. Resolved, That the constitution does not confer authority upon the federal government, directly or indirectly, to assume the debts of the several states, contracted for local internal improvements, or other state purposes; nor would such assumption be just or expedient. 4. Resolved, That justice and sound policy forbid the federal government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or to cherish the interests of one portion to the injury of another portion of our common country---that every citizen and every section of the country, has a right to demand and insist upon an equality of rights and privileges, and to complete and ample protection of person and property from domestic violence, or foreign aggression. 5. Resolved, That it is the duty of every branch of the government, to enforce and practice the most rigid economy, in conducting our public affairs, and that no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray the necessary expenses of the government. 6. Resolved, That congress has no power to charter a national bank; that we believe such an institution one of deadly hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a concentrated money power, and above the laws and the will of the people. 7. Resolved, That congress has no power, under the constitution, to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states, and that such states are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts by abolitionists or others, made to induce congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, and endanger the stability and permanency of the union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend to our political institutions. 8. Resolved, That the separation of the moneys of the government from banking institutions, is indispensable

1.5 Republican Party Platform 47 for the safety of the funds of the government, and the rights of the people. 9. Resolved, That the liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, and sanctioned in the constitution, which makes ours the land of liberty, and the asylum of the oppressed of every nation, have ever been cardinal principles in the democratic faith; and every attempt to abridge the present privilege of becoming citizens, and the owners of soil among us, ought to be resisted with the same spirit which swept the alien and sedition laws from our statute-book.

1.5 Republican Party Platform, June 17, 1856 This Convention of Delegates, assembled in pursuance of a call addressed to the people of the United States, without regard to past political differences or divisions, who are opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; to the policy of the present Administration; to the extension of Slavery into Free Territory; in favor of the admission of Kansas as a Free State; of restoring the action of the Federal Government to the principles of Washington and Jefferson; and for the purpose of presenting candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President, do Resolved: That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence, and embodied in the Federal Constitution are essential to the preservation of our Republican institutions, and that the Federal Constitution, the rights of the States, and the union of the States, must and shall be preserved. Resolved: That, with our Republican fathers, we hold it to be a self-evident truth, that all men are endowed with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior design of our Federal Government were to secure these rights to all persons under its exclusive jurisdiction; that, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished Slavery in all our National Territory, ordained that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its existence or extension therein. That we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislation, of any

individual, or association of individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States, while the present Constitution shall be maintained. Reso1ved: That theResolved: Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign powers over the Territories of the United States for their government; and that in the exercise of this power, it is both the right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism---Polygamy, and Slavery. Resolved: That while the Constitution of the United States was ordained and established by the people, in order to ‘‘form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty,’’ and contain ample provision for the protection of the life, liberty, and property of every citizen, the dearest Constitutional rights of the people of Kansas have been fraudulently and violently taken from them. Their Territory has been invaded by an armed force; Spurious and pretended legislative, judicial, and executive officers have been set over them, by whose usurped authority, sustained by the military power of the government, tyrannical and unconstitutional laws have been enacted and enforced; The right of the people to keep and bear arms has been infringed. Test oaths of an extraordinary and entangling nature have been imposed as a condition of exercising the right of suffrage and holding office. The right of an accused person to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury has been denied; The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, has been violated; They have been deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law; That the freedom of speech and of the press has been abridged; The right to choose their representatives has been made of no effect; Murders, robberies, and arsons have been instigated and encouraged, and the offenders have been allowed to go unpunished; That all these things have been done with the knowledge, sanction, and procurement of the present National Administration; and that for this high crime against the Constitution, the Union, and humanity, we arraign that Administration, the President, his advisers, agents, supporters, apologists, and accessories, either before or after the fact, before the country and before

48 Political Parties the world; and that it is our fixed purpose to bring the actual perpetrators of these atrocious outrages and their accomplices to a sure and condign punishment thereafter. Resolved, That Kansas should be immediately admitted as a state of this Union, with her present Free Constitution, as at once the most effectual way of securing to her citizens the enjoyment of the rights and privileges to which they are entitled, and of ending the civil strife now raging in her territory. Resolved, That the highwayman’s plea, that ‘‘might makes right,’’ embodied in the Ostend Circular, was in every respect unworthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any Government or people that gave it their sanction. Resolved, That a railroad to the Pacific Ocean by the most central and practicable route is imperatively demanded by the interests of the whole country, and that the Federal Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction, and as an auxiliary thereto, to the immediate construction of an emigrant road on the line of the railroad. Resolved, That appropriations by Congress for the improvement of rivers and harbors, of a national character, required for the accommodation and security of our existing commerce, are authorized by the Constitution, and justified by the obligation of the Government to protect the lives and property of its citizens. Resolved, That we invite the affiliation and cooperation of the men of all parties, however differing from us in other respects, in support of the principles herein declared; and believing that the spirit of our institutions as well as the Constitution of our country, guarantees liberty of conscience and equality of rights among citizens, we oppose all legislation impairing their security.

1.6 Senator Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft, 1905 Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics Recorded by William L. Riordon EVERYBODY is talkin’ these days about Tammany men growin’ rich on graft, but nobody thinks of drawin’ the distinction between honest graft and dishonest graft. There’s all the difference in the world between the two. Yes, many of our men have grown rich in politics. I have myself. I’ve made a big fortune out of the game,

and I’m gettin’ richer every day, but I’ve not gone in for dishonest graft---blackmailin’ gamblers, saloonkeepers, disorderly people, etc.---and neither has any of the men who have made big fortunes in politics. There’s an honest graft, and I’m an example of how it works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin’: ‘‘I seen my opportunities and I took ’em.’’ Just let me explain by examples. My party’s in power in the city, and it’s goin’ to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, I’m tipped off, say, that they’re going to layout a new park at a certain place. I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which nobody cared particular for before. Ain’t it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a profit on my investment and foresight? of course, it is. Well, that’s honest graft. Or supposin’ it’s a new bridge they’re goin’ to build. I get tipped off and I buy as much property as I can that has to be taken for approaches. I sell at my own price later on and drop some more money in the bank. Wouldn’t you? It’s just like lookin’ ahead in Wall Street or in the coffee or cotton market. It’s honest graft, and I’m lookin’ for it every day in the year. I will tell you frankly that I’ve got a good lot of it, too. I’ll tell you of one case. They were goin’ to fix up a big park, no matter where. I got on to it, and went lookin’ about for land in that neighborhood. I could get nothin’ at a bargain but a big piece of swamp, but I took it fast enough and held on to it. What turned out was just what I counted on. They couldn’t make the park complete without Plunkitt’s swamp, and they had to pay a good price for it. Anything dishonest in that? Up in the watershed I made some money, too. I bought up several bits of land there some years ago and made a pretty good guess that they would be bought up for water purposes later by the city. Somehow, I always guessed about right, and shouldn’t I enjoy the profit of my foresight? It was rather amusin’ when the condemnation commissioners came along and found piece after piece of the land in the name of George Plunkitt of the Fifteenth Assembly District, New York City. They wondered how I knew just what to buy. The answer is---I seen my opportunity and I took it. I haven’t confined myself to land; anything that pays is in my line. For instance, the city is repavin’ a street and has several hundred thousand old granite blocks to sell. I am on hand to buy, and I know just what they are worth. How? Never mind that. I had a sort of monopoly of this business for a while, but once a newspaper tried to do me. It got some outside men to

1.6 Senator Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft come over from Brooklyn and New Jersey to bid against me. Was I done? Not much. I went to each of the men and said: ‘‘How many of these 250,000 stones do you want?’’ One said 20,000, and another wanted 15,000, and other wanted 10,000. I said: ‘‘All right, let me bid for the lot, and I’ll give each of you all you want for nothin’.’’ They agreed, of course. Then the auctioneer yelled: ‘‘How much am I bid for these 50,000 fine pavin’ stones?’’ ‘‘Two dollars and fifty cents,’’ says I. ‘‘Two dollars and fifty cents!’’ screamed the auctioneer. ‘‘Oh, that’s a joke! Give me a real bid.’’ He found the bid was real enough. My rivals stood silent. I got the lot for $2.50 and gave them their share. That’s how the attempt to do Plunkitt ended, and that’s how all such attempts end. I’ve told you how I got rich by honest graft. Now, let me tell you that most politicians who are accused of robbin’ the city get rich the same way. They didn’t steal a dollar from the city treasury. They just seen their opportunities and took them. That is why, when a reform administration comes in and spends a half million dollars in tryin’ to find the public robberies they talked about in the campaign, they don’t find them. The books are always all right. The money in the city treasury is all right. Everything is all right. All they can show is that the Tammany heads of departments looked after their friends, within the law, and gave them what opportunities they could to make honest graft. Now, let me tell you that’s never goin’ to hurt

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Tammany with the people. Every good man looks after his friends, and any man who doesn’t isn’t likely to be popular. If I have a good thing to hand out in private life, I give it to a friend. Why shouldn’t X do the same in public life? Another kind of honest graft. Tammany has raised a good many salaries. There was an awful howl by the reformers, but don’t you know that Tammany gains ten votes for everyone it lost by salary raisin’? The Wall Street banker thinks it shameful to raise a department clerk’s salary from $1500 to $1800 a year, but every man who draws a salary himself says: ‘‘That’s all right. I wish it was me.’’ And he feels very much like votin’ the Tammany ticket on election day, just out of sympathy. Tammany was beat in 1901 because the people were deceived into believin’ that it worked dishonest graft. They didn’t draw a distinction between dishonest and honest graft, but they saw that some Tammany men grew rich, and supposed they had been robbin’ the city treasury or levyin’ blackmail on disorderly houses, or workin’ in with the gamblers and lawbreakers. As a matter of policy, if nothing else, why should the Tammany leaders go into such dirty business, when there is so much honest graft lyin’ around when they are in power? Did you ever consider that? Now, in conclusion, I want to say that I don’t own a dishonest dollar. If my worst enemy was given the job of writin’ my epitaph when I’m gone, he couldn’t do more than write: ‘‘George W. Plunkitt. He Seen His Opportunities, and He Took ’Em.’’

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Section 2 Elections

Introduction In democracies, voting in free elections to choose leaders is the principal means by which citizens control government. Not only do elections have the potential to serve as institutions of government legitimation, accountability, and popular influence, but historians and political scientists long have debated their role in shaping the dynamics (and continuities) of American political life. One such legendary scholar, Walter Dean Burnham, produced a classic study of ‘‘critical elections’’ in which he postulated that roughly once a generation the American voters debated big questions about the constitutional order and the future of U.S. government. These ‘‘surrogates for revolution,’’ as he described them, were moments of crisis, ideological polarization, and high participation that resulted in lasting and significant transformations of American politics and public policy. This theory of realignment has been a source of enormous scholarly controversy and discussion, and it reminds us that elections are central to how scholars and ordinary citizens explain patterns and transformations in American political history. As much as elections and campaigns can serve as engines of political change, they also have undergone

their own significant evolution. The shifting nature of communication and media technology, campaign finance, and party organization and nomination rules has dramatically remade American electoral politics over the years. So have restrictions and expansions of voting rights. At the start of the American republic, the right to vote was restricted to property-owning men. African Americans won formal access to the ballot box with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, but Jim Crow restrictions effectively disenfranchised in the South until passage of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Women suffragists struggled for more than a century for the right to vote, finally securing the vote with the Nineteenth Amendment of 1920. In 1971, voting rights were extended to citizens 18 years or older. Ironically, at the same time as opportunities to vote have expanded in recent decades, levels of this traditional form of participation have declined. The four essays that follow shed light on the evolving shape and impact of elections on American political development. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

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Elections in American Political Development Andrew J. Polsky Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, CUNY

Introduction

address the first historical pattern, the continuity of electoral politics derived from the stability of the underlying constitutional order. Part of the explanation for the limited impact of elections on American political development lies in the effectiveness of the original constitutional design at frustrating popular majorities. In the following section, I take up the second pattern, change in the electoral arena. Recalling the schematic model introduced at the outset, I examine shifts involving the various actors who have been at the center of American elections. But despite the dynamism of the electoral arena, change has not translated into political development as Orren and Skowronek define it. To connect elections to development, we need to look at the third historical pattern, the recurrent (or, as some would have it, cyclical) dimension of electoral politics that reflects the sequential rise and decline of dominant partisan regimes or governing coalitions. Periodically these have translated triumphs at the polls into broad mandates to remake policies and institutions. Combining popular legitimacy with governing authority, regime leaders have been major agents of political development in the United States.

Elections pose a paradox for understanding American political development. Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek define political development as a ‘‘durable shift in political authority’’ (2004, 123). Because authority in a republican system of government is vested in those holding public office, the people themselves, through the act of voting, cannot transfer authority---that is, they cannot directly produce political development. It follows that when we attempt to trace the creation, transformation, or dismantling of institutions exercising legal authority over the whole of American society, elections will not be the immediate or proximate cause. That said, elections have played a crucial role in American political development by altering the set of political actors charged with the power to make decisions. The periods marked by broad policy shifts and institutional innovation---for example, the advent of the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans in 1801, the Civil War, the New Deal, the Great Society, and the so-called Reagan Revolution---followed significant shifts in voting patterns. Even elections not typically identified as ‘‘transformative’’ have yielded dramatic shifts in authority. The relationship between electoral politics and American political development can be understood, I suggest in this essay, by exploring three historical patterns. I begin with a schematic model that identifies certain generic actors engaged in electoral politics. This framework points to the decisive role of political leadership and elite actors in shaping electoral choice and, by extension, the impact of election contests. I then

The Electoral Universe: A Theoretical Framework Four types of actors have played roles in American electoral politics across time: voters, office-seeking politicians, policy seekers, and preference (or opinion) shapers. I begin with basic claims about their respective

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54 Elections interests in elections. The model I suggest leans heavily on the rational choice tradition in political science. As applied to the world of elections, this literature suggests that individuals will be guided by self-interest and will weigh the relative costs and benefits of participation. At the same time, however, I also draw on literature that recognizes politics as a sphere in which people’s self-understanding may be shaped by discourse (Smith 1992, 1--36). The resulting framework stresses the importance of leadership in shaping electoral outcomes and, more important, in determining the effects of elections on larger patterns of policy making and political development. Let us begin with the individual citizen as a potential voter who must decide whether and for whom to cast a ballot on Election Day. The ‘‘calculus’’ about whether to vote may be represented as a simple function:1 R ¼ PB þ D  C R signifies the reward or expected utility the voter receives for voting. If it is positive, the citizen votes; otherwise she or he abstains. P stands for the probability that the citizen’s vote will determine the outcome of the election and B represents the expected benefit to him or her from the victory of the preferred candidate. As scholars have long appreciated, P is typically so low as to severely discount any possible benefit from the election of the candidate the citizen favors. C represents the cost of voting, broadly understood to include both the cost of learning enough about the choices to make a calculation about the benefit of one candidate defeating another and the cost of voting itself. The latter may vary widely, determined by such factors as the scheduling of the election, the location of the polling place, and the requirements for establishing eligibility to vote. Because C may be significant and the PB figure will be low, much depends on whether the citizen finds positive value in the act of voting itself. This calculation is reflected in D, which represents the expressive value of voting---fulfilling one’s sense of civic duty (hence the D), standing up for one’s preferred candidate, and the like. Two aspects of the voting function merit comment. First, much depends on the flow of information to the average citizen, for this influences the benefit calculation (B), may increase the expressive value of the act of casting a ballot (D), and constitutes a major element in the cost of voting (C). The citizen needs information to assess the benefits and costs likely to ensue following the victory of any candidate and, if one contender seems especially estimable, may inspire the citizen to view the act of voting for that candidate as a

worthwhile statement in its own right. Beyond that, information may be crucial to shaping voter preferences and even how a voter understands his or her selfinterest.2 Some citizens approach the political world with a clear, coherent set of principles---an ideology--but most do not.3 For the ordinary person, politics can appear bewildering, the issues distant to everyday concerns, the possible impact of political programs and policy proposals on one’s welfare obscure. Rather than treat individual preferences or interests as fixed, then, it makes more sense to treat them as subject under some conditions to redefinition through political discourse.4 Particularly in times of rapid social change or political crisis, when old political certainties are called into question, individual preferences are likely to be more unstable and fluid. Second, the rational citizen has little incentive to become informed. Unless a person derives some pleasure from learning about politics, the cost is likely to outweigh any possible gain. Yes, the well-informed citizen can reach a more accurate judgment about the relative merits of the candidates, increasing the confidence in the benefit (B) calculation. But the probability of casting the decisive ballot remains tiny. And although expressive satisfaction (D) may increase when a voter stands up to be counted for a candidate in whom she or he strongly believes, political information is just as likely to sow doubts.5 Meanwhile, the cost of becoming more knowledgeable can be steep, especially for those who lack knowledge of the political system. Evidence suggests that American voters in the main have paid little attention to politics. The poorly educated, semiliterate immigrant voter of the mid-19th century could be readily influenced by appeals to ethnicity, especially after being plied with liquor, and knew little about the major national issues of the day (Bensel 2004). His modern counterpart is much better educated, yet still pays little attention to politics. According to Robert Putnam, the average college graduate today knows about as much about political affairs as a 1940s high school graduate (Putnam 2000, 35; similarly, see Patterson 2002, 18--19). It is important to note, too, that citizens with limited political awareness may be readily influenced by any political information that reaches them. John Zaller points out that they do not detect bias or filter messages at odds with their existing beliefs. As a result, they accept all political messages they receive and convert these into the considerations that determine their decision on Election Day (Zaller 1995 [1992]). Other kinds of political actors have far more at stake in elections---and thus have powerful incentives to

Elections in American Political Development

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A woman reviews her selections in the privacy of a voting booth. Nationwide, officials reported record numbers of new voter registrations prior to the November 2004 elections. (Dana Smillie)

meet the information needs of certain voters. Officeseeking politicians stand to gain or lose the most in an election contest. Achievement of their goals---which may include securing power, continuing a political career, making good public policy, or gaining a visible platform to influence public discussion---depends on electoral victory. To win competitive elections, candidates need to get more of their supporters to the polls on election day than do their opponents. A politician can help his or her prospects by lowering the information costs for citizens who appear likely to vote the right way. This help has assumed a variety of forms in different historical periods. In the mid-19th century office seekers sought to identify potential supporters based on certain ethnic or cultural markers and put a party-printed ballot in their hands (Bensel 2004). In the early 21st century, a Democratic candidate mounts a phone campaign to urge union members to vote while a Republican might place the calls to an evangelical church congregation. Politicians also recognize that a one-sided flow of messages in their favor can have a major impact on voting behavior, mobilizing

supporters by increasing their satisfaction in standing up to be counted and persuading the undecided. Partylinked newspapers in the 1800s often were the sole source of printed information for loyal voters and thus stimulated turnout for party candidates. Overt media bias is much less common in the modern era, but politicians can compensate: incumbents seeking reelection or wealthy individuals use their vast advantage in campaign spending to dominate the airwaves and create a near-monopoly of messages slanted their way.6 In supplying information citizens can use, office seekers frame the political choices available to the electorate. Individual voters matter as the politicians’ targets, as the ‘‘consumers’’ for campaign ‘‘products’’ or packages. Adopting the language of the marketplace, the voter is a ‘‘price-taker’’ rather than a ‘‘price-setter’’: someone who may choose between campaign package A or B but who has no direct role in defining the content of either package. Of course, since victory requires securing a plurality of votes, politicians have an incentive to take positions that will appeal to the largest number of voters. Thus some versions of formal

56 Elections democratic theory posit that competing candidates, in their quest to win, will converge on the position favored by the median voter (the median voter hypothesis).7 How politicians have acquired information about public opinion accordingly is an important part of the development of American electoral politics. But the consumer metaphor suggests that politicians might pursue other approaches to electoral success, too. For example, just as consumer tastes are not fixed, so, too, may public opinion be influenced by the flow of political messages that reach citizens.8 Where multiple issues lie before the public, office seekers decide which ones to stress; even where an issue compels attention, politicians may highlight some facet that plays to their strength; and various, quite different policies can be advocated to ‘‘solve’’ any one issue. Voters choose a package on Election Day, but they exercise little real sovereignty. Conversely, politicians do not have a free hand in defining their campaign package. Policy seekers stand to gain or lose so much from a policy that they are prepared to invest scarce resources to influence the policy outcome. Where that outcome may rest on election results, policy seekers try to influence the positions candidates take or their electoral prospects. Moreover, unlike the average voter, policy seekers possess resources that candidates need as they try to persuade citizens and mobilize their backers to vote. Policy seekers long have played an important role in American electoral politics. Interest groups, for example, have sought to influence election results for several generations. Other policy seekers have emerged or declined with changes in the electoral system: the patronage-minded party precinct workers prominent during the late-19th century have given way in the modern era to citizen activists motivated by candidate issue commitments. Unlike voters, policy seekers cannot be expected merely to ‘‘take’’ whatever package a candidate presents, for they can have a significant impact on the election outcome should they choose to limit or increase their investment of resources. In defining campaign commitments, then, politicians and policy seekers have a reciprocal relationship.9 Politicians do not have a monopoly in framing the choice put before the voters. In a contested election, of course, there will be competing candidates, each trying to influence voters to see the choice in terms that work to his or her best advantage. Where campaign resources are not extremely unequal, the effect will be a twosided flow of messages to the electoral audience. In addition, policy seekers may influence how voters see the election. Interest groups may endorse a candidate,

which sends a message to their members and a cue to unaffiliated citizens about where she or he stands on issues of concern; the type of citizen activist involved in a campaign signals to neighbors what an unknown candidate---or, more generally, an entire party (Carmines and Stimson 1989)---stands for. Finally, information may be supplied by actors not tied to either campaign. The modern mass media share in shaping preferences by influencing voter perceptions of the issues and candidates. Although the structure of the media may introduce elements of bias into campaign coverage, explicit bias has become much less common than in the era of the partisan press. This model points to elite actors as the dominant figures in shaping election outcomes and determining the impact of elections on American political development. Voters choose between two (occasionally three) packages that have been defined by candidates, policy seekers, and other opinion shapers. The winners on Election Day then gain the authority to translate their campaign package into public policy. Scholars have found that the vast majority of campaign promises are fulfilled, but this does not imply strong voter sovereignty (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). Promises may be worded broadly, such that any number of actions may be depicted as satisfying a campaign commitment. Furthermore, campaign promises may have been made to gain the backing of policy seekers; ordinary voters neither know nor care about most issues on which a campaign takes a position. By determining who shall make policy, then, elections may have important consequences. But those consequences will be defined far more by political elites than by the citizens.

The Constitution: A Framework for Electoral Continuity The U.S. Constitution establishes a limited framework that has defined the basis for elections to national offices for more than two centuries. The Constitution specifies the length of term for each office and thus the frequency of elections. In designing a lower legislative chamber with two-year terms, the framers adopted a well-established American practice. The lower house of colonial and then state legislatures was filled by annual or biannual elections. Anticipating the possibility that a short legislative tenure might produce frequent political upheaval, the framers adopted staggered six-year terms for the upper house, thereby ensuring that no single election could lead to a complete sweep of the national government (Federalist No. 62). The framers also carried forward the principle that elections would

Elections in American Political Development be organized around subnational geographic political units. Under the constitutional system, state legislatures or citizens choose presidential electors and U.S. senators; members of the House of Representatives are mostly selected by smaller geographic units within states.10 Geographic apportionment of legislative members and presidential electors ensures a high degree of responsiveness to discrete local constituencies. The system has promoted one of the enduring features of American political development: the organization of the polity on geographic lines into distinct sectional groupings.11 As Madison pointed out in Federalist No. 10, the United States as a continental republic would necessarily embrace diverse interests, each grounded in a particular location. By structuring elections around place, the new system ensured that diverse local interests would each find their own voice in Congress. Geographic election districts did more than just to ensure a voice for particularism within the system of national government. Through the system of geographic selection of national officials, the framers tamed the very force they most feared would unsettle the system they designed. In Federalist No. 10, Madison warns that the masses of people who lack property might translate their numbers into a popular assault on property rights. But to exercise their power, the masses would first have to perceive that they share a common interest. Here geographic diversity works against them, for citizens would see their interests in narrow, parochial terms, grounded in the particular forms of economic activity of their home district or state. In such a system, any perception of a broader collective interest would be slow to take shape---a process requiring lengthy deliberation, one in which the sharp edges of redistributive class policies would be sanded smooth in the effort to forge majority agreement among lawmakers representing very different forms of property and enterprise. The framers, in short, designed an electoral order with a strong antidevelopment bias. Those who wish to preserve the distribution of authority have a far easier task than those who hope to transform it. The Constitution also defined the terrain upon which most struggles over the right to vote would be fought. Recognizing that any national rule on suffrage qualifications would imperil ratification, the framers chose instead to let each state define its own franchise. For much of American history, voting rights became a matter for states to address. Some national authority might be inferred from Article IV, section 4, which pledges the United States to sustain in each state ‘‘A Republican Form of Government.’’ But no branch of the national government interpreted this to imply anything about

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the scope of the franchise.12 After the Civil War, the addition of the Fifteenth Amendment seemed to define a broad national electorate, but political forces combined to undercut any national commitment to uphold voting rights. With the exception of women’s suffrage (the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920), the national government took little action to uphold voting rights until the modern civil rights era.

Disjointed Change in the American Electoral System Notwithstanding the continuity imposed by a stable constitutional framework, the 21st-century American electoral system bears only a limited resemblance to the one in place at the time of the nation’s founding. Over time, the eligible voting population has expanded dramatically; formal popular control over the national government has widened; vast discrepancies in the formal capacity of individual voters to influence election outcomes have been lessened; the voting booth has become placid and private; the political organizations and actors shaping elections have changed; and new mechanisms for sharing election-related information have been introduced. These developments, often driven by different forces, occurred at different times. Thus, although it is possible to periodize certain aspects of the American electoral universe, any effort to assign overarching labels seems likely to obscure as much as it would clarify.13 I propose instead to identify a number of significant changes along different dimensions of the electoral system and to periodize where appropriate within each dimension. We might begin at the bottom, so to speak, with the long-term broadening of the electorate itself. The universe of eligible voters began to expand in the early national period; in the modern ere, there are few formal exclusions. Alexander Keyssar points out in his recent history of the franchise that the path to electoral inclusion has not been smooth (Right to Vote). Even as certain groups gained the right to vote, it was taken away from others. For instance, the elimination of property qualifications or taxpayer status for white males in most states from the 1790s to the 1830s was accompanied by state constitutions, laws, and judicial rulings that denied suffrage to African Americans, sometimes stripping away voting rights established at the time of the Revolution (Keyssar, Right to Vote, ch. 3). In certain eras, notably the two decades after 1890, contraction of the right to vote became even more common. ‘‘Redeemer’’ governments in the South disenfranchised black voters (and not a few poor whites) during the

58 Elections Progressive Era, whereas in the North, self-styled reformers introduced personal registration requirements and other changes to discourage working-class immigrants from voting (Keyssar, Right to Vote, ch. 4--5; see also Perman 2001). The effect of the rules changes was to raise sharply the cost (C) of voting, overwhelming either the potential benefit (B) or the expressive value of casting a ballot (D). Still, even when we appreciate the complexity of the story, the fact remains that over time groups once barred from electoral participation now find the doors open, largely as the result of their own struggles. The Nineteenth Amendment eliminated the greatest single barrier by extending voting rights to women; the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other measures of the civil rights era restored the vote to African Americans and marked the return of the national state as a guarantor of suffrage; and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the voting age to 18. Electoral expansion and contraction played a part in broader political developments, but it is unclear how much significance to attach to the size of the voting universe. Early expansion preceded by a short interval and appears to have helped trigger the emergence of the mass party organizations of the Jacksonian period. To the degree that mass parties played a role in policy outcomes and institutional developments of the 1830s and after (including the dismantling of the Second Bank of the United States, the Mexican War, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and more), then-universal white manhood suffrage might be seen as a precondition for those results. But franchise expansion itself was not the immediate cause of any durable shift in governing authority in the antebellum era. Rather, new types of men came to the political foreground, winning elections and thereby securing the power to enact policy change. Some have argued for the importance of franchise contraction in the late-19th and early 20th centuries in accounting for broader policy shifts. Scholars such as Walter Dean Burnham have connected disenfranchisement to the partisan electoral order that prevailed after the 1896 election, the so-called System of 1896 (1970). According to this perspective, elections in the next three decades were generally noncompetitive, with the Republicans dominant through much of the country and Democrats in tight control over the overwhelmingly white southern electorate. Even here, however, recent scholarship has called into doubt whether a System of 1896 actually existed, which in turn would raise questions about the impact of voter disenfranchisement during the Progressive Era (Mayhew 2002). A more recent pattern has been the decline of turnout among potential voters. Turnout figures suggest

long-term disengagement from the electoral process dating back to the New Deal, possibly earlier. Each generation appears less likely to vote than the one before it. This decline has occurred despite noteworthy attempts to remove the barriers to voting and to promote registration (Patterson 2002, ch. 1). Various explanations have been advanced for the downward trend---an overall loss of civic engagement (see Putnam 2000; Patterson 2002, 14--16), the ready availability of nonpolitical mass entertainment (Patterson 2002, 20--21), the protracted nature of modern campaigns (Patterson 2002, 21--22), and more. Close electoral contests can boost turnout---a result, it appears, of added media attention that brings more information to the attention of potential voters (Aldrich 1995)---as can expensive mobilization drives by campaign organizations and independent groups. Nevertheless, despite sometime Herculean efforts to bring out the vote---the 2004 presidential election saw well-funded, carefully orchestrated projects across the political spectrum to get new voters to the polls---turnout figures still fall far below those reported in the late 1800s and below the percentages attained between the New Deal and the 1960s.14 Once again we need to ask whether lower turnout since 1960 has consequences for American political development. If those who vote reflect the opinions of the population as a whole (that is, there is no ‘‘turnout opinion differential’’), then election outcomes are unaffected by turnout level. On the other hand, Thomas Patterson maintains that voters and nonvoters are not alike: actual voters have been older and wealthier, and they tend to hold more intense opinions, than those who do not go to the polls. In partisan terms Republicans have gained an edge from the turnout opinion differential, sufficient to tip close elections in their favor and give the GOP (Grand Old Party) control of the White House and Congress in 2000. Patterson adds that if the electorate mirrored the views of the entire population, candidates in both parties might have moderated their positions, aiming for the median voter (Patterson 2002, 12--13). But as I suggested earlier, political elites shape preferences and define agendas. Were nonvoters as well informed as voters, the former would have absorbed more elite-generated political messages, which in turn would have influenced their views. It is far from certain that declining turnout can account for the policy shifts that have occurred since 1960. The early expansion of voting rights in the United States quickly altered the framers’ design for a system of essentially nominal popular control of the national government. The Constitution mandated popular elections only for the House of Representatives. Each state

Elections in American Political Development legislature would choose that state’s U.S. senators and decide how to pick electors to vote for the president. But this vision of an attenuated republic could not survive franchise expansion and the accompanying ethos of popular sovereignty. By 1820, only nine states continued to permit the state legislature to choose presidential electors; by 1832, South Carolina alone denied citizens the right to vote for presidential electors. The presidential contest had been transformed into a popular election (Aldrich 1995, 106--107). Change did not stop there. As Charles Stewart III demonstrates, elections for the U.S. Senate were popularized well before the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment (ratified in 1913) required the direct election of senators. Party organizations in the 1830s converted contests for state legislature into surrogate battles for U.S. Senate seats (Stewart 1992, 69--70). The celebrated Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858 occurred because both men sought to put their respective parties in control of the Illinois legislature that in turn would choose the state’s U.S. senator. It took far longer to begin to equalize the weight of each citizen’s vote, and constitutional arrangements still limit the degree of equality. The Constitution is silent on how states shall apportion their seats in the House of Representatives. As for the states themselves, fears of urban unrest led to early moves to limit the influence of population centers in the state legislature by apportioning seats on some basis other than population. Malapportionment then perpetuated itself, for state lawmakers had no interest in redrawing district boundaries to eliminate their seats. The same principles typically were carried over in the drawing of district lines for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Not until the early 1960s, beginning with the decision in Baker v. Carr (1962), did the U.S. Supreme Court insist on the principle of ‘‘one man, one vote’’ and declare malapportionment unconstitutional.15 By then, demographic trends favored suburbs rather than inner cities; urban voters had missed their chance to be the dominant popular voice in American politics. Even with judicial affirmation and federal enforcement of ‘‘one man, one vote,’’ equality in voter power in selecting national government officials remains incomplete. The legacy of the crucial constitutional compromise over the Senate continues to cast its long shadow. So long as each state enjoys equal representation in the upper chamber, citizens in thinly populated states (for example, Wyoming) will enjoy disproportionate influence in the U.S. Senate and in the electoral college. When we turn from the voters to the physical site of voting itself, striking differences emerge across time.

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Voting itself has become the most private of political acts. In the early years of the republic, the polling place was subject to a measure of oversight by leading citizens in a community. ‘‘Their physical presence at the polls was of prime importance,’’ Ronald Formisano observes, ‘‘because voting was a social act, often if not usually open’’ (1983, 129). Voice voting (viva voce) was used in some states until after the Civil War, and even printed ballots were readily distinguishable to observers because parties often used paper of different color (Bourke and DeBats 1995, 174--81). So long as the norm of social deference persisted---Formisano reports it was shaken by the American Revolution but continued to have an impact for perhaps 40 years---community notables exercised significant influence over their neighbors (Formisano 1983, 128ff). However, with the advent of Jacksonian mass politics, the polling place came under the eyes of different men. Richard Bensel describes it as rowdy and disorderly. This is not surprising since the saloon often served as the location where votes were cast. To vote, one advanced through the crowd, facing intimidation and an implicit threat of violence for voting the wrong way. Voting in the mid19th century was very much an affirmation of manhood---so much so that no respectable women would be seen in the vicinity of the polling place on Election Day (Bensel 2004, ch. 1). Fast forward to the 21stcentury voting both and the scene shifts profoundly. The introduction of the government-printed (or Australian) ballot at the end of the 19th century removed the identifying party markings; polling locations moved into public facilities such as schools; and electioneering was banned in the vicinity of the voting booth. Voting itself has ceased to be an act that openly connects a person to the larger community. To the contrary, with the ballot cast behind a curtain, the act has no audience. The remaking of the polling place points to other far-reaching changes in the set of key electoral actors. During the mass party era, which spanned the period from the late 1820s to about 1960,16 the most important figures linking voters to candidates were precinctlevel or district-level party agents. Party agents gave cues to voters (many illiterate) about how to cast their ballot, printed the ballots to distribute to voters, and gave moral support to men who might have to wade through a hostile crowd to hand in the ballot. Party elites had to satisfy organizational regulars---they could bolt to third parties or insurgents, even at last minute, or sit out an election with potentially dramatic consequences (Bensel 2004, 15). Money mattered in elections, though the sums involved were modest by any modern reckoning. Where patronage became a

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Democratic election ticket for the 1844 presidential campaign. Tickets were printed by political parties for voters to use instead of handmade ballots. (Library of Congress)

well-articulated system, a winning party could finance ongoing electoral operations by levying assessments on party members who had received patronage appointments. Party organizations declined over the 20th century, crippled by electoral reforms, civil service systems that deprived parties of patronage resources, and demographic shifts that transformed voting populations. In the early 21st century, candidates build their personal campaign organizations, draw on party-linked campaign

professionals, and raise campaign contributions from individuals and political action committees. In effect, the ambitious politician has become an entrepreneur who rents a party label for an election season to capitalize on brand-name recognition among interest groups and certain voters.17 The candidate-centered campaign hopes to excite potential citizen activists, who have become as critical to the modern electoral system as local party agents were in the mass party era. Citizen activists

Elections in American Political Development choose whether or not to back a particular candidate, and their enthusiasm depends on the perception that she or he shares their views and commitments. The activists in turn contribute money and become part of the public face of the campaign, helping to shape its image for other voters (Carmines and Stimson 1989, ch. 4). Information has remained central to electoral politics, even as the sources of information have changed. Brian Balogh suggests that the development of mechanisms for providing electoral information might be periodized into three eras (2003, 222--249). During the heyday of mass parties, they served as the key source of information for both ambitious politicians and voters. Office seekers need to know how citizens are likely to vote so that campaign resources can be allocated to make the greatest difference. Samuel Kernell (2000), in a study of the 1828 presidential campaign in Ohio, shows parties could achieve a degree of accuracy comparable to that of modern public opinion polling. Party agents also gave cues to semiliterate and illiterate voters, many of them immigrants, at time when they had little grasp of the national issues at stake (Bensel 2004), while party-subsidized newspapers provided messages embedded in a clear partisan context to middle-class readers. Balogh argues that a second information era began in the early 20th century as party organizations weakened and the electorate became more complex. Interest groups filled the information gap, signaling to office seekers what their constituents wanted while also, through group endorsements, identifying sympathetic candidates to group members. The third era followed soon after the advent of candidate-centered campaigns. Beginning around 1970, candidate organizations made use of advances in polling techniques to track voter opinion on an ongoing (even daily) basis (Balogh 2003). Meanwhile, to meet voters’ information needs, campaigns relied on paid advertisements. But in a media-saturated environment, campaigns must spend heavily to ensure that their messages are received by the ordinary citizen. The need for massive contributions---and dependence on the policy seekers who provide them---follow as an inevitable consequence.

Recurrence in Electoral Politics: Partisan Regimes, Electoral Legitimacy, and Political Development Elections have contributed to a powerful recurrent pattern in American politics, the rise and decline of dominant partisan governing coalitions or regimes, with important developmental effects. These regimes include the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, the Jacksonian

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Democrats, the Civil War Republicans, the post-1896 Industrial Republicans, the New Deal Democrats, and the Reaganite Republicans. Driven by entrepreneurial (sometimes visionary) politicians, regimes have linked three key sets of electoral actors---office seekers, policy seekers, and voters---around a core set of policy commitments. Elections establish one of the linkages that hold together these partisan coalitions, although the role of voters should not be overstated. Through their choice, they bestow on politicians the authority to translate the regime’s vision of the appropriate role of the national government into actual policies and institutions. But it is the politicians, in their capacity as officeholders, who determine the order of priorities for regime action, decide how to realize those priorities in concrete terms, and choose who shall implement their policy decisions. Thus, although regimes involve a measure of reciprocity among all participants, direction comes from the top. Voters remain consumers of regime policies, pricetakers, who must be kept content enough to preserve for the regime sufficient formal power to prevent the opposition from undoing its principal achievements. The partisan regime framework is an intellectual descendant of an earlier theoretical perspective, the electoral realignment model.18 According to realignment theory proponents, American electoral politics tend to be stable over several decades, a condition of ‘‘normal politics’’ in which political elites respond sluggishly to social changes, social tensions, and emerging policy issues and demands. The lack of responsiveness provokes citizens to become increasingly restive and disenchanted with politics as usual. Roughly once per generation (about every 32 to 36 years) tensions boil over in a pronounced electoral upheaval, characterized by an influx of new voters into the electorate and the movement of significant numbers of voters across party lines (not necessarily all in one direction). This yields an abrupt shift in the balance of power between the major political parties, leaving one with a decisive advantage. As the new dominant party quickly introduces policies to satisfy popular demands, it secures the long-term loyalty of the electorate that placed it in power. The realignment perspective, as this brief summary makes plain, puts voters and elections at the center of American political development: the demand for change wells up from below, the people empower their representatives to act, and political authority passes from the institutions of a discredited old order to the instruments invented by its successor. Critics of the realignment framework, however, have found much in it to challenge. They have questioned its applicability to early American history, when the

62 Elections electorate was much smaller and party coalitions lacked stability (Silbey 1991). Nor does the framework offer much insight into the period since the New Deal---as even realignment proponents concede, there has been no realignment for some seven decades. This may be due in part to new patterns of voter behavior, including an increase in the number of independent voters (to roughly one-quarter of the electorate) and a willingness by voters to split their tickets.19 Scholars also question whether the evidence supports the claims about realignment within the mass party era. David Mayhew contends that so-called realigning elections, especially 1896, are not distinct from other elections in terms of the prior degree of voter disaffection from the major parties, the magnitude of voter shifts, or the policy consequences that result (Mayhew 2002). A different kind of criticism emerges from rational choice literature that focuses on whether it makes sense to attribute electoral upheaval to the mass of ordinary voters. Given the cost to the average voter of informing and mobilizing like-minded citizens to demand policy change and the small share of the gain she or he would realize even if successful, the voter has little incentive to undertake the enormous task of mounting a challenge to normal politics. The realignment model thus lacks a plausible agent, an actor who can construct a political coalition capable of uprooting the established governing order and replacing it with one that can respond to the needs it failed to address.20 Partisan regime theory offers an answer to this problem of a missing agent.21 In the regime model, unlike realignment, the impetus for political change lies with ambitious politicians. As discussed, they have strong incentives to aggregate the resources needed to win elections, for victory alone makes it possible for them to achieve their goals. Winning office or advancing to a higher elected position is one such goal. Yet many politicians also are motivated by policy concerns, while others see their careers as a way to advance deeply held values and a few may be crusaders propelled by moral passion. If they find themselves in the minority party during a period of political stability, they have ample reason to call attention to the failings of the existing political order. They begin to tell stories about its flaws, its degrading effects, its deviation from core American values. They also offer a prescription for what has gone wrong---a package of solutions connected by the narrative to their diagnosis of what ails the nation. Through such discursive efforts, entrepreneurial politicians help overcome the information problems that complicate the choices of ordinary voters and legitimize for themselves a broad claim of authority to enact

political change. Compelling narratives are useful tools for reaching potential friendly voters: the stories simplify a complex reality, depict clear villains responsible for the current sad state of affairs, and point to the tangible benefits of overturning the status quo on Election Day. Partisan narratives reach policy seekers and attentive voters directly, through the standard contemporary information channels. Other, less-engaged voters pick up fragments and catchphrases through intermediaries. By nurturing discontent and framing it, politicians’ storytelling gives direction to voter dissatisfaction. At the same time, having spoken clearly about the failings of the old order and articulated an agenda for change, victorious regime builders can assert a mandate to reconstruct policies and institutions.22 Once given control over the policy-making branches of the national government, partisan regimes set about implementing their primary political goals. The firstorder objectives will be limited in scope, a necessary concession to the difficulties of securing power within an electoral system that requires alliances across sectional lines. (To put it another way, constitutional structures continue to exercise restraining influence even when voters give political coalitions a mandate for fundamental change.) Although the regime’s narrative will point to certain immediate tasks, it leaves open the precise means by which these are to be accomplished. Voters have no say in settling such issues. Rather, it is up to policy makers and organized policy seekers to shape the specific policies, reshape old institutions to carry them out or devise new ones, and select the personnel to implement regime goals (Polsky 2002b). In short, after the election, regime politics again become elite-level politics, with the electorate once more pushed to the sidelines. Despite the top-down character of partisan regimes, they have been the primary vehicle by which voters have shaped American political development. Periodically, voters have empowered partisan coalitions unified around a limited program of major policy innovation. The regime narrative has become the basis for the new conventional wisdom or ‘‘common sense’’ of everyday political life (Plotke 1996, ch. 6). Even the opposition has found that it must accommodate the new discourse or find itself marginalized. Each new regime has succeeded in implementing its first-order goals, resulting in major shifts in political authority. Examples include the dismantling of the Second Bank of the United States by the Jacksonians, the abolition of slavery by the Republicans, the construction of a two-tiered welfare state by the New Deal Democrats, and the ‘‘unbuilding’’ of parts of that state during the

Elections in American Political Development Reagan era. These policy changes persisted, too, because regime politicians used their control over national institutions to preserve their accomplishments when electoral support weakened.

Conclusion: Pattern and Contingency The historical patterns of continuity, change, and recurrence in American electoral politics allow us to explore much of the impact of elections on American political development. Concerned about the dangers of sudden shifts in popular mood and the risk the masses posed to property rights, the framers designed a system that could frustrate popular majorities. They relied on geography as a key external check on national state power. Although the system was soon popularized, it has continued to impede frequent policy transformation. Over time, the electoral system itself has become more inclusive, though voter turnout has declined in the contemporary period. Some of the important electoral actors of the past (the precinct captain, the publisher of the party newspaper) have largely disappeared, replaced by professionals skilled in the use of modern campaign technology who hire themselves out to candidates for an election season. Different though the electoral system of the 21st century may be from its predecessors, many of the changes do not have clear developmental consequences---that is, they have not led to durable shifts in political authority. In contrast, the rise of successive partisan regimes has led to recurrent bursts of far-reaching innovation in public policies and institutions, and partisan elites have used their control over the key institutions of national government to ensure that regime accomplishments endure. But the account is not yet complete. For any election holds the possibility that the outcome may trigger a shift of authority that will endure and perhaps bring in its wake other significant changes. We might call this the contingent dimension of electoral history---the short-term fluctuations that do not follow regime patterns, the drift of sectional alignments, or any other broad longitudinal trend. A couple of examples suffice to illustrate this point. In 1918, at the close of World War I, Woodrow Wilson had brought the Democrats back from near oblivion to a position approaching parity with the Republican Party, had expanded the role of the federal government in the economy through a series of wartime emergency measures, and had positioned the United States to play a major role on the world stage commensurate with its economic status. During the next two elections (the 1918 congressional contests and

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the 1920 presidential race), most of what he had achieved was undone. First the voters gave control of Congress to the Republicans in 1918, making it much easier for them to reject Wilson’s postwar global vision. Then the electorate gave the Republicans full control over the national government, so they could quickly dismantle the regulatory apparatus Wilson had erected (Polsky and Tkacheva 2002, 207--235). The developmental implications of the 1918 and 1920 elections were evident immediately, but elections have been known to produce far-reaching delayed results, too. Edward Carmines and James Stimson begin their fine study of the role of race in American politics with the 1958 off-year election, which saw the Democrats make major gains. Race was not on the agenda in 1958; the election turned on a recession and Sputnik. But by putting in place ‘‘a large and cohesive body of Democratic liberals who would not defer to southern sensibilities and southern political power over the delicate mater of race’’ and by destroying the liberal wing of the congressional Republican Party (the big losers in the election), the outcome set in motion a series of events that transformed the face of American politics. The 1958 election made possible the nomination of Barry Goldwater, the major civil rights measures of the mid-1960s, and the conservative dominance of the Republican Party that created the Reaganite regime (Carmines and Stimson 1989, xi--xii). The tendency in political science to focus on proximate or immediate causes leads us away from elections as we try to explain the durable shifts in political authority that some believe constitute American political development. After all, the actual choices about empowering one institution at the expense of another are made by those holding public office. To an extent this focus is appropriate. Voters merely choose decision makers, the first and often indeterminate link in the chain. But as these examples remind us, without that first link there is no chain.

References and Further Reading Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Balogh, Brian. 2003. ‘‘Mirrors of Desires: Interest Groups, Elections, and the Targeted Style in Twentieth-Century America.’’ In The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History. Edited by Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, 222--249. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bass, Harold F., Jr. 1991. ‘‘Background to Debate: A Reader’s Guide and Bibliography.’’ In End of Realignment? In The

64 Elections End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras. Edited by Byron E. Shafer, 141--178. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Bensel, Richard Franklin. 1984. Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880--1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Bensel, Richard Franklin. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859--1877. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Bensel, Richard Franklin. 2000. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877--1900. Cambridge, MA; New York: Cambridge University Press. Bensel, Richard Franklin. 2004. The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, MA; New York: Cambridge University Press. Bourke, Paul, and Donald DeBats. 1995. Washington County: Politics and Community in Antebellum America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton. Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Clubb, Jerome M., William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale. 1980. Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Ferguson, Thomas. 1995. Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Formisano, Ronald. 1983. The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s--1840s. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gimpel, James G., and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2004. Patchwork Nation: Sectionalism and Political Change in American Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1994. ‘‘Studying Substantive Democracy.’’ PS: Political Science & Politics 27, no. 1 (March): 9--10. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kernell, Samuel. 2000. ‘‘Life Before Polls: Ohio Politicians Predict the 1828 Presidential Vote.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 3 (September): 569--574. Key, V. O. 1955. ‘‘A Theory of Critical Elections.’’ Journal of Politics 17 (February): 3--17. Keyssar, Alexander. Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. New York: Basic Books. Mayhew, David R. 2002. Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. The Search for American Political Development. Cambridge, MA; New York: Cambridge University Press. Patterson, Thomas E. 2002. The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Perman, Michael. 2001. Struggle for Mastery: Disenfranchisement in the South, 1888--1908. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Plotke, David. 1996. Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Polsky, Andrew J. 1997. ‘‘Why Regimes? Ideas, Incentives, and Policies in American Political Orders.’’ Polity 29, no. 4 (Summer): 625--640. Polsky, Andrew J. 2000. ‘‘When Business Speaks: Political Entrepreneurship, Discourse, and Mobilization in American Partisan Regimes.’’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, no. 4 (October): 451--472. Polsky, Andrew J. 2002a. ‘‘A Theory of American Partisan Regimes.’’ Philadelphia American Politics Research Seminar, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, November 1. Polsky, Andrew J. 2002b. ‘‘‘Mr. Lincoln’s Army’ Revisited: Partisanship, Institutional Position, and Union Army Command, 1861--1865.’’ Studies in American Political Development 16, no. 2 (Fall): 176--207. Polsky, Andrew J. 2003. ‘‘The Political Economy of Partisan Regimes: Lessons from Two Republican Eras.’’ Polity 35, no. 4 (July): 595--612. Polsky, Andrew J., and Olesya Tkacheva. 2002. ‘‘Legacies versus Politics: Herbert Hoover, Partisan Conflict, and the Symbolic Appeal of Associationalism in the 1920s.’’ International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 16, no. 2 (Winter): 207--235. Popkin, Samuel, John Gorman, and Charles Phillips. 1976. ‘‘Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward and Investment Theory of Voting.’’ American Political Science Review 70 (September): 779--805. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, Simon and Schuster. Silbey, Joel. 1991. ‘‘Beyond Realignment and Realignment Theory: American Political Eras, 1789--1989.’’ In The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras. Edited by Byron E. Shafer. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, Rogers M. 1992. ‘‘If Politics Matters: Implications for a New Institutionalism,’’ Studies in American Political Development 6 (Spring): 1--36. Stewart, Charles, III. 1992. ‘‘Responsiveness in the Upper Chamber: The Constitution and the Institutional Development of Senate.’’ In The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institutional Perspective. Edited by Peter F. Nardulli, 69--70. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Rev ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Trubowitz, Peter. 1998. Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zaller, John R. 1995 [1992]. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Notes 1. Many scholars have contributed to discussion of the calculus of voting. My account is drawn from Aldrich (1995, 46--47).

Elections in American Political Development 2. In rational choice terms, if we treat a person’s interests as fixed, he or she still must calculate the cost of achieving various goals. Preferences reflect this calculation: an individual may settle for an attainable lesser goal because it can be secured at a reasonable cost in preference to a higher goal that seems unreachable. 3. On ideology among American voters, see Zaller (1995 [1992], 22ff). 4. This position has been suggested by a number of scholars (see, for example, Plotke 1996, 52). 5. Lack of citizen interest in elections is not merely a theoretical postulate. Studies of voter behavior suggest how little attention citizens pay to campaigns, although this can vary across elections (see Patterson 2002, 16--17). 6. Zaller (1995 [1992]) is particularly insightful on the impact of one-sided information flow. 7. For the classic statement of this hypothesis, see Downs (1957). 8. The two approaches may be mixed, too. Politicians may seek to mold opinion until an election looms in the immediate future, then become attentive to opinion polls and fashion their campaign approach in response (see Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). 9. Although some scholars argue that certain policy seekers (leading business interests) are the dominant figures in this relationship, I hold that politicians must remain in control to build support from a wide enough spectrum of policy seekers to assemble a coalition broad enough to win effective control of the national government. For the former view, see Ferguson (1995). My response may be found in Polsky (2000). 10. The Constitution does not direct that states divide themselves into congressional districts or that each district choose one representative. These have been common but not universal practices since the adoption of the Constitution. Early on, states sometimes had multimember house districts; more recently, states sometimes have selected one at-large House member in addition to those elected by districts. Such variations do not effect the basic argument I make. 11. Sectionalism has had powerful development consequences (see Bensel 1984, 1990, 2000; Trubowitz 1998; and Gimpel and Schuknecht 2004). 12. Keyssar notes that when Rhode Island voters in 1841 elected two separate governments under two constitutions, one with a broader franchise, neither the federal courts nor the executive branch regarded the Article IV language as obligating the national government to intervene (see Keyssar, Right to Vote, 71--76).

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13. Aldrich believes periods of rapid change in electoral politics can be grouped under the common heading of ‘‘critical eras.’’ He includes very different types of changes, however, and it is not clear what is gained by applying one label to such disparate phenomena (see Aldrich 1995). 14. There is reason to doubt the accuracy of turnout data from the 1800s, given the irregularities routinely associated with the voting process that Bensel describes in American Ballot Box in Mid-Nineteenth Century. But even if we conclude that turnout was overstated, the magnitude of the error cannot be as great as the difference between reported turnout then and now. In short, although there seems to have been significantly more cheating 150 years ago, there was also more voting. 15. For a discussion of the arguments by the majority and dissent in Baker, see Keyssar, Right to Vote, 285--87. 16. The endpoint of the mass party era is the subject of debate among scholars. Some believe that the introduction of civil service, ballot reform, in-person voter registration, and modern nonpartisan press in the late-19th century set the mass party era on the road to extinction. They have a point, but the erosion of mass parties took another 50 years to complete. For an analysis that identifies the decline of mass parties in the 1890s, see Silbey (1991). 17. For an excellent overview of the changes marking the post-1960 modern candidate-centered campaigns, see Aldrich (1995, ch. 8). 18. The literature on electoral realignment is too vast to list here. Seminal works include Key (1955); Burnham, Critical Elections; Sundquist (1983); and Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980). For an extensive bibliography, see Bass (1991, 141--178). 19. Silbey and others describe the modern period as one of postalignment or dealignment (see Silbey 1991; Aldrich 1995). 20. This argument was introduced in Popkin et al. (1976). The implications for realignment theory are developed in Ferguson (1995, ch. 1). 21. The discussion that follows builds upon my previous writings on partisan regimes (see Polsky 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). 22. Stephen Skowronek has stressed the value of securing from the electorate a broad warrant of authority for uprooting the old order. He connects this specifically to presidents from the opposition party who assume office when an old regime is failing (see Skowronek 1997).

The Revolution of 1800 Jeremy D. Bailey Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Houston

superstition, the Revolution of 1800 came about when men were no longer ‘‘hood-winked from their principles’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1084). Since Jefferson believed that most Americans were republican by nature and that the spread of science would expand the rights of men, he described the Revolution of 1800 as being both inevitable and the consequence of Republican education. In his words, the nation had weathered a storm and, thanks to the wave of public opinion and the perseverance of Republicans, was now on its republican tack.

The election of 1800, in which Thomas Jefferson was elected president and control of Congress passed from the Federalist Party to the Republican Party, was the first transfer of power from one party to another in the United States. The success of Jefferson’s party was overwhelming: Jefferson’s party gained seats in 1802 and again in 1804, when Jefferson was reelected by a wide majority; and after Jefferson’s two terms, James Madison and James Monroe, also Republicans from central Virginia, served two terms each. By the time of Monroe’s presidency, there was no national Federalist Party, which meant that electoral competition was waged between Republican factions. The last Republican president was John Quincy Adams, a former Federalist and the son of Jefferson’s electoral rival, John Adams. The election marked a permanent transfer of voter allegiance, making the election of 1800 the first of five or six periodically occurring critical realignments. According to Jefferson, the election was more than an exchange of one group of power-seeking politicians for another, for it ‘‘was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1425). In private letters written throughout his life, Jefferson credited the Revolution of 1800 to a ‘‘mighty wave of public opinion’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1086), and he believed the change in public opinion to be a victory for reason over bigotry and republicanism over monarchy. As he put it, the Revolution resulted from the project of Enlightenment: just as the Declaration of Independence had shown men that they need not bind themselves under ignorance and

The Election of 1800 Even though Jefferson spoke in terms of a tidal wave, his victory was not, by modern standards, a landslide. In fact, Jefferson almost lost. Under the existing constitutional provisions for presidential selection, presidential electors would vote for two candidates for president, and the person with the most votes would become president and the person with second most votes would become vice president. But the vice presidency was created only to ensure that the electors would make each vote count: because many of the designers of the electoral college believed that electors would vote for someone from their own state, they added the requirement that one vote had to be cast for someone out of state, hoping that electors would cast their second vote for a person with a national reputation---or as one delegate put it, a ‘‘continental character’’ (Madison 1987, 578). With the first vote going

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The Revolution of 1800 67 toward favorite sons, the second votes would coalesce on a few nationally known candidates, making it likely that one would receive a majority of the ‘‘whole Number of Electors appointed’’ (U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sec 1). But because the framers did not expect that presidential electors would take their cues from two national parties, their design made possible the country’s first extended election in 1800, when Republicans---who were organized enough that all of them cast their two votes for Jefferson and Aaron Burr but not organized enough to instruct one elector to throw away his Burr vote---gave Thomas Jefferson and their intended vice president, Burr, the same amount of votes. When the election was moved to the House of Representatives, Burr did not announce that he would refuse the presidency, and the lame-duck Federalist majority saw an opportunity to deprive Jefferson of the presidency. At the same time, some House Republicans believed that Burr had more national appeal than Jefferson, whose support was mostly in the South. Only after 36 ballots in the House, and the intervention of Alexander Hamilton, who said he feared Burr’s ambition more than Jefferson’s ideas, did Jefferson win the presidency. During the deadlock, there were rumors of plots by both parties to take the government by force, and Jefferson later said that he would have supported a new constitutional convention had the House failed to select a president. Just as Jefferson’s description of a mighty wave of public opinion omits reference to the tie with Burr, its resonance with similar claims by modern presidents requires that it be further qualified. At that time, the parties in Congress selected presidential candidates, state legislatures selected presidential electors, and suffrage laws varied throughout the states. Furthermore, the Jefferson-Burr electoral college victory over John Adams and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was close, and rested on several facts. First, Burr had outmaneuvered Hamilton in the earlier New York state elections and thus had enough allies in the state legislature to carry the state, which Adams had won in the previous election. Second, Virginia, from which Adams had received some electoral votes in 1796, had become a winner-take-all state, which meant that Republicans could expect to get all of that state’s electoral votes. Third, the eight-vote margin of victory might have been less than the amount of electoral votes allotted under the three-fifths clause to southern states for their nonvoting slaves. In short, Jefferson may have indeed won the contest of public opinion before him, but it was a difficult contest, and it concerned a different kind of public opinion.

Principles The partisan contest of 1800 was the culmination of differences of principle that emerged in the 1790s. In that decade, Jefferson served alongside Hamilton in George Washington’s cabinet, retired into private life, and then, with Madison, founded the Republican Party. Washington often sought advice from his entire cabinet rather than from the department head whose expertise and responsibility were more closely related to the issue at hand, and Jefferson, who was secretary of state, often disagreed with Hamilton, who was treasury secretary. Two such occasions illustrate the principles at stake. In 1791, Washington asked whether the Constitution allowed Congress the authority to create a bank, and Jefferson and Hamilton offered different conclusions based on opposing interpretations of the Constitution. The question of the bank arose in the context of Hamilton’s ambitious financial plan, which included the controversial assumption of the states’ debts---resolved only by a deal with Jefferson that the capital be located further south---and presupposed a prominent place for the commercial elites of the northeast. Hamilton argued that the government held the power to incorporate a bank because the national government was sovereign with respect to certain objects, such as regulating money and collecting taxes, and that creating a bank was an inherent feature of sovereignty. Furthermore, Hamilton offered a broad interpretation of the necessary and proper clause in Article I of the Constitution, asserting that the phrase was a test of expediency: since Congress could more ably carry enumerated duties with a bank, the power to create a bank was implied. Jefferson’s argument was also twofold. First, though the national government enjoyed explicit powers under the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment reserved remaining powers to the states or the people. Thus, instead of being an assumed feature of sovereignty, the authority to create a bank would have had to have been delegated specifically by the people. Second, Jefferson denied that the power to create a bank could be implied from the other enumerated powers given to Congress, since Congress could carry out its delegated powers without creating a bank. Whereas Hamilton intended to give any power to Congress that would be convenient, Jefferson preferred that implied powers be limited to those that were absolutely necessary. Washington sided with Hamilton. Two years later, the question of implied executive powers arose when Washington asked his cabinet whether he should declare neutrality between Great

68 Elections Britain and France. Since U.S. commerce benefited from trade with Britain, since many Americans felt indebted to France for coming to their aid in the War for Independence, since the United States had a standing treaty of alliance with France, and since France had recently undergone a revolution, neutrality offered a way out a difficult situation and would allow Washington to put an end to efforts by U.S. citizens to aid either of the warring nations. Again, Hamilton and Jefferson disagreed. Hamilton argued that the United States need not observe a treaty with France, since France was under a new form of government and since treaties were agreements between governments rather than peoples. Jefferson favored maintaining neutrality but argued that Washington should refrain from formally declaring it, if only to keep U.S. intentions secret. As a compromise, Washington announced that the nation was in a state of peace and avoided the word neutrality, but newspapers published the proclamation under that very title. The differences between Hamilton and Jefferson were deepened by Hamilton’s defense of Washington’s proclamation against criticisms that the president had exceeded his constitutional authority. Taking the pseudonym Pacificus, Hamilton asserted that foreign relations were naturally executive and that the constitutional limitations on the executive in foreign relations, such as Congress’ power to declare war, must be read strictly. He pointed to the difference between the vesting clauses of Articles I and II to show that Article II seemed to confer a broad executive power upon the president instead of a list of powers ‘‘herein granted’’ to Congress. Then, he offered an even broader argument from the nature of execution: since he who executes the laws must first interpret their meaning, presidents must judge whether an existing treaty obligates the United States to a particular policy. In short, Hamilton seemed to argue that the executive power included the power to decide if and when a treaty would apply. Jefferson worried that Hamilton’s arguments would become common doctrine, and he enlisted Madison to respond. With Jefferson’s assistance, Madison assumed the name Helvidius and argued that the power to say whether the nation was neutral was more legislative than executive, because Congress alone possesses the authority to change the state of the nation from peace to war. Furthermore, since treaties are more like laws than they are like executions of laws, treaties are closer to the legislative branch. On top of these arguments about the Constitution, Madison added a warning: since presidents will find glory in war making, it would be dangerous to

leave them the power to decide when and whether a war would be commenced or concluded. Central to the arguments over the bank and the neutrality proclamation were opposing interpretations of the Constitution. In each case, Hamilton argued that the Constitution conferred upon the U.S. government every power requisite to the tasks of governing. Since all respectable governments create banks and declare neutrality, the only question was deciding which department of government was allotted those powers by the Constitution. Under this construction, the necessary and proper and vesting clauses make the Constitution able to meet the demands of a world in which banks are necessary and in which treaties are complicated by revolution. Conversely, Jefferson and Madison rejected the assumption that the Constitution implied a general power to promote the public good. For them, the Constitution’s grants of power were actually limits on what the national government may do and, as such, were protections of the rights of the people and the states. That Washington sided with Hamilton in each case added to Jefferson’s growing suspicion that the Federalists wanted to make the president more like the British king. In the Federal Convention of 1787, Hamilton had proposed lifetime tenure for the president and members of the Senate. Jefferson later said that, during their time in Washington’s cabinet, Jefferson heard Hamilton characterize the Constitution as a stepping stone to a more energetic government, such as the monarchy in Great Britain. When the first Congress had considered how to address the president, John Adams proposed the title, ‘‘his highness the President of the United States and Protector of their Liberties.’’ And although Jefferson never doubted Washington’s allegiance to the republican form of government, he believed that some of Washington’s ceremonial precedents were too similar to the trappings of monarchy: Washington’s birthday was observed throughout the nation, and Washington held weekly levees, wore formal attire, and delivered his addresses to Congress in person. Jefferson, who is credited with first using the word ‘‘monocrat,’’ believed that Washington’s presidency had been enveloped by the ‘‘rags of royalty’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1011), and he feared that Hamilton and his followers were using Washington’s popularity to change the meaning of the Constitution. Jefferson resigned in 1793. Partisan conflict continued through the 1790s. In 1794, George Washington called out the state militia of Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania and mounted a horse himself to lead the troops used to put

The Revolution of 1800 69 down the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Washington then blamed the rebellion on ‘‘democratic societies’’ (Washington 1997, 893), groups of opposition that had organized throughout the country, and Jefferson told like-minded friends that Washington had used a military charade to cast his partisan opponents in a bad light. The following year, after Federalists made gains in the midterm elections, the Senate ratified the Jay Treaty, which Republicans regarded as proBritish, antagonistic to France, and tilted toward northern commercial interests. In 1798, Congress passed, and John Adams signed, the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to criticize the government, and Federalist judges used the law to imprison several newspaper editors affiliated with Jefferson’s Republican Party. In response to the Sedition Acts, Jefferson anonymously wrote a set of resolutions, eventually passed by the Kentucky legislature, arguing that states may determine the constitutionality of national laws. Madison authored a similar document passed by the Virginia legislature, though Madison’s draft asserted the less provocative position that the states could invite other states to amend the Constitution. To Federalists, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions confirmed their charges that Republicans wanted to revive the Articles of Confederation, under which the individual states retained power over most of their respective internal affairs. To Republicans, the Sedition Act illustrated how the Federalist doctrine of implied powers pointed toward a slippery slope, at the bottom of which was deprivation of liberty.

Contesting the Election To restore republican principles, Jefferson helped found the nation’s first opposition party. Throughout the 1790s, which Jefferson called a ‘‘reign of witches,’’ he calculated Federalist strength and the public mood, even perceiving that Adams had assumed the presidency just when Washington’s ‘‘bubble’’ was ‘‘bursting’’ (Jefferson 1984, 999). In 1791, he and Madison traveled to New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, ostensibly to study botany, but more likely to survey the political landscape. Around the same time, Jefferson secretly invited an editor to come to the capital to publish a newspaper critical of ‘‘aristocratical & monarchical writers.’’ Opposition became organized and formal when Republicans in Congress caucused to oppose the Jay Treaty. Nevertheless, scholars have shown that Jefferson and his Republican allies never asserted party loyalty as a good in itself, but rather believed that party organization was an illegitimate but necessary

means to turn the country away from its path to monarchy. It would be Martin’s Van Buren’s band of professional politicians, not Jefferson’s network of fellow travelers, who would first argue that the United States needed a permanent and organized opposition. As the party to end all parties, Jefferson’s Republican Party was meant to be as temporary as its victory would be overwhelming.

The First Inaugural For all the talk of revolution, Jefferson emphasized moderation and comity in his inaugural address. He did not announce that he would reorganize the judicial system, purge Federalists from the bureaucracy, or abolish the national bank. Rather, he urged his opponents to join him on behalf of the common good, and he told fellow partisans that majorities must be reasonable to be rightful and would thus have to respect the rights of the minority. In line with his belief that the Republican Party would end partisanship, he understated the differences between Republicans and Federalists by saying that differences of opinion were not the same as differences of principle. And he claimed that all Americans were both Republican and Federalist in their principles, that is, that all Americans believed in union and the republican form of government. Contemporaries in each party noticed the conciliatory tone of Jefferson’s first inaugural, and historians since Henry Adams have expressed wonder at the fact that the figure head of a revolution seemed determined to make it seem as if there had been no revolution at all. The moderate tone, of course, served Jefferson’s interests by making the revolution seem routine, for the Revolution of 1800 was a victory for a set of principles. Jefferson’s contemporaries recognized references to them in the inaugural address. His promise of commerce and friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none was meant to criticize Federalist foreign policy, especially the Jay Treaty. His pledge of support for the rights of state governments suggested his earlier attempt to assert the power of a state to judge the constitutionality of national laws. His call for economy in public expenditures and the payment of debts was at once a criticism of Hamilton’s financial program and a signal that he meant to reduce the responsibilities and size of the national government. His mention of agriculture reflected his previous praise in his Notes on the State of Virginia of the agrarian life and criticism of manufacturing and cities. And his declaration of the need for diffusion of information and freedom of the press was a stab at the Sedition Acts. These were partisan matters, and

70 Elections Jefferson reminded his audience of the differences between he and his opponent. Once in office, Jefferson and the Republicans brought their partisan project to government policy. Most important, they repealed most internal taxes while attempting to reduce the debt, accumulated under Hamilton’s direction, by cutting government programs. The military provided an easy target: Republicans distrusted the aristocratic presumptions, and Federalist tendencies, of the officers, and Jefferson believed that elite officers trained at West Point, with the state militias, could replace infantry and artillery and that gunboats could replace frigates. Consequently, as the disastrous War of 1812 would confirm, the military was gutted. Second, they repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, by which Federalists in a lame-duck Congress had enlarged the jurisdiction and size of the federal judiciary to check the Republican revolution. Third, Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act, and Congress returned, with interest, the fines paid under the convictions. Compared to similar attempts by later presidents to undo the strictures imposed by their predecessors, Jefferson reordered the national government with ease.

The Transformation of the Presidency Before he became president, Jefferson said privately that one difference between the parties was that Federalists wanted to accumulate power in the executive branch while Republicans preferred power to reside in the legislative branch. By this standard, historians since Henry Adams have concluded that Jefferson the president was as Federalist as his predecessors, for he advocated reforms that strengthened the presidency and he undertook extraordinary acts of executive power. Jefferson saw to it that the Constitution was amended to prevent future presidential elections from being decided in the House, made political loyalty the grounds for appointment and removal, doubled the size of the nation with the purchase and incorporation of the Louisiana Territory, supervised an undeclared war with nations in North Africa, asserted presidential privilege from scrutiny by Congress and the judiciary, and had Congress enact an ambitious and draconian embargo on American trade with Great Britain and France. Though Jefferson opened his inaugural address with a profession of humility and a pledge to seek guidance from Congress, he closed his address with the remarkable claim that critics should give him the benefit of the doubt, since only the president can see the ‘‘whole ground’’ (Jefferson 1984, 495).

Jefferson proclaimed deference to the legislative branch, but his leadership of Congress was impressive. With Federalists united in opposition and Republicans a coalition of factions, Jefferson recruited allies who could make his proposals while preserving the appearance that he was uninvolved in legislative business. To underscore his deference to Congress, Jefferson parted with precedent and delivered his addresses to Congress in writing rather than delivering them in person---a movement away from the British practice, which was observed until the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, who wanted to unify the executive and legislative branches. Such formal deference served Jefferson’s personal aversion to conflict and satisfied expectations against partisanship. Accordingly, Jefferson’s considerable skills of persuasion were confined to elaborately staged, but thoroughly private, dinner parties and to letters signed with the admonition that his name ‘‘not be associated with the business’’ (Jefferson 1905, 33). Federalists accused Republicans of deciding crucial business off the floor, and one Republican who broke with Jefferson complained of the influence held by Jefferson’s ‘‘backstairs’’ men. By calling important matters to the attention of Congress, he relentlessly pursued his program while preserving the institutional prerogatives of the legislative power.

Appointments and Removals One important result of the Revolution of 1800 was a transformation of the appointment and removal powers. Scholars have long recognized that Jefferson should share some of the credit, normally reserved for Andrew Jackson, for inventing the spoils system. By denying some Adams’s ‘‘midnight appointments’’ their jobs, eliminating offices in the military and judiciary, forcing resignations, and removing those who would not resign, Jefferson brought the Revolution of 1800 to the bureaucracy. But for the spoils system to take hold, the president’s power to remove officers from previous administrations had to be defended as well as asserted. When Jefferson took office in 1801, the president’s power to remove was uncertain. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton warned that presidents could introduce instability into administration by removing officials appointed by their predecessor, but he assured readers that such removals would require the Senate’s approval. When the latter question was raised in the first Congress, James Madison persuaded a majority to conclude that the Constitution gave the removal power to the president alone, largely because Senate participation would undermine the president’s accountability

The Revolution of 1800 71 to the people. But when John Adams forced the resignation of one member of his cabinet and fired another, Hamilton wrote a pamphlet critical of Adams, airing a split within the Federalist Party. When Jefferson removed Federalists from office to replace them with Republicans, he was not just setting a precedent, he was making an argument. Jefferson’s official removal policy changed over time. In line with his inaugural’s claim that not every difference of opinion was a difference of principle, he announced that he would not remove any Federalist officeholder on the basis of opinion alone. Rather, only those guilty of corruption or abuse of office, in addition to those who were appointed by John Adams after the results of the presidential election were known, would lose their positions. But Jefferson changed his policy when he grounded his removal policy on the principle of proportionality. To Connecticut Federalists who protested, Jefferson responded with a public letter, asserting that executive administration had to reflect the will of the people as expressed in the presidential elections. Thus reformulated, Jefferson’s policy presumed that differences of opinion did matter precisely because majority opinion, as determined by presidential elections, should be represented in administration. As he explained it, the relationship between public opinion and administration was self-reinforcing because the people would have more confidence in an administration that resembled itself. By replacing partisan opponents with friends, the president would achieve proportionality required by justice as well as the public confidence necessary for effectiveness. As he put it after he retired, presidents should use appointment and removal to bring energy to an administration: by gathering public opinion around a single point, a president could direct what otherwise would be dispersed. Later, when Jacksonians declared that the spoils belonged to the victors, they were putting into practice what Jefferson had made possible in theory. Absent this particular assertion of presidential primacy in removals, the bureaucracy may have moved closer to Hamilton’s preferred lifetime civil service, in which merit would count more than party affiliation and expertise more than public confidence.

The Louisiana Purchase As the central event in Jefferson’s presidency, the Louisiana Purchase requires particular attention. It was, by almost any measure, a spectacular achievement. Most obvious, it was a bargain that doubled the size of the country. By removing France from New Orleans and

from the continent, it secured a strategic port and all but abolished the possibility of challenge from a serious rival. By making southern and western expansion inevitable, it doomed the Federalist Party, which was by then confined to the northeast. By expanding the ‘‘empire of liberty’’ (Jefferson, PTJ, 4: 237--238), it left open the possibility of an agrarian life for all that wished it. In 1802, the United States learned that Spain had ceded control of the territory to France. Since the United States counted on Spain’s allowing it to use the mouth of the Mississippi at New Orleans, and since France had its own ambitions for North America, citizens of the United States, particularly in the East and West, viewed control of New Orleans as a matter of national security. To meet the crisis, Jefferson appointed James Monroe as special ambassador to France, instructing Monroe and the regular ambassador to France to secure access to New Orleans even if they had to purchase the city. Because of several unforseen events---particularly the success of the slave insurrection in Saint Domingue---Napoleon had by then lost interest in North America and needed money to finance his European campaigns, so he offered to sell the entire territory. This offer, in terms of money and land, was well beyond the scope of Jefferson’s instructions to Monroe, but it was all the more so because it included the condition that the territory be incorporated into the United States as soon as possible. It was the constitutionality of incorporating the territory, which included conferring the rights of citizenship upon its white inhabitants, that concerned Jefferson. Since incorporating vast amounts of land and a foreign people into the Union would water down the power of each existing state, and since it was unclear whether the Constitution granted that particular power to the national government, the Purchase conflicted with the principles of states’ rights and strict construction. Breaking with his advisors, who argued that the incorporation power followed from the treaty power and from Congress’ power to admit new states, he concluded that he would proceed with the deal but would request a constitutional amendment to retroactively approve of the Purchase. He and Madison drafted such an amendment, and Jefferson told Republican senators that they should join his act ‘‘beyond’’ the Constitution and then ‘‘throw themselves’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1139) on the people for judgment by proposing a constitutional amendment. For Jefferson, the event raised the constitutional questions he had tried to resolve in the controversies over the bank and neutrality proclamation, and he urged Republicans to avoid

72 Elections

Area comprising the Louisiana Purchase (highlighted, center), executed in 1803 during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. (Jose Gil)

the argument from implied powers, which he said would make the Constitution ‘‘a blank paper by construction’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1140). Even though Jefferson believed that control of New Orleans was a matter of national security, he never argued that his duty as commander in chief or his oath to defend the Constitution conferred upon him the authority to incorporate Louisiana. For Jefferson, it was safer to go outside the Constitution than it was to enlarge it by implication. But Jefferson did not ask for the amendment to the Constitution. Scholars have long conjectured that Jefferson feared that Napoleon would change his mind if given an opportunity, but there is reason to doubt that either Napoleon or Jefferson were thinking this way. Perhaps more important, Jefferson was told by allies in the Senate that he would lose the ratification vote if he announced his doubts regarding the constitutionality of incorporation. Votes recorded in the Annals of Congress suggest that such warnings were correct: even though Republicans enjoyed over a two-to-one advantage in the Senate, several Republicans had joined Federalists on previous votes, and Jefferson could not be certain that Republican leaders could

command the two-thirds majority required for ratification. Of these possible defectors, some were rigorous defenders of a strict construction of the Constitution and could have been troubled by an admission of unconstitutionality, while others would have had less principled reasons to object to the large land deal. Jefferson accepted the counsel of his friends, and never again mentioned his constitutional doubts. Instead, in his second inaugural, Jefferson alluded to criticisms that the Louisiana Purchase would make the Union too large, and he answered this argument by borrowing from Madison’s now famous argument in the Federalist Papers, which maintained that an extensive republic would better protect against faction than would a small republic. Though he reminded listeners that having citizens on the other side of the Mississippi River would be better than having rivals, he did not argue that the Purchase was authorized by constitutional provisions relating to national defense. On the constitutionality of the Purchase, Jefferson chose silence. That Jefferson never argued that the Constitution authorized the Louisiana Purchase points to an important understanding of executive power. Throughout his

The Revolution of 1800 73 career, Jefferson found ways to preserve the law by going outside it, and he praised executives who acted in the absence or in the face of legal authority on behalf of self-preservation or the public good. But, even though the argument was available to him, Jefferson never pointed to inherent executive powers and instead went out of his way to avoid such a claim. In this respect, Jefferson differs from most of the presidents who have followed him. For presidents since Abraham Lincoln, the president’s oath of office confers on the president the duty to defend the Constitution, which must include the power to do anything necessary to save the Constitution, which is to say that the Constitution authorizes the president to transgress the Constitution to preserve it. Under this account, remaining inside the Constitution is better than going outside it, since the people will lose respect for a Constitution that is inadequate for necessity. But, for Jefferson, it was safer to part temporarily with the Constitution to meet the emergency and then ask the people or their representatives for approval after the fact. Under Jefferson’s understanding, constitutionalizing necessity undermines consent in that it requires assuming that the people delegated undefined powers to the government--and requires legal argument that itself obscures the fact that there was a grave necessity. But Jefferson’s silence on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase left room for him to be misunderstood. Generations of scholars have commented upon the inconsistency between his doctrine of strict construction and his signing the Louisiana Treaty. Although Jefferson meant to show that the Constitution need not be made blank by construction to meet the demands---and opportunities---of political life, the Louisiana Purchase has been cited by other presidents--including Lincoln, Harry Truman, and Franklin D. Roosevelt---to justify their own appeals to inherent executive power. Paradoxically, Jefferson’s own scruples against broad construction signaled the practical defeat of strict construction. Jefferson’s silence on the constitutionality was all the more important, because at the heart of the Revolution of 1800, and its attempt to transform presidential power, was a faith in declarations of principle. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton ridiculed a Bill of Rights as a ‘‘parchment’’ protection belonging more in a treatise of ethics than a constitution. Instead of declaring what government could and could not do, the Constitution would harness ambition and self-interest, just as it would carefully divide and blend the three powers of government, to encourage each officer to act in the public good. But Jefferson, who was the principal

author of the Declaration of Independence and who had a hand in drafting the French Declaration of Rights, believed that declarations would enlighten the people with regard to the principles of government. Thus, declarations served Jefferson’s notion of political science, as education fit into his political philosophy: just as the University of Virginia would offer the naturally gifted---as opposed to the merely rich---a chance to rule, declarations would undermine those who wished to oppress the people by fooling them. Just as important, declarations would bring unity to the political order and thereby energize presidential power while demarcating it. Since presidents were required to throw themselves on the people when they parted with the written law, declarations of principle would provide the people a standard by which they could judge presidential action. Having been pointed toward the fundamental purpose of the law, the people are more equipped to judge whether the president acted for private gain rather than the public good. At the same time, the people could be unified around a common text: just as like-minded people often need an introduction to become friends, public opinion has to be gathered for it to be made into a majority will. Instead of laws that provide for every contingency and every preference, declarations make a strict construction of the Constitution compatible with political change. At the same time, declarations energize presidential power by democratizing it.

The Twelfth Amendment and the ‘‘Designating Principle’’ The centrality of declarations to the Revolution of 1800 provides a possible explanation for Jefferson’s decision to not ask for an amendment to the Constitution to purchase and incorporate Louisiana. Presidential selection, as the election of 1800 revealed, needed to be fixed in time for the election of 1804. Even though Republicans would not repeat the mistake from 1800, both parties realized that the Constitution, which was written without reference to national political parties, allowed the minority party to select the vice president and possibly determine which of the majority candidates would be president. Even though Republicans could expect a significant majority of presidential electors, the only way they could be sure to prevent Federalists from making the Republicans’ intended vice president the president was to cast aside their own votes for vice president, which, of course left open the possibility that Federalists would make the Federalists’ preferred president the vice president. In short, unless

74 Elections the Constitution was amended, it would be impossible to safely determine who the presidential electors intended to be president, and therefore it would be less likely that there could be any future, plausible, claim to a revolution. More immediate, it would undermine Jefferson’s ability to claim that the people had approved of his own act beyond the Constitution. Under the Twelfth Amendment, presidential electors cast one vote for a set of two candidates, naming who they intend to be president. Under this ‘‘designating principle,’’ there is no chance that the intended vice president can be made president by deal makers in the House. In 1804, Jefferson did not have to guess whether Federalist electors would vote for his vice president to rob him of the presidency. But there were more important consequences. First, as Federalists in 1803 pointed out, the old way allowed the minority to share the executive branch, as was the case in 1796 when Jefferson served as vice president under John Adams. Under the new way, the executive branch is dominated by a single party. Second, under the old way, a president could win by winning a majority of electors, which might be only one more than onefourth of the electoral vote. For instance, in 1796, Adams won 71 of 276 votes and, in 1800, Jefferson won 73 of 276 votes. Under the new way, a president must win a majority of electoral votes, which, combined with winner-take-all rules then emerging in the states, exaggerated the margins of presidential victories. Third, under the old way, the vice president could at least claim that he had won the second-to-most votes, which is to say that the office was prestigious if not powerful. Under the new way, the vice president lost his prestige: one Georgian senator’s worry that the amendment would render vice presidents as important as the ‘‘fifth wheel to a coach’’ was confirmed by the kind of men who occupied the office from 1804 until 1948, when the atomic bomb reminded voters that a spare wheel needs to be reliable. Fourth, as Federalists pointed out to Republicans from small states, the Twelfth Amendment lessened the likelihood that presidential elections would be decided in the House, and where each state delegation would have one vote, and therefore tilted presidential selection toward a popular majority. As Federalists put it, the Twelfth Amendment made the president more the ‘‘man of the people’’ and less the ‘‘man of the states’’ (Bailey 2007, 205--211). More than a technical improvement designed to prevent another Aaron Burr, then, the Twelfth Amendment was understood by its creators to confer a mandate on the president. While under the new way there could be no mistake about who the electors meant to be

president, the old way conferred an element of mystery, and therefore democracy, to presidential selection. As Federalists pointed out, the electoral college without the Twelfth Amendment could serve as a national nomination contest by screening favorite sons and sending a list of potential presidents to the House. At the same time, the underlying uncertainty would force compromise between the parties, who would otherwise risk being replaced by a ‘‘national unity’’ ticket of moderates from each party. Under the new way, the president---who benefitted from the vice president’s loss in dignity---would clearly be the person who had received the most support. Consequently, Federalists accused Republicans of ‘‘idol worship’’: by conflating the public will with a popular majority, and by making the election about a single man, the Twelfth Amendment democratized the presidency while making presidents less democratic. Instead of ensuring that ‘‘no one man could become too popular,’’ the Twelfth Amendment created the institutional conditions under which presidential aspirants would have an incentive to claim to possess a little more democracy than the rest. In Jefferson’s hands, the Twelfth Amendment made the landslide election of 1804 a vindication of the disputed election of 1800. Unlike Washington, whose second inaugural was more ceremony than address, Jefferson used the occasion to transform the institutional order. Just as his first inaugural was the first to declare a set of principles by which a president would carry out the laws, his second inaugural was the first to acknowledge a victory on behalf of executing those principles: in his words, the first was ‘‘promise,’’ the second ‘‘performance.’’ Thus the statement of performance was given in the context of a contest of opinion, which is to say that public opinion was connected to the presidency: if the subject of the first inaugural was the place of the president who presides over a transformation of power, the subject of the second was the competence of public opinion in evaluating presidential performance. In a section that seemed to simultaneously accuse the New England clergy of attempting to obstruct enlightenment and criticize the press for publishing rumors about his private life, Jefferson argued that his victory indicated that public opinion could be trusted to discern fact from falsehood. Just as Republicans and Federalists were united in principle, the election showed that public opinion could be discerned and that all were joining the republican ‘‘union of sentiment’’ (Jefferson 1984, 522). The Twelfth Amendment thus fit within Jefferson’s larger project to institutionalize declarations of principle and assumed higher priority than the Louisiana

The Revolution of 1800 75 amendment. From Republican failures in 1802 and the spring of 1803, he learned that amending the Constitution was no sure thing, and in the fall of 1803, he must have realized that he could not get both amendments to pass. Consequently, the Twelfth Amendment contributed to Jefferson’s decision to not ask for an amendment for Louisiana and undermined his consistency with regard to his requirement that executives who part with the law throw themselves on the people. At the same, however, it afforded the people the means by which they could more clearly approve or disapprove of presidents who act on their behalf.

Term Limits One of most lasting consequences of the Revolution of 1800 was the tradition of a term limit for presidents. When he first read the Constitution, Jefferson objected to the absence of a term limit for presidents, and, as president, he molded Washington’s decision to step down after two terms into a precedent that would become a term limit in practice if not in law. Scholars have long interpreted the term limit as evidence of Jefferson’s distrust of a strong presidency, but it is probable that Jefferson meant it to bring a new kind of energy to the presidency. The important point is that Jefferson presumed that presidents who sought reelection would achieve it and that, over time, a president would be reelected continually. So, without a term limit, presidents would serve for life because the people come to be attached to a sitting president and keep reelecting him, thus numbing presidential administration. Thus, when Jefferson announced his decision to retire, he told friends that his original proposal for a single seven-year term was improved on by the practice of two four-year terms in that the second way would offer the people an opportunity ‘‘in midway’’ to remove a president who was ‘‘doing wrong’’ (Jefferson 1984, 1153). At the same time, the limit would protect against presidents growing old in office. When Jefferson bragged that he was the first executive in history to retire before his mind had deteriorated, he surely was mocking George III, but he also must have meant Washington, whom he believed had been fooled by Hamilton. Reflection on Jefferson’s other objection to the Constitution helps further explain Jefferson’s creation of the term limit. Famously, Jefferson believed that the Constitution, like every constitution, needed a bill of rights. In an extraordinary exchange of letters with Madison from 1787 to 1789, Jefferson defended declarations of rights against the charge that they would be

‘‘parchment barriers,’’ that is, unable to restrain popular majorities that wished to persecute a minority. According to Jefferson, even though occasions would arise when the protections announced in a bill of rights would be violated, such declarations would point the people to the principles underlying those rights, thus enabling the people to judge the transgression of the details of the rights. He and Madison came to agree that a bill of rights could educate the people who might otherwise forget, or be led astray from, rights. For Jefferson, then, the term limit afforded the institutional foothold for his faith in declarations, which he believed could fulfill the educative requirement of democratic leadership. Since the president alone can claim to represent the whole over the part, the president is the most convenient official to enlighten and direct the majority will. Thus, instead of simply confining presidential power, the term limit would simultaneously radicalize and routinize presidential power by guaranteeing presidential transition. Instead of convening a constitutional convention for each generation, as Jefferson had once proposed, there would be a new declaration of principle would be drafted every eight years. The Revolution of 1800 thus began with an inaugural address that was as revolutionary in its form as it was in its content. Although Washington and Adams had each worn a military uniform---with sword---and ridden a carriage to their inaugurations, Jefferson walked and wore simple clothes. And though Washington offered his inaugural speech in the Senate chamber and addressed it to the members of Congress, Jefferson addressed his to ‘‘friends and fellow citizens’’ and had copies of the speech distributed before he delivered it. Most important, Jefferson was the first president to announce what he deemed to be the principles of the Constitution and those that would guide his administration. It was this innovation that caught the attention of those who read the address. One friend congratulated Jefferson for reducing the republican creed to a few aphorisms, and Republicans praised the address for its ‘‘American language’’ in offering a standard by which the new president would be judged. Federalists complained of Jefferson’s use of metaphor and wrote that the solemn occasion of taking the presidential oath was not the time to offer a manifesto. As a declaration of principle, the inaugural address would provide a way for the people to judge presidents who must part with the law during necessity. In his own first inaugural address, Jefferson listed the principles by which he would execute the laws, and he claimed that his list would be a ‘‘text of civic instruction,’’ or to change the metaphor, the ‘‘constellation’’

76 Elections that would guide him and the people when, in ‘‘moments of error or alarm’’ (Jefferson 1984, 495) they wandered from the republican path. Thus the declaration would serve in place of the law when necessity revealed the law to be incomplete. More than an opportunity to unite two opposing parties, the inaugural would simultaneously summarize and direct the majority will. When Jefferson opened his address by reflecting on the fact that the rising nation lived among nations that ‘‘feel power but forget right,’’ he was laying the groundwork for the later teaching about the executive discretion and declarations of principle. When he closed the address with the claim that presidents alone see the ‘‘whole ground,’’ he connected this lesson to his ambition to create a presidential mandate.

Paths Not Taken: Coordinate Review and Impeachments As the modern misuse of Jefferson’s understanding of executive power suggests, Jefferson’s revolution was not wholly successful. For his democratization of the presidency to be complete, he needed to establish the doctrine of coordinate review as well as expand impeachment to include political as well as criminal offenses. Under coordinate review, each of the three departments is the supreme interpreter of action within its respective constitutional responsibility. Instead of looking to the judiciary to resolve every constitutional question, this view leaves constitutional questions to be resolved by interdepartmental conflict. As Jefferson later illustrated his doctrine, Congress may pass the Sedition Act, but a later president, if he believes the law unconstitutional, may pardon those convicted under it. Also, in Marbury v. Madison (1803), the Supreme Court asserted that it could declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, and Jefferson never indicated that he disagreed with part of the decision. But he did object to John Marshall’s assumption that the Supreme Court could issue a writ of mandamus ordering the president to appoint an officer who a court determined had a legal claim to a job. For Jefferson, then, coordinate review could exist alongside judicial review, just so long as judges do not review matters left to the other branches by the Constitution. Coordinate review was thus meant as an alternative to judicial supremacy. Coordinate review has had an uncertain legacy in American political development. Andrew Jackson, the next realigning president, asserted the doctrine of coordinate review when he vetoed the recharter of the national bank, but modern presidents

(if not modern presidential candidates) have accepted the doctrine that judicial review makes the Supreme Court supreme with regard to interpreting the Constitution. Nevertheless, the reluctance of the courts to answer ‘‘political questions,’’ as well as their willingness to claim legislative deference, suggests that coordinate review has found a foothold in judicial practice. Similarly, Jefferson’s claim that the president need not answer judicial subpoena (to testify in court) has always been popular among presidents. But recent Supreme Court decisions reveal that even these traditions are not sacred. In 1997, the Supreme Court concluded that President Clinton was not immune from a civil suit seeking to recover damages from actions taken before he became president, and, a year later, it invalidated a law giving presidents a ‘‘line-item veto.’’ Even Jefferson must have had some doubt about the reception of coordinate review: a draft of his first annual message to Congress included an extended passage explaining it, but the final version did not. Jefferson’s belief in coordinate review sheds light on his conflict with the judiciary. After Republicans repealed the Judiciary Act, and after Jefferson removed Federalist marshals, Jefferson initiated the impeachment of John Pickering, a federal judge who most likely was insane. In impeaching and removing Pickering, who was a Federalist, Republicans relied on a broad interpretation of the Constitution, which provides for impeachment only for high crimes and misdemeanors, not inability to perform one’s office. Emboldened by their success and spurred on by Jefferson, Republicans in the House brought forth impeachment articles against Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, a Federalist who had used the Sedition Act to imprison Republican editors. Again, Republicans in the House voted for impeachment, testing the boundaries of the Constitution’s requirements for impeachment, since the principal charge was that Chase had included a partisan harangue in his instructions to a Maryland jury, not that he had broken a law. But Senate Republicans failed to gather the two-thirds required to remove Chase, leaving the acquittal of Chase to set a precedent that impeachment would be reserved for criminal, rather than political, acts. Consequently, the Chase impeachment has thus been interpreted as a victory for an independent judiciary, and it probably was, because Republicans might have impeached the chief justice, John Marshall, had they been successful in removing Chase. But, judicial independence cuts two ways. Just as no judge has been impeached and removed for his or her opinions, judges since Chase have refrained from

The Revolution of 1800 77 making political statements from the bench. The Chase impeachment rendered impeachment an unwieldy tool, but it also set boundaries on the public partisanship of judges. John Marshall said that he would rather Congress review court decisions than have Congress impeach judges for their opinions, and it was the Taney Court, not the Marshall Court, that declared, for the second time in the nation’s history, a national law unconstitutional. Although Jefferson’s Republicans could not broaden the impeachment power, and though Jefferson never explained coordinate review, such failures reveal the ambition of the Revolution of 1800. More than a test of whether the constitutional framework could withstand a transfer of power from one party to its opposition, and more than an attempt to purify political life by returning it to 1776, the Revolution of 1800 was meant to transform constitutional change itself. If political change can be reduced to elections, amendments and impeachments, Jefferson reworked the availability and importance of each: impeachment all but vanished, and presidential selection replaced constitutional amendment as the primary mode of political change. It is significant that, after the Twelfth Amendment, the only amendments associated with a realigning president required a civil war, and the other important amendments are associated with Woodrow Wilson’s progressive project, which was stalled by Warren Harding’s return to normalcy. It is fitting, then, that Jefferson refrained from asking for an amendment to Louisiana not only because he would have risked the treaty but also because he and his party would have missed the larger opportunity to transform presidential selection. As Alexis de Tocqueville later noted of American elections, Americans personify their theories in their presidential candidates.

At the center of this reconstruction of constitutional change, the two-term limit is the most obvious accomplishment of the Revolution of 1800. On the one hand, it checks particular presidents, as suggested by the formalization of the tradition when bucked for the first and only time by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But it also invigorates presidential power by calling forth a new expression of it. Rather than leaving power in the hands of a single president, who is more likely to grow weak rather than strong while in office, the limit offers a real, and scheduled, chance for the people to repudiate or confirm that president’s promise and performance. Such opportunities were made more significant by the institutionalization of a declaration of principles within the inaugural address. Combined, the term limit and the inaugural reveal Jefferson’s attempt to institutionalize public opinion by connecting it to the presidency. Even though both had to be constructed, it is difficult to imagine American politics, and American political development, without either.

References and Further Reading Bailey, Jeremy D. 2007. Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jefferson, Thomas. 1905. The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 9. Ed. Paul Leicester Ford. New York: Putnam’s. Jefferson, Thomas. 1951. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 4: October 1780 to February 1781. Ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jefferson, Thomas. 1984. Thomas Jefferson: Writings. Ed. Merrill Peterson. New York: Library of America. Washington, George. 1997. George Washington: Writings. Ed. John H. Rhodehamel. New York: Library of America.

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 Daniel J. Tichenor Philip H. Knight Professor of Social Science and Senior Faculty Fellow, Morse Center for Law and Politics, University of Oregon

Daniel Fuerstman Instructor of Government, Dutchess Community College

Introduction

order and faced with recalcitrant major-party leadership, Key thought that the alternatives were limited but not necessarily quixotic. Indeed, he perceived two main strategies available to reformers champing at the bit to unsettle the political status quo. First, reformers may form a pressure group or mobilize a large popular following to lobby the existing set of elected representatives of both major parties. Second, reformers may organize an insurgent electoral campaign that either promotes reform goals inside one of the dominant major parties (‘‘boring from within’’) or challenges the establishment by forming a third party (Key 1952, 299--300). It is this second form of insurgent political activity that we seek to investigate. In particular, our chief purpose is to consider both the aspirations and legacies of insurgent campaigns both within major parties and as third-party challenges to transform the American electoral process. Building on Key’s largely forgotten insights about dissident campaigns, we explore their motivations and potentially lasting effects by training a spotlight on two major challenges to the party establishment that were emboldened by popular democratic ideologies and that left an indelible mark on the rules of American electoral and partisan politics: the insurgent campaigns of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 and Eugene McCarthy in 1968.

American politics has featured numerous intraparty and third-party insurgency campaigns over time. When taking stock of minor party, independent, and dissident campaigns, scholars and pundits alike have tended to focus on how they have influenced electoral and policy outcomes. In particular, they have concentrated on the capacity of these campaigns to play spoilers in presidential voting or to place new issues on the public agenda. At least equally important, but often neglected by these observers, are the efforts of these campaigns to transform the political process, especially electoral politics. Over the course of U.S. political history, yearnings for greater popular democracy and commitments to fundamental procedural reform have driven intraparty and third-party insurgencies as much as (if not more than) final vote tallies or public policy innovation. V. O. Key, Jr., arguably the foremost student of political parties in the post--World II era, recognized the potential importance of these dissident campaigns more than a half-century ago (Key 1952, 241). While Key identified many strengths of the U.S. two-party system in his work, he also recognized that one of its pitfalls was the tendency of major-party leaders to evade significant national problems and public discontent rather than confront them openly and decisively (Key 1952, 241). For those disaffected by the existing political 78

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 79 We begin by focusing on Theodore Roosevelt’s transformative struggle with incumbent President William Howard Taft for the Republican presidential nomination and his formidable Progressive (or Bull Moose) Party campaign of 1912, a campaign that was devoted to ‘‘direct democracy’’ reforms and that advanced presidential primaries. We then turn to Eugene McCarthy’s antiwar insurgency within the Democratic Party in 1968, a campaign that ultimately fueled an unprecedented expansion of direct primary reforms in the presidential selection process that was begun by Roosevelt more than a half-century before. Both crusades highlight the power of participatory democracy and procedural reform goals for dissident candidates and activists seeking to challenge the major-party establishment. But we also highlight the extent to which the procedural legacies of the 1912 Roosevelt and 1968 McCarthy campaigns in particular are especially significant, contributing to critical transformations of partisan and electoral politics in America. It is to these insurgencies that we now turn.

‘‘Direct Democracy’’ and Roosevelt’s Insurgency Campaign of 1912 When William Howard Taft became president in 1909, Progressive Republicans had reason for optimism. They had worked with Theodore Roosevelt (TR) to develop a record of achievement in policy areas ranging from regulating corporations to labor welfare and conservation. Their power in the states was growing. Finally, Taft, who loyally served Roosevelt in foreign and military affairs, was handpicked by Roosevelt to carry on his reform agenda. Yet Progressives soon discovered that Taft was an ally of the party’s Old Guard and he unabashedly sided with conservatives in battles over tariff revision, the broad powers of House Speaker Joseph ‘‘Uncle Joe’’ Cannon, and conservation. Progressive animosity toward Taft and resurgent standpat conservatives led to pitched battles in 1910 and 1911 in the states over who would control the national Republican Party. James Garfield, a Progressive Republican appointed federal commissioner of corporations by TR, describes the situation in this way: By 1910 the split in the Republican Party had reached such proportions, taken with the open hostility of President Taft toward the Progressives, that the Progressives had to fight---and fight

effectively---or die; had to forge the Progressive sentiment into an enduring political weapon, or lose the advance of a decade (Gable 1978, 8). While many progressive Republicans focused their energies on fighting conservatives for control of the GOP (Grand Old Party) machinery, others called for a new party to unify reformers of both major parties. Nearly all agreed on the value of having Roosevelt play a prominent role in the factional struggle; some prominent Progressives initiated a movement in 1911 aimed at reelecting the former president. ‘‘More than any single leader,’’ Herbert Croly explains, ‘‘Theodore Roosevelt contributed decisively to the combination of political and social reform and to the building up a body of national public opinion behind the combination’’ (Croly 1914, 11). Significantly, reforming electoral and partisan processes was the impetus for Roosevelt’s return to political life. Intimates of Roosevelt trace the origins of his 1912 insurgency campaign to the summer of 1910, when he championed a direct primary bill in New York at the behest of Governor Charles E. Hughes (Roosevelt, ‘‘Politics of the Year 1912’’). These efforts ended in defeat when the state legislature defeated the measure, but it galvanized TR to launch a 14-state speaking tour to articulate Progressive ideals and programs. His theme of New Nationalism linked his long-standing commitment to federal regulation of national corporations and natural resources to other Progressive causes such as welfare legislation and direct democracy (Gable 1978, 9). These aspirations reflected a firm belief that Progressive policy goals could be secured only through procedural reforms that closed the distance between the people and their government. The reform of electoral and party politics was central to this agenda (Milkis and Tichenor 1994, 288--289). ‘‘We need to make our political representatives more quickly and sensitively responsive to the people whose servants they are,’’ Roosevelt explained in his famous New Nationalism speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, in August 1910. ‘‘More direct action by the people in their own affairs under proper safeguards is vitally necessary. The direct primary is a step in this direction’’ (Roosevelt 1926, XVII, 20). TR’s speaking tour energized Republican Progressives and hastened their efforts to draft ‘‘the Colonel’’ into a fight for the 1912 presidential nomination. Prominent elected officials like Governor W. R. Stubbs of Kansas regularly urged him to join the battle (Mowry 1946, 186). These developments were unsettling to Wisconsin reformer Robert LaFollette, who was elected to the Senate in 1906. LaFollette envisioned himself as the

80 Elections leading GOP Progressive candidate in 1912 and he formed the National Progressive Republican League with his supporters early in 1911 to promote just such an insurgency campaign. For his part, Roosevelt often told his closest friends and political allies in 1910 and 1911 that he absolutely had no interest in running (‘‘Theodore Roosevelt to James Garfield,’’ December 1, 1911). He was convinced that defeat was certain for any Republican. It therefore served Republican Progressives well ‘‘to make Taft’s nomination inevitable,’’ he reasoned, because his overwhelming failure in the general election would make it possible to transform the party and place it under ‘‘capable and sane progressive leadership’’ (‘‘Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Lee,’’ September 16, 1910). LaFollette’s campaign stalled by the end of 1911, however, due in no small part to Progressive hopes for a Roosevelt ticket. With the quiet consent of the former president, friends and political supporters organized a National Roosevelt Committee in December 1911. Soon thereafter, an innovative press bureau and a variety of subsidiary organizations targeting specific voting groups (for example, the National Progressive Italian American League) were formed (Mowry 1946, 223). Two months later, Roosevelt spoke to the Ohio Constitutional Convention in Columbus about the need for a new ‘‘Charter of Democracy’’ that would empower ordinary voters in the political process through direct primaries, initiatives, referenda, and the direct election of U.S. senators (‘‘A Charter for Democracy,’’ February 21, 1912). The same day he finally announced that ‘‘my hat is in the ring!’’ Yet Taft and Republican ‘‘standpatters’’ controlled federal patronage and most GOP machines, which all but ensured the incumbent’s dominance of state party conventions that still dominated the presidential nomination process. Two weeks before TR’s formal entry into the nomination battle, William B. McKinley, Taft’s campaign chief, leveraged administration patronage powers to impose discipline and loyalty at state conventions throughout the South. He removed Roosevelt allies from party leadership positions and warned southern federal employees not to bolt Taft. Local postmasters were informed that their jobs depended on their ability to bring pro-Taft delegations to southern state conventions. ‘‘If you will bring a delegation to the state and district conventions instructed for Taft,’’ an Oklahoma Republican Party boss bluntly wrote to one postmaster, ‘‘I will see that you are reappointed’’ (Mowry 1946, 226--27). McKinley also instructed southern state chairpersons to select delegates at conventions months

before the usual time, so as to shore up southern delegations before Roosevelt activists could organize in the region. On February 6, as ordered by McKinley, Florida Republicans held the first state convention. With Taft loyalists in control of the state organization, the convention wasted little time in selecting delegates in favor of the president. During the proceedings, however, Roosevelt supporters challenged the process as corrupt, bolted in unison from the hall, held a second convention nearby, and proceeded to nominate a contesting state delegation pledged to Roosevelt (New York Times, February 7, 1912). This scenario was replayed at state conventions throughout the South in coming weeks, as almost every pro-Taft delegation was contested by Roosevelt bolters. Roosevelt and his campaign team in fact expended little effort to organize in the South where they believed ‘‘rotten boroughs’’ made it unlikely they could win delegates. They were far more optimistic about their chances in the North and West, given TR’s enormous popularity among rank-and-file Republicans in these regions. But Taft’s control of federal patronage and support from most Republican state machines meant that Roosevelt’s only chance of securing the nomination lay in challenging the existing convention system by calling on states to adopt the direct primary. At the time, the direct primary was the means of selecting delegates in only six states. ‘‘The great fundamental issue now before the Republican party and before our people can be stated briefly,’’ he proclaimed in a March speech before a packed audience at Carnegie Hall. ‘‘It is, Are the American people fit to govern themselves, to rule themselves, to control themselves? I believe they are. My opponents do not’’ (Roosevelt 1926, XVII, 151). Opposed for the first time by most Republican machines, Roosevelt’s only recourse was to launch a candidate-centered campaign that appealed directly to voters. TR’s campaign organization challenged Taft to let the people decide by contesting the nomination by means of a direct primary in every state. Not surprisingly, the Taft forces rejected the proposal as out of hand. ‘‘I do not favor changes in the rules of the game while the game is in progress,’’ McKinley openly responded to Roosevelt’s campaign manager. Another Taft ally, Rep. Philip Campbell of Kansas, added that ‘‘the Republican Party does not believe in an appeal from the umpire to the bleachers’’ (Morrison 1952, VII, 521--524). The Roosevelt campaign hoped that the challenge would pose what William Riker called a ‘‘heresthetic moment’’: If Taft forces accepted the

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 81 proposal, which they were almost certain not to, Taft would surely lose. If they rejected the challenge, which they were certain to do, it would place Taft at odds with the ‘‘rule of the people.’’ The denials of McKinley and Campbell played right into Roosevelt’s hands. In a blistering open letter written by TR that was widely distributed by his campaign to promote the direct primary, he scored the Taft camp for confining the people to ‘‘the bleachers’’: Our opponents take the view that this contest is merely a game, that the object of the contest is to win prizes for the contestants, and that public office is the reward that goes to the winners of the game and that, therefore, it is a piece of allowable (although rather tricky) smartness to refuse to make changes in the laws during the progress of the contest, if these changes would deprive the lead captains of the political world of advantages they now hold over the plain people. The issue may be stated as follows: Should election laws be framed with a view to the interests of politicians or should election laws be framed with a view of carrying out the popular will? . . . We regard the present contest not as a contest between individuals---for we are not concerned with the welfare of any particular individual, neither with mine nor with any other man---but as a contest between two radically different views of the function of politics in a great democracy (Morrison 1952, VII, 521--524). Roosevelt had succeeded in transforming his insurgent candidacy itself into an issue, one of wresting the nomination process free from the stranglehold of party bosses and their corrupt machines. As northern and western state politics became embattled over the issue of adopting direct primaries, Roosevelt hit the campaign trail to rally for electoral reform. ‘‘From the first of April until June he waged one of the most strenuous campaigns in American political history,’’ George Mowry records. ‘‘Invading every important state and speaking as often as ten times a day, he set a pace which even his indefatigable vigor could not sustain’’ (Mowry 1946, 229). In the end, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, and South Dakota joined six earlier states in adopting the direct primary. The state-level struggles over the nomination process and, with them, the Republican presidential ticket aroused what one historian calls ‘‘near riot conditions’’ at district and state conventions (Gable

1978, 14). In Michigan, for instance, the presence of state troops did not prevent brawls from breaking out at the convention. Roosevelt dominated the primaries. In all, there were 12 northern, border, and western states with direct primaries. TR’s first victory came in Illinois on April 9, where he beat Taft by a margin of more than two to one and where the direct primary had been legally adopted only 10 days before. The exclamation point to Roosevelt’s primary campaign came in Ohio, Taft’s home state. Both camps fought strenuously to win the state, but ultimately TR won handily and captured every one of the state’s district delegates. The press reported the results of the Ohio primary as an unequivocal repudiation of the incumbent president (Milkis and Tichenor 1994, 300). When the dust settled on these contests, Roosevelt won a total of 278 delegates in the primaries, Taft 48, and LaFollette 36. In terms of the final Republican rank-and-file vote tally, TR outpolled Taft 1,157,397 to 761,716. At the national convention, 254 delegate seats were contested. The Republican National Committee, controlled by Taft supporters, resolved the disputes routinely in favor of the president. In the state of Washington where Roosevelt won county primaries by lopsided margins, for instance, the National Committee announced that it found irregularities and that it would be best to seat Taft delegates selected by the state committees. In Texas, the Republican organization was dominated by Roosevelt supporters who chose proRoosevelt delegates according to standard party rules. However, the National Committee determined that Taft contestants should be seated instead so as to discourage the rule of bosses and machines in the Texas party. When the Committee finished its deliberations, Taft was awarded 235 of the disputed 254 delegates to Roosevelt’s 19. The headline of the Chicago Tribune read: ‘‘THOU SHALT NOT STEAL.’’ Had Roosevelt received 50 more of the contested delegates, he would have controlled the convention and likely the nomination (Mowry 1946, 238--239; Gable 1978, 15; and Milkis and Tichenor 1994, 300--301). Aware that the National Committee’s decision virtually sealed the nomination for Taft, Roosevelt broke precedent by traveling to Chicago and taking personal command of his supporters at the party convention. The night before the full convention met, ‘‘the Colonel’’ addressed his followers at the Chicago Auditorium and memorably summoned a new party to war by telling them ‘‘we stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord.’’ As Taft

82 Elections

Theodore Roosevelt waves to the crowd during his campaign tour in New Jersey, 1912. (Library of Congress)

and the Old Guard took control of the Republican convention, Roosevelt delegates bolted for a rump convention in another hall; TR declared his willingness to accept the nomination of Progressives eager to form a third party. In coming months, Roosevelt and the National Progressive Party continued to champion significant electoral and constitutional reforms in the name of direct democracy. At the Progressive convention, Roosevelt spoke of the new party’s devotion to institutional changes that would make candidate-centered campaigns routine. He proposed a universal system of direct primaries that, in effect, would replace the convention as the method of nominating presidential candidates. This was the only way, he proclaimed, to overcome an ‘‘invisible government’’ that ignored the popular will. The theft of his nomination at the Republican convention and the machine politics that delayed Woodrow Wilson’s nomination for 46 ballots at the Democratic convention highlighted the corruption of the old parties:

The first essential of the Progressive programs is the right of the people to rule. . . . A few years ago . . . there was very little demand in this country for presidential primaries. There would have been no demand now if politicians had really endeavored to carry out the will of the people as regards nominations for President. But, largely under the influence of special privilege in the business world, there have arisen castes of politicians who not only do not represent the people, but who make bread and butter by thwarting the wishes of the people . . . The power of the people must be made supreme within several party organizations (Roosevelt 1926, XVII, 258, 260). In addition to mandatory direct primaries, the Progressive platform called for women’s suffrage, direct election of senators, easier methods for amending the Constitution, voter initiatives and referenda, and even popular means of overturning court rulings. The Bull Moose campaign’s devotion to direct democracy reforms in the

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 83 general campaign was matched by a level of political professionalism that employed, in the words of historian John Gable, ‘‘all the organizational and publicity techniques of modern electioneering’’ (Gable 1978, 121). Although Wilson ultimately won the election, Roosevelt and the National Progressive Party did remarkably well at the ballot box. Indeed, not since the emergence of the Republican Party in the 1850s had a third party been so successful. TR and the Progressives garnered 27.4 percent of the popular vote and 88 electoral college votes from six states in the election of 1912. Taft and the Republicans came in third in both the popular and electoral college vote, managing to capture only two states, Utah and Vermont. As the candidate of a party that had existed for only three months, Roosevelt came in second by carrying 5 states and most of California, but he came close to triumph in 9 other states and was second in 23 states (Milkis and Tichenor 1994, 330--331). More than a few of the social justice policy proposals advanced by the Bull Moose Party in its national platform and in TR speeches also had more than fleeting appeal, finding expression in the Progressive programs of Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt years. Yet TR’s insurgent campaign of 1912---first within the Republican Party and then as the Progressive standard-bearer---also had a notable impact on the American electoral process. Against the backdrop of the 1912 election, Wilson endorsed direct primaries to select presidential and congressional candidates. Public outrage over the role that machine politics and party bosses played in denying TR the nomination at the 1912 Republican convention helped spur efforts by Progressive reformers across party lines to advance direct primaries. Wilson endorsed a national primary in his first annual message to Congress. Although the proposal failed to win congressional passage, Progressives successfully pursued reform at the state level. By 1920, 21 states enacted presidential primaries. The Progressive vision of a universal system of direct primaries lost steam in later years, as state-by-state reform efforts stalled. Yet an important foundation stone for opening the nomination process had been laid. Most important for our purposes, the democratic-procedural reform aspirations and capacities of Roosevelt’s insurgency campaign of 1912 are unmistakable.

Movement Politics and the McCarthy Challenge of 1968 At its outset the 1968 campaign had some superficial parallels to 1912. The sitting president, Lyndon

Johnson, was unpopular, even among his own partisans. Many spoke of an impending intraparty nomination challenge from a strong candidate, Sen. Robert Kennedy, despite Kennedy’s frequent denials of interest. The opposing party, long a national minority, looked primed to steal a presidential election. More profoundly, as we shall see, both the 1912 and 1968 party insurgencies drew their lifeblood from larger political unrest that expressed a popular democratic crusade against bossism in the Progressive Era and in favor of ‘‘participatory democracy’’ amid the New Politics of the 1960s. Throughout 1967 the Left had soured on Johnson. They had once embraced his Great Society liberalism, but the vicissitudes of the Vietnam War had left liberals, particularly educated, white, middle-class liberals, disenchanted with the Democratic establishment. This disquiet expressed itself through various Dump Johnson movements that antiwar leaders fostered at the state level in 1967. By late 1967 Allard Lowenstein, a crucial anti-Vietnam organizer and former student movement leader, wanted to find a candidate to challenge President Johnson in the Democratic primaries. He turned first to 1968’s version of Teddy Roosevelt, but Robert Kennedy turned him down. In desperation, Lowenstein went down a list of candidates, from notable senators such as George McGovern and Frank Church to Congressman Don Edwards. He discovered that through a quirk of timing, many of the leading senatorial prospects faced their own uncertain reelection campaigns in the fall. And they had no desire to stir up the pot at such a crucial moment in their own careers (Chester et al. 1969). In late October Lowenstein met with Eugene McCarthy, a little-known senator from Minnesota (Larner 1970). McCarthy had independently mulled a run for the presidency. Like other Senate doves, he had tired of the administration’s half-truths on the state of the war. But McCarthy did not want to run only as an electoral dissent. He hoped that by giving students and other disaffected activists a way to protest inside the system in an election year, he could prevent a generation from completely checking out of mainstream politics. In his announcement of his candidacy, McCarthy said, ‘‘I am hopeful that a challenge may alleviate the sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the process of American politics and of American government.’’ For these reasons and others, McCarthy agreed to run (McCarthy 1969, 265--267). The McCarthy campaign aimed and succeeded at leaving its mark on the electoral process. Its impact was first registered, fittingly, in New Hampshire

84 Elections

Eugene McCarthy greets supporters outside his New York City campaign headquarters on April 23, 1968. (Bettmann/Corbis)

(Brereton 1987; Hoeh 1994). When the campaign opened in New Hampshire, McCarthy had little to bank on. Few in the state recognized the name, and some who thought they did confused him for a rather different Senator McCarthy. The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War had not penetrated New Hampshire as much as other parts of the country, notably the west coast. Prospects did not look good. But the McCarthy campaign revolutionized campaigning in the state. Using thousands of student volunteers, he flooded the streets with canvassers in the month before the March 12 primary. It represented the first-ever statewide political canvass (Hoeh 1994). McCarthy established himself as a serious candidate, even if his views on the war did not fully penetrate public consciousness. On Election Day, McCarthy triumphed, far exceeding expectations. He captured 42 percent of the vote, and won 20 of the 24 delegate slots (New Hampshire State Department 1969, v. 41). He also gave New Hampshire its reputation for surprising results and cemented its critical role in the presidential selection process.

The campaign rolled through the spring, pulling headlines in its wake. First Robert Kennedy declared his candidacy. Then President Johnson withdrew his. Finally, Vice President Humphrey entered the race. While we can never know whether the McCarthy campaign was a sufficient cause of any of these acts, it certainly seemed to be a necessary one. McCarthy unearthed a large protest vote and seriously damaged the invulnerable image of a prideful president. He drew Johnson’s biggest political nemesis, Kennedy, into the race, and demonstrated the possibility that Johnson might lose to a pro-peace candidate. The McCarthy campaign would never again reach the heights of the early spring. Once Johnson withdrew, Humphrey became the administration candidate. Humphrey worked hard behind the scenes to secure the support of state party leaders and other national convention delegates. Only McCarthy and Kennedy, both antiwar candidates, ran in the primaries. They viciously fought each other for the mantle of insurgent. Kennedy triumphed in the heartland states of Indiana and Nebraska. McCarthy then came back strong in

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 85 Oregon, handing the Kennedy family its first electoral defeat in nearly a decade. Both campaigns threw their all into California, hoping to ride the momentum from that state through to the Chicago convention. The slim hopes of the McCarthy campaign, as a compromise candidate between the bland and unpopular Humphrey and the off-putting Kennedy, died with Kennedy on the eve of his June triumph in California. Despite long odds from the start, McCarthy staffers worked hard in every state that had some form of primary system. In the process, they opened up the politics of those states to previously unheard voices and opinions. Connecticut provides the archetypical example. Connecticut, while not territorially large, had a dense population. Most of the electorate lived in urban or suburban areas. Connecticut also had a heavily ethnic population, and remained thoroughly Democratic. John Bailey, ‘‘King John’’ to most, was one of the few bosses leading a political machine that resembled those of the Democrats’ past. He dominated state politics, from political patronage to the governorship, and also had served as the Democratic National Chairman. But McCarthy supporters challenged his power. Connecticut McCarthy forces, led by peace activist Rev. Joseph Duffey, first turned their attention to deciphering the state’s arcane primary law. Connecticut law divided the state into 169 ‘‘towns’’; smaller towns held caucuses at the end of February that were open to any Democrat, while larger towns had committees (most supporting the Johnson-Humphrey ticket) that appointed delegates. The only way to prevent committees of larger towns from choosing delegates was to compile a rival slate. If the McCarthy campaign did this and got 5 percent of the registered Democrats to sign a petition supporting the slate, then these larger towns too would have caucuses (Chester et al. 1969, 112-118). The campaign registered qualifying petitions in 31 towns, and elected one or two McCarthy delegates in most small towns. When the state convention met, McCarthy forces had 284 out of 958 (or roughly 30 percent) of the delegates. Bailey could not ignore the insurgents, and ultimately conceded nine seats in the delegation to McCarthy supporters. The northeast’s most powerful machine had compromised. State politics, long closed, now stood open and waiting for penetration by ‘‘New Politics’’ Democratic liberals. Other attacks on closed state party systems occurred in New Mexico, New Hampshire, and Ohio, although on a smaller scale than in Connecticut. Despite the seemingly hopeless situation after Kennedy’s death, the campaign did not go quietly. McCarthy leaders, still dedicated to democratic-procedural

reforms, put together a series of rules and delegate seating challenges to air at the national convention in Chicago. The convention is best remembered for the tragic confrontation between the Chicago police and student protesters in the streets outside the convention. But inside the convention a ‘‘quiet revolution’’ occurred (Chester et al. 1969; Shafer 1983). The key procedural challenge stemmed from the McCarthy challenge to the unit rule as the most important procedural innovation. The unit rule was an anachronistic tool of bossism that decreed that in any procedural vote (on county, state, or national level) the majority of the group won all the votes. Thus even if, say, 8 of the 50 Texas delegates supported McCarthy, all 50 would go to Humphrey. A McCarthy strategist and former Democratic National Convention (DNC) member, George Mitchell, came up with the idea of challenging the unit rule as a way of unsettling the Humphrey forces. Humphrey and his supporters, seeing the danger in the issue, came out before the Convention in favor of a mild resolution abolishing the unit rule for future conventions. The Rules Committee took up the unit rule issue at the convention, where it became entangled with other McCarthy initiatives. If state-level McCarthy workers learned one lesson in 1968, it was that illogical and labyrinthine rules covered the party’s presidential selection. Some states had primaries. Others had caucuses. Most had neither, but instead vested delegate selection power in the hands of state party leaders. In a substantial number of states, these leaders selected delegates up to two years before the national convention. Connecticut leaders, recently stung by the iniquities in their dealings with John Bailey, thought up the idea of convening a preconvention commission to study party selection methods. Geoffrey Cowan, a leading McCarthy operative in Connecticut, was put in charge of the commission process. Cowan explained that the commission ‘‘grew out of my own frustration at delegate-hunting in Connecticut. We got only nine out of forty-four. We were denied a fair proportion on any basis of counting . . . we needed some way to document delegate selection. We needed some written document to back the challenge’’ (Shafer 1983, 15). In short order Cowan, along with fellow McCarthy supporter Anne Wexler and all-purpose liberal Thomas Adler, put together a working legal staff to research the delegate selection process in the various states. Cowan also set about recruiting commission members, including the eventual chairman, Governor Harold E. Hughes of Iowa. While the commission met only once, the recommendations, drafted and fleshed out by a largely

86 Elections pro-McCarthy staff, became the foundation document for reformers’ claims for change. At the convention, Hughes Commission staffers soon realized that the party reform issue promised little political advantage for McCarthy. The staff, again headed by Cowan, Adler, and Wexler, made their stand in the Rules Committee. The major issue before the Rules Committee, as previously stated, was the McCarthy-backed challenge to the unit rule. The committee took up the unit rule challenge first. The majority report would contain a carefully worded, fairly conservative abolition of the unit rule (conservative in that it occurred for future conventions, only at the state level, and only at the enforced discretion of the convention). Other Hughes Commission discussions of party reform went poorly for McCarthy forces. The committee voted down most of the recommendations, although they tabled several for future study. The reform group caucused in the wake of their Rules defeat, and composed a minority report that melded two issues. First, they took a much stronger stance against the unit rule, abolishing it for this and future conventions. They also abolished the unit rule at every level, down to precincts. Second, they pushed for the formation of a party reform commission to study the issue of delegate selection. The majority report also called for such a commission, but unlike the vague goals outlined in that report, the minority report demanded that every person have ‘‘a full and timely opportunity to participate’’ in delegate selection (Shafer 1983, 30). In the only insurgent victory of an otherwise strongarmed convention, the pro-reform faction, led on the floor by McCarthy supporters (including Iowa’s Governor Hughes), passed the Rules minority report. Byron Shafer describes the floor roll call as ‘‘the most confused ballot of that confused and unhappy gathering’’ (1983). Most delegates were unsure what they were voting for, as evidenced by the 15 delegations that passed on their first time through the roll. To make matters worse, debate started on another resolution while the voting continued for the Rules minority report. In the end, the reformers had shrewdly tacked the call for a future commission onto the call to thoroughly abolish the unit rule. Many who might have questioned the reform commission on its own merits voted for the minority report because of its strong antiunit language. The minority resolution passed 1,350--1,206 (Shafer 1983, 34--35). The ensuing history of the reform commission, which subsequently became the McGovern-Fraser Commission, is complex. But throughout the commission’s

deliberations, the pro-McCarthy, pro-reform ‘‘individuals became central to the politics of party reform in the months---indeed the years’’ that followed the 1968 convention (Shafer 1983, 14). In the end, the 1972 DNC met under very different rules than any that preceded it. The call for ‘‘timely opportunity’’ for citizens to participate in state delegate selection led many states to adopt a new primary or caucus. In 1968, 17 states had Democratic primaries. By 1980, 31 states used primaries. On the Republican side, the numbers climbed from 16 to 33. Greater participation, of a sort, was guaranteed (Polsby 1983, 64). Viewing the campaign through a policy or electoral lens, the McCarthy insurgency did not fare well. While McCarthy’s success led Johnson to renew peace discussions with North Vietnam in 1968, the war itself did not end for another seven years. And although McCarthy arguably played a large role in Kennedy’s entry and Johnson’s withdrawal, McCarthy himself lost the nomination, and quickly became a marginalized figure in American politics. But if we instead view the McCarthy insurgency in light of procedural reform aims, its successes were greater than the 1912 insurgency. At a minimum, McCarthy supporters brought a breath of fresh air into stale Democratic politics. More profoundly, McCarthy supporters originated and saw through the single biggest change in the presidential selection system since the fall of King Caucus in 1824. The McCarthy campaign, a failure in so many ways, vividly captures the insurgent desire and occasional capacity to make lasting changes in American partisan and electoral politics.

Conclusion In 1952, V. O. Key observed that the expansion of direct primary elections would give new social movements and issue-oriented independents increasing power over the two major parties. ‘‘The leaders of protest movements of all shades and hues may, if their following is strong enough, capture the nominations of either major party,’’ he noted (Key 1952, 303). Indeed, Key suggested that direct primaries would make it ‘‘less necessary for the leaders of movements of dissent to form new parties’’ (Key 1952, 303). There is little question that the 1912 Roosevelt and 1968 McCarthy insurgencies contributed mightily to the contemporary system of direct primaries. Even after the tumultuous struggle for the 1912 Republican nomination led to new primaries, Roosevelt’s Progressive Party campaign gave social movements and issue-oriented activists an unprecedented role within party politics and breathed

The Insurgency Campaigns of 1912 and 1968 87 life into a candidate-centered approach that foreshadowed more plebiscitary forms of governance (Milkis and Tichenor 1994). More than a half-century later, the McCarthy campaign of 1968, the Hughes Commission, and the McGovern-Fraser reforms represented a triumph and legitimization of both social movements and candidate-centered campaigns in national partisan and electoral politics. In this account, then, we associate the 1912 insurgency with the genesis of seismic shifts in the nature of American electoral and partisan politics and the 1968 insurgency with the consolidation of a more direct democratic politics hostile to older forms of party organization and governance. For both the Democratic and Republican parties, the procedural reforms won by the Bull Moose and McCarthy challenges helped loosen the hold of traditional party bosses and regulars in favor of issue-oriented activists dedicated to various extraparty causes and movements. Yet these insurgencies have a mixed legacy as watersheds in the fundamental shift toward what Sidney Milkis calls ‘‘a more direct, less party-oriented democracy’’ (Milkis 1993, 214). The elevation of candidate-centered campaigns and the expanded power of issue advocates and movements in electoral and partisan politics---developments originally thought to open the process to, or at least better represent, ordinary citizens---has vexed grassroots democracy in important ways. Most specifically, these innovations profoundly weakened political parties as instruments of collective mobilization and ironically contributed to the distance between an immobilized citizenry at the grassroots level and a warring political elite at the core.

References and Further Reading ‘‘A Charter for Democracy.’’ Address before the Ohio Constitutional Convention at Columbus, Ohio, February 21, 1912: 4--12. Original manuscript at Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

Brereton, Charles. 1987. First in the Nation. Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall. Chester, Lewis, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page. 1969. An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968. New York: Viking Press. Croly, Herbert. 1914. Progressive Democracy. New York: Macmillan. Gable, John A. 1978. The Bull Moose Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press. Hoeh, David C. 1994. 1968-McCarthy-New Hampshire-‘‘I Hear America Singing’’. Rochester, MN: Lone Oak Press, Ltd. Key, V. O., Jr. 1952. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. Binghamton, NY: Thomas Crowell Company. Larner, Jeremy. 1970. Nobody Knows: Reflections on the McCarthy Campaign of 1968. New York: MacMillan. McCarthy, Eugene. 1969. The Year of the People. New York: Doubleday. Milkis, Sidney. 1993. The President and the Parties. New York: Oxford University Press. Milkis, Sidney, and Daniel Tichenor. 1994. ‘Direct Democracy’ and Social Justice: The Progressive Party Campaign of 1912.’’ Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall). Morrison, Elting, ed. 1952. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mowry, George. 1946. Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. New Hampshire State Department. 1969. Manual for the Court of New Hampshire. Vol. 41. Concord. New York Times, February 7, 1912. Polsby, Nelson. 1983. Consequences of Party Reform. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Roosevelt, Philip James. ‘‘Politics of the Year 1912: An Intimate Progressive View,’’ unpublished manuscript. Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Roosevelt, Theodore. 1926. The Works of Theodore Roosevelt. 20 vols. New York: Scribner’s. Shafer, Byron. 1983. Quiet Revolution. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ‘‘Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Lee,’’ September 16, 1910, and November 11, 1910. Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University. ‘‘Theodore Roosevelt to James Garfield,’’ December 1, 1911. Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections William Field Lecturer, Georgian Court University

imagery into the observer’s home, and the airplane, which allowed campaigns to increase in intensity as candidates could spread their message to more places at greater speed. Coupled with the high degree of citizen involvement stemming from the war effort, the 1950s showed Americans as engaged in politics and loyal to parties, but relatively uninformed about the particulars of political platforms (Campbell et al. 1960). Unfortunately, we have little evidence from earlier years to compare this with. Public opinion polls began in the 1930s, but they were not applied to social science research until the 1950s. Thus, we do not know whether the decade of the 1950s were the norm of American politics or represented an exceptionally high water mark of civic engagement. This absence of data means we must use the 1950s as a starting point. While not drawing conclusion about the ‘‘normality’’ of the decade, we can and will use it as a baseline for exploring the changing American voter in the context of legal, strategic, and tactical changes in political campaigns. We will examine a number of areas in which voting behavior and election strategy have changed the most. These include the possible transformation of voting decision from one based primarily on party loyalty to one involving a rational calculation of interests, the strengthening of the political parties through the geographic realignment of party support and the rise of campaign contributions, the impact of campaign finance reform, the emergence of the ‘‘permanent

American national elections have undergone rather dramatic change in the last 40 years. The fifth party system has collapsed as party loyalty has faded and the states of the old Confederacy have moved from the Democratic column to the Republican column. Not by coincidence, the prominence of party labels during campaigns has also declined. The 1980s saw a period of ‘‘dealignment,’’ ‘‘divided government,’’ and ‘‘candidate-centered campaigns’’ as the United States emerged from a period of uncertainty and flux following the economic and social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. While this trend continued into the 1990s, the parties, especially the Republican Party, organized a response that created a national party structure that was more organized, coherent, and hierarchical than had been seen in generations. As we move into the first years of the 21st century, the national party organizations are stronger and more able to enforce party discipline than ever before, while voter loyalty is still low and campaigning candidates rarely emphasize party labels. This paradox of strong parties operating in a world in which the voters hate parties represents the current state of parties and elections in the United States. Students of American electoral behavior often view the 1950s as the standard by which to view change. There are two main reasons for this, one more general and one strictly methodological. From the general perspective, the 1950s saw the wide adoption by candidates of two technologies as key election campaign tools: the television, with its ability to bring campaign 88

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campaign’’ revolving around ‘‘candidate-centered politics’’ and the deployment of new technologies that have both strengthened and weakened the links among candidates, parties, and voters. The seeds of change were planted in the 1964 presidential election and have grown into an electoral landscape far different from the 1950s.

A Basic Voting Model: Party Identification The 1950s and early 1960s can be characterized in terms of high party loyalty. Campbell’s seminal study, The American Voter (1960), which drew on survey data that became the biannual National Election Study, highlighted this element in American voter behavior: In a survey interview most of our citizens freely classify themselves as Republicans or Democrats and indicate that these loyalties have persisted through a number of elections. Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place (Campbell et al. 1960, 121). This loyalty was especially important, because the parties had different ideological positions in different parties of the country. The Democrats, in particular, were divided between New Deal Democrats in the Northeast and West, and conservative ‘‘Yellow Dog’’ Democrats of the South whose loyalty was to the racist and states’ rights party of the Old Confederacy, not to the Progressive party ideals of the New Deal. The vast majority of voters in the 1950s and early 1960s defined themselves in terms of party, as is shown in figure 1. Nearly half the electorate proclaimed a loyalty to the Democrat Party, while Republican support stood at just under 30 percent. Only 23 percent of voters considered themselves independent, and most of those voters, when pressed, admitted they leaned toward one of the main parties. True independents numbered under 10 percent of the survey’s respondents. Almost as soon as party identification was discovered, events rose to challenge its position as the defining factor in elections. The social turmoil of the 1960s, centered on the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the women’s rights movement, put both major parties but especially the governing Democrats on the defensive. Voters, particularly the young, turned away from developing a party

Figure 1. Source: Campbell, et al. The American Voter (1969).

identification and declared themselves ‘‘independent.’’ These floating voters selected their candidate on the basis of issues and image, rather than party label. Independents outnumbered Republicans as early as 1968, and became the largest group in the voting booth from 1988. Flanigan and Zingale (2002) document the impact of these floating voters. Strong Democrats and strong Republicans rarely defect from their party at an election. Data from the National Election Study indicate that, generally, less than 10 percent of strong party identifiers abandon their party in favor of a presidential candidate from a different party. Weak identifiers are somewhat less loyal, but here, too, each party can count on the support of 60--80 percent of its identifiers. Independents, however, vary in their vote choice, and thus are more open to persuasion through the election campaign. In the heyday of party loyalty, political parties engaged in massive canvassing campaigns, contacting their supporters and making sure they voted. The Democratic message was simple: get out and vote. With 40 percent of the electorate supporting it, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress for 40 straight years, and dominated the White House between 1933 and 1969. The Republican message had to be more nuanced and had to appeal to the small numbers of independents and disaffected Democrats. Their presidential successes (1952 and 1956) could be attributed to the war hero candidacy of Eisenhower rather than a strong turnout for Republican ideas. As party loyalty fell, the Democratic strategy stopped working, while Republican experience with reaching out to the uncommitted voters saw increased success. In 1980, Republicans seized the presidency with a strategy that presented an image of presidential success and a new set of policy positions that appealed to independents and disaffected Democrats alike. Governor Reagan’s 1980 victory surprised many, given his

90 Elections ideological position was more extreme than President Carter’s position, and it cemented an electoral configuration of Republican dominance at the presidential level and led to Republican control of Congress 20 years later. The Clinton years saw a partial resurgence of Democratic Party loyalty, but by 2000, independents were once again the largest group of voters. Republican loyalty grew in the aftermath of September 11, however, as did political support of independents for President Bush’s Republican Party. The GOP (Grand Old Party) has scored three such consecutive congressional victories that by Bush’s second term, Republicans dominate both of the elected branches of the national government. This transformation of the national political scene, from Democratic to Republican dominance, could not have happened without a decline in party identification. Other major changes in elections and parties also start from this decline, to which we now turn.

Candidate-Centered Politics The weakening of party loyalty has made it necessary for elected officials to change how they campaign for office. In the days of the party machine, the parties had seemingly endless armies of workers, bankrolled by funds raised by the party machine. Workers would canvass potential voters, and candidates would present themselves through massive election rallies. These efforts were intended to mobilize voters and get them to the polls in support of a party and its candidates. Once elected, officials were beholden to the party machine that paid for their campaign and mobilized their voters.

Those days are long gone. Rarely do candidates present themselves as instruments of a political party. Indeed, party organizations faced collapse in the 1970s. Funds evaporated because of the campaign finance reforms begun in 1970. Volunteer party canvassers shifted their attention to individual candidates. Finally, candidates, especially those running for president, found they had direct, if expensive, access to the media that allowed them to present themselves as individuals and not as Republicans or Democrats. With independents accounting for a third of the electorate, the logic of campaigning on the party label weakened. The universal adoption of the primary election (and the related caucus) as the tool for selecting candidates nearly spelled the end of the party. Before primaries, potential candidates were vetted and selected by the party leaders, giving them the power to reward party loyalty and limit policy choices. Individuals seeking to influence elected officials would contribute to the party, knowing that the party selection would reflect the preferences of the contributors. Thus, it was advantageous for both the donors and the politicians to work with the party. Donors know they had influence, and politicians knew they would get support. Antagonism to the parties increased throughout the 1960s and came to a head after the Watergate scandal with sweeping campaign finance reform. Laws passed in the 1970s limited direct contributions by individuals, corporations, and political action committees (PACs) to parties and campaigns in an effort to reduce the influence of major donors and limit overall spending by anyone running for office. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled the spending limits invalid in the 1976 decision

Figure 2. Source: National Election Study.

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections Buckley v. Valeo, but endorsed limits on contributions to campaigns for federal office. The initial result was weaker parties at the national level as the Democratic and Republican National Committees (DNC and RNC) and their counterparts for the House and Senate saw their funds dry up. Candidates were forced to raise money on their own, thus reducing their dependence on the party and the party label at a time when voter interest in parties had diminished. The increased sophistication of candidate election committees and the hiring of specialized fund-raisers led candidates to emphasize their own policy positions over their party labels. Incumbents benefited from additional resources, including constituency service and the franking privilege. It is no surprise that the number of congressional staff members tripled between 1960 and 1993 as incumbents increased their assistance to constituents (or that, after a brief decline following the Republican takeover in 1994, they continued to rise). Neither should the rapid increase in volume and cost of congressional communications to constituents be a surprise in this era of limited support from party volunteers. Constituency service---intervening with the federal bureaucracy on behalf of a resident of the elected official’s district---is used to develop support across party lines, while mass mailings to constituents using the free postage of the franking privilege is used to spread the elected official’s message to all voters regardless of party affiliation. In both cases, the impact of the activity is to reduce party loyalty and build what Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) called the ‘‘personal vote’’: that is, a pool of support amounting to perhaps 15 percent of the voters in any one district that supports the incumbent regardless of ideology or party. Republican congress members can sometimes develop sizeable majorities in Democratic districts through the judicious use of these office perks, as can Democratic congress members in Republican districts.

The Permanent Campaign If voter loyalty has weakened and elected officials are trolling for support through constant interactions with the voters, a logical step for both incumbents and challengers is to enter into what has become known as the ‘‘permanent campaign.’’ The permanent campaign consists of just that: a constant presentation of candidates for office to the public, and constant examination of all political activity with an eye for how it will appeal to the voters. Congress members have stepped up their focus on elections, no matter how far distant they may appear at

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any particular time. Many members of Congress spend only three days a week in Washington, devoting Mondays and Fridays to traveling from and to their home districts and the weekends to meeting with constituents to stay in touch with them. Most evenings of a congress member’s career are spent in fund-raising activities. This frenetic schedule leaves congress members constantly on the run and with little time for development of real policy choices. A major component of the permanent campaign at both the presidential and congressional levels has been the increasing prominence of opinion polls. Opinion polls and focus groups became extremely important components of presidential campaigns as far back as the 1970s, but their use during the time between campaigns has also risen dramatically. Stanley Greenberg, President Clinton’s official pollster, was one of his main advisors and regularly contributed to high-level policy discussions. His interpretation of public opinion and the possible impact of policy on opinion contributed to the president’s oft-criticized yet successful tactic of ‘‘triangulation’’: deliberately positioning himself between the views of Democratic and Republican Party loyalists. President Bush claimed not to pay attention to opinion polls, but major elements of his campaign strategies were developed using focus groups, including his 2000 campaign slogan proclaiming him a ‘‘compassionate conservative,’’ and the Republican Party leadership continues to use polls to gauge opinion and shape the presidential strategy for presenting issues. A completely new component to this permanent campaign is the rise of the 24-hour news cycle. In the 1960s and 1970s, national and international news was presented to the public each evening. The three main television networks summarized the day’s news and provided insight and analysis on a regular schedule. As a result, government officials developed a pattern of feeding stories to the media to maximize coverage on the evening news. The launch of CNN (Cable News Network) in 1980 changed all this, though slowly. From its inception, CNN provided news 24 hours a day, thus breaking the evening news cycle. Stories gained nationwide attention almost as soon as they occurred. By the late 1990s, CNN, and later Fox News and MSNBC, all cable channels, reported the news as it happened, eating into network news audiences and transforming the dynamic of the cycle. The mushrooming of news outlets has allowed politicians greater, and less filtered, access to the public, encouraging them to dive deeper into a permanent campaign mode of thinking and acting. With 24-hour news has come a host of newsoriented talk shows, from Larry King Live on CNN to

92 Elections the O’Reilly Factor on Fox News and Hardball on MSNBC. These combative shows provide constant media scrutiny of political events. They also present a confrontational Left versus Right interpretation of the news, forcing elected officials and their challengers to constantly think in an ‘‘us versus them’’ mode rather than following a bipartisan path toward the best policy. The rise of Internet access has hastened this approach. From the right of the political spectrum comes a rising chorus of accusations that ‘‘mainline’’ media are biased toward the liberal Left. Much of the political energy of the Internet comes from private citizens and groups who orient themselves on the Right and dedicate themselves to debunking the myths they say are presented in mainstream media. Recent years have seen a response from the Left, but this response has perpetuated the norm of painting politics in simple black-and-white terms. We again are presented with an interesting paradox: as voters became less attached to parties, parties waned in importance, and politicians increasingly avoided party labels during and after campaigns, the new media outlets encouraged politicians and voters to think increasingly in terms of liberal versus conservative, Left versus Right, and right versus wrong (as in ‘‘we’re right; you’re wrong’’). The combative talk shows of cable news and talk radio, and the Web sites and blogs of the Internet, present the world in stark uncompromising colors where the right path is visible to the righteous and the opposition must be dismissed as misguided, wrongheaded, or even the progeny of the devil.

Financing Campaigns Federal law has contributed deliberately to the reduction of party power through a number of laws designed to control and limit contributions to political campaigns. The 20th century witnessed a number of major scandals in which political decisions appeared to be made in response to pressure from campaign contributors rather than the wishes of the voters, raising the specter of bribery and corruption undermining American democracy. In addition to outright scandal, the Republican Party’s fund-raising prowess alarmed Democrats who feared that grossly uneven campaign spending would threaten democratic competition.1 Scandals and rising concerns culminated in a series of reforms in the 1970s that severely restricted the ability of both major parties to raise money on behalf of their chosen candidates and thus hastened the antiparty tendencies described above. As the parties entered the 1980s, contributions to candidates and their campaign operations were severely

curtailed. Individuals were allowed to give $1,000 per year, per candidate, while PACs could give $5,000. Parties faced the same restrictions on transferring money to campaigns. Limitations on this so-called hard money meant candidates had to devote more of their time ‘‘shaking the money tree’’ by wining and dining potential supporters. Success in this activity further reduced their dependency on party organizations, just when organizations themselves saw access to traditional sources of money dry up and their ability to finance campaigns evaporate. In exchange for contribution limits, presidential campaigns were offered matching funds from government coffers. Taxpayers were offered the option of telling the government to donate $1 (later raised to $3) to the presidential campaign fund, and the general election component of all recent presidential campaigns has been funded in this way. Primary races were also funded this way until 2000, when George W. Bush declined the matching funds and avoided their accompanying spending limits. Federal matching funds served to equalize Democratic and Republican candidates, gave the appearance of reducing the influence of interest groups, and somewhat slowed the overall growth of campaign expenditures. By the late 1980s, however, interest groups and parties had found the loopholes in the law, and set up ways of raising and spending ‘‘soft money.’’ Soft money was money spent on ‘‘party building’’ activities rather than spent to endorse a particular candidate. Examples of such activities that still actively supported the party’s candidates include funding voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives among populations likely to support the party’s candidate, and paying for multiple candidate campaign offices. The 1996 presidential election showed the flaw of limiting spending through voluntary caps. President Clinton, running unopposed for reelection, was able to use his primary-season matching funds to attack his Republican opponent all summer, while Bob Dole had to spend his money fighting nine other Republicans for the nomination. His primary campaign war chest was empty well before the Republican Convention, and he started the fall campaign at a severe disadvantage. Already defined as an aging conservative and outside the mainstream, Dole never regained the momentum and lost badly. As a direct consequence of Dole’s defeat, the leading contender for the Republican nomination in 2000, George W. Bush, declined matching funds for the primary season. With John McCain’s challenge over by mid-spring, Bush was able to use seemingly unlimited

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections funds to begin attacking the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, who had agreed to spending limits and thus could not match spending. Bush’s deployment of major fundraisers, called Pioneers, to channel soft money into his campaign marks a new twist in campaign finance, as it represented a formal recognition of the role of private, wealthy, well-connected individuals in the campaign and rewarded them with consultations with the White House, ambassadorships, and other perks. The Bush campaign raised a record $191 million while the Gore campaign raised $133 million. Democrats viewed Bush’s electoral victory partly as a consequence of outspending their candidate, so in 2004, the Kerry campaign followed the Bush precedent in declining spending limits and federal matching funds during the primary campaign. The Kerry campaign raised $225 million, but the Republicans again set a record, raising nearly $275 million. After adding in federal matching funds, which both accepted for the general election, total spending by the two campaigns soared to more than $700 million (see figure 3). This represents hard money, raised by the campaigns and not the parties. Candidates who can raise these enormous amounts of money do not need the political party organization to support their campaigns; thus, spending of this magnitude suggests the end of the political party as a force for selecting, shaping, and funding political candidates. While campaign spending by the two major party campaigns has been growing steadily, the real story in campaign finance has been spending in the form of soft money and spending by interest groups that are not legally affiliated with any campaign but that intervene actively on one side or the other of the political struggle. This spending grew in the late 1990s, so much so that Sen. John McCain (R-AR) and Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI), along with others, grew increasingly concerned

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that unregulated soft money and outside spending were swamping the ability of candidates to present themselves to the voters. Their response was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, commonly known as McCainFeingold, which President Bush reluctantly signed in 2002 and which entered into force after the Supreme Court’s favorable ruling in December 2003. The major provisions of McCain-Feingold are as follows: • A complete ban on soft money contributions. • A ban on union and corporation spending to endorse or oppose a named candidate within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. • A raising of hard money donation limits. Individual donors are now allowed to contribute $2,000 per year to a candidate, and PACs may contribute to each candidate $5,000 for a primary election and $5,000 for a general election, for a total of $10,000 per candidate per year. McCain-Feingold has altered the financial landscape in several ways. Increasing the money contribution limits allowed the candidates to raise far more hard money than in the past: candidate Bush raised $100 million for his 2000 presidential bid, and $260 million for his 2004 reelection bid. For the Democrats, Gore raised $45 million (limited by his agreement to accept federal matching funds) in 2000, but Kerry raised $230 million. These unprecedented levels of funds build on the trends of candidate-centered politics that have developed since the 1970s. Soft money had been a fast-growing component of the war chests of the major parties’ national

Figure 3. Source: Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org.

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Senators John McCain (left) and Russell Feingold (right) accompany Doris ‘‘Granny D’’ Haddock, age 91, to a news conference regarding campaign finance reform on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on March 19, 2001. Haddock walked across the country in support of campaign finance reform in 1999. (AP/Wide World Photos)

committees. The 1991--1992 election cycle saw less than $100 million raised, but by 1999--2000, the parties raised nearly $250 million each, and a similar amount in 2002. Such money could not be given to a particular campaign, but it could be spent by state party organizations to set up local campaign offices, canvass voters, sponsor GOTV drives, fund opinion polls, and engage in similar work of real assistance to candidates. It could also be spent on advertising as long as individual candidates’ names were not mentioned. A memorable instance of this occurred in New Jersey, when the incumbent governor’s campaign ran out of funds in late October 1997, just before the general election. The Republican National Committee stepped in and paid for television and radio ads that merely replaced the words ‘‘Vote Whitman for Governor’’ with the words ‘‘Vote Republican for Governor.’’ The ability to spend soft money where it might do the party the most good meant the victorious candidate

incurred a debt to the national party. The Democratic and Republican National Committees liked soft money because it helped reverse the decline of the organizations’ influence. The Republicans were especially good at this: with Congressman Tom DeLay, a high-ranking member of the House leadership, raising and distributing or spending large amounts of money for Republican candidates, party discipline in the House rose to unprecedented levels. Following Bush’s 2000 presidential victory, this discipline meant that Bush was one of the most successful presidents of recent memory, rarely opposed by a majority in Congress and rarely having to threaten a veto. By eliminating soft money, McCainFeingold sought to limit the influence that such sums of money could buy. As Mitch McConnell (R-KY) predicted, though, banning soft money did not remove it; it simply shifted it. Sections 501(c) and 527 of the U.S. tax code provide for political advertising by public interest and advocacy

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections groups, and consequently groups that could not make unlimited donations decided to create organizations under these sections (unimaginatively called ‘‘501(c)s’’ and ‘‘527s’’) and spend the money themselves. Prominent 527s in the 2004 election include the liberal groups America Coming Together (ACT, which spent nearly $80 million) and Progress for America, and the conservative Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (later renamed Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth). The ads presented by these groups were influential first in undermining Bush’s support and later in casting doubt on Kerry’s Vietnam War record. It is worth remembering that the activities of 527s are not allowed to be coordinated with candidate campaigns. Unlike soft money, which is spent under the direction of each party’s leadership, money by advocacy groups is forbidden from having any coordination with any campaign. (When links between the Republican leadership and the coordinators of the Swift Boat Veterans emerged, there were several rapid forced resignations, though no prosecutions.) These advocacy groups represent a real unknown to any candidate and campaign: their intervention is completely unpredictable. The continuing development of these sorts of campaign influences has altered and will continue to alter campaigns considerably. Whereas soft money worked to strengthen the political parties by giving them leverage over which candidates were selected in primaries and how they would vote once elected, spending by 527s is free from any such central control. Indeed, 527s are likely to continue to fragment the political process and drive it to further extremes. Contributors to 527s are more extreme than the average party supporter, and 527s are allowed to spend their money however they wish in the months leading up to an election. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth succeeded in discrediting John Kerry in 2004, transforming him from a heroic Vietnam War veteran supported by his ‘‘Band of Brothers’’ to an opportunistic fighter who abandoned his comrades and did not deserve medals. Although most of the accusations were repeatedly debunked by the mainstream media, they stuck, contributing to Kerry’s defeat in the fall. Important as they are, expenditures of 527s must be placed in the context of overall campaign spending. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that campaign spending by parties, candidates, interest groups, and advocacy groups topped $4 billion in 2004, up from nearly $3 billion in 2000 and $1.8 billion in 1992. Spending by 527s stood at about $390 million in 2004, or about 10 percent of the total. By contrast, individuals contributed $2.5 billion in hard money

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directly to candidates and parties. Financially, therefore, we can see advocacy groups as small, but significant, participants in the electoral process. This suggests we should not overestimate the impact of advocacy groups. They will operate at the fringes of the electoral debate. At the same time, we should note the ongoing struggle over the ideological agenda between them and the political parties. Advocacy groups are generally more extreme in their positions than the parties, and they are connected to particular groups of voters that form the core of each party’s support base. Given their tendency toward extreme positions, successful advertising by advocacy groups has and will continue to push parties farther away from the political center. Campaign finance reform weakened political parties in the late 1970s and 1980s. With the discovery of soft money, party strength grew in the 1990s. The 21stcentury political party is healthy and flush with cash, though its cash has changed from soft to hard money thanks to McCain-Feingold. Throughout the period, spending by interest groups has grown as well. Today, the typical candidate for any federal position will supplement campaign funds raised by him- or herself (increasingly from personal fortunes) with spending donated by the party’s national committee and (if a candidate for Congress) the party’s House or Senate campaign committee. Facing that candidate will be spending from any opposing candidate, of course, but also spending by ideological, economic, and social advocacy groups opposed to one or more of the candidate’s positions. Occasionally a candidate might benefit from favorable comments by an advocacy group, but this should not be expected. Thus the modern candidate must raise ever-larger sums of money to maintain a fight on multiple fronts.

Parties and Campaigns in the Internet Age Americans have witnessed an electoral revolution in the last 10 years. The first forays onto the Internet in 1996, with simple statements of policy positions, were greeted with curiosity, but had little impact on campaigns or election results. About the only voters who looked at them were students in American government courses being told to research positions for class assignments. Things were different already in 2000. John McCain’s presidential hopes were boosted after his surprise victory in the New Hampshire primary, and he capitalized on that by raising $21,000 per hour over the next four days (more than $2 million in total)

96 Elections through his campaign Web site (Semiatin 2005). The financial momentum gained from the instant access to a national audience of donors helped keep McCain in the race for several more weeks, though of course he did eventually lose the nomination to Bush. If McCain’s Web site was newsworthy in 2000, the 2004 story belongs to Howard Dean. Dean essentially ran his campaign from a Web server. By January 2004, he had raised more than $40 million, mostly in small donations through his Web site, had a volunteer army of more than 180,000, and had positioned himself as the likely nominee. His Internet campaign enthralled the young, who saw him as the hippest of the Democrats and the candidate most in tune with their values. Even though older voters were far less responsive to his Populist message and he dropped out in March, his position as the likely nominee before a single primary or caucus vote had been cast was completely due to his presence on the Internet. Internet-savvy candidates are simply following Internet-savvy citizens. Voters have rapidly adapted to the Web and the ease with which one can find information on it. A 2002 survey by the Pew Internet and American Life project estimated that 20 million Americans used the Internet to gather information about candidates, a number that grew to 75 million in 2004 (Rainie, Cornfield, and Horrigan 2005). In addition to developing detailed policy platforms and posting them on Web sites, candidates developed e-mail lists to request donations and announce upcoming candidate events. As a result, voters had easier access to more information about candidates than ever before, and candidates had more direct access to sympathetic audiences. The impact on parties continues the trend seen elsewhere since the 1970s: candidates are becoming increasingly independent of political parties. No longer relying on party volunteers to distribute information, successful Web sites provide biographies of the candidate, policy positions, upcoming events, past speeches, and places to sign up for further information or to join an e-mail list. Web sites are easy to set up and cheap to run: all that is needed is a server linked to the Internet and someone with the skill to write appealing site content and provide regular updates. The two people who designed McCain’s 2000 Web site spent 10 weeks planning and programming his Web site, and about five hours per day maintaining it. This investment of perhaps $30,000 paid for itself in a few hours of fund-raising, freeing the candidate to focus on generating the positions and stories that appeared later on the Web site. The 2004 election saw a proliferation of candidate Web sites and prominent advertising for them on lawn signs and radio and television ads. Advocacy groups

joined the fray in great numbers. Planned Parenthood, Focus on the Family, and similar groups have had Web sites since the dawn of the Internet in 1994, but a decade later they were producing interactive sites that were visually appealing and drew millions of viewers and their dollars. These sites often replayed television ads for visitors to watch at leisure and to tell their friends about. Voters who offered their e-mail addresses were treated with weekly or even daily e-mails that debunked the advocacy group’s political opponents nearly every time they opened their mouths, and did so at minimal cost. These advocacy groups developed detailed responses to what the presidential candidates had said in debates, making it more difficult for the candidates to control the flow of the campaign. The most influential advocacy groups to emerge in the 2004 election cycle were the liberal group Move On.org and the conservative group Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. MoveOn was founded at the height of the proceedings to impeach President Clinton, but outlived that crisis to evolve into a large online community of Progressive activists and supporters. Not only did the organization raise millions of dollars to run advertising, but it also used its Web site to promote Progressive policy positions and its servers to send millions of e-mails to supporters. Watchdog groups have also emerged to debunk the candidates and their messages. As soon as a campaign produced a commercial, the media would untangle truth from fiction, as had happened in previous elections. Ideological watchdog groups produced even more debunking, often itself full of half-truths, and these explanations circulated the Internet as supporters e-mailed them to friends. Thus, even as the Internet allows candidates to shape and target their messages, and raise money from supporters, it also limits candidates’ ability to control their message and increases the power of unaffiliated, highly partisan, observers. The final innovation from the 2004 election cycle, one that become increasingly important since, is the Web log, or blog. Anyone can write a Web log, and most are of interest to only a small audience. However, in the hands of an ideologically driven writer, blogs provide entertaining commentary on political campaigns. Howard Dean’s early success can be attributed in part to blogs, whose authors highlighted his qualities to Progressive readers. A 2005 special election in Ohio shows the rising power of the blog. Rob Portman (R-OH) vacated his House seat to become the U.S. trade representative, setting up a contest between the favored Republican Jean Schmidt and Democrat Paul Hackett, a veteran of the Iraq War running on an antiwar platform. Most

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections observers wrote off his candidacy, noting the seat was the 57th most Republican House seat in the country (Bush won 66 percent of the vote in 2004) and that Hackett was a political unknown. However, an e-mail from DNC Chair Howard Dean and concerted efforts by progressive bloggers raised $475,000 for Hackett, allowing him to run television ads for the first time in that district’s history. Hackett lost the election, but by a narrow 52--48 percent margin, or 4,000 votes. The success of the bloggers in highlighting his campaign, drawing in outside money, and boosting support further weakens the traditional calculations of support by parties and may throw more elections wide open. The lesson of blogs is the ability of observers to influence election outcomes by throwing their support behind a candidate and raising money on behalf of that candidate. To be sure, the 527s were active in the 2004 election, and their millions were influential wherever they were spent. However, 527s and 501(c)s are generally founded by existing organizations as a way to circumvent the ban on soft money. Their ideological perspective is predictable. The funds raised through bloggers are a new and unpredictable variable in any future campaign. Setting up a blog is even easier than setting up a candidate Web site; in its most primitive form, it is simply an online diary. Once it attracts a readership, its author can use the instant soapbox to bring attention to any political race in the country and thereby rally financial support for just about anyone. A blog can be thought of as a leveler: by bringing the power of the press to each and every person who chooses to exercise it, it gives every citizen the chance to have a political voice beyond the ballot box. If the 1980s and 1990s showed the rising power of campaign specialists like Lee Atwater and James Carville, the 21st century may find their heirs’ influence balanced by amateur bloggers who debunk claims and rally support to their preferred candidates. Karl Rove, Bush’s main political advisor, has already found his influence undermined by blogs, just as President Clinton saw his power severely curtailed by a news story kept in the public’s eye by one of the first blogs, the DrudgeReport1. Thanks to the democratizing power of the blog, the next few years could be more fluid than recent years have been, shifting support from Left to Right, or vice versa, as writers gain and lose audience and influence free of the filters imposed by professional campaigns and corporate media. Alternatively, blogs could be of only peripheral importance as the audience stays small and the majority of voters continue on as before. The reality will probably be somewhere in between, as blogs succeed in mobilizing support for individual candidates and the mainstream media pick up on and accentuate

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Internet bloggers work on their web log (‘‘blog‘‘) stories during the Democratic National Convention at the FleetCenter July 26, 2004, in Boston, Massachusetts. The internet has transformed campaign coverage and strategy. (Mario Tama/ Getty Images)

some of the coverage, but even this change will mark a continued evolution for American elections.

A New Party System? In the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson trounced the conservative Republican Barry Goldwater, but Goldwater succeeded in doing something no Republican had done since Reconstruction: he won several states of the Old Confederacy. These nine states had selected the Democratic candidate for president almost without fail since the end of Reconstruction in 1876, to the extent that Republicans rarely bothered to campaign in the South or to pursue policies of interest to southern voters of either race. Goldwater adopted several policies of clear interest to southern white voters, including rolling back elements of the New Deal and shifting power back to the states (thus indirectly reducing federal involvement in the ongoing civil rights struggle). His approach cost him the election in one of the biggest landslides of

98 Elections presidential election history, but he won South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, as well as his native Arizona. In 1968, Richard Nixon pursued what has become known as the ‘‘Southern Strategy,’’ targeting the old Democratic states of the South to form a base of support. His states’ rights stance had more than a whiff of racism in the context of the civil rights movement and racial integration efforts, but he deliberately and successfully appealed to southern whites. His success, especially in 1972, laid the groundwork for the modern Republican Party. While Southerners who identified with the Democratic Party were reluctant to abandon their partisan identify, they cheerfully voted for Nixon and later Goldwater’s heir Ronald Reagan. This should not be news to anybody. The last nonsouthern Democrat to win the White House was John Kennedy in 1960. Even the Southerner Bill Clinton had difficulty in the South, winning four of the nine southern states in 1992 and only three in 1996. Despite being a Southerner himself, Al Gore failed to win a single southern state in 2004. Kerry’s nomination in 2004 was greeted with concern given this record of Democratic candidates, and his selection of John Edwards (D-NC) was a deliberate but unsuccessful attempt to boost southern support: the Democrats again failed to win a single southern state. What is news is the similar transformation of southern representation in the House and Senate, especially in recent years. So-called Dixiecrats dominated in the South through the civil rights era. Some, like Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond, changed party allegiance as the Republican Party’s came to more closely embrace the politics of southern culture, but new candidates like Max Cleland, John Edwards, and Mark Warner stepped forward to be the face of a new southern Democratic Party. These Democrats believed in many traditional values but also embraced racial inclusion, environmental protection, and economic opportunity, thus linking the Old with the New South. The Dixiecrats are gone--retired from the scene or, like Zell Miller (D-GA), endorsing the policies of the religious conservatives in the Republican Party---and the new Democrats are few in number. At the dawn of the 21st century, the South was divided racially, with the vast majority of whites adhering to the Republican Party and African Americans adhering to the Democratic Party. Observers generally agree that the fifth party system ended in 1968 with Nixon’s successful Southern Strategy. The sixth party system was marked by an institutional sharing of political power and an ongoing ideological battle over values. From an institutional perspective, divided government was the norm. Democrats controlled both houses of Congress for 18 of the

24 years between Nixon’s victory and Clinton’s election, while controlling the White House for only four years. Divided government continued in the 1990s as Clinton’s 1992 victory was matched by a Republican takeover of the House in 1994. Between 1968 and 2000, the same party controlled Congress and the presidency for only 6 of 32 years. At the level of issues, the sixth party system was characterized by clashes over what rights to extend to various groups in society. The initial manifestations of these clashes were race-based school desegregation and affirmative action, but women’s issues, especially abortion rights, soon gained equal billing. To these were added in the 1980s environmental defense and in the 1990s gay rights, but the dominant policy thrust during this party system was the debate over the expansion of federal power to defend and extend the rights of various groups, human and otherwise. The rising backlash, especially from Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians, who are loosely lumped together under the label ‘‘Christian conservatives,’’ contributed to the Republican takeover of the South and of Congress. Groups like these have been in American politics since the founding of the Christian Coalition and the Moral Majority in the early 1980s, and their primary role in their early years was to encourage primarily Republican candidates to adopt their policy preferences and subsequently to mobilize support for them. Coordination between conservative Christian groups and the Republican Party grew in the late 1990s to the extent that DNC Chair Howard Dean’s claim that the GOP is ‘‘a white Christian party’’ was not that far off the mark. The president and Republican leadership in both House and Senate listened carefully to Focus on the Family, Concerned Women of America, the Family Research Council, and other religiously inspired groups trying to bring traditional values back into the mainstream. Meanwhile, religious Jews and religious Hispanics take the Republican Party seriously, and show signs of moving away from the Democrats. The religious progressives who made the civil rights movement possible have faded almost completely from view. The 21stcentury Republican Party can be thought of as the party of the religiously inclined, whereas the Democrats present themselves as rather vehemently secular. This offers the Republican Party a window of opportunity. African Americans are generally more socially conservative than whites, yet today they proclaim allegiance to a party that embraces a progressive agenda. If the Republicans can abandon the racial approach to politics that served them so well in taking over the South, they have the potential for building a lasting governing majority.

Recent Trends in American Parties and Elections A second change in party fortunes revolves around the issue of security. September 11, 2001, marked a sea change in domestic American politics as well as in foreign policy. President Bush, who promised a ‘‘humbler’’ foreign policy should he win the 2000 election, found himself leading a policy that was far from humble, launching unilateral invasions of Afghanistan and then Iraq with the ambitious goal of transforming the politics of the entire Middle East. Americans expect more attacks like September 11, and they are willing to forego considerable liberty to avoid them. The USA Patriot Act gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation considerable ability to search homes; investigate computer, library, and bookstore records; and track the actions of individuals, all in the name of stopping terrorism, and all with majority support from the public. In foreign policy, the United States is engaged militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq with the purpose of eradicating Islamic extremist violence and transforming the politics of the Middle East. The issue of security is one of the top issues in the United States in the early 21st century. Republicans have long had an advantage in this area, and it was even more true since September 11. As long as the issue of terrorism remained near the top of the political agenda, Republicans enjoyed an electoral advantage. Challenges in Iraq, however, ended the Bush approach to the crisis, but it would not change the Republican advantage through 2006 because the threat of terrorism remained high. These two factors open the possibility that we are about to enter a seventh party system. The Republicans capitalized on the security issue, increasing their congressional representation in both 2002 and 2004 and reelecting President Bush against a decorated Vietnam War veteran. Additional gains are likely in 2006. Should the party find a way to abandon its racist image and attract increased support from African Americans, it would capture the middle-class Christian black vote and expand its support among Hispanics. Such gains would ensure the establishment of a new party system and Republican dominance for the next 30 years.

New Trends in Elections and Campaigns The United States has seen a number of changes in elections and campaigns in recent years. This essay has highlighted a number of the most important ones. These changes are not cumulative, but often work at conflicting purposes: parties are weaker than before even as their fund-raising prowess has grown. Candidates have grown increasingly independent of parties, and less and less willing to run on the basis of party, even as financial and operational support from the

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party has become more available and, once elected, politicians vote more and more in lockstep with the party position. It is possible, if ironic, to view the political party as moving more into the background of American political life. Its role in Washington is more important than it has been for decades, but its place in American hearts is fading. Voters are fed up with partisan bickering and have unfavorable views of candidates who promise to follow the party agenda. Candidates are increasingly able to fund and organize their own campaigns and draw on financial and volunteer support from outside parties and their traditional support networks. However, party funds are also rising, and the party line increasingly dominates in House and Senate roll call votes. If the political party is fading, the ideological justification for parties grows ever stronger. American political discourse is dominated by strident voices from the Left and the Right and their champions in advocacy groups. The majority of political activists are tied to these groups, their members are writing the blogs, and advocacy groups and their members place considerable pressure on candidates to conform to views of the groups. Given that most of these groups are closely aligned with the major parties, changes in the relative funding and organizational strength of candidates and parties may be akin to moving the deckchairs around on the Titanic: much ado about nothing. American politics is divided along important issue cleavages, and it will continue to be so divided in the near future.

References and Further Reading Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley. University of Chicago edition, 1980. Flanigan, William H., and Nancy H. Zingale. 2002. Political Behavior of the American Electorate. 10th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Ireland, Emmilienne, and Phil Nash. 2005. Winning Campaigns Online: Strategies for Candidates and Causes. 2nd ed. New York: Science Writers Press. Rainie, Lee, Michael Cornfield, and John Horrigan. 2005. The Internet and Campaign 2005. Pew Internet and American Life Project of the Pew Research Center for the People & Press. Washington, DC. Semiatin, Richard. 2005. Campaigns in the 21st Century. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Note 1. In 1972, for example, the Nixon campaign spent $61 million, twice what the McGovern campaign spent.

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Documents

2.1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 60

The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible. In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government, and in still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different

The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, February 26, 1788 To the People of the State of New York: WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive. 101

102 Elections propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors. As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of ‘‘time and manner,’’ which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooperation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed whether in their hands or in those of the Union. But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of ‘‘the wealthy and the well-born,’’ to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society? If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct

tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter. The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State. In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other. In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources

2.2 Anti-Federalist No. 52 103 of public prosperity upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity. I would rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of ‘‘the wealthy and the well-born.’’ These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body. But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are ‘‘the wealthy and the well-born,’’ as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.

Let it, however, be admitted, for argument’s sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?

2.2 Anti-Federalist No. 52 On the Guarantee of Congressional Biennial Elections We the subscribers being of the number, who did not assent to the ratification of the federal constitution, under consideration in the late state convention, held at Boston, to which we were called by the suffrages of the corporations to which we respectively belong-beg leave, through the channel of your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our constituents in particular, the reasons of our dissent, and the principles which governed us in our decision of this important question.

104 Elections Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the necessity of a firm, energetic government, we should have rejoiced in an opportunity to have given our assent to such a one; and should in the present case, most cordially have done it, could we at the same time been happy to have seen the liberties of the people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and secured. We conceive that the very notion of government carries along with it the idea of justice and equity, and that the whole design of instituting government in the world, was to preserve men’s properties from rapine, and their bodies from violence and bloodshed. These propositions being established, we conceive must of necessity produce the following consequence: That every constitution or system, which does not quadrate with this original design, is not government, but in fact a subversion of it. Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things in this constitution to which we object, and to enter into an inquiry, whether, and how far they coincide with those simple and original notions of government before mentioned. In the first place, as direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the numbers in each state, and as Massachusetts has none in it but what are declared free men, so the whole, blacks as well as whites, must be numbered; this must therefore operate against us, as two-fifths of the slaves in the southern states are to be left out of the numeration. Consequently, three Massachusetts infants will increase the tax equal to five sturdy full-grown Negroes of theirs, who work every day in the week for their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which they are allowed to get something for their own support. We can see no justice in this way of apportioning taxes. Neither can we see any good reason why this was consented to on the part of our delegates. We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in this vast continental union, should have his wish with regard to every single article composing a frame of government. And therefore, although we think it more agreeable to the principles of republicanism, that elections should be annual, yet as the elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it so dangerous to the liberties of the people, that we should have rejected the constitution merely on account of the biennial elections of the representatives-had we been sure that the people have any security even of this. But this we could not find. For although it is said, that ‘‘the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several states,’’ etc., and that ‘‘the times, places and manner of holding elections for

senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof,’’ yet all this is wholely superseded by a subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such regulations may be altered, except as to the places of choosing senators. Here we conceive the people may be very materially injured, and in time reduced to a state of as abject vassalage as any people were under the control of the most mercenary despot that ever tarnished the pages of history. The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, will warrant us to say, it may be possible, if not probable, that the congress may be composed of men, who will wish to burden and oppress the people. In such case, will not their inventions be fruitful enough to devise occasions for postponing the elections? And if they can do this once, they can twice; if they can twice, they can thrice, so by degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual. Or, if they choose, they have another expedient. They can alter the place of holding elections. They can say, whatever the legislature of this state may order to the contrary, that all the elections of our representatives shall be made at Mechias, or at Williamstown. Consequently, nine-tenths of the people will never vote. And if this should be thought a measure favorable to their reelection, or the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we doubt not it will be thus ordered. But says the advocates for the constitution, ‘‘it is not likely this will ever happen; we are not to expect our rulers will ever proceed to a wanton exercise of the powers given them.’’ But what reason have we more than past ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable rulers? We think not any. Although it has been said that every generation grows wiser and wiser, yet we have no reason to think they grow better and better. And therefore the probability lies upon the dark side. Does not the experience of past ages leach, that men have generally exercised all the powers they had given them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish their own sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought they could do it with impunity? This we presume will not be denied. And it appeared to us that the arguments made use of by the favorers of the constitution, in the late convention at Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in those who are to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government. But these arguments, we confess, could have no weight with us, while we judge them to be founded altogether upon a slippery perhaps. We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of government, it is necessary that certain powers should be delegated to the rulers from the people. At

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Election of the President’’ the same time, we think they ought carefully to guard against giving so much as will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or even in process of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic. This we think is the case with the form of government lately submitted to our consideration. We could not, therefore, acting uprightly, consulting our own good and the good of our constituents, give our assent unto it. We could not then and we still cannot see, that because people are many times guilty of crimes and deserving of punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to have power to punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish the innocent with the guilty without discrimination, which amounts to the same thing. But this we think in fact to be the case as to this federal constitution. For the congress, whether they have provocation or not, can at any time order the elections in any or all the states to be conducted in such manner as wholely to defeat and render entirely nugatory the intention of those elections, and convert that which was considered and intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people-the grand bulwark against any invasion upon them-into a formidable engine, by which to overthrow them all, and thus involve them in the depth of misery and distress. But it was pled by some of the ablest advocates of the constitution, that if congress should exercise such powers to the prejudice of the people (and they did not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the people) would not suffer it. They would have recourse to the ultima ratio, the dernier resort of the oppressed-the sword. But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity indeed, that the people, whilst in the full and indefeasible possession of their liberties and privileges, should be so very profuse, so very liberal in the disposal of them, as consequently to place themselves in a predicament miserable to an extreme. So wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad alternative of yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a venal and corrupt administration, whose only wish may be to aggrandize themselves and families-to wallow in luxury and every species of dissipation, and riot upon the spoils of the community; or take up the sword and involve their country in all the horrors of a civil war-the consequences of which, we think, we may venture to augur will more firmly rivet their shackles and end in the entailment of vassalage to their posterity. We think this by no means can fall within the description of government before mentioned. Neither can we think these suggestions merely chimerical, or that they proceed from an overheated enthusiasm in favor of republicanism; neither yet from an illplaced detestation

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of aristocracy; but from the apparent danger the people are in by establishing this constitution. When we take a forward view of the proposed congress-seated in the federal city, ten miles square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores and every implement; with a navy at command on one side, and a land army on the other-we say, when we view them thus possessed of the sword in one hand and the purse strings of the people in the other, we can see no security left for them in the enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare possibility that this supreme authority of the nation may be possessed of virtue and integrity sufficient to influence them in the administration of equal justice and equity among those whom they shall govern. But why should we voluntarily choose to trust our all upon so precarious a tenure as this? We confess it gives us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of the charms of eloquence to extenuate, or the power of art to remove. CONSIDER ARMS MALICHI MAYNARD SAMUEL FIELD Source: The Hampshire Gazette, April 9, 1788. Note: The essay was signed by Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and Samuel Field.

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Election of the President,’’ Chapter 8 in Democracy in America, 1835 . . . ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. The dangers of the elective system increase in proportion to the extent of the prerogative---This system possible in America because no powerful executive authority is required--How circumstances favor the establishment of the elective system---Why the election of the President does not change the principles of the government---Influence of the election of the President on secondary functionaries. THE dangers of the system of election, applied to the chief of the executive government of a great people, have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history. I wish to speak of them in reference to America alone. These dangers may be more or less formidable in proportion to the place that the executive power occupies and to the importance it possesses in the state; and

106 Elections they may vary according to the mode of election and the circumstances in which the electors are placed The most weighty argument against the election of a chief magistrate is that it offers so splendid a lure to private ambition and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power that when legitimate means are wanting, force may not infrequently seize what right denies. It IS clear that the greater the prerogatives of executive authority are, the greater is the temptation; the more the ambition of the candidates is excited, the more warmly are their interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize. The dangers of the elective system increase, therefore, in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of the state. . . . At the approach of an election the head of the executive government thinks only of the struggle that is coming on; he no longer has anything to look forward to; he can undertake nothing new, and he will only prosecute with indifference those designs which another will perhaps terminate. ‘‘I am so near the time of my retirement from office,’’ said President Jefferson, on January 21, 1809, six weeks before the election [sic; actually, six weeks before he left office], ‘‘that I feel no passion, I take no part, I express no sentiment. It appears to me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute, and for which he will be responsible.’’ On the other hand, the eyes of the nation are centered on a single point; all are watching the gradual birth of so important an event. The wider the influence of the executive power extends, the greater and the more necessary is its constant action, the more fatal is the term of suspense; and a nation that is accustomed to the government or, still more, one used to the administration of a powerful executive authority would be infallibly convulsed by an election. In the United States the action of the government may be slackened with impunity, because it is always weak and circumscribed. One of the principal vices of the elective system is that it always introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the state. But this disadvantage is less acutely felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small. In Rome the principles of the government underwent no variation although the consuls were changed every year, because the Senate, which was a hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. In most of the European monarchies, if the king were elective, the kingdom would be revolutionized at every new election. In America the President exercises a certain

influence on state affairs, but he does not conduct them; the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the whole nation. The political maxims of the country depend, therefore, on the mass of the people, not on the President alone; and consequently in America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixity of the government. But the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the elective system that it is still very perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the President extends. The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, in order to discharge his duty and bear the whole weight of responsibility, ought to be free to choose his own agents and to remove them at pleasure; the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the President more than they direct it. The consequence is that at every new election the fate of all the Federal public officers is in suspense. It is sometimes made a subject of complaint that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an administration often depends upon that of the ministers. But in elective governments this evil is far greater; and the reason therefor is very obvious. In a constitutional monarchy successive ministries are rapidly formed; but as the principal representative of the executive power is never changed, the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds; the changes that take place are in the details of the administrative system rather than in its principles; but to substitute one system for another, as is done in America every four years by law, is to cause a sort of revolution. As to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain tenure of the public offices does not produce the evil consequences in America which might be expected from it elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the United States that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence. I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system, applied to the head of the state, are augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it. However the functions of the executive power may be restricted, it must always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the country; for a negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent. The more precarious and the more perilous the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is the want of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more dangerous does the system of electing the chief magistrate become. The policy of the

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Election of the President’’ Americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple; and it may almost be said that nobody stands in need of them, nor do they stand in need of anybody. Their independence is never threatened. In their present condition, therefore, the functions of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances than by the laws and the President may frequently change his policy without involving the state in difficulty or destruction. Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately precedes an election, and that during which the election is taking place, must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of the country. Few of the nations of Europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest every time they might have to elect a new sovereign. In America society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the pressure of external dangers; and the election of the President is a cause of agitation, but not of ruin. MODE OF ELECTION. Skill of the American legislators shown in the mode of election adopted by them--Creation of a special electoral body---Separate votes of these electors---Case in which the House of Representatives is called upon to choose the President---Results of the twelve elections that have taken place since the Constitution was established. BESIDES the dangers that are inherent in the system, many others may arise from the mode of election; but these may be obviated by the precautions of the legislator. When a people met in arms on some public spot to choose its head, it was exposed to all the chances of civil war resulting from such a mode of proceeding besides the dangers of the elective system in itself. The Polish laws, which subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single individual, suggested the murder of that individual or prepared the way for anarchy. In the examination of the institutions and the political as well as social condition of the United States we are struck by the admirable harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of man. That nation possessed two of the main causes of internal peace it was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom. Besides, America had no hostile neighbors to dread; and the American legislators, profiting by these favorable circumstances, created a weak and subordinate executive power, which could without danger be made elective. It then remained for them only to choose the least dangerous of the various modes of election; and the

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rules that they laid down upon this point admirably correspond to the securities which the physical and political constitution of the country already afforded Their object was to find the mode of election that would best express the choice of the people with the least possible excitement and suspense. It was admitted, in the first place, that the simple majority should decide the point; but the difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of delay, which it was most important to avoid. It rarely happens that an individual can receive at the first trial a majority of the suffrages of a great people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate states, where local influences are far more developed and more powerful. The means by which it was proposed to obviate this second obstacle was to delegate the electoral powers of the nation to a body that should represent it. This mode of election rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the electors are, the greater is the chance of their coming to an agreement. It also offered an additional probability of a judicious choice. It then remained to be decided whether this right of election was to be entrusted to the legislature itself, the ordinary representative of the nation, or whether a special electoral college should be formed for the sole purpose of choosing a President. The Americans chose the latter alternative, from a belief that those who were chosen only to make the laws would represent but imperfectly the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate; and that, as they are chosen for more than a year, the constituency they represented might have changed its opinion in that time. It was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the head of the executive power, its members would, for some time before the election, be exposed to the maneuvers of corruption and the tricks of intrigue; whereas the special electors would, like a jury, remain mixed up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would appear for a moment only to give their votes. It was therefore determined that every state should name a certain number of electors, who in their turn should elect the President; and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been entrusted in elective countries inevitably became the centers of passion and cabal; that they sometimes usurped powers which did not belong to them, and that their proceedings, or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the state, it was determined that the electors should all vote on the same day, without being convoked to the same place. This double election rendered a majority probable,

108 Elections though not certain; for it was possible that the electors might not, any more than their constituents, come to an agreement. In that case it would be necessary to have recourse to one of three measures: either to appoint new electors, or to consult a second time those already appointed, or to give the election to another authority. The first two of these alternatives, independently of the uncertainty of their results, were likely to delay the final decision and to perpetuate an agitation which must always be accompanied with danger. The third expedient was therefore adopted, and it was agreed that the votes should be transmitted sealed, to the president of the Senate, and that they should be opened and counted on an appointed day, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives. If none of the candidates has received a majority, the House of Representatives then proceeds immediately to elect the President, but with the condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who have the highest number of votes in the electoral college. Thus it is only in case of an event which cannot often happen, and which can never be foreseen, that the election is entrusted to the ordinary representatives of the nation; and even then, they are obliged to choose a citizen who has already been designated by a powerful minority of the special electors. It is by this happy expedient that the respect due to the popular voice is combined with the utmost celerity of execution, and with those precautions which the interests of the country demand. But the decision of the question by the House of Representatives does not necessarily offer an immediate solution of the difficulty; for the majority of that assembly may still be doubtful, and in that case the Constitution prescribes no remedy. Nevertheless, by restricting the number of candidates to three, and by referring the matter to the judgment of an enlightened public body, it has smoothed all the obstacles that are not inherent in the elective system itself. In the forty-four years that have elapsed since the promulgation of the Federal Constitution, the United States have twelve times chosen a President. Ten of these elections took place at once by the simultaneous votes of the special electors in the different states. The House of Representatives has only twice exercised its conditional privilege of deciding in cases of uncertainty: the first time was at the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1801; the second was in 1825, when Mr. J. Quincy Adams was named. CRISIS OF THE ELECTION. The election may be considered as a moment of national crisis---Why?---Passions of the people-Anxiety of the President---Calm which succeeds the agitation of the election.

I HAVE shown what the circumstances are that favored the adoption of the elective system in the United States and what precautions were taken by the legislators to obviate its dangers. The Americans are accustomed to all kinds of elections; and they knew by experience the utmost degree of excitement which is compatible with security. The vast extent of the country and the dissemination of the inhabitants render a collision between parties less probable and less dangerous there than elsewhere. The political circumstances under which the elections have been carried on have not as yet caused any real danger. Still, the epoch of the election of the President of the United States may be considered as a crisis in the affairs of the nation. The influence which the President exercises on public business is no doubt feeble and indirect; but the choice of the President though of small importance to each individual citizen, concerns the citizens collectively; and however trifling an interest may be, it assumes a great degree of importance as soon as it becomes general. In comparison with the kings of Europe, the President possesses but few means of creating partisans; but the places that are at his disposal are sufficiently numerous to interest, directly or indirectly, several thousand electors in his success. Moreover, political parties in the United States are led to rally round an individual in order to acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd, and the name of the candidate for the Presidency is put forward as the symbol and personification of their theories. For these reasons parties are strongly interested in winning the election, not so much with a view to the triumph of their principles under the auspices of the President elect as to show by his election that the supporters of those principles now form the majority. For a long while before the appointed time has come, the election becomes the important and, so to speak, the all-engrossing topic of discussion. Factional ardor is redoubled, and all the artificial passions which the imagination can create in a happy and peaceful land are agitated and brought to light. The President, moreover, is absorbed by the cares of self-defense. He no longer governs for the interest of the state, but for that of his re-election; he does homage to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his duty commands, he frequently courts its worst caprices. As the election draws near, the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace increase; the citizens are divided into hostile camps, each of which assumes the name of its favorite candidate; the whole nation glows with feverish excitement, the election is the daily theme of the press, the subject of private conversation, the end of every thought and every

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Election of the President’’ action, the sole interest of the present. It is true that as soon as the choice is determined, this ardor is dispelled, calm returns, and the river, which had nearly broken its banks, sinks to its usual level; but who can refrain from astonishment that such a storm should have arisen? RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. When the head of the executive is re-eligible, it is the state that is the source of intrigue and corruption---The desire to be reelected is the chief aim of a President of the United States---Disadvantage of the re-election peculiar to America---The natural evil of democracy is that it gradually subordinate.s all authority to the slightest desires of the majority---The re-election of the President encourages this evil. WERE the legislators of the United States right or wrong in allowing the re-election of the President? At first sight is seems contrary to all reason to prevent the head of the executive power from being elected a second time. The influence that the talents and the character of a single individual may exercise upon the fate of a whole people, especially in critical circumstances or arduous times, is well known. A law preventing the reelection of the chief magistrate would deprive the citizens of their best means of ensuring the prosperity and the security of the commonwealth; and by a singular inconsistency, a man would be excluded from the government at the very time when he had proved his ability to govern well. But if these arguments are strong, perhaps still more powerful reasons may be advanced against them. Intrigue and corruption are the natural vices of elective government; but when the head of the state can be reelected, these evils rise to a great height and compromise the very existence of the country. When a simple candidate seeks to rise by intrigue, his maneuvers must be limited to a very narrow sphere; but when the chief magistrate enters the lists, he borrows the strength of the government for his own purposes. In the former case the feeble resources of an individual are in action; in the latter the state itself, with its immense influence, is busied in the work of corruption and cabal. The private citizen who employs culpable practices to acquire power can act in a manner only indirectly prejudicial to the public prosperity. But if the representative of the executive descends into the combat, the cares of government dwindle for him into second-rate importance, and the success of his election is his first concern. All public negotiations, as well as all laws, are to him nothing more than electioneering schemes; places become the reward of services rendered, not to the nation, but to its chief; and the influence of the

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government, if not injurious to the country, is at least no longer beneficial to the community for which it was created. It is impossible to consider the ordinary course of affairs in the United States without perceiving that the desire to be re-elected is the chief aim of the President; that the whole policy of his administration, and even his most indifferent measures, tend to this object; and that, especially as the crisis approaches, his personal interest takes the place of his interest in the public good. The principle of re-eligibility renders the corrupting influence of elective government still more extensive and pernicious. It tends to degrade the political morality of the people and to substitute management and intrigue for patriotism. . . . The principle of destruction in absolute monarchies lies in the unlimited and unreasonable extension of the royal power, and a measure tending to remove the constitutional provisions that counterbalance this influence would be radically bad even if its immediate consequences were unattended with evil. By parity of reasoning, in countries governed by a democracy, where the people is perpetually drawing all authority to itself, the laws that increase or accelerate this action directly attack the very principle of the government. The greatest merit of the American legislators is that they clearly discerned this truth and had the courage to act up to it. They conceived that a certain authority above the body of the people was necessary, which should enjoy a degree of independence in its sphere without being entirely beyond the popular control; an authority which would be forced to comply with the permanent determinations of the majority, but which would be able to resist its caprices and refuse its most dangerous demands. To this end they centered the whole executive power of the nation in a single arm; they granted extensive prerogatives to the President and armed him with the veto to resist the encroachments of the legislature. But by introducing the principle of re-election they partly destroyed their work; they conferred on the President a great power, but made him little inclined to use it. If ineligible a second time, the President would not be independent of the people, for his responsibility would not cease; but the favor of the people would not be so necessary to him as to induce him to submit in every respect to its desires. If re-eligible (and this is especially true at the present day, when political morality is relaxed and when great men are rare), the President of the United States becomes an easy tool in the hands of the majority. He adopts its likings and its animosities, he anticipates its wishes, he forestalls its

110 Elections complaints, he yields to its idlest cravings, and instead of guiding it, as the legislature intended that he should do, he merely follows its bidding. Thus, in order not to deprive the state of the talents of an individual, those talents have been rendered almost useless, and to retain an expedient for extraordinary perils, the country has been exposed to continual dangers.

2.4 Susan B. Anthony, On Woman’s Right to Suffrage, 1873 FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS: I stand before you to-night under indictment for the alleged crime of having voted at the last presidential election, without having a lawful right to vote. It shall be my work this evening to prove to you that in thus voting, I not only committed no crime, but, instead, simply exercised my citizen’s rights, guaranteed to me and all United States citizens by the National Constitution, beyond the power of any State to deny. . . . The preamble of the Federal Constitution says: ‘‘We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.’’ It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union. And we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of ourselves and the half of our posterity, but to the whole people---women as well as men. And it is a downright mockery to talk to women of their enjoyment of the blessings of liberty while they are denied the use of the only means of securing them provided by this democratic-republican government---the ballot. For any State to make sex a qualification that must ever result in the disfranchisement of one entire half of the people is to pass a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law, and is therefore a violation of the supreme law of the land. By it the blessings of liberty are for ever withheld from women and their female posterity. To them this government has no just powers derived from the consent of the governed. To them this government is not a democracy. It is not a republic. It is an odious aristocracy; a hateful oligarchy of sex; the most

hateful aristocracy ever established on the face of the globe; an oligarchy of wealth, where the rich govern the poor. An oligarchy of learning, where the educated govern the ignorant, or even an oligarchy of race, where the Saxon rules the African, might be endured; but this oligarchy of sex, which makes father, brothers, husband, sons, the oligarchs over the mother and sisters, the wife and daughters of every household---which ordains all men sovereigns, all women subjects, carries dissension, discord and rebellion into every home of the nation. Webster, Worcester and Bouvier all define a citizen to be a person in the United States, entitled to vote and hold office. The only question left to be settled now is: Are women persons? And I hardly believe any of our opponents will have the hardihood to say they are not. Being persons, then, women are citizens; and no State has a right to make any law, or to enforce any old law, that shall abridge their privileges or immunities. Hence, every discrimination against women in the constitutions and laws of the several States is to-day null and void, precisely as in every one against negroes.

2.5 Carrie Chapman Catt, Speech before Congress, 1917 Woman suffrage is inevitable. Suffragists knew it before November 4, 1917; opponents afterward. Three distinct causes made it inevitable. First, the history of our country. Ours is a nation born of revolution, of rebellion against a system of government so securely entrenched in the customs and traditions of human society that in 1776 it seemed impregnable. From the beginning of things, nations had been ruled by kings and for kings, while the people served and paid the cost. The American Revolutionists boldly proclaimed the heresies: ‘‘Taxation without representation is tyranny.’’ ‘‘Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.’’ The colonists won, and the nation which was established as a result of their victory has held unfailingly that these two fundamental principles of democratic government are not only the spiritual source of our national existence but have been our chief historic pride and at all times the sheet anchor of our liberties. Eighty years after the Revolution, Abraham Lincoln welded those two maxims into a new one: ‘‘Ours is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’’ Fifty years more passed and the president of

2.5 Carrie Chapman Catt, Speech before Congress the United States, Woodrow Wilson, in a mighty crisis of the nation, proclaimed to the world: ‘‘We are fighting for the things which we have always carried nearest to our hearts: for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government.’’ All the way between these immortal aphorisms political leaders have declared unabated faith in their truth. Not one American has arisen to question their logic in the 141 years of our national existence. However stupidly our country may have evaded the logical application at times, it has never swerved from its devotion to the theory of democracy as expressed by those two axioms. . . . With such a history behind it, how can our nation escape the logic it has never failed to follow, when its last unenfranchised class calls for the vote? Behold our Uncle Sam floating the banner with one hand, ‘‘Taxation without representation is tyranny,’’ and with the other seizing the billions of dollars paid in taxes by women to whom he refuses ‘‘representation.’’ Behold him again, welcoming the boys of twenty-one and the newly made immigrant citizen to ‘‘a voice in their own government’’ while he denies that fundamental right of democracy to thousands of women public school teachers from whom many of these men learn all they know of citizenship and patriotism, to women college presidents, to women who preach in our pulpits, interpret law in our courts, preside over our hospitals, write books and magazines, and serve in every uplifting moral and social enterprise. Is there a single man who can justify such inequality of treatment, such outrageous discrimination? Not one. . . . Second, the suffrage for women already established in the United States makes women suffrage for the nation inevitable. When Elihu Root, as president of the American Society of International Law, at the eleventh annual meeting in Washington, April 26, 1917, said, ‘‘The world cannot be half democratic and half autocratic. It must be all democratic or all Prussian. There can be no compromise,’’ he voiced a general truth. Precisely the same intuition has already taught the blindest and most hostile foe of woman suffrage that our nation cannot long continue a condition under which government in half its territory rests upon the consent of half of the people and in the other half upon the consent of all the people; a condition which grants representation to the taxed in half of its territory and denies it in the other half a condition which permits women in some states to share in the election of the president, senators, and representatives and denies them that privilege in others. It is too obvious to

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require demonstration that woman suffrage, now covering half our territory, will eventually be ordained in all the nation. No one will deny it. The only question left is when and how will it be completely established. Third, the leadership of the United States in world democracy compels the enfranchisement of its own women. The maxims of the Declaration were once called ‘‘fundamental principles of government.’’ They are now called ‘‘American principles’’ or even ‘‘Americanisms.’’ They have become the slogans of every movement toward political liberty the world around, of every effort to widen the suffrage for men or women in any land. Not a people, race, or class striving for freedom is there anywhere in the world that has not made our axioms the chief weapon of the struggle. More, all men and women the world around, with farsighted vision into the verities of things, know that the world tragedy of our day is not now being waged over the assassination of an archduke, nor commercial competition, nor national ambitions, nor the freedom of the seas. Do you realize that in no other country in the world with democratic tendencies is suffrage so completely denied as in a considerable number of our own states? There are thirteen black states where no suffrage for women exists, and fourteen others where suffrage for women is more limited than in many foreign countries. Do you realize that when you ask women to take their cause to state referendum you compel them to do this: that you drive women of education, refinement, achievement, to beg men who cannot read for their political freedom? Do you realize that such anomalies as a college president asking her janitor to give her a vote are overstraining the patience and driving women to desperation? Do you realize that women in increasing numbers indignantly resent the long delay in their enfranchisement? Your party platforms have pledged women suffrage. Then why not be honest, frank friends of our cause, adopt it in reality as your own, make it a party program, and ‘‘fight with us’’? As a party measure---a measure of all parties---why not put the amendment through Congress and the legislatures? We shall all be better friends, we shall have a happier nation, we women will be free to support loyally the party of our choice, and we shall be far prouder of our history. ‘‘There is one thing mightier than kings and armies’’---aye, than Congresses and political parties--‘‘the power of an idea when its time has come to move.’’ The time for woman suffrage has come. The

112 Elections woman’s hour has struck. If parties prefer to postpone action longer and thus do battle with this idea, they challenge the inevitable. The idea will not perish; the party which opposes it may. Every delay, every trick, every political dishonesty from now on will antagonize the women of the land more and more, and when the party or parties which have so delayed woman suffrage finally let it come, their sincerity will be doubted and their appeal to the new voters will be met with suspicion. This is the psychology of the situation. Can you afford the risk? Think it over. We know you will meet opposition. There are a few ‘‘women haters’’ left, a few ‘‘old males of the tribe,’’ as Vance Thompson calls them, whose duty they believe it to be to keep women in the places they have carefully picked out for them. Treitschke, made world famous by war literature, said some years ago, ‘‘Germany, which knows all about Germany and France, knows far better what is good for Alsace-Lorraine than that miserable people can possibly know.’’ A few American Treitschkes we have who know better than women what is good for them. There are women, too, with ‘‘slave souls’’ and ‘‘clinging vines’’ for backbones. There are female dolls and male dandies. But the world does not wait for such as these, nor does liberty pause to heed the plaint of men and women with a grouch. She does not wait for those who have a special interest to serve, nor a selfish reason for depriving other people of freedom. Holding her torch aloft, liberty is pointing the way onward and upward and saying to America, ‘‘Come.’’ To you and the supporters of our cause in Senate and House, and the number is large, the suffragists of the nation express their grateful thanks. This address is not meant for you. We are more truly appreciative of all you have done than any words can express. We ask you to make a last, hard fight for the amendment during the present session. Since last we asked a vote on this amendment, your position has been fortified by the addition to suffrage territory of Great Britain, Canada, and New York. Some of you have been too indifferent to give more than casual attention to this question. It is worthy of your immediate consideration. A question big enough to engage the attention of our allies in wartime is too big a question for you to neglect. Some of you have grown old in party service. Are you willing that those who take your places by and by shall blame you for having failed to keep pace with the world and thus having lost for them a party advantage? Is there any real gain for you, for your party, for your nation by delay? Do you want to drive the progressive men and women out of your party?

Some of you hold to the doctrine of states’ rights as applying to woman suffrage. Adherence to that theory will keep the United States far behind all other democratic nations upon this question. A theory which prevents a nation from keeping up with the trend of world progress cannot be justified. Gentlemen, we hereby petition you, our only designated representatives, to redress our grievances by the immediate passage of the Federal Suffrage Amendment and to use your influence to secure its ratification in your own state, in order that the women of our nation may be endowed with political freedom before the next presidential election, and that our nation may resume its world leadership in democracy. Woman suffrage is coming---you know it. Will you, Honorable Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, help or hinder it?

2.6 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 [1962] Baker Et Al. v. Carr Et Al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. No. 6. Argued April 19--20, 1961. Set for reargument May 1, 1961. Reargued October 9, 1961. Decided March 26, 1962. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. This civil action was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 to redress the alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights. The complaint, alleging that by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee apportioning the members of the General Assembly among the State’s 95 counties, ‘‘these plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes,’’ was dismissed by a three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 in the Middle District of Tennessee. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and also that no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted. 179 F. Supp. 824. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 364 U.S. 898. We hold that the dismissal was error, and remand the cause to the District Court for trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The General Assembly of Tennessee consists of the Senate with 33 members and the House of

2.6 Baker v. Carr Representatives with 99 members. The Tennessee Constitution provides in Art. II as follows: ‘‘Sec. 3. Legislative authority---Term of office. The Legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, both dependent on the people; who shall hold their offices for two years from the day of the general election. ‘‘Sec. 4. Census. An enumeration of the qualified voters, and an apportionment of the Representatives in the General Assembly, shall be made in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, and within every subsequent term of ten years. ‘‘Sec. 5. Apportionment of representatives. The number of Representatives shall, at the several periods of making the enumeration, be apportioned among the several counties or districts, according to the number of qualified voters in each; and shall not exceed seventy-five, until the population of the State shall be one million and a half, and shall never exceed ninety-nine; Provided, that any county having two-thirds of the ratio shall be entitled to one member. ‘‘Sec. 6. Apportionment of senators. The number of Senators shall, at the several periods of making the enumeration, be apportioned among the several counties or districts according to the number of qualified electors in each, and shall not exceed one-third the number of representatives. In apportioning the Senators among the different counties, the fraction that may be lost by any county or counties, in the apportionment of members to the House of Representatives, shall be made up to such county or counties in the Senate, as near as may be practicable. When a district is composed of two or more counties, they shall be adjoining; and no county shall be divided in forming a district.’’

Thus, Tennessee’s standard for allocating legislative representation among her counties is the total number of qualified voters resident in the respective counties, subject only to minor qualifications. Decennial reapportionment in compliance with the constitutional scheme was effected by the General Assembly each decade from 1871 to 1901. The 1871 apportionment was preceded by an 1870 statute requiring an enumeration. The 1881 apportionment involved three statutes, the first authorizing an enumeration, the second enlarging the Senate from 25 to 33 members and the

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House from 75 to 99 members, and the third apportioning the membership of both Houses. In 1891 there were both an enumeration and an apportionment. In 1901 the General Assembly abandoned separate enumeration in favor of reliance upon the Federal Census and passed the Apportionment Act here in controversy. In the more than 60 years since that action, all proposals in both Houses of the General Assembly for reapportionment have failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1961, Tennessee has experienced substantial growth and redistribution of her population. In 1901 the population was 2,020,616, of whom 487,380 were eligible to vote. The 1960 Federal Census reports the State’s population at 3,567,089, of whom 2,092,891 are eligible to vote. The relative standings of the counties in terms of qualified voters have changed significantly. It is primarily the continued application of the 1901 Apportionment Act to this shifted and enlarged voting population which gives rise to the present controversy. Indeed, the complaint alleges that the 1901 statute, even as of the time of its passage, ‘‘made no apportionment of Representatives and Senators in accordance with the constitutional formula . . ., but instead arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate and House without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable formula whatever.’’ It is further alleged that ‘‘because of the population changes since 1900, and the failure of the Legislature to reapportion itself since 1901,’’ the 1901 statute became ‘‘unconstitutional and obsolete.’’ Appellants also argue that, because of the composition of the legislature effected by the 1901 Apportionment Act, redress in the form of a state constitutional amendment to change the entire mechanism for reapportioning, or any other change short of that, is difficult or impossible. The complaint concludes that ‘‘these plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes.’’ They seek a declaration that the 1901 statute is unconstitutional and an injunction restraining the appellees from acting to conduct any further elections under it. They also pray that unless and until the General Assembly enacts a valid reapportionment, the District Court should either decree a reapportionment by mathematical application of the Tennessee constitutional formulae to the most recent Federal Census figures, or direct the appellees to conduct legislative elections, primary and general, at large. They also pray for such other and further relief as may be appropriate . . .

114 Elections

III. Standing. A federal court cannot ‘‘pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’’ Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39. Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of course, a question of federal law . . . These appellants seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of their own, and of those similarly situated. Their constitutional claim is, in substance, that the 1901 statute constitutes arbitrary and capricious state action, offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment in its irrational disregard of the standard of apportionment prescribed by the State’s Constitution or of any standard, effecting a gross disproportion of representation to voting population. . . . It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants’ allegations of impairment of their votes by the 1901 apportionment will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained it . . . ‘‘The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.’’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163.

IV. Justiciability. . . . We understand the District Court to have read the cited cases as compelling the conclusion that since the appellants sought to have a legislative apportionment held unconstitutional, their suit presented a ‘‘political question’’ and was therefore nonjusticiable. We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable ‘‘political question’’ . . . This case does, in one sense, involve the allocation of political power within a State, and the appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the Guaranty Clause. Of course, as we have seen, any reliance on that clause would be futile. But because any reliance on the Guaranty Clause could not have succeeded it

does not follow that appellants may not be heard on the equal protection claim which in fact they tender. True, it must be clear that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is not so enmeshed with those political question elements which render Guaranty Clause claims nonjusticiable as actually to present a political question itself. But we have found that not to be the case here. In this connection special attention is due Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118. In that case a corporation tax statute enacted by the initiative was attacked ostensibly on three grounds: (1) due process; (2) equal protection; and (3) the Guaranty Clause. But it was clear that the first two grounds were invoked solely in aid of the contention that the tax was invalid by reason of its passage: ‘‘The defendant company does not contend here that it could not have been required to pay a license tax. It does not assert that it was denied an opportunity to be heard as to the amount for which it was taxed, or that there was anything inhering in the tax or involved intrinsically in the law which violated any of its constitutional rights. If such questions had been raised they would have been justiciable, and therefore would have required the calling into operation of judicial power. Instead, however, of doing any of these things, the attack on the statute here made is of a wholly different character. Its essentially political nature is at once made manifest by understanding that the assault which the contention here advanced makes it [sic] not on the tax as a tax, but on the State as a State. It is addressed to the framework and political character of the government by which the statute levying the tax was passed. It is the government, the political entity, which (reducing the case to its essence) is called to the bar of this court, not for the purpose of testing judicially some exercise of power assailed, on the ground that its exertion has injuriously affected the rights of an individual because of repugnancy to some constitutional limitation, but to demand of the State that it establish its right to exist as a State, republican in form.’’ 223 U.S., at 150--151. The due process and equal protection claims were held nonjusticiable in Pacific States not because they happened to be joined with a Guaranty Clause claim, or because they sought to place before the Court a subject matter which might conceivably have been dealt with through the Guaranty Clause, but because the Court believed that they were invoked merely in verbal aid of the resolution of issues which, in its view, entailed

2.7 Reynolds v. Sims 115 political questions. Pacific States may be compared with cases such as Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, wherein the Court refused to consider whether a workmen’s compensation act violated the Guaranty Clause but considered at length, and rejected, due process and equal protection arguments advanced against it; and O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, wherein the Court refused to consider whether Nebraska’s delegation of power to form drainage districts violated the Guaranty Clause, but went on to consider and reject the contention that the action against which an injunction was sought was not a taking for a public purpose. We conclude then that the nonjusticiability of claims resting on the Guaranty Clause which arises from their embodiment of questions that were thought ‘‘political,’’ can have no bearing upon the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this case. Finally, we emphasize that it is the involvement in Guaranty Clause claims of the elements thought to define ‘‘political questions,’’ and no other feature, which could render them nonjusticiable. Specifically, we have said that such claims are not held nonjusticiable because they touch matters of state governmental organization.

2.7 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 [1964] Reynolds, Judge, et al. v. Sims et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA. No. 23. Argued November 13, 1963. Decided June 15, 1964. * MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

II. . . . In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, we held that a claim asserted under the Equal Protection Clause challenging the constitutionality of a State’s apportionment of seats in its legislature, on the ground that the right to vote of certain citizens was effectively impaired since debased and diluted, in effect presented a justiciable controversy subject to adjudication by federal courts. The spate of similar cases filed and decided by lower courts since our decision in Baker amply shows that the problem of state legislative malapportionment is one that is perceived to exist in a large number of the States. In Baker, a suit involving an attack on the apportionment of seats in the Tennessee Legislature, we remanded to

the District Court, which had dismissed the action, for consideration on the merits. We intimated no view as to the proper constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of a state legislative apportionment scheme. Nor did we give any consideration to the question of appropriate remedies. Rather, we simply stated: ‘‘Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial’’ [377 U.S. 533, 557]. We indicated in Baker, however, that the Equal Protection Clause provides discoverable and manageable standards for use by lower courts in determining the constitutionality of a state legislative apportionment scheme, and we stated: ‘‘Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.’’ Subsequent to Baker, we remanded several cases to the courts below for reconsideration in light of that decision. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, we held that the Georgia county unit system, applicable in statewide primary elections, was unconstitutional since it resulted in a dilution of the weight of the votes of certain Georgia voters merely because of where they resided. After indicating that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibit a State from overweighting or diluting votes on the basis of race or sex, we stated: ‘‘How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote---whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, [377 U.S. 533, 558] whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept

116 Elections of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.’’ Continuing, we stated that ‘‘there is no indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State.’’ And, finally, we concluded: ‘‘The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing---one person, one vote.’’ We stated in Gray, however, that that case, ‘‘unlike Baker v. Carr, . . . does not involve a question of the degree to which the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the geographical districts from which representatives are chosen either for the State Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives. . . . Nor does it present the question, inherent in the bicameral form of our Federal Government, whether a State may have one house chosen without regard to population’’ [377 U.S. 533, 559]. Of course, in these cases we are faced with the problem not presented in Gray---that of determining the basic standards and stating the applicable guidelines for implementing our decision in Baker v. Carr. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, decided earlier this Term, we held that attacks on the constitutionality of congressional districting plans enacted by state legislatures do not present nonjusticiable questions and should not be dismissed generally for ‘‘want of equity.’’ We determined that the constitutional test for the validity of congressional districting schemes was one of substantial equality of population among the various districts established by a state legislature for the election of members of the Federal House of Representatives. In that case we decided that an apportionment of congressional seats which ‘‘contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others’’ is unconstitutional, since ‘‘the Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote. . . .’’ We concluded that the constitutional prescription for

election of members of the House of Representatives ‘‘by the People,’’ construed in its historical context, ‘‘means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.’’ We further stated: ‘‘It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise---equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people---for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.’’ We found further, in Wesberry, that ‘‘our Constitution’s plain objective’’ was that ‘‘of making equal representation [377 U.S. 533, 560] for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal. . . .’’ We concluded by stating: ‘‘No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.’’ Gray and Wesberry are of course not dispositive of or directly controlling on our decision in these cases involving state legislative apportionment controversies. Admittedly, those decisions, in which we held that, in statewide and in congressional elections, one person’s vote must be counted equally with those of all other voters in a State, were based on different constitutional considerations and were addressed to rather distinct problems. But neither are they wholly inapposite. Gray, though not determinative here since involving the weighting of votes in statewide elections, established the basic principle of equality among voters within a State, and held that voters cannot be classified, constitutionally, on the basis of where they live, at least with respect to voting in statewide elections. And our decision in Wesberry was of course grounded on that language of the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Federal House of Representatives are to be chosen ‘‘by the People,’’ while attacks on state legislative apportionment schemes, such as that involved in the instant cases, are principally based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, Wesberry clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal [377 U.S. 533, 561]

2.7 Reynolds v. Sims 117 representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State. Our problem, then, is to ascertain, in the instant cases, whether there are any constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departures from the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats in state legislatures.

III. A predominant consideration in determining whether a State’s legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature. As stated by the Court in United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227, ‘‘[t]he right to vote is personal. . . .’’ While the result of a court decision in a state legislative apportionment controversy may be to require the restructuring of the geographical distribution of seats in a state legislature, the judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote. Like Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, such a case ‘‘touches a sensitive and important area of human rights,’’ and ‘‘involves one of the basic civil rights of man,’’ presenting questions of alleged ‘‘invidious discriminations . . . against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.’’ 316 U.S., at 536, 541. Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter [377 U.S. 533, 562] in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. Almost a century ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, the Court referred to ‘‘the political franchise of voting’’ as ‘‘a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’’ 118 U.S., at 370. Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid that a constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that certain otherwise qualified voters had

been entirely prohibited from voting for members of their state legislature. And, if a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10, while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course, the effect of [377 U.S. 533, 563] state legislative districting schemes which give the same number of representatives to unequal numbers of constituents is identical. Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against those individual voters living in disfavored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two, five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their favored neighbor. Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable. . . . State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government in this country. A number of them have their roots in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings of American political independence are to be found, in large part, in the views and actions of several of the colonial legislative bodies. With the birth of our National Government, and the adoption and ratification of the Federal [377 U.S. 533, 565] Constitution, state legislatures retained a most important place in our Nation’s governmental structure. But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of

118 Elections legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the Constitution demands, no less . . .

2.8 Voting Rights Act, 1965 AN ACT To enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act shall be known as the ‘‘Voting Rights Act of 1965.’’ SEC. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. SEC. 3. (a) Whenever the Attorney General institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court shall authorize the appointment of Federal examiners by the United States Civil Service Commission in accordance with section 6 to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment. ... SEC. 4. (a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State. . . . SEC. 10. (a) The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting (i) precludes persons of limited means from voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such persons as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise, (ii) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State interest in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because of race or color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.

SEC. 11. (a) No person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of this Act or is otherwise qualified to vote, or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person’s vote. (b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties under section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10, or 12(e) . . . SEC. 17. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person registered to vote under the law of any State or political subdivision. Approved August 6, 1965.

2.9 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 [1976] Buckley et al. v. Valeo, Secretary of the United States Senate, et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 75--436. Argued November 10, 1975. Decided January 30, 1976. . . . The intricate statutory scheme adopted by Congress to regulate federal election campaigns includes restrictions [424 U.S. 1, 13] on political contributions and expenditures that apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in the election process. The major contribution and expenditure limitations in the Act prohibit individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign and from spending more than $1,000 a year ‘‘relative to a clearly identified candidate.’’ Other provisions restrict a candidate’s use of personal and family resources in his campaign and limit the overall amount that can be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office. The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in this case. Thus, the critical constitutional [424 U.S. 1, 14] questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation that

2.9 Buckley v. Valeo 119 Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.

A. General Principles The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’’ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to ‘‘the exposition of ideas,’’ Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), ‘‘there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates. . . .’’ Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). This no more than reflects our ‘‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,’’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates [424 U.S. 1, 15] for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), ‘‘it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’’ The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that ‘‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.’’ Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee ‘‘‘freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,’’’ a freedom that encompasses ‘‘‘[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s choice.’’’ Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56, 57 (1973), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975).

It is with these principles in mind that we consider the primary contentions of the parties with respect to the Act’s limitations upon the giving and spending of money in political campaigns. Those conflicting contentions could not more sharply define the basic issues before us. Appellees contend that what the Act regulates is conduct, and that its effect on speech and association is incidental at most. Appellants respond that contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act’s limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct. . . . We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, [424 U.S. 1, 17] 820 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266. For example, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court contrasted picketing and parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a public official. The parading and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct ‘‘intertwined with expression and association,’’ whereas the newspaper comment and the telegram were described as a ‘‘pure form of expression’’ involving ‘‘free speech alone’’ rather than ‘‘expression mixed with particular conduct.’’ Id., at 563-564. Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O’Brien test because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve ‘‘suppressing communication.’’ The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the overall scope of federal election campaigns. Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups. Unlike O’Brien, where the Selective Service System’s administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as

120 Elections a means of communication, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged ‘‘conduct’’ of giving or spending money ‘‘arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.’’ 391 U.S., at 382. Nor can the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations be sustained, as some of the parties suggest, by reference to the constitutional principles reflected in such [424 U.S. 1, 18] decisions as Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Those cases stand for the proposition that the government may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of communication. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). In contrast to O’Brien, where the method of expression was held to be subject to prohibition, Cox, Adderley, and Kovacs involved place or manner restrictions on legitimate modes of expression---picketing, parading, demonstrating, and using a soundtruck. The critical difference between this case and those time, place, and manner cases is that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any reasonable time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed. [424 U.S. 1, 19] A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. The $1,000 ceiling on spending ‘‘relative to a clearly identified candidate,’’ 18 U.S.C. 608 (e) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most

[424 U.S. 1, 20] effective modes of communication. Although the Act’s limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling. By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication. [424 U.S. 1, 21] A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor. Given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations. The overall effect of the Act’s contribution [424 U.S. 1, 22] ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression.

2.10 Vice President Al Gore, Campaign 2000 121 The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act’s contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a candidate or committee, but leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates. And the Act’s contribution limitations permit associations and candidates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy. By contrast, the Act’s $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures ‘‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’’ precludes most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S., at 460. The Act’s constraints on the ability of independent associations and candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political expression ‘‘is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of [their] adherents,’’ Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). See Cousins v. [424 U.S. 1, 23] Wigoda, 419 U.S., at 487--488; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). In sum, although the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.

2.10 Vice President Al Gore Concession Speech December 13, 2000 Speaker: Albert Gore Jr., Vice President of the United States, Democratic Party Presidential Candidate Good evening. Just moments ago, I spoke with George W. Bush and congratulated him on becoming the 43rd president of the United States, and I promised him that I wouldn’t call him back this time. I offered to meet with him as soon as possible so that we can start to heal the divisions of the campaign and the contest through which we just passed. Almost a century and a half ago, Senator Stephen Douglas told Abraham Lincoln, who had just defeated

him for the presidency, ‘‘Partisan feeling must yield to patriotism. I’m with you, Mr. President, and God bless you.’’ Well, in that same spirit, I say to President-elect Bush that what remains of partisan rancor must now be put aside, and may God bless his stewardship of this country. Neither he nor I anticipated this long and difficult road. Certainly neither of us wanted it to happen. Yet it came, and now it has ended, resolved, as it must be resolved, through the honored institutions of our democracy. Over the library of one of our great law schools is inscribed the motto, ‘‘Not under man but under God and law.’’ That’s the ruling principle of American freedom, the source of our democratic liberties. I’ve tried to make it my guide throughout this contest as it has guided America’s deliberations of all the complex issues of the past five weeks. Now the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt, while I strongly disagree with the court’s decision, I accept it. I accept the finality of this outcome which will be ratified next Monday in the Electoral College. And tonight, for the sake of our unity of the people and the strength of our democracy, I offer my concession. I also accept my responsibility, which I will discharge unconditionally, to honor the new president elect and do everything possible to help him bring Americans together in fulfillment of the great vision that our Declaration of Independence defines and that our Constitution affirms and defends. Let me say how grateful I am to all those who supported me and supported the cause for which we have fought. Tipper and I feel a deep gratitude to Joe and Hadassah Lieberman who brought passion and high purpose to our partnership and opened new doors, not just for our campaign but for our country. This has been an extraordinary election. But in one of God’s unforeseen paths, this belatedly broken impasse can point us all to a new common ground, for its very closeness can serve to remind us that we are one people with a shared history and a shared destiny. Indeed, that history gives us many examples of contests as hotly debated, as fiercely fought, with their own challenges to the popular will. Other disputes have dragged on for weeks before reaching resolution. And each time, both the victor and the vanquished have accepted the result peacefully and in the spirit of reconciliation. So let it be with us.

122 Elections I know that many of my supporters are disappointed. I am too. But our disappointment must be overcome by our love of country. And I say to our fellow members of the world community, let no one see this contest as a sign of American weakness. The strength of American democracy is shown most clearly through the difficulties it can overcome. Some have expressed concern that the unusual nature of this election might hamper the next president in the conduct of his office. I do not believe it need be so. President-elect Bush inherits a nation whose citizens will be ready to assist him in the conduct of his large responsibilities. I personally will be at his disposal, and I call on all Americans---I particularly urge all who stood with us to unite behind our next president. This is America. Just as we fight hard when the stakes are high, we close ranks and come together when the contest is done. And while there will be time enough to debate our continuing differences, now is the time to recognize that that which unites us is greater than that which divides us. While we yet hold and do not yield our opposing beliefs, there is a higher duty than the one we owe to political party. This is America and we put country before party. We will stand together behind our new president. As for what I’ll do next, I don’t know the answer to that one yet. Like many of you, I’m looking forward to spending the holidays with family and old friends. I know I’ll spend time in Tennessee and mend some fences, literally and figuratively. Some have asked whether I have any regrets and I do have one regret: that I didn’t get the chance to stay and fight for the American people over the next four years, especially for those who need burdens lifted and barriers removed, especially for those who feel their voices have not been heard. I heard you and I will not forget. I’ve seen America in this campaign and I like what I see. It’s worth fighting for and that’s a fight I’ll never stop. As for the battle that ends tonight, I do believe as my father once said, that no matter how hard the loss, defeat might serve as well as victory to shape the soul and let the glory out. So for me this campaign ends as it began: with the love of Tipper and our family; with faith in God and in the country I have been so proud to serve, from Vietnam to the vice presidency; and with gratitude to our truly tireless campaign staff and volunteers, including

all those who worked so hard in Florida for the last 36 days. Now the political struggle is over and we turn again to the unending struggle for the common good of all Americans and for those multitudes around the world who look to us for leadership in the cause of freedom. In the words of our great hymn, ‘‘America, America’’: ‘‘Let us crown thy good with brotherhood, from sea to shining sea.’’ And now, my friends, in a phrase I once addressed to others, it’s time for me to go. Thank you and good night, and God bless America.

2.11 Gov. George W. Bush, Response to Gore’s Concession December 13, 2000 . . . Mr. Speaker, Lieutenant Governor, friends, distinguished guests, our country has been through a long and trying period, with the outcome of the presidential election not finalized for longer than any of us could ever imagine. Vice President Gore and I put our hearts and hopes into our campaigns. We both gave it our all. We shared similar emotions, so I understand how difficult this moment must be for Vice President Gore and his family. He has a distinguished record of service to our country as a congressman, a senator and a vice president. This evening I received a gracious call from the vice president. We agreed to meet early next week in Washington and we agreed to do our best to heal our country after this hard-fought contest. . . . I have a lot to be thankful for tonight. I’m thankful for America and thankful that we were able to resolve our electoral differences in a peaceful way. I’m thankful to the American people for the great privilege of being able to serve as your next president. ... Tonight I chose to speak from the chamber of the Texas House of Representatives because it has been a home to bipartisan cooperation. Here in a place where Democrats have the majority, Republicans and Democrats have worked together to do what is right for the people we represent. . . . The spirit of cooperation I have seen in this hall is what is needed in Washington, D.C. It is the challenge of our moment. After a difficult election, we must put politics behind us and work together to make the promise of America available for every one of our citizens. I am optimistic that we can change the tone in Washington, D.C.

2.11 Gov. George W. Bush, Campaign 2000 123 I believe things happen for a reason, and I hope the long wait of the last five weeks will heighten a desire to move beyond the bitterness and partisanship of the recent past. Our nation must rise above a house divided. Americans share hopes and goals and values far more important than any political disagreements. Republicans want the best for our nation, and so do Democrats. Our votes may differ, but not our hopes. I know America wants reconciliation and unity. I know Americans want progress. And we must seize this moment and deliver. Together, guided by a spirit of common sense, common courtesy and common goals, we can unite and inspire the American citizens. Together, we will work to make all our public schools excellent, teaching every student of every background and every accent, so that no child is left behind. Together we will save Social Security and renew its promise of a secure retirement for generations to come. Together we will strengthen Medicare and offer prescription drug coverage to all of our seniors. Together we will give Americans the broad, fair and fiscally responsible tax relief they deserve. Together we’ll have a bipartisan foreign policy true to our values and true to our friends, and we will have a military equal to every challenge and superior to every adversary. Together we will address some of society’s deepest problems one person at a time, by encouraging and empowering the good hearts and good works of the American people. This is the essence of compassionate conservatism and it will be a foundation of my administration. These priorities are not merely Republican concerns or Democratic concerns; they are American responsibilities. During the fall campaign, we differed about the details of these proposals, but there was remarkable consensus about the important issues before us: excellent schools, retirement and health security, tax relief, a strong military, a more civil society. We have discussed our differences. Now it is time to find common ground and build consensus to make America a beacon of opportunity in the 21st century. I’m optimistic this can happen. Our future demands it and our history proves it. Two hundred years ago, in the election of 1800, America faced another close presidential election. A tie in the Electoral College put the outcome into the hands of Congress.

After six days of voting and 36 ballots, the House of Representatives elected Thomas Jefferson the third president of the United States. That election brought the first transfer of power from one party to another in our new democracy. Shortly after the election, Jefferson, in a letter titled ‘‘Reconciliation and Reform,’’ wrote this. ‘‘The steady character of our countrymen is a rock to which we may safely moor; unequivocal in principle, reasonable in manner. We should be able to hope to do a great deal of good to the cause of freedom and harmony.’’ Two hundred years have only strengthened the steady character of America. And so as we begin the work of healing our nation, tonight I call upon that character: respect for each other, respect for our differences, generosity of spirit, and a willingness to work hard and work together to solve any problem. I have something else to ask you, to ask every American. I ask for you to pray for this great nation. I ask for your prayers for leaders from both parties. I thank you for your prayers for me and my family, and I ask you to pray for Vice President Gore and his family. I have faith that with God’s help we as a nation will move forward together as one nation, indivisible. And together we will create and America that is open, so every citizen has access to the American dream; an America that is educated, so every child has the keys to realize that dream; and an America that is united in our diversity and our shared American values that are larger than race or party. I was not elected to serve one party, but to serve one nation. The president of the United States is the president of every single American, of every race and every background. Whether you voted for me or not, I will do my best to serve your interests and I will work to earn your respect. I will be guided by President Jefferson’s sense of purpose, to stand for principle, to be reasonable in manner, and above all, to do great good for the cause of freedom and harmony. The presidency is more than an honor. It is more than an office. It is a charge to keep, and I will give it my all. Thank you very much and God bless America.

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Section 3 Interest Groups

Introduction

American political system have sought to alter that system to get a fairer hearing for their point of view and bring new interests into the process. As Theodore Roosevelt explained,

Its liberal philosophical focus on individual citizens notwithstanding, American politics has always been defined by the participation of interest groups. At the founding, James Madison famously argued that the primary function of government was to regulate the interaction of interests and indeed premised his argument for a strong union on the need to counter the ‘‘mischief of factions.’’ Subsequently, political scientists explored the ‘‘group basis of politics’’ and ‘‘the interest group society.’’ However, the existence and active participation of organized interests has always posed significant challenge. Under the First Amendment to the Constitution, all Americans are guaranteed the right to petition Congress for the redress of grievances. Exercising this right effectively, of course, requires significant resources to make one’s voice heard persuasively: money, connections, mastery of information, and organization. Such resources are always more likely to be at the disposal of political and economic elites than the general citizenry or diffuse interests. Thus, interest groups were understood to be, at once, natural actors on the political stage, and a potential threat to the rights and liberties of individual citizens. Over the course of two centuries of political development, interest groups have, if anything, become more influential and ensconced in the policy-making process at both the state and national levels. There are two dimensions to the increasing role of groups. In the first instance, groups organized around a desire for changing policy and frustrated by the policy inertia of the

[W]hen I say that I am for the square deal, I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity. The success of progressive reform efforts to democratize the policy process not only brings new groups in, but also energizes existing groups to improve their techniques and capacity, thereby ratcheting up the role of organized interests as a whole. In the second instance, the policy successes of progressive reform create new bureaucratic structures and congressional patrons around which groups and group activity coalesce. Such ‘‘clientele’’ politics is protected, even expected, under the First Amendment and further promotes the role of groups. The essays in this section provide an account of the burgeoning of interest group politics from its constitutional and philosophical foundations. In doing so, they illustrate both the factual case for this development and the normative challenges it presents. One of the great ironies of American politics is that democratic reforms and egalitarian policies have created a bureaucratic and legislative system in which Washington-based interest groups, whether purporting to represent particular interests or the public interest, enjoy a privileged

125

126 Interest Groups status in terms of access and influence. As McGee Young notes in his essay, explaining and evaluating the connection between interest groups and government institutions is a central challenge for students of American political development. As the American state has developed, decision making becomes increasingly focused in Congress, executive agencies, and courts, far

removed from citizens’ everyday lives. As Americans are committed to programs that can be provided only by a national administrative state, the sole means of supporting the classical liberal bases of American politics is to promote broad representation and healthy competition within a system of organized interests. ---Richard A. Harris

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins Daniel J. Tichenor Philip H. Knight Professor of Social Science and Senior Faculty Fellow, Morse Center for Law and Politics, University of Oregon

Richard A. Harris Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Administration, Rutgers University--Camden

of interest groups and their place in democratic theory, but focuses on the postwar era, essentially ignoring the earlier period. This essay is a first cut at exploring interest group behavior in American politics at the beginning of the 20th century, a focus that has received relatively short shrift in the political science literature on interest groups. The perfunctory treatment of the formation, activism, and attrition of organized interests in historical periods predating the New Deal (if not the 1960s) imposes a significant limitation on theory building in the interest group literature. By presenting research findings on the level and character of interest group activity in the Progressive Era, we hope to illustrate the value of bringing both history and theory to bear on the study of interest group politics in America. Beyond Pendleton Herring’s keen observations about groups in the earlier period, we are drawn to this inquiry for several reasons. First, our own research into the genesis of specific policy issues (antitrust and immigration) raises questions about a theoretical mainstay of American political science, the contention that

Within very recent years these [interest] groups have increased and multiplied. More important still, they have become highly organized and are today conducted by shrewd and capable leaders. ---E. Pendleton Herring, 1928

Ours is an era of vigorous activity by organized interests in national politics. In the past two decades we have witnessed what seems to be a virtual explosion in demands by private interest organizations in Washington. ---Kay L. Schlozman and John T. Tierney, 1986

Introduction The striking resonance of the above two quotations from leading students of interest groups suggests that something remarkably similar was happening at both ends of the 20th century. Contemporary political science provides a sophisticated literature on the behavior 127

128 Interest Groups highly organized and sophisticated interest group participation in policy making emerged in response to big government programs in the post--New Deal Era.1 Second, the state-centered work of political scientists studying the Progressive Era suggests that this was a vital and vibrant period of group involvement in national politics (Skowronek 1981; Skocpol 1992; Sanders 1999). This line of argument corroborates the findings of major historians who have asserted that the Progressive Era constituted both an ‘‘organizational synthesis’’ and pivotal era in which interest groups flourished in American politics (Link and McCormick 1983; Galambos 1987; Wiebe 1980). Third, in our reading of the interest group literature, we noted the reliance on contemporary data sources to track interest group formation and activities, and we were intrigued by the possibility of developing a set of indicators for group formation and behavior in the earlier periods. Fourth, it is striking that the early 20th century resembles the early 21st century in that both encompass major developments in national policy without benefit of a realignment or critical election (Burnham 1970).2 Finally, it occurred to us that if there were a period of extensive and sophisticated interest group activity that antedated big government, we might be able to examine the succession of interest group systems, not unlike the succession of party systems. Indeed, there may well be an important dynamic relationship between party systems and interest group systems over time. Our discussion is organized into five subsequent sections. We begin with a review of the interest group literature, pointing out both its highly developed explanation of organized interests on the second half of the 20th century and its neglect of the first half. We then present a conceptual framework for interest group systems by defining the five variables we postulate as characterizing such systems. Given the fact that we are presenting a new data set from sources previously unused in the study of interest groups, we discuss our methodology in detail. Based on that discussion and the definition of an interest group system, we contend that the Progressive Era constitutes a distinct system of interest group politics. This argument is developed in our fourth and fifth sections, a discussion of interest group activity in the case of immigration policy and a presentation of an extensive data analysis of organized interest activity over time. In addition, we argue that as groups are tracked over time we can discern cyclical patterns of interest group politics within a broader secular increase in the scale and scope of that politics.

Cornerstones of American Politics Beginning with Federalist No. 10 and James Madison’s seminal explication of factions, students of American government have understood that interest groups are the stuff of which politics is made (Bentley 1908; Herring 1929; Maas 1951; Latham 1952; Bernstein 1955; Madison 1961; Dodd and Schott 1979; Walker 1983; Berry 1977; Moe 1980). And for many political scientists in the postwar era, clientelism is the stuff of which interest groups are made. Defined in its most basic form, clientelism means the organization of an interest group around specific government programs and agencies that affect the welfare of its members. In a very real sense, the interest groups become the clients of the agencies that administer the programs. The growth of government, since the New Deal, in other words, caused the proliferation of well-organized interest groups (Schlozman and Tierny 1986). The logic and common sense of this argument is readily seen in the emergence and development of the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)---for example, the enactment and expansion of federal entitlement programs for senior citizens ‘‘explains’’ the place the AARP has assumed in American politics. Clientelism, of course, need not imply a simplistic relationship in which big government spawns interest groups. A sophisticated understanding of clientele politics allows for the role of either social movements or what James Q. Wilson (1980) labels majoritarian politics in creating federal programs. Such an understanding also allows for the possibility that interest groups are not created in direct response to government programs, but that preexisting interest groups are transformed as they become more professional and better organized to interact effectively with federal agencies that manage the programs of concern to their membership (Berry 1977; Harris and Milkis 1996). An excellent example of this phenomenon is the way that the Audubon Society developed its political and technical capacity as environmental policy emerged in the late 1960s on the national agenda. Despite these and other conceptual subtleties, however, the basic empirical significance of clientelism remains, namely, that big government antedated highly organized interests groups and those groups developed to protect and expand federal programs. From a normative perspective, this system, perforce, attenuates the democratic character of American politics. In the contemporary climate of weakened parties and alienated citizens, various subgovernments consisting of organized interest groups, working in concert with government agencies

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 129 and critical congressional committees, hold sway in the U.S. policy-making process. Again, it should be stressed that interest group scholars recognize important nuances and developments in their representation of this insular and undemocratic policy-making model. Schlozman and Tierney, for instance, gathered systematic data on groups in their study of organized interests in national politics to explore how much ‘‘the Washington pressure community’’ had changed between 1960 and 1981 (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 74--82). Political scientists have also documented the shifting role of business interests and the rise of countervailing public interest groups (Walker 1983; Vogel 1989; Martin 1991; Berry 1999). Thus, fairly closed and static models of iron triangles dominated by business interests have given way to more open and dynamic models of issue networks (Bauer, de Sola Poole and Dexter 1963; Schattschneider 1975; Heclo 1978; Ripley and Franklin 1980). The emergence of more or less permeable issue networks and the new balance of power between business and public, notwithstanding, the policy process described by contemporary interest group theory is a far cry from broad citizen engagement and strong democracy (Barber 1984). Rather, we are left with a portrait of a hyperpluralistic policy process that essentially turns Madison on his head, identifying the myriad interest groups, ‘‘minority factions’’ in the language of Federalist No. 10, as a greater source of political mischief than tyrannical majorities. Theodore Lowi has lampooned this system as ‘‘socialism for the organized and capitalism for the unorganized,’’ asserting that the modern liberal formula of creating federal programs controlled by federal agencies to address policy problems is the wellspring of our unaccountable, unresponsive, and interest group--dominated policy process (Lowi 1979). The New Deal, in his influential argument, set in motion this process through which our public and private spheres have become utterly conflated. With this theoretical perspective, it is hardly surprising that our scholarly work on interest groups focuses on their development from the 1950s onward. Practical research constraints, not the least of which is the availability of data sources, also have encouraged political scientists to concentrate their analysis of interest groups on the second half of the 20th century. Major treatises on modern interest groups rely on survey instruments, field interviews, and contemporary reference works such as Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional Quarterly’s Washington Information Directory, the yearly Congressional Information Service’s (CIS) U.S. Congressional Hearings Index, and

Washington Representatives (Walker 1983; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Berry 1999). While these sources have yielded impressive results in terms of counting, categorizing, and expanding our understanding of interest groups, they do not permit us to track back any further than the mid-1950s. Researchers did not ignore the possibility that earlier periods might hold rich information, but they did not move beyond speculation on this score primarily because they doubted the reliability of data sources on those periods and perhaps because the cost-benefit ratios for acquiring the data were so high. That being the case, the literature necessarily took on an ahistorical cast, or more precisely, implied that the immediate postwar period was the dawn of modern interest group politics. These politics definitely broadened in the 1970s to incorporate a strong public interest movement and deepened in the 1980s to institutionalize patterns of behavior discernable mostly to those within the Washington Beltway who understood administrative and judicial affairs. But what of the history of interest groups before the postwar, post--New Deal period? To be sure, Jack Walker and other leading students of interest group behavior acknowledge that sources do exist that could extend analysis back beyond the 1950s (Walker 1983, 397). They eschew this approach, however, contending that contemporary sources are more readily available and more trustworthy. As Walker asserts, ‘‘Without reliable estimates of both the birth and death rates of different types of groups it is not possible to reconstruct history conclusively from a cross-section survey’’ (1983, 397). We argue that while the interest group literature accurately portrays the postwar evolution of interest group politics and offers a persuasive explanation of group formation in that period, it is historically incomplete. Careful examination of the Progressive Era reveals another highly developed system of interest group politics with its own characteristics and dynamics. This argument is significant for three theoretical reasons. Perhaps most important, it provides evidence of organized interests predating big government and extensive federal policy making, thereby reversing the causal connection postulated by clientelism. As our data show, organized interests burst onto the national stage before the Progressive agenda had been translated into legislation and programs. If, as historians Arthur Link and Richard McCormick claim, the Progressive Era was our first period of widespread interest organization, what was the connection between groups and government before the New Deal? A second, key theoretical concern raised by this argument is that, as Walker suggests, we ought to pay attention not simply to group

130 Interest Groups formation and interest mobilization, but also to the attrition of organized interests. It is clear that many once-vital groups of the Progressive period withered and died or entered a period of dormancy. What were the reasons for this demobilization, and what were the accompanying shifts in interest group politics? Finally, the existence of a robust set of organized interests in the Progressive Era suggests the need for a careful, historically based explanation of the relationship between interest groups and American political development. Expanding the time horizons of interest group research can elucidate historical patterns not discernable by relying exclusively on data since the 1950s. What, for example, can we learn about state-building and party decline by exploring the historical development of organized interests?

Interests and American Political Development When political science turns its attention to dynamic change in American politics, it often does so with periodization schemes and a theoretical language that ignores organized interests. Consider, for example, partisan realignment theory that decades ago developed a general account of American political development built on the concept of party systems. Aside from highlighting the pivotal role of parties in U.S. political history, work on party systems illuminated both long-term, dynamic processes associated with realignments and distinctive features that distinguish one party system from another (Burnham 1970; Silbey). Historically, political parties are generally understood to have served the functions of aggregating interests and expressing popular will in the policy-making process. Partisan realignments and critical elections are the mechanisms through which these functions are fulfilled: when realignments occur, statebuilding, major policy shifts, and regime changes follow in their wake (Burnham 1970). What is striking about this realignment scholarship in relation to the interest group literature is that organized interests are not usually viewed as agents of transformation, even though a group basis of American politics has been acknowledged since the founding. Indeed, interests are typically understood as either an impediment to change or as organizations acted on by external forces. In their inertial role, interest groups provide lobbyists with privileged access and undue influence on policy making. These advantages, as we have noted, are the basis for a powerful critique of American politics (Schattschneider 1979; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lindblom 1977; Lowi 1979). In addition,

American politics is understood to be primarily about incrementally allocating money and material goods, not transforming the political status quo. This, of course, is our politics of iron triangles, subgovernments, and issue networks. In an important qualification to this bleak picture of unsystematic and unaccountable policy making, several political scientists have pointed out that the public interest movement of the 1960s and 1970s injected a vigorous element of competition into the process (McFarland 1976; Berry 1977; McCann 1986). Jeffrey Berry provides a compelling articulation of this viewpoint. Rooting his thesis in the postmaterialist argument advanced by Ronald Inglehart, Berry documents the success of public interest organizations in insinuating themselves into the issue networks and shaping the policy agenda (Inglehart 1977; Berry 1999). Since the 1970s, then, the corporate bias of subgovernmental politics, while not eradicated, has been modulated. The standard ‘‘history’’ of interest groups in American politics, thus, begins in the 1930s, and runs roughly as follows. The New Deal realignment laid the foundation for Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to launch in earnest the construction of a modern liberal state that would deliver federal programs to legitimate organized labor, regulate business, provide a measure of economic security, and distribute largess to corporations and citizens alike. Our modern interest group politics, in turn, developed from this milieu and gave rise to organizations that were adept at accessing federal largess and protecting the programs that mattered to them. This system reached its zenith in the early 1960s at which point the social movements spawned by postmaterialist values began an unrelenting attack on this insular and elitist politics. These social movements for civil rights, ending the war in Vietnam, women’s rights, environmental protection, consumer protection, gay rights, and so on essentially morphed into a new set of organized interests that took their place in Washington politics and fundamentally reshaped the policy process. With an enervated party system, the social movements could not be absorbed into the political arena and find expression through the electoral process. Perhaps, as Sidney Milkis has argued, the New Deal really was ‘‘the realignment to end all realignments,’’ putting in place an administrative state that would provide the arena for future political competition (Milkis 1993) It is clear that there was a regime change in the 1970s as these new interest groups, animated by quality of life rather than material concerns, introduced a new set of ideas and policies. These public interest lobby groups were institutionalized as part of the Washington landscape,

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 131

Ethel Percy Andrus, founder and president of the American Association of Retired Persons (right), testifies before the Senate Committee on Aging on January 17, 1963. The hearings focused on fraudulent schemes targeting the elderly. With her is Federal Trade Commission chairman Paul Rand Dixon. (Bettmann/Corbis)

leaving the states with an interest group system that, in some respects, is more permeable than that of the immediate postwar period and surely more focused on postmaterial values. This history of interest groups conveys a linear progression from materialism and subgovernments to postmaterialism and issue networks, with the partisan influence in policy making eroding steadily since the New Deal. As persuasive as this history is, it is also severely abridged and distorted. As early as 1926 E. Pendleton Herring’s observed, the first trait which these groups exhibit as factors of power is that of organization. They are organized to a degree never possible before in the history of the world. Technological processes have made this possible. In the second place, these groups are ably and intelligently directed. They know their way about. In the third place, they have all the strength of unity and cohesion which is the result of a definite program and a common aim. Let it be

emphasized again that the presence of these groups means that a systematized and integrated organization for the representation of diverse interest groups is now functioning at Washington. (Herring 1929, 18) [Emphasis added] It was apparent to Herring that an interest group system emerged at the national level shortly after the turn of the century that both reflected and generated political transformations. Upon reflection, it seems that the Progressive Era not only enjoyed a vibrant, albeit different, interest group system, but also that the turn of the last century was a time when nonmaterial issues also dominated the national agenda. In addition to labor and antitrust policy, the country was absorbed with such issues as suffrage, child labor, segregation, immigration, conservation, prohibition, and municipal reform. It would be difficult to describe these issues as postmaterial (perhaps they are ‘‘prematerial’’?), but clearly Americans were wrestling with quality-of-life concerns at both the

132 Interest Groups

Child laborer in a West Virginia coal mine in 1908. This mine driver has been employed for one year, working more than 10 hours daily. The plight of child labor helped to mobilize interest groups in the Progressive Era. (Lewis Hine/Library of Congress)

beginning and the end of the 20th century. This fact indicates that instead of a secular trend from material to postmaterial values in the postwar period, there is an ongoing tension and interaction between these sets of values. In both periods, moreover, social movements propelled these nonmaterial issues onto the national agenda without benefit of a partisan realignment. Certainly, in both periods, political parties sustained withering attacks, not the least of which came from organized interest groups. While a critical election was held in 1896, Progressive reform obviously took place in spite of that realignment, not because of it. To effect the major policy shifts of the Progressive Era, social movements organized for effective lobbying at the national level and helped to inaugurate big government, thereby belying the clientele version of history in which organized interests followed on the heels of big government. Similarly, the major policy shifts at the end of the century documented so well by Berry and others also constituted an episode of remaking

American politics by organizing new interests in support of new programs and the forming new federal bureaucracies. Rather than merely arguing that there is nothing new under the sun in American politics, however, we are proposing that drawing connections between these two periods reveals patterns of historical change that have not been examined in the literature on interest groups. An alternative version of interest group history, and one that we find persuasive, would posit that organized interests in both periods grew out of an interaction between social movements and the establishment. Specifically, because social movements at both the beginning and the end of this century found regular political institutions to be both inhospitable to reform programs and impediments to social progress, they eventually sought ways of working around or altering the status quo. These ways included not only organization and adoption of new lobbying techniques, but also reforming parties and electoral politics, opening up legislative decision making, and using the courts in new ways, essentially remaking interest group politics. The organized interests, as we have noted, pursued both material and nonmaterial, or as Herring put it, ‘‘selfish’’ and ‘‘altruistic’’ goals. In addition, our own case study work indicates that many of the characteristics of today’s issue networks were in ready supply in major policy arenas during the Progressive Era. Again this finding suggests that our existing accounts of interest group politics are not so much wrong as incomplete. Before assessing this theoretical possibility, however, we must delineate what we mean by the concept of an interest group system.

Interest Group Systems For the purposes of this essay, we define an interest group system in terms of five major variables: (1) the aggregate number of organized interests; (2) the variety of organized interests; (3) the nationalization of organized interests; (4) the resources of organized interests; and (5) the structural opportunities and obstacles confronting organized interests. The first three variables are fairly straightforward enumerations of the level and kind of organized interest activity. The latter two are more complex indicators of the character of interest group systems, and they react upon each other, as groups develop resources to take best advantage of the structural milieu in which they operate. Taken together, these variables will enable us to distinguish systems of interest group politics in different historical periods.

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 133 At the most elemental level, the aggregate number of organized interests active in American political life helps us to distinguish an interest group system. From Herring’s classic study through current scholarship, interest group theorists have sought to estimate the size of the interest group universe. Not only is this a logical first step in empirical analysis of interest group behavior, but it also has theoretical implications for understanding broader shifts in American politics. At least since David Truman’s seminal work in the early 1950s, political scientists have sought to amass empirical data on the formation of organized interests (Moe 19890; Salisbury 1984). Their explanations and findings on group formation have been a crucially important theoretical contribution, but tell us precious little about group formation before the mid-20th century. Truman, for example, has argued that social, technological, and economic complexity gives rise to more groups to represent emergent interests. For our purposes this may well imply that periods of societal transformation are the leavening for new interest group systems (Truman 1951). All of this work, however, leaves a glaring lacuna with respect to group attrition over the course of the past century. We should be cognizant that factors must lead to an attrition of some groups even as new groups emerge to take their place. Before we can discern those factors, we need longitudinal data on group numbers and formation throughout the 20th century to demarcate interest group systems. Second, interest group systems may be characterized by the variety of organized interests that exist in a given historical period. The search for measurement of the mix of groups has been driven in large part by the long-standing pluralist-elitist debate. On the one hand, there are those who believe, with E. E. Schattschneider, that business dominance in America ensures that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper-class accent, or who side with Lindblom and believe that business enjoys a privileged position (Schattschneider 1960; Lindblom 1977). On the other hand, there are those who maintain, as Bauer, Poole, and Dexter did, that even if business groups are more numerous than others, they are hardly monolithic (Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1963; Harris 1985). Still others have adduced evidence to demonstrate that the influence of public interest groups has been severely underestimated (McFarland 1976; Berry 1977; McCann 1986). Whichever side of this debate one favors, the variety of organized interests in play is a critical variable. In addition, shifts in the proportion of a particular kind of group and the relative mix of groups indicate the development of new systems. One might hypothesize, for example, that at

the outset of transformational periods we should expect to find a higher proportion of interests concerned with material issues as society struggles to find its footing in shifting socioeconomic relations. Conversely, one could suggest that population swings, such as a more educated demographic cohort, would lead to an interest group system with relatively more citizens organizations focused on nonmaterial issues. For different reasons, Walker theorizes that those groups will suffer very high mortality rates. Again, none of these theoretical questions can be answered without accumulating historical data that are lacking in contemporary scholarship. Following the typology developed by Schlozman and Tierney, we place all organized interests in one of the following categories: private businesses, trade and economic associations, unions, citizens groups, and other. The second category encompasses not only trade associations, but also other economic-based organizations such as the National Grange. The last category (other) includes the press, church-based religious groups, education institutions, hospitals or other health care institutions, and foundations. Third, the national versus local or regional orientation of organized interests distinguishes one interest group system from another. Students of the Progressive Era clearly see that period as a transition from classical to modern liberalism, from a negative to a positive view of government, and perhaps above all, as a transformation from state and local to national politics. Without developing strong quantitative indicators, they also postulate the nationalization of interest groups. The contemporary political science literature maintains, as we have seen, that the postwar period is the critical time in which interest groups were reoriented to the national level. We see these views as ultimately compatible, but only with a careful extension of our empirical data back to the early part of the last century. Indicators of nationalization would include the number of interest groups with staff and offices in Washington, D.C., testimony of national organizations before Congress on major policy issues, and coverage of group behavior in the national news media. The fourth variable that we propose to define an interest group system is the resources that organized interests mobilize in pursuit of their goals. We use the term resources in the broadest sense to include human, financial, and technological assets. Clearly, such resources will never be evenly (or justly) distributed among organized interests. Still, it is possible to distinguish systems based on the amount and kind of resources that are mobilized systemwide. Moreover, there is a dynamic, competitive dimension to any interest group

134 Interest Groups system such that success will be mimicked and diffused throughout the system. Thus, particular kinds of expertise, lobbying techniques, and communication technology will be adopted generally if they prove to be effective in specific cases. An organized interest group operating in the 1990s, for example, probably would not pursue a broad electoral strategy in pursuit of a policy goal, opting instead for a legislative or legal remedy. A group operating in the 1890s, on the other hand, would be more inclined to press its case in state or national elections. In each case, the group would be opting for an approach that not only seemed likely to work in its own historical context (that is, its own interest group system), but also an approach that matched its resources to the opportunities and obstacles of that context. Those opportunities and obstacles presented by the evolving political institutions of the American state constitute the fifth and final variable that shapes an interest group system. While, as we have suggested, organized interests seek change in political institutions to create a more hospitable policy environment, they also are influenced by the nature of political institutions confronting them. The institutions with which organized interests interact may be informal (issue networks and subgovernments) as well as formal (Congress and the courts) and as institutions change, so too do interest group politics. In assessing the relationship between organized interests and other political institutions, though, special attention has been paid to the interplay of groups and parties. Although many scholars have noted the likelihood of a relationship between parties and interest groups, we know of no careful historical analysis of the developmental relationship between the two. Certainly there is no extant discussion of interest group systems that parallels that of party systems. Schlozman and Tierney point out that, The common wisdom among political scientists is that party and organized interest strength are inversely proportional: where parties are strong, organized interests are weak and vice versa. . . . It would be useful to trace the vicissitudes in the fortunes of organized interests with reference to changing party strength (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 201--202). We agree strongly, but would go further. It would be equally interesting to trace the interactions between interest group activity and party strength. As Charles Merriam poignantly noted in early 20th century, ‘‘Organizations, societies, leagues, unions, spring up all around us, and become centers of political

power. . . . These groups did not exist on the same scale a generation ago, but now they rival the party and the ‘machine’ at many points’’ (quoted in Herring 1929, vi). Herring turned this logic around when he concluded ‘‘the chief explanation for the rise of these organized groups of voters, with an alert interest in legislation and politics, is to be found in the decline of the political party as a leader in opinion’’ (Herring 1929, 46). Two decades later, Schattschneider asserted that the power of interest groups correlates negatively with the power of parties (cited in Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 201). It is more than coincidental that organized interests proliferated and flourished in national politics during the two eras in which party power was systematically eroded by reformers, the Progressive Era and the 1960s and 1970s. To be sure, we must be sensitive to the fact that parties operate in both an electoral and a governmental (largely legislative) context and that they may be stronger in one context than the other. It is equally important to note that, in both periods, parties in Congress acted as roadblocks to reform: the Old Guard Republicans who controlled the committee system before 1910 and the southern Democrats who controlled the seniority system before 1965. As social movements sought reform, these redoubts of party strength may well have persuaded advocates that interest groups would provide a more effective platform than looser movement organizations for realizing policy goals. In any case, such propositions warrant consideration as much as Schlozman and Tierney’s more general suggestion that we study the impact of changing party strength on interest group behavior. In their formulation, parties are a contextual variable with which organized interests must cope. A historical interaction between the party systems and interest group systems has important implications for understanding American political development. It seems obvious, moreover, that a hallmark of organized interest behavior then and now is to place both substantive policy change and party reforms on their agendas. Thus, in the Progressive Era, organized interests pursued antimonopoly and child labor programs while working for direct election of senators and the ballot initiative; in the contemporary period, they have advocated for environmental protection and health care as well as campaign finance controls and open primaries. Ultimately, the relationship between parties and organized interests is central to the definition of an interest group system because parties provide the main alternative form of political participation. That relationship is key to understanding an interest group system at any point in time, but it is also critical to

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 135 tracking patterns of development in those systems over time. The dynamic interplay of parties and organized interests in American politics can be assessed systematically across several historical periods, and only by identifying distinctive partisan and interest group systems. In the section that follows, we focus on three crucial variables that define the interest group system that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century: the aggregate number of organized interests, their variety, and their degree of nationalization. We shall also see some rudimentary patterns of group formation, participation, and attrition that suggest an interesting cyclical model of interest group development that underlies a broader secular increase in organized interest activity. We turn now to a discussion of our methodology and sources.

Methodology and Sources Clearly an assessment of interest group activity over time requires the integration of multiple data sources, and such an assessment must be informed by both quantitative and qualitative.3 While we have developed what we believe to be exciting new sources, we also revisited some of the major contemporary work on interest groups to see whether the sources employed in those studies supported our own findings and to explore the pitfalls that might await us in drawing conclusions from particular data sets. The most useful starting point for this reassessment is Jack Walker’s pioneering study of interest group formation. Walker sought to provide comprehensive data on group formation and maintenance in the United States. As a basis for this project, he settled on the Congressional Quarterly’s Washington Information Directory (1980) as the best source from which to draw a reliable sample of organized interests engaged in national politics since the early 19th century. As he explained, ‘‘After checking several sources against each other and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, the Directory was chosen as the source of group names most likely to provide a balanced picture of associations concerned with national affairs’’ (Walker 1983). Eventually, Walker identified 913 groups that fit his definition, 564 of which responded to the survey he administered. In our view, two significant issues arise in Walker’s study. First, he relies on existing groups from a contemporaneous reference source to gain a sense of the overall number and variety of groups that have emerged in American national politics over time. Such

a source obviously does not, as Walker himself acknowledges, list groups that were once active in national policy making but no longer exist. His survey responses concerning founding dates of organized interests tell us nothing about those groups that have disappeared from the political landscape. Second, he excludes three significant kinds of organizations from his analysis: trade associations, unions, and businesses. While he provides a defensible justification for this research choice, we believe that a discussion of interest group systems requires the inclusion of these three critical sets of organized interests. These issues notwithstanding, we returned to the Washington Information Directory and Walker’s data for two reasons. In the first place, we wanted to see whether, after including trade associations and businesses, we could identify periods in which a critical mass of organized interests emerged. In addition we wanted to reconstruct a data set from the Directory to illustrate the limitations of using a contemporary source to look backward. With these objectives in mind, we compiled a list of all interest groups, including trade associations and unions (private companies are not enumerated in this source), listed in the most recent edition of the Directory. The total number of organizations, 2,643, is obviously much smaller than the total number of groups now participating in national political affairs. As Walker noted two decades ago, however, the Directory does provide a balanced sample of such groups, and thus a useful tool for developing comprehensive, if not complete data. Rather than relying on a survey instrument to establish the founding dates for our sample population of organizations, we turned to the Encyclopedia of Organizations for that information. The Encyclopedia yielded founding dates for 1,933 of the 2,643 groups on our list, or 71.2 percent (slightly higher than the 64.8 percent response rate elicited in Walker’s survey). These data reveal interesting clusters of group formation, but suggest as well the need for additional qualitative sources to establish the existence and development of interest group systems. Our strategy therefore was to use a variety of sources and methods to ‘‘triangulate’’ our analysis on the research objective of identifying and explicating interest group systems.4 In the absence of a single reliable data source, we have sought to pull together a wide variety of materials to provide the foundation for a comprehensive historical view of organized interests in American politics since the late 19th century.5 Most important, we developed a completely new data set from the CIS U. S. Congressional Hearings Index. The Index catalogs congressional testimony from

136 Interest Groups 1833 to the early 21st century, by topic and organization testifying. We believe that appearances before Congress provide a strong measure of both an organization’s participation in national politics and its legitimacy. The Index offers the best available data on the number and variety of groups engaged in national affairs before the 1950s. Moreover, it allows us to track the emergence of nascent issue networks by identifying sets of organized interests that testify regularly in particular issue areas. Thus, we can track the frequency of participation to assess which groups and which kinds of groups were most closely allied to the emerging Washington establishment. It is possible, for example, to compare in a ratio the number of groups in a particular category to the number of appearances by that group. As Jeffrey Berry points out, this statistic can demonstrate the relative importance and influence of an organization (Berry 1999). Another virtue of the Index is that it allows us to examine the same measures across time. Finally, when we compare data from this source with the Washington Information Directory’s listing of groups formed in the late -19th or early 20th century, we can see a clear indicator of attrition. Eventually, we will use this source to develop a list and analysis of all organized interest testimony to the early 21st century. For this essay, we present our findings on the period from 1833 to 1917, which is based on 10,656 appearances of 5,372 organized interest groups. As exciting as these new data are, they inevitably have limitations. A major concern derives from the fact that while the Index lists all organizations and associations testifying at congressional hearings, it does not separate them into the categories of our typology (private corporations, trade associations, unions, citizens groups, and other). Consequently, like other researchers, we had to make judgments about where to place organizations in developing this list. Another limitation of the CIS Index is that the list of groups derived from it is not exhaustive, because testimony before Congress depends on being invited to testify, and not all groups received invitations. This limitation, if anything, underestimates the level of participation in national politics. Cognizant of the methodological issues, we believe that utilizing the array of sources and approaches discussed above will provide a sound basis for investigating interest group systems across time. In the pages that follow, we will introduce the data that we have developed from the Washington Information Directory (group formation through the 20th century), the CIS Index (number and variety of organized interests from 1833--1917), and a case study on immigration policy. Taken together, they provide a persuasive case for both

the appearance of a distinct interest group system early in the century and a pattern of interest group development. Moreover, we can see some important clues about the dynamic relationship between organized interests and parties that have helped to shape American political development to the present.

The Case of Immigration Policy Our case study research, now in its early stages, strongly suggests that the Progressive Era was marked by a proliferation of interest groups directly advancing their policy goals within a Washington establishment. Not only were numerous policy realms penetrated by a rich variety of organized interests with national offices, but also citizens groups in particular commanded considerable influence. Many interest groups of this era viewed the formidable power of U.S. political parties in the late 19th century as a significant obstacle to their goals, and they responded by attempting to circumvent partisan barriers altogether. As we noted, none other than Charles Merriam observed during the Progressive Era that an explosion of organized interest groups had enervated traditional party machines in less than a decade. When it proved impossible to work around partisan structures, organized interests sometimes joined antiparty insurgents in directly attacking traditional party power. Whether evading or attacking the party system and its strongest agents in government, interest group activism was routinely premised on the conclusion that the 19th-century party system was decidedly inhospitable to their objectives. Just as striking, our case study research suggests that interest group activism in varied issue areas of the Progressive Era was consistent with a policy-making environment more closely resembling ‘‘issue networks’’ than ‘‘iron triangles’’ or ‘‘subgovernments’’ (Heclo 1978, 87--123). The politics of immigration reform from the 1890s to the 1920s is illustrative of these developments. During the 19th century, a succession of nativist associations set out to attain strong government restrictions on immigrant admissions and rights through partisan and electoral means. In particular, xenophobic movements of the 19th century advanced nativist policy goals either by soliciting support from one of the major parties or by forming third-party organizations. Although crucial to securing Chinese exclusion in the 1880s, both approaches proved decidedly ineffective with regard to restricting dominant European immigration. Major-party support for restricting European admissions and rights was routinely tepid and fleeting. The fact that large numbers of European settlers easily

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 137 gained entrance and 19th-century suffrage created important voting blocs with whom party politicians, especially Democrats, curried favor by defending immigration and the foreign born. Because the Democratic Party aligned itself with immigrant voters and kindred ethnics virtually from its inception, it is hardly surprising that nativist groups at times looked to the Whig and Republican Parties as partisan vehicles for restrictionist views. Yet even these parties, stung by electoral reprisals from foreign-born voters in national contests, had strong incentives to embrace the nation’s pro-immigration traditions. After Whig leaders concluded that they narrowly lost the 1844 presidential race largely due to heavy immigrant and Catholic support for the Democratic ticket, they quickly severed ties with xenophobic groups like the American Republicans in 1845 (Bennett, 59; Hamilton, 2). Roughly a half-century later, William McKinley purged the nativist American Protective Association from the ranks of the Republican Party, reminding voters that ‘‘we have always lived by the Golden Rule. The best policy is to live and let live’’ (quoted in Jensen, 291). Only in the area of Asian exclusion, where immigrant groups lacked access to the ballot box and kindred ethnics were small in number, were the major parties decisively responsive to restrictionist pressures. Nativist groups wishing to stem large-scale European immigration during the 19th century also had little success in pressing their cause by organizing third-party movements. The nation’s two-party system was typically hostile to such efforts. It was only on the eve of the Civil War that the nativist Know-Nothings capitalized on a party system strained and fractured by sectional discord to achieve surprising electoral support for its anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant agenda. But the leaders of rival parties, most notably the Democrats, posed a formidable veto-point in the national government. And their nativist agenda was soon overshadowed by precisely those issues that led to their meteoric rise: slavery and secession. Subsequent efforts by restrictionist groups to pursue their goals through third-party campaigns went nowhere. In general, the vibrant partisan and electoral politics of 19th-century America--sufficiently democratized to extend broad political rights to white male newcomers---was routinely inhospitable to the policy initiatives of nativist groups. During the 1890s, a new set of interest groups led by the Immigration Restriction League (IRL) emerged at the national level to champion broad reductions in European immigration. Significantly, these groups explicitly sought to transcend traditional party politics in favor of what might be best described as Progressive notions of ‘‘direct democracy’’ and ‘‘scientific

government.’’6 The IRL, for example, was a highly intellectual and professional organization, formed by prominent academics, business leaders, social workers, civic activists, jurists, and politicians that reached across party lines for support (see Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League 1894--1899). ‘‘Our organization is a non-partisan one,’’ the IRL declared early on, ‘‘and we do not support or oppose a candidate for office on party grounds.’’7 Instead, the group adopted what it considered a ‘‘dignified,’’ ‘‘factual,’’ and extraparty strategy, embracing social science research, mass publicity, broad coalition building with other groups, and direct Washington advocacy to advance its policy aims. ‘‘An office in Washington,’’ IRL leaders concluded in 1897, ‘‘is practically indispensable for successful prosecution of the League’s work’’ (Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League, January 11, 1897). Of course, the efficacy of the IRL and its allies among patriotic associations, professional groups, organized labor, and various citizens groups was contingent on whether key officials and institutions of the national state were receptive to their novel extraparty efforts. The standing immigration committees that were established by Congress in 1890 proved to be a crucial structural opening for the IRL and its allies in this period. The creation of these committees reflected the expanding scale and complexity of congressional work at the turn of the century (Polsby 1968; Keller 1977). The development of permanent House and Senate immigration committees was an important development for nativist groups like the IRL. Dominated by New England patricians like William Chandler (R-NH) and Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) in the Senate and Samuel McCall (R-MA) in the House, these committees welcomed independent expertise, favored policy activism, and supported broad restrictions on European immigration. Most important, these committees breathed life into a national immigration policy network that institutionalized formal input from social science experts and activists and routinized the drafting and proposal of immigration reform legislation. Working closely with nationally organized groups like the IRL in 1896, the immigration committees shepherded literacy test legislation (targeting Southern and Eastern European newcomers) through both houses (Tichenor, forthcoming, ch. 4). Tellingly, stunned defenders of robust European immigration responded by mounting their centralized opposition to the restrictionist measure. In Washington, trade associations like the National Association of Manufacturers, steamship and railroad companies, and various ethnic and religious associations mobilized at the eleventh hour, vigorously lobbying the White

138 Interest Groups House to veto the measure. When Grover Cleveland indeed vetoed the legislation, pro-immigration groups successfully pressured lawmakers to let the legislation die. In the wake of the 1896 legislative struggle, an impressive group of pro-immigration intellectuals, business leaders, social workers, and other activists formed the Immigration Protective League to mirror the advocacy work of the IRL (New York Times, January 8, 1898). Subsequently, traditional ethnic organizations like the German American Alliance and the Ancient Order of Hibernians were joined by representatives of newer immigrant groups, such as the Liberal Immigration League and the American Jewish Committee, which explicitly sought to counterpoise the IRL’s lobbying and research activities (Tichenor, forthcoming, ch. 5). During the first two decades of the 20th century, then, two large and diverse coalitions of interest groups waged a pitched battle in Washington over the future of national immigration and naturalization policies (see Table 1). If the large number of participants actively involved in this policy environment contrasted sharply with the small circle of actors associated with iron triangles or subgovernments, so too did the high visibility of the immigration issue in these years. Indeed, in their struggle for the hearts and minds (or even the tepid support) of uncommitted government officials and organized interests, both immigration defenders and restrictionists sought ‘‘to expand the scope of conflict’’ (to borrow Schattschneider’s terminology [1960]). Immigration restrictionists, for

example, took great pains to link their cause with a host of other prominent reform impulses of the day. They reminded prohibitionists and ‘‘good government’’ reformers that new immigrants undermined temperance and fueled corrupt urban party machines. They cast restrictionism as ‘‘but a part of the great conservation movement,’’ dedicated to conserving the quality of American citizenship. To social workers and welfare reformers, they warned that newcomers compounded urban poverty, crime, and overcrowding. In short, Progressive Era immigration reformers constantly sought to draw new groups and actors into the fray as fresh converts to their cause (Tichenor, forthcoming, ch. 5). If the congressional immigration committees were almost exclusively responsive to the restrictionist agenda during the 1890s, their changing membership and the mobilization of nationally organized proimmigration groups made them more receptive to representatives of both camps until World War I. In fact, interest groups both for and against immigration restriction in the early 20th century gained access to the national policy-making process in a variety of institutional settings, from congressional halls and federal courtrooms to the White House and bureaucratic offices. Significantly, each camp could point to a distinctive set of structural openings that afforded them privileged access to decision makers during the Progressive Era. Finally, it bears noting that the interest groups that were the most actively engaged in immigration reform politics understood well that power within the nascent

Table 1. Immigration Coalitions of the Progressive Era Alien Admissions Should Be: Alien Rights Should Be: EXPANSIVE

RESTRICTED

Source: Author.

EXPANDED OR MAINTAINED

RESTRICTED

Frances Kellor Louis Marshall Woodrow Wilson

Samuel Gompers Terence Powderly John R. Commons

Immigration Protective League American Jewish Committee German American Alliance Liberal Immigration League Social Justice Progressives

American Federation of Labor Knights of Labor Wisconsin Progressive Economists

Stephen Mason Charles Nagel William Howard Taft

Prescott Hall Madison Grant Albert Johnson

National Association of Manufacturers U.S. Chambers of Commerce Steamship and Railroad Companies

Immigration Restriction League Jr. Order of United Amer. Mech. Asian Exclusion Leagues The Grange Eugenicist Organizations

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 139 issue networks of this period often rested on policy knowledge or expertise. A familiar set of interest group representatives frequently appeared before congressional committees in these years, ranging from Frances Kellor of the Immigration Protective League to Prescott Hall of the Immigration Restriction League, each of whom skillfully linked their specific policy goals to expert findings. Both camps saw great importance in the creation of special commissions to investigate immigration and naturalization policy, believing that intellectual legitimacy was essential to winning crucial policy battles. When the Dillingham Commission was established in 1907, for example, Max Kohler of the American Jewish Committee and Union of American Hebrew Societies warned allies that its ‘‘report is likely to shape our immigration policy for a number of years’’ (Max James Kohler Papers, September 27, 1910). In similar fashion, IRL operatives concluded that a negative report ‘‘will hurt us for many years’’ (Joseph Lee Papers, February 17, 1907). Groups on both sides of the issue agreed that there was ‘‘no more valuable work’’ than developing expertise designed to shape the findings of congressional committees and investigatory commissions in this era of ‘‘scientific government’’ (Joseph Lee Papers, February 4, 1907). Policy specialists with both immigration expertise and knowledge of the complex Washington environment proved to be the most influential lobbyists in immigration reform politics. Our case study research to date suggests that the nascent ‘‘issue network’’ that emerged in immigration policy making during the Progressive Era was anything but an anomaly. In the area of antitrust, for instance, one can observe a marked expansion in the number and kind of organized interests that became regularly involved in shaping national policy on this issue. When the antitrust issue first emerged as a fixture in national politics with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, powerful congressional parties were the central aegis for aggregating competing interests. Not surprisingly, then, organized interest group involvement in lobbying these two major pieces of legislation was relatively modest (confined primarily to the Grange and local trade associations). By contrast, after the turn of the century, a fairly robust and stable set of organized interests---including trade associations, labor unions, and citizens groups---emerged as regular participants in the antitrust policy-making process. Another nascent issue network thereby was born. Our ongoing case study research suggests that the trends we have discerned in immigration and antitrust policy making were indicative of a rich variety of nascent issue networks that emerged during this political era.

A Historical View of Organized Interests While our case study work, as exemplified in the above discussion of immigration policy, strongly suggests that a distinct interest group system formed as the 19th century passed into the 20th, only long-term historical data can make the case that patterned development characterizes the evolution of organized interests. With this in mind, we have developed several tables to illustrate our hypothesis that our present interest group system can effectively be traced back much farther than the current literature undertakes to do. Our first task will be to delineate long-term trends in group formation, following Walker’s approach to explaining the development of interest group politics. Second we zero in on the Progressive Era to demonstrate more fully what we see as the real origin of our contemporary system.

Group Formation in the 20th Century As we sought to reconstruct Walker’s analysis to include unions as well as trade and economic associations and extend the data back to the Progressive Era, several key findings emerged. These findings are presented in Figures 1 and 2, which track interest group formation through the Washington Information Directory from 1881--1990. Figure 1 tracks group formation in 10-year increments beginning in 1881--1890 and ending with the 1931--1940. Figure 2 carries the data set forward from 1941--1950 through 1981--1990. Figure 1 reveals a consistent pattern of increasing group formation from the late-19th through the early 20th century, with a subsequent decline in the 1921-1930 period. In late 19th century, for example, professional groups formed at a rate of no more than 27 per decade, trade and economic groups no more than 16 per decade, unions no more than 11 per decade, and citizens groups no more than 12 per decade. As we move into the 20th century, marked changes in number and variety of groups become readily apparent. Professional groups show a spike from 23 new groups in the first decade to 46 in the second decade and tailing off to 34 in the third decade. Similarly, trade and economic associations progress from 20 to 59 in the first two decades and tail off to 26 in the third decade. Citizens groups move from 14 to 32 in the first two decades, dropping back to 14 in the third decade. Unions, interestingly, decline steadily over the same period. While there are some obvious historical explanations for the union decline, we can see with respect to the other major organized interests a clear cyclical upturn in group formation during the Progressive Era. To be sure,

140 Interest Groups

Figure 1 Source: Harris and Tichenor

we are dealing with total numbers that are relatively small in comparison to the numbers Walker uncovered in the postwar period. Nevertheless, the cyclical pattern is unmistakable and given our additional findings presented below, we are confident that these results are consistent with our hypothesis and definitely understate the burgeoning of organized interest activity in the Progressive Era. A final note on Figure 1: the 1931--1940 decade indicates an uptick in professional groups and trade associations, a phenomenon that likely is related to New Deal programs, but that will require much further analysis. Shifting our attention to Figure 2, we see a pattern of group formation entirely consistent with the current interest group literature. There is a cyclical upturn in group formation that is easily traceable from 1951 to 1990, although it is concentrated on trade associations and citizens groups. Indeed there is a steady decline in new professional associations. Moreover, the familiar story of a veritable explosion of citizens groups from the post-Vietnam period into the early 1980s clearly emerges. As we examine the variety of new groups, we can also see that the mix of organizations in the interest group universe has changed. In addition to increasing proportions of citizens and trade groups, there is also an increase in foundations and in education and research organizations breaking onto the scene as reflected in the other category. Again, explaining the exact character of this interest group system will take much more analysis, especially of a qualitative nature. For now, though, we can see another cycle analogous to the one at the turn of the century, albeit at a lower amplitude. As we see in Figures 1 and 2, the historical pattern that develops is one of a secular increase in organized interest activity throughout the 20th century, but with at least two distinct cycles or waves of political development embedded within that long-term increase. This pattern, of course, raises more theoretical questions

than it answers, not the least of which is how do these two interest group systems relate to party systems and other broad patterns of American political development? At a minimum, we would suggest that the early Progressive Era cycle was in fact the dawn of modern interest group politics and that the second postwar cycle echoes many of the same causal relations discernable in that first cycle. That second period also indicates group formation and organized interest activity to a much higher degree (note the difference in amplitude of the two cycles, a result completely in accord with the contemporary literature’s view that big government and clientele politics following the New Deal are responsible for our current system of issue networks. As promising as these data are, they do have important limitations. In addition to the small number of organizations in the Progressive Era, noted above, the key drawback is, as Walker pointed out, the lack of information on attrition of organized interests. To gain a perspective on this problem, we turned to the CIS Index for Congressional Hearings (23rd to 64th Congresses). After enumerating all of the organizations that testified before Congress by type and by Congress, we track the first appearance of groups (excluding private businesses) as a proxy for the emergence of new groups. Figure 3 compares our estimate based on the CIS data with the estimate we developed from the Washington Information Directory for two periods: pre-1901 and 1901--1920. The striking disparity in these bar graphs indicates that an enormous number of organizations came into being in the Progressive Era, but disappeared subsequently. A major task as this project unfolds will be to pursue this comparison throughout the 20th century to develop an appreciation of attrition rates, a key variable in understanding the life cycle of interest group systems. As imperfect as these estimates may be, when combined with the other sources, other measures

Figure 2 Source: Harris and Tichenor

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 141

Figure 3 Source: Harris and Tichenor

from CIS data, and qualitative analysis, they will reflect a significant advancement in explaining the development of interest group politics in America. The following discussion of the CIS data suggests how useful this information can be in reshaping our theoretical and empirical knowledge on interest groups.

Organized Interests in the Progressive Era When we cast our nets widely to examine the total number of appearances of both interest groups and private corporations at congressional hearings between 1833 and 1917, one of our most basic findings was the sharp increase in the amount of testimony by organized

Figure 4 Source: CIS Index (US GPO)

interests in Washington after the turn of the century. As Figure 4 captures, appearances of interest groups and private corporations more than tripled between 1899 and 1909 (the 56th to the 60th Congresses). They increased at nearly the same rate in the eight years between 1909 and 1917 (the 61st to 64th Congresses). This explosion in the representation of organized interests before congressional committees, and by implication within the Washington policy-making environment more generally, is unmistakable. One also may note that private corporations appeared at hearings more often than interest groups in these years. However, we found that private corporations

142 Interest Groups

Table 2. Private Corporations versus Interest Groups Appearing before Congress National Subnational TOTAL

Private Corporations

Interest Groups

338 (10.4%) 2,906 (89.6%) 3,244 (100.0%)

1,076 (52.0%) 993 (48.0%) 2,069 (100.0%)

Source: CIS Index, 1833--1917.

tended to testify before Congress only once or twice during the entire period examined. Moreover, most private corporations were local, and their appearances were inspired by the narrowest of concerns. That is, most of the private corporations in our data set were focused on how a specific national policy might affect a decidedly local and material interest (such as a local metal screw company testifying on tariffs for metal imports or a small Colorado mining company focused on the acquisition of nearby public lands). By contrast, a large proportion of the interest groups we analyzed appeared at several hearings and were concerned with a broader set of policy issues. This may reflect the fact that slightly more than half of the interest groups that testified before Congress in the period studies were national organizations, whereas only 10 percent of the private corporations could be described as national (see Table 2). Let us now focus more closely on some of the findings from our CIS Index data analysis regarding interest groups. Although social scientists currently lack systematic aggregate information on the precise number of interest groups that were founded in the decades before the 1950s, we can gain some sense of interest

group formation in earlier periods by looking at when certain groups first appeared before Congress. If anything, this proxy for the exact founding dates underestimates the universe of interest groups in previous eras, because only a subset of all politically active groups were invited to testify at congressional hearings. Despite this conservative estimate of interest groups’ initial engagement in national political life, our findings suggest a dramatic expansion in the number and kind of groups that first appeared at congressional hearings in the first two decades of the 20th century (see Figure 5). Consider, for example, that between 1889 and 1899 (the 51st to 55th Congresses) 216 interest groups appeared for the first time ever at a congressional hearing. Nearly three times as many groups---622 to be exact---came to Washington to testify for the first time in the first decade of the 20th century. During the following eight years, 1,008 new interest groups appeared before congressional committees. These aggregate findings confirm what many political historians have long contended, namely, that interest groups proliferated at a remarkable rate during the Progressive Era (and well before New Deal state-building).

Figure 5 Source: Data compiled from CIS Indexes (US GPO)

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 143

Figure 6 Source: Data compiled from CIS Indexes (US GPO)

Our findings with regard to an additional measure, the total number of interest groups appearing before Congress in each period, fortify this conclusion that the early 20th-century polity was a vibrant time for interest group activism at the national level, especially when compared to the 19th century (see Figure 6). Whereas 256 interest groups appeared before Congress from 1889 to1899, that figure rose to 734 between 1899 and 1909, and then nearly doubled to 1,301 over the next eight years. Moreover, when one compares the numbers of first group appearances with the total number of interest groups that testified at legislative hearings, it is striking just how many new interest groups were included in the total of those that testified each decade (for example, 1,008 of 1,301 interest groups between 1909 and 1917). Equally compelling are the rates at which particular kinds of interest groups first appeared before Congress. As figure 5 helps to illustrate, nearly every interest group category---professional groups, trade associations and economic interests, unions, citizens groups, and other varieties of groups---increased from one decade to the next. Yet the rates of expansion by category

were clearly not equal. Indeed, the number of trade associations and related economic interests that first appeared in each decade rose at a much sharper rate than any other interest group category between the 23rd and 64th Congresses. But just as striking is the unmatched rate of growth of citizens groups appearing at hearings for the first time during the early 20th century. Some 128 citizens groups first appeared between 1899 and 1909, less than half of the 288 new trade unions of the same period. Between 1909 and 1917, however, the number of new citizens groups testifying at hearings more than doubled to 361, nearly identical to the 368 trade unions and related economic interests that first appeared in the same eight years. Finally, we found that a comparison of the total number of groups that testified by category with the total number of appearances by group category underscores Berry’s recent finding that the kinds of groups with influence in the Washington policy-making setting may not always be proportional to their number (see Table 3). For instance, during the 1900s, trade associations and related economic interests accounted for 47 percent of the groups appearing at hearings and

Table 3. Appearances of Interest Groups by Type, 1889--1917 1889--1899 (51st---55th Congress) Category Trade Associations Citizens Groups Unions TOTAL

Group No. 110 (43%) 53 (21%) 27 (11%) 256

Source: CIS Index, 1833--1917.

No. of Apps. 165 (45%) 66 (18%) 56 (15%) 367

1899--1909 (56th---60th Congress) Group No. 342 (47%) 147 (20%) 72 (9%) 734

No. of Apps. 667 (46%) 262 (18%) 240 (17%) 1442

1909--1917 (61st to 64th Congress) Group No. 508 (39%) 426 (32%) 93 (7%) 1301

No. of Apps. 715 (29%) 819 (33%) 479 (17%) 2459

144 Interest Groups

Figure 7 Source: Data compiled from CIS Index (US GPO)

46 percent of group appearances, citizens groups accounted for 20 percent of all groups and 18 percent of group appearances, and unions accounted for 9 percent of all groups and 17 percent of total group appearances. Unions enjoyed similar influence during the next eight years, accounting for 7 percent of all groups testifying and 17 percent of all appearances. And while citizens groups made up 32 percent of all groups appearing and 33 percent of all appearances between 1909 and 1917, trade associations had fewer opportunities to testify (29 percent) than their number (39 percent of all groups appearing) may have implied (figure 7 gives some sense of the total number of group appearances by category). Why trade associations and related economic interests gave a smaller proportion of congressional testimony than one might have expected in the 1910s given their aggregate numbers is just as intriguing as the disproportionate number of appearances by unions. Finally, the fact that citizens groups appeared more often than any other kind of interest group between 1909 and 1917 is striking since trade associations represented 7 percent more of the total number of groups testifying. Perhaps most remarkable is that the total number of citizens groups and unions testifying in this period was roughly the same as that of trade associations, but they combined to give 50 percent of all testimony in these years compared with trade associations’ 29 percent.

Conclusion Almost a quarter-century ago, Hugh Heclo took political scientists to task for tending ‘‘to look for one group

exerting dominance over another, for subgovernments that are strongly insulated from other outside forces in the environment, for policies that get ‘produced’ by a few ‘makers.’ ’’ By searching for a privileged few, he observed, we overlooked ‘‘the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power. These webs, or what I will call ‘issue networks,’ are particularly relevant to the highly intricate and confusing welfare policies that have been undertaken in recent years’’ (Heclo 1978, 102). Our case study research, as illustrated by our discussion of interest group politics concerning immigration reform, clearly suggests that the concept of issue networks is highly relevant to earlier historical periods. Standard accounts of a secular shift over time from iron triangles of the old days to issue networks of today have, we suspect, mistaken the middle stages of a process for its beginning. In effect, these accounts run the risk of reviewing a drama without the benefit of seeing its first acts performed. Our analysis suggests that a number of nascent issue networks of the Progressive Era evolved into iron triangles in later decades and then became issue networks again in recent decades. Other issue networks have proven durable from one period to the next. Assessing interest groups and policy making over broad time horizons brings to light shifting proportions and constellations of issue networks and subgovernments from one period to the next, a phenomenon our conception of interest group systems helps capture. When data on group formation and legislative behavior is brought to bear on the tentative

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 145 conclusions from our case studies, we can see a picture of interest group politics that strongly suggests a set of historical patterns worthy of close examination. Organized interests did indeed burgeon in the post--New Deal/ postwar period as our current interest group literature demonstrates. However, it is equally clear to us that the beginning of the 20th century also witnessed a dramatic expansion of organized interest participation in national policy making. In addition, we have also shown that the earlier expansion included a disproportionately high rate of citizen group organization, in a foreshadowing of the surge of public interest group formation at back end of that century. Moreover, our analysis of the attrition rates of Progressive Era organizations suggests that it will be possible to construct a data set that will allow a deeper historical study of interest group politics in America and to draw evolutionary connections both across interest group systems and between interest group systems and party systems. What is the most exciting possibility of developing such a data set, however, is the opportunity to explore broader dynamics of interest group politics over time. By largely neglecting the task of gathering comprehensive information about the number, variety, and behavior of organized interests before the 1950s, political science has sacrificed prospects for more ambitious theory building on several fronts. We are hopeful that this research will contribute to a theoretical framework that apprehends not only group formation and maintenance, but also attrition. It is no less important that the study of interest groups take into account and seek explanations for the varying influence and participation rates of different types of organized interests in different historical periods. As we have seen, private corporations, trade associations, unions, citizens groups, and other organizations emerged at different rates over time and participated at different rates within historical periods. Also we have seen that at particular times the frequency of participation for particular categories of groups was not proportionate with their numbers. Thus, in the early decades of the last century, citizens groups and unions testified before Congress at rates that were disproportionately high given numbers and in comparison with the number of trade associations active at the same time. In the immediate postwar period, on the other hand, trade associations dominated interest group politics in both number and participation rates. At the end of the century, the mix and participation rates shifted back in favor of citizens groups, while unions had declined sharply on both measures. It is

precisely these sorts of historical patterns that we intend to analyze as this project unfolds. Extending our analysis of interest group politics back to the Progressive Era and before also provides evidence for the existence of issue networks, subgovernmental politics, and a widespread concern with quality of life issues, all purportedly hallmarks of our modern era of interest group politics. Rather than treating the political development of organized interests as a more or less secular expansion tied first to the emergence of postwar big government and second to our reaction to that system, our research suggests that a more promising line of analysis would focus on the transitions from one interest group system to another and their relationship to broader cycles of American politics. Assuming ‘‘what’s past is prologue’’ and formulating an understanding of organized interest groups based on analysis of the past 40 years is analogous to coming into a play after the second act. We surely can see the relationship among the actors, but we cannot have a deep appreciation for the underlying currents that moved events to that point.

References and Further Reading Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. ‘‘Two Faces of Power.’’ American Political Science Review 56 (1962): 947--952. Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Poole, and Lewis A. Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton. Bennett, David. Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to the Militia Movement. Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bernstein, Marver. 1955. Regulation by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Berry, Jeffrey. 1977. Lobbying for the People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Berry, Jeffrey. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton. Dodd, Lawrence, and Ronald Schott. 1979. Congress and the Administrative State. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Dunn, William. 1999. Public Policy Analysis. 4th ed. Princeton, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League. 1894--1899. Annual Reports. The Immigration Restriction League Papers, Prescott F. Hall Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Executive Committee of the IRL. January 11, 1897. Annual Report. Hall Collection.

146 Interest Groups Fiorina, Morris. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hamilton, Charles. Lincoln and the Know-Nothing Movement. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1954. Harris, Richard. 1985. Coal Firms under the New Social Regulation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Harris, Richard, and Sidney Milkis. 1996. The Politics of Regulatory Change. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Heclo, Hugh. 1978. ‘‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.’’ In The New American Political System. Edited by Anthony King, 87--124. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. Herring, E. Pendleton. 1929. Group Representation before Congress. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jensen, Richard. The Winning of the Midwest. Joseph Lee Papers. Immigration Restriction League Files, Massachusetts Historical Society, Box #3. Joseph Lee Papers. February 4, 1907. Prescott Hall to James Patten, Massachusetts Historical Society, Box #1. Joseph Lee Papers. February 17, 1907. Robert DeC Ward to Joseph Lee, Massachusetts Historical Society, Box #1. Keller, Morton. 1977. Affairs of State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Max James Kohler Papers. Max Kohler to Simon Wolf, September 27, 1910, National Jewish Historical Society, Box #1. Latham, Earl. 1952. The Group Basis of Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lindblom, Charles. 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books. Link, Arthur, and Richard L. McCormick. 1983. Progressivism. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davison. Lowi, Theodore. 1979. The End of Liberalism. 2nd ed. New York: Norton. Maas, Arthur. 1951. Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nations Rivers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Madison, James. 1961. ‘‘Federalist No. 10.’’ In The Federalist. Edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: The New American Library. Martin, Cathy J. 1991. Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation. Chicago: Chicago University Press. McCann, Michael. 1986. Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McFarland, Andrew. 1976. Public Interest Lobbies. Washington, DC: AEI. Milkis, Sidney. 1993. The President and the Parties: The American Party System Since the New Deal. New York: Oxford University Press. Milkis, Sidney, and Daniel Tichenor. 1994. ‘‘‘Direct Democracy’ and Social Justice.’’ Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall): 282--340. Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organized Interests. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Morone, James. 1990. The Democratic Wish. New York: Basic Books. New York Times. January 8, 1898.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Polsby, Nelson. 1968. ‘‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.’’ American Political Science Review 62: 144--168. Ripley, Randall, and Grace Franklin. 1980. Congress, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. Salisbury, Robert H. 1984. ‘‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.’’ American Political Science Review 78. Sanders, Elizabeth. 1999. Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877--1917. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Schlozman, Kay L., and John T. Tierny. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Schattschneider, E. E. 1975. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press. Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1981. Building a New American State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tichenor, Daniel. Forthcoming. Regulating Community: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Truman, David. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred Knopf. Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America. New York: Basic Books. Walker, Jack. 1983. ‘‘The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America.’’ American Political Science Review 77. Wiebe, Robert. 1980. The Search for Order. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Wilson, James Q. 1980. The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.

Notes 1. Leading commentators on interest group politics focus almost exclusively on the postwar era (for a Congresscentered view, see Salisbury 1984; Olson 1965; Lowi 1979; Fiorina 1977). 2. The 896 election was important, but it did not bring in a governing coalition that advocated Progressive programs. 3. Berry makes this argument persuasively in The New Liberalism (1999). 4. The concept of triangulation is introduced in Dunn (1999). 5. Martin Luther King and others. Building on our updating and extension of Walker’s data on group formation, we have developed lists of organizations by year from two additional sources. First, using the Washingtonia Collection of Washington, D.C.’s Martin Luther King Branch Library, we culled the City Directories and phone books for the Capitol to develop a list of organizations and associations with offices in the District of Columbia. This list provides some important insight into the formation

The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins 147 of groups in the first decades of the 20th century and their subsequent disappearance. Clearly, however, this source is incomplete because many groups may have chosen not to be listed or, in later years, had offices but no telephone service. Still others may have retained the services of lobbyists already in Washington (Herring notes the proliferation of this practice early on). Nevertheless, these directories do provide

data that are consistent with our hypothesis that an interest group system was forming in the early 1900s. 6. On ‘‘direct democracy’’ in Progressive Era political thought, see Milkis and Tichenor (1994); on Progressive reverence for ‘‘scientific government,’’ see Morone (1990). 7. Press statement issued by the IRL (see Joseph Lee Papers, Box #3).

Interest Group Development since 1950 McGee Young Assistant Professor of Political Science, Marquette University

that the best place to start is by paying specific attention to the interactions between organized interests and state institutions. This essay addresses three such areas: (1) the growth of the interest group community; (2) the changing policy-making process; and (3) the professionalization of lobbying and influence. At each point, interactions between interest groups and government are regulated by existing institutional arrangements, like the distribution of authority among government officials or the laws regulating the activity of influence seekers, and organizational imperatives, such as the desire to obtain greater access than one’s competitors. As noted above, three main questions arise at the intersection of interest groups and American political development. First, while it is true that lobbying existed well before World War II, the roots of the current system lie in developments that occurred in the postwar era. While the interest group system of the 1950s and 1960s looks quite differently in the early 21st century, especially with respect to the number and variety of interest groups that are active, it is important to understand what is particularly different now about the universe of interests that stalk the corridors of power in Washington, D.C. How many new groups have formed? What sorts of interests do they represent? What other forms of political representation are available for seeking influence that may compete with or complement the activities of interest groups? It is not only the composition of interest groups that has changed in recent decades but also the institutional context in which influence is exercised. Simply put, the

Among the more notorious sections of Washington, D.C., is the area known as the K Street Corridor. K Street is home to legions of lobbyists who have migrated to the nation’s capital, most in the past couple of decades. If anything is characteristic of the modern policy-making process, it is the unprecedented scope of lobbying that occurs, even on the most trivial bits of legislation, the most arcane bureaucratic rulemakings, or the most obscure judicial rulings. As one observer of lobbying put it, the K Street crowd is ‘‘now, more than ever, a permanent and pervasive force in Washington, essential to the daily workings of government and politics’’ (Birnbaum 2006). Such observations are commonplace, as are criticisms of lobbyist influence, most of which argue that the politics of influence ‘‘has eroded public trust in our political system and discouraged political participation’’ (Common Cause 2006). From the perspective of American political development, with its focus on state institutions and government actors, the role of interest groups and lobbying raises challenging questions. Primarily, how do nongovernmental organizations and actors fit into narratives of history that tend to elevate the importance of events and relationships grounded in the formal institutions of government? Is it possible to reconcile the fairly obvious conclusion that the activities of interest groups and lobbyists are instrumental to modern policy making with a scholarly tradition that in its genre-defining works equates political development with state development? Areas of overlap between the study of interest groups and the study of American political development suggest

148

Interest Group Development since 1950 149 rules of influence have changed considerably and the number of avenues available to influence policy has expanded dramatically. Thus, the second question asks what are the important institutional changes in recent decades that have changed the policy-making process? For example, how have reform efforts altered the calculus of influence? What have new government programs and procedures done to inspire interest group activity? Finally, a generation ago the lobbying community was relatively small, fairly insular, and, according to at least one influential study, largely ineffective (Bauer, de Sola, Pool, and Dexter 1963). The techniques of pressure were at best rudimentary in the immediate postwar era. In the early 21st century, strategies of influence combine all of the classic arm-twisting tactics of lobbyists past with modern Madison Avenue advertising slickness, sophisticated public relations campaigns, and technologically enabled grassroots mobilizations of constituents. Thus, the third question asks what is different about the exercise of influence in modern politics? What are lobbyists doing differently now than they were several decades ago? How are new technologies transforming the strategies and tactics of lobbyists and interest groups? Answering these questions will illuminate the construction of the modern interest group system and resolve debates over how to improve public trust and enhance political participation in American politics. A venture down K Street during a typical Washington, D.C., afternoon will reveal little of these academic concerns. Nor will the power that has congealed in lobbying offices over the past few decades be obvious from the outside. But behind the simple facades of the nondescript office buildings, denizens of K Street earn small fortunes representing interests as diverse as the small, but oil-rich West-African country of Equatorial Guinea, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs for the state of Hawaii, or SHOPA (the School, Home and Office Products Association). Within these same buildings, thousands of lawyers sit ready to parse changes in tax laws or regulations that could mean millions of dollars for their clients. And across town, giant defense contractors lobby for contracts for new weapons systems or homeland security contracts. It is a system of influence that no one would have built on purpose, and yet it is our creation.

The Changing Interest Group Universe At the turn of the 20th century, a couple of population explosions occurred that help to illuminate some more recent trends in the growth of interest groups. In the first instance, a new breed of lobbyists descended on Washington, D.C., to capitalize on opportunities made

available by hegemonic Republican control over national politics. As the New York Times reported, gone were the lobbyists of old and in their place stood ‘‘the railroad attorney, the corporation lawyer, and the promoter’’ (New York Times March 28, 1909). So struck were citizens and observers that ‘‘people’s lobbies’’ began to appear across the country as a bulwark against the new lobbyist infestation (Clemens 1997). On the other side of the world, the Australian government completed an ambitious project to construct a fence traversing the continent from north to south to protect western farmlands from a scourge of rabbits (Broomhall 1991). An unlikely villain, the rabbits had been brought to Australia some decades earlier by lonesome settlers hoping to retain a bit of their British identity. But with no natural predators in Australia, the rabbits began to multiply and soon outnumbered the human population by more than a million to one. One explosion of lobbyists, one explosion of rabbits. Ecologists explain instances of the latter by examining the combination of resources available for growth, the stability of the environment, and size of the area available for growth to take place. But is it possible to draw any meaningful connections between populations of animals and populations of human organizations? The political scientists Virginia Gray and David Lowery (1996) suggest that not only are populations of human organizations characterized by many of the same dynamics as populations of biological communities, but the theories that have been developed to explain events like the great rabbit explosion in Australia can be used to explain the density and diversity of interest groups in American politics. Gray and Lowery (1996) point to two primary environmental factors to explain the development of interest group populations. First, interest groups need sufficient numbers of constituents available for the investment in a political organization to be worthwhile. As one influential economist once put it, ‘‘it would be wasteful to make a hammer to drive a single nail’’ (Young 1928). Likewise, you would not organize an interest group around an issue that very few people would be interested in. Second, there must be the potential for policy action to occur to make interest group activity meaningful. A barren political landscape would hold little appeal for interest group entrepreneurs. Moreover, constituents must be interested in the issues upon which an interest group might lobby. If legislators do not fear constituent reprisals, they are less likely to respond to interest group pressure (Hansen 1991). The notion that aggregate interest group growth and decline is related to environmental factors is relatively

150 Interest Groups new in political science and pertinent to a discussion of interest groups from the vantage of scholarship on American political development. No doubt, the size of the interest group population at all levels of government has grown substantially in the past half-century, but explaining this growth is a much trickier proposition. As Jack Walker (1991) noted, orthodox theories of interest group development, with their emphasis on individual rational action, have difficulty accounting for the myriad groups that seem to find their way into politics. Despite substantial empirical evidence to the contrary, rational actor theories suggest that interest group mobilization and maintenance is actually quite difficult (Olson 1965). Gray and Lowery (1996) suggest that looking at organizational environments will tell us more about the population dynamics of interest groups than will looking at the individuals who join those organizations. When examining the changing context of policy making, it will be important to be aware of the basic patterns of interest group development in modern politics. As scholars of political development have emphasized, history is not just a sequence of events, but rather history reflects incongruities in the way that political institutions respond to expectations of action (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Indeed, as Elisabeth Clemens (1997) has demonstrated, the phenomenon of interest group politics itself arose out of unmet citizen demands for political representation. Thus, the breadth and diversity of interest group populations is interlinked with arrangements of institutional authority and the development of state institutional structures. It is instructive at the outset to draw a rough sketch of the growth of interest groups in the United States over the past half-century. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, so this sort of exercise is merely illustrative rather than evidentiary. Moreover, there are profound disagreements over what an interest group even is.

Caveats aside, the Encyclopedia of Associations provides the best comprehensive listing of nonprofit national membership associations and is generally considered a reliable source of information. As table 1 shows, the number of associations listed has surged from 5,843 in 1959 to 22,720 in 2006. The greatest expansion of associations actually occurred between 1980 and 1990 with numbers remaining mostly steady since then. This trend of interest group growth is echoed in the numbers of lobbyists listed in a compendium called the Washington Representatives. According to this source, in 1977, approximately 4,000 individuals were engaged in lobbying. By 1991, that number had increased to 14,500. A decade later, the Washington Representatives listed approximately 17,000 lobbyists that maintained a presence in the capital region (Petracca 1992, 14--15; Washington Representatives 2006). A closer look at the data reveals some important trends with respect to the types of groups that have experienced the greatest amount of growth. Most significantly, the number of groups classified as ‘‘public affairs’’ associations has grown from 117 in 1959 to 1,854 in 2006, which is actually down from 2,249 in 1990. Likewise, the number of ‘‘social welfare’’ groups has ballooned from a paltry 241 in 1959 to 2,025 in 2006. Like public affairs groups, social welfare groups experienced their greatest episode of growth during the 1980s, and while growth has tapered, the number of social welfare groups has continued to expand. Similarly, groups that are active in health and medical fields have grown in number from 433 in 1959 to nearly 3,000 in 2006. On the contrary, relatively less growth is seen among trade associations. In part, this is because the great explosion in the number of trade associations occurred before World War II (Tichenor and Harris 2003). By 1959, when the Encyclopedia of Associations began counting, there were already 2,309 active trade

Table 1. Growth of Lobbying Associations, 1959--2006 Type of Association Public Affairs Social Welfare Environmental and Agricultural Health and Medical Trade, Business, and Commercial Labor Unions, associations, and Federations Total All Groups

1959

1970

1980

1990

1995

2006

117 241 331

477 458 504

1,068 994 677

2,249 1,705 940

2,178 1,938 1,136

1,854 2,025 1,170

433 2,309

834 2,753

1,413 3,118

2,227 3,918

2,426 3,973

2,983 3,789

226

225

235

253

246

208

5,843

10,308

14,726

22,259

23,298

22,720

Sources: Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Encyclopedia of Associations 2006.

Interest Group Development since 1950 151 associations in Washington, D.C. Over the next three and a half decades that number increased by only 64 percent. A declining numerical advantage for trade associations is echoed in a broad survey of interest groups conducted by Jack Walker in the mid-1980s. Walker found that profit sector groups accounted for only 37.8 percent of his sample compared with 32.5 percent for nonprofit groups and 23.9 percent for citizen groups (Walker 1991, 59). Of the groups in Walker’s survey that were also in existence in 1960, 44 percent were profit sector groups whereas only 15 percent were citizens associations (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Ambiguity over the organizational representation of business has led to some disagreement among scholars over whether business enjoys an advantage. The numerical strength of business representation in trade associations has clearly diminished since the prewar years. Yet business representation is multifaceted and not easily captured by aggregate organizational data. For example, Robert Salisbury (1984) noted that many lobbyists in Washington, D.C., represent institutional interests like corporations, hospitals, or universities, rather than traditional interest groups like trade associations. Other authors point to cycles of business dominance and decline often correlated with economic cycles (Vogel 1989; McFarland 1991). Still, public interest groups seem to be more active than their business counterparts. They tend to testify more at congressional hearings, generate more attention in the media, and succeed in getting Congress to enact laws on their behalf at much greater rates than their numbers would suggest (Berry 1999). There is no consensus among scholars of interest groups over how to measure the relative power or influence of business or citizen groups, nor have specifications of the number of groups active in politics clarified differences of interpretation of relative strengths. Instead, the focus has shifted to the particular institutional settings in which policy gets made. Here it is often clearer which groups are the most influential and what sorts of biases the system introduces into policy-making processes. Consequently, interest group research in this area has been better at linking the activities of particular groups with relevant institutional contexts to understand how groups drive episodes of political development.

groups emerged under this evolving institutional arrangement, identifying the most important (1) shifts in institutional authority and (2) amendments to the laws governing influence is a bit trickier. Most types of organizations experienced episodes of significant growth for at least part of the postwar era, but as Gray and Lowery would note, this growth is best explained by focusing attention on the political environment in which it occurred. In the immediate postwar era, scholars of policy making focused significant attention on the arena in which conflict occurred. Most concluded that, where interest groups operated, they faced little threat of opposition. Instead, they partnered with sympathetic legislators and bureaucratic officials to push legislation through Congress that would empower agency officials to implement favorable policies for interest group constituencies. While there were many different names for this institutional arrangement, the metaphor that stuck was that of an ‘‘iron triangle.’’ A hypothetical iron triangle would consist of a congressional committee composed of sympathetic lawmakers; an administrative agency empowered to act in support of a particular constituency; and a dominant interest group that represented the members of that constituency. A classic example can be found in agricultural policy in which House and Senate committees dominated by Farm Bloc legislators pushed through legislation favorable to farmers; the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented these policies on terms favorable to farmers; and the American Farm Bureau Federation rewarded sympathetic legislators with votes from its members at election time (Hansen 1992). In reality, policies were never as neat and tidy as the iron triangle metaphor made them out to be. At best, only a minority of policies was crafted in such a cozy environment and even these required skilled legislative operatives to defend against outside interference. Still, the structure of Congress, the relative paucity of organized interests, and the absence of effective representation of the public interest meant that in the immediate postwar era, national policy-making structures were largely segmented from each other. Furthermore, in those policy areas like agriculture, where the benefits of public policies were relatively concentrated and the costs were relatively diffused, there was little incentive to act otherwise.

The Changing Policy-Making Structure

The Textbook Congress

The development of modern interest group politics was accompanied by substantial changes in the institutional context of policy making. While it is possible to document in a fairly precise manner what types of interest

The key to the success of the iron triangle system was the organization of policy making within Congress. Committee government, the seniority system, and enduring Democratic majorities allowed members of Congress

152 Interest Groups to insulate themselves from unwanted lobbying pressure for much of the time between the New Deal and the 1970s. The origins of the iron triangle system can be traced to reforms during the Progressive Era, in particular the overthrow of ‘‘Czar’’ Joe Cannon in the House of Representatives in 1910, which ushered in an era of committee government in Congress. The House of Representatives responded to Speaker Cannon’s dictatorial control over the chamber by stripping him of most of his legislative authority and vesting it in the chairs of the relevant policy committees. The Senate chose to maintain much of its informal structure but it too empowered committee chairs to assert control over the legislation that they were assigned. When bills would be introduced in Congress, the committee to which they were assigned would determine their fate. In most cases, the committee chair would determine whether the committee would consider the bill or let it die. Committee chairs could get away with egregious acts of legislative discrimination because of the seniority system. According to the rules, the legislator with the longest tenure on the committee would be assigned as the chair. Long-serving members of Congress could establish fiefdoms of influence that would be impossible to dislodge unless the member retired or died. Wilbur Mills (D-AR) famously ruled over the House Ways and Means committee from 1957--1975 and only repeated episodes of embarrassing public drunkenness forced him to ultimately step down. Mills’ longevity as committee chairman was helped by the fact that he came from a southern state, Arkansas, where until the end of the 20th century, the Republican Party scarcely existed. His fellow Southerners were similarly untroubled by reelection and eventually came to occupy most of the top spots on committees in both the House and the Senate. With solid majorities in both houses of Congress for much of the time between the New Deal and the 1990s, Democrats dominated the legislative agenda. Democrats held control of the House of Representatives from 1933 through 1994 with the exception of 1947--1948 and 1953--1954. The Senate remained in Democratic hands from 1933 through 1994 with the exception of 1947-1948, 1953--1954, and 1980--1986. Such was the permanence of this structure, with powerful committee chairs, an entrenched seniority system, and enduring Democratic majorities that scholars referred to it as the ‘‘textbook Congress’’ (Schepsle 1989).

Decline of the Textbook Congress The modern system of interest group politics took shape as the centers of power in the textbook Congress

began to erode. Three main forces reshaped the structure of policy making during the 1960s and 1970s. First, insurgent activism on the part of social movement organizations like civil rights groups, student groups, antiwar groups, and environmental groups forced members of Congress to acknowledge their demands. These groups in turn rewarded sympathetic members at the polls by reelecting them to office. Second, as Congress began to shift much of its authority over the implementation of policies to administrative agencies, the executive branch began to play a much greater role in policy implementation. In combination with an invigorated court system that also assumed a much larger role in policy implementation, this change resulted in a much looser construction of the old iron triangle. As one observer in the late 1970s put it, the iron triangle concept was not so much wrong as it was ‘‘disastrously incomplete’’ because it failed to recognize the importance of the broader ‘‘issue network’’ (Heclo 1978). Third, reforms within Congress shifted the balance of power away from the old, southern committee chairs and into subcommittees where a new generation of Democrats sought to put their stamp on federal policies. The first wave of social movement activity in the postwar era was galvanized by the abusive regime of segregation lodged in the southern states. When Americans returned from fighting Fascism abroad only to see it echoed in their own communities, they propelled the civil rights movement forward with a new sense of urgency. Sympathetic federal courts, strong local institutions like churches and schools, and deeply unsettling images of brutality inflicted on southern blacks combined to link local campaigns for justice to national campaigns for equality. Students from northern universities demonstrated their solidarity by riding ‘‘Freedom Buses’’ through the South and attending marches, demonstrations, and protests, while local clergy like Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth in Birmingham, Alabama, and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in Atlanta, Georgia, inspired from the pulpit (McAdam 1982). The civil rights movement threatened the foundations of the ‘‘textbook Congress’’ by upsetting the balance of northern and southern factions within the Democratic Party. As northern Democrats increasingly attached themselves to the cause of civil rights, southern Democrats aligned with their Republican counterparts to form a ‘‘conservative coalition.’’ When Lyndon Johnson signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, he was warned that it would spell the defeat of the Democratic Party in the South. Indeed, over the next few decades most of the white Democratic members of

Interest Group Development since 1950 153 Congress from the South retired, lost reelection, or switched to the Republican Party. Battles over civil rights coincided with the emergence of a broader ‘‘New Left’’ ideology that spawned citizens’ movements of all stripes. For many New Left activists, the civil rights movement was a galvanizing experience that they brought back to their universities, organizations, and communities. Protests erupted on campuses as students demanded access to institutional levers of power and spilled over into the streets as casualties mounted from the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam. Civil rights advocates and students were joined by women demanding equal rights, environmentalists calling for pollution control and wildlife preservation, consumer advocates concerned with product safety, and scores of other organizations all seeking access to policy-making institutions. When the internally divided Democratic Party failed to hold on to the Presidency in 1968, the stage was set for further erosion of the ‘‘textbook Congress.’’ With little support forthcoming from Democratic partisans in Congress, President Richard Nixon began to develop new tools for administering public policy. Most

significant, Nixon expanded the scope of administrative authority available to the president by reconstituting the Bureau of the Budget into what became the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB came to serve as a clearinghouse of sorts for agency budgets and regulatory proposals that gave the president new leverage in debates with other policy makers. Later, under Ronald Reagan, the OMB served as a critical weapon in efforts to dislodge the cozy relationships between policy makers and their interest group supporters (Tomkin 1998). In addition to greater presidential power, the ‘‘textbook Congress’’ had to cope with other political institutions asserting their authority. Among these, the federal courts had the greatest effect on the opening up of the policy-making process. As far back as the 1950s, when the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren began to rule in favor of civil rights advocates, the federal court system served as a point of entry into the political process for citizens who failed to get a hearing elsewhere. The success of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund in litigating the cases that overturned

Ralph Nader testifies before a House Subcommittee on Business about the energy crisis, January 17, 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

154 Interest Groups segregation inspired a new generation of lawyers to bring other sorts of citizen complaints to the courts. For example, in the late 1960s, a group of lawyers created what they called an ‘‘NAACP for the environment’’ and launched the Natural Resources Defense Council, an organization that specialized in filing lawsuits to protect the environment. The courts willingly accommodated this new activism by relaxing the standards required to bring a case and issuing rulings on an increasingly broad range of cases (Orren 1976). While activists plied new institutional venues, they also reaped the advantages of new technology for covering political news. Specifically, improvements in video technology made the news media a powerful conduit to connect citizens and their elected officials. Horrific nightly images from the carnage in Vietnam brought resonance to the calls of antiwar protesters to end the war. Images of oil spills, tainted rivers, and devastated landscapes lent clarity and urgency to environmentalist claims. And charismatic group leaders like Ralph Nader used the platform of televised congressional hearings to deliver powerful messages about issues like consumer safety. With the entry of mass televised media into politics, the iron triangles that served interest groups and policy makers well in the past were further degraded (Cook 2005). With its Democratic caucus in shambles as a consequence of the divisiveness of civil rights and other social movement issues; with pressure mounting to defend institutional turf in the face of activism on the part of the president and the courts; and with an invigorated media corps eager to steal political headlines, Congress responded by instituting far-reaching internal reforms. After the Watergate scandal, which resulted in the resignation of Richard Nixon from the White House, reformers pushed through a series of measures that fundamentally changed the policy-making process in Congress (Rieselbach 1986). First, Democrats reformed the seniority system so that long-serving conservative Southerners could be eased out and younger, more liberal members could take their place. Second, reformers decentralized legislative authority to give more power to subcommittee chairs and allowed multiple referrals of bills so that a wider number of committees would have a chance to act on any particular piece of legislation. Broadened legislative jurisdictions meant more points of access for interest groups seeking influence. Ironically, the decentralization of legislative authority, especially in the House of Representatives, has caused power to be centralized in the party leadership. The difficulties entailed in organizing legislative majorities on important pieces of legislation have led

party leaders to strengthen the whip system and consolidate power in their own hands, leading to what one congressional scholar has called a system of ‘‘unorthodox lawmaking’’ (Sinclair 2000). Consequently, a significant amount of major legislation gets passed in ‘‘omnibus’’ form, which means that a wide variety of competing agendas and interests get log rolled into a single bill.

Reforming Interest Groups Interest groups benefited immensely from congressional reform, from presidential and judicial activism, and from the actions of social movement organizations for the primary reason that each of these changes opened up the political process to more participants. While some older interest groups like the American Farm Bureau Federation struggled to adapt to the new open system, new groups have tended to occupy small niches and are thriving in the new policy environment. But with the great explosion of advocacy groups came fears that interest groups had grown too powerful and that widespread lobbying distorted the democratic process. Since the 1970s, advocates of ‘‘good governance’’ have called on Congress to enact legislation to curb the influence of special interests. While these reforms have failed to reduce the amount of money that flows into political campaigns and lobbying efforts, they have had the effect of shaping the strategies and tactics of interest groups seeking influence. The first major piece of campaign finance legislation coincided with other Watergate-era reforms and established the basic structure of modern campaign finance. Called the Federal Elections and Campaigns Act of 1974 (FECA), this legislation set limits on the amount of money that individuals could give to campaigns, campaignrelated organizations, and political parties. It established a government agency to which campaign receipts and expenditures had to be reported called the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). And until the Supreme Court intervened in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, it limited the amount of money that candidates could spend on their campaigns. The Court, however, ruled that in the case of political campaigns money equaled speech, and was therefore protected under the First Amendment. In the FECA legislation, Congress distinguished between money that could be given by an individual directly to a candidate and money that an individual could give to what was called a political action committee (PAC). Congress encouraged the creation of PACs by setting the amount that individuals could give to PACs higher than the amount that they could give directly to

Interest Group Development since 1950 155 campaigns. Since corporations and labor unions were prohibited from giving directly to campaigns, they established PACs that individual members of the company or union could contribute to directly while the corporation or union picked up the tab on administrative costs. PACs became a relatively efficient way to demonstrate support for a candidate, and because the FEC published all information related to campaign receipts and expenditures, it became possible to keep an eye on your opponents. Before too long if an interest group failed to establish a PAC, they were considered less of a contender for influencing the policy process. Subsequent reforms have required lobbyists to register with the clerk of the House before lobbying and to report all expenditures related to lobbying. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) limited the flow of money to state party organizations and restricted coordination between campaign organizations, party organizations, and interest groups. Still, interest groups have managed to find ways around these reforms by running attack ads that omit direct references to candidates or merely call attention to a particular issue rather than encouraging a vote one way or the other.

The Changing Policy-Making Structure We saw in the first section that the number of interest groups has expanded dramatically in the past 40 years. This expansion was driven by changes in the way policy is made at the national level in the United States. In the immediate postwar era, a system of iron triangles flourished as policy-making structures insulated themselves from external pressures. But a combination of social movement activity, presidential and judicial activism, and internal congressional reforms opened up broad issue networks within which new interest groups were able to find niche opportunities. The rise of interest groups was cause for concern, as many feared that ideals of democratic representation were at risk. But subsequent reform efforts have hardly alleviated the pressures of organized interests. If anything, interest groups seem to be more pervasive now than ever. In the final section of this essay, we will see how the techniques of influence have become increasingly refined and how technology has enabled further interest group development.

The Professionalization of Lobbying K Street lobbyists have become increasingly important policy actors as the number of interest groups has increased, the structure of policy making more decentralized, and lobbying more heavily regulated. The final

part of this essay looks at the professionalization of lobbying that has occurred in recent decades. Here the intersection of research on interest groups and political development yields interesting insight into the way that institutional changes have altered the behavior of lobbyists. Lobbying in the era of the textbook Congress involved a different set of expectations than it does in contemporary politics. In a classic (though not unchallenged) portrayal of lobbying in the 1950s, interest representatives were seen as carriers of information and cheerleaders for their particular side, but notably ineffectual in terms of actual policy leadership or the ability to exert pressure (Bauer, de Sola, Pool, and Dexter 1963). Instead, lobbyists deferred to seasoned members of Congress, whose expertise on the issues rendered most efforts to persuade them pointless. A typical cynical view of the relationship between lobbyists and legislators envisioned a natural affinity between the needs of the legislator and the needs of the lobbyist, cemented by the closed system of iron triangle--style policy making. Thus a lobbyist needed to be neither innovative nor particularly assertive to see that the needs of his or her organization were addressed. But with the changes that accompanied the political upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, the business of lobbying underwent a transformation. The rise of the issue network forced interest groups to become more adept at navigating the hidden corridors of power and to develop innovative strategies and tactics for influencing policy development. Effective lobbying required more than just a couple of Washington, D.C., veterans monitoring the rumors at the Hay-Adams Hotel bar. Interest groups generally professionalized their lobbying operations in three ways. First, groups improved their techniques of influence, whether that involved mobilizing citizens at the grassroots level or contesting rulemaking in bureaucratic agencies. Second, groups engaged in coalition building, developing innovative strategies for finding advocacy partners. Third, interest group leaders seized on the potential for technological advances to streamline advocacy operations and improve their ability to reach targeted constituents.

Strategies of Influence The breakdown of insulated policy-making communities occurred in part as a consequence of innovative lobbying strategies, but it also contributed to innovation in lobbying strategies. Insurgent groups, including many of the social movement organizations arising out

156 Interest Groups of the New Left in the 1960s, faced significant barriers to participation in policy development in the iron triangle system. Consequently, they began to experiment with new techniques for influencing policy agendas, debates, and outcomes. For example, in 1966, the Sierra Club famously took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times protesting plans by Congress and the Department of Interior to construct a dam that would back up water into Grand Canyon National Park (Cohen 1988). Civil rights organizations and student groups engaged in acts of civil disobedience to raise awareness among the public of the policies that they opposed. As the historian Glen Eskew (1997) pointed out in his account of the fight against segregation in Birmingham, Alabama, civil rights advocates achieved their greatest gains when confrontations with police resulted in an aggressive police response because these incidents captured the attention of the national media. These tactics raised awareness among all lobbying organizations that citizen mobilization was a potent new force in American politics. Part of the reason that grassroots lobbying efforts were paying dividends was because the textbook Congress had severed many of the connections between congress members and their respective political parties. As the political scientist David Mayhew (1974) pointed out in his influential book on Congress, members had increasingly come to be responsible for their own reelection. With political party organizations virtually nonexistent in many areas of the country, members relied on tactics like advertising, credit claiming, and position taking for protecting their incumbency. An effective grassroots lobbying effort could take advantage of the vulnerability felt by incumbents and force them to respond to new sets of issues and concerns. While some interest groups pursued highly visible campaigns to open up the policy-making process, other groups sought to take advantage of the increasing complexity of the policy-making process. A growing amount of legislation passed by Congress lacked specific rules for implementation, as legislators instead passed along responsibility to bureaucratic agencies and courts to define the details of new statutes. The complexity of issues such as air pollution left administrative agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency in the unenviable position of trying to sort out competing mandates while adjudicating between environmentalists and their industry foes. Highly arcane, scientific debates quickly reduced the pool of participants to a select few knowledgeable experts. In the realm of administrative law, citizen pressure was considerably weaker than when the issue was before

Congress. Consequently, lawyers and policy experts came to occupy positions of prestige within the lobbying community as they battled in relatively welldefined policy niches (Browne 1990). If insurgent interest group tactics caused policy making to become decentralized, and decentralized policy making caused interest groups to refine their influence techniques, a third change caused interest groups to standardize their strategies for influence. Campaign finance reforms forced many organizations to consider for the first time the possibility of contributing to the election of a potential supporter. Evidence from the FEC suggests that there was a rush to organize new PACs in the wake of FECA in 1974. By 1978, 1,986 new PACs had been formed and an additional 1,260 were formed in the following two years (Wilcox 1988). As table 2 shows, in a pattern similar to the growth of the number of interest groups, the growth rate for PACs skyrocketed in the late 1970s and early 1980s before leveling off by the middle to late 1980s. By that point, most of the interest groups that were going to form PACs had done so. While most categories of political action committee have held steady or gained slightly in the decades since, the number of labor PACs has declined by more than a third, reflecting the ill fortunes of labor unions in modern politics. Most scholars agree that PACs operate as an investment of sorts that interest groups hope will pay off in terms of favorable action on the part of legislators. The premise is that a PAC contribution to a candidate will earn the interest group good will and perhaps a bargaining chip for use when an issue arises that they want to see addressed. There is little certainty over what precisely the PAC contribution will ‘‘buy,’’ because members of Congress respond to a wide variety of pressures when making decisions. However, in light of the increasing complexity of the policy-making process, it is clear that a considerable amount of energy is required to shepherd legislation through Congress. Congressional scholars Richard Hall and Frank Wayman (1990) argue persuasively that PAC contributions are most useful when they target legislators who sit on influential committees and that what PAC contributions purchase are not so much votes as the energy necessary to see a bill through to a floor vote. In a way, the election reforms of the 1970s have actually strengthened ties between legislators and interest groups. The contemporary unorthodox, decentralized policy-making process has expanded the potential number of influential lawmakers at the same time that it has made lawmaking more difficult. Consequently, just as interest groups use PACs to invest in lawmakers,

Interest Group Development since 1950 157

Table 2. Growth of Political Actions Committees, 1974--2006 Committee Type Corporate Labor Trade/Membership /Health Non-Connected Cooperative Corp. without Stock Total

1974a

1978

1982

1986

1990

1995

2000

2006b

89 201 318

785 217 453

1469 380 649

1744 384 745

1795 346 774

1674 334 815

1545 317 860

1621 283 935

608

162 12 24 1653

723 47 103 3371

1077 56 151 4157

1062 59 136 4172

1020 44 129 4016

1026 41 118 3907

1233 40 105 4217

Source: Federal Elections Commission. Note:a. The FEC issues a semiannual federal PAC count. The numbers here are taken from the December 31, 2006 release, except where noted.b. For 1974, Trade/Membership/Health numbers represent all other PACs; no further categorization is available.

lawmakers have come to rely on interest groups to mobilize support for various policy initiatives. One of the most powerful strategies that interest groups have developed in recent years is coalition building. Often temporary, sometimes even nameless (one coalition famously called itself the No Name Coalition), interest group coalitions are vitally important for moving bills through the legislative process. Lawmakers rely on coalitions of interest groups to generate

grassroots support for an issue, to conduct research on the policy consequences of various issue alternatives, and to lobby other key lawmakers. For their part, interest groups find that coalitions can be useful for sharing costs, streamlining operations, and broadening the potential base of support for an issue. With an increasing number of issues competing for limited space on the political agenda, a coalition of interests may stand a better chance of a hearing than would a single interest

U.S. Secretary of State-designate Sen. Hillary Clinton greets people as she attends a luncheon of Emily’s List at the Hilton Washington Hotel January 18, 2009, in Washington, D.C. Emily’s List, a pro-choice political action committee, hosted a gala luncheon to celebrate the inauguration of President-elect Barack Obama. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)

158 Interest Groups alone. The best empirical research on interest group coalitions finds that, most frequently, interest group coalitions are employed for defensive purposes (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004). The costs of organizing opposition to a particular proposal are typically much lower than the costs associated with mobilizing a coalition in support of a particular proposal. Simply put, membership in a coalition (or an interest group for that matter) is more likely in light of a threat than in light of a promise (Hansen 1985). A brief example will illustrate the power of a defensive coalition. In 1993, on the heels of his election over George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton set out to overhaul the health care system in America. Having campaigned on the issue, Clinton possessed considerable political capital with which to push through his reforms. Yet, as Clinton’s proposal coalesced into a specific policy, a broad base of opposition began to materialize. Initially, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) anchored the opposition, appearing on national television to offer a rebuttal to Clinton’s initial policy address to the nation. Other groups that included interests as diverse as the Christian Coalition and the National Taxpayers Union gradually joined the NFIB under the auspices of the aforementioned No Name Coalition. Together with the Health Insurance Association of America, the No Name Coalition and the NFIB spearheaded an aggressive lobbying campaign that ultimately resulted in Clinton withdrawing his legislation from further consideration by Congress (Johnson and Broder 1996). Although these interest groups probably would have supported different affirmative health care policies, they could all agree that they opposed the plan that Clinton submitted. One of the reasons that the coalition allied against the Clinton health care proposal was so successful was their innovative use of new technologies. Computerized lists of supporters, coordinated call-in campaigns, and highly organized information dissemination gave Clinton’s opponents a distinct advantage in the battle for public opinion. In fact, technological innovation is one of the hallmarks of the new era of interest group lobbying. The ability to synthesize and repackage information has long been a virtue of the most successful lobbying operations, but new computerized data services have turned virtue into an art.

The Influence of Technology As recently as the early 1980s, political scientists studying lobbying found no evidence that technology was driving the choice of methods employed in the

pursuit of influence (Schlozman and Tierney 1983). Yet the impact of technology on political advocacy is inescapable. In the 21st century, an interest group would scarcely think to exist without a fully functioning Web site. Membership organizations use the Internet to offer opportunities to join, outline important issue positions, and enlist supporters in letter writing and other forms of electronic advocacy. Interest groups have placed a premium on their ability to communicate with members since the earliest mass-membership associations of the 19th century. For groups that rely on constituent pressure to exert influence over political officials, effective, reliable communication is essential. As the policy-making system began to break down in the 1960s and 1970s, more emphasis than ever was placed on interest groups’ ability to reach out to the public. Some interest groups focused on mobilizing their own members through targeted direct mail, while others sought a broader audience that may not have had a formal affiliation with the group. Direct mail has proven to be one of the most effective tactics for raising money, galvanizing support, and recruiting new members. Interest groups can target their appeals to particular segments of the population by purchasing the membership lists of other organizations or even purchasing information from commercial vendors. For example, an interest group interested in expanding access for snowmobiles in national forests may purchase a list of consumers who have bought a snowmobile in the past five years and then send information to that list of people inviting them to join the organization. To reach a broader audience, interest groups usually must turn to mass media. Early innovators on this front were groups like the National Small Businessmen’s Association, which sponsored radio broadcasts that drew attention to its advocacy efforts. But in the past two decades, television has been the medium of choice for interest groups with the financial means to purchase advertising time. The political scientist Darrell West, who studies television advertising, identifies the early 1990s as the era in which interest group television advertising began to emerge (West and Francis 1996). Debates over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Clinton health care initiative, reproductive rights, and tort reform thrust the positions of interest groups to the center of the public debate. Not only do groups advertise heavily while issues are debated, but increasingly they have staked out positions on candidates during elections. So widespread have these independent expenditures become that the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA)

Interest Group Development since 1950 159 expressly outlawed them unless they were paid for using contributions regulated by the FEC. Still, various loopholes have allowed interest groups to continue advertising for favored candidates virtually unabated. In sum, the emergence of new technology has allowed interest groups to refine their strategies for communicating with members of their organization and members of the public. The most successful groups have been the ones that use technology to augment existing strategies of influence. In conjunction with coalition partners, technologically sophisticated interest groups can be quite influential in the development of public policy. Even when groups go it alone, however, the new politics of public policy that take place in a fragmented institutional context provide multiple opportunities for groups to influence the development and implementation of laws.

Conclusion Today, interest groups pursue a wide variety of strategies that reflect the complicated institutional context of policy making. Some groups seek to rally public opinion while others focus on the minutiae of policy implementation. Despite vast differences in the way that interest groups go about seeking access, undoubtedly their efforts are central to contemporary policy development. This essay has underscored the interactions between interest groups and institutions of government. Interest group development and state development are best seen as complementary features of political development. While the focus of scholars of American political development has tended to emphasize the latter, it is clear that interest groups occupy an important subplot in the story as well.

References and Further Reading Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy. New York: Atherton Press. Baumgartner, Frank R. and Beth Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Berry, Jeffrey. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Birnbaum, Jeffrey. 2006. ‘‘Washington’s Once and Future Lobby.’’ Washington Post, September 10, 2006, B01. Broomhall, F. H. 1991. The Longest Fence in the World. Perth, Australia: Hesperian Press. Browne, William P. 1990. ‘‘Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain.’’ Journal of Politics 52, no. 2 (May): 477--509. Clemens, Elisabeth. 1997. The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the

United States, 1890--1925. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cohen, Michael P. 1988. The History of the Sierra Club: 1892--1970. San Francisco: Sierra Club. Common Cause. 2006. ‘‘Money in Politics.’’ Available at http://www.commoncause.com/moneyinpolitics (cited October 31, 2006). Cook, Timothy. 2005. Governing with the News. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Encyclopedia of Associations. 2006. 43rd ed. Detroit: Gale Research Co. Eskew, Glenn T. 1997. But for Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1996. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. ‘‘Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.’’ American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September): 797--820. Hansen, John Mark. 1985. ‘‘The Political Economy of Group Membership.’’ The American Political Science Review 59 (3): 79--96. Hansen, John Mark. 1992. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919--1981. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Heclo, Hugh. 1978. ‘‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.’’ In The New American Political System. Edited by Anthony King. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. Johnson, Haynes, and David S. Broder. 1996. The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Mahoney, Christine, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2004. ‘‘The Determinants and Effects of Interest Group Coalitions.’’ Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930--1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McFarland, Andrew S. 1991. ‘‘Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America.’’ British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 3 (July): 257--284. New York Times. March 28, 1909. ‘‘Ways and Wiles of the Up-to-Date Lobbyist.’’ ProQuest Historical Newspapers. New York Times (1851--2003). Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Orren, Karen. 1976. ‘‘Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts.’’ American Political Science Review 70, no. 3 (September): 723--741. Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. The Search for American Political Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. Petracca, Mark P. 1992. The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rieselbach, Leroy. 1986. Congressional Reform. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

160 Interest Groups Salisbury, Robert. 1984. ‘‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.’’ American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (March): 64--76. Schepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. ‘‘The Changing Textbook Congress.’’ In Can the Government Govern? Edited by John Chubb and Paul Peterson, 238--266. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. 1983. ‘‘More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change.’’ Journal of Politics 45, no. 2 (May): 351-377. Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Tichenor, Daniel J., and Richard Harris. 2003. ‘‘Organized Interests and American Political Development.’’ Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 4 (Winter): 587--612.

Tomkin, Shelley Lynne. 1998. Inside OMB: Politics and Process in the President’s Budget Office. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America. New York: Basic Books. Walker, Jack L. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Washington Representatives. 2006. 30th ed. Washington, DC: Columbia Books. West, Darrell, and Richard Francis. 1996. ‘‘Electronic Advocacy: Interest Groups and Public Policy Making.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 29, no. 1 (March): 25--29. Wilcox, Clyde. 1988. ‘‘PACs & Pluralism: Interest Group Formation & Partisanship.’’ Polity 21, no. 1 (Autumn): 155--166. Young, Allyn A. 1928. ‘‘Increasing Returns and Economic Progress.’’ The Economic Journal 38, no. 152 (December): 527--542.

Documents

must not be necessarily relinquished for the welfare of the Union. And, where so relinquished, the line should be definitely drawn. If under the proposed Constitution the States exercise any power, it would seem to be at the mercy of the General Government. For it is remarkable that the clause securing to them those rights not expressly relinquished in the old Confederation, is left out in the new Constitution. And we conceive that there is no power which Congress may think necessary to exercise for the general welfare, which they may not assume under this Constitution. And this Constitution, and the laws made under it, are declared paramount even to the unalienable rights which have heretofore been secured to the citizens of these States by their constitutional compacts. . . . Moreover those very powers, which are to be expressly vested in the new Congress, are of a nature most liable to abuse. They are those which tempt the avarice and ambition of men to a violation of the rights of their fellow citizens, and they will be screened under the sanction of an undefined and unlimited authority. Against the abuse and improper exercise of these special powers, the people have a right to be secured by a sacred Declaration, defining the rights of the individual, and limiting by them the extent of the exercise. The people were secured against the abuse of those powers by fundamental laws and a Bill of Rights, under the government of Britain and under their own Constitution. That government which permits the abuse of power, recommends it, and will deservedly experience the tyranny which it authorizes; for the history of

3.1 Anti-Federalist No. 60 Will the Constitution Promote the Interests of Favorite Classes? We have not that permanent and fixed distinction of ranks or orders of men among us, which unalterably separating the interests and views, produces that division in pursuits which is the great security of the mixed Government we separated from and which we now seem so anxiously to copy. If the new Senate of the United States will be really opposite in their pursuits and views from the Representatives, have they not a most dangerous power of interesting foreign nations by Treaty [to] support Their views?---for instance, the relinquishment of the navigation of [the] Mississippiand yet where Treaties are expressly declared paramount to the Constitutions of the several States, and being the supreme law, [the Senate] must of course control the national legislature, if not supersede the Constitution of the United States itself. The check of the President over a Body, with which he must act in concert---or his influence and power be almost annihilated---can prove no great constitutional security. And even the Representative body itself . . . are not sufficiently numerous to secure them from corruption. For all governments tend to corruption, in proportion as power concentrating in the hands of the few, tenders them objects of corruption to Foreign Nations and among themselves. For these and many other reasons we are for preserving the rights of the State governments, where they

161

162 Interest Groups mankind establishes the truth of this political adage-that in government what may be done will be done. The most blind admirer of this Constitution must in his heart confess that it is as far inferior to the British Constitution, of which it is an imperfect imitation, as darkness is to light. In the British Constitution the rights of men, the primary object of the social compact, are fixed on an immoveable foundation and clearly defined and ascertained by their Magna Charta, their Petition of Rights, their Bill of Rights, and their effective administration by ostensible Ministers secures responsibility. In this new Constitution a complicated system sets responsibility at defiance and the rights of men neglected and undefined are left at the mercy of events. We vainly plume ourselves on the safeguard alone of representation, forgetting that it will be a representation on principles inconsistent with true and just representation; that it is but a delusive shadow of representation, proffering in theory what can never be fairly reduced to practice. And, after all, government by representation (unless confirmed in its views and conduct by the constant inspection, immediate superintendence, and frequent interference and control of the people themselves on one side, or an hereditary nobility on the other, both of which orders have fixed and permanent views) is really only as one of perpetual rapine and confusion. Even with the best checks it has failed in all the governments of Europe, of which it was once the basis, except that of England. When we turn our eyes back to the zones of blood and desolation which we have waded through to separate from Great Britain, we behold with manly indignation that our blood and treasure have been wasted to establish a government in which the interest of the few is preferred to the rights of the many. When we see a government so every way inferior to that we were born under, proposed as the reward of our sufferings in an eight years calamitous war, our astonishment is only equaled by our resentment. On the conduct of Virginia and New York, two important States, the preservation of liberty in a great measure depends. The chief security of a Confederacy of Republics was boldly disregarded, and the Confederation violated, by requiring 9 instead of 13 voices to alter the Constitution. But still the resistance of either of these States in the present temper of America (for the late conduct of the party here [Maryland] must open the eyes of the people in Massachusetts with respect to the fate of their amendment) will secure all that we mean to contend for-the natural and unalienable rights of men in a constitutional manner.

At the distant appearance of danger to these, we took up arms in the late Revolution. And may we never have cause to look back with regret on that period when connected with the Empire of Great Britain, we were happy, secure and free. Source: John F. Mercer of Maryland was the author of this essay, taken from his testimony to members of the ratifying conventions of New York and Virginia, 1788 (Etting Collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).

3.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Public Associations in Civic Life,’’ Chapters 5 and 6 in Democracy in America, 1835 I DO not propose to speak of those political associations by the aid of which men endeavor to defend themselves against the despotic action of a majority or against the aggressions of regal power. That subject I have already treated. If each citizen did not learn, in proportion as he individually becomes more feeble and consequently more incapable of preserving his freedom singlehanded, to combine with his fellow citizens for the purpose of defending it, it is clear that tyranny would unavoidably increase together with equality. Only those associations that are formed in civil life without reference to political objects are here referred to. The political associations that exist in the United States are only a single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations in that country. Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association. I met with several kinds of associations in America of which I confess I had no previous notion; and I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a

3.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Public Associations in Civic Life’’ common object for the exertions of a great many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it. I have since traveled over England, from which the Americans have taken some of their laws and many of their customs; and it seemed to me that the principle of association was by no means so constantly or adroitly used in that country. The English often perform great things singly, whereas the Americans form associations for the smallest undertakings. It is evident that the former people consider association as a powerful means of action, but the latter seem to regard it as the only means they have of acting. Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men have, in our time, carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desires and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes. Is this the result of accident, or is there in reality any necessary connection between the principle of association and that of equality? Aristocratic communities always contain, among a multitude of persons who by themselves are powerless, a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens, each of whom can achieve great undertakings single-handed. In aristocratic societies men do not need to combine in order to act, because they are strongly held together. Every wealthy and powerful citizen constitutes the head of a permanent and compulsory association, composed of all those who are dependent upon him or whom he makes subservient to the execution of his designs. Among democratic nations, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help one another. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy, but they might long preserve their wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people among whom individuals lost the power of achieving great things single-handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism. . . . A government might perform the part of some of the largest American companies, and several states, members of the Union, have already attempted it; but what political power could ever carry on the vast multitude of lesser undertakings which the American citizens perform every day, with the assistance of the

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principle of association? It is easy to foresee that the time is drawing near when man will be less and less able to produce, by himself alone, the commonest necessaries of life. The task of the governing power will therefore perpetually increase, and its very efforts will extend it every day. The more it stands in the place of associations, the more will individuals, losing the notion of combining together, require its assistance: these are causes and effects that unceasingly create each other. Will the administration of the country ultimately assume the management of all the manufactures which no single citizen is able to carry on? And if a time at length arrives when, in consequence of the extreme subdivision of landed property, the soil is split into an infinite number of parcels, so that it can be cultivated only by companies of tillers will it be necessary that the head of the government should leave the helm of state to follow the plow? The morals and the intelligence of a democratic people would be as much endangered as its business and manufactures if the government ever wholly usurped the place of private companies. Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another. I have shown that these influences are almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this can only be accomplished by associations. When the members of an aristocratic community adopt a new opinion or conceive a new sentiment, they give it a station, as it were, beside themselves, upon the lofty platform where they stand; and opinions or sentiments so conspicuous to the eyes of the multitude are easily introduced into the minds or hearts of all around. In democratic countries the governing power alone is naturally in a condition to act in this manner, but it is easy to see that its action is always inadequate, and often dangerous. A government can no more be competent to keep alive and to renew the circulation of opinions and feelings among a great people than to manage all the speculations of productive industry. No sooner does a government attempt to go beyond its political sphere and to enter upon this new track than it exercises, even unintentionally, an insupportable tyranny; for a government can only dictate strict rules, the opinions which it favors are rigidly enforced, and it is never easy to discriminate between its advice and its commands. Worse still will be the case if the government really believes itself interested in preventing all circulation of ideas; it will then stand motionless and oppressed by the heaviness of voluntary torpor. Governments, therefore, should not be the only active

164 Interest Groups powers; associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away. As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to. The first time I heard in the United States that a hundred thousand men had bound themselves publicly to abstain from spirituous liquors, it appeared to me more like a joke than a serious engagement, and I did not at once perceive why these temperate citizens could not content themselves with drinking water by their own firesides. I at last understood that these hundred thousand Americans, alarmed by the progress of drunkenness around them, had made up their minds to patronize temperance. They acted in just the same way as a man of high rank who should dress very plainly in order to inspire the humbler orders with a contempt of luxury. It is probable that if these hundred thousand men had lived in France, each of them would singly have memorialized the government to watch the public houses all over the kingdom. Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America. The political and industrial associations of that country strike us forcibly; but the others elude our observation, or if we discover them, we understand them imperfectly because we have hardly ever seen anything of the kind. It must be acknowledged, however, that they are as necessary to the American people as the former, and perhaps more so. In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made. Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.

Chapter VII Relation of Civil to Political Associations There is only one country on the face of the earth where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes. This same country is the

only one in the world where the continual exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life and where all the advantages which civilization can confer are procured by means of it. . . . Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association; but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes. In civil life every man may, strictly speaking, fancy that he can provide for his own wants; in politics he can fancy no such thing. When a people, then, have any knowledge of public life, the notion of association and the wish to coalesce present themselves every day to the minds of the whole community; whatever natural repugnance may restrain men from acting in concert, they will always be ready to combine for the sake of a party. Thus political life makes the love and practice of association more general; it imparts a desire of union and teaches the means of combination to numbers of men who otherwise would have always lived apart. Politics give birth not only to numerous associations, but to associations of great extent. In civil life it seldom happens that anyone interest draws a very large number of men to act in concert; much skill is required to bring such an interest into existence; but in politics opportunities present themselves every day. Now, it is solely in great associations that the general value of the principle of association is displayed. Citizens who are individually powerless do not very clearly anticipate the strength that they may acquire by uniting together; it must be shown to them in order to be understood. Hence it is often easier to collect a multitude for a public purpose than a few persons; a thousand citizens do not see what interest they have in combining together; ten thousand will be perfectly aware of it. In politics men combine for great undertakings, and the use they make of the principle of association in important affairs practically teaches them that it is their interest to help one another in those of less moment. A political association draws a number of individuals at the same time out of their own circle; however they may be naturally kept asunder by age, mind, and fortune, it places them nearer together and brings them into contact. Once met, they can always meet again. Men can embark in few civil partnerships without risking a portion of their possessions; this is the case with all manufacturing and trading companies. When men are as yet but little versed in the art of association and are unacquainted with its principal rules, they are afraid, when first they combine in this manner, of buying their experience dear. They therefore prefer

3.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Public Associations in Civic Life’’ depriving themselves of a powerful instrument of success to running the risks that attend the use of it. They are less reluctant, however, to join political associations, which appear to them to be without danger because they risk no money in them. But they cannot belong to these associations for any length of time without finding out how order is maintained among a large number of men and by what contrivance they are made to advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object. Thus they learn to surrender their own will to that of all the rest and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common impulse, things which it is not less necessary to know in civil than in political associations. Political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association. But even if political association did not directly contribute to the progress of civil association, to destroy the former would be to impair the latter. When citizens can meet in public only for certain purposes, they regard such meetings as a strange proceeding of rare occurrence, and they rarely think at all about it. When they are allowed to meet freely for all purposes, they ultimately look upon public association as the universal, or in a manner the sole, means that men can employ to accomplish the different purposes they may have in view. Every new want instantly revives the notion. The art of association then becomes, as I have said before, the mother of action, studied and applied by all. When some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed, it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter beforehand. In this state of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort of public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise.1 It is therefore chimerical to suppose that the spirit of association, when it is repressed on some one point, will nevertheless display the same vigor on all others; and that if men be allowed to prosecute certain undertakings in common, that is quite enough for them eagerly to set about them. When the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones; but if they are allowed to combine only for small affairs, they will be neither inclined nor able to effect it. It is in vain that you will leave them entirely free to prosecute their business on joint-stock account: they will hardly care to avail themselves of the rights you have granted to them; and after having exhausted your strength in vain efforts to

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put down prohibited associations, you will be surprised that you cannot persuade men to form the associations you encourage. I do not say that there can be no civil associations in a country where political association is prohibited, for men can never live in society without embarking in some common undertakings; but I maintain that in such a country civil associations will always be few in number, feebly planned, unskillfully managed, that they will never form any vast designs, or that they will fail in the execution of them. This naturally leads me to think that freedom of association in political matters is not so dangerous to public tranquillity as is supposed, and that possibly, after having agitated society for some time, it may strengthen the state in the end. In democratic countries political associations are, so to speak, the only powerful persons who aspire to rule the state. Accordingly, the governments of our time look upon associations of this kind just as sovereigns in the Middle Ages regarded the great vassals of the crown: they entertain a sort of instinctive abhorrence of them and combat them on all occasions. They bear a natural goodwill to civil associations, on the contrary, because they readily discover that instead of directing the minds of the community to public affairs these institutions serve to divert them from such reflections, and that, by engaging them more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity, they deter them from revolutions. But these governments do not attend to the fact that political associations tend amazingly to multiply and facilitate those of a civil character, and that in avoiding a dangerous evil they deprive themselves of an efficacious remedy. When you see the Americans freely and constantly forming associations for the purpose of promoting some political principle, of raising one man to the head of affairs, or of wresting power from another, you have some difficulty in understanding how men so independent do not constantly fall into the abuse of freedom. If, on the other hand, you survey the infinite number of trading companies in operation in the United States, and perceive that the Americans are on every side unceasingly engaged in the execution of important and difficult plans, which the slightest revolution would throw into confusion, you will readily comprehend why people so well employed are by no means tempted to perturb the state or to destroy that public tranquillity by which they all profit. Is it enough to observe these things separately, or should we not discover the hidden tie that connects them? In their political associations the Americans, of all conditions,

166 Interest Groups minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to one another, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. Thus it is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom that the Americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable. If a certain moment in the existence of a nation is selected, it is easy to prove that political associations perturb the state and paralyze productive industry; but take the whole life of a people, and it may perhaps be easy to demonstrate that freedom of association in political matters is favorable to the prosperity and even to the tranquillity of the community. I said in the former part of this work: ‘‘The unrestrained liberty of political association cannot be entirely assimilated to the liberty of the press. The one is at the same time less necessary and more dangerous than the other. A nation may confine it within certain limits without ceasing to be mistress of itself, and it may sometimes be obliged to do so in order to maintain its own authority.’’ And further on I added: ‘‘It cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the last degree of liberty which a people is fit for. If it does not throw them into anarchy, it perpetually brings them, as it were, to the verge of it.’’ Thus I do not think that a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolute right of association for political purposes; and I doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it is wise to set no limits to freedom of association. A certain nation, it is said, could not maintain tranquillity in the community, cause the laws to be respected, or establish a lasting government if the right of association were not confined within narrow limits. These blessings are doubtless invaluable, and I can imagine that to acquire or to preserve them a nation may impose upon itself severe temporary restrictions: but still it is well that the nation should know at what price these blessings are purchased. I can understand that it may be advisable to cut off a man’s arm in order to save his life, but it would be ridiculous to assert that he will be as dexterous as he was before he lost it.

Notes 1. This is more especially true when the executive government has a discretionary power of allowing or prohibiting associations. When certain associations are simply prohibited by law, and the courts of justice have

to punish infringements of that law, the evil is far less considerable. Then every citizen knows beforehand pretty nearly what he has to expect. He judges himself before he is judged by the law, and, abstaining from prohibited associations, he embarks on those which are legally sanctioned. It is by these restrictions that all free nations have always admitted that the right of association might be limited. But if the legislature should invest a man with a power of ascertaining beforehand which associations are dangerous and which are useful and should authorize him to destroy all associations in the bud or to allow them to be formed, as nobody would be able to foresee in what cases associations might be established and in what cases they would be put down, the spirit of association would be entirely paralyzed. The former of these laws would assail only certain associations; the latter would apply to society itself, and inflict an injury upon it. I can conceive that a government which respects the rule of law may have recourse to the former, but I do not concede that any government has the right of enacting the latter.

3.3 Ida Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company, 1904 Now, in 1872 Mr. Rockefeller owned a successful refinery in Cleveland. He had the advantage of water transportation a part of the year, access to two great trunk lines the year around. Under such able management as he could give it, his concern was bound to go on, given the demand for refined oil. It was bound to draw other firms to it. When he went into the South Improvement Company, it was not to save his own business but to destroy others. When he worked so persistently to secure rebates after the breaking up of the South Improvement Company, it was in the face of an industry united against them. It was not to save his business that he compelled the Empire Transportation Company to go out of the oil business in 1877. Nothing but grave mismanagement could have destroyed his business at that moment; it was to get every refinery in the country but his own out of the way. It was not the necessity to save his business which compelled Mr. Rockefeller to make war on the Tidewater. He and the Tidewater could both have lived. It was to prevent prices of transportation and of refined oil going down under competition. What necessity was there for Mr. Rockfeller trying to prevent the United States Pipe Line doing business? Only the greed of power and money. Every great campaign against rival interests which the Standard Oil Company

3.4 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities has carried on has been inaugurated, not to save its life but to build up and sustain a monopoly in the oil industry. These are not mere affirmations of a hostile critic; they are facts proved by documents and figures. Very often people who admit the facts, are willing to see that Mr. Rockfeller has employed force and fraud to secure his ends, justify him by declaring, ‘‘It’s business.’’ That is, ‘‘it’s business’’ has come to be a legitimate excuse for hard dealing, sly tricks, special privileges. It is a common enough thing to hear men arguing that the ordinary laws of morality do not apply in business. Now, if the Standard Oil Company were the only concern in the country guilty of the practices which have given it monopolistic power, this story would never have been written. Were it alone in these methods, public scorn would long ago have made short work of the Standard Oil Company. But it is simply the most conspicuous type of what can be done by these practices. The methods it employs with such acumen, persistency, and secrecy are employed by all sorts of businessmen, from corner grocers up to bankers. If exposed, they are excused on the ground that this is business. If the point is pushed, frequently the defender of the practice falls back on the Christian doctrine of charity, and points that we are erring mortals and must allow for each other’s weaknesses!---an excuse which, if carried to its legitimate conclusion, would leave our businessmen weeping on one another’s shoulder’s over human frailty, while they picked one another’s pockets. One of the most depressing features of the ethical side of the matter is that instead of such methods arousing contempt they are more or less openly admired. And this is logical. Canonize ‘‘business success,’’ and men who make a success like that of the Standard Oil Trust become national heroes! The history of its organization is studied as a practical lesson in money-making. It is the most startling feature of the case to one who would like to feel that is possible to be a commercial people and yet a race of gentlemen. Of course such practices exclude men by all the codes from the rank of gentlemen, just as such practices would exclude men from the sporting world or athletic field. There is no gaming table in the world where loaded dice are tolerated, no athletic field where men must not start fair. Yet Mr. Rockfeller has systematically played with loaded dice, and it is doubtful if there has eve been a time since 1872 when he has run a race with a competitor and started fair. Business played in this way loses all its sportsmanlike qualities. It is fit only for tricksters . . . And what are we going to do about it, for it is our business? We the people of the United States, and

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nobody else, must cure whatever is wrong in the industrial situation, typified by this narrative of the growth of the Standard Oil Company. That our first task is to secure free and equal transportation privileges by rail, pipe and waterway is evident. It is not an easy matter. It is one which may require operations which will seem severe; but the whole system of discrimination has been nothing but violence, and those who have profited by it cannot complain if the curing of the evils they have wrought bring hardship in turn on them. At all events, until the transportation matter is settled, and right, the monopolistic trust will be with us---a leech on our pockets, a barrier to our free efforts. As for the ethical side, there is no cure but in an increasing scorn of unfair play, an increasing sense that a thing won by breaking the rules of the game is not worth the winning. When the businessman who fights to secure special privileges, to crowd his competitor off the track by other than fair competitive methods, receives the same summary disdainful ostracism by his fellows that the doctor of lawyer who is ‘‘unprofessional,’’ the athlete who abuses the rules, receives, we shall have gone a long way toward making commerce a fit pursuit for our young men. Note: Ida Tarbell was one of the little group of crusading journalist---muckrackers, as President Roosevelt called them---who in articles and books exposed the social evils and injustice of the time. Miss Tarbell’s most sensational series of articles, written for McClure’s magazine beginning in 1903, was on John D. Rockefeller and the beginnings of the Standard Oil Company. Her bold denunciation of Rockefeller was the epitome of the self-made man and the national symbol of the free-enterprise system. Miss Tarbell’s expose of the origins of his company and the methods he used to acquire his fortune caused many reflective Americans to consider the virtues and vices of the free-enterprise system itself. In 1904 Miss Tarbell’s articles were collected in a book from which the following selection is taken.

3.4 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, 1904 The Philadelphia machine isn’t the best. It isn’t sound, and I doubt if it would stand in New York or Chicago. The enduring strength of the typical American political machine is that it is a natural growth-a sucker, but deep-rooted in the people. The New Yorkers vote for Tammany Hall. The Philadelphians do not vote; they are disfranchised, and their disfranchisement is

168 Interest Groups one anchor of the foundation of the Philadelphia organization. This is no figure of speech. The honest citizens of Philadelphia have no more rights at the polls than the negroes down South. Nor do they fight very hard for this basic privilege. You can arouse their Republican ire by talking about the black Republican votes lost in the Southern States by white Democratic intimidation, but if you remind the average Philadelphian that he is in the same position, he will look startled, then say, ‘‘That’s so, that’s literally true, only I never thought of it in just that way.’’ And it is literally true. The machine controls the whole process of voting, and practices fraud at every stage. The assessor’s list is the voting list, and the assessor is the machine’s man. . . . The assessor pads the list with the names of dead dogs, children, and non-existent persons. One newspaper printed the picture of a dog, another that of a little four-year-old negro boy, down on such a list. A ring orator in a speech resenting sneers at his ward as ‘‘low down’’ reminded his hearers that that was the ward of Independence Hall, and naming over signers of the Declaration of Independence, he closed his highest flight of eloquence with the statement that ‘‘these men, the fathers of American liberty, voted down here once. And,’’ he added, with a catching grin, ‘‘they vote here yet.’’ Rudolph Blankenburg, a persistent fighter for the right and the use of the right to vote (and, by the way, an immigrant), sent out just before one election a registered letter to each voter on the rolls of a certain selected division. Sixty-three per cent were returned marked ‘‘not at,’’ ‘‘removed,’’ ‘‘deceased,’’ etc. From one four-story house where forty-four voters were addressed, eighteen letters came back undelivered; from another of forty-eight voters, came back fortyone letters; from another sixty-one out of sixty-two; from another, forty-four out of forty-seven. Six houses in one division were assessed at one hundred and seventy-two voters, more than the votes cast in the previous election in any one of two hundred entire divisions. The repeating is done boldly, for the machine controls the election officers, often choosing them from among the fraudulent names; and when no one appears to serve, assigning the heeler ready for the expected vacancy. The police are forbidden by law to stand within thirty feet of the polls, but they are at the box and they are there to see that the machine’s orders are obeyed and that repeaters whom they help to furnish are permitted to vote without ‘‘intimidation’’ on the names they, the police, have supplied. . . .

3.5 Henry D. Lloyd, The Lords of Industry, 1884 . . . Adam Smith said in 1776: ‘‘People of the same trade hardly meet together even for merriment and diversion but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’’ The expansive ferment of the New Industry, coming with the new science, the new land, and the new liberties of our era, broke up these ‘‘conspiracies,’’ and for a century we have heard nothing of them; but the race to overrun is being succeeded by the struggle to divide, and combinations are reappearing on all sides. This any one may see from the reports of the proceedings of the conventions and meetings of innumerable associations of manufacturers and dealers and even producers, which are being held almost constantly. They all do something to raise prices, or hold them up, and they wind up with banquets for which we pay. . . . There has been since 1872 a national combination of the manufacturers of the stoves, into which the combination coal must be put; and its effect, the founder said, in his speech at the annual banquet in Cleveland, last February, had been to change the balance from the wrong to the right side of the ledger. Until lately, at least, combination matches lighted the fire of combination coal in these combination stoves, and it is combination oil which the cook, contrary to orders, puts on the fires to make them burn faster. The combination of match manufacturers was perfected by the experience of sixteen years of fusions, till lately it shared with the coal combination the pleasure of advancing the price of fire by proclamation on the approach of winter. It is now at war with the new companies which have gone into the manufacture since the repeal of the internal revenue tax. These it is attempting to conquer by underselling them, tactics which have hitherto never failed. The Government of the United States, before which all men are equal, helped this combination to kill off its competitors, shielding it from foreign competition by a tax of thirty-five per cent. on the importation of matches from abroad, and shielding it from domestic competition, by administering the internal revenue tax so as to make its small competitors pay ten per cent. more tax . . . The American Paper Association aims to control the prices and production of paper for newspapers and books, and for writing. The dealers in old rags and old paper formed an association in Cleveland three years ago to deal with the ‘‘old rag’’ problem of how to cut down the enormous profits the women of our country

3.5 Henry D. Lloyd, The Lords of Industry are making out of the contents of their ragbags. In January, 1883, the trade met again at Rochester, formed two ‘‘national’’ associations, and solemnly agreed upon the prices to be paid for mixed rags ‘‘that we gather from house to house,’’ and for brown paper and rag carpet. ‘‘No change of price for rags or paper,’’ runs the decree of the old rag barons, ‘‘is to be made without consultation of every member of the executive committee.’’ The Western Wooden Ware Association discovered, last December, that there were too many pails, tubs, and bowls, and ordered its members to manufacture but one fifth of their capacity . . . Every one knows about the thirty million dollar steel combination, which has not kept the price of rails from declining from $166 a ton in 1867 to $32 a ton in 1884, but during this decline has kept the price of rails that is, the price of transportation, that is, the price of everything, higher in this country than anywhere else. Chairman Morrison of the Committee of Ways and Means is a witness to the fact that the chimneys of the Vulcan Mill at St. Louis stood smokeless for years, and meanwhile its owners received a subsidy reported at $400,000 a year from the other mills of the combination for not making rails, with, however, no payment to its men for not working. The steel rail makers of England, France, Belgium, and Germany are negotiating for an international combination to keep up prices. The ‘‘Age of Steel’’ startled the country last January by the statement that a monster pool was to be formed of all our pigiron manufacturers. The country was to be divided into six districts. As many furnaces were to be put out of blast as were necessary to prevent us from having too much iron, and these idle furnaces were to share, like the Vulcan Steel Mill, the profits of those that ran. This has not yet proved to be history, but it may turn out to have been prophecy. There are too many nails for the nail-makers, though no such complaint has been heard from the housebuilders . . . There is too much barbed wire for the wire manufacturers, though not for the farmers, and a pool, under the ‘‘entire control’’ of eleven directors, has, within a few weeks, been formed, in which are enrolled all of the chief manufacturers. Its members met in March in St. Louis, and advanced prices. They met again in Chicago, April 4th, and advanced prices 10 percent, and adjourned to meet in thirty days for the purpose of making another advance. This combination cuts off competition at both ends. It confederates the makers, so that they shall not sell in competition with each other, and it buys all its raw material through one purchasing agent, so that its members do not buy in competition . . .

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One of the objections raised thousands of years ago in Greece, against the union of people of the same trade, was that their meetings degenerated into political conspiracies, and Trajan, for the same ‘reason, refused to accede to the request of Pliny that he might enroll a fire company out of the workmen of Nicomedia. No precautions, said the shrewd emperor, can prevent such associations from becoming dangerous conspiracies. The whisky distillers’ pool is a combination of all the distillers north of the Ohio River from Pittsburgh to the Pacific Ocean. It regulates production, export, and prices. Its success at Washington, in scouring legislation several years ago granting whisky makers the privilege, given to no other taxpayer, of a postponement of the time for payment of taxes, is a significant reminder of Trajan’s saying . . . Two years ago it was found that there was too much milk in New York and Boston. The ‘‘embattled farmers’’ of Orange county, which supplies New York with two thirds of its milk, declared a milk war. The New York dealers were cut off from their regular supplies. Committees of farmers waited at every railroad station, and offered to buy all the milk that was brought down for shipment by those who did not join in the combination. When bought it was spilled. When not bought it was usually spilled just the same. Two Italians with performing bears were in Goshen on the night when the first milk was spilled. The farmers said the bears did it, and while the ‘‘milk war’’ lasted the spillers were known as ‘‘the bears.’’ When the superintendent of the Lehigh and Hudson Railroad allowed milk to be shipped against the protests of the farmers, they threatened to tear up the tracks, and the sheriff of the county had to be called in to protect the road. Sheriffs’ deputies, appointed to protect the shippers, helped the bears to spill the milk. At Warwick all the streets leading to the depot were barricaded by the bears with ropes. It took eight men armed with clubs, guns, and pistols to guard one man collecting milk. Peace was declared March 24, 1883. A committee of the farmers and a committee of the milkmen, representing eight hundred dealers in New York, Brooklyn, and Jersey City, agreed upon a fixed price for each month until April, 1884, ranging from two and a half to four cents a quart, according to the time of year. The organization of farmers spread until it covered Delaware, Orange, and Sullivan counties in New York, and Hunterdon and Sussex counties in New Jersey. March 22nd, of this year, the farmers’ committee and that of the milk dealers’ organization, known to the honest farmers as the ‘‘Pump Handle Association,’’ met again, agreed on prices for another twelvemonth, and this year there will

170 Interest Groups be no milk war. The trade in milk at the point of largest consumption in the United States now rests in the hands of these combinations of the mining companies, and similar tactics were employed to make money out of the new roads . . . Man, the only animal which forgets, has already in a century or two forgotten that the freedom, the independence of his group, of the state and even of the family, which he has enjoyed for a brief interval, have been unknown in most of the history of our race, and in all the history of most races. The livery companies of London, with their gloomy, guildhall, their wealth, their gluttony and winebibbing, their wretched Irish estates, exist today vain reminders to us of a time when the entire industry of Europe was regimented into organizations, voluntary at first, afterward adopted by the law, which did what our pools of railroads, laborers, manufacturers, and others are trying to do. Not only prices but manners were pooled. ‘‘The notion,’’ says Cliffe Leslie, ‘‘that every man had a right to settle where he liked, to carry on any occupation he thought fit, and in whatever manner he chose, to demand the highest price he could get, or on the contrary to offer lower terms than any one else, to make the largest profit possible, and to compete with other traders without restraint, was absolutely contrary to the spirit of the ages that preceded ours.’’ This system existed for centuries . . . Those were not exceptional times. Our day of free competition and free contract has been the exceptional era in history. Explorer, pioneer, Protestant, reformer, captain of industry could not move in the harness of the guild brother, the vassal, the monk, and were allowed to throw away medieval uniforms. But now ‘‘the individual withers; the world is more and more.’’ Society having let the individual overrun the new worlds to be conquered, is reestablishing its lines of communication with him. Literary theorists still repeat the cant of individualism in law, politics, and morals; but the world of affairs is gladly accepting, in lieu of the liberty of each to do as he will with his own, all it

can get of the liberty given by laws that let no one do as he might with his own. The dream of the French Revolution, that man was good enough to be emancipated from the bonds of association and government by the simple proclamation of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality, was but the frenzied expression of what was called Freedom of Self-interest in a quieter but not less bloody revolution, if the mortality of the factories, the mines, and the tenements be charged to its account. A rope cannot be made of sand; a society cannot be made of competitive units. We have given competition its own way, and have found that we are not good enough or wise enough to be trusted with this power of ruining ourselves in the attempt to ruin others. Free competition could be let run only in a community where every one had learned, to say and act ‘‘I am the state.’’ We have had an era of material inventions. We now need a renaissance of moral inventions, contrivances to tap the vast currents of moral magnetism flowing uncaught over the face of society. Morals and values rise and fall together. If our combinations have no morals, they can have no values If the tendency to combination is irresistible, control of it is imperative . . . Our young men can no longer go west; they must go up or down. Not new land, but new, virtue must be the outlet for the future. Our halt at the shores of the Pacific is a much more serious affair than that which brought our ancestors to a pause before the barriers of the Atlantic, and compelled them to practice living together for a few hundred years. We cannot hereafter, as in the past, recover freedom by going to the prairies; we must find it in the society of the good. In the presence of great combinations, in all departments of life, the moralist and patriot have work to do of a significance never before approached during the itinerant phases of bur civilization. It may be that the coming age of combination will issue in a nobler and fuller liberty for the individual than has yet been seen, but that consummation will be possible, not in a day of competitive trade, but in one of competitive morals.

Section 4 Social Movements

Introduction

movements shouldered their way into the political and policy-making process by mobilizing voters outside of the regular channels of party organization or interest groups. Such mobilization, as Glenn demonstrates, was rooted in the geographic organization of the electorate and impelled political leaders to address issues even if they did not solve problems. With the appearance of radio and television, leaders of social movements could connect directly with the mass public and social movements, and like the other institutions of American politics, these social movements took on a more national aspect. As movement politics became more centralized and built on communications mediated by technology, it also became more professionalized and distanced from direct interaction at the grassroots level. By the late 1960s, the antiwar movement and environmental movement retained a grassroots flavor, but they were essentially national happenings viewed through the media. Later, technological innovations the lead to phone banks, direct mail, and Web-based communication would make it easier to connect citizens, but in a way that was fundamentally different from the kind of bottom-up, face-to-face organization building upon which earlier social movements relied. And, like the development of interest group politics, these changes in social movements are a mixed blessing: more and more Americans can receive messages about policy and the need to mobilize, but fewer and fewer (at least as a percentage of engaged citizens) are directly involved in organizing social movement activity or influencing strategy and tactics.

Like interest groups, social movements represent a nongovernmental form of organization and participation intended to either change policy, reform the political process, or both. The four essays in this section, by Elisabeth Clemens, Brian Glenn, Carol Nackenoff, and Ann Marie Szymanski, examine social movements in terms of these three objectives. In one respect, the United States itself was born of a social movement, the collective action that spawned the American Revolution. This formative experience, as well as the heroes and rhetoric that define it, provides both a real and an iconic model that legitimates subsequent movements for change transformative change. It is has been said that American political parties were formed in large measure to overcome the inherent difficulty of democratic change in our constitutional system. While that is no doubt true, parties are not effective vehicles for fundamental or transformative change, that is historically the province of social movements. Abolitionist, suffragettes, civil rights activists, Populists, and environmentalists all engaged in nongovernmental collective action because neither governmental institutions not political parties were responsive to their demands, much as Great Britain never responded effectively to the demands of American colonists. One of the most important developments in the role of social movements in America revolves around changes in technology, first, as Clemens shows, the advent of effective mass media and, more recently, the communications revolution. Historically, social 171

172 Social Movements Glenn shows that by the late-19th century social movements were at the forefront of changing the public philosophy and policy focus of the United States, a narrative that Clemens takes through the 20th century. It is fair to say that the modern liberal welfare state that Americans take for granted in the 21st century was a result of the voluntary action of earlier social movements. While

contemporary movement politics is more centrally directed and media dependent than ever, social movements remain indispensable to significant political and policy change. Indeed, they may be more significant than ever as a counterweight to the emergent nexus among organized interests, bureaucracy, and the legislature. ---Richard A. Harris

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias: Collective Action in American Political Development from the Revolution to the New Deal Elisabeth Clemens Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

or political institutions. Abolitionists agitated against slavery contributing to the political tensions that fueled the Civil War which resulted in emancipation. Organized farmers joined forces in cooperative alliances and then the Populist movement, eventually failing to secure their demands for monetary reforms but generating the leverage for important advances in the creation of a national regulatory bureaucracy (Sanders 1999). Moral reformers, including large organizations of disfranchised women, mobilized in opposition to ‘‘demon alcohol’’ and in favor of local regulation, state prohibition, and eventually a prohibition amendment to the federal constitution (Szymanski 2003). Echoing Coxey’s Army, an earlier march on Washington by the unemployed of the 1890s, World War I veterans streamed into encampments in the nation’s capital during the Depression, demanding early payment of the soldiers’ bonus. Their demands secured votes in Congress on the Bonus Bill, but eventually were met with violent repression by the U.S. Army (Barber 2002; Dickson and Allen 2004). From abolition to the Bonus Army, social movements appear to push government for remedies to social problems. But beyond this catalog of specific policy remedies, how have processes of mobilization outside of political institutions and political parties transformed the organization of governance in the United States?

Although the United States was founded in a revolution, American political institutions---and political history---have had an uneasy relationship with social movements and collective action beyond the bounds of formal politics. Early accounts of the Revolution downplayed its revolutionary or movement-like qualities, highlighting the conservative features of the War for Independence in contrast to the violence and destructiveness of the French Revolution.1 For a nation dedicated to ‘‘government of, by, and for the people,’’ the large-scale mobilization of citizens outside the established channels of governance has been troubling. Such mobilization may signal resistance to government, the inadequacy of government, or the presence of inhabitants capable of political action yet denied access to basic political rights such as the vote. In each case, mobilization outside of routine politics seems to signal the presence of flaws in the American polity. Movements and mobs are often treated as eruptions of irrationality or correctives to injustices or releases of strain rather than as a central feature of American political development.2 Yet for particular episodes in American politics, popular mobilization is centrally important. Movements are recognized as the causes of important but particularistic political outcomes that remedy specific flaws in policy 173

174 Social Movements First, how do Americans ‘‘do politics’’ outside of recognized political institutions? To answer this question, the scope of inquiry needs to expand to include the forms of mobilization in addition to the specific content of movement goals or the particular demands made for government remedy and action. In short, we need to ask ‘‘how?’’ in addition to ‘‘what for?’’ (Clemens 1997, 48--62). After all, as a political project, the American Revolution itself represented a powerfully innovative answer to the question of how to resist a powerful government, the British Empire (Breen 2004). In the wake of the Revolution, Americans retained the capacity to mobilize (in rebellions against the expanding powers of the new state and national governments), to contest the power of traditional elites or competing parties, and to promote particular clauses or the claims of new constituencies to political standing. Fueled by grievances and visions for a better life, Americans also continued to innovate, to cultivate new ‘‘movement cultures’’ with distinctive understandings of political issues and new capacities or techniques for collective action (Goodwyn 1978). Inherited forms of collective action were regularly reevaluated; episodes in which citizens ‘‘took the law into their own hands’’ prompted renewed efforts to distinguish between ‘‘vigilance and vigilantism’’ and to renegotiate the proper role of citizens in assisting or appropriating the coercive powers of the state (Capozzola 2002). As a result of these repeated mobilizations, the repertoire of collective action was transformed at the same time that political institutions and parties co-evolved to contain, co-opt, and repress the changing forms of popular mobilization. Second, how and when does collective action contribute to changes in electoral politics or the broader organization of American government? Because movements mobilize along dimensions other than those of institutionalized politics, they are potentially destabilizing and transformative. At one extreme are movements that pursue strategies of ‘‘exit’’ or separatism from the dominant forms of social and political organization; utopian settlements exemplify this possibility. More frequently, movement activists move across different lines of action many of which cross-cut electoral politics: pursuing purely local mobilizations, endorsing major party candidates, merging with major parties, or even becoming third parties (Sanders 1999, 31--32). The interplay of movements and parties is structured by the federal organization of representation. The potential for movements to matter for politics is greatest when patterns of mobilization map on to the units of representation. As Sanders writes, ‘‘in the

territorially based American legislature, ideas [have] to find geographic vessels’’ (1999, 3). The American political system is somewhat, but not uniformly, porous or open to movements and other forms of political action. The match between movements and the ‘‘geographic vessels’’ of representative government is not automatic. In such a system, movement efforts operate on multiple levels: they dramatize public opinion to political elites (particularly important in the era before surveys and market research); they sustain electoral efforts, occasionally winning and thereby creating movement-allied cadres of activists within formal political institutions; and, sometimes, they become political parties. For much of the 19th century and beyond, social movements have been particularly disruptive and generative when they interact most intensely with political parties. Successful mobilizations, after all, signal the presence of a potential constituency---either currently or potentially enfranchised---to both movement entrepreneurs and party elites who may seek to capture members of the movement for their own support (Harvey 1998). Conversely, to the extent that party organizations successfully define grievances or interests and mobilize the electorate (Altschuler and Blumin 1997), they may ‘‘crowd out’’ other forms of collective political action. But movements may also operate independently of particular electoral constituencies; for example, the ‘‘march on Washington’’ was developed by Coxey’s Army---a ‘‘petition in boots’’---in the 1890s as a means of dramatizing issues to national public opinion through the medium of press coverage (Barber 2002). When enfranchised voters act collectively outside the parties and the institutions of government, they threaten to destabilize particular coalitions or alignments. But their grievances do not necessarily challenge the basic categories of membership in the polity as do mobilizations of the excluded, who lack the vote and therefore are relatively immune to capture by party politics. Because such excluded groups lacked the leverage of a promise of electoral support, they developed new methods for generating political pressure that relied heavily on dramatizations of grievances, appeals to moral standards, and the education (or manipulation) of public opinion, which would become systematized with the invention of survey research and the professionalization of marketing in the 1920s. Unlike the mass mobilization of voters, these new techniques did not directly challenge the partisan affiliations of those in whose name grievances were aired. With the magnification of message provided by the emerging national media---first newspapers, then radio,

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 175 and ultimately television---movements gained a much greater capacity to communicate their grievances and they did so at the same time that this orientation decoupled movement actions from the social networks that underpinned both party affiliations and potential insurgencies. By the New Deal, the lines of popular mobilization had begun to diverge from those of community membership and electoral affiliation (Brinkley 1983), fueled by the same dynamics that would drive a shift from ‘‘membership to management’’ in the nation’s largest voluntary associations (Skocpol 2003). Thus, the impact of collective action on American political development has changed with both the forms of popular politics and the institutions of American government.

The Repertoire of Popular Politics How do ordinary people participate in politics? The forms of collective action---the repertoire (Tilly 1995)--vary across societies and over time. In the wake of the American Revolution, this question took on new urgency. The vote was a partial answer, at least for the mostly male, mostly white, mostly property-owning portion of the population that secured the right to vote in various states, counties, and special elections. But Americans also brought an established repertoire of collective action to politics, including traditional forms of resistance to power and community control such as the food riot, tarring and feathering, and the charivari in which often-masked members of the community harassed neighbors to punish perceived violations of market practices, political stands, or sexual relationships. Ordinary people also mobilized to aid in the enforcement of government decisions, straddling the always uncertain distinction between citizen vigilance and mob action, lynching, and vigilantism. At the time of the Revolution, these established forms of collective action were being enriched by the development in the Anglo-American world of what is now recognized as the national social movement. As Charles Tilly (1995) has powerfully demonstrated in the case of Britain, the national social movement is a historically specific addition to the ‘‘repertoire of contention.’’ Tracing public claims-making from 1750 to 1834, he documents the decline of violent clashes with authority and the rise of new forms, above all the public meeting linked to a named association. A parallel movement took place in the colonies; indeed, some English commentators looked to the Committees of Correspondence and other American developments as models to be appropriated for domestic purposes. The

coordination of protest across ports and colonies that were governed separately, settled by different groups, and dominated by different economic activities and religious affiliations required the cultivation of new lines of identification that cut across the official divisions of imperial rule (Breen 2004). Following Tilly (1995, 144), the social movement can be defined as ‘‘the sustained, organized challenge to existing authorities in the name of a deprived, excluded, or wronged population.’’ Social movements, therefore, are importantly different from traditional forms of resistance to power and community control as well as from less organized types of collective action. The modern social movement is identified by three key traits: (1) the autonomy of participation from community roles, in contrast to mobilizations structured by membership in guilds, religious congregations, or other status groups; (2) the cosmopolitan orientation of movements to regional or national issues rather than to local grievances; and (3) the modular character of tactics or organizational practices that can be transposed from place to place or from cause to cause. Whereas charivari and vigilantism seem quite distinct from routine democratic politics, as a form of collective action, the social movement interjects itself directly into institutional politics. The most characteristic event in the development of the national social movement was the issue-focused public meeting: a gathering of citizens that commented on the action of government or made demands for some new government action. In the context of electoral politics with the right to vote extended to many more (if certainly less than all) adult men, such issue-oriented public meetings could link collective action to the emerging system of political parties. Yet even when participation was dominated by enfranchised citizens, those in attendance faced important choices about how to orient themselves to formal political institutions and electoral politics. Education, self-transformation, and separatist projects were some of the available alternatives to engagement with partisan politics. For these actors---a category that expanded from white adult males holding property to the majority of adults regardless of color (at least outside the South) or sex by the early 20th century---the distinction between social movement participation and other forms of political participation (voting, writing their representatives, attending public meetings) is difficult and unclear. Tilly recognizes the central place of institutionalized--or, in his terminology, continuous---politics in the development of the modern social movement, but the ongoing interaction of discontinuous politics with the

176 Social Movements established routines of ruling remains peripheral to his interests in the changing forms of contentious politics. For those who were excluded from full citizenship or denied the vote---the listing of ‘‘women, felons, slaves, morons’’ recited with indignation by woman suffragists of the 19th century or the student movements in an era when the vote came only at age 21--the addition of the social movement to the repertoire of popular politics was still more consequential. Women and blacks had to struggle to claim the component rights of the public meeting---that is, to speak in public or to gain access to meeting space. In the process, they helped to knit the form of the social movement with political rights other than the vote: the right to assemble, the right to speech, the right to petition the government. In these cases, the dynamic and destabilizing quality of social movements is particularly clear: this form of organizations sustained large-scale political action by those excluded from full membership in the polity. For American political development, therefore, it is helpful to elaborate Tilly’s definition in a number of respects. First, the organized challenge of a social movement flows along webs of relationships and categories of identity that may be more or less different from those of party politics. Collective action often involves the consolidation of new identities and understandings of the connection of the personal to the political, to invoke a slogan from more recent movement history. Benedict Anderson (1983) crystallized this process in the concept of ‘‘imagined communities,’’ illustrating the concept with the role of newspapers in increasing the mutual awareness and sense of shared fate among the American colonies. In his study of the American Revolution, Breen (2004) elaborates how colonists came to recognize themselves as consumers of imported manufactured goods and as contributors to the well-being of the British Empire. A similar self-recognition is central to Young’s (2006) analysis of the religiously inspired social movements for temperance, abolition, and the suppression of moral vice; individuals recognized themselves and one another as personally implicated in systems that perpetuated the sins of drink, slavery, and vice. But grievances also can be aggregated through social networks that distinguish those who are mobilized to participate from those who resist or ignore movement efforts. The institutions of government map onto these relationships in complex ways that, with regularity, generate networks of people who share grievances against government. Government offices may be distributed through networks of patronage and

sponsorship; those networks excluded from the perquisites of office then provide a potential social base for organized resistance (Gould 1996). The qualifications for voting include some categories of persons (adults, men, whites, owners of a certain amount of property, payers of a certain quantity of taxes) and exclude others. To the extent that the excluded share social ties or cultivate connections through organizational efforts, the disenfranchised may be capable of mobilizing to protest their exclusion. Because the relationships of ruling cross-cut other social networks and categories of identity, there is always a potential for grievances that inspire collective action. But how does collective action transform the organization of governance and thereby contribute to American political development? The greater the overlap between the networks or identities that sustain mobilization and partisanship, the more likely that collective actions and grievances will be co-opted---or championed---by electoral politics. Collective action may signal the presence of a constituency, providing information to candidates for elected office who may then seek to attract the support of this aggrieved group (Harvey 1998). But to the extent that these networks and categories diverge from those of party politics, they potentially sustain a ‘‘movement culture’’ constituted through interpretations, policy demands, and collective identities that ‘‘run counter to those of prevailing authority’’ (Goodwyn 1978, xviii). Because movements potentially articulate social networks and collective identities with action in formal political arenas, they also may generate new forms of political action by transposing models of coordination or identity based in economic, religious, military, or other social experiences (Clemens 1997). Thus, movements may contribute innovation to the ‘‘organizational technologies’’ and institutional infrastructure that persist beyond the success or failure of a particular episode of collective action. Movements change the repertoire of collective action, altering the future possibilities for popular politics. Movement mobilization and countermobilization also put the organizing categories of the social world in play. Struggles do involve specific objectives---to disrupt this meeting, to secure that legislation---but they also engage with key moral boundaries and taken-for-granted rules of social order. For example, what distinguishes legitimate grievances from subversive claims? In moments of heightened mobilization, different groups or individual actors attempt to align their efforts with values of justice, law and order, or patriotism (Haydu 1999; Isaac 2002). As contention and mobilization play out, they

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 177

Members of Coxey’s Army aboard a barge on the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal on their way to Washington, D.C., in 1894. Populist Jacob Coxey mobilized an ‘‘army’’ of unemployed workers to march from Massillon, Ohio, to Washington, D.C., to demand government action to create jobs in response to the economic bust of 1893. (Library of Congress)

may produce events---riots, deaths, desecrations---that realign the contending groups with these central values. In Cincinnati in the 1830s, for example, mob violence against abolitionists provided a context in which those very abolitionists were able to redefine themselves as allies of ‘‘law and order’’: ‘‘In short, collective action challenges or discredits some arguments and their underlying ideas, lends support for others, and in effect alters the social and cultural context of meaning production. This process compels speakers to reconstruct their discourses around the experience and consequences of collective actions’’ (Ellingson 1995, 110). The mobilization of workers in the strikes of 1877 provide another example of this broader reorganization of understanding: Never before had the American working class displayed such widespread militant solidarity. Those events clearly shocked dominant elites from their complacent view that such mass mobilizations were strictly a European social phenomenon and

intensified fears associated with other related cultural and political challenges. As the American working class forcefully announced its militant presence, it created one of those ‘‘literally significant’’ events, a turning point, that shaped history by changing organizational forms, cultural meanings, and consequently the configuration of collective action (Isaac 2002, 394--395). Economic elites reacted by mobilizing through militias, bringing the full force of government---both state and federal---to bear on the suppression of organizations of workers. Thus defeated, at least temporarily, would-be organizers of the working class attempted for the next few decades to develop new methods and models of collective action that would exert more effective leverage on the political system, securing improvements for their adherents (Cohen 1990). The innovations of the industrial unionism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and its alliance with the Democratic Party of Franklin Roosevelt, represented

178 Social Movements one more important turning point in an ongoing coevolution of the forms of collective action and the formal institutions of politics and policy that had begun with the American Revolution.

The American Revolution as Social Movement In colonial America, popular protest had a complex relationship to the formal powers of government. Given the absence of an elaborated structure of imperial governance, officials representing Parliament and Crown often relied on the mobilization of crowds to implement justice. Although imperial forces could be called in to enforce order, hostility to standing armies often led colonial governors to raise militias or, at a minimum, to tolerate popular mobilizations in pursuit of collective goods or the imposition of justice. The same coconstitution of governance by ‘‘crowd’’ and officials appeared in controversies involving colonial, county, and local laws: ‘‘uprisings over local issues proved extrainstitutional in character more often than they were anti-institutional; they served the community where no law existed or intervened beyond what magistrates thought they could do officially to cope with a local problem’’ (Maier 1970, 8). Inspired by theorists such as Locke, some of the emerging leadership of the Revolution, including Jefferson and Adams, even argued that rebellion and resistance could be a salutary force within the empire, reminding rulers of the limits of popular consent. During the colonial period, therefore, popular protest was often more than simple resistance to government. Protest could coconstitute governance or serve as a critical ‘‘feedback’’ to rulers in an era lacking other channels of popular participation in politics. As Britain sought to extract greater revenues from the colonies during the 1760s and 1770s, however, new forms of popular mobilization fueled the emergence of a popular politics that significantly differed from the traditional and highly local forms of charivari and communal justice. These new forms, which arguably represent the first appearance of the ‘‘social movement’’ as a mode of collective action (Tilly 1995, 11), were distinguished by at least three features. First, an expanded sense of collective identity in which residents of different communities stretched all along the Atlantic seaboard began to think of themselves as ‘‘colonists’’ or ‘‘Americans,’’ collectivities defined by their shared position of economic and political subordination to Britain. The emergence of this ‘‘imagined community’’ (Anderson

1983) reflected the growth of the colonial press, interrelationships among the colonies, and an intensified mutual orientation of settlers from Georgia to New England. Second, from the port cities of the Atlantic on through new areas of settlement, colonial Americans were increasingly embedded in economic relationships with Britain, particularly as consumers of products manufactured by British industry. This, in turn, gave rise to new self-understandings of the place of colonists in the economic well-being of the empire and, finally, to a recognition that the relations of ruling could be disrupted by refusals to consume (Breen 2004). Third, local economic protests around demands for nonimportation and nonconsumption (which would, by the 19th century, be known as ‘‘boycotts’’) were concatenated into a revolutionary movement by the development of new methods of communication and coordination across the colonies (notably the ‘‘Committees of Correspondence’’), new methods for enforcing protest and identifying dissenters, and a new level of trust across the colonies that eased the suspicion of defection. When Britain closed Boston Harbor in retaliation for the Tea Party, other port communities signaled solidarity by committing to nonimportation as well as sending direct support to Boston. With the development of these features, popular protest in the colonies exhibited what Tilly has argued are the defining features of the modern social movement: cosmopolitan rather than oriented to local conflicts, modular such that established templates for collective action can be transposed from place to place or grievance to grievance, and autonomous in the sense that participation is not structured by webs of local relationships (1995, 142). Embedded in a conflict over the legitimate extent of imperial power, popular mobilization during the revolution shifted from the coconstitution of governance or justice to a means of contesting fundamental claims to political sovereignty. To use Tilly’s terminology once more, the lines between contentious or discontinuous politics and the regular relationships of ruling in the British Empire were clearly drawn (1995, 16). With the success of the Revolution and the establishment of a new system of government, the place of popular protest and mobilization came into question once more. Whereas republican theorists of the colonial era may have recognized a beneficial dimension to resistance and protest, this salutary feedback loop appeared much more problematic once those theorists took office as the first generation of leaders of the new republic (Maier 1970). While resistance to taxation and imperial edicts was understood as legitimate in the

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 179 same degree as British rule came to be understood as illegitimate, any such claims for legitimacy of popular protest under the new regime inevitably challenged the authority of the new nation.

Party Politics and Antebellum Protest With independence, the interplay of state-building and popular mobilization took on new dimensions. Struggles around the power of the national government---the program of the Federalists---were reflected in popular resistance to new forms of taxation, notably Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion of western Pennsylvania. Traditional forms of resistance---the charivari and costumed ‘‘Indians’’ obstructing the actions of local law enforcement---were coupled with the leadership of community elites, whose political standing was threatened by the expansion of federal patronage (Gould 1996). The relationship of formal governmental powers to community elites was contested using modes of protest that would have been familiar to colonial Americans. In upstate New York in the 1820s, Masons used their presence in (or alliances with) positions of power first to harass---and, in one case, kidnap and allegedly murder---their critics; those same powerful alliances protected them from prosecution. In the sort of salutary spirit of popular resistance once praised by Adams and Jefferson, Anti-Masonry represented a countermobilization, a popular protest against the corruption of republican ideals by elites who had captured political powers and used them for their narrow purposes (Formisano and Kutolowski 1977). More generally, elites frequently granted riots a partial legitimacy, as a means of expressing public opinion that could not fundamentally challenge political order (Ellingson 1995, 116). Yet the mobilization of popular resistance, even in the form of traditional resistance, also offered opportunities for the new politics of self-government. Protest could transform into party. Anti-Masonry rapidly followed this path and, indirectly, shaped the politics of antislavery in which popular mobilization and party politics were so deeply entwined. This pattern of protest moving into partisanship quickly became familiar. In New York’s Hudson Valley, for example, the 1830s brought sustained resistance from tenants of the great estate holders; ‘‘Indians’’ kidnapped officials serving warrants and shut down forced sales or evictions. As the confrontations intensified, however, other tenants pursued their grievances through party politics, feeding an expansion of popular electoral mobilization that eroded the traditional power of the great estate holders

within state government. The opportunities afforded by a democratizing polity offered new channels for the mobilization of resistance. But, at the same time, protestors edited and transformed their demands through interactions with party politicians who framed what goals were possible, what demands viable (Huston 2000). As in the colonial period, resistance and popular mobilization coconstituted governance, but the interactions in electoral politics were now as, if not more, important than the role of crowds in local law enforcement. Traditional forms of contentious action did persist well into the 19th century, although their relationships to the formal institutions of governance were transformed by the constitutional framework of electoral democracy. But between long-standing forms of collective violence and full incorporation into party politics, the social movement stabilized as a form of public but extrapartisan political action. Americans did not entirely forget the inventions of the Revolution, the new forms of collective protest mobilized around the nonimportation of British goods (Breen 2004). As in the decade before the Revolution, the common relationship of individuals to an increasingly nationalized and internationalized market provided one important context for new waves of mobilization. Defined by their common relationship to the growing national economy and international commodity markets, groupings of farmers and manufacturers and financiers began to consolidate as the recognized forces within American electoral politics, which frequently turned on conflicts over currency, the national bank, taxation, and tariffs (Sellers 1991). Social movements became a more regular feature of American political life: sustained mobilizations around issues that extended across localities and remained at least somewhat orthogonal to the lines of party loyalty. Central to the consolidation of the social movement within the political repertoire of Americans was the construction of an account that directly linked individual actions to public issues. In contrast to older forms of resistance and contention in which mobilization took place directly through ties to community or membership in a guild or other order, individuals increasingly oriented themselves directly to national issues through analyses that linked personal grievances or commitments to major issues and conflicts. One powerful source for such linkages lay in the series of religious revivals that swept through American communities in the decades after Independence. Religious conversion and revivalism provided a matrix within which individuals took personal responsibility for the sins of the

180 Social Movements nation or the world: slavery, alcohol, vice (Young 2006). By extension, personal action---the refusal to consume alcohol, the refusal of social contact with slaveholders or drinkers, the ‘‘saving’’ of fallen women---became a mode of promoting social reform and national virtue. Yet, perhaps inevitably, the reform impulse grounded in religion also inspired a turn to institutions, efforts to leverage political authority in the elimination of sin. The linkage of personal commitment to collective political action was sustained by the development of new organizational vehicles, the voluntary associations celebrated by Alexis de Tocqueville and others as the distinctive component of American democracy. During the colonial and post-Revolutionary periods, there was considerable suspicion of such independent associations; charters were granted only sparingly and the legal standing of these corporate actors carefully limited. Yet, gradually, the chartered benevolent association became more accessible as the key vehicle for collective action. Although southern legislatures remained more suspicious of chartered charities and voluntary societies, associations chartered in a single state extended their influence throughout the nation, sponsoring missionaries to serve the new western settlements and organizers to support civic causes. This synthesis of organizational form with the religious revivalism of the Second Great Awakening produced a ‘‘Benevolent Empire’’ in which voluntary associations expanded nationally to organize support for abolition, temperance, and the suppression of vice (Hall 1987; McCarthy 2003; Young 2006). The expanded scale of voluntary association---from local charity to national organization---brought new interactions with the system of mass-based political parties, which also consolidated in the 1820s and 1830s. This ‘‘second party system’’ linked state-level political networks or organizations into national coalitions aimed at control of Congress and the presidency. Party leaders sought to suppress those issues that might divide their hard-won coalitions, most notably slavery. But mobilizations within single states could cross-pressure elected officials, threatening mass defections to the other party or to third parties if the official remained committed to the national party position. In the 1840s, for example, northern Democrats found themselves torn between local constituencies and the southern leadership of their party, which was enthusiastically committed to the expansion of slave territories through the accession of Texas and war with Mexico. The defection of thousands of New York voters to the Liberty Party was one important factor persuading

northern Democrats to oppose President Polk, a fellow Democrat, and to support the Wilmot Proviso, which declared that any lands acquired through war with Mexico would be ‘‘free soil’’ (Foner 1969). The combined shared identity and organizational framework of the abolition movement created a sustained tension with electoral politics that fueled the tensions that eventually would erupt in the Civil War. The interaction between movement and party changed movements and their goals as well. These encounters with electoral politics produced new ‘‘editings’’ (Huston 2000) of abolitionism in the form of the Free Soil Party, which opposed the extension of slavery into new territories while failing to call consistently for equal rights for free blacks. As soon as one faction---the Barnburners---returned to the Democratic Party, the remaining members were more open to demands for equal rights, but they continued to be silent on this issue in their national platform, leaving it to be worked out within the political context of different states (Foner 1965, 239--241). Thus, the broad field of antislavery mobilization came to encompass positions that did not include any commitment to equal rights for free blacks and soon-to-be-former slaves. These developments would lead to further compromises after the war during Reconstruction. More immediately, the cross-cutting of the abolition movement and the second party system undermined the Whig Party and, within a few years, the Republican Party consolidated out of the third-party Liberty and Free Soil campaigns. Out of the experience of the Civil War, party affiliation would emerge with heightened emotional salience; despite shared grievances, Democrats could collaborate with Republicans only at the very real risk of charges of treachery to the cause. Thus the repeated reconstitutions of movement and party that characterized the antebellum period gave way to a time of heightened partisanship and ever more dramatic eruptions of collective action and third-party efforts on a national scale.

From Reconstruction to Populism The decades after the Civil War were punctuated with mass mobilizations that sometimes shifted into thirdparty politics, sometimes into fusion with major parties, and sometimes tipped into violence. The early labor unions, based on the model of the fraternal order or secret society, gradually transformed into major associations that linked workers across localities and, through the encompassing producerism of the Knights of Labor, across craft and industry. This expanding organization allowed coordinated confrontations with employers,

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 181

The 10th annual convention of the Knights of Labor, as depicted in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper on October 16, 1886. The Knights of Labor was the first important national labor organization in the United States, founded in 1869. (Library of Congress)

confrontations that easily could produce violence and repression by the police or the military. Led by Oliver Kelly, a government clerk with a vision of overcoming the isolation of rural life, farmers organized into Granges; these local associations, federated into state organizations, then sustained an often successful legislative campaign for railroad regulation and antimonopoly statutes. Joined by their grievances against financiers, both agrarian and labor activists were attracted to the cause of ‘‘Greenbackism’’---a call for paper money in the place of currency backed by gold, a move that it was hoped would benefit debtors and allow for economic expansion. Although these efforts were largely unsuccessful---a few local offices, for an election or two---they left an enduring diagnosis of economic ills as well as a network of radicals in agrarian areas through the heart of the Plains (Goodwyn 1978, 15--18).

Just as issue-based, nonviolent forms of mobilization became more extensive during the first half of the 19th century, the forms of mobilizing violence also became increasingly modular and cosmopolitan. In the first years of Reconstruction in the South, former slaves joined to form Union Leagues, drilling in local companies to project a sense of their capacity to defend their new rights. In forceful response, new organizations such as the Knights of the White Camelia, the Ku Klux Klan, and the White-Line movement deployed organized violence to suppress the political efforts of southern blacks, creating an alternate arena in which ‘‘justice’’ was enforced by ‘‘paramilitary politics’’ (Hahn 2003, 265--311). In industrializing areas, the formation of volunteer militia companies created an infrastructure for suppressing labor agitation, sometimes in collaboration with political authorities, sometimes on their own less-than-licit authority (Kaufman 2001; Isaac 2002). During the same decades, the form of the voluntary association was adopted widely beyond the Benevolent Empire of religiously inspired causes to serve as a vehicle for the mass mobilization of workers, farmers, and disfranchised women among others. Thus the geographic scale and intensity of party organization, state power, and popular mobilization all expanded, increasing the potential for encounters that would reverberate through the political system. The mobilizations and insurgencies of the late-19th century led many commentators to reconsider the role of movements in American politics and to question the expectation of immunity from European radicalisms that had flowed from the dominant interpretation of the American Revolution as fundamentally conservative in comparison to its French counterpart (Wood 1991; Isaac 2002, 365). As the nation experienced a series of business recessions and crises, waves of strikes and worker organization challenged political authorities and repeatedly spilled into third-party efforts: Greenback, Union Labor, and others. But if worker mobilization threatened with its echoes of European socialism, the more sustained challenge to political authorities came from organized farmers. Agrarian discontent stemmed from large-scale economic developments: the centralized control of finances and transportation by eastern elites, the vicissitudes of increasingly global markets for agricultural commodities, and the unresponsiveness of the major political parties to farmers’ grievances. Yet despite the shortcomings of the parties on agricultural issues, many farmers remained ardent partisans for other reasons, not least their loyalties grounded in the allegiances of the Civil War. Efforts to mobilize a political

182 Social Movements challenge to the crop lien system in Texas in the 1880s through independent politics were undercut by appeals to the Democratic Party and the grand cause of the Confederacy (Goodwyn 1978). For this first incarnation of the Farmers Alliance, the lesson was that ‘‘immediate political insurgency was not the answer; too many of the poor had strong cultural memories that yoked them to traditional modes of political thought and behavior. Some means would have to be found to cut such ties before any kind of genuine people’s politics was possible’’ (Goodwyn 1978, 26). Stepping back from electoral politics, movement organizers developed new activities---lecturing circuits, cooperative marketing, and purchasing efforts---that could sustain a new collective identity independent of the partisan commitments that farmers brought into the movement. In the words of one Alliance leader, ‘‘There is a way to take part in politics without having it in the order. Call each neighborhood together and organize anti-monopoly leagues . . . and nominate candidates for office.’’ Movement organizations were to be independent from party organizations---grounded in shared activities and distinctive ideological commitments---but the movement would intervene in electoral politics to advance its specific policy concerns (Goodwyn 1978, 43). The potential of movements to generate new cultural commitments was most evident in the beginnings of interracial political alliances in southern states (Gerteis, forthcoming). This arrangement in which insurgent organizations engaged with, but remained independent from, electoral politics was difficult to sustain. By 1892, the Farmers Alliance had given birth to the People’s Party, which then confronted the dilemma of how to coordinate its political efforts across regions where farmers had very different prior political commitments. In the South, Alliancemen had pursued ‘‘reform through the Democrats’’ with some success, but such a strategy would be anathema to northern farmers with strong commitments to the Republicans, the party of Lincoln and the Union. Southern Alliancemen also faced political threats closer to home. White Alliancemen were attacked by Democratic partisans for working with blacks. Blacks, in turn, faced the dilemma of supporting a third-party effort at the cost of abandoning the southern Republican Party, which was a weak ally but their only ally in state governments (Hahn 2003, 375; Gerteis, forthcoming). Organized farmers also found it difficult to forge ties with labor. Although organized workers shared many of the same grievances against increasingly centralized corporations and markets, workers lacked organization at the same scale and, to the extent that they were committed to socialist

principles, could not recognize that farmers as owners of property---of means of production---could be allies in a political struggle (Sanders 1999, 64--65). Culminating in the presidential competition of 1896, the Farmers Alliance had given rise to the People’s Party, which merged with the Democratic Party once it had nominated William Jennings Bryan as its candidate. With Bryan’s defeat, the Populist insurgency ushered in a period of Republican dominance in national politics. Yet, like earlier waves of mobilization, the Populist mobilization left a legacy of organizational techniques, political analysis, and an aversion to entanglements with partisan electoral politics. In the years after 1896, social movement organizers sought new methods for linking mobilized grievances to political remedies, but the Populist legacy would remain to be drawn on in the economic crisis of the Great Depression (Brinkley 1983, 161--162).

From Movement to Lobby Throughout the 19th century, the relationship between social movements and political parties had been complicated by the profound antipartyism that infused much of American politics: ‘‘From the Antimasons to the Know-Nothings to the Populists, dissenting movements and parties proclaimed their hostility to politicians, politics as usual, and parties and claimed to represent the people against corrupt party organizations’’ (Formisano 1999, 98). Social movements sought to develop political means independent of the parties both because they were blocked by parties and because, in at least some cases, parties were understood to embody the corruption of democratic government. Yet so long as party organizations were key gatekeepers to elected office, movements could not ignore them. And, all too often, movement organizers found themselves defeated at elections or, if successful, betrayed or forgotten by the candidate they had supported. Consequently, repeated encounters of movement and party led to an elaborated tactical repertoire that included methods for directly influencing elected officials, shaping public opinion, and creating new mechanisms of governance, including the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall. Large voluntary associations---organized labor, farmers, and women among others---developed organizational techniques for coordinating the political efforts of their members without making lasting commitments to political parties. The roll call vote tabulation captures this spirit of practical innovation: associations identified key pieces of legislation or procedural votes that would

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 183 distinguish their supporters from their foes; they sent organizers to the state capital to record the votes of individual legislators; those vote tables were then publicized in the next election. Or, proactively, associations might request pledges from candidates during the election, promising support on key issues. In perhaps the grandest innovation in issue-specific politics, the woman suffrage and temperance movement pioneered popular mobilization in support of amendments to the federal constitution. Through such new techniques, movement organizations learned to link the political influence of their membership directly to issues without the mediating structure of political parties (Clemens 1997). These techniques were often effective, but American politics also presented difficult challenges to the new model of popular interest group politics. At the most basic level, politics does not proceed one issue at a time. Movement members who might agree on one issue could split over others; coalitions mobilized along one social identity or around one cause could be splintered by cross-cutting political conflicts. For example, the ‘‘women’s movement’’ was a broad and effective coalition built in support of women’s suffrage. Yet before adoption of the federal suffrage amendment, the networks sustaining the women’s movement were shaken by divisions between those committed to the peace movement and those who hoped that women’s support of preparedness during World War I would create a debt of gratitude that would be redeemed with the right to vote (Clemens 1999). So long as movement organizations presented a credible threat of mobilizing voters outside the major parties, they could secure concessions from party leaders (Harvey 1998). Consequently, collective action was more likely to secure political results when movement demands fell in the ideological or policy space between parties. Mobilization was less likely to have an impact in congressional districts or states---a ‘‘geographic vessel’’---in which the party out of power was not a plausible vehicle for remedying grievances. By the 1920s, the passing of the height of Progressivism left many movement participants without plausible allies in the ‘‘reform’’ factions of the major parties. At the same time, the organization of vigilance during World War I had left a legacy of patriotic organizations committed to rooting out the Communist and socialist threats in American politics---an infrastructure of repression that seriously crippled efforts to reignite the worker and farmer insurgencies of the late 19th century (Capozzola 2002). New mass membership organizations---ranging from the American Legion to the revived Ku Klux

Klan---sustained popular commitments to patriotism and nativism that restricted the possibilities for popular mobilization in opposition to current government policies. But the adoption of the repertoire of popular mobilization by new conservative forces lay the foundations for the emergence of the modern American right after World War II, a development that would decades later give rise to a new and consequential alignment of movement organizations and electoral politics. But, for much of the 1920s, the increasing economic problems facing farmers and---with the onset of the Depression---workers and professionals, were not effectively articulated with electoral politics.

The New Deal Order The economic crises of the Great Depression powerfully reconfigured the shared identities and networks that organized American political life. President Hoover’s repeated calls for private industry and charity to alleviate distress consolidated ties among local elites, but also led to widespread disillusionment with the Republican Party that had dominated national politics through the 1920s. At a more local level, the spreading economic crisis undermined the institutions that had organized community life, providing a focus for identities and political allegiances: mutual benefit and fraternal associations collapsed, religious congregations proved unmatched to the task of providing aid to their members who for so many years had contributed alms and tithes (Cohen 1990, 225). The intensifying hardship generated new patterns of protest as farmers destroyed crops they could not sell and workers marched on city halls demanding relief. This context of economic suffering provided a rich opportunity for new patterns of mobilizing and realignments of collective action to party politics. For the first time since the Populist insurgency of the 1890s, nationwide alliances emerged to support calls for systematic political and economic reform: from Louisiana, Huey Long and his call to ‘‘Share the Wealth’’; from Detroit, Father Coughlin known as the ‘‘radio priest’’; from Long Beach California, Dr. Francis Townsend with his revolving pension plan to remedy the suffering of the impoverished elderly (Brinkley 1983). The extent and intensity of discontent generated far-reaching mobilizations independent of the ties of partisanship. And, as Franklin Roosevelt was all too aware, these movements could provide the basis for political careers and challenges to his own hold on the presidency. The heightened mobilization of the 1930s set the stage for a competition for the political loyalty of the

184 Social Movements masses of citizens discontented with the current situation. The Townsend movement for old-age pensions followed a more traditional path, working within congressional districts and state legislatures to convert representatives to support the plan (Amenta and Zylan 1991). Coughlin and Long, however, relied more heavily on the new medium of the radio---along with coverage by the newspapers---to forge relationships more directly with individuals. Their ‘‘movements’’ lacked the national organizational infrastructure that created political networks within ‘‘geographic vessels’’ and sustained the crystallization of new collective identities that were shared across localities. Consequently, where Long and Coughlin did inspire local political mobilizations, the clubs formed in their names were tempting stepping stones for ambitious candidates and were easily caught up in local political rivalries (Brinkley 1983, 180--185; Mitchell 1992). At the same time, to defuse the challenge represented by these independent mobilizations, Roosevelt’s New Deal programs powerfully used government intervention to fashion more direct and seemingly personal relationships between individual citizens and their federal government (Cohen 1990, 252--260). By taking advantage of the new infrastructure of the national media, Coughlin and Long also turned away from the long-standing repertoire of collective action and popular politics: Insurgents in the 1890s, without access to instruments of mass communications, had no choice but to engage in elaborate grass-roots proselytizing. A dissident leader in the 1930s could reach a larger audience in a single radio broadcast than an orator could have addressed in a lifetime forty years before. There was, it seemed, no pressing need for elaborate local efforts. The message could be transmitted without them. Yet it was just such local organizational activity that worked most effectively to give ordinary men and women a strong sense of connection with dissident politics. By making the relatively passive process of listening to the radio the dominant activity of their followers, Long and Coughlin ensured that their movements would never become what the populist movement had once been: a constant, visible presence in the lives of communities. The two leaders remained, rather, the diffused voices of a new and non-involving medium (Brinkley 1983, 193). Although the large-scale voluntary associations that had sustained the insurgency of populism and the

reform campaigns of the Progressive Era would endure beyond the New Deal and World War II (Skocpol 2003), this period marks an important turning point in the coevolution of collective action and American political institutions. As movements became more oriented toward mass media (and, in time, to the institutions of the judicial system), they became less powerfully articulated with the ‘‘geographic vessels’’ of electoral politics. At the same time, the two major parties became less oriented to mobilizing electoral turnout and more likely to approach potential voters with the tools of public relations and mass marketing (Mitchell 1992). Whereas movement organizers had spent much of the 19th and early 20th century developing organizational techniques for destabilizing electoral politics and party alignments, this repertoire rested on the role of local organizations linked into national networks or associations. As both mass media and big government contributed to forging a more direct relationship between national leaders and individual citizens, movement organizations in the postwar period would face the challenge of developing new techniques capable of disrupting and transforming a new political order.

References and Further Reading Altschuler, Glenn C., and Stuart M. Blumin. 1997. ‘‘Limits of Political Engagement in Antebellum America: A New Look at the Golden Age of Participatory Democracy.’’ Journal of American History 84 (3): 855--885. Amenta, Edwin, and Yvonne Zylan. 1991. ‘‘It Happened Here: Political Opportunity, the New Institutionalism, and the Townsend Movement.’’ American Sociological Review 56 (2): 250--265. Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: The Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Barber, Lucy G. 2002. Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Breen, T. H. 2004. The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press. Brinkley, Alan. 1983. Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression. New York: Vintage. Capozzola, Christopher. 2002. ‘‘The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fervor: Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America.’’ Journal of American History 88 (4): 1354--1382. Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1997. The People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890--1925. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1999. ‘‘Securing Political Returns to Social Capital: Women’s Associations in the United States, 1880s-1920s.’’ Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (4): 613--638.

Social Movements, Mobs, and Militias 185 Cohen, Lizabeth. 1990. Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919--1939. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dickson, Paul, and Thomas B. Allen. 2003. The Bonus Army: An American Epic. New York: Walker and Company. Ellingson, Stephen. 1995. ‘‘Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati.’’ American Journal of Sociology 101 (1): 100--144. Foner, Eric. 1965. ‘‘Politics and Prejudice: The Free Soil Party and the Negro, 1849--1852.’’ The Journal of Negro History 50 (4): 239--256. Foner, Eric. 1969. ‘‘The Wilmot Proviso Revisited.’’ Journal of American History 56 (2): 262--279. Formisano, Ronald P. 1999. ‘‘The ‘Party Period’ Revisited.’’ Journal of American History 86 (1): 93--120. Formisano, Ronald P., and Kathleen Smith Kutolowski. 1977. ‘‘Antimasonry and Masonry: The Genesis of Protest, 1826-1827.’’ American Quarterly 29 (2): 139--165. Gerteis, Joseph. Forthcoming. Class and the Color Line: The Sources and Limits of Interracial Class Coalitions in the Knights of Labor and the Populist Movement. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1978. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York: Oxford University Press. Gould, Roger V. 1996. ‘‘Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion.’’ American Journal of Sociology 102 (2): 400--429. Hahn, Steven. 2003. A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South From Slavery to the Great Migration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hall, Peter Dobkin. 1987. ‘‘A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector.’’ In The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handboook. Edited by Walter W. Powell. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Harvey, Anna L. 1998. Votes without Leverage: Women in American Electoral Politics, 1920--1970. New York: Cambridge University Press. Haydu, Jeffrey. 1999. ‘‘Counter Action Frames: Employer Repertoires and the Union Menace in the Late Nineteenth Century.’’ Social Problems 46: 313--331. Huston, Reeve. 2000. Land and Freedom: Rural Society, Popular Protest, and Party Politics in Antebellum New York. New York: Oxford University Press. Isaac, Larry. 2002. ‘‘To Counter ‘The Very Devil’ and More: The Making of Independent Capitalist Militias in the Gilded Age.’’ American Journal of Sociology 108 (2): 353-405.

Jameson, J. Franklin. 1956 [1926]. The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement. Boston: Beacon Press. Kaufman, Jason. 2001. ‘‘‘Americans and their Guns’: Civilian Military Organizations and the Destabilization of American National Security.’’ Studies in American Political Development 15: 88--102. Kazin, Michael. 1992. ‘‘The Grass-Roots Right: New Histories of U.S. Conservatism in the Twentieth Century.’’ American Historical Review 97 (1): 136--155. Maier, Pauline. 1970. ‘‘Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America.’’ The William and Mary Quarterly 27 (1): 3--35. McCarthy, Kathleen D. 2003. American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society, 1700--1865. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mitchell, Greg. 1992. The Campaign of the Century: Upton Sinclair’s Race for Governor of California and the Birth of Media Politics. New York: Random House. Sanders, Elizabeth. 1999. Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State: 1877--1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sellers, Charles. 1991. The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815--1846. New York: Oxford University Press. Skocpol, Theda. 2003. Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Szymanski, Ann Marie E. 2003. Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social Movement Outcomes. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1995. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758--1834. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wood, Gordon. 1991. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Vintage. Young, Michael P. 2006. Bearing Witness against Sin: The Evangelical Birth of the American Social Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Notes 1. For critical discussions of the conservative interpretation of the Revolution, see Jameson (1956 [1926]) and Wood (1991). 2. The theorization of social movements as a constitutive element in American politics has also been limited by the characterization of movements as irrational and discontinuous with the rational, strategic action associated with pluralist models of politics. For a characterization of this literature, particularly some of the classic contributions of the 1950s and early 1960s, see Kazin (1992, 135--138).

U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 Brian Glenn Assistant Professor of Political Science, Emerson University

(guaranteeing all Americans national citizenship and equal protection under the law), and the Fifteenth Amendment (banning the denial of suffrage on the basis of race), citizenship was in practice a relationship between an individual and a given state. Thus, before the Civil War, it made little sense for Americans to call on the federal government for assistance. Instead, they appealed to their state government. Other than giving pensions or grants of land or money to men who fought in the Revolutionary War, by the middle of the 19th century, the federal government did little to help citizens through anything we would now consider social policy. What little assistance was provided came from states or localities. Both the nature of citizenship and social policy would change dramatically as the Civil War unfolded. The Civil War began as a conflict between two broad views over the nature of citizenship in America. Southerners struggled to find a coherent theory that justified slavery. What is important for our purposes is that those who supported slavery did not see blacks as being equal in any regard to whites. Races were widely believed to be biologically distinct, and even if blacks were conceded to be human, they were understood to be morally and intellectually inferior, and certainly incapable of functioning as free and equal citizens. In addition, the South was far less market driven than the North, resulting in a more traditional and hierarchical society combined with low levels of industrialization, and it was universally recognized that the end of slavery would fundamentally alter southern life.

Known as the Gilded Age, the period from 1865 to 1890 dramatically redefined the relationship between the citizen and the state, laying the groundwork for Progressive Era that followed. Three elements of social policy stand out in this time period. First, federal reconstruction programs started during the Civil War sought to create a modern free market economy in the South, with blacks fully integrated into it as full and equal citizens. Second, the federal government provided permanently wounded Union War veterans with pensions. This program would eventually become the single largest spending item in the federal budget, making the United States a leader in welfare state spending in the Western Hemisphere. Third, localities altered the care provided for their poorest residents, moving away from generalized poorhouses to specialized institutions such as orphanages, asylums for the mentally insane, and schools for the deaf. By the end of the Gilded Age, state and federal governments were far more involved in the well-being of their citizens than at the start. Before the Civil War, the fundamental political debate for the nation was over the nature of citizenship. If individuals were first and foremost citizens of the federal government, then they should have the same basket of rights anywhere within the nation’s borders. If citizenship was primarily conferred by state governments, one could have different rights depending on where he or she lived, and for black Americans, it could mean not having any rights at all in. In practice, before the addition of the Thirteenth Amendment (banning slavery), the Fourteenth Amendment

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U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 187 The rise to power of the Republican Party in the late 1850s created a powerful alternative vision of America. Those who flocked to the Republican Party were attracted to its platform of ‘‘free men, free labor, and free soil,’’ which meant a market-based economy for the whole nation, along with an end to slavery and free settlement lands in the territories. The North was far more industrial than the South, which lacked infrastructure and capital for investment. A true free market economy in the South would allow railroads and banking to expand, labor to move (lowering its cost to manufacturers), and, in time, more money in the South to purchase northern products. The idea of free labor was deeply powerful for normative reasons as well, the most important being an end to slavery, which many in the North (and the South) found deeply unconscionable. Thus, the Civil War was both about financial interests and also morality. During and especially after the war, this division turned to the question of citizenship. If Americans were in practice primarily citizens of their given state before the war, they moved to being primarily citizens of the national government after it. Many if not most citizens before the conflict spoke of the United States in the plural, referring to a union of states. Indeed, the Seventh and Eleventh Amendments can be read in just that manner, and for southerners the conflict was a ‘‘War between the States.’’ After the war, the United States became an entity spoken of in the singular. American citizens thereafter held a uniform set of rights, or at least that was what was intended by those who won the war. As the nation rebuilt itself, Republicans hoped to shape it into their own image. The opportunity existed, as the war had touched literally every aspect of American life directly. Just under 40 percent of all northern males who were between the ages of 15 and 44 in 1860 ended up fighting for the Union side, and 364,511 men, or about 1.8 percent of the northern male population, died in the conflict. Almost 260,000 southern men died in the war, resulting in a loss of roughly one white male in five. Between 1860 and 1870, the southern horse population fell by 29 percent, and that of pigs by 35 percent. Southern property values decreased by an average of 30 percent, and all slaves were set free. The southern economy was completely devastated, while its slave society was gone with the wind. On March 3, 1865, Congress created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, universally known as the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Bureau supervised but did not operate all relief efforts relating to food, shelter, and the education of refugees and freed

slaves. It also took control of abandoned lands and confiscated property in border and former Confederate states, Indian territory, and Washington, D.C. The scope and ambition of the Bureau was unprecedented, although the bill creating it originally allowed for just one year’s operation. The goal of the Bureau, almost utopian in hindsight, was to facilitate the conversion of the South into a place of free men and free labor. It represented the belief of Republicans in Congress that the federal government had a responsibility to involve itself both in the nation’s economy and society, which was a profound change in perspectives on the relationship between state and society. The period immediately following the war was one of tremendous population mobility in the South, especially for blacks. Under slavery, there had been no legal recognition of black families. Husbands, wives, and children were bought and sold individually as any other form of property, and after the war, enormous numbers of former slaves took to the road in search of separated relatives. Many former slaves owned nothing more than the clothes on their backs, and the Freedmen’s Bureau had the responsibility to oversee ‘‘all subjects’’ relating to their well-being in the South. At this time, there were few independent organizations through which blacks could help one another. Black churches and mutual benefit societies had been banned throughout most of the South, and although they sprang up immediately after the war, they usually lacked the resources to help those who were formerly enslaved. The Freedmen’s Bureau was extremely useful in preventing mass starvation and the upheaval that would have followed. In just the first year and a half after the war, the Bureau handed out more than 13 million rations, each sufficient to feed one person for one week. The idea of integrating blacks into southern society was extremely unpopular with almost all white Southerners. During Reconstruction, several Bureau agents were assassinated, and harassment was taken for granted as being part of the job. Agents were almost never welcomed into the local society and quite frequently lived apart, where they felt safer. Rather than relying on local law enforcement or courts, agents often needed to draw on the assistance of federal troops where available. Southern whites controlled the region’s entire infrastructure of stores, schools, banks, local governments, churches, and civic organizations, and the Bureau agents, who never numbered more than 900, were forced to work around this power structure, which was a daunting task under the best of circumstances.

188 Social Movements

A classroom at the Freedmen’s Bureau in Richmond, Virginia. Formally known as the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, the Freedmen’s Bureau was a federal agency within the War Department that was charged with supervising the transition from slavery to freedom in the erstwhile Confederacy. (Library of Congress)

A key goal of the Republican Party was the creation of a viable free market system with both whites and freedmen fully integrated into it. Toward this end, the Freedmen’s Bureau wanted blacks working for wages or as farmers growing cash crops of tobacco and cotton. By 1865, the Bureau controlled around 850,000 acres of land, and the famous policy of loaning former slaves ‘‘forty acres and a mule’’ was actually put in place in many regions of the South in the summer of 1865, but this was short-lived. Much of the Bureau’s land had been confiscated from the wealthiest elements of southern society, including that of the son of the former Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, and President Andrew Johnson was not comfortable with the federal government deviating from the nation’s history of protecting property rights---even for those of its enemies. In July 1865, Johnson not only ended the policy of handing former slaves land but also ordered the army

to return any confiscated land if the former owner agreed to take an oath of loyalty to the U.S. government, which most readily did. As a result, more than 20,000 formerly enslaved were evicted from lands provided by the Freedmen’s Bureau, some, sadly, at the point of a bayonet. The question of what relationship ex-slaves would have to their former owners was highly contentious. Whites did not want to negotiate with blacks as equals, and many former slaves were not inclined to go back into the cotton and tobacco fields. Work contracts were typically for an entire year and compensation was usually tied to profits on the harvest. Wages were at a fraction of what white counterparts were paid, and the years following the war were plagued by an unusually severe drought, so there were few, if any, profits to be shared. Before the war, slaveholders had to provide their slaves with certain levels of housing, food,

U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 189 clothing, and health care to protect the health and hence the value of their ‘‘property.’’ After the war, landowners no longer provided those goods, or if they did, they were deducted from already low wages. State and local governments quickly passed onerous laws allowing authorities to arrest black workers who did not have work contracts. Far from the ideal of free men entering into contracts as equals in a free market, exslaves found themselves placed back into what frequently amounted to indentured positions, while those who did not find work were rented out by the localities to landowners as prison labor. What became immediately apparent under Reconstruction was that there were three competing interpretations of the meaning of freedom for the former slaves. Most southern whites refused to acknowledge blacks as having any political rights at all, and for them ‘‘freedom’’ for blacks meant nothing more than a return to the status quo. Florida’s governor instructed the black residents of his state to go back to their former owners for work, and ‘‘call your old Master--‘Master.’ ’’ For many northern whites, freedom for blacks meant the ability to contract out their labors on the market and to participate as equal citizens. The Bureau worked to ensure political equality for blacks, registering them as voters and monitoring polling places, and for a while, blacks achieved a fair amount of electoral success. Still, many northern whites believed that blacks were less willing to work than whites were, and were hesitant to provide too much relief lest it provide incentives to shirk. As the head of Freedman’s Bureau in Virginia stated, blacks needed to ‘‘feel the spur of necessity if it be needed to make them selfreliant, industrious and provident.’’ Finally, there was the interpretation of freedom that appears to have been held by the majority of former slaves, which was the desire to be treated as equals, independent from white control. By all accounts, being independent of whites was a central element of black thought after the war. Much to the surprise of many whites, blacks who were able to obtain farms frequently did not plant cash crops of tobacco or cotton for sale on the market. Instead, they planted sustenance crops for their own consumption. In short, many blacks did not want to become part of the larger economy, but rather withdraw themselves from it and become self-reliant. Thomas Jefferson had hailed this mind-set of ‘‘yeoman farmers’’ as being the backbone of American liberty, since they would be financially dependent on no one. Many blacks, however, wanted to separate themselves as much as possible from the white world that surrounded them and instead

formed their own churches, mutual aid societies, burial grounds, and, most important, schools. Northern groups rushed in to open schools for freed slaves as quickly as Union forces occupied a territory. By the end of the war, there were 51 freedmen’s aid societies operating schools, of which 31 were connected to churches or religious organizations. Former slaves, many of whom were by law prevented from learning to read under slavery, flocked in droves to schools to learn to read. Accounts remarked of individuals working dawn to dusk in fields only to spend their evenings in ramshackle schools. Most northern churches and aid societies provided strong support for educating the former slaves, sending teachers and supplies, and often paying for the construction of new school buildings. Literacy was seen as a path to equality with whites. Knowing how to read allowed one to participate in civic life as a fully informed citizen. It revealed to bigots that blacks could perform just as well intellectually as whites could. It was a necessary precondition to achieving economic success beyond day labor and subsistence farming, and it allowed individuals to read the bible, which most blacks, as Protestants, saw as a necessary component of living a moral life. When the Freedmen’s Bureau had its enabling legislation renewed in 1866, Congress included additional funding to support the rent and repair of school buildings, and while all of its other operations were terminated by 1868, the Bureau continued to oversee and coordinate education until 1872. The Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard and his assistant for education, John Alvord, had wide discretion in how funds were allocated, and the two favored sectarian associations so heavily that by 1869 virtually all schools were directed by churches or religious organizations. The most favored group was the American Missionary Association (AMA), ostensibly nondenominational but in truth Congregational, as were both Howard and Alvord. Howard’s brother was a high official in the AMA and traveled on the government’s budget even when doing the association’s work. All school superintendents in the Southwest, except for Texas, were members of the AMA, and the organization received far more than its fair share of the Bureau’s budget. When school organizers originally went south, they discovered that informal black schools already dotted the landscape, their teachers being literate former slaves or Union soldiers who remained behind. Freedmen’s aid societies typically held these teachers in contempt and attempted to replace them whenever possible with their own, who typically were wealthy young

190 Social Movements white women. As with Bureau agents, these young women discovered they were not welcomed by white society in the South, and frequently received threats against their persons. White southern teachers were also invited to teach in the new schools for freed blacks, but almost no one ever took up the offer, knowing that to do so was to be shunned as a ‘‘nigger teacher’’ and traitor to their society. The Morrill 1862 Land Grant College Act led to the formation of many black colleges. Graduates discovered they were not wanted among the professions, and the solution was to go into teaching. If the first generation of teachers of black schools were wealthy young women of the North, the generations that followed were enterprising young black males from the South. Notably, federal support for black schools quickly led to universal public schooling in the South for both blacks and whites. Localities eventually took over the operation of the newly formed black schools, and perversely enough, in their attempts to segregate black children from white ones, they created a space for blacks to fill as public employees. Black teachers taught in and administered black public schools, creating opportunities for future generations to rise through education into other professions. What began as a temporary federal program to assist private efforts to educate blacks resulted in universal public education of all children, coupled with a large job program for educated black adults. Reconstruction altered social policy in many other ways as well, both for the North and the South, largely due to Republican dominance at both the state and federal levels. This was also informed by an infusion of black elected officials in the South in the second half of the 1860s. Nashville provided food and fuel for the poor. Petersberg created a Board of Health that provided free health care during the 1873 smallpox epidemic. South Carolina also established free health care for the poor. Alabama funded free legal services to indigent defendants. New York founded eight new teachers colleges as well as a Board of Charities to study care for the poor. A second major area of social policy started as a program to provide for injured Union veterans and evolved into a massive antipoverty system for the elderly. At the start of the Civil War, Congress created a system of pensions for permanently injured Union veterans and dependent survivors. The idea of providing assistance for injured war veterans was not new. During the Revolutionary War, army officers threatened to desert their commissions and go home if they did not get pensions afterward. The Continental Congress

granted them, and afterward used veterans’ benefits to achieve other state-building goals. Many veterans found they could obtain free land if they agreed to move to border territories that were being contested against the local Native American tribes that lived there. Veterans who agreed to settle were often provided with muskets, if that gives any indication of the federal government’s goals in relocating them. The big concern was that soldiers and sailors would become so injured that they would be unable to earn a living afterward. Given the carnage of Civil War battles from start to finish, along with the lack of medical knowledge and capacity to handle serious injuries, this was a justifiable concern. The stakes changed even more once the draft was called up, since now there was a strong moral claim of obligation to those compelled to serve, especially given that the wealthy could buy their way out by paying someone to take their place. The provisions for injury or death were quite generous by the standards of the time. The 1862 enabling legislation provided benefits according to rank, with privates receiving $8 per month, and generals getting $30 for total physical disability. Widows and dependents qualified for pensions valued at full disability for the death of a soldier. By 1864, Congress passed new legislation raising benefits and creating new ones for losses of particular limbs or for requiring certain kinds of assistance. The loss of a foot provided one benefit, the loss of a leg another. Complete blindness garnered a benefit of more than $30 per month for an average soldier, and within a decade benefits were doubled. By 1866, the federal government was spending $15.5 million per year on close to 127,000 pension recipients, but this was just a small fraction of potential beneficiaries. By 1875 only one in four eligible dependents and 43 percent of eligible veterans were receiving benefits. All this would change in the last two decades of the 19th century. In 1879, Congress passed the Arrears Act, allowing any veteran who had not yet received, but was eligible for, a pension to receive all the benefits he would have accrued up to that point as a lump-sum payment, and all those receiving pensions to get all they would have accrued had they applied at the time of their injury. Before 1879, around 1,600 new claims were filed each month. Once the Arrears Act was passed, the number jumped to more than 10,000. More important, the Republican and Democratic Parties discovered that increasing benefit levels was a politically advantageous route to maintaining support from veterans. By 1880, a full 25 percent of the federal budget was allocated to paying veterans’ benefits, second in size at times only to paying off the debt

U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 191 incurred by the war. This sum appears all the more impressive when one remembers that only Union soldiers were eligible; those who fought for the Confederacy never received government benefits of any kind. The pensions issue quickly became associated with the Republican Party. In 1881 President Garfield appointed Col. W. W. Dudley Commissioner of Pensions. Realizing the political benefits of handing out money, Dudley concluded that Ohio and Indiana were ripe with potential Republican voters, and ordered the Pension Bureau to accept all applications through the 1884 election, and to hasten applications from those two states. When the Republican Party swept the Senate, House, and presidency in 1888, the politics of pensions changed dramatically, making service alone, not injury, all that was needed to obtain a pension. By 1900, 74 percent of all veterans were enrolled as pensioners, a percentage that would rise to 90 percent a decade later. What had started as a pension program evolved into an old-age antipoverty program for northern veterans. Just as with its far more ambitious and far less successful attempts to integrate southern blacks into the national economy and southern society, the Republican Party controlling the federal government generated vast social policy programs when ideology and electoral interests supported them. The one broad group for whom there was no incentive to help was the poor, and their plight never drew the attention at the federal level during the Gilded Age. From its colonial times onward, the nation dealt with poverty on a local basis, and even the most progressive states did not start studying the issue with any seriousness until the 1870s. Most workers in the latter half of the 19th century lived on the verge of poverty for the simple reason that many wage positions did not offer year-round employment. Agrarian laborers, unless they tended dairy farms, were often hired on a seasonal basis, just as they still are today. Planting and harvest seasons meant laboring from dawn to dusk, but there was little work the rest of the year. For employees of the mills and manufacturing plants that sprouted up during and after the Civil War, work was frequently seasonal, especially in the North, where most industry was located. It was difficult to heat factories during the winter months, and often physically impossible to move their products when canals froze over, so plants would close for the winter and reopen once the thaw arrived. Laborers of all kinds therefore had to save their wages during periods of employment to make them last during down times. Given that studies revealed ‘‘fully employed’’ workers still worked an average of only 40 weeks per

year and wages for unskilled laborers were never all that high, this was quite a challenge for the average worker in the best of times, and an unexpected illness during the employment season could easily throw a family into destitution. Poverty was never understood as being systemically caused until the very end of the 19th century. Until that point, wealth and poverty were seen either as resulting from one’s willingness to work, or due to the Will of God. In the first case, the rich were rich because someone clever had an idea and worked hard to implement it, while the poor were in their position because they were lazy and unwilling to work. This perspective combined seamlessly with dominant Protestant religious interpretations that said those who pleased God were often blessed with wealth, while ‘‘poverty was the wage of sin.’’ This latter belief came to be challenged in a serious manner by Progressive theologians starting in the 1870s, leading to a system of thinking known as the Social Gospel. As it related to social policy, the Social Gospel movement argued that Christians should seek a more just social order and that poverty was not caused by sin but rather by a socioeconomic system that failed to care for its weakest. From this perspective, a polity had an obligation to treat humanely its poorest and helpless. As this belief spread in the 1880s and beyond, states began to create specialized institutions for the deaf, blind, and mentally ill---although the poor still remained a distinct category that into the 21st century have difficulty obtaining government assistance. Assistance for the poor was divided into two categories, indoor relief and outdoor relief. Indoor relief meant being sent to a poorhouse, which was administered by either the town or county. Outdoor relief meant cash assistance or goods such as food, clothing, and fuel. Data from New York’s secretary of state showed that in 1850, Kings County (Brooklyn, New York) helped 7,336 individuals through outdoor relief and 2,669 through indoor relief. By 1870, Kings County saw outdoor relief soar to 38,170 recipients and its poorhouses swell to 11,688. Spending on outdoor relief was never high, usually a few dollars per person, but the aggregate numbers meant higher taxes for the locals who paid them. Opponents of outdoor relief clamed that the typical recipient was a lazy, able-bodied male who did not want to work. Empirical evidence on paupers did not support such claims, however. An 1875 survey of 11,100 individuals who received outdoor relief that year revealed the following. Only 12.5 percent were adult males, and another 40 percent adult women (mostly widows), the remainder were children

192 Social Movements under the age of 16. Half of the adults were deemed to be poor due to ‘‘old age or permanent disability,’’ and a significant proportion of the remainder were poor from ‘‘temporary sickness or want of work of male heads of families and single men.’’ In short, those receiving assistance were either unable to work due to illness and old age, or were women unable to support themselves in an economy predicated on the existence of male breadwinners. There were very few poorhouses in America in the 18th century. Those that were founded during that time were located in port cities and served mostly as hospitals for the sick and destitute immigrants just off the boat from Europe, whereas locals were assisted through outdoor relief. By the 1860s, pretty much every major city and many rural counties had poorhouses, and they were the primary means of dealing with the truly destitute. Virtually all studies of poorhouses revealed their residents were elderly lacking children to take care of them, widows or abandoned single mothers with their children, and expecting women who used poorhouses as maternity wards. When local plants shut down, entire families often moved in, although the typical stay was not more than six weeks at a time. By the 1870s, the theory of scientific charity changed both outdoor and indoor relief in profound ways. Scientific charity conflated biology and socialization in the belief that through one’s actions one could become physically programmed to be lazy. Individuals fallen into such a state were described as ‘‘debased,’’ and once one became debased it was virtually impossible to be reprogrammed into a productive member of society again. Thus, antipoverty policies came to be harsh and punitive to make being a pauper so unattractive that even the most debased individuals would realize they were better off working---which it was assumed they always had the capacity to do. The main target of scientific charity practitioners was outdoor relief, which they thought took away the incentives to work. If the lack of outdoor relief meant one could not afford rent any longer, a few cold winter nights sleeping in an alley offered all the more incentive to turn one’s life around and go find work. If assistance had to be provided, it should come from private donations and be handled by ‘‘professionals,’’ that is, by practitioners of scientific charity organized into state aid societies that would hand out only what was absolutely necessary to the most deserving of applicants. The individuals who filled the state aid societies were usually quite wealthy and often well-connected, and were influential not only through personal connections but through the data they collected, whose

summaries always managed to support their point of view even when their raw data did not. By the mid1870s, outdoor relief was under serious attack, and where it did not disappear entirely, budgeting was often cut drastically. In 1890, Kings County stopped providing outdoor relief entirely. There were, of course, those who supported continuing outdoor relief. Employers wanted their skilled employees nearby during shutdowns. Many progressively minded people saw outdoor relief as a necessary component of an economic system that did not provide year-round employment. Finally, there were the social workers themselves, whose public statements always began with the mantra of the evils of outdoor relief but then turned to the reality of American poverty. As the superintendent of Albany, New York, wrote in his 1876 report, for example, ‘‘Everybody’’ knew that ‘‘the last two winters’’ had been exceptionally hard on the poor and laboring classes. They have been without employment and cannot get it. Now, what are you going to do with a man with a family of small children depending on him, with whom there is nothing in the world the matter except that he can’t work. While children rarely composed even 10 percent of poorhouse populations, their presence on any level was a large concern. Recalling that pauperism was understood not as a socioeconomic situation caused by the nature of a free market system, but rather by a character flaw that could be taught to children, a goal of scientific charity practitioners was to get children out of poorhouses completely before they became ‘‘debased.’’ When the New York State Commissioners of Public Charities first began studying the question in 1868, they counted 1,222 children who resided in a poorhouse at one point or another over the course the year. This number was seen as disturbing, and after a large and sustained economic depression starting in 1872, the state legislature decided it needed to do something. The result was the Children’s Act of 1875, which banned children from poorhouses and funded their stays in private orphanages. If parents entered poorhouses, their children were removed from them until they left. The Children’s Act had an unintended consequence. Before the act, parents either entered poorhouses with their children or they took responsibility for them on their own. After 1875, parents could hand their children over to the state for a time, and them take them back at a later one, whether or not they themselves

U.S. Social Policy, 1865--1890 193 entered a poorhouse. This allowed poor families to relinquish their children during periods of unemployment or sickness, which they did in remarkable numbers. Children being cared for by New York in orphanages and asylums jumped by three-quarters just in 1875 alone, and once outdoor relief was terminated, the numbers rose into the thousands. Most orphanages were operated by churches, and New York mandated that children go to one of their own religion. The Catholic Church witnessed a population explosion in its orphanages, with all but 17 of the 348 children residing in New York state’s poorhouses at that moment moving into one after the Children’s Act went into effect. This caused great consternation among New York’s Protestant elites, who watched the enormous Catholic orphanages built and funded by state money swell with pupils on their tax dollars. Despite this, political elites continued their support for both the Children’s Act and for paying to have children institutionalized. Under scientific charity, several groups of traditional poorhouse residents were transferred to institutions that could better serve their needs. The mentally ill were placed in state-funded asylums. Once formed, their populations increased dramatically as parents realized they could place their children (who were often adults) in an institution that was seen as far more humane than poorhouses. Deaf and the blind children also obtained their own schools, leaving poorhouses for the elderly and the unemployed. The mentally ill and handicapped had special needs that could be served by specialized institutions. The vast majority of children living in orphanages were not orphans, nor did they have special needs; they were children of impoverished parents who could not afford to look after them without support. Orphanages were used because lawmakers could not justify permanently taking children away from living parents simply because the parents were poor, nor could they justify paying parents to stay at home with their children while they were simultaneously ending outdoor relief for everyone else. Oddly enough, true orphans were often taken out of orphanages and placed with adoptive families. The most famous practitioner of placing children with adoptive parents was Charles Loring Brace, who in 1853 founded the New York Children’s Aid Society (CAS). Brace argued it was not merely the habits of poor families, but the very environments poor urban children lived in that taught them a lifestyle of poverty. Take those same children out of crowded urban slums and send them to rural farms, he argued, and they would learn the value of hard work. CAS specialized in

Beneficiaries of the Children’s Aid Society, around 1890. Child welfare historically has been a policy area that attracted wide support for government programs. (Library of Congress)

finding families for destitute city children. Most families were located in the Midwest on farms and needed children to help out with farm work. From the mid1850s to mid-1890s, Brace sent around 90,000 children out of New York City, assisted by public funds. Relocating children was highly controversial, and there is plenty of evidence that most children did not want to move. Indeed many ran away and returned to New York. Brace argued, however, that despite this, raising children in families was far superior to raising them in orphanages. Notably, the very attempt to take children out of the hands of poor parents led to policies supporting parents to keep them. The critique of orphanages made by Brace and many others was powerful, and allowing children to return to poorhouses was effectively written off as an option. It was extremely hard to counter the argument that the place for children was the home. As the orphanage population swelled in the 1890s, so did the costs to the state, and as a result, state legislators demanded better quality of service provision for the children in their charge. They wanted smaller sleeping quarters (to keep communicable diseases down), more nutritious food, lower teacher-to-students ratios, and

194 Social Movements better living conditions, all of which required new, smaller facilities, which were immensely expensive to build. If the best place for children was the home, and it turned out supporting parents directly was cheaper than institutionalizing their children, then there was strong reason to believe the best policy was to provide financial support for impoverished parents and to place orphans in foster homes, which is exactly what happened in the early decades of the 20th century once the Social Gospel became influential. When Americans began to study poverty systematically in the 1870s, they discovered that individuals fell into poverty for a variety of reasons, most of which were beyond their control, and localities began shaping social policy around distinctions of the ‘‘deserving’’ and ‘‘undeserving’’ poor in fine grained ways. The deserving were those who were poor due to unfortunate circumstances: the blind and deaf, the insane, children, and disabled Union veterans. Each group was pealed off from residing in poorhouses and given their own set of institutions, with veterans being provided pensions by the federal government. Children were sent to orphanages or state-run schools. Eventually their parents would be supported directly for their upkeep. The undeserving, such as the elderly who did not manage to save or serve their country, and ablebodied adults of both genders, were left without much assistance at all. Poorhouses and scant forms out outdoor relief were their only options during the Gilded Age. Social policy in the Gilded Age spanned a period of transition. The primary guarantor of citizenship rights shifted from states to the federal government, and this would have profound implications in later times when the federal government undertook massive antipoverty social policies such as Social Security, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and greater protection of

civil rights and liberties. The position of blacks moved from slaves with little to no rights in the South (and often not many more in the North), to a condition of full federal citizenship---even though it would be a full century before all the rights that accompanied citizenship could be enjoyed. Poverty slowly moved in this time from being a local to a state concern. Poorhouses and outdoor relief where slowly chipped away, first by moving the handicapped such as blind and deaf persons into their own schools and infirmaries, and second by moving those with psychological and mental disabilities, and then children. As narratives over the nature of citizenship and poverty changed, so too did social policy, with state and national governments slowly becoming more involved in the lives of their citizens, laying the groundwork for the vast expansion of the state during the Progressive Era and eventually the New Deal.

References and Further Reading Bensel, Richard. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859--1917. New York: Cambridge University Press. Carnegie, Andrew. 1920. The Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co. Chernow, Ronald. 1990. The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Banking. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. Hopkins, Charles. 1940. The Rise of the Social Gospel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kazin, Michael. 2006. A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan. New York: Anchor Books. Ladd-Taylor, Molly. 1995. Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare and the State, 1890--1930. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Luker, Ralph. 1991. The Social Gospel in Black and White: American Racial Reform, 1885--1912. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development1 Carol Nackenoff Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College

Women voters did not flood into the electorate in 1920 nor did they exhibit voting preferences that were markedly different from their male counterparts after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (1919). It would take more than 40 years for comparable numbers of men and women to vote in presidential elections. Sixty years after women across the nation were first able to vote in presidential elections, the proportion of eligible females voting began to exceed the proportion of eligible males voting, and this pattern has persisted and even become more pronounced since 1980. Starting in 1980 as well, a gender gap has opened up between voting preferences of women and men, with women more likely to support the Democratic presidential candidate than their male counterparts. This pattern is especially pronounced among white voters as white male support for the Democratic Party has declined. Attitudes on public policy also reveal some differences. Poll data reveal that women now tend to be more likely than men to support an activist role for government, especially in arenas such as health care and social welfare policy, to support gun control, and to oppose foreign U.S. military intervention. Especially during the final decades of the suffrage struggle, suffrage activists argued that women would bring different values and higher morals to the public sphere. There were no polls on attitudes toward public policy when they made this claim, but there may have been some different priorities on policy issues. There is historical evidence that quite a few men believed

‘‘American citizenship,’’ political scientist Rogers Smith notes, ‘‘has always been an intellectually puzzling, legally confused, and politically charged and contested status’’ (Smith 1998, 4). Despite universalistic and inclusive political and constitutional principles, inegalitarian legal provisions have played a profound role in shaping both who could participate in politics and the character of American politics itself. Smith notes that ‘‘for over 80 percent of U.S. history, American laws declared most people in the world legally ineligible to become full U.S. citizens solely because of their race, original nationality, or gender’’ (Smith 1998, 15). And as another recent scholar points out, ‘‘civic membership had a double meaning: in nineteenth-century America, it meant either all those recognized as members of the national community (anyone entitled to an American passport), or only the rights-bearing individuals entitled to full civic status and political participation (those who could vote, hold office, etc.)’’ (Ritter 2006, 12). Women seeking the franchise were repeatedly ensured that they were U.S. citizens. Voting, however, was not construed as an established right of U.S. citizens but rather pertained to the citizens of individual states, and ballot access was historically governed by the states. Struggles over women’s access to the ballot revealed a great deal about what qualified citizens to be judged responsible agents capable of participating fully in the political realm, and what ascribed or purported qualities made others less than fully members of the polity. 195

196 Social Movements women would at least close down saloons, since women had been active in the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the struggle for prohibition. Women sometimes pressed their demand for the vote in terms of their capacity to end corruption and sweep cities clean. They talked about shifting priorities from competitive capitalism and militarism, which they saw as male, to cooperation and social well-being. Many women leaders, including Jane Addams, were branded as unpatriotic and possibly even Communist sympathizers for their pacifism, which was linked to opposition to U.S. entry into World War I, during the Red Scare that followed the war. Women who created organizations such as the Women’s Peace Party and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom believed that women had a special role in promoting peace in the international arena. It is possible that gender differences in policy attitudes have waxed and waned in the past century, but there is some statistical evidence in the last quarter century that women and men have somewhat different political priorities and preferences. Despite the fact that the Nineteenth Amendment led to no flood of women into the electorate and made little immediate difference in terms of candidate preferences by gender, the struggle for votes for women had an important impact on American political development. The suffrage campaign affected the politics of race, labor, and immigration. It affected political parties, political campaigning, and the ability of parties to mobilize voters. The suffrage movement affected American institutions and national state-building. Struggles that reached the Court led to constitutional and statutory interpretations about citizenship, and about relations between the federal government and the states. As women sought the ballot, they also forged new visions of the state’s responsibilities toward its citizens, providing the underpinnings for the emergence of the limited social welfare state. Women active in suffrage politics also forged new public roles for themselves. They developed political skills that began, by the early part of the 20th century, to translate into new leadership positions in government and public life. Victoria Woodhull (1838--1927), who testified for suffrage before the 1871 House Judiciary Committee, became the first woman to run for president in 1872, and was followed by feminist activist and lawyer Belva Lockwood (1830--1917) in 1884 and 1888. Jeanette Rankin (1880--1973), a suffrage activist from Montana, became the first woman elected to Congress in 1916, where she worked for women’s rights and child welfare, opening debate on the Susan

B. Anthony (Nineteenth) Amendment in the House in 1917. Her stance against U.S. entry into World War I contributed to the loss of her seat. Frances Perkins (1880--1965), active in the New York Consumer’s League on behalf of women workers and who had participated in suffrage marches and given street corner suffrage speeches, became the first woman to enter the cabinet, appointed secretary of labor by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. Many women learned to become effective public speakers, to fund raise, lobby, and provide effective testimony before state and federal legislatures. They formed women’s networks and established their own organizations for equality that included the National Woman’s Suffrage Association, the American Woman’s Suffrage Association, the ensuing National American Woman’s Suffrage Association, the National Woman’s Party, and the League of Woman Voters. Women were engaged more broadly in separate female institution building on a national scale in this period, in line with their view that women had distinctive values and interests in the public sphere. They created large, active, mass membership organizations with chapters in many states. Women were central to the settlement movement and were engaged in many reform efforts from the municipal to the national level during the Progressive Era. Other organizations included the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, the Women’s Trade Union League, the National Consumer’s League, and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs. Some, but not all, of these organizations were active in their support of suffrage for women. All sought to assert women’s concerns and perspectives into matters of public concern.

Early Suffrage Politics and Political Development The women’s suffrage struggle in America began in earnest in 1848, when the first Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, New York, issued a Declaration of Rights and Sentiments. Early leaders had their upbringing in the abolitionist movement, and there were influenced by that movement’s emphasis on the moral equality of all human beings. Some of the leaders were also Quakers and had views of human equality shaped by the beliefs and practices of their faith. Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815--1902) and Lucretia Mott (1793--1880) met in antislavery circles and were the inspiration for the convention. Stanton modeled the document on the Declaration of Independence, the recourse to which indicated that women argued that certain natural rights had been violated by government.

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development Among the self-evident truths, Stanton argued, was that all men and women are created equal. Women have been denied their inalienable right to exercise the franchise, and, therefore, have been compelled to submit to laws to which they had no voice in making. Women have been deprived of all their rights when married, been shut out from most profitable employments, and denied access to higher education. Only the suffrage resolution proved controversial, but with the support of Frederick Douglass (1818--1895), it also passed. The Seneca Falls Declaration of Rights and Sentiments prefigured the predominant suffrage argument of the Gilded Age---that women should have access to what men have access to, including the vote. Based on the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, the 1848 document sought to establish its claim to political legitimacy by likening the struggle of women to the struggle of the colonies against illegitimate power. The Seneca Falls Declaration was based on the natural rights language of Enlightenment politics thought

Susan B. Anthony (left) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were pioneers in the fight for equal suffrage and women’s rights. (Library of Congress)

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rather than on any specific provision of the Constitution; the Constitution, Seneca Falls signers felt, should be read with these preexisting rights, the protection for which governments were created, in view. Lucy Stone (1818--1893) and Susan B. Anthony (1820--1906) were agents of the Anti-Slavery Society. Stone helped organize the first national Women’s Rights Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1850. Anthony became involved in women’s rights after working for abolition and temperance causes. Abolitionist women such as Stanton frequently drew parallels between the position of slaves and the position of women: ‘‘what have women and Negroes to do with rights?’’ Stanton asked rhetorically of the New York State Assembly in 1860. While recognizing that prejudice against woman’s equality was even more deeply rooted than that against racial equality, activists believed and hoped that women would gain from the abolitionist struggle.

The Impact of the Civil War Amendments on the Suffrage Movement and Political Development Women who had been active in the abolitionist struggle expected quick action on the enfranchisement of women after the Civil War and pressed Congress to this end. Congress not only failed to act, but during debate on the Fourteenth Amendment, deliberately attempted to control the scope of the amendment. Congressional authors of the post--Civil War amendments drafted the texts highly conscious of the effect of language chosen on the potential enfranchisement of women. The record of deliberations frequently speaks of women’s representation through male heads of household. The explicit desire of members not to enfranchise women---including black women---by neutral language in the amendment led to the introduction of gendered language into the Constitution for the first time. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, drafted by Congress in 1866, referred to ‘‘male inhabitants’’ and ‘‘male citizens’’ in its stipulations of consequences for apportioning representatives following from denial of the right to vote by any state. The introduction of gender in the Fourteenth Amendment angered suffrage leaders, who presented petitions containing 10,000 names in their attempt to thwart Congress on this language (Siegal 2002). The Fifteenth Amendment, which passed Congress in early 1869, would be the final straw for some women activists. Members of Congress told women that they could not ensure black enfranchisement if the suffrage amendment included women. The decision

198 Social Movements to enfranchise blacks before women caused a rift in the suffrage ranks. The woman suffrage movement, which had been organized as the American Equal Rights Association, split in 1869 over the exclusion of women from the Fifteenth Amendment stipulating that the right to vote would not be denied on account of race. The American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) supported the Fourteenth Amendment and stuck with the Republican Party, vowing to mobilize on a stateby-state basis to secure suffrage for women at the state level. Lucy Stone, her husband, Henry Blackwell, and Julia Ward Howe (1819--1910) were among the prominent leaders of the AWSA. The Women’s Journal was the official AWSA publication. Opposing the Fifteenth Amendment at the National Woman Suffrage Convention, the first such convention, in January of 1869, Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued that ‘‘manhood suffrage’’ was appalling and meant the lowest depths of political degradation for women. Stanton strongly opposed passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and argued for an ‘‘educated’’ suffrage: those who were the most intelligent should be enfranchised first. ‘‘Think of Patrick and Sambo and Hans and Yung Tung, who do not know the difference between a monarchy and a republic, who can not read the Declaration of Independence or Webster’s spelling-book, making laws for Lucretia Mott, Ernestine L. Rose, and Anna E. Dickinson,’’ she proclaimed (Meeting of the National Woman Suffrage Convention, January 19--20, 1869). At the American Equal Rights Association Meeting in May of that year, Stanton argued that if some must go first and others wait for suffrage, then ‘‘if intelligence, justice, and morality are to have precedence in the Government, let the question of woman be brought up first and that of the negro last’’ (American Equal Suffrage Association Meeting, May 12--14, 1869). Efforts to introduce a Sixteenth Amendment barring voting discrimination based on sex began immediately, with resolutions introduced in Congress both in 1868 and 1869. The NWSA vowed support for any political party that would promote woman suffrage. The newspaper of the NWSA was The Revolution, edited for many years by Susan B. Anthony. The NWSA pursued a pronounced militant strategy in the period from 1869-1875. Women’s attempts to use the language of the Constitution to advance their rights during this era reflected the ‘‘New Departure’’ campaign of the NWSA to read woman’s suffrage and other rights into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their efforts sometimes

resulted in decisions that reinscribed traditional roles and reaffirmed state power. Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment brought novel legal challenges to the federal court system. Women brought an early challenge to their exclusion from the practice of law on the basis of the new clause stipulating that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. In Bradwell v. State (1873), decided immediately after the more famous Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Court read privileges and immunities extremely narrowly. Decisions about who could be admitted to the bar, just as decisions about who would be licensed as butchers, were matters for the states and had nothing to do with privileges or immunities belonging to citizens of the United States. Moreover, it was not an equal protection issue for the Court. Myra Bradwell had passed the bar exam but was refused admission to the Illinois Bar. Justice Bradley added that the law did not have to make room for unusual cases and that women’s role in the family was founded in nature and divine ordinance. The Grimke sisters, long active in antislavery and women’s rights causes, were among those acting on the ‘‘New Departure.’’ Sarah (1792--1873), then 79 and Angelina (1805--1879), age 66, marched to the polls in Massachusetts in 1870 along with 42 other women to vote in local elections, claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment enfranchised them. Women had attempted to vote as early as 1868; Susan B. Anthony kept a list of white and black women who went to the polls, including a group of 172 women who went to vote in New Jersey (Anthony and Stanton Papers Project 2007). Other women attempted to vote in 1870 and 1871 elections in New Hampshire, Michigan California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. In the District of Columbia, more than 70 women marched to the polls in April, 1871 and were refused the opportunity to vote. Some of the women involved in these attempts brought lawsuits. Susan B. Anthony organized a group of women who went to register and cast a vote in Rochester, New York, in 1872 and she was prosecuted for casting an illegal ballot (also prosecuted were the ballot inspectors who allowed them to vote). Awaiting trial, Anthony went on a lecture tour and claimed both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment had extended the right to vote to women (women having also been in a state of servitude). She also argued that the Constitutional provision that the United States would guarantee to each state a republican form of government (Article IV, Section 4) supported a federal guarantee of suffrage.

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development In Missouri, Virginia Minor also attempted to register to vote in the 1872 election and was turned away by the registrar since the constitution of the State of Missouri stipulated that male citizens of the United States should be entitled to vote. Minor brought a legal challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment that ultimately was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Minor v. Happersett (1875), the Supreme Court considered whether women had a constitutionally protected right to vote under the Civil War Amendments. As new Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing for the Court, saw it, the argument was that as a woman, born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the State in which she resides, she has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities of her citizenship, which the State cannot by its laws or constitution abridge (Minor v. Happersett). While women were, indeed, citizens, the right of suffrage was not one of the necessary privileges of citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reasoned, had not added to the privileges and immunities of citizens. These remained no more and no less than what they had been before the passage of the amendment. In 1894, Belva Lockwood, a feminist lawyer who had already become one of the first women admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, asked the Court to overturn the decision by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to deny her admission to that state’s bar. The Virginia statute stipulated that ‘‘any person’’ could be licensed, but the state court held that in Virginia, the common usage and understanding did not include women. When the U.S. Supreme Court refused to overturn that decision, reiterating that the right to practice law was not among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, the Virginia General Assembly took the additional step of amending its statute, changing ‘‘any person’’ to ‘‘any male citizen.’’ In the case of Ex Parte Lockwood (1894), the attempt to press women’s rights resulted in a setback for women when the Supreme Court gave a green light to states wishing to exclude women. Meanwhile, the state-by-state campaign to achieve woman’s suffrage waged by the AWSA and later by the National American Woman’s Suffrage Association (NAWSA) yielded some victories in western states between 1890 and 1896. Wyoming, having had woman suffrage as a territory since 1869, was able to enter the Union with suffrage for women in 1890 despite a

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congressional attempt to bar them unless they dropped that provision. Women in Wyoming were highly mobilized in defense of the suffrage provision, and state officials sent a telegram to Washington saying that Wyoming would stay out of the Union rather than join without the vote for women. Wyoming became the ‘‘equality state,’’ and Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton took the newly completed transcontinental railroad to see this land of freedom. Colorado, Idaho, and Utah followed Wyoming to statehood with suffrage for women. There would be no new additions to the list until 1910; opponents frequently mobilized around the fear that women would institute prohibition. Wyoming would elect the nation’s first woman governor in 1924 and another western state, Montana, would send Jeanette Rankin as the first woman elected to Congress in 1924. The woman suffrage struggle made it difficult for men to talk in terms of universals such as ‘‘citizen’’ or ‘‘person.’’ As women continued to press their case, it became increasingly apparent that these terms meant males only. In fact, the franchise was often termed ‘‘manhood suffrage’’ in the latter part of the 19th century.

How Narratives about Lessons of the Civil War Amendments Informed the Suffrage Struggle Despite passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, access to the ballot remained largely a matter for state regulation following the Civil War. The Supreme Court insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no federal citizenship rights beyond those that had been recognized in the antebellum era and did not read this amendment to require a fundamental alteration of the relationship between the federal government and the states. This construction of the new language of the Fourteenth Amendment differed from at least some of the explicit expectations of key architects of Section 1 of that amendment (Amar 1998). As northern attempts to enforce the terms of Reconstruction faded, southern states gradually created both formal and informal barriers to black enfranchisement. By the late-19th century, race came to specify the terms of public incorporation of women and race became a vehicle through which white women would come to press their claims for inclusion. The ways in which institutional and political actors read the lessons from experience with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments came to influence debates about enfranchising others. Narratives and social

200 Social Movements memory about the aftermath of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were constructed inside and outside the legal community. Questions of suitability or preparation for citizenship increasingly mapped onto thinking about racial differences and overly hasty attempts to incorporate blacks in the aftermath of the Civil War. It was increasingly common to hear arguments that Indians, blacks, and immigrants required gradual tutelage and preparation for citizenship. These discussions also shaped how women would position their own struggle for the franchise. In the early 1880s, controversy over removal of the Ponca Indians from their Nebraska lands and Helen Hunt Jackson’s sensational volume, A Century of Dishonor, focused considerable public attention on ‘‘the Indian problem’’ (Jackson 1886 [1881]).2 Policy makers contemplating major changes in federal Indian law deliberated how to civilize and assimilate tribal Indians. During debates on the Civil War Amendments, lawmakers occasionally had raised questions about the implications of new constitutional language for Native Americans. In speaking about the apportionment of representatives, the Fourteenth Amendment excluded in the count of persons ‘‘Indians not taxed.’’ Opponents of citizenship and of enfranchisement argued that tribal Indians were not ‘‘born or naturalized in the United States,’’ as stipulated in the first section of that same amendment. The Supreme Court held that, while the United States could choose to naturalize them, no decision by a Native American to leave the tribe and live among white citizens made that Native American a citizen nor did it confer a right to vote (Elk v. Wilkins). Reaction against this construction by the Court fueled reform efforts. Although the Dawes (General Allotment) Act of 1887 provided that Native Americans who accepted individual allotments of land and gave up communal holdings would become U.S. citizens, the ability of states to determine who would have access to the ballot remained resilient. A significant portion of the organized activists and policy makers involved in federal Native American policy, such as those attending the annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian, tended to concede that foisting a mass of unprepared voters on an unwilling state, which might have been justified in the case of blacks in formerly rebellious southern states, was not justified here (Nackenoff 2006).3 The social construction of the errors of Reconstruction led to a climate of opinion in which state suffrage restrictions would be seen in terms of the need to be prepared to vote. Literacy tests in the South, used chiefly to eliminate African American would-be voters,

were defended with this logic. Literacy requirements for immigrants seeking entry into the United States would be introduced in Congress repeatedly, sometimes passed, and finally enacted over President Wilson’s veto in 1917. In the years leading up to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, some groups were judged unfit for citizenship altogether, considered unassimilable, such as Chinese and Japanese immigrants. Authority for this conclusion was generally found in U.S. Rev. Stat. 2169, in which the privilege of naturalization was restricted to free white persons ‘‘of good character,’’ as had been stipulated in the original Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization in 1790; persons of African nativity and descent were added by statute in 1870 (First Congress, Session II, Chapter 3, March 26, 1790; 16 Stat. 254, July 14, 1870). Asians were presumed excluded by this language. The Supreme Court read the 1906 Act providing for a uniform rule for naturalization of aliens, restrictively, holding that the 1906 Act had to be read consistently with all of the Naturalization Acts since 1790 and therefore Japanese could not be naturalized under existing legislation (Takao Ozawa v. United States). During waves of immigration in the late-19th and early 20th centuries, whiteness (which tended to be conflated with how the average man understood Caucasian) was taken as a marker of fitness for naturalization. It was in the midst of these other changes that white women were reunited in their quest for suffrage at the dawn of the last decade of the 19th century. The timing of the merger of the two estranged factions of the women’s movement, the AWSA and the NWSA, was noteworthy. Republicans were on the eve of totally abandoning their attempts to enfranchise blacks. By the early 1890s, northern Republicans generally concluded that the rush to enfranchise blacks had been overly hasty, had placed extreme burdens on state governments, and that when states demanded preparation for such responsibility they were not unreasonable. After 1891, no force would be used to compel states to enfranchise blacks. Even among liberal reformers, suffrage was not always seen as a necessary requisite of citizenship by this time. Senate filibuster killed the House-passed Lodge Bill in 1891, which would have provided some protection of black voting rights and protection against violence and voter intimidation; white Southerners widely perceived this as an invitation for them to enact formal disenfranchisement laws. In 1894, Congress went further by repealing the 1870 Enforcement Act, which had provided federal election oversight in the South. Moreover by the 1890s,

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development Supreme Court decisions had restricted the meaning and promise of citizenship in the United States and deemed most regulatory functions matters for state law. The Court had curbed congressional powers of remedy and read state action narrowly; new means of disenfranchising black voters in the South had begun to make their appearance. In this period, various prominent woman suffrage leaders came to embrace the argument that citizens should be literate and knowledgeable about public affairs. This was all the more reason they were rankled by the exclusion of educated, morally upright, bourgeois women from the franchise. Even when suffrage leaders argued that they did not wish to remove the vote from anyone, their arguments lent support to the movement to make it much harder for non-middleclass, non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants to establish a claim to citizenship in the mid-1910s and 1920s, especially in the era of postwar xenophobia. As Carrie Chapman Catt (1859--1947) pronounced in 1920, there is ‘‘no safe or sound democracy which is not based upon an educated, intelligent electorate’’ (Catt 1920, 861).

Race, Class, Ethnicity, and the Shift toward a Federal Suffrage Amendment By the early years of the 20th century, the struggle for votes for women brought many white, middle-class suffragists to meeting halls, street corners, churches, colleges, and legislative chambers across the country. They were joined by female working-class supporters, who had more experience in the streets than some of their bourgeois allies. Early in the century, some working women were getting experience speaking in legislatures on behalf of suffrage and some bourgeois women were on the streets and picket lines, engaged in battles for working women’s causes. Suffrage women increasingly participated in open-air meetings, large-scale marches, parades, and public spectacles as they continued to seek state-by-state enfranchisement (Finnegan 1999). In doing so, they challenged traditional notions of bourgeois femininity. The first suffrage parade, organized by the Women’s Political Union, took place in New York City in 1910; many more would follow.4 In the final years of the suffrage struggle, emboldened women assembled costumed street tableaux, wore sandwich boards, organized suffrage caravans with motor vehicles, created advertisements, and took their campaign to the beaches. Suffrage women garnered a significant public audience during these years, made a claim to moral authority while moving from the private

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to the public sphere, and increasingly found effective ways to shape public debate. But the experience of seeking votes for women at the grassroots level year after year took its toll on some suffrage leaders and affected both rhetoric and strategy in the final years of the struggle. By the early 20th century, many suffrage leaders were no longer vigorously campaigning to extend the vote to all adult Americans. Suffrage for (white, middle-class) women would arguably counterbalance the vote of foreigners and ignorant males and would even help preserve white supremacy in the South. Rhetorically, women increasingly turned to contrasting the education and moral stature of ‘‘women’’ and the deficiencies of many already entitled to vote. Despite the moving words of former slave Sojourner Truth (1851) at a woman’s rights convention that women who worked in the fields and behind the plow were women, too, suffrage leaders would revert to a classed and raced notion of ‘‘women’’ in making appeals for votes in an environment in which progress and enlightenment were associated with the white race. Rising concerns about immigration from eastern and southern Europe and the rising tide of Jim Crow legislation only heightened these associations. Issues of race, class, and immigration shaped the way in which suffrage leaders conducted their campaign. Suffrage activists frequently complained that they were classed alongside the criminal, the insane, the imbecile, and the Indian in their exclusion from voting. They voiced increasing humiliation at being ruled over by ignorant, illiterate immigrant males and by enfranchised African American males. NAWSA leaders Carrie Chapman Catt and the Rev. Anna Howard Shaw (1847--1919) widely shared their anger and disappointment that Native Americans who were unschooled, uncivilized, and capable of speaking the English language were being enfranchised in certain states such as South Dakota, while well-educated women and women who had staked out and held claims on the frontier remained excluded (Shaw 1891).5 Race was central to NAWSA’s commitment to work state-by-state for suffrage. The decision involved a strategic calculation about southern fears of federal intervention in the race question, and deference to state strategies of black disenfranchisement. There was an implicit assumption that if states disenfranchised black men they also would be able to do the same to black women with statewide woman’s suffrage. Suffrage leaders attempted to reassure southern audiences that suffrage would have no adverse effect on black voting restrictions established at the state level. With

202 Social Movements white-only primaries, literacy tests, and other racebased disenfranchising measures, including intimidation, gaining ground in the South by the 1890s, quite a few appeals for woman suffrage in the South were made on the grounds of continued white dominance. Southerners feared a federal rule that might supersede state regulations and undermine the accommodations the nation had only recently made to racial exclusivity after the Fifteenth Amendment. NAWSA’s approach was both a bow to southern fears and to the argument that suffrage was a state, not a federal, matter. However, some suffrage leaders began to believe their best hope lay with a federal suffrage amendment. After years of struggle at the state level, leaders such as Susan B. Anthony and Ida Husted Harper (1851--1931) were skeptical about democracy and thought their best hope resided with the enlightened. They grew frustrated with the people they had to win over. Activists appealed openly to members of Congress to support a federal suffrage amendment so that members of Congress and state legislators---the better sorts---could decide the issue rather than the man in the street. As Harper told a House committee in 1912, ‘‘the legislatures represent the picked men of the community, its intelligence, its judgment, the best that the community has.’’6 They argued it was impossible to convert foreigners who had grown up under monarchical governments to support woman’s suffrage. Immigrant males, they asserted, were backward, traditional, and patriarchal, and yet it was to these very voters they were forced to appeal in statewide campaigns. Carrie Chapman Catt claimed ‘‘the illiterate is universally an antiwomen suffragist’’ (quoted in Fowler, 1986, 84). Harper complained that We have to submit our question [woman suffrage] to the negro and to the Indian men of the whole country, when we go to the individual voters, and we have to submit it to the native-born Chinese, and to all those men from southern Europe who are trained in the idea of woman’s inferiority (Meeting of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, London, April 26--May 1, 1909, 831; Harper 1912, 71). Hull House Settlement co-founder Jane Addams (1860--1935), who led the 1912 delegation of prosuffrage speakers, took issue with some of her delegation over the contemptuous attitude they exhibited toward immigrants. While insisting that the immigrant vote was not a vote to be feared, she nevertheless offered that providing the franchise to every adult woman in

the United States would double the native vote but not the immigrant vote, because there are many more foreign men than women in this country (Addams 1912, 77). Other suffrage supporters in the final decade of the struggle resorted to mathematical arguments in venues ranging from the halls of Congress to pamphlets to contend that there were more native-born women than foreign-born of both sexes, and that ‘‘to enfranchise all women was to increase the proportion of the pious, law-abiding, and educated to the irreligious, vicious, and ignorant voters’’ (Kraditor 1981 [1965], 130--131, citing leaflets of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party in April and August 1917). The argument that women’s votes could counteract the misguided votes of others was extended fairly readily beyond ethnic to racially solidaristic appeals as activists began to broach the subject of a federal suffrage amendment in the South. Leaders indicated both their support for a federal amendment and for a state’s right to determine qualifications for electors. An article from New Orleans, reprinted with apparent tacit support from the editors of the Woman Citizen, the national newspaper of the NAWSA, averred that the suffrage amendment would not affect existing state restrictions, since ‘‘every law of every southern state that restricts a negro man in the right of suffrage under the fifteenth amendment, will restrict in exactly the same way every negro woman when the suffrage amendment is passed’’ (‘‘In Their Own Woodpile’’ 1919, 239). In Birmingham, Alabama, in 1915, shortly after President Wilson had vetoed a literacy bill, then--NAWSA president Dr. Anna Howard Shaw wondered ‘‘why we make it so easy for male ignorance to enter our country or to gain political power, and are so fearful at the very thought of injecting a little female ignorance into our electorate that we withhold the ballot from the large body of intelligent American women’’ (1915, 7). Crediting state-enfranchised women with efforts to remove party symbols (eagles, roosters, stars) that previously helped illiterate male voters mark their ballots at the polls, Shaw implied the existence of women’s block support for southern efforts to disenfranchise blacks via literacy requirements. Shaw continued: There is not a color from black to white, from red to yellow, there is not a race, there is not a nation, which has not contributed men to be our sovereign rulers . . . no nation has ever made its women the subjects of their former slaves save this our nation where we sing of the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave. And so I say that the most humiliating political position that the women of any nation have

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development ever occupied is that which American women occupy today (1915, 9). Suffrage leaders and many of their contemporaries linked ignorance, illiteracy, vice, and opposition with both democracy and suffrage to establish a discourse in which access to citizenship properly depended on merit. For some of these activists, there was a natural link between this argument and support for an education qualification for voting, echoing earlier sentiments of suffrage leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who had been a staunch supporter of a literacy test and requirement that voters understand English.

Divisions in the Suffrage Ranks NAWSA moved slowly and cautiously toward exploring a federal suffrage amendment, but some suffrage activists who had worked with or been influenced by radical English suffragist Dr. Emmeline Pankhurst (1858--1928) were growing impatient with conventional approaches. The militant suffragettes in England were more aggressive in pursuit of their goals, and Pankhurst had been arrested multiple times, jailed, and gone on hunger strikes. Alice Paul (1885--1977) and Lucy Burns (1879--1966) had participated in the suffrage campaign in England, as had Harriot Stanton Blatch (1856--1940), the daughter of Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Paul and Burns had joined other suffragettes in English jails. Blatch arranged Pankhurst’s first lecture tour of the United States in 1909. As founder of the New York--based Equality League for Self-Supporting Women, Blatch had two years earlier brought one of the first English suffrage prisoners from the Women’s Social and Political Union to the United States to speak (DuBois 1987, 52).7 At the 1912 NAWSA annual meeting, Rev. Dr. Anna Howard Shaw had established a Congressional Committee to spearhead the federal amendment work and appointed Alice Paul to head this committee. One of the first acts was the organization of a massive suffrage parade in Washington on the eve of the inauguration of President Wilson, drawing thousands of highly choreographed middle-class, professional, college-educated, and working-class women and also drawing out many protesters and police. Tensions soon emerged between the NAWSA leadership and the Congressional Committee. In early 1913, Paul and Burns formed the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage to help the work of the Congressional Committee, and they continued to engage in more militant tactics than NAWSA leaders were comfortable with, threatening to hold elected

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officials of the party in power responsible for the fate of suffrage, and engaging in activities that ran afoul of police. NAWSA leaders feared the militants would alienate congressional supporters and turn public opinion away from woman suffrage. Since Paul and Burns would not cease their Congressional Union activities, NAWSA expelled them from the Congressional Committee, attempted to stop the Congressional Union from working in states where NAWSA auxiliaries did not want them, and generally believed that the Congressional Union was undermining progress that had been made. The organization refused to admit the Congressional Union as an auxiliary member in 1914. In 1916, the Congressional Union leaders formed the National Woman’s Party (NWP), published its own weekly newspaper, The Suffragist, and in 1917 began using more militant tactics. The group deliberately began using tactics of nonviolent civil disobedience. Engaging in daily pickets of the White House, courting arrest, burning the president’s words, and chaining themselves to the White House fence, women of the newly formed NWP transgressed boundaries that other activists felt maintained or built public sympathy for suffrage. They were repeatedly jailed; Paul and other allies went on a highly publicized hunger strike. Paul was placed in solitary confinement and was force-fed. Other women faced similar treatment. While the women saw themselves as political prisoners, they were not officially acknowledged as such. The NWP attracted a variety of prominent female activists, including Harriot Stanton Blatch and author and editor Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860--1935). Their members believed that aggressive tactics and militancy brought the suffrage campaign to a quick and successful close. More moderate feminists in the NAWSA believed that they succeeded despite the NWP and Congressional Union tactics. During World War I, NAWSA leaders pressed the United States to grant votes to women as an emergency war measure. NAWSA President Carrie Chapman Catt and like-minded leaders had distanced themselves from the significant number of women who opposed U.S. entry into the War---an organized peace movement that led to substantial subsequent backlash. Catt and her allies argued that women were contributing importantly to the war effort, and moreover, Wilson’s campaign to make the world safe for democracy was harmed by the fact that was the United States continued to deny votes to women. If the United States wanted to serve as a model to the world, it should set its house in order and join the ranks of nations that had already enfranchised women. This wartime approach and Catt’s appeal to the

204 Social Movements president seems to have made an impact on Wilson, who began to urge members of Congress to support the suffrage amendment, and openly endorsed suffrage in the fall of 1918, noting that America was now judged in the view of all nations, that suffrage was necessary for successful prosecution of the war, and that women had made great sacrifices for the war effort. It appears that war achieved what decades of struggle had not: congressional action sending the Nineteenth Amendment to the states for ratification. The competing visions of the NWP and NAWSA were not at an end. Not only did they disagree over aggressive and militant tactics, but they disagreed about what followed upon suffrage. Moderates were convinced that women would transform politics and bring about wiser, better policies with their new votes. Paul and the NWP believed that equality for women required more additional and formal commitments. Shortly after women were guaranteed the vote under the Nineteenth Amendment, Paul penned the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which stated that ‘‘Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’’ The Amendment was introduced in Congress each year, and was finally sent to the states for ratification in 1972, only to fall short by three states. The NWP and NAWSA and its successor organization, the League of Women Voters, clashed over the ERA because NAWSA had supported and fought for protective labor for women, and they feared the language of equal rights would erase the gains working women had achieved. This battle to achieve gains in social welfare legislation during the Progressive Era had involved focusing on the most vulnerable first, to build support gradually for larger classes of workers, and had been waged in legislatures and courts. While efforts to pass a federal child labor amendment failed, several Court decisions had upheld legislation mandating maximum hours of work for women. This effort can be viewed in part as the age-old battle in which pragmatists, who thought that social welfare gains were best accomplished incrementally, were pitted against idealists. But it was more than this. The debate between ‘‘sameness’’ and ‘‘difference’’ feminists was joined. Feminist scholars and social welfare policy experts looking back on this period on the eve of the 21st century continue to discuss and debate what was gained, and what was lost, by emphasizing protection and gender difference during the formative New Deal period. Critics point out that, to the extent women became objects of policy making, they were

incorporated more as subjects than as citizens. Notions of dependence persisted, shaping welfare legislation and the state’s relationship with women (Pateman 1989; Mink 1995). Those who emphasize what was accomplished credit women with a substantial role in the formation of the American social welfare state, and note the role of maternalism in these accomplishments (Skocpol 1992; Nackenoff 1999).

Maternalism, Suffrage, and Constructing ‘‘Women’’ As Theda Skocpol has effectively demonstrated, women in the late-19th and early 20th centuries were highly mobilized and effective in achieving their social policy aims despite their exclusion from the franchise (Skocpol 1992). It was in no small measure due to the fact that women in the early decades of the century saw that the public interests they shared as women were as effective as their efforts in pressing and winning progressive and social reform measures before winning of suffrage. This shared identity was constructed. Another important development in the language in which women’s political equality was fought out during the last quarter-century of the suffrage struggle must be introduced, then, because it contributed both to claims about what enfranchising women stood to accomplish and to the emergence and construction of the category ‘‘woman.’’ The older view was exemplified by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, whose long suffrage struggle stressed the importance of self-sovereignty of rightsbearing individuals. All individuals should be encouraged to develop their faculties, to rely and depend on themselves. As Stanton argued, ‘‘nothing strengthens the judgment and quickens the conscience like individual responsibility’’ (Stanton 1892b; also see 1892a). Women were also individuals, and therefore should be self-governing as a means toward self-development. While not often renouncing the view that women rightfully governed the private sphere because of their special nature, suffrage activists in the mid- to late-19th century argued that they also should be full citizens in the public sphere. Another discourse was emerging that would tend to dominate the later suffrage struggle, however. Women began speaking much more about the differences and special qualities women offered in political spaces and began thinking of themselves as a group. Toward the end of the 19th century, women began to emphasize their difference from men as a positive reason for enfranchisement (Kraditor 1981 [1965]). This

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development was an extension of the cult of True Womanhood; women began to stress their common identity and stipulate common values. While these were not always essentialist claims, they were based at a minimum on women’s experiences as nurturers and care workers in their families and communities. Women argued that their special natures, perspectives, and experiences made them particularly fit for reforming politics. A short essay by Jane Addams (1860--1935) entitled ‘‘If Men Were Seeking the Franchise’’ captures the spirit of those claims. Men were enamored of fierce individualism, competitive capitalism, and militarism. Women paid attention to the proper administration of cities, were concerned with social welfare, peace, cooperation, and a social ethic (Addams 1913). Instead of stressing individual autonomy, women understood that society required cooperation and human interdependence. At a minimum, both sexes needed to be engaged in public affairs; a more chauvinistic position was that women would do a far better job with what was important. Women joined other critics of industrial capitalism such as Thorstein Veblen (1857--1929) and Edward Bellamy (1850--1898) to argue that male administration was mal-administration. Women brought a different sensibility to these activities, and a well-governed public sphere required the values, experience, and voices of women. An expanded notion of the home in the late suffrage years contributed to an expanded understanding of public space and public business. Home was everywhere, and therefore, so was woman’s work. Charlotte Perkins Gillman joined Addams in arguing that many of the functions that traditionally had belonged to women in the household had moved out into the public sphere, and if women were to behave responsibly, they would have to follow those tasks out of the traditional home (Gilman 1970 [1903], 330). There was a permeable boundary between public and private---and analogies between government and housekeeping---that established and proliferated this case in the Progressive Era. Some activists pressed for suffrage specifically (and sometimes chiefly) at the municipal level, in part because the kinds of issues on which women claimed authority were often handled here. School elections were often singled out as an example of the kind of public voice women should readily have. Other issues lending themselves to municipal solution ostensibly included juvenile delinquency, prostitution, public drunkenness, corruption, sanitation, public health, nutrition, squalor, and crime. In the early years of the new century, Jane Addams pressed for the municipal

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franchise so that women, traditional housekeepers, could be brought into city housekeeping. Drawing on maternalist rhetoric, suffrage leaders promised to sweep the nation’s cities clean and combat unhealthy influences on the public. It was as female activists began to talk about their common bonds and interests as women in positive terms---not merely in terms of the ways in which they experienced discrimination in work, citizenship, and the family---that feminism began to emerge in the early decades of the 20th century (Cott 1987). Women asserted a ‘‘we’’ that ostensibly transcended differences of class, race, ethnicity, region, or religion. Leaders who were themselves largely white, middle-class women, claimed an authority to speak for women’s interests and values, even though they spoke most accurately and authentically for middle-class white women who pursued causes at their leisure and who were not compelled to support themselves or their families. As suffrage increasingly became pitched as a battle between virtue and vice, politics was defined as a struggle between principle and selfishness, and between enlightenment and progress, on one hand, and backward people and the past, on the other (Fowler, 1986, 82). The opposition to suffrage was characterized as the voice of ignorance, of saloon-keepers and their friends, the voice of those who resisted public housekeeping reforms. While suffrage leaders generally remembered to argue that working women needed the vote as well and sometimes brought working women to testify before congressional committees, many industrial working women were immigrants, and their sort was frequently cast as the suffragists’ enemy. The non-English-speaking immigrant, the illiterate Eastern European peasant immigrant, and others who brought their nonprogressive, Old World attitudes with them became particularly visible targets in the battle. Women’s moral authority was linked to their nearmonopoly on claims to the nurturance, education, and moral development of young people, dependents, and the helpless. These were traditional women’s roles taken into the public sphere. Working-class women spent almost all of their waking hours and energies outside the home. Women empowered themselves in the public sphere, as Peggy Pascoe (1994) has argued, by engaging in relations of rescue. Certain women were able to claim moral authority in public by fostering relations of dependence: working women, immigrants, and Native Americans were to be cared for. They were to be legislated for, Americanized, and tutored in how to be good mothers and good citizens.

206 Social Movements

Suffragettes march for the right to vote in New York City on May 6, 1912. After more than 70 years of effort, women finally won the right to vote when the Nineteenth Amendment became law in August 1920. (Library of Congress)

The vote was no longer seen, as Addams had hoped, as a means for those with little power to express and protect their own interests and to press for needed reforms (Addams 1912, 79). Women would demonstrate their importance to the public sphere by leading, educating, and molding those who, like the young, needed to learn to be mature and self-governing, and who needed to learn responsible democratic citizenship. They were objects of policy making rather than equal voices in the policy-making process. Some white women gained the vote and a new avenue through which to speak for themselves, but they also gained leave to speak for others, including other women (Nackenoff 1999, 165). Even though African American middle-class women were active in suffrage organizations of their own, there was little cross-race work during this period. On the surface, there was agreement by white and African American suffrage leaders that women’s distinctive voices were sorely missed in politics. A number

of Progressive Era African American women emphasized either that there was a ‘‘feminine as well as a masculine side to truth’’ (Cooper 1988 [1892], 60). or that women were superior in the mission of civilizing and uplifting the race. Some early 20th-century African American suffrage leaders also appealed to social housekeeping to make the argument for suffrage. Adella Hunt Logan (1863--1915), a NAWSA member who was affiliated with the Tuskegee Institute, contended that in realms ranging from building and sanitary inspection, to public schools, juvenile courts, and prisons, public affairs would be better handled if women were participating in public life. Women were more attentive to the duties of citizenship than their male counterparts (Logan 1912, 242). Mary Church Terrell (1863--1954) likewise wrote of the differences between intelligent, cultured, and virtuous disenfranchised women and ‘‘illiterate, degraded, and vicious’’ male counterparts who are enfranchised (Terrell 1912, 244).

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development Despite similar understandings of the role of women in elevating politics and public discourse, white women---steeped in popularized late-19th-century evolutionary ideas---made distinctions between ‘‘Americans’’ and ‘‘Africans’’ in terms of level of civilization and the sexual differentiation that was a claim to authority and stature for white maternalist suffragists.8 Race and virtue were so closely linked in both the suffrage rhetoric and scientific understandings of the period that white woman’s claim to authority as a maternalist depended on skills that only she possessed and that generally were defined by exclusion. Addams, significantly, resisted claims for women that were based in race or gender. Maternalism, however, tended to incorporate a hierarchical argument about relations between nurturer and child that lent itself to some of these race, ethnic, and classbased assumptions.

Women, Suffrage, and the Growth of the Administrative State As Daniel Tichenor (2002) has demonstrated, shifts in policy paradigms meant privileging new claims and forms of expertise. Late suffrage maternalism also mapped onto Progressive discourses on the privileging of expertise and instituting a science of government. Since many matters that used to be administered in the home had become socialized, women needed to enter the public sphere to help in the proper administration of matters in which women had an expertise. Knowledge and information, properly applied, yielded solutions to social problems, and it was increasingly argued that such knowledge should be wielded by agents of the state. Some women entered government and began to assume positions of authority in part because of the spheres in which they, and other women, had been claiming and establishing expertise. There were ‘‘problems’’ to be solved, and many social problems were redefined as problems of proper administration. For instance, a synergy developed between municipal courts and suffrage reformers. Women worked with municipal courts to implement their reform agenda. The creation of a juvenile court system in cities such as Chicago was testimony to their success. In general, those who advanced claims of expertise tended to become proponents for the growth of national state capacity. Early 20th-century reformers required federal authority for many of their projects and became advocates for the extension of the reach of federal law and federal authority.

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There was, however, an alternative mode of thinking that was more democratic and less state monopolized. John Dewey and his followers, including Addams, departed significantly from the belief that top-down expertise could solve social problems. They insisted on an experimental method grounded in experience, which was not to be confused with granting political power to a cadre of experts. For Dewey and Addams, crafting solutions to social problems was not a matter of mere knowledge, control, or scientific management, but rather it required an experience-based understanding and incorporation of the knowledge and wishes of others. This argument was influential in some spheres and served as a counterweight to the expert-driven vision of improvement. Merit-based arguments about suffrage also led rather easily into arguments that responsible citizens were those who were armed with information and knowledge about government and policy issues in the communities, state, and nation. As women made the transition from supplicants to voters and the NWSA yielded to the new League of Woman Voters, the linkage between good citizenship and educated citizenship was high on the agenda. A significant issue before the 1920 Convention of the NAWSA and new Congress of the League of Women Voters in Chicago was the report of the Committee on American Citizenship. Arguing that ‘‘First of all, we must protect the United States from aliens and from unworthy citizenship and second, we must give a square deal to the alien applicants who have a right to be made citizens of the United States,’’ the chair of the committee spoke about Americanization and illiteracy. She reported that her committee supported an education qualification for naturalization, and the NAWSA/League of Women Voters membership supported this qualification when it was submitted to a vote (Convention of the NAWSA and Congress of the League of Women Voters, February 13--18, 1920). The League of Women Voters was expressly nonpartisan; good government was viewed as an objective aim. Women who previously had joined other Progressive Era activists in attacking corruption in government associated political parties with corruption. Parties, they argued, appealed to ignorance, emotion, self-interest, spectacle, and patronage---they were not the vehicles of proper government. By attacking spoils, patronage politics, party machines, and election practices that featured parades, liquor, picnics, and show over substance, reformers contributed to the sanitization of elections, a decline in the power of parties, and the emphasis on rational appeals to a presumably enlightened

208 Social Movements electorate. Partisan efforts to mobilize immigrant and working-class urban voters were also appeals to males, and the sanitization of electoral politics can also be seen in some measure as its feminization. The League of Women Voters, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and other organizations promoted citizenship schools in the early years of the 1920s. While sometimes these schools were part of an Americanization effort, they also were organized to prepare women to understand politics, gather and disseminate information about policies linked to the ‘‘good government’’ movement, and help women wield their new influence. Studying issues of politics and public policy in advance of voting created more distance between female reformers and the more passionate and partisan style of working-class voters. The era’s very commitment to progress and to science shaped the vision of government held by many of these heirs to the suffrage movement. For many Progressive Era activists, the solution to social problems required expanded state capacity and the introduction of more neutral and scientific approaches to governing. This narrative tended to privilege expertise over democratic decision making. Suffrage activists and women pressing for the responsible use of women’s new voting power tended to support the development of the administrative state, bureaucratic power, and insulation of the state from at least certain forces of democracy.

Conclusion There was an enormous amount of political mobilization around the woman’s suffrage struggle, and women active in suffrage work began building bridges to women seeking the franchise around the world. Female activists took the skills they built in one arena and employed them in others, whether in a social policy arena, in organization and party building, or in the peace movement. Suffrage women, who had hopes for what would become politically possible when females were armed with the vote, pressed for policy as well as for votes, and helped shape the state and state capacity in the process. While feminist consciousness and talk of solidarity would decline shortly after suffrage was won, women of this era, their organizing skills, and their public accomplishments were available as models for the ‘‘second-wave’’ feminists of the 1960s and 1970s. As in the earlier years of struggle, issues of race and class would continue to influence the choice of ‘‘women’s issues’’ and the focus of the movement.

References and Further Reading Addams, Jane. 1912. Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 62nd Congress, 2nd session, March 13, 1912. Addams, Jane. 1913. ‘‘If Men were Seeking the Franchise,’’ Ladies’ Home Journal 30 (June): 21. Amar, Akhil Reed. 1998. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. American Equal Suffrage Association Meeting, May 12--14, 1869, New York. Reported in History of Woman Suffrage. Edited by Elizabeth C. Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, Vol. II, 383. New York: Fowler & Wells, 1882. Anthony, Susan B., and Elizabeth Cady Stanton Papers Project. 2007. Rutgers University. Available at http://ecssba. rutgers.edu/resources/voters.html (accessed February 10, 2007). Baker, Paula. 1984. ‘‘The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780--1920.’’ American Historical Review 89 (June): 620--647. Catt, Carrie Chapman. 1919. Presidential Address, International Woman Suffrage Alliance, June, Geneva, Switzerland. In Ida Husted Harper, A Brief History of Woman Suffrage in the United States. Vol. VI, 861. New York: National American Woman Suffrage Association. Convention of the NAWSA and Congress of the League of Women Voters, February 13--18, Chicago, Illinois. History of Women Microform. New York: NAWSA. Cooper, Anna Julia. 1988 [1892]. A Voice from the South. New York: Oxford University Press. Cott, Nancy. 1987. The Grounding of Modern Feminism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. DuBois, Ellen Carol. 1987 ‘‘Working Women, Class Relations, and Suffrage Militance: Harriot Stanton Blatch and the New York Woman Suffrage Movement, 1894--1909.’’ Journal of American History 74 (June): 34--58. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). Finnegan, Margaret. 1999. Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture & Votes for Women. New York: Columbia University Press. First Congress, Session II, Chapter 3, March 26, 1790; 16 Stat. 254, July 14, 1870. Flexner, Eleanor. 1975. Century of Struggle: The Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Fowler, Robert Booth. 1986. Carrie Catt: Feminist Politician. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. 1970 [1903]. The Home, Its Work and Influence. New York: Source Book Press. Harper, Ida Husted. 1912. Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, March 13. ‘‘In Their Own Woodpile.’’ 1919. News Orleans Item, Woman Citizen 4, no. 10 (August 9): 239. Jackson, Helen Hunt. 1886 [1881]. A Century of Dishonor. Boston: Roberts Brothers. Kraditor, Aileen S. 1981 [1965]. The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890--1920. New York: Columbia University Press; New York: W.W. Norton (reprint of earlier edition, paperback). Logan, Adella Hunt. 1912. ‘‘Colored Women as Voters.’’ The Crisis 4, no. 5 (September): 242.

The Suffrage Movement and American Political Development McDonagh, Eileen. 1999. ‘‘Race, Class, and Gender in the Progressive Era: Restructuring State and Society.’’ In Progressivism and the New Democracy. Edited by Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, 145--191. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Meeting of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, April 26--May 1, 1909, London. President’s remarks. Ida Husted Harper, History of Woman Suffrage. Vol. VI, 831. New York: National American Woman Suffrage Association. Meeting of the National Woman Suffrage Convention, January 19--20, 1869, Washington, D.C. Reported in Editorial Correspondence, The Revolution (January 22, 1869 and May 27, 1869), in History of Woman Suffrage. Edited by Elizabeth C. Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, Vol. II, 1861--1876, 353. New York: Fowler & Wells, 1882. Mink, Gwendolyn. 1995. The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917--1942. Ithaca, NY: Cornell. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) Nackenoff, Carol. 1999. ‘‘Gendered Citizenship: Alternative Narratives of Political Incorporation in the United States, 1875--1925.’’ In The Liberal Tradition in American Politics. Edited by David F. Ericson and Louisa Bertch Green, 137-169. New York: Routledge. Nackenoff, Carol. 2006. ‘‘Constitutionalizing Terms of Inclusion: Friends of the Indian and Citizenship for Native Americans, 1880s-1930s.’’ In The Supreme Court and American Political Development. Edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, 366--413. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. Newman, Louise Michele. 1999. White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Pascoe, Peggy. 1994. Relations of Rescue. New York: Oxford University Press. Pateman, Carole. 1989. The Disorder of Women. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ritter, Gretchen. 2006. The Constitution as Social Design: Gender and Civic Membership in the American Constitutional Order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Shaw, Rev. Anna Howard. 1891. ‘‘Indians Versus Women.’’ Address before the National American Woman Suffrage Convention in Washington, D.C., February, 1891. Printed in The Woman’s Tribune, May 9, 146. Shaw, Reverend Anna Howard. 1915. Speech delivered in Birmingham, Alabama, April 16. Siegel, Reva. 1999. ‘‘Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning about ‘the Woman Question’ in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination.’’ In History, Memory, and the Law. Edited by Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, 131--182. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, citing evidence in the Congressional Globe for the 38th---40th Congresses. Siegal, Reva. 2002. ‘‘She, the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family.’’ Harvard Law Review 115 (947). Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States.

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Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Smith, Rogers M. 1998. Civic Ideals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 1892a. ‘‘Self-Government the Best Means of Self-Development.’’ In Concise History of Woman Suffrage. Vol. IV. Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. 1892b. ‘‘Solitude of Self.’’ Address before the U.S. Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, February 20. In Concise History of Woman Suffrage. Vol. IV, 189--191. Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds. 1969 [1881--1922]. History of Woman Suffrage. 6 vols. New York: Fowler & Wells (reprinted New York: Arno Press). Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 192--93 (1922). Terrell, Mary Church. 1912. ‘‘The Justice of Woman Suffrage.’’ The Crisis 4, no. 5 (September): 244. Tichenor, Daniel. Dividing Lines. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Truth, Sojourner. 1851. ‘‘Ain’t I a Woman?’’ Woman’s Convention, Akron, Ohio.

Notes 1. I would like to thank Maria Macia and Caitlin Markowitz for research assistance on this project. 2. The book was designed to expose the long history of wrongs committed by the federal government against the Native American, and a copy was sent to every member of Congress. The Poncas were removed from their Nebraska reservation lands when these lands were given to rival Sioux Indians by treaty. The removal and relocation took place over objections in 1877, resulting in hardship and loss of life. An eastern lecture circuit tour brought the issue to the attention of Jackson and other reformers. 3. The Lake Mohonk Conference began meeting in 1883 and met annually for over 30 years; the status of the Indian dominated the agenda until late in its history. 4. The Women’s Political Union was the new name of the New York City organization, the Equality League of SelfSupporting Women (1907), organized by Harriot Stanton Blatch as a cross-class organization. 5. The original speech may have been written by Carrie Chapman Catt. Prominent black feminist Anna Julia Cooper reacted in print to the invidious comparisons and assumptions that some deserve the vote more than others. 6. On women taking their domesticity outdoors in the first decade of the twentieth century and the relationship between class, gender, and public space, see Finnegan (1999); DuBois (1987). 7. The visitor was Anne Cobden-Sanderson, who emphasized the cross-class nature of the suffrage struggle and who had gone to jail with women factory workers. 8. On the science of sexual differentiation in the period see Newman (1999).

Contemporary Social Movements Ann Marie Szymanski Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Oklahoma

hierarchy, and consensual decision making over majority rule. Mantras, such as ‘‘the personal is the political,’’ suggested that social transformation now began at home, and that prior distinctions between private choices and public policies had become irrelevant. In short, studies of post-1960 activism frequently posit that NSMs played a key role in shaping America’s transition from an industrial to a postindustrial nation. As might be expected, other scholars have questioned the ‘‘newness’’ of social movements after 1960 and have shown that they obtained leaders, social networks, practices, ideas, and other resources from older movements. Some have doubted the relevance of generational politics, and whether recent movements really are the product of an identifiable ‘‘new class.’’ Still others have suggested that 19th-century movements resembled their post-1960 counterparts in numerous ways and that students of NSMs missed these similarities because they were so focused on how post-1960 activism diverged from that of the 20th-century labor movement. Undeniably, both the supporters and critics of the NSM paradigm make valid points. Even innovative social movements build on the legacies of earlier mobilizations, blending old practices with new, and using venerable concepts to frame fresh issues. Conversely, although American movements may operate within the same basic government structure, defined by a relatively stable Constitution, they nevertheless confront a dynamic political system with all the challenges and opportunities that presents. Indeed, as many recent

Activists, observers, and scholars have often remarked on the ‘‘newness’’ of social movements after 1960, leading to claims that this period produced a New Left, a New Right, and new social movements (NSMs) more generally. But, what was so ‘‘new’’ about post-1960 social activism? Among other things, analysts have observed that the social movements of the 1960s were the product of a new generation, the Baby Boomers, who were born during the years 1945--1964. Blessed with unprecedented affluence, this generation presumably formed the vanguard of a ‘‘new class’’ that, on the Left, devalued the traditional politics of economic inequality in favor of a new emphasis on rights consciousness, identity formation, and quality-of-life issues (such as environmental protection). Meanwhile, on the Right, young Americans combined the antiCommunism of their elders with a broader critique of society that trumpeted antistatism, free market capitalism, and cultural concerns (like abortion). In raising new and divisive issues, the NSMs seemed to challenge the postwar ‘‘liberal consensus,’’ an approach to governance that presumed broad-based economic growth would preclude serious social conflict. Observers have also noted that post-1960s activism assumed new forms, particularly on the Left. Nonviolent civil disobedience, consciousness raising, and ethnic nationalism were regarded as innovative approaches to achieving social change. Some protesters also relied on an apparently novel method for coordinating political action---participatory democracy---that privileged egalitarian organizational structures over

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Contemporary Social Movements movements have discovered, shifting political landscapes require tactical deftness and flexibility.

From Old Left to New: The Civil Rights Movement While commentators may disagree about the novelty of recent activism, they generally acknowledge the centrality of the civil rights movement (1955--1968) in sparking a new wave of protest after 1960. Doug McAdam even contended that this movement, which sought to abolish discrimination against African Americans, should be viewed as an initiator movement that forged the path for subsequent ‘‘spin-offs,’’ including those seeking the rights of women, Chicanos, gays, and Native Americans (McAdam 1995). McAdam is surely correct to emphasize the black insurgency’s role in setting the stage for subsequent movements on the Left; however, the civil rights movement itself cannot be understood without reference to the American labor and pacifist movements, prominent strands of the ‘‘Old’’ Left. As blacks began to mobilize against discrimination during the late 1950s, labor unions had seemingly ossified into unresponsive, bureaucratic organizations, more concerned with self-preservation than social change. Indeed, ‘‘Big Labor’’ was indicted during the 1960s for being undemocratic and for embracing business unionism, a philosophy that concentrates on improving wages, benefits, and working conditions rather than on transforming the capitalist system. However, the labor movement had not always been so hierarchical and timid. For example, during the 1920s and 1930s, unions had sponsored worker education institutes that challenged business unionism, experimented with participatory decision making, and trained future leaders of the civil rights movement, such as Ella Baker. Furthermore, the labor movement, along with its allies in the courts and the National Labor Relations Board, bequeathed its group-oriented constitutional vision to the civil rights movement. Just as unions had fought to represent workers as a class, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) would seek legal protection for blacks as a group rather than as aggrieved individuals. American pacifists also laid the groundwork for the civil rights movement in numerous ways. Pacifists helped found two key civil rights organizations, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), in 1942 and 1957, respectively. Believing that all forms of violence are wrong, they sponsored training workshops for civil

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rights activists that encouraged them to engage in nonviolent direct action and to understand the Gandhian philosophy behind it. Furthermore, peace groups like Fellowship of Reconstruction (FOR) had a long history of egalitarian organizational forms and participatory decision making. While pacifist organizational models were not overtly adopted by many subsequent groups, they did provide a critique of centralized, elite-led groups that resonated with civil rights activists who were impatient with the top-down leadership of SCLC and its singular focus on Martin Luther King, Jr. Although surely indebted to the Old Left for organization, ideas, and tactics, the civil rights movement also drew on existing black groups when developing its mass base. As the most deep-rooted institution in the black South, the black church usually adapted to the racial climate of the times. Beginning with the bus boycotts of the 1950s, however, black clergymen became key agitators on behalf of the civil rights agenda and brought thousands of churchgoers into the fray, often under the auspices of the SCLC. Similarly, historically black colleges and universities had long endured the racial status quo in exchange for their autonomy, but then found themselves supplying activists, facilities, and other resources to CORE, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and like organizations. Meanwhile, the nation’s oldest extant civil rights organization, the NAACP, founded in 1909, saw its local chapters engage in an escalating number of protest events as the 1950s progressed. Indeed, the NAACP was the first major movement organization to expand its activities during the 1950s. Responding to the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision, which banned racial segregation in public schools, local NAACP chapters sponsored school desegregation suits and other actions to secure compliance with Brown. This agitation provoked a harsh white backlash against the NAACP, however, and its efforts were soon overshadowed by the dramatic Montgomery bus boycott (1955--1956), a campaign that mobilized the blacks of Montgomery, Alabama, against the city’s segregated public transit system. The Montgomery effort taught southern blacks a valuable lesson: although lacking sufficient political power locally, they could directly confront white racist practices, expose their injustice, and bring moral and economic pressure to bear. Such direct action would become especially prevalent after 1960, when the movement sponsored successive waves of sit-ins, jailins, Freedom Rides, and community-led campaigns. The bus boycott also elevated Martin Luther King, Jr. to national prominence and led to the creation of

212 Social Movements the SCLC. Many later identified the black insurgency with King and the SCLC, but the civil rights movement included other major organizations, such as the NAACP, CORE, and SNCC, and sundry local groups. While the leading organizations often competed vigorously for resources, adherents, and credit, they also played complementary roles within the movement and coordinated efforts in particular campaigns. For example, the SCLC provoked national responses to its direct action campaigns in Birmingham (1963) and Selma, Alabama (1965), but it was the NAACP, longexperienced in lobbying, which helped shepherd the resulting civil rights and voting rights legislation through Congress. In a similar fashion, the major groups set aside their differences to participate in the Voter Education Project, a federally sponsored program to register voters in the South during the early 1960s. Of course, the development of the civil rights movement presupposed the economic, demographic, and political changes that encouraged mass mobilization in the first place. During the first half of the 20th century, cotton farming declined in the South at the same time that tight labor markets led northern industrialists to encourage the migration of millions of blacks to the North. This population shift, known as the Great Migration, meant that increasing numbers of African Americans could exercise the right to vote, a right that was severely circumscribed in the South. With more blacks voting in northern cities, politicians there became more sympathetic to the plight of African Americans. Courted by both Republicans and Democrats, black voters ultimately developed a stronger relationship with the Democratic Party, particularly after Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933 and his New Deal provided economic relief to the millions impoverished by the Great Depression, including blacks. Black identification with the Democratic Party would remain tenuous, however, as long as southern Democrats used their powerful positions in the party and Congress to block civil rights advances. Hence, the black vote remained in play during the 1940s and 1950s, and presidential candidates from both parties grew more responsive to demands for civil rights legislation. Interest in solving the ‘‘Negro question’’ was also higher after 1945 because racial inequality was incompatible with America’s claim to represent democratic values in its postwar rivalry with the former Soviet Union for international influence. Encouraged by the increasing salience of civil rights as a national and international issue, as well as by favorable Supreme Court decisions, blacks had good reason to believe that they could gain

further protection of their rights from the federal government during the 1950s and 1960s. While African Americans acquired some leverage over northern and national political leaders after World War II, they remained essentially shut out of the southern political system. Southern officials employed literacy tests, residency requirements, poll taxes, and intimidation to disfranchise most blacks. Nevertheless, even in the South, economic and demographic developments assisted the black insurgency. The decline of cotton farming not only spurred the Great Migration, but it also drew blacks into southern cities after 1930. By relocating from rural to urban areas, African Americans obtained greater education opportunities, economic independence, and the chance to join black organizations, like the NAACP, that would serve as the organizational base of the civil rights movement. Furthermore, urban blacks were less exposed to racial violence and more likely to register to vote than those living in rural areas. Thus, even before southern blacks began to mobilize on a mass scale, they had secured some autonomy from the white power structure. Significantly, a disproportionate number of civil rights leaders held occupations that could claim such autonomy. Clergymen, housewives, college students, and professionals serving the black community could lead protests without reprisals from white employers. Still, the movement also succeeded in organizing blacks from all walks of life, testimony to its wise strategic choices. Its embrace of nonviolence appealed to many religious African Americans, and its direct action campaigns typically advanced modest goals, such as the desegregation of local facilities and voter registration, which could be sought by ordinary blacks, agitating in their own communities. Through spiritually uplifting mass meetings and education training programs for organizers and citizens, civil rights leaders rendered their movement resilient to the repression it triggered from southern prosegregation forces after 1955. Indeed, civil rights groups even capitalized on the savagery of white supremacist violence. Whether sponsored by public officials or secretive Klansmen, supremacist attacks on activists only served to broadcast the intransigence and inhumanity of their opponents to Americans everywhere. In March 1965, white brutality in Selma, Alabama, helped convince 76 percent of the nation that the federal government needed to enact forceful voting rights legislation that removed the obstacles to black suffrage in the South (Lawson 1997, 111). Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had been looking for an opportunity to introduce such a measure, quickly took

Contemporary Social Movements action, and Congress obliged. The resulting statute--the Voting Rights Act (VRA)---had profound consequences for both the civil rights movement and the party system. Their new voting rights gave southern blacks access to electoral politics for the first time; accordingly, many civil rights activists focused on voter registration, candidate recruitment, and the pursuit of racial justice through the conventional political system rather than through disruptive protest. The VRA also cemented the alliance between the Democratic Party and African Americans, giving blacks an institutional base from which to wage battles against discrimination. As black identification with the Democratic Party soared, white southern Democrats began to seek other partisan options, including George Wallace’s third-party candidacy in 1968 and eventually the Republican Party. With the gradual departure of its most conservative elements, the Democratic Party became more liberal in its composition, thus making it the natural target of other New Left movements, including the antiwar, feminist, and gay rights movements.

Youth, Radicalism, and the Antiwar Movement Like many NSMs, the civil rights movement was multigenerational, encompassing school children, college students, World War II veterans, middle-age women, and grizzled veterans of the Old Left. Nevertheless, its youth wing---closely associated with SNCC---developed the most unconventional approaches to achieving racial equality. Whilst many civil rights activists sought to capitalize on the VRA, SNCC rejected such mainstream strategies, a decision that resonated with white campus radicals who supported civil rights, challenged campus governance, engaged in community organizing, and opposed America’s involvement in Vietnam. Since the early 1960s, the student movement, represented most notably by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), had admired the courage of young blacks, who risked life and limb to directly confront southern racism. Campus activists also appreciated SNCC’s loose organizational style, which sought to develop leadership at the grassroots, reach decisions by consensus, and encourage local control in decision making. During the mid-1960s, campus radicals found additional inspiration in SNCC’s radicalization after the 1964 Democratic National Convention refused to recognize the delegates from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), a multiracial alternative to the whites-only Mississippi Democrats. SNCC had fostered the creation of the MFDP, hoping to reform the

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Democratic Party from the inside. When that effort failed, several SNCC workers sought independence from the Democratic Party, abandoned their commitment to integration and nonviolence, and championed Black Power, a black nationalist ideology that celebrated black culture and the capacity of African Americans to determine their own fate, separate from that of whites. Black nationalist views were also held by the Black Panthers, founded in 1966, whose gun-toting campaigns to improve their communities made them outlaw heroes to white radicals. White radicals soon joined their black counterparts in forsaking conventional politics. In 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing American military attacks on Communist forces in Vietnam, and President Lyndon B. Johnson subsequently ordered massive assaults on the North Vietnamese and their southern allies, the National Liberation Front (NLF). With thousands of civilians and soldiers dying to keep a military junta in control of South Vietnam, campus activists found it hard to believe that mainstream liberalism really stood for freedom, democracy, and equality. Although most antiwar protesters worked within the political system to end America’s involvement in Vietnam, campus radicals believed that Vietnam was but a symptom of structural problems in that system. Like the black nationalists, radical white students lost faith in the Democratic Party, nonviolent protest, and coalition building as solutions to inequalities at home and imperialism abroad. Instead, they embraced alienation, confrontation, and revolution. The parallel development of black and white radicalism among the young is not surprising, particularly given the involvement of dozens of white students in SNCC, CORE, and in support of the black insurgency. For example, some of the white participants in the civil rights movement’s 1964 Freedom Summer campaign initiated the Free Speech Movement at the University of California--Berkeley later that fall. After helping black Mississippians demand the vote from hostile whites, Freedom Summer veterans returned to Berkeley intent on continuing the struggle for racial equality, only to be informed by university officials that they could not conduct political activities on campus property. Having defied southern segregationists, these students protested this policy as well, sparking a threemonth standoff with campus administrators that won over most of the campus community and eventually a reversal of university policy. Similarly, key members of SDS had experience in SNCC and CORE, and their attempt to organize an interracial movement of the

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H. Rap Brown (left, with bandage), national chairperson of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), was a leader in the black power movement and was shot and wounded in 1967 after delivering a fiery speech about the cause. The Black Power movement encompassed the more strident attempts of African Americans to establish their own political, cultural, and social institutions, independent of white society. (AP/Wide World Photos)

urban poor in the mid-1960s was heavily influenced by these groups’ aims and organizational forms. White radicals learned much from black insurgents, but they also created a movement with its own set of ideas, organizations, and practices. Significantly, white campus activists sought to distinguish their radicalism from that of the Old Left and its emphasis on the labor movement as central to political change. In its manifesto, The Port Huron Statement (1962), SDS criticized ‘‘Big Labor’’ for its adherence to business unionism, its top-down management style, its racism, and its sluggishness in responding to the changing structure of the American economy. Instead, SDS envisioned a future America in which the university would take the lead in combining the civil rights, peace, and labor movements into a force capable of challenging academic, corporate, military, political, and racial hierarchies. Once destroyed, such hierarchies were to be replaced by a democracy in which individuals participated directly and equally in decisions affecting the quality and

direction of their political, economic, and social lives. Though it originated as an ideal vision of America, student activists later sought ‘‘participatory democracy’’ within their movement organizations, including SDS and groups associated with the women’s liberation movement. During the early 1960s, SDS established itself as a multi-issue group that opposed poverty, racism, the arms race, and much of American foreign policy. In April 1965, however, the group became closely identified with the Vietnam issue after its March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam attracted more than 20,000 protesters and qualified as one of the largest antiwar demonstrations ever (Gosse 2005, 89). As opposition to the war mounted, new members flooded SDS and the group struggled to assimilate them and their exclusive focus on Vietnam. Older members clashed with newcomers, and the organization lost its cohesiveness as the war escalated and its activists lurched even further to the Left. Indeed, by the time

Contemporary Social Movements SDS collapsed in 1969, the group had evolved into something resembling the Marxist Old Left, with factions vying to lead a Marxist-Leninist revolution that would overthrow capitalism and imperialism. While significant in the annals of student radicalism, the demise of SDS was but a minor setback in the history of the much larger antiwar movement (1965-1975). Unlike SDS, which never expanded much beyond its campus base, the antiwar movement was composed of a broader, more diverse segment of the American population, including housewives, clergymen, military veterans, and trade unionists. War opponents also ranged across the ideological spectrum, from libertarian to liberal to radical. This diversity both strengthened and weakened the movement. On the one hand, as antiwar agitation spread to new constituencies, they created new organizations and expanded the movement’s overall resources. In 1966, for example, leading Christians and Jews responded to the escalation of the war by founding Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV), an ecumenical group that developed local chapters across the country. Also, its diversity allowed the movement to offset the loss of organizations like SDS that petered out. Nevertheless, the variety of antiwar activism made it difficult for the movement to forge shared goals and a unified message. During the mid-1960s, for instance, some activists desired an immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam; others sought a negotiated settlement to the war; and still others hoped for a ‘‘third solution’’ in South Vietnam whereby Vietnamese Buddhists and other non-Communist nationalists would create a new nation outside of American and North Vietnamese control. In light of such cacophony, no national group(s) stepped up to lead the movement, though SDS and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) were prominent voices for antiwar radicals and liberals, respectively, and broad-based coalitions, such as the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, organized substantial demonstrations in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. The movement was thus fragmented, a structure that allowed antiwar sentiment to bubble up from the grassroots, but which also meant that it lacked the capacity to discipline its more unruly adherents. Representing only a small portion of the movement, some radical activists engaged in arson, bombings, property damage, and the deliberate provocation of public authorities---invariably receiving disproportionate media coverage in the process. Radicals also periodically used anti-American rhetoric, waved

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NLF flags, and adopted the unorthodox lifestyle of the counterculture. As a result, Americans formed negative views of antiwar protesters despite their growing opposition to the war after the 1968 Tet Offensive, the Communist invasion of South Vietnam, which indicated that the Johnson administration was overoptimistic about the progress of the war. In 1970, antipathy toward protesters was so widespread that 53 percent of Americans who favored an immediate withdrawal of troops from Vietnam nonetheless felt antagonistic toward antiwar activists (De Benedetti 1990, 283--284). That the antiwar movement was associated with mayhem was unfortunate, for most of the movement’s adherents eschewed violence. As with the black insurgency, the antiwar movement owed many debts to the older pacifist movement, which had actively opposed war as a solution to international conflict since World War I. Long-time pacifists like David Dellinger helped lead antiwar demonstrations in the 1960s, and pacifist groups like FOR, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the War Resisters League (WRL) remained steadfast opponents of America’s intervention in Vietnam, regardless of the broader movement’s fluctuating fortunes. Pacifists also convinced a majority of the movement’s activists to fight the violence of war with nonviolent tactics. Most antiwar protesters were not pacifist in the sense that they rejected all violence, but many shared the pacifists’ belief that this particular war was immoral. Having framed their war opposition in moral terms, activists often felt that their protest acts should be consistent with that morality. Of course, even the antiwar movement’s nonviolent protest was sometimes viewed as confrontational; for example, draft-card burnings and other forms of peaceful civil disobedience were highly controversial. Still, the willingness of many war opponents to work within the political system was noteworthy. National organizations like CALCAV, SANE, AFSC, and WRL frequently lobbied Congress; local groups pressed municipal governments to pass resolutions, demanding an end to the war. In 1968 and 1972, activists sought to use the presidential primary system to secure an antiwar nominee from the Democratic Party; in 1970, they directed efforts to identify and promote peace candidates for Congress. Like civil rights supporters, war opponents typically targeted the Democratic Party as a source of institutional support, a strategy that proved fruitful in the long run. Though unsuccessful in convincing the 1968 Democratic National Convention to nominate their preferred candidate, Eugene McCarthy, or to approve a platform plank calling for a de-escalation of the war, the movement’s first incursion into

216 Social Movements national politics contributed to Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to end his 1968 reelection bid. By 1972, the Democrats were even more responsive to the movement, nominating antiwar candidate, George McGovern, and adopting a platform calling for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. McGovern was trounced by Richard Nixon, but antiwar activists could count on greater support in Congress as Democrats gained seats in 1972. In the end, the antiwar movement had a far greater impact on America and its foreign policy than its adherents initially thought. To war opponents, the Johnson and Nixon administrations seemed mulish in their determination to prosecute the war, regardless of widespread domestic opposition. Because foreign policy making within the executive branch is not transparent, activists had no way of knowing how protests shaped decision making. Hence, many peace advocates became discouraged as the war dragged on, even though their efforts undoubtedly constrained presidential warmaking. In 1968, popular dissent contributed to Johnson’s decision to establish a new ceiling on the number of American troops in Vietnam, halt the bombing north of the Twentieth Parallel, and engage in substantive peace talks. Meanwhile, Nixon’s Vietnamization policy, which involved reducing U.S. forces while enhancing the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military, reflected the administration’s belief that troop withdrawals and fewer draft calls would placate war opponents. Finally, as antiwar activists gained congressional allies during the early 1970s, they saw Congress ban funding for ground forces in Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (1970) forbid any further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia (1973), deny funding for Nixon’s unilateral air war in Indochina (1973), enact the War Powers Resolution (1973), which sought to limit the president’s power to wage war without congressional approval, and slash American assistance to Cambodia and South Vietnam (1974, 1975).

Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexual Orientation: The Rise of Identity Movements The antiwar and civil rights movements often shared personnel, tactics, and party affiliation, but they ultimately took separate paths after 1965. Whereas the antiwar movement mounted impressive demonstrations through April 1971 and could rely on growing congressional support thereafter, the late 1960s were a period of decline for the civil rights movement, which lost organizational strength, financial support, shared goals, and political leverage, despite the persistence of racial

inequality. Of course, some of the black insurgency’s energy was channeled into the political system by the VRA, a strategy backed by the still-robust NAACP. Blacks who resisted this approach and instead embraced black nationalism were most successful in particular localities and in the cultural realm, where universities, theaters, and other institutions increasingly recognized the significance of black contributions to history, literature, and the performing arts. Despite the ebbing of organized black protest, the civil rights movement’s influence continued to reverberate through American life in the movements seeking the rights of women, Native Americans, Chicanos (Mexican Americans), Puerto Ricans, Asian Americans, and gays. Like their precursor, these movements seized on the language of rights to demand remedies to the problems of inequality experienced by marginalized social groups. Such inequality, they argued, was not due to individual failings, but to a social structure that systematically privileged some Americans over others, denying them equal rights and opportunities. In addition to making rights claims, many feminist, ethnic, and gay activists also called for liberation. Drawing on the revolutionary discourse of SDS and black nationalism, such activists contended that their groups needed to go beyond formal equality if they were to defeat sexism, white supremacy, or homophobia. To be sure, laws upheld inequities, but so did seemingly private practices, such as the stereotypical depictions of group members by the media. To acquire real power, disadvantaged groups had to challenge widespread assumptions about who they were, what they were capable of, and how they fit into American society. In fact, social relations would only be transformed after a prolonged struggle for the liberation of marginalized groups from the cultural, social, and economic hierarchies that thwarted egalitarianism in the United States. Certainly, calls for liberation and equal rights were seldom mutually exclusive, but activists who emphasized liberation tended to be younger and were perceived to be more radical. Along with their rights-oriented associates, they contributed to one of the New Left’s more durable legacies: the rise of identity politics, which partly displaced the Old Left’s emphasis on economic inequality as the central concern of progressive America. The women’s movement, which embarked on a new wave of activism in the early 1960s, played a vital role in the development of identity politics in America. As was the case with several marginalized groups, women had a long history of organizing to improve their position in society but found the 1960s to be a particularly

Contemporary Social Movements propitious time to renew their efforts. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy created the President’s Commission on the Status of Women to study women’s position in the nation and the obstacles that prevented their full participation in American life. This commission, and the state commissions that formed shortly thereafter, did more than issue reports; they also convened women from around the nation who brought the perspectives of labor, religious groups, educators, the legal profession, the NAACP, and others to bear on the issue of women’s rights. Energized by their interactions and investigations, women activists lobbied Congress and state lawmakers for measures that would improve women’s lives, thus helping to secure the Equal Pay Act (1963), and the ban on sex discrimination by employers in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964). Such laws would have remained dead letters, however, as long as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with tackling complaints of sex discrimination, did not take them seriously. Stunned by the EEOC’s indifference, 27 women attending the 1966 conference of state statusof-women commissions founded the National Organization for Women (NOW) to demand that public and private entities grant women equal rights in America. NOW began its operations with few financial resources but with many intangible assets, including experienced activists and a president, Betty Friedan, whose book, The Feminine Mystique (1963), was a best-selling indictment of middle-class family life and the constraints it placed on women. As its members lobbied, litigated, and demonstrated, the group initially put equal employment practices at the top of its agenda. As early as 1967, however, NOW took up other concerns, including abortion rights and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which would have nullified all laws discriminating on the basis of sex once incorporated into the U.S. Constitution. Though endorsing such issues proved divisive, NOW survived the acrimony to confront a new challenge: that of the women’s liberation movement, which formed its first groups in 1967. While sharing many of the same concerns as NOW, the liberationists represented a younger generation of feminists, many of whom had experience in the civil rights, student, and antiwar movements. Older women activists appreciated the passion of this younger cohort, but worried that feminism would lose its credibility if it became too closely associated with the unconventional rhetoric and gestures used by liberationists in their public pronouncements and at demonstrations like the 1968 protest of the Miss America Pageant. Hence, while NOW worked with liberationist groups on specific

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projects, such as the 1970 sit-in at the Ladies’ Home Journal offices, the organization never created permanent ties with them, preferring the role of the respectable political insider to that of the rambunctious outside agitator. For their part, many young feminists found NOW, with its layers of formal organization, to be too bureaucratic. This attitude reflected their experience in other movement organizations that had experimented with consensual decision making and nonhierarchical forms of leadership that sought to give all participants some influence over the group’s direction. Liberationists who were veterans of SNCC and SDS appreciated participatory democracy as an ideal that would help build a more egalitarian society; unfortunately, these organizations had denied women full participation, thus failing to live up to that ideal. Consequently, liberationists sought truly egalitarian environments in which women could develop their own capacities without the intrusive presence of men. Liberationist groups like Columbia Women’s Liberation and Seattle Radical Women were to be all-woman enclaves; informal, intimate, and relatively small, they aimed to nurture sisterhood, make decisions jointly, and rotate leadership and spokespersons. Moreover, women’s liberation groups often raised issues that rights-oriented groups like NOW considered secondary, such as the division of labor in the home, human sexuality in a patriarchal society, and the objectification of women by beauty pageants, pornographers, and the mass media. From their perspective, antidiscrimination laws might help women secure jobs and education opportunities, but they would have little impact on who did the laundry, whose sexual needs were fulfilled, or how society perceived women. In other words, liberationists asserted that ‘‘the personal is political’’ and that ostensibly private relationships, practices, attitudes, and consumption patterns contributed to women’s inferior social status. To transform the private sphere, they argued that feminists needed to foster ‘‘consciousness raising,’’ a process in which women discussed experiences from their personal lives to understand how cultural, social, and economic forces constrained their choices as women. Once women recognized that traditional ideas about marriage, motherhood, sexuality, and careers diminished their ability to reach their highest potential, they could begin the process of reinventing themselves and American society. Although consciousness raising often occurred within small liberationist groups, women also gained greater insights into their plight from protest literature,

218 Social Movements novels, plays, or reading Ms. magazine. Indeed, liberationist groups were short-lived, as their members either burned out or wrangled over leadership, ideology, and lesbianism. Their passing by the mid-1970s was part of a broad restructuring of the women’s movement, which saw white, middle-class groups like NOW prosper alongside new organizations that addressed the particular concerns of women who were lesbians, black, Mexican American, and Asian American, as well as new groups that focused on issues of concern to women, such as women’s health, reproductive rights, rape, domestic violence, and pornography. Feminists may have gone in many different directions during these years, but specialization produced significant advances, such as a renewed attention from public authorities to the victims of rape and domestic violence. At the same time, however, the women’s movement faced increasing opposition as the 1970s progressed. During its campaign for the ERA, NOW and its allies easily gained congressional support in 1972, but then saw the ratification process stall at the state level where conservative opponents were able to convince enough state legislatures to reject the amendment. Meanwhile, feminists who believed that the Supreme Court’s legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973) would end the abortion controversy soon confronted a reinvigorated antiabortion movement, intent on reversing Roe and limiting access to abortions. Despite some setbacks, the movement saw women make substantial gains in almost every area of life, including the workplace, education, and politics. Of course, to this day, women have not achieved parity with men in all domains, and women’s groups continue to press for change. Since 1980, such efforts have been tied increasingly to the Democratic Party, which was more receptive to the feminist agenda than the Republicans, who abandoned the ERA and allied with social conservatives that year. As is the case with African Americans, progressive women have become a key component in the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition, and, in national elections, the party has sometimes appeared to profit from women’s votes by way of the ‘‘gender gap,’’ that is, the difference between men and women in their voting behavior and party identification. Feminists sought to take credit for this gap, but recent studies have suggested that its historical development has been driven more by men shifting to the Republican Party than by women leaving the GOP (Grand Old Party) to align with the Democrats. That said, analysts have shown that, since 1990, female political behavior has accounted for variations in the size of the gender gap, so women’s votes may

play a decisive role in elections to come (Kaufmann 2006). Women were joined in their quest for equal rights and liberation by movements of Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans. Since they represented groups that were geographically concentrated in particular regions of the United States, these movements were somewhat less visible than the civil rights and women’s movements during the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, their struggles underscored the complexity of American society and the multiple identities that comprise it. As was the case with black nationalists, many young Native American, Chicano, and Puerto Rican activists rejected assimilation with mainstream America, and instead sought self-determination and autonomy from the white power structure. Some would model their nationalist organizations on the militaristic Black Panthers; for instance, Los Angeles Chicanos formed the Brown Berets and Puerto Ricans founded the New York--based Young Lords, both of which provided Panther-style community services, such as free breakfast programs for children. These cultural liberation movements diverged from their black counterpart, however, because they often involved territorial claims to lands that had been expropriated by whites and the U.S. government. For example, the 1969--1971 occupation of Alcatraz Island by Native Americans sought to reclaim the island as Native American territory to protest federal relocation and termination programs that encouraged Native Americans to move from reservations to cities, terminated federal recognition of certain Native tribes, and liquidated these tribes’ communal claim to lands. Likewise, the 1967 raid of the Tierra Amarilla Courthouse by armed members of a Chicano organization, Alianza Federal de Mercedes, was part of their New Mexico-based campaign to win back land grants that Spain had distributed to their ancestors. Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party led the fight for independence of Puerto Rico, a dependent territory controlled by the U.S. government. Quests for territorial autonomy often went hand in hand with demands for cultural renewal. By honoring the history, customs, arts, and other forms of expression indigenous to their groups, marginalized peoples could reclaim their identities from white America and its tendency to unfairly malign them. Hence, organized Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans pressured educators to incorporate more study of their cultures into their curricula, and pushed colleges to establish separate centers of learning devoted to their groups. Such liberationist endeavors

Contemporary Social Movements did not mean that these movements neglected the call for equal rights and opportunities. As nonwhites, their constituencies often encountered police brutality, job discrimination, barriers to union organizing, and meager education opportunities for their children. In confronting these problems, marginalized groups frequently drew on the language of rights. Moreover, even in their demands for more cultural education in the schools, they asserted that such curriculum changes were prerequisites for providing truly equal education opportunities. Ultimately, the Native American, Chicano, Asian American, and Puerto Rican movements were only partially successful in obtaining greater equality, as many of their communities remain mired in poverty and enjoy limited opportunities. Still, groups representing Native Americans, Chicanos, and Asian Americans succeeded in forging new identities among oppressed minorities and dramatizing their collective challenges. Before the 1960s, Native Americans had identified more with their individual tribes than with Indians as a group; likewise, Asian Americans thought of themselves as Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, or Vietnamese. Meanwhile, during the 1940s and 1950s, many Mexican American organizations had declared Mexican Americans to be part of the white race and thus worthy of equality on that basis. By creating pan-Indian, panAsian, and Chicano identities, activists inspired their communities to take more forceful action against white racism. Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, did not undergo a similar identity transformation but nonetheless emerged from the 1970s with an increased appreciation for their heritage and their resourcefulness as a community. In fact, even after organizational in-fighting and government repression led to the decline of ethnic militancy during the mid-1970s, people of color often look back on the 1960s and 1970s with great pride in their groups’ willingness to embrace their identities rather than to deny them. In comparison to the other identity movements that began to flourish during the 1960s, the gay and lesbian movement confronted unique challenges. First of all, activists had yet to overcome the common belief that homosexuals suffered from a form of mental illness and were prone to sexual crimes like child molestation, claims that were upheld by reputable psychological studies into the 1970s. Second, because homosexuals do not necessarily appear different from heterosexuals, gays and lesbians routinely hid their sexual orientation, thus rendering them invisible to most Americans and often to each other. Their first organizations, founded in the 1950s, were likewise shrouded in secrecy, going

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so far as to adopt obscure names like the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis to conceal their association with homosexuality. Fears of public exposure, humiliation, and loss of employment were so pervasive in the gay community that it seemed highly unlikely that it would ever mobilize a mass movement in the United States. Indeed, gays and lesbians initially lacked allies in other social movements, and could boast of few ties to the black insurgency, SDS, and women’s groups like NOW that originally sought to keep their distance from the ‘‘lavender menace.’’ Until the late 1960s, gay and lesbian groups relied primarily on discreet lobbying to fight job discrimination, the criminalization of homosexual acts, the classification of homosexuals as mentally ill, and police harassment and arrests for promoting ‘‘public indecency.’’ Their efforts made some headway, but eschewed any attempt to assert a gay identity, especially if it embraced unconventional behavior like that associated with flamboyant drag queens. In 1969, though, young gays and lesbians rejected the cautious approach of their elders in the wake of the Stonewall riots in New York City. These riots, which began with a routine police raid of the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar, marked the first time that gays and lesbians had resisted police harassment in large numbers. Electrified by the courage of those who had sparred with the police, a handful of New York gays and lesbians left the Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bilitis to found the Gay Liberation Front (GLF), a revolutionary group seeking ‘‘gay power.’’ At first, the gay liberation movement had much in common with other liberationist and revolutionary projects. The GLF sought to incorporate participatory democracy into its organization and appointed a different leader every meeting. Borrowing from feminists, activists organized consciousness-raising sessions in which groups of gays and lesbians shared stories of the problems they confronted as homosexuals. Furthermore, gay liberationists viewed their oppression in light of radical critiques of American foreign policy. Among other things, they argued that the oppressive system waging war in Vietnam was the same system that alienated homosexuals from their own desires, and thus, it was logical for gays to oppose the war. Significantly, many liberationists were active in the antiwar movement, and some sought alliances with other revolutionary groups like the Black Panthers. By 1970, however, internal divisions about whether gays should link their cause to other movements contributed to the decline of the GLF and the birth of the New York-based Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), which sought to

220 Social Movements address only gay issues and adopted a somewhat more bureaucratic form of organization. Working primarily for antidiscrimination measures, the GAA made a name for itself by publicly confronting liberal lawmakers about their position on gay rights and by organizing attention-grabbing protests. Such tactics produced some results; for example, in 1972, New York Mayor John V. Lindsay signed an executive order outlawing public discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation after the GAA had invaded his campaign fund raiser at Radio City Music Hall. Likewise, disruptive protest at the 1970 and 1971 meetings of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) led to the creation of a committee that recommended the removal of homosexuality from the group’s official list of mental disorders, a proposal approved by the APA in 1973. Nonetheless, gay and lesbian activists increasingly operated within the political system as the 1970s progressed, and focused on obtaining equal rights through electoral politics and the Democratic Party. In 1973, members of the GAA founded the National Gay Task Force (later called the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force) as a mainstream lobbying organization that would give the movement more access to political elites. Gay reliance on conventional tactics coincided with the movement’s growing tendency to emphasize rights claims rather than gay liberation in its rhetoric. From the beginning, liberationists had struggled to create a shared identity among homosexual individuals, and that problem only worsened during the 1970s. Lesbians and gays were both attracted to members of their own sex and experienced social disapproval of their behavior, but their commonalities typically ended there. Many gay men experienced solidarity in communities that met in bars and bathhouses, and which enjoyed cruising for sex. In contrast, lesbians often preferred serial monogamy to casual sex, and developed camaraderie in new institutions that specifically catered to women’s interests, such as women’s health clinics, bookstores, coffeehouses, and music festivals. Also, lesbians resented gays for their sexism and their domination of the movement. Since their experiences diverged so sharply, gays and lesbians instead focused on the rights both were denied by public authorities and the private sector, such as equal employment and housing opportunities, and later in the 1990s, the rights to marry, join the military, and adopt children. Even the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a sexually transmitted disease that produced a severe health crisis in the gay community during

the 1980s, only served to solidify the movement’s shift from gay liberation to gay rights. Sexual freedom had been central to gay liberation, as laws outlawing sodomy were on the books in most states during the 1960s, and gay sex acts were traditionally stigmatized as unnatural and sinful. In addition to fighting the legal bans, gay liberationists also opposed established ideas about sexuality, including those that held that sex was not to be enjoyed for its own sake but was reserved for monogamous couples as an expression of their intimacy and love. Gay sexuality was thus relatively uninhibited until AIDS struck and health advocates campaigned to close gay bathhouses and convince gay men to adopt safe sex practices. Forced to choose between possible death and practices that could save their lives, many gay men altered their sexual behavior to prevent further infection. Gay men still had sex, of course, but it became less acceptable to celebrate unrestricted sex as though it were an unmitigated good. The AIDS epidemic may have tempered the liberationists’ views of sexuality, but it also unleashed a new militancy within the gay and lesbian movement. New groups like the Gay Men’s Health Crisis (1981) arose to demand a stronger government response to the AIDS epidemic, and AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), founded in 1987, became notorious for its use of direct action to dramatize the need for action to end AIDS. The prevalence of AIDS in the gay community also devastated the ranks of its leaders, many of whom died before life-saving drugs were discovered to treat the disease. Despite enduring staggering losses, the gay rights movement profited greatly from the fact that the epidemic encouraged more gays and lesbians to live their lives openly. As increasing numbers of homosexuals went public, more Americans reported knowing someone who was openly gay. Meanwhile, hostility toward gays steadily declined after 1990 and public support for key gay rights policies shot up (Brewer 2003). To be sure, gays and lesbians continue to face stiff opposition from social conservatives, but they are no long an invisible minority and have made progress on a number of fronts, including social acceptance. Notably, the growing support for gay rights illustrates the continuing salience of rights as a social movement demand. Other groups that have successfully employed rights claims include those associated with the disability rights, human rights, and animal rights movements. Obviously, movements of the Left do not have a monopoly on the use of rights discourse, as illustrated by the antiabortion movement’s claim to represent the rights of the unborn. Regardless of its source,

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Thousands of gays and lesbians march for equal rights in Washington, D.C., on October 14, 1979. The march was organized by the National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights. (Bettmann/Corbis)

all of this ‘‘rights talk’’ contributed to a fading interest in the working class as a central agent for change and to the eclipse of the labor movement, which declined as an economic and political force beginning in the 1960s. As ‘‘Big Labor’’ grappled with a changing economy, corruption scandals, charges of racism, sexism, and autocratic governance, public intellectuals began to speculate that a ‘‘new class’’ of young knowledge workers and professionals would be at the forefront of transforming society. Middle-class college students had been leading participants in the antiwar and identity movements; once they entered the workforce, activists continued to back causes, such as feminism, environmentalism, and the antinuclear weapons movement, as ends in themselves rather than as a means to advance their careers and other material interests. According to Ronald Inglehart, the growth of ‘‘postmaterialist’’ social movements reflected the relative affluence of the baby boomer generation, which could afford to focus on quality-of-life issues rather than on the economic insecurities that had previously triggered support for a strong labor movement (Inglehart 1989).

Goldwater Youths and Conservative Christians: The Rise of the New Right Beginning in the 1960s, conservative college students also played a key role in the development of American politics. Indeed, Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), a campus organization founded in 1960, helped conservatism become a powerful political force in the United States by training future politicians, political consultants, editors, and political analysts in the arts of debate and political organizing. SDS is often remembered for its Port Huron Statement (1962), but few recall that this manifesto was an unofficial rebuttal to YAF’s 1960 foundational document, the Sharon Statement. This ignorance of the ‘‘conservative 1960s’’ is understandable; historians have just recently produced studies of the New Right, and the conservative movement’s preference for conventional politics meant that it never secured the media exposure that accompanied the New Left’s often-theatrical events. Still, the history of the post-1960 conservative movement is important because it reshaped the Republican Party and political discourse in profound ways.

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Young Americans for Freedom participate in the Loyalty Day parade Philadelphia in June 1966. The parade was formed to show loyalty to the country and the American flag due to the growth of antiwar protests across the country. (Leif Skoogfors/Corbis)

Most scholars agree that the modern conservative movement was initially the product of three sets of ideas: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anti-Communism, which activists adopted either entirely or partially. A challenge for the movement was that these ideologies present contradictory visions, best seen in the disagreement between libertarianism and traditionalism. Whereas libertarians emphasize individual freedom and the perils of government intervention, traditionalists insist that government action is often necessary to guarantee public order and the moral health of the community. This divergence in conservative thinking had consequences for movement organizations like the YAF, which underwent a painful split in 1969 because the traditionalists could not stomach libertarian support for the antiwar movement, draft resistance, and the legalization of drugs. In its early years, however, anti-Communism, which rejected the isolationism of the Old Right, helped paper over the differences within the movement. Libertarians could deplore Communism as antithetical to human freedom,

and traditionalists could decry it for seeking to undermine American values. Hence, they could join the antiCommunists in demanding that the government take stern measures to prevent the spread of Marxist-Leninism at home and abroad, and possibly enroll in the ultra-anti-Communist organization, the John Birch Society (JBS), formed in 1958. Often dismissed as loony because of the conspiracy theories of its founder, Robert J. Welch, JBS was one of the first grassroots organizations in the New Right, and it attracted a following that was often more moderate than its leadership. One catalyst for the creation of a unified conservative movement was William F. Buckley, Jr. who founded the magazine, National Review, in 1955 and fashioned a philosophical doctrine called ‘‘fusionism’’ with his colleague, Frank Meyer, to resolve the tensions between libertarians and traditionalists. In addition to strengthening the intellectual foundation of conservatism, Buckley organized the first gathering of the YAF at his family’s Connecticut estate and orchestrated the campaign to secure Barry Goldwater the 1964

Contemporary Social Movements Republican nomination for president. The Goldwater campaign would prove to be a crucial episode for the movement, as it recruited thousands of new activists into conservative politics and introduced Ronald Reagan to the nation. The campaign also helped conservatives to construct networks of supporters that nurtured the movement for decades. For example, Richard Viguerie, a YAF activist who pioneered the use of direct mail to advance political causes, began his fund-raising career in 1965 when he copied, by hand, the names and addresses of more than 12,000 contributors to the Goldwater campaign (Oldfield 1996, 96). Outside of a few innovations like direct mail, New Right activists did not vigorously seek improvements to standard organizational models and tactics. Unlike their New Left counterparts, conservatives felt comfortable with hierarchical organizations and were often willing to sacrifice their own inclinations to preserve group unity. Untouched by the progressive obsession with participatory democracy, internal conflicts about leadership did not focus on the betrayal of egalitarian ideals. For instance, women in YAF never contested their secondary status in the organization; in fact, most of them repudiated the notion that that YAF was rife with sex discrimination. In a similar fashion, conservatives saw no reason to engage in disruptive protest as long as they could achieve power through traditional means, such as electioneering, seizing control of the Republican Party, and pursuing careers in politics. In short, conservative activists were not rebels; young conservatives did not reject the ways of their elders but instead worked closely with older leaders like Buckley who saw themselves as guardians of the movement. The New Right was ‘‘new,’’ however, in the sense that it raised fresh challenges to prevailing views about the role of government in American life. Since the 1930s, the federal government had assumed responsibility for economic growth, full employment, redistributing wealth, regulating sectors of the economy, and providing some security to those who suffered due to the vicissitudes of life and the economy. Traumatized by the misery of the Great Depression, most Americans accepted the expansion of federal authority as a necessary ingredient to economic prosperity and stability. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, conservatives began to chip away at this consensus by emphasizing the loss of freedom, human agency, and economic efficiency that could result from the growth of government. Likewise, conservatives were in the forefront of opposing the New Left’s egalitarian program. Long concerned about the social and economic effects of wealth redistribution, they now turned their attention to what

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they saw as excessive demands for equality by women and minorities, such as busing to desegregate public schools and affirmative action in education, employment, and government contracting. To advance their ideas, conservatives sponsored think tanks, journals, and research to publicize their agenda of low taxes, government deregulation, welfare reform, and equality of opportunity (rather than of results), policy ideas that would be routinely embraced by the Republican Party beginning in 1980. But, the movement also had a vibrant grassroots presence; in many communities, New Right activists formed study groups, operated patriotic bookstores, and held weeklong training seminars. Libertarian and anti-Communist conservatives cheered the 1980 election of conservative President Ronald Reagan, but this victory was also celebrated by the movement’s traditionalist wing in the form of the Christian Right. As a movement of evangelical Protestants and other orthodox Christians, the Christian Right organized to counter the moral breakdown of American culture. Among other things, conservative Christians contended that the New Left had fostered permissiveness in American culture that devalued the family as the cornerstone of the good life, and that led to higher divorce rates, increased illegitimate births, rampant drug use, soaring crime rates, and a popular culture saturated with sex and violence. Moreover, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court confirmed this trend when it legalized abortion and allowed women to avoid the sacred calling of motherhood. While conservative Christians hoped to reverse the nation’s moral decline, they also sought to defend their capacity to live as Christians in a secular society, governed by a secular government. The Supreme Court had banned prayer in the public schools, and some evangelical parents were troubled by the inclusion of evolution and sex education in school curricula as these subjects conflicted with their religious values. Meanwhile, in some states, education policies made it difficult for Christian parents to homeschool their children and Christian schools struggled to gain accreditation from public agencies. The early Christian Right emerged in the late 1970s as a coalition of Washington-based groups whose primary mission was to lobby Congress on behalf of ‘‘traditional values.’’ At the time, Congress seemed to be the appropriate arena for action because it was the most permeable national institution, and because these groups viewed the federal level as the best place to resolve issues like abortion, school prayer, and tuition tax credits for religious schools. Some locally based activism by conservative Christians did occur; for

224 Social Movements instance, Phyllis Schlafly mobilized her state campaigns against the Equal Rights Amendment through evangelical churches. However, in 1980, a media blitz allowed the national groups---the Moral Majority, the National Christian Action Coalition, the Religious Roundtable, and Christian Voice---to take center stage. During the early 1980s, these groups managed to place their concerns on the public and congressional agendas, but they then rapidly lost support as the decade came to a close. Narrowly based in the fundamentalist camp, these groups had failed to reach out to other conservative Protestants from the evangelical and Pentecostal traditions. Likewise, the Christian Right’s first direct foray into presidential politics---Pat Robertson’s 1988 campaign for the Republican nomination---ultimately demonstrated the limited appeal of a candidacy that was closely tied to the Pentecostal churches. While it was successful at raising money and won some victories in caucus states, the Robertson effort never united the greater evangelical community in his support. Ultimately, Pat Robertson’s failed presidential bid in 1988 stimulated the development of a broader-based Christian Right movement with a stronger grassroots component. After his failure to secure the Republican Party’s nomination, Robertson converted his huge mailing lists into the Christian Coalition and turned its operations over to Ralph Reed, a former director of a national GOP student committee. Reed and his leadership team rebuilt the organization from the bottom up, with activists much more involved in local issues. In doing so, the coalition’s leaders identified several vehicles for activist energy: school board elections, city council races, antipornography campaigns, anti--gay rights referenda, and contests for control of local GOP committees. Through such activities, the Christian Coalition hoped to develop grassroots leaders and to build local bases. At the same time, the organization sought to soften the Christian Right’s extremist image by championing mainstream conservative issues like deregulation and welfare reform. Finally, movement leaders reached out to traditionalist Catholics, orthodox Jews, and black churches in an effort to expand the movement’s base. During the early 1990s, the Christian Coalition and its allies managed to create a robust grassroots sector that contributed its rising national influence. At its peak in 1995, the Christian Coalition alone claimed 48 state units, 1,400 local chapters, 1.5 million active supporters, and a $25 million annual budget. In addition, the movement’s infiltration of local GOP committees apparently paid off. One-fourth of the delegates at the 1992 Republican National Convention described

themselves as ‘‘members’’ or ‘‘supporters’’ of the Christian Right; in a similar fashion, the movement completely dominated 18 state Republican Parties and considerably influenced 13 others by 1994. More important, the movement’s ability to mobilize its followers through its voter guides led some scholars to declare that it played a pivotal role in the GOP’s 1994 takeover of Congress (Guth, et al 1994). Though the Christian Coalition was replaced by Focus on the Family as the preeminent Christian Right organization in the late 1990s, the movement has continued to mobilize scores of voters for the GOP, and party operatives have come to value its efforts. Because of its loyal service, the Christian Right has been able to greatly alter the Republican Party’s character. As a prominent party faction, the movement has been able to shape party platforms and to rewrite party rules in favor of future pro--Christian Right candidates. GOP candidates for state and national office often cannot avoid addressing the movement’s agenda, and many accommodate its demands in some fashion. With the help of its Republican allies, as well as some sympathetic Democrats, the movement has obtained several tangible benefits, including abortion restrictions, laws mandating ‘‘moments of silence,’’ restrictions on pornography, and legal definitions of marriage that exclude same-sex marriage. Meanwhile, Republican President George W. Bush, who was elected in 2000 and 2004 with strong support from orthodox Christians, used his power to advance some of the movement’s aims. Among other things, he created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to increase federal funding of religious service providers, and he issued an executive order that limited federal stem cell research to studies that do not involve the destruction of human embryos. Finally, the Christian Right’s influence can be seen in contemporary political rhetoric, whereby politicians claim to represent ‘‘family values,’’ and some incorporate references to God and religious principles in their speeches. Of course, conservative Christians have failed to win major objectives, like the reversal of Roe v. Wade, and many libertarian conservatives coexist uneasily with the Christian Right within the Republican Party and the larger conservative movement. With all its setbacks and internal contradictions, the New Right nevertheless reshaped American politics since the 1960s. Working in tandem with the New Left, modern conservatives have drawn attention to new issues, such as affirmative action, abortion, and family structure, which have little to do with the economic concerns, such as the quest for a living wage, that dominated movement politics

Contemporary Social Movements during the first half of the 20th century. The prominence of such issues does not necessarily mean that the two sets of movements have produced a broad-based ‘‘culture war,’’ pitting the religiously orthodox against the more secular progressives. It does suggest, however, that Americans are still grappling with fundamental questions about how best to live in a pluralist society.

References and Further Reading Brewer, Paul R. 2003. ‘‘The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion about Gay Rights.’’ Journal of Politics 65(4):1208-1220. DeBenedetti, Charles. 1990. An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

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Gosse, Van. 2005. Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretive History. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Guth, James L., John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Margaret M. Poloma. 1994. The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kaufmann, Karen M. 2006. ‘‘The Gender Gap.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 39(3):447--453. Lawson, Stephen F. 1997. Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America Since 1941, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. McAdam, Doug. ‘‘The Role of Activist Subcultures in the Emergence of Collective Action,’’ paper presented at the Pacific Sociological Association Meetings in San Diego, April 1994. Oldfield, Duane M. 1996. The Right and the Righteous. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed on, even impose on them-selves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India-rubber, would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads. But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it. After all, the practical

4.1 Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience’’ I HEARTILY accept the motto, ‘‘That government is best which governs least;’’ and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe,---‘‘That government is best which governs not at all;’’ and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. This American government---what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people

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228 Social Movements reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience?---in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should he men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy-Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts,---a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniments, though it may be,--‘‘Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note, As his corse to the rampart we hurried; Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot O’er the grave where our hero we buried.’’ The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free

exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others---as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders--serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few---as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men---serve the state with their con-sciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be ‘‘clay,’’ and ‘‘stop a hole to keep the wind away,’’ but leave that office to his dust at least:--‘‘I am too high-born to be propertied, To be a secondary at control, Or useful serving man and instrument To any sovereign state throughout the world.’’ He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist. How does it become a man to behave toward this American government to-day? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave’s government also. All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of ’75. If one were to tell me that this was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole

4.1 Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience’’ country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is the fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army. . . . All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or became there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote. I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to? Shall we not have the advantage of his wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions? But no: I find that the respectable man, so called, has immediately drifted from his position, and despairs of his country, when his country has more reason to despair of him. He forthwith adopts one of the candidates thus selected as the only available ones thus proving that he is himself available for any purposes of the demagogue. His vote is of no more worth than that of any unprincipled foreigner or hireling native, who may have been bought. O for a man who is a man, and, as my neighbor says, has a bone in his back which you cannot pass your hand through! Our statistics are at fault: the population has been returned too large. How many men are there to a square thousand miles in this country? Hardly one. Does not America offer any inducement for men to settle here? The American has dwindled into an Odd Fellow,---one who may be known by the development of his organ of gregariousness, and a manifest lack of

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intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief concern, on coming into the world, is to see that the almshouses are in good repair; and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect a fund for the support of the widows and orphans that may. be; who, in short, ventures to live only by the aid of the Mutual Insurance company, which has promised to bury him decently. It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous, wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man’s shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. See what gross inconsistency is tolerated. I have heard some of my townsmen say, ‘‘I should like to have them order me out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico;---see if I would go;’’ and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. The soldier is applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and authority he disregards and sets at naught; as if the state were penitent to that degree that it hired one to scourge it while it sinned, but not to that degree that it left off sinning for a moment. Thus, under the name of Order and Civil Government, we are all made at last to pay homage to and support our own meanness. After the first blush of sin comes its indifference; and from un moral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, and not quite unnecessary to that life which we have made. The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. Some are petitioning the State to dissolve the Union, to disregard the requisitions of the President. Why do they not dissolve it themselves,---the union between themselves and the State,---and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury? Do not they stand in the same relation to the State that the State does to the Union? And have not the same reasons prevented the State from resisting

230 Social Movements the Union which have prevented them from resisting the State? How can a man be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy it? Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved? If you are cheated out of a single dollar by your neighbor, you do not rest satisfied with knowing that you are cheated, or with saying that you are cheated, or even with petitioning him to pay you your due; but you take effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount, and see that you are never cheated again. Action from principle, the perception and the performance of right, changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divides States and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine. Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels? One would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offence never contemplated by government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate, penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings for the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who placed him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again. If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: per-chance it will wear smooth,---certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to an-other, then, I say, break

the law. Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn. As for adopting the ways which the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong. It is not my business to be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to petition me; and if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconciliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is all change for the better, like birth and death, which convulse the body. I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already. I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year---no more---in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer, is the very man I have to deal with,---for it is, after all, with men and not with parchment that I quarrel,---and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well what he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he shall treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborliness without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action. I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if

4.1 Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience’’ ten men whom I could name,---if ten honest men only,---ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State’s ambassador, who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister,---though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her,---the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject the following winter. Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place to-day, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race should find them; on that separate, but more free and honorable, ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her,---the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all, just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the taxgatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one

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has done, ‘‘But what shall I do?’’ my answer is, ‘‘If you really wish to do anything, resign your office.’’ When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now. I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods,---though both will serve the same purpose,---because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man---not to make any invidious comparison---is always sold to the institution which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; and it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as what are called the ‘‘means’’ are increased. The best. thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians according to their condition. ‘‘Show me the tribute-money,’’ said he;---and one took a penny out of his pocket;---if you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar’s government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it. ‘‘Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar’s, and to God those things which are God’s,’’---leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know. When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the

232 Social Movements existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same, time comfortably, in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject, of the Turkish government. Confucius said: ‘‘If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a, state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are the subjects of shame.’’ No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case. Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. ‘‘Pay,’’ it said, ‘‘or be locked up in the jail.’’ I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster; for I was not the State’s schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax-bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing:---’’ Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined.’ This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all

the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find a complete list. I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment, there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it. Thus the State never intentionally confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to live this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a government which says to me, ‘‘Your money or your life,’’ why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert

4.1 Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience’’ to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man. The night in prison was novel and interesting enough. The prisoners in their shirt-sleeves were enjoying a chat and the evening air in the doorway, when I entered. But the jailer said, ‘‘Come, boys, it is time to lock up;’’ and so they dispersed, and I heard the sound of their steps returning into the hollow apartments. My roommate was introduced to me by the jailer as ‘‘a firstrate fellow and a clever man.’’ When the door was locked, he showed me where to hang my hat, and how he managed matters there. The rooms were whitewashed once a month; and this one, at least, was the whitest, most simply furnished, and probably the neatest apartment in the town. He naturally wanted to know where I came from, and what brought me there; and, when I had told him, I asked him in my turn how he came there, presuming him to be an honest man, of course; and, as the world goes, I believe he was. ‘‘Why,’’ said he, ‘‘they accuse me of burning a barn; but I never did it.’’ As near as I could discover, he had probably gone to bed in a barn when drunk, and smoked his pipe there; and so a barn was burnt. He had the reputation of being a clever man, had been there some three months waiting for his trial to come on, and would have to wait as much longer; but he was quite domesticated and contented, since he got his board for nothing, and thought that he was well treated. He occupied one window, and I the other; and I saw that if one stayed there long, his principal business would be to look out the window. I had soon read all the tracts that were left there, and examined where former prisoners had broken out, and where a grate had been sawed off, and heard the history of the various occupants of that room; for I found that even here there was a history and a gossip which never circulated beyond the walls of the jail. Probably this is the only house in the town where verses are composed, which are afterward printed in a circular form, but not published. I was shown quite a long list of verses which were composed by some young men who had been detected in an attempt to escape, who avenged themselves by singing them. I pumped my fellow-prisoner as dry as I could, for fear I should never see him again; but at length he showed me which was my bed, and left me to blow out the lamp. It was like traveling into a far country, such as I had never expected to behold, to lie there for one night. It

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seemed to me that I never had heard the town clock strike before, nor the evening sounds of the village; for we slept with the windows open, which were inside the grating. It was to see my native village in the light of the Middle Ages, and our Concord was turned into a Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village inn,---a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about. In the morning, our breakfasts were put through the hole in the door, in small oblong-square tin pans, made to fit, and holding a pint of chocolate, with brown bread, and an iron spoon. When they called for the vessels again, I was green enough to return what bread I had left; but my comrade seized it, and said that I should lay that up for lunch or dinner. Soon after he was let out to work at haying in a neighboring field, whither he went every day, and would not be back till noon; so he bade me good-day, saying that he doubted if he should see me again. When I came out of prison,---for some one interfered, and paid that tax,---I did not perceive that great changes had taken place on the common, such as he observed who went in a youth and emerged a tottering and gray-headed man; and yet a change had to my eyes come over the scene,---the town, and State, and country,---greater than any that mere time could effect. I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived. I saw to what extent the people among whom I lived could be trusted as good neighbors and friends; that their friendship was for summer weather only; that they did not greatly propose to do right; that they were a distinct race from me by their prejudices and superstitions, as the Chinamen and Malays are; that in their sacrifices to humanity they ran no risks, not even to their property; that after all they were not so noble but they treated the thief as he had treated them, and hoped, by a certain outward observance and a few prayers, and by walking in a particular straight though useless path from time to time, to save their souls. This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that many of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village. It was formerly the custom in our village, when a poor debtor came out of jail, for his acquaintances to salute him, looking through their fingers, which were

234 Social Movements crossed to represent the grating of a jail window, ‘‘How do ye do?’’ My neighbors did not thus salute me, but first looked at me, and then at one another, as if I had returned from a long journey. I was put into jail as I was going to the shoemaker’s to get a shoe which was mended. When I was let out the next morning, I proceeded to finish my errand, and, having put on my mended shoe, joined a huckleberry party, who were impatient to put themselves under my con-duct; and in half an hour,---for the horse was soon tackled,---was in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off, and then the State was nowhere to be seen. This is the whole history of ‘‘My Prisons.’’ I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellowcountrymen now. It is for no particular item in the taxbill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man or a musket to shoot one with, the dollar is innocent, but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases. If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good. This, then, is my position at present. But one cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his action be biased by obstinacy or an undue regard for the opinions of men. Let him see that he does only what belongs to himself and to the hour. I think sometimes, Why, this people mean well, they are only ignorant; they would do better if they knew how: why give your neighbors this pain to treat you as they are not inclined to? But I think again, This is no reason why I should do as they do, or permit others to suffer much greater pain of a. different kind. Again, I sometimes say to myself, When many millions of men, without heat, without ill will, without personal feeling of any kind, demand of you a few shillings only, without the possibility, such is their constitution,

of retracting or altering their present demand, and without the possibility, on your side, of appeal to any other millions, why expose yourself to this overwhelming brute force? You do not resist cold and hunger, the winds and the waves, thus obstinately; you quietly submit to a thousand similar necessities. You do not put your head into the fire. But just in proportion as I regard this as not wholly a brute force, but partly a human force, and consider that I have relations to those millions as to so many millions of men, and not of mere brute or inanimate things, I see that appeal is possible, first and instantaneously, from them to the Maker of them, and, secondly, from them to themselves. But if I put my head deliberately into the fire, there is no appeal to fire or to the Maker of fire, and I have only myself to blame. If I could convince myself that I have any right to be satisfied with men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and I ought to be, then, like a good Mussulman and fatalist, I should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are, and say it is the will of God. And, above all, there is this difference between resisting this and a purely brute or natural force, that I can resist this with some effect; but I cannot expect, like Orpheus, to change the nature of the rocks and trees and beasts. I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I are but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity. ‘‘We must affect our country as our parents, And if at any time we alienate Our love or industry from doing it honor, We must respect effects and teach the soul Matter of conscience and religion, And not desire of rule or benefit.’’ I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better a patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable, and rare

4.1 Henry David Thoreau, ‘‘Civil Disobedience’’ things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; but seen from a point of view a little higher, they are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all? However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him. I know that most men think differently from myself; but those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects content me as little as any. Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly be-hold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are wont to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Webster never goes behind government, and so cannot speak with authority about it. His words are wisdom to those legislators who contemplate no essential reform in the existing government; but for thinkers, and those who legislate for all time, he never once glances at the subject. I know of those whose serene and wise speculations on this theme would soon reveal the limits of his mind’s range and hospitality. Yet, compared with the cheap professions of most reformers, and the still cheaper wisdom and eloquence of politicians in general, his are almost the only sensible and valuable words, and we thank Heaven for him. Comparatively, he is always strong, original, and, above all, practical. Still, his quality is not wisdom, but prudence. The lawyer’s truth is not Truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency. Truth is always in harmony with herself, and is not concerned chiefly to reveal the justice that may consist with wrong-doing. He well deserves to be called, as he has been called, the Defender of the Constitution. There are really no blows to be given by him but defensive ones. He is not a leader, but a follower. His leaders are the men of ‘87. ‘‘I have never made an effort,’’ he says, ‘‘and never propose to make an effort; I have never countenanced an effort, and never mean to countenance an effort, to disturb the arrangement as originally made, by which the various States came into the Union.’’ Still thinking of

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the sanction which the Constitution gives to slavery, he says, ‘‘Because it was a part of the original compact,--let it stand.’’ Notwithstanding his special acuteness and ability, he is unable to take a fact out of its merely political relations, and behold it as it lies absolutely to be disposed of by the intellect,---what, for instance, it behooves a man to do here in America to-day with regard to slavery,---but ventures, or is driven, to make some such desperate answer as the following, while professing to speak absolutely, and as a private man,--from which what new and singular code of social duties might be inferred? ‘‘The manner,’’ says he, ‘‘in which the governments of those States where slavery exists are to regulate it is for their own consideration, under their responsibility to their constituents, to the general laws of propriety, humanity, and justice, and to God. Associations formed elsewhere, springing from a feeling of humanity, or any other cause, have nothing whatever to do with it. They have never received any encouragement from me, and they never will.’’ They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and drink at it there with reverence and humility; but they who behold where it comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and continue their pilgrimage toward its fountain-head. No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the muchvexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufactures and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations. For eighteen hundred years, though perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been writ-ten; yet where is the legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which it sheds on the science of legislation? The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to,---for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things

236 Social Movements even those who neither know nor can do so well,---is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

4.2 William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, December 16, 1859 A word upon the subject of Peace. I am a non-resistant--a believer in the inviolability of human life, under all circumstances; I, therefore, in the name of God, disarm John Brown, and every slave at the South. But I do not stop there; if I did, I should be a monster. I also disarm, in the name of God, every slaveholder and tyrant in the world. (Loud applause.) For wherever that principle is adopted, all fetters must instantly melt, and there can be no oppressed, and no oppressor, in the nature of things. How many agree with me in regard to the doctrine of the inviolability of human life? How many non-resistants are there here to-night? (A single voice---‘‘I.’’) There is one! (Laughter.) Well, then, you who are otherwise are not the men to point the finger at John Brown, and cry ‘‘traitor’’---judging you by your own standard. (Applause.) Nevertheless, I am a non-resistant, and I not only desire, but have labored unremittingly to effect the peaceful abolition of slavery, by an appeal to the reason

and conscience of the slaveholder; yet, as a peace man--an ‘‘ultra’’ peace man---I am prepared to say, ‘‘Success to every slave insurrection at the South, and in every slave country.’’ (Enthusiastic applause.) And I do not see how I compromise or stain my peace profession in making that declaration. Whenever there is a contest between the oppressed and the oppressor,---the weapons being equal between the parties,---God knows that my heart must be with the oppressed, and always against the oppressor. Therefore, whenever commenced, I cannot but wish success to all slave insurrections. (Loud applause.) I thank God when men who believe in the right and duty of wielding carnal weapons are so far advanced that they will take those weapons out of the scale of despotism, and throw them into the scale of freedom. It is an indication of progress, and a positive moral growth; it is one way to get up to the sublime platform of non-resistance; and it is God’s method of dealing retribution upon the head of the tyrant. Rather than see men wearing their chains in a cowardly and servile spirit, I would, as an advocate of peace, much rather see them breaking the head of the tyrant with their chains. Give me, as a nonresistant, Bunker Hill, and Lexington, and Concord, rather than the cowardice and servility of a Southern slave plantation. The verdict of the world, whether ‘‘resistance to tyrants is obedience to God,’’ has been rendered in the affirmative in every age and clime. Whether the weapons used in the struggle against despotism have been spiritual or carnal, that verdict has been this:--Glory to those who die in Freedom’s cause! Courts, judges, can inflict no brand of shame, Or shape of death, to shroud them from applause! No, manglers of the martyr’s earthly frame, Your hangmen fingers cannot touch his fame! Long trains of ill may pass, unheeded, dumb--But Vengeance is behind, and Justice is to come! (Loud applause.) We have been warmly sympathizing with John Brown all the way through, from the time of his arrest till now. Now he no longer needs our sympathy, for he is beyond suffering, and wears the victor’s crown. Are we to grow morbid over his death, to indulge in sentimental speech, to content ourselves with an outburst of emotional feeling, and not to come up to the work of abolishing slavery? I confess, I am somewhat apprehensive in regard to this powerful and wide-spread excitement, lest there may follow an exhaustion of the system, a disastrous reaction, in consequence of

4.3 Mark Twain, Women’s Temperance Movement neglecting to make it directly subservient to the cause of emancipation by earnest and self-sacrificing effort. I see in every slave on the Southern plantation a living John Brown---one to be sympathized with far more than ever John Brown needed sympathy, whether in the jail or on the scaffold at Charlestown. I see four millions of living John Browns needing our thoughts, our sympathies, our prayers, our noblest exertions to strike off their fetters. And, by God’s help, will we not do it? What can we do? I do not know that we can do any thing for Virginia. She seems past all salvation---to have been ‘‘given over to believe a lie that she may be damned.’’ But here we stand, with our feet upon the old Pilgrim ground; and I ask the sons of the Fathers, are we not competent to make the old Bay State free to all who tread its soil? (Enthusiastic applause.) Are we to have another Anthony Burns rendition? (‘‘No!’’ ‘‘No!’’) Shall we allow any more slave-hunting from Berkshire to Barnstable? (‘‘No!’’ ‘‘No!’’) No? How, then, will you prevent it? You must make that decree a matter of record, through your representatives in the State House; and if you want to do an effectual work tomorrow, and to consummate John Brown’s object as far as you can, see to it that you put your names to the petition to the Legislature, now in circulation, asking that body to declare that, henceforth, no human being shall be regarded, tried or treated as a slave within the limits of this Commonwealth. (Immense applause.) But that is ‘‘treason,’’ (laughter,) and John Brown was a ‘‘traitor.’’ The Boston Post and the Boston Courier are very anxious to discover who were the instigators of the Harper’s Ferry rebellion. Most disinterested and patriotic journals! When you read any of their editorials on this subject, just look at the bottom and see in staring capitals---‘‘SOLD TO THE DEVIL, AND PAID FOR.’’ (Laughter and applause.) Who instigated John Brown? Let us see. It must have been Patrick Henry, who said---and he was a Virginian---‘‘Give me liberty, or give me death!’’ Why do they not dig up his bones, and give them to the consuming fire, to show their abhorrence of his memory? It must have been Thomas Jefferson---another Virginian---who said of the bondage of the Virginia slaves, that ‘‘one hour of it is fraught with more misery than ages of that which our fathers rose in rebellion to oppose’’---and who, as the author of the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed it to be ‘‘a SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH, that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with AN INALIENABLE RIGHT TO LIBERTY.’’ (Applause.) Beyond all question, it must have been VIRGINIA HERSELF, who, by her coat of arms, with its terrible motto, ‘‘Sic semper tyrannis,’’ asserts the

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right of the oppressed to trample their oppressors beneath their feet, and, if necessary, consign them to a bloody grave! Herein John Brown found the strongest incitement and the fullest justification. Who instigated the deed at Harper’s Ferry? The people whose motto is, ‘‘Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God’’---and whose exulting talk is of Bunker Hill and Yorktown, and the deeds of their REVOLUTIONARY sires! Nay, we must go back to the source of life itself:---‘‘So God created man in his own image; male and female created he them.’’ Thus making an ‘‘irrepressible conflict’’ between the soul of man and tyranny from the beginning, and confirming what Lord Brougham so eloquently uttered years ago---‘‘Tell me not of rights; talk not of the property of the planter in his slaves. I deny the right; I acknowledge not the property. The principles, the feelings of our nature rise in rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to the understanding or to the heart, the sentence is the same that rejects it. In vain you tell me of laws that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments of human codes---the same throughout the world, the same in all time---it is the law written by the finger of God upon the heart of man; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men despise fraud, and loathe rapine, and abhor blood, they will reject with indignation the wild and guilty phantasy that man can hold property in man.’’ (Loud applause.) We have a natural right, therefore, to seek the abolition of slavery throughout the globe. It is our special duty to make Massachusetts free soil, so that the moment the fugitive slave stands upon it, he shall take his place in the ranks of the free. God commands us to ‘‘hide the outcast, and bewray not him that wandereth.’’ I say, LET THE WILL OF GOD BE DONE! That is ‘‘the head and front’’ of my ‘‘fanaticism’’! That is the extent of my ‘‘infidelity’’! That comprehends all of my ‘‘treason’’! THE WILL OF GOD BE DONE! (Great applause.)

4.3 Mark Twain, Women’s Temperance Movement, 1873 Would you consider the conduct of these crusaders justifiable, I do---thoroughly justifiable. They find themselves voiceless in the making of the laws, and the election of officers to execute them. Born with brains, born in the country, educated, having large interests at stake, they find their tongues tied and their hands fettered, while every ignorant, whisky-drinking, foreignborn savage in the land may hold office, help to make

238 Social Movements the laws, degrade the dignity of the former, and break the latter at his own sweet will. They see their fathers, husbands, and brothers, sit inactive at home, and allow the scum of the country to assemble at the ‘‘primaries,’’ name the candidates for office from their own vile ranks, and, unrebuked, elect them. They live in the midst of a country where there is no end to the laws, and no beginning to the execution of them. And when the laws intended to protect their sons from destruction by intemperance lie torpid and without sign of life, year after year, they recognize that there is a matter that interests them personally, a matter which comes straight home to them. And since they are allowed to lift no legal voice against the outrageous state of things they suffer under in this regard, I think it is no wonder that their patience has broken down at last, and they have tried to persuade themselves that they are justifiable in breaking the law of trespass, when the laws that should make the trespass needless are allowed by the voters to lie dead and inoperative. The present Crusade will, doubtless, do but little work against intemperance that will be really permanent; but it will do what is as much, or even more, to the purpose, I think. I think it will suggest to more than one man that if women could vote they would vote on the side of morality, even if they did vote and speak rather frantically and furiously; and it will also suggest that when the women once made up their minds that it was not good to have the all-powerful ‘primaries’ in the hands of loafers, thieves, and pernicious little politicians, they would not sit indolently at home, as their husbands and brothers do now, but would hoist their praying banners, take the field in force, pray the assembled political scum back to the holes and slums where they belong, and set some candidates fit for human beings to vote for. I dearly want the women to be raised to the political altitude of the negro, the imported savage, and the pardoned thief, and allowed to vote. It is our last chance, I think. The women will be voting before long; and then if a B. F. Butler can still continue to lord it in Congress; if the highest offices in the land can still continue to be occupied by perjurers and robbers; if another Congress, like the forty-second, consisting of fifteen honest men and two hundred and ninety-six of the other kind, can once more be created, it will at least be time, I fear, to give over trying to save the country by human means, and appeal to Providence. Both the great parties have failed. I wish we might have a woman’s party now, and see how that would work. I feel persuaded that, in extending the suffrage to women, this country could lose nothing, and might gain a great deal. For thirty

centuries history has been iterating and reiterating that, in a moral fight, woman is simply dauntless; and we all know, even with our eyes shut upon Congress and our voters, that, from the day that Adam ate of the apple and told on Eve, down to the present day, man, in a moral fight, has pretty uniformly shown himself to be an arrant coward.

4.4 Terence Powderly, The Plea for Eight Hours, 1890 ONE of the principles of organized labor is to ‘‘reduce the hours of labor to eight per day,’’ and at the present time there is an agitation going on throughout the United States and England which has for its object the accomplishment of this looked-for result. All employers of labor claim to be workers; they assert that they have to toil as wearily as do the men whom they employ. They will tell the advocate of the short-hour work-day that there is no necessity for a shortening of the hours of labor, and that a man should be allowed to work as long as he pleases. That all employers are workers is true, but there is this difference between them and their employees: the employer may work one hour or ten as he pleases; the workman must work whether it pleases him or not. The employer enjoys a profit on each hour of labor performed by the employee, while the latter has no share in the profit whatever; he simply receives all that be can wrest from his employer. Competition obliges the humane employer to adopt the same methods as the skinflint, or go out of business, and, as a consequence, the lowest rate of compensation for which men will work is all that he will pay. Justice seldom enters into the adjustment of wages: necessity is the standard by which they are regulated. Previous to 1825 men worked from sun-up to sundown, and they saw but little of their homes on what was then rigidly observed as ‘‘the Sabbath.’’ The adornment of the home gave the head of the family no concern, for he spent but a short time in the house. He knew but little of the wants of the household except those that pertained to food; and to the fact that he went forth for the purpose of supplying the family with food we owe [465] the term ‘‘bread-winner’’ as applied to the laborer. To be a bread-winner was all that the workman of the last century aspired to; and yet he grew tired of the contest, for it brought him but a scanty portion of what be struggled for. In 1825, the agitation for the establishment of the ten-hour system began, and it continued until it was officially

4.4 Terence Powderly, The Plea for Eight Hours recognized by the President of the United States in 1840. Strikes, contentions, disputes, and, very often, bloodshed, at length brought the ten-hour system into operation, and with its final adoption the workman became ambitious of being more than a bread-winner. . . . Fewer hours of toil mean more time to read, and after the adoption of the ten-hour system the workman took more of interest in the press of the land; he had more time to read; and, that fact once established, it became a paying investment to advertise in ‘‘the papers.’’ The number of papers began to increase, for the masses had more time to read; having more time to read, they learned what was going on throughout the world, and they naturally acquired new tastes and desires. The adornment of the home became an object with the man who could see his home by daylight, and the demand for articles of home consumption and adornment increased very rapidly. The ‘‘oldest inhabitant’’ has only to travel back some fifty years in memory to see a house with bare floors from cellar to garret, sawed-off stumps serving as chairs, stone dishes on the table, and sheepskins for blankets. He will remember that the workman of that day lived in a log hut, and that he had to stuff the cracks with fresh mud every fall; that a coat of whitewash was a luxury, and that corned beef and cabbage were regarded as delicacies. It was very easy to supply these wants, and had men continued to work on for as many hours as they were able, they would never have dreamed of improving their condition. . . . Too many advocates of the eight-hour day are in ignorance of the vital principle which underlies the agitation. They argue in this fashion: If the hours of labor are cut down to eight, the idle men who have flocked to this country will be employed, and we shall be correspondingly happy. Following that course of reasoning to its logical conclusion, we should have to cut down the hours of labor still further in a few years to accommodate the idle thousands imported to this country by steam and railway companies; and after the number of the unemployed increased again, we should have to reduce the hours of labor again and again until the unemployed of Europe and of Asia had landed, when we should have nothing to do. On higher ground does the sincere advocate of the short-hour work-day base his agitation. The final solution of the work-day problem will come when the workman becomes a sharer in what he creates. To-day the laborer is considered by his employer to [467] be no more a factor in the field of production than the spade which be handles. The laborer has no other

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interest in the work he performs than to draw pay for the work done at the end of the week or month. Workman and employer find their interests to be identical in that one particular---to get the most out of each other. Take an employer who gives work to one hundred men. The value of their labor we will rate at $2 a day. He pays them an average of $1 a day each. His profits will equal the total wages paid, and in twenty years he may retire a wealthy man. How fares it with his workmen? They remain poor and retire only to the poor-house or the cemetery. What do the riches of the one represent? Unpaid labor. To labor, then, belong the vast sums that rich men leave after them to erect poor-houses and charitable institutions, which would not be necessary if the workmen were paid what they earned. . . . No one now thinks of requiring the bank clerk to work ten hours, or even eight. His mind would not stand the strain, and the physical part would also decay. The work of the future will be scientific in its nature, and will call for more exercise of the brain than of the hand. Witness the rapidity with which [468] women are being crowded into the places made vacant by men, and we realize that it is no longer strength, but skill, that is required. No man or woman can work as long at an occupation which requires skill as at one which calls for no exercise of the mental powers. Turn to statistics, and it will be seen that the mechanic dies many years in advance of the day-laborer. One exercises the muscles alone; the other exercises brain and muscle. The double wear ends existence more quickly. Brain work will soon be required in all callings, and if for no other than a sanitary reason, the hours of labor should be reduced to the eight-hour standard. Men who work short hours are better educated than those who do not; they have more time in which to study. A thinking, studious man will learn that overexertion shortens life, and he will guard against it. Thousands go to early graves through overwork every year, and until the struggle for existence is shortened by cutting down the hours of toil, this condition of affairs will continue. . . . The manufacturer complains that he must keep his factory running long hours in order to pay his taxes. He should study the question of taxing land for full value for use, and know that his improvements should not be taxed out of his hands. The manufacturer complains that he cannot pay the interest on borrowed capital unless he works his factory long hours. He should study the question of finance, and learn that his government, and not its enemies, should regulate and control the volume of currency, that it may become a

240 Social Movements circulating medium, instead of an interest-gathering machine. He complains of excessive freight charges, and declares that he must work long hours in order to meet his obligations. Let him unite with the Knights of Labor and the Farmers’ Alliance in demanding that his government control the avenues of transportation and distribution. To study how to solve these problems, men must work fewer hours each day. Should this much-desired reform be inaugurated by strikes? is asked. Not necessarily. In a given occupation or trade the employers and workmen throughout the country should agree on the establishment of the eighthour work-day. To institute it by means of a strike in one part of the country would but place the short-hour employer at the mercy of his long-hour competitors. To demand the same rate of compensation for short hours as is now paid would be unjust. To rush the system through would unsettle affairs; and for that reason Knights of Labor ask for a gradual reduction of the hours of labor. We believe that, unless workmen are educated to understand the full and true reasons why their hours of labor should be reduced, they will not retain what they get; and for this reason we appeal to their reasoning powers rather than to their powers of endurance in case of a strike. Employers as well as workmen will soon realize that the short work-day will be the most beneficial. In any event its introduction will soon be announced. Source: North American Review (April 1890): 464--469.

4.5 James E. Doom, The Principles of Populism, January 1895 Speech Delivered in the Oklahoma Legislative Council Mr. President: I had not intended taking any part in this discussion, but the senator from Canadian has so far diverged from the subject as to cast reflections on the principles, and misrepresent the aims, of the People’s Party, and sneer at the senator from Payne (Mr. Spencer) that I feel it my duty to declare my hearty approval of the sentiments expressed by the senator from Payne. The People’s Party need no defense from me. Its platform of principles speaks for itself. It did not emanate from the dark recess of the midnight caucus, but was enacted in the broad light of the midday sun, on the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence---

an event forming an epoch in the history of the world, and I say it with all reverence, equaled only by that memorable event when the Prince of Peace was born in Bethlehem. Sir, since the fourth day of July, 1892, when our banner was unfurled to the breeze, our principles have been known to all men. The vituperation and misrepresentations of a venal press, and the sophistry of hireling orators, has only served to strengthen the attachment of true, generous and patriotic hearts. Investigation and arguments have convinced reflecting minds that the best interests, if not the salvation, of this nation depend on the success of the policies advocated in the Omaha platform. Sir, in reply to the misrepresentations of our opponents, I measure my words and unhesitatingly declare that we are not anarchists; we are not nihilists; we are not revolutionists. On the contrary, there is not a pillar or stone in the government edifice erected by the fathers of the republic that we would tear down or deface. We heartily subscribe to the sentiment of that old man---William E. Gladstone,---‘‘The theory of the American government is the perfection of human wisdom.’’ We want nothing better. Our greatest desire and highest aim is to transmit this beneficent government in its original purity to our posterity. Mr. President, with sorrow, not in anger, I express it as my deliberate conviction that, considering the present condition of this country, brought about by legislation, combined with executive action, for which the Republican and Democratic parties are solely responsible, the People’s party is today the only national party whose policies will perpetuate the government founded by the wisdom of Washington and Jefferson and brought by the blood and privations of our fathers and mothers in the war of Revolution, to establish the principle of ‘‘Equal rights to all, special privileges to none.’’ Sir, the time has gone by when the dangers that menace the welfare of the people and the very existence of the government, can be dismissed with a sneer, or be made the subject of jest. History but repeats itself. The man of today is the same creature, with like desires and ambitions as those for whom, in the far distant past, Draco made laws in Athens. Like causes produce like effects. Every student of history knows that, from the days of Draco to the present time, whenever the wealth of a nation has passed into possession of a privileged few, and the mass of the people became miserably poor, that nation sank into ignoble slavery, or, by bloody revolution, righted its economic conditions.

4.5 James E. Doom, The Principles of Populism 241 Sir, the American people will never be slaves. They are patient, are long-suffering, but when the cup of their misery is full, to the running over of a single drop, there may be precipitated a condition of things, the thought of which makes my blood run cold. We are traveling the same road traversed by the French people preceding the great revolution of 1789. There, the governing class, the privileged few, with three-fourths of the wealth in their possession, turned a deaf ear to the prayers of the down-trodden millions. That governing class, arrogant from long immunity, sneered at and derided the advice of Turgot, drove Necker into exile. The starving people who cried for bread were hanged on gallows fifty feet high, in order to deter others form the disturbing festivities at the royal palace. But the day of retribution was at hand; the cry of the poor and oppressed had gone up on high. A just God, who is no respecter of persons, poured out the vials of his wrath on the heads of the oppressors. Who can say that punishment was not deserved? They would not listen to Turgot; they would not listen to Necker; they would not heed the admonitions of LaFayette, nor of the Girondists, B but were forced to hearken to the inexorable logic of Robespierre, Marat, and the guillotine. So today, in our own beloved country, the money power, which Mr. Ingalls characterized as having ‘‘No politics but plunder, no principles but the spoliation of the human race, acting through gigantic corporations, arrogant in assurance of security afforded by vicious legislative, executive and judicial action, turns a deaf ear to the cries of distress going up from every city and town and from almost every fireside. The cry for bread is answered by volleys of musketry or by imprisonment. Surely, a day of retribution will come. The just God, the omnipotent Jehovah, who as the foundation of political economy for his children in all ages and in every climate, said to each and everyone of Adam’s race, ‘‘In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,’’ and ‘‘Thou shalt not steal,’’ will ere long, loose the thunderbolts of his wrath, unless the wrongs of his children are righted. It is the mission of the People’s party to avert that wrath. Like Abraham pleading for Sodom and Gomorrah, the most profound thinkers, the most ardent patriots, eminent men and women in every walk of life, have raised their warning voices. Mr. President, the time is past when the cry of ‘‘calamity howler’’ is sufficient to close people’s ears to the truth. Facts are stubborn things and events are forcing the truth home to the understanding of immense numbers. It is not only the ‘‘impracticable cranks’’ of the People’s party, but the most eminent scholars, statesmen, and jurists, have sounded the note of

warning. Listen to John J. Ingalls whose ability and orthodoxy no Republican will dispute; speaking from his place in the national senate, he said: ‘‘It is useless to deny the fact that we are on the verge of impending revolution,’’---the principle cause being---‘‘a financial system which allows 31,000 out of a population of 63,000,000 to acquire, mostly within twenty years, over one-half of the immense wealth of this great nation while a million Americans citizens are walking the streets and highways seeking work by which to procure food, NEEDS READJUSTMENT,’’ Again he declares: ‘‘Society is becoming rapidly stratified into the superfluous rich, and the people who are becoming hopelessly, miserably poor.’’ He further says, ‘‘A social system which condemns virtuous, dependent females to prostitution or suicide, to escape beggary, IS A CRIME, for which unrelenting justice will sooner or later demand atonement.’’ The influences which are surely undermining the foundations of that government which Mr. Gladstone pronounced ‘‘the perfection of human wisdom,’’ Mr. Ingalls designates as a ‘‘vast conspiracy, having its ramifications in every quarter of the civilized world.’’ These conspirators he characterizes as ‘‘Men of all nationalities, and of no nationality; with no politics but plunder, no principle but the spoliation of the human race.’’ Volumes could be filled with utterances equally significant and prophetic, from men utterly beyond the pale of the People’s party. I can not refrain from quoting from that tribune of the people, Senator Plumb of Kansas, who characterizes the condition as ‘‘one of helplessness, hopelessness, brought about by legislation, combined with executive action.’’ His admonition---‘‘Let us burst the bonds which bind us to this body of death called ‘fixed capital’ which oppresses labor and discourages enterprise; instead, let us legislate for the people, the common people, who were loved and trusted by Jefferson, Jackson and Abraham Lincoln, and who, in every fateful hour of the republic, rescued it from whatever danger it might be encompassed,’’---I heartily commend to the earnest consideration of all true lovers of republican government. Mr. President, I repeat, we are not nihilists, we are not anarchists. We want no bloody revolution. We are trying to avert it, and seek by peaceful and constitutional means to so readjust economic conditions that each and every inhabitant of this land may enjoy ‘‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’’ Very many of us are old soldiers. Mr. Ingalls recently declared that seventy-five percent of the old soldiers in Kansas vote the People’s party ticket. We want no war. We know what war is. It means widowed mothers and fatherless children, deserted fields, and

242 Social Movements devastated homes. Our earnest desire is to transmit to our posterity, in its original purity the liberty, blessings and government brought by the blood and sacrifices of our forefathers and mothers, organized by the wisdom and patriotism of Washington, Jefferson and Franklin, and to perpetuate which we gave the best years of our young manhood. Source: Norman People’s Voice (Oklahoma Territory), September 30, 1898.

4.6 Emma Goldman, A New Declaration of Independence, July 1909 When, in the course of human development, existing institutions prove inadequate to the needs of man, when they serve merely to enslave, rob, and oppress mankind, the people have the eternal right to rebel against, and overthrow, these institutions. The mere fact that these forces---inimical to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness---are legalized by statute laws, sanctified by divine rights, and enforced by political power, in no way justifies their continued existence. We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all human beings, irrespective of race, color, or sex, are born with the equal right to share at the table of life; that to secure this right, there must be established among men economic, social, and political freedom; we hold further that government exists but to maintain special privilege and property rights; that it coerces man into submission and therefore robs him of dignity, self-respect, and life. The history of the American kings of capital and authority is the history of repeated crimes, injustice, oppression, outrage, and abuse, all aiming at the suppression of individual liberties and the exploitation of the people. A vast country, rich enough to supply all her children with all possible comforts, and insure well-being to all, is in the hands of a few, while the nameless millions are at the mercy of ruthless wealth gatherers, unscrupulous lawmakers, and corrupt politicians. Sturdy sons of America are forced to tramp the country in a fruitless search for bread, and many of her daughters are driven into the street, while thousands of tender children are daily sacrificed on the altar of Mammon. The reign of these kings is holding mankind in slavery, perpetuating poverty and disease,

maintaining crime and corruption; it is fettering the spirit of liberty, throttling the voice of justice, and degrading and oppressing humanity. It is engaged in continual war and slaughter, devastating the country and destroying the best and finest qualities of man; it nurtures superstition and ignorance, sows prejudice and strife, and turns the human family into a camp of Ishmaelites. We, therefore, the liberty-loving men and women, realizing the great injustice and brutality of this state of affairs, earnestly and boldly do hereby declare, That each and every individual is and ought to be free to own himself and to enjoy the full fruit of his labor; that man is absolved from all allegiance to the kings of authority and capital; that he has, by the very fact of his being, free access to the land and all means of production, and entire liberty of disposing of the fruits of his efforts; that each and every individual has the unquestionable and unabridgeable right of free and voluntary association with other equally sovereign individuals for economic, political, social, and all other purposes, and that to achieve this end man must emancipate himself from the sacredness of property, the respect for man-made law, the fear of the Church, the cowardice of public opinion, the stupid arrogance of national, racial, religious, and sex superiority, and from the narrow puritanical conception of human life. And for the support of this Declaration, and with a firm reliance on the harmonious blending of man’s social and individual tendencies, the lovers of liberty joyfully consecrate their uncompromising devotion, their energy and intelligence, their solidarity and their lives. This ‘Declaration’ was written at the request of a certain newspaper, which subsequently refused to publish it, though the article was already in composition. Source: Mother Earth IV, no. 5 (July 1909).

4.7 Martha Gruening, Two Suffrage Movements, September 1912 The woman suffrage movement in England and America really dates from the beginning of the anti-slavery struggle. It was not only contemporaneous with it, but it owes its existence in a large measure to this phase of the struggle for human rights. For it was in the abolitionist ranks that the early suffragists received their training, both as thinkers and propagandists. It was impossible for them to agitate continually for the freedom of the Negro without desiring freedom for

4.7 Martha Gruening, Two Suffrage Movements themselves, or realizing the parallel between his situation and their own. For if the Negro was a slave the married woman of that day was no less a chattel. She was no longer openly bought and sold, but she had no more than he, a separate legal existence. If the Negro slave belonged to his master, she belonged no less, absolutely, to her husband as did her property, her earnings, and even her children. Both were disfranchised. Both were deprived of education and subject to economic disabilities which they shared with no other class. Even the constitutional right of free speech was not extended to woman when it meant public speech, as she found when she wished to join in the protest against slavery; and even among the abolitionists her presence on platforms and committees caused serious dissensions. The most striking instance of this was offered at the World’s Antislavery Convention held in London in 1840, when the credentials of the American women delegates were refused for no other reason than that they were women. They were, indeed, allowed to be present, but not to have any part in the proceedings. With this they had to be content, as their fellow delegates apparently were, the only exceptions being William Lloyd Garrison and Nathaniel Rogers, the editor of the Herald of Freedom. Of all the men present these two alone seemed to realize that a principle was at stake, and rather than compromise on a point they felt to be vital they resigned their seats in the convention, remaining merely as spectators in the gallery. This was one of many bitter experiences that taught women the lesson of their own impotence. To many of those rejected delegates, among them Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, it brought an overwhelming realization that they were still something less than human in the minds of most men and a conviction that their first duty was to free themselves from the artificial restraints imposed on them because of their sex; that then and then only they could work with men as equals. In these two women, at least, the action of the convention kindled a profound resolve to work toward this end, resulting in an agitation which culminated in the women’s rights convention of 1848 and its now famous ‘‘declaration of rights.’’ This convention held at Seneca Falls, N.Y., and attended by about 100 men and women, was denounced by the press of that date as ‘‘the most unnatural and shocking incident in the history of humanity,’’ while the declaration excited almost universal derision. This document stated the belief of its framers in the equality of men and women and demanded for women education, the liberty of entering

243

all trades and professions, the right to appear in public, the right to ‘‘work with men in any good cause,’’ reminiscent of the anti-slavery convention, and, finally, the ballot. It is significant that of all the resolutions offered at this convention this one alone was not unanimously adopted. It was finally carried by a small majority, but throughout the discussion only two of those present, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frederick Douglass, warmly favored it. They alone at this stage seem to have grasped the fact that all rights and privileges go back to this most fundamental right. Throughout the storm of ridicule and abuse which broke out after the convention Douglass maintained his position and brilliantly defended the convention in his paper, The North Star. The early history of the suffrage movement abounds with like incidents showing the help given to the cause by colored people. Perhaps none is more striking than the story of Sojourner Truth at the Akron convention, quoted from the ‘‘Reminiscences of Mrs. Frances D. Gage’’: The second day the work waxed warm. Methodist, Baptist, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Universalist ministers came in to hear and discuss the resolutions presented. One claimed superior rights and privileges for man, on the ground of ‘‘superior intellect’’; another because of the ‘‘manhood of Christ’’; another gave us a theological view of the ‘‘sin of our first mother.’’ Through all these sessions Sojourner Truth, quiet and reticent, sat crouched against the wall, on the corner of the pulpit stairs, her elbows on her knees, her chin resting on her broad, hard palms. Again and again, timorous and trembling ones came to me and said with earnestness: ‘‘Don’t let her speak, Mrs. Gage, it will ruin us.’’ There were very few in those days who dared ‘‘speak in meeting,’’ and the august teachers of the people were seemingly getting the better of us, while the boys in the gallery and the sneerers in the pews were hugely enjoying the discomfiture as they supposed of the ‘‘strong minded.’’ Some of the tender-skinned friends were on the point of losing dignity and the atmosphere betokened a storm, when slowly from her seat in the corner rose Sojourner Truth. ‘‘Don’t let her speak,’’ gasped half a dozen in my ear. She moved slowly and solemnly to the front and turned her great speaking eyes to me. There was a hissing sound of disapprobation, both above and below, as I announced ‘‘Sojourner Truth’’ and begged the audience to keep silence for a few minutes. At her first words there was a profound hush. She spoke in deep tones, not loud, but which reached

244 Social Movements every ear in the house, and away through the throng at the doors and windows. ‘‘Wall, chilern, whar dar is so much racket dar must be somethin’ out o’ kilter. I reckon dat ‘twixt de Niggers in de Souf and de women in de Norf, de white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what’s all dis here talkin’n about? ‘‘Dat man ober darsays dat women needs to be helped into carriages, and lifted ober ditches, and to hab de best place everywhar. Nobody eber helps me into carriages or ober mud puddles, or gibs me de best place! And ain’t I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm’’ (and she bared her tremendous arm showing her great muscular power). ‘‘I have ploughed, I have planted and gathered into barns and noone could head me---and ain’t I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man---when I could get it---and bear de lash as well, and ain’t I a woman? I have borne thirteen chilern and seen most of dem sold off into slavery, and when I cried out in my mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me; and ain’t I a woman? ‘‘Den dey talks ’bout dis ting in de head. What dey call it?’’ (‘‘Intellect,’’ someone whispered.) ‘‘Dat’s it, honey. What’s dat got to do with Nigger’s rights or women’s rights? If my cup won’t hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn’t you be mean not to let me have my little half measure full?’’ (And she sent a keen glance at the minister who made the argument. The cheering was long and loud.) ‘‘Den dat man ober dar, he say women can’t have as much right as men ’cause Christ wan’t a woman! Whar did your Christ come from?’’ (Rolling thunder couldn’t have stilled the crowd as did those deep wonderful tones as she stood with outstretched arms and eyes of fire.) ‘‘Whar did your Christ come from? From God and a woman. Man had nothin’ to do with him!’’ What a rebuke that was to the little man! Lastly she took up the defense of Mother Eve, eliciting almost deafening applause at every word, and finally returned to her corner, leaving many of us with streaming eyes and hearts beating with gratitude. She had taken us up in her strong arms and carried us safely over the slough of difficulty, turning the whole tide in our favor. I have never seen anything like the magical influence which turned the sneers and jeers of an excited crowd into notes of respect and admiration. If such incidents have been less frequent in recent years it is not because the profound and close connection between the Negro and women movements no longer exists. The parallel between their

respective situations is as clear to-day as it was in 1848, but it is too frequently ignored by the reformers on both sides. Both have made some progress toward complete emancipation, the gains of women in the direction of enfranchisement being seemingly the more lasting. Both, however, are still very largely disfranchised, and subject to those peculiar educational, legal and economic discriminations that are the natural results of disfranchisement. And finally, both are being brought with every onward step nearer to the identical temptation---to sacrifice the principle of true democracy to the winning of a single skirmish. So when one sees a national body of suffragists refusing to pass a universal suffrage resolution, one is compelled to wonder at the logic of those who, knowing so well what disfranchisement means, would allow it to be inflicted on others. ‘‘Let us not confuse the issue,’’ these suffragists plead, some in good faith. Yet the confusion, if any, exists only in their minds. Here are not two distinct issues at stake, but merely the vital principle of democracy. Others insist that the granting of the ballot to women must precede all other reforms because ‘‘women have waited long enough’’ and recall the fact that women were forced to stand aside and see Negro men enfranchised at the close of the Civil War. This is undoubtedly true and was quite justly a source of bitter disappointment to the suffrage leaders of that day---a disappointment we should not underestimate---but merely to reverse the principles in an unjust occurrence is not to work justice. It is strange to see so many suffragists who point with pride to the action of Garrison in withdrawing from the anti-slavery convention, blind to the larger significance of that action. Stranger still to see them following, not Garrison’s lead, but that of the convention in their attitude toward colored people, and forgetting that no cause is great to the exclusion of every other. This Robert Purvis, a noted colored leader, understood, as is shown by his noble reply to the suffragists’ appeal: ‘‘I cannot agree that this or any hour is specially the Negro’s. I am an anti-slavery man. With what grace could I ask the women of this country to labor for my enfranchisement and at the same time be unwilling to put forth a hand to remove the tyranny in some respects greater to which they are exposed?’’ This is what all suffragists must understand, whatever their sex or color---that all the disfranchised of the earth have a common cause. Source: The Crisis, September 1912, 245--247.

4.8 Anna Howard Shaw, The Fundamental Principle of a Republic 245

4.8 Anna Howard Shaw, The Fundamental Principle of a Republic, 1915 Albany, New York When I came into your hall tonight, I thought of the last time I was in your city. Twenty-one years ago I came here with Susan B. Anthony, and we came for exactly the same purpose as that for which we are here tonight. Boys have been born since that time and have become voters, and the women are still trying to persuade American men to believe in the fundamental principles of democracy, and I never quite feel as if it was a fair field to argue this question with men, because in doing it you have to assume that a man who professes to believe in a Republican form of government does not believe in a Republican form of government, for the only thing that woman’s enfranchisement means at all is that a government which claims to be a Republic should be a Republic, and not an aristocracy. The difficulty with discussing this question with those who oppose us is that they make any number of arguments but none of them have anything to do with Woman’s Suffrage; they always have something to do with something else, therefore the arguments which we have to make rarely ever have anything to do with the subject, because we have to answer our opponents who always escape the subject as far as possible in order to have any sort of reason in connection with what they say. Now one of two things is true: either a Republic is a desirable form of government, or else it is not. If it is, then we should have it, if it is not then we ought not to pretend that we have it. We ought at least be true to our ideals, and the men of New York have for the first time in their lives, the rare opportunity on the second day of next November, of making the state truly a part of the Republic. It is the greatest opportunity which has ever come to the men of the state. They have never had so serious a problem to solve before, they will never have a more serious problem to solve in any future of our nation’s life, and the thing that disturbs me more than anything else in connection with it is that so few people realize what a profound problem they have to solve on November 2. It is not merely a trifling matter; it is not a little thing that does not concern the state, it is the most vital problem we could have, and any man who goes to the polls on the second day of next November without thoroughly informing himself in regard to this subject is unworthy to be a citizen of this state, and unfit to cast a ballot.

If woman’s suffrage is wrong, it is a great wrong; if it is right, it is a profound and fundamental principle, and we all know, if we know what a Republic is, that it is the fundamental principle upon which a Republic must rise. Let us see where we are as a people; how we act here and what we think we are. The difficulty with the men of this country is that they are so consistent in their inconsistency that they are not aware of having been inconsistent; because their consistency has been so continuous and their inconsistency so consecutive that it has never been broken, from the beginning of our Nation’s life to the present time. If we trace our history back we will find that from the very dawn of our existence as a people, men have been imbued with a spirit and a vision more lofty than they have been able to live; they have been led by visions of the sublimest truth, both in regard to religion and in regard to government that ever inspired the souls of men from the time the Puritans left the old world to come to this country, led by the Divine ideal which is the sublimest and the supremest ideal in religious freedom which men have ever known, the theory that a man has a right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, without the intervention of any other man or any other group of men. And it was this theory, this vision of the right of the human soul which led men first to the shores of this country. Now, nobody can deny that they are sincere, honest, and earnest men. No one can deny that the Puritans were men of profound conviction, and yet these men who gave up everything in behalf of an ideal, hardly established their communities in this new country before they began to practice exactly the same sort of persecutions on other men which had been practiced upon them. They settled in their communities on the New England shores and when they formed their compacts by which they governed their local societies, they permitted no man to have a voice in the affairs unless he was a member of the church, and not a member of any church, but a member of the particular church which dominated the particular community in which he happened to be. In Massachusetts they drove the Baptists down to Rhode Island; in Connecticut they drove the Presbyterians over to New Jersey; they burned the Quakers in Massachusetts and ducked the witches, and no colony, either Catholic or Protestant allowed a Jew to have a voice. And so a man must worship God according to the conscience of the particular community in which he was located, and yet they called that religious freedom, they were not able to live the ideal of religious liberty, and from that time to this the men of this government have been following along

246 Social Movements the same line of inconsistency, while they too have been following a vision of equal grandeur and power. Never in the history of the world did it dawn upon the human mind as it dawned upon your ancestors, what it would mean for men to be free. They got the vision of a government in which the people would be the supreme power, and so inspired by this vision men wrote such documents as were went from the Massachusetts legislature, from the New York legislature and from the Pennsylvania group over to the Parliament of Great Britain, which rang with the profoundest measures of freedom and justice. They did not equivocate in a single word when they wrote the Declaration of Independence; no one can dream that these men had not got the sublimest ideal of democracy which had ever dawned upon the souls of men. But as soon as the war was over and our government was formed, instead of asking the question, who shall be the governing force in this great new Republic, when they brought those thirteen little territories together, they began to eliminate instead of include the men who should be the great governing forces, and they said, who shall have the voice in this great new Republic, and you would have supposed that such men as fought the Revolutionary War would have been able to answer that every man who has fought, everyone who has given up all he has and all he has been able to accumulate shall be free, it never entered their minds. These excellent ancestors of yours had not been away from the old world long enough to realize that man is of more value than his purse, so they said every man who has an estate in the government shall have a voice; and they said what shall that estate be? And they answered that a man who had property valued at two hundred and fifty dollars will be able to cast a vote, and so they sang ‘‘The land of the free and the home of the brave.’’ And they wrote into their Constitution, ‘‘All males who pay taxes on $250 shall cast a vote,’’ and they called themselves a Republic, and we call ourselves a Republic, and they were not quite so much of a Republic that we should be called a Republic yet. We might call ourselves angels, but that wouldn’t make us angels, you have got to be an angel before you are an angel, and you have got to be a Republic before you are a Republic. Now what did we do? Before the word ‘‘male’’ in the local compacts, they wrote the word ‘‘Church-members’’; and they wrote in the word ‘‘taxpayer.’’ Then there arose a great Democrat, Thomas Jefferson, who looked down into the day when you and I are living and saw that the rapidly accumulated wealth in the hands of a few men would endanger the liberties of the people, and he knew what you and I know, that no

power under heaven or among men is known in a Republic by which men can defend their liberties except by the power of the ballot, and so the Democratic party took another step in the evolution of the Republic out of a monarchy and they rubbed out the word ‘‘taxpayer’’ and wrote in the word ‘‘white’’, and then the Democrats thought the millennium had come, and they sang ‘‘he land of the free and the home of the brave’’ as lustily as the Republicans had sung it before them and spoke of the divine right of motherhood with the same thrill in their voices and at the same time they were selling mother’s babies by the pound on the auction block-and mothers apart from their babies. Another arose who said a man is not a good citizen because he is white, he is a good citizen because he is a man, and the Republican party took out that progressive evolutionary eraser and rubbed out the word ‘‘white’’ from before the word ‘‘male’ and could not think of another word to put in there---they were all in, black and white, rich and poor, wise and otherwise, drunk and sober; not a man left out to be put in, and so the Republicans could not write anything before the word ‘‘male’’, and they had to let the little word, ‘‘male’’ stay alone by itself. And God said in the beginning, ‘‘It is not good for man to stand alone.’’ That is why we are here tonight, and that is all that woman’s suffrage means; just to repeat again and again that first declaration of the Divine, ‘‘It is not good for man to stand alone,’’ and so the women of this state are asking that the word ‘‘male’’ shall be stricken out of the Constitution altogether and that the Constitution stand as it ought to have stood in the beginning and as it must before this state is any part of a Republic. Every citizen possessing the necessary qualifications shall be entitled to cast one vote at every election, and have that vote counted. We are not asking as our Anti-Suffrage friends think we are, for any of awful things that we hear will happen if we are allowed to vote; we are simply asking that that government which professes to be a Republic shall be a Republic and not pretend to be what it is not . . . .

4.9 Marcus Garvey, Aims and Objects of the Movement for Solution of Negro Problem, 1923 Generally the public is kept misinformed of the truth surrounding new movements of reform. Very seldom, if ever, reformers get the truth told about them and their movements. Because of this natural attitude, the

4.9 Marcus Garvey, Aims and Objects of the Movement for Solution of Negro Problem Universal Negro Improvement Association has been greatly handicapped in its work, causing thereby one of the most liberal and helpful human movements of the 20th century to be held up to ridicule by those who take pride in poking fun at anything not already successfully established. The white man of America has become the natural leader of the world. He, because of his exalted position, is called upon to help in all human efforts. From nations to individuals the appeal is made to him for aid in all things affecting humanity, so, naturally, there can be no great mass movement or change without first acquainting the leader on whose sympathy and advice the world moves. It is because of this, and more so because of a desire to be Christian friends with the white race, why I explain the aims and objects of the Universal Negro Improvement Association. The Universal Negro Improvement Association is an organization among Negroes that is seeking to improve the condition of the race, with the view of establishing a nation in Africa where Negroes will be given the opportunity to develop by themselves, without creating the hatred and animosity that now exist in countries of the white race through Negroes rivaling them for the highest and best positions in government, politics, society and industry. The organization believes in the rights of all men, yellow, white and black. To us, the white race has a right to the peaceful possession and occupation of countries of its own and in like manner the yellow and black races have their rights. It is only by an honest and liberal consideration of such rights can the world be blessed with the peace that is sought by Christian teachers and leaders. THE SPIRITUAL BROTHERHOOD OF MAN The following preamble to the constitution of the organization speaks for itself: ‘‘The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities’ League is a social, friendly, humanitarian, charitable, educational, institutional, constructive, and expansive society, and is founded by persons, de-siring to the utmost to work for the general uplift of the Negro peoples of the world. And the members pledge themselves to do all in their power to conserve the rights of their noble race and to respect the rights of all man-kind, believing always in the Brotherhood of Man and the Fatherhood of God. The motto of the organization is: One God! One Aim! One Destiny! Therefore, let justice be done to all mankind, realizing that if the strong oppresses the weak confusion and discontent will ever mark the path of man, but with love, faith and charity toward all the reign of peace and

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plenty will be heralded into the world and the generation of men shall be called Blessed.’’ The declared objects of the association are: ‘‘To establish a Universal Confraternity among the race; to promote the spirit of pride and love; to reclaim the fallen; to administer to and assist the needy; to assist in civilizing the backward tribes of Africa; to assist in the development of Independent Negro Nations and Communities; to establish a central nation for the race; to establish Commissaries or Agencies in the principal countries and cities of the world for the representation of all Negroes; to promote a conscientious Spiritual worship among the native tribes of Africa; to establish Universities, Colleges, Academies and Schools for the racial education and culture of the people; to work for better conditions among Negroes everywhere.’’ SUPPLYING A LONG FELT WANT The organization of the Universal Negro Improvement Association has supplied among Negroes a longfelt want. Hitherto the other Negro movements in America, with the exception of the Tuskegee effort of Booker T. Washington, sought to teach the Negro to aspire to social equality with the whites, meaning thereby the right to intermarry and fraternize in every social way. This has been the source of much trouble and still some Negro organizations continue to preach this dangerous ‘‘race destroying doctrine’’ added to a program of political agitation and aggression. The Universal Negro Improvement Association on the other hand believes in and teaches the pride and purity of race. We believe that the white race should uphold its racial pride and perpetuate itself, and that the black race should do likewise. We believe that there is room enough in the world for the various race groups to grow and develop by them-selves without seeking to destroy the Creator’s plan by the constant introduction of mongrel types. The unfortunate condition of slavery, as imposed upon the Negro, and which caused the mongrelization of the race, should not be legalized and continued now to the harm and detriment of both races. The time has really come to give the Negro a chance to develop himself to a moral-standard-man, and it is for such an opportunity that the Universal Negro Improvement Association seeks in the creation of an African nation for Negroes, where the greatest latitude would be given to work out this racial ideal. There are hundreds of thousands of colored people in America who desire race amalgamation and miscegenation as a solution of the race problem. These people are, therefore, opposed to the race pride ideas of black

248 Social Movements and white; but the thoughtful of both races will naturally ignore the ravings of such persons and honestly work for the solution of a problem that has been forced upon us. Liberal white America and race loving Negroes are bound to think at this time and thus evolve a program or plan by which there can be a fair and amicable settlement of the question. We cannot put off the consideration of the matter, for time is pressing on our hands. The educated Negro is making rightful constitutional demands. The great white majority will never grant them, and thus we march on to danger if we do not now stop and adjust the matter. The time is opportune to regulate the relationship between both races. Let the Negro have a country of his own. Help him to return to his original home, Africa, and there give him the opportunity to climb from the lowest to the highest positions in a state of his own. If not, then the nation will have to hearken to the demand of the aggressive, ‘‘social equality’’ organization, known as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, of which W. E. B. Du Bois is leader, which declares vehemently for social and political equality, viz.: Negroes and whites in the same hotels, homes, residential districts, public and private places, a Negro as president, members of the Cabinet, Governors of States, Mayors of cities, and leaders of society in the United States. In this agitation, Du Bois is ably supported by the ‘‘Chicago Defender,’’ a colored newspaper published in Chicago. This paper advocated Negroes in the Cabinet and Senate. All these, as everybody knows, are the Negroes’ constitutional rights, but reason dictates that the masses of the white race will never stand by the ascendancy of an opposite minority group to the favored positions in a government, society and industry that exist by the will of the majority, hence the demand of the Du Bois group of colored leaders will only lead, ultimately, to further disturbances in riots, lynching and mob rule. The only logical solution therefore, is to supply the Negro with opportunities and environments of his own, and there point him to the fullness of his ambition. NEGROES WHO SEEK SOCIAL EQUALITY The Negro who seeks the White House in America could find ample play for his ambition in Africa. The Negro who seeks the office of Secretary of State in America would have a fair chance of demonstrating his diplomacy in Africa. The Negro who seeks a seat in the Senate or of being governor of a State in America, would be provided with a glorious chance for statesmanship in Africa.

The Negro has a claim on American white sympathy that cannot be denied. The Negro has labored for 300 years in contributing to America’s greatness. White America will not be unmindful, therefore, of this consideration, but will treat him kindly. Yet it is realized that all human beings have a limit to their humanity. The humanity of white America, we realize, will seek self-protection and self-preservation, and that is why the thoughtful and reasonable Negro sees no hope in America for satisfying the aggressive program of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, but advances the reasonable plan of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, that of creating in Africa a nation and government for the Negro race. This plan when properly undertaken and prosecuted will solve the race problem in America in fifty years. Africa affords a wonderful opportunity at the present time for colonization by the Negroes of the Western world. There is Liberia, already established as an independent Negro government. Let white America assist Afro-Americans to go there and help develop the country. Then, there are the late German colonies; let white sentiment force England and France to turn them over to the American and West Indian Negroes who fought for the Allies in the World’s War. Then, France, England and Belgium owe America billions of dollars which they claim they cannot afford to repay immediately. Let them compromise by turning over Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast on the West Coast of Africa and add them to Liberia and help make Liberia a state worthy of her history. The Negroes of Africa and America are one in blood. They have sprung from the same common stock. They can work and live together and thus make their own racial contribution to the world. Will deep thinking and liberal white America help? It is a considerate duty. It is true that a large number of self-seeking colored agitators and so-called political leaders, who hanker after social equality and fight for the impossible in politics and governments, will rave, but remember that the slave-holder raved, but the North said, ‘‘Let the slaves go free’’; the British Parliament raved when the Colonists said, ‘‘We want a free and American nation’’; the Monarchists of France raved when the people declared for a more liberal form of government. The masses of Negroes think differently from the self-appointed leaders of the race. The majority of Negro leaders are selfish, self-appointed and not elected by the people. The people desire freedom in a land of their own, while the colored politician desires office and social equality for him-self in America, and that is

4.10 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 249 why we are asking white America to help the masses to realize their objective.

4.10 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, April 16, 1963 MY DEAR FELLOW CLERGYMEN: While confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement calling my present activities ‘‘unwise and untimely.’’ Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of my work and ideas. If I sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little time for anything other than such correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no time for constructive work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will and that your criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statements in what I hope will be patient and reasonable terms. I think I should indicate why I am here In Birmingham, since you have been influenced by the view which argues against ‘‘outsiders coming in.’’ I have the honor of serving as president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in every southern state, with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. We have some eighty-five affiliated organizations across the South, and one of them is the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights. Frequently we share staff, educational and financial resources with our affiliates. Several months ago the affiliate here in Birmingham asked us to be on call to engage in a nonviolent direct-action program if such were deemed necessary. We readily consented, and when the hour came we lived up to our promise. So I, along with several members of my staff, am here because I was invited here I am here because I have organizational ties here. But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their ‘‘thus saith the Lord’’ far beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman world, so am I. compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid. Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice

everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial ‘‘outside agitator’’ idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds. You deplore the demonstrations taking place In Birmingham. But your statement, I am sorry to say, fails to express a similar concern for the conditions that brought about the demonstrations. I am sure that none of you would want to rest content with the superficial kind of social analysis that deals merely with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes. It is unfortunate that demonstrations are taking place in Birmingham, but it is even more unfortunate that the city’s white power structure left the Negro community with no alternative. In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self-purification; and direct action. We have gone through an these steps in Birmingham. There can be no gainsaying the fact that racial injustice engulfs this community. Birmingham is probably the most thoroughly segregated city in the United States. Its ugly record of brutality is widely known. Negroes have experienced grossly unjust treatment in the courts. There have been more unsolved bombings of Negro homes and churches in Birmingham than in any other city in the nation. These are the hard, brutal facts of the case. On the basis of these conditions, Negro leaders sought to negotiate with the city fathers. But the latter consistently refused to engage in good-faith negotiation. . . . You may well ask: ‘‘Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and so forth? Isn’t negotiation a better path?’’ . . . The purpose of our direct-action program is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. I therefore concur with you in your call for negotiation. Too long has our beloved Southland been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than dialogue. One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in Birmingham is untimely. Some have asked: ‘‘Why didn’t you give the new city administration time to act?’’ The only answer that I can give to this query is that the new Birmingham administration must be prodded about as much as the outgoing one, before it will act. We are sadly mistaken if we feel that the election of Albert Boutwell as mayor will bring the millennium to Birmingham. While Mr. Boutwell is a much more gentle

250 Social Movements person than Mr. Connor, they are both segregationists, dedicated to maintenance of the status quo. I have hope that Mr. Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to desegregation. But he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil rights. My friends, I must say to you that we have not made a single gain civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but, as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups tend to be more immoral than individuals. We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was ‘‘well timed’’ in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word ‘‘Wait!’’ It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This ‘‘Wait’’ has almost always meant ’Never. ’’We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that ‘‘justice too long delayed is justice denied.’’ We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we stiff creep at horse-and-buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging dark of segregation to say, ‘‘Wait.’’ But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your sixyear-old daughter why she can’t go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white people; when you have to concoct an answer for a five-year-old son who is asking: ‘‘Daddy, why do white people treat colored people so mean?’’; when you take a cross-county drive and find it necessary to sleep night after night in the uncomfortable

corners of your automobile because no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading ‘‘white’’ and ‘‘colored’’; when your first name becomes ‘‘nigger,’’ your middle name becomes ‘‘boy’’ (however old you are) and your last name becomes ‘‘John,’’ and your wife and mother are never given the respected title ‘‘Mrs.’’; when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never quite knowing what to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and outer resentments; when you no forever fighting a degenerating sense of ‘‘nobodiness’’ then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair. I hope, sirs, you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience. You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court’s decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may seem rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. One may won ask: ‘‘How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’’ The answer lies in the fact that there fire two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the Brat to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that ‘‘an unjust law is no law at all’’ Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distort the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an ‘‘I-it’’ relationship for an ‘‘I-thou’’ relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and awful. Paul Tillich said that sin is separation. Is not segregation an existential expression

4.10 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 251 of man’s tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness? Thus it is that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is morally right; and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong. Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up that state’s segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population, not a single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured? Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading without a permit. Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which requires a permit for a parade. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest. . . . Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience. It was evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a higher moral law was at stake. It was practiced superbly by the early Christians, who were willing to face hungry lions and the excruciating pain of chopping blocks rather than submit to certain unjust laws of the Roman Empire. To a degree, academic freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience. In our own nation, the Boston Tea Party represented a massive act of civil disobedience. We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was ‘‘legal’’ and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was ‘‘illegal.’’ It was ‘‘illegal’’ to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler’s Germany. Even so, I am sure that, had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers. If today I lived in a Communist country

where certain principles dear to the Christian faith are suppressed, I would openly advocate disobeying that country’s antireligious laws. I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘‘order’’ than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: ‘‘I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action’’; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man’s freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a ‘‘more convenient season.’’ Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fan in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with an its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured. In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn’t this like condemning a robbed man because his possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn’t this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries

252 Social Movements precipitated the act by the misguided populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn’t this like condemning Jesus because his unique God-consciousness and never-ceasing devotion to God’s will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from a white brother in Texas. He writes: ‘‘An Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth.’’ Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely rational notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be coworkers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity . . . Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The yearning for freedom eventually manifests itself, and that is what has happened to the American Negro. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom, and something without has reminded him that it can be gained. Consciously or unconsciously, he has been caught up by the Zeitgeist, and with his black brothers of Africa and his brown and yellow brothers of Asia, South America and the Caribbean, the United States Negro is moving with a sense of great urgency toward the promised land of racial justice. If one recognizes this vital urge that has engulfed the Negro

community, one should readily understand why public demonstrations are taking place. The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations, and he must release them. So let him march; let him make prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; let him go on freedom rides-and try to understand why he must do so. If his repressed emotions are not released in nonviolent ways, they will seek expression through violence; this is not a threat but a fact of history. So I have not said to my people: ‘‘Get rid of your discontent.’’ Rather, I have tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled into the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action. And now this approach is being termed extremist. But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extremist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love: ‘‘Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.’’ Was not Amos an extremist for justice: ‘‘Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.’’ Was not Paul an extremist for the Christian gospel: ‘‘I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus.’’ Was not Martin Luther an extremist: ‘‘Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise, so help me God.’’ And John Bunyan: ‘‘I will stay in jail to the end of my days before I make a butchery of my conscience.’’ And Abraham Lincoln: ‘‘This nation cannot survive half slave and half free.’’ And Thomas Jefferson: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that an men are created equal . . .’’ So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we viii be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremist for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice? In that dramatic scene on Calvary’s hill three men were crucified. We must never forget that all three were crucified for the same crime---the crime of extremism. Two were extremists for immorality, and thus fell below their environment. The other, Jeans Christ, was an extremist for love, truth and goodness, and thereby rose above his environment. Perhaps the South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists. . . . Let me take note of my other major disappointment. I have been so greatly disappointed with the white church and its leadership. Of course, there are some notable exceptions. I am not unmindful of the fact that each of you has taken some significant stands on this issue. I commend you, Reverend Stallings, for your Christian stand on this past Sunday, in welcoming

4.10 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 253 Negroes to your worship service on a non segregated basis. I commend the Catholic leaders of this state for integrating Spring Hill College several years ago. But despite these notable exceptions, I must honestly reiterate that I have been disappointed with the church. I do not say this as one of those negative critics who can always find something wrong with the church. I say this as a minister of the gospel, who loves the church; who was nurtured in its bosom; who has been sustained by its spiritual blessings and who will remain true to it as long as the cord of Rio shall lengthen. When I was suddenly catapulted into the leadership of the bus protest in Montgomery, Alabama, a few years ago, I felt we would be supported by the white church felt that the white ministers, priests and rabbis of the South would be among our strongest allies. Instead, some have been outright opponents, refusing to understand the freedom movement and misrepresenting its leader era; an too many others have been more cautious than courageous and have remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of stained-glass windows. In spite of my shattered dreams, I came to Birmingham with the hope that the white religious leadership of this community would see the justice of our cause and, with deep moral concern, would serve as the channel through which our just grievances could reach the power structure. I had hoped that each of you would understand. But again I have been disappointed. I have heard numerous southern religious leaders admonish their worshipers to comply with a desegregation decision because it is the law, but I have longed to hear white ministers declare: ‘‘Follow this decree because integration is morally right and because the Negro is your brother.’’ In the midst of blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro, I have watched white churchmen stand on the sideline and mouth pious irrelevancies and sanctimonious trivialities. In the midst of a mighty struggle to rid our nation of racial and economic injustice, I have heard many ministers say: ‘‘Those are social issues, with which the gospel has no real concern.’’ And I have watched many churches commit themselves to a completely other worldly religion which makes a strange, on Biblical distinction between body and soul, between the sacred and the secular. . . . Before closing I feel impelled to mention one other point in your statement that has troubled me profoundly. You warmly commended the Birmingham police force for keeping ‘‘order’’ and ‘‘preventing violence.’’ I doubt that you would have so warmly commended the police force if you had seen its dogs

sinking their teeth into unarmed, nonviolent Negroes. I doubt that you would so quickly commend the policemen if you were to observe their ugly and inhumane treatment of Negroes here in the city jail; if you were to watch them push and curse old Negro women and young Negro girls; if you were to see them slap and kick old Negro men and young boys; if you were to observe them, as they did on two occasions, refuse to give us food because we wanted to sing our grace together. I cannot join you in your praise of the Birmingham police department. It is true that the police have exercised a degree of discipline in handing the demonstrators. In this sense they have conducted themselves rather ‘‘nonviolently’’ in pubic. But for what purpose? To preserve the evil system of segregation. Over the past few years I have consistently preached that nonviolence demands that the means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek. I have tried to make clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends. But now I must affirm that it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve immoral ends. Perhaps Mr. Connor and his policemen have been rather nonviolent in public, as was Chief Pritchett in Albany, Georgia but they have used the moral means of nonviolence to maintain the immoral end of racial injustice. As T. S. Eliot has said: ‘‘The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason.’’ I wish you had commended the Negro sit-inners and demonstrators of Birmingham for their sublime courage, their willingness to suffer and their amazing discipline in the midst of great provocation. One day the South will recognize its real heroes. They will be the James Merediths, with the noble sense of purpose that enables them to face Jeering, and hostile mobs, and with the agonizing loneliness that characterizes the life of the pioneer. They will be old, oppressed, battered Negro women, symbolized in a seventy-two-year-old woman in Montgomery, Alabama, who rose up with a sense of dignity and with her people decided not to ride segregated buses, and who responded with ungrammatical profundity to one who inquired about her weariness: ‘‘My fleets is tired, but my soul is at rest.’’ They will be the young high school and college students, the young ministers of the gospel and a host of their elders, courageously and nonviolently sitting in at lunch counters and willingly going to jail for conscience’ sake. One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in our

254 Social Movements Judaeo-Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation back to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding fathers in their formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Never before have I written so long a letter. I’m afraid it is much too long to take your precious time. I can assure you that it would have been much shorter if I had been writing from a comfortable desk, but what else can one do when he is alone in a narrow jail cell, other than write long letters, think long thoughts and pray long prayers? . . . I hope this letter finds you strong in the faith. I also hope that circumstances will soon make it possible for me to meet each of you, not as an integrationist or a civil rights leader but as a fellow clergyman and a Christian brother. Let us all hope that the dark clouds of racial prejudice will soon pass away and the deep fog of misunderstanding will be lifted from our feardrenched communities, and in some not too distant tomorrow the radiant stars of love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation with all their scintillating beauty. Yours for the cause of Peace and Brotherhood, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

4.11 Proclamation of the Delano Grape Workers for International Boycott Day, May 10, 1969 We, the striking grape workers of California, join on this International Boycott Day with the consumers across the continent in planning the steps that lie ahead on the road to our liberation. As we plan, we recall the footsteps that brought us to this day and the events of this day. The historic road of our pilgrimage to Sacramento later branched out, spreading like the unpruned vines in struck fields, until it led us to willing exile in cities across this land. There, far from the earth we tilled for generations, we have cultivated the strange soil of public understanding, sowing the seed of our truth and our cause in the minds and hearts of men. We have been farm workers for hundreds of years and pioneers for seven. Mexicans, Filipinos, Africans and others, our ancestors were among those who founded this land and tamed its natural wilderness. But we are still pilgrims on this land, and we are pioneers who blaze a trail out of the wilderness of hunger and deprivation that we have suffered even as our ancestors did. We are conscious today of the significance of our

present quest. If this road we chart leads to the rights and reforms we demand, if it leads to just wages, humane working conditions, protection from the misuse of pesticides, and to the fundamental right of collective bargaining, if it changes the social order that relegates us to the bottom reaches of society, then in our wake will follow thousands of American farm workers. Our example will make them free. But if our road does not bring us to victory and social change, it will not be because our direction is mistaken or our resolve too weak, but only because our bodies are mortal and our journey hard. For we are in the midst of a great social movement, and we will not stop struggling ’til we die, or win! We have been farm workers for hundreds of years and strikers for four. It was four years ago that we threw down our plowshares and pruning hooks. These Biblical symbols of peace and tranquility to us represent too many lifetimes of unprotesting submission to a degrading social system that allows us no dignity, no comfort, no peace. We mean to have our peace, and to win it without violence, for it is violence we would overcome-the subtle spiritual and mental violence of oppression, the violence subhuman toil does to the human body. So we went and stood tall outside the vineyards where we had stooped for years. But the tailors of national labor legislation had left us naked. Thus exposed, our picket lines were crippled by injunctions and harassed by growers; our strike was broken by imported scabs; our overtures to our employers were ignored. Yet we knew the day must come when they would talk to us, as equals. We have been farm workers for hundreds of years and boycotters for two. We did not choose the grape boycott, but we had chosen to leave our peonage, poverty and despair behind. Though our first bid for freedom, the strike, was weakened, we would not turn back. The boycott was the only way forward the growers left to us. We called upon our fellow men and were answered by consumers who said---as all men of conscience must---that they would no longer allow their tables to be subsidized by our sweat and our sorrow: They shunned the grapes, fruit of our affliction. We marched alone at the beginning, but today we count men of all creeds, nationalities, and occupations in our number. Between us and the justice we seek now stand the large and powerful grocers who, in continuing to buy table grapes, betray the boycott their own customers have built. These stores treat their patrons’ demands to remove the grapes the same way the growers treat our demands for union recognition-by ignoring them. The consumers who rally behind our

4.12 National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, Equal Rights Amendment cause are responding as we do to such treatment---with a boycott! They pledge to withhold their patronage from stores that handle grapes during the boycott, just as we withhold our labor from the growers until our dispute is resolved. Grapes must remain an unenjoyed luxury for all as long as the barest human needs and basic human rights are still luxuries for farm workers. The grapes grow sweet and heavy on the vines, but they will have to wait while we reach out first for our freedom. The time is ripe for our liberation.

4.12 National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, Equal Rights Amendment, 1978 Women will not have equality in the United States unless it is guaranteed by the Constitution. In 1978, more than 200 years after the founding of this Nation, American women, 51.3 percent of the population, still are not the equals of men before the law. The rights they have are unclear and incomplete and are at the mercy of conflicting State laws and inconsistent court decisions. There is no clear standard to guide legislators in writing laws about women or to guide judges in interpreting them. The Equal Rights Amendment has been ratified by 35 States, in which three-fourths of the U.S. population live. Approval by only three more States is needed to make the ERA part of the Constitution. Under the preamble to the amendment approved by Congress, ratification must be completed by March 22, 1979, unless Congress votes to extend that date. Although a majority of Americans favor equal rights for women, ratification in the remaining States has been blocked by a well-organized, well-financed minority that relies on many of the same false arguments that were used to prevent women from getting the vote, namely, that ERA would destroy the family and morality. In some States, ratification has been held up by the negative votes of as few as two or three male legislators. The Equal Rights Amendment itself is short and simple: ‘‘Section 1: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. ‘‘Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

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‘‘Section 3: This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.’’ Why an amendment is needed The Declaration of Independence, signed in 1776, stated that ‘‘all men are created equal’’ and that governments derive their powers ‘‘from the consent of the governed.’’ Women were not included in either concept. The original American Constitution of 1787 was founded on English common law, which did not recognize women as citizens or as individuals with legal rights. A woman was expected to obey her husband or nearest male kin, and if she was married, her person and her property were owned by her husband. The power of the ballot was denied to her by the States, which also denied it to Indians, slaves, the mentally unfit, and criminals. It has been argued that the ERA is not necessary because the 14th amendment, passed after the Civil War. guarantees that no State shall deny to ‘‘any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’. . . Just as women were not included under the 14th amendment, they were also omitted from the 15th amendment, which enfranchised former slaves, but males only. This exclusion from coverage resulted in a century long struggle that ended with approval of the 19th amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote. Aside from the fact that women have been subjected to varying, inconsistent, and often unfavorable decisions under the 14th amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment is a more immediate and effective remedy to sex discrimination in Federal and State laws than a case-by-case interpretation under the 14th amendment could ever be. The critical distinction is that under the ERA, sex is a prohibited classification, not a classification that is subject to some level of judicial review and that, therefore, may or may not be sustained. What the ERA will do In interpreting the ERA, the courts can be expected to rely on the legislative history as expressed in the majority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee and in the congressional debates on passage of the amendment. That the courts will interpret the ERA responsibly and with an understanding of the underlying legislative intent is evident from the existing decisions interpreting equal rights amendments in those 16 States which have such amendments in their constitutions. Based on this record, it is fair to say that: ERA will enshrine in the Constitution the value judgment that sex discrimination is wrong.

256 Social Movements ERA will require the Federal Government and each State to review and revise all laws and official practices to eliminate discrimination based on sex. ERA will insure that governments do not enact future laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. Many State and Federal laws have been revised and new laws enacted to eliminate sex discrimination as a result of the debates on ERA. But these laws could be changed by new Congresses and new State legislatures, and failure to ratify the ERA may result in some losses of recent gains. A constitutional amendment provides permanent basis for progress. ERA will be the basis for recognition of the principle (ignored in most family law) that the homemaker’s role in marriage has economic value and that marriage is a full partnership. Under Pennsylvania’s ERA. for example, the State supreme court ruled in 1975 that nonmonetary contributions to a marriage, such as household work and child care, must be considered when a couple’s household goods are divided as a result of divorce. ERA will insure equality of opportunity in public schools, state colleges and universities, employment training programs of Federal, State, or local governments, and in governmental recreation programs. ERA will insure equal opportunity, privileges, and benefits in all aspects of Government employment. ERA will insure that families of women workers receive the same benefits as families of men workers under the social security law, Government pension plans, and workers’ compensation laws. ERA will insure that married women can engage in business freely and dispose of separate or community property on the same basis as married men. ERA will give the same rights to a woman as to a man in marital law and allow a married woman to maintain a separate domicile for voting purposes, for passports, for car registration, etc. (A husband may be in the military service and maintain his legal domicile ‘‘back home,’’ but his wife may want to vote for the local school board where the kids go to school, for example.). . . Women have waited more than 200 years for the equality promised by the Declaration of Independence to all men. Two years after the United States of America celebrated its Bicentennial, it is time to extend democracy to all American citizens and to put women into the Constitution at last. Source: The Spirit of Houston: The First National Women’s Conference. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, 49--52.

4.13 Pat Robertson, Citizens of Character Must Get Involved, 1986 National Religious Broadcasters, Feb. 5, 1986--- The Bible says despise not the day of small things. How could we have imagined that tiny voice which barely reached around the community we lived in would one day be a signal that would one day take us all around the world by satellite and we would have all these millions of people on cable? How could we have dreamed 25 years ago that it would grow into what we see now? Small beginnings Some of you right now in this organization are just starting out. We had initial capital of 70 dollars. Our first year’s operating expenses for our TV station was $8,000 for the year. The second year we added the radio we had $20,000 total income. In the old days you made due with what you had, and you believed God and it just seemed that there would never be anything else. While we were growing, you were growing. We were all adding a voice around this nation. It was a quiet, voice. It wasn’t taken very seriously. But back then, they didn’t have organizations like People for the American Way saying what a danger we were to America. The fact is, nobody could hear us so they didn’t think we were a danger to anybody. While we were growing we were just like children and this nation was going through some growth of its own. It wasn’t very healthy growth. It was in the early 60’s that the Supreme Court determined that prayer couldn’t be dictated. A year later they said you couldn’t read the Bible anymore in schools. Not too long after that I learned of the horrifying news that our President had been shot in Dallas and I began to broadcast that across our radio station to tell the shocked audience that there had been an assassination. Then I sat by and watched as you did as we saw this nation plunge into a terrible war that drained our energies and our finances: $150 billion spent and 45,000-50,000 of our men died in a no-win war. It didn’t just take the lives and the treasures of this nation, it took the will and the resolve of this nation away and let us go into a battle that left scars that we are still having to deal with. War undermined unity Suddenly, the young were pitted against the old and the husbands against the wives; the women against the men. The authority of the educators was pitted against the students. The blacks were pitted against the whites.

4.13 Pat Robertson, Citizens of Character Must Get Involved There was rioting, revolution, revolts, anarchy in our streets, as people were protesting what seemed to be a foolish war. I want to tell you something about war, ladies and gentlemen, war is hell. There is one thing you don’t do with war---if you are going to get into war, get in to win, and if you are not going to win, don’t play with the lives of American boys. I watched as you watched as Watergate unfolded, the terrible scandal that brought down a president that was elected by almost the largest landslide in history. We watched at the same time the Supreme Court begin to run wild with the liberties of our people. When the American Civil Liberties Union linked up with liberal judges, they decided they would usurp the role of the legislature to the fifty states and would do for the people what the people refused to do for themselves. Along with that, they began to legitimatize the sexual revolution we had and said, ‘‘Well, you are free sexually now of the bondage of Christianity and the bondage of the strictures of religious beliefs.’’ Now, if you are going to do that, what you will have is the product of conception. It’s not a baby, it’s a fetus. It’s a blob of tissue and it can be done away with. Despite reason, despite law, despite common sense, and despite the legislative acts of all 50 states, the Supreme Court determined that the slaughter of the innocent in America was now law and there could be no voice against it in the land. Family assaulted Over the decade of the 70’s, we saw a breakdown of the family like we have never seen in this century. You might be interested to know that divorces have gone up 700 percent in our century and the majority of that divorce rate went up during the 1970’s. Before it was over it was said that this country was ungovernable. It was said that we could not hold on because we did not have the will and the resolve any longer because of Vietnam. Then we surrendered to Communists in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Angola, and Nicaragua. Everywhere we looked the enemies of the United States and those who claimed to be atheists were on the attack. It seemed as if this nation was being fragmented by indecision, lack of resolve and moral decay. Suddenly those of us who had been broadcasting began to do something. We said ‘‘Enough!’’ Some of the other Evangelicals, some of our Catholic friends, and those from every walk of life from all 50 states came to Washington in 1985---100,000 people. We fasted and we prayed and we said, ‘‘God Almighty, we must have revival in America lest we perish.’’

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God Almighty heard and God Almighty answered. He sent a change in government. He sent a change in perception. He sent a change in attitude. But I want you to know something; it isn’t finished yet. We still have crime. We still have a million babies a year slaughtered since Roe vs. Wade. By the end of this century, we will have 40 million children slaughtered. And we talk about the butchery of the Communists, the Nazis, Genghis Khan, and other savages in history. We’ve exceeded them all here in a civilized Christian country. Not only are we turning on the unborn, we are turning on the born. I served on the President’s Commission on Victim’s Rights. According to the Attorney General, one out of every four children in America is a victim of sexual abuse before he or she reaches 10 or 12 years old. . . . Revival in the air We are seeing juxtaposed with these problems and with these evils, the greatest spiritual revival in the entire history of the world. There are at least 60--70 million evangelicals in America, and the numbers are rolling like a great flood and a great tide. We are moving on a flood-tide of revival here in America, and we’ve all been a part of it. We realize that homosexuality, for example, is an abomination before the Lord. We realize that things are being done to the families of our nation that are wrong: We realize that the Constitution never intended for five old men in black robes who never got elected to dominate our entire political system. Never! Suddenly, many of us who never thought too much of ‘‘politics,’’ we were more concerned about the Kingdom of Heaven, we are realizing that the Kingdom of Heaven also encompasses the secular system we live in and that it’s an intolerable thing to have our cherished values trampled on and millions and billions of tax dollars going to fight the things we believe are destroying our families. It isn’t coincidental. I don’t mean this to be political, that from 1980 to 1984, there were 6 million evangelicals who switched party allegiance because of the activity that took place, what Pat Buchanan calls ‘‘Sodom by the bay’’ in 1984. And there were two million more registered evangelicals---and you’d be interested to know that at this point in time there are between 20 and 22 million evangelicals in the Republican Party now. In the South, there was a dramatic switch in allegiance, almost overnight, because the people said, ‘‘We can’t tolerate anti-biblical values any longer.’’ And we’re going to be organized. We’re going to get

258 Social Movements involved because we are citizens just like everybody else is . . . A challenge issued Ladies and gentlemen, I want to challenge you tonight. We can reverse the tide of secularism. We can bring a reformation to America. We can see little children praying in schools. We can stop the slaughter of abortion. We can eliminate this plague of pornography and the organized crime that goes with it. We can eliminate the drug addiction. We can make the government responsible to the citizens. We can stop the incredible waste in this government. But it’s only going to happen if people like you and like me get involved. Because the one thing that we’ve got going for us is we’re not trying to get some kind of advantage. We’re not looking for something from the federal government. I have a university, and we don’t take a dime of federal money and I don’t want any of it. The only things we care about are our children and our grandchildren and the future of this land and the glory of the Lord. And that puts us in sort of a different perspective on things. But we’ve thought for so many years as I did when I was seeing CBN built, ‘‘Well, we’ll leave it to them. That’s dirty, that’s secular, we don’t want to get involved in it.’’ Well the Bible says that the public servants are ministers of God. Read Romans 13. They are ministers of God. We are told to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s. Who is Caesar in our society? We are Caesar. We have a republic and we are Caesar. There is no hereditary monarch in America. We are the people. It’s time for us to say we can do a better job.

I’ve traveled with many of the congressional people when I was growing up as a youngster. I’ve seen distinguished senators at receptions so drunken that they could hardly stand up. I watched the newspapers and the television as the head of the tax writing Ways and Means Committee was having an affair with a stripper in Washington and was an acknowledged alcoholic. Others stood by when the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the house would fall drunk on a table because he too was an alcoholic. There are many under the pressure of the life that they are engaged in that are using drugs. I respect and honor the leaders. But there are some leaders that I think would be better off in private life. And I believe that in this body and in your audiences around the nation, there are men and women of character, of leadership, of integrity, of intelligence, who are far better and will see things more clearly. The Bible says that when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice. And I think we should dedicate ourselves in this nation that we are not any longer going to sit idly by and see this great land that was given us by our forefathers destroyed by those who are out for selfish gains and who are motivated by outmoded concepts and ideas which are proven false and failures. I believe as we leave this place, we do have, as President Reagan said, a date with destiny. We are going to see a change in this nation, and you’re going to be a part of it. And who knows, that God has called you to the Kingdom for such a time as this. Thank you and God bless you.

Section 5 The Media and Public Opinion

Introduction

Among the most important forces shaping public opinion are the news media. Freedom of the press long has been a cherished safeguard of American liberty, and successful democracy has required an unfettered flow of information that keeps a free people aware of important current events, the activities of government actors, and a diverse set of opinions and ideas. For much of the country’s history, Washington was a remote place to many Americans who received national news slowly and sparingly. National growth and technological innovations ushered in a communications revolution, as mass-circulation print media, the radio, television, and Internet have transformed the scale and speed of political news coverage. The relative power of the mass media today has become a subject of considerable debate, from deciding what is and what is not news to interpreting events and political leaders to playing a role in setting the public agenda. Dianne Garyantes traces the historical development of the mass media in American politics, while Susan Sherr sheds light on the complex roles of the media and public opinion in this informationrich age. ---Richard A. Harris

Public opinion is typically understood as essential to democracy, but the American founders favored a government that did not accord too much influence to the preferences of the people. As James Madison explained in Federalist No. 10, the constitutional system was designed to ‘‘refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.’’ When the Englishman James Bryce came to observe American politics firsthand in the 1880s, however, he was struck by the power of public opinion, or at least the dominant view that the people should govern. With some hyperbole, Bryce noted that ‘‘towering over Presidents and State governors, over Congress and State legislatures, over conventions and the vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out . . . as the master of servants who tremble before it.’’ Later generations of Americans, beginning with Walter Lippman and John Dewey, have expressed differing levels of faith in the people and their preferences. The advent of modern polling and other means of registering the preferences of ordinary citizens have only heightened questions about the place of public opinion in democratic governance.

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The Media in American Political Development Dianne Garyantes Assistant Professor of Journalism, Rider University

There were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. ---Thomas Carlyle, quoting Edmund Burke, 1841 (Powe 1991, 261).

to the roots of journalism in the United States to understand the relationships between the media, policy, and policy makers.

Today in the United States, most scholars and members of the political community believe that the mass media play a critical role in a democratic society. The U.S. media’s role is considered so important that many still refer to it the way Thomas Carlyle did---as a ‘‘Fourth Estate’’ of government, acting alongside the other three ‘‘Estates’’ of the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch. The media play an important role in a democratic society, or a society in which citizens rule themselves, in various ways. The United States is a representative democracy, meaning that citizens elect representatives to decide for them issues of governance and policy. Within this context, the media’s major role is as a conduit of communication between citizens and their elected representatives about policy issues of the day. The media are expected to provide the information necessary for the public to elect representatives in an educated manner. Given the media’s important role as a provider of information to the electorate, policy makers and political scientists have questioned whether the media actually could affect U.S. domestic and foreign policy. And if so, how? To answer these questions, one must go back

The mass media in the United States started in the form of small newspapers distributed by businessmen running print shops in the newly established colonies. The owner of the newspaper, usually the owner of the print shop, served as publisher and editor. The newspapers were intended to promote the print shops, while the ‘‘news’’ featured was ‘‘an assortment of local advertising, occasional small paragraphs of local hearsay, and large chunks of European political and economic intelligence lifted directly from London newspapers’’ (Schudson and Tifft 2005, 18). Criticism of the local government and political officials was largely avoided by the early colonial papers, in part because publishers who fell out of favor with the government would lose lucrative printing contracts. The lack of criticism also was due to a variety of laws and government controls of the press, including laws for seditious libel. Seditious libel is defined as ‘‘the intentional publication, without lawful excuse or justification, of written blame of any public man, or of the law, or of any institution established by law’’ (Chaffee 1967, 19). In 1722, publisher James Franklin was jailed after criticizing the governor of Massachusetts, forcing his younger and now-famous brother, Ben, to take over

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262 The Media and Public Opinion the paper (Starr 2004, 62). Over time, however, the government’s controls of the press, most of which were carried over from England, began to lose their power. A turning point came in 1732 with the seditious libel case of John Peter Zenger, publisher of a partisan oppositional paper in the colonies who was indicted for attacking then--New York royal governor William Cosby. Zenger’s attorney successfully argued at his trial that there had been no libel because the charges Zenger made against Cosby were true. The jury acquitted Zenger, a decision that has been described as opening the door to the press’s future role as a government watchdog. After the Zenger case, few seditious libel cases were brought against colonial publishers. Still, the early U.S. press continued to avoid controversy related to the government until around 1765, when revolutionary fever took hold in the colonies. Newspapers then started to become more political, with most taking an anti-British stance. This era represented the start of a partisan press on a large scale in the United States. For the next several decades, U.S. newspapers acted as political entities, serving as mouthpieces for and, in some cases, being subsidized by political parties and factions. President Thomas Jefferson, a famous advocate for a free press, found himself regularly attacked by the Federalist press. Stung, Jefferson wrote to a friend in 1807: ‘‘The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors’’ (Jefferson 1944, in a letter to John Norvell, June 11, 1807). The 1830s brought another major turning point in the U.S. media. The period represented the start of the private commercialization of the press, beginning with the so-called penny press. The penny press is credited with developing the media business model still present in the United States in the 21st century: providing relatively inexpensive news and information to mass audiences and paying for the product through advertisements. Entrepreneurs in the 1830s slashed the price of newspapers from six cents to one penny and sold their papers on the street rather than by subscription, as was the practice at the time. Circulation and readership went up. Moreover, the owners of penny press operations aggressively sought local news to garner a wide audience for their advertisers. The shift to local news and the commercialization associated with the penny press redefined the concept of ‘‘news.’’ News was now a product sold to readers and was focused on local issues and events. Much of the news was locally gathered, entertainment oriented, and designed to intrigue and even shock readers as a

way to drive up circulation and advertising revenues. The penny press operators also were some of the first to make use of new technologies such as the steamdriven press and the telegraph. One of the first successful penny press newspapers was the Sun of New York City. By 1835, two years after it was started, the Sun already had moved from a hand press to a steam press and carried a circulation of 15,000 to 20,000, the largest circulation of its time (Starr 2004, 131). Importantly, the penny press business model also allowed newspapers to be financially independent from their political support and subsidies. Editors and publishers, now usually separate individuals operating in separate positions, could act independently of political parties. This trend laid the groundwork for press criticism of the government and the future watchdog role of journalists. By the latter part of the 19th century, large circulation newspapers were part of the urban milieu of the United States and renowned publishers such William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer came to the forefront of power. The style of reporting in Hearst’s and Pulitzer’s newspapers came to be known as ‘‘yellow journalism.’’ ‘‘Yellow journalism’’ was characterized by sensationalized storytelling, self-promotion, prominent headlines splashed across the front page, and the generous use of photographs. The ‘‘new journalism,’’ as it was initially called, was designed to appeal to mass audiences. Hearst and Pulitzer, whose New York dailies competed with one another, were aggressive in trying to sell their papers to the masses and, in some cases, tried to push their own agendas through their publications. Hearst, for example, advocated for war with Spain in the 1890s, and reportedly took credit for the subsequent decision by the U.S. Congress and the McKinley administration to enter the war (Sparrow 1999, 11). As the nation moved into the 20th century, nationwide political reforms were being called for, which helped shift the U.S. press away from ‘‘yellow journalism’’ to a more activist form of journalism known as ‘‘muckraking.’’ The ‘‘muckraking’’ form of journalism questioned trends in society and in some cases advocated for political reform. One of the most celebrated of the muckraking journalists, Lincoln Steffens, is credited with helping to encourage the city-manager form of government after uncovering widespread corruption among city governments in the early part of the 20th century (Streitmatter 1997, 87--88). This new style of journalism helped pave the way for a new professionalism in the field, one that allowed reporters at the time to develop their own culture and set of norms. Journalism and news reporting were considered completely

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independent of political parties and the government. Nonpartisanship and objectivity became the ethical and professional standards that reporters held close. Objectivity is defined as a construct that ‘‘guides journalists to separate facts from values and to report only the facts’’ (Schudson 2001, 150). By the time U.S. newspapers finished their comprehensive coverage of World War I and World War II, objectivity was the journalistic norm (Schudson and Tifft 2005, 27). Objectivity in news reporting continues to be the occupational norm in 21st-century U.S. journalism.

Watchdog Role of the Media With increased objectivity came a stronger sense of responsibility on the part of the U.S. news media. Journalists perceived themselves as unbiased witnesses to news and events, including policy making and governmental affairs. An unbiased press seems to be the most appropriate form of journalism for an institution that was granted specific constitutional protections starting from the country’s founding. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: ‘‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’’ Early founders of the United States endorsed the notion of a free and open press as essential to a democracy. Political scientist Timothy E. Cook writes, ‘‘Political communication receives special treatment in the United States for a simple reason: it is vital to the consent of the governed’’ (Cook 2005, 115). Not only do the media serve an important role as a conduit of information between citizens and their political and governmental representatives, but they also play other significant roles in politics and democracy. The other roles include providing a marketplace of ideas, agenda setting, mobilizing the public, and acting as a watchdog of government (Cook 2005, 115--119). The most familiar role of the media to the U.S. public is the role of government watchdog. As watchdogs, the U.S. media keep a careful eye on the politics and policy-making activities of the government and report them to the public. Press scrutiny of government and other public institutions is considered an important protective measure for the public in a democratic government. Famous revelations of the doings and wrongdoings of public officials, such as those reported in the so-called Pentagon Papers and Watergate, were the result of reporters acting in a watchdog role. Recently, however, there has been criticism about whether the U.S. media are fulfilling their role as a watchdog for the public. Because of their increasing reliance on

Fred Clow of Boston listens to President Nixon as he delivers a nationwide television address on Watergate on April 30, 1973. In the foreground a copy of the Boston Globe reports the latest Watergate happenings. (Bettmann/Corbis)

government and political sources for news and information, the U.S. media have been referred to by some as ‘‘lapdogs,’’ content to report on news controlled by the government (Sparrow 1999, 55--72). Others have used the ‘‘dog’’ metaphor to criticize the media in other ways. In times of crisis, such as during threats to national security, some scholars say that the U.S. media tend to act as ‘‘guard dogs,’’ which protect and serve the country (Bishop 2000, 65). Still others criticize the media’s inclination to aggressively publish unflattering or even intimate details of public officials’ lives, calling the media ‘‘attack dogs’’ (Sabato 1991, 52--93).

Expansion and Impact of New Mass Media Technologies Regardless of the role the media play at a particular time, it is important to note the evolution of mass

264 The Media and Public Opinion media technologies in the United States and their impact on the political environment. While the first mass media produced in the United States were newspapers and other printed material, other ‘‘new’’ mass communication technologies, including radio and motion pictures, were developed and widely in use early in the 20th century. One study found that children in the United States in 1929 and 1930 went to the movies an average of once a week by the time they reached the fourth grade (Dale 1935, 30). Radios also came into widespread use relatively quickly in the United States. In 1930, there were 14 million radio receivers in use in U.S. households; by 1940, the number had grown to an estimated 44 million sets (Davis 1992, 91). The post--World War II period brought another new communication medium to the American scene: television. Television use grew enormously in the United States, particularly during the 1950s. In 1948, for example, there were less than 100,000 television sets in the United States; just one year later, there were 1 million sets in use; by 1959, there were more than 50 million sets in U.S. households (Lowery and DeFleur 1995, 239). More recently, computer technology has brought the Internet into U.S. households, allowing the medium to become a distributor of news, culture, and information. A major influence of this medium in terms of politics and journalism has been the development of weblogs, or ‘‘blogs,’’ which are updated, electronic journals that are posted over the Internet and provide commentary and information on a variety of subjects. Blogs typically are operated by individuals and have little or no editing or fact-checking. In 1999, an estimated 50 blogs were posted on the Internet; by 2007, there were an estimated 22.6 million U.S. bloggers according to eMarketer data cited by technorati.com, a media company that collects and distributes information about blogs and social media sites. As they were developed, ‘‘new’’ media technologies affected the way in which political and government news was reported and presented. Radio, for example, made it possible for government and political leaders to speak directly to the U.S. public, rather than talking to citizens through a newspaper reporter. One of the most effective uses of this new way to connect with the people was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s fireside chats. The ‘‘chats,’’ or regular radio addresses by the president, provided Roosevelt with a way to speak with the public about policy and political issues in a direct, almost intimate manner. One scholar notes, ‘‘Roosevelt’s use of radio probably not only fostered public support for his domestic policy moves, but also changed the relationship of the average citizen to the office of president’’ (Davis 1992, 95).

Television also influenced political campaigning. Schudson and Tifft (2005) report that the 1952 presidential race between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson was the first campaign to feature advertisersponsored coverage. Eight years later, they note, ‘‘When Nixon squared off with John F. Kennedy in a series of decisive televised debates, the medium’s ability to influence public opinion was indisputable---and not always applauded’’ (Schudson and Tifft 2005, 29). Some political leaders and scholars have attributed the eventual unpopularity of the Vietnam War, known as America’s ‘‘living room war,’’ to its frequent and graphic coverage on television. As mass media technologies became more sophisticated and developed the capability of reaching thousands and even millions of citizens at once, a question raised by political and communication researchers was: What effects do the mass media actually have on their audiences? The question was important to political leaders and policy makers in terms of potential media effects on public opinion. Yet uncovering and understanding the effects of the media on the public has turned out to be difficult. Decades of research have yielded some answers, but the understanding of the media’s influence on its audiences remains incomplete.

Effects of the Mass Media In the early part of the 20th century, when newspapers, radio, and motion pictures were becoming commonplace, the media were thought to have a tremendous effect on how their audiences felt and behaved. A theory emerged that the mass media acted as a ‘‘magic bullet,’’ with which audiences would be ‘‘swayed and controlled by cleverly designed mass communication messages’’ (Lowery and DeFleur 1995, 13). The theory indicated that whoever controlled the media, controlled the masses. Studies on the media conducted from 1929 until 1932, known as the Payne Fund Studies, seemed to confirm the magic bullet theory. The studies found that children in particular were influenced by movies in their attitudes, emotions, and even morals (Lowery and DeFleur 1995, 42). Then the 1938 radio program, War of the Worlds, was broadcast and an estimated 1 million people in the United States spun into a panic, believing the nation was under attack. Again, the heavy influence of the media seemed to be at work. However, 5 million other Americans who also heard the broadcast did not panic. A new school of thought began to emerge: that the media were not all powerful in their effects. Researchers found that personality characteristics of the audience

The Media in American Political Development members could mitigate or even negate media influences. The magic bullet theory of the media was being challenged. The next two decades in the United States ushered in a host of communication research that looked at the effects of the media in areas such as persuasive communication and propaganda. The conclusions at the time solidified the new school of thought about the effect of the mass media---that is, that mass media tended to have a short-term and limited effect on the public. In cases in which the media did have an effect on audiences, researchers found, it was in influencing how people think. The media were found to be less successful in changing attitudes and even less effective in influencing behavior. For example, during World War II, the U.S. government funded a series of studies on the persuasive effect of Frank Capra’s Why We Fight films, which were designed to inform and motivate American soldiers being deployed to the war in Europe. The researchers found that Capra’s films were successful in disseminating factual information about the war in Europe and had an effect on soldiers’ opinions and interpretations of the films’ themes (for example, that the battle of Britain was a major defeat for the Nazis). However, the films had little effect on the soldiers’ attitudes toward British soldiers and had no effect on their motivation to fight. The findings led researchers to conclude that the persuasive effect of the films clearly was limited and, furthermore, that the effects of mass communication in general were limited by individual differences in the receivers of the messages (Lowrey and DeFleur 1995, 135--164). By the 1960s, political leaders and policy makers were struggling with new questions related to violent television programming and its effect on children. Could violence portrayed on television prompt aggressive behavior in children? The question led to the massive 1969 U.S. Surgeon General’s report on Television and Social Behavior. The report’s main conclusions were as follows: television programming contained a good deal of violent content; children and adults in the United States were spending more and more time exposed to the violent content; and the research evidence supported the belief that viewing violent entertainment increased the likelihood of aggressive behavior (Lowrey and DeFleur 1995, 340). The third conclusion, however, remains controversial; not all social scientists concur with the finding. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the prevailing thinking was that the mass media, even relatively ‘‘new’’ forms of mass media such as television, had some effects on their audiences, yet those effects were

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limited. However, soon there was yet another shift away from this school of thought, one that would have a profound impact on political leaders and policy makers. In the early 1970s, researchers began to examine more closely the mass media’s ability to influence the way people think. New studies were conducted and the conclusions showed that there were strong media effects in the areas of agenda setting, priming, and framing. Evidence of strong media effects in these areas continues to be found in research conducted in the early 21st century. Agenda setting was mentioned earlier in this essay as one of the roles played by the mass media. It was first uncovered by researchers Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, who studied media coverage of the 1968 presidential election campaign and found that voters tended to attribute importance to issues in a way that mirrored the media’s coverage of those issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 184) Thus, the issues determined by the media to be important were subsequently considered by the public to be important. As Bernard Cohen noted more than 40 years ago, ‘‘The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’’ (Cohen 1963, 13). Since McCombs and Shaw’s study showed that the media help to set an agenda, numerous studies have supported their findings. Agenda-setting theory had significant implications for subgovernments and policy networks, which work to respond to public needs and negotiate policies and solutions to address those needs. The interconnected nature of both subgovernments and policy networks means that they need to pay attention not only to public opinion, but also to how the media are covering issues and events in ways that might influence public opinion. Subgovernments and policy networks also need to be aware of how the media ‘‘prime’’ and ‘‘frame’’ issues, because both can have an effect on public opinion and, potentially, on policy and the political environment. Priming relates to media coverage that helps members of the public assess their leaders regarding their performance on policies (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). For example, during George Bush Sr.’s presidential campaign for reelection, Seaver (1998) noted that Bush emphasized his foreign policy experience, which the media in turn reported as part of his campaign coverage. The public in response tended to evaluate the president’s performance based on foreign policy issues. Following the Gulf War, however, the media turned their attention to domestic issues, including the economy, and the public then began to judge the president based on those issues. ‘‘Realizing

266 The Media and Public Opinion the public tide had turned toward domestic issues, Bush attempted to shift gears and started to focus more on domestic matters to improve his prospects for reelection in 1992’’ (Seaver 1998, 80). Framing refers to the way journalists organize, interpret, and present issues of the day (Entman 1993). The way issues are framed by the media can create a particular perspective about a policy. Even the words used to describe an event or issue can attach widely different meanings to the topic. For example, a relatively new technology such as nuclear energy could be labeled as ‘‘progress’’ rather than ‘‘not cost effective’’ or a ‘‘devil’s bargain’’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 33). The choice of words or perspective could affect how people respond to the matter under discussion. Thus, researchers found that the media could influence public opinion, particularly in areas of agenda setting, priming, and framing. For political leaders and policy makers, the media’s influence in these areas meant that they would be forced to consider how their decisions might be perceived not only by the public, but also by the media. The next question for political leaders, policy makers, and scholars was whether the media could influence policy itself.

Media Influence on Public Policy Research regarding media influence on public policy is ongoing, with several schools of thought being developed. There is evidence that media can influence policy, although the extent of the influence remains unclear. Much of the current research focus has been on when or under what circumstances the media is able to influence policy. Those circumstances are believed to include the following: when the media provide real-time depiction of news and events; when political and governmental elites are split over a particular policy; whether the policy is of a particular type or at a particular stage of development; through public opinion; through the use of new technologies such as ‘‘blogs’’; and through particular news values, norms, and routines. This list highlights specific areas of potential media influence on policy and is not complete. The circumstances under which the media can affect policy will continue to be researched and debated. These circumstances provide an understanding of the current considerations being discussed regarding how the media can affect public policy.

‘‘Real-Time’’ Depiction of News An emerging school of thought is that the media can have a significant influence on policy, particularly on

foreign policy, through the real-time depiction of news and events. Some have dubbed this influence ‘‘the CNN Effect’’ (Robinson 2001, 524). The ‘‘CNN Effect,’’ while contested and often ill-defined, refers to the real-time, global broadcast of national and international news, to which policy makers find themselves under pressure to respond. Real-time depiction of news can serve as a critical source of information to policy makers during a policy crisis. The real-time influence of the media can have a particularly strong effect in the area of international policy. The instantaneous depiction of news and events can put political and government officials in a position in which they may have to respond more quickly than traditional diplomatic channels allow. The wide reach of global news networks such as CNN also can put pressure on public officials, since coverage of specific issues can influence opinion globally. The amount of influence on policy by global, realtime news networks such as CNN is under debate. However, many policy and media experts believe that some type of influence of this coverage is likely. In once example, when CNN first reported about the aftermath of a marketplace massacre in Sarajevo---66 people died---it put pressure on the Clinton administration to respond. According to a Newsweek article published on February 14, 1994, ‘‘The horror of the marketplace massacre shown on CNN pushed (Clinton) and his advisers into the Oval Office on Saturday afternoon to review once again what, if anything, America could do to stop the slaughter.’’

Elite Debate Another perspective on the media’s influence on policy is that the media do not influence policy directly, but rather reflect the actions and attitudes of policy makers and other political elites. One thesis, known as the ‘‘manufacturing consent’’ thesis, claims that the commercial media in the United States tend to serve the goals of special interests and elite groups. According to this perspective, policy makers and other elites control policy; the media merely record or report on the policy. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, who developed the thesis, wrote that the ‘‘constraints are so powerful, and are built into the system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news choices are hardly imaginable’’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988, 2). Other scholars also believe that the media do not influence policy directly, but do not go so far as to say that the media serve elites and special interests. Rather, they believe the media tend to report about policies according to the consensus of political elites. When

The Media in American Political Development elites are in agreement, the media report the events from the elite perspective and do not take a critical or questioning stance toward a policy. Political scientist Bartholomew H. Sparrow calls this elite consensus a ‘‘policy monopoly,’’ one the press does not want to assume responsibility for breaking (Sparrow 1999, 55). When elites are split on a policy and are debating its merits, however, media coverage tends to be more questioning toward the policy and is likely to explore various sides of the policy debate. When an exploration of policy options occurs, the media have the potential to influence the public or other elites’ opinions toward the policy. Hallin (1986), for example, found that media coverage of the Vietnam War, often credited with influencing government policy and the eventual pullout of U.S. troops, actually followed elite debate about the war (Hallin 1986, 213). Media coverage initially followed elite consensus in support for the war until political and government elites began to question it, at which time the media began reporting the various perspectives for and against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A stronger influence on policy can occur when media coverage takes a particular side in an elite debate (Robinson 2001, 531). For example, in the case of the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, the media started covering the war according to the U.S. secretary of state’s frame of ‘‘ancient ethnic’’ hatreds. Later, after other political elites voiced outrage about the violence in Bosnia, media coverage began depicting the events as ‘‘Serbian brutality,’’ a frame that ‘‘demanded that something be done’’ (Robinson 2001, 532). The Clinton administration eventually sent U.S. troops into Bosnia.

Type and Stage of Policy The influence of the media also will differ depending on the type of policy covered. The media and public opinion tend to have more influence on certain types of policies than others. For example, the media and public opinion have more influence on policies related to economic issues compared with other policies, such as diplomatic issues (Seaver 1998, 82). The length of time a policy will be in place also affects the level of influence of the media and public opinion. Short-term policies, such as interventions in Somalia or Grenada, are more susceptible to media-influenced public opinion than long-term policies. The stage of a policy also is a key consideration when assessing the potential for media influence. The policies are particularly susceptible to media and public opinion influence in their early stages of development (Seaver 1998, 82). Another situation in which the media can influence policy is when the policy itself is

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uncertain or unclear. If a policy has been compromised through bargaining within the subsystems of the executive branch, or if an event occurs and no policy is in place, the policy is said to be uncertain and susceptible to influence by media coverage (Robinson 2001, 534). The absence of a clearly articulated policy on an issue could result in criticism by the media, particularly if the media have taken on an adversarial role.

Public Opinion and Media Influence on Policy Another school of thought claims that neither the media alone nor policy makers alone decide and control policy. Public opinion also plays a role in the development and decision making on policy. Seaver (1998) developed a ‘‘flow of influence’’ classification scheme that takes into account three fundamental factors in the policy-making process: the mass media, public opinion, and the U.S. policy itself. Each has the potential to influence the other. For example, as discussed, the media can influence policy by affecting public opinion through agenda setting, priming, and the framing of news and events. Previous communication research has consistently shown that policy changes by elites tend to move in the same direction as public opinion (Holsti 1992, 459). Even in the case of foreign policy, public opinion often is considered, as evidenced in the phenomenon of the CNN Effect. Some scholars and practitioners argue that political leaders’ focus on public opinion can be detrimental to policy. David R. Gergen, an editor at U.S. News and World Report and a special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, writes: Increasingly during the 1980s, government officials have shaped their policies with an eye toward generating positive and timely television coverage and securing public approval. What too often counts is how well the policy will ‘‘play,’’ how the pictures will look, whether the right signals are being sent, and whether the public will be impressed by the swiftness of the government’s response---not whether the policy promotes America’s long-term interests (Gergen 1990, 48--49). Regardless of the effect, most policy makers, political leaders, and scholars agree that public opinion plays an important role in shaping policy and that the media can be influential in affecting public opinion.

New Media Technologies New media technologies are an increasingly important factor in the media’s ability to influence policy. Today’s

268 The Media and Public Opinion technology includes Internet weblogs, or ‘‘blogs,’’ which have begun to serve as agenda setters for the mainstream media and other elites in influencing policy (Drezner and Farrell 2004, 34). The creation of blogs has allowed the general public to have access to many more so-called gatekeepers, or providers of news and information. Now, political leaders and policy makers need to consider bloggers when formulating and deciding policy. For example, Drezner and Farrell (2004) report that one expert in Middle Eastern affairs started his own blog after his opinion pieces did not capture the attention of the mainstream media despite tensions between the Middle East and the United States following the attacks of September 11. The blog came to attract 250,000 readers per month and the expert since has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and appeared on National Public Radio and CNN (Drezner and Farrell 2004, 34). The blog and its creator clearly had affected political leaders’ thinking regarding policy toward the Middle East. The blogosphere functions as a rare combination of distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news, and public opinion barometer . . . (B)logs increasingly serve as a conduit through which ordinary and not-so-ordinary citizens express their views on international relations and influence a policymaker’s decision making (Drezner and Farrell 2004, 34).

Journalists’ Attitudes, Norms, and Routines The role of individual journalists can influence media coverage and, potentially, policy. Individual characteristics that can shape journalists’ coverage of news and events come in the form of professional factors, such as values, objectivity, and ethics, and individual factors, such as perceptions and background. Media routines such as pack journalism, in which most media outlets cover the same event in the same way, also have the potential to influence policy by placing an inordinate amount of emphasis on a single event. Other routines by the U.S. media, such as simply recording rather than investigating government claims, particularly claims by U.S. presidents, can influence coverage and, potentially, policy. For example, the lack of journalists’ investigative efforts and inattention to alternative news sources hindered coverage of the Bush administration’s claims in 2002 and 2003 of the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq (Moeller 2004, 6, 13). Within this context, the Bush administration’s claim of existence of WMDs was aired through the media with little or no challenge and with little attention paid to

other policy options. Changes in news norms and routines potentially could prevent unexamined policies from being implemented in the future. Thus, there is evidence that the media can influence policy, although the extent of that influence remains unclear. Political and government leaders tend to take some or all of the circumstances under which the media are believed to influence policy into consideration during the policy-making process.

What Lies Ahead The founding fathers of the United States ensured that the nation would have a free press because they believed it was vital to their new democratic government. Their belief has held true for more than 230 years. Throughout that time, it has become clear that the media have played an important role in the democratic and policy-making process. The extent of that role and its level of effectiveness are not clear and are likely to continue to be debated by policy makers, political leaders, and scholars. Some of their conclusions are likely to change. Certainly, national and world trends, governments, policies, and the media will change. What is not likely to change is the importance of the media in the political and policy arena. The media in the United States will continue to act as a ‘‘Fourth Estate’’ of government, one that just might be ‘‘more important far than they all,’’ as Carlyle once said.

References and Further Reading Bennett, W. Lance. 2005. News: The Politics of Illusion, 6th ed. New York: Pearson Longman. Bishop, Ronald. 2000. ‘‘To Protect and Serve: The ‘Guard Dog’ Function of Journalism in Coverage of the JapaneseAmerican Internment.’’ Journalism & Communication Monographs 2 (2): 65--103. Chaffee, Zechariah, Jr. 1967. Free Speech in the United States. 7th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cohen, Bernard C. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cook, Timothy E. 2005. ‘‘The Functions of the Press in a Democracy.’’ In The Press. Edited by Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 115--119. New York: Oxford University Press. Dale, Edgar. 1935. Children’s Attendance at Motion Pictures. New York: The Macmillan Company. Davis, Richard. 1992. The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator. White Plains, NY: Longman Publishing Group. Drezner, Daniel W., and Henry Farrell. 2004. ‘‘Web of Influence.’’ Foreign Policy (November/December): 32--40. Dyrud, Marilyn A., and Rebecca B. Worley. 2005. ‘‘Blogs.’’ Business Communication Quarterly 68 (1): 66--67. Entman, Robert M. 1993. ‘‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.’’ Journal of Communication 43 (4): 51--58. Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1989. ‘‘Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A

The Media in American Political Development Constructionist Approach.’’ The American Journal of Sociology 95 (1): 1--37. Gergen, David R. 1990. ‘‘Diplomacy in a Television Age: The Dangers of a Teledemocracy.’’ In The Media and Foreign Policy. Edited by Simon Serfaty, 47--63. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hallin, Daniel C. 1986. The ‘‘Uncensored War:’’ The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press. Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books. Holsti, Ole R. 1992. ‘‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates.’’ International Studies Quarterly 36: 439--466. Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago. Jefferson, Thomas. 1944. ‘‘The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson.’’ Edited by Adrienne Koch and William Peden. New York: Modern Library. Lowery, Shearon A., and Melvin L. DeFleur. 1995. Milestones in Mass Communication Research: Media Effects. 3rd ed. White Plains, NY: Longman Publishing Group. McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. ‘‘The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.’’ The Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (2): 176--187. Moeller, Susan D. 2004. ‘‘Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction.’’ College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Nelson, Harold L. 1959. ‘‘Seditious Libel in Colonial America.’’ The American Journal of Legal History 3 (2): 160--172.

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Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. ‘‘The Spiral of Silence. A Theory of Public Opinion.’’ Journal of Communication 24(2): 43--51. Powe, Lucas A. Jr. 1991. The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Robinson, Piers. 2001. ‘‘Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics: Models of Media Influence of Foreign Policy.’’ European Journal of Communication 16 (4): 523-544. Sabato, Larry J. 1991. Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics. New York: The Free Press. Schudson, Michael. 2001. ‘‘The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism.’’ Journalism 2 (2): 149--170. Schudson, Michael, and Susan E. Tifft. 2005. ‘‘American Journalism in Historical Perspective.’’ In The Press. Edited by Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 17--47. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. Seaver, Breanda M. 1998. ‘‘The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy.’’ Press/Politics 3 (1): 65--91. Sparrow, Bartholomew. 1999. Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Starr, Paul. 2004. The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications. New York: Basic Books. ‘‘State of the Blogosphere 2008.’’ http://technorati.com/ blogging/state-of-the-blogosphere/.Retrieved Aug. 28, 2009. Streitmatter, Rodger. 1997. Mightier Than the Sword: How the News Media Have Shaped American History. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Media and Public Opinion: Contemporary Perspectives Susan Sherr Research Director, Social Science Research Solutions

and opinions to be limited to those in concert with one’s own. Truly, the news media are in a period of contradiction. Another paradox that exists within the current media environment is that despite the numerous cable news channels, publications, Web sites, and so on, it is still difficult to find extensive coverage of political issues. This is true at the national level when it comes to real, in-depth coverage of the issues that affect the country, but it is even more evident when seeking coverage of state and local politics. Certainly there are some high-quality print news sources, but even they frequently focus on the competitive aspects of politics instead of the substantive public problems that elected officials grapple with every day. With the paucity of information abut politics and public affairs available to most citizens, it is difficult for them to establish informed, and sometimes even accurate, opinions. Even if more information were available, there is no guarantee that people would take advantage of it. For those who would like to learn more about their state or local government, the task is not made simple by the news media. The most egregious example of news organizations’ neglect of political news may be found in local television newscasts in which the emphasis is on isolated events such as fires and crimes and not on the policies and actions of local governing bodies. A good part of the explanation for the lack of local news coverage of politics relates to the fact that but a few media

The potential for the media to both reflect and affect public opinion has interested scholars and practitioners for centuries. However, because we currently live in a period of unparalleled access to information mediated through a range of technologies, the question of what impact the media have on public opinion seems to take on a more pressing urgency. Those who have the time, resources, and inclination have access to an unlimited range of arguments and opinions. On the other hand, for those whose media consumption is limited to more mainstream, easily accessible sources, the range of available opinions is progressively more limited by a media industry increasingly dominated by a few large companies. Even if we assume there is true diversity among the many available sources of information, having so many options also poses certain risks. For example, since they are no longer limited to three television networks and a small group of print outlets that present more general news, citizens are now able to expose themselves only to news and information with which they already agree. As a result, our national debate may lack a true exchange of ideas, creating an impoverished dialog where compromise and consensus is unlikely. Anyone can create a blog on the Internet and spread his or her particular ideology to anyone who is willing to read it. Conversely, the many sources of information that limit discourse to only one side of an argument and the decreasing emphasis on objectivity within major new organizations allow exposure to information 270

Media and Public Opinion: Contemporary Perspectives conglomerates own increasing numbers of media outlets. A small group of corporations such as Time Warner, Viacom, and Clear Channel own most local news stations, newspapers, and radio stations across the country. Pressure from these huge companies to maximize profits results in less investment in reporters covering local politics and public affairs, more news content that can be used in various locations across the country, and more pressure on local outlets to promote the interest of the larger corporation. For example, local news programs often present stories about the entertainment programming found on the parent network. This takes up time that could be devoted to substantive coverage of local issues.

Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing What about when the media do focus on issues of national or local importance? Does this reporting have a significant impact on people’s opinions about these issues? Whether media coverage of issues can actually cause people to change their opinions is a matter of controversy. However, communication scholars and political scientists have demonstrated repeatedly that the news does have the power to influence the public’s issue priorities. So, while people may not change their perspective or ideological leanings as a result of consuming news, they are likely to adjust their beliefs about what issues are of greatest importance to the country. This is called the ‘‘agenda-setting’’ power of the media. McCombs and Shaw (1972) explained that the media may not be sufficiently powerful to determine what people think, but that they are very good at influencing what they think about. So, if the news is filled with stories about crime and unemployment, citizens who are asked what they think are the most important issues are likely to name crime and unemployment, regardless of whether they deal with either of these problems in their own lives. This also gives the media the ability to indirectly influence public policy. Public opinion surveys frequently ask citizens to identify the most important issues facing the country (or state, city, and so on). Public officials may use responses to these questions to determine what issues should receive their attention. However, it may be the news media that really are setting the agenda. Of course, those who serve in government take great pains to influence what stories are covered in the media, so it is often difficult to determine where the influence really originates. Most likely, it is the interplay among elected officials, news media,

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and real-world conditions that ultimately determines the public agenda. The media may also affect the public’s issue priorities through the process of ‘‘priming.’’ Priming is a concept that is closely related to agenda setting. Essentially, the theory of priming suggests that, the more frequently the news media cover a particular issue, the more likely it is that citizens will evaluate presidential performance based on that issue. So, if stories about the economy appear regularly in the news, citizens will probably base their assessments of the president on how successfully he has handled economic issues. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) who conducted early research into the priming effect, say it is most likely to occur when the news also talks about the issue as being the responsibility of the president. Another way that the news media may have an impact on public opinion is through the ‘‘framing’’ of news stories. Every story has a certain ‘‘spin’’ or perspective from which it is being told. Reporters cannot include all the information that exists about a topic in every news story nor can they represent every possible viewpoint about a particular issue. The decisions they make about which details and perspectives to include and which to leave out are referred to as ‘‘framing’’ a story. For example, in discussing election coverage, scholars often talk about the prevalent use of the ‘‘strategy frame’’ in news reporting about politics. This means that reporters chose to focus on the strategic, competitive aspects of politics and to leave out in-depth discussion of issues. Stories written or told in a strategy frame would focus on poll results or might refer to a political debate using sports or war metaphors such as ‘‘slugfest’’ or ‘‘duel’’ (Cappella and Jamieson 1997). The language used in telling news stories helps to establish the frame as do the aspects of an issue or event that are included in the story. For example, there has been an ongoing debate in the United States over whether inherited money should be taxed. Proponents of this tax might refer to it as the ‘‘estate tax,’’ conjuring an image of wealthy people who can afford to contribute extra money to government coffers. Those who oppose this policy call it a ‘‘death tax,’’ implying that the government, having exhausted all other sources of revenue, has now resorted to taxing the deceased. It is clear that the type of language used to describe a particular issue provides a frame of reference for how people will understand it and form an opinion about it. Reporters can help frame issues for the public by selecting terminology or perspectives to emphasize.

272 The Media and Public Opinion The media are active participants in the process of framing issues for the public, a process in which government officials also engage aggressively. Regardless of the number of frames that are available for talking about an issue, one often emerges as the dominant narrative to use in reporting on that topic. With certain issues, particularly those involving foreign policy, where people have less personal experience to draw on when formulating opinions, one frame organizes most discussions for the American public. Entman (1993) discusses shifting foreign policy frames in the public discourse. According to Entman, during the Cold War era, both the government and the media framed foreign policy in terms of the battle between Democracy and Communism. However, under the new paradigm, in which terrorism is the enemy, this frame has been breaking down in media coverage. The government may try to maintain this frame with the use of language referencing evil empires and wars. However, because this language is less applicable to the war on terrorism, the media have more latitude to develop alternative frames for the issue. Of the three media effects discussed here, framing comes closest to postulating that actual opinion change results from consumption of news coverage. When issues are regularly presented to the public from a certain perspective, the effects are likely to be relatively widespread agreement about the accuracy of that viewpoint. In fact, experimental research into framing effects does indicate that, when people are exposed to certain frames in media content, they tend to express opinions that reflect those frames. In the case of framing, the potential exists for quite powerful effects on public opinion.

Media and Elections Several of the contradictions discussed in the introduction that define the modern media environment, are profoundly evident in news coverage of elections. Scholars have regularly pointed to the lack of substantive information about candidates and issues available to citizens through mainstream news sources. Farnsworth and Lichter’s book, The Nightly News Nightmare addresses the declining substance found in television network election coverage. Their research indicates that, in 1992, the presidential election received 168 minutes of airtime on the three television network news broadcasts. In 2000, the networks dedicated only 98 minutes to presidential election coverage. The trend is the same for the length of time candidates are shown speaking in their own words on network news programs.

Local television news has an even worse record when it comes to covering politics. The Lear Center Local News Archive Project at the University of Southern California Annenberg School published a report on local news coverage of the 2002 general election. Members of Congress ran for office in this election, making local news coverage vitally important to citizens wishing to learn about the candidates. The researchers recorded and analyzed 10,000 top-rated local news broadcasts from 122 stations across the country. They found that only 44 percent of these broadcasts contained any campaign coverage of any kind. The majority of the stories aired in the last two weeks of the campaigns and most were about the horserace, not the issues. In 2004, the researchers found that local election news focused on the presidential election and not local races. In fact 8 out of 10 campaign stories were about the presidential election. Again, most of these were strategy stories, focusing on polls and campaign tactics instead of substance. With most Americans saying they get their news from local television (Pew Center for the People and the Press), it appears unlikely that they will be able to develop informed opinions about nonpresidential candidates running for office. An emphasis on the competitive aspects of elections: the polls, campaign strategies, campaign advertising techniques, and the hiring and firing of campaign strategists, is hardly limited to local television news. This type of coverage is pervasive across media and types of elections. This makes opinion formation based on accurate information a challenge for voters. It is interesting to know who is ahead or behind in the polls and what types of strategic choices are made by political campaigns. Yet, this type of information is unlikely to provide citizens with a clear idea of which candidate would better serve their interests if elected to office. The constant focus on poll numbers has another negative effect on voters. It also takes away their opportunity to decide who they believe should win the election. When the media constantly tell voters who has the best opportunity of winning, an environment is created in which victory for one candidate appears inevitable before citizens have an opportunity to hear the competing arguments of all the candidates. Finally, the prevalence of strategic coverage casts a pall over the entire process and those who chose to participate in it. According to Cappella and Jamieson (1997), the prevalence of strategy coverage also leads to a cynical citizenry that does not trust the motives of candidates or elected officials.

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Polls, Media, and Elections The most obvious indication that a news story is focusing on the competitive or horserace aspects of an election instead of on the issues is the reporting of survey results. In a number of key ways, political reporting has become indistinguishable from public opinion research. The news media participate in conducting surveys. They also report on the results of their own polls and those of other organizations. Moreover, the results of election polls often help dictate how news organizations cover the candidates in a campaign. Several scholars (Lavrakas, Traugott 1995 and Jamieson 2000) have argued that a candidate who starts out lower in the polls is at a permanent disadvantage because his or her initial lack of popularity will result in less press attention relative to other candidates. This deficit in coverage can only perpetuate the candidate’s standing in relation to his or her competitors. The combination of low poll numbers and little or no news coverage will also hurt the candidate’s chances of raising money, the only way he or she can gain access to the public without the benefit of free media attention. This is especially true during primary campaigns when the parties are not supposed to endorse one candidate over another. This renders the political parties unable to help citizens understand the differences among what can sometimes be a large number of candidates (Patterson 1993). Therefore, the media are left to fill this gap and help citizens differentiate among candidates who often have similar views. Often, the way they do this is by emphasizing strategy and electability. Keeping this in mind, it is important to consider whether the constant measuring and reporting of poll results during elections is a case of reporting public opinion or helping to form citizens’ views about candidates and issues. If the effect of pervasive news coverage of polls is to determine who is running for office, then the process is clearly malfunctioning on a fundamental level. The news media have had a long-term interest in reporting quantitative measures of public opinion, with varying degrees of accuracy. According to Frankovic (1998), however, here is an unprecedented level of importance attributed to poll results in the current news environment. She argues that technological reasons contribute to this, such as the advent of random digit dialing technologies and computerized data processing that make it less expensive to conduct polls and allow surveys to be completed more quickly. The standard of objectivity in news reporting and the ‘‘watchdog’’ role of the media also explain the news

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media’s reliance on polls (Lavrakas, Traugott, and Miller 1995). The norms of their profession demand that journalists appear to be objective in their reporting. The data generated by a public opinion poll enable a journalist to report on one candidate having a better chance of winning than another or a president receiving high levels of approval from the citizens without appearing to favor the candidate or president. As watchdogs for the public, the news media are supposed to monitor the government and ensure that it is acting in the best interests of citizens. Reporters can use survey data as evidence that they know what citizens want from their government and that they are carrying out their mission appropriately. Moreover, reporting these data enable the journalists to appear that they are going directly to the people for their information and not accepting the ‘‘spin’’ of candidates and public officials (Frankovic 1998). The idealistic way of viewing the prevalence of polling in the modern news media then is that the heavy use of survey data permits the media to serve as a conduit for information between the people and their government and among the citizens. However, an argument can also be made that the country should not be governed based on the sometimes capricious and not always well-informed opinions collected in public opinion polls and reported in the media (Delli, Carpini, and Keeter 1996). Furthermore, reporting of poll results can often be problematic, resulting in the dissemination of inaccurate information about public opinion (Asher 2001). According to Asher, the ways the media report on the technical aspects of polling, and even on the findings, can be misleading. Even when public opinion researchers adhere to professional standards of reporting in their press releases and analyses, media outlets do not always include all of this information in their stories. For example, important details such as sampling error and question wording are frequently excluded from news reports. Sampling error refers to the degree to which the percent of people who respond a particular way to a survey questions deviates from the percentage of people in the overall population who would respond that way. For example, if a survey has a sampling error of 3 percent, and 40 percent of people who respond to a survey say they approve of the president’s performance, it is likely that the actual percentage of people in the overall population who approve of the president falls somewhere between 37 percent and 43 percent (this ‘‘margin of error’’ is 3 percentage points above and 3 percentage points below the percent of

274 The Media and Public Opinion survey respondents). Even if reporters do report the margin of error on a survey, they still may say a candidate is in the lead regardless of whether that lead falls within the margin of error. The way survey questions are worded also can result in responses that deviate from the actual proportion of the population that would answer a question in a particular way. Asher (2001) also points out that by focusing on responses to some questions and not others, by disregarding whether the sponsor of a poll has a vested interest in the findings, and by ignoring variations in question wording across polls, journalists err in their interpretations of survey results, helping their audience draw false conclusions about the nature of opinion. These potential inaccuracies matter for a number of reasons. First, as we have already discussed, elected officials may look to survey results and the way public opinion is portrayed in the media as a gauge for making decisions about policy priorities. If the information derived from these surveys and reported in the media is not an accurate measure of public opinion, the decisions made by those in government may not be consistent with the real opinions of citizens. Second, citizens themselves are mislead about the nature of public opinion when surveys or reporting on surveys contain inaccuracies. Research demonstrates that people are more likely to express their opinions if they believe others agree with them (Noelle-Neumann 1974). Those who believe they are in a minority are unlikely to be as vocal about their beliefs as others. If incorrect information leads people to believe their opinions are not shared by others, they may be less likely to express their opinions, causing that viewpoint to be underrepresented in the public dialog.

The Media and Public Cynicism Although it is an open question whether the media can effectively change public opinion about specific issues, they may well be contributing to opinion change about government institutions and actors. A Gallup Poll conducted in September 2003 asked how much trust and confidence respondents had in general in men and women in political life in this country who either hold or are running for public office. Forty percent of those who responded to the survey said they had ‘‘not very much’’ trust or ‘‘none at all’’ in these individuals. Only 5 percent said they had a ‘‘great deal’’ of trust. ‘‘Strategic’’ coverage of politics goes beyond a disproportionate focus on the competitive aspects of elections. The media frame many of the nation’s most important policy debates as a competition for advantage between

political enemies. Coverage of the debate over health care policy during the Clinton administration is an example of the type of news that deprives citizens of a detailed analysis of an important policy issue by focusing on which elected official or party is winning the political argument (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Fallows 1997). According to Fallows, the Clinton administration provided limited access to the press in the early days of the health care reform debate. As a result, even though the administration was involved in open and active talks with congressional committees, the media conveyed the impression that the administration was deliberately acting in secret to sneak a plan through the Congress. This created a competitive framework suggesting that the health care debate was about a battle among political actors and not a deliberative discussion of an important public policy issue. This type of cynical, strategic narrative so often employed by journalists to describe the motives and actions of public officials creates a citizenry disillusioned and disappointed by those they elect to represent them. Patterson (1997) explains that stories about political maneuverings are more attractive to journalists than discussions of complex issues because they fit into a narrative form with conflict-filled dramas and recognizable characters. However, this type of story places the actions of public officials under suspicion, often making even attempts at policy making appear to be no more than a struggle for power for its own sake.

Public Opinion about the News Media: Credibility and Bias Public officials are not alone in finding themselves viewed skeptically by the public. Thus far the discussion has revolved around the impact the media have on public opinion, but what about public opinion about the media? If the media are to influence people’s political judgments, they must maintain some degree of credibility with the citizenry. This does not mean that the information being disseminated through media channels must appear to be completely objective to influence opinions and issue priorities. People can certainly be influenced by ideologically valenced information. However, if citizens do not trust the veracity of information they receive from at least certain media sources, how can they use that information to make effective decisions? There is ample evidence that people are increasingly less trusting of the information found in the mainstream media. In a poll conducted by the Pew Center for the People and the Press in the spring of 1998,

Media and Public Opinion: Contemporary Perspectives respondents were asked to provide a one-word description of the national news media. The word mentioned most frequently was, ‘‘biased.’’ In January 2004, another Pew study revealed that the public had more concerns about partisan bias in news coverage of the presidential race than they had in previous presidential campaign years. These are just a few examples of what is a clear and growing mistrust of the media. Based on simple observation, it might appear that, to some extent, people are correct in their assessment of the media. The degree to which news programming consists of people with clear ideological leanings opining about politics seems apparent to many observers of the news. But is it really true that the news media, as a whole, are biased toward one political party or political philosophy? As one might expect, people who hold the most extreme ideological positions are most likely to perceive the press as being biased---against their own belief system. So, conservatives believe the media exhibit a liberal bias and liberals believe it is a conservative bias that afflicts the media. Scholars call this phenomenon the ‘‘hostile media effect,’’ because partisans often view the media as being antagonistic to their point of view (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1981, 1985; Beck 1991; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998). The robust nature of this finding can be seen as evidence against the existence of an overriding ideological bias in the news media. If people perceive different types of bias depending on their own viewpoint, it is difficult to imagine that there is an obvious slant one way or the other, at least toward one political party. In fact it may be the emphasis on objectivity that leaves the door open for accusations of bias to be leveled at the media with such regularity. By trying to present at least two mainstream points of view, news organizations may make themselves vulnerable to these accusations. This is not to say that no news frames predominate over others and emphasize one side of a story over another or that certain news outlets are not clearly ideological. In fact, scholars contend that numerous biases in news coverage can affect not only public opinion but also the degree to which our democracy is able to function effectively. Bennett 2005), for example, argues that it is not bias toward one side of the political debate that plagues the media and citizens but rather news biases that convey a negative attitude about politics and government in general. These biases dissuade citizens from examining public issues and becoming politically engaged. Bennett outlines four news biases that he believes have this demobilizing effect on the citizenry. The first

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is personalization or the tendency for the news to focus on individual human drama instead of systemic political and social issues. The second is dramatization, which is the frequent reporting of news stories that fit easily into a narrative form and have compelling visual elements but neglect of important issues that do not lend themselves to this format. The third bias is fragmentation. According to Bennett, fragmentation is the tendency for the news media to report stories without context and without explaining connections among events and issues. Fourth, the authority-disorder bias represents the news media’s propensity to report on stories about the breakdown of order and how well the government (the authority) manages to restore and maintain order. Unlike bias against one political party or another, these trends in news reporting are evident across media outlets. They may not turn citizens against a particular political party but have the potential to create antagonism toward or apathy about the government itself. According to the research discussed earlier, bias toward strategy coverage also has the potential to create an unhealthy cynicism about politics and government. Yet, little evidence has been uncovered that would suggest there is an overriding propensity to present favorable coverage for or against one political party in the American news media. Why then is discussion of a biased news media such a ubiquitous part of our public dialog? Watts, Domke, Shah, and Fan (1999) find that it is actually an increase in the amount of news coverage about liberal media bias that has influenced people’s perceptions of the news media. Candidates in elections use accusations of bias, particularly liberal bias, as a way of explaining low poll numbers or rallying their partisan base. The media cover these accusations in part as a way of inoculating themselves against the charge that they favor more liberal candidates. If the news media engage in this self-reflexive exercise of examining their own coverage, perhaps the public will perceive this as objectivity. Yet, the implications of this repetition may be an alteration in the way the public views the news media itself, and not for the better.

What Americans Think about the First Amendment Another way to gauge American’s opinion of the media is by evaluating their opinions about the first amendment to the Constitution, which provides for freedom of the press. The First Amendment Center, an organization that advocates for rights guaranteed in the First

276 The Media and Public Opinion Amendment, has tracked American’s views on the First Amendment for eight years. In 2004, 42 percent of respondents said that the press has ‘‘too much freedom.’’ This number dropped to 36 percent when the question asked whether ‘‘American have too much press freedom’’ (First Amendment Center 2004). This indicates that Americans are more likely to believe that the press exceeds its mandate than that they should be legally constrained. However, 36 percent of Americans is hardly an insignificant number who believe that the press in America enjoys excessively broad freedom. In 2001, before the September 11 attacks, Americans were even more skeptical about freedom of the press. At that time, 46 percent said the press had too much freedom, down slightly from 51 percent in 2000. Whether looking at perceptions of ideological bias or other issues, Americans are clearly cynical about the press.

Talk Radio and Blogs Although this essay has argued that the media are not biased as a whole, some media outlets produce overtly partisan content. Media that are truly ideological, such as talk radio programs, Web sites, blogs, and other outlets where entertaining or charismatic messengers have a forum to express their own attitudes are widely believed to influence the opinions of large numbers of people. Scholars and pundits have taken a particular interest in talk radio and its effects on American political discourse.

Talk Radio The popularity of political talk radio increased dramatically in the early 1990s (Annenberg Report 1999). There are several likely reasons for this, three of which are related to technological innovation. Satellite dishes allowed syndicated talk shows to be broadcast across the country, enabling hosts to reach a wide audience of like-minded people. The proliferation of car phones gave listeners the ability to call in to political talk shows while commuting or during the work day. After FM radio became more popular than AM and was able to reach more listeners, there was a greater need for programming for the AM stations, a need filled by political talk radio. Finally, older listeners often prefer talk radio to music, and the baby boomer cohort was bringing a greater number of older listeners into the market. Rush Limbaugh in particular emerged during this period as an influential talk radio host with millions of listeners. Politicians and pundits credited Limbaugh

with ushering in the wave of Republicans elected to the House of Representatives in 1994 under the banner of the ‘‘Contract with America.’’ In addition to its alleged influence on public opinion, talk radio is an interesting medium for study because of its potential to reach people who already agree with the attitudes of the host. It is possible that talk radio does not change many minds but instead reinforces preexisting opinions and gives individuals the security of knowing they belong to a larger community of like-minded people. This may give them a greater feeling of security about expressing and acting on their opinions. These interesting questions have motivated a number of studies about political talk radio and its effects on attitudes and behaviors. Because of his popularity and the assumptions about his influence on the composition of the legislative branch of the U.S. government, much of this research revolved around the impact that Rush Limbaugh had on his listeners. The Annenberg Public Policy Center (1999) published a report indicating that Limbaugh listeners were more likely to believe that strategic campaign decisions and not substantive policy issues were responsible for Bill Clinton’s victory in the 1996 presidential election than were other people. The study also found that Limbaugh’s audience responded more negatively to Bill and Hillary Clinton than any other group of talk radio listeners or nonlisteners. Listeners were more likely to oppose government regulation of business, to believe that corporations seek the public interest, and to be distrustful of government, all ideas consistent with conservative ideology. Barker and Knight (2000) found that when Limbaugh criticized particular ideas, groups, or individuals in at least half of his broadcasts, his listeners showed a clear tendency to express ideas consistent with those messages. This was true even when controlling for ideology and exposure to other conservative messages. Contrary to these studies, Jones (1998) was unable to find effects among listeners of Limbaugh’s regular criticism of candidate Pat Buchanan during the 1996 Republican primary. It is possible that Buchanan’s political conservatism made him a popular figure with Limbaugh’s listeners, and so his ability to influence them was mitigated. Overall, it appears that, under certain conditions, talk radio hosts like Rush Limbaugh can affect specific opinions about people and issues. Whether they can create conservatives or liberals is a more complex question. Research tells us that talk radio listeners are more likely to be older, white males; have higher incomes;

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A right-wing radio and television talk show host, Rush Limbaugh has been one of the most controversial and influential personalities in the nation. (Mark Peterson/Corbis)

be Republican; and be conservative politically (Annenberg Report 1999). Obviously, talk radio cannot make someone into an older, white, wealthy man. So, talk radio clearly attracts an audience that is predisposed to agree with its messages.

Blogs According to Johnson and Kaye, Web-logs or blogs are ‘‘diary-like Web sites that generally offer observations and news listed chronologically on the site as well as commentary and recommended links’’ (2004, 622). A format that has only recently garnered the attention of academics, journalists, and political observers, there is little empirical evidence about the degree to which blogs affect public attitudes. Like talk radio, blogs convey opinion, usually the opinion of one person, with the possibility of audience members contributing their own commentary. Although research is, at this point, somewhat lacking, there is anecdotal evidence to support the power of blogs to alter the public dialog. One well-known

incident in December 2002, led to then--Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott losing his position (Smolkin 2004). At a retirement dinner for Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, a known segregationist, Lott commented that, had Thurmond been elected president when he ran in 1948 the country, ‘‘wouldn’t have had all these problems over all these years.’’ The mainstream media did little reporting on this story, but a number of blogs discussed it in detail, bringing the story to the attention of the traditional media outlets and the public. Another political milestone that brought attention to blogs was the 2004 presidential primary campaign of Howard Dean. Dean’s campaign rallied young voters to its cause by using online technologies. The campaign used the Internet to raise enormous amounts of money and to create blogs that engaged young voters across the nation. Although this essay has argued that the media are not biased toward one political party or another, it certainly has a lack of opinion diversity in the mainstream. Often, expressing only two sides of an issue is

278 The Media and Public Opinion considered sufficient for demonstrating objectivity. New outlets such as blogs allow a broader range of opinion to come into public view. Much like talk radio, this type of information outlet has the potential to contribute to the fragmentation of U.S. society by isolating individuals into information enclaves in which they are unlikely to experience diverse viewpoints. Moreover, those who already hold opinions consistent with the media they are consuming may have those opinions strengthened and made more extreme instead of moderated by those who disagree with them (Sunstein 2001).

Emerging Issues in Media and Public Opinion Campaign Finance Reform and 527s The ability for candidates to influence the opinions of voters during elections is determined to a large degree by how much money they have available to purchase advertising. Unless a candidate is independently wealthy, this generally means that he or she must raise a great deal of money to wage a successful campaign. This raises concern about donors having disproportionate influence on the political process compared with other citizens. In response, politicians and interest groups have advocated for, and been successful in achieving, significant reforms in the way campaigns can be financed. With the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), political parties can no longer raise unlimited amounts of money from corporations, interest groups, and individuals. They are now limited to the same contribution levels as individuals as regulated by the Federal Election Committee. BCRA also changed how regulated political advertising is classified. In the past, an ad that did not explicitly advocate voting for or against a particular candidate did not fall under the jurisdiction of Federal Election Committee regulations. This led to a large number of ads being broadcast that were not subject to laws about funding or disclosure of the sponsor but that clearly hinted at a preferred candidate. Under BCRA, any ad that is broadcast within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election and depicts a candidate in any way must adhere to federal election law. A number of controversies are related to campaign finance reform. Those who oppose these reforms believe that they violate First Amendment rights to free speech. Others believe the new laws do not go far enough. Everyone agrees that loopholes hinder the full

intention of the law from being carried out. One such loophole is the roll of 527 organizations. According to the Center for Public Integrity, a nonpartisan research group that investigates the role of money in politics, a 527 is a non-profit organization formed under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, which grants tax-exempt status to political committees at the national, state, and local level. Over the past several years, the term has come to refer to a new form of political organization operating in a gray area of the law. These 527s advocate for or against a specific set of issues or policies. Often they support a specific candidate or party in an election but are not permitted to expressly advocate for or against any federal candidates. This includes providing funds to the campaigns of federal candidates or coordinating strategies with them. On the state level, 527s have somewhat greater flexibility. They often give money to state and local candidates but have to abide by state laws for disclosure and financial reporting. In the 2004 presidential election, 527s were important actors. Groups on both the Republican and Democratic sides spent large sums of money on television advertising and other forms of communication to influence the election outcome. Residents of swing states were inundated with messages from these groups that did not have to follow the same guidelines as the parties or the campaigns of the presidential candidates, allowing them a great deal of latitude in trying to influence opinion. Campaign finance laws and reforms have real implications for public opinion about candidates and political parties and issues. These laws affect the degree to which interest groups can convey their preferences about candidates. They also control how explicit interest groups must be about their political activities. In deciding whether to accept a political argument, citizens have a right to know who is making the case they are considering. The degree to which individuals accept a given political argument and change their opinions based on that argument certainly can be affected by who is responsible for the message. Campaign finance regulations have an impact on who is empowered to disseminate messages to the public. In an unregulated system, institutions with more money have far greater power to influence public opinion than individuals or less wealthy interest groups. This prevents citizens from getting a full picture of the

Media and Public Opinion: Contemporary Perspectives

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At a television store showroom in Brooklyn, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama is shown as he delivered a paid 30-minute multi-network prime time television campaign speech on October 29, 2008. The advertisement, titled ‘‘Barack Obama: American Stories,’’ is the first time in 16 years a presidential candidate has purchased a national address before the general election. (Richard H. Cohen/Corbis)

range of policy options before formulating opinions about what policies they prefer. On the other hand, those who argue that restrictions on campaign spending limits speech clearly believe that citizens are disadvantaged by campaign finance reform. With the prohibition on spending of large amounts of money by corporations and interest groups, they become less capable of disseminating their message to large numbers of people, thus limiting their ability to influence public opinion. The most important point may be that the ability to affect people’s opinions about policies, elected officials, and candidates is directly related to how frequently an individual or group can convey its message through the media. The frame in which the story is told is an important factor considering that all groups want to control the spin put on their messages. To disseminate messages widely, it is enormously important to have financial resources. Regulations on the way these resources can be used dramatically affect the kind of information available to the public.

Conclusion This discussion demonstrates that our current media environment has both positive and negative elements. If they are willing and able to seek it out, Americans have access to more information than ever before. On the other hand, the sources of information that are most accessible and familiar often leave the average citizen with very little information on which they can base an informed voting decision. People who share a point of view have many opportunities to interact and engage in political discussion, but it is increasingly possible to hear only your own voice echoing in the vast media universe instead of many diverse expressions of ideas and opinions. Lawmakers are attempting to regulate the influence of large interest groups on public opinion, but loopholes in these laws are allowing certain groups to have significant effects on the political process. Finally, the media have significant power to set the public agenda both by selecting what issues should receive attention and by collecting and disseminating data on public

280 The Media and Public Opinion opinion. This allows for a level of measurement and widespread reporting of public opinion that is historically unprecedented, but also may result in capricious policy making and undue influence on elections. Like any great power, the technologies currently available to those who wish to persuade or inform must be used wisely if they are to benefit citizens and allow for our political process to function effectively. When misused, the media can cause cynicism, fragmentation, and disengagement, all of which have the potential to degrade the very democracy that allows for the existence of freedom of speech and the press.

References and Further Reading Altheid, David L. 2002. Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Asher, Herbert. 2001. Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know, 5th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Barker, David C., and Kathleen Knight. 2000. ‘‘Political Talk Radio and Public Opinion, 1993--1997.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 64(2): 149--170. Baum, Matthew A. 2003. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bennett, W. Lance. 2009. News: The Politics of Illusion, 5th ed. Boston: Longman. Call-In Political Talk Radio: Background, Content, Audiences, Portrayal in Mainstream Media. August, 1996. A Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania under the direction of Joseph N. Cappella, Joseph Turow and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. Cappella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good. New York: Oxford University Press. Delli Carpini, M. X., and S. Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fallows, James. 1996. Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy. New York: Vintage Books. Farnsworth, Stephen J., and S. Robert Lichter. 2006. The Nightly News Nightmare: Television’s Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1988--2004. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Frankovic, Kathleen A. 1998. ‘‘Public Opinion and Polling,’’ 150--170, in The Politics of News: The News of Politics, edited by Doris A. Graber, Denis McQuail, and Pippa Norris. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Graber, Doris A. 2005. Mass Media and American Politics. 7th edition. Washington, DC: C.Q. Press.

Internet News Takes Off. June 8, 1998. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey Report. Iyengar, S., and D. Kinder. 1987. News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Iyengar, Shanto. 1994. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 2000. Everything You Think You Know About Politics---and Why You’re Wrong. New York: Basic Books. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Paul Waldman. 2003. The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories that Shape Our Political World. New York: Oxford University Press. Johnson, T. J., and Kaye, B. K. 2004. ‘‘Wag the Blog: How Reliance on Traditional Media and the Internet Influence Perceptions of Credibility of Weblogs among Blog Users.’’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 81 (3):622--642. Jones, David A. 2001. ‘‘Political Talk Radio: The Limbaugh Effect on Primary Voters.’’ Political Communication, 15(3):367--381 Kaplan, Martin, Kenneth Goldstein, and Matthew Hale. 2003. Local TV News Coverage of the 2002 General Election. A Report of The Lear Center Local News Archive. Kaplan, Martin, Kenneth, Goldstein, and Matthew, Hale. February 15, 2005. Local News Coverage of the 2004 Campaigns: An Analysis of Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets. A Report of The Lear Center Local News Archive. McCombs, Maxwell E., and D. L. Shaw, D. L. 1972. ‘‘The Agenda-setting Function of Mass Media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2):176--187. McMasters, Paul K. June 28, 2004. Analysis: 2004 State of First Amendment Survey Report. The First Amendment Center. News Audiences Increasingly Polarized. June 8, 2004. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey Report. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1993. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion---Our Social Skin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Patterson, Thomas E. 1993. Out of Order. New York: Knopf Price, Vincent. 1992. Public Opinion. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Smolkin, R. 2004. ‘‘The Expanding Blogosphere.’’ American Journalism Review. 26(3): 38--43. Sunstein, Casso 2001. Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Watts, Mark D., Domke, David, Shah, Dhavan, and Fan, David P. 1999. Elite Cues and Media Bias in Presidential Campaigns. Communication Research. 26(2): 144--176. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Documents

and publisher of false news and seditious libels, both wickedly and maliciously devising the administration of His Excellency William Cosby, Captain Genera] and Governor in Chief, to traduce, scandalize, and vilify both His Excellency the Governor and the ministers and officers of the king, and to bring them into suspicion and the ill opinion of the subjects of the king residing within the Province, on the twenty-eighth day of January, in the seventh year of the reign of George the Second, at the City of New York did falsely, seditiously, and scandalously print and publish, and cause to be printed and published, a certain false, malicious, seditious, scandalous libel entitled The New York Weekly Journal.’’ ‘‘In which libel, among other things therein contained, are these words, ’Your appearance in print at last gives a pleasure to many, although most wish you had come fairly into the open field, and not appeared behind entrenchment’s made of the supposed laws against libeling, and of what other men had said and done before. ’These entrenchment’s, gentlemen, may soon be shown to you and to all men to be weak, and to have neither law nor reason for their foundation, and so cannot long stand in your stead. Therefore you had much better as yet leave them, and come to what the people of this City and Province (the City and Province of New York meaning) think are the points in question. They (the people of the City and Province of New York meaning) think, as matters now stand, that their liberties and properties are precarious, and that slavery is like to be entailed on them and their posterity

5.1 John Peter Zenger, Trial Record, 1736 . . . Case for the Prosecution MR. ATTORNEY. ‘‘May it please Your Honors and you, Gentlemen of the Jury. The information now before the Court, and to which the defendant, Zenger, has pleaded ‘Not guilty,’ is an information for printing and publishing a false, scandalous, and seditious libel in which His Excellency, the Governor of this Province, who is the king’s immediate representative here, is greatly and unjustly scandalized as a person that has no regard to law or justice; with much more, as will appear upon reading the information. libeling has always been discouraged as a thing that tends to create differences among men, ill blood among the people, and oftentimes great bloodshed between the party libeling and the party libeled. There can be no doubt but you, Gentlemen of the Jury, will have the same ill opinion of such practices as judges have always shown upon such occasions. But I shall say no more at this time, until you hear the information, which is as follows: ‘‘Be it remembered that Richard Bradley, Attorney General of the king for the Province of New York, who prosecutes for the king in this part, in his own proper person comes here into the Court of the king, and for the king gives the Court here to understand and be informed: ‘‘That John Peter Zenger, of the City of New York, printer, being a seditious person; and a frequent printer 281

282 The Media and Public Opinion if some past things be not amended, and this they collect from many past proceedings.’’ (Meaning many of the past proceedings of His Excellency, the Governor, and of the ministers and officers of the king, of and for the said Province.) ‘‘And the Attorney General likewise gives the Court here to understand and be informed: ‘‘That the said John Peter Zenger afterwards, to wit on the eighth day of April, did falsely, seditiously and scandalously Print and publish another false, malicious, seditious, and Scandalous libel entitled The New-York Weekly Journal. ‘‘In which libel, among other things therein contained, are these words, ‘one of our neighbors (one of the inhabitants of New Jersey meaning) being in company and observing the strangers (some of the inhabitants of New York meaning) full of complaints, endeavored to persuade them to remove into Jersey. To which it was replied, that would be leaping out of the frying pan into the fire; for,’ says he, ‘we both are under the same Governor (His Excellency the said Governor meaning), and your Assembly have shown with a vengeance what is to be expected from them.’ One that was then moving to Pennsylvania (meaning one that was then removing from New York with intent to reside at Pennsylvania), to which place it is reported that several considerable men are removing (from New York meaning), expressed in terms very moving much concern for the circumstances of New York (the bad circumstances of the Province and people of New York meaning), and seemed to think them very much owing to the influence that some men (whom he called tools) had in the administration (meaning the administration of government of the said Province of New York). He said he was now going from them, and was not to be hurt by any measures they should take, but could not help having some concern for the welfare of his countrymen, and should be glad to hear that the Assembly (meaning the General Assembly of the Province of New York) would exert themselves as became them by showing that they have the interest of their country more at heart than the gratification of any private view of any of their members, or being at all affected by the smiles or frowns of a governor (His Excellency the said Governor meaning); both of which ought equally to be despised when the interest of their country is at stake. ‘‘‘You,’ says he, ’complain of the lawyers, but I think the law itself is at an end. We (the people of the Province of New York meaning) see men’s deeds destroyed, judges arbitrarily displaced, new courts erected without consent of the legislature (within the Province of New

York meaning) by which it seems to me trial by jury is taken away when a governor pleases (His Excellency the said Governor meaning), and men of known estates denied their votes contrary to the received practice, the best expositor of any law. Who is there then in that Province (meaning the Province of New York) that can call anything his own, or enjoy any liberty, longer than those in the administration (meaning the administration of government of the said Province of New York) will condescend to let them do it? For which reason I have left it, as I believe more will.) ‘‘These words are to the great disturbance of the peace of the said Province of New York, to the great scandal of the king, of His Excellency the Governor, and of all others concerned in the administration of the government of the Province, and against the peace of the king, his crown, and his dignity. ‘‘Whereupon the said Attorney General of the king prays the advisement of the Court here, in the premises, and the due process of law against the said John Peter Zenger. ‘‘To this information the defendant has pleaded not guilty, but we are ready to prove [Zenger’s guilt].’’ . . . MR. HAMILTON. ‘‘May it please Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Attorney that government is a sacred thing, but I differ widely from him when he would insinuate that the just complaints of a number of men who suffer under a bad administration is libeling that administration. Had I believed that to be law, I should not have given the Court the trouble of hearing anything that I could say in this cause. ‘‘I own that when I read the information I had not the art to find out, without the help of Mr. Attorney’s innuendos, that the Governor was the person meant in every period of that newspaper. I was inclined to believe that they were written by some who, from an extraordinary zeal for liberty, had misconstrued the conduct of some persons in authority into crimes; and that Mr. Attorney, out of his too great zeal for power, had exhibited this information to correct the indiscretion of my client, and at the same time to show his superiors the great concern he had lest they should be treated with any undue freedom. ‘‘But from what Mr. Attorney has just now said, to wit, that this prosecution was directed by the Governor and the Council, and from the extraordinary appearance of people of all conditions, which I observe in Court upon this occasion, I have reason to think that those in the administration have by this prosecution something more in view, and that the people believe they have a good deal more at stake, than I apprehended. Therefore, as it is become my duty to be both

5.1 John Peter Zenger, Trial Record plain and particular in this cause, I beg leave to bespeak the patience of the Court.’’ ‘‘I was in hopes as that terrible Court where those dreadful judgments were given, and that law established, which Mr. Attorney has produced for authorities to support this cause, was long ago laid aside as the most dangerous Court to the liberties of the people of England that ever was known in that kingdom---that Mr. Attorney, knowing this, would not have attempted to set up a star chamber here, nor to make their judgments a precedent to us. For it is well known that what would have been judged treason in those days for a man to speak, has since not only been practiced as lawful, but the contrary doctrine has been held to be law.’’ ‘‘In Brewster’s case for printing that subjects might defend their rights and liberties by arms in case the king should go about to destroy them, he was told by the Chief justice that it was a great mercy he was not proceeded against for his life; for to say the king could be resisted by arms in any case whatsoever was express treason. And yet we see since that time, that Doctor Sacheverell was sentenced in the highest court in Great Britain for saying that such a resistance was not lawful. Besides, as times have made very great changes in the laws of England, so in my opinion there is good reason that [other] places should do so too. ‘‘Is it not surprising to see a subject, upon receiving a commission from the king to be a governor of a Colony in America, immediately imagining himself to be vested with all the prerogatives belonging to the sacred person of his princes? And, which is yet more astonishing, to see that a people can be so wild as to allow of and acknowledge those prerogatives and exemptions, even to their own destruction? Is it so hard a matter to distinguish between the majesty of our sovereign and the power of a governor of The Plantations?’ Is not this making very free with our prince, to apply that regard, obedience, and allegiance to a subject, which is due only to our sovereign. ‘‘And yet in all the cases which Mr. Attorney has cited to show the duty and obedience we owe to the supreme magistrate, it is the king that is there meant and understood, although Mr. Attorney is pleased to urge them as authorities to prove the heinousness of Mr. Zenger’s offense against the Governor of New York. The several Plantations are compared to so many large corporations, and perhaps not improperly. Can anyone give an instance that the head of a corporation ever put in a claim to the sacred rights of majesty? Let us not, while we are pretending to pay a great regard to our prince and his peace, make bold to

283

transfer that allegiance to a subject which we owe to our king only. ‘‘What strange doctrine is it to press everything for law here which is so in England? I believe we should not think it a favor, at present at least, to establish this practice. In England so great a regard and reverence is had to the judges that if any man strikes another in Westminster Hall while the judges are sitting, he shall lose his right hand and forfeit his land and goods for so doing. Although the judges here claim all the powers and authorities within this government that a Court of King’s Bench has in England, yet I believe Mr. Attorney will scarcely say that such a punishment could be legally inflicted on a man for committing such an offense in the presence of the judges sitting in any court within the Province of New York. The reason is obvious. A quarrel or riot in New York can not possibly be attended with those dangerous consequences that it might in Westminster Hall; nor, I hope, will it be alleged that any misbehavior to a governor in The Plantations will, or ought to be, judged of or punished as a like undutifulness would be to our sovereign. ‘‘From all of which, I hope Mr. Attorney will not think it proper to apply his law cases, to support the cause of his governor, which have only been judged where the king’s safety or honor was concerned. ‘‘It will not be denied that a freeholder in the Province of New York has as good a right to the sole and separate use of his lands as a freeholder in England, who has a right to bring an action of trespass against his neighbor for suffering his horse or cow to come and feed upon his land or eat his corn, whether enclosed or not. Yet I believe it would be looked upon as a strange attempt for one man here to bring an action against another whose cattle and horses feed upon his grounds that are not enclosed, or indeed for eating and treading down his corn, if that were not enclosed. ‘‘Numberless are the instances of this kind that might be given to show that what is good law at one time and in one place is not so at another time and in another place. So that I think the law seems to expect that in these parts of the world men should take care, by a good fence, to preserve their property from the injury of unruly beasts. And perhaps there may be a good reason why men should take the same care to make an honest and upright conduct a fence and security against the injury of unruly tongues.’’ . . . Source: John Peter Zenger. A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger 1736.

284 The Media and Public Opinion

5.2 Walter Lipmann, Public Opinion, 1922 Chapter XVI, The Self-Centered Man and Chapter XXIV, News, Truth, and a Conclusion Since Public Opinion is supposed to be the prime mover in democracies, one might reasonably expect to find a vast literature. One does not find it. There are excellent books on government and parties, that is, on the machinery which in theory registers public opinions after they are formed. But on the sources from which these public opinions arise, on the processes by which they are derived, there is relatively little. The existence of a force called Public Opinion is in the main taken for granted, and American political writers have been most interested either in finding out how to make government express the common will, or in how to prevent the common will from subverting the purposes for which they believe the government exists. According to their traditions they have wished either to tame opinion or to obey it. Thus the editor of a notable series of text-books writes that ‘‘the most difficult and the most momentous question of government (is) how to transmit the force of individual opinion into public action.’’ But surely there is a still more momentous question, the question of how to validate our private versions of the political scene. There is, as I shall try to indicate further on, the prospect of radical improvement by the development of principles already in operation. But this development will depend on how well we learn to use knowledge of the way opinions are put together to watch over our own opinions when they are being put together. For casual opinion, being the product of partial contact, of tradition, and personal interests, cannot in the nature of things take kindly to a method of political thought which is based on exact record, measurement, analysis and comparison. Just those qualities of the mind which determine what shall seem interesting, important, familiar, personal, and dramatic, are the qualities which in the first instance realistic opinion frustrates. Therefore, unless there is in the community at large a growing conviction that prejudice and intuition are not enough, the working out of realistic opinion, which takes time, money, labor, conscious effort, patience, and equanimity, will not find enough support. That conviction grows as self-criticism increases, and makes us conscious of buncombe, contemptuous of ourselves when we employ it, and on guard to detect it. Without an ingrained habit of analyzing opinion when we read, talk, and decide, most of us would hardly

suspect the need of better ideas, nor be interested in them when they appear, nor be able to prevent the new technic of political intelligence from being manipulated. Yet democracies, if we are to judge by the oldest and most powerful of them, have made a mystery out of public opinion. There have been skilled organizers of opinion who understood the mystery well enough to create majorities on election day. But these organizers have been regarded by political science as low fellows or as ‘‘problems,’’ not as possessors of the most effective knowledge there was on how to create and operate public opinion. The tendency of the people who have voiced the ideas of democracy, even when they have not managed its action, the tendency of students, orators, editors, has been to look upon Public Opinion as men in other societies looked upon the uncanny forces to which they ascribed the last word in the direction of events. . . . So the early democrats insisted that a reasoned righteousness welled up spontaneously out of the mass of men. All of them hoped that it would, many of them believed that it did, although the cleverest, like Thomas Jefferson, had all sorts of private reservations. But one thing was certain: if public opinion did not come forth spontaneously, nobody in that age believed it would come forth at all. For in one fundamental respect the political science on which democracy was based was the same science that Aristotle formulated. It was the same science for democrat and aristocrat, royalist and republican, in that its major premise assumed the art of government to be a natural endowment. Men differed radically when they tried to name the men so endowed; but they agreed in thinking that the greatest question of all was to find those in whom political wisdom was innate. Royalists were sure that kings were born to govern. Alexander Hamilton thought that while ‘‘there are strong minds in every walk of life . . . the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions.’’ Jefferson thought the political faculties were deposited by God in farmers and planters, and sometimes spoke as if they were found in all the people. The main premise was the same: to govern was an instinct that appeared, according to your social preferences, in one man or a chosen few, in all males, or only in males who were white and twenty-one, perhaps even in all men and all women. In deciding who was most fit to govern, knowledge of the world was taken for granted. The aristocrat believed that those who dealt with large affairs possessed the instinct, the democrats asserted that all men

5.2 Walter Lipmann, Public Opinion possessed the instinct and could therefore deal with large affairs. It was no part of political science in either case to think out how knowledge of the world could be brought to the ruler. If you were for the people you did not try to work out the question of how to keep the voter informed. By the age of twenty-one he had his political faculties. What counted was a good heart, a reasoning mind, a balanced judgment. These would ripen with age, but it was not necessary to consider how to inform the heart and feed the reason. Men took in their facts as they took in their breath. But the facts men could come to possess in this effortless way were limited. They could know the customs and more obvious character of the place where they lived and worked. But the outer world they had to conceive, and they did not conceive it instinctively, nor absorb trustworthy knowledge of it just by living. Therefore, the only environment in which spontaneous politics were possible was one confined within the range of the ruler’s direct and certain knowledge. There is no escaping this conclusion, wherever you found government on the natural range of men’s faculties. ‘‘If,’’ as Aristotle said, ‘‘the citizens of a state are to judge and distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other’s characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of law suits will go wrong.’’ Obviously this maxim was binding upon every school of political thought. But it presented peculiar difficulties to the democrats. Those who believed in class government could fairly claim that in the court of the king, or in the country houses of the gentry, men did know each other’s characters, and as long as the rest of mankind was passive, the only characters one needed to know were the characters of men in the ruling class. But the democrats, who wanted to raise the dignity of all men, were immediately involved by the immense size and confusion of their ruling class--the male electorate. Their science told them that politics was an instinct, and that the instinct worked in a limited environment. Their hopes bade them insist that all men in a very large environment could govern. In this deadly conflict between their ideals and their science, the only way out was to assume without much discussion that the voice of the people was the voice of God. The paradox was too great, the stakes too big, their ideal too precious for critical examination. They could not show how a citizen of Boston was to stay in Boston and conceive the views of a Virginian, how a Virginian in Virginia could have real opinions about the government at Washington, how Congressmen in Washington could have opinions about China or Mexico. For in that

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day it was not possible for many men to have an unseen environment brought into the field of their judgment. There had been some advances, to be sure, since Aristotle. There were a few newspapers, and there were books, better roads perhaps, and better ships. But there was no great advance, and the political assumptions of the Eighteenth Century had essentially to be those that had prevailed in political science for two thousand years. The pioneer democrats did not possess the material for resolving the conflict between the known range of man’s attention and their illimitable faith in his dignity. Their assumptions antedated not only the modern newspaper, the world-wide press services, photography and moving pictures, but, what is really more significant, they antedated measurement and record, quantitative and comparative analysis, the canons of evidence, and the ability of psychological analysis to correct and discount the prejudices of the witness. I do not mean to say that our records are satisfactory, our analysis unbiased, our measurements sound. I do mean to say that the key inventions have been made for bringing the unseen world into the field of judgment. They had not been made in the time of Aristotle, and they were not yet important enough to be visible for political theory in the age of Rousseau, Montesquieu, or Thomas Jefferson. In a later chapter I think we shall see that even in the latest theory of human reconstruction, that of the English Guild Socialists, all the deeper premises have been taken over from this older system of political thought. That system, whenever it was competent and honest, had to assume that no man could have more than a very partial experience of public affairs. In the sense that he can give only a little time to them, that assumption is still true, and of the utmost consequence. But ancient theory was compelled to assume, not only that men could give little attention to public questions, but that the attention available would have to be confined to matters close at hand. It would have been visionary to suppose that a time would come when distant and complicated events could conceivably be reported, analyzed, and presented in such a form that a really valuable choice could be made by an amateur. That time is now in sight. There is no longer any doubt that the continuous reporting of an unseen environment is feasible. It is often done badly, but the fact that it is done at all shows that it can be done, and the fact that we begin to know how badly it is often done, shows that it can be done better. With varying degrees of skill and honesty distant complexities are reported every day by engineers and accountants for business

286 The Media and Public Opinion men, by secretaries and civil servants for officials, by intelligence officers for the General Staff, by some journalists for some readers. These are crude beginnings but radical, far more radical in the literal meaning of that word than the repetition of wars, revolutions, abdications and restorations; as radical as the change in the scale of human life which has made it possible for Mr. Lloyd George to discuss Welsh coal mining after breakfast in London, and the fate of the Arabs before dinner in Paris. For the possibility of bringing any aspect of human affairs within the range of judgment breaks the spell which has lain upon political ideas. There have, of course, been plenty of men who did not realize that the range of attention was the main premise of political science. They have built on sand. They have demonstrated in their own persons the effects of a very limited and self-centered knowledge of the world. But for the political thinkers who have counted, from Plato and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to the democratic theorists, speculation has revolved around the self-centered man who had to see the whole world by means of a few pictures in his head. . . . The hypothesis, which seems to me the most fertile, is that news and truth are not the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished. The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act. Only at those points, where social conditions take recognizable and measurable shape, do the body of truth and the body of news coincide. That is a comparatively small part of the whole field of human interest. In this sector, and only in this sector, the tests of the news are sufficiently exact to make the charges of perversion or suppression more than a partisan judgment. There is no defense, no extenuation, no excuse whatever, for stating six times that Lenin is dead, when the only information the paper possesses is a report that he is dead from a source repeatedly shown to be unreliable. The news, in that instance, is not ‘‘Lenin Dead’’ but ‘‘Helsingfors Says Lenin is Dead.’’ And a newspaper can be asked to take the responsibility of not making Lenin more dead than the source of the news is reliable; if there is one subject on which editors are most responsible it is in their judgment of the reliability of the source. But when it comes to dealing, for example, with stories of what the Russian people want, no such test exists. . . . The task of deflating these controversies, and reducing them to a point where they can be reported as news, is not a task which the reporter can perform. It is possible and necessary for journalists to bring home to

people the uncertain character of the truth on which their opinions are founded, and by criticism and agitation to prod social science into making more usable formulations of social facts, and to prod statesmen into establishing more visible institutions. The press, in other words, can fight for the extension of reportable truth. But as social truth is organized to-day, the press is not constituted to furnish from one edition to the next the amount of knowledge which the democratic theory of public opinion demands. This is not due to the Brass Check, as the quality of news in radical papers shows, but to the fact that the press deals with a society in which the governing forces are so imperfectly recorded. The theory that the press can itself record those forces is false. It can normally record only what has been recorded for it by the working of institutions. Everything else is argument and opinion, and fluctuates with the vicissitudes, the self-consciousness, and the courage of the human mind. If the press is not so universally wicked, nor so deeply conspiring, as Mr. Sinclair would have us believe, it is very much more frail than the democratic theory has as yet admitted. It is too frail to carry the whole burden of popular sovereignty, to supply spontaneously the truth which democrats hoped was inborn. And when we expect it to supply such a body of truth we employ a misleading standard of judgment. We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, and all-round competence. We suppose an appetite for uninteresting truths which is not discovered by any honest analysis of our own tastes. If the newspapers, then, are to be charged with the duty of translating the whole public life of mankind, so that every adult can arrive at an opinion on every moot topic, they fail, they are bound to fail, in any future one can conceive they will continue to fail. It is not possible to assume that a world, carried on by division of labor and distribution of authority, can be governed by universal opinions in the whole population. Unconsciously the theory sets up the single reader as theoretically omnicompetent, and puts upon the press the burden of accomplishing whatever representative government, industrial organization, and diplomacy have failed to accomplish. Acting upon everybody for thirty minutes in twenty-four hours, the press is asked to create a mystical force called Public Opinion that will take up the slack in public institutions. The press has often mistakenly pretended that it could do just that. It has at great moral cost to itself, encouraged a democracy, still bound to its original premises, to expect newspapers to supply spontaneously for every organ of government,

5.3 Gitlow v. People of State of New York 287 for every social problem, the machinery of information which these do not normally supply themselves. Institutions, having failed to furnish themselves with instruments of knowledge, have become a bundle of ‘‘problems,’’ which the population as a whole, reading the press as a whole, is supposed to solve. The press, in other words, has come to be regarded as an organ of direct democracy, charged on a much wider scale, and from day to day, with the function often attributed to the initiative, referendum, and recall. The Court of Public Opinion, open day and night, is to lay down the law for everything all the time. It is not workable. And when you consider the nature of news, it is not even thinkable. For the news, as we have seen, is precise in proportion to the precision with which the event is recorded. Unless the event is capable of being named, measured, given shape, made specific, it either fails to take on the character of news, or it is subject to the accidents and prejudices of observation. Therefore, on the whole, the quality of the news about modern society is an index of its social organization. The better the institutions, the more all interests concerned are formally represented, the more issues are disentangled, the more objective criteria are introduced, the more perfectly an affair can be presented as news. At its best the press is a servant and guardian of institutions; at its worst it is a means by which a few exploit social disorganization to their own ends. In the degree to which institutions fail to function, the unscrupulous journalist can fish in troubled waters, and the conscientious one must gamble with uncertainties. The press is no substitute for institutions. It is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents, and eruptions. It is only when they work by a steady light of their own, that the press, when it is turned upon them, reveals a situation intelligible enough for a popular decision. The trouble lies deeper than the press, and so does the remedy. It lies in social organization based on a system of analysis and record, and in all the corollaries of that principle; in the abandonment of the theory of the omnicompetent citizen, in the decentralization of decision, in the coordination of decision by comparable record and analysis. If at the centers of management there is a running audit, which makes work intelligible to those who do it, and those who superintend it, issues when they arise are not the mere collisions of the blind. Then, too, the news is uncovered for the press by a system of intelligence that is also a check upon the press.

That is the radical way. For the troubles of the press, like the troubles of representative government, be it territorial or functional, like the troubles of industry, be it capitalist, cooperative, or communist, go back to a common source: to the failure of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their prejudice, by inventing, creating, and organizing a machinery of knowledge. It is because they are compelled to act without a reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers and churches make such small headway against the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and three legged calves. This is the primary defect of popular government, a defect inherent in its traditions, and all its other defects can, I believe, be traced to this one.

5.3 Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) The following facts were established on the trial by undisputed evidence and admissions: The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of ‘moderate Socialism.’ Membership in both is open to aliens as well as citizens. The Left Wing Section was organized nationally at a conference in New York City in June, 1919, attended by ninety delegates from twenty different States. The conference elected a National Council, of which the defendant was a member, and left to it the adoption of a ‘Manifesto.’ This was published in The Revolutionary Age, the official organ of the Left Wing. The defendant was on the board of managers of the paper and was its business manager. He arranged for the printing of the paper and took to the printer the manuscript of the first issue which contained the Left Wing Manifesto, and also a Communist Program and a Program of the Left Wing that had been adopted by the conference. Sixteen thousand copies were printed, which were delivered at the premises in New York City used as the office of the Revolutionary Age and the head quarters of the Left Wing, and occupied by the defendant and other officials. These copies were paid for by the defendant, as business manager of the paper. Employees at this office wrapped and mailed out copies of the paper under the defendant’s direction; and copies were sold from this office. It was admitted that the

288 The Media and Public Opinion defendant signed a card subscribing to the Manifesto and Program of the Left Wing, which all applicants were required to sign before being admitted to membership; that he went to different parts of the State to speak to branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of the Left Wing and advocated their adoption; and that he was responsible for the Manifesto as it appeared, that ‘he knew of the publication, in a general way and he knew of its publication afterwards, and is responsible for the circulation.’ There was no evidence of any effect resulting from the publication and circulation of the Manifesto . . . It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. We need not enter upon a consideration of the English common law rule of seditious libel or the Federal Sedition Act of 1798,11 to which reference is made in the defendant’s brief. These are so unlike the present statute, that we think the decisions under them cast no helpful light upon the questions here. And finding, for the reasons stated, that the statute is not in itself unconstitutional, and that it has not been applied in the present case in derogation of any constitutional right, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (dissenting). MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS and I are of opinion that this judgment should be reversed. The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States. If I am right then I think that the criterion sanctioned by the full Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249 (63 L. Ed. 470), applies: ‘The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the State] has a right to prevent.’

It is true that in my opinion this criterion was departed from in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17, but the convictions that I expressed in that case are too deep for it to be possible for me as yet to believe that it and Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, have settled the law. If what I think the correct test is applied it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant’s views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.

5.4 Calvin Coolidge, The Press under a Free Government, January 17, 1925 Given before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C. The relationship between governments and the press has always been recognized as a matter of large importance. Wherever despotism abounds, the sources of public information are the first to be brought under its control. Wherever the cause of liberty is making its way, one of its highest accomplishments is the guarantee of the freedom of the press. It has always been realized, sometimes instinctively, oftentimes expressly, that truth and freedom are inseparable. An absolutism could never rest upon anything save a perverted and distorted view of human relationships and upon false standards set up and maintained by force. It has always found it necessary to attempt to dominate the entire field of education and instruction. It has thrived on ignorance. While it has sought to train the minds of a few, it has been largely with the purpose of attempting to give them a superior facility for misleading the many. Men have been educated under absolutism, not that they might bear witness to the truth, but that they might be

5.4 Calvin Coolidge, The Press under a Free Government the more ingenious advocates and defenders of false standards and hollow pretenses. This has always been the method of privilege, the method of class and caste, the method of master and slave. When a community has sufficiently advanced so that its government begins to take on that of the nature of a republic, the processes of education become even more important, but the method is necessarily reversed. It is all the more necessary under a system of free government that the people should be enlightened, that they should be correctly informed, than it is under an absolute government that they should be ignorant. Under a republic the institutions of learning, while bound by the constitution and laws, are in no way subservient to the government. The principles which they enunciate do not depend for their authority upon whether they square with the wish of the ruling dynasty, but whether they square with the everlasting truth. Under these conditions the press, which had before been made an instrument for concealing or perverting the facts, must be made an instrument for their true representation and their sound and logical interpretation. From the position of a mere organ, constantly bound to servitude, public prints rise to a dignity, not only of independence, but of a great educational and enlightening factor. They attain new powers, which it is almost impossible to measure, and become charged with commensurate responsibilities. The public press under an autocracy is necessarily a true agency of propaganda. Under a free government it must be the very reverse. Propaganda seeks to present a part of the facts, to distort their relations, and to force conclusions which could not be drawn from a complete and candid survey of all the facts. It has been observed that propaganda seeks to close the mind, while education seeks to open it. This has become one of the dangers of the present day. The great difficulty in combating unfair propaganda, or even in recognizing it, arises from the fact that at the present time we confront so many new and technical problems that it is an enormous task to keep ourselves accurately informed concerning them. In this respect, you gentlemen of the press face the same perplexities that are encountered by legislators and government administrators. Whoever deals with current public questions is compelled to rely greatly upon the information and judgments of experts and specialists. Unfortunately, not all experts are to be trusted as entirely disinterested. Not all specialists are completely without guile. In our increasing dependence on specialized authority, we tend to become easier victims for the propagandists, and need to cultivate sedulously the

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habit of the open mind. No doubt every generation feels that its problems are the most intricate and baffling that have ever been presented for solution. But with all recognition of the disposition to exaggerate in this respect, I think we can fairly say that our times in all their social and economic aspects are more complex than any past period. We need to keep our minds free from prejudice and bias. Of education, and of real information we cannot get too much. But of propaganda, which is tainted or perverted information, we cannot have too little. Newspaper men, therefore, endlessly discuss the question of what is news. I judge that they will go on discussing it as long as there are newspapers. It has seemed to me that quite obviously the news-giving function of a newspaper cannot possibly require that it give a photographic presentation of everything that happens in the community. That is an obvious impossibility. It seems fair to say that the proper presentation of the news bears about the same relation to the whole field of happenings that a painting does to a photograph. The photograph might give the more accurate presentation of details, but in doing so it might sacrifice the opportunity the more clearly to delineate character. My college professor was wont to tell us a good many years ago that if a painting of a tree was only the exact representation of the original, so that it looked just like the tree, there would be no reason for making it; we might as well look at the tree itself. But the painting, if it is of the right sort, gives something that neither a photograph nor a view of the tree conveys. It emphasizes something of character, quality, individuality. We are not lost in looking at thorns and effects; we catch a vision of the grandeur and beauty of a king of the forest. And so I have conceived that the news, properly presented, should be a sort of cross-section of the character of current human experience. It should delineate character, quality, tendencies and implications. In this way the reporter exercises his genius. Out of the current events he does not make a drab and sordid story, but rather an informing and enlightened epic. His work becomes no longer imitative, but rises to an original art. Our American newspapers serve a double purpose. They bring knowledge and information to their readers, and at the same time they play a most important part in connection with the business interests of the community, both through their news and advertising departments. Probably there is no rule of your profession to which you gentlemen are more devoted than that which prescribes that the editorial and the business

290 The Media and Public Opinion policies of the paper are to be conducted by strictly separate departments. Editorial policy and news policy must not be influenced by business consideration; business policies must not be affected by editorial programs. Such a dictum strikes the outsider as involving a good deal of difficulty in the practical adjustments of every-day management. Yet, in fact, I doubt if those adjustments are any more difficult than have to be made in every other department of human effort. Life is a long succession of compromises and adjustments, and it may be doubted whether the press is compelled to make them more frequently than others do. When I have contemplated these adjustments of business and editorial policy, it has always seemed to me that American newspapers are peculiarly representative of the practical idealism of our country. Quite recently the construction of a revenue statute resulted in giving publicity to some highly interesting facts about incomes. It must have been observed that nearly al the newspapers published these interesting facts in their news columns, while very many of them protested in their editorial columns that such publicity was a bad policy. Yet this was not inconsistent. I am referring to the incident by way of illustrating what I just said about the newspapers representing the practical idealism of America. As practical newsmen they printed the facts. As editorial idealists they protested that there ought to be no such facts available. Some people feel concerned about the commercialism of the press. They note that great newspapers are great business enterprises earning large profits and controlled by men of wealth. So they fear that in such control the press may tend to support the private interests of those who own the papers, rather than the general interest of the whole people. It seems to me, however, that the real test is not whether the newspapers are controlled by men of wealth, but whether they are sincerely trying to serve the public interests. There will be little occasion for worry about who owns a newspaper, so long as its attitudes on public questions are such as to promote the general welfare. A press which is actuated by the purpose of genuine usefulness to the public interest can never be too strong financially, so long as its strength is used for the support of popular government. There does not seem to be cause for alarm in the dual relationship of the press to the public, whereby it is on one side a purveyor of information and opinion and on the other side a purely business enterprise. Rather, it is probably that a press which maintains an intimate touch with the business currents of the nation, is likely to be more reliable than it would be if it were

a stranger to these influences. After all, the chief business of the American people is business. They are profoundly concerned with producing, buying, selling, investing and prospering in the world. I am strongly of opinion that the great majority of people will always find these are moving impulses of our life. The opposite view was oracularly and poetically set forth in those lines of Goldsmith which everybody repeats, but few really believe: ‘‘Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.’’ Excellent poetry, but not a good working philosophy. Goldsmith would have been right, if, in fact, the accumulation of wealth meant the decay of men. It is rare indeed that the men who are accumulating wealth decay. It is only when they cease production, when accumulation stops, that an irreparable decay begins. Wealth is the product of industry, ambition, character and untiring effort. In all experience, the accumulation of wealth means the multiplication of schools, the increase of knowledge, the dissemination of intelligence, the encouragement of science, the broadening of outlook, the expansion of liberties, the widening of culture. Of course, the accumulation of wealth cannot be justified as the chief end of existence. But we are compelled to recognize it as a means to well-nigh every desirable achievement. So long as wealth is made the means and not the end, we need not greatly fear it. An there never was time when wealth was so generally regarded as a means, or so little regarded as an end, as today. Just a little time ago we read in your newspapers that two leaders of American business, whose efforts at accumulation had been most astonishingly successful, had given fifty or sixty million dollars as endowments to educational works. That was real news. It was characteristic of our American experience with men of large resources. They use their power to serve, not themselves and their own families, but the public. I feel sure that the coming generations, which will benefit by those endowments, will not be easily convinced that they have suffered greatly because of these particular accumulations of wealth. So there is little cause for the fear that our journalism, merely because it is prosperous, is likely to betray us. But it calls for additional effort to avoid even the appearance of the evil of selfishness. In every worthy profession, of course, there will always be a minority who will appeal to the baser instinct. There always have been, and probably always will be some who will feel that their own temporary interest may be furthered by betraying the interest of others. But these are becoming constantly a less numerous and less potential

5.5 Edward R. Murrow and Joseph McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate element in the community. Their influence, whatever it may seem at a particular moment, is always ephemeral. They will not long interfere with the progress of the race which is determined to go its own forward and upward way. They may at times somewhat retard and delay its progress, but in the end their opposition will be overcome. They have no permanent effect. They accomplish no permanent result. The race is not traveling in that direction. The power of the spirit always prevails over the power of the flesh. These furnish us no justification for interfering with the freedom of the press, because all freedom, though it may sometime tend toward excesses, bears within it those remedies which will finally effect a cure for its own disorders. American newspapers have seemed to me to be particularly representative of this practical idealism of our people. Therefore, I feel secure in saying that they are the best newspapers in the world. I believe that they print more real news and more reliable and characteristic news than any other newspaper. I believe their editorial opinions are less colored in influence by mere partisanship or selfish interest, than are those of any other country. Moreover, I believe that our American press is more independent, more reliable and less partisan today than at any other time in its history. I believe this of our press, precisely as I believe it of those who manage our public affairs. Both are cleaner, finer, less influenced by improper considerations, than ever before. Whoever disagrees with this judgment must take the chance of marking himself as ignorant of conditions which notoriously affected our public life, thoughts and methods, even within the memory of many men who are still among us. It can safely be assumed that self-interest will always place sufficient emphasis on the business side of newspapers, so that they do not need any outside encouragement for that part of their activities. Important, however, as this factor is, it is not the main element which appeals to the American people. It is only those who do not understand our people, who believe that our national life is entirely absorbed by material motives. We make no concealment of the fact that we want wealth, but here are many other things that we want very much more. We want peace and honor, and that charity which is so strong an element of all civilization. The chief ideal of the American people is idealism. I cannot repeat too often that America is a nation of idealists. That is the only motive to which they every give any strong and lasting reaction. No newspaper can be a success which fails to appeal to that element of our national life. It is in this direction that the public press can lend its strongest support to our Government.

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I could not truly criticize the vast importance of the counting room, but my ultimate faith I would place in the high idealism of the editorial room of the American newspaper.

5.5 Edward R. Murrow and Joseph McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate, 1954 Edward R. Murrow See it Now (CBS-TV, March 9, 1954) ‘‘A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’’ Murrow: Good evening. Tonight See it Now devotes its entire half hour to a report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy told mainly in his own words and pictures. But first, ALCOA would like you to meet a man who has been with them for fifty years. (Commercial break.) Murrow: Because a report on Senator McCarthy is by definition controversial we want to say exactly what we mean to say and I request your permission to read from the script whatever remarks Murrow and Friendly may make. If the Senator believes we have done violence to his words or pictures and desires to speak, to answer himself, an opportunity will be afforded him on this program. Our working thesis tonight is this question: If this fight against Communism is made a fight against America’s two great political parties, the American people know that one of those parties will be destroyed and the Republic cannot endure very long as a one party system. We applaud that statement and we think Senator McCarthy ought to. He said it, seventeen months ago in Milwaukee. McCarthy: The American people realize this cannot be made a fight between America’s two great political parties. If this fight against Communism is made a fight between America’s two great political parties the American people know that one of those parties will be destroyed and the Republic cannot endure very long as a one party system. Murrow: Thus on February 4th, 1954, Senator McCarthy spoke of one party’s treason. This was at Charleston, West Virginia where there were no cameras running. It was recorded on tape. McCarthy: The issue between the Republicans and Democrats is clearly drawn. It has been deliberately

292 The Media and Public Opinion drawn by those who have been in charge of twenty years of treason. The hard fact is---the hard fact is that those who wear the label, those who wear the label Democrat wear it with the stain of a historic betrayal. Murrow: Seventeen months ago Candidate Eisenhower met Senator McCarthy in Green Bay, Wisconsin and he laid down the ground rules on how he would meet Communism if elected. Eisenhower: This is a pledge I make. If I am charged by you people to be the responsible head of the Executive Department it will be my initial responsibility to see that subversion, disloyalty, is kept out of the Executive Department. We will always appreciate and welcome Congressional investigation but the responsibility will rest squarely on the shoulders of the Executive and I hold that there are ample powers in the government to get rid of these people if the Executive Department is really concerned in doing it. We can do it with absolute assurance. (Applause.) This is America’s principle: Trial by jury, of the innocent until proved guilty, and I expect to stand to do it. Murrow: That same night in Milwaukee, Senator McCarthy stated what he would do if the General was elected. McCarthy: I spent about a half hour with the General last night. While I can’t---while I can’t report that we agreed entirely on everything---I can report that when I left that meeting with the General, I had the same feeling as when I went in, and that is that he is a great American, and will make a great President, an outstanding President. But I want to tell you tonight, tell the American people as long as I represent you and the rest of the American people in the Senate, I shall continue to call them as I see them regardless of who happens to be President. Murrow: November 24th, 1953. McCarthy: A few days ago I read that President Eisenhower expressed the hope that by election time in 1954 the subject of Communism would be a dead and forgotten issue. The raw, harsh unpleasant fact is that Communism is an issue and will be an issue in 1954. Murrow: On one thing the Senator has been consistent. . . . Often operating as a one-man committee, he has traveled far, interviewed many, terrorized some, accused civilian and military leaders of the

past administration of a great conspiracy to turn the country over to Communism, investigated and substantially demoralized the present State Department, made varying charges of espionage at Fort Manmouth. (The Army says it has been unable to find anything relating to espionage there.) He has interrogated a varied assortment of what he calls ‘‘Fifth Amendment Communists.’’ Republican Senator Flanders of Vermont said of McCarthy today: He dons war paint; he goes into his war dance; he emits his war whoops; he goes forth to battle and proudly returns with the scalp of a pink Army dentist. . . . And upon what meat doth Senator McCarthy feed? Two of the staples of his diet are the investigation (protected by immunity) and the half-truth. We herewith submit samples of both. First, the half-truth. This was an attack on Adlai Stevenson at the end of the 1952 campaign. President Eisenhower, it must be said, had no prior knowledge of it. McCarthy: I perform this unpleasant task because the American people are entitled to have the coldly documented history of this man who says, ‘‘I want to be your President.’’ Strangely, Alger---I mean, Adlai [laughter]---But let’s move on to another part of the jigsaw puzzle. Now, while you think---while you may think there can be no connection between the debonair Democratic candidate and a dilapidated Massachusetts barn, I want to show you a picture of this barn and explain the connection. Here is the outside of the barn. Give me the pictures of the inside, if you will. Here is the outside of the barn up at Lee, Massachusetts. It looks as though it couldn’t house a farmer’s cow or goat from the outside. Here’s the inside: a beautifully panelled conference room with maps of the Soviet Union. Well, in what way does Stevenson tie up with that? My---my investigators went out and took pictures of the barn after we had been tipped off of what was in it---tipped off that there was in this barn all the missing documents from the Communist front--IPR---the IPR which has been named by the McCarran Committee---named before the McCarran Committee as a coverup for Communist espionage. Now, let’s take a look at a photostat of a document taken from the Massachusetts barn---one of

5.5 Edward R. Murrow and Joseph McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate those documents which was never supposed to see the light of day. Rather interesting it is. This is a document which shows that Alger Hiss and Frank Coe recommended Adlai Stevenson to the Mount Tremblant Conference which was called for the purpose of establishing foreign policy (postwar foreign policy) in Asia. And, as you know, Alger Hiss is a convicted traitor. Frank Coe has been named under oath before congressional committees seven times as a member of the Communist Party. Why? Why do Hiss and Coe find that Adlai Stevenson is the man they want representing them at this conference? I don’t know. Perhaps Adlai knows. Murrow: But Senator McCarthy didn’t permit his audience to hear the entire paragraph. This is the official record of the McCarran hearings. Anyone can buy it for two dollars. Here’s a quote: ‘‘Another possibility for the Mount Tremblant conferences on Asia is someone from Knox’ office or Stimson’s office.’’ (Frank Knox was our wartime Secretary of the Navy; Henry Stimson our Secretary of the Army, both distinguished Republicans.) And it goes on: ‘‘Coe, and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevenson (one of Knox’ special assistants) and Harvey Bundy (former Assistant Secretary of State under Hoover, and now assistant to Stimson) because of their jobs.’’ We read from this documented record, not in defense of Mr. Stevenson, but in defense of truth. Specifically, Mr. Stevenson’s identification with that red barn was no more, no less than that of Knox, Stimson or Bundy. It should be stated that Mr. Stevenson was once a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But so were such other loyal Americans as Senator Ferguson, John Foster Dulles, Paul Hoffman, Harry Luce and Herbert Hoover. Their association carries with it no guilt, and that barn has nothing to do with any of them. Now---a sample investigation. The witness was Reed Harris, for many years a civil servant in the State Department, directing the information service. Harris was accused of helping the Communistic cause by curtailing some broadcasts to Israel. Senator McCarthy summoned him and questioned him about a book he had written in 1932. McCarthy: Now we’ll come to order. Mr. Reed Harris? Your name is Reed Harris? Harris: That’s correct. McCarthy: You wrote a book in ’32, is that correct?

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Harris: Yes, I wrote a book. As I testified in executive session . . . McCarthy: At the time you wrote the book--pardon me; go ahead. I’m sorry. Proceed. Harris: At the time I wrote the book the atmosphere in the universities of the United States was greatly affected by the great depression then in existence. The attitudes of students, the attitudes of the general public were considerably different than they are at this moment and for one thing there was generally no awareness, to the degree that there is today, of the way the Communist Party works. McCarthy: You attended Columbia University in the early thirties. Is that right? Harris: I did, Mr. Chairman. McCarthy: Will you speak a little louder, sir? Harris: I did, Mr. Chairman. McCarthy: And were you expelled from Columbia? Harris: I was suspended from classes on April 1st, 1932. I was later reinstated and I resigned from the University. McCarthy: And you resigned from the University? Did the Civil---Civil Liberties Union provide you with an attorney at that time? Harris: I had many offers of attorneys, and one of those was from the American Civil Liberties Union, yes. McCarthy: The question is did the Civil Liberties Union supply you with an attorney? Harris: They did supply an attorney. McCarthy: The answer is yes? Harris: The answer is yes. McCarthy: You know the Civil Liberties Union has been listed as ‘‘a front for, and doing the work of,’’ the Communist Party? Harris: Mr. Chairman this was 1932. McCarthy: Yeah, I know it was 1932. Do you know that they since have been listed as ‘‘a front for, and doing the work of’’ the Communist Party? Harris: I do not know that they have been listed so, sir. McCarthy: You don’t know they have been listed? Harris: I have heard that mentioned or read that mentioned. McCarthy: Now, you wrote a book in 1932. I’m going to ask you again: at the time you wrote this book, did you feel that professors should be given the right to teach sophomores that marriage---and I

294 The Media and Public Opinion quote---‘‘should be cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena?’’ Was that your feeling at that time? Harris: My feeling is that professors should have the right to express their considered opinions on any subject, whatever they were, sir. McCarthy: All right, I’m going to ask you this question again. Harris: That includes that quotation. They should have the right to teach anything that came into their minds as being the proper thing to teach. McCarthy: I’m going to make you answer this. Harris: All right, I’ll answer yes, but you put an implication on it and you feature this particular point of the book, which, of course, is quite out of context, does not give a proper impression of the book as a whole. The American public doesn’t get an honest impression of even that book, bad as it is, from what you are quoting from it. McCarthy: Well, then, let’s continue to read your own writing, and . . . Harris: Twenty-one years ago, again. McCarthy: Yes, but we shall try and bring you down to date, if we can. Harris: Mr. Chairman, two weeks ago, Senator Taft took the position that I took twenty-one years ago, that Communists and Socialists should be allowed to teach in the schools. It so happens that, nowadays I don’t agree with Senator Taft, as far as Communist teaching in the schools is concerned, because I think Communists are, in effect, a plainclothes auxiliary of the Red Army, the Soviet Red Army. And I don’t want to see them in any of our schools, teaching. McCarthy: I don’t recall Senator Taft ever having any of the background that you’ve got, sir. Harris: I resent the tone of this inquiry very much, Mr. Chairman. I resent it, not only because it is my neck, my public neck, that you are, I think, very skillfully trying to wring, but I say it because there are thousands of able and loyal employees in the federal government of the United States who have been properly cleared according to the laws and the security practices of their agencies, as I was---unless the new regime says no; I was before. McClellan: Do you think this book did considerable harm, its publication might have had adverse influence on the public by an expression of views contained in it?

Harris: The sale of that book was so abysmally small. It was so unsuccessful that a question of its influence. . . . Really, you can go back to the publisher. You’ll see it was one of the most unsuccessful books he ever put out. He’s still sorry about it, just as I am. McClellen: Well, I think that’s a compliment to American intelligence . . . (Laughter). I will say that for him. Murrow: Senator McCarthy succeeded in proving that Reed Harris had once written a bad book, which the American people had proved twenty-two years ago by not buying it, which is what they eventually do will all bad ideas. As for Reed Harris, his resignation was accepted a month later with a letter of commendation. McCarthy claimed it as a victory. The Reed Harris hearing demonstrates one of the Senator’s techniques. Twice he said the American Civil Liberties Union was listed as a subversive front. The Attorney General’s list does not and has never listed the ACLU as subversive, nor does the FBI or any other federal government agency. And the American Civil Liberties Union holds in its files letters of commendation from President Truman, President Eisenhower, and General MacArthur. . . . No one familiar with the history of this country can deny that congressional committees are useful. It is necessary to investigate before legislating, but the line between investigating and persecuting is a very fine one and the junior Senator from Wisconsin has stepped over it repeatedly. His primary achievement has been in confusing the public mind, as between internal and the external threats of Communism. We must not confuse dissent with disloyalty. We must remember always that accusation is not proof and that conviction depends upon evidence and due process of law. We will not walk in fear, one of another. We will not be driven by fear into an age of unreason, if we dig deep in our history and our doctrine, and remember that we are not descended from fearful men---not from men who feared to write, to speak, to associate and to defend causes that were, for the moment, unpopular. This is no time for men who oppose Senator McCarthy’s methods to keep silent, or for those who approve. We can deny our heritage and our history, but we cannot escape responsibility for the result. There is no way for a citizen of a republic to

5.5 Edward R. Murrow and Joseph McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate abdicate his responsibilities. As a nation we have come into our full inheritance at a tender age. We proclaim ourselves, as indeed we are, the defenders of freedom, wherever it continues to exist in the world, but we cannot defend freedom abroad by deserting it at home. The actions of the junior Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay amongst our allies abroad, and given considerable comfort to our enemies. And whose fault is that? Not really his. He didn’t create this situation of fear; he merely exploited it---and rather successfully. Cassius was right. ‘‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.’’ Good night, and good luck.

Edward R. Murrow and Sen. Joseph McCarthy See it Now (CBS-TV, April 6, 1954) ‘‘Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s Reply’’ Murrow: One month ago tonight we presented a report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. We labeled it as controversial. Most of that report consisted of words and pictures of the Senator. At that time we said if the Senator believes that we have done violence to his words or pictures---if he desires to speak---to speak to answer himself, an opportunity will be afforded him on this program. The Senator sought the opportunity, asked for a delay of three weeks because he said he was very busy and he wished adequate time to prepare his rebuttal. We agreed. We supplied the Senator with a kinescope of that program of March 9 and with such scripts and recordings as he requested. We make no exception upon the manner of presentation and we suggested that we would not take the time to comment on this particular program. The Senator chose to make his reply on film. Here now is Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, junior Senator from Wisconsin. McCarthy: Good evening. Mr. Edward R. Murrow, educational director of the Columbia Broadcasting System, devoted his program to an attack on the work of the United States Senate Investigating Committee and on me personally as its chairman, and over the past four years he has made repeated attacks upon me and those fighting Communists. Now, of course, neither Joe McCarthy nor Edward R. Murrow is of any great importance as individuals.

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We are only important in our relation to the great struggle to preserve our American liberties. The Senate Investigating Committee has forced out of government, and out of important defense plants, Communists engaged in the Soviet conspiracy. And, you know, it’s interesting to note that the viciousness of Murrow’s attacks is in direct ratio to our success in digging out Communists. Now, ordinarily---ordinarily I would not take time out from the important work at hand to answer Murrow. However, in this case, I feel justified in doing so because Murrow is a symbol---the leader and the cleverest of the jackal pack which is always found at the throat of anyone who dares to expose individual Communists and traitors. I am compelled by the facts to say to you that Mr. Edward R. Murrow, as far back as twenty years ago, was engaged in propaganda for Communist causes. For example, the Institute of International Education, of which he was the acting director, was chosen to act as a representative by a Soviet agency to do a job which would normally be done by the Russian secret police. Mr. Murrow sponsored a Communist school in Moscow. In the selection of American students and teachers who were to attend, Mr. Murrow’s organization acted for the Russian espionage and propaganda organization known as Voks (V-O-K-S) and many of those selected were later exposed as Communists. Murrow’s organization selected such notorious Communists as Isadore Gegun, David Zablodowsky. Incidentally, Zablodowsky was forced out of the United Nations, when my chief counsel presented his case to the grand jury and gave a picture of his Communist activities. Now, Mr. Murrow, by his own admission, was a member of the IWW. That’s the Industrial Workers of the World---a terrorist organization cited as subversive by an attorney general of the United States, who stated that it was an organization which seeks (and I quote) ‘‘to alter the Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.’’ Now, other government committees have had before them actors, screen writers, motion picture producers and others, who admitted Communist affiliations but pleaded youth or ignorance. Now, Mr. Murrow can hardly make the same plea. On March nine of this year, Mr. Murrow (a trained reporter, who had traveled all over the world, who

296 The Media and Public Opinion was the educational director of CBS) followed implicitly the Communist line, as laid down in the last six months, laid down not only by the Communist Daily Worker, but by the Communist magazine Political Affairs and by the National Conference of the Communist Party of the United States of America. Now the question: Why is it important to you, the people of America, to know why the Educational Director and the Vice President of CBS so closely follow the Communist Party line? To answer that question we must turn back the pages of history. A little over a hundred years ago a little group of men in Europe conspired to deliver the world to a new system, to Communism. Under their system, the individual was nothing, the family was nothing, God did not even exist. Their theory was that an allpowerful state should have the power of life or death over its citizens without even a trial---that everything and everybody belonged to the rulers of the state. They openly wrote---nothing secret about it!--that, in their efforts to gain power, they would be justified in doing anything: that they would be justified in following the trail of deceit, lies, terror, murder, treason, blackmail. All these things were elevated to virtues in the Communist rule book. If a convert to Communism could be persuaded that he was a citizen of the world, it of course would be much easier to make him a traitor to his own country. . . . In every country they, of course, had to find glib, clever men like Edward R. Murrow who would sponsor invitations to students and teachers to attend indoctrination schools in Moscow, exactly as Murrow has done. They trained Communists in every country in the world. Their sole purpose was: infiltrate the government. And, once Communists were in government, they in turn brought others in. . . . It is often said by the left wing that it is sufficient to fight Communism in Europe and Asia, but that Communism is not a domestic American issue. But the record, my good friends, is that the damage has been done by cleverly calculated subversion at home, and not from abroad. It is this problem of subversion that our Committee faces. Now, let us very quickly glance at some of the work of our Committee, some of the work was done in slightly over a year’s time. For example, 238 witnesses were examined in public session; 367

witnesses examined in executive session; 84 witnesses refused to testify as to Communist activities on the ground that, if they told the truth, they might go to jail; twenty-four witnesses with Communist backgrounds have been discharged from jobs in which they were handling secret, top-secret, confidential material---individuals who were exposed before our committee. Of course you can’t measure the success of a committee by a box score, based on the number of Communist heads that have rolled from secret jobs. It is completely impossible to even estimate the sort of the effects on our government of the day-to-day plodding exposure of Communists. And that is, of course, why the Murrows bleed. For example, the exposure of only one fifth amendment Communist which I’ve been thinking of in obtaining secret materials from almost every government agency, resulted in the removal of the loyalty board and the revamping of oaths and loyalty rules so that we do have pretty good tight rules coming out at this time. Also the disclosure of Communists in the military and in the laboratories resulted in the abolition of a pentagon board which had cleared and ordered reinstatement of Communists who had for years been handling government papers. Also, as a result of those hearings Army orders have been issued to avoid a recurrence of the Major Peress scandal which was a closed-door thing. Now in attempts to evaluate the efforts of the work of an investigating committee would be about as impossible to attempt to evaluate the effects of well-trained watchdogs upon the activities of professional burglars. We Americans live in a free world, a world where we can stand as individuals, where we can go to the church of our own choice and worship God as we please, each in his own fashion, where we can freely speak our opinions on any subject or on any man. Now whether---whether we shall continue to so live has come to issue now. We will soon know whether we are going to go on living that kind of life or whether we are going to live the kind of life that 800,000,000 slaves live under Communist domination. The issue is simple. It is the issue of life or death for our civilization. Now, Mr. Murrow said on this program---and I quote---he said: ‘‘The actions of the junior Senator from Wisconsin have given considerable comfort to

5.6 New York Times Co. v. United States 297 the enemy.’’ That’s the language of our statute of treason---rather strong language. If I am giving comfort to our enemies, I ought not to be in the Senate. If, on the other hand, Mr. Murrow is giving comfort to our enemies, he ought not to be brought into the homes of millions of Americans by the Columbia Broadcasting System. Now, this is a question which can be resolved with very little difficulty. What do the Communists think of me? And what do the Communists think of Mr. Murrow? One of us is on the side of the Communists; the other is against the Communists, against Communist slavery. . . . Now let’s take thirty seconds or so, if we may, to look a little further to see who is giving comfort to our enemies. Here is a Communist Daily Worker of March 9, containing seven articles and a principal editorial, all attacking McCarthy. And the same issue lists Mr. Murrow’s program as---listen to this!---‘‘One of tonight’s best bets on TV.’’ And then, just one more, here’s the issue of March 17th. Its principal front-page article is an attack on McCarthy. It has three other articles attacking McCarthy. It has a special article by William Z. Foster, the head of the Communist Party in America (and now under indictment on charges of attempting to overthrow this government by force and violence)---this article by Foster, praising Edward R. Murrow. Just one more, if I may impose on your time, the issue of March 26th. This issue has two articles attacking witch-hunting, three articles attacking McCarthy, a cartoon of McCarthy, and an article in praise of Mr. Edward R. Murrow. And now I would like to also show you the Communist political organ, entitled Political Affairs. The lead article is a report dated November 21, 1953 of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, attacking McCarthy and telling how the loyal members of the Communist Party can serve their cause by getting rid of this awful McCarthy. And as you know Owen Lattimore has been named as a conscious, articulate instrument of the Communist conspiracy. He’s been called in by the Senate Internal Security Committee. He is now under criminal indictment for perjury with respect to testimony in regard to Communist activities. In his book Ordeal by Slander, he says, ‘‘I owe a very special debt to a man I have never met. And I must mention

at least Edward R. Murrow.’’ Then there’s a book by Harold Laski, admittedly the greatest Communist propagandist in England. In his book Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times he dedicates the book to ‘‘my friends E. R. Murrow and I. Tichaner, with affection.’’ Now, I am perfectly willing to let the American people decide who’s giving comfort to the enemy. Most of the documentation that we have here on the table tonight will not be available to the American people by way of television. However, this will all be made available to you within the next two weeks. In conclusion, may I say that under the shadow of the most horrible and destructive weapons that man has ever devised, we fight to save our country, our homes, our churches, our children. To this cause, ladies and gentlemen, I have dedicated and will continue to dedicate all that I have and all that I am. And I want to assure you that I will not be deterred by the attacks on the Murrows, the Lattimores, the Fosters, the Daily Worker, or the Communist Party itself. Now, I make no claim to leadership. In complete humility, I do ask you and every American who loves this country to join with me. Murrow: That was film of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, presented at your invitation. It was in response to a program we presented on March 9th. This reporter undertook to make no comment at this time, but naturally reserved his right to do so subsequently. Good night, and good luck.

5.6 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Argued June 26, 1971 Decided June 30, 1971 MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, concurring. I adhere to the view that the Government’s case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument

298 The Media and Public Opinion when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment’s continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, after oral argument, I agree completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons stated by my Brothers DOUGLAS and BRENNAN. In my view, it is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the First Amendment. Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adoption of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, followed in 1791. Now, for the first time in the 182 years since the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of current news of vital importance to the people of this country. In seeking injunctions against these newspapers, and in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment. When the Constitution was adopted, many people strongly opposed it because the document contained no Bill of Rights to safeguard certain basic freedoms. They especially feared that the new powers granted to a central government might be interpreted to permit the government to curtail freedom of religion, press, assembly, and speech. In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed: ‘‘The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable. (Emphasis added.) The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people’s freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the Solicitor General argues and some

members of the Court appear to agree that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: ‘‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press. . . .’’ Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints. In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do. The Government’s case here is based on premises entirely different from those that guided the Framers of the First Amendment. The Solicitor General has carefully and emphatically stated: ‘‘Now, Mr. Justice [BLACK], your construction of . . . [the First Amendment] is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that ‘‘no law’’ does not mean ‘‘no law,’’ and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true. . . . [T]here are other parts of the Constitution that grant powers and responsibilities to the Executive, and . . . the First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States.’’ And the Government argues in its brief that, in spite of the First Amendment,

5.6 New York Times Co. v. United States 299 ‘‘[t]he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-Chief.’’ In other words, we are asked to hold that, despite the First Amendment’s emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of ‘‘national security.’’ The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon themselves to ‘‘make’’ a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law. See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. To find that the President has ‘‘inherent power’’ to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make ‘‘secure.’’ No one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time. The word ‘‘security’’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged. This thought was eloquently expressed in 1937 by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes---great man and great Chief Justice that he was---when the Court held a man could not be punished for attending a meeting run by Communists. ‘‘The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political

discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, concurring. While I join the opinion of the Court, I believe it necessary to express my views more fully. It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides that ‘‘Congress shall male no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’’ That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press. There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the press of the material which the Times and the Post seek to use. Title 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) provides that ‘‘[w]hoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing . . . or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.’’ The Government suggests that the word ‘‘communicates’’ is broad enough to encompass publication. There are eight sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship, §§ 792--799. In three of those eight, ‘‘publish’’ is specifically mentioned: § 794(b) applies to ‘‘Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates . . . [the disposition of armed forces]. Section 797 applies to whoever ‘‘reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away’’ photographs of defense installations. Section 798, relating to cryptography, applies to whoever: ‘‘communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available . . . or publishes’’ the described material. (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is apparent that Congress was capable of, and did, distinguish between publishing and communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act. The other evidence that § 793 does not apply to the press is a rejected version of § 793. That version read: ‘‘During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and, by

300 The Media and Public Opinion proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the [403 U.S. 722] enemy.’’ 55 Cong. Rec. 1763. During the debates in the Senate, the First Amendment was specifically cited, and that provision was defeated. 55 Cong. Rec. 2167. Judge Gurfein’s holding in the Times case that this Act does not apply to this case was therefore preeminently sound. Moreover, the Act of September 23, 1950, in amending 18 U.S.C. § 793 states in § 1(b) that: ‘‘Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall be promulgated hereunder having that effect.’’ 64 Stat. 987. Thus, Congress has been faithful to the command of the First Amendment in this area. So any power that the Government possesses must come from its ‘‘inherent power.’’ The power to wage war is ‘‘the power to wage war successfully.’’ See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93. But the war power stems from a declaration of war. The Constitution by Art. I, § 8, gives Congress, not the President, power ‘‘[t]o declare War.’’ Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide, therefore, what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have. These disclosures may have a serious impact. But that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on the press. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719--720: ‘‘While reckless assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring obloquy upon those who are endeavoring faithfully to discharge official duties, exert a baleful influence and deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, it cannot be said that this abuse is greater, and it is believed to be less, than that which characterized the period in which our institutions took shape. Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal

does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.’’ As we stated only the other day in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, ‘‘[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘‘heavy presumption’’ against its constitutional validity.’’ The Government says that it has inherent powers to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect the national interest, which, in this case, is alleged to be national security. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, repudiated that expansive doctrine in no uncertain terms. The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, c. V (1970); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, c. XIII (1941). The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle. A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. That debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress. Secrecy in government is fundamentally antidemocratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions, there should be ‘‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’’ debate. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269--270. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Post case, vacate the stay of the Court of Appeals in the Times case, and direct that it affirm the District Court. The stays in these cases that have been in effect for more than a week constitute a flouting of the principles of the First Amendment as interpreted in Near v. Minnesota. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

I I write separately in these cases only to emphasize what should be apparent: that our judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to block the publication of material sought to be

5.6 New York Times Co. v. United States 301 suppressed by the Government. So far as I can determine, never before has the United States sought to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information in its possession. The relative novelty of the questions presented, the necessary haste with which decisions were reached, the magnitude of the interests asserted, and the fact that all the parties have concentrated their arguments upon the question whether permanent restraints were proper may have justified at least some of the restraints heretofore imposed in these cases. Certainly it is difficult to fault the several courts below for seeking to assure that the issues here involved were preserved for ultimate review by this Court. But even if it be assumed that some of the interim restraints were proper in the two cases before us, that assumption has no bearing upon the propriety of similar judicial action in the future. To begin with, there has now been ample time for reflection and judgment; whatever values there may be in the preservation of novel questions for appellate review may not support any restraints in the future. More important, the First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these cases. II The error that has pervaded these cases from the outset was the granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise. The entire thrust of the Government’s claim throughout these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined ‘‘could,’’ or ‘‘might,’’ or ‘‘may’’ prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment’s ban on prior judicial

restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation ‘‘is at war,’’ Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), during which times ‘‘[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.’’ Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature. ‘‘[T]he chief purpose of [the First Amendment’s] guaranty [is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication.’’ Near v. Minnesota, supra, at 713. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, [403 U.S. 727] and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient, for if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. And, therefore, every restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment---and not less so because that restraint was justified as necessary to afford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may issue.

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Section 6 The Policy-Making Process

Introduction

government could ensconce a tyrannical majority in control of public policy, thereby undermining individual liberty and threatening private property. Their remedy was to divide decision-making authority several ways to make it difficult to forge long-lasting majorities. Thus, power was separated between the states and the federal government, among the three branches of government, and between the House and Senate within the legislature; to effect policy change, majorities of both the population and the states would have to be forged and would have to withstand a possible presidential veto as well as judicial review. Viewed in this light, the development of the policy-making process in America may be viewed as an ongoing effort to overcome the constitutional impediments placed in the path of democracy. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

Politics is often described as the means of deciding ‘‘who gets what, when, and how.’’ In other words, politics is the business of making public policy. In the United States, as David Robertson’s essay illustrates, the broad outlines of the policy process remain defined by our constitutional framework, although American political development has led to major changes, particularly with respect to domestic, as opposed to foreign, policy. From the outset, our policy process has been, in Robertson’s understated phrase, ‘‘difficult to use’’ precisely because conflict and adversarial relationships were built in by the constitutional design. While the founders were intent on creating a central government that was more ‘‘energetic’’ than the one established by the Articles of Confederation, they also were acutely aware that an unconstrained central

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Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process David Brian Robertson University of Missouri Curators Teaching Professor, University of Missouri--St. Louis

Introduction

American government. State officials constantly have battled the national government over their policy-making prerogatives. Similarly, office holders in the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, the presidency, the federal bureaucracy, and the courts have battled political position of their institution. This policy structure, in turn, has encouraged Americans to invent and pursue a variety of strategies for using their unique government institutions to produce the policy results they desire. By trial and error, Americans have learned that their policy process makes it difficult to build and sustain inclusive economic interest groups and strong political parties. It has instead encouraged unusually weak political parties, fragmented interest groups, pluralism, and incrementalism.

The politicians who wrote the U.S. Constitution laid the foundations of the American policy process. These framers were determined to create a more effective process for making policies vital for the nation’s interests, while ensuring that interests of their own constituents would not face an even worse threat from the new national policy process they were building. They met these conflicting demands by creating a policy process that would be difficult to use. They built conflict into national policy making by ensuring that the political ambitions of state officials would clash with the political ambitions of national officials and that the political ambitions of U.S. representatives, U.S. senators, the president, and the courts would clash as well. Any public policy initiative would require extraordinary majorities to successfully navigate this process. Politics has driven the development of the American policy-making process from the beginning. As expected, ambitious politicians have filled the offices the framers created. These legislators, presidents, administrators, and judges brought these institutions to life and strengthened their independence and prerogatives. They have generally concerned themselves with protecting the autonomy of the offices they occupied, increasing their influence and resources, and sometimes evading responsibility for politically harmful results. Their actions have complicated and extended the inherent policy conflicts built into the foundation of

The Original Design of the National Policy-Making Institutions The authors of the U.S. Constitution were practical politicians who had firsthand experience in building and using republican policy-making institutions. Some of the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention had helped construct new, republican state governments after the U.S. declared its independence of Britain in 1776. Most had served as elected state legislators, and many had served in the Continental Congress. Several had served as state governors and judges. The Constitution’s authors knew that politicians would use the policy-making process they were

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Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process constructing. As experienced politicians, then, they could be certain that some of these future politicians would use the policy process to further their own interests at others’ expense. The framers aimed to build a national policy process that would produce better outcomes for the nation than the weak Confederation government then in place. They sought a government that could provide a stronger defense, a more stable currency, and improved commerce. While the delegates took it for granted that the new national government would be republican, republican principles alone were far too general to ensure that the reconstituted government would do more good than harm. Republican principles merely required, first, that government power depend ultimately on the people and, second, that no one institution should exercise legislative power (the power to make laws), executive power (the power to implement laws), and judicial power (the power to settle disputes about the laws). Republican principles did not specify how the people would control government or how those powers would be separated. Each of the states provided an example of the way a republican policy process could work. Most of the states had produced the very problems the delegates were trying to solve: unstable laws, selfish economic policies, constraints on commerce, and threats to private property. Each state constitution made elected legislatures the centerpiece of the policy process and gave executives relatively little power. Their state government experiences disposed most of the Convention delegates to support a legislature divided between two houses, as well as an executive who could veto the legislature’s laws, and a judiciary as separated from political jousting as possible. Beyond these areas of general agreement, the Convention delegates disagreed about the design of the policy process because they had different priorities for what they wanted the national government to do. Delegates from New England sought to expand trade for their region, while the southern delegates insisted on protecting slavery in theirs. Delegates from states with limited access to ports or land insisted that the states fortunate enough to have these resources make them equally available to all Americans. Different delegates placed different priorities on the importance of national authority over the military, the economy, and everyday life. Each decision about the reconstitution of the national policy-making process had direct political implications for the delegates because each decision increased the chances of a particular outcome (Jillson 1998). The central problem for the Constitution’s authors, then, was to strengthen national policy making in a

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way that would produce the outcomes they wanted without threatening their own constituents and political interests. As the Convention’s deliberations dragged out for an unexpected three and a half months, decisions about the national policy process emerged gradually from an evolving and unpredictable web of agreements about who each branch would represent, what powers the national government would have, and what role each institution would play in using this process. As the effects of all these compromises became less predictable, the delegates insisted on strengthening the powers of the different institutions most likely to favor their interests. When Madison proposed proportional representation in both houses of Congress, for example, delegates from smaller states like Connecticut insisted on equal state representation in a strong Senate. When the Connecticut Compromise gave states equal representation in the Senate, Madison adjusted by demanding that the president---whose selection would depend disproportionately on larger states---play a larger and more independent role in national policy making. Because each choice forced them to adjust subsequent decisions about national policy institutions to one another, the national policy process they produced was more complex than any delegate had initially imagined or wanted. States gained an especially important role in the national policy process; the agents of state governments could delay, defeat, or extract concessions for the expansion and use of national powers (Wechsler 1955; Rakove 1996; Robertson 2005). When their work was done, the delegates instilled in each major policy-making institution the independent means and the motive to slow, block, or divert the use of the national policy process. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, expected to take the initiative in national policy making, would be most sensitive to the short-term interests of regions smaller than a state. U.S. senators would act on behalf of the longer-term interests of state governments and statewide constituencies. The delegates gave the Senate exceptional policy influence, including the power to ratify treaties, confirm presidential appointees, and try impeachments. The president, who served a much larger constituency than any member of Congress and had a lead role in foreign policy, could shape the policy process from beginning to end by influencing the policy agenda, vetoing congressional bills, and implementing policy. Because judges had virtually lifetime appointments and did not have to attract voters to remain in office, the national judiciary would view public policy from time horizon longer than the other branches. But judges’ tools were reactive and could be used only to respond

306 The Policy-Making Process to disputes about actions already authorized by other institutions. Judges could settle conflicts about existing national laws and could strike down state laws inconsistent with the Constitution. Different policy makers, then, had overlapping policy responsibilities and distinct, often clashing obligations to regional, state and the national political interests. These ‘‘inventions of prudence,’’ as James Madison put it in Federalist No. 51, have remained basically intact since the Constitution took effect in 1789. The Constitution created a national policy-making system that was hard to use, and it has remained hard to use throughout American history. By providing each of these institutions with the power to defend against policies that could damage particular interests, the Constitution erected barriers to national political coalitions bent on any public policy that would harm a minority of the states. A bicameral Congress still is the primary national law-making body. Representatives still are elected for two-year terms by geographic constituencies that represent a fraction of the nation’s population, and remain attentive to the immediate interests of the

regions they represent. Although voters instead of state legislators now choose senators for their six-year terms, two senators still represent each state regardless of size. Early in the 21st century, California’s two senators, who represent about 12 percent of the U.S. population, have the same weight in Senate policy making as Wyoming’s two senators, who represent two-tenths of 1 percent of the U.S. population. To enact any law, a majority of the House of Representatives still must concur with a majority of U.S. senators. Thus, extraordinarily large geographic majorities are necessary for passing any bill. Veto points abound in the U.S. policy process. The Senate and House can veto any bill enacted by the other, and the president can veto any bill on which they could agree. The concurrent majorities required in the House and Senate, along with the president’s veto, make gridlock routine even when members of the same political party control the House, the Senate, and the White House (Brady and Volden 2006). Even when congressional leaders can cobble together a majority coalition on some issue, it is difficult to keep the coalition together on other issues. Especially

George Washington presides at the signing of the U.S. Constitution on September 17, 1787. (Library of Congress)

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process through the Senate, the states’ representatives can delay, defeat, or extract concessions for the expansion and use of national powers. The president still serves a four-year term that puts him on a different political timetable than U.S. representatives and senators. The president’s national constituency and powers still give the office strong incentives to define his or her goals much more broadly than Congress. Yet presidents still find the original policy-making structure a major impediment to achieving their goals, because they must depend on Congress to achieve their most fundamental priorities: legislation, the budget, significant reorganization, and major appointments. Courts still exercise an independent influence on both the design and implementation of American public policy. Congress and the president still clash over policy design and implementation, while courts still clash with other branches over the meaning and enforcement of public policy. Using this enduring policy-making system successfully, then, required extraordinary, sustained effort and extraordinarily large political coalitions. Only a large majority could align the interests of the House, Senate, and the presidency, any one of which could defeat policies it found objectionable. Public policy would succeed only if it survived a gauntlet of institutions, each deliberately anchored by different constituencies, calendars, and powers. The policy consequences of these arrangements became apparent more gradually than the consequences of federalism.

Federalism in the American Policy Process As they were separating the national government’s powers, the framers were negotiating the distribution of policy authority between the national government and the existing state governments. All the Convention delegates wanted the national government to have some very strong and effective powers to regulate currency, make treaties, provide national taxes, and support a national military. But several influential delegates insisted that the states retain as many policy prerogatives as possible. Their gradual compromises led the delegates to embrace the concept of dual sovereignty, that is, the notion that the national government would be sovereign with respect to some policies, and the states would be sovereign in other policy areas. The Constitution specifically authorized the national government to exercise only a limited list of policy tools (although the Constitution blurs the dividing line by authorizing the national government to serve the

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‘‘general welfare’’ and to exercise ‘‘necessary and proper’’ powers to pursue its objectives). In particular, the delegates armed the national government with better tools for pursuing national economic sovereignty, such as international and interstate commerce. States lost the tools of economic sovereignty---over tariffs, currency, and other tools used by nation-states to deal with their national economies---but they retained most of the tools of domestic policy management. For most of American history, state governments have exercised enormous policy authority. States have governed the basic elements of everyday life, regulating births and deaths, marriages and families, health and safety, and property and contracts. States did almost all of the governing of the nation’s basic economic resources---land, labor, and capital---until the nation already had become a mature industrial power. Because states governed commerce within their borders, their laws governed such basic industries as coal, oil, steel, and auto until the 1930s. Accordingly, state policy makers initially responded to most of the big, substantive policy controversies of American history, such as slavery and segregation, corporate power and labor rights, education and civil liberties, abortion, criminal procedures, and the protection of the disadvantaged. States have invested billions of dollars in infrastructure, from canals and asylums to public roadways, parks, universities, and prisons. In the early 21st century, states manage a large share of the nation’s education, health, welfare, transportation, and domestic security policies, and they exercise a much larger role than generally is appreciated in regulating pollution, working conditions, insurance, securities, and banks (Bensel 2001; Novak 1996; John 1997; Teaford 2002; Campbell 1995; Teske 2004). State policy making formally resembles the national policy process, but in practice, the states’ policy processes are much more restrained. American state policy makers have been heavily influenced by the need to maintain a good ‘‘business climate,’’ that is, a set of policies attractive for business investment. Because the Constitution amputated the states’ tools of economic sovereignty, state policy makers cannot offset higher business taxes or stricter regulations with tariff or currency policies that cushion the direct effects of their actions on business profits. American federalism thus has made it politically difficult for state policy makers to promote taxes, regulations, and other policies that seem to put the state’s businesses at a competitive disadvantage with businesses elsewhere. In this way, American federalism has made state officials resistant to business regulations and social expenditures that do

308 The Policy-Making Process not have the support of private economic interests. This feature has tended to make state social policy more conservative than national social policy. Some states indeed served as ‘‘laboratories of democracy,’’ pioneering welfare, employment, and civil rights policies later emulated by other states and the national government. But no state has imposed the taxes necessary to match the level of spending provided by the average West European welfare state. National programs delegated to the states, such as Aid to Family and Dependent Children, permitted the states to provide minimal support for women and minorities (Mettler). Other features restrict the states’ policy-making capacity. Like the national process, the states have separated powers among an upper and a lower legislative chamber (only Nebraska has a unicameral legislature), an elected governor, and a court system. But states, went further in dividing powers. Key executive positions, notably state attorneys general, are elected separately from the governor, so that these executives have different political constituencies and goals than the state’s chief executive. Many states did not utilize fulltime legislatures, and even in the 21st century in many states’ legislatures are considered part time and meet for a legally specified window of weeks. States also restricted their policy makers by requiring annually balanced budgets, by making tax increases difficult, and more recently by placing ceilings on revenues. In the 20th century, national rules limited state discretion---at first, in the area of civil rights and liberties, then in substantive policy areas such as welfare and environmental protection, and more recently in regulating financial services and other economic activities (Gray and Hanson 2007). Federalism also has complicated the national policy process. First, the Constitution thrusts the U.S. Senate into the middle of national policy making. This Senate, intended to be an assembly of state agents acting for the states as equals, enjoys the special privileges of consenting to treaties, approving presidential appointees, and potentially convicting the president of impeachable offenses. Second, the ambiguity of the dividing line between the policy authority of the state and national governments has made political battles over this boundary became an inherent part of American policy conflicts. Much of politics involves the struggle over the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960), and in the United States, federalism has made it attractive and simple to displace many substantive political conflicts, such as slavery, civil rights, child labor, and abortion, into contests over state versus national government authority. Federalism is a major part of the

politics that animates the national policy process in the United States.

The Politics of National Policy Making From the moment the first U.S. Congress convened in the spring of 1789, it was clear that politics would permeate the national government and affect all the policies it produced. The key to legislative policy making is constructing a political majority in support of a policy. Political mastery would be the most important skill necessary to make the American policy process work. These political arts were familiar to America’s politicians, who already had developed peerless expertise in republican politics at the state level. The enduring art of successful policy making in the U.S. Congress has required policy makers to assemble a political coalition large enough to win majority support in the House and Senate and to avoid a presidential veto. Building these coalitions required skill in framing issues, structuring choices, timing political action, and using persuasion, rhetoric, pressure, and compromise. It often requires political deals. From the start, then, national policies regularly have resulted from compromises about outcomes that have been politically acceptable to at least a majority of legislators. To build the majority coalitions necessary for moving bills through Congress, legislative leaders instinctively employed ‘‘logrolling,’’ the process of distributing policy benefits to large numbers of legislative constituencies to ensure the support of a majority of legislators. For example, James Madison ensured that a list of tariff duties on specific imported goods was the very first item on the agenda of the first U.S. House of Representatives. These duties would provide the lion’s share of the new government’s revenues and, at the same time, could allow different regions to profit if their products were protected by high duties on the products of foreign competitors. As the leader of the first House of Representatives, James Madison approached the problem of building a legislative majority for the tariff by balancing the interests of representatives from the deep South who wanted low export-promoting tariffs and legislators from Pennsylvania, New York, and New England who sought higher tariff barriers for their infant manufactures. He urged a moderate duty on salt to establish some protection while keeping prices low and urged a duty on hemp to protect both southern farmers and northern cordwainers who would use the crop to make rope. From the start, then, enacting legislation resulted in laws that distributed benefits across a large majority of states

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process and regions. American legislation at the national and state levels still requires inventive logrolling compromises among a supermajority of diverse regional interests. This imperative has been evident in tariffs, a central issue of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Legislative logrolling has pervaded the development of American public policy, from river and harbor improvements, highway programs, economic development initiatives, antipoverty programs, defense procurement, homeland security, and even academic research grants (Bensel 2001; Robertson 2005). It soon became clear that shared policy and electoral interests would naturally foster the long-term legislative alliances that evolved into American political parties. Such continuing political coalitions called ‘‘parties’’ or ‘‘factions’’ were familiar in state politics before 1787. Even in the first Congress, it became apparent that some members had a reason to coalesce on a variety of issues. During President George Washington’s first term in office, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton put forward a series of economic policy proposals that threatened to transfer capital from farmers to urban creditors, from the south and west to the north and New England, and from veterans and voters of modest means to speculators and investors. Hamilton’s proposals naturally aligned members of Congress in support of and opposition to his program. Madison and Thomas Jefferson organized the opposition into a self-styled ‘‘Republican’’ (later DemocraticRepublican) Party. By 1796, their party was contesting the presidency, and by 1800 it defeated the incumbent Federalist president. But regional differences, along with the difficultly of using the American policy process, worked against a political alliance held together solely by shared policy goals. American regions were too different, and political offices too independent, to permit parties to coalesce around disciplined policy agendas. Politicians since James Madison have found it more expedient to build political parties around elections and office seeking, relying on a few specific national policy priorities to pull the coalition together, leaving great latitude for individual candidates to tailor their election platforms to local circumstances (Gerring 1998; Bensel 2001; Sartori 1976). Political parties always have found it difficult to make American public policy coherent and effective. The sluggishness and unpredictability of the policymaking process, combined with the centrifugal force of local political interests, has made it easy for party members to abandon the party as the policy process wears on. For more than a century, political leaders found it much easier to organize political parties at the state

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level where the control of government paid direct political benefits. American party leaders therefore insisted controlling key public policy features at the state level. National leaders of the Democratic Party downplayed slavery and then overlooked segregation in the southern states, for example, because southern Democrats won state elections by supporting their state’s racial prerogatives. In the national government, political party leaders could cooperate on a limited range of issues with fellow partisans from other states without subordinating themselves to a disciplined party organization. Stephen Skowronek has labeled American policy making before the 1900 as the ‘‘state of courts and parties,’’ in which political parties only loosely coordinated national policy making, mainly by recruiting candidates for the many public offices that existed in the American republic (Skowronek). The fragmentation of policy authority rewarded elected officials for creating long-term alliances of politicians more committed to helping each other seek and hold office than to a systematic policy platform. These alliances may have little value for achieving specific, short-term policy results, so that once in office, politicians often would have to build somewhat different, short-term, coalitions to achieve particular policy outcomes. The deliberate fragmentation of the American policy process also made it much more difficult to engineer the disciplined cross-state party control of candidates, money, or philosophy that were prerequisites of the more programmatic political parties that emerged in comparable nations after 1900 (Robertson 2005, 257). As the national government’s responsibilities grew, each of its branches grew stronger and more autonomous.

The Growing Autonomy of National Policy Institutions In the 19th century, Congress generally dominated the national policy-making process as ‘‘unquestionably, the predominant and controlling force, the centre and source of all motive and of all regulative power’’ (Wilson 1885, 31). The popularly elected House of Representatives initially generated much of the policymaking energy in the new government; the House typically held longer sessions than the Senate, initiated more legislation, and attracted far more publicity (Binder and Smith 1997). Henry Clay had made the position of speaker of the House the dominant office in that body in the 1810s, and within 20 years the position of speaker had become the principle leader the majority party in the House. At the same time, the House was building a system of standing committees to manage

310 The Policy-Making Process increasingly complex and varied issues on the national policy agenda. The House committee system became so deeply entrenched that political scientist Woodrow Wilson concluded that the ‘‘practical effect’’ of committee organization is ‘‘to consign to each of the Standing Committees the entire direction of legislation upon those subjects which properly come to its consideration’’ (Wilson 1885, 64). House rules ensured that the majority party would dominate the policy process undeterred by dilatory efforts by the minority. Late in 19th century, rule revisions centralized substantial power in the hands of the speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules (Binder and Smith 1997). At first, the Senate played a subordinate policy role. Compared with the House, the U.S. Senate initiated relatively few laws, met for relatively few days, and took relatively few votes. The Senate behaved more like a Confederation-era state ‘‘council of revision’’ than an independent lawmaking body; these councils, composed of a relatively small number of political elites, were expected to do no more than accept, revise, or reject the initiatives of the popularly elected assemblies. The increasing importance of foreign policy in the 1810s forced the Senate to become a much more independent and enterprising policy-making institution. The Senate began to spend more days in session; its workload increased and it attracted more national publicity. The growth of mass-based political parties in the 1800s made senators a stronger force in politics in their states. A number of senators, such as Stephen Douglas in Illinois, developed an independent political base and strongly influenced the elections of the state legislators who, in turn, elected them to the U.S. Senate. Like the House, the Senate developed a system of committees, allowing the Senate more capacity to formulate policy independent of the House. In strong contrast to the House, though, the Senate’s evolving rules protected political minorities and permitted a small number of senators to delay the policy process. The Senate, but not the House, enabled a filibuster, that is, for one or more senators to hold the floor and talk a bill ‘‘to death’’ through interminable speeches. Senators by the 1830s were beginning to use filibusters to kill legislation they opposed. Whenever party competition became particularly acute in the late-19th century, the Senate’s ability to delay legislation indefinitely became strategically important in the national policy process. While a simple partisan majority could virtually dictate legislation passed by the House, ‘‘obstructionism in the Senate became all the more imperative,’’ especially when one party controlled both houses of Congress and the presidency (Binder and Smith 1997, 69).

In fits and starts, presidential powers also began to grow more independent and formidable. President George Washington asserted the president’s right to remove officers at his pleasure and to develop independent executive branch reports. Jefferson utilized his Democratic-Republican majority in Congress to steer the policy process. Jefferson, who had advocated a restricted view of national powers before his presidency, expanded presidential prerogatives by proceeding with the purchase of the vast Louisiana territory even though he lacked the formal constitutional authority to do so. President Andrew Jackson built more independent control of the bureaucracy by using political party patronage systematically to place loyalists in federal jobs. Jackson also extended presidential power by using the veto power as a policy tool. President James K. Polk increased presidential control over executive branch departments, and during the War with Mexico established a larger presidential role as commander in chief. President Abraham Lincoln greatly expanded the president’s war powers during his term, took a more active control of national economic and fiscal policy, and provided Congress with an active domestic policy agenda. After Lincoln’s death, Congress reasserted its powers. For most of the remainder of the 19th century, presidents asserted primarily defensive powers. While parties organized the 19th-century policy process in legislatures and the executive, courts were establishing shared rules about the range of policies that could be considered valid (Skowronek 1982). The Supreme Court had established its independence in the policy process early in the century. The framers made it clear that the national courts could strike down state laws as unconstitutional; when the Court began to exercise this power of judicial review of state legislation in such cases as Fletcher v. Peck [1810] and McCulloch v. Maryland [1819], it injected itself into state policy making. Chief Justice John Marshall, a Federalist who presided over the Court for 34 years, asserted in Marbury v. Madison [1803] the Court’s judicial review power to strike down national laws that it considered inconsistent with the Constitution. By interpreting the Constitution, the court could decide that national policies were invalid, even if approved overwhelmingly by Congress and the president. This enduring judicial power has made the U.S. Supreme Court the most influential court in any national policy process in the world. The Supreme Court’s Dred Scott ruling of 1857, for example, struck down the two generations of policy compromises over the expansion of slavery into new states, a decision that contributed to the Civil War (Maltz 2007). After Reconstruction, federal courts used judicial

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process review more frequently, often using it to strike down laws interfering with free markets and business prerogatives (Bensel 2001). Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court has used its power of judicial review to overturn as unconstitutional more than 150 acts of Congress and more than 1,000 state laws (Epstein and Walker 1992, 53--54).

Reform and Policy Complexity in the Progressive Era Far-reaching changes prompted demands for more active public policy in the United States in the early 20th century. The population grew, the economy industrialized, and urban areas expanded rapidly. Financial volatility, unemployment, poverty, and other problems seemed to reach an unprecedented scale. Many Americans were confident that purposeful government action could alleviate these problems. Interest groups proliferated and became much more important players in American politics (Harris and Tichenor 2002). While the great merger movement around 1900 created powerful and politically influential corporations, the American Federation of Labor became the dominant voice of the labor movement. Farmers became more organized, effective, and forceful in their claims on government. These interests, along with doctors, lawyers, academics, public sector professionals, women’s organizations, religious groups, and a host of others, insisted that government recognize and act on their priorities. Facing a fragmented government in which policy institutions had been gradually growing more autonomous of one another, these groups developed ad hoc strategies for achieving their goals (Sanders 1999, Harris and Tichenor 2002; Skocpol 1992; Morone 2003). The result was a progressive spirit of change that had far-reaching consequences for the process of making public policy in the United States. This progressive impulse sparked dramatic changes in the state and local governments, which together spent twice as much as the national government in 1913 (and still spent twice as much as late as 1932). States steadily occupied the fields of financial, energy, and labor regulation, social welfare policy, and election reform. For example, states initiated mother’s pensions, protective labor regulations, worker’s compensation laws, prohibitions on branch banking, and public utility commissions to regulate electricity, gas, telephones, and urban rail transit. State laws diverged. Industrial states like Massachusetts and New York had limits on child labor comparable to those in Britain and Germany, but southeastern states resisted effective child labor laws to protect the

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advantage that low-wage child labor gave their textile plants. States regulated their natural resources in a way that balanced state economic and constituent interests, with limited regard for the consequences nationwide. West Virginia’s policy makers effectively put the state’s authority in the service of the bituminous coal industry. The Texas Railroad Commission regulated oil for the benefit of the industry and the many Texans who gained royalties from oil production on their property. Several states implemented election laws, including primary elections, the initiative, and the referendum, that aimed to increase the direct policy influence of voters and to supersede the influence of the political parties. Much less celebrated, but important, was the spread of laws in southern states that restricted the electoral participation and social equality of African Americans. At the local, state, and national levels, progressive reform fueled an increase of executive power and leadership in policy making. Reform mayors like Cleveland’s Tom Johnson and Progressive governors like Wisconsin’s Robert LaFollette pushed for far-reaching reforms. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson greatly strengthened the policy role of the U.S. presidency. Both Roosevelt and Wilson took an unusually active role in domestic policy leadership. Both took the initiative in settling domestic disputes like the anthracite coal strike of 1902 and the looming national railroad strike of 1916. These presidents developed the ‘‘rhetorical’’ presidency, using the prerogatives of the office actively to increase public support for their policy agenda through newspapers and magazines (Tulis 1988). Wilson, for example, used press conferences to control his policy message. Later presidents grew more sophisticated in using radio, television, and other new mass media to present their messages directly to voters, to control the policy agenda and to shape policy outcomes. Wilson also took party leadership to a new level, putting forward an ambitious agenda for Congress and working closely with congressional Democrats to achieve it (Skowronek 1997). By the end of Wilson’s term, it was clear that the president had much more latitude in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Theodore Roosevelt took an active role in facilitating the building of the Panama Canal and the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. Woodrow Wilson managed the first national full-scale mobilization for a foreign war. Both presidents, and their successors, intervened actively in Latin American affairs. Under Wilson, the executive branch dominated war policy and used its war powers to assert control over industrial production, wages, prices, and civil liberties. These ‘‘two presidencies’’---one, a domestic

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President Woodrow Wilson addresses Congress, in 1917, about severing relations with Germany. (National Archives)

presidency in which presidential policy control is severely limited, and a second presidency in foreign affairs and military policy in which presidential power is relatively broad---profoundly affected the American policy process (Wildavsky 1966). Presidents remain tempted to cast their policy priorities as ‘‘national security’’ issues to increase their ability to determine policy outcomes. Bureaucracy proliferated and steadily gained power at all levels of government. The number of federal employees more than doubled between 1901 and 1932. Presidents expanded civil service protections and separated administrators from outside political interference; the percentage of protected civil service rules increased from under half to more than three-quarters (Stanley and Niemi, 268). The 1920 Budget Act pulled together federal policy activity by creating a unified federal budget, and gave the president more power over policy by creating a Budget Bureau under presidential control. Although presidents gained much more power over two of the key tools for controlling public policy---personnel and budgets---the bureaucracy grew more disjointed and pluralistic. Building on networks of interest

group support, the U.S. Postal Service and the Agriculture Department became formidable political actors in their own right. Gifford Pinchot, the head of the U.S. Forest Service, and Harvey Wiley, a founder of the Food and Drug Administration, provided clear examples of the ways in which public administrators could build networks of support and resist control of other institutions in the fragmented American policy system (Carpenter 2001). The Federal Reserve Board, which would become the most powerful single agent of national economic policy, was established as an independent agency at arm’s length from presidential and congressional control (Woolley 1984). New agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, and newly expanded agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), adapted to shifting opportunities and constraints to shore up their position (Skowronek 1982, 248--284). Some of the independent regulatory agencies, such as the ICC, built political support by becoming advocates for the very interests they had been charged with regulating (Huntington 1952). Disjointed pluralism also characterized developments in Congress, which had made the transition to its

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process modern form by 1920. Powerful speakers dominated the House of Representatives until the revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon in 1910 stripped the office of important prerogatives. When Republicans regained control of Congress, power decentralized to House committees and remained decentralized for over half a century. Seniority, rather than party loyalty or effectiveness, became the critical determinant of committee chairmanships. Committees, in turn, became decentralized strongholds of policy power. Party leadership also eroded in the Senate, and the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment requiring direct election of the senators made the senators even more independent. In 1917 the Senate adopted the cloture rule, permitting the Senate to end a filibuster while protecting the power of a third of the senators to resist cloture. The House had 560 standing committees and the Senate had 74 by 1920. The number of committees declined over time, but the committees remained powerful centrifugal forces in congressional policy making (Schickler 2001; Loomis 2000, 80--104). The federal courts also grew stronger in the Progressive Era. In 1922, Congress institutionalized the federal judiciary with what would become the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922. A dozen years later, Congress delegated authority over judicial procedures to the Supreme Court and gave the Court the responsibility for making procedural rules. The U.S. Supreme Court had declared about 50 state and federal laws unconstitutional in each decade of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1900s, but when the Progressive Era peaked in the decade of the 1910s, the Court declared 118 state laws and six federal laws unconstitutional. The Court declared 139 state and 15 federal laws unconstitutional in the 1920s. Most of these rulings concerned government efforts to regulate the economy; for example, the Court struck down a national child labor law enacted by Congress and signed by the president (Stanley and Niemi 1992, 306--307). Because the courts refused to expand the scope of the national government in economic and social policy, reformers who sought sweeping national changes generally had to campaign state by state to achieve a national result (the campaign for the illfated constitutional amendment prohibiting alcohol was a rare exception). Such state-based campaigns for nationally uniform laws proved difficult, costly, and uncertain, and usually had a limited impact in states where policy problems were the worst. It became clear in the Progressive Era that the difficulty of using the American policy process encouraged the very pluralism and incrementalism that are the

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most distinguishing features American policy making. Because it was more difficult to engineer coherent and effective national public policy from the national policy making process in the United States, interests tended to pursue narrow policy goals without building broad policy coalitions. Because of the number of access and veto points in the system, individual interest groups often found that it was easier merely to defend their prerogatives against policy threats than to join a broad-ranging policy coalition. In this way, the policy process has encouraged a strategy of ‘‘pluralism,’’ or the individual pursuit of interests by competing interest groups. It made it easier for businesses, trade unions, and interest groups to lobby separately for individual gains than to work together in an inclusive, disciplined alliance united by a clear policy agenda. Instead, by focusing on limited policy achievements, such as small and specific tax breaks, grant-in-aid programs, or regulatory changes, interest groups can achieve a policy goal without building broad policy alliances with other groups. In this way, pluralism also has promoted ‘‘incrementalism’’---that is, American public policy seems to evolve in small, incremental steps (Lindblom and Wodehouse 1993). These developments ensured that American public policy making would fracture as it expanded. This period of government activism had caused the House of Representatives, the Senate, the presidency, and the judiciary to grow more capable of injecting themselves into the policy process, and more autonomous of one another.

National Activism from the New Deal to the 1970s The stock market crash of 1929 ignited an unprecedented expansion of national policy activism. The Great Depression overwhelmed local and state governments, creating unprecedented demands on the national government to mitigate the crisis. One out of four Americans were jobless in 1932, and unemployment exceeded 50 percent in several American cities. High unemployment continued through the 1930s, only to be replaced by an even larger policy challenge: the mobilization of American society for a world war more protracted than World War I. Once World War II ended in 1945, the United States began a period of global military and economic leadership that lasted for more than half a century. Meanwhile, the national government was expected to maintain an active leadership role in economic management and domestic problems after the New Deal.

314 The Policy-Making Process Franklin Roosevelt’s administration dramatically and permanently expanded the reach of national policy. Roosevelt’s first 100 days resulted in an explosion of national authority, including an overhaul of the banking system, federal emergency relief for the jobless, an Agricultural Assistance Act to shore up the farm sector, a major initiative to develop the Tennessee Valley, and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The NIRA sanctioned national cartel arrangements in more than 500 industries, including the most basic industries such as coal, steel, and automobiles. Later, the New Deal established the framework of a national welfare state (the Social Security Act) and of American labor relations (the National Labor Relations Act), among other laws. The Supreme Court initially resisted this expansion of federal power, but after Roosevelt’s second election, the Court acquiesced to a broad federal authority to regulate commerce. Roosevelt’s Democratic successors, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, built on the New Deal’s activist precedent. After Roosevelt played an active role as commander in chief during World War II, Cold War presidents naturally gained the initiative in military and foreign affairs. The role of executive power was underscored by the fact that, although military actions occurred many times after World War II, no subsequent president asked Congress for a formal declaration of war. This new activism, then, especially increased the policy making capacity of the executive branch. New agencies multiplied, and the powers of existing agencies increased. The growth of federal spending increased executive branch influence and strained central management. The federal government was spending about as much as the state and local governments by 1936, and the states never have regained their previous fiscal dominance in the American system. Overall, the number of federal employees doubled by 1940, and increased to more than 2.5 million by the 1950s. Some bureaucratic leaders, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s J. Edgar Hoover, became powerful and autonomous sources of power in the policy areas. Others, like Adm. Hyman Rickover and the leaders of the Social Security Administration, built independent networks of political support in the postwar years (Lewis 1980; Derthick 1979). Informal systems of policy alliances were expanding and becoming entrenched in several policy areas in the same period. Variously styled ‘‘subgovernments’’ or ‘‘iron triangles’’---selfserving policy alliances between congressional committees, executive branch agencies---and interest groups resisted control from the White House and congressional leaders (Cater 1964; Anderson 1984; Ripley and

Franklin 1991; McCool 1994). Because Democrats held a majority of seats in the House of Representatives for all but four years between 1933 and 1995, committee chairs with years of seniority could exercise great power in some policy areas, such as agriculture or taxation (Browne 1995; Zelizer 1998). Even as presidents built the presidency into a chief steward of the nation’s interests, occupants of the White House often found themselves overmatched by the burgeoning complexity of the American policy process. They responded by constructing a personal bureaucracy. The Executive Reorganization Act of 1939 created the Executive Office of the President (EOP) that included the Bureau of the Budget (later expanded and renamed the Office of Management and Budget). After World War II, a Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security Council were added to the EOP, establishing the president as the leading actor in national economic and foreign policy making. The EOP expanded to more than 1,000 employees by the late 1940s and has remained an influential force in shaping the federal policy agenda and policy implementation (Milkis and Nelson 2003, 262). While the New Deal and its successors stimulated extensive growth in policy activity, these administrations often employed policy tools that delegated substantial policy authority to the states, the local governments, and private actors. The New Deal often increased policy activism simply by providing grantsin-aid to local governments for specified categories of policy. This grants activism provided a template for many new policy initiatives for the next 40 years, when national programs provided support of a host of policies managed by the states, such as highways, agricultural extension services, vocational education, public health, and assistance to the poor (Robertson and Judd 1989, 118). Many regulatory laws shared considerable power with the states. The Public Utility Holding Company Act broke apart the large interstate utility holding companies so that the states could regulate electricity and natural gas. The Connally Hot Oil Act permitted Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana to coordinate oil production and stabilize prices to benefit one of their most important industries. New regulations of trucks and buses, and a revitalized system of public employment offices, permitted southern states to preserve the legal segregation of races in these public services (Robertson and Judd 1989, 107; Lieberman 2001). Both Democratic and Republican policy makers greatly increased grants programs in the 1960s and 1970s. Grants-in-aid to state and local governments increased from $7 billion in 1960 to $95 billion in 1981. These grants programs were well suited to the

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process fragmented American policy system. The programs allowed members of Congress to claim credit for the largesse sent to their states and districts, while allowing local governments and contractors to tailor these federal benefits to state and local political, social, and economic needs. Increasingly effective organizations lobbying for state and local governments worked hard to increase federal funding for grant programs and to limit federal control over the way those funds were spent (Robertson and Judd 1989, 125--163). At the same time, the federal government also expanded national rules to set standard civil rights, environmental, and consumer policies nationwide. After World War II, civil rights leaders recognized that they could alter the policy process by adapting tactics to television, taking political battles to any institution that could provide a more sympathetic venue for policy making, and expanding the scope of conflict to the national level. Civil rights groups took their battle against segregation to federal courts, and won. Later reformers copied these tactics. Ralph Nader and other reform-minded outsiders insisted on policy-making transparency and access to the ‘‘iron triangles.’’ The War on Poverty encouraged the organization of advocates for the poor and minorities, and where independent groups strengthened, they demanded a presence in the local policy establishment. Television provided a new avenue of influence for these self-described ‘‘public interest’’ groups. Accordingly, federal regulations increased in the 1960s and 1970s, and federal laws empowered these groups to take policy disputes into court. As the federal government expanded its national civil rights, environmental, and consumer protections, these federal regulations also began to draw together a political backlash against the federal government. Together, these developments had increased federal policy responsibility, but made it even more difficult to effectively exercise national policy-making authority. Power had flowed to presidents, policy experts, and congressional committee chairs during the Cold War prosperity. Changing circumstances and public concerns allowed new political claimants successfully to insist on new conditions for American policy making. Policy information and access became more widely available. The policy process became more tentative as power became more dispersed, the exercise of power more conditional, and publicity about government mistakes more widespread. The very conditions placed on the exercise of political power, then, contributed to a sense of gridlock that further undermined confidence in the government’s problem-solving capacity.

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Recent Developments in the Policy Process Frustrations with Vietnam, Watergate, economic stagflation, regulatory growth, welfare, crime, and domestic unrest cast increasing doubts on the efficacy of public policy. Faith in professionals, policy experts, and politicians dropped precipitously in the 1970s. Television, now the main source of news for American citizens, amplified scandals, conflicts, and policy failures. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) shed new light on government decision making, while public disclosure of campaign contributions shed new light on policy influence, even as political contributions increased precipitously. Open meetings and public hearings became a routine part of the policy process. As civil rights, environmental, consumer, and other public interest group gained more access, ‘‘issue networks’’ seemed to supplant ‘‘iron triangles.’’ These networks of policy influence were looser, larger, more diverse, and more conflicted than the tight policy alliances of the 1950s and 1960s (Heclo 1978, 87--124; Bosso 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 45; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993; Mucciaroni 1995). Policy scholars have developed the notion of an ‘‘advocacy coalition’’ to describe more systematically the relatively open networks of policy influence that have endured (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). New institutional reforms added even more complications to the policy process. The War Powers Act of 1973 and the Congressional Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974 aimed to increase congressional control of the president’s policy discretion. Congress tried to limit administrative discretion by making laws much more detailed and specific. Civil rights laws, civil liberties issues, and new social regulations invited the courts to take a greater role in participating in policy disputes and controlling administrators (Ginsberg and Shefter 1909, 149--150; Mackenzie 1996; Rosenbaum 1995, 30; Mansbridge 1986). Congressional committees expanded their investigations of executive branch activities. Power within Congress became more diffuse as reforms substantially weakened the seniority system and the power of the committee chairs. In both houses, committee and subcommittee positions increased, and the number of staff grew (Sundquist 1981, 367--414; Davidson 1992). The emerging field of public policy scholarship was emphasizing the growing problems of the American policy system in the 1970s. Congress seemed to function primarily to provide benefits incumbents and had become the keystone of a Washington ‘‘establishment’’ in which interest groups, elected officials, and career officials produced policies to benefit one another

316 The Policy-Making Process (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977). The more scholars examined policy implementation, the more it seemed unpredictable and divorced from the laws that authorized programs. National officials seemed to have limited ability to control the way local officials used the funds they received from the federal government (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). It seemed impossible to control spending in some programs, or to prevent local officials from using federal resources for purposes that had little to do with the original intentions of national policy makers (Derthick 1975). It even seemed possible that national governments would follow New York City into bankruptcy (Rose and Peters 1978). Tax revolts struck at government’s fundamental capacity to raise revenues for social programs, and Republican candidates increasingly made resistance to tax increases a central unifying theme of their party. Critics on the Left and Right complained that public officials were using public policy for personal benefits or established economic elites, at the expense of the long-term public good (Niskanen 1971, Buchanan, and Tullock 1962; Stigler 1971; Lindblom 1977; J. O’Connor 1973). At the same time that grants-in-aid continued to grow, Hugh Heclo observed that ‘‘the executive establishment in Washington tends to get the worst of both worlds---blamed for poor delivery by its customers and besieged with bills from its middlemen’’ (1978, 93). As public confidence eroded and requirements of policy making became more cumbersome, it became increasingly difficult to exercise national policy authority actively to address pressing public problems. Deep changes in American politics also have been affecting the policy-making process. The century-long loyalty of southerners to the Democratic Party reached the breaking point. Southern Democrats drifted toward the Republicans and built majorities in southern delegations to the House and Senate by the early 2000s (Shafer 2003). For all but half a dozen of the years from 1969 through 2001, the parties divided control of the presidency and at least one house of Congress. Partisanship became increasingly sharp. Investigations and indictments of policy makers escalated (Lunch 1987; Ginsberg and Shefter 1909). Some developments evoked developments of the late-19th century. Party unity in the House and Senate began to increase. After they regained a majority in the House of Representatives in the 1994 elections, House Republicans increased the power of the speaker and tried to exercise more party control over House committees. Republicans especially embraced strong presidential powers when their party held the White House. Presidents Reagan and both Bushes used executive orders, executive memoranda, and executive review of the bureaucracy to reign in regulations and advance conservative principles (Shane 2009).

All of these developments nurtured support for more economically conservative policy agenda. The policy influence of conservative, free market economists grew, shifting the macroeconomic policy agenda toward conservative monetary policy, microeconomic policy toward deregulation under national rules, and social welfare toward work requirements (Eisner 1991, Woolley 1984, and O’Connor 2001). Increasing federal budget deficits crowded out a more expansive national policy agenda. Grants-in-aid shrank. Welfare reforms aimed to cut the number of recipients and to place tighter restrictions on the remaining recipients for the private labor market. As in the Gilded Age, economic conservatives favored those national rules that would benefit business generally and enhance market-driven economic development. American policy makers, particularly Republicans, pushed for national laws granting corporations extensive discretion with regard to corporate behavior, energy, financial services, telecommunications, and other policy areas. The states have continued to employ their policy prerogatives and alter the nation’s policy agenda. State attorneys general, who are among the nation’s most ambitious elected officials, have actively pursued legal actions against tobacco companies, software companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and large financial companies. Several states have enacted laws that protect in-state firms from hostile takeovers by enterprises in other states. States have enacted policies to regulate unwanted sales calls, defective automobiles, pets, and predatory loans. Some states, particularly New Jersey, have taken an active role in developing policies for dealing with global climate change (Rabe 2004).

Continuity and Change in the Policy Process The unique framework of the American policy process has endured since 1789. As America developed politically, its policy institutions grew stronger and more independent, and the number of participants multiplied. Geographic expansion, population shifts, dramatic economic and technological changes, and wrenching political conflicts have forced the American policy process to adapt to new conditions. As demands for action swept across the government agenda, the separation of powers has encouraged the separation of policy domains, making it even more difficult to coordinate policy action. The constants of American policy making are clear: procedural fragmentation, institutional rivalry, the difficulty of ensuring reliable outcomes, and the need for large, enduring coalitions to make the process work. Pluralism, incrementalism, disjointed policy making, geographic

Inventions of Prudence: The Development of the American Policy Process diversity, and a bias toward distributive policy remain characteristic of the American policy process. The American policy process is difficult to change and to use effectively, but it is not impossible to do so. Even when a policy system has seemed stable, consequential political events have punctuated that equilibrium and set the policy on a different developmental path (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pierson 2005). American policy makers have proven that, when called on to react to a crisis, they can make American government respond rapidly and forcefully. The true capacity of American government to act on policy problems can be observed only historically, in its responses to the Civil War, World War I, the Depression, World War II, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Friedberg 2002).

References and Further Reading Anderson, James E. 1999. Public Policy Making. 4th ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Bensel, Richard Franklin. 2001. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877--1900. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Binder, Sarah A., and Steven S. Smith. 1997 . Politics or Principle?: Filibustering in the United States Senate. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Bosso, Christopher J. 1987. Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle of a Public Issue. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Brady, David W., and Craig Volden. 2006. Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Browne, William P. 1995. Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Campbell, Ballard C. 1995. The Growth of American Government: Governance from the Cleveland Era to the Present. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862--1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cater, Douglass.1964. Power in Washington: A Critical Look at Today’s Struggle to Govern in the Nation’s Capital. New York: Random House. Clarke, Jeanne Nienaber, and Daniel C. McCool. 1996. Staking Out the Terrain: Power and Performance among Natural Resource Agencies, 2nd ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Davidson, Roger H., ed. 1992. The Postreform Congress. New York: St. Martin’s.

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Derthick, Martha. 1975. Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Derthick, Martha. 1979. Policymaking for Social Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Eisner, Marc Allen. 1991. Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics: Institutions, Expertise, and Policy Change. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker. 1992. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Friedberg, Aaron I. 2002. ‘‘American Antistatism and the Founding of the Cold War State.’’ In Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, edited by Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 239--266. Gerring, John. 1998. Party Ideologies in America, 1828--1996. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Ginsberg, Benjamin, and Martin Shefter. 1999. Politics by Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater. New York: W.W. Norton. Gray, Virginia, and Russell L. Hanson. 2007. Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Harris, Richard, and Daniel Tichenor. 2002. ‘‘Organized Interests and American Political Development,’’ Political Science Quarterly 117:4 (Winter), 587--612 Heclo, Hugh. 1978. ‘‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,’’ in King, Anthony ed., The New American Political System. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 87--124. Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1952. ‘‘The Marasmus of ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public interest.’’ Yale Law Journal 61, 467--509. Jillson, Calvin C. 1988. Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Agathon Press. John, Richard R. 1997. ‘‘Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787--1835.’’ Studies in American Political Development 11, 347--380. Lewis, Eugene. 1980. Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power: the Organizational Lives of Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar Hoover, and Robert Moses. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lieberman, Robert C. 2001. Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lindblom, Charles A. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books. Lindblom, Charles E., and Edward J. Woodhouse. 1993. The Policy-Making Process. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Loomis, Burdett A. 2000. The Contemporary Congress, 3rd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Lunch, William. 1987. The Nationalization of American Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

318 The Policy-Making Process Madison, James. 1961 [1787--1788]. Federalist 51. in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1961: 347--353. Mackenzie, G. Calvin. 1996. The Irony of Reform: Roots of American Political Disenchantment. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Maltz, Earl M. 2007. Dred Scott and the Politics of Slavery. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Mansbridge, Jane J. Mansbridge. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: the Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mettler, Suzanne. 1998. Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Milkis, Sidney M., and Nelson, Michael. 2003. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776--1998, 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Morone, James A. 2003. Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mucciaroni, Gary. Reversals of Fortune: Public Policy and Private Interests. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine, Atherton. Novak, William J. 1996. The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. O’Connor, Alice. 2001. Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. O’Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pierson, Paul. 2005. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; or, Why it’s Amazing That Federal Programs Work at aAll, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Rabe, Barry G. 2004. Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Rakove, Jack N. 1996. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A. Franklin. 1991. Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/ Cole. Robertson, David Brian. 2005. The Constitution and America’s Destiny. New York: Cambridge University Press. Robertson, David Brian. 2005. ‘‘Madison’s Opponents and Constitutional Design. American Political Science Review 99:2 (May): 225--243. Robertson, David Brian, and Dennis R. Judd. 1989. The Development of American Public Policy: The Structure of Policy Restraint. Glenview, IL and Boston: Scott, Foresman /Little, Brown. Rose, Richard, and B. Guy Peters. 1978. Can Government go Bankrupt? New York: Basic Books. Rosenbaum, Walter A. 1995. Environmental Policy and Politics, 3rd ed. Washington: CQ Press.

Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, eds. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: an Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sanders, Elizabeth. 1999. Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877--1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Schickler, Eric. 2001. Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shafer, Byron E. 2003. The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Shane, Peter M. 2009. Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Welfare Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877--1920. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Stanley, Harold W., and Robert G. Niemi. 1992. Vital Statistics on American Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press Stigler, George J. 1971. ‘‘The Theory of Economic Regulation.’’ Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3--21. Sundquist, James L. 1981. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the American Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Teaford, Jon C. 2002. The Rise of the States: Evolution of American State Government. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Teske, Paul. 2004. Regulation in the States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1988. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wechsler, Herbert. 1955. ‘‘The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government.’’ In Federalism: Mature and Emergent, edited by Arthur W. MacMahon. New York: Columbia University Press, 97--114. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. ‘‘The Two Presidencies,’’ TransAction: 7--14. Wilson, Woodrow. 1885. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Woolley, John. 1984. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Politics of Monetary Policy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Zelizer, Julian E. 1998. Taxing America:Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945--1975. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Section 7 Domestic Policy

Introduction

This 18th-century liberal model for our policymaking system has, at one level, proved remarkably durable; essentially the same broad outlines of that system have remained in effect for more than two centuries, making the United States the world’s oldest functioning democracy. A deeper level of analysis, though, reveals that by the late-19th century this system began to fray severely with the constant abrasions of a modern industrial society and, by the end of the 20th century, had been transformed through constitutional amendment and (re)interpretation. The essays in Volume I chronicle the development of governmental and nongovernmental institutions that define this transformation. The essays in this section demonstrate the policy-making implications of these changes for both the policy process as a whole and for particular substantive areas of public policy. A central fact of American public policy they identify is that changes wrought by political development are harder to undo than to achieve; the same inertial forces of our constitutional system that retard the creation of new policy tend to protect programs after they are put in place. A corollary proposition is that the size and scope of the government’s policy role tend to increase secularly. In any specific area of public policy---immigration, education, environment, or welfare---new ideas advanced by interest groups or social movements contend with entrenched interests and institutional barriers to change. By the time of the Great Depression, though, frustration with the nation’s inability to respond

Policy is made in the political space where ideas collide with interests and institutions. Policy making, reaching decisions that promote certain ideas, regulate particular interests, and designate institutions to implement those decisions, is a quintessentially political process. In writing the U.S. Constitution, the founders, all men of politics, set the parameters within which these policy collisions would take place to provide the stability and predictability that they deemed essential to the preservation of their new nation and the liberties for which they had fought a revolutionary war. In this endeavor, a paramount concern of theirs was to limit the probability of democratic excess, which they feared would lead to ‘‘mutability of legislation,’’ sacrifice of civic virtue, tyranny of the majority, and even mob rule. Although well understood that democratic principles were necessary to legitimate government action, they devised a system in which it would be difficult for majorities to form and even harder for them to persist. The democratic will was to be constrained by representative institutions and the separation of powers both within and between sovereign state and national governments. Government itself was designed, through a system of checks and balances, to promote competition rather than cooperation among branches of government, thereby further impeding rapid satisfaction of the popular will. Such a constitutional paradigm ensured, as the essays in this section illustrate, that policy making would remain largely incremental and that existing interests would have ample opportunity to defend themselves. 319

320 Domestic Policy effectively to the perceived needs of a modern society had made Americans receptive to the idea of a more activist policy process led by a president in tune with the popular mood and able to overcome the incrementalism and logrolling that typified congressional policy making. By the middle of the New Deal, even the Supreme Court had been brought to heel and abandoned its opposition to executive agencies wielding

both legislative (rulemaking) and judicial (adjudicatory) power. In the post--New Deal Era, the advent of this administrative state superimposed on our classical liberal regime created a policy process that was hospitable, one might even say programmed, to the idea of expanding national policy-making activity, but that also evinced its own barriers to fundamental change. ---Richard A. Harris

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology, 1890--1925 Chris Ziegler-McPherson Historian

and 1930, more than 27.5 million immigrants entered the United States; on average, nearly 900,000 were admitted each year between 1900 and 1914. Whether and how all of these newcomers could be integrated into American society was the leading question of the day. Settlement houses pioneered what later would be called Americanization. Beginning in the 1890s, Progressive women, such as Jane Addams of Hull-House in Chicago and Lillian D. Wald of the Henry Street Settlement on New York’s Lower East Side, worked to address the needs of the thousands of immigrants crowding into the nation’s largest cities. Inspired by the Social Gospel mandate to do good in this world, and looking for new professional opportunities for white middle-class women, settlement residents created neighborhood-based programs and services designed to foster interaction and cultural understanding between native-born Americans and the foreign-born. These programs included classes in English, civics, citizenship, home economics, hygiene, and sanitation. Some settlements also encouraged immigrants to display and preserve their cultural heritages through music, dance, art, and theater. The degrees of cultural chauvinism and paternalism varied widely among settlements, but the general impetus behind settlement Americanization work was to help the individual immigrant adjust to life in a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing society (Muncy 1991; Crocker 1992). As private, local, and sometimes poorly

Of all the movements of the Progressive Era, Americanization was perhaps the most ambitious. Not content with structural political reform or economic regulation, Americanization sought the transformation of the individual: culturally, emotionally, and even psychically. Part of the Progressive movement of the early 20th century, Americanization linked citizenship and national identity to a social reform program that promoted adult education and improved labor and housing conditions as a way of creating a more homogeneous society that was also more tolerant of cultural diversity. Americanization is defined here as a social movement to improve the status of immigrants in American society between the 1890s and 1920s. Assimilation is defined as processes by which society becomes more homogeneous and individuals come to see themselves as sharing a common identity. The history of assimilation in the United States and the historical meanings and uses of the labels ‘‘(un)American’’ are beyond the scope of this essay. This essay discusses the origins and history of the Americanization movement and its effects on American government and theories of national identity, race and ethnicity, and social structure and organization. Concerns about the status of immigrants in the United States developed in the 1880s and 1890s, when some Americans began to fear that the decades’ violent strikes and depressions were creating a gap between classes and between citizens and aliens. Between 1880 321

322 Domestic Policy funded organizations, settlements lacked the power and the resources to change the structure of the American economy and society in relation to immigration and urbanization. Many settlements also shared Jane Addams’ belief that the foreign born were making important cultural contributions, ‘‘immigrant gifts,’’ to American society. These Progressives believed that assimilation was inevitable and so advocated simply gently helping the foreign born adapt to life in the United States. Middle-class women’s clubs were important partners in many settlement house Americanization projects. Like settlement house residents, women’s club members were attracted to new forms of social service beyond 19th-century traditions of church and charity work. Women’s patriotic organizations, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Colonial Dames of America, began promoting civics education in the early 1900s, publishing pamphlets and holding lectures designed to encourage immigrants to become citizens. In the mid-1910s, the National Federation of Women’s Clubs launched a nationwide English literacy campaign, in which local chapters lobbied school districts to offer night and weekend classes to non-English speakers; sometimes clubs even organized classes themselves. ‘‘Organized womanhood’’ would become the foot soldiers of the Americanization movement, contributing volunteers for immigrant welfare projects organized by settlements, state agencies, and national organizations in the 1910s and 1920s (McClymer 1991; Gullett 1995). Ethnic societies---particularly Jewish ones---were also active in Americanization in the early 20th century. The Council of Jewish Women and the Conference of Jewish Women’s Organizations were among those that blended Anglo women’s clubs’ focus on community service with religious commitments to charity and social justice to provide assistance to their newly arrived co-religionists. The Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society of New York was just one of the many ethnic societies that met immigrants as they arrived in the United States to try to protect them from the thieves, confidence men, and overcharging porters and cabbies who frequented the dock areas of America’s largest ports (Hartmann 1967 [1948]). Most organizations working with immigrants between 1890 and 1910 focused on social interaction and integration, education, and social welfare (excluding financial assistance). Settlements, ethnic societies, and women’s clubs wanted to ameliorate some of the harsh consequences of American industrialization and urbanization: poverty, crime, violence,

inadequate housing, congestion, accident, addiction, and disease. Helping immigrants---especially men---find jobs, and resolving disputes with landlords, employers, neighbors, and others gradually became significant parts of the Americanization work of many settlements and ethnic societies. The motivations of the organizations involved in Americanization in the 1890s and early 1900s varied widely. Fears of social instability, religious convictions, guilt about native-born social privilege, cultural chauvinism, the need to expand professional and personal horizons, and the genuine desire to help others all played a role in different degrees in encouraging native-born Americans to address ‘‘the immigrant problem.’’ The Social Gospel, coupled with the fear of social and economic instability, motivated many settlement residents and women’s club members. These Americanizers hoped that if immigrants received some degree of justice and friendly assistance, they would view American society more favorably and be more inclined to adopt white middle-class Anglo-American cultural values and mores. There was also a growing concern that if immigrants were treated badly, they would reject middle-class American values and habits, retain their cultural traditions and native languages, or embrace Marxist, socialist, or anarchist theories of capitalism and class struggle. Ethnic societies were less interested in promoting assimilation into an Anglo-American cultural mode, but they still encouraged naturalization and the learning of English as vehicles for socioeconomic mobility. At the turn of the 20th century, the dominant themes of Americanization were cosmopolitanism, tolerance of cultural diversity, and an insistence on social justice. Progressive Americanizers encouraged immigrants to adopt Anglo-American cultural practices and values, yet believed that assimilation should not be forced or hurried. Immigrant advocates challenged native-born prejudices against the foreign-born and emphasized the social and cultural contributions that immigrants were making to America. Believing that immigrants were disadvantaged by their foreign-born status, Progressive Americanizers argued that it was native-born Americans who needed to change their attitudes and behaviors to create a better society. ‘‘The attitude of the alien toward this country, in great part, is a reflection of the attitude of our own citizens towards him. Americanization should undertake to teach the duty of the host, not less than the duty of the guest,’’ was a common statement made by Progressive Americanizers (California Commission of Immigration

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology and Housing 1918, 5). Many Americanizers also believed that labor unions, ethnic societies, foreignlanguage newspapers, and immigrant churches played critical roles in assimilating the foreign born, and so sought and welcomed their support. Concern about immigration and assimilation intensified in 1908, after three consecutive years of more than 1 million entries per year. That year, the Chicago Women’s Trade Union League, Judge Julian W. Mack, and Grace Abbott and Sophonisba Breckinridge of HullHouse formed the League for the Protection of Immigrants (later renamed the Immigrants’ Protective League [IPL]). The mission of the IPL was to meet immigrant girls traveling alone to Chicago, help them find morally safe housing, and direct them toward organized jobs. Although the League restricted its work to Chicago and focused on assisting women, it did help immigrant men, primarily in the area of employment services. Within a few years, the IPL was providing information, advice, and assistance to thousands of Chicago immigrants. The dramatic surge in immigration also attracted the attention of industry leaders, who were worried about the growing popularity of immigration restriction. In February 1907, a group of prominent New England businessmen, philanthropists, and Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) leaders formed the North American Civic League for Immigrants (NACL) to promote naturalization and assimilation and to counter the influence of the Immigration Restriction League. The NACL was an elite group: D. Chauncey Brewer, an attorney active in the Boston Chamber of Commerce, was president, and members included Boston Chamber president and flour mill magnate Bernard J. Rothwell; Boston & Maine Railroad president Lucius Tuttle; National City Bank of New York City president Frank A. Vanderlip, and banker and Jewish philanthropist Felix Warburg. Muckraking journalist Jacob A. Riis was one of the few nonbusinessmen in the group. Unlike some religiously oriented ethnic societies and settlements, the NACL was nonsectarian and sought to provide religiously neutral immigrant aid. It also wanted to counter the spread of Marxism, socialism, and anarchism by humanizing immigrants’ experiences in the United States. With its definitions of socialism and labor organization as ‘‘un-American,’’ the NACL introduced a more conservative, upper-class perspective into Americanization than had existed in femaledominated settlements, clubs, and ethnic societies. Believing that early experiences of exploitation and injustice immediately soured immigrants on the United States, the NACL hoped that friendly assistance would

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help prevent negative (and possibly radical) attitudes from developing. So the League joined the many immigrant aid groups that were already meeting immigrants arriving at the ports of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and provided similar protective services at eastern railroad stations for immigrants passing through the port cities on their way to the Midwest and far West. The NACL also lobbied state and local education authorities to provide more and higher-quality nightschool classes for immigrants who wanted to learn English and to naturalize. In addition, the League was at the forefront of promoting ‘‘industrial Americanization’’ by lobbying businesses to establish English classes in factories. League members hoped that industrial Americanization would help lower accident rates and undermine organized labor by lessening one cause of union complaints: workplace safety. Industrial Americanization laid the groundwork for the welfare capitalism programs of the 1920s, in which employers provided workers health and social benefits to thwart labor organization. The NACL’s approach to Americanization was similar to that of settlements and many ethnic societies; the key differences between the League and other immigrant aid organizations were the NACL’s elite relationships to big business and to government, and its extensive financial resources. But fear of the ‘‘alien menace’’ also permeated NACL statements to a much stronger degree than those by most settlements or even women’s clubs, and was a harbinger of the nativist direction that the movement would take in the late 1910s. Another leader in industrial Americanization was the YMCA, which began its program of night schools for immigrant men in 1907. But the YMCA’s program differed from many of the English literacy projects of women’s clubs and civic groups in that it focused on first teaching immigrants useful words and phrases related to work and daily life, and taught American history and civics only to those aliens applying for citizenship who needed more specialized instruction. Organizations that embraced Americanization as promoted by the NACL and the YMCA included the national chamber of commerce and the American Manufacturers Association. Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller were among the dozens of large employers who instituted classes in their factories. In these programs, foreign-born employees were taught English and the values of efficiency, thrift, and loyalty to the company and to the nation (Korman 1967). Chambers of commerce in major industrial cities, such as Detroit,

324 Domestic Policy Buffalo, and Pittsburgh, instituted aggressive campaigns to promote English speaking and literacy in factories and workshops in the 1910s. The presence of so many businessmen active in Americanization groups, such as the NACL, and the fact that most Americanization activists opposed immigration restriction caused organized labor to shy away from the movement. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), already lobbying for immigration restriction, was rightfully suspicious that the purpose of industrial Americanization was to create more passive workers and to weaken unions’ influence with foreign-born laborers. Labor leaders thus pursued their own kind of Americanization of immigrant workers. Unions sought to direct their foreign-born members toward the principles and values of organized labor, not business and industry. Informally, labor leaders wanted immigrants to assimilate into an American working-class culture that rejected middle-class values of individualism, sobriety, and conspicuous consumption in favor of communitarianism, democratic republicanism, and class consciousness. Through union membership, strikes, work on the shop floor, and participation in radical political parties, immigrant men interacted with workers of different ethnicities and helped create a new American working class (Hartmann 1967 [1948], 141--146; Barrett 1992). Even as settlements, women’s clubs, the NACL, and others were refining their immigrant aid programs and gradually developing theories of assimilation and American national identity, they also began lobbying for government action to correct the socioeconomic consequences of mass immigration. After more than a decade of immigrant advocacy work in private organizations, many Americanizers were frustrated with the limitations of the private sector when confronted by nonexistent or unenforced protective legislation. These Progressives desired government power to force (if necessary) recalcitrant employers, landlords, and others who exploited immigrants to better treat the foreign born. In response to this pressure, high immigration states, such as New York and Massachusetts, awoke to the increasing costs of literally millions of newcomers passing through or settling in their cities, and they began forming investigative commissions to study immigration in their states. As the state with the most immigrants in the United States, New York pioneered Americanization at the state level with the creation of the Bureau of Industries and Immigration within the state Department of Labor in 1910. The chief investigator for the Bureau was

Frances A. Kellor, a former resident of Hull-House and the College Settlement on Rivington Street in New York City. She was also the secretary of the NACL’s New York--New Jersey Committee, which had lobbied for the creation of the bureau. Through her connections to the NACL’s elite membership, as well as to former President Theodore Roosevelt and New York governor Charles Evans Hughes, Kellor quickly became the most prominent and influential figure in the national Americanization movement that was emerging in the 1910s. Under Kellor’s direction, the New York Bureau of Industries and Immigration focused its attention on the Port of New York, where crime and fraud were rampant. The Bureau’s small staff investigated conditions at the port and elsewhere in New York, and then lobbied for new laws regulating steamship agents, hotel porters, cabmen, and teamsters, as well as immigrant bankers, notaries public, and others who tried to profit from immigrants. The Bureau also heard and adjudicated disputes; inspected and licensed immigrant lodging houses; and visited factories, canneries, and railroad and highway construction camps as part of its charge to study the conditions in which foreign-born New Yorkers lived and worked. Despite its relatively weak regulatory powers, the Bureau asserted the authority of the state government to interfere with private property rights and labor contracts in the name of community and individual welfare. Inspired by the New York Bureau, Jewish merchant and Progressive Republican Simon J. Lubin successfully lobbied California governor Hiram W. Johnson to form that state’s Commission of Immigration and Housing in 1913 to provide protective social welfare services for immigrants. The Commission developed an Americanization policy that focused on both urban and rural living conditions and adult education. After the Wheatland Hopfield Riot in August 1913, the Commission developed an increasingly aggressive program of inspecting agricultural labor camps, and investigated housing conditions in several California cities in 1914 and 1915. Commissioner and women’s club activist Mary Simons Gibson successfully lobbied for the Home Teacher Act of 1915, which sent teachers into immigrant homes to instruct women in English and home economics. By 1916, the Commission of Immigration and Housing had well-established programs in rural labor camp inspection, urban housing inspection, complaints resolution, and adult education. Also in 1913, the city of Cleveland, unwilling to wait for state action, developed its own Americanization program by creating its Municipal Immigration Bureau within the city’s Department of Public Welfare.

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology

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Frances Kellor’s calls for government action on behalf of immigrants made her a leading reformer of the Progressive Era. (Library of Congress)

Almost unique in the country, Cleveland’s Americanization policy sought to coordinate all public agencies and private organizations working with the foreign born in that city. Immigrants arriving into town were met at the train station, where they were given information in their native languages about housing, jobs, education opportunities, and other social services in the city. Large employers offered English classes in their factories and encouraged their employees to naturalize. Cleveland also developed an extensive nightschool system tailored toward teaching immigrants what they needed to know to become American citizens, while churches, foreign-language newspapers, and ethnic societies all exhorted the importance of learning English and naturalizing. The goals of states’ Americanization policies were similar to those of private immigrant aid organizations but in addition to the desire for greater social stability, cultural homogeneity, educational opportunity, and

economic efficiency were aspirations for a stronger social welfare state that could successfully challenge laissez-faire industrial capitalism. In New York, California, and the handful of other states that created immigration agencies, Americanization focused on the passage and enforcement of stronger protective legislation to create a more just and humane social environment into which immigrants would want to assimilate. But unlike settlements and women’s clubs, which sought to help the individual adjust to society, state Americanization officials also wanted to change the structure of the American economy and society by regulating housing and working conditions according to the larger goals of Progressive reform. These immigrant welfare policies were based on the premise that the foreign born faced unique challenges in adjusting to life in the United States and so deserved special protection and assistance that only government could provide. State Americanizers insisted that immigrants’ poor

326 Domestic Policy living and working conditions were the result of prejudice and discrimination by the native born, who paid a lower ‘‘immigrant’’ wage, segregated immigrants in substandard housing, and then claimed that the immigrants’ culture and heritage predisposed them to live in poverty and squalor. These Progressive officials argued that it was the native born who needed to be ‘‘Americanized’’ to be more tolerant of the foreign born. And if Americans were unwilling to reform themselves, then Americanization agencies would compel them to treat immigrants more justly. This philosophy of Americanization reflected the fact that many of the staff in state Americanization agencies had been active in settlements or women’s clubs and had worked closely with the foreignlanguage press, ethnic societies, and immigrant churches to communicate with immigrant communities, encourage naturalization, and articulate a philosophy of cultural tolerance. Only a handful of states and municipalities developed Americanization policies in the 1910s; the bulk of immigrant social welfare was still provided by private organizations. In 1914, the NACL’s New York--New

Jersey Committee separated from the League over differences toward organized labor. Secretary Kellor wanted to pursue more liberal state social welfare policies for immigrants, while the Boston leadership began to engage in industrial espionage and strike breaking after the 1912 Lawrence, Massachusetts textile strike. Kellor, who had left the New York Bureau in 1913, reorganized the New York--New Jersey Committee into the Committee for Immigrants in America, which began lobbying for stronger protective legislation and publishing the quarterly magazine The Immigrants in America Review to serve as a clearinghouse of information about immigration, Americanization, and Progressive reform. But Kellor still maintained good relations with the chamber of commerce, becoming the vice chair of the chamber’s influential Committee on Immigration in 1915 as a way of remaining connected to the chamber’s wealthy members. The federal government hesitantly developed its own Americanization policy in the mid-1910s, focusing primarily on citizenship education. But Americanization policy at the federal level was divided between the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Education and

Department of Labor naturalization class, between 1918 and 1928. (Library of Congress)

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Naturalization. The Bureau of Immigration, also within the Labor Department, saw Americanization as outside its charge and had little involvement or interest in Americanization. The Bureau of Naturalization joined the Americanization movement in 1914 with the goal of making naturalization more ceremonial and celebratory to impress upon the new citizen the significance of legally becoming an American. Naturalization Commissioner Richard K. Campbell and his deputy, Raymond F. Crist, also wanted to improve citizenship education and clarify the education requirements needed to satisfactorily complete the naturalization process. This question of education requirements pushed the Naturalization Bureau into civics education. The Bureau began to monitor night schools offering English literacy and civics instruction to ensure that the U.S. history and government curriculum met Bureau standards and that naturalization court judges would accept these public school graduation certificates as proof of the candidate’s qualifications for citizenship. In 1916, the Bureau designed a course in citizenship education, the outline of which was distributed widely among teachers of citizenship classes along with material on naturalization law. In an effort to increase enrollment in citizenship classes, the Bureau mailed the names of aliens who had petitioned to naturalize to local school authorities, requesting that the officials approach the immigrants to persuade them to enroll in night school. The Bureau of Naturalization’s civics education work caused it to stray into the jurisdictional territory of the Bureau of Education, which claimed that adult education, as well as the larger question of how American history and civics were to be taught, belonged in its domain. Headed by Commissioner of Education Philander P. Claxton, the Bureau of Education created new divisions of Civic Education and Education of Immigrants in 1914, but a lack of funds forced Claxton to turn to Kellor’s private Committee for Immigrants in America for financial support. The Committee would subsidize many of the Education Bureau’s Americanization programs until the practice was made illegal in 1919. The Bureau of Education was more active and more ambitious in its Americanization work than the Naturalization Bureau, reflecting its relationship with Kellor and the Committee for Immigrants in America. But the policy assumptions of the Bureau of Naturalization and the Bureau of Education also differed. The Naturalization Bureau interacted with local school authorities through its field representatives and occasionally gave

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information and advice about citizenship and naturalization to civic and patriotic groups. As the agency responsible for naturalization, it viewed Americanization, not surprisingly, in terms of simply naturalizing the foreign born. The Education Bureau, on the other hand, saw Americanization as coming under the rubric of education and was thus the responsibility of the public schools and the Bureau. It sought to improve the quality and availability of adult education, and so included Americanization within its larger mission of professionalizing education (McClymer 1978, 1982). After the success of President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘‘Too Proud to Fight’’ speech in defense of neutrality, given May 10, 1915, at a public reception honoring newly naturalized Philadelphians, the Committee for Immigrants in America realized that widely publicized naturalization ceremonies could inspire more immigrants to become citizens and hopefully value that citizenship more deeply. The Committee formed the National Americanization (Day) Committee (NAC) and quickly organized National Americanization Day to be held on July 4, 1915. The holiday marked one of the first uses of the term ‘‘Americanization’’ and featured elaborate naturalization ceremonies and speeches by prominent Americans, including President Wilson. National Americanization Day was held amid a growing national debate about the degree to which the United States should involve itself in the world war that had been raging in Europe since the summer of 1914. Although neutrality was the official policy of the Wilson administration, many prominent Americans lobbied for greater military preparedness. The Committee for Immigrants in America and NAC embraced the preparedness movement, but they continued to voice Progressive arguments about employers’ obligations to their employees, such as ensuring safe and healthy working conditions and paying livable wages. Arguing in her 1916 book, Straight America, A Call to National Service, that ‘‘industrial preparedness’’ was a fundamental component of military preparedness, Frances Kellor stressed that, with the war hindering Atlantic migration, companies would have to treat their immigrant workers better to conserve their labor supply. In Straight America and her many other statements between 1914--1916, Kellor reiterated the values of Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘‘New Nationalism,’’ with its emphasis on community service, progressive social welfare, cultural homogeneity, and coercive social engineering (McClymer 1980, 111--113). Roosevelt shared Kellor’s enthusiasm for preparedness. With the beginning of war in 1914, Roosevelt

328 Domestic Policy seized the opportunity both to attack his old political rival, Woodrow Wilson, and to express his long-held beliefs in ‘‘100 percent Americanism.’’ The idea of 100 percent Americanism represented an abrupt shift from the ‘‘immigrant gifts’’ view that had predominated among Progressive Americanizers before 1914. Now the emphasis was on total national loyalty through cultural conformity, public displays of patriotism (narrowly defined as veneration of the flag and other civic icons), and zero tolerance of deviance or individualism (Higham 1994, 242--244). Roosevelt’s declaration that ‘‘The men who do not become Americans and nothing else are hyphenated Americans; and there ought to be no room for them in this country,’’ was representative of the intolerance behind 100 percent Americanism (Roosevelt 1920, 649). Initially, native-born hostility toward the ‘‘hyphen’’--the person with divided loyalties, or even worse, loyalty to a foreign power---targeted German Americans, the largest immigrant group in the United States. But fear of the hyphen quickly spread to other immigrant groups as deep-seated American suspicion of foreigners fueled nativistic anger (Higham 1994, 198--200). Fear of how an ethnically and culturally diverse society would fare in modern war caused many Americans to embrace 100 percent Americanism, but not all Americanizers were 100 Percenters. Many Progressive Americanizers, such as Jane Addams, Grace Abbott, and Simon Lubin, continued to emphasize the positive aspects of the presence of immigrants in America and rejected 100 percent Americanism as xenophobic and ultimately counterproductive. Although Frances Kellor did not fully embrace 100 percent Americanism, she hoped to use its adherents to gain support for her ambitions of a national Americanization program. The debate about neutrality, preparedness, and immigrant loyalty intensified in the 1916 presidential election between Wilson and former New York governor and Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes. During the campaign, both political parties treaded the fine line between courting ethnic voters and attacking German Americans and Irish Americans for exercising their democratic right to lobby the government. Wilson embraced 100 percent Americanism and won the rhetorical battle in October 1916 with his response to an Irish American charge of being pro-British. In a telegram that earned him widespread approval, Wilson wrote back to Jeremiah A. O’Leary: ‘‘I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anyone like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them’’ (McClymer 1980, 108).

With statements such as these coming from the president, Progressive Americanizers’ pleas for tolerance and sympathy for the immigrant were drowned out. The dominant message of Americanization was beginning to emphasize conformity over cosmopolitanism, unity over diversity, linguistic and cultural intolerance, and the shallow adoption of visible cultural practices without actual socioeconomic integration or assimilation. Progressive Americanizers had long emphasized the important role native-born Americans needed to play in creating a more humane and just country; now the rhetoric focused on how immigrants needed to change to fit into American society. The growing national support for 100 percent Americanism set the political stage for less tolerance and more coercion of the foreign born. In February 1917, the United States passed (over Wilson’s veto) a new immigration law that contained several antiradicalism provisions and a literacy test that excluded immigrants who could not read a short passage in any language. The antiradicalism sections amended the nation’s immigration code to exclude any alien who advocated violent revolution or who belonged to an anarchist organization; in October 1918, the law was expanded to allow the deportation of any alien who belonged to an anarchist organization, regardless of the length of time in the country. Then, in March 1917, the Department of Justice approved the creation of the American Protective League (APL) by a Chicago advertising executive. The APL was a volunteer spy organization that grew rapidly to 250,000 members and had chapters throughout the country. APL members monitored public opinion in their communities, pressured their neighbors to visibly support preparedness and the war, and participated in local vigilanteeism and patriotic gangsterism. The National Security League was similar group, composed of elite businessmen, that emerged out of the preparedness movement and devoted itself to local espionage and labor harassment in the name of 100 percent Americanism. These and other ‘‘superpatriot’’ groups would quickly dominate the wartime Americanization movement with their message of 100 percent Americanism (Higham 1994, 211--212; Hartmann 1967 [1948], 218--219). The United States entered World War I on the side of Britain and France and their allies on April 6, 1917. Barely six months after winning reelection with the slogan, ‘‘He Kept Us Out of War,’’ Woodrow Wilson faced the challenge of military, industrial, and social mobilization of a country that had long been divided over participation in the conflict.

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology Americanization followed two courses at the federal level after April 1917: one was the actual programs the federal government implemented, the other was the ideology and rhetoric that accompanied these policies. In many cases, the government’s statements and actions about Americanization and national unity were disconnected. Thus, federal officials talked belligerently about 100 percent Americanism and called for the deportation of aliens who failed to enthusiastically contribute to the war effort, while they implemented relatively benign and ineffectual programs that involved mostly holding conferences and mailing out thousands of speeches, pamphlets, and leaflets urging state and local officials to create more and better adult education programs. Federal propaganda did associate Americanism, loyalty, and patriotism with support for the war, and government officials did pressure ethnic societies and foreign-language newspapers to encourage their conationals to buy war bonds, register for the draft, and not support antiwar unions or churches. But for many Americanizers and particularly 100 Percenters, federal Americanization was a lot of talk and not much action. This disconnect between harsh rhetoric and mild policy reflected the relatively weak nature of the American state during the Progressive Era; the war was one important event that would strengthen the powers of the government (Kennedy 1980; Breen 1984). Despite national hysteria about the questionable loyalties of the nation’s immigrant population, the Wilson administration did not immediately embrace Americanization as a branch of national defense. For much of 1917, the practicalities of military, industrial, and agricultural mobilization dominated government attention. The federal government created the (Creel) Committee for Public Information in April 1917 to proselytize the war and stimulate patriotism, but the Council of National Defense, which was responsible for coordinating the government’s war programs, did not begin to even consider the Committee for Immigrants in America and NAC’s Americanization proposals until October 1917 and would not act on them until early 1918. Even then, the Wilson administration did not include Americanization in its war industry plans, preferring to handle labor and industrial issues through the National War Labor Board and the War Industries Board. With the declaration of war, the coercive power of government was quickly revealed. All German citizens in the United States were required to register with local police authorities, and President Wilson flexed his political muscles by ordering the arrest of more than 1,000 German aliens under the Alien Enemies Act of

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1798. In June 1917, Congress passed and Wilson signed the Espionage Act, which was later expanded into the Sedition Act in May 1918. The Espionage Act criminalized false statements designed to interfere with the war effort or aid the enemy; the Sedition Act made any disparaging remark about the war, the nation, or the government illegal and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Several states and cities also restricted foreignlanguage instruction, publications, and speech, particularly of the now-hated German language. A climate of fear, suspicion, and intimidation permeated the country as fearful Americans saw German spies and radical saboteurs lurking behind every tree and in every munitions factory. Ironically, despite the surge in nativism against Germans and other central Europeans, labor radicals--many of them native born---suffered the most persecution during the war. The small but vocal Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, whose members were called Wobblies) openly opposed the war and began organizing strikes among miners in the Southwest and timber workers in the Pacific Northwest. Fearful that the German government was instigating industrial unrest to undermine the American war economy, hysterical business and patriotic groups organized lynching parties and violently attempted to expel more than 1,300 Wobblies out of Arizona and into California and New Mexico, where federal authorities took them into custody. Several western states passed ‘‘criminal syndicalism’’ laws that targeted the I.W.W.’s tactics of industrial sabotage and encouraging violent repression of their strikes to highlight the brutality of capitalism. Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory ordered a crackdown on the I.W.W., in which more than 300 Wobblies were arrested and tried in September 1917 for violating the new Espionage Act. Aliens caught associating with the I.W.W. were arrested and held for deportation under the new 1917 immigration act (Dubofsky 1959). The federal government also supported industries that instituted coercive industrial Americanization programs, as many companies began requiring employees to attend factory classes or refused to hire non-English speakers or noncitizens. Yet, despite the atmosphere of hysteria instigated by the Justice Department, Congress, and the Committee for Public Information (among others), Americanization as public policy at the federal level still focused primarily on adult education for immigrants wanting to learn English or applying for citizenship. State policies, such as the California Commission of Immigration and Housing’s inspection of labor camps and urban housing conditions or the New York Bureau of Industries and

330 Domestic Policy Immigration’s monitoring of port conditions, were beyond the purview of the federal government to attempt at the national level. Ironically, education---the most local of American institutions---was the one area of Americanization in which the federal government played a significant role. The Bureau of Naturalization took advantage of the new national fear of unnaturalized aliens by focusing its resources on increasing the number of night schools offering citizenship instruction and improving the quality of that instruction. The Bureau was nearly overwhelmed by applicants for citizenship, as immigrants sought to protect themselves from discriminatory employment practices and to demonstrate their loyalty by naturalizing. But the Naturalization Bureau was pleased with the increase because the ability to actually naturalize aliens lay within its domain, and not with the Bureau of Education. After the declaration of war, the Education Bureau continued its coordination of efforts with Frances Kellor’s Americanization committees. As early as 1914, the Bureau had begun researching effective ways of teaching adult immigrants and then disseminating its findings among the nation’s educators. Before and during the war, the Bureau of Education held a series of nationwide conferences on what it called ‘‘educational Americanization,’’ and it organized numerous professional development sessions to train teachers in how to best teach adult immigrants. The agency also developed curriculum materials for teacher training schools to help those institutions train new teachers to work with immigrants. In addition to the conferences and the flood of textbooks and pamphlets, the Bureau of Education continued to be a clearinghouse of information about immigration, immigrants, and Americanization activities around the country through its monthly Americanization Bulletin. In May 1918, Frances Kellor successfully lobbied Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to expand the Division of Immigrant Education to include a ‘‘war work extension service’’ with offices in New York City and Washington, D.C. (headed by herself and her former New York Bureau of Industries and Immigration colleague Joseph Mayper). Although nominally within the Education Bureau, this new Division of Americanization---also called the War Work Extension---was in actuality financed, staffed, and directed by Kellor and the Committee for Immigrants in America and NAC. The extension service partnered with foreign-language newspapers to disseminate war propaganda in immigrant communities and recruited foreign-born ‘‘racial advisors’’ to monitor ethnic groups’ opinions and keep

federal officials informed of immigrants’ attitudes about the war. For the duration of the war and after November 1918, the Bureaus of Naturalization and Education battled for leadership of federal Americanization policy. In May 1918, the Bureau of Naturalization got Congress to pass a law recognizing its Americanization efforts and authorizing it to continue its citizenship education work with public schools. The law also approved the Bureau’s use of naturalization fees to publish and distribute materials for citizenship education and naturalization, including its long-awaited textbook on citizenship, which was mailed to thousands of nightschool instructors. The Bureau of Naturalization even tried (unsuccessfully) in July 1918 to get Congress to create a Bureau of Citizenship and Americanization within the Labor Department, where it resided. Despite the efforts of the Bureau of Naturalization and the Committee for Public Information to be the federal government’s primary Americanization agency, the Council of National Defense was more supportive of the Bureau of Education’s Americanization work (although the Council did support the Naturalization Bureau’s citizenship education program). The Council of National Defense and the Bureau of Education encouraged states to develop their own Americanization policies based on the Education Bureau’s program of promoting immigrant education in night schools and factories. By June 1918, 35 states had formed Americanization committees and were at various stages of implementation when the war ended five months later in November. The Bureau of Education benefited from the fact that, for most Americans awakening to the Americanization movement, the easiest way to ‘‘Americanize’’ the immigrant was to educate him, usually in the English language. Education-focused Americanization, with its narrow concentration on English literacy and sometimes on civics education, dominated wartime Americanization programs. The Armistice threw the Americanization movement into turmoil. Most states and communities, as well as the federal government, were still in the process of implementing their wartime Americanization programs in November 1918. Long-time Americanizers, such as Frances Kellor and Grace Abbott, argued that the war had provided valuable lessons in federal-state-municipal coordination that needed to be continued and expanded. These Progressives still wanted a strong federal Americanization agency with the power and resources to coordinate immigrant settlement, regulate working conditions, and promote English literacy and

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology citizenship (Graham 1971). Superpatriots and the police agencies of the federal government joined with immigration restrictionists in countering Progressive Americanizers’ arguments by insisting that the best way to preserve American society and culture was by closing the gates to all immigrants, radical or otherwise. Fear and loathing of the ‘‘Hun’’ quickly shifted to hysteria about the ‘‘Red’’ within a few months of the war’s end. Even as President Wilson sailed for Paris to negotiate the Versailles Treaty and American service members began to return home from Europe, social tensions reached their breaking point. In 1919, the pressure cooker that had been American society during the war exploded, as large segments of the country vented frustration over a host of issues, including immigration, national security and identity, labor, and the economy. The federal government had compelled unions and industry to cooperate in the war economy through a combination of patriotic rhetoric and the underlying threat of the actual use of government power. With the Armistice, this less-than-cozy economic relationship fractured immediately. Wartime taxes and commodities shortages had raised the cost of living, and organized labor lobbied the federal government to maintain wartime price controls, nationalize the railroads, and establish a system of compulsory health insurance. A wave of strikes shook the U.S. economy, with the biggest walkouts affecting industries that employed large numbers of immigrants, such as textiles and clothing. A general strike in Seattle in February 1919 terrified business leaders and the middle class nationwide. Steel and coal strikes by immigrant workers in the fall of 1919 flamed native-born fears that aliens were threatening the nation’s most essential industries (Higham 1994, 225--226). In 1918--1919, unions took wartime rhetoric of unity and loyalty and transferred that language to their battles with employers. Strikes were framed in terms of fighting the Kaiser or the Czar at home; labor leaders attacked employers as ‘‘un-American’’ profiteers who took advantage of the wartime boom and tried to keep immigrant workers from earning an ‘‘American’’ wage (Barrett 1992). Labor’s resurgent combativeness frightened many employers, who were determined not to tolerate any more government or union interference in their businesses. Employers repeatedly connected class conflict and alien radicalism in their fights with unions, with the result that many immigrant workers became the target of both superpatriotic violence and industrial blacklisting. Russian immigrants, in particular, suffered from the combination of xenophobia and antiradicalism.

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Under the banner of the ‘‘American Plan,’’ large employers combined welfare capitalism with industrial espionage, private armies of strikebreakers, and legal tactics, such as injunctions, to break unions and divide workers along ethnic and racial lines. The Red Scare of 1919 and early 1920 powerfully combined fears of labor radicalism and revolution with native-born prejudices against immigrants, particularly those from Eastern Europe. In March 1919, Attorney General Gregory was replaced by the ambitious A. Mitchell Palmer, just as public opinion against radical labor and immigrants was reaching a crescendo. Taking advantage of congressional fears about national security after a series of unsolved bombings in the spring, Palmer gained additional funds to start a new Bureau of Investigation. Palmer put his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to work targeting radical Russian labor activists and alien Communists and Socialists. In a series of well-publicized ‘‘Palmer Raids’’ in November 1919 and January 1920, the FBI arrested approximately 10,000 people, most of them aliens. Anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were among the most famous of the nearly 250 Russian immigrants

The mass arrests of accused radicals and the deportation of aliens accused of being disloyal during the ‘‘Red Scare’’ of the post-World War I years were known as the Palmer Raids, ordered by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. (Library of Congress)

332 Domestic Policy who were deported to the Soviet Union on a specially chartered ship, the Buford (The Soviet Ark), in December 1919. That month also, 33 Wobblies were put on trial in Kansas City on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government, a laughable charge given the small size of the I.W.W., but one that was legal under the new antisyndicalism laws. Ultimately, what saved most of the immigrants arrested during the Red Scare from deportation or imprisonment for radical beliefs and behavior was the Department of Labor’s lack of enthusiasm for the Department of Justice’s crusade against radicalism. The Justice Department could arrest people but could not deport them, and Assistant Labor Secretary Louis F. Post, who was in charge of the department for most of 1919, due to Labor Secretary William B. Wilson’s illness, refused to deport anyone not clearly linked to a crime. Yet, the limitation of the government’s power to deport only aliens simply accentuated the antiimmigrant nature of the Red Scare (Higham 1994, 227--230). Another factor in defusing the national panic was the division that emerged within the business community in response to the deportations. Many businessmen, especially small business owners, were upset by the federal government’s tolerance of organized labor’s wartime demands and wanted to roll back any union gains. However, large manufacturers were worried about the growing congressional support for immigration restriction. Some industrialists were also pleased with the increased productivity they had experienced during the war, as they realized the benefits of their investments in welfare capitalism. These business leaders, particularly those who had been involved in prewar industrial Americanization and had connections to the NAC or the Committee for Immigrants in America, tended to resist community and industry pressures for a strong crackdown on immigrant workers (Hartmann 1967 [1948], 217--225; Higham 1994, 232). The year 1919 was the high water mark of the Americanization movement, as most states with large immigrant populations passed Americanization legislation or created Americanization agencies, virtually all of them equating immigrant assimilation with adult education. Some states, such as Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Wyoming, continued their immigrant education programs through the 1920s. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah combined education with coercion as those states passed laws requiring illiterate aliens to attend school for some period of the year or prohibiting

the employment of anyone who could not speak English unless that person attended an English language program. Idaho and Oregon also passed laws in 1921 compelling illiterate and non-English-speaking immigrants to attend night schools. This emphasis on coercion was an important distinction between pre- and postwar Americanization policies; prewar Americanization had relied on persuasion and making American society more hospitable to immigrants, while postwar Americanization used compulsion to require individual immigrants to learn English. The economy’s swift downturn in 1920 and the surprising surge in immigration that year---430,000 entries versus only 131,000 in 1919---caused many business leaders to begin to question the value of industrial Americanization. Factory classes were expensive, a cost that employers thought communities should bear through their adult education programs. Unemployment (of both foreign- and native-born workers) resulting from demobilization, pressure to hire the recently discharged soldier, and fear of alien radicals disrupting the workforce all encouraged business leaders to abandon Americanization and support immigration restriction. Demobilization included federal Americanization. By 1920, the Bureau of Education’s funding for its Immigrant Education Division had been eliminated by a congressional ban on federal agencies receiving private funds and Congress refused to appropriate additional moneys for the Bureau’s Americanization programs. Faced with a lack of funds, the Bureau of Education produced its last issue of the Americanization Bulletin in November 1919 and closed its Americanization Division that fall. The Education Bureau hosted its third and final Americanization conference in May 1919. This conference revealed for the first time a sharp difference in opinion as to just what constituted Americanization, as Father John O’Grady of the National Catholic War Council’s reconstruction committee attacked the conference organizers for excluding AFL leaders. Federal officials’ focus on the perceived threats of Bolshevism and labor radicalism alienated many immigrant leaders and social workers, who wanted a more liberal Americanization program based on prewar ideals of Progressive social welfare protections and the creation of a new American culture through the mutual assimilation of both foreign- and native-born individuals. These Progressive Americanizers were distressed by the nearly exclusive emphasis on English literacy and the lack of consideration of the deep-seated problems of exploitative labor conditions, inadequate housing, and fraud

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology and violence experienced by so many immigrants (Hartmann 1967 [1948], 228). The Bureau of Naturalization’s Americanization program survived but on a much smaller scale, as congressional attention shifted toward immigration restriction. The first quotas were imposed in 1921, and by 1924 the National Origins system was being developed. The Bureaus of Naturalization and Immigration were eventually combined into the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1933, and most of the agency’s resources were shifted to border control and enforcement of immigration restriction. Citizenship and naturalization were afterthoughts. But at least the Bureau of Naturalization could justify its Americanization work in the 1920s in the name of making better citizens, as Congress and superpatriots demanded greater scrutiny of those who were admitted to the franchise. The Bureau of Naturalization continued to collaborate with public schools, promoting night-school programs and distributing textbooks and other citizenship materials to teachers until declining immigration numbers in the late 1920s made the expense unjustifiable. Attacks on state Americanization programs came more slowly than those on federal programs, but were often equally as deadly. The ‘‘return to normalcy’’ brought the conservative wing of the Republican Party into power in many states and these fiscal conservatives objected to the cost and intrusiveness of Progressive Americanization programs, such as visiting teachers and housing inspection. Some liberals also increasingly refused to support compulsory education and employment laws. Between 1919 and 1925, many state Americanization programs struggled to maintain appropriations or found their budgets drastically cut, as fear of radical aliens combined with objections to the high cost and the coercive nature of some programs. In Illinois in 1921, Gov. Len Small slashed the appropriation of the Immigrants Commission to zero after Executive Secretary Grace Abbott refused to submit to his patronage demands. The Immigrants’ Protective League reactivated itself and partnered with Chicago’s women’s clubs and other Progressive organizations in a fruitless campaign to regain public funding for the Immigrants Commission. New York’s Bureau of Industries and Immigration had struggled to find a place for itself in the larger Americanization movement after Frances Kellor left in 1913. But in 1921, the Bureau faced a serious threat in the form of a dramatic reorganization of the state Labor Department. The reorganization transferred the Bureau’s investigative powers to the Department’s Inspection Division, gutting the Americanization

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agency. Although the Bureau of Industries and Immigration regained some responsibilities in 1925, most Americanization work in New York in the 1920s was provided by the state’s Education Department, which naturally focused on adult education. In California in 1923, the Commission on Immigration and Housing barely survived an attack by Gov. Friend W. Richardson, who first tried (unsuccessfully) to eliminate the agency’s budget before removing Labor Commissioner Paul Scharrenberg for lobbying for a stronger housing bill, legislation supported by the entire Commission. Commission President Simon Lubin resigned in protest. With Education Commissioner Mary Gibson’s resignation in 1922 because of ill health, Richardson gained the opportunity to appoint three new commissioners who shared the more conservative values and goals of the business wing of the Republican Party. The California Department of Education took over educational Americanization, including home teaching, in 1921, and in 1927, the Commission was absorbed into the state’s Department of Industrial Relations, eventually becoming California’s Department of Housing. The termination of federal Americanization programs meant that Frances Kellor was without a public vehicle for her ideas about immigrant social welfare policy. But she quickly organized the Inter-Racial Council (IRC) in March 1919 out of the remains of the Committee for Immigrants in America and NAC. Once again, business leaders made up the core membership, and many of the members had supported Kellor’s Americanization ambitions since she joined the North American Civic League for Immigrants’ New York--New Jersey Committee in 1909. Still trying to balance her concern for immigrant welfare with her intolerance for aliens’ resistance to assimilate, Kellor argued that native-born exploitation caused immigrants to embrace Bolshevism and ‘‘IWWism.’’ In an effort to sway immigrant workers away from these ‘‘un-American’’ influences, the IRC turned to the foreign-language press. In 1921, the IRC bought the Association of Foreign-Language Newspapers, which supplied all of the national advertising to the foreign-language press, and began to bombard foreign-language newspapers with propaganda designed to counter radicalism and encourage immigrants to learn English and naturalize. But by the mid-1920s, Progressive Americanizers faced an uphill battle against immigration restriction, nativism, and immigrants’ rejection of the sentiments of 100 percent Americanism that had dominated the Americanization movement during the war. Many

334 Domestic Policy immigrant leaders, especially those active in ethnic societies and foreign-language journalism, had supported and often helped lead the Americanization movement in their communities before the war when Americanization focused on addressing social and economic injustice and politically and culturally integrating immigrants into American society. These upwardly mobile immigrants welcomed the Progressive rhetoric that emphasized the contributions that the foreign born were making to the United States. But when the movement turned coercive, xenophobic, and even violent during the war and the Red Scare, many immigrants and their leaders rejected Americanization as an attack on their cultures, languages, and traditions (Hartmann 1967 [1948], 254--258). The failure of many Americanization programs to reach large numbers of immigrants further encouraged congressional and conservative state legislative attacks on Progressive agencies’ budgets. English-language night-school classes, in particular, had notoriously high dropout rates, with sometimes as many as 80 percent of students failing to complete a course. Other Americanization programs that focused on improving the immigrant’s social environment, such as California’s labor camp inspection program or New York’s immigrant lodging house licensing act, also touched a small minority of the foreign born. Americanization bureaus confronted literally thousands of labor camps and boarding houses that catered to the immigrant working class, and states’ funding for housing regulation was miniscule when compared with the task. The fact that Americanization agencies were able to inspect as many labor camps and tenements as they did each year is impressive. But higher sanitation standards, larger budgets, and more aggressive enforcement of stronger laws would be needed to improve rural and urban housing conditions. Despite these policy failures, Americanization did contribute to the development of a stronger welfare state. Equally as important, the Americanization movement also helped lay the foundations for theories of assimilation, pluralism, and national identity. The fundamental basis of Americanization was the interrelated belief that immigrants were capable of adjusting to a new social environment and that the American environment and institutions could shape immigrants. The most cosmopolitan of Americanizers, such as Simon Lubin, argued that immigrants were helping to create a new American nationality through cultural interaction and intermarriage. But Progressive Americanizers were often vague and unclear about their understandings of the nature and

structure of American culture; was Americanization a process by which a new American culture was created through group interaction? Or did the immigrant assimilate into something already formed, that is, the dominant Anglo-American society, thus implying that the United States already had a distinct culture? Despite talk of mutual assimilation, more often than not, for most Americanizers, Anglo-American culture was to serve as the base, with ‘‘immigrant gifts’’ of culture and ethnic tradition added for flavor. The depth and degree to which immigrants were to contribute was often not clarified; the assumption was that American institutions and values would remain largely unchanged while ‘‘immigrant gifts’’ would be primarily cultural in nature (Lissak 1989). Another, unexpected contributor to theories of assimilation came from immigration restrictionists. According to the Immigration Restriction League and its supporters, the structure of American society was shaped by the nation’s British heritage, and so assimilation of non-Anglo migrants was not possible without significant restriction. High levels of immigration were constantly replenishing existing ethnic enclaves and thus interrupting the assimilative powers of AngloAmerican institutions. Although the restrictionists believed that Anglo-Saxon Protestants could absorb groups culturally, such as Germans and Scandinavians, assimilating Slavs, Jews, and southern Europeans, such as Italians and Greeks, was an entirely different and distasteful proposal. But even restrictionists believed in the power of the American social environment; they either wanted that environment to be permitted to work its assimilationist magic on immigrants, or they feared that too many of the ‘‘wrong’’ kinds of foreign cultures ultimately would change America’s malleable society and culture for the worse (Matthews 1991; Wacker 1991). Some Americanizers, such as Marian K. Clark, Kellor’s replacement at the New York Bureau of Industries and Immigration, even participated in the eugenics movement and argued that only by excluding, deporting, or sterilizing ‘‘defective’’ aliens could the United States effectively absorb the foreign born. The idea was that if America was going to literally create a new nationality by promoting assimilation through intermarriage, then undesirable traits needed to be filtered out first. Otherwise, the American ‘‘melting pot’’ would be contaminated with the genetic dross of Europe. Social science research into assimilation was just beginning in the 1920s. One of the most influential theories came from sociologist Robert E. Park of the University of Chicago. Park described ethnic relations

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology as shaped by a ‘‘race relations cycle’’ composed of four stages: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation (Gleason 1992, 54--56; Kazal 1995, 444-446). For Americanizers such as Jane Addams and Grace Abbott, Park’s theories validated their belief that Americanization should be gentle assistance in adapting and absorbing selective aspects of American culture, resulting in the gradual transformation of society through various forms of social interaction, not the sudden cultural transformation demanded by 100 Percenters. Americanization also contributed to early theories of pluralism, which were developed first in reaction to the Americanization movement and then modified, as sociologists began to study the nation’s various ethnic groups in the 1920s. In 1915, Jewish philosopher Horace Kallen published the article, ‘‘Democracy versus the Melting Pot,’’ in the popular progressive magazine, The Nation. In it, Kallen argued for a ‘‘federation of nationalities,’’ in which no one group would be allowed to dominate, culturally or politically. Although Kallen did not use the term ‘‘cultural pluralism,’’ he described a type of pluralistic society in which each ethnic group was free to pursue its own cultural identity. Building upon Kallen’s ideas, cultural critic Randolph Bourne argued in the 1916 essay, ‘‘TransNational America,’’ for a type of ‘‘cosmopolitan dual nationality,’’ in which a person could be fully American and yet also fully Italian, German, and so on. But Bourne did not clearly articulate this cosmopolitan vision, nor resolve the question of the nature of the second generation, which straddled the two worlds of their parents and their American home, before he died in the 1918--1919 influenza epidemic (Matthews 1991, 161). Kallen and Bourne’s articles stimulated a growing number of scholarly and popular works that examined the concepts of culture, race, and national identity in the 1920s. This theorizing contributed to the ultimate repudiation of racialized ideas about culture. The traditional 19th-century understanding of race and culture had been that culture was the outward expression of inherited genetic characteristics of distinct groups of people, which were hierarchically ranked, with Anglo-Saxons at the top and darker people progressively lower according to skin color. Ethnic groups were viewed as distinct races, biologically predisposed to certain cultural behaviors and values. Thus, ‘‘nationalism was naturalized; and ‘race’ in every sense came to imply a biological determinism’’ (Higham 1984, 46). In the 1920s, the work of social scientists,

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such as Franz Boas, a German Jewish emigre ethnologist at Columbia University, rejected this idea and shifted the focus from race to culture as the primary means of understanding human groups. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the academic community and eventually the general public gradually accepted Boas’ view that a clear distinction existed between race, as a branch of biology, and culture, as learned social behavior and human creativity (Matthews 1991; Gleason 1992). As a social movement and ultimately as public policy, Americanization evolved from settlement houses’ focus on adjustment to life in a complex urban industrial society to the 100 percent Americanizers’ aggressive assault on immigrant life in American society during and immediately after World War I (Hartmann 1967 [1948], 267--271). Despite attempts by Frances Kellor, the NACL, and others to lead the movement, Americanization was seemingly whatever anyone wanted it to be, and different aspects of the movement appealed to groups as diverse as settlement houses, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and corporate welfare industrialists, such as Henry Ford. The shallowness of most Americanization programs developed after 1916 revealed the enormity and complexity of the task and the lack of knowledge and sociological theory regarding immigration and assimilation. Ultimately, the backlash against 100 percent Americanism from immigrants and pluralism advocates helped to check the virulence of American nativism in the 1920s. But a more cosmopolitan view of immigrants and their foreign cultures also declined with postwar disillusionment and dismay at immigrants’ rejection of the hard-sell tactics of 100 percent Americanism. Americanization, like the Progressive movement that had spawned it, faded from national attention in the mid-1920s. When viewed at a macro level, Americanization followed a clear trajectory from relatively benign paternalism and tolerance when it operated at the level of settlement houses and women’s clubs to xenophobia and coercion when Americanization moved to the realm of public policy, particularly of the federal government. But great diversity could be found within the Americanization movement throughout the 1910s and 1920s: men and women; native and foreign born; upper class, middle class, working class; Protestant, Catholic, Jewish; Democrat and Republican; liberal and conservative; cosmopolitan and culturally chauvinistic. Scratch the surface and one will find a movement, public policies, and ideologies as diverse as the United States itself.

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References and Further Reading References Barrett, James R. 1992. ‘‘Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880--1930.’’ Journal of American History 79, no. 3 (December): 996--1020. Breen, William J. 1984. Uncle Sam at Home, Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National Defense, 1917--1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. California Commission of Immigration and Housing. 1918. ‘‘Americanization: The California Program’’ (January). Crocker, Ruth Hutchinson. 1992. Social Work and Social Order, The Settlement Movement in Two Industrial Cities, 1889-1930. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Dubofsky, Melvyn. 1969. We Shall Be All, A History of the Industrial Workers of the World. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Gleason, Phillip. 1992. Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Graham, Otis L., Jr., 1971. The Great Campaigns, Reform and War in America, 1900--1928. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Gullett, Gayle. 1995. ‘‘Women Progressives and the Politics of Americanization in California, 1915--1920.’’ Pacific Historical Review 64, no. 1 (February): 71--94. Hartmann, Edward George. 1967 [1948]. Chapter 1, ‘‘Background of the Americanization Movement.’’ In The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant. New York: AMS Press, Inc.; New York: Columbia University Press [original edition]. Higham, John. 1984. Send These to Me, Immigrants in Urban America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Higham, John. 1994. Strangers in the Land, Patterns of American Nativism. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Kazal, Russell A. 1995. ‘‘Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History.’’ American Historical Review (April): 444--446. Kennedy, David M. 1980. Over Here, The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press. Korman, Gerd. 1967. ‘‘Americanization at the Factory Gate.’’ In Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers, The View from Milwaukee, 1866--1921. Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Lissak, Rivka Shpak. 1989. Pluralism and Progressives: Hull House and the New Immigrants, 1890--1919. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Matthews, F. H. 1991. ‘‘The Revolt against Americanism: Cultural Pluralism and Cultural Relativism as an Ideology of Liberation.’’ In Assimilation, Acculturation, and Social Mobility. Edited by George E. Pozzetta. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. McClymer, John F. 1978. ‘‘The Federal Government and the Americanization Movement, 1915--1924.’’ Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives no. 10 (Spring): 22--41. McClymer, John F. 1980. War and Welfare, Social Engineering in America, 1890--1925. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

McClymer, John F. 1982. ‘‘The Americanization Movement and the Education of the Foreign-born Adult, 1914--25.’’ American Education and the European Immigrant. Edited by Bernard J. Weiss, 96--116. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. McClymer, John F. 1991. ‘‘Gender and the ‘American Way of Life’: Women in the Americanization Movement.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 10, no. 3 (Spring): 3--21. Muncy, Robyn. 1991. Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890--1935. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roosevelt, Theodore. 1920. ‘‘Americanism.’’ Address delivered before the Knights of Columbus, Carnegie Hall, Tuesday Evening, October 12. In Immigration and Americanization, Selected Readings. Edited by Philip Davis, 649. Boston: Ginn & Co. Wacker, R. Fred. 1991. ‘‘Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism in American Social Thought.’’ In Assimilation, Acculturation, and Social Mobility. Edited by George E. Pozzetta. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.

Historiography Abramson, Harold J. 1980. ‘‘Assimilation and Pluralism.’’ In The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Edited by Stephan Thernstrom, 150--160. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gerstle, Gary. 1997. ‘‘Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans.’’ Journal of American History 84, no. 2 (September). Gleason, Philip. 1980. ‘‘American Identity and Americanization.’’ In The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Edited by Stephan Thernstrom, 31--58. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gleason, Philip. 1992. Speaking of Diversity, Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Graham, Otis L., Jr., and Elizabeth Koed. 1993 ‘‘Americanizing the Immigrant, Past and Future: History and Implications of a Social Movement.’’ The Public Historian 15, no. 4 (Fall): 24--45. Pozzetta, George E. ed. 1991a. Assimilation, Acculturation, and Social Mobility. Vol. 13 in American Immigration and Ethnicity. 20 vols. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. Pozzetta, George E. ed. 1991b. Americanization, Social Control, and Philanthropy. Vol. 14 in American Immigration and Ethnicity. 20 vols. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. 1980. The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

History Barrett, James R. 1992. ‘‘Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880--1930.’’ Journal of American History 79, no. 3 (December): 996--1020. Carlson, Robert A. 1987. The Americanization Syndrome: A Quest for Conformity. New York: Croom Helm. Hartmann, Edward George. 1948. The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant. New York: Columbia University Press.

Americanization: Progressive Movement, Public Policy, and Ideology Higham, John. 1994 [1955]. Strangers in the Land, Patterns of American Nativism, 1860--1925. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Gullett, Gayle. 1995. ‘‘Women Progressives and the Politics of Americanization in California, 1915--1920.’’ Pacific Historical Review. 64, no. 1 (February): 71--94. King, Desmond. 2000. Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Korman, Gerd. 1967. Industrialization, Immigrants and Americanizers, The View from Milwaukee, 1866--1921. Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Lissak, Rivka Shpak. 1989. Pluralism and Progressives, Hull House and the New Immigrants, 1890--1919. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McClymer, John F. 1980. War and Welfare, Social Engineering in America, 1890--1925. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. McClymer, John F. 1982. ‘‘The Americanization Movement and the Education of the Foreign-born Adult, 194--25.’’ In American Education and the European Immigrant. Edited by Bernard J. Weiss. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. McClymer, John F. 1991. ‘‘The Federal Government and the Americanization Movement, 1915--1924.’’ In Americanization, Social Control, and Philanthropy. Edited by George E. Pozzetta. New York: Garland Publishing Inc. McClymer, John F. 1991. ‘‘Gender and the ‘American Way of Life’: Women in the Americanization Movement.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 10, no. 3 (Spring): 3--21. Sanchez, George. 1991. ‘‘ ‘Go after the Women’: Americanization and the Mexican Immigrant Woman, 1915--1929.’’ Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in United States Women’s History. Edited by Ellen Carol DuBois and Vicki Ruiz. New York: Routledge, New York.

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Van Nuys, Frank. 2002. Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890--1930. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Theory Conzen, Kathleen Neils, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli. 1992. ‘‘The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 12, no. 4 (Fall): 3--41. Higham, John. 1981. ‘‘Integrating America: The Problem of Assimilation in the Nineteenth Century.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 1, no. 1 (Fall): 7--15. Higham, John. 1982. ‘‘Current Trends in the Study of Ethnicity in the United States.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 2, no. 1 (Fall): 5--15. Higham, John. 1984a. ‘‘Integrating America: The Problem of Assimilation.’’ Chapter 8 in Send These to Me, Immigrants in Urban America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Higham, John. 1984b. ‘‘Ethnic Pluralism in Modern American Thought.’’ Chapter 9 in Send These to Me, Immigrants in Urban America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Kazal, Russell A. 1995. ‘‘Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History.’’ American Historical Review (April): 437--471. Sollors, Werner, ed. 1989. The Invention of Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press, New York. Sollors, Werner, ed. 1996. Theories of Ethnicity, A Classical Reader. New York University Press. Zunz, Olivier. 1985. ‘‘American History and the Changing Meaning of Assimilation.’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 4, no. 2 (1985): 53--71.

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies Melissa Buis Michaux Associate Professor of Politics, Willamette University

fear of the Depression subsided and ‘‘[d]ulled conscience, irresponsibility, and ruthless self-interest’’ rose in its place (1941, 1). So, even as he painted a bleak picture of economic conditions, Roosevelt worried that prosperity would undermine his attempt to complete his transformation of American social policy. Such a dire warning about the threat of prosperity to the progressive agenda must have seemed premature in 1937, when less conservative estimates placed the poverty rate at 40 to 50 percent of the population (Patterson 1986, 42). In fact, most economic planners worried about the absence of prosperity until well after World War II when the predicted massive unemployment failed to materialize. Given the overwhelming public support for the New Deal made manifest in huge Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, there seemed little to threaten FDR’s agenda except perhaps the Supreme Court, which had struck down key provisions of the New Deal in 1935 and 1936. But neither the Supreme Court nor prosperity provided the most important challenge to FDR’s plans. Instead the ‘‘Progressive purpose’’ set by Roosevelt suffered ultimately from a combination of the exigencies of war and political structures, namely, Federalism and the separation of powers, that permitted (or encouraged) anti-Progressive institutions and policy to flourish despite the national triumph of New Deal advocates. A number of southern states and their congressional representatives resisted FDR’s national vision, fragmented the welfare state, and divided citizens in the process

After his landslide reelection victory in 1936, wherein he earned 523 electoral votes after carrying every state except Vermont and Maine, Franklin Roosevelt set an ambitious agenda for his second term. FDR explained in his Second Inaugural Address that although ‘‘we have come far from the days of stagnation and despair’’ during the early Depression, the task of government is incomplete until we ‘‘make every American citizen the subject of his country’s interest and concern.’’ On that score, the nation had far to go. Highlighting the persistence of grinding poverty and inequality, Roosevelt warned: I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family disaster hangs over them day by day. I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions labeled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago. I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better the lot of their children. I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions. I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished. ---(Roosevelt 1937, 1) The goal of rectifying these economic injustices, Roosevelt believed, was even harder in 1937 than in 1933, as 338

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies (Mettler 1998). Divisions in the Progressive coalition, too, helped to undermine national policy. Often where state Progressive leaders had succeeded, they were reticent to trust national institutions. The resultant welfare state neglected major policy areas (like health care) and substantial populations in need (largely women and African Americans). To characterize the New Deal as limited and constrained, however, is not to argue that it was less than transformative. The inability of the Progressives to enact their full vision of reform should not blind us to the significant ways the New Deal reordered American politics by establishing an affirmative duty of the federal government to redress economic insecurity. Furthermore, the combination of contributory social insurance and poverty relief established the fundamental administrative framework for the American welfare state. Through countercyclical entitlement spending and protection in infirmity and old age, the New Deal system of social provision sought to mitigate the effects of a turbulent capitalist system. In the place of ad hoc and irregular charitable social provision, the New Deal institutionalized and regularized social provision.

Stalled Progressive Reforms In 1912, the Progressive Party launched its greatest organizational challenge to the conventional parties, calling for more democratic accountability and enhanced federal and state government power to regulate business, end political corruption, and provide for the general welfare. These two imperatives---for more democracy and stronger government---did not appear to be contradictory impulses to reformers who saw enhanced government as the mechanism for realizing the will of the people. Without such measures to strengthen government, Progressives believed, the common interest and general welfare were victims of power-hungry business and narrow party interests. In their call for ‘‘social and industrial justice,’’ Progressives envisioned ‘‘a system of social insurance’’ that included old age and survivor’s benefits, unemployment, disability, and workers’ compensation (‘‘Progressive Platform of 1912’’). Stymied at the national level, Progressives worked to enact social provision in the states with some significant but ultimately limited success. Most notably, mothers’ pensions or aid to widows raising small children were enacted in 40 states by 1920 (Skocpol, 1992, 424). Such pensions, pushed by women’s groups, were an assault on private charity organizations whose meager provisions often came at great cost to self-respect.

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Furthermore, inadequate charitable provision often meant that poor families who lost the male breadwinner had to rely on child labor or orphanages for their survival. The Progressive solution was to provide ample payment to deserving mothers for the hard work of raising responsible citizens, thereby keeping homes intact, supporting full-time motherhood, and cutting down on juvenile delinquency. Unfortunately, while states were quick to enact mothers’ pensions legislation, adequate funding was slow to follow. In the end, as Theda Skocpol explains, ‘‘Inadequate funds, handled by social service workers who were trying to demonstrate the worth of their programs to a skeptical and tightfisted public, inevitably made mothers’ pension programs more and more like traditional poor relief or charity, with their burdensome and demeaning regulations and investigations’’ Skocpol, 1992, 475). Mothers’ pensions failed to live up to the promise of advocates for more universal, more compassionate state support. Other strides toward social welfare reform during the Progressive Era included the first public housing, state workmen’s compensation laws, and a variety of public health programs (Davis 1967). Of the three, state workmen’s compensation laws were probably the most successful; at least 37 states had enacted such laws by the end of the Progressive Era where they contributed to improvements in workplace safety (Keller 1994, 202). However, despite a flurry of new state welfare laws during the Progressive Era, state welfare expenditures stayed virtually the same between 1902 and 1913, when adjusted for inflation (Keller 1994, 186). World War I spurred concerted action on the part of governments for the general welfare, leading one social reformer to declare: ‘‘ ‘Laissez-faire is dead,’ ’’ and to predict the continuation of social experimentation long after the war (quoted in Davis 1967, 520). Instead, Progressives were greatly disappointed and confronted an abandonment of social insurance after the war. What few programs survived suffered from insufficient funding and poor coverage. One-time presidential candidate and later chief justice of the Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes, observed: ‘‘Our government is the most successful contrivance the world has ever known for preventing things from being done’’ (quoted in Keller, 1999, 126).1 His statement summarized the frustrations of many Progressives who found the structure of federalism and the national system of checks and balances powerful forces against change. The Supreme Court provoked the ire of Progressives nearly as much as concentrated economic power and corrupt political parties. As Wisconsin’s Senator Robert LaFollette remarked, ‘‘the judiciary

340 Domestic Policy has grown to be the most powerful institution in our government. It, more than any other, may advance or retard human progress. Evidence abounds that, as constituted today, the courts pervert justice almost as often as they administer it’’ (quoted in Ingram, 82 Or. L. Rev. 779 [2003]). Faced with Supreme Court invalidations of progressive labor legislation and economic regulation, reformers condemned the court for undermining democracy (quoted in Ingram, 82 Or. L. Rev. 780 [2003]). Therefore, the Progressive Party Platform of 1912 called for ‘‘a more easy and expeditious method of amending the Federal Constitution’’ as well as a restriction on the judicial review power of the courts (‘‘Progressive Platform of 1912’’). Specifically, Progressives advocated a referendum on state laws held unconstitutional by the courts, hoping to utilize democratic remedies against constitutional constraints. Such bold attempts to remake the constitutional system failed and left state and national government power largely contained. However, the devastation caused by the Great Depression suspended normal politics. The Great Depression illustrated, in a dramatic fashion, the inadequacies of the American system. In fact, the world economic crisis raised grave doubts about the viability of republican government in general. As one British historian observed, ‘‘In 1931, men and women all over the world were seriously contemplating and frankly discussing the possibility that the Western system of society might break down and cease to exist’’ (Arnold Toynbee quoted in Leuchtenburg 1995). Calls for radical action and reform reverberated throughout the nation.

The New Deal Vision Campaigning for the presidency in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt moved well beyond Progressive calls for constitutional reform, seeking instead to remake American politics by developing ‘‘an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order’’ based on new social conditions. Appealing to a ‘‘greater social contract,’’ Roosevelt argued for the need of ‘‘distributing wealth and products more equitably,’’ securing work and a livelihood for the willing, and providing a place of safety for every individual. Reconciliation to the larger principles of government meant recognition that ‘‘[t]he issue of Government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of Government or economics, or whether a system of Government and economics exists to serve individual men and women’’ (Roosevelt 1932).2

FDR later argued that the Constitution is a ‘‘layman’s document, not a lawyer’s contract’’ and therefore contained the necessary flexibility to change with time and circumstance. Roosevelt placed the debates on the interpretation of the Constitution within an historical context: ‘‘But for one hundred and fifty years we have had an unending struggle between those who would preserve this original broad concept of the Constitution as a layman’s instrument of government and those who would shrivel the Constitution into a lawyer’s contract’’ (Roosevelt 1937). The remaking of American politics that Roosevelt engaged in did not involve constitutional amendment, but executive persuasion, new administrative structures, and enhanced national capacity. However, in maintaining the constitutional order, Roosevelt ultimately sacrificed more coherent and universal policies. Specifically, the prominent role given to the states for allocation of relief and administration of poverty programs resulted in both the misuse of funds and the perpetuation of antidemocratic hierarchies, especially in the South. In March 1933, when Roosevelt took office, onethird of the workforce was unemployed; all banks were closed in 32 states and banking activity was curtained in the remaining states. Americans were losing their farms and did not have food for themselves or their livestock. A severe drought in 1933 worsened conditions. One journalist remarked, ‘‘When you drive through the Middle West drought country you try not to look at the thrusting out ribs of the horses and cows, but you get so you can’t see anything else but ribs, like hundreds of thousands of little beached hulks. It looks like the bones are rising right up out of the skin’’ (Le Sueur 1934). Municipalities and state governments were unable to provide adequate poor relief; the bread lines were long and rioting began to break out in urban areas. States and localities were literally running out of money and were unable to raise more revenue. Within five days of assuming office, Roosevelt took decisive and drastic action by closing the banks and preventing the flow of gold out of the country (Stein 1969, 40). Having averted a major monetary crisis, Roosevelt next turned to providing emergency relief. Just two months after his inauguration, FDR signed the Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) and placed Progressive social worker Harry Hopkins in charge of distributing grants to states for direct relief. ‘‘Hopkins, wasting no time, spent more than $5 million in his first two hours in office’’ (Patterson 1986, 57). Initially, states were required to match three dollars for every one dollar of federal aid but the matching scheme broke down, leaving the federal government with the

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies bulk of the relief burden. Between 1933 and 1935, FERA distributed more than $3.25 billion for immediate, direct relief through state and local governments (Amenta 1998, 73). Concurrently, Roosevelt sought to provide relief through work with the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC employed men in reforestation and flood control projects designed to enhance the nation’s natural resources while providing 250,000 immediate jobs. In a fireside radio chat, FDR noted that such an undertaking was, in fact, a massive endeavor for the federal government since the CCC meant ‘‘feeding, clothing and caring for nearly twice as many men as we have in the regular army itself’’ (Roosevelt 1933). The effort involved the Departments of Labor, War, Agriculture, and Interior. Unmarried men ages 18 to 25 were recruited from the relief rolls to work in camps for one year in 1,300 sites across the country (Schlesinger 1959, 337--338). By the end of the CCC in 1942, the program had employed more than 2.5 million young men (Schlesinger 1959, 339). Building on the success of the CCC, Roosevelt created an even larger jobs program through executive order to employ men in the winter of 1933--1934. The Civilian Works Administration (CWA) provided a range of jobs on projects largely chosen by the states for road construction, public works of art, school buildings, airports, park and playground development, and teaching. Recruitment was not difficult: ‘‘[s]ome nine million people applied for two million positions by the end of [1933]’’ (Amenta 1998, 75). The CWA lasted less than four months, but in that time, it employed 4 million people and resulted in approximately 500,000 miles of roads, 40,000 new or improved schools, nearly 500 new airports, and countless parks, playgrounds, and swimming pools (Schlesinger 1959, 270; Amenta 1998, 74--75). Like the CCC, the CWA embodied Roosevelt’s preference for work relief over direct cash payments and presaged the creation of a more comprehensive public employment plan. Such public works schemes had the advantage of meeting two urgent necessities, building and enhancing the nation’s infrastructure and, in Roosevelt’s words, ‘‘relieving an appreciable amount of actual distress’’ (1933). Clearly, Roosevelt was concerned with meeting actual need in these emergency measures, but almost as important, he argued that relieving distress was necessary for restoring public confidence. The battle against the Depression had to be fought, he believed, on the psychological front as well as the economic. In the fall of 1934, Roosevelt defended his focus on public jobs in another fireside radio chat:

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Civilian Conservation Corps recruitment poster. The CCC was a centerpiece of FDR’s effort to address the massive unemployment problem in the 1930s. (Library of Congress)

To those who say that our expenditures for Public Works and other means for recovery are a waste that we cannot afford, I answer that no country, however rich, can afford the waste of its human resources. Demoralization caused by vast unemployment is our greatest extravagance. Morally, it is the greatest menace to our social order. Some people try to tell me that we must make up our minds that for the future we shall permanently have millions of unemployed just as other countries have had them for over a decade. What may be necessary for those countries is not my responsibility to determine. But as for this country, I stand or fall by my refusal to accept as a necessary condition of our future a permanent army of unemployed. On the contrary, we must make it a national principle that we will not tolerate a large army of unemployed and that we will arrange our national economy to end our

342 Domestic Policy present unemployment as soon as we can and then to take wise measures against its return. I do not want to think that it is the destiny of any American to remain permanently on relief rolls (1934). So while direct and immediate relief through FERA was necessary during the crisis, it could not provide the proper foundation for Roosevelt’s new economic constitutional order. The ‘‘dole’’ left people idle and unfulfilled. Cash payments to the states for relief had the further disadvantage of being filtered through inefficient (and often corrupt) state and local governments. For true security, the New Dealers turned to an expanded system of national public employment and social insurance.

Bold Initiatives: Social Insurance and Employment After the midterm elections of 1934, Roosevelt turned his administration’s attention to broader recovery through reform, not merely relief. This shift in emphasis was clearly laid out in FDR’s 1935 State of the Union address, in which he explained that although progress had been made through emergency measures, the goal of the administration was security of livelihood and from the ‘‘major hazards and vicissitudes of life,’’ a phrase that was repeated in a number of Roosevelt’s speeches. Despite defending the need for direct emergency relief, FDR fought to distinguish between cash aid (relief) and the reform goal of public employment (work): The lessons of history, confirmed by the evidence immediately before me, show conclusively that continued dependence upon relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the national fibre. To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit. It is inimical to the dictates of sound policy. It is in violation of the traditions of America. Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute workers (1938a, 15). Public employment was not charity, not the same as governmental aid, but the realization of a right to security through one’s livelihood. In recasting the work program this way, FDR hoped to ensure the program’s future from the ‘‘traditions of America’’ in local, inadequate, and stigmatized social provision. State and local governments could resume authority over relief efforts, but the right to work demanded the protection and resource coordination of the federal government.

Less than two weeks after the State of the Union speech in which FDR outlined his bold plan for a more comprehensive and expanded public works program that would employ the able-bodied, Roosevelt delivered a message to Congress on his plans for ‘‘Social Security’’ (1938b, 43). This system of social insurance, Roosevelt argued, must include the following: unemployment compensation, old age benefits, federal aid for mothers’ pensions, and federal aid to local public health agencies. The goal was prevention of future distress, to lay the foundation for mitigating future depressions, and to institutionalize the role of the national government in protecting its citizens from economic insecurity. Together, with a system of comprehensive public employment (Works Progress Administration) and one of social insurance (Social Security), the New Deal promised to create a new social contract that guaranteed a positive role for government in protecting individual rights to economic benefits.

Public Employment Understanding the limits in the United States to acceptance of a broad program of cash relief, New Dealers sought to provide a positive role for the federal government in relieving economic hardship that could not be classified as charity. Public employment on public works became the answer. Roosevelt asked for and received nearly free reign from Congress to identify and fund public works projects and, in May 1935, created the Works Progress Administration (WPA) by executive order (Amenta et al. 1998, 11). To complete the transition from relief to work reform, the administration disbanded FERA, and Hopkins moved over to head up the WPA. Over and over again, the president and New Deal advocates emphasized the difference between work initiatives and the ‘‘dole.’’ While the dole undermined American values, work reinforced them. Cash and inkind ‘‘handouts’’ sapped the public spirit; public works produced enhancements to natural resources and the nation’s infrastructure, the benefits of which would pay for itself over time. Relief was given to ‘‘destitutes;’’ the WPA focused on ‘‘employables.’’ As a WPA administrator Ellen Woodward echoed the Roosevelt refrain that traditional relief begets as many problems as it solves: ‘‘This, in a word, is the first aim of the Works Progress Administration: To put destitute people to work at familiar tasks, that their moral fibre may not be undermined and their hopes and ambitions killed, by the forced acceptance of public charity in the form of a dole’’ (Woodward, Record Group 69, National Archive).

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies As a reform, and not merely recovery, measure, the WPA was intended to provide a more permanent model for social provision. The need for permanent reform was highlighted by another recession in 1937. With declines in industrial production, rising unemployment and a sharp turn down in the stock market, Roosevelt agreed with Hopkins and other pro-spending New Dealers to abandon budget balancing and to try to stimulate consumption through governmental spending (Stein 1969, 109). As a result, by 1938, the United States committed 29.4 percent of its spending to social provision, equaling more than 6 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP); these numbers represent significantly more social spending by the United States than Germany, the United Kingdom, France, or Sweden at the same time (Amenta et al. 1998, 16). A year later, the WPA budget equaled $1.57 billion and represented 46 percent of all U.S. social spending (Amenta et al. 1998, 17). Perhaps more impressive than just the spending, the WPA supported an incredible range of projects from

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road construction to community theater and reached into all corners of the nation. Under Hopkins’ management, the WPA sponsored the construction of schools and sewers but also kept American culture alive through public subsidization of art, music, and historical record preservation. The public works program engaged in projects big and small all across the country, from small mining towns to big cities like Chicago and New York. New Dealer William Pryor documented the work of the WPA in one small mining town, Carbon Hill, Alabama. According to Pryor, before the WPA came to town, Carbon Hill had one paved road and a water, but not sewer, system. Carbon Hill got a sewer system. The WPA built sidewalks, paved roads, cleaned ditches, and constructed a high school building, a swimming pool, and an athletic field. Importantly for public health, the WPA drained a number of abandoned mines that had been a breeding ground for malaria-infected mosquitoes. Pryor’s assessment frankly concluded:

Their means of livelihood from the soil cut off by drought, these farmers are reporting to work on a Works Progress Administration water conservation project near Pierre, South Dakota, in the 1930s. (UPI/Bettmann/Corbis)

344 Domestic Policy These improvements have made Carbon Hill a healthier and a pleasanter town than it was, although there still is much to be done especially in the matter of paving to relieve the awful redrock dust. Carbon Hill was and is an ugly town as most coal mining towns are and the improvements have not and could not make it beautiful (Pryor 1938). Beautification aside, public works in Carbon Hill clearly and dramatically improved life for its residents. As critical as public work was to realizing the New Deal vision of providing a right to livelihood, the WPA was inadequate to address the broader issue of ensuring long-term economic security. A crucial component of FDR’s new economic order included federal programs for the unemployables, largely the elderly and families without a male breadwinner.

Social Insurance Much more than the public employment scheme, social insurance had strong roots in the Progressive Era. Attempts to enact unemployment insurance at the state level, however, failed in all except one state. The history of old-age pensions was just as bleak. Compared with Germany, Britain, and France, which all adopted old-age pension plans between 1889 and 1910, the United States relied on a mix of private charity, employer, Civil War, union, and fraternal pension plans (Keller 1994, 188--189). Although Civil War pension payments grew quite large (even by European standards), by 1929 one-quarter of all elderly persons were poor (Keller 1994, 189). Summing up the state of the social insurance movement prior to the New Deal, historian Morton Keller found By 1929 some three hundred state old age pension acts had been introduced since the first one appeared in Massachusetts in 1903; sixteen states had appointed twenty-six investigating committees on the subject. Yet only six laws, in practice providing almost no pensions, were on the books (Keller 1994, 190). Social insurance, then, promised to complete an important element of the Progressive agenda in the creation of national social provision for long-term security. Designing national social insurance proved to be a complicated task. In fact, only old-age pensions, established as a contributory plan, were wholly national in character. Unemployment insurance and mothers’ pensions retained strong state administrative controls.

Although all three programs---old-age pensions, unemployment, and mothers’ pensions---were included in the Social Security Act of 1935, in the early 21st century, the public distinguishes between ‘‘Social Security’’ and ‘‘welfare.’’ For Roosevelt, protecting every man, woman and child from the vicissitudes of life involved a broad understanding of social security. Old-age pensions embodied most strongly the national vision for social insurance. Seeking to insulate old-age pensions from annual congressional appropriations, the administration funded the program through employee and employer matching contributions. Roosevelt calculated that having workers see their contribution to the pension system through payroll reductions would reinforce the notion of social insurance to which they had an individual right. The redistributive element of the pension plan would be somewhat hidden in a scale that rewarded higher contributions with higher benefits. Finally, this program would tie individual economic security directly to the federal government with a national administrative board instead of states as mediators. Hence, the policy design of old-age pensions reinforced the sense of national social citizenship, wherein economic rights are earned through work and are uniform across the country (Mettler 1998). The universal nature of old-age pensions helped to establish cash payments to the aged who had worked as ‘‘insurance,’’ although as an economic matter of funding, they resembled other government programs in which taxes were assessed from the many and benefits awarded to the few. Since old-age pensions were insurance into which employees had contributed, they could not be part of the enervating dole. As a result, our national system of old-age pensions (what we now call Social Security), proved to be the most enduring bedrock of the New Deal through widespread public support. The Progressive program of mothers’ pensions, however, was translated in the Social Security Act to Aid to Families and Dependent Children (AFDC). Whereas a pension is self-supporting income earned because of prior service, aid is given to the poor. New Dealers hoped to keep ADC from general critiques of relief by emphasizing that such benefits were going to children, particularly children who lost their breadwinning father. But ADC proved to be a more vulnerable program because of the tremendous administrative discretion left to states to establish eligibility and set benefit levels. Although states had pioneered mothers’ pensions, they were never well funded and mothers often had to demonstrate their fitness for aid. Variability across the states

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies was far from the model of national social insurance provided by old-age pensions. The authors of the ADC program, however, thought that with increased national funding, states and localities would still be in the best position to deliver the necessary services to widows and their families (Mettler 1998, 128--132). In fact, this important administrative decision left women and poor children subject to local power structures that discriminated between deserving and undeserving women. Deserving women were widows who kept their houses immaculately clean and attended church; the undeserving represented nearly anyone who strayed from that ideal and against whom the state wished to discriminate. Like ADC, Unemployment Insurance (UI) also required state administration. Unlike ADC, however, UI could not build from existing state programs. Instead, as Suzanne Mettler argues, the policy design of UI enhanced speedy implementation at the state level with greater uniformity ‘‘changing the character of the policy until it approximated, for its male beneficiaries, a national right of citizenship’’ (Mettler 1998, 149). While ADC provided federal matching grants to states, UI was funded through a nationally uniform tax on employers, which meant that states had every incentive to recoup the tax money levied on their employers but collected by the national government (Mettler 1998, 146). Finally, only ADC went to the needy. Both old-age pensions and unemployment benefits were made available to all income groups, regardless of need. In fact, generally, the more one paid into pensions or insurance, the more one received in benefits. In practice, that meant that ADC beneficiaries were subject to intrusive investigations into their possible means of support. Home visiting served as a social worker tool to better serve clients but also to observe their habits of housework, spending, and additional sources of support. Together, old-age pensions, ADC, and UI, laid the essential framework for the modern American welfare state. Social Security represented a tremendous improvement in securing an economic safety net for American citizens over the piecemeal and scattered provisions of the Progressive Era. Even more important, future expansions of the welfare state largely respected and enhanced the administrative apparatus established by the Social Security Act, often enshrining its limitations for future generations.

Limits of the New Deal As groundbreaking as both the WPA and the Social Security Act were in establishing a national framework

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for social welfare provision, both programs contained important limitations and represented political compromises necessitated by the structure of the American polity. Despite Progressive Era fears about an allpowerful court, the Supreme Court was not the greatest threat to Roosevelt’s vision of a new economic order. Although it is true that the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the New Deal in 1935--1936, especially those related to industrial and agricultural planning and price setting, the Court did not curtail relief, work supports, or social insurance. In fact, after 1937, the Court essentially upheld the expanded role for the federal government in economic regulation and social provision. Instead, the separation of powers and federalism worked to constrain the New Deal. Geographic, instead of programmatic, representation in Congress meant a powerful role for a South that was still clinging mightily to hierarchical structures in the face of the New Deal’s egalitarian impulses. By maintaining such a powerful role for the states in social provision, the American welfare state contained significant gaps in coverage. Finally, the New Deal’s most ambitious vision for full employment through public works was ultimately undermined by war and the transformation of the nation from a welfare to a warfare state.

Separation of Powers and Federalism While FDR enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action from Congress in the first 100 days of his administration and benefited from huge Democratic majorities in Congress after 1934, the fact that individual congress members (they were overwhelmingly men) did not owe their election directly to Roosevelt meant that party majority did not always translate to party coherence. In fact, overrepresentation of the South and the rural South at that, meant that many New Deal programs, including the WPA and Social Security, deviated from Roosevelt’s goal of ‘‘mak[ing] every American citizen the subject of his country’s interest and concern.’’ Even the most universalistic aspects of the New Deal---the WPA and old-age pensions---were designed in ways that excluded certain groups, namely women and African Americans. Because most of the southern states kept African Americans from voting through legal (poll taxes and literacy tests) and extralegal (violence, intimidation, and economic reprisals) means, white Southerners enjoyed disproportionate power in Congress until after 1965. Seniority rules in Congress further enhanced southern power since the South experienced little party

346 Domestic Policy competition. The Democratic hold on the South meant that unchallenged southern incumbents grew to national prominence and dominated committee chairs. While many New Dealers were elected to Congress in 1934, conservative southern Democrats placed important restrictions on the scope and depth of New Deal policies. By 1937, conservatives within the party openly defied the president and sought actively to curb expansions of the New Deal agenda (Milkis 1993, 79--80). Opposition to the Social Security Act in 1935 was muted in Congress; after all, much more radical proposals for old-age pensions and unemployment relief were gaining ground. The Roosevelt administration proposed nationally uniform pensions to workers who contributed to the system through payroll taxes. Labor Secretary Francis Perkins insisted that old-age pensions cover workers at the lowest end of the pay scale, including domestics and agricultural workers. Conservatives in Congress, however, sought to replace the national structure with state-run pension plans and variable occupational coverage. In the end, the administration accepted restrictions on beneficiaries to retain national control and uniformity. The exclusion of domestics, agricultural workers, temporary workers, religious, and nonprofit organizations meant that female workers were largely left out of the most generous social insurance plan. Ninety percent of African American women worked in domestic or agricultural jobs. Women of all races accounted for the vast majority of religious and nonprofit workers (Mettler 1998, 65, 72--73). Congress did not set the terms for the administration of the WPA since it was created by executive order and African American men appeared to fare better under the WPA than under the old-age pension plan that excluded agricultural work. A greater proportion of African Americans worked in the WPA than worked in private jobs and likely received better wages there (Amenta 1998, 158). Public employment plans, however, really did not target women. Women certainly benefited from WPA jobs, but the program also came under ‘‘some of the most vitriolic and uncalled-for criticism’’ in its employment of women (Woodward, Record Group 69, National Archives). The rule that only one person per household could receive public employment served to reinforce the male breadwinner role at the expense of paid female work (Amenta et al. 1998, 23--24). Given the perceived unsuitability of women for many kinds of construction work, the WPA struggled to find relevant community projects. Conservative congressional preference for state over national administration found little resistance in the

case of ADC. Because a large number of states had already enacted mothers’ pension plans, fortifying existing legislation appeared to be the most expeditious way to bring quick relief. As Mettler persuasively argues, the decision to build on the existing structure of mothers’ pensions represented, in part, a failure of vision for officials in the Children’s Bureau who were used to working with small sums of money and state structures (Mettler 1998, 131--132). But state administration also served to appease southern conservatives in Congress who feared a national program of aid to poor mothers with dependent children for its effect on the local political economy and racial power dynamics. The southern system of sharecropping and cotton production required a cash-poor labor pool. As sociologist Jill Quadagno explains, ‘‘Southerners simply would not allow the federal government to dictate standards or set benefit levels. They sought control over any social program that might threaten white domination, so precariously balanced on cotton production’’ (Quadagno 1994, 21--22). In the end, Congress eliminated what few national standards ADC advocates had hoped to retain. If New Dealers sought to build on the Progressive mothers’ pensions in enacting ADC, the reality of state implementation frustrated their hopes. ADC remained a low priority for states and it remained chronically underfunded and marginalized. The desire of reformers to preserve state and local administration to better inject social work into the ADC program largely failed and national advocates had few levers in the policy design to encourage recalcitrant states (Gordon 1994, 101--102). Instead of a program of ‘‘social security’’ for children, ADC represented a stigmatized form of cash relief as states set eligibility restrictions based on subjective and arbitrary definitions of fitness and need. Given that most of the southern states in the 1930s and 1940s could not properly be called democratic regimes because of their suppression of the African American vote, reliance on state administration for ADC seems especially egregious. State administration largely reinforced racial and class hierarchy. Southern states routinely eliminated ADC payments during harvest times, forcing women and their children into menial, low-wage farm work. In addition, African American women were ‘‘systematically deprived to access to ADC benefits: In 1937--40 only 14--17 percent of recipients were black, far below the proportion of their need’’ (Gordon 1994, 276). Even ‘‘deserving’’ mothers received inadequate relief payments; ‘‘In 1940 the Alabama monthly average was $13.63, compared to $32.39 nationally’’ (Gordon 1994, 276).

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies The exclusion of so many of the most marginalized in society made the New Deal radically incomplete in its promise to protect every man, woman, and child from the vicissitudes of life and to usher in a new economic constitutional order. In defense of the New Dealers, few could have predicted the political difficulties they would face in spite of FDR’s landslide reelection victory in 1936. However, resistance to the New Deal’s national agenda grew concertedly after 1937, making impossible other programmatic expansions like health care or family allowances of the kind found in Europe. If New Dealers could not be expected to know that 1935 represented the height of their influence, they also might be excused for not predicting the role of the emerging world war on their New Deal programs.

World War II U.S. entrance into World War II had the paradoxical effect of both ending the New Deal and enshrining for posterity many of its features, including an enhanced role for the federal government and an enlarged budget. Without the war, opponents of Social Security and countercyclical spending might have gained power and reversed course. Mobilization for the war, however, required even greater national government capacity and ultimately marked the United States as a world leader such that the national government could not be seriously undone. On the other hand, World War II dramatically changed the focus of government, diverting resources and changing mind-sets about the possibilities for activist government. Significantly, the advent of the war brought the end of the New Deal’s public employment programs. Wartime mobilization consumed the able-bodied and the nation quickly faced the need to generate more workers for industrial production. Full employment during the war need not have permanently derailed the WPA, however. Widespread fear of unemployment after the war persisted such that even Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey in 1944 supported the goal of full employment and emphatically endorsed public jobs to reach it (Stein 1969, 173--174). After the war, social policy was once again directed at veterans through the G.I. Bill and the full-employment commitment subsided. Other policies on the New Deal agenda like health care would take another couple of decades to resurface and then only in ways that largely reinforced the role of private health insurance. Historian Alan Brinkley suggests that the rise of totalitarianism in Europe changed the liberal mind-set, making the collective enterprise represented by the New Deal and its activist national government more

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difficult to support. The large administrative state had always been anathema to American concepts of limited self-government. However, after the war, the liberal Left increasingly critiqued the bureaucratic ‘‘managerial state’’ that sought to order economic and social relations in favor of greater democratic control and personal freedom (Brinkley 1995, 154--155, 164--165). At the very least, prosecution of the war greatly diverted the attention of Roosevelt and his administration. War mobilization required bipartisan and business cooperation as well as tremendous coordination across government agencies. The need for national action was clearly apparent, but not necessarily for pushing innovative social policies. Since Roosevelt did not finish his fourth term in office, we cannot know whether he would have returned to the New Deal agenda after the war. However, by the time of his death in 1945, congressional resistance to universal, big government expansions of the welfare state was strong. While the war seemed to scuttle expansions of the welfare state and thoroughly undermined its extensive program of public employment, the world crisis solidified the role of the U.S. government in taxation and spending and underlined the need for a strong national government. The war probably saved Social Security---from liberals on the Left who wanted to replace it with a more generous system and from conservatives on the Right who wanted to dismantle it--by placing it farther down on the political agenda (Sparrow 1996, 57). Reform would come to Social Security through amendment not wholesale revision (see Derthick 1990).

Conclusion: The New Deal Policy Legacy The Social Security Act remains the foundation of the American welfare state, supplemented in the 1960s with health insurance for the poor (Medicaid) and aged (Medicare). Social provision in the United States remains largely categorical or targeted instead of universal. The welfare state continues divided between relatively high benefit, nationally uniform social insurance, and largely residual, stigmatized relief or ‘‘welfare.’’ The greatest success of New Deal social policy was in enhancing the incomes of the elderly poor. While originally structured in a way that left out the most vulnerable members of society---women and African Americans---national administration of old-age pensions resulted in uniform expansions across previously excluded occupations with rights of survivorship. As Social Security expenditures rose, elderly poverty

348 Domestic Policy decreased dramatically (‘‘Social Security and Elderly Poverty’’ 2006). Women are still disadvantaged because they are less likely than men to have paid into the system, but female workers on the whole are not exempt from national social insurance as it was originally devised. In the case of old-age pensions, incremental policies worked toward greater and greater inclusivity. Benefits remain largely generous and the program enjoys widespread popular support. ADC similarly retained its essential structure of state administration with federal grants to states for maintaining the program with few national standards for eligibility or benefit level. In fact, under the current program of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (which replaced the successor to ADC in 1996), national ‘‘standards’’ consist of restrictions on aid through a national five-year time limit. Such categorical assistance for families with dependent children remains highly stigmatized as ‘‘welfare’’ instead of social insurance. In the early 21st century, children have the highest rates of poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).3 While the New Deal made tremendous strides in ensuring a role for the federal government in responding to economic distress, its elevation of work over relief and its perpetuation of state administration for poverty programs left the country’s neediest citizens without a common institutional platform for reform. Furthermore, while retired workers could claim a right to social security due to past contributions, welfare recipients lacked a corresponding language of entitlement. As historian Linda Gordon notes, ‘‘Social Security did not create inequality in social citizenship but solidified it’’ (1994, 293). Given the promises for a new economic constitutional order, the limitations of the New Deal are disappointing. We continue to live with the consequences.

References and Further Reading Abramovitz, Mimi. 1996. Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present. South End Press. Amenta, Edwin. 1998. Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Amenta, Edwin, Ellen Benoit, Chris Bonastia, Nancy Cauthen, and Drew Halfmann. 1998. ‘‘Bring Back the WPA: Work, Relief, and the Origins of American Social Policy in Welfare Reform.’’ Studies in American Political Development 12 (Spring): 11. Brinkley, Alan. 1995. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War. New York: Vintage Books.

Davis, Allen F. 1967. ‘‘Welfare, Reform and World War I.’’ American Quarterly 19 (3): 516--533. Derthick, Martha. 1990. Agency under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Gordon, Linda. Pitied but not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare. New York: The Free Press, 1994. Ingram, Steven. ‘‘Taking Liberties with Lochner: The Supreme Court, Workmen’s Compensation, and the Struggle to Define Liberty in the Progressive Era.’’ 82 Or. L. Rev. 779. Keller, Morton. 1994. Regulating a New Society: Public Policy and Social Change in America, 1900--1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keller, Morton. 1999. ‘‘Social and Economic Regulation in the Progressive Era.’’ In Progressivism and the New Democracy. Edited by Sidney Milkis and Jerome Mileur, 126. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Le Sueur, Meridel. 1934. ‘‘The Cows and Horses are Hungry.’’ Originally published in American Mercury (September 1934). The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal. feri.org/voices/voce03.htm. Leuchtenburg, William. 1995. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy. New York: Columbia University Press. Mettler, Suzanne. 1998. Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Milkis, Sidney M. 1993. The President and the Parties. New York: Oxford University Press. Milkis, Sidney M. 1993. The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal. New York: Oxford University Press. Patterson, James T. 1986. America’s Struggle Against Poverty 1900--1985. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ‘‘Progressive Platform of 1912.’’ Available at http://teaching americanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=607 (accessed January 5, 2006). Pryor, William. ‘‘A New Deal for Carbon Hill, Alabama.’’ National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the WPA, ‘‘Miscellaneous Records of the Photography Division,’’ RG 69, E 696, Box 2. The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/carbonhill/06.htm (accessed January 4, 2006). Quadagno, Jill. 1994. The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1932. ‘‘New Conditions Impose New Requirements upon Government and Those Who Conduct Government.’’ Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the Commonwealth Club. San Francisco, California. September 23. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933. ‘‘Outlining the New Deal Program,’’ May 7. Available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/050733.html. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1934 ‘‘On Moving Forward to Greater Freedom and Greater Security,’’ September 30. Available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/093034.html. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1937. ‘‘Address on Constitution Day, Washington DC,’’ September 17. The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/court/fdr03.htm. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1938a. ‘‘Annual Message to Congress, 1935,’’ January 4. The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1935a.htm (accessed March

Institutionalizing the Welfare State: The New Deal and Its Legacies 9, 2006). Reprinted in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 4. New York: Random House. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1938b. ‘‘A Message to Congress on Social Security,’’ January 17. The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1935b.htm (accessed March 9, 2006). Reprinted in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 4. New York: Random House. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1941. ‘‘Second Inaugural Address,’’ January 20, 1937. The New Deal Network. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1937a.htm. Reprinted in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 2. New York: MacMillan Company, 1941. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.1959. The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ‘‘Social Security and Elderly Poverty.’’ NBER Web site. Available at http://www.nber.org/aginghealth/summer04/ w10466.html (accessed March 13, 2006).

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Sparrow, Bartholomew. 1996. From the Outside In: World War II and the American State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stein, Herbert. 1969. The Fiscal Revolution in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. U.S. Census Bureau. 2004. ‘‘Current Population Survey 2004.’’ Available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/ poverty04/pov04fig04.pdf (accessed March 13, 2006). Weir, Margaret, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1988. The Politics of Social Policy in the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Woodward, Ellen. ‘‘The Lasting Values of the WPA,’’ National Archives, WPA Papers, Record Group 69, Series 737, Box 8. Available at http://newdeal.feri.org/works/wpa01.htm.

Notes 1. Hughes lost to Woodrow Wilson in 1916. 2. For a discussion of the meaning of the Commonwealth Club address, see Milkis (1993, 39--50). 3. The poverty rate for children in 2004 was 17.8 percent.

Truman and the Fair Deal Sean Savage Professor of Political Science, Saint Mary’s College (Notre Dame, Indiana)

21-Point Program announced on September 6, 1945, his advocacy of the Employment Act of 1946, his various other domestic policy proposals, and his campaign speeches of 1948, Truman had committed himself and his party to protecting and expanding such New Deal policies as higher minimum wages, Social Security benefits, public power and reclamation projects, and union rights. By the time of the 1948 campaign, though, it was evident that Truman’s presidency and party leadership wanted Democratic liberalism to extend beyond protecting the policy legacy of the New Deal from the hostility of a Republican-controlled Congress and its bipartisan conservative coalition. In particular, Truman’s liberal policy agenda sought to achieve three especially difficult policy goals: civil rights laws, national health insurance, and federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Even though he failed to achieve congressional passage of these proposals, Truman’s persistent rhetoric and efforts on their behalf permanently ingrained them into the ideology and policy goals of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, thus influencing the policy priorities of future Democratic presidents and liberal Democrats in Congress (Hamby, 1985, 91--92). In the period immediately after the 1948 election, Truman repeatedly asserted that the voters had provided a mandate for this liberal policy agenda, which he identified as the platform of the Democratic Party, rather than as his own personal initiatives (Public Papers of the Presidents 1948, 941, 945). But less than half (49.3 percent) of the voters had supported Truman

President Harry S. Truman’s articulation and advocacy of the Fair Deal were partially influenced by his two distinct, occasionally contradictory and conflicting, value systems as a party regular and a policy reformer. Truman the regular emphasized party loyalty and intraparty cohesion, respect for the separation of powers between the president and Congress, frequent consultations with Democratic national chairs, deference to the judgment of Democratic legislative leaders in Congress, and divisive partisan rhetoric in highlighting the domestic policy differences between the Democratic and Republican Parties. Truman’s value as a policy reformer was especially developed by his experiences as a county judge trying to efficiently build high-quality paved roads and other public works and as a senator investigating and exposing waste, fraud, and inefficiency in defense spending during World War II. Truman the reformer wanted the Fair Deal to be more than merely a continuation of the New Deal. Besides trying to achieve especially difficult, liberal legislative goals on civil rights and national health insurance, the Fair Deal aimed to reform such existing New Deal--based policies as outmoded agricultural subsidy programs, insufficient federal aid to elementary and secondary education, and inadequate federal guidance and funding for urban renewal. A few weeks before the 1948 election, Harry Truman wrote to his sister Mary Jane that, regardless of whether or not he won, ‘‘people will know where I stand and a record will be made for future action by the Democratic Party’’ (Ferrell 1980, 150). In his

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Truman and the Fair Deal

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Harry Truman shown at his desk on April 19, 1945. Truman sought to extend the socio-economic policies of the New Deal. (Library of Congress)

in the election, and it was impossible to discern whether most of them had voted for him because of his liberal policy positions, especially his more controversial positions, such as repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and national health insurance. Gallup polls conducted during the first few months of 1949 revealed that a plurality of Americans surveyed opposed Truman’s health insurance proposal and believed that, if it were enacted, the quality of health care would decline (Gallup 1972, 802). More significantly, only 35 percent of one poll’s respondents agreed with Truman’s position on the Taft-Hartley Act (Gallup 1972, 805). Despite the lack of evidence of strong public support for new, major liberal domestic policies and the absence of an atmosphere of national emergency, like the Great Depression during Roosevelt’s first 100 days, Truman devoted his 1949 State of the Union message to what he called the Fair Deal (Public Papers of the

Presidents 1949, 7). The domestic policy proposals that collectively became known as the Fair Deal reiterated Truman’s 21-Point Program of 1945 and included such major campaign promises as repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, national health insurance, federal aid to education, and a comprehensive federal housing policy (Truman, 1955, 530; Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 1--7). In contrast to his slashing, combative rhetoric of the 1948 campaign, Truman’s words and tone were more conciliatory. The president emphasized in his concluding paragraphs that he hoped ‘‘for cooperation from farmers, from labor, and from business’’ and needed the cooperation of Congress in enacting this liberal legislation (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 7). According to Clark M. Clifford, Truman coined the term Fair Deal when he revised the draft of his State of the Union message (1991, 248). Clifford also claimed that the Fair Deal was intended to be an ‘‘analysis’’ or

352 Domestic Policy refinement of the New Deal, instead of merely a continuation of Roosevelt’s policies (1971, 67). Ironically, while some parts of the Fair Deal agenda, such as civil rights and national health insurance, were more liberal than the New Deal by seeking greater federal intervention in these policy areas, the rhetoric and approach to Congress that Truman and his administration officials used were often more moderate and compromising than those of Roosevelt and his New Dealers (Hamby, 1973, 53--86). There were several reasons for the relative moderation of the Fair Deal’s style in its articulation by Truman and his submission of its policy proposals to Congress. One reason is that while Truman wanted to increase federal spending in such domestic policy areas as education, health care, and housing, he also wanted to regularly reduce the national debt and maintain balanced budgets, which he accomplished three times during his presidency (Truman 1955, v. 1, 147). Leon H. Keyserling, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) who became its chair in 1950, was the chief articulator of and influence on Fair Deal economics (Keyserling 1986). Like Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and other economic advisers in the early New Deal’s ‘‘Brain Trust,’’ he sought to encourage both economic growth and a broader, more equitable distribution of wealth and economic unity through economic planning and greater cooperation among government, business, and labor (Pickens 1986). Keyserling was critical of the Keynesian economists’ dogmatic emphasis on trust-busting and deficit spending later in the Roosevelt administration. Besides the emphasis on consensus and cooperation in Keyserling’s economic philosophy, another moderating influence on Truman’s tactics in promoting the Fair Deal to Congress was the difference between Roosevelt’s approach to relations with Congress and his approach. Roosevelt appealed directly to the public through radio addresses and had White House aides like Thomas Corcoran and administration officials like Harry Hopkins aggressively lobby and pressure Democratic members of Congress to support his legislation (Neustadt 1955, 1014). As a senator, Truman resented how Roosevelt treated him and his fellow Democrats in Congress.1 Consequently, Truman refused to appoint a formal White House liaison staff on legislation and usually relied on department heads to submit legislation to Congress (Heller 1980, 228--230). Truman the party regular wanted to forge greater intraparty harmony in Congress, despite his submission of divisive liberal legislation, by being more deferential to Democratic Party leaders and committee chairmen

than Roosevelt had been (Amlund 1965, 640--645; Christenson 1978, 257--268). Truman, moreover, believed that there should be a truly equal balance of power between the president and Congress in the legislative process, rather than presidential domination (Truman 1955, v. 2, 536--537). Partially because of Truman’s perceived passivity in congressional relations concerning Fair Deal legislation, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) members and other liberals would later question the efficacy and even the sincerity of Truman’s leadership of the Fair Deal (Brock 1962, 112--114). Truman also had a more pragmatic, specific reason for his cautious approach in submitting his Fair Deal legislation to the Democratic-controlled 81st Congress. Truman could not afford to risk alienating speaker of the House Sam Rayburn or Senate majority leader Scott Lucas. He was relying on them to shepherd his legislation through the complexities and obstacles of the bicameral legislative processes and to overcome the implacable opposition of southern conservative Democrats led by Richard Russell in the Senate and Eugene Cox in the House who were likely to coalesce with Republican allies to kill the Fair Deal. Both Rayburn and Lucas were moderates who accepted some parts of the Fair Deal but opposed its most controversial, liberal proposals (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier 1977, 302--320; Hardeman and Bacon 1987, 348--419). In particular, both Rayburn and Lucas opposed repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, a top priority of Truman and organized labor. Rayburn also opposed such key Fair Deal legislation as civil rights and federal aid to education (Hardeman and Bacon 1987, 333). Senate Democrats had elected Lucas as majority leader because they regarded him as a compromise candidate acceptable to southern conservatives (Douglas 1971, 561). Lucas’s conservatism in his future legislative behavior would include his opposition to two major features of the Fair Deal, national health insurance and the Brannan Plan. The Brannan Plan was Truman’s proposed reform of agricultural subsidies that had been formulated by Charles Brannan, his secretary of agriculture (Hamby, Beyond the New Deal 1973, 305). Because of their party loyalty and personal respect for Truman, Rayburn and Lucas avoided making public statements against Fair Deal proposals that they opposed. During the 81st Congress, Rayburn and Lucas would simply allow Fair Deal legislation that they opposed or found too divisive within their party and difficult to pass to die in committees or elsewhere in the legislative process (Brock 1962, 111--114). Hoping that compromise and conciliation with these party

Truman and the Fair Deal leaders would eventually produce at least modest, partial victories for Fair Deal legislation, Truman the party regular refrained from public criticism or aggressive, private pressure toward Rayburn and Lucas (Steinberg 1975, 359). In a confidential 1952 memo, however, Truman acerbically claimed that Lucas was defeated for reelection in 1950 because of his ‘‘half hearted approach’’ toward the Fair Deal (Ferrell 1980, 283). Liberal observers of the 81st Congress were initially optimistic of the passage of Fair Deal proposals because of the sharp increase in the number of union-endorsed, nonsouthern Democrats in Congress, especially in the House of Representatives, and in the prominence of determined liberal reformers like Hubert Humphrey, Paul Douglas, and Estes Kefauver among the freshman senators. Liberals, though, were especially emboldened by a procedural victory in the House Rules Committee. The power and ability of southern conservative Democrats and Republicans on this committee to kill or delay liberal legislation were weakened by the adoption of a new rule. This rule allowed the chair of any standing committee, upon recognition by the speaker, to require the House Rules Committee to call up any bill that his or her committee has approved after it has been before the House Rules Committee for at least 21 days (‘‘Congress Clears the Decks’’ 1949, 6). In particular, southern conservatives opposed to this rules’ reform warned that it would expedite the passage of civil rights legislation, exactly what the liberals intended. The House Rules Committee, furthermore, would now be chaired by Rep. Adolph Sabath, a Chicago Democrat committed to civil rights and the rest of the Fair Deal (Boxerman 1973, 442). Supporters of civil rights and other Truman policy goals, though, were discouraged by the failure of the Senate to amend cloture rules (Riddick 1951, 54--55). Vice President Alben W. Barkley, Sen. Francis Myers of Pennsylvania, and other Truman supporters tried but failed to make cloture easier to invoke to prevent or end anticipated filibusters against civil rights and other major Fair Deal proposals (Abels 1959, 285). Liberals like ADA member Joseph Rauh blamed Lucas for the narrow, 46--41 vote that defeated this procedural reform in the Senate (Hamby 1973, 313). The Senate’s failure to make cloture easier to invoke served as a harbinger of the later use of filibusters to reject Truman’s civil rights legislation, despite the fact that the House of Representatives passed this legislation’s creation of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) and prohibition of poll taxes (Riddick 1951, 66). Another procedural factor that hampered congressional passage of major Fair Deal

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bills were the timing and order in which Truman submitted Fair Deal legislation.2 In particular, organized labor pressured Truman to make repeal of the TaftHartley Act a top priority, while the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and ADA insisted that Truman and their allies in Congress immediately and aggressively seek passage of civil rights measures. By March, 1949, Leslie Perry, the NAACP’s lobbyist in Washington, D.C., bluntly asserted that Truman owed his narrow electoral victory to black voters and that now it was his responsibility to ‘‘get prompt and speedy hearings on the House and Senate calendars before spring.’’ But Truman’s civil rights proposals seemed to be dead in the Senate because of filibusters (‘‘Next Steps in the Fair Deal’’ 1949, 11). In his determination to discipline and pressure Democrats in Congress to support repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, though, Truman the reformer had publicly stated his willingness to use federal patronage to reward or punish Democrats in Congress according to their voting records on repeal legislation and other planks of the 1948 Democratic national platform, which was the basis of the Fair Deal. In a November 30, 1948, letter to J. Howard McGrath, liberal Democratic congress member John Dingell, Sr., of Michigan told the Democratic National Committee (DNC) chairman that anti-Truman Democrats should be denied federal patronage because they ‘‘will have to do some penance for their lack of faith and cowardly abandonment of the President before being restored to good standing’’ (Dingell 1948). Throughout the first session of the 81st Congress, columnists, liberal activists, Eleanor Roosevelt, and organizations like the ADA, Congress of Industrial Organizations--Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC), and the NAACP urged Truman to use the denial of patronage as just one of several weapons for punishing both the Dixiecrat members of Congress who formally joined the States’ Rights Democratic (SRD) movement and the regular, southern Democrats who opposed most Fair Deal legislation (DNC Clipping File 1948). But Sen. John Eastland of Mississippi, an outspoken supporter of the SRD movement, kept his seat on the Senate Judiciary Committee and could hamper Justice Department patronage and hearings on judicial appointments (Bailey and Samuel 1952, 74). Truman’s ethos as a party regular eventually prevailed, and he formulated a moderate, compromised policy on patronage. He and his White House aide on personnel, Donald Dawson, would give less consideration toward Dixiecrats than for pro-Truman Democrats on patronage decisions within a state (DNC Clipping File 1949; Boyle HSTL; HST to Donald Dawson, June 25, 1949, PSF,

354 Domestic Policy HSTL; Estes Kefauver to HST, August 30, 1949, OF 300, HSTL; and Estes Kefauver to HST, December 29, 1949, PSF, HSTL). Truman’s compromised policy for using patronage as a tool of party leadership in rewarding loyalty to his administration’s policy goals was criticized by liberals for being too soft and ineffective and by southern conservatives as vindictive and unjustified (Maury Maverick to Donald Dawson, October 6, 1950, OF 300, HSTL). On May 3, 1949, Rep. Walter K. Granger (Utah), a pro-Truman Democrat, chastised Dixiecrat Rep. F. Edward Hebert (La.) for complaining about patronage denials and delays because of his opposition to Fair Deal legislation. According to Granger, ‘‘patronage is just about the most persuasive argument that a President has with Congress’’ (Clipping, Congressional Record, May 3, 1949, A2785, OF 300, HSTL). But, even if Truman had relied more on his reformer ethos by aggressively and systematically using patronage in an attempt to persuade or pressure southern conservative Democrats to support Fair Deal legislation, it is highly unlikely that the prospect of not securing presidential approval of their nominees for the relatively few federal appointments in their states would have motivated southern Democrats in Congress to support civil rights legislation and other major, divisive Fair Deal proposals (Bailey and Samuel 1952, 138; White 1952, 5). A more powerful procedural change within Congress, though, to facilitate passage of Fair Deal legislation would be to deny former Dixiecrats their preferred committee seats. The Democratic majorities in the 81st Congress had a larger percentage of southern conservatives in the Senate than in the House. Consequently, the Democratic Steering Committee did not punish Dixiecrat senators like Eastland through the denial of their previously held committee seats. Since all Senate chairs were chosen entirely because of seniority, 10 of the 15 Senate committees were chaired by senators from southern and border states (Bailey and Samuel 1952, 81). Once again, though, the House of Representatives appeared more likely to adopt procedural reforms that would weaken the power of the bipartisan conservative coalition and promote the passage of liberal legislation. Most members of the House Committee on Committees, which assigned Democrats to committees, were now nonsouthern liberals and moderates. Liberal columnists and editorials urged Truman and pro--Fair Deal Democrats in Congress to abolish the seniority system and elect committee chairs according to secret ballots and their loyalty to the Fair Deal (DNC Clipping File, November 28, 1948). The New York Star argued that

it is perfectly proper and desirable for Mr. Truman to exercise the party leadership which the people have entrusted to him. It is perfectly proper and desirable that those members of Congress who support his program . . . should organize both houses along lines that will at least minimize the chances of outright obstruction (DNC Clipping File, December 5, 1948). During Truman’s November 1948 vacation in Key West, Florida, he consulted Sam Rayburn about the possibility of denying Democratic seniority and committee assignments to Rep. John Rankin (Miss.) and other southern Democratic representatives who openly supported the Dixiecratic presidential nominee J. Strom Thurmond or were nominated on SRD slates (Donovan 1982, 17). Rayburn, however, convinced the president that such presidential intervention in House procedures would arouse the resentment of even pro-Truman Democrats. Truman agreed with the speaker of the House (Steinberg 1975, 250). Despite Rayburn’s later public announcement that there would be no reprisals against former Dixiecrats in making committee assignments, the Democratic Committee on Committees changed the membership rules of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to intentionally eliminate Dixiecrats John Rankin of Mississippi and F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana as members. The Democratic Committee on Committees had ruled that HUAC members had to be lawyers and could not chair other committees (Truman 1955, v. 2, 31). Hebert was not a lawyer, and Rankin chaired the Veterans’ Affairs Committee. Modest procedural changes in the House combined with the greater proportion of pro-Truman liberal Democrats in the House than in the Senate and with the experienced leadership of Sam Rayburn as speaker and John McCormack as House majority leader meant that Fair Deal legislation usually succeeded in the House more often than in the Senate. The greater control that conservative Democrats exerted in Senate committees, the more successful bipartisan cooperation of conservatives of both parties in the Senate to oppose Truman’s domestic policy proposals, and the fact that Senate majority leader Scott Lucas proved to be less skillful and reliable in promoting Fair Deal bills than House Democratic leaders all contributed to the Housing Act of 1949 being the only major Fair Deal proposal to become law. The failed efforts to repeal the TaftHartley Act and pass civil rights legislation early in the 81st Congress endangered passage of other controversial Fair Deal legislation, especially in the Senate.

Truman and the Fair Deal Intraparty conflicts over federal aid to education, the Brannan Plan for agricultural reform, and national health insurance further exposed and exacerbated intraparty regional, racial, and ideological differences and demonstrate the power of lobbyists to kill Fair Deal legislation. Compared with his support for the Brannan Plan and federal aid to education, Truman’s advocacy of compulsory national health insurance had earlier roots in his presidency and political career. As a county judge, Truman oversaw the construction of a county hospital for the indigent (Truman 1955, v. 1, 172). As a senator, Truman believed that the Social Security Act of 1935 ‘‘was a move in the right direction, although it lacked health insurance for hospitals and doctor bills’’ (Truman 1955, v. 2, 32). Like Roosevelt, Truman was alarmed by the millions of young men rejected for military service because of health reasons during World War II (Campion 1984, 153--157). As Cold War tensions worsened, Truman emphasized improving public health through a federally administered system of compulsory national health insurance as an essential contribution to national defense (Poen 1982, 96). He also hoped that since millions of Americans could not afford private health insurance and also did not qualify for charitable care given to the very poor by private and public hospitals then national health insurance would receive the same broad political support that the old-age pension and unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act received. In a 1949 letter to a retired Missouri businessman who opposed Truman’s health insurance proposal, Truman asserted that he did not seek to impose ‘‘socialized medicine’’ (Poen 1982, 97). Instead, he was ‘‘trying to fix it so the people in the middle income bracket can live as long as the very rich and the very poor’’ (Public Papers of the Presidents 1945, 280). In Truman’s 21-Point Program speech of September 6, 1945, Truman expressed his support for laws that would fulfill Roosevelt’s economic bill of rights. These included the rights ‘‘to adequate medical care and . . . good health’’ and ‘‘to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment’’ (Public Papers of the Presidents 1945, 482--489). More significant, Truman became the first president to deliver a special message to Congress entirely devoted to health care on November 19, 1945. Truman identified the five basic goals of his administration in health care policy as the construction of more hospitals and related facilities, expansion of public health services, especially for maternal and children’s health, improvement and expansion of medical

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education and research, prepayment of medical costs, and protection against lost income due to illness and disability (Public Papers of the Presidents 1945, 488). Truman realized that his fourth goal, that is, the prepayment of medical costs through compulsory national health insurance, would be the most controversial. He repeatedly emphasized in this speech that his health program was not socialized medicine. ‘‘Socialized medicine means that all doctors work as employees of government . . . No such system is here proposed’’ (White 1959, 90--94). It is not surprising, therefore, that of these five goals the first goal was the most successful in being achieved during the Truman administration. Sponsored by Sen. Lister Hill (D-Ala.) and Sen. Harold Burton (R-Ohio), the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act of 1946 enjoyed broad bipartisan support in Congress and the endorsements of organized labor and the American Medical Association (AMA). The broad support for the Hill-Burton statute and the relative ease with which it passed both houses were mostly due to the widespread recognition that there was a serious shortage of hospitals and the fact that this law’s content consisted of federal aid to states and nonprofit hospitals (Public Papers of the Presidents 1946, 218; Poen 1979, 70--71). The federal government under this law, therefore, supplemented, rather than superseded, state health care policies and did not threaten the AMA’s interest in preventing federal dominance in health care. While Truman did not conduct a regular rhetorical campaign to promote the passage of national health insurance legislation in 1946, he generally supported the health insurance legislation sponsored by Sen. Robert Wagner (D-N.Y.) and Sen. James Murray (D-Mont.) and Rep. John Dingell, Sr. (D-Mich.) (Byrne 1951, 254-255). Having failed to persuade Roosevelt to include national health insurance in the Social Security Act of 1935, Wagner submitted his first health insurance bill in 1939. Compared with the legislation that he cosponsored in 1943 and 1945, its health insurance provision was fairly modest (Campion 1984, 8--9). Wagner’s 1939 proposal wanted to amend the Social Security Act of 1935 so that federal grants would be given to states to develop state health insurance plans (Fishbein 1947, 413). Wagner’s 1939 bill, though, aroused the opposition of the AMA, which suspected that if this bill became law it could lead to compulsory, nationwide, federally controlled health insurance (Rivet 1941, 120--121). Roosevelt, furthermore, did not champion this bill. The bill seemed destined to defeat in Congress, due to the significant loss of liberal legislative strength following

356 Domestic Policy the 1938 elections, and Roosevelt needed to gain the support of conservative Democrats and Republicans for his foreign policy and defense legislation after World War II began in Europe (Parron 1945, 249--273). Because of the medical needs of military personnel, though, American entry into World War II led to a sharp increase in federal involvement in medical care. Military needs during the war facilitated the enactment of federal aid for medical research and education in addition to the vast construction of veterans’ hospitals (Cantril 1951, 441). With servicemen’s wives and children also receiving federally provided medical care and many Americans fearing a postwar depression, a 1943 Gallup poll indicated that 59 percent of its respondents favored national health insurance (Ferrell 1980, 165--166). Truman was determined to ensure that national health insurance was compulsory and federally administered to ensure universal coverage and adequate medical care (Poen 1979, 84). In addition to his belief that his 1948 campaign platform and upset victory gave him a public mandate to seek passage of such legislation, Truman also felt politically obligated to organized labor and the NAACP, two of the most prominent interest groups endorsing compulsory national health insurance (Ewing 1969, 115). Truman’s liberal position on national health insurance was strengthened and articulated by Oscar Ewing, administrator of the Federal Security Agency. Besides being head of the agency that would administer a compulsory national health plan, Ewing had briefly served as acting DNC chair in 1946 and was a key member of Truman’s campaign staff (Hamby 1973, 296--297). An outspoken liberal ideologue committed to a comprehensive welfare state, Ewing published his report to Truman, The Nation’s Health, toward the end of the 1948 campaign (Ewing 1948). This was the most detailed document representing the Truman administration’s position on national health insurance (Ewing 1948, 80, 114). This report concluded ‘‘that the voluntary insurance plans can never do the job that the national interest requires to be done’’ and that national health insurance is the only ‘‘possible way of bringing adequate medical service to fully half of the American people’’ (Kelley 1956, 70). The major provisions of Truman’s national health insurance plan in 1949 were contained in Senate bill 1679, introduced by Sen. Elbert Thomas of Utah (‘‘Assessment and Public Opinion’’ 1948). Truman’s deference to Ewing as his administration’s chief spokesman and advocate for compulsory national health insurance proved to be a tactical error. Ewing

had a reputation among Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress as a highly partisan liberal who had a bureaucratic self-interest in simultaneously promoting the elevation of the Federal Security Agency, which would administer Truman’s health plan, to cabinet status (Schriftgiesser 1951, 124). A special House committee later investigated Republican charges that Ewing and Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan engaged in improper lobbying activities to promote Fair Deal proposals under their purview (Dingell 1950; ‘‘The Truth about Health Program’’ 1950; Campion 1984, 156--157). Despite this congressional investigation of Ewing, the advocacy of compulsory national health insurance by the Truman administration, the DNC apparatus, and their allies in Congress and among interest groups, especially organized labor, the National Farmers Union, and the Committee for the Nation’s Health, was pitifully inferior to the lobbying and publicity of their primary opponent, the AMA (Garceau 1941, 75--76). Compared with other interest groups that successfully opposed Fair Deal legislation, the AMA conducted the most expensive, well-planned, sophisticated, and systematic lobbying and publicity effort. The AMA had already been aroused to political opposition of national health insurance by Wagner’s 1939 bill and was encouraged by its success in defeating Gov. Earl Warren’s proposal for a state-run, compulsory health insurance program in California in 1945 (Allen and Shannon 1950, 338). Between 1940 and 1945, the National Physicians’ Committee spent nearly $1 million on publicity against the Wagner-Murray-Dingell legislation (Allen and Shannon 1950, 338). The AMA raised a $3.5 million fund and paid the public relations firm of Whitaker and Baxter more than $8,000 a month to defeat congressional passage of national health insurance (Starr 1982). The AMA shrewdly realized that it could not appear to be merely obstructionistic and callous toward the medical needs of the poor and uninsured (‘‘Which Medicine’’ 1949, 48). Since 1938, it publicly supported the formation and mass enrollment in Blue Cross and later Blue Shield private, voluntary health insurance plans throughout the nation (Somers and Somers 1961, 548). Partially because of AMA advocacy, the number of Blue Cross and Blue Shield health insurance policies increased from approximately 28 million in 1945 to more than 61 million by the end of Truman’s presidency (Poen Poen 1979, 90). The AMA’s interest group allies included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Legion, National Grange, and American Farm Bureau (Gallup 1972, v. 2, 802).

Truman and the Fair Deal As early as April 1949, Gallup polls revealed that a plurality of Americans agreed with the AMA’s assertion that the quality of medical care would decline under national health insurance (Gallup 1972, v. 2, 802). One poll also indicated that 47 percent of its respondents supported the AMA proposal that the federal government provide grants to states to help provide needed care for Americans who could not afford private health insurance. Only 33 percent supported Truman’s plan (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 227). Despite the lack of strong public support for compulsory national health insurance, Truman stated in his special message to Congress on April 22, 1949, ‘‘The only fair and effective means to assure adequate medical care through insurance is to build on the pattern of our existing social insurance plans,’’ that is, the Social Security system (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 227). Truman then specified flaws and inadequacies in voluntary private health insurance plans in meeting this national need (Poen 1979, 165). A few days after this speech, though, Sen. James Murray of Montana, chairman of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, failed to convince a majority of his committee’s members to support and report out of committee Senate bill 1679’s provision for compulsory national health insurance (Kelley 1956, 72). Senate bill 1679 thus did not receive a floor vote while the Senate considered three compromise health care bills that did not include compulsory national health insurance (Congressional Record 1950, v. 96, pt. 6, 7770). The House version of Senate bill 1679 sponsored by Rep. John Dingell, Sr. likewise died in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1950 (Kelley 1956, 77). Besides the paucity of Democratic support within Congress for compulsory national health insurance, the intensification of the issues of domestic and international Communism also contributed to the defeat of Truman’s health insurance proposal, the most liberal, controversial, and revolutionary Fair Deal social welfare measure. The Alger Hiss controversy, the fall of China to Communism, the rise of McCarthyism, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, and the outbreak of the Korean War heightened public concern about the ideas and actions of American and foreign Communists during the 81st Congress. Such fear was receptive to the AMA’s charges of socialism against Truman’s health insurance plan (Congressional Record 1950, A2530--2532). In a 1950 speech, Sen. Robert A. Taft specified Truman’s proposal for compulsory national health insurance as one of the most dangerous examples of ‘‘socialist’’ Fair Deal legislation that threatened to destroy liberty and ultimately lead to Communism in

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the United States (Kelley 1956, 99--106; O’Malley 1950). In the 1950 congressional elections, such prominent Democratic supporters of compulsory national health insurance as Sen. Claude Pepper of Florida and Sen. Elbert Thomas of Utah and Rep. Andrew Biemiller of Wisconsin and Rep. Eugene O’Sullivan of Nebraska were defeated, partially because of AMA publicity against them and Republican charges linking ‘‘socialized medicine’’ to softness on Communism (Public Papers of the Presidents 1951, 353; 1952--1953, 746--747; Ferrell 1980, 303). Despite the controversy, intraparty divisiveness, and electoral defeats that his failed health insurance plan promoted, Truman continued to advocate a federally administered, compulsory national health insurance program during and after his presidency (Ferrell 1980, 262). Truman’s refusal to abandon compulsory national health insurance prevented the enactment of any of the compromise health care bills in the Senate. The president’s persistent refusal to compromise on this issue was partially motivated by his programmatic belief that only a compulsory national health insurance program that was part of the Social Security system would ensure adequate coverage. As a matter of political principle, Truman also did not want to yield to the policy position of the AMA. He bitterly and suspiciously perceived the AMA as a selfish, reactionary interest group callous to the medical needs of uninsured Americans (Neustadt 1954, 349--381). Truman’s ideological, programmatic, and partisan inflexibility about compulsory national health insurance was also a product of his campaign obligation to organized labor, which was adamant about this position on health care. Unfortunately for Truman’s party leadership, his vigorous pursuit of this policy commitment to organized labor, like his early effort to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, was not shared by most Democrats in Congress and was not supported by public opinion. As political scientist Richard Neustadt convincingly argued, however, Truman’s tenacity on this issue pressured Congress to pass two less controversial elements of his health care agenda: more federal aid to hospital construction and medical research (Campion 1984, 277--278). This issue’s long-term programmatic and partisan impact, of course, was the partial fulfillment of Truman’s policy goal of universal health coverage through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ advocacy of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor and their enactment in 1965 (Ferrell 1991, 382). Unlike the health insurance component of the Fair Deal, the Brannan Plan initially appeared to hold a

358 Domestic Policy stronger possibility of enactment because of Truman’s campaign success in attracting the votes of Republican farmers in 1948. Among Truman’s cabinet members, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan was the most active, effective campaigner for Truman in 1948. Brannan delivered more than 80 speeches directed at farmers and emphasizing the Republican Congress’s failure to authorize enough federal grain storage space and the Republican threat to future farm income and federal programs benefiting farmers. Having proven himself to Truman as both an able, experienced administrator of federal agricultural programs since 1935 and a shrewd political strategist, Brannan was one of the most influential architects of the Fair Deal in the Truman administration (Christenson 1974, 61). He held a strong personal and ideological commitment toward formulating and implementing policies that would save family farms and politically unite small farmers and the urban working class (Christenson 1974, 50--54). This commitment was strengthened by his close political relationship with James Patton, president of the National Farmers Union. In contrast to the larger, more prosperous, and conservative membership of the American Farm Bureau, the National Farmers Union’s members were mostly lowerincome small farmers from the Great Plains and western states. Under Patton’s leadership, the National Farmers Union endorsed Truman’s health insurance proposal and forged an alliance with the CIO (Matusow 1967, 194--199). It was not surprising, therefore, that Patton played a major role in formulating the provisions of the socalled Brannan Plan for changing the system of agricultural price supports in 1949 and in ensuring that his farm organization, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the CIO endorsed the Brannan Plan. The Brannan Plan intended to simultaneously ensure higher, stable incomes for farmers, lower food prices for consumers, and fewer surpluses of grains that would need to be stored by federal facilities. The Brannan Plan would encourage farmers to reduce grain production by subsidizing greater production of milk and livestock. The more specific methods of the Brannan Plan included the abolition of acreage allotments for price support payments and replacing them with direct payments to the farmers, based on units of production (Griffith 1989, 75). Intending to benefit small family farmers while limiting government subsidies to large, commercial farmers, the Brannan Plan limited this federal aid to the first $27,500 of production (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 130, 238-239, 292).

With confidence in Brannan’s political acumen and agricultural expertise, Truman publicly deferred to Brannan as his administration’s spokesperson and advocate of his Fair Deal proposal (Christenson 1974, 61). Brannan conducted an extensive speaking campaign to promote this agricultural plan, and he was assisted by the efforts of the DNC’s Publicity Division and Women’s Division. The DNC sponsored a regional Democratic conference in Des Moines, Iowa, on June 12--13, 1949, primarily to organize support in the Midwest for the Brannan Plan (New York Times, June 29, 1949, 5). The Brannan Plan seemed to have a good chance of becoming law after Rep. Stephen Pace (D-Ga.), chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, drafted a bill that contained key elements of the Brannan Plan and a majority of his committee’s members voted to report it out by late June (Mayhew 1966, 49). Fearing that the Brannan Plan would damage future farm prices, especially for cotton and tobacco, most southern Democrats in the House opposed the Pace bill and supported a substitute bill rejecting the Brannan Plan sponsored by Rep. Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tenn.) (Matusow 1967, 210). Assisted by aggressive lobbying by the American Farm Bureau, a coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans passed the Gore bill by a vote of 239--170 (Christenson 1974, 159--160). The Brannan Plan also died in the Senate by late July 1949. Although Sen. Elmer Thomas (D-Okla.) chaired the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee and supported the Brannan Plan, Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-N. Mex.) held more influence with Democratic senators (Ferrell 1991, 324). As Brannan’s predecessor as secretary of agriculture, Anderson dealt a fatal blow to the Brannan Plan by publicly opposing it (Matusow 1967, 214). Shortly before the House floor vote on the Gore bill, the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee unanimously voted to reject the Brannan Plan (Peterson 1959, 120--128). Anderson submitted a substitute bill that provided price supports on a sliding scale from 75 percent to 90 percent of parity, depending on the type of commodity. Combined with the Gore bill’s provision of 90 percent parity for basic commodities, the Anderson bill became the basis of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1949. This law modified the formula for acreage allotments and the use of marketing quotas but mostly updated the price support and commodity storage systems established during the New Deal (Rasmussen 1975, 2952--2971). It continued 90 percent price supports for two more years (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 464--469; New York Times, December 13, 1949, 37).

Truman and the Fair Deal Although Truman reluctantly signed the GoreAnderson bill into law, he and Brannan still hoped that elements of the Brannan Plan could be reintroduced to Congress in 1950 (Matusow 1967, 220--221). But their two chief congressional supporters, Stephen Pace and Elmer Thomas, were retiring in 1950. Any lingering, remote possibility that most Democrats in Congress would support the Brannan Plan was ended by the outbreak of the Korean War. Military food purchases raised farm prices and reduced stored, government-purchased surpluses. The results of the 1950 congressional elections indicated that most prosperous midwestern and western farmers who supported Truman in 1948 had returned to their typically Republican voting behavior, partially because of their hostility toward the Brannan Plan (Ross 1968, 256). Truman thought that the 1948 election gave him a public mandate to propose an agricultural policy that intended to satisfy both farmers and consumers, but he failed to realize that normally Republican farmers who voted for him in 1948 wanted to maintain federal agricultural policy rather than revolutionize it (Christenson 1974, 155). Despite the Populist desire of Truman and Brannan to formulate an agricultural policy intended to politically unite and economically benefit small farmers, wage-earners, and consumers, the methods of the Brannan Plan failed to adequately address and satisfy the different policy interests of farmers, especially cotton and tobacco farmers, represented by southern Democrats in Congress. Since the general public tended to be more aloof and apathetic about the legislative conflicts over the Brannan Plan than those regarding national health insurance, agricultural interest groups led by the American Farm Bureau were especially significant in preventing passage or even serious committee consideration of the Brannan Plan by the Democratic-controlled Congress (Public Papers of the Presidents 1949, 76). Unlike compulsory national health insurance and the Brannan Plan, there seemed to be broad support in public opinion and Congress for federal aid to elementary and secondary education. During the 1948 campaign and in his 1949 budget message to Congress, Truman proposed $300 million in federal education grants to the states (Gallup 1972, v. 2, 780). A Gallup poll released on January 10, 1949, the same day that Truman submitted his budget message to Congress, revealed that a plurality of its respondents supported this amount of federal aid to education (Gallup 1972, v. 2, 781). Furthermore, 55 percent of this poll’s respondents expressed a willingness to pay higher taxes for this

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purpose, while only 30 percent were unwilling to do so (Weaver 1972, 7--123). Among Democrats in Congress, there was broad support for at least the concept of federal aid to education. Democrats from a broad range of ideological and regional characteristics wanted some type of federal role in improving the quality and quantity of teaching and school facilities in their states (Brown 1968, 225--253). Just as Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio was essential in providing bipartisan leadership to ensure passage of the Housing Act of 1949, his qualified support for some type of federal aid to education provided the prospect of significant Republican support for Fair Deal legislation on federal aid to elementary and secondary education (U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, 1945, 118--125). The Senate Education and Labor Committee’s 1945 hearings on the conditions of public schools provided disturbing evidence of such

Beneficiaries of the Housing Act of 1949, the only piece of Truman’s Fair Deal legislation enacted. The Stuart family of Hempstead County, Arkansas, read the news about their good fortune in becoming the first African American family in the nation to receive a farm housing loan, authorized by the Housing Act of 1949. (Library of Congress)

360 Domestic Policy worsening problems as teacher shortages, overcrowded, aging school buildings, and inadequate salaries that motivated more teachers to seek defense industry jobs (Patterson 1972, 432). There was enough bipartisan support for federal aid to education in 1948 that the Republican-controlled Senate passed a bill authorizing $270 million in aid in 1948 (Donovan 1982, 124). The bill was sponsored by Taft and Sen. Elbert Thomas (D-Utah) and Sen. Lister Hill (D-Ala.), but it subsequently died in the House of Representatives (Ravitch 1983, 33). Following Truman’s 1949 budget message to Congress, the Senate drafted a federal aid to education bill that easily passed the Senate by a vote of 58--15 on May 5, 1949 (New York Times, May 6, 1949, 1). Truman and, to a lesser degree, most Senate supporters of federal aid to elementary and secondary education did not expect this issue to become so bitterly divisive in the House of Representatives, in the media, among interest groups, and throughout the general public in 1949. The Senate bill scrupulously avoided the explosive issues of race and religion. It remained silent on the issue of whether states that practiced de jure racial segregation in public education should be denied federal funds and thus made all states eligible for federal aid. It also allowed each state to decide whether any of this federal aid would be given to parochial schools (Douglas 1971, 416--417). In contrast to the Senate’s consensus-building approach in its legislative process on this policy goal, the proceedings of the House Education and Labor Committee tended to exacerbate religious and racial differences and make House passage of a compromise bill impossible (Lachman 1965, 35--66). Rep. John Lesinski (D-Mich.) chaired this committee and was determined that the wording of an education bill would ensure parochial schools federal aid (Munger and Fenno 1962, 122--124). But the subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee, which drafted the House bill, was chaired by Rep. Graham A. Barden (D-N.C.), and Barden was equally adamant that the bill’s wording must specifically prohibit any federal aid to parochial schools (U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education, 1949, 743--744). Consequently, the bill that Barden’s subcommittee drafted and submitted to the full committee on July 7, 1949, limited federal aid to public schools and eliminated the wording of the Senate bill that states must distribute this federal aid in a ‘‘just and equitable’’ manner (Patterson 1972, 433). The ‘‘just and equitable’’ provision of the Senate bill was included by its

cosponsors as a compromise to the pro--civil rights liberals who insisted that the Senate bill at least require southern states to allocate an adequate share of federal aid to black public schools (Puryear 1979, 86). The possibility of compromise within the entire House Education and Labor Committee evaporated when Lesinski and Barden engaged in a rancorous, public quarrel over this bill. Lesinski denounced Barden’s bill for being racist and anti-Catholic and vowed that it would die in his committee (Smith 1982, 317-318). One week before Lesinski’s diatribe, Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York also accused the Barden bill of anti-Catholic bigotry in a June 19, 1949, speech (Gannon 1962, 311--322; Lash 1972, 157--158). Four days later, Eleanor Roosevelt expressed her disagreement with the cardinal in her ‘‘My Day’’ newspaper column (Lash 1972, 158). The prolonged public dispute that ensued between Eleanor Roosevelt and Spellman broadened and inflamed the issue from federal aid to education to the separation of church and state. In a publicized letter, the cardinal accused Roosevelt of having a ‘‘record of anti-Catholicism’’ that was ‘‘unworthy of an American mother’’ (Ravitch 1983, 38). Her calm yet scolding refutation of Spellman’s charges against her in her column and the public and editorial outcry against the cardinal stiffened the determination of the National Education Association (NEA), Protestant and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (POAU), and several Protestant and Jewish organizations to ensure that any federal aid policy should not benefit the mostly Catholic parochial schools (Blanshard 1958, 322--323). To many Americans, Spellman’s intervention on this public policy issue raised anxieties about a perceived growth in the secular power and influence of the Catholic hierarchy (Hamilton 1992, 226--227). The issue of federal aid to education was further complicated and polarized by race. Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. of New York, a black Democrat nationally recognized by many African Americans as a spokesperson for their policy interests in the House Education and Labor Committee, introduced an amendment in the 1950 session that would prohibit federal education grants to states that maintained legally segregated school systems. The NAACP had previously advised Powell to make sure that the wording of his amendment specifically denied federal aid to segregated public schools and did not just vaguely state that federal aid should be given in a nondiscriminatory manner (Public Papers of the Presidents 1950, 141--143). The Powell amendment simply strengthened the determination of Barden and other southern Democrats to oppose

Truman and the Fair Deal any federal aid bill that threatened the continuation of racially segregated schools. Privately, Truman wanted to limit federal aid to public schools and hoped that the civil rights and federal aid to education aspects of the Fair Deal could be maintained as separate issues (Poen 1982, 98). In an unsent letter addressed to John Lesinski and written in August 1949, Truman complained to Lesinski, ‘‘I certainly didn’t expect the Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor to join in a filibuster on one of the main bulwarks of the Democratic Platform’’ (Public Papers of the Presidents 1950, 386). During the remainder of the 81st Congress, Truman continued to express the need to provide federal aid to elementary and secondary education while avoiding references to the religious and racial dimensions of this issue (Public Papers of the Presidents 1951, 94--95; 1952--1953, 100--101). Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman articulated a correlation between his proposals for federal aid to elementary and secondary education and for national defense needs in his 1951 and 1952 budget messages to Congress (Ravitch 1983, 41--42). But even this rhetorical linkage between foreign and domestic policies during a war failed to stimulate passage of broad-based federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Truman’s only minor legislative success at these levels of education was congressional passage of a revision and expansion of a 1940 program to provide federal aid to public school districts that were ‘‘adversely impacted’’ by large numbers of military personnel and defense industry workers. Harry Truman’s legislative leadership of the Fair Deal has often been regarded as a failure because the most prominent, controversial, and pioneering Fair Deal proposals---civil rights legislation, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, compulsory national health insurance, the Brannan Plan, and federal aid to elementary and secondary education---were not enacted into laws (Griffith 1989, 87--88). Historian Richard O. Davies recognized the Housing Act of 1949 as the only major Fair Deal proposal to be enacted (Davies 1966, 114). But even the Housing Act of 1949 was not a truly distinct Fair Deal initiative. To a great extent, it was a refinement and expansion of the Housing Act of 1937 and passed because it received extensive bipartisan support due to Republican Sen. Robert A. Taft’s leadership skills (Brown 1968, 219--253). The passage of the Housing Act of 1949 was indicative of the factors that enabled the more minor, less controversial Fair Deal proposals to be passed by Congress. Like the Housing Act of 1949, most Fair Deal legislative successes were revisions, expansions, or

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consolidations of New Deal programs that were widely accepted by the public and by most Democrats and a significant number of Republicans in Congress. While Gallup polls in 1949 indicated that most Americans opposed Truman’s health insurance proposal and only 43 percent supported his recommendation of $300 million in federal aid to education, 68 percent supported the Fair Deal proposal to raise the minimum wage to $0.75 an hour, and 69 percent supported the legislation that became the 1949 Housing Act (Gallup 1972, v. 2, 780--781). It is not surprising, therefore, that Truman succeeded in persuading Congress to pass legislation raising the minimum wage and expanding Social Security coverage (Cohen and Myers 1950, 3--14). Congress likewise passed compromised versions of Truman’s Fair Deal recommendations to expand or modernize programs for rural electrification, soil conservation, reclamation, and flood control (Neustadt 1954, 349). By the end of the 81st Congress, it was evident that Truman would never achieve the enactment of the Fair Deal’s most groundbreaking and controversial policy goals (Riddick 1951, 60--66). Democratic losses in the 1950 congressional elections, allegations of corruption in the Truman administration, Truman’s declining public approval ratings, the nation’s focus on the Korean War and its impact on the civilian economy, and McCarthyism combined to negate any possibility of a major Fair Deal proposal being enacted during the rest of Truman’s presidency. The legislative successes of the Fair Deal, therefore, were generally limited to an extension, consolidation, and revision of the New Deal policy foundation. This limited success reflected the parameters of public opinion and bipartisan support in Congress and the hostility that they posed to any innovative domestic legislation that threatened this consensus during the immediate postwar era. But neither the legislative success of more obscure, moderate Fair Deal policies nor the failure of major, divisive, liberal Fair Deal proposals to be enacted should be underestimated in their significance for the long-term impact of Truman’s party leadership. The success of the Fair Deal in protecting and updating the policy legacy of the New Deal demonstrated the political fact that such New Deal policies as rural electrification, minimum wage laws, and agricultural price supports were not the vulnerable, ephemeral products of the emergency atmosphere of the Great Depression and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal leadership. These New Deal policy accomplishments were deeply ingrained as the domestic policy expectations of most Americans and as the policy identity of the

362 Domestic Policy national Democratic Party. The presidential and congressional election results of 1948 indicated that most voters wanted to protect the New Deal policy foundation and that the Republican sweep of the 1946 congressional elections did not express a public mandate to repeal it. Harry Truman’s exaggerated, inaccurate perception of the 1948 election results as an ideological and programmatic mandate motivated him to futilely lead his party in Congress in a direction that most Democrats rejected on major Fair Deal proposals. Of course, Truman’s efforts to unite and lead Democrats in Congress behind most Fair Deal initiatives were further weakened by his own abstention from aggressively lobbying Congress, the continued success of the bipartisan conservative coalition in manipulating legislative procedures against the Fair Deal (particularly in the Senate against civil rights legislation), and the sophisticated, effective tactics of anti--Fair Deal interest groups (Gable 1953, 254--273). Especially in the Fair Deal’s priorities of passing civil rights legislation and repealing the Taft-Hartley Act, Truman’s party leadership pursued policy goals that seemed unattainable from the beginning of the 81st Congress. But Truman’s liberal, reformist ethos and his sense of campaign obligations to African Americans, the ADA, and organized labor were more influential in the conduct of his party leadership than his more pragmatic, cautious ethos as a party regular. Although Truman’s party leadership failed to persuade a Democratic-controlled Congress to pass the most ambitious, groundbreaking Fair Deal proposals, it provided a blueprint for future action by Democratic presidents, liberal Democrats in Congress, and liberal interest groups during a political era more conducive to their enactment (Bernstein 1991, 247). Shortly before leaving the presidency, Truman complained that Adlai Stevenson lost the 1952 presidential election partially because Stevenson, as the titular leader of the Democratic Party, failed to express a strong commitment to ‘‘Roosevelt’s New Deal and the President’s Fair Deal’’ (Ferrell 1980, 282--283). Stevenson’s campaign rhetoric was more moderate and ambiguous than Truman preferred, but it did not express an abrupt abandonment of the Fair Deal’s policy agenda. Stevenson, Truman, the Democratic Advisory Council, liberal Democrats in Congress, and the ADA would articulate and advocate the principles unattained, major policy goals of the Fair Deal, during the Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations would partially or fully achieve them (Savage 2004, 91--142).

References and Further Reading Abels, Jules. 1959. Out of the Jaws Victory. New York: Holt. Allen, Robert S., and William V. Shannon. 1950. The Truman Merry-Go-Round. New York: Vanguard. Amlund, Curtis A. 1965. ‘‘Executive-Legislative Imbalance: Truman to Kennedy.’’ Western Political Quarterly 18: 640--645. ‘‘Assessment and Public Opinion.’’ 1948. Journal of the American Medical Association 138: 1230--1231. Bailey, Stephen K., and Howard D. Samuel. 1952. Congress at Work. New York: Holt. Bernstein, Irving. 1991. Promises Kept. New York: Oxford University Press. Blanshard, Paul. 1958. American Freedom and Catholic Power. Boston: Beacon Press. Boxerman, Burton A. 1973. ‘‘Adolph Joachim Sabath in Congress, The Roosevelt and Truman Years.’’ Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 66 (Winter): 442. Brock, Clifton. 1962. Americans for Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press. Brown, Charles C. 1968. ‘‘Robert A. Taft, Champion of Public Housing and National Aid to Schools.’’ Bulletin of the Cincinnati Historical Society 26 (July): 225--253. Byrne, Thomas R. 1951. ‘‘The Social Thought of Robert F. Wagner.’’ (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University). Campion, Frank D. 1984. The AMA and U.S. Health Policy Since 1940. Chicago: Chicago Review Press. Cantril, Fred, ed. 1951. Public Opinion: 1935--1946. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Christenson, Reo M. 1974. The Brannan Plan: Farm Politics and Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Christenson, Reo M. 1978. ‘‘Presidential Leadership of Congress: Ten Commandments Point the Way.’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 8: 257--268. Clifford, Clark M. 1971. Transcript, Oral History Interview, July 26. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Clifford, Clark M. 1991. Counsel to the President. New York: Random House. Cohen, Wilbur J., and Robert J. Myers. 1950. ‘‘Social Security Act Amendments of 1950.’’ Social Security Bulletin 13 (October): 3--14. ‘‘Congress Clears the Decks.’’ 1949. New Republic 120 (January 17): 6. Congressional Record. May 3, 1949. A2785, Official File 300, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Congressional Record., 81st Congress, 2nd session, 1950, v. 96, pt. 6, 7770. Congressional Record. 81st Congress, 2nd session, 1950, A2530--2532. Davies, Richard O. 1966. Housing Reform during the Truman Administration. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966. Dingell, John, Sr. 1948. Dingell to J. Howard McGrath, November 30. President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Dingell, John, Sr. 1950. Speech, September 14, 1950, DNC Folder. JFK Pre-Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. DNC Clipping File. 1948. Chicago Sun, November 21, 1948; New York Star, December 5, 1948; Chicago Sun-Times, November 28, 1948. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Truman and the Fair Deal DNC Clipping File. 1948., New York Star, December 5, 1948. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. DNC Clipping, Kansas City Times, June 23, 1949, William M. Boyle, Jr. Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO; Harry S. Truman to Donald Dawson, June 25, 1949, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO; Estes Kefauver to Harry S. Truman, August 30, 1949, Official File 300, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO; and Estes Kefauver to Harry S. Truman, December 29, 1949, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Donovan, Robert J. 1982. Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman: 1949--1953. New York: Norton. Douglas, Paul H. 1971. In the Fullness of Time: The Memoirs of Paul H. Douglas. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Ewing, Oscar R. 1969. Transcript, Oral History Interview, April 29--30 and May 1--2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Ferrell, Robert H., ed. 1980. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York: Harper and Row. Ferrell, Robert H., ed. 1991. Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Fishbein, Morris. 1947. A History of the American Medical Association. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders. Gable, Richard W. 1953. ‘‘NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?’’ Journal of Politics 15: 254--273. Gallup, George H. 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935--1971. Vol. 2. New York: Random House. Gannon, Robert I. 1962. The Cardinal Spellman Story. London: Robert Hale. Garceau, Oliver. 1941. The Political Life of the American Medical Association. Hamden, CT: Archon Books. Griffith, Robert. 1989. ‘‘Forging America’s Postwar Order.’’ In The Truman Presidency. Edited by Michael J. Lucey. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hamby, Alonzo L. 1973. Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Hamby, Alonzo L. 1985. Liberalism and Its Challengers: F.D.R. to Reagan. New York: Oxford University Press. Hamilton, Charles V. 1992. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma. New York: Collier Books. Hardeman, B., and Donald C. Bacon. 1987. Rayburn: A Biography. Lanham, MD: Madison Books. Heller, Francis J., ed. 1980. The Truman White House. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas. Kelley, Stanley, Jr. 1956. Professional Public Relations and Political Power. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Keyserling, Leon. 1986. ‘‘Harry S. Truman: The Man and the President.’’ In Harry S. Truman: The Man from Independence. Edited by William E. Levantrosser, 235--244. New York: Greenwood Press. Lachman, Seymour P. 1965. ‘‘The Cardinal, the Congressman, and the First Lady.’’ Journal of Church and State 7: 35--66. Lash, Joseph P. 1972. Eleanor: The Years Alone. New York: Norton. Matusow, Allen J. 1967. Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Maverick, Maury. 1950. Maverick to Donald Dawson, October 6. Official File 300, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Mayhew, David R. 1966. Party Loyalty among Congressmen: The Difference between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Munger, Frank J., and Richard F. Fenno. 1962. National Politics and Federal Aid to Education. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Neustadt, Richard E. 1954. ‘‘Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance Sheet.’’ Public Policy 5: 349--381. Neustadt, Richard E. 1955. ‘‘Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President’s Program.’’ American Political Science Review 49 (December): 1014. New York Times, May 6, 1949, 1. New York Times, June 29, 1949, 5. New York Times, December 13, 1949, 37. ‘‘Next Steps in the Fair Deal.’’ 1949. New Republic 120 (March 7): 11. O’Malley, George E. 1950. O’Malley to Jake More, November 15. Iowa Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Peterson, William H. 1959. The Great Farm Problem. Chicago: Regnery. Pickens, Donald K. 1986. ‘‘Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors and the Legacy of New Deal Liberalism.’’ In Harry S. Truman: The Man from Independence. Edited by Levantrosser, 245--264. New York: Greenwood Press. Parron, Thomas. 1945. ‘‘The United States Public Health Service in the War.’’ In Doctors at War. Edited by Morris Fishbein, 249--273. New York: Dutton. Patterson, James T. 1972. Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Poen, Monte M. 1979. Harry S. Truman versus the Medical Lobby: The Genesis of Medicare. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Poen, Monte M., ed. 1982. Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed. Boston: Little, Brown. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman. 1961--1966. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Puryear, Elmer L. 1979. Graham A. Barden: Conservative Carolina Congressman. Buies Creek, NC: Campbell University Press. Rasmussen, Wayne D., ed. 1975. Agriculture in the United States. Vol. 4. New York: Random House. Ravitch, Diane. 1983. The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945--1980. New York: Basic Books. Riddick, Floyd M. 1951. ‘‘The Eighty-First Congress: First and Second Sessions.’’ Western Political Quarterly 4 (March): 54--55. Rivet, Kathleen. 1941. ‘‘Lost: A National Health Program.’’ American Labor Legislation Review 31 (September): 120-121. Ross, Irwin. 1968. The Loneliest Campaign. New York: New American Library. Savage, Sean J. 2004. JFK, LBJ, and the Democratic Party. Albany: State University of New York Press. Schapsmeier, Edward L., and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. 1977. ‘‘Scott W. Lucas of Havana: His Rise and Fall as Majority

364 Domestic Policy Leader of the United States Senate.’’ Journal of Illinois State Historical Society 70: 302--320. Schriftgiesser, Karl. 1951. The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Smith, Gilbert E. 1982. The Limits of Reform: Politics and Federal Aid to Education. New York: Garland Press. Somers, Herman M., and Anne R. Somers. 1961. Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books. Steinberg, Alfred. 1975. Sam Rayburn: A Biography. New York: Hawthorn. Truman, Harry S. 1955. Memoirs. Vol. 1. New York: Doubleday. ‘‘The Truth about Health Program.’’ 1950. DNC Folder, JFK PrePresidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education, Public School Assistance

Act of 1949, 81st Congress, 1st session, 1949, 743-744. U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor. Federal Aid for Education, 79th Congress, 1st session, 1945, 118--125. Weaver, Samuel H. 1972. ‘‘The Truman Administration and Federal Aid to Education.’’ (PhD dissertation, American University). ‘‘Which Medicine.’’ 1949. Time 53 (June 21): 48. White, Hugh. 1952. Governor Hugh White’s speech to States’ Rights Convention, June 26. President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. White, William S. 1959. ‘‘Medicine Man from Alabama.’’ Harper’s Magazine 219 (November): 90--94.

Notes 1. Author’s interviews with Ken Hechler, August 27, 1991, and Richard E. Neustadt, July 24, 1991. 2. Author’s interview with Neustadt.

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Patrick McGuinn Associate Professor of Political Science, Drew University

Introduction

schools within the context of broader institutional, ideational, and electoral developments in American politics since the end of World War II.

In recent years, education has risen to the top of the national political agenda and the federal role in schools has been dramatically transformed and expanded with the 2002 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. The new federal focus on accountability and the extension of federal policy to cover every student and every school in the country marks a major shift in the governance of elementary and secondary education in the United States. Richard Elmore calls NCLB ‘‘the single largest expansion of federal power over the nation’s education system in history,’’ while Andy Rotherham, a former Clinton education advisor, says that it ‘‘represents the high water mark of federal intrusion in education’’ (2002, 31--35).1 The development of such a sizable and reform-oriented federal role in education is remarkable when placed in the context of the nation’s history of decentralized school governance. It is also extraordinary given the longstanding opposition of conservatives and states’ rights advocates to federal influence over schools, the desire of most liberals to keep the federal role narrowly focused on providing funds for disadvantaged students, and the widespread push for deregulation and privatization that dominated the national policy-making climate in the 1980s and 1990s. To understand how NCLB and the expanded federal role in education came to pass and the political dynamics that continue to shape federal education policy, this article places the evolution of the federal role in

America’s Tradition of Localism in Education America has a longstanding tradition of local control of schools. The U.S. Constitution is silent on education and the issue was historically deemed the province of state and local governments.2 Prior to the 1950s, federal involvement in education was almost nonexistent; conceptions of equal education opportunity were less central to political disputes, and broad inequities were not considered problematic. As late as 1930 less than a fifth of adults over 25 had completed high school and education was not perceived by citizens as central to economic success. Progressives had fought doggedly to convince the public that schooling decisions ought to be entrusted to ‘‘non-political’’ educational professionals (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, Table 8). When education did emerge as a political issue, it was typically due to religious and ethnic tensions, rather than more abstract concerns about school quality.** As a result, the issue of elementary and secondary education was largely absent from the national political agenda until the second half of the 20th century. As Hugh Davis Graham has noted, ‘‘Prior to the 1960s, one of the most distinctive attributes of America’s political culture had been the tenacity with which the United

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366 Domestic Policy States, unlike other nations, had resisted a national education policy’’ (Graham 1984, xvii). Even the ambitious legislative agenda of the New Deal contained remarkably little on elementary and secondary education---only impact aid for school districts adversely affected by the presence of nontaxed governmental institutions.3 Education gained new prominence in America after World War II, however, as high school completion became the norm and as the G.I. Bill spurred a dramatic increase in college enrollment.4 For the first time, education became part of the lexicon of the working-class American and a key to economic and social mobility (Ravitch 1983, 10--16). Education gained additional salience in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown ruling on school segregation and the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik, the first orbiting satellite. The Supreme Court’s powerful statement in Brown on the importance of equal education opportunity, as well as the civil rights struggles of the following decade, gave rise to a public conception of education as the birthright of a free citizenry.5 Education opportunity was increasingly considered vital to ensuring all Americans the chance to better their circumstances. Sputnik, meanwhile, emphasized the importance of education to national security and the Cold War competition with the former Soviet Union. These developments provided the impetus for the passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, which provided categorical aid to states to improve math, science, and foreign language instruction in American schools. The NDEA was an important political precedent and psychological breakthrough for advocates of federal aid to education. Even the opponents of federal aid to education recognized the NDEA’s significance, with Barry Goldwater writing during consideration of the bill that it reminded him ‘‘of an old Arabian proverb: ‘If the camel once gets his nose in the tent, his body will soon follow.’ If adopted, the legislation will mark the inception of aid, supervision, and ultimately control of education in this country by federal authorities’’ (cited Sundquist 1968, 178). Even with the NDEA, however, as of 1960 national support for education remained quite small in absolute dollars (less than $1 billion) and as a percentage of total education spending (around 2 percent). It was also fragmented into several categorical grants with little direct federal oversight. Existing federal aid was generally devoted to narrow ends: statistics collection, specialized research and demonstration grants, vocational education assistance, the school lunch program, and impact aid. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s created a much greater public awareness of the

economic and education inequalities facing African Americans and other racial minorities in the United States. A large body of social science research released in the early 1960s documented the terrible education conditions facing poor children and the dire consequences that these conditions had on their later life prospects. Work by Michael Harrington (The Other America), James Conant (Slums and Suburbs), and others highlighted the resource and achievement gap between students in poor schools on the one hand and students in middle- and upper-class schools on the other. Poor children, it was also recognized at the time, were concentrated in the inner cities and were often from racial minority groups. The consequence, as one observer noted, was that ‘‘beginning in the 1950’s and continuing through the 1960’s and 1970’s, Americans generally were made keenly aware of the existence of a number of social injustices. Thus, there developed a climate of public opinion favorable to social reform efforts’’ (Guthrie 1983, 674). Despite increasing public awareness of the unequal opportunities in American schools, however, the political opposition to an expanded federal role in education remained strong. As Graham has written in his classic work on the period, ‘‘to propose federal ‘intrusion’ into the sanctity of the state-local-private preserve of education was to stride boldly into a uniquely dangerous political mine field that pitted Democrat against Republican, liberal against conservative, Catholic against Protestant and Jew, federal power against states rights, white against black, and rich constituency against poor in mercurial cross-cutting alliances’’ (Graham 1984, xv). This opposition had succeeded in defeating a number of proposals by Democrats for increased federal education spending in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as several by President Kennedy’s administration in the early 1960s.

ESEA and the Big Bang of Federal Education Policy Kennedy’s successor, his vice president and the former Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), would capitalize on the growing public awareness of school inequalities, the political goodwill for Kennedy’s agenda following his assassination, and the large Democratic majority in Congress following the 1964 election to push again for an education bill.6 LBJ declared a War on Poverty and thrust the quest for civil rights to the center of his domestic agenda. He identified his education bill as a crucial component of the broader antidiscrimination efforts begun with the Civil Rights

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Act of 1964 and of his antipoverty program. If education was the key to economic and social mobility, however, too many schools lacked the resources to provide the necessary skills to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. As one observer noted, ‘‘the architects of the Great Society have found the school systems, for the most part, ill-prepared and ill-equipped to meet the educational challenges to be encountered in building the Great Society. Furthermore, they learned that most

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localities today are hard pressed to finance the schools on which success depends’’ (Spraggins 1968, 46). When LBJ introduced his education plan in 1965, the former schoolteacher argued that nothing matters more to the future of our country; not our military preparedness, for armed might is worthless if we lack brainpower to build a world of peace; not our productive economy, for we cannot

President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Elementary and Secondary Education Bill on April 11, 1965. He is joined by his childhood schoolteacher, Kate Deadrich Loney. (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library)

368 Domestic Policy sustain growth without trained manpower; not our democratic system of government, for freedom is fragile if citizens are ignorant. (Meranto 1967, 104) Johnson also saw federal leadership in education as a logical---and essential---extension of the New Deal. During a State of Education address in February 1968, Johnson remarked that, On January 6, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth to Congress and the people four essential freedoms for which America stands . . . Today, wealthier, more powerful, and more able than ever before in our history, our nation can declare another essential freedom---the fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance (Howe 1990, 102). From the outset, however, Johnson and his advisors were cognizant of the political obstacles---intense opposition to government support for integration, Catholic schools, and centralized administration---that had defeated previous attempts to expand the federal role in education. What had become known as the ‘‘three R’s’’---race, religion, and the reds---remained a substantial barrier. The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, however---and particularly Title VI, which outlawed the allocation of federal funds to segregated programs---would prevent Johnson’s education proposals from becoming entangled with racial issues as earlier efforts had in 1956 and 1960 (Meranto 1967, 132). Johnson’s Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel warned in a 1964 memo, however, that the other two ‘‘R’s’’ remained. Any plan to provide substantial new federal aid to schools, he observed, would still meet with intense opposition from states’ rights and antigovernment conservatives, as well as create conflict between two important Democratic constituencies, Catholics and the National Education Association (NEA) (Spring 1999, 96--97). Catholics opposed any bill that would direct federal money to public but not private schools, while the NEA opposed any diversion of federal education aid to private schools. Keppel devised an ingenious compromise solution that provided the basis for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. His plan was to target federal aid to poor children regardless of the type of school they attended (whether public or private). This plan had the advantage of spreading money around to a majority of congressional districts, to public and private school children, and to state education agencies for implementation purposes, thereby undercutting most of the potential political opposition to the program.

ESEA was intended to be primarily a redistributive bill, to supplement school spending in the nation’s poorest communities, and to lend federal muscle to efforts to innovate and improve education services. The centerpiece of this effort and of the legislation itself was the Title I program, which stated that ‘‘the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . . . to expand and improve . . . educational programs by various means . . . which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children’’ (Spring 1976, 225). Title I was designed to assist communities with a high concentration of low-income families by raising per-pupil expenditures. The nature of the legislative process, however, meant that the redistributive edge of ESEA got rubbed off as money was spread around in exchange for political support. In the end, the funding formula was designed to maximize the number of school districts (and thus the number of congressional districts) that would be eligible and the restrictions on how the money could be spent were loosened considerably. Ninety-four percent of the school districts in America ultimately received ESEA funds and the Act allowed Title I funds to be used for a variety of purposes, including hiring additional staff, purchasing classroom equipment, or supporting classroom instruction (Eidenberg and Morey 1969, 247). The result was that ESEA would, despite Johnson’s initial desire, remain a hybrid program, both distributive and redistributive in its design and impact. The political incentives for local school authorities and state policy makers---and at times national politicians---to disperse education funding broadly would lead to a longstanding struggle over its focus on disadvantaged students. The ESEA was the result of widespread agreement among education policy makers and researchers that the federal government should intervene in what was widely seen as an education crisis among poor children. There remained, however, a great deal of disagreement over the causes of poverty and education inequality and what the government should do to address them. Researchers and policy makers disagreed about the most important factors influencing education achievement and what kind of education reforms were likely to work for disadvantaged students. In addition, a great ideological rift existed between conservatives and liberals about whether the issue of disadvantaged students should be approached from a deficit perspective, a structural perspective, or something else entirely. Conservatives argued that disadvantaged students suffered from a ‘‘culture of poverty’’ and that they could only succeed if they were taught middle-class values.7

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Liberals countered that the primary problem facing poor students was that they attended poor schools. In this view, the structure of the American social, political, and economic systems resulted in inequalities that the schools largely served to replicate. In addition to these debates over education strategy, policy makers disagreed about which level of government (federal, state, or local) was best suited to achieve school reform. The design as well as the substance of ESEA was to have important consequences for American education policy. One of the most significant features of ESEA was what it did not do: it did not provide general federal aid to public schools in the United States Instead, ESEA provided ‘‘categorical’’ aid that was targeted to a specific student population---disadvantaged students. As Paul Peterson and Barry Rabe would later note, ‘‘passage of the ESEA . . . provided for greatly increased support for public education, but it hardly took the form that traditional education interest groups had long advocated. Instead of a program of general aid, the legislation concentrated resources on educationally disadvantaged children living in low-income areas’’ (Peterson and Rabe, 1983, 717). And, as will be discussed in more detail below, the creation of federal categorical programs required that federal education institutions shift from what had been largely an information-gathering and disseminating role to a more supervisory role in the administration of the new federal funds and programs. Given the political opposition to federal ‘‘control’’ in education, however, it had been impossible to include rigorous compliance provisions in ESEA, or even the kind of administrative requirements that normally were attached to categorical grants. Nonetheless, many observers at the time recognized the symbolic significance of ESEA for national education policy---an important threshold had been crossed and an important federal role in education policy cemented. President Johnson remarked at the time that in one year Congress ‘‘did more for the wonderful cause of education in America than all the previous 176 regular sessions of Congress did, put together’’ (Sundquist 1968, 16). And as both the supporters and opponents of federal aid to education acknowledged, the federal role in education was likely to expand after ESEA despite continuing opposition on some fronts. Rep. John Williams (R-Del.), for example, remarked after the passage of ESEA, Make no mistake about it, this bill . . . is merely the beginning. It contains within it the seeds of the first

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federal education system which will be nurtured by its supporters in the years to come long after the current excuse of aiding the poverty stricken is forgotten . . . The needy are being used as a wedge to open the floodgates, and you may be absolutely certain that the flood of federal control is ready to sweep the land (Sundquist 1968, 215). Indeed, in his classic study of the Johnson years, James Sundquist comments that with ESEA ‘‘the national ‘concern’ for education had become a national ‘responsibility’ . . . The question would be, henceforth, not whether the national government should give aid but how much it should give, for what purposes---and with how much federal control’’ (Sundquist 1968, 16). The combination of the NDEA and the ESEA dramatically increased federal funding for education both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total education spending. Between 1958 and 1968, for example, federal spending on education multiplied more than 10 times, from $375 million to $4.2 billion, and the federal share expanded from less than 3 percent to about 10 percent of all school funding. The beneficiaries of federal aid to education---particularly teachers’ unions, parent groups, and state and local education agencies--quickly became a powerful political force in Washington and fought hard to protect existing programs and to create new ones. As Graham notes, ‘‘by the end of the Johnson administration, the very proliferation of Great Society programs . . . reinforced the growing triangular networks with a vested interest in maximizing their benefits by pressing willing congressional authorizing committees to exceed by large margins the president’s budget requests, especially in education’’ (Graham 1984, 193). Although the political survival of ESEA seemed guaranteed by the end of the 1960s, concern was growing in many quarters about the implementation of federal education programs and their effectiveness in promoting equal education opportunity.

The Implementation and Expansion of ESEA Policy making and implementation in education is inherently difficult given the vagaries, conflicting goals, and ambiguities that characterize schooling. It quickly became clear that the implementation challenges surrounding ESEA were especially difficult and that the compromises required to gain congressional approval of ESEA in many ways compromised the legislation’s original goal of improving education

370 Domestic Policy opportunities for poor children. First, as noted, the legislation itself incorporated multiple goals and methods, some of which were incompatible with one another. Second, the original ESEA gave federal administrators few tools to force compliance with federal directives and goals in the use of ESEA funds. Third, even if such tools had been available, the agency charged with implementing ESEA, the U.S. Office of Education (USOE), was for several years after its passage disinclined or unable to make use of the compliance tools it had. Fourth, lingering opposition to federal control of education ensured that attempts to administer ESEA rigorously would generate a strong political backlash. Fifth, and finally, the politics and implementation of ESEA were greatly complicated by the addition of new purposes and programs to ESEA in the years following 1965. Though the goal of ESEA---to improve education opportunity for the poor---was clear, the legislation was vague as to how this goal was to be achieved. The ESEA distributed funds to school districts according to the number of poor children enrolled, but did not specify which services districts should provide to ‘‘educationally deprived’’ children (Jennings 2000, 4). The consequence of ESEA’s initial flexibility was that federal funds were used in a wide variety of ways for a wide variety of purposes, and local districts often diverted funds away from redistributive programs.8 As Graham observed, ‘‘the upshot of all this is that when Title I was implemented, it produced not a Title I program, but something more like 30,000 separate and different Title I programs’’ (Graham 1984, 204). The original ESEA legislation gave the USOE little power to coerce states to comply with federal regulations or goals or to punish states and school districts that failed to do so. The large amount of discretion accorded to states and school districts in spending the new federal money ensured that compliance with federal goals would be spotty at best. In his examination of the implementation of ESEA, Joel Berke notes that federal aid is channeled into an existing state political system and pattern of policy, and a blend distilled of federal priorities and the frequently different state priorities emerges . . . Federal money is a stream that must pass through a state capitol; at the state level, the federal government is rarely able---through its guidelines and regulations--radically to divert the stream or reverse the current (Berke 1974, 143).

The wide latitude given to school districts and the lack of compliance mechanisms in ESEA were serious barriers to effective implementation of the Act. The USOE, however, was also ill-suited to a compliance role. It had long been a small, passive organization that focused on collecting and disseminating statistical data on education and did little else. The result, as John and Anne Hughes note, was that, ‘‘if USOE had limitations on its policymaking authority and capability---and these have been legion---its ability to enforce its policies has been even more limited. The state agencies and the local districts, by and large, were used to going their own ways, which often meant disregarding federal requirements’’ (1972, 50). Initially the USOE relied on the assurances of state education officials that they were in compliance with federal guidelines. By the 1970s, the additional resources available to the USOE and the agency’s gradual adjustment to its new administrative role led the USOE to begin to take its enforcement responsibilities seriously and to reorganize its enforcement efforts to make them more effective (Hughes and Hughes 1972, 57). One of the fundamental premises behind the idea of compensatory education, and of ESEA more generally, was that state and local education authorities had failed to ensure equal education opportunities for their students and that they could not be trusted to do so in the future without federal intervention. The distrust of local education authorities---and mounting evidence that states and localities were diverting federal funds to purposes for which they were not intended---ultimately led federal bureaucrats to increase the regulation and supervision of federal aid. As Ravitch has observed, in this atmosphere of discord and distrust, those with grievances turned naturally to the courts and the federal government to enforce their rights against local school boards . . . programs, regulations, and court orders began to reflect the strong suspicion that those in control of American institutions were not to be trusted with any discretion where minorities, women, or other aggrieved groups were concerned (Ravitch 1983, 271). Democrats and their allies in the federal education bureaucracy continued to argue that the best way to help poor students was to direct additional federal money to their schools and to regulate how it was used. Continuing opposition to federal micromanagement in education and the lack of consensus on how to measure the effectiveness of school reform efforts, however, led federal administrators (using the

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development substantial discretion given to them in the legislation) to focus on school district spending patterns and administrative compliance. The result was that an enormous amount of bureaucratic red tape was created during the 1970s without any kind of concomitant focus on student or school results---everything was judged by procedure and process. In the 1980s, John Chubb noted that, ‘‘in federal programs that are not explicitly regulatory, as well as those that are, policy has come to be carried out by increasingly detailed, prescriptive, legalistic, and authoritative means’’ (Chubb 1985, 287). Between 1964 and 1976, for example, the number of pages of federal legislation affecting education increased from 80 to 360, while the number of federal regulations increased from 92 in 1965 to nearly 1,000 in 1977 (Ravitch 1983, 312). One of the most significant consequences of ESEA was thus the centralization of education policy making from the local level to the state and federal levels. From 1965 to 1975, federal funds for elementary and secondary education more than doubled (National Center for Education Statistics 2000, 395). In addition, between 1960 and 1985, the percentage of total education spending provided by the national government grew from 8 percent to 16 percent. Over the same period, the share of local spending dipped from 51 percent to 31 percent while the state share increased from 41 percent to 55 percent (Wright 1988, 195). Eligibility for federal education funds was often conditioned on the provision of state matching funds, the creation of central implementing offices, and the collection of a variety of statistical information that necessitated that state education agencies expand their size and activities and become more institutionalized. This was a clear objective of ESEA, as the original legislation contained funding for the agencies to build up their administrative capacity so that they would be better equipped to handle their new, federally imposed, responsibilities. Due in part to the centralization and professionalization of state education agencies mandated by New Deal and Great Society programs, the number of independent school districts in the U.S. dropped from approximately 150,000 in 1900 to 15,000 in 1993 (Newman 1994, 166). Administrative centralization at the state level ultimately made education more susceptible to federal regulation by reducing the number of decisionmaking foci. In practice, centralization also meant that local decision makers had less and less flexibility in how they ran their schools. As Ravitch notes, During the decade after 1965, political pressures converged on schools . . . in ways that undermined

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their authority to direct their own affairs . . . Congress, the courts, federal agencies, and state legislatures devised burdensome and costly new mandates. In elementary and secondary schools, almost no area of administrative discretion was left uncontested (Ravitch 1983, 267). The implementation of ESEA also quickly became enmeshed in the highly charged struggles over integration and busing that were fought across the country during the 1960s and 1970s. States that failed to comply with court integration decrees would lose their share of federal education funds, which as discussed were sizable after the creation of ESEA. The original Brown decision in 1954, while declaring that states must integrate their public schools, was silent on the crucial issues of when and how this was to be accomplished. The court’s 1955 Brown II decision declared that integration should proceed ‘‘with all deliberate speed,’’ but the Court again declined to set firm deadlines or methods for integration. The following year 101 congress members and senators from the South signed the ‘‘Southern Manifesto,’’ which denounced the Brown decisions as ‘‘contrary to established law and to the Constitution.’’ Recalcitrant states such as Virginia engaged in ‘‘massive resistance’’ and were able to postpone large-scale integration efforts.9 The initial flexibility and discretion that the Supreme Court accorded state desegregation efforts came to an end, however, with the 1968 Green v. County School Board of Kent County, Virginia case when the court declared that school boards must develop integration plans that promise ‘‘realistically to work now.’’10 In response to the decision, lower courts mandated the widespread busing of students, which engendered a great deal of disruption and opposition across the country. Nonetheless, as opponents of federal control of education had feared, the passage of ESEA had given a crucial beachhead to those who sought to increase further the federal role in education policy. ESEA had been based on the idea that the federal government had the obligation to assist ‘‘disadvantaged’’ students and that such assistance would be efficacious. Once this rationale had been enshrined in federal law and court precedent, a number of education-related interest groups worked hard to protect it and to expand the number and type of students considered ‘‘disadvantaged’’ and thus eligible to receive federal Title I aid. These groups included the National Advisory Council for the Education of Disadvantaged Children, the National Welfare Rights Organization, the Legal Standards and Education Project of the National Association

372 Domestic Policy for the Advancement of Colored People, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, and the National Association of Administrators of State and FederallyAssisted Education Programs. With the support of these and other organizations, a number of disadvantaged groups were able (often with the assistance of the courts) to secure additional federal spending and protections. Amendments to the ESEA in 1968 provided funding and new federal programs for disadvantaged students in rural areas, for dropout prevention programs, and for the support of bilingual programs. Congress strengthened the Act in 1974 and reauthorized it in 1978 by wide bipartisan margins. (The $50 billion five-year reauthorization of 1978, for example, passed 86--7 in the Senate and 350--20 in the House.) The education proposals of the Nixon and Carter administrations largely continued in the path established by LBJ by adding more than 100 new categorical programs in education. Migrant children, children for whom English was a second language, delinquent and neglected children, and children with mental and physical handicaps would all eventually be added to Title I. The creation and growth of the special education program within ESEA demonstrates how the scope of the Act was expanded and some of the consequences of this expansion. A 1966 amendment to ESEA created a new title (Title VI) to provide grants to programs for ‘‘handicapped’’ children. This new program---like ESEA itself---continued to expand over time as the definition of ‘‘handicapped’’ was broadened to cover more and more students. Despite a decline in the total public school population between 1968 and 1986, the number of children in special education programs in the United States during that period increased from 2.3 million to 4.3 million. The cost of providing special education services has been estimated at between $25 and $30 billon per year, with the federal government contributing only $4 billion of that total. The remaining amount constituted an enormous unfunded federal mandate that localities and states had to finance on their own (Melnick 1995, 24). Some of the expansion of special education programs occurred as a result of direct congressional action, but state and federal courts came to play an increasingly active and expansionist role in education policy during the 1970s. Shep Melnick’s research has shown how generally expansive interpretations of vague federal statutes by the courts contributed to the dramatic growth of federal regulation and spending in the case of special education. He attributes the sizable growth in special education programs, for example, to the vague language contained in the 1975 Education

for All Handicapped Children Education Act (EAHCA) and the subsequent broad determinations of eligibility by federal courts and administrators. The EAHCA mandated that all school systems provide a ‘‘free appropriate public education’’ to all handicapped children; that schools develop an ‘‘individualized educational program’’ for each handicapped child; and that schools provide ‘‘related services’’ to handicapped children. The Act did not, however, specify how the crucial terms--‘‘handicapped,’’ ‘‘appropriate,’’ ‘‘individualized,’’ or ‘‘related services’’---should be defined. As Melnick notes, ‘‘legislators talked blithely about providing equal educational opportunity and allowing individuals to maximize their potential, without giving serious thought to what this might mean in practice’’ (Melnick 1995, 37). Because the legislation also granted parents the right to appeal school decisions to the courts, it ensured that judges would ultimately provide those definitions and they tended to interpret the EAHCA broadly in terms of protecting the individual rights of handicapped children. While the design and priorities of some federal programs were questioned, the central idea that the federal government had an obligation to expand the opportunities of the disadvantaged through new programs and resources was widely accepted during the 1970s by politicians and the public alike (Kaplan and Cuciti 1986, 1, 13). By 1980 federal spending and influence on schooling had expanded dramatically and ESEA had facilitated the centralization, bureaucratization, and judicialization of education policy making. The case of special education policy represented an extension of the ESEA logic---that the federal government needed to protect the most vulnerable from local majorities or inequities in the larger state and local systems. The result was a growing federal involvement in education but also increasingly inflexible and copious regulations and more intrusive court involvement. President Carter’s creation of a cabinet-level Department of Education in 1979 was symbolic of the growth of the national presence in education policy. By 1980, the department administered approximately 500 different federal education programs. The focus of the federal effort in education at this point was on supplying additional resources to promote equity and ensuring an equitable process of determining how these resources were allocated. There was little effort, however, to measure the education progress of students covered by federal programs or to evaluate the programs’ effects on student performance.11 This fueled the growing perception in the 1970s that federal education policy---like many other federal policies from the

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Great Society---had become more about providing entitlements and protecting rights than about enhancing opportunity or demanding responsibility. This situation led to growing discontent among Republicans, states rights advocates and even some Democrats about the nature and effectiveness of federal education aid and set the stage for a backlash against ESEA.

The Backlash against ESEA Given the difficulties in the design and implementation of ESEA, it was not surprising that researchers and policy makers began to question the effectiveness of federal education aid. During the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of prominent studies were published that argued that ESEA funds and programs had largely failed to improve education opportunity for disadvantaged students (see, for example, those by Bailey and Mosher 1968; Berke and Kirst 1972; Berke 1974; McLaughlin 1975; Thomas 1975; Jeffrey 1976). In addition, because ESEA was premised on the provision of additional resources rather than the promotion of school reform, federal education aid generally went to support existing state and local programs. This approach came under fire over time as the additional resources failed to generate improvement in student achievement. In a September 1970 speech whose themes would be widely repeated in the following years, Republican President Richard Nixon argued that increased spending on education would not improve education opportunity unless more fundamental changes in schools were required. Congress had been, he noted, ‘‘extraordinarily generous in its support of education . . . [and] much of this activity was based on the familiar premise that if only the resources available for education were increased, the amount youngsters learn would increase.’’ It was time, he argued, to recognize that existing education ‘‘programs and strategies . . . are . . . based on faulty assumptions and inadequate knowledge’’ (Jeffrey 1978, 143). By this point, the Great Society was under fire from both conservative and liberal politicians. As Gareth Davies has noted, ‘‘the former was increasingly certain that the poor did not deserve the War on Poverty’s largesse, and the latter was equally adamant that they were entitled to far more’’ (Davies 1996, 78). As a result of the questionable benefits of ESEA, public support for it and many of the other social welfare programs born during the Great Society began to wane in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s. The growing perception was that many programs that had begun as an effort to promote opportunity and self-reliance had morphed

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into entitlements that encouraged dependency---that opportunity liberalism had transformed into what Davies calls ‘‘entitlement liberalism’’ (Davies 1996, 1--9). ‘‘Although the very visible War on Poverty program appeared to be aimed at assisting the poor to find a competitive place in the system,’’ Kaplan and Cuciti note, ‘‘the entitlement programs that evolved seemed premised on a commitment to assist a poverty population that could not, should not, or would not compete’’ (Kaplan and Cuciti 1986, 217).12 In addition, conservatives George Wallace and Richard Nixon seized on the unpopularity of school busing during the 1968 presidential election campaign. In this and subsequent elections, Republican presidential candidates would successfully use opposition to school busing and integration as a key part of their ‘‘southern strategy’’ to appeal to conservative Democratic voters and their assault on federal government activism more generally. Several scholars have argued that race---and particularly the debate over school integration--became the decisive issue in American politics during the second half of the 20th century and led to the unraveling of the coalition that had supported the Great Society and the War on Poverty, and ultimately, a partisan electoral realignment (see, for example, Carmines and Stimson 1989). As ESEA continued to expand in size and to cover more and more disadvantaged groups despite its apparent failure to deliver on its promise to enhance education opportunity, support for a fundamental reconsideration of the federal role in education gained momentum. In the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan took advantage of growing public opposition to federal ‘‘interference’’ in schools and the expansion of the welfare state more generally to defeat Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter.13 Reagan energized the Republican Party behind a conservative agenda centered on cutting taxes and rolling back the size and scope of the federal government. Once in office, he argued that ‘‘it’s time to bury the myth that bigger government brings more opportunity and compassion’’ (Levitan and Johnson 1986, 73). As part of his New Federalism program, Reagan gained passage in 1981 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA) which dramatically reformed many of the provisions of ESEA. The changes reduced the amount of federal funding for education by almost 20 percent, simplified eligibility requirements, and increased flexibility for states in the use of federal education funds.14 States’ rights advocates celebrated what they thought was the beginning of a new era (or perhaps more accurately a return to an old era) in which the

374 Domestic Policy federal government would leave education policy making to the states. As Graham observed at the time, however, the Reaganite hostility to a strong federal role in education (beyond defense related R & D) is not shared by a congressional majority that clings with surprising tenacity to the consensus forged during the Kennedy-Johnson years, which survived and even prospered under the Nixon and Ford administrations, and which was strongly reinforced under Carter. (Graham 1984, 22). By 1980, ESEA and the federal role in education had been institutionalized and were vigorously defended by teachers unions, state education agencies, and parent groups. The result was that, as Ravitch has noted, ‘‘the new politics of the schools rotated about a state-federal axis rather than a local-state axis’’ (Ravitch 1983, 320). Republican efforts to roll back federal influence in education in the 1980s also ran into fresh evidence that American schools were in poor shape. A widely publicized 1983 report on the state of American education, A Nation at Risk, painted a dire portrait of the country’s public schools and highlighted how far American students lagged behind their foreign counterparts on academic achievement tests. It emphasized that the dire performance of American students was a matter of national security, both in our Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and our competition in the global economy. The widespread sense that the country was facing an education crisis enhanced public support for increased federal leadership, despite the Republican argument that the best way to improve our schools was to get the federal government out of education policy.15 Acknowledging the increased salience of education among voters, Republican George Bush promised during the 1988 campaign to be an ‘‘education president’’ and convened an unprecedented meeting of the nation’s governors in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the fall of 1989 to discuss education reform.16 Despite a great deal of disagreement concerning the proper extent of the federal role, the governors agreed to support the creation of a set of national education goals and to assess the progress of states in meeting them.17 In April 1991, President Bush introduced his America 2000 education reform plan, which called for the development of more detailed standards in the core academic subjects and asked governors to adopt voluntary national testing for 4th, 8th, and 12th graders. At this point, however, both Republicans and Democrats

opposed federal standards and tests, though for very different reasons. Republicans feared that they inevitably would lead to federal control of education, while Democrats feared that they would unfairly penalize teachers and disadvantaged students and lead to a deemphasis on the importance of increasing federal funding for schools. As a result of this bipartisan opposition, Bush’s America 2000 bill ultimately died in Congress.

New Democrats, Compassionate Conservatives, and the Battle to Redefine ESEA During the 1992 presidential campaign, Democrats used the end of the Cold War and the economic recession to reemphasize their party’s commitment to using the federal government to promote federal leadership on a number of pressing domestic issues, including education. In 1992, William Clinton, the Democratic presidential nominee and a self-proclaimed New Democrat, called for a strong federal role in education, and the legislative enactments of the first two years of his administration helped to further nationalize politics and policy making in education and to advance the cause of standards-based reform.18 Clinton capitalized on the increased salience of education and Democratic control of Congress to gain passage of two major school reform bills---Goals 2000 and the Improving America’s Schools Act. States were required under Goals 2000 to develop targets for the attainment of factual information and intellectual abilities that students should master at specified grade levels. Many of the reform ideas that would later form the core of the 2002 NCLB---such as standards, assessments, adequate yearly progress, school report cards, and corrective action--found their first expression in the 1994 ESEA reauthorization. Though the new laws did not include many mandates for states, they nonetheless signified a sea change in federal education policy and codified the shift from the historic focus on ensuring equity for disadvantaged students and impoverished schools to a new commitment to improve the academic performance of all students and schools (Mintrom and Vergari 1997, 15). Lingering conservative opposition to a strong federal role in education and the continuing liberal reservations about testing and accountability ensured that the 1994 reforms were relatively weak and weakly enforced.19 The shift in ends and means of the federal role in elementary and secondary education was of great import, but tougher reforms paired with federal

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development sanctions would have to wait. Clinton made such reforms more likely by establishing a strong and publicly accessible rationale for broader federal involvement in school reform efforts that linked education to economic growth. His emphasis on the need for increased education reform---including choice, high standards and accountability for results---as opposed to merely increased spending, was crucial and helped identify the Democratic Party as the party of school improvement. The broad scope of Goals 2000 rekindled fears of federal micromanagement in education and ESEA remained controversial throughout the remainder of the 1990s.20 Republicans battled the attempts by Clinton and congressional Democrats to secure large increases in federal education spending and create an assortment of new federal education programs.21 Extending Reagan’s argument that government was the problem rather than the solution, Republicans hoped to reduce federal involvement in education by cutting federal spending, by converting it into block grants or vouchers, or by eliminating the Department of Education entirely. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, and while popular with the party’s conservative base, proved unpopular with the general public and particularly with moderate swing voters.22 Clinton and the Democrats were largely successful during the 1990s in focusing national attention on the problems in America’s schools, in arguing that school improvement should be a federal priority, and in positioning the Democratic Party as the party of education standards and reform. Federal spending on elementary and secondary education increased dramatically during the decade,23 and national policy moved beyond the original premise of ESEA---equalizing resources for disadvantaged students---toward a new focus on student performance and accountability for all schools. By the end of the decade, there was a growing recognition among many Republicans that the party’s opposition to federal activism in education had been costly in national elections and that it needed to develop a more appealing domestic philosophy and policy agenda to compete with Clinton’s popular ‘‘Third Way.’’

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voters’ highest priorities in the election and Bush developed and disseminated a detailed education reform plan that endorsed a significant expansion of the federal role in schools.25 He and the Democratic nominee Al Gore both called for more federal funding for education, for using tests to allow the federal government to hold all schools accountable for student achievement, and for increased federal support for charter schools. This convergence between the Democratic and Republican Parties on education would have been unthinkable only five years earlier and set the stage for an historic compromise on the pending ESEA reauthorization. Bush entered office declaring that education reform would be his first priority and used his success on the issue in the election to forge a bipartisan coalition behind his NCLB Act. At the heart of the legislation was the grand bargain that had developed during the late 1990s---increased federal spending and activism on education in exchange for expanded flexibility, accountability, and choice. After years of debate over whether there should even be a federal role in education, there was now general agreement not only on the

No Child Left Behind and the New Era of Federal Education Policy The Republican presidential nominee in 2000, George W. Bush, proclaimed that he was a ‘‘compassionate conservative’’ and education became the central issue of his campaign and a symbol of his break with antigovernment conservatives.24 Education ranked as one of

President George W. Bush remarks on education at a magnet school in Little Rock, Arkansas, on August 29, 2002. Bush visited the school to highlight the important new changes that are taking place in schools across America as a result of the No Child Left Behind Act. (AP Photo/Rick Bowmer)

376 Domestic Policy need for federal leadership to improve public schools but also on the broad direction that such leadership should take. As a result, despite often contentious negotiations, the final vote on the conference report of NCLB was overwhelming and bipartisan in both the House (381--41) and Senate (87--10). President Bush signed NCLB into law on January 8, 2002. The centerpiece of the new law is the requirement that states, as a condition of accepting federal funds, establish academic standards to guide their curricula and adopt a testing regime that is aligned with those standards.26 State must now test students every year in grades three through eight (as well as once in high school) in math, reading, and science. Schools are free to develop and use their own standards and tests, but every school, school district, and state will have to make student test results publicly available and disaggregated for certain groups of disadvantaged students. States also have to administer a national test, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), every other year to a sample of their students in grades four and eight to check the effectiveness of state standards and to provide a means of comparability of student performance across states. NCLB mandates that every state and school district issue report cards that detail student test scores and identify those schools that have failed to meet proficiency targets and are in need of ‘‘program improvement.’’ The law requires that states use this information to track their efforts to close the achievement gaps on reading and math between different racial, ethnic, and income groups. States are required to establish a timeline (with regular benchmarks) for making ‘‘adequate yearly progress’’ toward eliminating these gaps and moving all students to state proficiency levels within 12 years (by 2014). Perhaps most important, the law’s accountability provisions require states to take a number of escalating actions (including offering parents public school choice and tutoring) with Title I schools that do not reach state performance objectives. NCLB also required states to have a ‘‘highly qualified teacher’’ in every classroom where core academic subjects are taught by 2005--2006. In exchange for meeting these new federal demands, NCLB provided a significant increase (approximately 49 percent in its first year) in federal education spending and new flexibility in how states can spend it.27

Conclusion The passage of the NCLB Act signaled the beginning of a new era of federal education policy and a

significantly transformed and expanded national role in the country’s schools. The original federal role outlined in the 1965 ESEA was narrowly targeted on disadvantaged students, focused on school inputs, and contained few federal mandates. NCLB, on the other hand, applies to all schools and students, is focused on school outputs, and is remarkably prescriptive. NCLB was fundamentally a response to the perceived failure of lower levels of government---despite considerable expenditures and reform activity---to improve student performance, particularly in the nation’s urban schools and for its most disadvantaged students, since the release of A Nation at Risk in 1983. But NCLB and the new accountability regime enshrined in it would not have been possible without major changes in the politics of education that encouraged liberals and conservatives to abandon their longstanding opposition to an active reform-oriented federal role in education. For much of American history, the principle of Federalism exerted a powerful restraining influence on the size and character of the federal role in education---but that time appears to have passed. Regardless of whether NCLB ultimately improves schools or student achievement, the law has created a new education Federalism in the United States. The U.S. Department of Education now functions as a national schoolmarm, hovering over state school reform efforts and whacking those states that fail to record satisfactory and timely progress toward federal education goals with financial penalties and mandatory corrective actions. Future debates about school reform---whether at the local, state, or national level---will have to adapt to a new politics of federal education policy that is fundamentally different from earlier eras and that has produced an unprecedented level of federal involvement in the country’s historically state and locally controlled schools.

References and Further Reading Armor, David. 1995. Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law. New York: Oxford University Press. Bailey, Stephen, and Edith Mosher. ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968. Berke, Joel, and Michael Kirst. Federal Aid to Education. Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972. Berke, Joel 1974. Answers to Inequity: An Analysis of the New School Finance. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corporation. Carmines, Edward, and James Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development Chubb, John E. ‘‘Excessive Regulation: The Case of Federal Aid to Education,’’ Political Science Quarterly, 100 (2):287. Cornelius, Wayne A., Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. 2004. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Davies, Gareth. 1996. From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Edelman, Marian Wright. ‘‘Southern School Desegregation, 1954--1973: A Judicial-Political Overview,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 407. Eidenberg, Eugene, and Roy Morey. 1969. An Act of Congress: The Legislative Process and the Making of Education Policy. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Elmore, Richard.‘‘Unwarranted Intrusion,’’ Education Next (Spring 2002): 31--35 Glendening, Parris N., and Mavis Mann Reeves. 1984. Pragmatic Federalism. Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers. Graham, Hugh Davis. 1984. The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Guthrie, James. ‘‘The Future of Federal Education Policy,’’ Teachers College Record, 84, (3): 674. Heath, Jena. ‘‘Bush Education Plan Draws From All Sides.’’ Austin-American Statesman, October 22, 1999. Heise, Michael. ‘‘Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and Legalization of Educational Policy,’’ Fordham Law Review, 345: 63. Howe, Harold. 1990. ‘‘LBJ as the Education President,’’ in The Presidency and Education, edited by Kenneth Thompson. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Hughes, John, and Anne Hughes. 1972. Equal Education: A New National Strategy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Jeffrey, Julie Roy. Education for Children of the Poor: A Study of the Origins and Implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978. Jennings, Jack ‘‘Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise,’’ Phi Delta Kappan, March 2000. Jennings, Jack. 1998. Why National Standards and Tests? Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Kaplan, Marshall, and Peggy Cuciti. 1986. The Great Society and Its Legacy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Katz, Michael. 1987. Reconstructing American Education. Boston: Harvard University. Levitan, Sar, and Clifford Johnson. 1986. ‘‘Did the Great Society and Subsequent Initiatives Work?’’ in The Great Society and Its Legacy, edited by Marshall Kaplan and Peggy Cuciti. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Marschall, Melissa, and Robert McKee. ‘‘From Campaign Promises to Presidential Policy: Education Reform in the 2000 Election.’’ Educational Policy, January--March 2002, 101. McGuinn, Patrick. No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education Policy, 1965--2005. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Mclaughlin, Milbrey. Evaluation and Reform: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title I. New York: Harper Collins, 1975. Melnick, Shep. 1995. ‘‘Separation of Powers and the Strategy of Rights: The Expansion of Special Education,’’ in The New Politics of Public Policy, edited by Marc Landy

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and Martin Levin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Meranto, Phillip. 1967. The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Mintrom, Michael, and Sandra Vergari. ‘‘Education Reform and Accountability Issues in an Intergovernmental Context,’’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism 27: 15. Murray, Charles. 1984. Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950--1980. New York: Basic Books. National Center For Education Statistics. 2000. The Condition of Education 2000. Washington, DC. National Center for Education Statistics. 2002. Federal Support for Education: 1980--2001. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, NCES. Newman, Michael. 1994. America’s Teachers. New York: Longman. Orfield, Gary, and Susan Eaton, eds. 1996. Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown vs. Board of Education. New York: The Free Press. Patterson, James. 2001. Brown vs. Board of Education. New York: Oxford University Press. Peterson, Paul. 1985. The Politics of School Reform: 1870-1940. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peterson, Paul, and Barry Rabe. ‘‘The Role of Interest Groups in the Formation of Educational Policy.’’ Teachers College Record, 84(3). Peterson, Paul, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth K. Wong. 1986. When Federalism Works. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Ravitch, Diane. 1983. The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945--1980. New York: Basic Books. Ravitch, Diane. 2000. Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms. New York: Simon and Schuster. Spraggins, Tinsley. ‘‘New Educational Goals and Direction: A Perspective of Title I, ESEA,’’ The Journal of Negro Education, 37 (1):46. Spring, Joel. 1976. The Sorting Machine: National Educational Policy since 1945. New York: David McKay Company, Inc. Spring, Joel. 1999. Conflict of Interests: The Politics of American Education. Boston: McGraw Hill. Stallings, D.T. ‘‘A Brief History of the U.S. Department of Education, 1979--2002,’’ Phi Delta Kappan, 83(9). Story, Ronald. 2001.‘‘The New Deal and Higher Education,’’ in The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, edited by Sidney Milkis and Jerome Mileur. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Sundquist, James. 1968. Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Thomas, Norman C. Education in National Politics. New York: David Mckay Company, 1975. U.S. Department of Commerce. Education of the American Population. U.S. Census of Population. Washington DC, 1999. Table 8. Wilkinson, J. Harvie III. ‘‘The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955--1970,’’ Virginia Law Review, 64 (4). Wright, Deil. 1988. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

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Notes 1. Also see Andy Rotherham interview with the author, August 22, 2002. 2. The origin of federal involvement in education can be traced to the Land Ordinance Act of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinances of 1787 which required that new states guarantee public education for citizens in their constitutions. The federal government became more directly involved in education---and set a precedent for later grants-in-aid programs---with the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862 which supported the creation of a network of land-grant colleges. It was not until 1867, however, that a tiny four-person U.S. Office of Education was established, and it was another five decades before the federal government first provided an annual appropriation for K--12 schooling (with the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917). 3. For more on the educational policies of the New Deal, see Story (2001). 4. Whereas in 1940, just 38.1 percent of 25--29 year olds had graduated high school and just 5.9 percent had completed four years of college, by 1970, 75.4 percent had finished high school and 16.4 percent four years of college (U.S. Department of Commerce 1999, Table 8). 5. For an extensive account of the context and consequences of the Brown decision, see Brown vs. Board of Education (Patterson 2001). 6. Johnson won the 1964 presidential election by what was then the largest margin in American history---16 million votes. Johnson’s popularity was also widely credited with helping the Democratic Party significantly increase its control of Congress by expanding its majority to 36 in the Senate and 155 in the House. Johnson used his strong popular mandate and the gratitude of many Democratic senators and congress members for the strength of his coattails, to effectively lobby for support of his education agenda. 7. As Ravitch has noted, ‘‘From the middle 1950’s to the end of the 1960’s, a vast literature was produced which sought to account for the low achievement of poor and minority children in urban schools. Books, articles, symposia, seminars, and conferences proliferated around the theme of how to educate the ‘culturally deprived,’ the ‘culturally disadvantaged,’ the ‘underprivileged,’ and the ‘lower-class child.’’’ (1983, 150). 8. See When Federalism Works (Peterson et al. 1986, 136-140) for a more detailed discussion of the local tendency to shift federal funds from redistributive programs to other purposes. 9. For more on the Supreme Court’s Brown and Brown II decisions and southern desegregation efforts see Wilkinson (1978, 485--559). 10. For more on the judicial and political context of this period see Orfield and Eaton (1996); Armor (1995); and Edelman (1973). 11. Sen. Robert Kennedy fought to have testing and accountability measures included in the original ESEA legislation, but was rebuffed. Forty years later, however, George W. Bush would remind Ted Kennedy of his brother’s efforts to enlist his support for No Child Left Behind. 12. Typical of the growing backlash against the Great Society was Charles Murray’s widely publicized book Losing

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Ground: American Social Policy 1950--1980 (1984), which argued that the poor were worse off after the Great Society than they had been before it. The 1980 Republican platform called for ‘‘deregulation by the federal government of public education and . . . the elimination of the federal Department of Education.’’ The platform fretted that ‘‘parents are losing control of their children’s schooling’’ and that Democratic education policy had produced ‘‘huge new bureaucracies to misspend our taxes’’ (Historic Documents of 1980 1981, 583--584). One scholar estimated that the number of regulatory mandates imposed on states through federal education programs was reduced by 85 percent during the Reagan administration (Glendening and Reeves (1984, 243). Also, as D. T. Stallings has noted, ‘‘The new administration planned to move the Department of Education away from awarding categorical grants and toward the awarding of block grants, with the goal of eventually eliminating federal grants entirely, which would cause the federal role to revert to what it had been in 1838---nothing more than collecting statistics’’ (2002, 678). A 1987 Gallup poll, for example, found that 84 percent of Americans thought that the federal government should require state and local educational authorities to meet minimum national standards (Heise 1994, 11). Several southern governors who had been active in pushing standards at the state level---Bill Clinton (D-Ark.), Richard Reilly (D-S.C.), and Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.)--played a prominent role at the conference and would later become important players in federal school reform efforts. The six goals were as follows: (1) all children in America will start school ready to learn; (2) the high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent; (3) students in grades 4, 8, and 12 will be competent in English, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, and geography; (4) every school will be free of drugs, violence, firearms, and alcohol and will offer a disciplined learning environment; (5) U.S. students will be the first in the world in mathematics and science achievement; and (6) every adult will be literate and will possess the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy. New Democrats laid out a comprehensive vision for federal education reform in a 1992 book by the Progressive Policy Institute of the DLC, which was seen as a blueprint for the administration. Mandate for Change emphasized that increased funding alone would not solve schools’ problems and called for the president to ‘‘marshal public support for a radical redesign of U.S. education.’’ Fore more on the political divisions and policy debates in Congress during the Clinton administration see Jennings (1998). These fears were not assuaged by strong and specific language in the legislation that reasserted the primacy of local and state control in education. Though the states were theoretically free to devise their own standards, they initially were required to submit applications to the U.S. Department of Education for approval before receiving Goals 2000 funds. Several states, including Virginia and California, initially refused to accept Goals 2000 funds and mandates.

Nationalizing Schools: Education and American Political Development 21. Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994, and the House voted to eliminate funding for Goals 2000 twice (in 1995 and 1996) before compromises with the Senate restored funds for the program. The 1996 national Republican Party platform stated that ‘‘We will abolish the Department of Education, end Federal meddling in our schools, and promote family choice at all levels of learning. We therefore call for prompt repeal of the Goals 2000 program.’’ 22. The advocacy of these positions by the party’s nominee in the 1996 presidential election, Bob Dole, contributed to a huge disadvantage on education during the campaign, with voters favoring Clinton on the issue by more than a two to one margin (Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online). 23. Federal on-budget funds for elementary and secondary education increased 69 percent in constant dollars

24.

25.

26.

27.

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between fiscal year (FY) 1990 and FY 2001 (National Center for Education Statistics 2002--129, 3). As governor, Bush had been one of the first Republicans to recognize that the party’s traditional position on education was problematic electorally, noting in 1996 that it had played a key role in Dole’s defeat and that ‘‘Republicans must say that we are for education’’ (Heath 1999, A1). Bush discussed school reform more than any other issue during the campaign, and his rhetoric and proposals helped close the education gap between the parties and contributed to his victory over Gore (see Marschall and McKee 2002, 101). For detailed analyses of the NCLB from the viewpoint of state implementers, see Education Commission of the States (2003); National Governors Association). For a comprehensive analysis of national politics and policy making in education, see McGuinn (2006).

Environmentalism and Conservatism: An Ideational and Institutional Analysis Richard A. Harris Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Administration, Rutgers University--Camden

Introduction

of post--World War II conservatism in America that were in tension with environmental principles. In particular, environmentalists’ implicit, and at times explicit, advocacy of collective values and planning posed a direct challenge to conservatives’ commitment to individual freedom and property rights. This underlying philosophical friction was exacerbated by the contemporary environmentalist movement, which advanced its policy objectives in concert with a more fundamental program aimed at institutional transformation of the policy process. As Bruce Ackerman and Andrew Hassler observed,

By the time of Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, environmental policy had become a salient liberal-conservative fault line defining American politics and his promise of ‘‘relief’’ from environmental regulation generated enthusiastic support from business interests that had been on the defensive ever since Earth Day in 1969. At one level, this observation seems unremarkable. Between 1969 and 1977, Congress enacted no fewer than 18 major pieces of legislation aimed, in one way or another, at conservation and pollution control (Harris and Milkis 1989, 80--96). This tide of legislative activity imposed significant regulatory costs and established a number of new government agencies to oversee business compliance: predictably, organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as well as countless industry lobby groups and individual firms reacted with strident resistance. This predictably negative business response received academic support in the late 1970s as economic and policy analytic critiques questioned environmental regulation in terms of costbenefit and efficacy criteria. What could be more natural than business interests finding common cause with a conservative presidential candidate in opposition to intrusive new regulation and in regaining the initiative from liberal politicians and environmental advocates? At a deeper level, however, Reagan’s animus toward environmental regulation was rooted in core precepts

The passions of Earth Day have marked our law in deep and abiding ways. Statutes passed in the early 1970s did more than commit billions of dollars to the cause of environmental protection in the decades ahead. They also represent part of a complex effort by which the present generation is revising the system of administrative law inherited from the New Deal (1981, 5). Thus, the environmentalists of the 1970s, like other advocates of the new social regulation such as consumer protection and affirmative action, had concluded that the ‘‘privileged position of business’’ necessitated a remaking of the policy process if reform objectives were to be secured (Lindblom 1977). They not only shifted attention from the traditional regulatory focus on particular markets (for example, securities, banking, railroads, 380

Environmentalism and Conservatism or communications) to broader quality-of-life concerns that cut across industries, but also sought to make the policy process more hospitable to public interest groups and less susceptible to industry capture and business dominance. In the postwar period, historians, sociologists, and political scientists ‘‘revealed’’ that despite a half-century of reform, beginning with the Progressive Era and culminating in the New Deal, the public interest had made little headway in its struggle with business interests and corporate power. Gabriel Kolko and other revisionist historians insisted that the Progressive Era amounted to little more than a chimera, with big business undermining reform efforts or even worse manipulating them in the interest of corporate aggrandizement (Kolko 1963). C. Wright Mills’ claim that a power elite ensured business dominance of American politics and public policy through its occupation of interlocking directorates fueled a growing literature in neo-Marxist and New Left analysis (Mills 1956). For their part, political scientists showed that the administrative institutions reformers had constructed to regulate business in fact created a symbiotic relationship between regulators and the regulated that was presided over by senior legislators such that industry ‘‘capture’’ of regulatory agencies was the logical result (Bernstein 1955). They also asserted that those same institutions raised barriers to meaningful participation that business rather than the public was best equipped to surmount (Schattschneider 1961; Lowi 1969). To be sure, such arguments that business dominated the regulatory process met with some telling methodological as well as empirical criticism. Nevertheless, the fact that business lobby organizations vastly outnumbered other interest groups, that tightly knit subgovernments defined the policy process, and that even Dwight Eisenhower felt the need to admonish Americans about an emerging military-industrial complex defined a genuine policy reality. Environmentalism, born in the milieu of 1960’s reaction to the American political system, accepted this critique and aimed not only to save the ecosystem, but also to open up administrative and policy processes to more democratic impulses. For conservatives like Ronald Reagan, the fundamental challenge of environmental policy lay not in business complaints about rising compliance costs or the critique of economists about inefficiency, but in its animating ideas and its institutional objectives. An effective response would require, therefore, a conservative counterrevolution in the policy process that directly addressed the ideational and institutional bases

381

William Ruckelshaus, director of the Environmental Protection Agency, in 1983. Ruckelshaus was the first EPA Adminstrator and was called back to service when President Reagan’s Adminstrator, Ann Burford, was forced to resign. (Bettmann/ Corbis)

of environmental policy. This essay picks up the narrative of postwar conservatism’s relationship to environmental policy and explores why the successes of environmentalists in challenging the regulatory status quo evoked an ideological as well as a policy response from conservatives. That response flowed from the confluence of three distinct streams of conservative thought: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anti-Communism. The discussion below describes the ‘‘fusion’’ of these distinct bases of postwar conservative thought and demonstrates, more fully, how specific ideas, institutions, and policies of environmental regulation elicited the ‘‘regulatory relief’’ program of the Reagan administration. With a clear understanding of the intrinsic tensions between environmentalism and conservatism as a foundation, we will turn to an appraisal of two signature pieces of environmental legislation of the 1970s, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) and the Clean Air Act of 1977 (CAA) that fomented the almost maniacal regulatory response of the Reagan Revolution.

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Conservative Intellectual ‘‘Fusion’’ The Reagan presidential campaign of 1980 helped to recast the public discourse about environmental policy as a contest between modern liberals who had an abiding faith in federal regulation for the pursuit of public interest and conservatives who sought to reassert core principles of limited government. This ideological divide on regulation in general, and on environmental regulation in particular, did not spring forth full-blown in the campaign itself. A post--World War II coalescence of libertarian and traditional conservatism formed around a common animus toward modern liberalism and its practical manifestation, the administrative state. Yet, the intellectual history of this period also demonstrates that a third philosophical position, namely, the anti-Communism of James Burnham and Frank Chodorov, was paramount in uniting traditionalist followers of Russell Kirk and Richard Weaver with the libertarian followers of Ludwig von Mises and Fredrich Hayek. If libertarian and traditionalist thought stood as two distinct elements bonded together to form conservatism, the catalyst for this chemical reaction undoubtedly was anti-Communism. The postwar conservative angst over Soviet and later Chinese expansion tended to overwhelm any philosophical tensions between libertarians’ commitment to rationality and individual freedom on the one hand and traditionalists’ commitment to transcendent principles of virtue and the need for social order on the other. While the thought of traditionalists and libertarians---both committed to individualism, property rights, and originalist constitutional interpretation---has a direct connection with conservative opposition to environmental policy, the anti-Communist strain of conservative thought elucidates their hostility to environmentalism. Conservatives, already alert to perceived socialist tendencies of modern liberalism generally, found confirmation of their fears in environmental policies, rooted in collectivist arguments about the need to subordinate property rights and individual freedom to societal needs and ecological laws. The conservative suspicion that environmentalism was a peculiar and potent manifestation of the modern inclination to substitute planning for markets seemed all the more plausible given its linkages with 1960s-style New Left radicalism. Thus, while many point to Reagan’s first inaugural in which he declared big government an inherent problem as a turning point in the policy dialog on environmental regulation, a careful historical examination shows a longer and more nuanced backdrop to the conservative attack on environmental policy. Six years

earlier, at a symposium on business and government relations, then-governor Ronald Reagan observed that We are the most regulated society the nation has ever seen, and we are paying for it not only in the coin of the realm, but also in the greater loss of freedom than any of us realize. We have moved a great distance from the system that originated this country, a system based on the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with an orderly society (Reagan 1974, 61). Although this argument echoes the economists’ and policy analysts’ concerns with runaway regulatory compliance costs and bureaucratic style, it also hearkens back to earlier conservative themes of freedom, property rights, constitutionalism, and universal principles that define post-1945 conservatism. Compare Reagan’s 1974 lament to the 1947 Declaration at the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society: The central values of civilization are in danger . . . The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power . . . Even the most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression is threatened by the spread of creeds which . . . seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own (cited in Nash). Reagan echoed the same alarms about core western values as the conservatives who founded the Mont Pelerin Society 27 years earlier, and like those progenitors of the contemporary conservatism, Reagan too was concerned about the evil of Communism. Their common recognition of the Soviet threat helped to ground and to reinforce their common recognition of the challenge to freedom posed by domestic administrative power, of which environmental regulation emerged as a particularly egregious expression. Yet, why would environmental policy in particular be such a lightning rod for conservative reaction? In the estimation of the Reagan administration, environmentalists had introduced a ‘‘creed,’’ to use the terminology of the Mont Pelerin Society, establishing their own position of power in policy subgovernments and, through the federal courts, sought to ‘‘obliterate all views but their own.’’ As deep as the philosophical divisions were and as sharp as the debates were between the libertarian and traditional conservatives, their common apprehension of collectivism, manifest in

Environmentalism and Conservatism

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Ronald Reagan delivers his first inaugural speech in which he said ‘‘We are a nation that has a government---not the other way around,’’ January 20, 1981. (U.S. Department of Defense)

both the modern liberal administrative state and Communist expansion, provided a powerful incentive to work out a coherent position that would resonate with the public. The central figure in forging a coherent conservative message was Frank S. Meyer. Like many intellectual leaders of the postwar conservative movement, Meyer was a former Socialist. Indeed, he was a loyal member of the Communist Party in the 1930s, and ultimately he

rejected the oppression and statism that he came to see as the inevitable logic of the left. In his treatise, In Defense of Freedom (1962), Meyer insisted that using state power to promote virtue was both wrongheaded and romantic; ‘‘Unless men are free to be vicious they cannot be virtuous.’’ Nevertheless, as adamant as he was that true conservatives could never advocate employing the state to promote public morality, he was equally uncomfortable with the perceived moral

384 Domestic Policy relativism that Dewey, Holmes, and their modern liberal disciples promoted. What Meyer sought, perhaps quixotically, was a position in which universal moral principles were rooted in a rational analytic defense of freedom rather than in metaphysical arguments for public virtue backed by police power. It was precisely this objective that he maintained could integrate the philosophical positions of the libertarian, traditional and anti-Communist strains of the conservative movement. His edited volume, What Is Conservatism? (1964), brought out in the year of Barry Goldwater’s candidacy, assembled traditionalist as well as libertarian thinkers in an effort not merely to identify the common intellectual ground that conservatives shared, but more important to arrive at a unified understanding of conservatism’s quintessential nature. The book concluded with Meyer’s heroic attempt to define the essentials of a coherent conservative position, what came to be labeled, fusionism. What were these essentials? According to Meyer, conservatives believed, above all, that individual human beings were the basis of any desirable social or political order, that society was organized to promote their freedom and well-being. He contended that all conservatives understood that freedom and individual responsibility defined human beings as human beings. Freedom, thus, was inherent in the human condition, not simply a value to be supported by a utilitarian calculus. This understanding was the basis, he claimed, for libertarians, traditionalists, and anti-Communists to oppose social engineering in whatever guise and however well intentioned. Communism, socialism, and the welfare state all undermined the dignity and freedom of human beings, even if they varied in the degree of their overt intrusiveness on the individual. Meyer also discerned that a coherent conservatism rejected cultural relativism and embraced a set of universal principles, including the rule of law; private property as a bulwark against the state; and Judeo-Christian morality. These universal principles, moreover, were revealed in the American Constitution and were consistent with the original intent of the founders. Finally, conservatives, in Meyer’s estimation, were unified perhaps above all else in their implacable opposition to international Communism. Beyond an abstract hostility to core values of western civilization, Communism trampled on the rights of millions of individuals living behind the iron curtain (Meyer, 228--231). Meyer’s fusionism did take hold if for no other reason than that overwhelming reality of the threats conservatives of all persuasions perceived: the unchecked expansion of a centralized administrative state; the

attacks on private property in the cause of unconstrained egalitarianism; and the ineffectual American response to Communist expansion. By 1964, all of these apparent challenges impelled conservatives to adopted Meyer’s fusion thesis, even if they did not do so with complete enthusiasm. Barry Goldwater’s candidacy, moreover, stood as a testament to the practical application of fusionism. Ronald Reagan’s nominating speech at the 1964 Republican Convention in Los Angeles reads like a tribute to fusionism. In tracing the lineage of conservative thought, it is worth quoting this speech at some length, for it serves as a bridge between the intellectual development of postwar conservatism and the beginnings of its practical adaptation to politics and policy. The most basic tenet of fusionism, a conviction that freedom is inherent in the human condition, runs throughout Reagan’s speech: You and I are told increasingly that we have to choose between a left or right, but I would like to suggest that there is no such thing as a left or right. There is only an up or down---up to a man’s ageold dream, the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with law and order---or down to the ant heap totalitarianism, and regardless of their sincerity, their humanitarian motives, those who would trade our freedom for security have embarked on this downward course . . . Senator Clark of Pennsylvania, another articulate spokesman, defines liberalism as ‘‘meeting the material needs of the masses through the full power of centralized government.’’ Well, I for one resent it when a representative of the people refers to you and me---the free man and woman of this country---as ‘‘the masses.’’ This is a term we haven’t applied to ourselves in America. However, beyond that, ‘‘the full power of centralized government’’---this was the very thing the Founding Fathers sought to minimize. They knew that governments don’t control things. A government can’t control the economy without controlling people. In addition, they know when a government sets out to do that; it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. [Emphasis added] Not only is the centrality of freedom to man’s humanity readily apparent, but also is its connection with the Constitution and the original intent of the founders. As Reagan announced these key components of fusionist conservatism, the quarrels between libertarians and traditionalists seemed small and irrelevant.

Environmentalism and Conservatism No less apparent in Reagan’s rhetoric were the universal principles Meyer associated with conservatism. With respect to rule of law and private property, Reagan was direct and unapologetic in identifying modern liberalism as a threat to these core American values. More than liberals’ record of advocating everincreasing statist power at the expense of individual freedom, the problem with liberalism was its real impacts on the institutions of property and rule of law: Now it doesn’t require expropriation or confiscation of private property or business to impose socialism on a people. What does it mean whether you hold the deed or the title to your business or property if the government holds the power of life and death over that business or property? [Emphasis added] Neither Milton Friedman nor William Buckley could find much with which to quibble in these sentiments. Reagan was offering a clarion message that ‘‘fused’’ essential elements of libertarian, traditionalist and anti-Communist thought. His message, that the modern liberal project of constructing a strong state to protect an ever-expanding list of ‘‘rights’’ posed a fundamental threat to our core political values, also proved effective in attacking the command and control regulation that typified environmental policy. Sixteen years after his nomination of Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan took the podium at the Republican convention in Detroit to accept his own nomination and launch his presidential campaign. In his acceptance speech, we find many of the same fusionist themes exemplified in his 1964 address: a passionate dedication to individual human freedom; a reverence for the founders’ commitment to rule of law; a confidence that free enterprise and private property are superior to government programs and federal regulation; and, of course, unwavering opposition to the Communism and collectivism. If Reagan was alarmed by intrusive government and burdensome regulation in 1964, by the end of the 1970s, his fellow conservatives and he had a new and inviting target for their animus toward big government: overly intrusive environmental policy. In their view, the emergence of strong environmental regulations of the 1970s not only was hamstringing business, weakening economic performance, and undermining property rights with misguided liberal visions of protecting the ecology, but also was jeopardizing national security by preventing an effective response to the energy crisis. That domestic agenda, moreover, would focus carefully on the perceived challenge of environmental regulation by shifting the

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policy debate to incorporate conservative concerns about regulatory cost, economic growth, administrative power, and property rights. Reagan would need to muster a great deal of political capital indeed to confront the status quo of environmental regulation.

The Environmentalist Challenge The advent of extensive environmental regulation in the 1970s posed a multidimensional challenge accentuated, as President Reagan observed, by the collision of the energy crisis with environmental policy. SMCRA and the CAA, two landmarks 1977 environmental laws, clearly illustrate the several dimensions of the environmental challenge as well as the complicating effect of the energy crisis. As we have noted, well before Reagan scored his electoral victory in 1980, high compliance costs resulting directly from environmental policy provided evidence of far-reaching economic as well as regulatory impacts. In a widely publicized study, Murray Weidenbaum and Robert de Fina claimed that by 1976 environmental and energy-related regulation was costing $8.372 billion annually, far more than the $6.610 billion and $4.498 billion attributable to consumer protection and worker safety, respectively (Weidenbaum and de Fina 1978). A few years later, the Business Roundtable released a study it had commissioned by the accounting firm of Arthur Anderson that analyzed social regulatory compliance cost impacts of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the top 48 U.S. corporations in 1978. The findings revealed that EPA imposed $2.018 billion, while OSHA accounted for $217 million and the FTC $26 million (Business Roundtable 1979). Moreover, studies by students of the policy process showed that environmental regulation significantly affected business behavior, not only by imposing higher costs, which might be justified by externality arguments or by the value of social benefits identified, but also by inflexible implementation that was driven more by compliance procedures than policy outcomes (Eads and Fix 1984). These claims about the economic impacts of new social regulation, and environmental measures in particular, were amplified by the energy crisis and cost-push inflation of the late 1970s that focused attention on the macroeconomic impacts of environmental policy. Even under the Carter administration, which had facilitated enactment of SMCRA and the Clean Air Amendments Act after years of policy stalemate between Democratic Congresses and Republican White Houses, the EPA was beginning to examine

386 Domestic Policy alternatives to the standard command-control approach to regulation that liberal as well as conservative economists attacked as inefficient and anticompetitive. With respect to air pollution control, for example, emissions trading programs sought to adopt more efficient, market-like approaches to environmental regulation. As interesting as these measures were, they constituted reform efforts intended to make environmental regulation more ‘‘rational’’; they did not attack the ideational or institutional bases of environmental policy. While conservatives agreed that environmental regulation imposed unacceptable financial costs on business and on society, they pressed for a more aggressive and, frankly, more fundamental response than Democratic reformers were willing to pursue. Conservatives viewed the environmental movement as a small, ideologically motivated elite group that had foisted its collectivist worldview and no-growth vision of ecology on the American people at the expense of freedom, prosperity, and energy security. More worrisome to conservatives, environmentalist organizations appeared to subvert democratic processes and the rule of law by establishing an undue and unhealthy influence within regulatory agencies such as the EPA or the Department of Interior (DOI). As Jeffrey Berry noted in his path-breaking study of public interest groups,

regulatory process into one conservatives deemed deeply threatening (Harris and Milkis 1989). The conservative reaction to environmental regulation, moreover, reflected all three elements of fusionism, libertarianism, traditionalism, and anti-Communism, at least in its broad, antistatist guise. Environmental policy aroused libertarians by challenging the morality of the market, interposing bureaucratic analysis for managerial prerogative, and saddling the economy with unjustifiably high regulatory costs. They aroused traditionalists by challenging the very concept of private property and substituting judicial policy making for the representative functions of Congress. Finally, they aroused antistatists by challenging freedom and individualism with a collectivist New Left vision of society in which ecological principles trumped individual rights and in which natural law would be subordinated to the laws of nature---as articulated by environmental activists. The First Earth Day in 1969 proclaimed a new environmentalist order with a manifesto, The Declaration of Interdependence, which asserted the following:

these organizations are slowly changing the overall environment within which government officials formulate public policy . . . public interest groups have been consistent and enduring actors, aggressively trying to influence governmental decision makers . . . The opinions they can arouse, the bad publicity they can generate, the lawsuits they can file are all factors relevant to the deliberations of those who must make policy decisions (1977, 289).

Nature has instituted certain principles for the sustenance of all species, deriving these principles from the planet’s life support system . . . whenever any behavior by the members of any one species becomes destructive of these principles, it is the function of the other members of that species to alter or abolish such behaviors and to reestablish the theme of interdependence of all life . . . cultural values long established should not be altered for light and transient causes, that man is more disposed to suffer from its asserting a vain notion of independence than to right themselves by abolishing that culture to which they are now accustomed.

Indeed, by transforming the courts into agents of policy making and implementation, as one conservative critic put it, the courts had become, ‘‘full managing partners in the administrative state’’ (Rabkin 1986). The accomplishments of this regulatory regime transformation appear remarkable given the broad academic consensus at the end of the 1960s that business interests held sway in the policy process generally, but most particularly in rulemaking and administrative procedure (Bernstein, McConnell, Lowi, and Schattschneider). In spite of this scholarly agreement, or rather based on their appreciation of the scholarship, environmental advocates succeeded in establishing a myriad of programs that not only imposed significant costs on business but also essentially remade the American

These assertions left no doubt that the core values of environmentalism challenged individualism and traditional concepts of freedom or that environmentalists, the ‘‘other members of that species’’ arrogated to themselves the right to determine what behavior and culture were legitimate. Most important, though, the Earth Day manifesto rejected universal principles of private property and rule of law in favor of a collectivist, statist vision of the future. Indeed, Aaron Wildavsky (1982) argued that only an anthropological analysis could explain environmentalism, since it challenged the cultural bases of American society. Congressional testimony of environmental organizations that had become fixtures in the Washington policy community reinforced the perception that

Environmentalism and Conservatism environmental policy was rooted in a public philosophy at odds with core conservative values. Speaking before Henry Reuss’ (D-Wisc.) Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources, David Brower, president of Friends of the Earth, called for the 1970s to be a ‘‘decade of renunciation’’ in which Americans would abandon their ‘‘cowboy economy,’’ which was incompatible with existence on ‘‘spaceship earth.’’ (U.S. House 1970, 182). Even more chilling for conservatives was the view expressed by Garrett de Bell, director of Zero Population Growth: To get at the root of our problem [the environmental crisis], the goal of production and consumption for its own sake must be changed . . . We can put the highway people and the detergent industry out of business if we just don’t buy their products. We can adopt life-styles that require less material goods and leave us more time for enjoyment (U.S. House 1970, 185). The conservative response ultimately articulated by President Reagan was aimed at confronting this ideological and cultural challenge posed by environmentalism as much as it was aimed at easing the regulatory burden of environmental policy. While one may disagree with the depth of dangers Reagan and his conservative fellow travelers diagnosed, an honest analysis of environmentalism and its impact on federal regulation suggests that many environmentalists harbored a deep suspicion not only of the established liberal policy processes developed under the New Deal, but also of the capitalist system Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) had sought to make more human. Environmentalists’ values clearly clashed with those of free enterprise, and environmental advocates viewed the regulatory institutions constructed in earlier periods as a democratic sham, a view that grew out of the New Left philosophy and the movement politics of the sixties (Harris and Milkis 1989, 53--91). Environmentalists, therefore, demanded both policy changes to protect the American people from the ecological degradation and negative public health effects of a market economy and process changes to protect them from corporate power. Conservatives, for their part, saw that environmental policy was part of that ‘‘broader effort,’’ as Ackerman and Hassler put it, to impose new regulatory ideas and to reconstruct administrative institutions. Environmentalists ‘‘recognized’’ that the New Deal formula of passing laws and creating agencies to implement them left the critical policy space of implementation open to excessive business influence and, accordingly, proposed to democratize

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administrative decision making. Their misgivings about the New Deal regulatory model naturally drew environmental organizations to the New Left concept of participatory democracy, procedures and institutional mechanisms to ensure a genuine voice for citizens throughout the policy process. The animating idea for New Left critics was that the American democracy had been supplanted by corporate liberalism, a big government--big business condominium that morphed from the New Deal effort to control ‘‘economic royalists’’ into a policy system that systematically catered to organized corporate interests and excluded citizens. Accordingly, public interest groups, including environmental lobby groups, organized to provide a measure of countervailing power to the organized corporate interests the New Left decried. To be sure, the NRDC and Sierra Club were a far cry from community action projects organized by SNCC and SDS (though Green Peace and the Friends of the Earth certainly employed the concept of direct action pioneered by the New Left). Nevertheless, environmental leaders clearly saw their groups as consistent with the objectives of participatory democracy. A director of litigation for Public Citizen, Alan Morrison, saw in his work a strong ‘‘democratic participatory aspect’’ of public interest activity: A framework was established in which people other than industry have a significant role to play, and this is not only true in regulatory agencies, but also in terms of going to court to assure compliance with the law . . . In the mid-sixties, agencies could do anything not strictly prohibited by law. (Personal Interview 1986) [Emphasis added] In words strikingly similar to New Left calls for participatory democracy, Daniel Becker, the legislative affairs director for Environmental Action (EA), explained that One of the most significant achievements brought about by the public interest groups has been the development of the grass roots . . . EA is concerned with how to get people involved in the movement and to learn how to help themselves, equipping local citizens to protect their interests against corporate power. (Personal Interview 1986) [Emphasis added] Environmental advocates such as Morrison and Becker, with their emphasis on the use of the courts as a means of enforcing regulatory laws, posed a double challenge to conservatives. Not only did they promote regulation that conservatives saw as undermining property rights

388 Domestic Policy and the free market, but they also used the rulemaking process and administrative law to enlist federal courts in the enforcement of regulation and often the ‘‘obstruction’’ of development projects and economic growth. This approach was especially objectionable to conservatives because it interposed the judicial branch in a decisive policy making and policy implementation role, in direct conflict with what they held to be its original constitutional responsibilities. The single most important legislative achievement of the environmental movement, interestingly, may have been a procedural measure---the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)---that fundamentally changed the way the federal government did business, explicitly embedding environmental considerations in all federal activities. Reflecting the notion of interdependence expressed in the Earth Day Declaration, NEPA’s statement of basis and purpose acknowledged ‘‘the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment’’ and declared it to be federal policy to ‘‘create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony’’ (Public Law 91--190, sec. 101-a). The most far-reaching effect of NEPA, however, was section 102--2-c, its requirement for environmental impact statements (EISs). This section directs all federal agencies to (C) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on--(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. At a stroke, this provision established a basis for federal environmental review of all laws and projects with any federal involvement. In practice, section 102-c also

imposed significant costs, in terms of the time value for EIS preparation as well as the actual dollar outlays for these reports. More important, EISs provided both a means of engaging environmental organizations in the approval of projects and a paper trail environmental lawyers like Alan Morrison could follow to court to monitor performance in the name of the public. Once in court, the EIS record provided a basis for public interest groups to participate more effectively in the implementation process. Even though the courts themselves are hardly a democratic arena, judicial review of administrative action and corporate compliance proved to be a most effective weapon in the environmental organizations’ arsenal for blasting open the insular politics of subgovernments. Perhaps the most interesting, albeit contemporary, example of how far reaching NEPA’s effect could be is the use of its EIS requirement in the context of contesting implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Ralph Nader’s public interest group, Public Citizen, led a challenge to NAFTA, contending that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA), a bureau in the Department of Transportation, was required under NEPA to develop an EIS, particularly with respect to potential effects on air quality, in order to open up the United States market to Mexican trucking firms. FMSCA contended that an Environmental Assessment (EA), a far less thorough evaluation tool, would suffice and the agency prepared to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) to implement NAFTA with respect to the trucking industry. Public Citizen, joined by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the California Labor Federation, the Environmental Law Foundation, the NRDC, and the Planning and Conservation League, employed NEPA to challenge this action in court. The Ninth Circuit Court ruled in DOT v. Public Citizen (316 F. 3d, 2003) that, in refusing to require an EIS, the FMSCA had acted in an ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ manner’’ thereby violating the rulemaking standard of the Administrative Procedures Act. Although, the Supreme Court ultimately granted DOT a writ of certiorari and reversed the decision, the case demonstrates the significance of NEPA in providing access to administrative decision making, even in the area of international trade. Following the enactment of NEPA, environmental laws, including the Clean Air Amendments Act and the SMCRA, both signed in 1977, not only mandated extensive new environmental protection policies but also reinforced the role of public interest and environmental activists in the regulatory process. The new laws included provisions that expanded efforts to counter

Environmentalism and Conservatism the influence of business interests and advance the goals of participatory democracy. Most notably, these and other environmental measures enacted in the 1970s mandated public permitting processes that required projects ranging from highway and power plant construction to the opening of surface mines or logging operations to provide opportunities for public interest group participation. These permitting requirements were precise about where and how frequently notice of public hearings had to be provided, in order to maximize the prospects for citizens affected by projects to have their voices heard, on the record, thereby providing official documentation that could be useful in Congress, in regulatory agencies, and in court. Environmental laws also granted to ‘‘interested parties,’’ in some instances, automatic standing to sue, thereby facilitating lawsuits by which environmentalists could intervene in regulatory approvals or challenge implementation even if they did not have a direct economic interest. Perhaps most galling to many conservatives, court decisions appeared to incentivize public interest lawyers by providing for their recovery of fees in successful lawsuits against regulated firms. As Dick Ayers, a lawyer with the NRDC explained, the courts were a key to environmental organizations providing a counterweight to industry influence: The basic formula for public interest activity is for the public to form a balance against industry. In the past, business had the advantage in administrative settings, but now the courts are a lever against the agencies . . . I live in terror of the present [Supreme] Court shutting down the avenue of litigation as a means of asserting balance in the administrative process (Personal Interview 1986). Ayers, a graduate of Yale Law School in the late 1960s, explained how he and a few dedicated young environmental activists launched the NRDC with seed money and continued early support from the Ford Foundation (Personal Interview 1986). Their intent was to leverage their legal expertise to create a channel for citizens’ voices to be heard in the implementation of environmental regulation. As the Ford Foundation proclaims in its mission statement: The fundamental challenge facing every society is to create political, economic and social systems that promote peace, human welfare and the sustainability of the environment on which life depends. We believe that the best way to meet this challenge is to encourage initiatives by those living and

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working closest to where problems are located; to promote collaboration among the nonprofit, government and business sectors; and to ensure participation by men and women from diverse communities and at all levels of society. [Emphasis added] This view reflects one of the key messages of the New Left critique, that success in getting a set of issues on the national agenda, or even enacting landmark legislation was no guarantee of achieving one’s aims unless people directly affected by policy choices had a seat at the table and a voice when decisions were made. For environmental policy, Ford’s support of the NRDC and other organizations was intended to level the policy playing field by guaranteeing that, when it came time to write regulations and oversee their execution, competent challenges to business interests could be made, by going to court if necessary. In a legal venue, a few good environmental lawyers could have a more predictable impact on regulatory implementation than environmental organizations participating in electoral or congressional politics, where business held sway, based on campaign contributions and organizational resources. This perceived business dominance ironically provided a powerful rhetorical resource for environmentalists. When environmental protection emerged on the national agenda in the late 1960s, it did so in the context of a particular policy narrative that made the rhetorical case for action (Stone 1981). The narrative developed by environmental advocates wove together time-honored Populist arguments about business dominance and citizen disenfranchisement, albeit recast in a distinctly New Left motif, with the classic Progressive approach of compiling data about the social and public health effects of business practice, especially the effects on children and the aged. Like the opening decades of the 20th century, this narrative provided a potent set of arguments for major legislative and judicial action, and its potency was enhanced by the introduction of modern epidemiological analyses as well as scientific and engineering studies that highlighted risks to humans and endangered species. By focusing the public’s attention on how corporate behavior undermined our ‘‘rights’’ to clean air and clean water and by emphasizing the particular vulnerabilities of the very young and the very old to environmental-based cancers and respiratory diseases, public interest advocates were able to mobilize voters and financial supporters (both individuals and foundations). This message resonated well politically, because the public perceived that measures to protect the environment would force corporations to be ‘‘socially responsible’’ by complying with new

390 Domestic Policy programs to guarantee a healthy environment and would create new government agencies to guarantee environmental rights for all citizens. Moreover, environmentalists proved especially adroit at using the media, particularly television and film to dramatize the ecological, and more important, health effects of irresponsible business behavior or lax government regulation. For example, In Our Water, a classic environmental advocacy film funded by the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation, portrayed the plight of several New Jersey residents who lived adjacent to a landfill that was leaching toxic pollutants into their well water (Switzgable 1981). The film effectively shows crops devastated by irrigation from the polluted wells, discolored tap water in family kitchens, and interviews with parents of sickly children. The film strikingly juxtaposed these images with scenes of state and local regulators providing bureaucratic justifications for why they could do nothing to alleviate an unconscionable situation and with interviews of corporate officers of the landfill denying any ‘‘scientific’’ proof of a problem. As effective as such documentaries were, their political impact paled in comparison to evening news stories about asthma, emphysema, carcinogens in food and water supplies, and airborne toxins or Hollywood films such as the China Syndrome that depicted how corporate interests, in their immoral pursuit of profit, were only too willing to expose ordinary people to lifethreatening risk. In the face of this policy narrative, business complaints about regulatory burdens or conservative admonitions about substituting judicial activism for congressional deliberation appeared selfcentered and small-minded. Perhaps the most powerful indicator of the success environmentalists had in winning the hearts and minds of the public is the consistent appearance of environmental protection at the top of surveys asking which policies citizens would be willing to fund. A recent survey of public opinion polling on environmental issues from the early 1970s to the present asserted that ‘‘public awareness of environmental problems and support for environmental protection is higher now than in the early seventies. Since most problems fade from the public agenda rather quickly, the persistence and recent renewal of environmental concern might be termed the second miracle’’ of public opinion (Dunlap and Scarce 1991). According to the Gallup Organization, in March 1970, 63 percent of Americans polled (compared to 79 percent in 1990) answered ‘‘yes’’ to the question, ‘‘Would you be willing to pay the slightly higher prices for your goods and services business would have to charge to control

pollution?’’ The same study also reports an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll that tracked Americans’ responses to the question, ‘‘Which do you think is more important: Protecting the environment or keeping prices down?’’ The results show that from 1975 through 1981, a period of severe stagflation, more than 50 percent consistently thought protecting the environment was more important (that figure jumped to 80 percent in 1990). In this political setting, debates about environmental policy took shape, not around whether the federal government should protect the environment (and public health), but how extensive those efforts should be. President Reagan, then, had it right in his inauguration speech, at least insofar as he portrayed environmental policy as in tension with prevailing economic, political, and cultural values. One may disagree with his characterization of environmentalists as ‘‘obstructionists’’ or as a ‘‘tiny minority,’’ but there can be no doubt that they held different values than he and his conservative supporters with respect to what decisions to make and how to make them. As Reagan prepared to meet the environmentalist challenge, he and his supporters faced a stern test. At the end of the 1960s, a student of American politics would have been hardpressed to predict that by the middle of the next decade environmentalists would have overcome the well-documented political advantages of business interests, not to mention the political inertia of the Washington establishment to enact landmark legislation and essentially to remake the regulatory process. Yet they did. These achievements derived from three critical factors that conservatives would have to address with respect to environmental policy: (1) The environmental movement had changed the terms of debate by introducing scientific analysis and public health issues into a policy arena that had been dominated by questions of natural resource development and national parks; (2) Public interest groups, especially environmental organizations, had become permanent players in the world of Washington issue networks; and (3) Business interests proved to be far less than monolithic and, in some instances, far more open to finding common ground on environmental regulation than portrayed by post--World War II political science. The enactments of SMCRA and the CAA, both of which developed between 1970 and 1977, clearly reflect each

Environmentalism and Conservatism of these three factors. The emergence of the two statutes, moreover, illustrates the ideational and institutional transformation of the regulatory process brought about in the area of environmental policy.

Environmental Regulation in Practice: SMCRA and the CAA In their 1981 classic, Clean Coal/Dirty Air, Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler documented the emergence of an unholy alliance between environmental activists, committed to reducing emissions in all coalfired power plants regardless of marginal benefits, and eastern coal producers, intent on protecting their market position against lower-sulfur western coal. Together, they conspired to ensure that the 1977 CAA would require costly and inefficient ‘‘scrubbing’’ of coal at each power plant. As Ackerman and Hassler indicated in the subtitle to their study, this was really the story of ‘‘how the Clean Air Act became a multibillion dollar bailout of high-sulfur coal producers’’ rather than an effective pollution control measure. A contemporaneous policy history reveals how environmental activists first abandoned their intention to regulate all surface mining in favor of a focus on coal and then how, ironically, they aligned themselves with western producers of low-sulfur coal to ensure that the 1977 SMCRA severely constrained the production of ‘‘dirty’’ coal in the East. To achieve their legislative goals, environmentalists relied not only on their analysis of ecological impacts and the broad public support for environmental protection but also on divisions among business and regional interests represented in Congress. These two landmark statutes also illustrate the dual aims of environmentalists: they were willing to work with eastern coal producers on the CAA and western coal producers on SMCRA because each statute coupled compromises on overall policy substance with noteworthy progress on their efforts to remake the policy process. This assessment of environmentalism’s impact on the policy process applies with equal force to the SMCRA and the CAA. SMCRA clearly bears the ideational and institutional as well as the policy imprint of environmentalism. In fact, six years before Ackerman and Hassler published their analysis, Carl Bagge, president of the National Coal Association, concluded that ‘‘[p]olitically, the consumer movement, the environmental ethic, the drive toward participatory democracy . . . are all pushing regulatory agencies to adopt policies that were regarded as irrelevant a few years ago’’ (cited in Moynihan 1975, 187). His observation is important not

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only insofar as it takes note of new legislative initiatives (such as SMCRA), but also because it associated these policy initiatives with key ideas that animated the new social regulation. The ‘‘environmental ethic’’ overrode considerations of higher prices (How can one put a value on human life or scenic beauty?) and property rights (What was private property but a legal refuge for business obstinacy?). Similarly, ‘‘the drive toward participatory democracy’’ impelled congressional allies of environmentalist ‘‘elites’’ to write specific provisions into the law that guaranteed easier access for public interest advocates to both the rulemaking process and the courts, institutional venues in which they could participate in the implementation of SMCRA. Among the 13 specific purposes enumerated in the law, three are particularly noteworthy in their reflection of environmental policy’s ideational and institutional bases: 1. Establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations; 2. Assure that appropriate procedures are provided for the public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of regulations, standards, reclamation plans, or programs established by the Secretary or any State under this Act; 3. Wherever necessary, exercise the full reach of Federal constitutional powers to insure the protection of the public interest through effective control of surface coal mining operations. (30 USCS 102) The surface mining law promised more big government explicitly backed by a modern liberal understanding of constitutional authority, a commitment to embedding environmental elites in all phases of policy making, and an obligation to protect society against depredations of private enterprise. Thus, SMCRA exemplified critical environmental challenges to libertarian, traditional, and anti-collectivist streams of conservatism. Viewed conversely, it embodied essentially the canon of the new social regulation. SMCRA’s complex and detailed requirements for obtaining a permit to surface mine coal illustrate the triumph of environmental ideals over economic efficiency and a competitive market. They also demonstrate how environmentalists changed the terms of policy debate by introducing scientific analysis and data requirements, thereby neutralizing to a degree the political and resource advantages of business lobbies.

392 Domestic Policy To operate a surface mine, SMCRA directed coal firms to produce 25 separate sets of information for OSM to review. Some of the more onerous and expensive requirements mandated the following: (1) maps of the permit area, including cross-sections of mining pits indicating soil types, siltation ponds, storage pile locations segregated into topsoil, and overburden; (2) a study of climatology and ambient air quality along with a ‘‘fugitive dust’’ control plan and monitoring system; (3) a study of hydrology on the site with analysis of sources and quality of water, a restoration plan and long-term impacts on surrounding water supplies; and (4) studies of flora, fauna, and geology on the site, along with a thorough restoration plan. When President Carter signed SMCRA into law, the economics of coal production changed instantly. In particular, compliance with its premining information provisions compelled firms under its provisions to allocate significant resources to meeting these requirements before moving a cubic yard of earth. Each of these measures reflects another of the Act’s objectives, providing ‘‘a means for development of the data and analyses necessary to establish effective and reasonable regulation of surface mining operations’’ (30 USCS 102). Like other environmental statutes, including the CAA, SMCRA shifted discussions of policy development from traditional concerns about stakeholder influence and economic growth to the realm of science, engineering, and public health data. In the legislative process, environmentalists produced data in support of their goals. In the regulatory phase, individual coal firms were responsible for developing all information necessary for permitting. For larger firms with in-house scientific and engineering resources, SMCRA increased their cost of capital insofar as the studies demanded could take a considerable amount of time, years in the case of flora and fauna analyses. Midsize firms, without the necessary expertise on staff, had to allocate additional funding to contract out for acquiring the necessary information. Smaller firms, operating with low cash reserves and higher relative labor costs, often faced insurmountable financial challenges to comply with informational requirements, a result that did not displease environmentalists and that reduced competition. In fact, SMCRA exacerbated the financial burden on smaller firms, primarily located in the East, by establishing minimum bonding fees far above the levels to which they were accustomed and on which their profitability depended. By tying these information requirements to regulatory permits, moreover, the law provided environmental lawyers with an evidentiary basis to sue firms for

noncompliance. SMCRA, in clear anticipation that environmental organizations could use the federal courts to play a supplementary enforcement role, endowed ‘‘interested parties’’ with automatic standing to sue noncompliant coal firms or even to sue OSM for nonenforcement. Along these same lines, the law provided explicit instructions for alerting interested parties of permitting proceedings for any new surface mining project, specifying the media and frequency of public notice. These arrangements represent the law’s clear attempt to move away from the New Deal regulatory regime and to put teeth into the objective of promoting participatory democracy throughout the policy process. Subsequent regulations in fact guaranteed that private citizens could request that OSM perform spot inspections of a duly permitted surface mining operation if they had ‘‘reason to believe that a violation exists’’ (30 CFR 842.12). The authors of the regulations well understood that local, state, or even national public interest groups would support private citizens in such activities. Moreover, to guard against the coal industry ‘‘capturing’’ OSM, implementing regulations prohibited the agency from hiring any federal employee from a department or bureau that had any ‘‘legal authority, program or function in any Federal Agency which has as its purpose promoting the use or development of coal’’ (30 CFR 1211). Thus, SMCRA and its regulations positioned environmental advocates to augment the enforcement capacity of OSM and sought to ensure that the agency would remain hospitable to them. These institutional measures embedded citizens and public interest groups in the implementation of the surface mining law, thereby altering subgovernmental politics to fit the new social regulation’s goal of participatory democracy and underscoring the fact that environmentalists saw that remaking regulatory processes was as important an objective as passing legislation, if they were to achieve their environmental goals. As significant as the environmentalists’ success was in enacting SMCRA, it did not represent a total triumph. Indeed, even with public opinion in support of environmental protection overwhelmingly on their side, public interest groups fighting for SMCRA had to find ways to adapt to and exploit differing business interests. As SMCRA took shape in the mid-1970s, the deep divisions in the broader mining industry help to explain why the law, originally intended to control all surface mining, came to regulate only coal. Although environmentalists initially sought a comprehensive federal law to regulate all surface mining, by the time Congress passed SMCRA, all that remained of this sweeping goal was a brief title that allocated funds to

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A strip-mining coal operation in western Kentucky. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act permits mountaintop removal strip mining under certain conditions. (David Davis)

study the feasibility of regulating noncoal operations. This outcome of environmental policy making clearly illustrated how divisions among business could facilitate the enactment of major regulatory programs. It shed light on the limits of translating broad public support into tough environmental laws, on the transformation of subgovernmental politics, and on the political maturation (some might say ‘‘aging’’) of the environmental movement. While there was legislative precedent for treating coal separately from so-called hard rock mining, the former being governed by the Coal Leasing Act of 1928 and the latter by the Mining Act of 1872, environmental organizations were not likely to be persuaded that reclamation should be bound by laws intended to promote mining operations. Rather, the explanation lies in congressional and subgovernmental politics. From the outset of the struggle to enact a surface mining law, hard rock mining interests within the American Mining Congress (AMC) strove to dissociate themselves from coal, and several factors helped their

effort along. The coal surface mining historically located in the East and the lower Midwest had ravaged Appalachia as well as farmland in Ohio and Indiana. The results of surface mining in these regions and the surface effects of extensive underground mining, also controlled by SMCRA, created the visceral impression that environmentalists adeptly translated into effective political material. Harry Caudill’s influential Night Comes to the Cumberlands served as the surface mining equivalent of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, exposing the deleterious impacts of eastern surface mining on water resources, on local communities where erosion and landslides proved devastating, and on the scenic beauty of the region. Congressional hearings included tragic photographic evidence of these natural and human effects. In addition, environmentalists were keenly aware that coal, unlike other mining, produced fossil fuel that contributed to air pollution and serious public health problems for children and seniors. Environmentalists also worried that the development of mining technology suitable to vast coal deposits in the

394 Domestic Policy West combined with the energy crisis following the Arab oil embargo would create a ‘‘second Appalachia’’ in Wyoming, Colorado, and Montana. The public understanding of surface mining issues, therefore, provided dominant AMC members---such as the National Limestone Institute, the National Crushed Stone Association, Phosphate Lands Conference, the American Iron Ore Association, the Copper Development Association, the National Land and Gravel Association, and the Industrial Sand Association---with the perfect scapegoat, coal mining. The fact that the sand and gravel mining industries were integral to road construction, and by extension, the National Highway Trust Fund, created an additional powerful incentive for legislators to accept hard rock arguments that coal ought to be treated separately and a more comprehensive treatment of surface mining should be postponed. Just as important, key legislators represented western hard rock mining interests. In the House, Morris Udall (D-Ariz.) chaired the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, while on the Senate side, Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) chaired the Interior Committee and John Melcher (D-Mo.) chaired the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining. Each of these lawmakers was a strong supporter of environmental regulation, especially Udall whose brother Stewart as secretary of interior had issued a major study of surface mining impacts in Appalachia. However, all were sympathetic to hard rock mining, which was critical to their state economies. In particular, Udall was a strong supporter of major copper interests based in Arizona. National Coal Association (NCA) and National Independent Coal Operators Association (NICOA) complained bitterly, but to no avail, that these congressional leaders acquired national credentials as environmental advocates while catering to mining firms back home. Once it became clear that the law would be about coal, AMC lent its support to the efforts of its coal members to minimize the negative economic effects, even forming a joint AMC-NCA legislative task force to work on SMCRA. Environmentalists, recognizing political reality, decided to seek as aggressive a coal surface mining law as possible. Notwithstanding the AMC-NCA task force, the regional and economic diversity of the coal industry itself facilitated their strategy. By the time the struggle to enact a surface mining law commenced, the coal industry was diverse. This diversity owed, in part, to the consolidation of large segments of the industry as major oil companies acquired coal firms. It also reflected the different nature and scale of surface mining operations in the East, the Midwest, and the West. In the East, relatively small surface mines unearthed

narrow coal seams among the steep slopes of the Appalachians where they impinged directly on the quality of life in many rural communities. In the Midwest, midsize companies, so-called captive firms owned by coal burning power companies, operated on rolling terrain in southern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, often clashing with farming interests. In the West, huge surface mining projects employed gigantic earth-moving equipment to excavate wide coal seams many of which lay on public lands in Wyoming, Colorado, and Montana. These differences were magnified by the fact that coal in each of the regions varied substantially in its BTU rating and its sulfur content, with eastern coal yielding the highest heat content but also the most sulfate pollution and western coal providing both the lowest heat and the lowest sulfur content. This industry diversity created major collective action problems for lobby groups representing the coal industry, and spawned the formation of alternative organizations to advocate for particular segments of the industry. The four most important business groups involved with SMCRA, in descending order of size and scope, were the AMC, the NCA, the NICOA, and MARC (the Mining and Reclamation Council). The AMC represented all mining industries, including hard rock mining as well as coal. NCA organized mostly larger coal firms with operations in several states, while NICOA essentially represented smaller eastern firms and a few like-minded ones from southern Ohio and Indiana. According to its vice president, Dan Jerkins, MARC organized in 1977 to speak for firms committed to ‘‘expansion of the coal industry through environmentally sound practices’’ (Personal Interview 1981). The difficulty businesses encountered in speaking with one voice opened the door for environmentalists to pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy. As it suited them, they forged alliances with firms more congenial to environmental policy, ordinarily larger ones interested in legislative certainty and uniform national regulatory policies, and confronted more ideologically conservative firms, ordinarily smaller ones unaccustomed to Washington Beltway politics and for whom SMCRA’s compliance costs could spell economic ruin. With respect to congressional politics, western domination of the critical committees and subcommittees again came into play as Udall, Jackson, and Metcalf were disposed to write a law that included particularly draconian requirements on returning surface-mined lands to their ‘‘approximate original contour’’ and banning any mining in areas adjacent to farmland or slopes of greater than 20 degrees. These provisions clearly targeted Appalachian mining in the East, rather

Environmentalism and Conservatism than the rolling terrain of the western coal reserves. In addition, in 1975 when President Ford vetoed an earlier version of SMCRA he attempted to head off further legislative efforts by authorizing the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to regulate surface mining on public lands, almost all of which were in the West. Once BLM promulgated its surface mining rules, most western operations moved into compliance with reclamation practices on original contour, and they reprised the role of hard rock mining firms, characterizing older, eastern firms as the real culprits in despoiling the land. As an environmental bonus, they and their congressional allies highlighted the fact that lower-sulfur western coal promised to abate pollution from power plants (though the CAA eliminated that advantage with its rules requiring scrubbing technology). To make matters worse for the majority of coal firms operating in the East and the Midwest, the United Mine Workers (UMW) joined this ‘‘alliance’’ of environmental advocates and western coal. Since the enactment of the 1969 Mining Safety and Health Act, underground mining in the East and the Midwest lost significant market share to nonunion surface mining, and a tough surface mining law held out the prospect of leveling the economic playing field in favor of unionized underground operations. The UMW also reasoned that SMCRA would reduce the comparative advantage of the emerging nonunion western coal market. Although the persuasiveness of this view evaporated when OSM wrote rules to treat surface effects of underground mining as severely as surface mining, the UMW did provide valuable legislative support for enacting SMCRA. In sum, SMCRA typified the environmental policies that provoked conservatives and animated the Reagan Revolutionaries. In their view, SMCRA’s detailed ‘‘command and control’’ approach to regulation supplanted free enterprise with bureaucratic direction. Its costly federal requirements undermined state authority while increasing the price and decreasing the supply of a key energy resources. Its concept of environmental ethics trumped individualism with a collectivist vision. Finally, conservatives saw its institutional reforms as endowing elite liberals with undue influence on the policy process while bastardizing the constitutional role of the courts. Just as dismaying to conservatives, the business response to SMCRA appeared feckless and shortsighted. The other major environmental law of 1977, the CAA, provided no less a disheartening outcome for conservatives. As Ackerman and Hassler (1981) explained, the CAA of 1977 exemplified the ideas and institutions typical of the new social regulation in

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general and environmental policy in particular. Indeed, it was section 304 of the CAA that pioneered the inclusion of citizen suit provisions in environmental protection laws. While their analysis of the law’s attempt to regulate power plant emissions is highly instructive, many observers agree that the major legislative engagement occurred around the CAA’s efforts to control automobile emissions. As with the case of SMCRA, the battle to regulate auto emissions under the CAA reveals the bases of conservatives’ frustration with both environmental policy and the business community. In discussing the genesis of the CAA, one of its key architects, Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-Maine) identified the three pillars of the law: Three fundamental principles shaped the 1970 law. I was convinced that strict federal air pollution regulation would require a legally defensible premise. Protection of public health seemed the strongest and most appropriate such premise. Senator Howard Baker believed that the American technological genius should be brought to bear on the air pollution problem, and that industry should be required to apply the best technology available. Senator Thomas Eagleton asserted that the American people deserved to know when they could expect their health to be protected, and that deadlines were the only means of providing minimal assurance. Over a period of several markup sessions, those three concepts evolved into a proposed Clean Air Act that set deadlines, required the use of best available technology, and established health-related air quality levels (Muskie 1990, 25) [Emphasis added]. These three principles, enshrined in the 1970 Act, drove the confrontation between the auto industry and environmentalists when the CAA came up for reauthorization in 1977. In particular, section 202 of the 1970 Act required a 90 percent reduction in automobile emissions by the 1975--1976 model year, while prescribing the best available control technology to achieve that goal. The law’s supporters readily acknowledged that they were not banking on the precise achievement of the 90 percent reduction by the deadline (as a compromise, the Senate amended its original bill to extend the deadline by one year). Rather, as many legislators made clear in hearings on the 1970 and 1977 Acts, these ‘‘technology forcing’’ measures were intended to hold the auto industry’s feet to the fire and allow Congress to directly monitor progress rather than following the New Deal model of tasking regulatory agencies with that responsibility for

396 Domestic Policy Congress. Epidemiological evidence of the negative public health effects of emissions, especially as they affected children and the elderly, provided the political lever environmentalists and their congressional supporters used to enact these ambitious measures over the considerable clout of the Big Three auto manufacturers and the Automobile Dealers Association. In public debates and congressional testimony, environmentalists allied themselves with the National Cancer Institute, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association to hammer home the public health threat, which Senator Muskie had identified as the ‘‘legally defensible premise’’ of the law. The Senate bill passed unanimously, a testament to the political efficacy of the environmental--public health nexus. The House of Representatives, however, passed a far-less-stringent bill for two principle reasons. First, the automobile industry had a powerful ally on the Commerce Committee, John Dingell (D-Mich.), representing the Detroit area. Second, members of the House were more susceptible to electoral pressure than senators not only because they ran every two years instead of six, but also because almost every congressional district in the nation had an automobile dealership and some ancillary industry to automobile manufacture. While a spirited fight ensued in the Conference Committee, the Senate conferees ultimately prevailed, and the stronger CAA passed both houses. This initial victory in 1970 set the stage for a dramatic clash between the auto industry and environmentalists in 1977. Between 1970 and 1977, a number of significant developments framed the context for amending the CAA. Most notably, the oil embargo and accompanying economic stagflation posed an effective political counterweight to the public support of environmentalism as well as the appeals to public health arguments that advocates employed in Congress. In addition, corporations, Washington law firms, business lobby groups, and trade associations responded to the early successes of environmental policy by investing in their own scientific and analytic expertise to better participate in the new subgovernment politics (Vogel 1989). This investment had an important double-edged impact, on the one hand augmenting the capacity of these interests to contest the scientific and engineering data adduced in support of environmental laws, but on the other hand reinforcing the terms of debate and the authority of environmental ideas. To the chagrin of conservative critics, building this capacity focused the political debate on how much environmental protection we could afford rather than on the legitimacy of the policies’ underlying ideas and institutions. Thus, the question for the CAA was what the deadlines

should be for achieving automobile emission targets, not whether the framework for regulating them under the CAA was appropriate. Nevertheless, the increased capabilities of business interests did reshape the character of environmental issue networks and establish limits on the sway of environmentalism. Also in this same period, the first policy analytic and economic critiques of environmental protection emerged and provided important evidence of the attendant opportunity costs. Finally, after several years of opposition from Gerald Ford, the first Democratic presidential victory since 1964 brought an individual committed to signing a new CASA, Jimmy Carter, to the White House. Within this political milieu, the effort to reauthorize the CAA began in the mid-1970s, and it quickly became clear that the auto emissions provisions would be the major battleground. The initial engagement would be in the Subcommittee on Health and Environment, chaired by Paul Rogers (D-Fla.), widely known as ‘‘Mr. Health.’’ Closely allied with Senator Muskie and a mentor to another strong environmental advocate in the House, Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), Rogers faced off against the second-ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, John Dingell. With Rogers representing Palm Beach Florida whose senior citizens were interested in promoting public health and Dingell representing Detroit where the auto industry was interested in preserving jobs, the CAA was vigorously contested. Environmentalists, angered by the fact that the auto industry had not come close to achieving the 90 percent emissions reduction mandated by the 1970 Act, were intent on achieving a stringent bill and on Congress holding business to account precisely as the CAA framework had intended. Unlike seven years earlier though, car manufacturers, reeling from Japanese competition as well as the trebling of oil prices, enjoyed the support of the United Auto Workers (UAW). When Leonard Woodcock, president of the UAW, testified as part of a panel including executives of the Big Three automakers, Rogers, Waxman, and their allies in the environmental and public health communities understood that they would have to moderate their objectives. By the time Rogers’ Subcommittee passed the bill on to the full Commerce Committee, Representative Joel Broyhill (R-Va.) had openly aligned with John Dingell, signaling that opposition to a strong set of auto emission provisions would come from a formidable coalition of business, labor, a united Republican Party, and a powerful Democrat. In contrast to the unanimity of 1970, the Senate had to overcome a filibuster that delayed passage until 1977. Indeed, by the time the

Environmentalism and Conservatism law emerged from conference this time, the CAA provided an additional four-year extension on achieving the original 1970 emissions targets. As Senator Muskie reviewed the 1977 struggle, he concluded, ‘‘Fortunately, most of the special interests’ political capital was exhausted in the fight for the auto industry amendment, and we were able to avoid a number of other special industry efforts’’ (Muskie 1990). In retrospect, it appears that a unique set of political and economic circumstances, explain why Congress relented on the Clean Air Act’s auto emissions standards. The economic distress of the 1970s, an uncharacteristically unified business front, and an unprecedented opposition alliance doomed the environmentalists’ effort to bring the auto industry into compliance with the ambitious 1970 standards. The legislative history on NAAQS and power plant emissions reflects a more predictable ‘‘substantive’’ outcome of environmental policy, a strong command and control of regulation pursued regardless of effectiveness or efficiency. With respect to administrative ‘‘process,’’ however, the auto emissions provisions of the 1977 CAA remained consistent with the rest of the Act, with SMCRA, and with the new social regulation in general. Both SMCRA and the CAA demonstrate the ideational and institutional transformation effected in the realm of environmental policy as well as the limits of this transformation. By introducing participatory reforms such as public permitting and citizen suits, changing the terms of debate to require scientific and engineering information, relying increasingly on courts as policy partners, rooting policy arguments in concerns about public health, and effectively promoting a collectivist ethic, the environmental movement helped to remake both the policy agenda and the regulatory process. While these successes could not purge business or conservative influence from congressional politics, as both SMCRA and the CAA show, they did bring about the enactment of landmark legislation and advanced a public philosophy that conservatives viewed as incompatible with American democracy.

A Consensus Clash: Environmentalism v. Conservatism By the late 1970s, the ideational and institutional development of environmental policy presented Ronald Reagan and the fusionist coalition he helped to forge with both a raison d’etre for mobilization and significant barriers to overcome. The conservative campaign messages initiated by Goldwater in 1964 and perfected

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by Nixon in 1968 served Ronald Reagan well in 1980. Resurrecting America’s commitment to individualism, freedom, and patriotism, while forcefully rejecting collectivism and a defeatist foreign policy, proved effective in constructing a conservative electoral consensus. The problem conservatives would face, though, was that their electoral consensus organized around opposition to liberal extremism would confront a powerful alternative consensus in support of environmental policies. Laws and regulations aimed at limiting exposure to carcinogens or protecting children and the elderly from air pollution had convinced Americans that environmental policies were a good thing. Conservative critics of environmentalism were speaking to an electorate more than 60 percent of which consistently asserted that it would pay higher taxes for a cleaner environment. By the 1970s, moreover, environmental organizations became permanent players in the Washington policy community and were adroit at nurturing the consensus in favor of environmental policy. Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, the stage was set for a clash between the conservative consensus that opposed environmentalist ideology and a popular consensus that supported environmental policies. The former helped to elect a conservative president with a vision of relieving business and the nation of overbearing and overly expensive environmental regulation. The latter provided a staunch barrier to the policies essential to realizing that vision. This clash would be played out in the administrative and judicial institutions that environmental organizations and their congressional supporters had built into the regulatory process. Those institutions, as we have seen, included important procedural ‘‘safeguards’’ that ensured environmental advocates had an ongoing role in implementing policy as well as entree to the courts where they could hold federal regulators as well as private firms accountable. In addition, by 1980, those institutions had been operating for almost a full decade and businesses, trade associations, congressional committees, public lobby groups, and federal agencies had developed a familiarity with these processes that bred an inertia that would requires extraordinary resources to break. Environmental policies, then, had become embedded in American politics in both an ideational and an institutional sense. While these policies were open to a reformist critique aimed at protecting the environment in the most efficient way possible, it would take a huge investment of political capital to build a legislative coalition effective enough to change environmental laws and rein in environmental regulators through

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President Reagan signs a bill extending the deadline for the steel industry to comply with the Clean Air Act He hailed it as the nation’s commitment ‘‘to cast aside the overzealous unnecessary regulation that has shackled the most productive forces in our economy.’’ The president is surrounded by lawmakers of steel-producing states during the rose garden signing, July 17, 1981. (Bettmann/Corbis)

the congressional oversight process. The consensus on environmental policy had taken deep root in the nation’s legal and regulatory institutions as well as in the popular mind.

References and Further Reading Bernstein, Marver. 1955. Regulation by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lowi, Theodore J. 1979 The End of Liberalism, 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

McConnell, Grant. 1966. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Vintage Books. Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. Nash, George. 1976. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945. New York: Basic Books. Reagan, Ronald. 1974. Comments during a Symposium in Neil Jacoby, ed., The Business-Government Relationship: A Reassessment. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co. Schattschneider, E. E. 1975. The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press.

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue Daniel J. Tichenor Philip H. Knight Professor of Social Science and Senior Faculty Fellow, Morse Center for Law and Politics, University of Oregon

Introduction

political allies should hardly surprise us. We are accustomed to viewing our political world in binaries---liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, Red States and Blue States. Yet immigration routinely cuts across familiar partisan and philosophical lines. Indeed, immigration has inspired vigorous debate since the founding of our nation, and we can identify four distinctive and durable ideological traditions that have found expression over the course of American history on the heated subject. To better appreciate and conceptualize these ideological traditions, it is useful to map rival goals toward alien admissions and rights along two dimensions. One dimension focuses on immigration numbers, and divides those who support expansive immigration opportunities and robust numbers from those who favor substantial restrictions on alien admissions. The second dimension focuses on the rights of noncitizens residing in the United States, and distinguishes those who endorse the provision of a broad set of civil, political, and social rights (as defined by T. H. Marshall) to newcomers from those who advocate strict limitations on the rights accorded to aliens (especially membership goods such as access to certain public benefits programs, legal due process claims, and so forth) (Marshall 1950). At table 1 captures, we can identify four categories from these two dimensions that in fact comport well with the distinctive ideological traditions that have emerged in America’s enduring debate over immigrant and immigration policies: cosmopolitans,

The United States is hardly alone among advanced industrial democracies in confronting the broad array of practical and ethical challenges posed by illegal immigration (Cornelius et al. 2004). The origins and development of America’s recurring illegal immigration dilemma, however, are distinctive. Not only do few nations have as long a history of mass immigration in general or of unauthorized flows in particular, but the social, economic, and political foundations of illegal immigration to the United States reflect a unique history that informs the character of reform efforts past and present. Indeed, the contemporary dilemmas posed by illegal immigration reflect important historical patterns and legacies of how national policy makers since the early 20th century responded to porous borders and the presence of large numbers of unauthorized. Specifically, America’s contemporary struggle with illegal immigration has been profoundly shaped by a series of Faustian bargains among odd political bedfellows over time, a tradition of beleaguered enforcement, and the irresistible power of immigrant labor and votes.

Four Ideological Traditions and Faustian Bargains The long-standing linkage between the achievement of immigration reform and compromises among unlikely 399

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Table 1. Immigration and Four Ideological Traditions Immigrant Admissions and Rights (A Two-Dimensional Model) Immigrant Admissions Should Be Expansive (Robust Numbers)

Immigrant Admissions Should Be Restricted (Reduced Numbers)

Cosmopolitans

Egalitarian Nationalists

T. Paine, Common Sense

T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia

Ralph Waldo Emerson Jane Addams Rep. Emanuel Celler Sen. Edward Kennedy Rep. Linda Sanchez German American Alliance, MALDEF, American Jewish Committee, NNIR, AFL-CIO (1990s-present)

The Rights of Aliens Should Be Expansive (Broader Civil, Political, and Social Rights for Noncitizens) The Rights of Aliens Should Be Restricted

Frederick Douglass Samuel Gompers John Rawls IRC Chair Barbara Jordan

Free Market Expansionists

Knights of Labor, Wisconsin progressive economists, AFL (1900-1956), Zero Population Growth and the Sierra Club (1970s-1980s) Classic Restrictionists

A. Hamilton, Report on Manufactures Andrew Carnegie William Howard Taft President Ronald Reagan Sen. Spencer Abraham Sen. John McCain

Agrippa (Anti-Federalist), Letters in the Mass. Gazette Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Madison Grant Sen. Patrick McCarren Peter Brimelow Rep. Tom Tancredo

Nat. Assn of Manufacturers, Steamship companies, Nat. Assn of Manufacturers, Steamship companies, Amer. Farm Bureau Fedn, Microsoft, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Know-Nothings, APA, Immigration Restriction League, Americans for Better Immigration, FAIR

free-market expansionists, national egalitarians, and national protections. (Narrower Civil, Political, and Social Rights for Noncitizens) For all of the acrimony engendered by immigration policy making during our history, it is important to note that heroes and rogues can be identified in each ideological tradition. Each tradition has featured champions who have advanced specific policy goals on behalf of what they perceived as the greater good, and those who have done so for their own self-interested motives. Moreover, all of these ideological traditions found expression during the earliest days of the American republic and they continue to describe well the rival camps in national immigration politics that transcend the standard liberal and conservative labels.

Cosmopolitans Cosmopolitans believe that large-scale immigration is socially, economically, and politically beneficial to the United States and that the country’s assimilative capacities are vast. As postwar immigration reformer Hyman Bookbinder put it in 1960, ‘‘Perhaps even more appropriate than the mosaic, the true image of America is the kaleidoscope. It is a mosaic of human beings that is always changing but encased in a basic framework of freedom, of brotherhood, of tolerance, of creativity’’ (Bookbinder 1960). Today, cosmopolitan legislators like Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Calif.) embrace expansions in family-based and employment-based legal immigration as well as legalization of the roughly 12--18 million unauthorized aliens living in the U.S. Likewise, this ideological tradition has favored a broad set of legal protections and

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democracy’’ justifies policies ‘‘resisting the influx of great numbers of a greatly different race’’ (quoted in Tichenor 2002, 38). One can hear echoes of this argument on behalf of cultural homogeneity in the work of a contemporary Harvard scholar, political scientist Samuel Huntington, and conservative commentator Peter Brimelow (Huntington 2004). However, many of today’s classic restrictionists favor tough limits on immigrant admissions and rights not on racial or cultural grounds, but because stringent controls are necessary to uphold American national sovereignty and to protect the United States from newcomers who would threaten our security, overburden public benefits programs, or disregard the rule of law. These reformers oppose temporary worker programs, ‘‘chain migration’’ produced by our current legal preference system, amnesty or legalization for unauthorized immigrants, birthright citizenship for their children, and immigrant access to social welfare programs.

Egalitarian Nationalists

Immigration cartoon from Harper’s Weekly illustrates the historical perspective on discrimination against succeeding waves of immigrants as well as the tension between immigrants and freed slaves. (Library of Congress)

entitlements for aliens. As the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR) declared recently, its member organizations seek ‘‘the enfranchisement of all immigrant and refugee communities . . . advocating for their full labor, environmental, civil and human rights’’ (NNIRR Mission Statement). To cosmopolitans, expansive immigrant admissions and rights are basic ingredients of universalist democracy.

Classic Restrictionists At the other end of the continuum, classic restrictionists advocate substantial reductions in immigrant admissions and strict limits on alien rights. Historically, immigration activists of this ideological tradition have worried about significant shifts in the ethnic, racial, or religious composition of immigration. As Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell, a supporter of the Immigration Restriction League (IRL), argued during the Progressive Era, ‘‘the need for homogeneity in a

Egalitarian nationalists are principally concerned with protecting the common interests of U.S. citizens, seeking reductions in overall immigration to enhance the economic well-being of the nation’s least advantaged members before welcoming new arrivals. More than a century ago, Frederick Douglass championed immigration limits, lamenting that ‘‘every hour sees the black man elbowed out of employment by some newly arrived immigrant’’ (quoted in Cook 1974, 205). A later generation of labor leaders like Terence Powderly of the Knights of Labor and Samuel Gompers of American Federation of Labor (AFL) championed sweeping immigration restrictions because they believed immigrants undercut the wages, working conditions, and job security of American workers.1 In both cases, mass immigration was viewed as a potent threat to advancing social, economic, and political justice among citizens. More recently, environmentalists like former-govenor Richard Lamm contend that lowered immigration is necessary for curbing population growth and preserving U.S. natural resources for existing citizens. Nevertheless, egalitarian nationalists have tended to share with cosmopolitans a discomfort with inequalities between citizens and newcomers already here. Douglass, for instance, decried mistreatment of Chinese on the Pacific Coast during the Gilded Age. During the 1990s, Barbara Jordan, chair of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, urged Congress ‘‘to retain for legal immigrants eligibility for our safety net programs’’ lest ‘‘individuals whom we have invited to enter become vulnerable’’ (Jordan 1995).

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Free Market Expansionists Finally, free market expansionists support large-scale immigration to meet the labor needs of business interests and to promote national prosperity. In his Report on Manufactures, Alexander Hamilton praised robust immigration as ‘‘an important resource, not only for extending the population, and with the useful and productive labor of the country, but likewise for the prosecution of manufactures’’ (1957, 194--195). Andrew Carnegie later celebrated mass immigration as ‘‘a golden stream which flows into the country each year.’’ He added crassly, ‘‘These adults are surely worth $1,500 each---for in former days an efficient slave sold for that sum’’ (Carnegie 1887, 34--35). Today, free market expansionists favor increased provisions for employment-based inflows and temporary worker programs, and oppose employer sanctions in the name of regulatory relief. At the same time, they idealize newcomers who are entrepreneurial and economically self-sufficient, and thereby support denial of social welfare and other public benefits to noncitizens. In contrast to cosmopolitians and national egalitarians, free market expansionists evidence little concern about providing U.S. businesses access to low-wage workers with limited rights. These distinctive ideological traditions remind us that American political debate about immigration reflects a depth and texture that defies standard philosophical labels such as our liberal-conservative divide. But the significance of these four ideological traditions also lies in the long-standing necessity of building incongruous coalitions to obtain major immigration reform. Odd bedfellows not only abound in U.S. immigration politics, but they also make nonincremental policy innovation possible. Of the four camps of immigration activists (free market expansionists, cosmopolitans, classic restrictionists, or egalitarian nationalists), none has secured immigration reform independently. Over time, immigration reform almost invariably has required compromise between two or more of these groupings of political actors. Consequently, Faustian bargains over porous borders and access to cheap and exploitable labor have been a recurring feature of national immigration policy making.

Mexican Labor and World War I Ironically, the origins of America’s illegal immigration dilemma can be traced to one of the most restrictionist periods in our nation’s history, namely, the early 20th century. This was a time when the federal government enacted a literacy test requirement for immigrants, a so-called Asiatic Barred Zone, a draconian national

origins quota system, and an overall ceiling on annual overseas immigration that slowed European arrivals to a trickle. It was also a time when Mexican laborers were being recruited in steady numbers to develop a budding southwestern economy. But new impediments to this labor stream emerged with enactment of the Immigration Act of 1917. The new law made all alien admissions contingent upon payment of an $8.00 head tax and passage of a literacy test. The new requirements slowed the flow of Mexican workers across the southern border, although many simply crossed without inspection. When World War I began, the supply of Mexican laborers was more dramatically dampened when rumors that they would be drafted into the U.S. armed forces spurred a mass exodus (Reisler 1976, 24--32). Against this backdrop, southwestern growers, ranchers, miners, railroad companies, and supportive lawmakers pressured the Labor Department---then responsible for the Immigration Bureau and domestic enforcement---to facilitate the importation of thousands of Mexican workers. Bowing to this intense lobbying on the grounds that the war had produced labor shortages, Labor Secretary William Wilson invoked a special clause of the 1917 law (the ninth proviso of section 3) that enabled him to ‘‘issue rules and prescribe conditions . . . to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission’’ (Reisler 1976, 27). Wilson ordered that the literacy test, head taxes, and contract labor restrictions be waived for Mexicans; he also led publicity efforts to assure potential guestworkers that they would not be conscripted into the armed forces. Although Mexican contract labor was justified as an emergency wartime measure, an array of southwestern employers of low-wage labor joined with their congressional representatives in demanding extensions of the program after wartime hostilities ceased in 1918. The Labor Department again acceded to this lobbying pressure, as it did in subsequent years. Between 1917 and 1921, roughly 75,000 Mexicans worked as contract laborers in the United States under Wilson’s waiver plan, along with an indeterminate number of undocumented workers (Tichenor 2002, 168--170).

‘‘Restrictions . . . with a Bribe’’: Closing the Ports and Opening the Borders The issue of Mexican migratory labor threatened the immigration restriction movement in the 1920s. The diverse nativist coalition that emerged from the Progressive Era was united in its hostility toward Asian and southern and Eastern European immigration, as

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue well as in its devotion to eugenicist principles of racial order and Anglo-Saxon superiority. But Mexican labor flows were another matter. The northern IRL, the AFL, patriotic societies, and a number of northern lawmakers favored stringent limits on Latin and South American immigration. By contrast, southern and western lawmakers and groups favoring national origins quotas for overseas immigration also extolled the virtues of a cheap and flexible Mexican labor force. Rep. John Nance Garner (D-Tex.), Roosevelt’s future vice president, explained that ‘‘the prices that [Mexicans] charge are much less than the same labor would be from either the negro or the white man’’ (Reisler 1976, 40). He assured his House colleagues that Mexican laborers were by definition temporary, powerless, and easily expelled. The Grange and the American Farm Bureau Federation adamantly opposed a change in Mexico’s nonquota status. ‘‘We do not want to see the condition arise again when white men who are reared and educated in our schools have got to bend their backs and skin their fingers,’’ business interests like the Great Western Sugar Company explained to Congress. ‘‘You have got to give us a class of labor that will do . . . back-breaking work, and we have the brains and ability to supervise and handle the business part of it’’ (Reisler 1976, 175). The uneasy 1920s coalition of northern nativists, organized labor, and southern and western restrictionists were deeply divided over Mexican labor. The controversy seemed to place the national origins quota system begun in 1921 in jeopardy. Immigration defenders attempted to exploit these fractures within the nativist coalition during legislative debates of 1924, the year when the 1921 quotas were due to expire. Rep. Fiorello La Guardia (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) offered an amendment that placed strict quotas on Western Hemisphere countries. Their hope was to kill the 1924 quota legislation by sundering the disparate restrictionist camp. Faced with stalemate or defeat, restrictionists called for a compromise on the divisive Mexican labor question. As one closed-border advocate declared, ‘‘I want the Mexicans kept out, but I do not want this bill killed by men who want these and all others admitted in unrestricted numbers’’ (Reisler 1976, 201). The Immigration Act of 1924 ultimately erected formidable barriers to southern and Eastern Europeans and reinforced Asian exclusion, but was decidedly permissive on Canadian and Mexican admissions. Aliens with 10 years continuous residence in a Western Hemisphere country could enter the U.S. as nonquota immigrants. ‘‘Restrictions of immigration and setting up of un-American racial tests has been enacted through a

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fusion of northern Republicans from urban districts with southern Democrats, with a bribe tossed to the latter by keeping Mexico open,’’ observed one pro-immigration lobbyist (Kohler n.d.). As nativist reformers prepared new quota legislation in 1928, they agreed to treat Mexican inflows as a distinctive issue. ‘‘These two kinds of restriction are quite separate and independent,’’ New York restrictionist Demarest Lloyd declared in reference to overseas versus Western Hemisphere migration. ‘‘We all agree that unity of restrictionists is desirable’’ (1928). Recalling the potential split in 1924, the IRL also urged coalitional comity on ‘‘the National Origins-Mexican Quota situation’’ (Ward 1928). It even expressed sympathy for the dilemma faced by southwestern nativists. ‘‘Although the West has become racially conscious and wants to be a white civilization, it also wants to develop and to develop rapidly. For this it needs unskilled labor of a mobile type, like the Mexicans, for it cannot get white labor to do its unskilled work’’ (Immigration Restriction League 1928). The 1928 law codified this compromise, reaffirming a bifurcated system that imposed draconian restrictions on European and Asian immigration while remaining open and flexible toward labor inflows from Mexico and other Western Hemisphere countries.

Mexican Braceros and Undocumented Aliens During the first New Deal, AFL leaders campaigned for legislation that would place national origins quotas on Mexico and other Western Hemisphere countries. In 1924, the AFL’s Washington office vigorously pursued legislation that would establish a 1,500 annual quota for Mexican immigrants. But the AFL failed to build a broad coalition of support, and they faced insurmountable opposition from the House and Senate Immigration Committees that were dominated by southern and western legislators who favored European and Asian restrictions but welcomed Mexican labor migration (American Federation of Labor 1934). By 1938, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reported that illegal immigration from Mexico was soaring due to the construction of new highways and ‘‘automobile travel’’ (U.S. Department of Labor 1939, 95--96). At the start of World War II, southwestern growers and other business interests, joined by their legislative champions, complained to executive branch officials that war-induced labor shortages necessitated a new Mexican temporary worker program. In response, an interagency committee was formed to facilitate the importation of Mexican guestworkers. In 1942, the State Department negotiated a special agreement with Mexico establishing the Bracero Program that Congress

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New braceros receive registration packets for temporary employment in the United States in 1943. Immigrant workers from Mexico have long provided an agricultural workforce in the U.S. (Howard R. Rosenberg, ‘‘Snapshots in a Farm Labor Tradition,’’ Labor Management Decisions, Winter-Spring, 1993)

swiftly approved. Under the bilateral agreement, the U.S. pledged that wages, living conditions, workplace safety, and medical services would be comparable to those of native workers. In turn, the Mexican government was to supervise the recruitment and contracting of braceros (Altmeyer 1942). Once the Bracero Program began, neither employers nor federal administrators saw that the negotiated protections of Mexican laborers were honored. Mexican braceros routinely received much lower wages than native workers and endured substandard living and working conditions. Contrary to the bilateral agreement, the INS permitted growers and other employers to directly recruit braceros at the border. If they resisted direct employer recruitment, one INS official recalled, ‘‘a good many members of Congress would be on the Service’s neck’’ (Calavita 1992, 32--35). Tellingly, the Bracero Program endured for almost two decades after the war ended. Guarded by a ‘‘cozy triangle’’ of agribusinesses, southern and western

congressional ‘‘committee barons,’’ and a lax immigration bureaucracy, roughly 4.2 million Mexican workers were imported under the Bracero Program. Unauthorized flows across the southern border also continued apace. During the early 1950s, influential restrictionist legislators such as Sen. Pat McCarren (R-Nev.) and Sen. James Eastland (D-Miss.) and Rep. Francis Walter (DPa.) fervently guarded stringent limits on Asian, African, and Southern and Eastern European immigration. The McCarren-Walter bill promised to maintain the national origins quota system. As in the past, the AFL pledged support for the national origins quotas, but it joined other labor organizations in expressing alarm that Mexican braceros and unauthorized migrants had ‘‘depressed wages and destroyed working conditions.’’ In 1951, the AFL proclaimed that the presence of hundreds of thousands of braceros coupled with an estimated 1.5 million undocumented aliens compromised

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Table 2. Unauthorized Migrants Apprehended and Deported, 1961--1980 YEAR

NUMBER

YEAR

NUMBER

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1961--1970

88,823 95,758 88,712 86,597 110,371 138,520 161,608 212,057 283,557 345,353 1,608,356

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1971--1980

420,126 505,949 655,968 788,145 766,600 875,915 1,046,215 1,057,977 1,076,418 910,361 11,883,328

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990).

the ‘‘security’’ of American workers. Their appeal had no impact on the policy process. McCarren and Eastland shepherded passage of Public Law 78 reauthorizing the Bracero Program in 1951, claiming that termination would be ‘‘unfair to the farmer and the Mexican involved’’ (Reimers 1992, 54). During floor action on the McCarren-Walter bill one year later, liberal Sen. Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) proposed legal sanctions against those who illegally smuggled aliens into the country and on employers who intentionally hired illegal aliens. McCarran and Eastland successfully defeated the amendment; however, the final legislation contained language that made it unlawful to transport or harbor illegal aliens, and stipulated that ‘‘harboring’’ did not include employment of unauthorized migrants (Reimers 1992, 54). This ‘‘Texas proviso,’’ as it later became known, highlighted the lengths to which many key congressional defenders of national origins quotas were willing to go to preserve Mexican labor flows, both legal and illegal. After the 1960 election, the American Federation of Labor--Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) lobbied hard for the Bracero Program’s termination. The Kennedy administration and Democratic leadership in Congress lent their support to the effort. Yet growers and other business interests exerted considerable pressure of their own on members of Congress. The American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cotton Council, the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, the National Beet Growers, ranchers, and other business interests rallied to save the Bracero Program. In 1961, these pressure groups won a two-year extension of the program but failed to win reauthorization in 1963 despite vigorous lobbying. Sweeping immigration reform in 1965 dismantled national origins quota in favor of a new preference system that emphasized family-based immigration, but it also placed a 120,000

annual ceiling on Western Hemisphere visas (Calavita 1992, 163--169; Gonzalez 1996). Reformers did not anticipate that this new ceiling and the end of the Bracero Program would swell unauthorized Mexican inflows.

Illegal Immigration and Employer Sanctions: the 1970s Logjam The issue of illegal immigration inspired more media attention, public concern, and remedial proposals by policy makers than did any other migratory issue of the 1970s. The dramatic rise in apprehensions and deportations of unauthorized migrants was unmistakable and troubling to decision makers (see table 2). Liberal Democrats led the assault on illegal immigration. At Senate hearings on the problem in 1969, Sen. Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) warned that if the federal government did not ‘‘stop that hemorrhaging . . . along the Texas border and along the California border,’’ labor protections and antipoverty programs would be compromised (Reimers 1992, 202). A year earlier, Cesar Chavez and his Farm Workers Association (FWA) desperately urged Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.) to pressure INS officials ‘‘to remove Wetbacks . . . who are being recruited to break our strike’’ (Chavez 1968). In 1971, Rep. Peter Rodino (D-N.J.), chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Immigration, led prolabor liberals in the pursuit of employer sanctions legislation to resolve the perceived illegal immigration crisis (Biemiller 1972, 1973a, 1973b). Rodino’s employer sanctions legislation initially passed the House in 1972 but languished in the Senate where Eastland refused to allow the Judiciary Committee he chaired to take action (see, for example, the New York Times, December 31, 1974). When Rodino reintroduced his bill a year later, new resistance emerged in the

406 Domestic Policy House from fellow Democrats who warned that the measure would lead to job discrimination against Latinos, Asians, and anyone who looked or sounded foreign (Congressional Record 1972, 30164, 30182-30183).2 Amid the legislative impasse, President Gerald Ford established a Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Immigration that urged in 1976 that the administration ‘‘aggressively pursue legislation [imposing] penalties for employers who knowingly hire aliens not authorized to work’’ (Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Immigration 1976, 241). Its report observed that little reliable, ‘‘quantified’’ evidence existed regarding the size of the unauthorized population or its impact on American society. But in explaining why illegal immigration must be discouraged, it appealed to values beyond traditional economic and cultural anxieties. Indeed, it placed special emphasis on the rule of law and equal rights: ‘‘People who are underground . . . cannot be protected from abuse on the job or from landlords, discrimination, disease, or crime; they may avoid education for children, and they are unable or reluctant to assert political or legal rights’’ (Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Immigration 1976, 212-214). This was not the familiar assault on illegal aliens who take American jobs, consume public benefits, and promote crime and disease. Illegal immigration’s dangers lay not only with its disregard for the rule of law, its fiscal burdens, or its economic impact on poor citizens, but also with its propensity to create ‘‘a substantial underclass’’ anathema to post-1960s notions of nondiscrimination and equal rights. The report also cautioned against a vigorous internal enforcement campaigns that targeted the unauthorized population for removal. ‘‘Mass deportation is both inhumane and impractical,’’ the Domestic Council concluded. Ford’s INS director, Leonard Chapman, reiterated this view when he warned Congress that mass deportation campaigns might require ‘‘police state’’ tactics ‘‘abhorrent to the American conscience’’ (‘‘Illegal Aliens’’ 1975, 34--35). It remained silent, however, on how policy makers should deal with the large number of undocumented aliens residing in the country. In 1977, the Carter White House wasted little time in proposing a comprehensive plan for addressing illegal immigration. The reform package included stiff civil and criminal penalties who engaged in a ‘‘pattern or practice’’ of hiring undocumented aliens; use of the Social Security card as an identification document for verifying employee eligibility; enhanced Border Patrol forces at the Mexican border; and an amnesty program that would confer legal resident alien status on all

aliens living in the country before 1970 (White House Statement 1977). The White House proposal galvanized opposition from growers and other free market expansionists as unfair to employers; from the National Council of La Raza, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and various cosmopolitans as detrimental to civil rights; and from law and order conservatives and classic restrictionists as rewarding law-breakers with amnesty (‘‘Memorandum to Interested Parties’’ 1977). With immigration reform mired in conflict, a bipartisan Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) was formed for the purpose of studying the controversial illegal immigration problem and all other facets of U.S. immigration and refugee policy and issuing recommendations for future reform.

SCIRP and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 The SCIRP completed a sweeping final report in 1981 that portrayed ‘‘lawful immigration’’ as ‘‘a positive force in American life,’’ serving the national interest in terms of economic growth and productivity, reuniting families, and advancing key foreign policy imperatives (SCIRP 1980, 34). But it also concluded that illegal immigration was an urgent problem that needed to be controlled before legal immigration could be expanded. In language similar to Ford’s Domestic Council, the SCIRP noted that unauthorized entries created a vulnerable shadow population that had few incentives to report crimes, health problems, or exploitation by employers. The presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens ‘‘undercut the principle that all who live and work in the U.S., regardless of ethnicity, should have fundamental rights’’ (Fuchs 1990, 252). The SCIRP members also asserted that unrestrained illegal immigration encouraged a perilous disregard for the rule of law: ‘‘illegality erodes confidence in the law generally, and immigration law specifically’’ (SCIRP 1980, 34). To address the problem, the SCIRP endorsed the familiar scheme of enhanced Border Patrol resources and employer sanctions. But it also underscored the notion that the efficacy of sanctions hinged on faithful enforcement and the development of a tamper-resistant national identification card as the linchpin of a security and universal system of employee eligibility. All 16 commissioners also agreed on a generous legalization program for undocumented aliens already residing in the country (New York Times, August 24, 1981). Two young lawmakers---Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.), who served on the SCIRP, and Rep. Romano

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue

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House Senate conferees meet at the start of their first session on the immigration reform bill on Capitol Hill, September 13, 1984. From left are, Sen. Edward Kennedy, Sen. Alan Simpson, Rep. Romano Mazzoli, Rep. Hamilton Fish, and Rep. Peter Rodino. (AP Photo/Ira Schwarz)

Mazzoli (D-Ky.), a moderate with ties to the SCIRP chair Father Theodore Hesburgh---took the lead in pressing for immigration reform. Early in 1982, the pair introduced omnibus legislation on illegal and legal immigration. The measure met fierce resistance from a broad coalition of business interests (the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, agribusinesses, and the Business Roundtable), ethnic and civil rights groups such as National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), religious lobbies, and a new immigrant rights organization, the National Immigration Forum. LeftRight opposition to the Simpson-Mazzoli initiative was reflected in the resistance of both the Reagan administration, which saw employer sanctions and national identification cards working at cross-purposes with its regulatory relief agenda, and House Democrats led by the Hispanic and Black Caucuses, which raised familiar concerns about discriminatory impacts of sanctions and other provisions. Gridlock was overcome only after

three more years of wrangling, and the resulting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) depended on a compromise package with watereddown employer sanctions provisions, legalization for undocumented aliens living in the country since 1982, and a new Seasonal Agricultural Worker program to appease grower interests. The measure proved highly successful in granting legal status to nearly 3 million undocumented aliens, but employer sanctions proved to be a ‘‘toothless tiger.’’ This was largely by design: In the absence of a reliable identification system for verifying employee eligibility, which the SCIRP described as a linchpin for effective enforcement, the employer sanctions provisions lacked teeth. By the late 1980s, it was clear to national policy makers that the IRCA had done virtually nothing to discourage illegal immigration. But legislators were eager to shift their attention to the politically painless task of expanding legal immigration. The Immigration Act of 1990 unified cosmopolitans and free market expansionists behind a 40 percent increase in annual visa allocations that

408 Domestic Policy benefited both family-based and employment-based immigration.3 The Faustian bargains of the 1980s, like their forbears, left the nettlesome problems posed by massive illegal immigration for a future generation to resolve.

Bedeviled Enforcement During the first century of the U.S. republic, the federal government was mostly a reluctant regulator of immigration. Indeed, it was content to devolve responsibility for inspecting newcomers to the major receiving states and port cities. The development of national governmental capacities to enforce immigration law was initiated only after the federal courts invalidated the constitutionality of state-level controls. From the time the national government began directly regulating immigration in the late-19th-century, enforcement efforts focused almost exclusively on European and Asian inflows. Whereas federal inspection stations could be found at nearly every major American port of entry by the turn of the century, efforts to control the country’s land borders were negligible. This contrast was not lost on the nation’s first commissioner general of immigration. In the Immigration Bureau’s 1903 annual report, he warned that the Canadian and Mexican borders were largely unmonitored (U.S. Bureau of Immigration 1904, 105). Only a handful of inspection stations with skeletal staffs were scattered along national land borders. By 1906, Bureau managers lamented that the 75 inspectors patrolling the 1,900-mile Mexican border on horseback were unable to curtail illegal immigration, which it described as ‘‘constantly on the increase’’ (Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1980, 14). They regularly complained in the early 20th century about a ‘‘lack of funds, men, and facilities’’ at the border (Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1980, 21). Even as nativist political actors were building a strong legal foundation for restricting Asian and new European immigration during World War I and the 1920s, they had nagging fears that their policy aims would be compromised in the administrative realm. In particular, the IRL and other advocacy groups worried that lax enforcement by the Immigration Bureau may provide openings for European arrivals at immigration stations like Ellis Island. For these reasons, restrictionist groups pressed for innovations in bureaucratic structure and practices that were equal to their legislative breakthroughs in 1917, 1921, 1924, and 1928. What ultimately emerged in the years that followed was a two-tiered system of immigration law enforcement. One layer of immigration control was administered by

new State Department agencies and consular officials who zealously employed broad exclusionary powers overseas to all but shut down European and Asian immigration. A second layer of administered by the Immigration Bureau (later INS) focused on Western Hemisphere immigration and was ultimately dominated by powerful southern and western business interests and congressional committee barons who promoted legal and illegal entry of low-wage Mexican workers. This bifurcated regulatory system governing immigration was at once draconian toward overseas immigrants (with fateful implications for Jewish refugees seeking to escape the Holocaust) and strikingly tolerant toward the flow of temporary workers across the nation’s southern border (Tichenor 2002, ch. 6). When Congress consolidated consular inspection procedures and visa requirements in 1924 to ensure stringent enforcement of national origins quotas overseas, the Immigration Bureau continued to struggle for adequate resources to guard the Canadian and Mexican borders. ‘‘It must be conceded that the present law was enacted primarily for the purpose of providing for the closer inspection of aliens coming to the seaports of the United States,’’ U.S. immigration commissioner John Clark stated plainly. ‘‘When we come to consider the dangers of unlawful invasion along the land boundaries, however, we find our law conspicuously weak, and almost totally inadequate to protect the interests of our Government’’ (Clark). Congress later established the Border Patrol, but largely in response to Labor Department warnings that inadmissible Asians and Europeans were flocking to Mexico and Canada ‘‘to gain admission by stealth’’ (U.S. Department of Labor 1923, 13). The Border Patrol was significantly understaffed from the start, and by 1928, Immigration Bureau officials warned lawmakers that ‘‘we have simply got to have the men or else we cannot enforce the law’’ (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration 1928, 3). The plea for resources from overwhelmed Border Patrol and Immigration Bureau officers would be a familiar refrain over time. During the decades that the Bracero Program was in full swing, INS officials were not encouraged to confront employers who recruited temporary workers at the border. Moreover, the INS also felt considerable congressional and interest-group pressure to accommodate illegal Mexican immigration during the 1940s and 1950s. The INS avoided search and deportation procedures against illegal aliens during harvest seasons because ‘‘it could likely result in a loss of crops.’’ One Texas farm group explained enforcement arrangements to Sen. Thomas Connally (D-Tex.) this way:

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue For a number of years, citizens of Mexico entered the United States both legally and illegally, engaging in agricultural work. . . . While from time to time they have been picked up by the Border Patrol, there has been a tendency on the part of the Border Patrol to concentrate their efforts on deporting only those who were bad . . . This arrangement, although it didn’t have the stamp of legislative approval, has worked out very nicely for our farmers down here (Calavita 1992, 35). Strict enforcement was reserved principally for those Mexican workers who attempted to organize fellow laborers in pursuit of better wages, housing, or working conditions. The alliance of agricultural growers, southern and western committee barons, and INS officials permitted the easy flow of Mexican labor immigration for most of the postwar era. A more contemporary illustration of this tradition of lax enforcement can be seen in the implementation of the IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions. As stated above, the absence of a reliable identification system for verifying employee eligibility made it relatively easy for undocumented aliens to evade detection at the workplace. Soon after passage of the IRCA, an underground industry of fraudulent documents flourished in both Mexico and the United States, enabling unauthorized migrants to obtain work with ease. But if the legislative design of employer sanctions discouraged their efficacy, the Reagan administration was less than zealous in their enforcement. The INS tended to enforce employer sanctions with considerable forbearance toward offenders. Alan Nelson, the INS commissioner under Reagan, was urged to pursue a policy of ‘‘least employer resistance’’ by stressing business education over penalties (Anonymous 1996; see also U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 1994, 95). The IRCA authorized a 70 percent increase in the INS budget, with an annual $100 million targeted for employer sanctions enforcement. Tellingly, $34 million was spent on enforcing sanctions in fiscal year 1987, $59 million in fiscal year 1988, and less than $30 million annually in ensuing years (Anonymous 1996; see also U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 1994, 95). From his perch on the Senate immigration subcommittee, Senator Simpson pressed the Reagan and Bush administrations to take a harder line on employer sanctions. Yet despite his clout as Republican minority whip, Simpson made little headway during either Republican presidency. ‘‘Even when we direct the Administration to do such things as ‘study’ the employer sanctions verification system and develop a more

409

secure system, if necessary, we get no action,’’ he lamented (Simpson 1991). Few of Simpson’s congressional colleagues shared his disquietude over the inefficacy or uneven enforcement of employer sanctions. In fact, the most vigorous oversight of sanctions focused on whether they should be repealed because they unfavorably burdened small businesses (led by Orrin Hatch) or because they engendered increased job discrimination against legal aliens or citizens who look or sound foreign (led by Edward Kennedy). Few conservative politicians of the 1980s, most of whom embraced ‘‘regulatory relief’’ and free markets, or their liberal counterparts, dedicated to universal rights and inclusion, worried about the efficacy of employer sanctions. For most of the 20th century, enforcement at both the national borders and the workplace was hindered by powerful economic and political interests and by a poorly funded, overburdened, and often compromised immigration bureaucracy. Students of U.S. immigration policy often focus their attention on the formulation and achievement of major reform legislation. To adequately explain the development of America’s illegal immigration dilemma, however, we would do well to remember that the devil has often been in the details of enforcement.

Two Pillars of Expansive Immigrant Admissions and Rights To the chagrin of nativist groups like the KnowNothings and the American Protective Association, the federal government for most of the 19th century alternated between maintaining a laissez-faire approach toward the record numbers of European immigrants streaming into the country or actively recruiting them. Along with welcoming robust European admissions, white male arrivals quickly gained access to most of the same civil and political rights as citizens. These expansive de facto policies rested upon two pillars: the allure of immigrant labor and the perceived clout of new immigrant voters and kindred ethnics. The United States was built on immigrant labor, and its enduring appeal can be traced back to the nation’s founding when Madison ended constitutional debate over foreign-born rights by noting that those states that encouraged European immigration with easy admission and swift acquisition of membership were the most advanced in wealth, territory, and the arts (Madison 1966, 418--422). Decades later, Lincoln’s Republican administration saw mass European immigration as critical to national economic development. The Homestead Act of 1862

410 Domestic Policy offered 160 acres of land free to citizens and aliens who worked it for at least five years. The stated purpose of the legislation was not to encourage European immigration, but Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase and Secretary of State William Seward saw it as a means of doing just that. With Lincoln’s blessing, Seward instructed U.S. consular officials in Europe to distribute government-published pamphlets hyping the opportunities promised to newcomers under the Homestead Act. The U.S. consuls also hired full-time agents to recruit ‘‘industrious’’ European men. The federal government was hardly alone in this venture. While Western states and territories continued to employ their own immigration agents and publicity campaigns to induce European inflows, railroad companies sent agents to Germany to recruit farmers to develop vast railroad lands (Lonn 1952, 420; Erickson 1957, 8). In 1864, Lincoln urged Congress to adopt other measures for attracting immigration to redress ‘‘a great deficiency of laborers,’’ and lawmakers obliged with legislation that authorized immigrant labor contracts enabling prospective European arrivals to contract their labor for one year in exchange for free transportation to the U.S. As a congressional committee concluded one year after the law was put into effect, ‘‘the advantages which have accrued heretofore from immigration can scarcely be computed’’ (Congressional Globe, 1--2; Davie 1936, 82). The nation’s insatiable appetite for low-wage labor obviously lies at the heart of its Faustian bargains over illegal immigration during the past century. When Asian migration to the Pacific Coast and mountain states slowed in the early 20th century, employers in these regions increasingly turned to Mexican workers to help with farming, mining, construction, and clearing land. They arrived at a time when the southwestern economy was undergoing significant development, as new irrigation technology and refrigerated train cars enabled growers to shift from grain crops to far more profitable fruit and vegetable harvests. Mexican migrant labor also played a key role in building an infrastructure of railroads across the Southwest that further spurred the regional economic boom. Growers and other employers reveled over the cheap wages and high productivity of Mexican workers, who in turn were drawn to the region by the magnet of jobs (Reisler 1976, ch. 1--3). The die was cast. Low-wage migrant labor remains for American political and business leaders an irresistible benefit of porous borders and expansive immigrant admissions. Little wonder that temporary worker programs are a prominent component of most immigration reform proposals today.

If cheap and flexible immigrant labor has always stood as a pillar supporting expansive policies, the political mobilization of newcomers had negligible impact on immigration policy making for most of the 20th century. Of course, from the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 through the Gilded Age, broad immigration opportunities and easy acquisition of citizenship made white male newcomers an electoral force that political leaders had a compelling interest to win over. From its inception, the Democratic Party pledged to protect generous terms of European immigrant admission and foreign-born rights. The mass-based party organizations that first emerged during the Jacksonian era worked hard to enfranchise and earn the loyalties of European arrivals; many states and territories even established voting rights for white male aliens. An 1845 congressional investigation found that urban Democratic Party machines were well practiced at naturalizing thousands of immigrants on the eve of elections. Anti-Catholic nativists like Samuel Morse bitterly criticized the nation’s founding generation for establishing easy naturalization and broad political rights for white male newcomers on a nonsectarian basis. ‘‘How is it possible,’’ he demanded, ‘‘that so vital a point as the ballot box was not constitutionally surrounded with double, ay, with treble guards?’’ Early restrictionists understood clearly that the enfranchisement of immigrants made them a political force, facilitating alliances with party politicians who supported mass European immigration and the federal government’s laissez-faire response. Even the Democrats’ fiercest competitors wavered between conciliating nativist or immigrant voters. Like Hamiltonian Federalists before them, many Whigs came to the conclusion that it was not in their interest to antagonize significant immigrant voting blocs by embracing xenophobic causes. Mindful of the political clout of European newcomers, Whig President John Tyler publicly extended ‘‘to the peoples of other countries an invitation to come and settle among us as members of our rapidly growing family.’’ The fact that Whigs lost presidential elections in which they openly courted anti-immigrant votes, as was the case with Henry Clay’s 1844 defeat, was not lost on national party leaders who tended to distance themselves from nativist goals. Republican leaders, already enamored by the economic benefits of European immigration, also came to avoid nativist positions that cost them votes (vividly illustrated by the purge of APA activists from the Grand Old Party [GOP] in 1896). In short, immigrant enfranchisement and mass-based party competition fortified national policies that solidified robust European immigrant admissions and rights.

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue During the first decades of the 20th century, the linkage between immigrant votes and national immigration policy was trumped by national security imperatives, faith in scientific government, and the ascendance of new racial hierarchies. During the mid1990s, several reforms designed to scale back alien rights reinvigorated immigrant electoral clout that had been dormant in American political life since the Progressive Era. In California, local restrictionists advanced Proposition 187 to deny unauthorized migrants and their children welfare benefits, health care, and public education. Republican Gov. Pete Wilson and the state GOP threw their support behind the measure during the 1994 campaign, transforming it into a partisan issue. Proposition 187 carried the state with 59 percent of the vote. For the first time since 1952, Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress in 1995, and new immigration subcommittee leadership and a special task force on immigration reform chaired by California Republican Elton Gallegly called for restrictive policy challenges. Their agenda included new crackdowns on criminal aliens and illegal immigration, denial of welfare benefits to immigrants, and imposition of new limits on legal admissions. The first two of these goals were secured in 1996 with passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA). Efforts to reduce legal immigration were defeated in the Senate by a cross-party alliance of cosmopolitans and free market expansionists. In 1995, several prominent Republican congressional leaders expressed optimism behind closed doors that the immigration issue would cost Democrats some important blue-collar votes. At the start of the 1996 election, Pete Wilson made immigration control the defining issue of his short-lived presidential campaign; Pat Buchanan assailed developing world immigration as a source of economic and cultural insecurity at home; and Bob Dole, the eventual Republican standard-bearer, associated himself with the stringent immigrant measures then working their way through Congress. The 1996 Republican platform pledged support for national legislation barring children of undocumented aliens from public schools. In the later stages of the campaign, however, Dole and other Republican candidates took heed of new reports that immigrants and kindred ethnic groups had become energized by political restrictionism. But it was too late for backpedaling. The results of the 1996 election left little doubt about two crucial developments: immigrants made up

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the nation’s fastest-growing voting bloc and Democrats were the immediate beneficiaries of their unanticipated electoral clout. Naturalization rates soared after 1995, as record numbers of aliens became citizens. More than 1 million people naturalized in 1996 alone. At the same time as unprecedented numbers of aliens petitioned for naturalization in the mid-1990s, President Clinton instructed the INS to implement the so-called Citizenship USA initiative. In the words of the agency, the initiative ‘‘was designed to streamline the naturalization process and greatly increase naturalizations during 1996.’’ Voter registrations among Latinos grew by 1.3 million, or 28.7 percent, between 1992 and 1996; the percentage of Latinos on the voter rolls rose from 59 percent of those eligible in 1992 to 65 percent in 1996. The Latino Democratic vote increased from 60 percent in the 1992 presidential election to 72 percent in 1996. Asian voters, a smaller yet important swing bloc, increased their support for the Democratic ticket in the same years from 29 to 43 percent. Dole became the first Republican presidential candidate to lose Florida since Gerald Ford in 1980. By the 2000 election, Republican national and state organizations drew up plans to attract new Asian and Latino voters. They were emboldened by party strategists who warned that ‘‘if we’re only getting 25 percent of the Hispanic vote, you wait three, four presidential elections, and we’ll be out of business.’’ Then--Texas governor George W. Bush was hailed by party leaders as the ideal candidate to court new immigrant voters in 2000, and he reminded Latinos throughout the campaign that early on he had ‘‘rejected the spirit of Prop 187,’’ opposed ‘‘English-only’’ proposals, and refused ‘‘to bash immigrants’’ when it was popular. For his part, Vice President Al Gore assured immigrant voters of Democratic plans to restore access to welfare protections stripped away by a Republican Congress in 1996 and vowed to defend expansive legal immigration. The grassroots restrictionist movement that galvanized policy makers in the early 1990s reawakened an expansionist politics rooted in immigrant enfranchisement and competitive democratic elections. Ironically, several important anti-immigrant measures fueled this revival. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 introduced changes in the nation’s naturalization laws that, more than 150 years after the first naturalization rules were adopted, made nonwhite newcomers eligible for full membership in the American polity. Four decades later, Proposition 187, IIRIRA, and welfare reform motivated record numbers of new immigrants and kindred ethnics to make the most of their naturalization opportunities and voting rights. The unintended consequences of

412 Domestic Policy immigrant labor and votes. ‘‘History is a guide to navigation in perilous times,’’ the historian David McCullough has observed. ‘‘History is who we are and why we are they way we are.’’ We might add that the past powerfully structures our contemporary political debates and policy challenges.

References and Further Reading

A supporter of Republican presidential hopeful George W. Bush holds a sign during the candidates’ stop in Long Beach, California, on March 6, 2000. (David McNew/Getty Images)

these restrictive laws is a new generation of foreignborn voters, who, like European newcomers more than a century before, have created fresh electoral incentives for national politicians to guard expansive immigration policies.

Conclusion America’s illegal immigration dilemma did not appear overnight. Its origins and development have played out over the past century, yielding patterns and legacies that inform official efforts to address the problem today. Our contemporary struggles with both porous borders and the presence of millions of unauthorized migrants unmistakably reflect the distinctive ideological camps that have taken shape in U.S. immigration reform politics over time, the odd alliances and Faustian bargains they have struck, a checkered history of lax enforcement, and the irresistible power of

Altmeyer, Arthur. 1942. Executive director of the War Manpower Commission, to Claude Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, Memo on Proposed Agreement for the Importation of Mexican Workers, July 29, 1942, Folder 26 on Mexican Labor. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation Papers, George Meany Archives, Silver Spring, MD. American Federation of Labor. 1934. Proceedings of the Annual Convention. George Meany Archives, Silver Spring, MD. Anonymous. 1996. Author’s interviews with Reagan administration officials. Biemiller, Andrew. 1972. Biemiller to Peter Rodino, September 8. Papers of the Legislation Department of the AFL-CIO, Box 71, Folder No. 28, George Meany Archives. Biemiller, Andrew. 1973a. Biemiller to Rodino, March 23. Papers of the Legislation Department of the AFL-CIO, Box 71, Folder No. 28, George Meany Archives. Biemiller, Andrew. 1973b. Rodino to Biemiller, May 15. Papers of the Legislation Department of the AFL-CIO, Box 71, Folder No. 28, George Meany Archives. Bookbinder, Hyman. 1960. ‘‘The World’s Refugees---A Challenge to America,’’ March 30. Papers of the AFL, Box 27, Folder 28. AFL-CIO Department of Legislation Papers, George Meany Archives, Silver Spring, MD. Calavita, Kitty. 1992. Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS. New York: Routledge, 1992. Carnegie, Andrew. 1887. Triumphant Democracy. New York. Chavez, Cesar. 1968. Chavez to Robert F. Kennedy, Western Union Telegram, August 11. Robert F. Kennedy Papers, Container No. 71, Senate Legislative Subject Files. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Clark, John. n.d. U.S. Commissioner of Immigration, ‘‘Surreptitious Entry of Aliens.’’ Record Group 233, Box No. 487, National Archives. Congressional Globe. 38th Congress, 1st Session, app., pp. 1--2. Congressional Record. 1972. September 12, 30164, 30182--83. Cook, Adrian. 1974. The Armies of the Streets. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Cornelius, Wayne A., Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. 2004. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Davie, Maurice. 1936. World Immigration. New York: Macmillan. Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Immigration. 1976. Preliminary Report, December. Gonzalez, Rep. Henry B. 1996. Author’s interview, March. Erickson, C. 1957. American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860--1885. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Illegal Immigration and American Politics: Past as Prologue Hamilton, Alexander. 1957. Papers on Public Credit, Commerce and Finance. Edited by Samuel McKee. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Huntington, Samuel. 2004. Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster. ‘‘Illegal Aliens.’’ 1975. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, February 4, 26. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1990. Statistical Yearbook. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Immigration Restriction League. 1928. Executive Committee Bulletin No. 12, June 1. Immigration Restriction League Papers. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Jordan, Barbara. 1995. ‘‘Testimony Before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies,’’ March 29. Kohler, Max. n.d. Undated Notes, Max Kohler Papers, Box 5, Immigration Notes Folder. American Jewish Historical Society, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, Lloyd, Demarest. 1928. Lloyd to Joseph Lee, May 17. Joseph Lee Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. Lonn, Ella. 1952. Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Madison, James. 1966. Notes of Debates in the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. Athens: Ohio University Press. Marshall, T. H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. ‘‘Memorandum to Interested Parties from the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund: Statement of Position Regarding the Administration’s Undocumented Alien Legislation Proposal.’’ 1977. Papers of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Container No. 23, November 11, ‘‘Issues: Alien Civil Rights’’ Folder. National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. Mission Statement. Available at www.nnirr.org/about/ about_miision.html. New York Times. August 24, 1981. New York Times. December 31, 1974.

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Reimers, David. 1992. Still the Golden Door. New York: Columbia University Press. Reisler, Mark. 1976. By the Sweat of Their Brow. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 1980. History of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print, December. SCIRP. 1980. Transcript of meeting, May 7. Record Group 240, Box 26, National Archives. Simpson, Alan. 1991. Simpson to Lawrence Fuchs, January 24. Correspondence Files of Lawrence Fuchs (made available to the author by Fuchs). Tichenor, Daniel J. 2002. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. 1994. U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor. 1923. Fiscal Year 1922 Annual Report Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor. 1939. 26th Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1938. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration. 1904. Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration. 1928. Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Ward, Robert. 1928/ Ward to Joseph Lee, May 17. Joseph Lee Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. White House Statement. 1977. Patricia Roberts Harris Papers, August 4.

Notes 1. The views of both of these labor leaders are discussed extensively in Tichenor’s Dividing Lines (2002, ch. 5). 2. National Council of La Raza documents were made available to the author by the national office of the LR. 3. The arduous path to the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation in 1986 is discussed in depth in Tichenor’s Dividing Lines (2002, ch. 9).

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problems as these: To what extent can competence displace pauperism? How nearly can we free ourselves from the low-minded and the vicious, not by their expatriation, but by their elevation? To what extent can the resources and powers of Nature be converted into human welfare, the peaceful arts of life be advanced, and the vast treasures of human talent and genius be developed? How much of suffering, in all its forms, can be relieved? or, what is better than relief, how much can be prevented? Cannot the classes of crimes be lessened, and the number of criminals in each class be diminished? . . . Now two or three things will doubtless be admitted to be true, beyond all controversy, in regard to Massachusetts. By its industrial condition, and its business operations, it is exposed, far beyond any other State in the Union, to the fatal extremes of overgrown wealth and desperate poverty. Its population is far more dense than that of any other State. It is four or five times more dense than the average of all theother States taken together; and density of population has always been one of the proximate causes of social inequality. According to population and territorial extent there is far more capital in Massachusetts--capital which is movable, and instantaneously available---than in any other State in the Union; and probably both these qualifications respecting population and territory could be omitted without endangering the truth of the assertion. . . . Now surely nothing but universal education can counterwork this tendency to the domination of capital

7.1 Horace Mann, On Education and National Welfare, 1848 Twelfth Annual Report of Horace Mann as Secretary of Massachusetts State Board of Education . . . A cardinal object which the government of Massachusetts, and all the influential men in the State, should propose to themselves, is the physical wellbeing of all the people,---the sufficiency, comfort, competence, of every individual in regard to food, raiment, and shelter. And these necessaries and conveniences of life should be obtained by each individual for himself, or by each family for themselves, rather than accepted from the hand of charity or extorted by poor laws. It is not averred that this most desirable result can, in all instances, be obtained; but it is, nevertheless, the end to be aimed at. True statesmanship and true political economy, not less than true philanthropy, present this perfect theory as the goal, to be more and more closely approximated by our imperfect practice. The desire to achieve such a result cannot be regarded as an unreasonable ambition; for, though all mankind were well fed, well clothed, and well housed, they might still be half civilized. . . . Our ambition as a State should trace itself to a different origin, and propose to itself a different object. Its flame should be lighted at the skies. Its radiance and its warmth should reach the darkest and the coldest of abodes of men. It should seek the solution of such 415

416 Domestic Policy and the servility of labor. If one class possesses all the wealth and the education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name the relation between them may be called: the latter, in fact and in truth, will be the servile dependents and subjects of the former. But, if education be equally diffused, it will draw property after it by the strongest of all attractions; for such a thing never did happen, and never can happen, as that an intelligent and practical body of men should be permanently poor. Property and labor in different classes are essentially antagonistic; but property and labor in the same class are essentially fraternal. The people of Massachusetts have, in some degree, appreciated the truth that the unexampled prosperity of the State---its comfort, its competence, its general intelligence and virtue---is attributable to the education, more or less perfect, which all its people have received; but are they sensible of a fact equally important,--namely, that it is to this same education that two-thirds of the people are indebted for not being to-day the vassals of as severe a tyranny, in the form of capital, as the lower classes of Europe are bound to in any form of brute force? Education then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is a great equalizer of the conditions of men,--the balance wheel of the social machinery. I do not here mean that it so elevates the moral nature as to make men disdain and abhor the oppression of their fellow men. This idea pertains to another of its attributes. But I mean that it gives each man the independence and the means by which he can resist the selfishness of other men. It does better than to disarm the poor of their hostility toward the rich: it prevents being poor. Agrarianism is the revenge of poverty against wealth. The wanton destruction of the property of others---the burning of hay-ricks, and corn-ricks, the demolition of machinery because it supersedes handlabor, the sprinkling of vitriol on rich dresses---is only agrarianism run mad. Education prevents both the revenge and the madness. On the other hand, a fellowfeeling for one’s class or caste is the common instinct of hearts not wholly sunk in selfish regard for a person or for a family. The spread of education, by enlarging the cultivated class or caste, will open a wider area over which the social feelings will expand; and, if this education should be universal and complete, it would do more than all things else to obliterate factitious distinctions in society. . . . For the creation of wealth, then,---for the existence of a wealthy people and a wealthy nation,---intelligence is the grand condition. The number of improvers will increase as the intellectual constituency, if I may so call

it, increases. In former times, and in most parts of the world even at the present day, not one man in a million has ever had such a development of mind as made it possible for him to become a contributor to art or science. . . . Let this development proceed, and contributions . . . of inestimable value, will be sure to follow. That political economy, therefore, which busies itself about capital and labor, supply and demand, interests and rents, favorable and unfavorable balances of trade, but leaves out of account the elements of a wide-spread mental development, is naught but stupendous folly. The greatest of all the arts in political economy is to change a consumer into a producer; and the next greatest is to increase the producing power,---and this to be directly obtained by increasing his intelligence. For mere delving, an ignorant man is but little better than a swine, whom he so much resembles in his appetites, and surpasses in his power of mischief. . . .

7.2 Theodore Roosevelt, On Americanism, 1915 . . . There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americanism. When I refer to hyphenated Americans, I do not refer to naturalized Americans. Some of the very best Americans I have ever known were naturalized Americans, Americans born abroad. But a hyphenated American is not an American at all. This is just as true of the man who puts ‘‘native’’ before the hyphen as of the man who puts German or Irish or English or French before the hyphen. Americanism is a matter of the spirit and of the soul. Our allegiance must be purely to the United States. We must unsparingly condemn any man who holds any other allegiance. But if he is heartily and singly loyal to this Republic, then no matter where he was born, he is just as good an American as any one else. The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities, an intricate knot of German-Americans, Irish-Americans, English-Americans, French-Americans, ScandinavianAmericans or Italian-Americans, each preserving its separate nationality, each at heart feeling more sympathy with Europeans of that nationality, than with the other citizens of the American Republic. The men who do not become Americans and nothing else are hyphenated Americans; and there ought to be no room for them in this country. The man who calls himself an American citizen and who yet shows by his actions that

7.2 Theodore Roosevelt, On Americanism he is primarily the citizen of a foreign land, plays a thoroughly mischievous part in the life of our body politic. He has no place here; and the sooner he returns to the land to which he feels his real heart-allegiance, the better it will be for every good American. There is no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American. The only man who is a good American is the man who is an American and nothing else. For an American citizen to vote as a German-American, an Irish-American, or an English-American, is to be a traitor to American institutions; and those hyphenated Americans who terrorize American politicians by threats of the foreign vote are engaged in treason to the American Republic.

Americanization The foreign-born population of this country must be an Americanized population---no other kind can fight the battles of America either in war or peace. It must talk the language of its native-born fellow-citizens, it must possess American citizenship and American ideals. It must stand firm by its oath of allegiance in word and deed and must show that in very fact it has renounced allegiance to every prince, potentate, or foreign government. It must be maintained on an American standard of living so as to prevent labor disturbances in important plants and at critical times. None of these objects can be secured as long as we have immigrant colonies, ghettos, and immigrant sections, and above all they cannot be assured so long as we consider the immigrant only as an industrial asset. The immigrant must not be allowed to drift or to be put at the mercy of the exploiter. Our object is to not to imitate one of the older racial types, but to maintain a new American type and then to secure loyalty to this type. We cannot secure such loyalty unless we make this a country where men shall feel that they have justice and also where they shall feel that they are required to perform the duties imposed upon them. The policy of ‘‘Let alone’’ which we have hitherto pursued is thoroughly vicious from two stand-points. By this policy we have permitted the immigrants, and too often the nativeborn laborers as well, to suffer injustice. Moreover, by this policy we have failed to impress upon the immigrant and upon the native-born as well that they are expected to do justice as well as to receive justice, that they are expected to be heartily and actively and single-mindedly loyal to the flag no less than to benefit by living under it. We cannot afford to continue to use hundreds of thousands of immigrants merely as industrial assets

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while they remain social outcasts and menaces any more than fifty years ago we could afford to keep the black man merely as an industrial asset and not as a human being. We cannot afford to build a big industrial plant and herd men and women about it without care for their welfare. We cannot afford to permit squalid overcrowding or the kind of living system which makes impossible the decencies and necessities of life. We cannot afford the low wage rates and the merely seasonal industries which mean the sacrifice of both individual and family life and morals to the industrial machinery. We cannot afford to leave American mines, munitions plants, and general resources in the hands of alien workmen, alien to America and even likely to be made hostile to America by machinations such as have recently been provided in the case of the two foreign embassies in Washington. We cannot afford to run the risk of having in time of war men working on our railways or working in our munition plants who would in the name of duty to their own foreign countries bring destruction to us. Recent events have shown us that incitements to sabotage and strikes are in the view of at least two of the great foreign powers of Europe within their definition of neutral practices. What would be done to us in the name of war if these things are done to us in the name of neutrality?

One America All of us, no matter from what land our parents came, no matter in what way we may severally worship our Creator, must stand shoulder to shoulder in a united America for the elimination of race and religious prejudice. We must stand for a reign of equal justice to both big and small. We must insist on the maintenance of the American standard of living. We must stand for an adequate national control which shall secure a better training of our young men in time of peace, both for the work of peace and for the work of war. We must direct every national resource, material and spiritual, to the task not of shirking difficulties, but of training our people to overcome difficulties. Our aim must be, not to make life easy and soft, not to soften soul and body, but to fit us in virile fashion to do a great work for all mankind. This great work can only be done by a mighty democracy, with these qualities of soul, guided by those qualities of mind, which will both make it refuse to do injustice to any other nation, and also enable it to hold its own against aggression by any other nation. In our relations with the outside world, we must abhor wrongdoing, and disdain to commit it, and we must no less disdain the baseness of spirit which lamely

418 Domestic Policy submits to wrongdoing. Finally and most important of all, we must strive for the establishment within our own borders of that stern and lofty standard of personal and public neutrality which shall guarantee to each man his rights, and which shall insist in return upon the full performance by each man of his duties both to his neighbor and to the great nation whose flag must symbolize in the future as it has symbolized in the past the highest hopes of all mankind. Source: Philip Davis, ed. Immigration and Americanization. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1920.

7.3 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message to the Congress on Social Security, January 17, 1935 To the Congress: IN ADDRESSING you on June 8, 1934, I summarized the main objectives of our American program. Among these was, and is, the security of the men, women, and children of the Nation against certain hazards and vicissitudes of life. This purpose is an essential part of our task. In my annual message to you I promised to submit a definite program of action. This I do in the form of a report to me by a Committee on Economic Security, appointed by me for the purpose of surveying the field and of recommending the basis of legislation. I am gratified with the work of this Committee and of those who have helped it: The Technical Board on Economic Security drawn from various departments of the Government, the Advisory Council on Economic Security, consisting of informed and public-spirited private citizens and a number of other advisory groups, including a committee on actuarial consultants, a medical advisory board, a dental advisory committee, a hospital advisory committee, a public health advisory committee, a child welfare committee and an advisory committee on employment relief. All of those who participated in this notable task of planning this major legislative proposal are ready and willing, at any time, to consult with and assist in any way the appropriate congressional committees and members, with respect to detailed aspects. It is my best judgment that this legislation should be brought forward with a minimum of delay. Federal action is necessary to, and conditioned upon, the action of States. Forty-four legislatures are meeting or will meet soon. In order that the necessary State action may

be taken promptly it is important that the Federal Government proceed speedily. The detailed report of the Committee sets forth a series of proposals that will appeal to the sound sense of the American people. It has not attempted the impossible, nor has it failed to exercise sound caution and consideration of all of the factors concerned: the national credit, the rights and responsibilities of States, the capacity of industry to assume financial responsibilities and the fundamental necessity of proceeding in a manner that will merit the enthusiastic support of citizens of all sorts. It is overwhelmingly important to avoid any danger of permanently discrediting the sound and necessary policy of Federal legislation for economic security by attempting to apply it on too ambitious a scale before actual experience has provided guidance for the permanently safe direction of such efforts. The place of such a fundamental in our future civilization is too precious to be jeopardized now by extravagant action. It is a sound idea---a sound ideal. Most of the other advanced countries of the world have already adopted it and their experience affords the knowledge that social insurance can be made a sound and workable project. Three principles should be observed in legislation on this subject. First, the system adopted, except for the money necessary to initiate it, should be self-sustaining in the sense that funds for the payment of insurance benefits should not come from the proceeds of general taxation. Second, excepting in old-age insurance, actual management should be left to the States subject to standards established by the Federal Government. Third, sound financial management of the funds and the reserves, and protection of the credit structure of the Nation should be assured by retaining Federal control over all funds through trustees in the Treasury of the United States. At this time, I recommend the following types of legislation looking to economic security:

1. Unemployment compensation. 2. Old-age benefits, including compulsory and voluntary annuities. 3. Federal aid to dependent children through grants to States for the support of existing mothers’ pension systems and for services for the protection and care of homeless, neglected, dependent, and crippled children. 4. Additional Federal aid to State and local publichealth agencies and the strengthening of the Federal Public Health Service. I am not at this time

7.4 Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address 419 recommending the adoption of so-called ‘‘health insurance,’’ although groups representing the medical profession are cooperating with the Federal Government in the further study of the subject and definite progress is being made. With respect to unemployment compensation, I have concluded that the most practical proposal is the levy of a uniform Federal payroll tax, 90 percent of which should be allowed as an offset to employers contributing under a compulsory State unemployment compensation act. The purpose of this is to afford a requirement of a reasonably uniform character for all States cooperating with the Federal Government and to promote and encourage the passage of unemployment compensation laws in the States. The 10 percent not thus offset should be used to cover the costs of Federal and State administration of this broad system. Thus, States will largely administer unemployment compensation, assisted and guided by the Federal Government. An unemployment compensation system should be constructed in such a way as to afford every practicable aid and incentive toward the larger purpose of employment stabilization. This can be helped by the intelligent planning of both public and private employment. It also can be helped by correlating the system with public employment so that a person who has exhausted his benefits may be eligible for some form of public work as is recommended in this report. Moreover, in order to encourage the stabilization of private employment, Federal legislation should not foreclose the States from establishing means for inducing industries to afford an even greater stabilization of employment. In the important field of security for our old people, it seems necessary to adopt three principles: First, noncontributory old-age pensions for those who are now too old to build up their own insurance. It is, of course, clear that for perhaps 30 years to come funds will have to be provided by the States and the Federal Government to meet these pensions. Second, compulsory contributory annuities which in time will establish a selfsupporting system for those now young and for future generations. Third, voluntary contributory annuities by which individual initiative can increase the annual amounts received in old age. It is proposed that the Federal Government assume one-half of the cost of the old-age pension plan, which ought ultimately to be supplanted by self-supporting annuity plans. The amount necessary at this time for the initiation of unemployment compensation, old-age security,

children’s aid, and the promotion of public health, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Economic Security, is approximately $100,000,000. The establishment of sound means toward a greater future economic security of the American people is dictated by a prudent consideration of the hazards involved in our national life. No one can guarantee this country against the dangers of future depressions but we can reduce these dangers. We can eliminate many of the factors that cause economic depressions, and we can provide the means of mitigating their results. This plan for economic security is at once a measure of prevention and a method of alleviation. We pay now for the dreadful consequence of economic insecurity---and dearly. This plan presents a more equitable and infinitely less expensive means of meeting these costs. We cannot afford to neglect the plain duty before us. I strongly recommend action to attain the objectives sought in this report.

7.4 Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address, January 5, 1949 Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress: I am happy to report to this 81st Congress that the state of the Union is good. Our Nation is better able than ever before to meet the needs of the American people, and to give them their fair chance in the pursuit of happiness. This great Republic is foremost among the nations of the world in the search for peace. During the last 16 years, our people have been creating a society which offers new opportunities for every man to enjoy his share of the good things of life. In this society, we are conservative about the values and principles which we cherish; but we are forward--looking in protecting those values and principles and in extending their benefits. We have rejected the discredited theory that the fortunes of the Nation should be in the hands of a privileged few. We have abandoned the ‘‘trickledown’’ concept of national prosperity. Instead, we believe that our economic system should rest on a democratic foundation and that wealth should be created for the benefit of all. The recent election shows that the people of the United States are in favor of this kind of society and want to go on improving it. The American people have decided that poverty is just as wasteful and just as unnecessary as preventable

420 Domestic Policy disease. We have pledged our common resources to help one another in the hazards and struggles of individual life. We believe that no unfair prejudice or artificial distinction should bar any citizen of the United States of America from an education, or from good health, or from a job that he is capable of performing. The attainment of this kind of society demands the best efforts of every citizen in every walk of life, and it imposes increasing responsibilities on the Government. The Government must work with industry, labor, and the farmers in keeping our economy running at full speed. The Government must see that every American has a chance to obtain his fair share of our increasing abundance. These responsibilities go hand in hand. We cannot maintain prosperity unless we have a fair distribution of opportunity and a widespread consumption of the products of our factories and farms. Our Government has undertaken to meet these responsibilities. We have made tremendous public investments in highways, hydroelectric power projects, soil conservation, and reclamation. We have established a system of social security. We have enacted laws protecting the rights and the welfare of our working people and the income of our farmers. These Federal policies have paid for themselves many times over. They have strengthened the material foundations of our democratic ideals. Without them, our present prosperity would be impossible. Reinforced by these policies, our private enterprise system has reached new heights of production. Since the boom year of 1929, while our population has increased by only 20 percent, our agricultural production has increased by 45 percent, and our industrial production has increased by 75 percent. We are turning out far more goods and more wealth per worker than we have ever done before. This progress has confounded the gloomy prophets---at home and abroad who predicted the downfall of American capitalism. The people of the United States, going their own way, confident in their own powers, have achieved the greatest prosperity the world has even seen. But, great as our progress has been, we still have a long way to go. As we look around the country, many of our shortcomings stand out in bold relief. We are suffering from excessively high prices. Our production is still not large enough to satisfy our demands. Our minimum wages are far too low.

Small business is losing ground to growing monopoly. Our farmers still face an uncertain future. And too many of them lack the benefits of our modern civilization. Some of our natural resources are still being wasted. We are acutely short of electric power, although the means for developing such power are abundant. Five million families are still living in slums and firetraps. Three million families share their homes with others. Our health is far behind the progress of medical science. Proper medical care is so expensive that it is out of the reach of the great majority of our citizens. Our schools, in many localities, are utterly inadequate. Our democratic ideals are often thwarted by prejudice and intolerance. Each of these shortcomings is also an opportunity--an opportunity for the Congress and the President to work for the good of the people. Our first great opportunity is to protect our economy against the evils of ‘‘boom and bust.’’ This objective cannot be attained by government alone. Indeed, the greater part of the task must be performed by individual efforts under our system of free enterprise. We can keep our present prosperity, and increase it, only if free enterprise and free government work together to that end. We cannot afford to float along ceaselessly on a postwar boom until it collapses. It is not enough merely to prepare to weather a recession if it comes. Instead, government and business must work together constantly to achieve more and more jobs and more and more production---which mean more and more prosperity for all the people. The business cycle is man---made; and men of good will, working together, can smooth it out. So far as business is concerned, it should plan for steady, vigorous expansion---seeking always to increase its output, lower its prices, and avoid the vices of monopoly and restriction. So long as business does this, it will be contributing to continued prosperity, and it will have the help and encouragement of the Government. The Employment Act of 1946 pledges the Government to use all its resources to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. This means that the Government is firmly committed to protect business and the people against the dangers of recession and against the evils of inflation. This means that the Government must adapt its plans and policies to meet changing circumstances.

7.4 Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address 421 At the present time, our prosperity is threatened by inflationary pressures at a number of critical points in our economy. And the Government must be in a position to take effective action at these danger spots. To that end, I recommend that the Congress enact legislation for the following purposes: First, to continue the power to control consumer credit and enlarge the power to control bank credit. Second, to grant authority to regulate speculation on the commodity exchanges. Third, to continue export control authority and to provide adequate machinery for its enforcement. Fourth, to continue the priorities and allocation authority in the field of transportation. Fifth, to authorize priorities and allocations for key materials in short supply. Sixth, to extend and strengthen rent control. Seventh, to provide standby authority to impose price ceilings for scarce commodities which basically affect essential industrial production or the cost of living, and to limit unjustified wage adjustments which would force a break in an established price ceiling. Eighth, to authorize an immediate study of the adequacy of production facilities for materials in critically short supply, such as steel; and, if found necessary, to authorize Government loans for the expansion of production facilities to relieve such shortages, and to authorize the construction of such facilities directly, if action by private industry fails to meet our needs. . . . The Wagner Act should be reenacted. However, certain improvements, which I recommended to the Congress 2 years ago, are needed. Jurisdictional strikes and unjustified secondary boycotts should be prohibited. The use of economic force to decide issues arising out of the interpretation of existing contracts should be prevented. Without endangering our democratic freedoms, means should be provided for setting up machinery for preventing strikes in vital industries which affect the public interest. The Department of Labor should be rebuilt and strengthened and those units properly belonging within that department should be placed in it. The health of our economy and its maintenance at high levels further require that the minimum wage fixed by law should be raised to at least 75 cents an hour. If our free enterprise economy is to be strong and healthy, we must reinvigorate the forces of competition. We must assure small business the freedom and opportunity to grow and prosper. To this purpose, we should strengthen our antitrust laws by closing those

loopholes that permit monopolistic mergers and consolidations. Our national farm program should be improved--not only in the interest of the farmers, but for the lasting prosperity of the whole Nation. Our goals should be abundant farm production and parity income for agriculture. Standards of living on the farm should be just as good as anywhere else in the country. . . . Our program for farm prosperity should also seek to expand the domestic market for agricultural products, particularly among low---income groups, and to increase and stabilize foreign markets. We should give special attention to extending modern conveniences and services to our farms. Rural electrification should be pushed forward. And in considering legislation relating to housing, education, health, and social security, special attention should be given to rural problems. . . . The Government has still other opportunities---to help raise the standard of living of our citizens. These opportunities lie in the fields of social security, health, education, housing, and civil rights. The present coverage of the social security laws is altogether inadequate; the benefit payments are too low. One---third of our workers are not covered. Those who receive old---age and survivors insurance benefits receive an average payment of only $25 a month. Many others who cannot work because they are physically disabled are left to the mercy of charity. We should expand our social security program, both as to the size of the benefits and the extent of coverage, against the economic hazards due to unemployment, old age, sickness, and disability. We must spare no effort to raise the general level of health in this country. In a nation as rich as ours, it is a shocking fact that tens of millions lack adequate medical care. We are short of doctors, hospitals, nurses. We must remedy these shortages. Moreover, we need---and we must have without further delay---a system of prepaid medical insurance which will enable every American to afford good medical care. It is equally shocking that millions of our children are not receiving a good education. Millions of them are in overcrowded, obsolete buildings. We are short of teachers, because teachers’ salaries are too low to attract new teachers, or to hold the ones we have. All these school problems will become much more acute as a result of the tremendous increase in the enrollment in our elementary schools in the next few years. I cannot repeat too strongly my desire for prompt Federal financial aid to the States to help them operate and maintain their school systems.

422 Domestic Policy The governmental agency which now administers the programs of health, education, and social security should be given full departmental status. The housing shortage continues to be acute. As an immediate step, the Congress should enact the provisions for low---rent public housing, slum clearance, farm housing, and housing research which I have repeatedly recommended. The number of low---rent public housing units provided for in the legislation should be increased to 1 million units in the next 7 years. Even this number of units will not begin to meet our need for new housing. Most of the houses we need will have to be built by private enterprise, without public subsidy. By producing too few rental units and too large a proportion of high---priced houses, the building industry is rapidly pricing itself out of the market. Building costs must be lowered. The Government is now engaged in a campaign to induce all segments of the building industry to concentrate on the production of lower priced housing. Additional legislation to encourage such housing will be submitted. The authority which I have requested, to allocate materials in short supply and to impose price ceilings on such materials, could be used, if found necessary, to channel more materials into homes large enough for family life at prices which wage earners can afford. The driving force behind our progress is our faith in our democratic institutions. That faith is embodied in the promise of equal rights and equal opportunities which the founders of our Republic proclaimed to their countrymen and to the whole world. The fulfillment of this promise is among the highest purposes of government. The civil rights proposals I made to the 80th Congress, I now repeat to the 81st Congress. They should be enacted in order that the Federal Government may assume the leadership and discharge the obligations dearly placed upon it by the Constitution. I stand squarely behind those proposals. Our domestic programs are the foundation of our foreign policy. The world today looks to us for leadership because we have so largely realized, within our borders, those benefits of democratic government for which most of the peoples of the world are yearning. We are following a foreign policy which is the outward expression of the democratic faith we profess. We are doing what we can to encourage free states and free peoples throughout the world, to aid the suffering and afflicted in foreign lands, and to strengthen democratic nations against aggression.

The heart of our foreign policy is peace. We are supporting a world organization to keep peace and a world economic policy to create prosperity for mankind. Our guiding star is the principle of international cooperation. To this concept we have made a national commitment as profound as anything in history. To it we have pledged our resources and our honor. Until a system of world security is established upon which we can safely rely, we cannot escape the burden of creating and maintaining armed forces sufficient to deter aggression. We have made great progress in the last year in the effective organization of our Armed Forces, but further improvements in our national security legislation are necessary. Universal training is essential to the security of the United States. During the course of this session I shall have occasion to ask the Congress to consider several measures in the field of foreign policy. At this time, I recommend that we restore the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to full effectiveness, and extend it for 3 years. We should also open our doors to displaced persons without unfair discrimination. It should be clear by now to all citizens that we are not seeking to freeze the status quo. We have no intention of preserving the injustices of the past. We welcome the constructive efforts being made by many nations to achieve a better life for their citizens. In the European recovery program, in our good---neighbor policy and in the United Nations, we have begun to batter down those national walls which block the economic growth and the social advancement of the peoples of the world. We believe that if we hold resolutely to this course, the principle of international cooperation will eventually command the approval even of those nations which are now seeking to weaken or subvert it. We stand at the opening of an era which can mean either great achievement or terrible catastrophe for ourselves and for all mankind. The strength of our Nation must continue to be used in the interest of all our people rather than a privileged few. It must continue to be used unselfishly in the struggle for world peace and the betterment of mankind the world over. This is the task before us. It is not an easy one. It has many complications, and there will be strong opposition from selfish interests. I hope for cooperation from farmers, from labor, and from business. Every segment of our population and every individual has a right to expect from our Government a fair deal.

7.5 Cliff Humphrey, Thomas Jefferson, and Friends, Ecology Action In 1945, when I came down before the Congress for the first time on April 16, I quoted to you King Solomon’s prayer that he wanted wisdom and the ability to govern his people as they should be governed. I explained to you at that time that the task before me was one of the greatest in the history of the world, and that it was necessary to have the complete cooperation of the Congress and the people of the United States. Well now, we are taking a new start with the same situation. It is absolutely essential that your President have the complete cooperation of the Congress to carry out the great work that must be done to keep the peace in this world, and to keep this country prosperous. The people of this great country have a right to expect that the Congress and the President will work in closest cooperation with one objective---the welfare of the people of this Nation as a whole. In the months ahead I know that I shall be able to cooperate with this Congress. Now, I am confident that the Divine Power which has guided us to this time of fateful responsibility and glorious opportunity will not desert us now. With that help from Almighty God which we have humbly acknowledged at every turning point in our national life, we shall be able to perform the great tasks which He now sets before us.

7.5 Cliff Humphrey, Thomas Jefferson, and Friends, Ecology Action, 1969 The Unanimous Declaration of Interdependence When in the course of evolution it becomes necessary for one species to denounce the notion of independence from all the rest, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the interdependent station, to which the natural laws of the cosmos have placed them, a decent respect for the opinions of all mankind requires that they should declare the conditions which impel them to assert their interdependence. We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all species have evolved with equal and unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness; that to insure these rights, nature has instituted certain principles for the sustenance of all species, deriving these principles from the capabilities of the planet’s life-support system; that whenever any behavior by members of one species becomes destructive to these principles, it is the function of other members of

423

that species to alter or abolish such behavior and to reestablish the theme of interdependence with all life, in such a form and in accordance with those natural principles that will effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that cultural values long established should not be altered for light and transient causes, that mankind is more disposed to suffer from asserting a vain notion of independence that to right itself by abolishing that culture to which it is now accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations of these principles of interdependence, evinces a subtle design to reduce them, through absolute despoliation of the planet’s fertility, to a state of ill will, bad health, and great anxiety, it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such notions of independence from other species and from the life support system, and to provide new guards for the re-establishment of the security and maintenance of these principles. Such has been the quiet and patient sufferage of all species, and such is now the necessity which constrains the species of Homo sapiens to reassert the principles of interdependence. The history of the present notion of independence is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations all having in direct effect the establishment of an absolute tyranny over life. To prove this let facts be submitted to a candid world. • People have refused to recognize the roles of other species and the importance of natural principles for growth of the food they require. • People have refused to recognize that they are interacting with other species in an evolutionary process. • People have fouled the waters that all life partakes of. • People have transformed the face of the earth to enhance their notion of independence from it and in so doing have interrupted many natural process that they are dependent upon. • People have contaminated the common household with substances that are foreign to the life processes and which cause many organisms great difficulties. • People have massacred and extincted fellow species for their feathers and furs, for their skins and tusks. • People have persecuted most persistently those known as coyote, lion, wolf, and fox because of their dramatic role in the expression of interdependence.

424 Domestic Policy • People have warred upon one another which has brought great sorrow to themselves and vast destruction to the homes and food supplies of many living things. • People are proliferating in such an irresponsible manner as to threaten the survival of all species. • People have denied others the right to live to completion their interdependencies to the full extent of their capabilities. WE therefore, among the mortal representatives of the eternal process of life and evolutionary principles, in mutual humbleness, explicitly stated, appealing to the ecological consciousness of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do solemnly publish and declare that all species are interdependent; that they are all free to realize these relationships to the full extent of their capabilities; that each species is subservient to the requirements of the natural processes that sustain life. And for the support of this declaration with a firm reliance on all other members of our species who understand their consciousness as a capability, to assist all of us and our brothers to interact in order to realize a life process that manifests its maximum potential of diversity, vitality and planetary fertility to ensure the continuity of life on earth. Signed ECOLOGY ACTION, Cliff Humphrey, Thomas Jefferson, and 50 other ‘‘concerned Homo sapiens.’’ Source: Originally published in the Whole Earth Catalogue Supplement (September 1969), and included in Theodore Roszak, ed., Sources. Harper, 1972, 388.

7.6 Ash Council on EPA 1970, April 29, 1970 Executive Office of the Presidentpresident’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization Washington, D.C. 20506 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Federal Organization for Environmental Protection This memorandum deals with the organization of antipollution programs. A second memorandum, which you will receive shortly, will deal with the organization of natural resource programs. The President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization recommends that key anti-pollution programs

be merged into an Environmental Protection Administration, a new independent agency of the Executive Branch. In your February 10 Environmental Message, you pledged yourself to ‘‘. . . repair the damage already done, and to establish new criteria to guide us in the future.’’ The Environmental Protection Administration will be the principal instrument for the fulfillment of that pledge. In reaching this conclusion we have explored, but regard as less desirable, several other organizational alternatives (Appendix A): • Creation of a Department of Natural Resources and Environment; • Assignment of most anti-pollution responsibilities to a new bureau within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; • Creation of a small standard-setting entity within the Executive Office of the President, or as an independent agency. The details of our recommendations will follow brief examinations of (1) the environmental crisis; (2) the inadequacy of the present government structures which attempt to cope with it; (3) the organizational concepts we regard as pertinent; and (4) the specific rationale for the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA).

The Environmental Crisis Pollution is essentially a by-product of our vastly increased per capita consumption, intensified by population growth, urbanization, and changing industrial processes. In the coming years, problems of environmental degradation will rise exponentially. While our population will increase from 200 to 260 million by the year 2000, pollution will increase much more rapidly. Even if 50 percent of the nation’s electric generating capacity is nuclear-powered by the year 2000, pollutants resulting from fossil-fuel generation will double by 1980 and redouble by 2000. Similarly, a seven-fold increase is expected in industrial wastes produced by the large water-using industries. These wastes are also expected to become more variable, more difficult to decompose, and more toxic. At the same time, our demand for fresh water will increase from 350 to 800 billion gallons a day---considerably exceeding the dependable supply of fresh water now available, some 650 billion gallons daily. More and more clean water will have to be retrieved from progressively dirtier waterways.

7.6 Ash Council on EPA 1970 425 Even the fact that Americans annually junk 7 million cars, 100 million tires, 20 million tons of paper, 28 billion bottles, and 48 billion cans, does not reveal the dimensions of the problem. The 7 million cars, for example, represent less than 15 percent of the annual solid waste load. Each year we create 400 to 500 new chemicals. Many are toxic, but their exact ecological effects are not fully understood. We cannot even reliably forecast where or how they will turn up in our environment after they are used. The enormous future needs for land, minerals, and energy require that the protection of our environment receive a powerful new impetus. In this, the nation will be on the ‘‘horns of a dilemma.’’ The economic progress which we have come to expect, or even demand, has almost invariably been at some cost to the environment. Pesticides have increased the yield of our crops and made it possible for less land to produce more food. They have also polluted the streams and lakes. Automobiles have broadened our economic and social opportunities, even as they have dirtied the air and jammed our highways. Some means must be found by which our economic and social aspirations are balanced against the finite capacity of the environment to absorb society’s wastes.

now requires the coordinated efforts of a variety of separate agencies and departments. The result is a blurring of focus, and a certain Federally-sponsored irrationality. A far more effective approach to pollution control, in our view, would: • identify contaminates; • trace them through the entire ecological chain, observing and recording changes in form as they occur; • determine the total exposure of man and his environment; • examine interactions among forms of pollution; • and identify where in the ecological chain interdiction would be most effective. Scientists we have consulted tell us that over the next ten years a geometric increase in our knowledge and ability to understand the problem will be required if we are to make wise and economic judgments concerning our environment. The Administration is on the threshold of a major Federal effort. It will not prosper without a sound organizational base.

Organizational Concepts Inadequacy of Present Organization Our National Government is neither structured nor oriented to sustain a well-articulated attack on the practices which debase the air we breathe, the water we drink and the land that grows our food. Indeed, the present departmental structure for dealing with environmental protection defies effective and concerted action. The environment, despite its infinite complexity, must be perceived as a unified, interrelated system. Present assignments of departmental responsibilities do not reflect this primary characteristic. Many agency missions, for example, are designed primarily along media lines---air, water, and land. Yet the sources of air, water, and land pollution are interrelated and often interchangeable. A single source may pollute the air with smoke and chemicals, the land with solid wastes, and a river or lake with chemical and other wastes. Control of the air pollution may convert the smoke to solid wastes that then pollute land or water. Control of the water-polluting effluent may convert it into solid wastes which must be disposed of on land. Similarly, some pollutants---chemicals, radiation, pesticides---appear in all media. Successful interdiction

The special contribution that organization can make to the administration of large-scale enterprise is to mobilize people, ideas, and things in ways best calculated to achieve clearly articulated goals. While good people can sometimes make a poor organizational form work, more to the point is the fact that the system within which people operate can make it difficult for them to reach their institution’s objectives. Conversely, good organization can greatly increase the probability of reaching those goals. Organization, therefore, is not a neutral factor. It is a major determinant of the success of almost any enterprise. There is no perfect structural arrangement which will reconcile all interests or resolve all conflicts. Yet there is no real substitute for clear, logical assignments of functions and unequivocal establishment of centers of responsibility in accordance with sound organizational concepts. • Opposing interests should be drawn together at the right levels of government, so that the vast majority of conflicts are resolved below the level of the Executive Office.

426 Domestic Policy • The objectives of a proposed agency must be plainly set out, and must respond to a distinct and enduring public need. • There must be some assurance that the functions to be housed in a single agency not only belong together, but that the package can be managed efficiently. • The Executive Branch should be so structured that a high order of public interest is served in making policy, rather than a narrower advocacy position.

Rationale for the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) Almost every part of government is concerned with and affects the environment. But since each agency has a job to do---resource development, transportation, health, defense, urban growth, or agriculture---its view of the environment is likely to be influenced accordingly. Sound environmental administration must reconcile divergent interests and serve the total public constituency. It must appreciate and take fully into account competing social and economic claims. To bring together under one organizational roof all the Executive Branch entities dealing with the environment is impossible. This practical fact overwhelms the normally sound concept of building line organizations which can make trade-off decisions among competitor groups. Nor would it help very much, given the large number of departments involved, to affiliate the environmental responsibility, particularly the critical standard-setting function, with any single existing department. That department wold then be called upon to make decisions affecting other departments, when its own objectivity could be called into question. If in HEW, for example, a decision affecting DOT or HUD might well give primacy to HEW’s health mission. If in Interior, a natural resource bias might well exist with respect to a matter involving the farmer or the city dweller. In short, no single agency encompasses more than a few of the perspectives requisite to environmental administration. Given the nature and causes of environmental deterioration, programs to rectify pollution are largely geared to the great concentrations of urban population. The fact further weakens the argument for associating environmental protection with natural resources and less populated areas. Since the Council believes that the key standard-setting function should be performed outside the agencies whose interests may affect those standards, we regard the EPA as the strongest organizational alternative. The

question then becomes one of deciding what other functions such an agency should have to do its job. We believe the standard-setting function cannot stand alone. We must know that standards are soundly based; thus, a research capability is necessary. We must know if standards are working; thus, we must be able to monitor the environment. And we must be able to offer incentives for compliance and to move against violators. These are the activities that will give effect to the standard-setting function. The Council also believes that an independent EPA would offer distinct advantages to the business community and to state and local governments. The Federal Government is not equipped solely or even primarily to effect a turnabout in our environmental situation through its own powers and resources. The business community is an indispensable partner in this process, even though enforcement is needed so that a business which cooperates will not be placed at a competitive disadvantage. The single agency would simplify the relationship of the private sector whose cooperation and ingenuity are essential if any real progress is to be made. Federal anti-pollution programs must rely heavily on state and local efforts. The trend toward merger and coordination of environmental efforts at the state and local level is often inhibited by present Federal fragmentation. The EPA will simplify relationships with state and local governments and reduce the need to shop around for grant programs and other assistance . . .

7.7 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, May 15, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. I’ve asked for a few minutes of your time to discuss a matter of national importance---the reform of America’s immigration system. The issue of immigration stirs intense emotions, and in recent weeks, Americans have seen those emotions on display. On the streets of major cities, crowds have rallied in support of those in our country illegally. At our southern border, others have organized to stop illegal immigrants from coming in. Across the country, Americans are trying to reconcile these contrasting images. And in Washington, the debate over immigration reform has reached a time of decision. Tonight, I will make it clear where I stand, and where I want to lead our country on this vital issue.

7.7 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform We must begin by recognizing the problems with our immigration system. For decades, the United States has not been in complete control of its borders. As a result, many who want to work in our economy have been able to sneak across our border, and millions have stayed. Once here, illegal immigrants live in the shadows of our society. Many use forged documents to get jobs, and that makes it difficult for employers to verify that the workers they hire are legal. Illegal immigration puts pressure on public schools and hospitals, it strains state and local budgets, and brings crime to our communities. These are real problems. Yet we must remember that the vast majority of illegal immigrants are decent people who work hard, support their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives. They are a part of American life, but they are beyond the reach and protection of American law. We’re a nation of laws, and we must enforce our laws. We’re also a nation of immigrants, and we must uphold that tradition, which has strengthened our country in so many ways. These are not contradictory goals. America can be a lawful society and a welcoming society at the same time. We will fix the problems created by illegal immigration, and we will deliver a system that is secure, orderly, and fair. So I support comprehensive immigration reform that will accomplish five clear objectives. First, the United States must secure its borders. This is a basic responsibility of a sovereign nation. It is also an urgent requirement of our national security. Our objective is straightforward: The border should be open to trade and lawful immigration, and shut to illegal immigrants, as well as criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists . . . Tonight I’m calling on Congress to provide funding for dramatic improvements in manpower and technology at the border. By the end of 2008, we’ll increase the number of Border Patrol officers by an additional 6,000. When these new agents are deployed, we’ll have more than doubled the size of the Border Patrol during my presidency. At the same time, we’re launching the most technologically advanced border security initiative in American history. We will construct high-tech fences in urban corridors, and build new patrol roads and barriers in rural areas. We’ll employ motion sensors, infrared cameras, and unmanned aerial vehicles to prevent illegal crossings. America has the best technology in the world, and we will ensure that the Border Patrol has the technology they need to do their job and secure our border. . . .

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The United States is not going to militarize the southern border. Mexico is our neighbor, and our friend. We will continue to work cooperatively to improve security on both sides of the border, to confront common problems like drug trafficking and crime, and to reduce illegal immigration. Another way to help during this period of transition is through state and local law enforcement in our border communities. So we’ll increase federal funding for state and local authorities assisting the Border Patrol on targeted enforcement missions. We will give state and local authorities the specialized training they need to help federal officers apprehend and detain illegal immigrants. State and local law enforcement officials are an important part of our border security and they need to be a part of our strategy to secure our borders. The steps I’ve outlined will improve our ability to catch people entering our country illegally. At the same time, we must ensure that every illegal immigrant we catch crossing our southern border is returned home. More than 85 percent of the illegal immigrants we catch crossing the southern border are Mexicans, and most are sent back home within 24 hours. But when we catch illegal immigrants from other country [sic] it is not as easy to send them home. For many years, the government did not have enough space in our detention facilities to hold them while the legal process unfolded. So most were released back into our society and asked to return for a court date. When the date arrived, the vast majority did not show up. This practice, called ‘‘catch and release,’’ is unacceptable, and we will end it. We’re taking several important steps to meet this goal. We’ve expanded the number of beds in our detention facilities, and we will continue to add more. We’ve expedited the legal process to cut the average deportation time. And we’re making it clear to foreign governments that they must accept back their citizens who violate our immigration laws. As a result of these actions, we’ve ended ‘‘catch and release’’ for illegal immigrants from some countries. And I will ask Congress for additional funding and legal authority, so we can end ‘‘catch and release’’ at the southern border once and for all. When people know that they’ll be caught and sent home if they enter our country illegally, they will be less likely to try to sneak in. Second, to secure our border, we must create a temporary worker program. The reality is that there are many people on the other side of our border who will do anything to come to America to work and build a better life. They walk across miles of desert in the summer heat, or hide in the back of 18-wheelers to

428 Domestic Policy reach our country. This creates enormous pressure on our border that walls and patrols alone will not stop. To secure the border effectively, we must reduce the numbers of people trying to sneak across. Therefore, I support a temporary worker program that would create a legal path for foreign workers to enter our country in an orderly way, for a limited period of time. This program would match willing foreign workers with willing American employers for jobs Americans are not doing. Every worker who applies for the program would be required to pass criminal background checks. And temporary workers must return to their home country at the conclusion of their stay. A temporary worker program would meet the needs of our economy, and it would give honest immigrants a way to provide for their families while respecting the law. A temporary worker program would reduce the appeal of human smugglers, and make it less likely that people would risk their lives to cross the border. It would ease the financial burden on state and local governments, by replacing illegal workers with lawful taxpayers. And above all, a temporary worker program would add to our security by making certain we know who is in our country and why they are here. Third, we need to hold employers to account for the workers they hire. It is against the law to hire someone who is in this country illegally. Yet businesses often cannot verify the legal status of their employees because of the widespread problem of document fraud. Therefore, comprehensive immigration reform must include a better system for verifying documents and work eligibility. A key part of that system should be a new identification card for every legal foreign worker. This card should use biometric technology, such as digital fingerprints, to make it tamper-proof. A tamperproof card would help us enforce the law, and leave employers with no excuse for violating it. And by making it harder for illegal immigrants to find work in our country, we would discourage people from crossing the border illegally in the first place. Fourth, we must face the reality that millions of illegal immigrants are here already. They should not be given an automatic path to citizenship. This is amnesty, and I oppose it. Amnesty would be unfair to those who are here lawfully, and it would invite further waves of illegal immigration. Some in this country argue that the solution is to deport every illegal immigrant, and that any proposal short of this amounts to amnesty. I disagree. It is neither wise, nor realistic to round up millions of people, many with deep roots in the United States, and send

them across the border. There is a rational middle ground between granting an automatic path to citizenship for every illegal immigrant, and a program of mass deportation. That middle ground recognizes there are differences between an illegal immigrant who crossed the border recently, and someone who has worked here for many years, and has a home, a family, and an otherwise clean record. I believe that illegal immigrants who have roots in our country and want to stay should have to pay a meaningful penalty for breaking the law, to pay their taxes, to learn English, and to work in a job for a number of years. People who meet these conditions should be able to apply for citizenship, but approval would not be automatic, and they will have to wait in line behind those who played by the rules and followed the law. What I’ve just described is not amnesty, it is a way for those who have broken the law to pay their debt to society, and demonstrate the character that makes a good citizen. Fifth, we must honor the great American tradition of the melting pot, which has made us one nation out of many peoples. The success of our country depends upon helping newcomers assimilate into our society, and embrace our common identity as Americans. Americans are bound together by our shared ideals, an appreciation of our history, respect for the flag we fly, and an ability to speak and write the English language. English is also the key to unlocking the opportunity of America. English allows newcomers to go from picking crops to opening a grocery, from cleaning offices to running offices, from a life of low-paying jobs to a diploma, a career, and a home of their own. When immigrants assimilate and advance in our society, they realize their dreams, they renew our spirit, and they add to the unity of America. . . . America needs to conduct this debate on immigration in a reasoned and respectful tone. Feelings run deep on this issue, and as we work it out, all of us need to keep some things in mind. We cannot build a unified country by inciting people to anger, or playing on anyone’s fears, or exploiting the issue of immigration for political gain. We must always remember that real lives will be affected by our debates and decisions, and that every human being has dignity and value no matter what their citizenship papers say. I know many of you listening tonight have a parent or a grandparent who came here from another country with dreams of a better life. You know what freedom meant to them, and you know that America is a more hopeful country because of their hard work and

7.7 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform sacrifice. As President, I’ve had the opportunity to meet people of many backgrounds, and hear what America means to them. On a visit to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Laura and I met a wounded Marine named Guadalupe Denogean. Master Gunnery Sergeant Denogean came to the United States from Mexico when he was a boy. He spent his summers picking crops with his family, and then he volunteered for the United States Marine Corps as soon as he was able. During the liberation of Iraq, Master Gunnery Sergeant Denogean was seriously injured. And when asked if he had any requests, he made two: a promotion for the corporal who helped rescue him, and the chance to become an American citizen. And when this brave Marine raised his right hand,

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and swore an oath to become a citizen of the country he had defended for more than 26 years, I was honored to stand at his side. We will always be proud to welcome people like Guadalupe Denogean as fellow Americans. Our new immigrants are just what they’ve always been---people willing to risk everything for the dream of freedom. And America remains what she has always been: the great hope on the horizon, an open door to the future, a blessed and promised land. We honor the heritage of all who come here, no matter where they come from, because we trust in our country’s genius for making us all Americans---one nation under God. Thank you, and good night.

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Section 8 Making Foreign Policy

Introduction

early American republic. The traditional era of U.S. foreign policy drew to a close as the United States flirted with colonialism at the turn of the century and later participated in World War I. As Paul McCartney shows, this was a critical transitional period. Most Americans and political leaders of the interwar period wanted to avoid a larger role in world affairs, but the United States was no longer one of the ‘‘small or weak’’ nations that President Washington worried would be dominated by one of its stronger counterparts. World War II and its aftermath made the United States the so-called leader of the free world, and its foreign and defense policies were defined for nearly half a century by conflict with the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, the country remains at the center of world politics as a superpower, but its challenges have changed dramatically. Clark Kent Ervin’s essay provides a valuable window onto this contemporary foreign policy process. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

‘‘History and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government,’’ President George Washington warned the public as he prepared to retire after his second term. ‘‘Steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.’’ Washington was particularly concerned that ‘‘small or weak’’ nations like the United States were doomed to become ‘‘satellites’’ of stronger ones if they became entangled in foreign affairs. The notion that the United States should avoid the power struggles between Europe’s strongest nation-states was perhaps the keynote of American foreign policy before the 20th century. Yet the country was not purely isolationist in these years, as it eagerly embraced trade with the outside world, zealously pursued expansionist goals in the North American continent, and sought to prevent European powers from controlling the Western Hemisphere. Jeffrey Selinger’s essay provides a trenchant view of foreign affairs and political development in the

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After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic Jeffrey S. Selinger Visiting Assistant Professor of Government, Bowdoin College

the British Parliament than it is at this moment’’ (quoted in LaFeber 1972, 23). For the Federalists, union was the most efficient, indeed, the only means to a meaningful independence. The Federalists identified the problem of independence with the demands of union; yet the difficulties that associated the two endured long after the ratification of the Constitution. The Constitution did not remedy, but instead transformed the problem of independence: if the divergent interests of the individual states were a threat to American unity before the Constitution, the discordant actions of factions and parties endangered political unity thereafter. Indeed, the overriding governing exigency for American leaders in the early national period (1789--1815) was to curb the spirit of faction and party to preserve the new nation’s independence (the terms ‘‘faction’’ and ‘‘party’’ were used interchangeably by the Founders and their contemporaries). This essay will examine the problem of independence from the ratification of the Constitution to the conclusion of America’s second war of independence, the War of 1812; it will then reflect upon how American politics was transformed in the aftermath of the War of 1812, when the United States secured a measure of autonomy from European affairs. Why was a constitutional union believed to be necessary for political independence? What obstacles did political leaders confront as they sought to preserve America’s

America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would . . . be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera (divide and conquer) must be the motto of every nation that either hates us or fears us. ---Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 7 America’s break from the politics of the Old World could not be consummated without a formidable bond of union in the New. This was the essence of the appeal made to the American people in numerous of the famed Federalist Papers, in which Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay advocated for the ratification of the new Constitution of the United States in 1787-1788. They maintained that a ‘‘simple league,’’ such as that framed by the Articles of Confederation, would not realize the promise of American independence. The American states formally achieved their independence from Britain with the Treaty of Peace of 1783, yet their political and economic condition left them vulnerable to the machinations of European powers. In 1785, Madison lamented the state of American commerce: ‘‘Our trade was never more compleatly [sic] monopolized by G.B. (Great Britain), when it was under the direction of

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434 Making Foreign Policy commercial and political autonomy in the years following ratification? Finally, how were American political institutions and practices altered following the conclusion of the War of 1812, once the United States vindicated its claim (against numerous skeptics in Europe) that republican government could endure the trials of war?

The Constitution and the Specter of Foreign Influence The vulnerability of the American states in the global political arena was a crucial consideration for the delegates who met at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The states were surrounded by hostile powers that many believed would benefit from an America that was fragmented and weak. The British effectively controlled the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River and refused to abandon armed posts---seven in all---in open violation of the Peace Treaty of 1783 (the failure of the American states to settle existing debts with Britain, also stipulated in the Treaty, provided an invaluable pretext for the British to maintain their positions along the Great Lakes and elsewhere on the northwestern frontier). The British held onto these posts because they believed that it was only a matter of time before the United States self-destructed; once the American government collapsed, they would support British operations to reestablish rule in the old colonies. The American states also had to contend with Native American tribes that often aligned with the British to preserve their lands against American encroachments. Hostilities between the Americans and Native American tribes in the northwest persisted for approximately 10 years until Gen. Anthony Wayne won a decisive victory in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Spanish authorities, for their part, controlled territories in the Southwest and, in 1784, closed the Mississippi River to American navigation. The actions of Great Britain, Spain, and Native American tribes limited the westward expansion of the American states. Moreover, these powers leveraged the commercial interest on the frontier to encourage neighboring American states to ally with them or resist union with their American counterparts. The governor general of Canada, for example, offered inducements to separatists in Vermont, hoping to attach it to Canada with the promise of access to Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence River. The Spanish set their sights on an alliance with frontiersmen in Kentucky whose economic interest in the Mississippi rivaled their attachment to the new federal government in Philadelphia.

Nor did freedom from Great Britain pay the anticipated dividends on the high seas. The American states continued to be deeply dependent upon their maritime trade with Britain and were unable to effectively challenge British restrictions on American commerce. This became a crucial consideration after British authorities (who regretted the generous terms offered to the Americans in 1783) declared soon after that American ships would not be free to carry on their profitable trade with the British West Indies. The American states, though an ocean apart from Europe, were situated in a hostile environment. Moreover, they were poorly served by the Articles of Confederation, which left them commercially, militarily, and politically weak in regard to their major foreign antagonists. Union, the authors of the Federalist Papers argued, would provide numerous advantages. The following is a list of those advantages highlighted by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, which are most relevant to America’s dealings with foreign powers:

1. Revenue: Union would strengthen the bargaining power of the states in trade negotiations; by creating a uniform trade policy, the united American states could impose higher duties on imported goods than the states could otherwise demand if they competed with one another for foreign commerce. A uniform trade policy would thereby improve the revenue for the new nation and lighten the burden of taxation on American citizens (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, Federalist No. 13). 2. Army: If the states united, they would not require heavy investment in the military because they would not have to defend their internal borders. A smaller military establishment would minimize the threat that standing armies pose to liberty, and lighten the financial burden of providing for a national defense (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, Federalist No. 8 and No. 13). 3. Navy: Union would enable the Americans to pool their resources to build a more powerful naval force (more expensive than ground forces); though it would not rival that of Great Britain, a united navy could be strong enough to deter depredations on America’s maritime commerce and could even exact a price for its neutrality in foreign conflicts (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, Federalist No. 11). 4. Political Alliances: Perhaps most important of all, if the individual states were prohibited from

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 435 forming alliances with foreign powers (as they would be in the new Constitution), European antagonists would be unable to excite jealousies and animosities between the states. John Jay called attention to this danger by posing the following rhetorical questions: If one [of the states] was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence [sic]? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquility and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, Federalist No. 4).

5. With a legal framework for political unity, foreign enemies could not purchase the neutrality of some of the states while making war on others. Without a Constitution, the states would likely form into several confederacies (most probably in the North, South, and the West), each with its own---and perhaps discordant---foreign policy (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, Federalist No. 4 and No. 7). A new Constitution, once adopted, brought these benefits to the newly united American states. But it also changed the nature of the problem the United States confronted as a new nation. The chief task at hand was to secure in fact what had been achieved on the parchment of the Constitution; that is, to build and maintain federal authority in a politically diverse polity. Factions and parties posed the greatest challenge to federal governance in the period which followed the adoption of the Constitution. This was fully anticipated by the Framers of the Constitution, most famously by Madison, who argued in Federalist No. 10 that the pernicious effects of faction might be best controlled in a large republic; ‘‘extended’’ republics, he maintained, were more stable and conducive to liberty because they incorporated within their dominions a great diversity of interests that might counteract one another in the pursuit of the benefits and protections of the federal government (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, Federalist No. 10). Constitutional design was one answer to the challenges posed by faction and party. The charismatic authority of George Washington was another. The unanimity of public affection enjoyed by President Washington during the early years of his tenure would

distinguish his presidency from all that followed. Washington’s status entailed a professed disposition against politics; a public form of politeness, instead, would stand in its place. His personal gravitas and unassuming manner were necessary to overcome the skepticism and distrust of executive authority, in particular, and central government more generally. As the leading statesman of his time, Washington hoped that he might stand ‘‘above’’ party, and thereby calm the bitter partisan disputes that erupted soon after he took office (Ketcham 1984). America’s enemies, he believed, would triumph if the nation’s leadership was distracted by partisan squabbling.

The Politics of Neutrality in the Federalist Years Foreign controversies were not the first order of business for the First Congress, convened in 1789. Public attention was instead drawn to Alexander Hamilton’s program to manage the finances and restore the credit of the new nation. To facilitate American commerce, Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, wished to charter a national bank and to fund, rather than eliminate the national debt (to ‘‘fund’’ debt is to make regular payments on it, while preserving the principal). Both measures, he believed, would attract foreign investment in the new polity. He also supported the distribution of ‘‘pecuniary bounties’’ (subsidies) to promote infant American industries. The linchpin of Hamilton’s vision for the national economy was a foreign policy that protected the vibrant trade between the United States and Great Britain. Hamilton expected that steady trade with Great Britain---far and away America’s most important trading partner---would provide revenue through import duties and thereby enable the federal government to make regular payments on its debt without imposing an onerous tax burden on the American people. Opponents of this plan, however, could not help but see the close resemblance between Hamilton’s system and the political economic model that America had just fought a war to overthrow. Indeed, Hamilton’s critics associated these economic policies and institutions with the overpopulation, poverty, and debauched morality that typified, for many, the urban, manufacturing nightmare of late 18th-century Britain. James Madison, the leading opponent of Hamilton’s plan in the House of Representatives (his ally, Thomas Jefferson, served as secretary of state), devised an alternative program---one which he believed to be more compatible with America’s republican values. While

436 Making Foreign Policy Hamilton’s plan relied on revenues from trade with Britain, Madison’s political economic vision hinged upon removing the yoke of Britain’s mercantilist influence. Native industries (that is, shipping and agriculture) would develop and prosper if the United States could force Britain to acquiesce to better terms of trade. Madison proposed a program of discriminatory trade measures at several junctures in the 1790s---particularly when anti-British sentiment was high---to coerce Great Britain to accept better terms of exchange. His first and only success in promoting such a program as a leader of the House of Representatives came in March of 1794 when Congress passed a temporary embargo in response to British aggression against American trade in the Caribbean. This strategy, which espoused a ‘‘get tough’’ approach with the British to challenge their system of commercial regulations, relied instead on the expansion of trade with France and its possessions in the Americas. The feud between Madison and Jefferson against Hamilton over their competing economic programs helped to frame an ideological and partisan division between Jeffersonian Republicans and Hamiltonian Federalists.1 Washington steadfastly refused to identify with either camp; yet his actions in office soon associated him with the Hamiltonians. Indeed, by the end of his second term, all of his cabinet members were wellknown Federalists (some of them, in fact, were ardent Anglophiles). Developments in Europe soon raised the stakes of this party split between the Federalists, who preferred close Anglo-American relations, and the Republicans, who were fervent supporters of the French Revolution. Revolution in France, at least in its early goings, filled most Americans with optimism for the future of republican government. Support for the abstract aims of republicanism seemed harmless enough, so long as France’s unsteady experiment was contained on another continent. French ideas about revolution and the rights of man, however, did not stay where they were. For the Federalists, the ‘‘French disease,’’ as Hamilton called it, spread like a contagion to American soil and infected the minds of Republican sympathizers (Hamilton quoted in Miller 1964, 365). The shift in public sentiments against France, particularly within Federalist circles, was spurred by news of the execution of Louis XVI and the French declaration of war (February 1, 1793) against Great Britain, Holland, and Spain. The political effects of European war quickly made their way to the United States. War between France and Great Britain challenged the American mass public to choose between its deep sympathies

with the ever-spreading republican revolution in France and its profitable commercial relations with Britain. This schism only reinforced the divisions already established by domestic differences over public finance. As Jefferson pointed out, the French Revolution ‘‘kindled & brought forward the two parties with an ardour which our own interest merely, could never excite’’ (Jefferson quoted in Miller 2004, 363). Americans’ conceptions of their own interests, it appears, were deeply intermingled with their sympathies for the foreign combatants. The French Revolutionary War (1792--1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803--1815) introduced mutual suspicions of disloyalty into the party politics of this period. Federalists were politically suspect for their efforts to model the American political economy after the manufacturing, banking, and commercial institutions of the British Empire. For Jeffersonian Republicans, these objectives were nothing less than heresy and a betrayal of the ‘‘Spirit of ’76.’’ For their part, Federalists were convinced that Republicans had succumbed to their Francophilia and their taste for revolution and radical democracy. The first four American presidents, George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, served their terms in this partisan political landscape, which scholars label the ‘‘first American party system.’’ Yet each of these presidents was opposed in principle to the modern idea of a party system. Factions and parties were thought to be a dangerous, though inevitable, outgrowth of political liberty. In the view of leading statesmen of the time, parties posed a threat to American independence because they could operate as the instruments of foreign adversaries. Washington made this case in his famed Farewell Address of 1796, when he observed that the spirit of party ‘‘opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country, are subjected to the policy and will of another’’ (Washington 1997, 970). Leading statesmen in America, mindful of the domestic political division over the war abroad, agreed that preservation of the union required a foreign policy of neutrality. Any other policy would fan the flames of party conflict and provoke violent civil unrest, if not full-blown civil war. The United States, however, was already committed. Two treaties were signed in 1778 which bound the nation to ‘‘perpetual friendship and alliance’’ with France. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce granted the United States formal recognition and most-favored-nation trading privileges, and also

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 437 permitted the French fleet to enter American ports with prizes of war. The Treaty of Alliance included a promise that France would help fight for American independence, that neither nation could forge a peace treaty without the other’s consent, and a guarantee that each nation would guard each other’s possessions. This last provision could require the United States to help defend the French West Indies in the war with Britain. Hamilton advised Washington that these treaties would have to be suspended temporarily to forge a neutrality that would not lead to war with Britain. Hamilton was concerned, in particular, with the provision of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which permitted each country to bring prizes of war into each others’ ports (excluding either nation’s enemy from the same privileges). If enforced, this provision would almost certainly provoke war with Britain. Jefferson, however, maintained that failure to enforce such provisions would violate the French Alliance and possibly provoke war with France. The suspension of the Alliance and the insult that this would deliver was unnecessary in Jefferson’s view, since decisions about the interpretation of the treaty could be postponed until France asked the United States to implement its guarantees (if France should choose to make such a request at all). Rejecting the Alliance outright would not only be a great insult to the French, it also could provoke retaliation. As Jefferson prophetically observed, ‘‘An injured friend is the bitterest of foes’’ (Jefferson 1892, 6:225). The Washington administration was faced with a strategic minefield, where each available option posed a risk of entangling the country in the foreign conflict. Washington agreed with Jefferson that suspending the French Alliance would be unnecessary. The president, however, agreed with Hamilton that a formal declaration of America’s position should be issued. The President’s Proclamation of Neutrality on April 22, 1793, was the president’s answer to the dilemma. He declared that the United States would be neutral in the conflict, suggesting that this position was a point of national consensus. However, there was no such consensus when the specifics of this problem were taken into consideration. Indeed, his critics sharply objected to his program, which they believed to be a ‘‘British neutrality.’’ It was not long after the issuance of the Proclamation of Neutrality that the partisan presses began ‘‘to groan with invective against the Chief Magistrate of the Union’’ (Hamilton 2001, 797). Federalists maintained that the opposition, intoxicated by the euphoria of their Francophilia, would go to any length to

undermine the authority of the president and stir anarchy for their political aggrandizement. ‘‘Americans as individuals’’ one prominent historian observes, ‘‘were not neutral; American neutrality was a precarious thing’’ (DeConde 1958, 269). The barrage of criticism leveled at Washington’s alleged British neutrality was especially distressing for the president because he knew that popular action in support of one of the belligerents could, in fact, undermine the authority of his policy. The task of controlling the actions of the people to preserve peace---and federal authority---was deeply complicated by the activities of the new minister from France, Edmond Gen^et, who was determined to utilize the bond between France and America to achieve his wartime objectives. Immediately upon his landing in the spring of 1793, Gen^et began organizing operations to outfit French privateers and to encourage American citizens to participate in offensive naval actions against the British. He also setup prize courts on American soil to rule on the legality of seizing prizes of war (that is, captured British goods) (Elkins and McKitrick 1993, 334). In addition to these initial operations, Gen^et brought with him an ambitious set of plans to rouse Americans across the continent to strike at Spanish and British installations in Florida, Louisiana, and Canada. When Gen^et and the Washington administration feuded over the interpretation of the Treaties of 1778, Gen^et threatened to appeal to the people over the head of the president. Washington was furious: Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance, with impunity? And then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the People [?] What must the world think of such conduct, and of the Governmt. [sic] of the U. States in submitting to it? (Washington 1836, 10:355--356) The Washington administration promptly moved to have Gen^et recalled. Gen^et was a menace to the Washington administration not only because of the defiance and disrespect that he directed towards the president, but also because he exposed and exploited the institutional weakness of the federal government. With a limited navy, the federal government could not hope to effectively regulate armed vessels in American ports. Furthermore, without a sizeable standing army, the Washington administration could not enforce other aspects of American’s neutrality without the assistance of the states. For example, the federal government could not, without great effort, prevent Gen^et from recruiting frontiersmen in the West

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Nineteenth-century illustration showing Edmond Gen^et, French ambassador, presenting himself to George Washington. Upon his arrival to America in 1793, Gen^et began drumming up support for the French cause in the country’s war with England. His actions earned him the disdain of the president, who attempted to have him recalled to France. (Library of Congress)

to strike at Spanish holdings. Gen^et was therefore an uncontrolled force inside American borders, capable of exploiting the federal government’s limited capacity to enforce its own law. As Vice President John Adams suggested to Jefferson some years after the Gen^et affair had been settled, You certainly never felt the terrorism excited by Gen^et, in 1793, when ten thousand people in the streets of Philadelphia, day after day threatened to drag Washington out of his house, and effect a revolution in the government, or compel it to declare war in favor of the French Revolution and against England. (Adams 1856, 10:47) The irritant from the French Foreign Minister notwithstanding, the United States stood on the brink of war with Britain in 1794, thanks to a host of

outstanding grievances---namely, Great Britain’s incitement of Native American tribes to strike at American possessions in the northwest (as well as their continued occupation of armed posts in that region), depredations carried out against American vessels in the Caribbean, and alleged British efforts to arm blacks to rebel against their colonial oppressors, the French, in Saint-Dominique (the geographic equivalent of modern Haiti). This last element was unsettling for southern slaveholders, fearful that freedom in SaintDominique would inspire their own slaves to rebel. These developments brought anti-British sentiment to a boil. To avert war, Washington sent John Jay, then the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court, to negotiate an agreement with Britain. The British, at war once again with the French, were more receptive to dealing with the Americans. The commercial treaty that resulted, known as Jay’s Treaty, ratified by the Senate and signed by the president in 1795, polarized the American public and infuriated the French. The partisan rage that the treaty elicited was unprecedented since the founding of the American nation. Effigies of ‘‘Sir John Jay’’ were hung. In Virginia, men toasted to ‘‘A speedy death to General Washington’’ (The Aurora (Philadelphia), quoted in DeConde 1958, 133). Supporters of the Jay Treaty viewed its passage as the only certain means to avoid war with Britain. This view was not unreasonable; historian Joseph Charles, however, argues that because of its dire financial condition and its dependence on the United States for food and raw materials, Britain was unlikely to declare war if the United States rejected the treaty (1961, 118--121). Republicans viewed opposition to the treaty as a patriotic imperative. The devout Francophiles among them understood that the Jay Treaty would shatter their hopes of supporting the French in a war against the British. Moreover, the treaty contained significant grounds for discontent. It did not address southern ‘‘losses’’ due to confiscated slaves, valued at about $10 million from the War of Independence; the Treaty also required the repayment of American debts to British creditors (much of it held by southerners) (McDonald 1974, 156). The United States additionally gave up the right to impose discriminatory tariffs on British goods or ships for 10 years. The threat to punish Britain with discriminatory tariffs was the centerpiece of the Republican opposition’s economic program; the Jay Treaty, however, placed this weapon off limits for a decade. The British, for their part, agreed to evacuate their posts in the American northwest and to compensate Americans for property seized at sea by the British Navy.

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 439 They also agreed to open ports in the British East Indies and the British West Indies to American ships. By righting itself in regard to the British, the United States had provoked the French into militant indignation. The French government viewed the ratification of the Jay Treaty as a signal of a decisive departure by the American government---both in letter and in spirit--from the commitments of the French Alliance. The French did not declare war at this juncture; they first sought a political solution to troubles with the United States. That is, they sought to promote the election of a more sympathetic executive. This effort was led by the new foreign minister to the United States, Pierre Adet. Adet sent a series of letters to the secretary of state, Timothy Pickering (and to the Republican presses), in the height of the electoral season in 1796, appealing directly to the people of the United States and encouraging them to wear the French tri-color in a show of support for the French Alliance. (Those who did not wear the colors, Adet warned, would be denied the services of French consuls and the protection of the French government). He announced that the French government had instructed him to suspend ministerial functions with the federal government. The American people, he insisted, could remedy the rift caused by the federal government: ‘‘Let your Government return to itself and you will still find in Frenchmen faithful friends and generous allies’’ (quoted in DeConde 1958, 440). The French government’s support for Jefferson’s candidacy was barely concealed in this message. In the end, popular indignation over French interference may have hurt Jefferson more than it helped; the moderate Federalist, John Adams, ultimately won the election by a narrow margin. Relations with France only deteriorated in the near term. The French government issued a set of stringent regulations on American shipping, which some historians view as a pretext for the French to continue their practice of plundering American vessels. The difficulties of Franco-American relations came to a head with the failure of a commission Adams appointed to negotiate a new diplomatic agreement with the French government. The commission was not received by the proper French authorities, but was instead approached by French agents who demanded a loan for the French government, a bribe for its foreign ministers, and an official apology from the U.S. government for some of the harsh words President Adams delivered in a recent address to Congress. The so-called XYZ Affair2 unleashed a torrent of anti-French fury and precipitated a season of nationalist spectacle. Black cockades, like the ones worn by

Continental soldiers during the Revolution, became symbols of Federalism and the new fashion in the streets. ‘‘Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute,’’ became the patriotic slogan. Anti-French sentiment spread to the South (the region aligned most closely with the Republicans), as rumors circulated that the French were preparing to incite a slave revolt by invading the southern states with black soldiers from Saint Dominique led by the famous revolutionary, Toussaint L’Ouverture (Elkins and McKitrick 1993, 598; DeConde 1966, 84). No such attack was forthcoming; nevertheless, an undeclared quasi-war persisted until 1799 as French privateers preyed on American commercial ships in the West Indies and along the U.S. coastline. The notorious Alien and Sedition Acts---all passed in June and July of 1798---were by-products of this Franco-phobic political climate. Taken together, these acts were designed to regulate naturalization and political speech to curb Republican partisanship. The Federalist effort to clamp down on their opposition--originating from resident aliens and American citizens alike---came as no surprise to many. Indeed, Madison observed that it is, perhaps, ‘‘a universal truth, that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger real or pretended from abroad’’ (Madison 1999, 588). The danger in question was Republican partisanship itself. The Sedition Act was crafted to shield the government (that is, elected officials) from criticism and facilitate the enforcement of a consolidated public opinion. The Alien Acts, for their part, were constructed to meet the threat of Republican partisanship by striking at the legal status of the party’s growing immigrant support. Irish immigrants, who harbored strong sympathies for the French republican struggle against the British, were as suspect as the French in this political climate. The tenuous condition of American sovereignty in this period disposed the Federalists to restrict the growth of the electorate and to embrace strict limits on civil liberties. Federalists acted out of the conviction that the political independence of the United States required limits on the influence of the French government, which actively manipulated American politics through its proxy, the Republican Party; independence, in their view, required a united front in support of the Federalist leadership. This would not come to pass, however, as anti-French sentiment waned almost as quickly as it erupted, and the electoral tide suddenly turned against the Federalists. Jefferson and his Republican supporters were swept into power in 1800, in what Richard Hofstadter has termed ‘‘the first election

440 Making Foreign Policy in modern history which, by popular decision, resulted in the quiet and peaceful transition of national power from the hands of one of two embattled parties to another’’ (1969, 128).

Neutrality and Politics in the Republican Era Jefferson confronted the same dilemma that the Federalists faced when they were in power: a nation bitterly divided by European war, and a federal government with a limited capacity to exclude foreign influence and curb the excesses of partisan conflict. The Jeffersonians, however, benefited from a brief respite. By 1800, the country was finally at peace after several years of quasi-war with France. Furthermore, with the signing of the Treaty of Amiens of 1802 between Britain and France, hopes ran high that America could disentangle itself from the warring powers of Europe. Peace paid dividends in the first few years of Jefferson’s first term, as international trade boomed and revenue from import duties grew. Jefferson was able to hasten the retirement of the national debt even as he abolished internal, direct taxes. These fortunate circumstances enabled Jefferson to establish a frugal fiscal regime which he believed to be most conducive to the public and private happiness of the American people. Jefferson reduced and reformed America’s military establishment, both for the sake of economy and to preserve the nation’s republican principles. He felt that regular armies were both unnecessary and costly where citizen militias could capably defend the polity. Frigates and large gunships were not only expensive to build and maintain, but also, as historian Forrest McDonald succinctly observed, ‘‘extended a nation’s hostile boundaries and thus the likelihood of stumbling into war’’ (1976, 43). A fleet of small gunboats, Jefferson believed, would provide a capable defense of American ports at a fraction of the cost, without posing the risk of controversy on the high seas. This program of fiscal and military retrenchment was sanctioned by republican theory yet remained untested in practice. Detractors observed that each in their own way saddled American prosperity with an unacknowledged dependence on the policies of Great Britain. The abolition of internal, direct taxes meant that government revenue ultimately would rely on import duties (most of American imports at the time came from Britain). Without a viable navy to protect merchant vessels, American trade and federal revenue would rely on the goodwill of foreign navies, Britain’s

powerful Royal Navy in particular, to abide by international law. Jefferson was more preoccupied in his first term with developments in the west. Rumor of Spain’s cession of the Louisiana territory to France spread rapidly throughout America’s western frontier in the fall of 1802. So long as the territory remained in Spanish hands, Jefferson believed that there would be an opportunity to obtain New Orleans (and free use of the Mississippi River) peacefully, provided that America could patiently wait for the Spanish regime to falter. News that Napoleon had acquired the Louisiana territory suggested a far more ominous turn of events: it signaled to the Americans that Napoleon aimed to extend his empire to the American west, a move that would enable France to contain the growth of the United States. Republicans in power generally were disposed to avoid antagonisms with the French; this, however, was not sustainable so long as France positioned itself as the overseer of American expansion. The Mississippi question was brought to a critical standoff when the Spanish authorities at New Orleans, rumored to be under orders from Napoleon himself, suspended America’s right of deposit (the right of commercial vessels to deposit their shipments at the port) in the fall of 1802. This act, Jefferson observed, threw the country into ‘‘a flame of hostile disposition as can scarcely be described’’ (Jefferson 1892, 8:209--210). Indeed, the Mississippi was the commercial lifeline of the West. Without free passage at New Orleans, western trade with the eastern seaboard and with the rest of the world would be paralyzed. Napoleon, however, suddenly reversed course in 1803, and abandoned his ambition to extend his empire to North America. Napoleon’s decision to sell the Louisiana territory to the United States was prompted by unforeseen difficulties combating black revolutionaries in Saint-Dominique (French forces there were decimated by yellow fever) and weather conditions in Europe, which prohibited the departure of a fleet intended for New Orleans. Napoleon instead chose to conserve his resources for war with Britain. Given the circumstances which gave rise to the Louisiana Purchase, it appears that diplomatic historian Samuel Bemis’ refrain that ‘‘Europe’s distresses were America’s advantage’’ proved to be true for Jefferson’s first term (1950, 137). The same cannot be said for the period that followed. The Napoleonic Wars, which commenced in 1803, reignited war between France and Great Britain. For a time, America’s neutrality served as a comparative economic advantage against its rivals: from 1803--1805, a neutral

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 441 status permitted the growth of a lucrative carrying trade. The neutrality of maritime commerce was increasingly jeopardized as the war in Europe progressed. The impressment of American sailors became a crucial point of controversy between the United States and Great Britain. Britain had insisted on the practice of impressment as a matter of right, to return and punish sailors that British officials alleged were fugitives from the Royal Navy. This right, however, was used as a pretext to seize American sailors to meet the Royal Navy’s urgent need for manpower. As John Quincy Adams explained, ‘‘The pretense was the right of the king to take his own subjects only, the practice was to presume every man a British subject who was wanted’’ (quoted in Adams 1877, 178--179). A set of prohibitive decrees issued by both France and Britain in rapid succession placed American neutral commerce in a legal vise grip: Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, prohibited all trade in British goods, and declared a blockade of the British Isles. Napoleon’s ‘‘continental system’’ of blocking British access to all continental ports was, in effect, an ultimatum to all neutral nations that they were either France’s ally, or her enemy. In retaliation, Britain instituted an order in January 1807 which prohibited neutral trade between all enemy ports. This edict prohibited nearly all of the trade that the Berlin Decree permitted. Napoleon responded to Britain’s Order-inCouncil with another round of stringent rules for neutral vessels. This was the Milan Decree of December 1807. The United States could no longer preserve its neutrality by observing the strictures of both warring parties. Americans had to either choose sides, pursue a ‘‘triangular war’’ (a war against both powers), or refrain from foreign commerce altogether. The Jefferson administration’s answer was not naval strength on the high seas, but a strategy of peaceful, economic coercion. This was Madison’s brainchild, and Jefferson was not immediately converted. The disestablishment of the navy under Jefferson’s watch, however, left the administration with few alternatives when America’s neutral rights were abridged. The choice to avert war through the implementation of an embargo was, in Jefferson’s view, not ideal: ‘‘What is good in this case cannot be effected; we have, therefore, only to find out what will be least bad’’ (Jefferson to Gallatin, December 3, 1807, in Gallatin 1879, 367). What began, however, as the lesser evil became a veritable good, serving both defensive and offensive purposes. Jefferson explained that ‘‘The embargo keeping at home our vessels, cargoes & seamen, saves us the necessity of making their capture the cause of

immediate war’’ (Jefferson 1905, 11:414). Furthermore, by ‘‘keeping within ourselves,’’ Jefferson reasoned that the embargo would starve America’s enemies (Jefferson 1892, 9:193). Jefferson’s experiment with peaceful coercion came at a steep price---an economic burden that was not borne equally throughout the nation. It was a policy of self-inflicted economic hardship implemented on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, it fell especially hard on coastal constituents, generally, and in New England, in particular, where the economy was especially dependent on shipping. This policy, in other words, antagonized many New Englanders who already felt alienated by America’s westward progress. Federalists viewed the measure as both an assault on the American economy and a capitulation to Napoleon. The French enjoyed very little trade with the United States, since Britain’s Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic. Though neutral to the warring powers on its face, the embargo was certain to exact a far greater impact on the British. Moreover, the American embargo complemented (though not deliberately) Napoleon’s ‘‘continental system,’’ which prohibited British trade from ports on the European continent. The president’s embargo policy was certain to spark intense opposition in port towns along the eastern seaboard, even though it could not be successfully enforced without the cooperation of the mass public. Indeed, enforcement of the embargo was an administrative challenge of epic proportions: the temptation for merchants to defy the law was widespread, and opportunities to do so were readily available to any enterprising smuggler. Effective enforcement required both manpower for surveillance, and a capacity for interdiction both in the ports and near smuggling routes, mostly in the northeast. There was, however, no readily available approach to policing commerce on such a great territorial scale, especially in an institutional context in which the allegiances of state militiamen---the enforcement authorities of first resort---were often divided. Jefferson’s policy of neutrality and peaceful coercion was put to the test by the smuggling operations of politically disaffected New Englanders. The line between criminality and partisanship blurred in New England and on the frontier with Canada---mostly because extensive smuggling burgeoned in regions politically opposed to Jefferson’s policy. Jefferson’s embargo policy came to an end with the conclusion of his presidency in 1809. The failure of his embargo scheme was a testament to the fact that the successful enforcement of an ambitious policy program

442 Making Foreign Policy

A political cartoon lampoons the ‘‘cursed Ograbme’’ (embargo spelled backwards). The Embargo Act of 1807 eliminated U.S. trade with other nations, with the intent of forcing England and France to respect the neutral trading rights of the United States. The act was repealed in 1809, as it had failed to end either action by England or France, but instead caused a disruption of the U.S. economy and the revitalization of Federalist protest against the Republicans. (Lossing, Benson J., The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812, 1868)

required broad-based political support in an institutional climate in which the federal government could not guarantee the faithful execution of its own laws. The embargo crisis cast a basic condition of governance in the early national period in bold relief: that is, that enforceable federal authority across a territorially expansive polity was tenuous at best. Because of the institutional weakness of the federal government, partisan divisions and factional strife posed a grave danger to the strength and autonomy of the new nation.

National Loyalty and the War of 1812 Whereas Jefferson sought to enforce an embargo in the face of public resistance, Madison sought to prosecute a war bitterly opposed by Federalists. The tensions between the United States and Britain had changed little since 1808, when the embargo plan was originally

set in place. With the option of economic coercion a proven failure, however, war was viewed as the only remedy to the diversity of grievances held by many Republican leaders. Indeed, a confluence of disparate sectional interests galvanized support for war in 1812. The strongest proponents for war were westerners, many of whom believed that British restrictions on American navigation were responsible for declining prices of American agricultural exports (Taylor 1931; Perkins 1961, 287). The war was also motivated by the temptation to seize Canada. For westerners, Canada was the base from which the British provoked Native American aggression in the northwest territories (most notably at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 in the Indiana Territory) (Perkins 1961, 283--284). Northerners believed that seizing Canada would shift the balance of power in the Union toward the free, non-slave-holding states,

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 443 and southerners, for their part, hoped to foster future support for their claims on Florida by backing war on Canada. On a tactical level, however, American motives might be reduced to a simple logic: According to historian Bradford Perkins, ‘‘The central, universal theme’’ for proponents of war was to ‘‘strike at Canada, the most vulnerable British target, the easiest way to inflict punishment and extort concession’’ (1961, 289). For Madison’s political opponents, the decision to declare war against Britain alone was evidence enough that the administration was under the spell of Napoleon. Indeed, the French were nearly as hostile to America’s trade overseas as the British. According to Secretary of State James Monroe, France seized 307 American vessels under the Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807, plus 45 after the repeal of these decrees. Great Britain had seized 389 since November 1807. Republicans, however, were able to draw a sharp distinction between their grievances against the French and the British: a prominent Republican newspaper declared that ‘‘there is another atrocity incident solely to Great Britain, of the blackest and most savage complexion, which would alone convict her of being beyond all comparison to the greatest aggressor. We refer to the barbarous THEFTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS!’’ (Independent Chronicle [Boston] May 27, 1811, quoted in Perkins 1961, 85). It was readily apparent to the administration’s fiercest critics, nevertheless, that the issue of impressments was merely a pretext for the conquest of Canada. Some Federalist leaders from New England, fearful of the consequences of war, publicly endorsed a separation from the union or the negotiation of a separate peace with the British. Federalist clergyman Elijah Parish of Massachusetts issued such a message to his parishioners: proclaim an honourable neutrality; let the southern Heroes fight their own battles, and guard . . . against the just vengeance of their lacerated slaves. . . . Break those chains, under which you have sullenly murmured, during the long, long reign of democracy; . . . and once more breathe that free, commercial air of New England which your fathers always enjoyed. . . . Forbid this war to proceed in NewEngland (quoted in Banner 1970, 307). Talk of disunion was tempered only by a strange mix of horror and amusement at the failures of the federal government’s prosecution of the war. There were many to speak of: in addition to being duped by Napoleon into imposing trade sanctions on the British under the false pretense that France’s restrictive decrees had

been revoked, Madison also declared war before adequate measures to build American defenses were taken. American forces led by General William Hull surrendered Detroit without having fired a shot. Washington, D.C., was left vulnerable to attack; the White House, the Capitol, and government offices were burned by British forces. Meanwhile, the country’s finances were in disarray: Secretary of State James Monroe had to offer his private credit to finance Andrew Jackson’s forces in the West. Matters were made all the more desperate by the state governments of Massachusetts and Connecticut (Federalist strongholds), which refused to dedicate their militias to the cause. Fortunately for the Americans, the British were more preoccupied with destroying Napoleon’s forces than they were with putting down their former subjects. The desire of British industrialists to restore trade with the United States also prompted the British to negotiate an agreement. The Treaty of Ghent, signed December 24, 1814, ended the hostilities and required the return of most conquered territories. This treaty was more significant for what it did not resolve than for what it did: it left the issues of impressments, blockades, rights of neutrals, and control of the Great Lakes unresolved; nor did it address British support for an Indian buffer state in the American west. Andrew Jackson’s stunning victory at New Orleans on January 8, 1815 (before word arrived in America of the peace agreement signed at Ghent), however, relieved Americans from the embarrassing realities of an ill-conceived and poorly executed war---one which produced few if any concessions from the British. This was monumental triumph for the United States not only because it was militarily lopsided (only eight of Jackson’s soldiers were killed, while more than 2,000 British soldiers were killed or wounded), but also because it was feared that the British were likely to obtain New Orleans and hold it indefinitely. Once in control of New Orleans, the British would have been in a position to encourage frontiersmen to separate from the Union in exchange for access to the Mississippi River. Jackson’s victory was also politically crucial for the Republicans, who were able to conclude a poorly fought war with a taste of victory. Federalists, by contrast, were left in deep disrepute. New England Federalists had organized a convention, assembled in Hartford, Connecticut, to protest the war and the constitutionality of trade embargoes. As it was successfully framed by Republican leaders, the Hartford Convention called the authority of the Constitution into question and thereby encouraged the enemy in a time of war. The

444 Making Foreign Policy

The Battle of New Orleans, fought on January 8, 1815, resulted in the death of British lieutenant general Edward Pakenham and a victory for Major General Andrew Jackson. The battle is known as the greatest American victory of the war, although it was actually fought after the war had officially ended because news of the Treaty of Ghent, signed on December 24, 1814, had not yet reached the United States. (Library of Congress)

Hartford Convention discredited the Federalist cause and inflicted permanent damage to the Federalist Party, which soon declined into obscurity.

Setting the Stage for the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny The War of 1812 proved to be a crucial moment in early American state-building. The obvious lessons of the war prompted Republican leaders who had bitterly opposed the expansion of federal authority to reconsider the wisdom of their ideological commitments. In its immediate aftermath, President Madison submitted a set of recommendations to the Senate, promoting a policy course that echoed the Federalist agenda of the 1790s: the establishment of a regular army and navy to stand during peacetime, internal taxes, assistance for manufacturers (protective tariffs), a plan for internal improvements (for example, the construction of roads

and canals), and most controversially, the chartering of a national bank (an institution that Madison emphatically opposed when it was originally proposed by Hamilton in 1790). The restoration of peace following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 was a watershed moment in American history because it freed U.S. foreign policy from the controversies of neutrality and neutral rights. The United States was no longer pitted between two superpowers, setting to rest the suspicions of foreign influence and intrigue that had dominated American party politics since 1793. The absence of great foreign policy controversies after the War of 1812 ‘‘lowered the temperature’’ of domestic policy disputes and, with the collapse of the Federalist Party, inaugurated a period of single-party government that lasted until 1828. The march of American expansion continued after the war as southern leaders set their sights on East and West Florida. President James Monroe was able to

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 445 negotiate the transfer of the Floridas from the weak Spanish Empire to the United States, with help from Andrew Jackson, who used the Tennessee and Alabama militias to seize parts of Florida in a campaign against the Seminole Indians. This treaty, the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, set the stage for a critical departure in American diplomatic history. The United States had been reluctant to express sympathy or support for the wave of republican revolutions that had been cresting in Latin America for fear of angering the Spanish and compromising the prospects for a deal to obtain the Floridas. Once the Floridas had been secured, however, the Monroe administration had a freer hand to endorse the cause of the republican revolutionaries in South America. President Monroe seized on this moment in international political history to espouse a new set of diplomatic principles that would define, at least in principle, a confident, perhaps even arrogant, posture toward the world. The Monroe Doctrine, as it was later called, was a public declaration addressed to European powers stating that the United States could not view European efforts to recolonize lands in either of the American continents with ‘‘indifference’’ (Monroe 2001, 650). This was an ambitious position for the United States to assume, since it did not have the capacity to prevent European powers from working their will in Latin America. The stated purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was ultimately enforced by Britain’s Royal Navy, whose government was equally averse to the efforts of the France and Spain to reestablish their colonies in the New World. Monroe’s bold diplomatic departure made sense in the larger scheme of American political development: though the United States had gained few if any concessions from the British in the aftermath of the War of 1812, the United States had achieved a more durable security for its own territory. Security within their own borders afforded Americans the luxury to assert themselves on the world stage. American ambition for trade and solidarity with the republican revolutionaries of South America prompted the United States to commit itself (again, in theory) to a policy of insulating the whole hemisphere---the American continents---from European influence. In this sense, the Monroe Doctrine expanded the geographic scope of the long-standing U.S. priority to limit European interference in the New World. It also functioned as a justification for American claims in North America. Indeed, the Doctrine was, at least in part, the by-product of an ongoing tussle with Russia and Britain over claims to settlement in the Pacific Northwest. As such, the political outlook of the

Doctrine complemented the aggressive westward movement that defined American politics in the antebellum years. No longer polarized by foreign war, the focus of American politics turned inward. Political leaders increasingly directed their attention to matters concerning the proper relationship between the states and the federal government, debating the advantages and disadvantages of a system of federally sponsored internal improvements, protective tariffs for the promotion of domestic manufactures, and the establishment of a national bank. America’s turn inward coincided with several crucial developments in the operation of American democracy: the gradual extension of the franchise to white male Americans and the rise of mass party organizations. Electoral politics had been dominated in the early national period by a patrician elite drawn from the ‘‘great families’’ of society. By the 1820s, American politics became more egalitarian as members of the middle and working classes, no longer willing to defer to their ‘‘betters,’’ increasingly campaigned for and won elective office. Barriers to the franchise for white, male Americans were gradually weakened on a stateby-state basis as previously excluded persons, especially immigrants and the poor, were drawn into the political process. The gradual enfranchisement of white male Americans, however, is closely correlated with the disenfranchisement of free blacks. This pattern is not a coincidence: white male Americans in this period increasingly sought to strengthen their electoral power by excluding free blacks who previously enjoyed the right to vote in many states. These developments coincided with the rise of mass party organizations. Parties were traditionally feared by the patrician elite of the founding generation because of their tendency to politicize the masses and to divide the political loyalties of the people; by the 1820s, however, parties gradually came to be seen as institutions necessary to the functioning of America’s representative democracy. Indeed, they became a ‘‘normal’’ part of American politics, thanks, in part, to the end of war in Europe: parties no longer opposed one another over the most polarizing questions of foreign policy. In fact, there were no longer any momentous foreign policy questions on America’s political agenda to contest. Parties became more moderate in their orientation and therefore, more ‘‘safe’’ for republican government. Opposition between Jacksonian Democrats (heirs to the legacy of the Jeffersonian Republicans) and Whigs (who maintained a loose lineage from the Federalist Party) focused, instead, on differences over questions

446 Making Foreign Policy of primarily domestic importance, such as internal improvements, the propriety of economic protection for manufacturers, and the constitutionality of the national bank. The focus of American politics also turned westward. American settlers moved west in increasing numbers, motivated by the lure of virgin territory and sanctioned by the ideological doctrine of Manifest Destiny. America’s colonization of the western frontier shaped the development of a new brand of American politics, defined by growing tensions between the geographic sections of the country (North, West, and South) over the extension of the institution of slavery. Leading figures from the slaveholding elite believed that their ‘‘peculiar institution’’ needed to spread to new lands for it to endure in the South. This view was shared by many northerners who were optimistic that slavery eventually would end, so long as it was not permitted to extend beyond the states where it already existed. The settlement of new territories and the admission of new states became a political flashpoint because new states meant new members of Congress, and the existing states sought to achieve advantage in political representation by promoting the admission of states that would stand with them on matters concerning the institution of slavery. The controversy that erupted in 1819 over the proposal to prohibit the introduction of slavery to the new state of Missouri, for example, was settled only after its admission was tied to that of a free state, Maine. Western expansion therefore became a challenge of maintaining political balance in the polity. The requisite for political balance was the sobering consequence of America’s aggressive efforts to secure new lands. Federal forces in the antebellum years were increasingly stationed on the western frontier to defend American territorial gains and remove Native American tribes from the lands that were desired by American settlers. American expansion also brought the United States into conflict with Mexico. The federal government had, since 1825, actively promoted the settlement of the Americans in the northern part of the territory of Texas, a province of Mexico. Expansionist-minded politicians in the United States hoped to annex this territory ever since the settlers in Texas achieved a de facto independence from Mexico (they staged a successful revolt against Mexican authorities in 1836). The effort to annex Texas was the signature achievement of the Jacksonian Democrat James K. Polk of Tennessee, elected president in 1844. Polk sought to draw Mexican forces into a fight by stationing American troops in territory that Polk dubiously claimed to be part of Texas. Once the Mexicans attacked, Polk

rallied the nation to resist Mexico’s assault on ‘‘American soil.’’ The Mexican War gained for the United States the cession of Texas and territory in the southwest reaching to California’s Pacific Coast. Polk, however, did not seem to anticipate the sectional controversy that annexation would provoke. A proposal to exclude slavery from the territory ceded by Mexico, offered by the northern Democrat, David Wilmot, sparked a controversy akin to that which erupted over Missouri’s bid for statehood in 1819. Wilmot’s proposal, however, did not pass the Senate. Less than a decade later, in 1854, the standard set by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which held that slavery would be prohibited north of 36° 30’ latitude, came undone with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which institutionalized a principle of ‘‘popular sovereignty,’’ allowing the Kansas and Nebraska territorial governments (both states are north of 36° 30’ latitude) to decide whether to permit the institution of slavery. Northerners alarmed by the precedent of the KansasNebraska Act, and the Dred Scott decision of 1857 organized a new political party, the Republican Party,3 with a platform committed to limiting slavery to the states and territories where it already existed. The polarization of the political parties along a sectional (NorthSouth) divide foreshadowed the breakup of the Union. Indeed, the election of Abraham Lincoln on the Republican ticket in 1860 provoked secession from the southern states and ultimately brought the country to civil war. The nature of U.S. foreign policy was fundamentally altered once hostilities between Confederate and Union forces commenced. The overriding objective of U.S. foreign policy (that is, the foreign policy of the Union North) was reminiscent of its position in the early national period: to prevent European interference in America’s domestic affairs. This meant resisting foreign dealings with the secessionist states. The federal government in the 1860s was up to the task: by this point in time, the United States (the Union North in particular) was a far more populous and commercially powerful nation, and therefore more capable of deterring attempts by foreign powers to meddle in American politics. Britain and France had a greater interest in the outcome of the war than any other of the European powers. The textile industries of both nations were deeply dependent on imported cotton from the American South; the supply of cotton was severely restricted during the Civil War by the blockade imposed by the Union navy on Confederate ports. A speedy conclusion to the war (regardless of the victor) would have been advantageous for these industries. Many British manufacturers, on the other hand, were able to capitalize on

After Independence: Foreign Affairs and Political Development in the New Republic 447 the war by supplying the North and, to a lesser extent, the South with arms and other supplies. Sentiment in Britain over the justice and the advantages of the war was divided. Despite the humanitarian objections to slavery held by much of the British public, astute observers knew that an independent Confederacy would have substantially lowered the tariff burden imposed on British-manufactured goods sold in the South. Union efforts focused on restricting the export of cotton, preventing the Confederate states from purchasing ships and military supplies abroad, and discouraging foreign powers from recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation. The Union had at its disposal the capacity to blockade key Confederate ports (though the Union blockade was quite porous early in the conflict) and the ability to threaten war with any power that formally recognized the Confederacy as an independent nation or attempted to mediate the conflict, an act that likely would lead to recognition. Risking war with the United States posed real risks for the British: Canada was vulnerable to attack, and the British Isles were deeply dependent on wheat from the Union North (Bemis 1950, 373). France, for its part, would not interfere in the struggle if Britain would not take the lead (Bemis 1950, 365--366). Events on the battlefield ultimately dissuaded foreign involvement in the conflict (Bemis 1950, 373-374). The British, the French, and the Russians considered a proposal to mediate between the Union and the Confederacy, but cooled to the idea when Lee’s army was defeated at Antietam in September 1862. Foreign powers were far less inclined to interfere once the Union’s forces gained a decisive advantage in the conflict (after victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg).

Conclusion President Washington left office optimistic that America’s constitutional union would endure, so long as the country resisted the perils of foreign entanglements. He believed, in fact, that serious political disagreements would not arise in the United States if the new republic maintained an arm’s length from foreign controversies (Hofstadter 1969, 100). This belief, though somewhat utopian, held true for the early national period, when the great political controversies of the day were deeply intertwined with developments in Europe. Less than a decade after the conclusion of the War of 1812, however, deep sectional divisions began to take shape over the extension of slavery to the territories. America’s progress westward---and not foreign

entanglements---drew American politics toward intractable questions concerning the future of slavery. The dynamic relationship between foreign affairs and domestic politics in the early national period and in the antebellum years raises a crucial question about the course of early American political development: how, and to what extent, was the political and economic independence of the new republic secured? While the United States may have achieved its independence de jure (that is, as a matter of law) with the Treaty of Paris of 1783, it remained vulnerable to attack and intimidation in its own territory and on the high seas, and its commerce remained deeply dependent on the British. The autonomy of the new nation was also complicated by problems of governance: the agents of foreign powers (or Americans with foreign sympathies) could operate on American soil contrary to the dictates of federal law because the federal government’s control of its own territory was limited. American leaders sometimes went to great lengths to compensate for this institutional vulnerability by imposing strict political controls on the American people, most notoriously by the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, but also by the Jefferson administration as he sought to enforce his embargo policy. A more substantive, durable independence was eventually achieved, not by such draconian measures, but rather by the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the military stalemate that concluded the War of 1812. No longer caught in the cross fire of foreign war or threatened by invasion from powerful enemies abroad, the United States achieved a measure of security at home and a degree of autonomy in its commercial affairs. Yet, the new opportunities for expansion in the aftermath of the War of 1812 ultimately produced new challenges that redefined the nature of American politics: while statesmen in the early national period were preoccupied with the definition and enforcement of America’s neutrality in the global political arena, leading figures in the antebellum years were fixated on the tensions between free and slave states. The organizing dilemma of American politics shifted from the management of neutrality in the world to the preservation of internal political balance. Developments abroad did not cause this transformation, but they did contribute to a fundamental redefinition of the American political agenda.

References and Further Reading Adams, Henry, ed. 1877. Documents Relating to New-England Federalism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

448 Making Foreign Policy Adams, John. 1856. The Life and Works of John Adams. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Banner, James M. 1970. To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789--1815. 1st ed. New York: Knopf. Bemis, Samuel Flagg. 1950. A Diplomatic History of the United States. 3rd ed. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. Charles, Joseph. 1961. The Origins of the American Party System: Three Essays. New York: Harper & Row. DeConde, Alexander. 1958. Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. DeConde, Alexander. 1966. The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797--1801. New York: Scribner. Elkins, Stanley M., and Eric L. McKitrick. 1993. The Age of Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Gallatin, Albert. 1879. The Writings of Albert Gallatin. Edited by Henry Adams. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Hamilton, Alexander. 2001. Writings. Edited by Joanne B. Freeman. New York: The Library of America. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 1961. The Federalist. Edited by Benjamin Fletcher Wright. New York: Metro Books. Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. The Idea of a Party System: the Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840. Berkeley: University of California Press. Jefferson, Thomas. 1892. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Paul L. Ford. Vols. 6, 8, and 9. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Jefferson, Thomas. 1905. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Albert Ellery Bergh. Vol. 11. Washington, DC: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States. Katznelson, Ira, and Martin Shefter, eds. 2002. Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ketcham, Ralph L. 1984. Presidents above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789--1829. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. LaFeber, Walter. 1972. ‘‘Foreign Policies of a New Nation: Franklin, Madison, and the ‘‘Dream of a New Land to Fulfill with People in Self-Control.’’ In From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations. Edited by William Appleman Williams, 9--37. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Longmore, Paul K. 1988. The Invention of George Washington. Berkeley: University of California Press. Madison, James. 1999. Writings. Edited by Jack N. Rakove. New York: Library of America. McDonald, Forrest. 1974. The Presidency of George Washington. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. McDonald, Forrest. 1976. The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Miller, John Chester. 1964. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation. New York: Harper & Row. Monroe, James. 2001. The Political Writings of James Monroe. Edited by James Lucier. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc. Perkins, Bradford. 1961. Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805--1812. Berkeley: University of California Press. Perkins, Bradford. 1993. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776--1865. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, George. 1931. ‘‘Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812.’’ Journal of Political Economy 39: 471--505. Washington, George. 1836. The Writings of George Washington; being his Correspondence, Addresses, Messages, and other papers, official and private, selected and published from the original manuscripts; with a life of the author, notes and illustrations. Edited by Jared Sparks. Boston: Russell, Shattuck, and Williams, and Hilliard, Gray, and Company. Washington, George. 1997. Writings. Edited by John H. Rhodehamel. New York: Library of America.

Notes 1. The Hamiltonian Federalist Party took shape in the early to mid-1790s, and endured as a national political party until approximately 1815. The Hamiltonian Federalists (henceforth to be referred to as the Federalist Party) should not be confused with the Federalists of the late 1780s, who advocated the ratification of the Constitution. 2. When Congress requested from Adams the full record of the mission, he inserted X, Y, and Z for the names of the French agents involved. 3. The Republican Party formed in the 1850s shared neither a political nor an ideological relationship with Jefferson’s Republican Party of the early national period.

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 Paul McCartney Professor of Political Science, Towson University

throughout their nation’s history on fulfilling this destiny only within their own borders, which were expanded when necessary to ‘‘enlarge the realm of liberty,’’ few Americans disputed the notion that their model ultimately should be adopted by all the world’s peoples. Until the 1890s, however, capacity, opportunity, and resolve had never converged sufficiently to allow the country to endorse this vision through its actions on the world stage. Yet, once the United States began to engage the world, its sense of mission endowed even the boldest actions with moral legitimacy and allowed the American people to accept a radical change in their nation’s place in the world without essentially challenging their identity as a people. Their leaders, who skillfully blended virtuous rhetoric with strategic accomplishment, helped them in this process. Most successful in persuading the public to embrace their nation’s new stature were William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson. Thus, even as the rest of the world uneasily saw the United States as becoming a great power like any other, the American people were able to interpret their new status as a fulfillment of both their core values and their exceptional identity. America’s specific policies always aimed to secure economic and geopolitical interests, but as the country’s place in world politics evolved, so too did its definition of those interests. It was a self-reinforcing process. Yet, despite the obvious transformations that accompanied America’s great ascent, its conduct

During its formative years, the United States avoided engaging politically in ‘‘entangling alliances’’ with the European powers that dominated world affairs, because it considered itself to be too weak. Little more than two centuries later, America enjoys unrivalled global influence---a stunning expansion of national power. The first stage of this explosive transformation lasted from 1890--1920, when the United States undertook a new, boldly assertive approach to international politics. The essential contours of that era’s foreign policy remain in place in the early twenty-first century, as the United States continues to embed its pursuit of the national interest in a broader agenda of redefining the norms governing international relations. Among the forces that drove and channeled America’s new activism were a vigorous national government no longer hamstrung by Civil War--era fractiousness, an enormous economy fueled by the Second Industrial Revolution, a national ideology that embraced greatness and celebrated America’s ‘‘universal’’ values, and a series of opportunities that seemed tailored to fit American ambitions. Because of the combined effect of these conditions, the United States was able to transform itself in 30 years from a relatively inconsequential state on the world scene into one of its leading powers. America’s engagement with the world forced a reexamination of the national identity. Americans had always believed themselves to be an exceptional people with the special purpose of establishing the viability of liberal democratic governance. While concentrating 449

450 Making Foreign Policy abroad consistently supported certain basic initiatives. The most significant of these were expanding its military, especially the navy; keeping foreign markets available to Americans (a goal that found its prototypical expression in the Open Door policy in China); enforcing a more interventionist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine; enhancing America’s extraterritorial presence through the construction, for example, of the Panama Canal and Pacific naval bases; and adjusting relations with the European powers, notably Great Britain, to reflect America’s new equivalence in international prestige. Punctuating these years were two episodes that catalyzed America’s transformation: the Spanish-American War of 1898, with its accompanying colonial forays, and World War I, which culminated in Wilson’s articulation of a bold new paradigm for world politics. By surveying U.S. foreign policy from 1890-1920, it is possible to discern how a gradual accumulation of concrete decisions, pursuing the above goals and guided by an ambitious idealism, laid the foundation for America’s current role of global superpower.

Roots: 1890--1897 Conceivably, the United States might have embarked on its activist course sooner than it did, but internal divisions relating to slavery and Federalism made doing so impossible. The Civil War allowed the country to overcome these obstacles. Most significant for foreign policy, the Civil War settled the issue regarding the federal government’s political primacy over the states. The consolidation of the United States into a unified nation-state did not take place overnight---the process that began with the Union’s victory in 1865 accelerated during the Spanish-American War and only became irreversible under Roosevelt and Wilson. Two consequences of this development decisively altered U.S. foreign policy. First, Washington became capable of mobilizing America’s vast natural and economic resources for its own purposes and projecting them outward to a degree unimaginable during the sectionalism of the antebellum era. Second, the nation, though still divided along racial and religious lines, began the necessary but arduous process of reimagining itself as a single, united people. Though of uncertain cohesion, this newly unified American nation provided another resource for the national government to mobilize when necessary, and it provided the backbone that could stiffen ambitious presidents’ resolve. As long as the politics of Reconstruction dominated Americans’ attention in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, it was difficult to recognize the full foreign policy implications

of either American nationalism or Washington’s new primacy in national affairs, but in any situation of this sort, where latent power is available but untapped, political entrepreneurs inevitably will discover it and put it to use. President Benjamin Harrison and his secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, were the first to employ this new capacity in foreign affairs in a way that stuck. They exploited the nation’s political and industrial might by instituting a naval-expansion program in 1890 that built the world’s 12th-ranked navy into one that, within 25 years, was equal even to Great Britain’s. Harrison and Tracy’s contribution to this meteoric ascent was modest in terms of new armaments---Congress appropriated funds for only three new battleships in the first year of the program---but it was decisive in terms of institutionalizing a new perspective on the nature and purpose of American power. Yet, Harrison and Tracy were not the originators of the philosophy that justified the new American Navy that would become so instrumental in establishing the United States as a great power. Nor was the man whom most credit with these ideas, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the originator, although he was an indispensable agent in the process and someone whose contribution merits special attention. Mahan’s most important book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1600--1783, was published in 1890. It was an immediate sensation. Its thesis held that the foundation of a nation’s greatness lies in its ability to control the seas. Elegant and seductive, this argument challenged policy makers to test its assumptions and see whether controlling the seas really did lead to national supremacy. Mahan’s ideas changed history not only by persuading top governmental officials in the United States to start building more ships, but also by inspiring Germany to undertake its own massive navalbuilding program. Accurate or not, therefore, Mahan’s masterpiece decisively changed the behavior of some of the most powerful states in the world. Without him, it is unlikely that the United States would have begun its relatively vigorous effort to enhance its power-projecting capability when it did, and without the modest but still noteworthy naval power that resulted, America in turn would have fought a different sort of war with Spain in 1898---if indeed it had chosen to fight at all. Even so, Mahan’s essential contribution lay less in generating a new worldview than in translating existing popular assumptions about social and political competition into a compelling plan of action. The intellectual tide that crested with Harrison’s implementation of Mahan’s vision had begun to rise during the 1880s, when social Darwinism became the

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 451 dominant social construct in American culture. Under Darwinism’s sway, the tradition of maintaining only enough power to remain successfully aloof from Europe now seemed inadequate, and Americans came to regard the constant accrual of strength and power as essential to national survival. Part of social Darwinism’s appeal lay in the high regard it paid elite individuals and societies, which, according to Darwinism, earned their position because they were the most deserving. As a self-designated exceptional people, Americans enjoyed the implications of this perspective, and they came increasingly to resent the discrepancy between their first-rate ‘‘fitness’’ and third-rate international stature. Also, as a white supremacist society, they appreciated how Darwinism could be used to justify their racism, although many social Darwinian theorists were silent on race. The conceptual mood that Mahan bottled, in short, was that since the ‘‘best’’ societies were also the most powerful, competing more directly with other peoples should be seen as a national moral imperative. The change in thinking that Mahan represented became evident in how Americans described the oceans that formed their eastern and western boundaries: no longer ‘‘moats,’’ they became ‘‘highways,’’ especially in the discourse of public officials. These terms expressed quite different worldviews. Previously, Americans had considered the oceans to have provided them with ‘‘free security’’ in regard to the Europeans, which freed them up to conquer the non-Europeans who occupied land that they desired in North America without worrying about being overtaken themselves. By reconceiving the oceans as highways, however, Americans saw the seas both as avenues by which Europeans could conceivably reach the American mainland and, significantly, as the means by which they could reach new markets and investment opportunities. More fundamentally, the combination of Darwinism and the image of oceanic ‘‘highways’’ inspired Americans to regard their proper role to be one in which they projected themselves onto the world. It suddenly mattered whether or not the United States. was a powerful nation. While Mahan articulated the implications of this evolving sentiment with persuasive clarity, new realities gave his ideas urgency. The most important force encouraging an activist posture was the massive surge in America’s economic might. While the economy grew relatively slowly during the 1870s and 1880s, indeed sinking into a depression from 1873 until 1896, the huge growth in America’s economy over the course of its history had never quite been translated into traditional international power because of the internal

divisions surrounding slavery. Once the smoke cleared from the Civil War, therefore, Americans felt increasingly itchy to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by their superior economy. In addition, a more centralized economic system dominated by corporate titans such as Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller had arisen in the 1870s, and these individuals and the ‘‘trusts’’ they led demanded that the federal government provide them with increased assistance in their overseas competition with European mercantilism. Given the proportion of the domestic economy that these trusts controlled, it is understandable that Washington agreed that the nation’s economic fortunes corresponded to some degree with that of the corporate giants. Free trade, a stable investment environment, and ready access to overseas markets such as China thus became important foreign policy goals. These goals became more imperative after a theory became widely accepted that held that robust economies require new outlets for their goods. The increased efficiency in American production that was spawned by the Second Industrial Revolution had gradually worked to depress prices. The only way to pick those prices back up, it was believed, was to find new markets for American goods. Unfortunately, as the U.S. Census declared in 1890, the American frontier had just closed, and no new markets were available within the country’s borders. Yet, overproduction of American manufactures continued, and, worse, Europeans during these years had been racing to secure exclusive vassalage relationships with the world’s nonwhite peoples, potentially foreclosing American access to the markets that they represented. Continued passivity was no longer an option. Washington had to help to open and protect markets for American merchants and investors if the United States were to avoid an economic implosion. Both foreign trade and overseas investments thus rose precipitously in dollar value during the decades bridging the Civil War with the turn of the century, and an ever-larger portion of the American economy became dependent on events and conditions overseas. A forward military presence to protect these activities began to appear necessary to national economic survival. Also significant in impelling and sustaining the adoption of Mahan’s navalist vision was a new sense of security needs. More precisely, since no real security threats had truly emerged (the ‘‘moat’’ analogy remained fitting as far as meaningful assault on the mainland was concerned), Americans felt motivated to enhance their national power due to threats to their pride and self-understanding. Lurking in the

452 Making Foreign Policy background of some leaders’ imaginations was Germany, though that state only concerned Americans episodically. For example, a diplomatic crisis between Germany and the United States had erupted in 1889 over the disposition of Samoa, which each state desired as part of its own broader plan of dominance in the Pacific. After a brief naval standoff there, Germany, Britain, and the United States ratified a treaty that divided the islands between them, leaving the United States in control of the port in Pago Pago. That port had been the major concern of Americans from the start, as it offered an important stepping-stone to the fabled Chinese market, and the German question faded for a while. As a security-pride concern, though, looming larger to Americans than Germany was Chile. Chile earned special attention from Americans in 1891, when events there nearly precipitated a war. Soldiers on shore leave in Santiago fought a brawl with a Chilean mob; 2 Americans were killed and 16 others were seriously injured. The episode worsened already poor relations between Chile and the United States enough to prompt President Harrison to issue a war address, at which point Chile backed down. As the crisis unfolded, Americans came uncomfortably to realize both that Chile’s navy was more potent than theirs and that Chile would be no pushover if the disagreement actually became a military one. The prospect of suffering major losses at the hands of a Latin American state (no one actually thought that the United States would lose a war against Chile) exposed the Monroe Doctrine as more rhetoric than reality, and it made a farce of America’s self-understanding as one of the movers of history. At some point, Americans determined, the United States would have to start accumulating the material capacity to inflict real and not merely metaphoric changes on others if it were to maintain its identity and pride as a transformative nation. The Chilean crisis of 1891, while something less than a footnote to most contemporary observers, thus developed into a wake-up call to U.S. foreign policy makers---especially in situations that implicated the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine had been such a staple of American foreign policy for so long that it had become part of America’s identity. By the 1890s, however, cracks in the facade of America’s entitlement to dictate events in Latin America, if only rhetorically, grew too obvious to ignore. Chile’s insolence (in Americans’ eyes) and the inability of the United States easily to ‘‘correct’’ it sounded the first alarm. A second, more dangerous episode grew out of America’s efforts to induce Britain and Venezuela to use arbitration in

1894--1895 to settle a boundary dispute at the mouth of the Orinoco River, where gold had been found. Venezuela was only too eager to employ arbitration; the British, on the other hand, found little incentive to replace the discretion of an arbitrator for that of its warships. Europeans had never ceased enforcement activities in Latin America, and Britain saw itself in this situation as simply continuing in a well-established tradition. It is easy to forget that the Monroe Doctrine did not ban outsiders from the Western Hemisphere; it only ‘‘prohibited’’ them from seeking new colonies there. Free to establish economic relations with the states of Latin America---many of whom were their excolonies---Europeans, especially Britain, had acquired something of a stranglehold on the ‘‘southern’’ market. When the United States therefore insisted that Britain and Venezuela settle their dispute via arbitration, Britain understandably regarded America’s assertion of the Monroe Doctrine’s dispositive influence dismissively. In seeking to employ arbitration, moreover, the United States invoked the principles of the PanAmerican Union, a brainchild of President Harrison’s secretary of state, James G. Blaine, that had convened for the first time in the Washington Congress of 1889-1890. By creating an institutional framework for resolving differences according to international law, facilitating trade through reciprocity treaties, and dealing with numerous issues such as extradition, international railroads, and a postal union, the Pan-American Union was designed to establish stable, peaceful, and profitable relations among the American states. In other words, it was meant to tie Latin America more closely to the United States---at the expense of Europe. Britain clearly recognized American intentions in the region and was beginning, along with the other European states, to regard the Monroe Doctrine as not merely the empty rhetoric of a preening young nation, but also as a bit of nuisance. When, therefore, President Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state, Richard Olney, issued a memorandum to Britain about the Venezuela border dispute in 1895 that asserted an aggressive new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, it became clear that the United States meant business. In language shocking for its bluster and naivete, the ‘‘Olney Note,’’ as it became known, declared to the most powerful state in the world: Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? . . . It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 453

Political cartoon titled ‘‘Keep off! The Monroe Doctrine must be respected!’’ depicts Uncle Sam as an armed soldier protecting the Latin American powers of Nicaragua and Venezuela from the European powers of Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Portugal. The cartoon was published in Judge, February 15, 1896. (Library of Congress)

equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of its situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. Great Britain rejected this argument, accurately dismissed the Monroe Doctrine as having no basis in international law, and went about its business. Cleveland reacted angrily and announced that the United States would enforce its own conclusion as to where the Venezuelan boundary actually lay. Amazed, Britain at last acceded to arbitration, and a very relieved American public realized that it had come perilously close to starting a war that it did not want to fight. Similarly, Britain was confirmed in its suspicion that the United States was no longer a weakling to be ignored, but a state whose power could render it either a dangerous rival or a valuable ally. This episode was a defining moment in America’s relations with Europe. By backing down from a direct

conflict with the United States---as it also did in several other, less explosive instances during these years--Britain signaled both a newfound respect for American power and a shrewd calculation that the United States could prove useful if British relations with Germany continued to deteriorate. By accommodating the prickly new assertiveness of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, where the British had traditionally been preeminent, Britain showed that it was willing to regard America as a partner with whom it could divvy up global responsibilities. American Anglophiles agreed, and relations between the two countries, which had been bitter rivals throughout the 19th century, perceptibly began to improve. Another indication of America’s growing prestige could be seen in the enhanced status of its diplomats, who were accorded greater respect during the 1890s and in many instances received the official rank of ambassador for the first time. Long uneasy about the potential realization of America’s might, in other words, Europeans had begun to conclude that the United States was indeed becoming a factor in world affairs. The administration of William

454 Making Foreign Policy McKinley, which began in 1896, went far toward confirming this expectation. Under his watch, the United States decisively defeated Spain in a war, acquired colonies, and incorporated a new brand of global triumphalism into its national identity. If the Olney Note indicated that something might be afoot in American foreign policy, subsequent events soon confirmed the suspicion.

The Pivot: 1898--1902 The major event signaling America’s emergence on the world stage was the Spanish-American War of 1898. A product of complex social forces, the SpanishAmerican War initiated the modern era, during which time the United States broadened its mission from perfecting democracy domestically to altering the conduct of non-Americans. Each of the trends discussed above contributed in important ways to the outbreak of the war and its expansionist settlement, but nationalism had a particularly pronounced effect on events. Regarding the time at last ripe for their country to take its place with the era’s leading powers, Americans used force to end Spanish colonialism in the Caribbean and Pacific and replace it with their own model of imperialism. Although the colonial experiment would not last very long, the sentiment from which it emerged---that the United States should ‘‘fix’’ or Americanize other countries and peoples when it could and when doing so would also enhance American power---became entrenched as a result of the war. Acquiring colonies, however, was a consequence unforeseen before the conflict by most Americans, including even the president who ultimately engineered the policy. Indeed, for longer than any observer would have thought possible, President William McKinley staunchly resisted the powerful jingoistic tide that carried the nation into war in the first months of 1898. The impulse to fight Spain grew out of moral indignation over atrocities that Spanish forces committed against the Cuban population during the SpanishCuban War that began in 1895. That war affected the United States only indirectly by requiring it to maintain an active presence along its coastline to prevent filibustering expeditions from carrying arms to the Cuban insurgents. It also disrupted the profitable sugar trade that had grown up between the United States and Cuba, while also damaging Americans’ extensive investments on the island. But without the angry humanitarianism of a nation that took offense at Spain’s insistence on acting in a way that the United States disapproved of and doing so only 90 miles off the Florida coast, there

would have been no war. A strong sense of Christian duty, liberal nationalism, and Anglo-Saxonism had merged to persuade Americans---both ordinary citizens and their political leaders---that the United States must intervene in Cuba to create conditions that would be more congenial to American values and interests. American belligerence reflected the same restless pride that had led to Harrison’s naval expansion and Olney’s stout note to Britain and that otherwise had been searching for tangible expression in the broader global arena. Here, in the Spanish-Cuban War, Americans found a set of circumstances that seemed almost to have been calculated specifically to excite the nationalism and righteous indignation of a proud, moralistic people. Even given Americans’ penchant to fluster themselves about perceived shortcomings, however, Spanish conduct on the island was shockingly depraved. Thus, while American sentiment had been heavily inclined to favor the Cuban nationalists from the outset of the war, once Spanish Gen. Valeriano Weyler implemented his infamous ‘‘reconcentration’’ policy, American opinion irrevocably settled into a virulently anti-Spanish posture. The reconcentration policy entailed rounding up Cuba’s rural population and placing it in fortified compounds, where disease and starvation ultimately took the lives of at least 100,000 civilians. The ‘‘yellow press’’ dutifully documented, exaggerated, and supplemented the horrors stemming from this and other policies, cultivating among its readers the conviction that Spanish brutality must stop. More sober analysts were skeptical of the outrageous accounts that trickled out from the island, and the business community in particular was leery of jeopardizing the economy’s young and still uncertain recovery from the long depression of 1873--1896 by embarking on a war not demanded by clear security considerations. In addition, President McKinley recognized that America was not yet prepared to fight a major war against a European state, even one as decrepit and fading as Spain. America’s 27,000-member military had been kept miniscule due to Americans’ profound mistrust of a standing army, and it had been built mostly to subdue the Native Americans in the West. The jingoist energy that was clamoring for war---and finding prominent expression in Congress by 1897---also was inarticulate as to the ultimate goals of the war beyond removing Spain from Cuba and vindicating American power, and this lack of focus also gave the cautious president pause. Three events catalyzed the movement to war. The first was the publication of a purloined letter from the Spanish ambassador, Dupuy de Lome, that indicated

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 455 that Spanish diplomacy with the United States regarding Cuba had been duplicitous. McKinley had been striving for a peaceful solution to the crisis, and the de Lome letter unmistakably revealed that Spanish feints at accommodation were merely ploys for continued delay, an untenable policy for a president whose public had been stamping its feet with impatience. The second major event was a speech given on the floor of the Senate by the Vermont Republican, Redfield Proctor. Proctor was a close ally of both the president and the business community, and his skepticism regarding the more sensational accounts of Spanish policy was well known. When he returned from his own fact-finding mission to Cuba, calmly confirmed the extent of Spanish brutality there, and advocated intervention, a strong signal was sent that America’s conservative elements, who had McKinley’s ear, no longer wished to resist the push to fight. The third, most famous spark precipitating the war was the sinking of the battleship Maine. One of the earliest products of Harrison’s naval-expansion program, the Maine was moored in the Havana harbor on a neutral mission of safeguarding American lives and property. Spanish citizens there were mirroring their American counterparts with spasms of anti-American fury that found increasingly dangerous expression. The battleship’s presence was meant to serve as a quiet reassurance to Americans and a not-too-subtle warning to Spain to rein in its citizens. It was a stunning turn of events, therefore, when the Maine mysteriously exploded and sank to the floor of the harbor. The sinking was gasoline on the fire of American public opinion, which immediately accused Spain of rank treachery. When the naval commission investigating the cause of the explosion erroneously concluded that an external source---a mine---was responsible for sinking the ship, war became a foregone conclusion. McKinley was certain that Spain had not planted the mine, as he recognized that the last thing Spain wanted to do was provoke America to fight. Given the state of public opinion and the seriousness of the tragedy, however, he had little choice but to hold Spain responsible for the event (which it would have been, had a mine really been the cause of the explosion rather than the true culprit, a coal-bin fire). The only issue to be settled at this point was the terms by which America would fight. Consciously implicated in this question was the larger one of the broader purpose that the Spanish-American War should have for American grand strategy. A spirited debate in Congress on this point resulted in the Teller Amendment being appended to the war resolution; it forbade

the United States from acquiring Cuba as a colony. McKinley, a Republican, was willing to accept this provision against annexation, but he rejected the Democrats’ preference for merely supporting the Cuban effort to win freedom from Spain as too limited. Instead, he recognized in the conflict an opportunity to begin externalizing American values in a manner unprecedented in the American experience, and he convinced the Republican majority of both houses to embrace his more expansive vision of the war’s intended consequences. The war itself was quick and easy, at least from a military standpoint. It was won, predictably, through naval superiority, and it featured the famous exploits of the Rough Riders, a strange cavalry unit that combined Harvard athletes, authentic cowboys, and Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned his post in the Navy Department to lead the charge up San Juan Hill. The Spanish-American War was not neat, however, and it exposed serious deficiencies in the organizational capacity of the American military, which McKinley subsequently undertook to reform. Far more soldiers had died of disease than combat, and much of the food that was sent to America’s soldiers in their base camps in Tampa (where most of them remained for the duration of the conflict) was contaminated or otherwise inedible. After McKinley replaced Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, a political appointee lacking the requisite experience, with the hypercompetent Elihu Root, the military became far more efficient. Under Root’s direction, it began to modernize and transform itself to handle the demands of America’s emerging global role. In addition to disastrous incompetence, another, ironic impetus for the permanent enlargement and modernization of the army was the highly unpopular Philippine-American War that grew out of the Spanish-American War. The Philippine conflict will be discussed more directly below, but its present significance lay in its forcing the government to maintain a sizeable army after the reason for raising it in the first place---fighting Spain---had passed. Suppressing the Filipino insurgency not only protracted the service of America’s volunteers, it also gave a clear indication of what the country’s newly expansive foreign policy might require. Colonialism, Americans quickly learned, was neither cheap nor supportable with a military force geared only toward pacifying the dwindling resistance of Native Americans. The war helped McKinley to attain a significantly more powerful position in the government than any president had enjoyed since Abraham Lincoln. McKinley took charge of the war’s administration, setting up the country’s first-ever war room in the White

456 Making Foreign Policy

The damaged forward section of the U.S. battleship Maine following its sinking. In 1911, army engineers built a coffer dam around the wreckage, pumping out the water and allowing the wreckage to be studied. (Naval Historical Center)

House basement from which he dictated events in the field using telephones and other new technology. He also enforced party discipline around each of his policies, which had the cumulative effect of strengthening his voice relative to others in the national policymaking process. In addition, McKinley was an effective orator capable of marshaling nationalist imagery to great effect. In fact, over the course of the conflict, Americans came to regard the war as an opportunity to overcome lingering sectional divisions, and McKinley translated the effusive fellow-feeling that he consciously cultivated into a national constituency willing to follow his lead. Overall, by exploiting the relatively greater constitutional authority that the executive enjoys in foreign affairs, especially when acting as commander in chief, McKinley centralized power in his own hands, took charge of the national agenda, and led the country in new directions. Colonialism, by far the most significant policy choice to be made immediately following the war, also carried the largest symbolic weight over the long term.

While the Teller Amendment had legally forbidden the United States from annexing Cuba, nothing prevented the United States from seizing the other Spanish colonies. In early 1899, therefore, the United States ratified a peace treaty that forced Spain to cede Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands to the United States. In a separate action in the summer of 1898, the United States also formally annexed Hawaii, and through the Platt Amendment of 1902, America’s occupying forces in Cuba were able to consolidate U.S. control of that island, too. The populations of the new island acquisitions were barred from participating in any of the annexation decisions. Much of the political drive and intellectual justification for imperialism came from a group of influential Republicans who surrounded the president, including Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred T. Mahan, Elihu Root, and Brooks Adams. Known as the Large Policy group, these men saw the United States as overdue in taking its rightful place alongside the European great powers, which at the time were engaged in a volatile and vigorous

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 457 competition for colonies. While the Large Policy advocates certainly must shoulder much responsibility for America’s experiment with colonialism, the decision to undertake this radical departure from past practice was McKinley’s, and his motivations for choosing this course derived as much from his understanding of America’s mission as from the clear geopolitical and economic stakes that such a policy raised. Ultimately, America’s decision to rule over other peoples to whom it had no intention of granting citizenship grew out of McKinley’s acceptance that changing world conditions demanded a more proactive foreign policy. In McKinley’s estimation, if the United States did not strive to implant its values in other places, then the Europeans would do so. The choice, in other words, was not whether the acquisitions should become American colonies or become independent, but whether the islands should fall under the sway of American or European values. Framed in this way, it became morally suspect for the United States merely to swap one set of European rulers for another. Especially given the humanitarian dimension of the decision to engage Spain, McKinley convinced himself that nothing could help the Filipinos more than receiving America’s beneficent stewardship. Had Americans still regarded themselves as a people completely apart from the intrigues and concerns of the rest of the world, it would have mattered little to them whether the Filipinos fell under American or, say, German influence. The fact that Americanizing the Filipinos suddenly seemed an important task shows that a new way of thinking about foreign affairs had taken root by 1899. To say the least, McKinley’s decision was not embraced universally, least of all by the Filipinos themselves. A nationalist group that had begun fighting for its freedom from Spain in 1896 quickly began an insurgency against the United States once it realized that the American concept of ‘‘liberating’’ them actually meant colonizing them. Led by Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino nationalists had already established an autonomous constitutional government modeled explicitly after America’s, and their cause enjoyed wide support. The United States used brutal tactics to put down the guerillas, with soldiers justifying their decisions to use torture, a scorched earth campaign, and a close variant of Spain’s reconcentration policy with arguments premised on harsh racism and dubious military necessity. One of the more sordid episodes of American history, the Philippine-American War, which ended in 1903, ultimately caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Filipino civilians. It was a far bloodier war than the Spanish-American War had been, and its brutality both

galvanized opponents of America’s imperial policy and provoked a Senate inquiry. Domestic opposition to the colonial experiment rested on more than disgust with the atrocities American soldiers were committing, however. The conflict between American principles and maintaining colonies was obvious, and a thoughtful and profound debate about American values and ideals achieved tangible, meaningful expression as Americans grappled with the implications of their new foreign policy. Serious opposition to colonialism appeared early and remained vocal for decades; the initially massive anti-imperialist movement was first organized to encourage senators to reject the treaty and avoid the policy in the first place. Despite the weighty objections that colonialism inspired, however, President McKinley skillfully and sincerely defended his policy as being a natural outgrowth of America’s deepest traditions and values. The debate that transpired between the imperialists and anti-imperialists engaged all levels of American society in a fundamental inquiry into both the purpose of the United States and its proper role on world affairs, but McKinley’s policy ultimately carried the day. The Philippines remained a colony until 1946 and Puerto Rico and Guam are still protectorates hovering in a netherworld between sovereignty and full membership in the United States. Yet, the American style of colonialism was distinctive. Though Americans imitated Europe in undertaking to ‘‘uplift and civilize’’ those who came under their control, their goal was to prepare the possessions for autonomy and relinquish the intensive responsibilities of governing as quickly as possible. Establishing strict mercantile relations on the European model was never a goal, nor was permanently retaining territories that ultimately were not destined to become states, as the new island possessions clearly were not (largely for racist reasons). On the other hand, Americans fully intended their new territories to benefit them both politically and economically and to be immune from the European landgrab. The policy’s gains were quickly apparent. Cuba and Puerto Rico shored up the American presence in Latin America, converted the Caribbean Sea into something like an American lake, and transformed the Monroe Doctrine from an empty boast into a vehicle for economic dominance. Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines, meanwhile, served America’s strategic interests in the Pacific, where both Germany and Japan had been making disquieting noises, and provided a series of coaling stations and military bases that could link the American mainland to the fabled China market.

458 Making Foreign Policy China had been a particular focus in the great imperial competition of the late-19th century, as each of the great powers placed portions of it under their own exclusive jurisdiction. The Chinese, of course, thought differently about who should be in control of their country, and the Boxer Rebellion of 1898--1900 pitted Chinese nationalists against the combined force of the occupying powers, who sought to protect their Christian missionaries, whom the Boxers targeted. McKinley sent 5,000 troops from Manila to defend American lives and interests there and put down the uprising. American participation in the Boxer Rebellion was something of an aberration, though, since America’s true goal was not to maintain an active military presence in China but to secure it as an open market where the United States could trade freely in any state’s sphere of influence. McKinley’s secretary of state, John Hay, thus issued the famous Open Door Notes in 1898 and 1900, which articulated the principle of free trade throughout China. Reluctantly, the other powers agreed to its terms (the Chinese were never consulted), and the Open Door became another symbol of the American-style imperialism. Collectively, these events announced unmistakably to the world that the United States was ready to begin participating in global politics, at least in places where it deemed itself to have special interests. Moreover, America did not signal its emergence on the world stage with hollow gestures, but with concrete actions that had to be either recognized or rejected by the Europeans and Japanese whose own policies were affected by them. Increasingly, Germany would resent American intrusions into its ambitions, and the peoples who were most directly affected by American policies---such as the Filipinos, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans---came to resent the United States even more. But by proactively insisting on the Open Door, by challenging Spain’s methods of colonial administration by reference to American standards, and above all by seizing colonies, the United States decisively turned a corner in its foreign policy. At least in Latin America and in the Pacific region, the United States was determined to have a voice in how affairs were run in places outside America’s sovereign jurisdiction.

Consolidation: 1902--1912 William McKinley was an unlikely innovator of so momentous a foreign policy as the one he initiated. In 1901, he was assassinated by an anarchist and succeeded by Theodore Roosevelt (TR), a leader of legendary energy. Unsurprisingly, Roosevelt added to

McKinley’s accomplishments by intensifying America’s involvement in Latin American affairs, further strengthening the Navy, dealing effectively with a rising Japan, and engaging Europe more directly. One of the phrases for which we remember TR is, ‘‘Speak softly but carry a big stick.’’ Though his historical reputation rarely seems to whisper, Roosevelt’s diplomatic style was actually marked by tact, personal relations with the leading figures of world politics, and a preference for negotiation over the cruder instruments of foreign policy. By the same token, Roosevelt was scrupulous about tailoring his nation’s ambitions to conform to the force, the ‘‘big stick,’’ it had at its disposal. Sometimes that meant scaling back on American ventures, but just as often it led Roosevelt to boost American power relative to that of its chief rivals in whatever manner he thought expedient. An adherent to the European balance-of-power approach to world politics, Roosevelt skillfully kept geostrategic interests foremost in his policy designs. He regarded the United States to be a full peer of the great European states, and he expected it to be treated accordingly. Similarly, he willingly adhered to the proper norms of great-power conduct, although this posture did little to improve relations with the weaker states who were understood merely to be objects, not subjects, in the powers’ maneuverings. By acting with prolonged success as a great power, the United States under Theodore Roosevelt secured its prominent role in world events. Roosevelt’s earnest belief in America’s inherent greatness combined with his explicit social Darwinist worldview to yield a redoubling of his predecessors’ efforts to improve and increase America’s armed forces. Improvements in the Army were modest until Woodrow Wilson built it up for World War I, in large part because Americans still regarded sea power as the central element of national might and mistrusted standing armies. Even so, the Army hovered at around 88,000 soldiers during Roosevelt’s time in office, a substantial increase over levels before the Spanish-American War. Moreover, Elihu Root centralized its administration through the creation in 1903 of the Army General Staff Corps, which was designed to improve relations between the War Department and the generals. But the real strides in enhancing America’s power were taken, as usual, by the Naval Department. While TR was in office, the U.S. Navy continued its ascent in the world’s ranks, moving from fifth to second overall. Continuing to follow the basic logic first set forth in the early 1890s, Americans saw a powerful navy as essential to safeguarding their territory---which

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 459

Cover of Harper’s Weekly from February 3, 1906, shows Theodore Roosevelt walking through the Caribbean Sea carrying a "big stick" and leading a fleet of war ships. (Bettmann/Corbis)

now extended deep into the Caribbean and across the Pacific---and its vulnerable coast; for guaranteeing American participation in Asian trade, including continued access to the Chinese market; and for visibly demonstrating American power in a manner comprehensible to states inclined to underappreciate it. Roosevelt tended to give the Navy free reign in defining its own needs, and he was often successful in persuading Congress to fund those needs, including its expansion. It is possible that Congress might have refused to allocate the necessary resources in ordinary circumstances, but given the alarming rise in German and Japanese naval power as well as their increasing assertiveness in regions Americans regarded as key to their security interests, Congress was willing to fund Roosevelt’s famous Great White Fleet. An obvious effort to flaunt America’s ‘‘new’’ navy, Roosevelt’s decision to send the Great White Fleet around the world on a goodwill mission sent a pointed

message to the Japanese. Relations had steadily worsened between Japan and the United States during the first decade of the 20th century. One source of ill will was American racism. Japanese immigration was resented by white Americans living on the West Coast, who passed stringent laws that relegated the newcomers explicitly to second-class status. The Japanese government was understandably displeased with the treatment of its citizens, as was Roosevelt, who recognized the geopolitical implications of policies such as San Francisco’s decision to bar Japanese children from its schools. Roosevelt therefore entered into a Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan, under which the Japanese would curb the immigration of its nationals to America in exchange for their receiving equal treatment under American laws. One immigration loophole that the Gentleman’s Agreement intended to close was Hawaii, which the Japanese used as a way station on their journey across the Pacific.

460 Making Foreign Policy

From his pulpit atop a gun turret, President Theodore Roosevelt addresses the crew of battleship Connecticut, flagship of Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, upon her return to Hampton Roads, Virginia, in February 1909. (Naval Historical Center)

Hawaii was a sore spot between the states, since Japan had only grudgingly reconciled itself to America’s annexation of it. The Japanese had long outnumbered the white population there, and the islands figured crucially in both states’ vision of Pacific domination. Roosevelt recognized in Japan’s mounting strength a potential threat to American interests in Asia, and while Hawaii was rather securely within the American security orbit, the Philippine Islands were not. Agreeing with the anti-imperialist argument that the archipelago represented an Achilles’ heel in the U.S. defense perimeter, Roosevelt drew down American involvement there. Although he shared with McKinley the paternalist desire to ‘‘civilize’’ the Filipinos, geopolitical considerations came first. Despite his reputation as an ardent expansionist, Roosevelt actually sought to minimize American military interventions abroad; vocal

exasperation accompanied each of his decisions to violate this precept. His real preference was to engage in the sort of diplomacy that won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1904 for ending the Russo-Japanese War. The secret negotiations he held at Portsmouth deftly dissuaded the Japanese from aggrandizing territory in Northeast Asia (beyond Korea) that would have antagonized the Russians enough to resume hostilities. In the process, however, he ignored a pledge to honor Korean sovereignty by allowing Japan to annex it in exchange for Japanese recognition of America’s possession of the Philippines. Overall, TR’s accommodation with Japanese ascendancy was uneasy, but it held. The other powers that concerned Roosevelt were in Europe. Throughout the 30 years bridging the administrations of Harrison and Wilson, the Monroe Doctrine regularly proved to be the flash point in American

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 461 relations with Europe. The Doctrine’s two dimensions that became especially relevant under Roosevelt were its insistence on maintaining the Western Hemisphere as a security zone from which Europeans must be denied significant inroads and the essential irrelevance of the Latin Americans themselves to U.S. interests. During his time in office, Wilson would emphasize an additional part of the Monroe Doctrine---the passage declaring America’s special concern with the democratic status of its southern neighbors---but this concern was secondary to Roosevelt. The blunt apathy to Latin Americans’ own interests that Roosevelt represented would continue to haunt U.S. foreign policy in subsequent decades, but the former Rough Rider was sincere in his claim not to want to intervene, unless it was necessary, in the various states where Marines ultimately landed. It is also a near certainty that the Marines never would have been sent in if warships from Europe had not preceded them. Two episodes clarified TR’s thinking on the triangular relations between Latin America, the United States, and Europe. The first was the Venezuelan crisis of 1902, in which Germany and Great Britain blockaded the South American state and bombarded it from time to time as a way of encouraging Venezuela to pay its debts to them. The active presence of several European military vessels in the Caribbean Sea was disconcerting to Americans, as was the understanding that those ships were addressing long-term circumstances. Venezuelan indebtedness, combined with political and economic conditions likely to perpetuate it, meant that Germany and Britain intended to keep warships off the Venezuelan coast indefinitely. In Roosevelt’s view, this meant the probable construction of bases to maintain the European fleets’ access to Venezuela and whatever other interests might crop up in the region. Obviously this was unacceptable to the United States, and Roosevelt (privately) gave the Europeans a 10-day ultimatum to desist in their activities off the South American coast; he also ordered the U.S. Navy to conduct exercises off the coast of Puerto Rico to demonstrate how seriously he took the situation. Eventually, the blockade was lifted, and the United States served as arbitrator to resolve the debt settlement. The Dominican Republic offered a similar situation to Roosevelt, except Americans were as heavily invested there as the Europeans. The Dominican government was bowed under massive debts accumulated by a combination of usurious western lenders and corrupt local politicians who borrowed the money to pay for private militias. The debts thus accrued had such exorbitant interest rates that they were essentially

unpayable. When Dominican President Ulysses Heuraux was assassinated in 1899, the country descended into chaos and defaulted on its loans, prompting a steady threat of European interventions. The U.S. government was already using State Department agents, backed by warships, to collect debts owed to a shady American corporation; in the eyes of Germany and other European creditors, there was no reason why they should not be paid, too. Germany in particular engaged in loud saber rattling; it was unwilling serenely to ignore its interests simply because they were located in the Western Hemisphere. Just as in Venezuela, the prospect of a steady European military presence in the Caribbean became a very real possibility. It was in this geopolitical context that Roosevelt issued his famous Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which formalized the ongoing transformation of America’s relationship with its hemispheric neighbors and, indirectly, with Europe. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 declared that the United States would intervene in Latin American states plagued by ‘‘chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society.’’ Its immediate purpose was to justify Roosevelt’s decision to create a customs receivership in the Dominican Republic, thus satisfying the European creditors while stabilizing a bloody and chaotic situation on the island. As part of the receivership, under which the United States seized control of the customs houses to guarantee the loan payments, the Dominicans’ debts were both lowered substantially and backed by American banks, and the corrupt U.S. corporation that had been monopolizing prior payments was essentially cut out of future debt payouts. The real significance of the Roosevelt Corollary, of course, went considerably farther than its immediate impact on the Dominican Republic and included three major revisions to U.S. foreign policy. First, ‘‘Dollar Diplomacy,’’ which will be discussed below, was born; second, the Americans announced that they would intervene---militarily or otherwise---in any Latin American state whose behavior threatened to invite European occupation; and third, the express desires of the Latin Americans themselves was officially declared to be irrelevant where they conflicted with the American interests in regional stability and great-power comity. The Roosevelt Corollary fashioned America’s response to a specific crisis in the Dominican Republic, but the standards it enunciated were tailored around the president’s broader geopolitical vision. One lynchpin of his program, a transisthmian canal, was uniquely well served by the Corollary’s interventionist platform. The emergence of the United States as a Pacific power

462 Making Foreign Policy

Construction of the Panama Canal, about 1910. The canal, which links the Pacific and Atlantic oceans over the isthmus of Central America, revolutionized the possibilities for the international movement of people and trade goods. (Library of Congress)

added urgency to the creation of a canal that could link its Atlantic and Pacific fleets, and America’s accelerating interests in the Caribbean fed both this pressure and the sense of American entitlement to simply make the long-held vision of an isthmian canal a reality. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 mandated joint control of a canal between Great Britain and the United States. It was replaced by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, in which Britain ceded its rights in yet another example of the world’s greatest power calculating that its geopolitical interests would best be served by exchanging domination of Latin America for a closer relationship with the United States. The way that the United States strong-armed its southern neighbors into agreeing to the canal demonstrates how the Roosevelt Corollary invited actions that bred inevitable, long-lasting resentment. Yet, the United States did not single-handedly sully the transactions that culminated in the canal’s construction, which took place between 1907 and 1914; local politicians also put greed before honor. The site of the

canal, Panama, had been a province of Colombia long given to periodic uprisings, which the United States would quell at the invitation of the Colombian government. After Colombia backed out of the HayHerran Treaty, which would have granted to the United States the right to construct and maintain the canal for $10 million plus $250,000 per year, because the Colombian Parliament wanted more money, Panamanians staged yet another revolt. Roosevelt, incensed at Colombian president Jose Marroquin’s reneging on a handshake deal, sent the Marines to Panama for the fourth time in three years---but this time on the side of the Panamanian rebels. Panama became independent, and the United States ratified the same treaty with the new Panamanian government that it had negotiated with the Colombians. The United States was apparently unconcerned that the ‘‘ambassador’’ with whom they dealt, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was also the contractor and lobbyist for the company that owned the properties on which the canal was to be constructed.

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 463 However shady its background, the Hay-BunuaVarilla Treaty satisfied one of Roosevelt’s chief ambitions. The canal not only shortened shipping times and costs dramatically, but also enormously facilitated the country’s power-projecting capacities. Its location also heightened America’s sensitivity regarding political relations in Latin America, while its importance to American interests accelerated a tendency toward interventionism in all the states of the region. Although much teeth-gnashing and little foresight accompanied each occupation by the United States of its neighbors, the fact nonetheless remains that the first decades of the 20th century found U.S. Marines landing in Cuba, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic---often multiple times and sometimes leading to occupations that lasted years, even decades. Although broader geopolitical interests usually spurred each decision to intervene in Latin American affairs, arrogance and racism provided the underlying framework for viewing events, while economic interests sometimes dominated Americans’ concerns. Economics always played a role in U.S. foreign relations, but the relationship between the U.S. government, private American corporations, and foreign states underwent considerable revision under the administrations of Roosevelt and his successor, William Howard Taft. Under Roosevelt, economics became the handmaiden of geopolitical interests, whereas previously there was little if any coordination between private investors and U.S. government action. Under Taft, the cooperation begun under TR continued, with the difference that economics became an end in itself. The disconnect between private entrepreneurship and official U.S. policy in the years before the Roosevelt Corollary, which was announced in conjunction with the creation of a U.S. customs receivership in the Dominican Republic, allowed unscrupulous American businessmen and corrupt local officials to reap exorbitant profits at the expense of the local populations. Under Taft, the coordination of business and government interests overseas became closer and earned the moniker, Dollar Diplomacy; its ambition was, in Taft’s words, to ‘‘replace dollars for bullets.’’ Under Dollar Diplomacy, the U.S. government would advocate on behalf of American investors and send warships or Marines to enforce debt collections when necessary. During these years, the first of the so-called banana republics was formed in Honduras, as U.S. banana magnate Sam Zemurray seized control of the Honduran government and merged with United Fruit Company--with the backing of the U.S. military. Actions of this

kind took place throughout Latin America and accelerated a trend of American businessmen seizing power in foreign lands that had begun in Hawaii in the early 1890s. One of the goals of Dollar Diplomacy was to root out corruption by imposing oversight over business transactions between Americans and foreign governments. The policy was moderately successful in this effort, although in places like Mexico, upright consular generals who were so scrupulous that they forced dishonest Americans out of business found themselves transferred to make room for officials who were more pliable to American economic concerns. In some cases, Dollar Diplomacy was an unmitigated disaster, most notably in China, where Taft and his secretary of state, Philander Knox, tried to build railroads across Manchuria despite the existence of railroads already in existence or under contract by Japan and Russia. American political pressure to replace these with railroads built by American firms alienated the Japanese, Chinese, and Europeans; helped to destabilize the already faltering Manchu dynasty; and thus contributed to the revolution of 1912 that brought the Kuomintang to power. To some degree, the Manchurian railroad fiasco demonstrated shortcomings peculiar to Dollar Diplomacy, but in other ways, it revealed the American penchant to ignore the complexity of overseas conditions and achieve results by attempting to bring superior power (in this case economic) to bear on the situation. While this strategy worked well enough in securing American short-term business interests in Latin America, it proved less reliable where stronger states were involved. For Taft, Dollar Diplomacy was the perfect vehicle for liberalizing international relations. The future Supreme Court chief justice preferred law and stability to the vigorous, militaristic competition that enthralled Roosevelt. For this reason, he supported Wilson’s League of Nations as both a principle and a policy, though he never proposed such an organization himself while president. Taft calculated that the conditions that made for good business---peace, stability, secure property rights, and having the ‘‘right’’ people in charge--made for good international relations, too. He further believed that America’s natural economic superiority would allow it to gain the advantage over its rivals without requiring colonial competition or the establishment of a large military. In these assumptions, Taft revealed himself to be committed to American internationalism, trusting of liberal solutions to international rivalry, and confident of America’s place in the world. As a conservative, in other words, Taft found himself

464 Making Foreign Policy preserving a foreign policy status quo that would have been unrecognizably ambitious 30 years before.

Transformation: 1912--1920 The tendencies in U.S. foreign policy that had been manifesting since the 1890s received their fullest articulation and synthesis during the administration of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson was a headstrong and principled leader of broad vision and pronounced rhetorical gifts. His speeches on U.S. foreign policy capture the paradigm shift that took place during his era. In the 1870s, for instance, it would have been utterly inconceivable for a president to lead the United States into a war with the goal of making ‘‘the world safe for democracy’’ or of converting the conflict into a ‘‘war to end all wars’’ as Wilson did. Most revealing of the nation’s new confidence was Wilson’s willingness to challenge the European powers and the very structure of their international system. From Harrison to Taft, American presidents had been seeking to secure America’s rightful place alongside the great powers that organized world politics. Wilson, by contrast, tried to dictate to them how they needed to adjust their policies to conform to American principles. Although he failed to attain his most ambitious goals during his lifetime, his ideas and attitude became fixed in the deep structure of American foreign policy, especially from World War II to the present. Wilson’s vision could have such powerful and permanent repercussions because they represented the core tenets of American nationalism. For Wilson, the United States was more than just another state---it was a metaphor for and embodiment of higher values. This view expresses the assumption of American exceptionalism discussed earlier. By this logic, the interests that the United States pursues transcend their particular situation and exist on the metaphoric level; enemies become categories (for example, ‘‘empires’’ or ‘‘militarism’’), so the policies that deal with them must address their abstract nature as well as the immediate challenges they present. Thus, Wilson would impose inflexible, principle-based solutions on the problems he faced in office, refusing to compromise for fear of undermining the moralistic foundation on which his policies rested. In addition, Wilson believed that the universal appeal of American values, most notably democracy and selfdetermination, was artificially constrained by unrepresentative forces such as autocracy and the balance of power. It was therefore a responsibility of the United States to encourage the flourishing of those ideals by eliminating the obstacles to their realization. Only

McKinley before him had sought to invigorate this strand of American nationalism through U.S. foreign policy when he seized the Philippines to Americanize them, but Wilson pressed American nationalism’s missionary spirit much farther. By the time he assumed office, certain assumptions about America’s relationship with the world had taken root; had they not, it is improbable that Wilson would have pursued so presumptuous a foreign policy. The most cogent and influential presentation of these ideas was Herbert Croly’s revolutionary, The Promise of American Life. Croly argued that the Second Industrial Revolution had forever changed the relationship between citizens and society in America; greater governmental centralization was needed to offset corporate power and maintain American democracy. Those same forces, moreover, vastly increased intercourse with Europe and made it inevitable that Americans would have to negotiate a more comprehensive framework for interacting with European states. Rather than wait for a war triggered by the Monroe Doctrine to provide the context for initiating this new relationship, Croly argued that the United States should proactively undertake to democratize the world system, starting with Latin America and working outwards from there. He theorized that spreading America’s democratic principles to the rest of the hemisphere would create a zone of peace and stability, which would attract the European powers. The empowerment of the national government that domestic conditions required would, conveniently, also produce the greater capacity needed to effect change on the world stage. In other words, centralization, a Progressive Era motif, would provide for greater government efficiency in the achievement of its goals, in this case strengthening and spreading democratic institutions overseas. Thus the United States, in culminating the national consolidation process begun after the Civil War, would at last be able to realize its promise as the harbinger of global democracy. Croly insisted that his program was not as far-fetched as it seemed. European states had already shown considerable acceptance of democratic ideals, and the United States was deep into the process of centralizing its government (in part because of Croly’s influence) by the time Wilson took office. Moreover, since the world system was rapidly and fundamentally changing anyway, America was presented with the best opportunity it might ever have to help direct that change in a democratic direction. Rather than urging a reckless foreign policy revolution, in short, Croly insisted that his agenda would simply make a virtue of necessity. In fact, his program proves

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 465 in retrospect to offer an accurate description of the changes that were under way in U.S. foreign policy, especially in Latin America. Wilson, of course, was only following a well-worn path when he wielded a heavy hand in Latin American affairs. Unlike his predecessors, however, Wilson emphasized the ‘‘democratic’’ component of the Monroe Doctrine as much as its other provisions. That is, his policies toward the other states of the hemisphere were dictated to a considerable degree by how democratically legitimate he regarded their governments. In particular, he used the executive power of ‘‘recognition’’ to endorse (or not) neighboring regimes. It was a policy that inspired terrific resentment. Whenever a new government came to power in Latin America through revolutionary methods, Wilson withheld recognition, which precluded normalizing commercial relations. He also tried to induce other states to refrain from extending recognition to the government to isolate it and encourage it to step down. The aim of this policy was to ensure that the peoples of the Western Hemisphere lived under stable, democratically elected governments. In countries such as Costa Rica, where Wilson enforced his nonrecognition policy despite Costa Rica’s support for the United States in World War I, Wilson’s policy served only to wreck the nation’s finances, incur the wrath of the population whose interests Wilson ostensibly had at heart, and, ultimately, destabilize the country in a way that the initial coup d’etat never had. Despite strong indications that the Costa Rican regime enjoyed popular support and administrative efficiency (at least before the effects of nonrecognition set in), Wilson prioritized the principle of elected governance and refused to alter the policy that expressed it even after its effects contradicted its goals. Other than World War I, Wilson’s most significant foreign policies concerned Mexico. For more than 40 years, Profirio Diaz had been the soft dictator of America’s southern neighbor, and he had assiduously cultivated investment from the West, above all the United States. In 1912, he was replaced by Francisco Madero, who in turn was immediately overthrown in a coup by his general, Victoriano Huerta. Not only did Huerta come to power in a manifestly illegitimate manner, but his rule was also brutal to the Mexican population. For Wilson, removing Huerta from power became something of a personal moral responsibility. Wilson’s vision of proper governance in Latin American reached its logical conclusion in his efforts to oust Huerta (even though Taft’s ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, had been complicit in bringing him to power). For example,

Huerta was able to retain control of the government for some time due to support he received from London, which had its own sizeable investments in Mexico and, therefore, a natural stake in affairs there. Wilson deemed America’s position as more moral than Britain’s, since it rested on principle rather than pecuniary interest, and so he prevailed on Britain to withdraw its support for Huerta despite the fact that doing so would be detrimental to British interests. More concerned with Germany than Mexico by 1913, and interested in accommodating a potential ally, Britain relented. Despite Wilson’s current reputation as something of an idealistic pacifist, he was willing to send troops to Mexico on multiple occasions. The famous episode in which Gen. John J. Pershing marched deep into Mexican territory in pursuit of Pancho Villa was perhaps justified by Villa’s attacks on U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. Wilson’s occupation of Vera Cruz, however, was indefensible even by the era’s generous standards of intervention. The pretext for the occupation was an affront to the honor of American soldiers; the true motive for occupying Vera Cruz, the port by which weapons entered Mexico and exports left, was Wilson’s desire to remove Huerta from power. After 19 U.S. soldiers and more than 200 Mexicans were killed, Wilson withdrew the forces. Three months later, Huerta resigned and was replaced by Venustiano Carranza, whose belligerency Wilson had supported. Despite Wilson’s support, Carranza had fiercely condemned the occupation of Vera Cruz; relations between Mexico and the United States never quite recovered from Wilson’s meddling. Wilson had the interests of the Mexican people at heart (although his stance was tainted by his personal contempt for Huerta), but his belief that he knew what was best for Mexico and his willingness to use force to encourage ‘‘good government’’ fueled Mexicans’ skepticism about Yankee intentions and fear of America’s overwhelming power. Continuing instability in Mexico remained a concern not only for Wilson but also for subsequent administrations; however, the president found his attention completely absorbed in European affairs after the Great War erupted. Without the outbreak of a systemwide conflict, liberal internationalism would not have emerged as Wilson’s legacy to future generations. Indeed, one of the ironies of history is that Wilson came to power neither interested in nor fully prepared to deal with foreign affairs. World War I, however, forced his hand, and gave him an unexpected opportunity to fulfill America’s democratizing purpose. Wilson had tried valiantly to keep the United States out of the war, and he succeeded for three years. During the

466 Making Foreign Policy period of American neutrality (a somewhat misleading characterization given America’s clearly favorable disposition toward the Allies), Wilson encouraged the combatants to cease hostilities and secure a ‘‘peace without victory,’’ which would preclude the winners from imposing onerous demands on the losers, whoever they might be. He failed both to keep the United States out of the war and to prevent the Allies from imposing harsh terms on the Germans. World War I started in 1914, and the United States joined the fray in 1917. In the intervening years, the most important issue Americans dealt with was ‘‘preparedness,’’ or enlarging the military to prepare for the possibility of joining the war at a future date. Wilson’s preparedness campaign was controversial not only because it seemed to contradict his campaign pledge to keep the country out of the war, but also because it fed Americans’ visceral mistrust of a standing army. Wilson’s championing of the League of Nations helped allay Americans’ fears that he intended permanently to militarize the country, but his massive acceleration of the naval expansion program in 1916 and institution of a draft in 1917---2.8 million men were conscripted into service---inevitably altered the character of the American military. The United States finally entered the war for a combination of reasons. Most important was Germany’s insistence on unrestricted submarine warfare, which was crucial to German success in the conflict but which also killed many Americans, including the passengers on the ocean liner, Lusitania, and caused millions of dollars of damage to American vessels and lost trade. Failing to change the nature of world politics from the position of disinterested mediator as he had hoped, Wilson chose instead to use American involvement in the war as a way of realizing his grand vision. To maintain the integrity of American purposes, Wilson kept the U.S. forces separate from the Allied command and defined the conditions by which America would fight. He also announced that the United States did not fight the German people, who he understood to be naturally peace-loving like anyone else, but the autocracy that thwarted their will and celebrated militarism. In addition to autocracy, Wilson tilted against the balance-of-power system that he regarded as accommodating and even encouraging such powers. Thus, Wilson identified as America’s enemies German autocracy, autocracy in general, and the international system that required states to adopt militaristic policies to succeed. If the United States were to pledge its blood and treasure, merely defeating Germany was not enough; the world would have to be fundamentally reorganized

to prevent such wars from breaking out in the future. In other words, the international system itself had to be Americanized. The foreign policy program that embodied this precept is now referred to as Wilsonianism; its essential logic is liberal internationalism. Its core tenets include the right of self-determination for European and select other peoples; freedom of the seas; arms reduction, which the Washington Treaty of 1922 would later enforce; and a general commitment to international democracy, as characterized not only by the League of Nations’ collective security system, but also by transparent diplomacy and a general commitment to uphold international law. These ideals, which make up the heart of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, were wildly celebrated at the time throughout the world. When the war finally ended and Wilson traveled to Paris for the peace conference that would settle the terms of the war, he was greeted practically as a messiah by the people of Europe. His proposal for a League of Nations in particular enjoyed widespread support, both in Europe and in the United States. It was generally viewed as the mechanism that would allow diplomacy and arbitration to prevail whenever conflicts between states inevitably arose. Although the League was built to tackle many vexing issues, such as handling the breakup of the Ottoman and Austrian empires according to the principle of self-determination, its defining purpose was collective security. States would no longer be able to settle disputes by unilateral resort to arms under the League’s collective security process, and if any individual state tried, then the force of the other powers would be arrayed against it. Sanctions and other limited methods would first be employed to deter aggression, but ultimately, the combined might of the world would guarantee peace. The League’s Executive Council would also engage in binding arbitration, although unanimity was required for its decisions to be valid. According to Article X of the League Covenant, only if a state invaded another after going through these various mechanisms would collective security be triggered, at which point all members would be obligated to respond with force. The League Covenant was appended to the peace treaty ending World War I, and Article X was a major reason why the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty and insist, later, on a separate peace with Germany. Most treaty opponents objected to the requirement that the United States fight other countries’ wars when collective security mandated such action. They also expressed discomfort with Congress losing its prerogative to declare war, and they worried the Monroe

Engaging the World: U.S. Foreign Policy from 1890--1920 467 Doctrine would be effectively nullified if the United States lost its ability to freely police the Western Hemisphere. In effect, they were unwilling to accept Wilson’s vision of integrating the United States so completely into the world system---even if it were to be substantially Americanized in the process---that it could no longer stand apart from global events and conflicts if it chose. Unilateralists such as Henry Cabot Lodge and isolationists like William Borah agreed that Wilson’s plan required the United States to engage the world much more intensively than was called for. While some objected to the treaty for other reasons---such as its clauses attributing war guilt to the Germans, imposing massive reparations on Germany in violation of American pledges, and allowing Japan to seize Shantung---without Article X, the Senate probably would have ratified the treaty, and the United States would have joined the League of Nations. Instead, Wilsonianism marked the high water mark for American involvement in world politics until World War II forced the United States to integrate with the world more intensively and irrevocably than ever before. When it did so, it followed many of the patterns that were well established by Wilson’s time and also adopted many policies based in liberal internationalism and a commitment to global democracy that Wilson might have recognized as his own.

Conclusion In 1919, Woodrow Wilson believed that the United States could finally culminate the process of global democratization that had begun with America’s own founding. In 1890, it hoped only to earn a place at the table. Clearly, much had changed in the intervening 30 years. As the foregoing overview shows, most of the specific foreign policy decisions that the United States made during these 30 years were ad hoc and reactive, undertaken without a clear sense of contributing consciously to a broader historical transformation. There were exceptions, of course, notably McKinley’s annexation of the Philippine Islands and Wilson’s framing of U.S. intervention into World War I as an opportunity to confront European politics head-on. Still, the foreign policy of the United States from 1890--1920 was a process of growing engagement with the world primarily because the underlying worldview of Americans impelled them to recognize, in dynamic world conditions, their world historical mission and their economic power---a combination that could yield a new world

system with America at its center. Americans always had a vague sense that this role was their birthright; the administrations of Benjamin Harrison through Woodrow Wilson steadily made this dream more tangible. Several important legacies of this period’s foreign policy remain with in the early 21st century. These include a greatly strengthened executive branch; a much larger and more efficient military; deeper involvement in the affairs of America’s hemispheric neighbors; a stronger commitment to international law and institutions; greater prominence in the international economic order; a fitful dedication to spreading democracy; and the physical capacity (through naval bases, for instance) to easily project American power around the globe. While World War II and the Cold War would take many of these aspects of U.S. foreign policy to the next level, the major moves in transforming America’s world role were all taken before World War I. The 30 years from 1890--1920, therefore, constitute the central turning point in the development of American foreign policy.

References and Further Reading Cooper, John Milton. 1983. The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Croly, Herbert. 1963. The Promise of American Life. Hamden: CT: Archon Books. Graebner, Norman, ed. 1985. Traditions and Values: American Diplomacy, 1865--1945. New York: University Press of America. Knock, Thomas J. 1992. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. LaFeber, Walter. 1993. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: The American Search for Opportunity. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mahan, Alfred. 1980. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660--1805. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. May, Ernest. 1961. Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. McCartney, Paul T. 2006. Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Perkins, Dexter. 1966. The Evolution of American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zimmerman, Warren. 2002. First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States Clark Kent Ervin Director, Homeland Security Program, Aspen Institute

Introduction

on the president’s powers in the field of foreign affairs, those constraints are considerably fewer and considerably looser than those governing his or her powers in the field of domestic policy. To a considerable degree, the foreign policy of the United States is what the president of the United States decides it will be. This explains why it is said that even presidents who come into office less interested in foreign policy than some of their predecessors, over time, tend to prefer dealing with foreign policy matters than dealing with domestic ones. By law and, at least in theory, the chief adviser to the president with regard to foreign policy is the secretary of state. The Department of State is the nation’s oldest cabinet department, and it supports the secretary in his or her official role as the president’s chief foreign policy adviser and the chief executor of that foreign policy. To assist the secretary in playing this role, the State Department is organized along both geographic and functional lines. With regard to the latter, there is, for example, an Office of the Legal Adviser to provide advice on the increasingly wide range of legal questions attendant to foreign policy and international relations; a ‘‘bureau’’ of Consular Affairs that issues visas to those seeking to visit the United States and that provides a variety of services to Americans traveling or living aboard; a self-explanatory ‘‘Management’’ bureau; and a Chief Information Officer, who handles information technology--related

In this essay, I will explain how foreign policy is made and carried out in the 21st century in the United States. Specifically, I will explain the roles of the various key players---the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (and the other members of the intelligence community), the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, and the relatively new Department of Homeland Security---and how they interact with each other in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. This essay also identifies and examines some of the issues that have tended to dominate the American foreign policy agenda---trade, arms control, human rights, democracy, counterterrorism, and, more broadly, the tension between idealism and realism.

The Secretary of State The making of foreign policy in the United States is anything but unidimensional and tidy. It is a multifaceted and multidimensional process. Numerous actors inside and outside government play roles that are at once different and overlapping. And, the relative role of each actor waxes and wanes over time. The Constitution, statutory law, and tradition give the president an outsized role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. While there are constraints 468

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 469 issues. As for the former, there are ‘‘bureaus’’ of African Affairs; East Asian and Pacific Affairs; European and Eurasian Affairs; Near Eastern Affairs; South Asian Affairs; and Western Hemisphere Affairs, which help to formulate and execute policy with respect to each such region and to coordinate overall U.S. government interaction with the governments of each such region. The assistant secretary of state for each such region is the secretary of state’s chief adviser with respect to that region, and he or she serves as the liaison between each ambassador posted to the individual countries in that region and the secretary. It is a mark of the putative primacy of the State Department in the constellation of foreign policy actors that the ambassador in each country is the senior U.S. government representative in that country. Signifying the degree to which foreign policy and international relations are not the exclusive preserve of the State Department, virtually every embassy has representatives from not only the State Department but also from one or another government agency with interests abroad. The Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, and, since 2001, the Homeland Security Department, are all cases in point. But, U.S. ambassador to each country decides which government agencies other than State may have a presence in the embassy, how large that presence can be, and whether and when other U.S. government officials may visit that country. Alexander Haig, President Reagan’s first secretary of state, summed up the considerable nominal authority of his office well when he famously called himself the administration’s foreign policy ‘‘vicar,’’ or its chief representative on foreign policy matters to the nation and the world. Perhaps it was his tendency to confuse the nominal authority of the office with its somewhat lesser real authority that led to his being a rather short-lived secretary of state. For the ultimate power of the secretary of state lies not in law, tradition, or organization charts, but in the nature of his or her relationship with the president. Unquestionably, the most powerful secretary of state in recent history was Henry Kissinger. His intellect, effectiveness, and industry are justly legendary. But, for all his vaunted ability, Kissinger’s vast power derived ultimately from his relationship with President Nixon. The president was keenly interested and intensely involved in foreign policy, and he gave Kissinger a wide berth to act in his name.

The National Security Adviser But, it is telling that Kissinger became President Nixon’s foreign policy ‘‘vicar’’ before he became the secretary of state. It was during his time in the White House as the president’s national security adviser in the early years of the Nixon administration that he became the nation’s top diplomatic strategist and executor. Relative to the secretary of state’s, the job of national security adviser is a relatively recent creation. The trauma of World War II, the defeat of Nazism, the rise of totalitarian Communism as a global geopolitical counterweight to democratic capitalism, and the gnawing threat of nuclear annihilation led to the creation of a number of internal institutions by the United States (for example, the Defense Department as we know it today, the National Security Council [NSC], and the Central Intelligence Agency) and a number of multilateral ones by the international community largely at the behest of the United States (for example, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund). The creation of the NSC, by virtue of the seminal National Security Act of 1947, grew out of the recognition that foreign policy making and implementation had become an ever more multidisciplinary and multidimensional enterprise with numerous players other than the State Department playing important roles in the process. There was a need for a mechanism, under the president’s control in his role as chief policy maker, to coordinate the foreign policy related activities of the various federal players. The members of the Council by law are the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the secretary of the treasury, and the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs (known colloquially as the national security adviser). The chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutorily designated military adviser to the Council, and the director of central intelligence (DCI) is the statutorily designated intelligence adviser. (In response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the DCI’s role in this and other important endeavors may be overtaken by the occupant of the newly created post of director of national intelligence. The recent radical reorganization of the intelligence community will be discussed in some detail later in this essay.) The White House chief of staff, the counsel to the president, and the assistant to the president for economic policy may attend any meeting of the Council. The attorney general and the director of the Office of Management and

470 Making Foreign Policy Budget may attend meetings that pertain to their respective areas of responsibility. The national security adviser serves as the president’s chief in-house adviser on foreign policy--related matters and as the de facto staff director of the NSC. In the latter capacity, he or she is to be an ‘‘honest broker’’ among the different members of the Council, and, in so doing, to ensure that the views of each Council member on the issues of the day are fairly and timely laid out before the president so that he can make an informed decision. In the early days of the Council, the national security adviser was largely anonymous and invisible, and the unquestioned center of power in the foreign policy world was ‘‘Foggy Bottom’’ (as the State Department is sometimes called). It helped in this regard that the secretaries of state who served during this period, notably, Dean Acheson in the Truman years and John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower years, were strong, dominating personalities who had the ear of the president. The relative primacy of the secretary of state in relation to the national security adviser began to change in the Kennedy years. Like President Nixon after him, President Kennedy took a keen interest in foreign policy matters. But unlike President Eisenhower before him, who as a military man favored a rigidly hierarchical governmental structure, President Kennedy favored a more ad hoc, atomized, and informal structure. Especially in the area of foreign policy, Kennedy was famous for going around the organization chart and personally reaching into the bowels of government to get information and advice directly from officials who were relatively junior in the hierarchy but particularly expert in the policy area at issue. Kennedy abandoned the formalized NSC structure his predecessor had established and vested in the national security adviser the responsibility to coordinate the interagency foreign policy process. It helped in this regard that the national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, was just the kind of young, dynamic, charismatic, whiz kid--type the president liked to surround himself with, and that the secretary of state, Dean Rusk, was comparatively dour, demure, and retiring. Adding to Bundy’s advantages over Rusk in the competition for the president’s attentions and favor was the simple fact of geography. Perhaps even more than in the private sector world, proximity to power is power in Washington. Being located in the West Wing of the White House just doors away from the Oval Office was immensely useful to the national security

adviser in making himself the ‘‘indispensable’’ person in the foreign policy process, especially in an activist administration headed by a curious and energetic president who wanted to keep his hand in things. Finally, the relatively small size of the national security adviser’s staff and its rather improvisational, ad hoc, organizational structure made it infinitely more lithe, nimble, and responsive than the comparatively bloated, ponderous, and lumbering State Department bureaucracy. In short order, then, Bundy came to supplant Rusk as the president’s chief foreign policy adviser and as the ‘‘go to guy’’ when Kennedy wanted a particular issue explored or a particularly policy implemented. Bundy certainly presented the views of the other members of the NSC to the president, but he and his successors would attempt to use their geographical and metaphorical proximity to the president to ensure that the most persuasively presented point of view and the final piece of advice the president would receive before making a decision would be their own. To a large degree, the primacy of the national security adviser over the secretary of state in the formulation and execution of foreign policy continued in the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) administration, although the highly influential secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, himself a young, brilliant, dynamic, and charismatic figure, came increasingly to have the president’s ear on foreign policy as well as military policy. (We will explore the Defense Department’s role in greater detail later.) The apex of power for the national security adviser came in the Nixon years. No national security adviser before or since has played as large a role in foreign policy as Henry Kissinger, and it is doubtful that anyone ever will again. It is mark of how much more powerful Kissinger was that the colorless and eminently forgettable secretary of state, longtime Nixon friend and Eisenhower administration attorney general, William Rogers, was shut out of the secret negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with China and the process of improving relations with the Soviet Union known as ‘‘detente,’’ the administration’s two signal foreign policy achievements. Adding to the impetus to marginalize State was the feeling on the part of Nixon and his White House inner circle that Foggy Bottom could not be trusted. The State Department was perceived to be full of liberal Democrats who were violently opposed to Nixon’s relatively conservative domestic policies. And, there was also a cultural disconnect as well. The State Department

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 471

Henry Alfred Kissinger, United States National Security Adviser (1969--1975) and Secretary of State (1973--1977). Kissinger, a historian by training, sought to turn American foreign policy away from the pursuit of ideals and toward national interests. (Library of Congress)

was perceived to be full of Ivy League educated, East Coast establishment bluebloods who could not be more different from the humbly reared man in the White House. Nixon believed State to be leak-prone, and he perceived Rogers to be a captive of the department--‘‘State’s man at the White House, rather than the White House’s man at State,’’ to use one common formulation of the phenomenon. LBJ tended to have the same feeling about State and to make the same complaints. But, the feeling and complaints only hardened and intensified in the Nixon years. Inevitably, form eventually followed function, Rogers was pushed aside, and Kissinger was officially promoted to secretary of state, while retaining his job as national security adviser. For the first and only time since 1947, there was no tension between the national security adviser and the secretary of state because the occupants of these critically important foreign policy posts were one and the same man.

Power tends to be fleeting, and the more absolute it is the more fleeting power tends to be. It was probably inevitable, then, that the jobs of secretary of state and national security adviser eventually would be separated again, and, indeed, they were a few years later during the course of the 1976 presidential campaign. Gerald Ford, who succeeded to the presidency upon Nixon’s resignation over the Watergate scandal, was forced by the pressures of political expediency to take Kissinger down a peg when the policy of reaching out to China and the Soviet Union was challenged by the powerful conservative wing of the Republican Party in the person of Gov. Ronald Reagan of California. Reagan very nearly defeated Ford for the 1976 presidential nomination, and among the chief points in contention was the policy of detente, which Kissinger had come to personify. Kissinger remained the secretary of state, but an obscure Air Force general, Brent Scowcroft, was brought in to be the national security adviser. Until the premature end of the administration with its electoral defeat, Kissinger remained the principal player in foreign policy, though his role was much reduced. President Carter continued the Kennedy-JohnsonNixon-Ford tradition of relying on his national security adviser to be his principal foreign policy adviser and executor. The national secretary adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was very much in the mold of Kissinger and other powerful national security advisers, while Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a pillar of the foreign policy establishment and high-level Pentagon official in the Kennedy-Johnson years, was very much in the mold of Rogers and other less powerful secretaries of state. The low point of State’s influence came when, at the height of the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the president rejected Vance’s advice to the contrary and sided with Brzezinski in ordering an ill-fated rescue attempt. True to his pledge to do so irrespective of whether the mission succeeded, Vance resigned after the failed mission came to light. In his first term, President Reagan likewise followed the model of his immediate predecessors and, as noted above, tended to concentrate foreign policy making and execution in the White House. That changed when the Iran-Contra scandal erupted. A junior-level Marine, Oliver North, working out of the NSC, had become the point man on an illegal scheme to sell arms to Iran and to use the proceeds to finance anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua. The scandal marred the president’s second term and led to a number of resignations, indictments, convictions, and prison terms. In the end, an outside panel recommended that the NSC’s role in policy making and execution be greatly circumscribed,

472 Making Foreign Policy and the State Department began to resume its traditional preeminence. This reversion to tradition was continued and strengthened in the George H. W. Bush administration. It helped immensely that the secretary of state was the president’s longtime close friend, chief political strategist and fixer, and a longtime top-level government insider, James Baker. It helped, too, that the national security adviser was Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s unassuming successor in the job in the Ford years. Not incidentally, Scowcroft also served, in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, on the so-called Tower Commission that recommended, among other things, the downgrading of the NSC’s role in foreign policy. In the Clinton years, the pattern reverted to that prevailing during most of the postwar years. There was constant tension between each national security adviser and the then secretary of state, and the president tended to let the former call the shots. This was particularly true in the early years, when the secretary of state was the demure and retiring eminence grise, Warren Christopher. (Christopher, incidentally, had served as Vance’s deputy in the Carter administration.) It became less true when the assertive Madeleine Albright became secretary of state in the second term. That pattern continued in the George W. Bush administration, at least initially to the wonderment of

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at a press conference regarding the Middle East peace talks on September 19, 1997. (Najlah Feanny/Corbis Saba)

official Washington and longtime foreign policy observers. While Henry Kissinger rose to unrivalled prominence during his time in office, no one in recent history came to the office of Secretary of State with greater prestige and acclaim than Colin Powell. But Powell never developed a personal relationship with the president. Coupled with that impediment (which could be fatal in itself) were two incredibly strong competing forces for the president’s ear---the vice president and the secretary of defense. Vice President Cheney had been an immensely powerful and assertive secretary of defense in the George H. W. Bush administration, gaining prominence with his conduct of the highly successful Persian Gulf War. Before that, he’d been a congress member attuned to foreign policy and defense issues, and, before that, in the Ford administration, he served as the White House chief of staff. In the latter job and in that of defense secretary, Cheney had followed in the footsteps of his mentor, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld had been the youngest secretary of defense in history in the Ford administration and became the oldest secretary of defense in the Bush administration. He had also served as ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Ford years, an emissary on special diplomatic missions for President Reagan, and on various boards and commissions related to foreign policy and national security matters. It is a mark of Rumsfeld’s bureaucratic infighting skills that the Machiavellian Henry Kissinger famously said that Rumsfeld’s skills in this regard exceeded his own. With Powell isolated at State, the vice president and secretary of defense playing unusually large roles, and the national security adviser being located in the White House and having developed an unusually close relationship with the president as his foreign policy tutor during his first presidential campaign, the balance of power shifted during the first George W. Bush term to the national security adviser. In the second Bush term, the first term national security adviser was the secretary of state. The situation was somewhat similar to that when Henry Kissinger briefly held both jobs in the Nixon-Ford years. Of course, there is no exact parallel, inasmuch as there was a separate national security adviser, Stephen Hadley. But, very much in the mold of Scowcroft, Hadley was all but invisible, and his role was the one initially envisaged for the office of a spectral honest broker presenting, without prejudice, different views to the president and coordinating the foreign policy machinery. This same pattern has continued under the Obama

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 473 Administration, particularly given the commanding presence of Hillary Clinton in the State Department.

The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Defense is responsible for devising and executing the military strategy for the defense of the nation against external threats. Of course, the secretary of defense must work closely with the secretary of state, the national security adviser, and the Central Intelligence Agency (and the rest of the intelligence community) to understand the geopolitical environment to ascertain potential threats to the United States and to develop a military strategy for addressing them. The secretary of defense must be intimately involved in the foreign policy-making process because the nation’s foreign policy directly affects the geopolitical environment. The key question here is the meaning of ‘‘intimately involved.’’ At a minimum, the defense secretary must be aware of the administration’s positions on foreign policy matters, its initiatives in this area, and the state of its relations with each nation (especially those that could pose a threat to the United States). At the maximum, the defense secretary plays a role in formulating and executing foreign policy, rivaling the secretary of state and the national security adviser in so doing. Most secretaries of defense have taken a minimalist view of their role in foreign policy matters. Melvin Laird in the Nixon administration, Harold Brown in the Carter administration, and Les Aspin and William Perry in the Clinton administration are all cases in point. Few secretaries take a maximalist view, and, not surprisingly, these secretaries tend to be the best known and most controversial ones. Robert McNamara in the Kennedy-Johnson years, and Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush administration are cases in point. It is telling that President Johnson so relied on McNamara for foreign policy advice as well as military advice that speculation was rampant during the early years of the administration that the defense chief would be asked to leave the Pentagon to head up Foggy Bottom. Though he was never officially made secretary of state, it is fair to say that McNamara exercised as least as much influence on foreign policy matters during the Kennedy administration and the early years of the Johnson administration as Secretary of State Rusk. President Johnson frequently called on him to undertake missions to Vietnam to assess and shape the course of diplomacy as well as the course of the fighting. But as the Vietnam War dragged on and the casualties mounted, McNamara came to the military

conclusion that the war had become unwinnable, and to the political conclusion that the whole enterprise had been a tragic mistake and that the administration should make a greater effort to negotiate a settlement. At that point, Johnson and McNamara became irremediably estranged from each other, and McNamara was eventually eased out of the Pentagon to assume the presidency of the World Bank. As noted above, Donald Rumsfeld first became secretary of defense in the Ford years. To the surprise of no one more than Kissinger himself, Rumsfeld proved to be Kissinger’s match in the cutthroat world of Washington political intrigue and bureaucratic maneuver. As the 1976 presidential campaign began to heat up and the Nixon-Kissinger devised policy of negotiating with the Soviets rather than confronting them came under fire from the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Rumsfeld increasingly was seen as the leader of the hawks, particularly on the then critically important issue of arms control agreements. It is said that Rumsfeld was instrumental in nixing Ford and Kissinger’s plans to negotiate and sign a sweeping arms control agreement with the Soviet Union known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) II. It is a mark of Rumsfeld’s outsized role at the time in the making and execution of foreign policy that even the word ‘‘detente’’ disappeared from the president’s vocabulary by the spring of the campaign year. In the Reagan years, there was considerable tension between George Schultz’s State Department and Caspar Weinberger’s Pentagon. Generally, like Kissinger and Rumsfeld, respectively, before them, Schultz tended to favor a more moderate, diplomacy-based approach, while Weinberger was more confrontational and less inclined to trust in negotiations to advance America’s interests in the world. To some extent, this tension is institutionalized, and, therefore, par for the course. After all, it is the job of the State Department to practice diplomacy and to advocate for it. It is the job of the Pentagon to be skeptical of diplomacy’s effectiveness and to prepare for war, which has aptly been described as the failure of diplomacy. Indeed, the tension between the institutional biases and roles of these two actors can be healthy. A president should be encouraged by the State Department to pursue every reasonable diplomatic course of action before resorting to the horror and agony of war. At the same time, a president should be encouraged by the Defense Department to bring to bear the full weight of America’s military power when diplomacy has run its course, the national interest is gravely threatened, and the Pentagon is as certain as it can be

474 Making Foreign Policy under the circumstances that the United States will prevail. Ideally, diplomacy and military strength work in tandem as complementary arrows in a president’s quiver. The stronger the nation’s military might and the firmer its resolve to use it when all else fails, the more effective diplomacy can be in achieving objectives short of war. When diplomacy fails and war ensues, at the appropriate time, diplomacy can be reintroduced to shorten a conflict and, ultimately, end it on as favorable a set of terms as possible. But, when diplomacy and the threat of military action are disconnected from each other, or simply are perceived to be disconnected from each other, the effect can be disastrous. Diplomatic efforts by State to resolve conflict short of war can be undercut by a too bellicose Pentagon, making war more likely rather than less. On the other hand, a weak or timid Pentagon can undercut diplomacy and make war more likely, for example, by making the diplomats’ threat of military action incredible. The run-up to the present war in Iraq is the latest and most extreme example of nearly dysfunctional tension between the State Department and the Defense Department. An extraordinarily powerful secretary of defense, allied with an extraordinarily powerful vice president, effectively isolated and outmaneuvered the secretary of state. Recent books and news articles have suggested that the decision to go to war was made by the president relatively early in the game, and while Secretary Powell’s efforts to negotiate a resolution short of war were indulged, the White House viewed diplomatic moves all along as mostly for show. Powell’s cautionary advice against (1) invading Iraq at all (encapsulated neatly in his characteristically catchy phrase, the ‘‘Pottery Barn rule---you break it; you own it,’’ or, in other words, if the United States toppled Saddam Hussein and his government, we would be responsible for bringing about a better alternative); (2) underestimating the number of troops that would be necessary to prevail; and (3) letting the Pentagon rather than the State Department run the political and economic reconstruction process afterward was all swept aside. Whatever the truth of these assertions, it is fair to say that the war in Iraq and its aftermath have represented the lowest point in the State Department’s influence over the foreign policy process in recent history. It was only after the secretary of state was the former national security adviser and the Pentagon’s handling of the war had come widely to be seen as inept that the State Department’s star began to rise again in the constellation of actors who shape and execute American foreign policy.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Rest of the Intelligence Community The other key actor in the foreign policy-making and execution process is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Unbeknownst to most Americans, the CIA is but one agency among 15 that collectively constitute the ‘‘intelligence community.’’ In addition to the CIA, the State Department has its own intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Likewise, the Departments of Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security (lodged in an ‘‘Information Analysis’’ unit and a separate one in the Coast Guard), and Justice (lodged in the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]) have their own respective intelligence components. The lion’s share of intelligence community (and about 80 percent of its budget) is controlled by the Pentagon. Each of the four armed services has an intelligence component. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency provides military-related intelligence to policy makers, war fighters, and force planners; the National Security Agency, which intercepts and analyzes foreign telephonic and electronic communications and protects critical U.S. information security systems from compromise; the National Reconnaissance Office, which coordinates collection and analysis of intelligence from airplane and satellite reconnaissance by the various military services and the CIA; and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which provides detailed maps of sites of intelligence interest to the U.S. government. But, at least until the war in Iraq began, the CIA had been the top player in the intelligence community, and the director of the CIA, in his or her capacity as the DCI, has been both the nominal and the de facto leader of the intelligence community. The role of the CIA is to collect intelligence abroad that is relevant to the security of the United States, to analyze that intelligence, and to engage in covert operations abroad in furtherance of our national security. In collecting and analyzing intelligence, the CIA is to be scrupulously objective and apolitical. It is to ‘‘call it as it sees it,’’ and not color or skew the collection process or the analytical process to fit the preconceived judgments or policy preferences of administration and congressional policy makers. The CIA’s role in helping to make the case for the war in Iraq is cited by its critics as but the latest example of its tendency to cross the line between collecting and analyzing intelligence, on the one hand, and fashioning it to suit policy makers’ political ends, on the other. Thanks to, among other things, the 2004 Duelfer Report, named for the report of Charles Duelfer, a CIA

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 475 official himself and the special adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and the report of the presidentially appointed Silberman-Robb Commission, we now know that the CIA relied on flimsy and faulty intelligence in coming to the erroneous conclusion that Saddam Hussein had a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and an active program to acquire more. The then CIA director, George Tenet, formed an unusually close relationship with President Bush, and he became in effect a member of the administration’s ‘‘war cabinet’’ in the run-up to the outbreak of hostilities. For example, it was he, who, to signal the CIA’s rock solid confidence in the intelligence on which the case was based, famously accompanied Secretary Powell to the United Nations for the climatic meeting to present America’s case for war to the international community. It was he who famously told the president in a key prewar Oval Office meeting that the case for Iraq’s having weapons of mass destruction was a ‘‘slam dunk.’’ A CIA director less concerned with whether the Agency’s analytical judgments pleased his political superiors might have taken a more jaundiced view of the meaning of the limited and conflicting intelligence on the matter. And, had he done so, it is at least questionable, if not doubtful, that the war ever would have been launched. As mentioned above, the CIA’s other key role is to plan and execute covert operations to further the national security interests of the United States. Over the course of the CIA’s history, these operations have ranged from bribery, espionage, and sabotage, to coup d’etats and assassinations. The political climate that had not only tolerated, but even encouraged, the Agency’s more sinister activities shifted markedly after Watergate with the widespread national consensus behind the notion that governmental abuse of power had gone too far. The Church Committee named for the liberal Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) led headline grabbing hearings in the mid1970s that exposed some of the CIA’s worst excesses and ultimately led to a considerable reining in of the Agency’s covert activity. But the bridle was loosened a decade later when President Reagan’s close friend and confidante, then-CIA Director William Casey, worked closely with the national security adviser’s office to effect the arms for hostages deal known as the Iran-Contra scandal. In the typical ebb and flow of Washington politics, this led to the CIA’s being reined in yet again, and the tether was largely held until 9/11. Immediately after 9/11, the Bush administration loosed the reins, and the Agency ranged freely in the

field of covert action until, inevitably, scandal erupted again, this time in the form of the Abu Gharib prison abuses and mounting political, moral, and legal concerns about the practice of ‘‘extraordinary renditions,’’ whereby suspected terrorists are sent to countries known to practice harsh methods for interrogation. But the curbs resulting from these incidents are nothing compared with the diminution in the CIA’s power and status resulting from the recent legislation enacted in response to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. That legislation has radically restructured the entire intelligence community, dethroning the CIA from its perch as primus inter pares and superimposing above it and the whole community, a new office, the director of national intelligence (DNI). Longtime diplomat, John Negroponte, was sworn in as the nation’s first DNI, who is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the work of the entire community. While the director of the CIA in his dual capacity as the DCI was to perform this oversight and coordination role, his ability to do so effectively was always limited by the fact that the bulk of the community’s employees, assets, and resources were controlled by the Pentagon. The legislation establishing the DNI is still somewhat ambiguous as to scope of this oversight and coordination role, but the DNI has been given more legal and political authority than the DCI ever had to ride herd over the community. Given the clubby and change-resistant nature of the intelligence community, the big question is whether the DNI will be any more successful than successive DCIs at so doing. And, over time, as the fallout over the Iraq war fades from view, there may again be times when the intelligence community yet again will be seen as stretching intelligence to fit the political agenda of its ultimate master in the White House.

Other Executive Branch Agencies Relatively speaking, other executive branch agencies play important, but bit parts in the foreign policy making and execution process. As the world’s economies have grown more interdependent, the Treasury Department has played an increasingly important role in coordinating American economic policy with those of the world’s other major economic powers. The Commerce Department has worked in partnership with the U.S. Trade Office and the Agriculture Department to expand existing and open new markets for American agricultural produce and manufactured goods. America remains largely dependent on foreign nations for its energy supply, and, of course, the Energy Department plays a role in ensuring that the nation has the energy

476 Making Foreign Policy it needs at a price that it can afford. The Justice Department (including the FBI) works closely with foreign governments to identify, track, apprehend, and prosecute transnational terrorists and criminals, especially in the post-9/11 age. The Homeland Security Department is likewise involved in this effort. In addition, it works with the State Department to distinguish between visa applicants who are terrorists and criminals and those who are seeking to visit the United States for benign purposes like commerce, tourism, and study, and with the intelligence community to detect foreign-based threats against the homeland.

The Congress Continuing with a recurring theme, Congress’ influence over the foreign policy-making and execution process waxes and wanes over time. Given his constitutional primacy in this regard, the president is typically deferred to. But, consistently, when the president is widely seen as having overstepped his admittedly broad authority in this field, the Congress intervenes to put on the brakes. The best illustration of the scope of the Congress’ braking power is Vietnam. By the terms of the Constitution, only the Congress may ‘‘declare war.’’ But, starting with President Eisenhower, successive presidents waged an increasingly bloody and costly war in Vietnam without ever seeking a formal declaration from Congress. At the height of the war, President Johnson used still-disputed incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin to elicit a congressional resolution sanctioning the conflict, but that was the extent of it. That said, President Johnson, himself a creature of Congress, having served as a congress member, a senator, the Senate majority leader, and the president of the Senate in his capacity as President Kennedy’s vice president, consulted widely with key congressional leaders throughout the course of the conflict, and the counsel of those leaders certainly helped to shape it. Vietnam would prove to be Johnson’s political undoing, and by the time Richard Nixon succeeded him, the war was becoming increasingly unpopular both on Capitol Hill and in the country at large. In reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 over Nixon’s veto, requiring the president to notify the Congress without 48 hours of the introduction of American forces into a conflict, and requiring the president to withdraw those forces within 60 to 90 days unless the Congress declares war or otherwise expresses its approval of the use of force.

Of course, just as Vietnam proved to be President Johnson’s political undoing, prompting him to decide not to seek reelection, Watergate proved to be the political undoing of President Nixon. But, while Watergate dominated the political landscape toward the end of Nixon’s term, the war in Vietnam continued to rage and to grow even bloodier and more unpopular. Ultimately, during the ensuing Ford administration, the Congress used its ultimate foreign policy power, the ‘‘power of the purse,’’ to cut off funding for the war. American troops withdrew shortly thereafter, the Communist North Vietnamese soon took over the rest of Vietnam, and the United States suffered its very first military defeat. The specter of Vietnam would haunt the use of presidential power in foreign policy, especially the resort to military force, for a generation. It was not until the Gulf War of 1990 to dislodge Saddam Hussein’s invading forces from neighboring Kuwait that the ‘‘Vietnam syndrome’’ was laid to rest. It was, however, a mark of the reaccretion of foreign policy power to Congress in the ensuing years that President George H. W. Bush felt obliged to seek congressional approval for the use of force to liberate Kuwait, for which approval was obtained overwhelmingly. Likewise, President George W. Bush found it expedient, if not politically or legally necessary, to obtain congressional consent to the use of force to topple Saddam from power in the latest U.S. war with Iraq. Another factor in the degree to which Congress asserts itself in foreign policy is the political makeup of that body versus the party affiliation of the president. It was surely a factor in Congress’ exercise of power in the Nixon-Ford years that the presidents were Republicans and the Congress was controlled by Democrats. A Republican Congress exercised less oversight over the Bush White House in foreign policy matters (and, domestic matters, too) than it surely would if the Congress were of one party and the president were of another. The same relationship of cooperation and deference is visible under Barack Obama and a Democratic Congress.

The Judiciary To an even greater degree than the Congress, the judicial branch has tended to defer to the president in the field of foreign affairs. The Constitution requires the courts to leave ‘‘political’’ questions to the executive and legislative branches, and foreign policy questions generally have been thought to be quintessentially ‘‘political.’’

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 477 The courts’ tendency to defer to the president in particular on foreign policy has historically never been more pronounced than at times of war. For example, during the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus (the right of an incarcerated citizen to challenge in the courts the legality of his confinement), without interference from the courts. In the landmark 1944 Supreme Court case, Korematsu v. United States, a majority of justices upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II on the grounds of ‘‘military necessity.’’ Following the September 11 attacks---which, though different and unique, were reminiscent of both the Civil War and Pearl Harbor in constituting an existential threat to the nation and in being waged on the soil of the homeland itself---the courts were very much inclined to give the administration wide latitude in the conduct of the war on terrorism. However, as time went by and more excesses like the Abu Gharib scandal came to light, the courts have bestirred themselves more and begun to place limits on presidential authority. Most notably, the Supreme Court ruled against the administration in the summer of 2004 by holding that suspected terrorists detained at the U. S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were entitled to have access to the federal courts to challenge their detention and in some cases have done so. Barring another attack, as 9/11 fades into history, it is likely, given the pattern of history, that the courts will increasingly feel free to second-guess the legality of various aspects of the war on terrorism.

The Press and Interest Groups No account of the various influences on American policy would be complete without a word about the press and interest groups. Vietnam and Watergate were watershed events in not only the balance of power between the executive branch and the legislative, but also between the government and the ‘‘fourth estate,’’ as the press is sometimes called. Until those debacles, which manifested a pattern of presidential deceit and deception, the press largely deferred to the White House in foreign policy matters. Decisions were seldom questioned, and the official administration line was generally accepted as gospel. The balance was decidedly recalibrated in the press’ favor when the Supreme Court sided in 1973 with the New York Times and the Washington Post in authorizing the publication of the ‘‘Pentagon Papers,’’ a secret, detailed, ‘‘warts and all’’ history of the Vietnam War

that Robert McNamara’s Pentagon had ordered and compiled, and there the balance as remained ever since. In the early twenty-first century, the press is reflexively skeptical of administration foreign policy moves, and it does not hesitate to shine the light of scrutiny. The high water mark of the press’ exertion of its power in this field surely came during the midst of the 2004 presidential campaign. The press uncovered and repeatedly emphasized both the Abu Gharib prison abuse scandal and the intelligence failure that led the administration to base its case for war in Iraq on the erroneous claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, nearly costing President Bush the election in the process. As for interest groups, depending on the issue, a variety of nongovernmental actors play significant roles in the foreign policy-making and execution process. Among notable examples are various ethnically oriented groups like the Jewish-affiliated American Israel Public Affairs Committee that ensures that America’s Mideast policy is as favorable to Israel as possible, and the fiercely anti-Communist Cuban American Foundation that staunchly opposes any effort to normalize relations with the Castro regime. Issue or ideologyoriented groups like Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union on the left, and the American Conservative Union and Christian evangelical groups on the right all work to push one aspect or another of American foreign policy in their philosophical direction. Groups based on economic interest also play an important role. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers are but two of many business supported groups that lobby for free trade agreements, while the American Federation of Labor--Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO) and other labor groups lobby against them. In short, interest groups serve a push-pull function in foreign policy. They can push policy makers in a given policy direction, and they can pull policy makers away from a certain direction. The degree of their influence depends on the degree to which policy makers depend on them for the mother’s milk of politics---votes and campaign funds.

World Opinion Finally, a word about the role of world opinion in influencing American foreign policy, one of the ‘‘hotter’’ issues in American foreign policy in the twenty-first century. What John Donne famously observed about human beings, ‘‘No man is an island, entire of itself,’’ is, of course, equally true of nations.

478 Making Foreign Policy To varying degrees, nations depend on one another, and, therefore, to one degree or another, they must take other nations’ opinions into account in formulating and carrying out their own foreign policy. It is equally true, however, that the stronger a nation is the less necessary it is to take other nations’ opinions into account. The United States has enjoyed outsized political, economic, and military power ever since World War II, giving us unrivalled freedom of maneuver in the field of international affairs. But, each successive postwar president has found it at least expedient, if not necessary, to consult with other nations and to take their views into account before embarking on courses of action deemed controversial in some quarters of the globe. Presidents have differed only in the degree to which they have been willing to let international opposition constrain their freedom of maneuver, or, to put the issue positively, to court world opinion in the service of unpopular goals or actions. To cite differing examples, in the early 1980s, President Reagan was not deterred by fierce opposition from left-leaning popular opinion in Western Europe from installing Pershing missiles in West Germany to counter the Soviet military threat. A decade later, President George H. W. Bush went to elaborate lengths to line up international political, economic, and military support for his decision to dislodge Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, even though the United States could have accomplished that relatively limited objective on its own. Citing it as a limitation on his freedom of action, President Clinton has cited the lack of international support pre-9/11 as the reason for his reluctance to be more aggressive militarily against the Al Qaeda network. President George W. Bush, of course, invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam, and installed an American-led (and, now, American-influenced) regime in its place over the vehement objection of the lion’s share of the international community.

Key Foreign Policy Issues There are discrete issues that dominate over time, and then there are larger, overarching themes, trends, and organizing principles that are even more important for students of American foreign policy to understand. A full discussion of the relevant issues would fill volumes and then leave much still be to be discussed. Suffice it here to concentrate on only the most important ones.

Trade Certainly, economically related issues have historically been important and remain so in the twenty-first

century. Tariff and trade issues have been enormously important over the course of American history. Indeed, the predominant source of revenue for the U.S. government until 1913, when the income tax was introduced, was tariffs and customs duties. Generally, there has been a wide consensus in the country favoring liberal trade policy, in recognition of the degree to which such a policy conduces to both domestic economic growth and international political stability. The most notable and, now, infamous, manifestation of the contrary ‘‘protectionist’’ tendency can be found in the Smoot-Hawley legislation of 1930, which raised tariffs dramatically on cheap foreign imports in an effort to protect American farmers and manufacturers from competition. Scholars have debated whether this law was a cause or a consequence of the Great Depression, but there is no doubt that it certainly worsened it. The Smoot-Hawley experience has served since as a cautionary tale and a check against the influence of political pressure groups (labor unions, and some individual industries and businesses) clamoring for protection from competition. Since the 1930s, the United States has been an international leader in schemes and mechanisms designed to push for liberalizing global trading regimes, notably, in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the regional or bilateral level, the United States likewise has consistently been a leader in the field of trade liberalization, notably with regard to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) encompassing the United States, Canada, and Mexico; the present effort to conclude a similar agreement between the United States and the nations of Central America; and various nation-to-nation deals with countries as disparate as Chile and Jordan.

Containment, Arms Control, and Missile Defense At the end of World War II, Europe and much of Asia lay in ruins. The United States stood alone on the world stage as the mightiest political, economic, and military power on earth. Only the United States had the most lethal kind of weapon, nuclear weapons, and as Hiroshima and Nagosaki demonstrated, the United States also had both the means and will to use them. In short order, though, the Soviet Union became a rival nuclear power. To make matters still worse, the Soviet Union, which had been an ally in the fight against Nazism, began to commit itself to a policy of actively opposing the United States and spreading Communism throughout the world. The Truman administration was persuaded by the then director of policy

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 479 and planning in the State Department, the now legendary career foreign service officer and Soviet expert, George Kennan, to adopt a policy of ‘‘containment’’ to limit the spread of Communism and to eventually defeat it by countering it politically, undermining it economically, and outspending it militarily. A series of overt (Vietnam/the Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1967 and 1973) and covert (Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, to name a few) proxy wars were fought as Americans and Soviets vied against each other for world dominance. While the threat of nuclear annihilation hung like the Sword of Damocles over the world throughout this period, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis took the two superpowers to the very brink of cataclysmic war, on the whole, the postwar period was characterized by remarkable degree of stability because of the ‘‘balance of terror’’ established by the rough parity between the two superpowers’ respective nuclear arsenals. Each superpower knew that if it ever were first to strike the other with nuclear weapons its rival would still be able to retaliate with a devastating blow. Thus, the term ‘‘mutual assured destruction’’ (or MAD) was coined, and the concept served as the nation’s central strategic doctrine and organizing principle until the Berlin Wall fell and Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe ceded power in 1989. But, conscious of the perils of a miscalculation as to the others’ intentions, an inadvertent launch, or a deliberate launch by a crazed or malevolent civilian and military official, American and Soviet leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s sought to negotiate arms control agreements to reduce the superpowers’ stockpile, while maintaining the strategic balance. These negotiations culminated in the so-called SALT agreements that progressively limited the size of American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The United States was less successful in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the Soviet Union. Communist China eventually developed a formidable arsenal of its own, which further threatened American interests and limited U.S. freedom of maneuver in international affairs, particularly in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict. Subsequently, nations as disparate as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea acquired small nuclear arsenals, and still more nations, ranging from Iran to Iraq to Libya to Brazil have sought to acquire nuclear technology. Demonstrating the degree to which nuclear fears still dominate the American foreign policy agenda almost two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the principal stated reason for the George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was, as noted above, the fear that

Saddam had or would soon acquire nuclear weapons. Headlines remain dominated by concern about North Korea’s nuclear program and Iran’s nuclear capabilities and ambitions. The idea of a defensive shield against nuclear missiles first gained currency during the Reagan years. ‘‘Star Wars,’’ as it was popularly known, was enthusiastically championed by the president himself and by his allies on Capitol Hill and in the media/think tank ‘‘commentariat.’’ Such a shield was seen as a way to render the Soviet arsenal useless against the United States and thereby greatly to reduce its influence in global affairs, all without firing a shot. While, to be sure, the Soviet Union had a large conventional military capability, it was considered no match for the United States in the critical areas of technology ability, strategic thinking, and tactical flexibility. Because the idea of MAD had kept the peace for three decades, the concept of missile defense was considered by the rest of the foreign policy establishment as radical and dangerous. They argued that efforts to erect a defensive shield against America and its allies might actually encourage the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear first strike while it still could, making nuclear war more rather than less likely. Ironically, then, during this period, the ‘‘conservative’’ wing of foreign policy establishment was pushing for a radically new and different strategic concept, while the more ‘‘liberal’’ wing was clamoring to retain the strategic status quo. In the end, the dispute remained academic, because, despite the billions spent on research during the Reagan years, a workable system was never devised. Thanks to Reagan allies in Congress, efforts to develop such a system continued in the George H. W. Bush and Clinton years, but neither president made it a priority. And, the whole issue became less urgent with the demise of the Soviet Union. The issue was revived when President George W. Bush came to power. Even before 9/11, the administration had decided to make developing and fielding a missile defense system a priority; after 9/11, doing so was made even more of a priority.

Human Rights, Democracy, Counterterrorism, and Idealism versus Realism In keeping with U.S. history, laws, and traditions, the United States has consistently been a champion among nations for the notion of an inalienable and universal set of ‘‘human rights,’’ irrespective of differing national histories, traditions, legal systems, and mores. It is fair to say that the high water mark of this issue in the

480 Making Foreign Policy

During his national security speech on March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan speaks to the nation regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative, proposing intensive research on a space-based antiballistic missile defense system (popularly known as ‘‘Star Wars’’) that would destroy Soviet missiles before they reached their target. (Ronald Reagan Library)

hierarchy of issues dominating American foreign policy came in the years of the Carter presidency. To a considerable degree, the foreign policy agenda of the nation is the foreign policy agenda of the president. And President Carter made it a priority in America’s relations with other nations those nations’ respect for and adherence to the notion of human rights. In so doing, the president was following in the long American tradition of idealism in foreign policy. Accordingly, the United States will be true to its liberal, democratic principles, and it will seek to extend those principles to the rest of the world. It in this spirit that President Wilson after World War I pushed for the creation of the League of Nations in the hopes that an international body organized around these principles would mean the end of war and international conflict. It is in this spirit that Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Truman were instrumental in the creation of the League’s successor, the United Nations. President Reagan’s efforts not simply to ‘‘contain’’ the Soviet Union, but to bring about its demise and its replacement by a more liberal

and democratic system, were in this spirit. It is in this spirit that President George W. Bush made the promotion of democracy the chief objective of American foreign policy. Barack Obama has adopted a more ‘‘humble,’’ to use his term, and pragmatic approach. This idealistic strain in foreign policy has been opposed throughout U.S. history by a ‘‘realist’’ or ‘‘pragmatic’’ strain. The realists or pragmatists maintain that they are just as committed to democracy and human rights as the idealists, but that it is na€ive and even dangerous to try to impose America’s conception of these concepts on nations in which they are foreign, and that it is na€ive and even dangerous to sublimate other aspects of the American foreign policy agenda to such concerns. Presidents Nixon and Ford, whose foreign policy was so largely shaped and executed by Henry Kissinger, exemplified the realist or pragmatic school. Their administrations argued that America must deal with the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be, and that America’s security and its economic power rested

Contemporary Foreign Policy Process in the United States 481 to a considerable degree on the stability that came from maintaining amicable relations with regimes that could be despotic and illiberal. President George H. W. Bush’s administration likewise was in this camp, and it is no coincidence in this regard that the president’s national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, was a Kissinger protege and his successor as national security adviser during the Ford administration. While not unprecedented to find tension within the very same administration between idealism and realism, it has perhaps never been as pronounced as in the George W. Bush administration. If the overarching foreign policy organizing principle of the second George W. Bush term was the promotion of democracy, the overarching foreign policy organizing principle of his first term, at least after 9/11, was fighting the war against terrorism. During the president’s second term, two organizing principles came into conflict. For example, before 9/11, the Bush administration followed the Clinton administration’s idealism in distancing itself from Pakistan politically, economically, and military, because Pakistan was ruled by a military dictator, because it had acquired and tested nuclear weapons, and because it was suspected of contributing to (or, at the least, turning a blind eye toward efforts to) the spread of nuclear technology. But, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the administration embraced the Pakistani government, warts and all, because its strategic location made it an indispensable ally in the effort to topple the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan and to track down and eliminate Osama bin Laden and as much of his Al Qaeda terror network as possible. A truly free election in Pakistan could well bring to power Islamic fundamentalists sympathetic to terrorists and armed with a nuclear arsenal, the ultimate nightmare scenario. Likewise, democratic elections elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world (notably, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) could well lead to the installation of regimes that are virulently anti-American and,

therefore, inimical to our strategic interests. Thus, the foreign policy of the United States for the remainder of the Bush administration is likely to be characterized by future historians as a high-wire balancing act between the short-term strategic imperative of aligning the United States with illiberal regimes to combat terrorism and the long-term political and moral imperative of being true to our origins, traditions, and values by promoting democracy. The administration argued, and many analysts agreed, that the long-term solution to the problem of global terrorism was the spread of democracy, but, in the interval between the here and now and the long-term, the tension between exigency and principle remains.

Conclusion Indeed, foreign policy making and execution in the United States is a complex, multifaceted process. And the issues that dominate the foreign policy agenda of the United States are at once many and varied on the one hand, and similar and recurrent on the other. While the United States is without peer in the twenty-first century in terms of its global political influence, economic wealth, and military power, it is far from guaranteed that this will remain the case indefinitely. U.S. political influence is being checked by a rising tide of anti-Americanism. Its economic power is threatened by rising budget deficits, a crushing entitlements burden, crumbling infrastructure, and a failing pre-college education system at home, not to mention intense competition abroad from emerging nations like China, India, and, Brazil. Its military dominance is threatened by an increasingly militarily sophisticated China, an increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western Russia, and the asymmetric efficacy of terrorism. Countering these external threats to American supremacy will surely dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda and test the skills of the nation’s foreign policy-making actors for years to come.

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Documents

prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the Powers at war, or any of them. In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the city of Philadelphia, the twenty-second day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the seventeenth.

8.1 George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality, April 22, 1793 A Proclamation Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other; and the duty and interest of the United States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerant Powers; I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those Powers respectfully; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition. And I do hereby also make known, that whatsoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said Powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States, against such punishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause

8.2 Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823 Expressed during President Monroe’s seventh annual message to Congress . . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In

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484 Making Foreign Policy the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition

toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .

8.3 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848 In the Name of Almighty God The United States of America and the United Mexican States animated by a sincere desire to put an end to the

8.3 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo calamities of the war which unhappily exists between the two Republics and to establish Upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship. . . .

Article I There shall be firm and universal peace between the United States of America and the Mexican Republic, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, without exception of places or persons.

Article II Immediately upon the signature of this treaty, a convention shall be entered into between a commissioner or commissioners appointed by the General-in-chief of the forces of the United States, and such as may be appointed by the Mexican Government, to the end that a provisional suspension of hostilities shall take place . . .

Article III Immediately upon the ratification of the present treaty by the Government of the United States, orders shall be transmitted to the commanders of their land and naval forces, requiring the latter (provided this treaty shall then have been ratified by the Government of the Mexican Republic, and the ratifications exchanged) immediately to desist from blockading any Mexican ports and requiring the former (under the same condition) to commence, at the earliest moment practicable . . .

Article IV Immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty all castles, forts, territories, places, and possessions, which have been taken or occupied by the forces of the United States during the present war, within the limits of the Mexican Republic, as about to be established by the following article, shall be definitely restored to the said Republic, together with all the artillery, arms, apparatus of war, munitions, and other public property . . .

Article V The boundary line between the two Republics shall commence in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land, opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, otherwise called Rio Bravo del Norte, or Opposite the mouth of its deepest branch, if it should have more than one branch emptying directly into the sea; from thence up the middle of that river, following the

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deepest channel, where it has more than one, to the point where it strikes the southern boundary of New Mexico; thence, westwardly, along the whole southern boundary of New Mexico (which runs north of the town called Paso) to its western termination; thence, northward, along the western line of New Mexico, until it intersects the first branch of the river Gila; (or if it should not intersect any branch of that river, then to the point on the said line nearest to such branch, and thence in a direct line to the same); thence down the middle of the said branch and of the said river, until it empties into the Rio Colorado; thence across the Rio Colorado, following the division line between Upper and Lower California, to the Pacific Ocean. The southern and western limits of New Mexico, mentioned in the article, are those laid down in the map entitled ‘‘Map of the United Mexican States, as organized and defined by various acts of the Congress of said republic, and constructed according to the best authorities. Revised edition. Published at New York, in 1847, by J. Disturnell,’’ of which map a copy is added to this treaty, bearing the signatures and seals of the undersigned Plenipotentiaries. And, in order to preclude all difficulty in tracing upon the ground the limit separating Upper from Lower California, it is agreed that the said limit shall consist of a straight line drawn from the middle of the Rio Gila, where it unites with the Colorado, to a point on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, distant one marine league due south of the southernmost point of the port of San Diego, according to the plan of said port made in the year 1782 by Don Juan Pantoja, second sailingmaster of the Spanish fleet, and published at Madrid in the year 1802, in the atlas to the voyage of the schooners Sutil and Mexicana; of which plan a copy is hereunto added, signed and sealed by the respective Plenipotentiaries. In order to designate the boundary line with due precision, upon authoritative maps, and to establish upon the ground land-marks which shall show the limits of both republics, as described in the present article, the two Governments shall each appoint a commissioner and a surveyor, who, before the expiration of one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, shall meet at the port of San Diego, and proceed to run and mark the said boundary in its whole course to the mouth of the Rio Bravo del Norte. They shall keep journals and make out plans of their operations; and the result agreed upon by them shall be deemed a part of this treaty, and shall have the same force as if it were inserted therein. The two

486 Making Foreign Policy Governments will amicably agree regarding what may be necessary to these persons, and also as to their respective escorts, should such be necessary. The boundary line established by this article shall be religiously respected by each of the two republics, and no change shall ever be made therein, except by the express and free consent of both nations, lawfully given by the General Government of each, in conformity with its own constitution.

Article VI The vessels and citizens of the United States shall, in all time, have a free and uninterrupted passage by the Gulf of California, and by the river Colorado below its confluence with the Gila, to and from their possessions situated north of the boundary line defined in the preceding article; it being understood that this passage is to be by navigating the Gulf of California and the river Colorado, and not by land, without the express consent of the Mexican Government. . . .

Article VIII Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever. Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories may either retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States. But they shall be under the obligation to make their election within one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in the said territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States. In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it guarantees equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United States.

Article IX The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic, conformably with what is stipulated in the preceding article, shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States. and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the Constitution; and in the mean time, shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction. . . .

Article XII In consideration of the extension acquired by the boundaries of the United States, as defined in the fifth article of the present treaty, the Government of the United States engages to pay to that of the Mexican Republic the sum of fifteen millions of dollars. . . .

8.4 Neutrality Act, August 31, 1935 Providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent countries; the prohibition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of belligerent states; for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting travel by American citizens on belligerent ships during war. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such belligerent states, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country. The President, by proclamation, shall definitely enumerate the arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the export of which is prohibited by this Act. The President may, from time to time, by proclamation, extend such embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to other states as and when they may become involved in such war.

8.4 Neutrality Act 487 Whoever, in violation of any of the provisions of this section, shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States, or any of its possessions, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and the property, vessel, or vehicle containing the same shall be subject to the provisions of sections 1 to 8, inclusive, title 6, chapter 30, of the Act approved June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 223--225; U. S. C., title 22, sees. 238-245). In the case of the forfeiture of any arms, ammunition, or implements of war by reason of a violation of this Act, no public or private sale shall be required; but such arms, ammunition, or implements of war shall be delivered to the Secretary of War for such use or disposal thereof as shall be approved by the President. When in the judgment of the President the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist he shall revoke the same and the provisions hereof shall thereupon cease to apply. Except with respect to prosecutions committed or forfeitures incurred prior to March 1, 1936, this section and all proclamations issued thereunder shall not be effective after February 29, 1936. SEC. 2. That for the purpose of this Act--(a) The term ‘‘Board’’ means the National Munitions Control Board which is hereby established to carry out the provisions of this Act. The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State, who shall be chairman and executive officer of the Board; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of War; the Secretary of the Navy; and the Secretary of Commerce. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, or by other law, the administration of this Act is vested in the Department of State; (b) The term ‘‘United States’’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the several States and Territories, the insular possessions of the United States (including the Philippine Islands), the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia; (c) The term ‘‘person’’ includes a partnership, company, association, or corporation, as well as a natural person. Within ninety days after the effective date of this Act, or upon first engaging in business, every person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any of the arms, ammunition, and

implements of war referred to in this Act, whether as an exporter, importer, manufacturer, or dealer, shall register with the Secretary of State his name, or business name, principal place of business, and places of business in the United States, and a list of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war which he manufactures, imports, or exports. Every person required to register under this section shall notify the Secretary of State of any change in the arms, ammunition, and implements of war which he exports, imports, or manufactures; and upon such notification the Secretary of State shall issue to such person an amended certificate of registration, free of charge, which shall remain valid until the date of expiration of the original certificate. Every person required to register under the provisions of this section shall pay a registration fee of $500, and upon receipt of such fee the Secretary of State shall issue a registration certificate valid for five years, which shall be renewable for further periods of five years upon the payment of each renewal of a fee of $500. It shall be unlawful for any person to export, or attempt to export, from the United States any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war referred to in this Act to any other country or to import, or attempt to import, to the United States from any other country any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war referred to in this Act without first having obtained a license therefor. All persons required to register under this section shall maintain, subject to the inspection of the Board, such permanent records of manufacture for export, importation, and exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war as the Board shall prescribe. Licenses shall be issued to persons who have registered as provided for, except in cases of export or import licenses where exportation of arms, ammunition, or implements of war would be in violation of this Act or any other law of the United States, or of a treaty to which the United States is a party, in which cases such licenses shall not be issued. The Board shall be called by the Chairman and shall hold at least one meeting a year. No purchase of arms, ammunition, and implements of war shall be made on behalf of the United States by any officer, executive department, or independent establishment of the Government from any person who shall have failed to register under the provisions of this Act. The Board shall make an annual report to Congress, copies of which shall be distributed as are other reports transmitted to Congress. Such report shall contain such

488 Making Foreign Policy information and data collected by the Board as may be considered of value in the determination of questions connected with the control of trade in arms, ammunition, and implements of war. It shall include a list of all persons required to register under the provisions of this Act, and full information concerning the licenses issued hereunder. The Secretary of State shall promulgate such rules and regulations with regard to the enforcement of this section as he may deem necessary to carry out its provisions. The President is hereby authorized to proclaim upon recommendation of the Board from time to time a list of articles which shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of this section. This section shall take effect on the ninetieth day after the date of its enactment. SEC. 3. Whenever the President shall issue the proclamation provided for in section 1 of this Act, thereafter it shall be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any port of the belligerent countries named in such proclamation as being at war, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country. Whoever, in violation of the provisions of this section, shall take, attempt to take, or shall authorize, hire, or solicit another to take any such vessel carrying such cargo out of port or from the jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; and, in addition, such vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, equipment, and the arms, ammunition, and implements of war on board shall be forfeited to the United States. When the President finds the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation, and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply. SEC. 4. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President, or any person ‘‘hereunto authorized by him, shall have cause to believe that any vessel, domestic or foreign, whether requiring clearance or not, is about to carry out of a port of the United States, or its possession, men or fuel, arms, ammunition, implements of war, or other supplies to any warship, tender, or supply ship of a foreign belligerent nation, but the evidence is not deemed sufficient to justify forbidding the departure of the vessel as provided for by section 1, title V, chapter 30, of the Act approved June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. [221[22]]; U. S. C. title 18, sec. 31), and if, in the President’s judgment, such action will serve to maintain peace between the

United States and foreign nations, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to require the owner, master, or person in command thereof, before departing from a port of the United States, or any of its possessions, for a foreign port, to give a bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in such amount as he shall deem proper, conditioned that the vessel will not deliver the men, or the cargo, or any part thereof, to any warship, tender, or supply ship of a belligerent nation; and, if the President, or any person thereunto authorized by him, shall find that a vessel, domestic or foreign, in a port of the United States, or one of its possessions, has previously cleared from such port during such war and delivered its cargo or any part thereof to a warship, tender, or supply ship of a belligerent nation, he may prohibit the departure of such vessel during the duration of the war. SEC. 5. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that special restrictions placed on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United States, or of its possessions, by the submarines of a foreign nation will serve to maintain peace between the United States and foreign nations, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security of the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any such submarine to enter a port or the territorial waters of the United States or any of its possessions, or to depart therefrom, except under such conditions and subject to such limitations as the President may prescribe. When, in his judgment, the conditions which have caused him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply. SEC. 6. Whenever, during any war in which the United States is neutral, the President shall find that the maintenance of peace between the United States and foreign nations, or the protection of the lives of citizens of the United States, or the protection of the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or the security of the United States requires that the American citizens should refrain from traveling as passengers on the vessels of any belligerent nation, he shall so proclaim, and thereafter no citizen of the United States shall travel on any vessel of any belligerent nation except at his own risk, unless in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe: Provided, however, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to a citizen travelling on

8.5 Sen. Robert A. Taft, Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty the vessel of a belligerent whose voyage was begun in advance of the date of the President’s proclamation, and who had no opportunity to discontinue his voyage after that date: And provided further, That they shall not apply under ninety days after the date of the President’s proclamation to a citizen returning from a foreign country to the United States or to any of its possessions. When, in the President’s judgment, the conditions which have cause him to issue his proclamation have ceased to exist, he shall revoke his proclamation and the provisions of this section shall thereupon cease to apply. SEC. 7. In every case of the violation of any of the provisions of this Act where a specific penalty is not herein provided, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. SEC. 8. If any of the provisions of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby. SEC. 9. The sum of $25,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended by the Secretary of State in administering this Act. Approved, August 31, 1935. Source: U.S. Department of State. 1983. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931--1941. 265--271.

8.5 Sen. Robert A. Taft, Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, July 26, 1949 [. . .] Why did I vote against the Atlantic Pact? I wanted to vote for it---at least I wanted to vote to let Russia know that if she attacked western Europe, the United States would be in the war. I believe that would be a deterrent to war. . . . We issued just this warning in the Monroe Doctrine, and though we were a much less powerful nation, it prevented aggression against Central and South America. That was only a President’s message to Congress, and there were no treaty obligations, and no arms for other nations. But it was one of the most effective peace measures in the history of the world. I would favor a Monroe Doctrine for western Europe. But the Atlantic Pact goes much further. It obligates us to go to war if at any time during the next 20 years anyone makes an armed attack on any of the 12

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nations. Under the Monroe Doctrine we could change our policy at any time. We could judge whether perhaps one of the countries had given cause for the attack. Only Congress could declare a war in pursuance of the doctrine. Under the new pact the President can take us into war without Congress. But, above all the treaty is a part of a much larger program by which we arm all these nations against Russia . . . A joint military program has already been made. . . . It thus becomes an offensive and defensive military alliance against Russia. I believe our foreign policy should be aimed primarily at security and peace, and I believe such an alliance is more likely to produce war than peace. A third world war would be the greatest tragedy the world has ever suffered. Even if we won the war, we this time would probably suffer tremendous destruction, our economic system would be crippled, and we would lose our liberties and free system just as the Second World War destroyed the free systems of Europe. It might easily destroy civilization on this earth. . . . There is another consideration. If we undertake to arm all the nations around Russia from Norway on the north to Turkey on the south, and Russia sees itself ringed about gradually by so-called defensive arms from Norway and. Denmark to Turkey and Greece, it may form a different opinion. It may decide that the arming of western Europe, regardless of its present purpose, looks to an attack upon Russia. Its view may be unreasonable, and I think it is. But from the Russian standpoint it may not seem unreasonable. They may well decide that if war is the certain result, that war might better occur now rather than after the arming of Europe is completed . . . How would we feel if Russia undertook to arm a country on our border; Mexico, for instance? Furthermore, can we afford this new project of foreign assistance? I think I am as much against Communist aggression as anyone, both at home and abroad; certainly more than a State Department which has let the Communists overrun all of China. . . . But we can’t let them scare us into bankruptcy and the surrender of all liberty, or let them determine our foreign policies. We are already spending $15,000,000,000 on our armed forces and have the most powerful Air Force in the world and the only atomic bomb. That, and our determination to go to war if Europe is attacked, ought to be sufficient to deter an attack by armed force. We are spending $7,000,000,000 a year on economic aid to build up those countries to a condition of prosperity where communism cannot make internal progress. Shall we start another project whose cost is incalculable, at the very time when we have a deficit of

490 Making Foreign Policy 1,800,000,000 dollars and a prospective deficit of three to five billion? The one essential defense against communism is to keep this country financially and economically sound. If the President is unwilling to recommend more taxes for fear of creating a depression, then we must have reached the limit of our taxpaying ability and we ought not to start a new and unnecessary building project . . . But, finally, I believe there is only one real hope of peace in the world to come---an association of nations binding itself to abide by a law governing nations and administered by a court of legal justice. Such a judicial finding must not be subject to veto by any nation and there must be an international force to enforce the court’s decree. Such a plan can only succeed if the public opinion of the world is educated to insist on the enforcement of justice. The United Nations looks in this direction but it can be improved and should be. This pact might have set up such a system between the nations of western Europe. It unfortunately did not do so. We should undertake to make it a model to which the United Nations may later conform. But as set up, it is a step backward---a military alliance of the old type where we have to come to each others’ assistance no matter who is to blame, and with ourselves the judges of the law.

8.6 George Ball, Cutting Our Losses in South Vietnam, 1965

course must sustain the burden of proof that commitment of American forces to combat will assure our objectives at an acceptable cost. 3. Combining expanded air attacks in the North with increased troop commitments in the South will not achieve the desired objective. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. 4. Since the measures discussed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above offer no assurance that we can win the war by substantially greater US commitments, we should undertake either to extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South VietNam to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment. 5. This is our last clear chance to make this decision. If we go forward with Phase III combat, even at the present level of troop deployment, a substantial number of Americans will be killed. This will make it much harder and more costly to extricate ourselves or reduce our commitments. We should, therefore, revise current orders to return to Phase II and we should maintain our present levels of deployment while we seek to get out of the quagmire and cut our losses. 6. By pursuing a systematic and careful plan for cutting our losses we should be able to create the conditions under which we can get out of a dangerous situation without excessive loss of American prestige and influence.

Summary

How to Think about the Problem

This paper, written on the premise that we are losing the war in Viet-Nam, advances and supports the following propositions:

To determine a proper course of action we must balance the risks and costs of a war fought by United States forces against the risks and costs of a carefully organized tactical withdrawal of the United States from South Viet-Nam or a systematic reduction of our territorial commitment to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment. Obviously, if a curtailment of our commitment in South Viet-Nam would place the United States in imminent peril, we would be justified in taking long chances in pouring troops and equipment into that beleaguered country and in running large risks of escalation. On the other hand, if we could accomplish such curtailment in a manner that would minimize the costs and dangers to the United States, the indicated formula would be quite different. The ultimate decision, therefore, involves a hardnosed judgment as to the relative costs and dangers to

1. We cannot achieve our political objectives by expanding the bombing of North Viet-Nam. On the contrary, extending the geographical scope of our bombing will pose grave dangers of involving both Red China and the Soviet Union while isolating the United States from its friends and allies. 2. There is no assurance that we can achieve our objectives by substantially expanding American forces in South Viet-Nam and committing them to direct combat. On the contrary, we would run grave risks of bogging down an indeterminate number of American troops in a protracted and bloody conflict of uncertain outcome. This risk is so great, in fact, that those who advocate this

8.6 George Ball, Cutting Our Losses in South Vietnam 491 America---both short-term and long-term---of these two courses of action.

Plan for Cutting Our Losses Against the background of these propositions, we propose a plan that should either create the conditions for a systematic US extrication or---less likely---establish a sound basis for our continued involvement at present levels of commitment. This plan consists of the following elements: Step 1 The President should make the firm decision that he will not commit United States land forces to combat in South Viet-Nam. Step 2 We should use every occasion to re-emphasize what has been clear ever since the first Eisenhower letter but has not been recently stated---that our assistance is being provided on two explicit conditions: (a) that there is a government genuinely representing the people of South Viet-Nam which continues to ask for our support; and (b) that such government maintains an adequate standard of performance, both in the conduct of the war and the making of necessary political, economic and social reforms.

Step 3 1. Since Americans are dying in South Viet-Nam, the United States has both the right and duty to demand of Saigon that it fashion a stable Government of National Union. We should, therefore, make the following demarche not only on General Ky but on the leaders of all principal groups in Saigon---the Catholics, the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, the military, the Dai Viet: (a) unless, within a month’s time, those leaders are able to put together a Government of National Union under civilian leadership, the United States will have to reconsider the extent of its commitment until such a Government is formed; (b) a Government of National Union must have authentic representation of all key ethnic, religious, and regional groups with a commitment to national elections as soon as hostilities cease;

(c) such a Government must announce and begin to implement a broad program of political, social and economic reforms, including a cancellation of all peasant debts, land reform, seed and fertilizer programs, etc. (d) the Government must announce the essentials of the Acheson Plan-including a major amnesty effort---in order to attract and protect defectors from the Viet Cong so as to provide a sound intelligence base for our military operations and a transition to a post-hostility reconstruction of South Viet-Nam as a national entity. The ability of the Saigon Government to accomplish these objectives is not dependent on the course of the war. If there is to be genuine unity, it can come about regardless of whether the ARVN is winning or merely holding its own during the rainy season. In fact, the worse the war, the greater the crisis that should instill a willingness to abandon internecine strife and unite against the common enemy. If no such willingness prevails in Saigon, we cannot take over the war ourselves. Step 4 If the leaders of the various factions in Saigon prove unwilling or unable to put aside petty factional jealousies and comply with the US demarche we must be prepared to follow through. We must be prepared to advise the Ky Government---or whatever government may then be in power---that we cannot maintain even the present level of our assistance. It is more than likely that a notice of this kind from the United States Government would have the effect of either (a) inducing the Ky Government to adopt an extreme nationalist position and announce it would go it alone without United States help; or (b) bring about the fall of the Ky Government in favor of a government prepared to try to find a political solution with the Viet Cong. In either event, we would not expect that American forces would leave quickly. Rather we would expect a protracted discussion between US representatives and representatives of the various Vietnamese factions. Should Ky or his successor demand the immediate removal of US forces from South Viet-Nam, he would almost certainly be ousted by more moderate elements.

492 Making Foreign Policy Even if those elements were neutralist, they would still tend to regard our presence for a period of time as essential to prolonged bargaining with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Our willingness to cooperate in this negotiating phase could permit us to remain in South VietNam for a considerable period and thus avoid any public appearance of a precipitate and undignified withdrawal. We could use this interval profitably to establish the justice and wisdom of our position with our friends and allies. We could also undertake the necessary diplomatic and economic actions in Thailand and Laos designed to offset so far as possible the immediate shock of the developments in South Viet-Nam.

Defensive and Affirmative Actions In our anxiety to build up support for the struggle in South Viet-Nam, we have tended to exaggerate the consequences for US power and prestige of a tactical withdrawal from South Viet-Nam. Admittedly, such a withdrawal would create short-term problems, especially in Thailand, but by taking prompt and effective defensive and affirmative measures we should be able to avoid any serious long-term consequences. By and large, the world knows that the government in Saigon is a joke, and if our withdrawal resulted from an effort to face this problem squarely, friendly nations would not interpret it as a US failure to keep its commitments. More likely most nations would consider that we had more than kept our commitments to Viet-Nam---and that our decision to force the issue of stability was a mark of prudence and maturity. The following memorandum contains a discussion of some of the measures which should be taken to avoid damage to our position in specific countries and areas.

Renvoi The position taken in this memorandum does not suggest that the United States should abdicate leadership in the cold war. But any prudent military commander carefully selects the terrain on which to stand and fight, and no great captain has ever been blamed for a successful tactical withdrawal. From our point of view, the terrain in South VietNam could not be worse. Jungles and rice paddies are not designed for modern arms and, from a military point of view, this is clearly what General de Gaulle described to me as a ‘‘rotten country’’. Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong---as is shown by

the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study--are deeply committed. Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The ‘‘government’’ in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government. In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this is it.

8.7 President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point (The Bush Doctrine), 2002 United States Military Academy, West Point, New York THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, General Lennox. Mr. Secretary, Governor Pataki, members of the United States Congress, Academy staff and faculty, distinguished guests, proud family members, and graduates: I want to thank you for your welcome. Laura and I are especially honored to visit this great institution in your bicentennial year. In every corner of America, the words ‘‘West Point’’ command immediate respect. This place where the Hudson River bends is more than a fine institution of learning. The United States Military Academy is the guardian of values that have shaped the soldiers who have shaped the history of the world. A few of you have followed in the path of the perfect West Point graduate, Robert E. Lee, who never received a single demerit in four years. Some of you followed in the path of the imperfect graduate, Ulysses S. Grant, who had his fair share of demerits, and said the happiest day of his life was ‘‘the day I left West Point.’’ (Laughter.) During my college years I guess you could say I was---(laughter.) During my college years I guess you could say I was a Grant man. (Laughter.) You walk in the tradition of Eisenhower and MacArthur, Patton and Bradley---the commanders who saved a civilization. And you walk in the tradition of second lieutenants who did the same, by fighting and dying on distant battlefields. Graduates of this academy have brought creativity and courage to every field of endeavor. West Point produced the chief engineer of the Panama Canal, the mind behind the Manhattan Project, the first American to walk in space. This fine institution gave us the man

8.7 President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point (The Bush Doctrine) they say invented baseball, and other young men over the years who perfected the game of football. You know this, but many in America don’t---George C. Marshall, a VMI graduate, is said to have given this order: ‘‘I want an officer for a secret and dangerous mission. I want a West Point football player.’’ (Applause.) As you leave here today, I know there’s one thing you’ll never miss about this place: Being a plebe. (Applause.) But even a plebe at West Point is made to feel he or she has some standing in the world. (Laughter.) I’m told that plebes, when asked whom they outrank, are required to answer this: ‘‘Sir, the Superintendent’s dog---(laughter)---the Commandant’s cat, and all the admirals in the whole damn Navy.’’ (Applause.) I probably won’t be sharing that with the Secretary of the Navy. (Laughter.) West Point is guided by tradition, and in honor of the ‘‘Golden Children of the Corps,’’---(applause)---I will observe one of the traditions you cherish most. As the Commander-in-Chief, I hereby grant amnesty to all cadets who are on restriction for minor conduct offenses. (Applause.) Those of you in the end zone might have cheered a little early. (Laughter.) Because, you see, I’m going to let General Lennox define exactly what ‘‘minor’’ means. (Laughter.) Every West Point class is commissioned to the Armed Forces. Some West Point classes are also commissioned by history, to take part in a great new calling for their country. Speaking here to the class of 1942---six months after Pearl Harbor---General Marshall said, ‘‘We’re determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle, our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand, and of overwhelming power on the other.’’ (Applause.) Officers graduating that year helped fulfill that mission, defeating Japan and Germany, and then reconstructing those nations as allies. West Point graduates of the 1940s saw the rise of a deadly new challenge--the challenge of imperial communism---and opposed it from Korea to Berlin, to Vietnam, and in the Cold War, from beginning to end. And as the sun set on their struggle, many of those West Point officers lived to see a world transformed. History has also issued its call to your generation. In your last year, America was attacked by a ruthless and resourceful enemy. You graduate from this Academy in a time of war, taking your place in an American military that is powerful and is honorable. Our war on terror is only begun, but in Afghanistan it was begun well. (Applause.)

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I am proud of the men and women who have fought on my orders. America is profoundly grateful for all who serve the cause of freedom, and for all who have given their lives in its defense. This nation respects and trusts our military, and we are confident in your victories to come. (Applause.) This war will take many turns we cannot predict. Yet I am certain of this: Wherever we carry it, the American flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom. (Applause.) Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace---a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Building this just peace is America’s opportunity, and America’s duty. From this day forward, it is your challenge, as well, and we will meet this challenge together. (Applause.) You will wear the uniform of a great and unique country. America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. We wish for others only what we wish for ourselves---safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope for a better life. In defending the peace, we face a threat with no precedent. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger the American people and our nation. The attacks of September the 11th required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than the cost of a single tank. The dangers have not passed. This government and the American people are on watch, we are ready, because we know the terrorists have more money and more men and more plans. The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology---when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends---and we will oppose them with all our power. (Applause.) For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence---the promise of massive retaliation against nations---means

494 Making Foreign Policy nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. (Applause.) Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger security, and they’re essential priorities for America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. (Applause.) In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act. (Applause.) Our security will require the best intelligence, to reveal threats hidden in caves and growing in laboratories. Our security will require modernizing domestic agencies such as the FBI, so they’re prepared to act, and act quickly, against danger. Our security will require transforming the military you will lead---a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. (Applause.) The work ahead is difficult. The choices we will face are complex. We must uncover terror cells in 60 or more countries, using every tool of finance, intelligence and law enforcement. Along with our friends and allies, we must oppose proliferation and confront regimes that sponsor terror, as each case requires. Some nations need military training to fight terror, and we’ll provide it. Other nations oppose terror, but tolerate the hatred that leads to terror---and that must change. (Applause.) We will send diplomats where they are needed, and we will send you, our soldiers, where you’re needed. (Applause.) All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants. (Applause.) We will lift this dark threat from our country and from the world. Because the war on terror will require resolve and patience, it will also require firm moral purpose. In this way our struggle is similar to the Cold War. Now, as then, our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of

power with no place for human dignity. Now, as then, they seek to impose a joyless conformity, to control every life and all of life. America confronted imperial communism in many different ways---diplomatic, economic, and military. Yet moral clarity was essential to our victory in the Cold War. When leaders like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan refused to gloss over the brutality of tyrants, they gave hope to prisoners and dissidents and exiles, and rallied free nations to a great cause. Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. (Applause.) Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. (Applause.) Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong. (Applause.) Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong. (Applause.) There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. (Applause.) By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it. (Applause.) As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war. The history of the last century, in particular, was dominated by a series of destructive national rivalries that left battlefields and graveyards across the Earth. Germany fought France, the Axis fought the Allies, and then the East fought the West, in proxy wars and tense standoffs, against a backdrop of nuclear Armageddon. Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not. More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the same side--united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge---(applause)---thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace. Today the great powers are also increasingly united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting ideologies. The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all of Europe, share a deep commitment to human freedom, embodied in strong alliances such as NATO. And the tide of liberty is rising in many other nations.

8.7 President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point (The Bush Doctrine) Generations of West Point officers planned and practiced for battles with Soviet Russia. I’ve just returned from a new Russia, now a country reaching toward democracy, and our partner in the war against terror. (Applause.) Even in China, leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only lasting source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only true source of national greatness. (Applause.) When the great powers share common values, we are better able to confront serious regional conflicts together, better able to cooperate in preventing the spread of violence or economic chaos. In the past, great power rivals took sides in difficult regional problems, making divisions deeper and more complicated. Today, from the Middle East to South Asia, we are gathering broad international coalitions to increase the pressure for peace. We must build strong and great power relations when times are good; to help manage crisis when times are bad. America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal. (Applause.) And finally, America stands for more than the absence of war. We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with hope of a better day. Through most of history, poverty was persistent, inescapable, and almost universal. In the last few decades, we’ve seen nations from Chile to South Korea build modern economies and freer societies, lifting millions of people out of despair and want. And there’s no mystery to this achievement. The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision---yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible. When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of

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the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes. (Applause.) A truly strong nation will permit legal avenues of dissent for all groups that pursue their aspirations without violence. An advancing nation will pursue economic reform, to unleash the great entrepreneurial energy of its people. A thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society can prosper while denying opportunity to half its citizens. Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, in liberation they celebrate. (Applause.) America has a greater objective than controlling threats and containing resentment. We will work for a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror. The bicentennial class of West Point now enters this drama. With all in the United States Army, you will stand between your fellow citizens and grave danger. You will help establish a peace that allows millions around the world to live in liberty and to grow in prosperity. You will face times of calm, and times of crisis. And every test will find you prepared---because you’re the men and women of West Point. (Applause.) You leave here marked by the character of this Academy, carrying with you the highest ideals of our nation. Toward the end of his life, Dwight Eisenhower recalled the first day he stood on the plain at West Point. ‘‘The feeling came over me,’’ he said, ‘‘that the expression ‘the United States of America’ would now and henceforth mean something different than it had ever before. From here on, it would be the nation I would be serving, not myself.’’ Today, your last day at West Point, you begin a life of service in a career unlike any other. You’ve answered a calling to hardship and purpose, to risk and honor. At the end of every day you will know that you have faithfully done your duty. May you always bring to that duty the high standards of this great American institution. May you always be worthy of the long gray line that stretches two centuries behind you. On behalf of the nation, I congratulate each one of you for the commission you’ve earned and for the credit you bring to the United States of America. May God bless you all. (Applause.)

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Index

abolitionists, 173, 177 Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 200 Adams, Henry, 69--70 Adams, John Quincy, 6, 12--15, 66--69, 71, 74 administrative agencies, 152 Administrative Procedures Act, 388 advocacy groups, 94--95 Afghanistan, 99 African American migration, 9 African Americans, 51 electoral participation, 9 voting rights, 51 Agricultural Assistance Act, 314 agricultural policy, 151 Agriculture Adjustment Act, 358 airplane, 88 Albright, Madeleine, 472 Alder, Thomas, 85, 86 Alien Enemies Act, 329 Alvord, John, 189 American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), 128 American Equal Rights Association, 198 American Farm Bureau Federation, 151, 154 American Jewish Committee, 138, 139 American Manufacturers Association, 323 American Medical Association (AMA), 355 American Missionary Association (AMA), 189 American national elections, 88 American Political Science Association, 22, 36

American Protective Association, 137 American Psychiatric Association (APA), 220 American Revolution, 175--176 as social movement, 178--179 ‘‘American System,’’ 13, 15 American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), 198 Americanization, 321--335 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 138 Andrus, Ethel Percy, 131 Antebellum Protest, 179 Anthony, Susan B., 196--197 on woman’s right to suffrage, 110Doc anti-Catholicism, 20 Anti-Federalist No. 52, 103--105Doc Anti-Federalist No. 60, 161--162Doc Anti-Mason Party, 19 Anti-Masonic movement, 7, 16, 179 populist democracy of, 18 Anti-Masonic Party, 19--20 Antimasons, 18 antitrust policy, 139 anti--Vietnam War movement, 89 antiwar movements, 213--216 arms control, foreign policies, 478--479 Articles of Confederation, 69 Ash Council on EPA 1970, 424--426Doc Association of Foreign-Language Newspapers, 333 Atwater, Lee, 97 Audubon Society, 128 Australia, 149 Australian government, 149

497

Bailey, John, 85 Baker v. Carr, 59, 112--115Doc Ball, George Cutting Our Losses in South Vietnam, 490--492Doc banks, 67--69 BCRA (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), 23, 93, 155 Benton, Thomas Hart, 12--13 Berry, Jeffrey, 130 big business interests, 8 big government, 129, 140 Bill of Rights, 73, 75 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 278 blogs, 96--97, 277--278 Blumenthal, Sidney, 37 Bonus Army, 173 Boston Harbor, 178 Bradwell v. State, 198 Brand, H. W., 15 Britain, 68 Brown v. Board of Education, 211--212 Bryan, William Jennings, 8 Buckley v. Valeo, 91, 154 Budget Act, 312 Bull Moose, 79, 82, 83 Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands. See Freedmen’s Bureau Bureau of the Budget, 153 Burnham, Walter Dean, 51, 58 Burr, Aaron, 5, 6, 67 Bush, George W., 30, 90, 92, 99, 158 Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 426--429Doc campaign, 93, 122--123Doc

498 Index Graduation Speech at West Point (The Bush Doctrine), 492--495Doc Bush administration, 26 business interests, 129, 135 Cable News Network (CNN), 91 Calhoun, John C., 12--13 campaign finance legislation, 154 modern, 154 campaign organizations, 58 campaign package, 56 campaign spending, 23, 55, 95 campaign-governance cycle, 35, 36--37 campaigns dissident, 78 permanent, 37, 91 third-party, 137 Campbell, Philip, 80, 81 candidate organizations, 61 candidate-centered campaigns, 19, 60--61, 80, 87 Cannon, Joseph, 79, 152 Carter-Reagan contest, 34 Carville, James, 97 Catholic Northerners, 8 Catt, Carrie Chapman speech before Congress, 1917, 110--112Doc Center for Responsive Politics, 95 Central Committee, 14 Central Intelligence Agency, 474--475 centralization, organizational, 37 Chandler, William, 137 Changing Policy-Making Structure, 155 Chase impeachment, 76--77 child labor, 132 Children’s Act, 192--193 Children’s Aid Society (CAS), 193 Christian Coalition, 98, 158, 224 Christian conservatives, 98 Church, Frank, 83 CIS Index, 136, 140, 142 citizen activists, 60 citizens, individual, 125 citizens groups, 133, 136, 139--140, 143--145 civil rights, 152 Civil Rights Act, 152, 217, 366, 368 civil rights movement, 89, 98, 152--153, 156, 211--213 Civil Service Reform Act, 8 civil service merit-based, 8 reforms, 35 Civil War, 7, 10, 20, 53, 137, 186--187 Civil War Amendments impact on Suffrage Movement, 197--203 Civil War Republicans, 61 classic restrictionists, and immigration, 402

Clay, Henry, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16 Clean Air Act, 381, 391 Clean Air Amendments Act, 385, 388 Cleland, Max, 98 Cleveland, Grover, 8, 138 clientelism, 128--129 Clinton, Bill, 30, 90--92, 97, 98, 158 Clinton, Governor DeWitt, 16 Clinton, Hillary, 157 Coal Leasing Act, 393 coalition of interest, 157 coalitions, conservative, 152 collective action, 175, 176 collective decision making, 4 communication, political, 25 Concerned Women of America, 98 Congress, 68 foreign policy, 476 reforms within, 152 textbook, 152--153, 156 two-year, 29--30 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 177 Congressional Budget Control and Impoundment Act, 315 congressional committees, 139, 151 congressional hearings, 141 Congressional Hearings Index, 135--136 Congressional Informational Service, 129 congressional parties organizational cohesion, 31 Congressional Quarterly, 30 Almanacs, 129 average party unity support score, 28 proportion of partisan roll call scores, 28 Washington Information Directory, 129 Connally Hot Oil Act, 314 conservatism, 382--385 neo-Jeffersonian, 15 Constitution, 5, 67--69, 72--76 framework for electoral continuity, 56 Constitution-against-parties, 1 constitutionalism, 22 construction, strict, 73 containment, foreign policies, 478--479 contemporary social movement, 210--211 antiwar movements, 213--216 Civil Rights movement, 211--213 identity movements, 216--221 New Right movement, 221--225 radicalism, 213--216 youth in, 213 convention national, 81, 85 Republican, 92 Coolidge, Calvin

The Press under a Free Government, 288--291Doc corporations, private, 136, 141, 145 cosmopolitans, and immigration, 401--402 cost-benefit ratios, 129 counterterrorism, foreign policies, 479--481 court system, federal, 153 Cowan, Geoffrey, 85, 86 Coxey’s Army, 174 Crawford, William H., 12, 13 critical elections, 4, 51 Dawes (General Allotment) Act, 200 Dean, Howard, 96--98, 277 declaration of principles, 75, 77 declarations of rights, 75 democracy foreign policies, 479--481 mass-centered, 11, 19 democratic delegates, 25 Democratic National Committee (DNC), 23, 91, 94, 353 Democratic National Convention (DNC), 85--86, 97 Democratic Party, 6, 9--10, 14--15, 19--20, 25, 36--37, 45--46, 98, 152--153, 182, 212--213, 215, 218, 350, 362--363, 375 platform, 46--47Doc Democratic primaries, 83, 86 Democratic-Republican party, schism, 6 Democratic-Republicans, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 53, 309 democratization, 7, 10, 76 Democrats, 3, 6--10, 16, 23--25, 27--28, 32--33, 36--37, 63, 85, 89--90, 98, 122--123, 152, 359, 361--363, 373--375 after Civil War, 8 Department of Interior (DOI), 156, 386 designating principle, 73, 74 Dillingham Commission, 139 direct democracy, and Roosevelt’s insurgency campaign of 1912, 79 direct primaries, 82 dissident campaigns, 78 divided party government, 7, 9 Dixiecrats, 98 Dixon, Paul Rand, 131 Dole, Bob, 92 defeat, 92 domestic policy, 319--320 Americanization, 321--335 educational policies, 365--376 environmentalism and conservatism, 380--398 Fair Deal, 350--362 immigration policies, 400--413 New Deal, 340--348

Index welfare state institutionalization, 338 Doom, James E. The Principles of Populism, 240--242Doc DOT v. Public Citizen, 388 Douglas, Stephen, 20 DrudgeReport, 97 Dudley, W. W., 191 Duffey, Joseph, 85 Dump Johnson movements, 83 economic associations, 133, 139 economic interests, 143--144 Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA), 373 Education for All Handicapped Children Education Act (EAHCA), 372 education institutions, 133 education policies, 365--376 educational localism, 365--366 educational policies, 365--376 Edwards, Don, 83 Edwards, John, 98 egalitarian nationalists, and immigration, 402 egalitarianism, 11 election, 272--274 emerging issues, campaign finance reform and 527s, 278--279 and media and public cynicism, 274 public opinion about, 274--275 election cycle, 94 Election of 1800, 66--70 contest, 69--70 partisan principles, 67--69 second inaugural, 74 election-related information, 57 elections, 51 national, 134 realigning, 62 electoral college, 5, 66 electoral continuity framework, 56 electoral information, 61 electoral politics, 37 recurrence, 61 electoral system, disjointed change in, 57 electoral universe, theoretical framework, 53 electoral votes, 34 electorate, 33 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 368, 372 Elk v. Wilkins, 20 Embargo Act, 442 Employment Act, 350 Encyclopedia of Associations, 150 Encyclopedia of Organizations, 135 environmental challenge, 385--391 environmental regulation, 391--397

environmentalism and conservatism, 380--398 EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 156 Equal Pay Act, 217 ESEA backlash against, 373--374 and federal education policy, 366--369, 375--376 implementation and expansion of, 369--373 localism, 365--366 No Child Left Behind, 375--376 redefinition, 374--375 Espionage Act, 329 European immigration, 137 Evangelical Antimasons, 18 evangelical Protestant faiths, 18 executive branch, 152 agencies, 475--476 executive policy making, 4 executive power, 68, 72--73, 76 Executive Reorganization Act, 314 Fair Deal, 350--362 Family Research Council, 98 Farmers Alliance, 182 Fascism, 152 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 99 FDR (Franklin Delano Roosevelt), 77, 83 FEC (Federal Elections Commission), 154--156 Federal Convention of 1787, 68 Federal Elections and Campaigns Act, 154 Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA), 340 federal government, 63 federal laws, 92 Federal Sedition Act, 288, 329, 439 federalism, 22 Federalist No. 4, 434--435 Federalist No. 7, 433, 435 Federalist No. 8, 434 Federalist No. 10, 57, 128, 129, 435 Federalist No. 11, 434 Federalist No. 13, 434 Federalist No. 51, 306 Federalist No. 60, 101--103Doc Federalist No. 62, 56 Federalist Papers, 70, 72--73 Federalist Party, 12 Federalists, 3, 5, 9, 12, 69--70 Feingold, Russell, 93, 94 Fifteenth Amendment, 51, 57 fifth party system, 88, 98 financial activity of political parties, 23 major parties, 24 financing campaigns, 92

499

Fiorina, Morris, 36 First Amendment, 125, 154 public opinion about, 275--276 first party system, 12 527s, 95, 97, 278--279 Fletcher v. Peck, 310 focus groups, 91 Focus on the Family, 96, 98 foreign policy, 69, 99, 431, 433 1890 to 1897, 450--454 1898 to 1902, 454--458 1902 to 1912, 458--464 1912 to 1920, 464--467 arms control, 478--479 Central Intelligence Agency, 474--475 Congress, 476 and Constitution, 434--435 containment, 478--479 counterterrorism, 479--481 democracy, 479--481 executive branch agencies, 475--476 human rights, 479--481 idealism versus realism, 479--481 in Federalist years, 435--440 in Republicans years, 440--442 intelligence communities, 474--475 judiciary, 476--477 and Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny, 444--447 missile defense, 478--479 national loyalty and War of 1812, 442--444 National Security Adviser, 469--473 neutrality politics press and interest groups, 477 Secretary of Defense, 473--474 Secretary of State, 468--469 trade, 478 world opinion, 478 foundations, 133 Fox News, 91--92 France, 68, 70--71 franchise expansion, 59 free blacks, right to vote, 20 free market expansionists, and immigration, 403 free silver, 8 Freedmen’s Bureau, 187--189 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 315 Freemasonry, 16 French Declaration of Rights, 73 funding voter registration drives, 92 fund-raising, 23, 91 Gallup Organization, 32, 38, 390 Garfield, James, 79

500 Index Garrison, William Lloyd John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, 236--237Doc Garvey, Marcus Aims and Objects of the Movement for Solution of Negro Problem, 246--249Doc Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), 219--220 Gay Men’s Health Crisis, 220 gay rights, 98 geographic election districts, 57 George III, King, 6, 75 German American Alliance, 138 get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives, 92 Gilded Age, 8, 191, 194 Gingrich revolution, 28 Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 287--288Doc Goldman, Emma A New Declaration of Independence, 242Doc Goldwater, Barry, 63, 97 GOP (Grand Old Party), 8, 58, 79, 90, 98, 218, 224, 411, 412 GOP Progressive candidate, 80 Gore, Al, 26, 93, 98, 412 campaign, 93, 121--122Doc government, divided, 98 government agencies, 154 government factions, 4 government officials, 91 Grand Canyon National Park, 156 Great Britain, 68 and France, 70 Great Depression, 9--10 Great Society, 53, 83 Green v. County School Board of Kent County, Virginia, 371 groups antiwar, 152 economic, 139 environmental, 152 formation, 135, 145 nativist, 137 professional, 139--140, 143 pro-immigration, 138 social welfare, 150 student, 152 watchdog, 96 Gruening, Martha Two Suffrage Movements, 242--244Doc Hackett, Paul, 96, 97 Haddock, Doris, 94 Hall, Prescott, 139 Hamilton, Alexander, 4, 67--68, 70 hard money, 8, 23, 92--93, 95 Harrison, William Henry, 6 health care institutions, 133 Health Insurance Association of America, 158

Helms, Jesse, 98 Herring, Pendleton, 133 Hickory Clubs, 21 Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act, 355 Hispanics, 99 Hofstadter, Richard, 1 Holt, Michael, 14 Home Teacher Act, 324 Homestead Act, 410--411 hospitals, 133 House of Representatives, 7 House Ways and Means committee, 152 Housing Act, 354, 359, 361 Howard, Oliver O., 189 Hughes, Charles E., 79 Hughes, Harold E., 85 Hughes Commission, 86--87 human rights, foreign policies, 479--481 Humphrey, Cliff Ecology Action, 423--424Doc Humphrey, Hubert, 84--85 idealism versus realism, foreign policies, 479--481 identity movements, 216--221 ideological coherence, 36 ideological watchdog groups, 96 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 412 Illinois, 11 immigration, 138, 139 bedeviled enforcement, 409--410 expansive immigrant admissions and rights, 410--413 classic restrictionists, 402 cosmopolitans, 401--402 egalitarian nationalists, 402 free market expansionists, 403 ideological traditions, 400--401 illegal immigration and employer sanctions, 406--407 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 407--409 Mexican labor migration bribery, 403--404 Mexican Braceros and undocumented aliens, 404--406 and World War I, 403 and SCRIP, 407--409 Immigration Act, 404 Immigration Coalitions, 138 immigration policy, 136, 139 Immigration Protective League, 138--139 immigration reform, 136 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 407, 408 Improving America’s Schools Act, 374 incumbency, 34, 156

incumbents, 34, 91 independents, 89--90 Indiana, 11 individual citizen, as potential voter, 54 individual liberty, 14 individual-level political responsibility, 23 industrial unionism, 177 industrialization, 6 information, 56, 58, 61 Inglehart, Ronald, 130 institutionalization of parties, 23 of party organizations, 37 institutional-level political responsibility, 23 insurgent activism, 152 insurgent campaigns of Eugene McCarthy, 78 of Theodore Roosevelt, 78 intelligence communities, 474--475 interest activity, organized, 140 interest group activism, 143 interest group activity, assessment, 135 interest group coalitions, 158 interest group development, since 1915, 148 interest group formation, 135, 142 in 20th century, 139--141 interest group literature, 130 interest group mobilization and maintenance, 150 interest group politics, 132, 145 interest group systems, 132--135, 140 interest group universe, 140 changing, 149 interest groups, 25, 36, 56, 60--61, 92, 125, 127, 129, 138, 141, 143, 151, 154--156 and foreign policies, 477 formation, 135 meaningful activity, 149 need for sufficient constituents, 149 organized, 132, 136 reforming, 154 interest mobilization, 130 interests, commercial, 69 Interests and American Political Development, 130 Internet, 23, 92, 95 Internet-savvy candidates, 96 Internet-savvy citizens, 96 Interstate Commerce Act, 139 Iraq, 99 IRL (Immigration Restriction League), 137--139 iron triangle metaphor, 151 iron triangles, 138, 151--152, 154--155 issue networks, 129, 139--140, 144, 152 Jackson, Andrew, 6--7, 10, 12--13, 16, 70 campaign, 15 opposition to, 6

Index Jacksonian Democrats, 61, 445 Jay Treaty, 69 Jefferson, Thomas, 4--6, 10, 12, 66--70, 72--74, 76 Ecology Action, 423--424Doc first inaugural address, 41--43Doc Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, 61 Jim Crow laws, 9, 51 John Marshall’s assumption, 76 Johnson, Lyndon, 30, 83, 86, 97, 152 judiciary, 476--477 Judiciary Act, 70 K Street Corridor, 148 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 58, 446 Kellor, Frances, 139 Kennedy, John, 98 Kennedy, Robert, 83--84 Kerry, John, 95 campaign, 93 nomination, 98 Key, V. O., Jr., 78, 86 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 152 Letter from Birmingham City Jail, 249--254Doc Knights of the White Camelia, 181 Know-Nothings, nativist, 137 Kohler, Max, 139 Korematsu v. United States, 477 Ku Klux Klan, 181, 183 LaFollette, Robert, 79 campaign, 80 Land Grant College Act, 190 law-makers, 57 lawmaking, unorthodox, 154 leadership, major-party, 78 Legal Defense Fund, 153 Liberal Immigration League, 138 liberal philosophy, 125 lifetime civil service, 71 limited government, 14 Lincoln, Abraham, 7, 10, 73 Lincoln-Douglas debate, 59 Lipmann, Walter Public Opinion, 284--287Doc Lloyd, Henry D. The Lords of Industry, 168--170Doc lobbying, 148, 154--155 community, 149 professionalization of, 148, 155 lobbyists, 149, 155 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 137 Louisiana Purchase, 71--73 Louisiana Treaty, 73 Lowenstein, Allard, 83 Madison, James, 5, 6, 12, 57, 66, 68--70, 72, 125, 128 on parties, 41Doc Maisel, Sandy, 24

major parties, 4, 78--79, 89 Mann, Horace On Education and National Welfare, 415--416Doc Marbury v. Madison, 76, 310 Marshall, John, 76 Marshall Court, 77 Masonry, 16, 18 Mass Democracy, 15, 19 mass media, 25 mass party era, 59 mass-based democracy, invention of, 12 mass-centered democracy, 11 matching funds, 92 federal, 93 maternalism, 204--207 McCain, John, 93, 95 McCain-Feingold, 93--95 McCain’s Web site, 96 McCall, Samuel, 137 McCarran-Walter Act, 412 McCarthy, Eugene, 79, 83--84, 86 campaign, 83--85, 87 strategist, 85 success, 86 McConnell, Mitch, 94 McCormick, Richard, 11 McCulloch v. Maryland, 310 McGovern, George, 83 McGovern-Fraser Commission, 86, 87 McKinley, William B., 8, 10, 80--81, 137 media, 91, 259, 261 agenda setting, priming and framing, 271--272 biased coverage, 56 blogs, 277--278 delivery mechanisms, 23 effects of, 264--266 and election, 272--274 elite debate, 266--267 emerging issues, campaign finance reform and 527s, 278--279 future, 268 historical perspective, 261--263 influence on public policy, 266, 267 journalists, 268 mass media technologies, expansion and impact, 263--264, 267--268 opinion about First Amendment, 275--276 policy, type and stage, 267 and public cynicism, 274 public opinion about, 274--275 real-time depiction of news, 266 talk radio, 276--277 televised, 154 watch dog role of, 263 Merriam, Charles, 136 Mexican labor migration and World War I, 403

501

bribery, 403--404 Mexican Braceros and undocumented aliens, 404--406 Mexican War, 58 Miller, Zell, 98 Mills, Wilbur, 152 Mining Act, 393 Mining Safety and Health Act, 395 minor parties, 4 Minor v. Happersett, 199 missile defense, foreign policies, 478--479 Missouri, 11 Mitchell, George, 85 money, 23, 92, 94 as party strength, 23 Monroe, James, 5, 12, 66, 71 Monroe Doctrine, 483--484Doc Moral Majority, 98 Moral politics, 36 Morgan, William, 16 Morone, James, 36 movement organizations, social, 152 movement politics, and McCarthy challenge of 1968, 83--86 movements third-party, 137 women’s rights, 89 xenophobic, 136 Moveon.org, 25, 96 MSNBC, 91 Murrow--McCarthy, ‘‘See It Now’’ Debate, 291--297Doc Nader, Ralph, 153--154 Napoleon, 71--72 NARAL, 25 National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, 25 national agenda, 132 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 153, 211, 353 National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 137 national bank, 16, 69 National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, 255--256Doc National Defense Education Act (NDEA), 366 National Election Study (NES), 32, 89 NES question set, 33 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 388 National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), 158 national government, 13, 57, 63 National Grange, 133 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 314

502 Index National Labor Relations Act, 314 national laws, 69 national organizations, 14 national party convention, 4, 7 National party nominating convention delegates, 25 National Party Nonfederal Receipts, 25 national party power, 8 national policy making, 145 institutions original design, 304--307 autonomy of, 309--311 national political parties, 3 National Progressive Italian American League, 80 National Progressive Party, 82--83 National Progressive Republican League, 80 National Republican Party, 6 National Republicans, 6--7 National Rifle Association, 25 National Roosevelt Committee, 80 National Security Act, 469 National Security Adviser, 469--473 National Taxpayers Union, 158 nationalization, 133 Natural Resources Defense Council, 154 naturalization policies, 138 Neutrality Act, 486--489Doc New Deal, 9, 36, 53, 58, 62, 89, 97, 127--130, 140, 152, 183--184, 340--342, 347--348 limits to, 345--347 and separation of power and federalism, 345--34 and World War II, 347 New Deal Democrats, 61, 89 New England Puritan, 17 New Left, 20, 153, 156 New Nationalism, 79 New Right movement, 221--225 New York Times Co. v. United States, 297--301Doc news media, 154 newspapers, party-subsidized, 61 Nineteenth Amendment, 51, 57--58 Nixon, Richard, 98, 153--154 Nixon-McGovern contest, 34 No Child Left Behind, 375--376 nominating caucus, 4 North American Civic League for Immigrants (NACL), 323 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 472 Obama, Barack, 279, 472, 476, 480 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 149 office seekers, 61 office-holding elites, 36, 37 Ohio, 11 Ohio Constitutional Convention, 80

Old Confederacy, 89, 97 Old Guard, 9, 82, 134 Old Hickory, 13 OMB (Office of Management and Budget), 153 omnibus form, 154 opposition scores, average party unity, 28 Ordinance of Nullification, 6 organizational cohesiveness, 35--36 organizations campaign-related, 154 economic-based, 133 national, 14, 133, 142 organized interests, 125, 130, 133--134, 139, 145 aggregate number of, 133, 135 historical view, 139 and parties, relationship between, 134 in Progressive Era, 141 regional orientation, 133 and state institutions, 148 PACs (political action committees), 60, 90, 92, 155--156 participation, 36 civic, 25 participatory democracy, 20, 79 particularism, 57 parties anti-Masonic, 18 national, 94 third, 19--20, 78, 82--83 partisan conflict, 5, 68 Partisan regime theory, 62--63 partisan roll call vote, 28 partisans, 4, 36 party activists, 24--26 distinctiveness, 25 party agents, 59, 61 district-level, 59 party elites, 59 party engagement, 28 party eras, 4, 9 party identification, 33, 89--90 party in office/government, 4 party labels, 38, 90--91 party organizations, 4--5, 59--60, 69, 87, 92 national, 24, 88 pragmatic, 20 party platforms, 26 Party Politics and Antebellum Protest, 179--180 party rank-and-file, 25 party realignments, 4 party systems, 4, 27, 130 responsible, 22, 35--36 Party Unity/Oppositions Scores, 29--30 party workers, 25 party-linked campaigns professionals, 60

party-linked newspapers, 55 Patriot Act, 99 Patterson, Thomas, 58 Pendleton Act, 8 permanent campaigns, 37--38, 89, 137 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA), 412 personal vote, 91 Pew Internet and American Life project, 96 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, 67 pioneers, 93 Planned Parenthood, 96 platforms, 26 Plunkitt, Senator George Honest Graft and Dishonest Graft, 48--49Doc policy seekers, 53, 56, 61--62 policy-making process, 125, 129--130, 138, 139, 143, 151, 153--154, 303 autonomy of, 309--311 continuity and changes in, 316--317 domestic policy. See domestic policy federalism in, 307--308 national policy-making institutions original design, 304--307 national activism, 313--315 politics of, 308--309 in Progressive era, 311--313 recent developments, 315--316 policy-making structure, changing, 151 political authority, 63 political coalitions, 62 political development, 53 political information, 23, 37, 54 supersaturation of, 23 political institutions, 134, 150, 153 political messages, elite-generated, 58 political parties, 1, 3--4, 22--23, 95, 154 attitudes, 27 behavior, 27 class differences between, 9 definition, 3 as government factions, 4 national, 3 relationships, 27 as responsible officeholders, 27 as responsible organizations, 23 political responsibility, 22--24, 27, 31 politically responsible electorate, 32 politicians ambitious, 60, 62 office-seeking, 53, 55 politics candidate-centered, 89--90, 93 clientele, 125, 140 elite, 22 Pomper, Gerald, 31 Poole and Rosenthal ideological scores, 27 popular vote, 34

Index population, 149 Populism and Reconstruction, 180--182 Populist Democracy, rise of, 16 Populist Parties, 18 Populist style of democracy, 19--20 Portman, Rob, 96 Powderly, Terence The Plea for Eight Hours, 238--240Doc power, 23 to declare war, 68 as party strength, 23 separation of, 22 precinct-level, 59 preference shapers, 53 presidency, transformation of, 70 president, 19 presidential campaigns, 60, 92 presidential candidates, 89 Presidential Election Two-Party Vote, 33 presidential elections, 58, 71 presidential electors, 59 presidential nominations, 7 presidential party leadership, 6--7 presidential power, 73 presidential selection, 73 presidential support, 30 press, 133 private business, 133 Proclamation of Neutrality, 68 Proclamation of the Delano Grape Workers for International Boycott Day, 254--255Doc professional associations, 140 Progressive Era, 35, 58, 83, 128--129, 136, 139 organized interests in, 141 Progressive movement, 9 Progressive Party, 86 Progressive programs, 83 Progressive Republicans, 79 Progressives, 8, 20, 79 Prohibition issue, 8 pro-McCarthy staff, 86 Proportion of Partisan Roll Call Votes, 28, 29 Protestant Southerners, 8 Protestantism, 8 evangelical, 20 public employment, 342--344 public opinion, 18, 32, 56, 66--67, 73--74, 91, 259 polls, 88, 91 Public Utility Holding Company Act, 314

Reagan revolution, 36, 53 Reaganite Republicans, 61 realignment, 132 Reconstruction, 8, 97 and Populism, 180--182 reforms campaign finance, 88, 90, 94--95, 156 direct democracy, 79 progressive, 132 regime model, 62 reign of witches, 69 religious groups, church-based, 133 Remini, Robert, 11, 13, 15 Republican Contract, 28 Republican National Committees, 23, 81, 91, 94 republican nomination, 86, 92 Republican Party, 37, 63, 69, 83, 152, 187 platform, 47--48Doc Republicans, 3, 5, 7, 9, 27, 69--70, 90 after Civil War, 8 post-1896 Industrial, 61 resources, 133 responsible parties, need for, 35 responsible party doctrine, 36 Revolution of 1800, 66--70 appointments and removals, 70--71 coordinate review and impeachments, 76--77 first inaugurals, 69--70 term limit, 75--76 transformation of presidency, 70--77 Twelfth Amendment and designating principles, 73--75 Reynolds v. Sims, 115--118Doc Riker, William, 80 Robertson, Pat Citizens of Character Must Get Involved, 256--258Doc Roe v. Wade, 218, 223, 224 roll call votes, 28 Roman Catholics, 8--9, 20 Roosevelt, Franklin, 9--10, 73 A Message to the Congress on Social Security, 418--419Doc Roosevelt, Theodore, 8, 9, 79, 80, 81, 125 On Americanism, 416--418Doc Rove, Karl, 97 Rules Committee, 85--86 defeat, 86 minority report, 86

race, in American politics, 63 radicalism, 213--216 radio ads, 94 rank-and-file, 5, 37 Ranney, Austin, 34 Reagan, Ronald, 89, 98, 153 Reagan era, 27

Saint Domingue, 71 Schattschneider, E. E., 133 schools nationalization, 365--376 educational localism, 365--366 Second Bank, 58 second-party system, 7 Secretary of Defense, 473--474

503

Secretary of State, 468--469 security, 99 national, 71--72 Sedition Acts, 69--70, 76 Seminole Indians, 13 senators, direct election of, 59 seniority system, reforming by Democrats, 154 September 11, 90, 99 Seventeenth Amendment, 59 Shaw, Anna Howard The Fundamental Principle of a Republic, 245--246Doc Shays Rebellion, 179 Sherman Antitrust Act, 139 SHOPA, 149 Shuttlesworth, Fred, 152 Sierra Club, 156 sixth political system, 98 Social Gospel movement, 191, 194 social insurance, 342, 344--345 social movements, 19, 36, 130, 132, 171--172 activity, 152 and lobby, 182--183 social networks, 25 social policy, 186--194 Social Security Act, 314, 344, 345, 346, 355 soft money, 23, 25, 92--95, 97 Southern Strategy, 98 Southerners, 9 Spain, 13, 71 split-ticket voting, 34--35 spoils system, 7, 70 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 196--197 state party organizations, 94 Steffens, Lincoln The Shame of the Cities, 167--168Doc Stewart, Charles, 59 straight-ticket voting, 34--35 street lobbying, 155 subgovernments, 138, 144 suffrage, women’s, 82 administrative growth, 207--208 Civil War Amendments impact on, 197--203 divisions in ranks, 203--204 maternalism and constructing ‘‘women,’’ 204--207 and political development, 195--197 Supreme Court, 76, 90, 153--154 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 187 Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, 95--96 System of 1896, 58 Taft, William Howard, 8, 79, 81 forces, 80 Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, 489--490Doc

504 Index Taft-Hartley Act, 351, 352, 354, 357, 361, 362 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 200 talk radio, 276--277 Tarbell, Ida History of the Standard Oil Company, 166--167Doc Taylor, Zachary, 6 television, 88, 94 networks, 91 Tenth Amendment, 67 terrorism, 99 Textbook Congress, 151 decline of, 152 third party, 16 Thoreau, Henry David ‘‘Civil Disobedience,’’ 227--236Doc Thurmond, Strom, 98 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 77 ‘‘Election of the President,’’ 105--110Doc ‘‘Parties in the United States,’’ 43--46Doc ‘‘Public Associations in Civic Life,’’ 162--166Doc Townsend movement, 183--184 trade, 143--145 associations, 133, 135--136, 139--140, 144, 150--151 foreign policies, 478 Traditional Values Coalition, 25 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 484--486Doc trends by-chamber split-ticket voting, 35 presidential-by-chamber, 34 Trends in Ideological Positions Two-Year Congresses, 27 Truman, David, 133 Truman, Harry, 9, 73 and Fair Deal, 350--362 State of the Union Address, 419--423Doc

Twain, Mark Women’s Temperance Movement, 237--238Doc Twelfth Amendment, 5, 73--74, 77 Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 51 Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 58 two-party competition, 3--5, 9, 12, 78, 137 Union of American Hebrew Societies, 139 unions, 133, 136, 139, 143--145, 155 U.S. Congressional Hearings Index, 129 U.S. Supreme Court, Buckley v. Valeo, 118--121 Van Buren, Martin, 12, 13, 14, 16, 69 Van Dusen, Glydon, 15 vice president, 5, 74 becoming (acting) president, 7 Vietnam War, 83--84 voice voting, 59 Volunteer party canvassers, 90 voters, 53, 61, 96 attentive, 62 floating, 89 voting, 51, 59 rights, 51, 57--58 straight-ticket versus-split ticket, 33 Voting Rights Act (VRA), 58, 118Doc, 213 Walker, Jack, 135, 150--151 Walker’s analysis, 139 war, power to declare, 68 War for Independence, 68 War of 1812, 11, 12, 13, 70 War Powers Act, 315 Warner, Mark, 98 Warren, Earl, 153

Washington, George, 4, 12, 67--68, 135 The Proclamation of Neutrality, 483Doc Washington Beltway, 129, 394 Washington committee, 14--15 Washington Information Directory, 135, 136, 139 Washington Representatives, 129, 150 Washington’s proclamation, 68 Watergate scandal, 154 Watergate-era reforms, 154 Weak identifiers, 89 Web site, 92, 96 Webster, Daniel, 7, 12, 15 welfare state, 338--339 limits to, 345--347 New Deal, 340--342, 347--348 Progressive reforms, 339--340 public employment, 342--344 and separation of power and federalism, 345--347 social insurance, 342, 344--345 and World War II, 347 Wexler, Anne, 85, 86 Whig Party, 6, 7 Whigs, 3, 6--7, 9, 19--20 Whiskey Rebellion, 69, 179 White-Line movement, 181 Wilson, James Q., 128 Wilson, Woodrow, 8--9, 63, 70, 82--83 Wirt, William, 19 women, right to vote, 20, 51, 58 workers, patronage-minded party precinct, 56 Yellow Dog Democrats, 89 youth, in social movement, 213 Zenger, John Peter Trial Record, 281--283Doc

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM

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A HISTORY OF THE

U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM Ideas, Interests, and Institutions VOLUME III CRITICAL DOCUMENTS BY HISTORICAL ERAS

Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor Editors

Copyright 2010 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A history of the U.S. political system : ideas, interests, and institutions / Richard A. Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor, editors. 3 v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-713-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) --- ISBN 978-1-85109-718-0 (ebook) 1. United States---Politics and government. I. Harris, Richard A., 1951- II. Tichenor, Daniel J., 1966JK31.H57 2010 320.973---dc22

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

About the Editors

Richard A. Harris, PhD, is a professor at Rutgers University--Camden with a joint appointment in political science and public policy and administration. He directs the Senator Walter Rand Institute for Public Affairs. He has written and edited several books, including Coal Firms Under the New Social Regulation (Duke University Press), The Politics of Regulatory Change (Oxford University Press, coauthored), and Remaking American Politics (Westview Press, coedited). He has been a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and received the Mary Parker Follett Award and the Jack Walker Award from the American Political Science Association for best article (coauthored) in Politics and History and Political Organizations and Parties, respectively. Daniel J. Tichenor, PhD, is Philip H. Knight professor of Social Science and senior faculty fellow at the Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon. In addition to numerous articles and chapters, he has published Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton University Press) and The Oxford Handbook on International Migration (Oxford University Press). He has been the recipient of fellowships from the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, the Brookings Institution, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Along with Dr. Harris, he has received the Follett and Walker awards. He also was awarded the Gladys Kammerer Prize by the American Political Science Association for best book in American public policy and politics.

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Contents Volume III Introduction to Volume III, xiii

Section 1: The Early Republic, 1 Introduction, 1 Documents, 3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13

The Mayflower Compact, November 1620, 3 William Penn, Plan of Union, 1697, 3 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, 1764, 4 Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, March 23, 1775, 6 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1776, 7 Abigail Adams, Letter to John Adams on the Rights of Women, March 31, 1776, 11 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781, 11 Anti-Federalist No. 7, 13 Benjamin Banneker, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, August 19, 1791, 14 George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796, 16 The Kentucky Resolutions, 1799, 23 Absalom Jones, Sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade, January 1, 1808, 24 The New England Threat of Secession, Columbian Centinel, January 13, 1813, 25

Section 2: The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period, 27 Introduction, 27 Documents, 29 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9

Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States,’’ Democracy in America, 1835, 29 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘What Are the Chances of Duration of the American Union, and What Dangers Threaten It,’’ Democracy in America, 1835, 33 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Government of the Democracy in America,’’ Democracy in America, 1835, 36 Frederick Jackson Turner, Significance of the Frontier in American History, 1893, 41 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States, July 10, 1832, 45 Henry Clay, Speech on President Jackson’s Veto of the Bank Bill in Senate, July 10, 1832, 46 Andrew Jackson, Second Annual Message, 1834, 50 Chief John Ross, Cherokee Letter Protesting the Treaty of New Echota, September 28, 1836, 51 John L. O’Sullivan, Manifest Destiny, 1839, 52

viii Contents 2.10

James K. Polk, Message to the Senate and House Concerning the Mexican-American War, May 11, 1846, 53 2.11 Henry Clay, Speech on the Mexican-American War, 1847, 57 2.12 Seneca Falls Declaration, 1848, 61 2.13 Sojourner Truth, ‘‘Ain’t I A Woman?’’ 1851, 62 2.14 George Fitzhugh, The Universal Law of Slavery, 1849, 63 2.15 Daniel Webster, The Constitution and the Union, 1850, 64 2.16 Augustus Washington, African Colonization---By a Man of Color, July 3, 1851, 66 2.17 Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, 1852, 68 2.18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 [1856], 71 2.19 William Lloyd Garrison, Dred Scott and Disunion, March 12, 1858, 75 2.20 John Brown, Speech to the Court at His Trial, November 2, 1859, 76 2.21 William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, December 16, 1859, 77

Section 3: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 79 Introduction, 79 Documents, 81 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8

William Lloyd Garrison, The War---Its Cause and Cure, May 3, 1861, 81 Jefferson Davis, Farewell Speech on the Senate Floor, January 21, 1861, 83 The Homestead Act, May 20, 1862, 85 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 1863, 85 Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863, 86 Frederick Douglass, The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America, June 1863, 87 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, 90 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Destructive Male, 1868, 91

Section 4: The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism, 93 Introduction, 93 Documents, 95 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16

Chief Joseph, On Surrender to the U.S. Army, 1877, 95 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 [1876], 95 Susan B. Anthony, Social Purity, March 14, 1875, 98 Blanche Bruce, Speech in the Senate, March 31, 1876, 101 Henry George, The Paradox of Capitalist Growth, 1879, 102 Chinese Exclusion Act, May 6, 1882, 103 Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case, October 22, 1883, 105 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward, 1888, 108 The Interstate Commerce Act, 1887, 111 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890, 113 Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 1889, 114 Populist Party Platform, July 1892, 116 Samuel Gompers, Letter to Judge Grosscup on Strikes, 1894, 119 William Allen White, ‘‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?’’ August 16, 1896, 121 William Jennings Bryan, Cross of Gold, July 9, 1896, 122 Jane Addams, ‘‘The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements,’’ 1892, 125

Contents

Section 5: The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s, 129 Introduction, 129 Documents, 131 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21

Booker T. Washington, Democracy and Education, September 30, 1896, 131 Albert Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire, 1898, 133 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Evolution of Negro Leadership, July 16, 1901, 138 Lincoln Steffens, Major Problems in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1904, 140 Lochner v. The People of New York, 198 U.S. 45 [1905], 141 Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 [1908], 143 The Panama Canal Treaty (Convention between the United States and Panama), November 18, 1903, 146 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Chapter 1), 1913, 151 Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, 1916, 153 Carrie Chapman Catt, The Crisis, 1916, 154 Herbert Croly, Promise of American Life, 1909, 159 Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, 1910, 162 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? 1912, 165 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, 1918, 176 W. E. B. Du Bois, President Harding and Social Equality, 1921, 178 Ellison DuRant Smith, Shut the Door, April 9, 1924, 180 League of Nations Debate in the Senate, June 28, 1919, 182 Warren Harding, Return to Normalcy, March 14, 1920, 188 William E. Borah, On the Necessity for Naval Disarmament, 1921, 189 Margaret Sanger, The Children’s Era, 1925, 191 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism, October 22, 1928, 192

Section 6: The New Deal, 201 Introduction, 201 Documents, 203 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11

Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933, 203 Henry A. Wallace, A Declaration of Interdependence, May 13, 1933, 205 Father Coughlin, The National Union for Social Justice, November 11, 1934, 207 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 1935, 208 Huey Long, Speech to the American People, March 7, 1935, 214 Social Security Act, 1935, 220 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Negro and Social Change, December 12, 1935, 224 Herbert Hoover, This Challenge to Liberty, October 30, 1936, 226 John L. Lewis, Labor and the Nation, September 1937, 231 Harry Hopkins, America’s Economic Problem, August 5, 1938, 233 Mary McLeod Bethune, What Does American Democracy Mean to Me? November 23, 1939, 237

Section 7: World War II and Postwar America, 239 Introduction, 239 Documents, 241 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms (Address to Congress), January 6, 1941, 241 Wendell Wilkie, A Warning on Isolationism, January 8, 1941, 241 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pearl Harbor Speech (Declaration of War), December 8, 1941, 243 Executive Order No. 9066 (Japanese Internment), 1941, 243

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x Contents 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15

Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights, July 13, 1942, 244 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), 1944, 249 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech), March 5, 1946, 250 George Marshall, Harvard Commencement Speech (The Marshall Plan), June 5, 1947, 255 Harry S. Truman, Address before a Joint Session of Congress (The Truman Doctrine), March 12, 1947, 257 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Struggle for Human Rights, September 28, 1948, 259 Executive Order No. 9981 (Desegregation of the Armed Forces), 1948, 264 Robert Taft, Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, July 26, 1949, 264 North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, 265 Senate Resolution on the Censure of Sen. Joseph McCarthy, 1954, 267 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961, 267

Section 8: The 1960s, 271 Introduction, 271 Documents, 273 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16

John F. Kennedy, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, 273 Statement upon Signing Executive Order No. 10924 (Establishing the Peace Corps), March 1, 1961, 274 John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 22, 1962, 275 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement, 1962, 278 George C. Wallace, Statement and Proclamation on Integrating the University of Alabama, June 11, 1963, 286 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, August 28, 1963, 287 Civil Rights Act, 1964, 289 Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 1964, 293 Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, April 3, 1964, 296 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Great Society, 1964, 301 National Organization of Women (NOW), Statement of Principles, 1966, 303 Paul Potter (Students for a Democratic Society President), Vietnam Anti-War Speech, 1965, 305 Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence, April 4, 1967, 309 Mario Savio, Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 1967, 314 Judith Gabree, Letter to Staughton Lynd on His Article ‘‘A Good Society,’’ 1968, 314 Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, August 8, 1968, 315

Section 9: The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution, 319 Introduction, 319 Documents, 321 9.1 9.2 9.3

The National Environmental Policy Act, 1969, 321 Richard M. Nixon, Speech on ‘‘Vietnamization’’ (The Nixon Doctrine), November 3, 1969, 323 Betty Friedan, Testimony before the Senate against the Nomination of Judge Carswell and the ‘‘Sex Plus’’ Doctrine, 1970, 327 9.4 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 [1973], 330 9.5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 [1973], 333 9.6 Richard M. Nixon, Resignation Speech, August 8, 1974, 337 9.7 Gerald Ford Pardons Richard Nixon, 1974, 339 9.8 Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, June 1977, 340 9.9 Cesar Chavez, On Organizing Farm Workers, 1979, 344 9.10 Ronald Reagan, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 1980, 344

Contents 9.11 9.12 9.13 9.14

Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981, 350 Jesse Jackson, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 1984, 352 Mario Cuomo, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 1984, 355 Ronald Reagan, Tear Down This Wall, 1987, 360

Section 10: Contemporary American Politics, 365 Introduction, 365 Documents, 367 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 10.12 10.13 10.14 10.15 10.16 10.17 10.18

William K. Reilly, Announcement of Clean Air Amendments Act, 1990, 367 Americans with Disabilities Act, 1990, 368 George H. W. Bush, Desert Storm Speech on the Invasion of Iraq, January 16, 1991, 372 Lawrence Walsh, Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report, 1993, 374 William Jefferson Clinton, Memphis Church of Christ Address, November 13, 1993, 378 Republican Contract with America, 1994, 382 William Jefferson Clinton, Oklahoma Bombing Memorial Prayer Service Address, 1995, 383 William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Statement on Welfare Reform Bill, August 22, 1996, 384 William Jefferson Clinton Articles of Impeachment, 1998, 386 Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech, February 21, 2000, 387 USA Patriot Act, 2001, 392 American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU on the Patriot Act, 2002, 396 George W. Bush, White House Report on No Child Left Behind Act, 2001, 397 Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S. 306 [2003], 401 George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on a Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 2003, 406 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 [2004], 407 Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, Outsourcing America, March 11, 2004, 411 Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group Report, December 6, 2006, 415

Index, 419

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Introduction to Volume III

The first two volumes of this encyclopedia have assembled original essays focusing on the evolution of key government institutions (Volume I) and key nongovernment institutions as well as policy debates (Volume II) in American politics. The two volumes also organized primary documents to amplify those essays. This third volume presents an additional 153 primary documents organized into 10 historic epochs in American political history: The Early Republic; The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period; The Civil War and Reconstruction; The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism; The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s; The New Deal; World War II and Postwar America; The 1960s; The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution; and Contemporary American Politics. These documents offer a rich resource for scholars and students of American politics to engage directly with the people, the controversies, and the ideals that have shaped the nation and defined critical periods of development. In selecting documents for inclusion in this third volume, we were mindful of the diversity of voices and perspectives that have woven the tapestry of American political development. Thus, for example, in Section 1 on the early republic, we present not only the founders’ explanations of what they were trying to accomplish but also the critiques and admonitions of those not yet fully endowed with citizenship. Benjamin Banneker’s remarkably poignant letter to Thomas Jefferson on the problem of slavery in a democracy and Abigail Adams’ letter to her husband John imploring him to include women in the founding are two such documents. Similarly, the reader will find speeches and letters of abolitionists, first- and second-wave feminists, union organizers, and social gospel leaders that illustrate the interplay of social movements, interests groups, and public opinion with government institutions in changing policy. We also included excerpted landmark Supreme Court cases that have shaped and reshaped our rights as citizens. In sorting through the wealth of documents representing the traditional elites and policy makers of American history, we have attempted to incorporate materials that speak to a different kind of diversity---that is, the variety of ideas, issues, and influences that have molded America since the Puritans arrived in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The primary sources found in this volume include early documents such as the Mayflower Compact (Section 1) and William Penn’s Plan of Union (Section 1) that informed the founders, as well as public pronouncements such as the Kentucky Resolutions (Section 1) and Andrew Jackson’s Bank Veto Message (Section 2) along with Henry Clay’s rejoinder (Section 2) that illustrate how political actors applied the founders’ constitutional framework. The reader will find momentous addresses of presidents and presidential candidates that defined our responses as a nation to crises and challenges: Lincoln’s Second Inaugural (Section 3); Bryan’s Cross of Gold Speech (Section 4); FDR’s The Four Freedoms (Section 7); and Barry Goldwater’s Acceptance at the 1964 Republican National Convention (Section 8). In addition, we have excerpted crucial public laws that have channeled and demarcated U.S. socioeconomic development, among them the Homestead Act (Section 3); the Chinese Exclusion Act (Section 4); the Sherman Antitrust Act (Section 4); FDR’s Executive Order No. 9066 Authorizing Japanese Internment (Section 7); the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) (Section 7); the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Section 8); the 1990 Clean Air Amendments Act (Section 10); and the USA Patriot Act (Section 10). Volume III compiles as well the landmark Supreme Court decisions that have established both civil rights and relations between government and business. Finally, this third volume includes historic statements on U.S. foreign and defense policy, including Henry Clay’s declamation on the

xiv

Introduction to Volume III

Mexican-American War (Section 2); Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (Section 5); Albert Beveridge’s In Support of an American Empire (Section 5); the Truman Doctrine (Section 7); George Marshall’s Harvard Commencement announcing the Marshall Plan (Section 7); and Ronald Reagan’s Speech at the Berlin Wall (Section 9). In sum, this collection of primary documents is an invaluable resources for scholars and students interested in American political history and the development of the U.S. socioeconomic system. The documents provide a window into the passions and the policies that, as well as the protagonists who, shaped America’s development. ---Richard A. Harris

Section 1 The Early Republic

Introduction

individuals could devise their own plans of self-government. Moreover, they showed that men could apply their own powers of reason to organize their political and social life. These documents also established a tradition of appealing to protestant religion and divine inspiration as a basis for American politics. Appeals to religion and the will of God would arouse the passions of the founders’ to justify their revolution, of abolitionists and suffragettes demanding their own rights and freedoms, of labor organizers, of industrialists, and of advocates for westward expansion and empire building. In the early republic, we also find articulate and engaged citizens pointing out the hypocrisy of a liberal democracy that denies the basic civil rights for African Americans and women. These initial statements on slavery and women’s rights were harbingers of movements that would convulse the nation in the future, but would also remake the Constitution and our laws. The success of these efforts drew heavily on the civic and religious ideals that shaped our political culture: natural rights, rule of law, tolerance, individual liberty and responsibility, and popular sovereignty. As reflected in the constitutional ratification, this period in American political development clearly joined a long-running debate about the respective roles of the central government, the states, and the people. While the people (at least those enjoying suffrage) granted political legitimacy to the government, sovereignty was in fact shared in that the people enjoyed an electoral connection with both the state and federal governments and the Constitution itself was ratified by the states.

The period from 1620 when the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock through the American Revolution, the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and end of Thomas Jefferson’s presidency in 1808 can rightly be understood as formative years in the development of political culture and institutions in America. Many of the tensions and issues that animated the founding generation and continue to play out in contemporary American politics took root in those 188 years. The overarching theme of this period, however, is the struggle of Americans to design a system of governance based on popular sovereignty rather than divine right or hereditary privilege. This enterprise brought succeeding generation of the early republic face to face with the challenge of balancing individual freedom with the collective needs. The preamble to the Constitution perfectly reflects the founders’ awareness of this challenge: ‘‘We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity . . .’’ As several of the documents in this section indicate, religion and the principle religious tolerance were central to the American experiment with democratic government. Puritans and Quakers rehearsed the act of constitution writing in the formation of their settlements of Massachusetts’s Bay Colony and Pennsylvania. The heritage of The Mayflower Compact and William Penn’s Plan of Union demonstrated that 1

2 The Early Republic The founding generation wrestled with the difficulty of how to create a powerful enough central government to provide foreign and domestic security while preserving individual rights and a meaningful role for the states. Subsequent controversies around the regulation

of business, civil rights, intelligence gathering, education, and environmental policy reflected the conflicting positions and unresolved questions of federalism that emerged in the nation’s first decades. ---Richard A. Harris

Documents

Rhode Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and Carolina---may be made more useful to the crown and one another’s peace and safety with an universal concurrence.

1.1 The Mayflower Compact, November 1620 IN The Name of God, Amen. We, whose names are underwritten, the Loyal Subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord King James, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, etc. Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honor of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid; And by Virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general Good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due Submission and Obedience. In WITNESS whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names at Cape Cod the eleventh of November, in the Reign of our Sovereign Lord King James of England, France, and Ireland, the eighteenth and of Scotland, the fifty-fourth. Anno Domini, 1620.

1. That the several colonies before mentioned do meet once a year, and oftener if need be during the war, and at least once in two years in times of peace, by their stated and appointed deputies, to debate and resolve of such measures as are most advisable for their better understanding and the public tranquility and safety. 2. That, in order to it, two persons, well qualified for sense, sobriety, and substance, be appointed by each province as their representatives or deputies, which in the whole make the congress to consist of twenty persons. 3. That the king’s commissioner, for that purpose specially appointed, shall have the chair and preside in the said congress. 4. That they shall meet as near as conveniently may be to the most central colony for ease of the deputies. 5. Since that may in all probability be New York, both because it is near the center of the colonies and for that it is a frontier and in the king’s nomination, the governor of that colony may therefore also be the king’s high commissioner during the session, after the manner of Scotland.

1.2 William Penn, Plan of Union, 1697

6. That their business shall be to hear and adjust all matters of complaint or difference between

A brief and plain scheme how the English colonies in the North parts of America---viz., Boston, Connecticut, 3

4 The Early Republic province and province. As, 1st, where persons quit their own province and go to another, that they may avoid their just debts, though they be able to pay them; 2nd, where offenders fly justice, or justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the provinces that entertain them; 3rd, to prevent or cure injuries in point of commerce; 4th, to consider the ways and means to support the union and safety of these provinces against the public enemies. In which congress the quotas of men and charges will be much easier and more equally set than it is possible for any establishment made here to do; for the provinces, knowing their own condition and one another’s, can debate that matter with more freedom and satisfaction, and better adjust and balance their affairs in all respects for their common safety. 7. That, in times of war, the king’s high commissioner shall be general or chief commander of the several quotas upon service against the common enemy, as he shall be advised, for the good and benefit of the whole.

1.3 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, 1764 Let no Man think I am about to commence advocate for despotism, because I affirm that government is founded on the necessity of our natures; and that an original supreme Sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable, earthly power must exist in and preside over every society; from whose final decisions there can be no appeal but directly to Heaven. It is therefore originally and ultimately in the people. I say supreme absolute power is originally and ultimately in the people; and they never did in fact freely, nor can they rightfully make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this divine right. It is ever in the nature of the thing given in trust, and on a condition, the performance of which no mortal can dispence with; namely, that the person or persons on whom the sovereignty is confer’d by the people, shall incessantly consult their good. Tyranny of all kinds is to be abhor’d, whether it be in the hands of one, or of the few, or of the many.---And tho’ ‘‘in the last age a generation of men sprung up that would flatter Princes with an opinion that they have a divine right to absolute power’’; yet ‘‘slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that

’tis hard to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it.’’ Especially at a time when the finest writers of the most polite nations on the continent of Europe, are enraptured with the beauties of the civil constitution of Great-Britain; and envy her, no less for the freedom of her sons, than for her immense wealth and military glory. But let the origin of government be placed where it may, the end of it is manifestly the good of the whole. Salus populi supreme lex esto, is of the law of nature, and part of that grand charter given the human race, (tho’ too many of them are afraid to assert it,) by the only monarch in the universe, who has a clear and indisputable right to absolute power; because he is the only One who is omniscient as well as omnipotent. It is evidently contrary to the first principles of reason, that supreme unlimited power should be in the hands of one man. It is the greatest ‘‘idolatry, begotten by flattery, on the body of pride’’, that could induce one to think that a single mortal should be able to hold so great a power, if ever so well inclined. Hence the origin of deifying princes: It was from the trick of gulling the vulgar into a belief that their tryants were omniscient, and that it was therefore right, that they should be considered as omnipotent. Hence the Dii majorum et minorum gentium; the great, the monarchical, the little Provincial subordinate and subaltern gods, demigods, and semidemi-gods, ancient and modern. Thus deities of all kinds were multiplied and increased in abundance; for every devil incarnate, who could enslave a people, acquired a title to divinity; and thus the ‘‘rabble of the skies’’ was made up of locusts and caterpillars; lions, tygers and harpies; and other devourers translated from plaguing the earth! The end of government being the good of mankind, points out its great duties: It is above all things to provide for the security, the quiet, and happy enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. There is no one act which a government can have a right to make, that does not tend to the advancement of the security, tranquility and prosperity of the people. If life, liberty and property could be enjoyed in as great perfection in solitude, as in society, there would be no need of government. But the experience of ages has proved that such is the nature of man, a weak, imperfect being; that the valuable ends of live cannot be obtained without the union and assistance of many. Hence ’tis clear that men cannot live apart or independent of each other: In solitude men would perish; and yet they cannot live together without contests. These contests require some arbitrator to determine them. The necessity of a common, indifferent and impartial judge, makes all men seek one;

1.3 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved 5 tho’ few find him in the sovereign power, of their respective states or any where else in subordination to it. Government is founded immediately on the necessities of human nature, and ultimately on the will of God, the author of nature; who has not left it to men in general to choose, whether they will be members of society or not, but at the hazard of their senses if not of their lives. Yet it is left to every man as he comes of age to chuse what society he will continue to belong to. Nay if one has a mind to turn Hermit, and after he has been born, nursed, and brought up in the arms of society, and acquired the habits and passions of social life, is willing to run the risque of starving alone, which is generally most unavoidable in a state of hermitage, who shall hinder him? I know of no human law, founded on the law of nature, to restrain him from separating himself from the species, if he can find it in his heart to leave them; unless it should be said, it is against the great law of self-preservation: But of this every man will think himself his own judge. The few Hermits and Misanthropes that have ever existed, show that those states are unnatural. If we were to take out from them, those who have made great worldly gain of their godly hermitage, and those who have been under the madness of enthusiasm, or disappointed hopes in their ambitious projects, for the detriment of mankind; perhaps there might not be left ten from Adam to this day. The form of government is by nature and by right so far left to the individuals of each society, that they may alter it from a simple democracy or government of all over all, to any other form they please. Such alteration may and ought to be made by express compact: But how seldom this right has been asserted, history will abundantly show. For once that it has been fairly settled by compact; fraud force or accident have determined it an hundred times. As the people have gained upon tyrants, these have been obliged to relax, only till a fairer opportunity has put it in their power to encroach again. But if every prince since Nimrod had been a tyrant, it would not prove a right to tyranize. There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature, and the grant of God almighty; who has given to all men a natural right to be free, and they have it ordinarily in their power to make themselves so, if they please. Government having been proved to be necessary by the law of nature, it makes no difference in the thing to call it from a certain period, civil. This term can only relate to form, to additions to, or deviations from, the substance of government: This being founded in nature, the super-structures and the whole administration should be conformed to the law of universal reason. A

supreme legislative and supreme executive power, must be placed somewhere in every common-wealth: Where there is no other positive provision or compact to the contract, those powers remain in the whole body of the people. It is also evident there can be but one best way of depositing those powers; but what that way is, mankind have been disputing in peace and in war more than five thousand years. If we could suppose the individuals of a community met to deliberate, whether it were best to keep those powers in their own hands, or dispose of them in trust, the following questions would occur---Whether those two great powers of Legislation and Execution should remain united? If so, whether in the hands of the many, or jointly or severally in the hands of a few, or jointly in some one individual? If both those powers are retained in the hands of the many, where nature seems to have placed them originally, the government is a simple democracy, or a government of all over all. This can be administered, only by establishing it as a first principle, that the votes of the majority shall be taken as the voice of the whole. If those powers are lodged in the hands of a few, the government is an Aristocracy or Oligarchy. Here too the first principles of a practicable administration is that the majority rules the whole. If those great powers are both lodged in the hands of one man, the government is a simple Monarchy, commonly, though falsly called absolute, if by that term is meant a right to do as one pleases.---Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas, belongs not of right to any mortal man. The same law of nature and of reason is equally obligatory on a democracy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy: Whenever the administrators, in any of those forms, deviate from truth, justice and equity, they verge towards tyranny, and are to be opposed; and if they prove incorrigible, they will be deposed by the people, if the people are not rendered too abject. Deposing the administrators of a simple democracy may sound oddly, but it is done every day, and in almost every vote. A. B. & C. for example, make a democracy. Today A & B are for so vile a measure as a standing army. Tomorrow B & C vote it out. This is as really deposing the former administrators, as setting up and making a new king is deposing the old one. Democracy in the one case, and monarchy in the other, still remain; all that is done is to change the administration. The first principle and great end of government being to provide for the best good of all the people, this can be done only by a supreme legislative and executive ultimately in the people, or whole community, where God has placed it; but the inconveniencies, not to say impossibility, attending the consultations and

6 The Early Republic operations of a large body of people have made it necessary to transfer the power of the whole to a few: This necessity gave rise to deputation, proxy or a right of representation. 1. The power of GOD almighty is the only power that can properly and strictly be called supreme and absolute. In the order of nature immediately under him, comes the power of a simple democracy, or the power of the whole over the whole. Subordinate to both these, are all other political powers, from that of the French Monarque to a petty constable. 2. Mr. Locke. 3. Kingcraft and Priestcraft have fell out so often, that ’tis a wonder this grand and ancient alliance is not broken off forever. Happy for mankind will it be, when such a separation shall take place.

1.4 Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, March 23, 1775 No man thinks more highly than I do of the patriotism, as well as abilities, of the very worthy gentlemen who have just addressed the House. But different men often see the same subject in different lights; and, therefore, I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen if, entertaining as I do opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my sentiments freely and without reserve. This is no time for ceremony. The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth, and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty toward the Majesty of Heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings. Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and, having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may

cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it. I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry for the last ten years to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves and the House. Is it that insidious smile with which our petition has been lately received? Trust it not, sir; it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss. Ask yourselves how this gracious reception of our petition comports with those warlike preparations which cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies necessary to a work of love and reconciliation? Have we shown ourselves so unwilling to be reconciled that force must be called in to win back our love? Let us not deceive ourselves, sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission? Can gentlemen assign any other possible motive for it? Has Great Britain any enemy, in this quarter of the world, to call for all this accumulation of navies and armies? No, sir, she has none. They are meant for us: they can be meant for no other. They are sent over to bind and rivet upon us those chains which the British ministry have been so long forging. And what have we to oppose to them? Shall we try argument? Sir, we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we anything new to offer upon the subject? Nothing. We have held the subject up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in vain. Shall we resort to entreaty and humble supplication? What terms shall we find which have not been already exhausted? Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves. Sir, we have done everything that could be done to avert the storm which is now coming on. We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned, with contempt, from the foot of the throne! In vain, after these things, may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free---if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending---if we mean not basely to abandon the

1.5 Thomas Paine, Common Sense 7 noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained---we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An appeal to arms and to the God of hosts is all that is left us! They tell us, sir, that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Sir, we are not weak if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. The millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable---and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come. It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace---but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!

1.5 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1776 Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs IN the following pages I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense: and have no other preliminaries to settle with the reader, than that he

will divest himself of prejudice and prepossession, and suffer his reason and his feelings to determine for themselves that he will put on, or rather that he will not put off, the true character of a man, and generously enlarge his views beyond the present day. Volumes have been written on the subject of the struggle between England and America. Men of all ranks have embarked in the controversy, from different motives, and with various designs; but all have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is closed. Arms as the last resource decide the contest; the appeal was the choice of the King, and the Continent has accepted the challenge . . . The Sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. ’Tis not the affair of a City, a County, a Province, or a Kingdom; but of a Continent---of at least one-eighth part of the habitable Globe. ’Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of Continental union, faith and honour. The least fracture now will be like a name engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; the wound would enlarge with the tree, and posterity read in it full grown characters . . . As much hath been said of the advantages of reconciliation, which, like an agreeable dream, hath passed away and left us as we were, it is but right that we should examine the contrary side of the argument, and enquire into some of the many material injuries which these Colonies sustain, and always will sustain, by being connected with and dependant on Great Britain. To examine that connection and dependance, on the principles of nature and common sense, to see what we have to trust to, if separated, and what we are to expect, if dependant. I have heard it asserted by some, that as America has flourished under her former connection with Great Britain, the same connection is necessary towards her future happiness, and will always have the same effect. Nothing can be more fallacious than this kind of argument. We may as well assert that because a child has thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat, or that the first twenty years of our lives is to become a precedent for the next twenty. But even this is admitting more than is true; for I answer roundly that America would have flourished as much, and probably much more, had no European power taken any notice of her. The commerce by which she hath enriched herself are the necessaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom of Europe. But she has protected us, say some. That she hath engrossed us is true, and defended the Continent at our

8 The Early Republic expense as well as her own, is admitted; and she would have defended Turkey from the same motive, viz.---for the sake of trade and dominion. Alas! we have been long led away by ancient prejudices and made large sacrifices to superstition. We have boasted the protection of Great Britain, without considering, that her motive was INTEREST not ATTACHMENT; and that she did not protect us from OUR ENEMIES on OUR ACCOUNT; but from HER ENEMIES on HER OWN ACCOUNT, from those who had no quarrel with us on any OTHER ACCOUNT, and who will always be our enemies on the SAME ACCOUNT. Let Britain waive her pretensions to the Continent, or the Continent throw off the dependance, and we should be at peace with France and Spain, were they at war with Britain. The miseries of Hanover last war ought to warn us against connections. It hath lately been asserted in parliament, that the Colonies have no relation to each other but through the Parent Country, i.e. that Pennsylvania and the Jerseys and so on for the rest, are sister Colonies by the way of England; this is certainly a very roundabout way of proving relationship, but it is the nearest and only true way of proving enmity (or enemyship, if I may so call it.) France and Spain never were, nor perhaps ever will be, our enemies as AMERICANS, but as our being the SUBJECTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. But Britain is the parent country, say some. Then the more shame upon her conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young, nor savages make war upon their families. Wherefore, the assertion, if true, turns to her reproach; but it happens not to be true, or only partly so, and the phrase PARENT OR MOTHER COUNTRY hath been jesuitically adopted by the King and his parasites, with a low papistical design of gaining an unfair bias on the credulous weakness of our minds. Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America. This new World hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from EVERY PART of Europe. Hither have they fled, not from the tender embraces of the mother, but from the cruelty of the monster; and it is so far true of England, that the same tyranny which drove the first emigrants from home, pursues their descendants still . . . But, admitting that we were all of English descent, what does it amount to? Nothing. Britain, being now an open enemy, extinguishes every other name and title: and to say that reconciliation is our duty, is truly farcical. The first king of England, of the present line (William the Conqueror) was a Frenchman, and half the peers of England are descendants from the same country; wherefore, by the same method of reasoning, England ought to be governed by France.

Much hath been said of the united strength of Britain and the Colonies, that in conjunction they might bid defiance to the world. But this is mere presumption; the fate of war is uncertain, neither do the expressions mean anything; for this continent would never suffer itself to be drained of inhabitants, to support the British arms in either Asia, Africa, or Europe. Besides, what have we to do with setting the world at defiance? Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of all Europe; because it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free port. Her trade will always be a protection, and her barrenness of gold and silver secure her from invaders. I challenge the warmest advocate for reconciliation to show a single advantage that this continent can reap by being connected with Great Britain. I repeat the challenge; not a single advantage is derived. Our corn will fetch its price in any market in Europe, and our imported goods must be paid for buy them where we will . . . The authority of Great Britain over this continent, is a form of government, which sooner or later must have an end: And a serious mind can draw no true pleasure by looking forward, under the painful and positive conviction that what he calls ‘‘the present constitution’’ is merely temporary. As parents, we can have no joy, knowing that this government is not sufficiently lasting to ensure any thing which we may bequeath to posterity: And by a plain method of argument, as we are running the next generation into debt, we ought to do the work of it, otherwise we use them meanly and pitifully. In order to discover the line of our duty rightly, we should take our children in our hand, and fix our station a few years farther into life; that eminence will present a prospect which a few present fears and prejudices conceal from our sight. Though I would carefully avoid giving unnecessary offence, yet I am inclined to believe, that all those who espouse the doctrine of reconciliation, may be included within the following descriptions. Interested men, who are not to be trusted, weak men who CANNOT see, prejudiced men who will not see, and a certain set of moderate men who think better of the European world than it deserves; and this last class, by an ill-judged deliberation, will be the cause of more calamities to this Continent than all the other three. It is the good fortune of many to live distant from the scene of present sorrow; the evil is not sufficiently brought to their doors to make them feel the precariousness with which all American property is possessed. But let our imaginations transport us a few moments to

1.5 Thomas Paine, Common Sense 9 Boston; that seat of wretchedness will teach us wisdom, and instruct us for ever to renounce a power in whom we can have no trust. The inhabitants of that unfortunate city who but a few months ago were in ease and affluence, have now no other alternative than to stay and starve, or turn out to beg. Endangered by the fire of their friends if they continue within the city and plundered by the soldiery if they leave it, in their present situation they are prisoners without the hope of redemption, and in a general attack for their relief they would be exposed to the fury of both armies . . . This is not inflaming or exaggerating matters, but trying them by those feelings and affections which nature justifies, and without which, we should be incapable of discharging the social duties of life, or enjoying the felicities of it. I mean not to exhibit horror for the purpose of provoking revenge, but to awaken us from fatal and unmanly slumbers, that we may pursue determinately some fixed object . . . It is repugnant to reason, to the universal order of things to all examples from former ages, to suppose, that this continent can longer remain subject to any external power. The most sanguine in Britain does not think so. The utmost stretch of human wisdom cannot, at this time, compass a plan short of separation, which can promise the continent even a year’s security. Reconciliation is now a falacious dream . . . Small islands not capable of protecting themselves, are the proper objects for kingdoms to take under their care; but there is something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be perpetually governed by an island. In no instance hath nature made the satellite larger than its primary planet, and as England and America, with respect to each other, reverses the common order of nature, it is evident they belong to different systems: England to Europe, America to itself. I am not induced by motives of pride, party, or resentment to espouse the doctrine of separation and independence; I am clearly, positively, and conscientiously persuaded that it is the true interest of this continent to be so; that every thing short of that is mere patchwork, that it can afford no lasting felicity,---that it is leaving the sword to our children, and shrinking back at a time, when, a little more, a little farther, would have rendered this continent the glory of the earth. As Britain hath not manifested the least inclination towards a compromise, we may be assured that no terms can be obtained worthy the acceptance of the continent, or any ways equal to the expense of blood and treasure we have been already put to. . . . As I have always considered the independency of this continent, as an event, which sooner or later

must arrive, so from the late rapid progress of the continent to maturity, the event could not be far off. Wherefore, on the breaking out of hostilities, it was not worth the while to have disputed a matter, which time would have finally redressed, unless we meant to be in earnest; otherwise, it is like wasting an estate on a suit at law, to regulate the trespasses of a tenant, whose lease is just expiring. No man was a warmer wisher for reconciliation than myself, before the fatal nineteenth of April 1775, but the moment the event of that day was made known, I rejected the hardened, sullen tempered Pharaoh of England for ever; and disdain the wretch, that with the pretended title of FATHER OF HIS PEOPLE, can unfeelingly hear of their slaughter, and composedly sleep with their blood upon his soul. But admitting that matters were now made up, what would be the event? I answer, the ruin of the continent. And that for several reasons. First. The powers of governing still remaining in the hands of the king, he will have a negative over the whole legislation of this continent. And as he hath shewn himself such an inveterate enemy to liberty, and discovered such a thirst for arbitrary power; is he, or is he not, a proper man to say to these colonies, ‘‘You shall make no laws but what I please.’’ And is there any inhabitant in America so ignorant, as not to know, that according to what is called the present constitution, that this continent can make no laws but what the king gives it leave to; and is there any man so unwise, as not to see, that (considering what has happened) he will suffer no law to be made here, but such as suit his purpose. We may be as effectually enslaved by the want of laws in America, as by submitting to laws made for us in England. After matters are made up (as it is called) can there be any doubt, but the whole power of the crown will be exerted, to keep this continent as low and humble as possible . . . America is only a secondary object in the system of British politics, England consults the good of this country, no farther than it answers her own purpose. Wherefore, her own interest leads her to suppress the growth of ours in every case which doth not promote her advantage, or in the least interferes with it. A pretty state we should soon be in under such a second-hand government, considering what has happened! Men do not change from enemies to friends by the alteration of a name: And in order to shew that reconciliation now is a dangerous doctrine, I affirm, that it would be policy in the king at this time, to repeal the acts for the sake of reinstating himself in the government of the provinces; in order that HE MAY ACCOMPLISH BY CRAFT AND SUBTILITY, IN THE LONG RUN, WHAT HE

10 The Early Republic CANNOT DO BY FORCE AND VIOLENCE IN THE SHORT ONE. Reconciliation and ruin are nearly related. Secondly. That as even the best terms, which we can expect to obtain, can amount to no more than a temporary expedient, or a kind of government by guardianship, which can last no longer than till the colonies come of age, so the general face and state of things, in the interim, will be unsettled and unpromising. Emigrants of property will not choose to come to a country whose form of government hangs but by a thread, and who is every day tottering on the brink of commotion and disturbance; and numbers of the present inhabitants would lay hold of the interval, to dispose of their effects, and quit the continent. But the most powerful of all arguments, is, that nothing but independance, i.e. a continental form of government, can keep the peace of the continent and preserve it inviolate from civil wars. I dread the event of a reconciliation with Britain now, as it is more than probable, that it will followed by a revolt somewhere or other, the consequences of which may be far more fatal than all the malice of Britain. Thousands are already ruined by British barbarity; (thousands more will probably suffer the same fate.) Those men have other feelings than us who have nothing suffered. All they now possess is liberty, what they before enjoyed is sacrificed to its service, and having nothing more to lose, they disdain submission . . . If there is any true cause of fear respecting independance, it is because no plan is yet laid down. Men do not see their way out---Wherefore, as an opening into that business, I offer the following hints; at the same time modestly affirming, that I have no other opinion of them myself, than that they may be the means of giving rise to something better. Could the straggling thoughts of individuals be collected, they would frequently form materials for wise and able men to improve into useful matter . . . A committee of twenty-six members of Congress, viz. two for each colony. Two members for each House of Assembly, or Provincial Convention; and five representatives of the people at large, to be chosen in the capital city or town of each province, for, and in behalf of the whole province, by as many qualified voters as shall think proper to attend from all parts of the province for that purpose; or, if more convenient, the representatives may be chosen in two or three of the most populous parts thereof. In this conference, thus assembled, will be united, the two grand principles of business, knowledge and power. The members of Congress, Assemblies, or Conventions, by having had experience in national concerns, will be able and useful

counsellors, and the whole, being impowered by the people, will have a truly legal authority. The conferring members being met, let their business be to frame a CONTINENTAL CHARTER, or Charter of the United Colonies; (answering to what is called the Magna Charta of England) fixing the number and manner of choosing members of Congress, members of Assembly, with their date of sitting, and drawing the line of business and jurisdiction between them: (Always remembering, that our strength is continental, not provincial:) Securing freedom and property to all men, and above all things, the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; with such other matter as is necessary for a charter to contain. Immediately after which, the said Conference to dissolve, and the bodies which shall be chosen comformable to the said charter, to be the legislators and governors of this continent for the time being: Whose peace and happiness, may God preserve, Amen. Should any body of men be hereafter delegated for this or some similar purpose, I offer them the following extracts from that wise observer on governments Dragonetti. ‘‘The science’’ says he ‘‘of the politician consists in fixing the true point of happiness and freedom. Those men would deserve the gratitude of ages, who should discover a mode of government that contained the greatest sum of individual happiness, with the least national expense.’’ ‘‘Dragonetti on virtue and rewards.’’ But where says some is the King of America? I’ll tell you Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honors, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve as monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is. A government of our own is our natural right: And when a man seriously reflects on the precariousness of human affairs, he will become convinced, that it is infinitely wiser and safer, to form a constitution of our own in a cool deliberate manner, while we have it in our power, than to trust such an interesting event to time and chance . . . Ye that oppose independance now, ye know not what ye do; ye are opening a door to

1.7 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 11 eternal tyranny, by keeping vacant the seat of government. There are thousands, and tens of thousands, who would think it glorious to expel from the continent, that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and Negroes to destroy us, the cruelty hath a double guilt, it is dealing brutally by us, and treacherously by them. To talk of friendship with those in whom our reason forbids us to have faith, and our affections wounded through a thousand pores instruct us to detest, is madness and folly. Every day wears out the little remains of kindred between us and them, and can there be any reason to hope, that as the relationship expires, the affection will increase, or that we shall agree better, when we have ten times more and greater concerns to quarrel over than ever? . . . O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the tyrant, stand forth! Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia, and Africa, have long expelled her.---Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.

1.6 Abigail Adams, Letter to John Adams on the Rights of Women, March 31, 1776 I wish you would ever write me a Letter half as long as I write you; and tell me if you may where your Fleet are gone? What sort of Defence Virginia can make against our common Enemy? Whether it is so situated as to make an able Defence? Are not the Gentery Lords and the common people vassals, are they not like the uncivilized Natives Brittain represents us to be? I hope their Riffel Men who have shewen themselves very savage and even Blood thirsty; are not a specimen of the Generality of the people. I am willing to allow the Colony great merrit for having produced a Washington but they have been shamefully duped by a Dunmore. I have sometimes been ready to think that the passion for Liberty cannot be Eaquelly Strong in the Breasts of those who have been accustomed to deprive their fellow Creatures of theirs. Of this I am certain that it is not founded upon that generous and christian principal of doing to others as we would that others should do unto us.

... I long to hear that you have declared an independency---and by the way in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could. If perticuliar care and attention is not paid to the Laidies we are determined to foment a Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation. That your Sex are Naturally Tyrannical is a Truth so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute, but such of you as wish to be happy willingly give up the harsh title of Master for the more tender and endearing one of Friend. Why then, not put it out of the power of the vicious and the Lawless to use us with cruelty and indignity with impunity. Men of Sense in all Ages abhor those customs which treat us only as the vassals of your Sex. Regard us then as Beings placed by providence under your protection and in immitation of the Supreem Being make use of that power only for our happiness. Source: Butterfield 120--121. teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp? document¼278

1.7 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781 It will probably be asked, Why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the state, and thus save the expence of supplying, by importation of white settlers, the vacancies they will leave? Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race.---To these objections, which are political, may be added others, which are physical and moral. The first difference which strikes us is that of colour. Whether the black of the negro resides in the reticular membrane between the skin and scarf-skin, or in the scarf-skin itself; whether it proceeds from the colour of the blood, the colour of the bile, or from that of some other secretion, the difference is fixed in

12 The Early Republic nature, and is as real as if its seat and cause were better known to us. And is this difference of no importance? Is it not the foundation of a greater or less share of beauty in the two races? Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one, preferable to that eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immoveable veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race? Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them, as uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black women over those of his own species. The circumstance of superior beauty, is thought worthy attention in the propagation of our horses, dogs, and other domestic animals; why not in that of man? Besides those of colour, figure, and hair, there are other physical distinctions proving a difference of race. They have less hair on the face and body. They secrete less by the kidnies, and more by the glands of the skin, which gives them a very strong and disagreeable odour. This greater degree of transpiration renders them more tolerant of heat, and less so of cold, than the whites. Perhaps too a difference of structure in the pulmonary apparatus, which a late ingenious experimentalist has discovered to be the principal regulator of animal heat, may have disabled them from extricating, in the act of inspiration, so much of that fluid from the outer air, or obliged them in expiration, to part with more of it. They seem to require less sleep. A black, after hard labour through the day, will be induced by the slightest amusements to sit up till midnight, or later, though knowing he must be out with the first dawn of the morning. They are at least as brave, and more adventuresome. But this may perhaps proceed from a want of forethought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it be present. When present, they do not go through it with more coolness or steadiness than the whites. They are more ardent after their female: but love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient. Those numberless afflictions, which render it doubtful whether heaven has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt, and sooner forgotten with them. In general, their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. To this must be ascribed their disposition to sleep when abstracted from their diversions, and unemployed in labour. An animal whose body is at rest, and who does not reflect, must be disposed to sleep of course. Comparing them by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it appears to me, that in

memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior, as think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous. It would be unfair to follow them to Africa for this investigation. We will consider them here, on the same stage with the whites, and where the facts are not apocryphal on which a judgment is to be formed. It will be right to make great allowances for the difference of condition, of education, of conversation, of the sphere in which they move. Many millions of them have been brought to, and born in America. Most of them indeed have been confined to tillage, to their own homes, and their own society: yet many have been so situated, that they might have availed themselves of the conversation of their masters; many have been brought up to the handicraft arts, and from that circumstance have always been associated with the whites. Some have been liberally educated, and all have lived in countries where the arts and sciences are cultivated to a considerable degree, and have had before their eyes samples of the best works from abroad. The Indians, with no advantages of this kind, will often carve figures on their pipes not destitute of design and merit. They will crayon out an animal, a plant, or a country, so as to prove the existence of a germ in their minds which only wants cultivation. They astonish you with strokes of the most sublime oratory; such as prove their reason and sentiment strong, their imagination glowing and elevated. But never yet could I find that a black had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration; never see even an elementary trait, of painting or sculpture. In music they are more generally gifted than the whites with accurate ears for tune and time, and they have been found capable of imagining a small catch. Whether they will be equal to the composition of a more extensive run of melody, or of complicated harmony, is yet to be proved. Misery is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry.--Among the blacks is misery enough, God knows, but no poetry. Love is the peculiar maelstrom of the poet. Their love is ardent, but it kindles the senses only, not the imagination. Religion indeed has produced a Phyllis Whately; but it could not produce a poet. The compositions published under her name are below the dignity of criticism. The heroes of the Dunciad are to her, as Hercules to the author of that poem. Ignatius Sancho has approached nearer to merit in composition; yet his letters do more honour to the heart than the head. They breathe the purest effusions of friendship and general philanthropy, and shew how great a degree of the latter may be compounded with strong religious zeal. He is

1.8 Anti-Federalist No. 7 13 often happy in the turn of his compliments, and his stile is easy and familiar, except when he affects a Shandean fabrication of words. But his imagination is wild and extravagant, escapes incessantly from every restraint of reason and taste, and, in the course of its vagaries, leaves a tract of thought as incoherent and eccentric, as is the course of a meteor through the sky. His subjects should often have led him to a process of sober reasoning: yet we find him always substituting sentiment for demonstration. Upon the whole, though we admit him to the first place among those of his own colour who have presented themselves to the public judgment, yet when we compare him with the writers of the race among whom he lived, and particularly with the epistolary class, in which he has taken his own stand, we are compelled to enroll him at the bottom of the column. This criticism supposes the letters published under his name to be genuine, and to have received amendment from no other hand; points which would not be of easy investigation. The improvement of the blacks in body and mind, in the first instance of their mixture with the whites, has been observed by every one, and proves that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their condition of life. . . . To justify a general conclusion, requires many observations, even where the subject may be submitted to the Anatomical knife, to Optical glasses, to analysis by fire, or by solvents. How much more then where it is a faculty, not a substance, we are examining; where it eludes the research of all the senses; where the conditions of its existence are various and variously combined; where the effects of those which are present or absent bid defiance to calculation; let me add too, as a circumstance of great tenderness, where our conclusion would degrade a whole race of men from the rank in the scale of beings which their Creator may perhaps have given them. To our reproach it must be said, that though for a century and a half we have had under our eyes the races of black and of red men, they have never yet been viewed by us as subjects of natural history. I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It is not against experience to suppose, that different species of the same genus, or varieties of the same species, may possess different qualifications. Will not a lover of natural history then, one who views the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the department of man as distinct as nature has formed them? This unfortunate difference of colour, and perhaps of faculty, is a

powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these people. Many of their advocates, while they wish to vindicate the liberty of human nature, are anxious also to preserve its dignity and beauty. Some of these, embarrassed by the question ’What further is to be done with them?’ join themselves in opposition with those who are actuated by sordid avarice only. Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort. The slave, when made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture. Source: etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefVirg

1.8 Anti-Federalist No. 7 Adoption of the Constitution Will Lead to Civil War The time in which the constitution or government of a nation undergoes any particular change, is always interesting and critical. Enemies are vigilant, allies are in suspense, friends hesitating between hope and fear; and all men are in eager expectation to see what such a change may produce. But the state of our affairs at present, is of such moment, as even to arouse the dead . . . [A certain defender of the Constitution has stated that objections to it] are more calculated to alarm the fears of the people than to answer any valuable end. Was that the case, as it is not, will any man in his sober senses say, that the least infringement or appearance of infringement on our liberty---that liberty which has lately cost so much blood and treasure, together with anxious days and sleepless nights-ought not both to rouse our fears and awaken our jealousy? . . . The new constitution in its present form is calculated to produce despotism, thraldom and confusion, and if the United States do swallow it, they will find it a bolus, that will create convulsions to their utmost extremities. Were they mine enemies, the worst imprecation I could devise would be, may they adopt it. For tyranny, where it has been chained (as for a few years past) is always more cursed, and sticks its teeth in deeper than before. Were Col. [George] Mason’s objections obviated, the improvement would be very considerable, though even then, not so complete as might be. The Congress’s having power without control-to borrow money on the credit of the United States; their having power to appoint their own salaries, and their being paid out of the treasury of the United States, thereby, in some

14 The Early Republic measure, rendering them independent of the individual states; their being judges of the qualification and election of their own members, by which means they can get men to suit any purpose; together with Col. Mason’s wise and judicious objections are grievances, the very idea of which is enough to make every honest citizen exclaim in the language of Cato, O Liberty, O my country! Our present constitution, with a few additional powers to Congress, seems better calculated to preserve the rights and defend the liberties of our citizens, than the one proposed, without proper amendments. Let us therefore, for once, show our judgment and solidity by continuing it, and prove the opinion to be erroneous, that levity and fickleness are not only the foibles of our tempers, but the reigning principles in these states. There are men amongst us, of such dissatisfied tempers, that place them in Heaven, they would find something to blame; and so restless and self- sufficient, that they must be eternally reforming the state. But the misfortune is, they always leave affairs worse than they find them. A change of government is at all times dangerous, but at present may be fatal, without the utmost caution, just after emerging out of a tedious and expensive war. Feeble in our nature, and complicated in our form, we are little able to bear the rough Posting of civil dissensions which are likely to ensue. Even now, discontent and opposition distract our councils. Division and despondency affect our people. Is it then a time to alter our government, that government which even now totters on its foundation, and will, without tender care, produce ruin by its fall? Beware my countrymen! Our enemies---uncontrolled as they are in their ambitious schemes, fretted with losses, and perplexed with disappointments---will exert their whole power and policy to increase and continue our confusion. And while we are destroying one another, they will be repairing their losses, and ruining our trade. Of all the plagues that infest a nation, a civil war is the worst. Famine is severe, pestilence is dreadful; but in these, though men die, they die in peace. The father expires without the guilt of the son; and the son, if he survives, enjoys the inheritance of his father. Cities may be thinned, but they neither plundered nor burnt. But when a civil war is kindled, there is then forth no security of property nor protection from any law. Life and fortune become precarious. And all that is dear to men is at the discretion of profligate soldiery, doubly licentious on such an occasion. Cities are exhausted by heavy contributions, or sacked because they cannot answer exorbitant demand. Countries are eaten up by the parties they favor, and ravaged by the one they oppose.

Fathers and sons, sheath their swords in another’s bowels in the field, and their wives and daughters are exposed to rudeness and lust of ruffians at home. And when the sword has decided quarrel, the scene is closed with banishments, forfeitures, and barbarous executions that entail distress on children then unborn. May Heaven avert the dreadful catastrophe! In the most limited governments, what wranglings, animosities, factions, partiality, and all other evils that tend to embroil a nation and weaken a state, are constantly practised by legislators. What then may we expect if the new constitution be adopted as it now stands? The great will struggle for power, honor and wealth; the poor become a prey to avarice, insolence and oppression. And while some are studying to supplant their neighbors, and others striving to keep their stations, one villain will wink at the oppression of another, the people be fleeced, and the public business neglected. From despotism and tyranny good Lord deliver us. Source: ‘‘PHILANTHROPOS,’’ The Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser, December 6, 1787. Note: ‘‘PHILANTHROPOS,’’ an anonymous Virginia Anti-Federalist, was writing his version of history under the proposed new Constitution.

1.9 Benjamin Banneker, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, August 19, 1791 SIR, I AM fully sensible of the greatness of that freedom, which I take with you on the present occasion; a liberty which seemed to me scarcely allowable, when I reflected on that distinguished and dignified station in which you stand, and the almost general prejudice and prepossession, which is so prevalent in the world against those of my complexion. I suppose it is a truth too well attested to you, to need a proof here, that we are a race of beings, who have long labored under the abuse and censure of the world; that we have long been looked upon with an eye of contempt; and that we have long been considered rather as brutish than human, and scarcely capable of mental endowments. Sir, I hope I may safely admit, in consequence of that report which hath reached me, that you are a man far less inflexible in sentiments of this nature, than many others; that you are measurably friendly, and well disposed towards us; and that you are willing and ready to lend your aid and assistance to our relief, from

1.9 Benjamin Banneker, Letter to Thomas Jefferson those many distresses, and numerous calamities, to which we are reduced. Now Sir, if this is founded in truth, I apprehend you will embrace every opportunity, to eradicate that train of absurd and false ideas and opinions, which so generally prevails with respect to us; and that your sentiments are concurrent with mine, which are, that one universal Father hath given being to us all; and that he hath not only made us all of one flesh, but that he hath also, without partiality, afforded us all the same sensations and endowed us all with the same faculties; and that however variable we may be in society or religion, however diversified in situation or color, we are all of the same family, and stand in the same relation to him. Sir, if these are sentiments of which you are fully persuaded, I hope you cannot but acknowledge, that it is the indispensible duty of those, who maintain for themselves the rights of human nature, and who possess the obligations of Christianity, to extend their power and influence to the relief of every part of the human race, from whatever burden or oppression they may unjustly labor under; and this, I apprehend, a full conviction of the truth and obligation of these principles should lead all to. Sir, I have long been convinced, that if your love for yourselves, and for those inestimable laws, which preserved to you the rights of human nature, was founded on sincerity, you could not but be solicitous, that every individual, of whatever rank or distinction, might with you equally enjoy the blessings thereof; neither could you rest satisfied short of the most active effusion of your exertions, in order to their promotion from any state of degradation, to which the unjustifiable cruelty and barbarism of men may have reduced them. Sir, I freely and cheerfully acknowledge, that I am of the African race, and in that color which is natural to them of the deepest dye; and it is under a sense of the most profound gratitude to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, that I now confess to you, that I am not under that state of tyrannical thraldom, and inhuman captivity, to which too many of my brethren are doomed, but that I have abundantly tasted of the fruition of those blessings, which proceed from that free and unequalled liberty with which you are favored; and which, I hope, you will willingly allow you have mercifully received, from the immediate hand of that Being, from whom proceedeth every good and perfect Gift. Sir, suffer me to recal to your mind that time, in which the arms and tyranny of the British crown were exerted, with every powerful effort, in order to reduce you to a state of servitude: look back, I entreat you, on the variety of dangers to which you were exposed; reflect on that time, in which every human aid

15

appeared unavailable, and in which even hope and fortitude wore the aspect of inability to the conflict, and you cannot but be led to a serious and grateful sense of your miraculous and providential preservation; you cannot but acknowledge, that the present freedom and tranquility which you enjoy you have mercifully received, and that it is the peculiar blessing of Heaven. This, Sir, was a time when you cleary saw into the injustice of a state of slavery, and in which you had just apprehensions of the horrors of its condition. It was now that your abhorrence thereof was so excited, that you publicly held forth this true and invaluable doctrine, which is worthy to be recorded and remembered in all succeeding ages: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and that among these are, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’’ Here was a time, in which your tender feelings for yourselves had engaged you thus to declare, you were then impressed with proper ideas of the great violation of liberty, and the free possession of those blessings, to which you were entitled by nature; but, Sir, how pitiable is it to reflect, that although you were so fully convinced of the benevolence of the Father of Mankind, and of his equal and impartial distribution of these rights and privileges, which he hath conferred upon them, that you should at the same time counteract his mercies, in detaining by fraud and violence so numerous a part of my brethren, under groaning captivity and cruel oppression, that you should at the same time be found guilty of that most criminal act, which you professedly detested in others, with respect to yourselves. I suppose that your knowledge of the situation of my brethren, is too extensive to need a recital here; neither shall I presume to prescribe methods by which they may be relieved, otherwise than by recommending to you and all others, to wean yourselves from those narrow prejudices which you have imbibed with respect to them, and as Job proposed to his friends, ‘‘put your soul in their souls’ stead;’’ thus shall your hearts be enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards them; and thus shall you need neither the direction of myself or others, in what manner to proceed herein. And now, Sir, although my sympathy and affection for my brethren hath caused my enlargement thus far, I ardently hope, that your candor and generosity will plead with you in my behalf, when I make known to you, that it was not originally my design; but having taken up my pen in order to direct to you, as a present, a copy of an Almanac, which I have calculated for the succeeding year, I was unexpectedly and unavoidably led thereto.

16 The Early Republic This calculation is the production of my arduous study, in this my advanced stage of life; for having long had unbounded desires to become acquainted with the secrets of nature, I have had to gratify my curiosity herein, through my own assiduous application to Astronomical Study, in which I need not recount to you the many difficulties and disadvantages, which I have had to encounter. And although I had almost declined to make my calculation for the ensuing year, in consequence of that time which I had allotted therefor, being taken up at the Federal Territory, by the request of Mr. Andrew Ellicott, yet finding myself under several engagements to Printers of this state, to whom I had communicated my design, on my return to my place of residence, I industriously applied myself thereto, which I hope I have accomplished with correctness and accuracy; a copy of which I have taken the liberty to direct to you, and which I humbly request you will favorably receive; and although you may have the opportunity of perusing it after its publication, yet I choose to send it to you in manuscript previous thereto, that thereby you might not only have an earlier inspection, but that you might also view it in my own hand writing. And now, Sir, I shall conclude, and subscribe myself, with the most profound respect, Your most obedient humble servant, BENJAMIN BANNEKER.

1.10 George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796 Friends and Citizens: The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive government of the United States being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those out of whom a choice is to be made. I beg you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured that this resolution has not been taken without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that in withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest,

no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness, but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with both. The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that, in the present circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove my determination to retire. The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust, I will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed towards the organization and administration of the government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious in the outset of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe that, while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it. In looking forward to the moment which is intended to terminate the career of my public life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved country for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our

1.10 George Washington, Farewell Address 17 country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead, amidst appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging, in situations in which not unfrequently want of success has countenanced the spirit of criticism, the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts, and a guarantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual; that the free Constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained; that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it. Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all-important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion. Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment. The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee that, from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress

against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts. For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens, by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels, and joint efforts of common dangers, sufferings, and successes. But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the union of the whole. The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The South, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and, while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The West derives from the East supplies

18 The Early Republic requisite to its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious. While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied together by the same governments, which their own rival ships alone would be sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is that your union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other. These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who in any quarter may endeavor to weaken its bands. In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations, Northern and

Southern, Atlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heartburnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our Western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen, in the negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the General Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi; they have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain, and that with Spain, which secure to them everything they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens? To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a government for the whole is indispensable. No alliance, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a constitution of government better calculated than your former for an intimate union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The

1.10 George Washington, Farewell Address 19 very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government. All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and modified by mutual interests. However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion. Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government

is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property. I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From

20 The Early Republic their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume. It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield. Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked: Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and

experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric? Promote then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened. As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it, avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertion in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinion should co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should practically bear in mind that towards the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarrassment, inseparable from the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate. Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at

1.10 George Washington, Farewell Address 21 least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices? In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations, has been the victim. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the

truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils? Such an attachment of a small or weak towards a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy to be useful must be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government. the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

22 The Early Republic It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing (with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them) conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard. In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated.

How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them. In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the twenty-second of April, I793, is the index of my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it. After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness. The considerations which respect the right to hold this con duct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all. The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations. The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes. Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and that, after forty five years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.

1.11 The Kentucky Resolutions Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations, I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government, the ever-favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers. Geo. Washington.

1.11 The Kentucky Resolutions, 1799 Resolutions in General Assembly THE representatives of the good people of this commonwealth in general assembly convened, having maturely considered the answers of sundry states in the Union, to their resolutions passed at the last session, respecting certain unconstitutional laws of Congress, commonly called the alien and sedition laws, would be faithless indeed to themselves, and to those they represent, were they silently to acquiesce in principles and doctrines attempted to be maintained in all those answers, that of Virginia only excepted. To again enter the field of argument, and attempt more fully or forcibly to expose the unconstitutionality of those obnoxious laws, would, it is apprehended be as unnecessary as unavailing. We cannot however but lament, that in the discussion of those interesting subjects, by sundry of the legislatures of our sister states, unfounded suggestions, and uncandid insinuations, derogatory of the true character and principles of the good people of this commonwealth, have been substituted in place of fair reasoning and sound argument. Our opinions of those alarming measures of the general government, together with our reasons for those opinions, were detailed with decency and with temper, and submitted to the discussion and judgment of our fellow citizens throughout the Union. Whether the decency and temper have been observed in the answers of most of those states who have denied or attempted to obviate the great truths contained in those resolutions, we have now only to submit to a candid world. Faithful to the true principles of the federal union, unconscious of any designs to disturb the harmony of that Union, and anxious only to escape the fangs of despotism, the good people of this commonwealth are regardless of censure or calumniation.

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Least however the silence of this commonwealth should be construed into an acquiescence in the doctrines and principles advanced and attempted to be maintained by the said answers, or least those of our fellow citizens throughout the Union, who so widely differ from us on those important subjects, should be deluded by the expectation, that we shall be deterred from what we conceive our duty; or shrink from the principles contained in those resolutions: therefore. RESOLVED, That this commonwealth considers the federal union, upon the terms and for the purposes specified in the late compact, as conducive to the liberty and happiness of the several states: That it does now unequivocally declare its attachment to the Union, and to that compact, agreeable to its obvious and real intention, and will be among the last to seek its dissolution: That if those who administer the general government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to the special delegations of power therein contained, annihilation of the state governments, and the erection upon their ruins, of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable consequence: That the principle and construction contended for by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism; since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy: That this commonwealth does upon the most deliberate reconsideration declare, that the said alien and sedition laws, are in their opinion, palpable violations of the said constitution; and however cheerfully it may be disposed to surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states in matters of ordinary or doubtful policy; yet, in momentous regulations like the present, which so vitally wound the best rights of the citizen, it would consider a silent acquiesecence as highly criminal: That although this commonwealth as a party to the federal compact; will bow to the laws of the Union, yet it does at the same time declare, that it will not now, nor ever hereafter, cease to oppose in a constitutional manner, every attempt from what quarter soever offered, to violate that compact: AND FINALLY, in order that no pretexts or arguments may be drawn from a supposed acquiescence on the part of this commonwealth in the constitutionality

24 The Early Republic of those laws, and be thereby used as precedents for similar future violations of federal compact; this commonwealth does now enter against them, its SOLEMN PROTEST. Approved December 3rd, 1799.

1.12 Absalom Jones, Sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade, January 1, 1808 Thanksgiving sermon preached at St. Thomas Church (or the African Episcopal), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Having enumerated the mercies of God . . . it becomes us to ask, What shall we render unto the Lord for them? Sacrifices and burnt offerings are no longer pleasing to him: the pomp of public worship, and the ceremonies of a festive day, will find no acceptance with him, unless they are accompanied with actions that correspond with them. The duties which are inculcated upon us by the event we are now celebrating, divide themselves into five heads. In the first place, let not our expressions of gratitude to God for his late goodness and mercy to our countrymen, be confined to this day, nor to this house: le us carry grateful hears with us to our places of abode, and to our daily occupations; and let praise and thanksgivings ascend daily to the throne of grace, in our families, and in our closets for what God has done for our African brethren. Let us not forget to praise him for his mercies to such of our colour as are inhabitants of this country; particularly, for disposing the hearts of the rulers of many of the states to pass laws for the abolition of slavery; for the number and zeal of the friends he has raised up to plead our cause; and for the privileges we enjoy of worshiping God agreeably to our consciences, in churches of our own. This comely building, erected chiefly by the generosity of our friends, is a monument of God’s goodness to us, and calls for our gratitude with all the other blessings that have been mentioned. Secondly, Let us unite, with our thanksgiving, prayer to Almighty God, for the completion of his begun goodness to our brethren in Africa. Let us beseech him to extend to all nations in Europe, the same humane and just spirit to them, which he has imparted to the British and American nations. Let us, further, implore the influence of his divine and holy Spirit, to dispose the hearts of our legislatures to pass laws, to ameliorate

the condition of our brethren who are still in bondage; also, to dispose their masters to treat them with kindness and humanity: and, above all things, to favour them with the means of acquiring such parts of human knowledge, as will enable them to read the holy scriptures, and understand the doctrines of the Christian religion, when by they may become, even while they are the slaves of men, the freemen of the Lord. Thirdly, Let us conduct ourselves in a manner as to furnish no cause of regret to the deliverers of our nation, for their kindness to us. Let us constantly remember the rock whence we were hewn, and the pit whence we were digged. Pride was not made for man, in any situation; and still less, for persons who have recently emerged from bondage. The Jews, after they entered the promised land, were commanded, when they offered sacrifices to the Lord, never to forget their humble origin; and hence, part of the worship that accompanied their sacrifices consisted in acknowledging, that a Syrian, ready to perish, was their father: in like manner, it becomes us, publickly and privately, to acknowledge, that an African slave, ready to perish, was our father or our grandfather. Let our conduct be regulated by the precepts of the gospel; let us be sober minded, humble, peaceable, temperate in our meats and drinks, frugal in our apparel and in the furniture of our houses, industrious in our occupations, just in all our dealings, and ever ready to honour all men. Let us teach our children the rudiments of the English language, in order to enable them to acquire a knowledge of useful trades, and, above all things, let us instruct them in the principles of the gospel of Jesus Christ, whereby they may become wise unto salvation. It has always been a mystery Why the impartial Father of the human race should have permitted the transportation of so many millions of our fellow creatures to this country, to endure all the miseries of slavery. Perhaps his design was, that a knowledge of the gospel might be acquired by some of their descendants, in order that they might become qualified to be the messengers of it, to the land of their fathers. Let this thought animate us, when we are teaching our children to love and adore the name of our Redeemer. Who knows but that a Joseph may rise up among them, who shall be the instrument of feeding the African nations with the bread of life, and of saving them, not from earthly bondage, but from the more galling yoke of sin and satan. Fourthly, Let us be grateful to our benefactors who, by enlightening the minds of the rulers of the earth, by means of their publications and remonstrances against the trade in our countrymen, have produced the great event we are this day celebrating. Abolition societies

1.13 The New England Threat of Secession, Columbian Centinel and individuals have equal claims to our gratitude. It would be difficult to mention the names of any of our benefactors, without offending many whom we do not know. Some of them are gone to heaven, to receive the reward of their labours of love towards us; and the kindness and benevolence of the survivors, we hope, are recorded in the book of life, to be mentioned with honour when our Lord shall come to reward his faithful servants before an assembled world. Fifthly, and lastly, Let the first of January, the day of the abolition of the slave trade in our country, be set apart in every year, as a day of publick thanksgiving for that mercy. Let the history of the sufferings of our brethren, and of their deliverance, descend by this means to our children, to the remotest generations; and when they shall ask, in time to come, saying, What mean the lessons, the psalms, the prayers and the praises in the worship of this day? let us answer them, by saying, the Lord, on the day of which this is the anniversary, abolished the trade which dragged your fathers . . .

1.13 The New England Threat of Secession, Columbian Centinel, January 13, 1813 North of the Delaware, there is among all who do not bask or expect to bask in the Executive sunshine but one voice for Peace. South of that river, the general cry is ‘‘Open war, O peers!’’ There are not two hostile nations upon earth whose views of the principles and polity of a perfect commonwealth, and of men and measures, are more discordant than those of these two great divisions. There is but little of congeniality or sympathy in our notions or feelings; and this small residuum will be extinguished by this withering war. The sentiment is hourly extending, and in these Northern States will soon be universal, that we are in a condition no better in relation to the South than that of a conquered people. We have been compelled without the least necessity or occasion to renounce our habits, occupations, means of happiness, and subsistence. We

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are plunged into a war, without a sense of enmity, or a perception of sufficient provocation; and obliged to fight the battles of a Cabal which, under the sickening affectation of republican equality, aims at trampling into the dust the weight, influence, and power of Commerce and her dependencies. We, whose soil was the hotbed and whose ships were the nursery of Sailors, are insulted with the hypocrisy of a devotedness to Sailors’ rights, and the arrogance of a pretended skill in maritime jurisprudence, by those whose country furnishes no navigation beyond the size of a ferryboat or an Indian canoe. We have no more interest in waging this sort of war, at this period and under these circumstances, at the command of Virginia, than Holland in accelerating her ruin by uniting her destiny to France. We resemble Holland in another particular. The officers and power of government are engrossed by executive minions, who are selected on account of their known infidelity to the interest of their fellow citizens, to foment divisions and to deceive and distract the people whom they cannot intimidate. The land is literally taken from its Old Possessors and given to strangers. The Cabinet has no confidence in those who enjoy the confidence of this people, and on the other hand the solid mass of the talents and property of this community is wholly unsusceptible of any favorable impressions or dispositions towards an Executive in whose choice they had no part, and by whom they feel that they shall be, as they always have been, degraded and marked as objects of oppression and resentment. The consequence of this state of things must then be, either that the Southern States must drag the Northern States farther into the war, or we must drag them out of it; or the chain will break. This will be the ‘‘imposing attitude’’ of the next year. We must no longer be deafened by senseless clamors about a separation of the States. It is an event we do not desire, not because we have derived advantages from the compact, but because we cannot foresee or limit the dangers or effects of revolution. But the States are separated in fact, when one section assumes an imposing attitude, and with high hand perseveres in measures fatal to the interests and repugnant to the opinions of another section, by dint of a geographical majority.

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Section 2 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period

Introduction

and established a ‘‘spoils system’’ that rewarded supporters with appointed offices or partronage. Andrew Jackson called for the federal government to have more limited powers, and his preference for laissezfaire economics forced a dramatic showdown with the Whig opposition over the rechartering of the national bank. Many Jacksonian Democrats expressed faith in the notion that white Americans were destined to expand westward and to settle the entire North American continent, a belief that led to harsh Indian removal, including the so-called Trail of Tears in which Cherokees and other southeastern tribes were forced to march more than 1,200 miles to Oklahoma territory. Their quest for geographic expansion ironically intensified national tensions over slavery, which the Jacksonians had hoped to subordinate. Tellingly, Jackson devoted considerable energy during his own presidential term to quelling a Nullification Crisis in South Carolina and to suppressing a young abolitionist movement. The slavery issue and sectional conflict consumed American politics after 1850, shattering the party system established by the Jacksonians and pushing the nation closer to an unprecedented conflict. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The Jacksonian era is traditionally associated with the advancement of mass democracy between the 1820s and 1840s, as reflected in the political philosophy, institutional transformations, and policies of President Andrew Jackson and his supporters. In the 21st century, the period is just as powerfully known for the Jacksonians’ endorsement of the existing slavery system, fervent belief in Manifest Destiny, and brutal Indian removal policies. Elected in 1828 and reelected in 1832, Jackson promoted the presidency as a popular office and he sought to strip away long-standing republican political principles and practices to make the national government more democratic and to broaden the role of public opinion. The Jacksonians favored greater democratic participation for white males, and white manhood suffrage was dramatically expanded in these years, while property qualifications for holding elected office were removed in most states by 1840. Meanwhile, women and African Americans were denied the right to vote. The framework for a mass-based, decentralized two-party system also emerged in the Jacksonian era. The new parties developed grassroots organizations and organized voters in all parts of the country, held national conventions,

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Documents

2.1 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States,’’ Democracy in America, 1835

nor language, nor habits. Their only resemblance lies in their misfortunes. Both of them occupy an equally inferior position in the country they inhabit; both suffer from tyranny; and if their wrongs are not the same, they originate from the same authors. If we reason from what passes in the world, we should almost say that the European is to the other races of mankind what man himself is to the lower animals: he makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue he destroys them. Oppression has, at one stroke, deprived the descendants of the Africans of almost all the privileges of humanity. The Negro of the United States has lost even the remembrance of his country; the language which his forefathers spoke is never heard around him; he abjured their religion and forgot their customs when he ceased to belong to Africa, without acquiring any claim to European privileges. But he remains half-way between the two communities, isolated between two races; sold by the one, repulsed by the other; finding not a spot in the universe to call by the name of country, except the faint image of a home which the shelter of his master’s roof affords . . . The Negro enters upon slavery as soon as he is born, nay, he may have been purchased in the womb, and have begun his slavery before he began his existence. Equally devoid of wants and of enjoyment, and useless to himself, he learns, with his first notions of existence, that he is the property of another, who has an interest in preserving his life, and that the care of it does not

. . . The territory now occupied or claimed by the American Union spreads from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific Ocean. On the east and west its limits are those of the continent itself On the south it advances nearly to the tropics, and it extends upward to the icy regions of the north. The human beings who are scattered over this space do not form, as in Europe, so many branches of the same stock. Three races, naturally distinct, and, I might almost say, hostile to each other, are discoverable among them at the first glance. Almost insurmountable barriers had been raised between them by education and law, as well as by their origin and outward characteristics, but fortune has brought them together on the same soil, where, although they are mixed, they do not amalgamate, and each race fulfills its destiny apart. Among these widely differing families of men, the first that attracts attention, the superior in intelligence, in power, and in enjoyment, is the white, or European, the MAN pre-eminently so-called, below him appear the Negro and the Indian. These two unhappy races have nothing in common, neither birth, nor features,

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30 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period devolve upon himself; even the power of thought appears to him a useless gift of Providence, and he quietly enjoys all the privileges of his debasement. If he becomes free, independence is often felt by him to be a heavier burden than slavery; for, having learned in the course of his life to submit to everything except reason, he is too unacquainted with her dictates to obey them. A thousand new desires beset him, and he has not the knowledge and energy necessary to resist them: these are masters which it is necessary to contend with, and he has learned only to submit and obey. In short, he is sunk to such a depth of wretchedness that while servitude brutalizes, liberty destroys him. Oppression has been no less fatal to the Indian than to the Negro race, but its effects are different. Before the arrival of white men in the New World, the inhabitants of North America lived quietly in their woods, enduring the vicissitudes and practicing the virtues and vices common to savage nations. The Europeans having dispersed the Indian tribes and driven them into the deserts, condemned them to a wandering life, full of inexpressible sufferings . . . The Negro, who earnestly desires to mingle his race with that of the European, cannot do so; while the Indian, who might succeed to a certain extent, disdains to make the attempt. The servility of the one dooms him to slavery, the pride of the other to death . . .

The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Indian Tribes That Inhabit the Territory Possessed by the Union. The Europeans introduced among the savages of North America firearms, ardent spirits, and iron; they taught them to exchange for manufactured stuffs the rough garments that had previously satisfied their untutored simplicity. Having acquired new tastes, without the arts by which they could be gratified, the Indians were obliged to have recourse to the workmanship of the whites; but in return for their productions the savage had nothing to offer except the rich furs that still abounded in his woods. Hence the chase became necessary, not merely to provide for his subsistence, but to satisfy the frivolous desires of Europeans. He no longer hunted merely to obtain food, but to procure the only objects of barter which he could offer. While the wants of the natives were thus increasing, their resources continued to diminish. From the moment when a European settlement is formed in the neighborhood of the territory occupied by the Indians, the beasts of chase take the alarm. Thousands of savages, wandering in the forests and destitute of any fixed dwelling, did not disturb

them; but as soon as the continuous sounds of European labor are heard in their neighborhood, they begin to flee away and retire to the West, where their instinct teaches them that they will still find deserts of immeasurable extent. ‘‘The buffalo is constantly receding,’’ say Messrs. Clarke and Cass in their Report of the year 1829; a few years since they approached the base of the Allegheny; and a few years hence they may even be rare upon the immense plains which extend to the base of the Rocky Mountains.’’ I have been assured that this effect of the approach of the whites is often felt at two hundred leagues’ distance from their frontier. Their influence is thus exerted over tribes whose name is unknown to them, and who suffer the evils of usurpation long before they are acquainted with the authors of their distress . . . It is impossible to conceive the frightful sufferings that attend these forced migrations. They are undertaken by a people already exhausted and reduced; and the countries to which the newcomers betake themselves are inhabited by other tribes, which receive them with jealous hostility. Hunger is in the rear, war awaits them, and misery besets them on all sides. To escape from so many enemies, they separate, and each individual endeavors to procure secretly the means of supporting his existence by isolating himself, living in the immensity of the desert like an outcast in civilized society. The social tie, which distress had long since weakened, is then dissolved; they have no longer a country, and soon they will not be a people; their very families are obliterated; their common name is forgotten; their language perishes; and all traces of their origin disappear. Their nation has ceased to exist except in the recollection of the antiquaries of America and a few of the learned of Europe. I should be sorry to have my reader suppose that I am coloring the picture too highly; I saw with my own eyes many of the miseries that I have just described, and was the witness of sufferings that I have not the power to portray. At the end of the year 1831, while I was on the left bank of the Mississippi, at a place named by Europeans Memphis, there arrived a numerous band of Choctaws (or Chactas, as they are called by the French in Louisiana). These savages had left their country and were endeavoring to gain the right bank of the Mississippi, where they hoped to find an asylum that had been promised them by the American government. It was then the middle of winter, and the cold was unusually severe; the snow had frozen hard upon the ground, and the river was drifting huge masses of ice. The Indians had their families with them, and they brought in their train the wounded and the sick, with children newly born and old

2.1 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races’’ men upon the verge of death. They possessed neither tents nor wagons, but only their arms and some provisions. I saw them embark to pass the mighty river, and never will that solemn spectacle fade from my remembrance. No cry, no sob, was heard among the assembled crowd; all were silent. Their calamities were of ancient date, and they knew them to be irremediable . . . The expulsion of the Indians often takes place at the present day in a regular and, as it were, a legal manner. When the European population begins to approach the limit of the desert inhabited by a savage tribe, the government of the United States usually sends forward envoys who assemble the Indians in a large plain and, having first eaten and drunk with them, address them thus: ‘‘What have you to do in the land of your fathers? Before long, you must dig up their bones in order to live. In what respect is the country you inhabit better than another? Are there no woods, marshes, or prairies except where you dwell? And can you live nowhere but under your own sun? Beyond those mountains which you see at the horizon, beyond the lake which bounds your territory on the west, there lie vast countries where beasts of chase are yet found in great abundance; sell us your lands, then, and go to live happily in those solitudes.’’ After holding this language, they spread before the eyes of the Indians firearms, woolen garments, kegs of brandy, glass necklaces, bracelets of tinsel, ear-rings, and looking-glasses. If, when they have beheld all these riches, they still hesitate, it is insinuated that they cannot refuse the required consent and that the government itself will not long have the power of protecting them in their rights. What are they to do? Half convinced and half compelled, they go to inhabit new deserts, where the importunate whites will not let them remain ten years in peace. In this manner do the Americans obtain, at a very low price, whole provinces, which the richest sovereigns of Europe could not purchase. These are great evils; and it must be added that they appear to me to be irremediable. I believe that the Indian nations of North America are doomed to perish, and that whenever the Europeans shall be established on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, that race of men will have ceased to exist. The Indians had only the alternative of war or civilization; in other words, they must either destroy the Europeans or become their equals.

Situation of The Black Population in the United States, and Dangers with Which its Presence Threatens The Whites . . . It is important to make an accurate distinction between slavery itself and its consequences. The

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immediate evils produced by slavery were very nearly the same in antiquity as they are among the moderns, but the consequences of these evils were different. The slave among the ancients belonged to the same race as his master, and was often the superior of the two in education and intelligence. Freedom was the only distinction between them; and when freedom was conferred, they were easily confounded together. The ancients, then, had a very simple means of ridding themselves of slavery and its consequences: that of enfranchisement; and they succeeded as soon as they adopted this measure generally. Not but that in ancient states the vestiges of servitude subsisted for some time after servitude itself was abolished. There is a natural prejudice that prompts men to despise whoever has been their inferior long after he has become their equal; and the real inequality that is produced by fortune or by law is always succeeded by an imaginary inequality that is implanted in the manners of the people. But among the ancients this secondary consequence of slavery had a natural limit; for the freedman bore so entire a resemblance to those born free that it soon became impossible to distinguish him from them . . . The modern slave differs from his master not only in his condition but in his origin. You may set the Negro free, but you cannot make him otherwise than an alien to the European. Nor is this all we scarcely acknowledge the common features of humanity in this stranger whom slavery has brought among us. His physiognomy is to our eyes hideous, his understanding weak, his tastes low; and we are almost inclined to look upon him as a being intermediate between man and the brutes. The moderns, then, after they have abolished slavery, have three prejudices to contend against, which are less easy to attack and far less easy to conquer than the mere fact of servitude: the prejudice of the master, the prejudice of the race, and the prejudice of color . . . I see that in a certain portion of the territory of the United States at the present day the legal barrier which separated the two races is falling away, but not that which exists in the manners of the country, slavery recedes, but the prejudice to which it has given birth is immovable. Whoever has inhabited the United States must have perceived that in those parts of the Union in which the Negroes are no longer slaves they have in no wise drawn nearer to the whites. On the contrary, the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known. It is true that in the North of the Union marriages may be legally contracted between Negroes and whites;

32 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period but public opinion would stigmatize as infamous a man who should connect himself with a Negress, and it would be difficult to cite a single instance of such a union. The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges; and although they may legally serve as jurors, prejudice repels them from that office. The same schools do not receive the children of the black and of the European. In the theaters gold cannot procure a seat for the servile race beside their former masters; in the hospitals they lie apart; and although they are allowed to invoke the same God as the whites, it must be at a different altar and in their own churches, with their own clergy. The gates of heaven are not closed against them, but their inferiority is continued to the very confines of the other world. When the Negro dies, his bones are cast aside, and the distinction of condition prevails even in the equality of death. Thus the Negro is free, but he can share neither the rights, nor the pleasures, nor the labor, nor the afflictions, nor the tomb of him whose equal he has been declared to be; and he cannot meet him upon fair terms in life or in death. In the South, where slavery still exists, the Negroes are less carefully kept apart; they sometimes share the labors and the recreations of the whites; the whites consent to intermix with them to a certain extent, and although legislation treats them more harshly, the habits of the people are more tolerant and compassionate. In the South the master is not afraid to raise his slave to his own standing, because he knows that he can in a moment reduce him to the dust at pleasure. In the North the white no longer distinctly perceives the barrier that separates him from the degraded race, and he shuns the Negro with the more pertinacity since he fears lest they should some day be confounded together. Among the Americans of the South, Nature sometimes reasserts her rights and restores a transient equality between the blacks and the whites; but in the North pride restrains the most imperious of human passions. The American of the Northern states would perhaps allow the Negress to share his licentious pleasures if the laws of his country did not declare that she may aspire to be the legitimate partner of his bed, but he recoils with horror from her who might become his wife. Thus it is in the United States that the prejudice which repels the Negroes seems to increase in proportion as they are emancipated, and inequality is sanctioned by the manners while it is effaced from the laws

of the country. But if the relative position of the two races that inhabit the United States is such as I have described, why have the Americans abolished slavery in the North of the Union, why do they maintain it in the South, and why do they aggravate its hardships? The answer is easily given. It is not for the good of the Negroes, but for that of the whites, that measures are taken to abolish slavery in the United States. . . . in general, the colonies in which there were no slaves became more populous and more prosperous than those in which slavery flourished. The farther they went, the more was it shown that slavery, which is so cruel to the slave, is prejudicial to the master. But this truth was most satisfactorily demonstrated when civilization reached the banks of the Ohio. The stream that the Indians had distinguished by the name of Ohio, or the Beautiful River, waters one of the most magnificent valleys which have ever been made the abode of man. Undulating lands extend upon both shores of the Ohio, whose soil affords inexhaustible treasures to the laborer; on either bank the air is equally wholesome and the climate mild, and each of them forms the extreme frontier of a vast state: that which follows the numerous windings of the Ohio upon the left is called Kentucky; that upon the right bears the name of the river. These two states differ only in a single respect: Kentucky has admitted slavery, but the state of Ohio has prohibited the existence of slaves within its borders. Thus the traveler who floats down the current of the Ohio to the spot where that river falls into the Mississippi may be said to sail between liberty and servitude; and a transient inspection of surrounding objects will convince him which of the two is more favorable to humanity. Upon the left bank of the stream the population is sparse; from time to time one descries a troop of slaves loitering in the half-desert fields; the primeval forest reappears at every turn; society seems to be asleep, man to be idle, and nature alone offers a scene of activity and life. From the right bank, on the contrary, a confused hum is heard, which proclaims afar the presence of industry; the fields are covered with abundant harvests; the elegance of the dwellings announces the taste and activity of the laborers; and man appears to be in the enjoyment of that wealth and contentment which is the reward of labor. The state of Kentucky was founded in 1775, the state of Ohio only twelve years later; but twelve years are more in America than half a century in Europe; and at the present day the population of Ohio exceeds that of Kentucky by two hundred and fifty thousand souls. These different effects of slavery and freedom may

2.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘What Are the Chances of Duration of the American Union’’ readily be understood; and they suffice to explain many of the differences which we notice between the civilization of antiquity and that of our own time. Upon the left bank of the Ohio labor is confounded with the idea of slavery, while upon the right bank it is identifies with that of prosperity and improvement; on the one side it is degraded, on the other it is honored. On the former territory no white laborers can be found, for they would be afraid of assimilating themselves to the Negroes; all the work is done by slaves; on the latter no one is idle, for the white population extend their activity and intelligence to every kind of employment. Thus the men whose task it is to cultivate the rich soil of Kentucky are ignorant and apathetic, while those who are active and enlightened either do nothing or pass over into Ohio, where they may work without shame. It is true that in Kentucky the planters are not obliged to pay the slaves whom they employ, but they derive small profits from their labor, while the wages paid to free workmen would be returned with interest in the value of their services. The free workman is paid, but he does his work quicker than the slave; and rapidity of execution is one of the great elements of economy. The white sells his services, but they are purchased only when they may be useful; the black can claim no remuneration for his toil, but the expense of his maintenance is perpetual; he must be supported in his old age as well as in manhood, in his profitless infancy as well as in the productive years of youth, in sickness as well as in health. Payment must equally be made in order to obtain the services of either class of men: the free workman receives his wages in money; the slave in education, in food, in care, and in clothing. The money which a master spends in the maintenance of his slaves goes gradually and in detail, so that it is scarcely perceived; the salary of the free workman is paid in a round sum and appears to enrich only him who receives it; but in the end the slave has cost more than the free servant, and his labor is less productive. The influence of slavery extends still further: it affects the character of the master and imparts a peculiar tendency to his ideas and tastes. Upon both banks of the Ohio the character of the inhabitants is enterprising and energetic, but this vigor is very differently exercised in the two states. The white inhabitant of Ohio, obliged to subsist by his own exertions, regards temporal prosperity as the chief aim of his existence; and as the country which he occupies presents inexhaustible resources to his industry, and ever varying lures to his activity, his acquisitive ardor surpasses the ordinary limits of human cupidity: he is tormented by the desire of wealth, and he boldly enters upon every path that

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fortune opens to him; he becomes a sailor, a pioneer, an artisan, or a cultivator with the same indifference, and supports with equal constancy the fatigues and the dangers incidental to these various professions; the resources of his intelligence are astonishing, and his avidity in the pursuit of gain amounts to a species of heroism. But the Kentuckian scorns not only labor but all the undertakings that labor promotes; as he lives in an idle independence, his tastes are those of an idle man; money has lost a portion of its value in his eyes; he covets wealth much less than pleasure and excitement; and the energy which his neighbor devotes to gain turns with him to a passionate love of field sports and military exercises; he delights in violent bodily exertion, he is familiar with the use of arms, and is accustomed from a very early age to expose his life in single combat. Thus slavery prevents the whites not only from becoming opulent, but even from desiring to become so . . .

2.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘What Are the Chances of Duration of the American Union, and What Dangers Threaten It,’’ Democracy in America, 1835 . . . An attentive examination of what is going on in the United States will easily convince us that two opposite tendencies exist there, like two currents flowing in contrary directions in the same channel. The Union has now existed for forty-five years, and time has done away with many provincial prejudices which were at first hostile to its power. The patriotic feeling that attached each of the Americans to his own state has become less exclusive, and the different parts of the Union have become more amicable as they have become better acquainted with each other. The post, that great instrument of intercourse, now reaches into the backwoods; and steamboats have established daily means of communication between the different points of the coast. An inland navigation of unexampled rapidity conveys commodities up and down the rivers of the country. And to these facilities of nature and art may be added those restless cravings, that busymindedness and love of pelf, which are constantly urging the American into active life and bringing him into contact with his fellow citizens. He crosses the country in every direction; he visits all the various populations of the land. There is not a province in France in which the natives are so well known to one another as the

34 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period thirteen millions of men who cover the territory of the United States. While the Americans intermingle, they assimilate; the differences resulting from their climate, their origin, and their institutions diminish; and they all draw nearer and nearer to the common type. Every year thousands of men leave the North to settle in different parts of the Union; they bring with them their faith, their opinions, and their manners, and as they are more enlightened than the men among whom they are about to dwell, they soon rise to the head of affairs and adapt society to their own advantage. This continual emigration of the North to the South is peculiarly favorable to the fusion of all the different provincial characters into one national character. The civilization of the North appears to be the common standard, to which the whole nation will one day be assimilated. The commercial ties that unite the federated states are strengthened by the increasing manufactures of the Americans, and the union which began in their opinions gradually forms a part of their habits; the course of time has swept away the bugbear thoughts that haunted the imaginations of the citizens in 1789. The Federal power has not become oppressive; it has not destroyed the independence of the states; it has not subjected the confederates to monarchical institutions; and the Union has not rendered the lesser states dependent upon the larger ones. The confederation has continued to increase in population, in wealth, and in power. I am therefore convinced that the natural obstacles to the continuance of the American Union are not so powerful as they were in 1789, and that the enemies of the Union are not so numerous. And yet a careful examination of the history of the United States for the last forty-five years will readily convince us that the Federal power is declining; nor is it difficult to explain the causes of this phenomenon. When the Constitution of 1789 was promulgated, the nation was a prey to anarchy; the Union which succeeded this confusion excited much dread and hatred, but it was warmly supported because it satisfied an imperious want. Although it was then more attacked than it is now, the Federal power soon reached the maximum of its authority, as is usually the case with a government that triumphs after having braced its strength by the struggle. At that time the interpretation of the Constitution seemed to extend rather than to repress the Federal sovereignty; and the Union offered, in several respects, the appearance of a single and undivided people, directed in its foreign and internal policy by a single government. But to attain this point the people had risen, to some extent, above itself.

The Constitution had not destroyed the individuality of the states, and all communities, of whatever nature they may be, are impelled by a secret instinct towards independence. This propensity is still more decided in a country like America, in which every village forms a sort of republic, accustomed to govern itself. It therefore cost the states an effort to submit to the Federal supremacy; and all efforts, however successful, necessarily subside with the causes in which they originated. As the Federal government consolidated its authority, America resumed its rank among the nations, peace returned to its frontiers, and public credit was restored; confusion was succeeded by a fixed state of things, which permitted the full and free exercise of industrious enterprise. It was this very prosperity that made the Americans forget the cause which had produced it; and when once the danger was passed, the energy and the patriotism that had enabled them to brave it disappeared from among them. Delivered from the cares that oppressed them, they easily returned to their ordinary habits and gave themselves up without resistance to their natural inclinations. When a powerful government no longer appeared to be necessary, they once more began to think it irksome. Everything prospered under the Union, and the states were not inclined to abandon the Union; but they desired to render the action of the power which represented it as light as possible. The general principle of union was adopted, but in every minor detail there was a tendency to independence. The principle of confederation was every day more easily admitted and more rarely applied, so that the Federal government, by creating order and peace, brought about its own decline. As soon as this tendency of public opinion began to be manifested externally, the leaders of parties, who live by the passions of the people, began to work it to their own advantage. The position of the Federal government then became exceedingly critical. Its enemies were in possession of the popular favor, and they obtained the right of conducting its policy by pledging themselves to lessen its influence. From that time forwards the government of the Union, as often as it has entered the lists with the governments of the states, has almost invariably been obliged to recede. And whenever an interpretation of the terms of the Federal Constitution has been pronounced, that interpretation has generally been opposed to the Union and favorable to the states. The Constitution gave to the Federal government the right of providing for the national interests; and it had been held that no other authority was so fit to superintend the internal improvements that affected the prosperity of the whole Union, such, for instance, as the

2.2 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘What Are the Chances of Duration of the American Union’’ cutting of canals. But the states were alarmed at a power that could thus dispose of a portion of their territory; they were afraid that the central government would by this means acquire a formidable patronage within their own limits, and exercise influence which they wished to reserve exclusively to their own agents. The Democratic Party, which has constantly opposed the increase of the Federal authority, accused Congress of usurpation, and the chief magistrate of ambition. The central government was intimidated by these clamors, and it finally acknowledged its error, promising to confine its influence for the future within the circle that was prescribed to it . . . The slightest observation in the United States enables one to appreciate the advantages that the country derives from the Bank of the United States. These advantages are of several kinds, but one of them is peculiarly striking to the stranger. The notes of the bank are taken upon the borders of the wilderness for the same value as at Philadelphia, where the bank conducts its operations. But the Bank of the United States is the object of great animosity. Its directors proclaimed their hostility to the President, and they were accused, not without probability, of having abused their influence to thwart his election. The President therefore attacked the establishment with all the warmth of personal enmity; and he was encouraged in the pursuit of his revenge by the conviction that he was supported by the secret inclinations of the majority. The bank may be regarded as the great monetary tie of the Union, just as Congress is the great legislative tie; and the same passions that tend to render the states independent of the central power contributed to the overthrow of the bank. The Bank of the United States always held a great number of the notes issued by the state banks, which it can at any time oblige them to convert into cash. It has itself nothing to fear from a similar demand, as the extent of its resources enables it to meet all claims. But the existence of the provincial banks is thus threatened and their operations are restricted, since they are able to issue only a quantity of notes duly proportioned to their capital. They submitted with impatience to this salutary control. The newspapers that they bought over, and the President, whose interest rendered him their instrument, attacked the bank with the greatest vehemence. They roused the local passions and the blind democratic instinct of the country to aid their cause; and they asserted that the bank directors formed a permanent aristocratic body, whose influence would ultimately be felt in the government and affect those principles of equality upon which society rests in America.

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The contest between the bank and its opponents was only an incident in the great struggle which is going on in America between the states and the central power, between the spirit of democratic independence and that of a proper distribution and subordination of power. I do not mean that the enemies of the bank were identically the same individuals who on other points attacked the Federal government, but I assert that the attacks directed against the Bank of the United States originated in the same propensities that militate against the Federal government, and that the very numerous opponents of the former afford a deplorable symptom of the decreasing strength of the latter. But the Union has never shown so much weakness as on the celebrated question of the tariff. The wars of the French Revolution and of 1812 had created manufacturing establishments in the North of the Union, by cutting off free communication between America and Europe. When peace was concluded and the channel of intercourse reopened by which the produce of Europe was transmitted to the New World, the Americans thought fit to establish a system of import duties for the twofold purpose of protecting their incipient manufactures and of paying off the amount of the debt contracted during the war. The Southern states, which have no manufactures to encourage and which are exclusively agricultural, soon complained of this measure. I do not pretend to examine here whether their complaints were well or ill founded, but only to recite the facts. As early as 1820 South Carolina declared in a petition to Congress that the tariff was ‘‘unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust.’’ And the states of Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi subsequently remonstrated against it with more or less vigor. But Congress, far from lending an ear to these complaints, raised the scale of tariff duties in the years 1824 and 1828 and recognized anew the principle on which it was founded. A doctrine was then proclaimed, or rather revived, in the South, which took the name of Nullification. I have shown in the proper place that the object of the Federal Constitution was not to form a league, but to create a national government. The Americans of the United States form one and the same people, in all the cases which are specified by that Constitution; and upon these points the will of the nation is expressed, as it is in all constitutional nations, by the voice of the majority. When the majority has once spoken, it is the duty of the minority to submit. Such is the sound legal doctrine, and the only one that agrees with the text of the Constitution and the known intention of those who framed it. The partisans of Nullification in the South maintain, on the contrary, that the intention of the Americans in

36 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period uniting was not to combine themselves into one and the same people, but that they meant only to form a league of independent states; and that each state, consequently, retains its entire sovereignty, if not de facto, at least de jure, and has the right of putting its own construction upon the laws of Congress and of suspending their execution within the limits of its own territory if they seem unconstitutional and unjust. The entire doctrine of Nullification is comprised in a sentence uttered by Vice President Calhoun, the head of that party in the South, before the Senate of the United States, in 1833: ‘‘The Constitution is a compact to which the States were parties in their sovereign capacity: now, whenever a compact is entered into by parties which acknowledge no common arbiter to decide in the last resort, each of them has a right to judge for itself in relation to the nature, extent, and obligations of the instrument.’’ It is evident that such a doctrine destroys the very basis of the Federal Constitution and brings back the anarchy from which the Americans were delivered by the act of 1789 . . . Almost all the controversies of which I have been speaking have taken place under the Presidency of General Jackson; and it cannot be denied that in the question of the tariff he has supported the rights of the Union with energy and skill. I think, however, that the conduct of this President of the Federal government may be reckoned as one of the dangers that threaten its continuance. Some persons in Europe have formed an opinion of the influence of General Jackson upon the affairs of his country which appears highly extravagant to those who have seen the subject nearer at hand. We have been told that General Jackson has won battles; that he is an energetic man, prone by nature and habit to the use of force, covetous of power, and a despot by inclination. All this may be true; but the inferences which have been drawn from these truths are very erroneous. It has been imagined that General Jackson is bent on establishing a dictatorship in America, introducing a military spirit, and giving a degree of influence to the central authority that cannot but be dangerous to provincial liberties. But in America the time for similar undertakings, and the age for men of this kind, has not yet come; if General Jackson had thought of exercising his authority in this manner, he would infallibly have forfeited his political station and compromised his life; he has not been so imprudent as to attempt anything of the kind. Far from wishing to extend the Federal power, the President belongs to the party which is desirous of limiting that power to the clear and precise letter of the Constitution, and which never puts a construction upon that act favorable to the government of the Union; far

from standing forth as the champion of centralization, General Jackson is the agent of the state jealousies; and he was placed in his lofty station by the passions that are most opposed to the central government. It is by perpetually flattering these passions that he maintains his station and his popularity. General Jackson is the slave of the majority: he yields to its wishes, its propensities, and its demands---say, rather, anticipates and forestalls them. Whenever the governments of the states come into collision with that of the Union, the President is generally the first to question his own rights; he almost always outstrips the legislature; and when the extent of the Federal power is controverted, he takes part, as it were, against himself; he conceals his official interests, and labors to diminish his own dignity. Not, indeed, that he is naturally weak or hostile to the Union; for when the majority decided against the claims of Nullification, he put himself at their head, asserted distinctly and energetically the doctrines which the nation held, and was the first to recommend force; but General Jackson appears to me, if I may use the American expression, to be a Federalist by taste and a Republican by calculation. General Jackson stoops to gain the favor of the majority; but when he feels that his popularity is secure, he overthrows all obstacles in the pursuit of the objects which the community approves or of those which it does not regard with jealousy. Supported by a power that his predecessors never had, he tramples on his personal enemies, whenever they cross his path, with a facility without example; he takes upon himself the responsibility of measures that no one before him would have ventured to attempt. He even treats the national representatives with a disdain approaching to insult; he puts his veto on the laws of Congress and frequently neglects even to reply to that powerful body. He is a favorite who sometimes treats his master roughly. The power of General Jackson perpetually increases, but that of the President declines; in his hands the Federal government is strong, but it will pass enfeebled into the hands of his successor . . .

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Government of the Democracy in America,’’ Democracy in America, 1835 I AM well aware of the difficulties that attend this part of my subject; but although every expression which I am about to use may clash, upon some points, with the feelings of the different parties which divide my country, I shall still speak my whole thought.

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Government of the Democracy in America’’ In Europe we are at a loss how to judge the true character and the permanent instincts of democracy, because in Europe two conflicting principles exist and we do not know what to attribute to the principles themselves and what to the passions that the contest produces. Such is not the case in America, however; there the people reign without impediment, and they have no perils to dread and no injuries to avenge. In America democracy is given up to its own propensities; its course is natural and its activity is unrestrained, there, consequently, its real character must be judged. And to no people can this inquiry be more vitally interesting than to the French nation, who are blindly driven onwards, by a daily and irresistible impulse, towards a state of things which may prove either despotic or republican, but which will assuredly be democratic.

Universal Suffrage I HAVE already observed that universal suffrage has been adopted in all the states of the Union; it consequently exists in communities that occupy very different positions in the social scale. I have had opportunities of observing its effects in different localities and among races of men who are nearly strangers to each other in their language, their religion, and their modes of life; in Louisiana as well as in New England, in Georgia as in Canada. I have remarked that universal suffrage is far from producing in America either all the good or all the evil consequences which may be expected from it in Europe, and that its effects generally differ very much from those which are attributed to it.

The Choice of the People, and the Instinctive Preferences of the American Democracy. In the United States the ablest men are rarely placed at the head of affairs---Reason for this peculiarity---The envy which prevails in the lower orders of France against the higher classes is not a French but a purely democratic feeling---Why the most distinguished men in America frequently seclude themselves from public affairs. MANY people in Europe are apt to believe without saying it, or to say without believing it, that one of the great advantages of universal suffrage is that it entrusts the direction of affairs to men who are worthy of the public confidence. They admit that the people are unable to govern of themselves, but they aver that the people always wish the welfare of the state and instinctively designate those who are animated by the same good will and who are the most fit to wield the supreme authority. I confess that the observations I

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made in America by no means coincide with these opinions. On my arrival in the United States I was surprised to find so much distinguished talent among the citizens and so little among the heads of the government. It is a constant fact that at the present day the ablest men in the United States are rarely placed at the head of affairs; and it must be acknowledged that such has been the result in proportion as democracy has exceeded all its former limits. The race of American statesmen has evidently dwindled most remarkably in the course of the last fifty years. Several causes may be assigned for this phenomenon. It is impossible, after the most strenuous exertions, to raise the intelligence of the people above a certain level. Whatever may be the facilities of acquiring information, whatever may be the profusion of easy methods and cheap science, the human mind can never be instructed and developed without devoting considerable time to these objects. The greater or lesser ease with which people can live without working is a sure index of intellectual progress. This boundary is more remote in some countries and more restricted in others, but it must exist somewhere as long as the people are forced to work in order to procure the means of subsistence; that is to say, as long as they continue to be the people. It is therefore quite as difficult to imagine a state in which all the citizens are very well informed as a state in which they are all wealthy; these two difficulties are correlative. I readily admit that the mass of the citizens sincerely wish to promote the welfare of the country; nay, more, I even grant that the lower classes mix fewer considerations of personal interest with their patriotism than the higher orders; but it is always more or less difficult for them to discern the best means of attaining the end which they sincerely desire. Long and patient observation and much acquired knowledge are requisite to form a just estimate of the character of a single individual. Men of the greatest genius often fail to do it, and can it be supposed that the common people will always succeed? The people have neither the time nor the means for an investigation of this kind. Their conclusions are hastily formed from a superficial inspection of the more prominent features of a question. Hence it often happens that mountebanks of all sorts are able to please the people, while their truest friends frequently fail to gain their confidence. Moreover, democracy not only lacks that soundness of judgment which is necessary to select men really deserving of their confidence, but often have not the desire or the inclination to find them out. It cannot be denied that democratic institutions strongly tend to promote the feeling of envy in the human heart; not so

38 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period much because they afford to everyone the means of rising to the same level with others as because those means perpetually disappoint the persons who employ them. Democratic institutions awaken and foster a passion for equality which they can never entirely satisfy. This complete equality eludes the grasp of the people at the very moment when they think they have grasped it, and ‘‘flies,’’ as Pascal says, ‘‘with an eternal flight; the people are excited in the pursuit of an advantage, which is more precious because it is not sufficiently remote to be unknown or sufficiently near to be enjoyed. The lower orders are agitated by the chance of success, they are irritated by its uncertainty; and they pass from the enthusiasm of pursuit to the exhaustion of ill success, and lastly to the acrimony of disappointment. Whatever transcends their own limitations appears to be an obstacle to their desires, and there is no superiority, however legitimate it may be, which is not irksome in their sight. It has been supposed that the secret instinct which leads the lower orders to remove their superiors as much as possible from the direction of public affairs is peculiar to France. This is an error, however; the instinct to which I allude is not French, it is democratic; it may have been heightened by peculiar political circumstances, but it owes its origin to a higher cause. In the United States the people do not hate the higher classes of society, but are not favorably inclined towards them and carefully exclude them from the exercise of authority. They do not fear distinguished talents, but are rarely fond of them. In general, everyone who rises without their aid seldom obtains their favor. While the natural instincts of democracy induce the people to reject distinguished citizens as their rulers, an instinct not less strong induces able men to retire from the political arena, in which it is so difficult to retain their independence, or to advance without becoming servile. This opinion has been candidly expressed by Chancellor Kent, who says, in speaking with high praise of that part of the Constitution which empowers the executive to nominate the judges: ‘‘It is indeed probable that the men who are best fitted to discharge the duties of this high office would have too much reserve in their manners, and too much austerity in their principles, for them to be returned by the majority at an election where universal suffrage is adopted.’’1 Such were the opinions which were printed without contradiction in America in the year 1830! I hold it to be sufficiently demonstrated that universal suffrage is by no means a guarantee of the wisdom of the popular choice. Whatever its advantages may be, this is not one of them.

Causes Which May Partly Correct These Tendencies of the De. Contrary effects produced on nations as on individuals by great dangers---Why so many distinguished men stood at the head of affairs in America fifty years ago---Influence which intelligence and morality exercise upon the popular---Example of New England--States of the Southwest---How certain laws influence the choice of the people---Election by an elected body---Its effects upon the composition of the Senate. WHEN serious dangers threaten the state, the people frequently succeed in selecting the citizens who are the most able to save it. It has been observed that man rarely retains his customary level in very critical circumstances; he rises above or sinks below his usual condition, and the same thing is true of nations. Extreme perils sometimes quench the energy of a people instead of stimulating it; they excite without directing its passions; and instead of clearing they confuse its powers of perception. The Jews fought and killed one another amid the smoking ruins of their temple. But it is more common, with both nations and individuals, to find extraordinary virtues developed from the very imminence of the danger. Great characters are then brought into relief as the edifices which are usually concealed by the gloom of night are illuminated by the glare of a conflagrations. At those dangerous times genius no longer hesitates to come forward; and the people, alarmed by the perils of their situation, for a time forget their envious passions. Great names may then be drawn from the ballot box. I have already observed that the American statesmen of the present day are very inferior to those who stood at the head of affairs fifty years ago. This is as much a consequence of the circumstances as of the laws of the country. When America was struggling in the high cause of independence to throw off the yoke of another country, and when it was about to usher a new nation into the world, the spirits of its inhabitants were roused to the height which their great objects required. In this general excitement distinguished men were ready to anticipate the call of the community, and the people clung to them for support and placed them at their head. But such events are rare, and it is from the ordinary course of affairs that our judgment must be formed. If passing occurrences sometimes check the passions of democracy, the intelligence and the morals of the community exercise an influence on them which is not less powerful and far more permanent. This is very perceptible in the United States.

2.3 Alexis de Tocqueville, ‘‘Government of the Democracy in America’’ In New England, where education and liberty are the daughters of morality and religion, where society has acquired age and stability enough to enable it to form principles and hold fixed habits, the common people are accustomed to respect intellectual and moral superiority and to submit to it without complaint, although they set at naught all those privileges which wealth and birth have introduced among mankind. In New England, consequently, the democracy makes a more judicious choice than it does elsewhere. But as we descend towards the South, to those states in which the constitution of society is more recent and less strong, where instruction is less general and the principles of morality, religion, and liberty are less happily combined, we perceive that talents and virtues become more rare among those who are in authority. Lastly, when we arrive at the new Southwestern states, in which the constitution of society dates but from yesterday and presents only an agglomeration of adventurers and speculators, we are amazed at the persons who are invested with public authority, and we are led to ask by what force, independent of legislation and of the men who direct it, the state can be protected and society be made to flourish. There are certain laws of a democratic nature which contribute, nevertheless, to correct in some measure these dangerous tendencies of democracy. On entering the House of Representatives at Washington, one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly. Often there is not a distinguished man in the whole number. Its members are almost all obscure individuals, whose names bring no associations to mind. They are mostly village lawyers, men in trade, or even persons belonging to the lower classes of society. In a country in which education is very general, it is said that the representatives of the people do not always know how to write correctly. At a few yards’ distance is the door of the Senate, which contains within a small space a large proportion of the celebrated men of America. Scarcely an individual is to be seen in it who has not had an active and illustrious career: the Senate is composed of eloquent advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates, and statesmen of note, whose arguments would do honor to the most remarkable parliamentary debates of Europe. How comes this strange contrast, and why are the ablest citizens found in one assembly rather than in the other? Why is the former body remarkable for its vulgar elements, while the latter seems to enjoy a monopoly of intelligence and talent? Both of these assemblies emanate from the people; both are chosen by universal suffrage; and no voice has hitherto been

39

heard to assert in America that the Senate is hostile to the interests of the people. From what cause, then, does so startling a difference arise? The only reason which appears to me adequately to account for it is that the House of Representatives is elected by the people directly, while the Senate is elected by elected bodies. The whole body of the citizens name the legislature of each state, and the Federal Constitution converts these legislatures into so many electoral bodies, which return the members of the Senate. The Senators are elected by an indirect application of the popular vote; for the legislatures which appoint them are not aristocratic or privileged bodies, that elect in their own right, but they are chosen by the totality of the citizens; they are generally elected every year, and enough new members may be chosen every year to determine the senatorial appointments. But this transmission of the popular authority through an assembly of chosen men operates an important change in it by refining its discretion and improving its choice. Men who are chosen in this manner accurately represent the majority of the nation which governs them; but they represent only the elevated thoughts that are current in the community and the generous propensities that prompt its nobler actions rather than the petty passions that disturb or the vices that disgrace it. The time must come when the American republics will be obliged more frequently to introduce the plan of election by an elected body into their system of representation or run the risk of perishing miserably among the shoals of democracy. I do not hesitate to avow that I look upon this peculiar system of election as the only means of bringing the exercise of political power to the level of all classes of the people. Those who hope to convert this institution into the exclusive weapon of a party, and those who fear to use it, seem to me to be equally in error.

Influence Which the American Democracy Has Exercised on the Laws Relating to Elections. When elections are rare, they expose the state to a violent crisis---When they are frequent, they keep up a feverish excitement---The Americans have preferred the second of these two evils---Mutability of the laws-Opinions of Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson on this subject. WHEN elections recur only at long intervals, the state is exposed to violent agitation every time they take place. Parties then exert themselves to the utmost in order to gain a prize which is so rarely within their reach; and as the evil is almost irremediable for the candidates who fail, everything is to be feared from

40 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period their disappointed ambition. If, on the other hand, the legal struggle is soon to be repeated, the defeated parties take patience. When elections occur frequently, their recurrence keeps society in a feverish excitement and gives a continual instability to public affairs. Thus, on the one hand, the state is exposed to the perils of a revolution, on the other to perpetual mutability; the former system threatens the very existence of the government, the latter prevents any steady and consistent policy. The Americans have preferred the second of these evils to the first; but they were led to this conclusion by instinct more than by reason, for a taste for variety is one of the characteristic passions of democracy. Hence their legislation is strangely mutable. Many Americans consider the instability of their laws as a necessary consequence of a system whose general results are beneficial. But no one in the United States affects to deny the fact of this instability or contends that it is not a great evil. Hamilton, after having demonstrated the utility of a power that might prevent or at least impede the promulgation of bad laws adds: ‘‘It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones, and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments.’’ (Federalist, No. 73.) And again, in No. 62 of the same work, he observes: ‘‘The facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable.’’ Jefferson himself, the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced, pointed out the same dangers. ‘‘The instability of our laws,’’ said he, ‘‘is really a very serious inconvenience. I think that we ought to have obviated it by deciding that a whole year should always be allowed to elapse between the bringing in of a bill and the final passing of it. It should afterwards be discussed and put to the vote without the possibility of making any alteration in it; and if the circumstances of the case required a more speedy decision, the question should not be decided by a simple majority, but by a majority of at least two thirds of each house.’’

Public Officers Under the Control of the American Democracy. Simple exterior of American public officers---No official costume---All public officers are remunerated---

Political consequences of this system---No public career exists in America---Results of this fact. PUBLIC officers in the United States are not separate from the mass of citizens; they have neither palaces nor guards nor ceremonial costumes. This simple exterior of persons in authority is connected not only with the peculiarities of the American character, but with the fundamental principles of society. In the estimation of the democracy a government is not a benefit, but a necessary evil. A certain degree of power must be granted to public officers, for they would be of no use without it. But the ostensible semblance of authority is by no means indispensable to the conduct of affairs, and it is needlessly offensive to the susceptibility of the public. The public officers themselves are well aware that the superiority over their fellow citizens which they derive from their authority they enjoy only on condition of putting themselves on a level with the whole community by their manners. A public officer in the United States is uniformly simple in his manners, accessible to all the world, attentive to all requests, and obliging in his replies. I was pleased by these characteristics of a democratic government; I admired the manly independence that respects the office more than the officer and thinks less of the emblems of authority than of the man who bears them. I believe that the influence which costumes really exercise in an age like that in which we live has been a good deal exaggerated. I never perceived that a public officer in America, while in the discharge of his duties, was the less respected because his own merit was set off by no adventitious signs. On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether a peculiar dress induces public men to respect themselves when they are not otherwise inclined to do so. When a magistrate snubs the parties before him, or indulges his wit at their expense, or shrugs his shoulders at their pleas of defense, or smiles complacently as the charges are enumerated (and in France such instances are not rare), I should like to deprive him of his robes of office, to see whether, when he is reduced to the garb of a private citizen, he would not recall some portion of the natural dignity of mankind. No public officer in the United States has an official costume, but every one of them receives a salary. And this, also, still more naturally than what precedes, results from democratic principles. A democracy may allow some magisterial pomp and clothe its officers in silks and gold without seriously compromising its principles. Privileges of this kind are transitory; they belong to the place and not to the man. But if public officers are unpaid, a class of rich and independent public functionaries will be created who will constitute the basis

2.4 Frederick Jackson Turner, Significance of the Frontier in American History 41 of an aristocracy; and if the people still retain their right of election, the choice can be made only from a certain class of citizens. When a democratic republic requires salaried officials to serve without pay, it may safely be inferred that the state is advancing towards monarchy. And when a monarchy begins to remunerate such officers as had hitherto been unpaid, it is a sure sign that it is approaching a despotic or a republican form of government. The substitution of paid for unpaid functionaries is of itself, in my opinion, sufficient to constitute a real revolution. I look upon the entire absence of unpaid offices in America as one of the most prominent signs of the absolute dominion which democracy exercises in that country. All public services, of whatever nature they may be, are paid; so that everyone has not merely a right, but also the means of performing them. Although in democratic states all the citizens are qualified to hold offices, all are not tempted to try for them. The number and the capacities of the candidates more than the conditions of the candidateship restrict the choice of the electors. In nations where the principle of election extends to everything no political career can, properly speaking, be said to exist. Men arrive as if by chance at the post which they hold, and they are by no means sure of retaining it. This is especially true when the elections are held annually. The consequence is that in tranquil times public functions offer but few lures to ambition. In the United States those who engage in the perplexities of political life are persons of very moderate pretensions. The pursuit of wealth generally diverts men of great talents and strong passions from the pursuit of power; and it frequently happens that a man does not undertake to direct the fortunes of the state until he has shown himself incompetent to conduct his own. The vast number of very ordinary men who occupy public stations is quite as attributable to these causes as to the bad choice of democracy. In the United States I am not sure that the people would choose men of superior abilities even if they wished.

2.4 Frederick Jackson Turner, Significance of the Frontier in American History, 1893 . . . The peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people---to the changes

involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. Said Calhoun in 1817, ‘‘We are great, and rapidly---I was about to say fearfully---growing!’’ So saying, he touched the distinguishing feature of American life. All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, however, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labor, up to manufacturing civilization. But we have in addition to this a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, which is made so exclusive an object of attention by writers like Professor von Holst, occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion. In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave---the meeting point between savagery and civilization. Much has been written about the frontier from the point of view of border warfare and the chase, but as a field for the serious study of the economist and the historian it has been neglected . . . From decade to decade distinct advances of the frontier occurred. By the census of 1820 the settled area included Ohio, southern Indiana and Illinois, southeastern Missouri, and about one-half of Louisiana. This settled area had surrounded Indian areas, and the management of these tribes became an object of political concern. The frontier region of the time lay along the Great Lakes, where Astor’s American Fur Company operated in the Indian trade, and beyond the Mississippi, where Indian traders extended their activity even

42 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period to the Rocky Mountains; Florida also furnished frontier conditions. The Mississippi River region was the scene of typical frontier settlements. The rising steam navigation on western waters, the opening of the Erie Canal, and the westward extension of cotton culture added five frontier states to the Union in this period. Grund, writing in 1836, declares: ‘‘It appears then that the universal disposition of Americans to emigrate to the western wilderness, in order to enlarge their dominion over inanimate nature, is the actual result of an expansive power which is inherent in them, and which by continually agitating all classes of society is constantly throwing a large portion of the whole population on the extreme confines of the State, in order to gain space for its development . . .’’ In the middle of this century the line indicated by the present eastern boundary of Indian Territory, Nebraska, and Kansas marked the frontier of the Indian country. Minnesota and Wisconsin still exhibited frontier conditions, but the distinctive frontier of the period is found in California, where the gold discoveries had sent a sudden tide of adventurous miners, and in Oregon, and the settlements in Utah. As the frontier had leaped over the Alleghanies, so now it skipped the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains; and in the same way that the advance of the frontiersmen beyond the Alleghanies had caused the rise of important questions of transportation and internal improvement, so now the settlers beyond the Rocky Mountains needed means of communication with the East, and in the furnishing of these arose the settlement of the Great Plains and the development of still another kind of frontier life. Railroads, fostered by land grants, sent an increasing tide of immigrants into the Far West. The United States Army fought a series of Indian wars in Minnesota, Dakota, and the Indian Territory. By 1880 the settled area had been pushed into northern Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, along Dakota rivers, and in the Black Hills region, and was ascending the rivers of Kansas and Nebraska. The development of mines in Colorado had drawn isolated frontier settlements into that region, and Montana and Idaho were receiving settlers. The frontier was found in these mining camps and the ranches of the Great Plains . . . In these successive frontiers we find natural boundary lines which have served to mark and to affect the characteristics of the frontiers, namely: the ‘‘fall line;’’ the Alleghany Mountains; the Mississippi; the Missouri where its direction approximates north and south; the line of the arid lands, approximately the ninety-ninth meridian; and the Rocky Mountains. The fall line marked the frontier of the seventeenth century; the

Alleghanies that of the eighteenth; the Mississippi that of the first quarter of the nineteenth; the Missouri that of the middle of this century (omitting the California movement); and the belt of the Rocky Mountains and the arid tract, the present frontier. Each was won by a series of Indian wars . . . The effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in our history is important. From the close of the seventeenth century various intercolonial congresses have been called to treat with Indians and establish common measures of defense. Particularism was strongest in colonies with no Indian frontier. This frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union. The Indian was a common danger, demanding united action. Most celebrated of these conferences was the Albany congress of 1754, called to treat with the Six Nations, and to consider plans of union. Even a cursory reading of the plan proposed by the congress reveals the importance of the frontier. The powers of the general council and the officers were, chiefly, the determination of peace and war with the Indians, the regulation of Indian trade, the purchase of Indian lands, and the creation and government of new settlements as a security against the Indians. It is evident that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated by the previous co€ operation in the regulation of the frontier. In this connection may be mentioned the importance of the frontier, from that day to this, as a military training school, keeping alive the power of resistance to aggression, and developing the stalwart and rugged qualities of the frontiersman . . . From the time the mountains rose between the pioneer and the seaboard, a new order of Americanism arose. The West and the East began to get out of touch of each other. The settlements from the sea to the mountains kept connection with the rear and had a certain solidarity. But the over-mountain men grew more and more independent. The East took a narrow view of American advance, and nearly lost these men. Kentucky and Tennessee history bears abundant witness to the truth of this statement. The East began to try to hedge and limit westward expansion. Though Webster could declare that there were no Alleghanies in his politics, yet in politics in general they were a very solid factor. The exploitation of the beasts took hunter and trader to the west, the exploitation of the grasses took the rancher west, and the exploitation of the virgin soil of the river valleys and prairies attracted the farmer. Good soils have been the most continuous attraction to the farmer’s frontier. The land hunger of the Virginians drew them down the rivers into Carolina, in early colonial days; the search for soils took the Massachusetts

2.4 Frederick Jackson Turner, Significance of the Frontier in American History 43 men to Pennsylvania and to New York. As the eastern lands were taken up migration flowed across them to the west. Daniel Boone, the great backwoodsman, who combined the occupations of hunter, trader, cattleraiser, farmer, and surveyor-learning, probably from the traders, of the fertility of the lands of the upper Yadkin, where the traders were wont to rest as they took their way to the Indians, left his Pennsylvania home with his father, and passed down the Great Valley road to that stream. Learning from a trader of the game and rich pastures of Kentucky, he pioneered the way for the farmers to that region. Thence he passed to the frontier of Missouri, where his settlement was long a landmark on the frontier. Here again he helped to open the way for civilization, finding salt licks, and trails, and land. His son was among the earliest trappers in the passes of the Rocky Mountains, and his party are said to have been the first to camp on the present site of Denver. His grandson, Col. A. J. Boone, of Colorado, was a power among the Indians of the Rocky Mountains, and was appointed an agent by the government. Kit Carson’s mother was a Boone. Thus this family epitomizes the backwoodsman’s advance across the continent. The farmer’s advance came in a distinct series of waves. In Peck’s New Guide to the West, published in Boston in 1837, occurs this suggestive passage: Generally, in all the western settlements, three classes, like the waves of the ocean, have rolled one after the other. First comes the pioneer, who depends for the subsistence of his family chiefly upon the natural growth of vegetation, called the ‘‘range,’’ and the proceeds of hunting. His implements of agriculture are rude, chiefly of his own make, and his efforts directed mainly to a crop of corn and a ‘‘truck patch.’’ The last is a rude garden for growing cabbage, beans, corn for roasting ears, cucumbers, and potatoes. A log cabin, and, occasionally, a stable and corn-crib, and a field of a dozen acres, the timber girdled or ‘‘deadened,’’ and fenced, are enough for his occupancy. It is quite immaterial whether he ever becomes the owner of the soil. He is the occupant for the time being, pays no rent, and feels as independent as the ‘‘lord of the manor.’’ With a horse, cow, and one or two breeders of swine, he strikes into the woods with his family, and becomes the founder of a new county, or perhaps state. He builds his cabin, gathers around him a few other families of similar tastes and habits, and occupies till the range is somewhat subdued, and hunting a little precarious, or, which is more frequently the case, till the neighbors crowd around, roads, bridges, and fields annoy him, and he lacks elbow room. The pre€emption law enables him to dispose of his cabin and cornfield

to the next class of emigrants; and, to employ his own figures, he ‘‘breaks for the high timber,’’ ‘‘clears out for the New Purchase,’’ or migrates to Arkansas or Texas, to work the same process over. The next class of emigrants purchase the lands, add field to field, clear out the roads, throw rough bridges over the streams, put up hewn log houses with glass windows and brick or stone chimneys, occasionally plant orchards, build mills, school-houses, courthouses, etc., and exhibit the picture and forms of plain, frugal, civilized life. Another wave rolls on. The men of capital and enterprise come. The settler is ready to sell out and take the advantage of the rise in property, push farther into the interior and become, himself, a man of capital and enterprise in turn. The small village rises to a spacious town or city; substantial edifices of brick, extensive fields, orchards, gardens, colleges, and churches are seen. Broad-cloths, silks, leghorns, crepes, and all the refinements, luxuries, elegancies, frivolities, and fashions are in vogue. Thus wave after wave is rolling westward; the real Eldorado is still farther on . . . Thus the demand for land and the love of wilderness freedom drew the frontier ever onward . . . The public domain has been a force of profound importance in the nationalization and development of the government. The effects of the struggle of the landed and the landless States, and of the Ordinance of 1787, need no discussion. Administratively the frontier called out some of the highest and most vitalizing activities of the general government. The purchase of Louisiana was perhaps the constitutional turning point in the history of the Republic, inasmuch as it afforded both a new area for national legislation and the occasion of the downfall of the policy of strict construction. But the purchase of Louisiana was called out by frontier needs and demands. As frontier States accrued to the Union the national power grew In a speech on the dedication of the Calhoun monument Mr. Lamar explained: ‘‘In 1789 the States were the creators of the Federal Government; in 1861 the Federal Government was the creator of a large majority of the States.’’ When we consider the public domain from the point of view of the sale and disposal of the public lands we are again brought face to face with the frontier. The policy of the United States in dealing with its lands is in sharp contrast with the European system of scientific administration. Efforts to make this domain a source of revenue, and to withhold it from emigrants in order that settlement might be compact, were in vain. The jealousy and the fears of the East were powerless in the face of the demands of the frontiersmen . . .

44 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period But the most important effect of the frontier has been in the promotion of democracy here and in Europe. As has been indicated, the frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression. Prof. Osgood, in an able article, has pointed out that the frontier conditions prevalent in the colonies are important factors in the explanation of the American Revolution, where individual liberty was sometimes confused with absence of all effective government. The same conditions aid in explaining the difficulty of instituting a strong government in the period of the confederacy. The frontier individualism has from the beginning promoted democracy. The frontier States that came into the Union in the first quarter of a century of its existence came in with democratic suffrage provisions, and had reactive effects of the highest importance upon the older States whose peoples were being attracted there. An extension of the franchise became essential. It was western New York that forced an extension of suffrage in the constitutional convention of that State in 1821; and it was western Virginia that compelled the tide-water region to put a more liberal suffrage provision in the constitution framed in 1830, and to give to the frontier region a more nearly proportionate representation with the tide-water aristocracy. The rise of democracy as an effective force in the nation came in with western preponderance under Jackson and William Henry Harrison, and it meant the triumph of the frontier---with all of its good and with all of its evil elements. An interesting illustration of the tone of frontier democracy in 1830 comes from the same debates in the Virginia convention already referred to. A representative from western Virginia declared: But, sir, it is not the increase of population in the West which this gentleman ought to fear. It is the energy which the mountain breeze and western habits impart to those emigrants. They are regenerated, politically I mean, sir. They soon become working politicians, and the difference, sir, between a talking and a working politician is immense. . . . So long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power secures political power. But the democracy born of free land, strong in selfishness and individualism, intolerant of administrative experience and education, and pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds, has its dangers as well as its benefits. Individualism in America has allowed a laxity in regard to governmental affairs

which has rendered possible the spoils system and all the manifest evils that follow from the lack of a highly developed civic spirit. In this connection may be noted also the influence of frontier conditions in permitting lax business honor, inflated paper currency and wildcat banking . . . Thus each one of the periods of lax financial integrity coincides with periods when a new set of frontier communities had arisen, and coincides in area with these successive frontiers for the most part. The recent Populist agitation is a case in point. Many a State that now declines any connection with the tenets of the Populists, itself adhered to such ideas in an earlier stage of the development of the State. A primitive society can hardly be expected to show the intelligent appreciation of the complexity of business interests in a developed society. The continual recurrence of these areas of paper-money agitation is another evidence that the frontier can be isolated and studied as a factor in American history of the highest importance . . . From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom-these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier. Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for opportunity, and the people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which has not only been open but has even been forced upon them. He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise. But never again will such gifts of free land offer themselves. For a moment, at the frontier, the bonds of custom are broken and unrestraint is triumphant. There is not tabula rasa. The stubborn American environment is there with its imperious summons

2.5 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States 45 to accept its conditions; the inherited ways of doing things are also there; and yet, in spite of environment, and in spite of custom, each frontier did indeed furnish a new field of opportunity, a gate of escape from the bondage of the past; and freshness, and confidence, and scorn of older society, impatience of its restraints and its ideas, and indifference to its lessons, have accompanied the frontier . . .

2.5 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States, July 10, 1832 Veto Message, Washington, D.C. To the Senate. The bill ‘‘to modify and continue’’ the act entitled ‘‘An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States’’ was presented to me on the 4th July instant. Having considered it with that solemn regard to the principles of the Constitution which the day was calculated to inspire, and come to the conclusion that it ought not to become a law, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with my objections. A bank of the United States is in many respects convenient for the Government and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty at an early period of my Administration to call the attention of Congress to the practicability of organizing an institution combining all its advantages and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that in the act before me I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the Constitution of our country.. . . It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the Government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the original contract. If we must have such a corporation, why should not the Government sell out the whole stock and thus secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted? Why should not Congress create and sell twenty-eight millions of stock, incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act and putting the premium upon the sales into the Treasury?

But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be predicated on the erroneous idea that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right not only to the favor but to the bounty of Government. It appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners and the residue is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth. This seems the less excusable because some of our citizens not now stockholders petitioned that the door of competition might be opened, and offered to take a charter on terms much more favorable to the Government and country. But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to all the private stock in the existing bank, has been set aside, and the bounty of our Government is proposed to be again bestowed on the few who have been fortunate enough to secure the stock and at this moment wield the power of the existing institution. I can not perceive the justice or policy of this course. If our Government must sell monopolies, it would seem to be its duty to take nothing less than their full value, and if gratuities must be made once in fifteen or twenty years let them not be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government nor upon a designated and favored class of men in our own country. It is but justice and good policy, as far as the nature of the case will admit, to confine our favors to our own fellow-citizens, and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to profit by our bounty. In the bearings of the act before me upon these points I find ample reasons why it should not become a law. It has been urged as an argument in favor of rechartering the present bank that the calling in its loans will produce great embarrassment and distress. The time allowed to close its concerns is ample, and if it has been well managed its pressure will be light, and heavy only in case its management has been bad. If, therefore, it shall produce distress, the fault will be its own, and it would furnish a reason against renewing a power which has been so obviously abused. But will there ever be a time when this reason will be less powerful? To acknowledge its force is to admit that the bank ought to be perpetual, and as a consequence the present stockholders and those inheriting their rights as successors be established a privileged order, clothed both with great political power and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connection with the Government. The modifications of the existing charter proposed by this act are not such, in my view, as make it

46 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period consistent with the rights of the States or the liberties of the people. The qualification of the right of the bank to hold real estate, the limitation of its power to establish branches, and the power reserved to Congress to forbid the circulation of small notes are restrictions comparatively of little value or importance. All the objectionable principles of the existing corporation, and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation.. . . It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society-the farmers, mechanics, and laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and unnecessary departure from these just principles. Nor is our Government to be maintained or our Union preserved by invasions of the rights and powers of the several States. In thus attempting to make our General Government strong we make it weak. Its true strength consists in leaving individuals and States as much as possible to themselves-in making itself felt, not in its power, but in its beneficence; not in its control, but in its protection; not in binding the States more closely to the center, but leaving each to move unobstructed in its proper orbit. Experience should teach us wisdom. Most of the difficulties our Government now encounters and most of the dangers which impend over our Union have sprung from an abandonment of the legitimate objects of Government by our national legislation, and the adoption of such principles as are embodied in this act. Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed section against section, interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake

the foundations of our Union. It is time to pause in our career to review our principles, and if possible revive that devoted patriotism and spirit of compromise which distinguished the sages of the Revolution and the fathers of our Union. If we can not at once, in justice to interests vested under improvident legislation, make our Government what it ought to be, we can at least take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many, and in favor of compromise and gradual reform in our code of laws and system of political economy. I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace. In the difficulties which surround us and the dangers which threaten our institutions there is cause for neither dismay nor alarm. For relief and deliverance let us firmly rely on that kind Providence which I am sure watches with peculiar care over the destinies of our Republic, and on the intelligence and wisdom of our countrymen. Through His abundant goodness and heir patriotic devotion our liberty and Union will be preserved. ANDREW JACKSON.

2.6 Henry Clay, Speech on President Jackson’s Veto of the Bank Bill in Senate, July 10, 1832 . . . A bill to re-charter the bank has recently passed Congress after much deliberation. In this body, we know that there are members enough who entertain no constitutional scruples, to make, with the vote by which the bill was passed, a majority of two thirds. In the House of Representatives, also, it is believed, there is a like majority in favor of the bill. Notwithstanding this state of things, the president has rejected the bill, and transmitted to the Senate an elaborate message, communicating at large his objections. The Constitution requires that we should reconsider the bill, and that the question of its passage, the president’s objections notwithstanding, shall be taken by ayes and noes. Respect to him, as well as the injunctions of the Constitution, require that we should deliberately examine his reasons, and reconsider the question. The veto is an extraordinary power, which, though tolerated by the Constitution, was not expected, by the convention, to be used in ordinary cases. It was

2.6 Henry Clay, Speech on President Jackson’s Veto of the Bank Bill in Senate designed for instances of precipitate legislation, in unguarded moments. Thus restricted, and it has been thus restricted by all former presidents, it might not be mischievous. During Mr. Madison’s administration of eight years, there occurred but two or three cases of its exercise. During the last administration, I do not now recollect that it was once. In a period little upward of three years, the present chief magistrate has employed the veto four times. We now hear quite frequently, in the progress of measures through Congress, the statement that the president will veto them, urged as an objection to their passage. The veto is hardly reconcilable with the genius of representative government. It is totally irreconcilable with it, if it is to be frequently employed in respect to the expediency of measures, as well as their constitutionality. It is a feature of our government, borrowed from a prerogative of the British king. And it is remarkable, that in England it has grown obsolete, not having been used for upward of a century. At the commencement of the French Revolution, in discussing the principles of their Constitution, in national convention, the veto held a conspicuous figure. The gay, laughing population of Paris, bestowed on the king the appellation of Monsieur Veto, and on the queen, that of Madame Veto. The convention finally decreed, that if a measure rejected by the king, should obtain the sanction of two concurring legislatures, it should be a law, notwithstanding the veto. In the Constitution of Kentucky, and perhaps in some other of the State Constitutions, it is provided that if, after the rejection of a bill by the governor, it shall be passed by a majority of all the members elected to both Houses, it shall become a law, notwithstanding the governor’s objections. As a coordinate branch of the government, the chief magistrate has great weight. If, after a respectful consideration of his objections urged against a bill, a majority of all the members elected to the Legislature, shall still pass it, notwithstanding his official influence, and the force of his reasons, ought it not to become a law! Ought the opinion of one man to overrule that of a legislative body, twice deliberately expressed! It can not be imagined that the Convention contemplated the application of the veto, to a question which has been so long, so often, and so thoroughly scrutinized, as that of the bank of the United States, by every departments of the government, in almost every stage of its existence, and by the people, and by the State legislatures. Of all the controverted questions which have sprung up under our government, not one has been so fully investigated as that of its power to establish a bank of the United States . . .

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Mr. Madison, himself opposed to the first bank of the United States, yielded his own convictions to those of the nation, and all the department of the government thus often expressed. Subsequently to this true but strong statement of the case, the present bank of the United States was established, and numerous other acts, of all the departments of government manifesting their settled sense of the power, have been added to those which existed prior to the date of Mr. Madison’s message. No question has been more generally discussed, within the last two years, by the people at large, and in State Legislatures, than that of the bank. And this consideration of it has been prompted by the president himself. In the first message to Congress (in December, 1829) he brought the subject to the view of that body and the nation, and expressly declared, that it could not, for the interest of all concerned, be ‘‘too soon’’ settled. In each of his subsequent annual messages, in 1830, and 1831, he again invited the attention of Congress to the subject. Thus, after an interval of two years, and after the intervention of the election of a new Congress, the president deliberately renews the chartering of the bank of the United States. And yet his friends now declare the agitation of the question to be premature! It was not premature, in 1829, to present the question, but it is premature in 1832 to consider and decide it . . . The friends of the president, who have been for nearly three years agitating this question, now turn round upon their opponents, who have supposed the president quite serious and in earnest, in presenting it for public consideration, and charge them with prematurely agitating it. And that for electioneering purposes! The other side understands perfectly, the policy of preferring an unjust charge, in order to avoid a wellfounded accusation. If there be an electioneering motive in the matter, who have been actuated by it! those who have taken the president at his word, and deliberated on a measure which he has repeatedly recommended to their consideration! or those who have resorted to all sorts of means to elude the question---by alternately coaxing and threatening the bank; by an extraordinary investigation into the administration of the bank; and by every species of postponement and procrastination, during the progress of the bill. Notwithstanding all the dilatory expedients, a majority of Congress, prompted by the will and the best interests of the nation, passed the bill . . . The power to establish a bank is deduced from that clause of the Constitution which confers on Congress all powers necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers. In 1811, I believed a bank of the United States not necessary, and that a safe reliance

48 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period might be placed on the local banks, in the administration of the fiscal affairs of the government. The war taught us many lessons, and among others demonstrated the necessity of the bank of the United States, to the successful operations of the government . . . The interest which foreigners hold in the existing bank of the United States, is dwelt upon in the message as a serious objection to the recharter. But this interest is the result of the assignable nature of the stock; and if the objection be well founded, it applies to government stock, to the stock in local banks, in canal and other companies, created for internal improvements, and every species of money or movables in which foreigners may acquire an interest. The assignable character of the stock is a quality conferred not for the benefit of foreigners, but for that of our own citizens. And the fact of its being transferred to them is the effect of the balance of trade being against us---an evil, if it be one, which the American system will correct. All governments wanting capital resort to foreign nations possessing it in superabundance, to obtain it. Sometimes the resort is even made by one to another belligerent nation. During our revolutionary war we obtained foreign capital (Dutch and French) to aid us. During the late war American stock was sent to Europe to sell; and if I am not misinformed, to Liverpool. The question does not depend upon the place whence the capital is obtained, but the advantageous use of it. The confidence of foreigners in our stocks is a proof of the solidity of our credit. Foreigners have no voice in the administration of this bank; and if they buy its stock, they are obliged to submit to citizens of the United States to manage it. The senator from Tennessee (Mr. White), asks what would have been the condition of this country if, during the late war, this bank had existed, with such an interest in it as foreigners now hold? I will tell him. We should have avoided many of the disasters of that war, perhaps those of Detroit and at this place. The government would have possessed ample means for its vigorous prosecution; and the interest of foreigners, British subjects especially, would have operated upon them, not upon us. Will it not be a serious evil to be obliged to remit in specie to foreigners the eight millions which they now have in this bank, instead of retaining that capital within the country to stimulate its industry and enterprise? The president assigns in his message a conspicuous place to the alleged injurious operation of the bank on the interests of the western people. They ought to be much indebted to him for his kindness manifested toward them; although I think they have much reason to deprecate it. The people of all the West owe to this

bank about thirty millions, which have been borrowed from it; and the president thinks that the payments for the interest, and other facilities which they derive from the operation of the bank, are so onerous as to produce ‘‘a drain of their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and occasional distress.’’ His remedy is to compel them to pay the whole of the debt which they have contracted in a period short of four years. Now, Mr. President, if they can not pay the interest without distress, how are they to pay the principal? If they can not pay a part, how are they to pay the whole? Whether the payment of interest be or be not a burden to them, is a question for themselves to decide, respecting which they might be disposed to dispense with the kindness of the president. If, instead of borrowing thirty millions from the bank, they had borrowed a like sum from a Girard, John Jacob Astor, or any other banker, what would they think of one who would come to them and say, ‘‘Gentlemen of the West, it will ruin you to pay the interest on that debt, and therefore I will oblige you to pay the whole of the principal in less than four years.’’ Would they not reply, ‘‘We know what we are about; mind your own business; we are satisfied that in ours we can make not only the interest on what we loan, but a fair profit besides.’’ A great mistake exists about the western operation of the bank. It is not the bank, but the business, the commerce of the West, and the operations of government, that occasion the transfer, annually, of money from the West to the Atlantic States. What is the actual course of things? The business and commerce of the West are carried on with New Orleans, and the southern, and southwestern States, and with the Atlantic cities. We transport our dead or inanimate produce to New Orleans, with receive in return checks or drafts of the bank of the United States at a premium of a half per centum. We send by our drovers our livestock to the South and South-west, and receive similar checks in return. With these drafts or checks our merchants proceed to the Atlantic cities, and purchase domestic or foreign goods for western consumption. The lead and fur trade of Missouri and Illinois is also carried on principally through the bank of the United States. The government also transfers to places where it is wanted, through that bank, the sums accumulated at the different land-offices, for purchases of the public lands. Now all these varied operations must go on; all these remittances must be made, bank of the United States or no bank. The bank does not create, but facilitate them. The bank is a mere vehicle; just as much so as the steamboat is the vehicle which transports our produce to the great mart of New Orleans, and not the grower

2.6 Henry Clay, Speech on President Jackson’s Veto of the Bank Bill in Senate of that produce. It is to confound cause and effect, to attribute to the bank the transfer of money from the West to the East. Annihilate the bank to-morrow, and similar transfers of capital, the same description of pecuniary operations, must be continued; not so well, it is true, but performed they must be, ill or well, under any state of circumstances . . . The president tells us, that if the executive had been called upon to furnish the project of a bank, the duty would have been cheerfully performed; and he states that a bank, competent to all the duties which may be required by the government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our own delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the States. The president is a co-ordinate branch of the legislative department. As such, bills which have passed both Houses of Congress are presented to him for his approval or rejection. The idea of going to the president for the project of a law, is totally new in the practice, and utterly contrary to the theory of the government . . . Must all legislation, in its commencement and in its termination concentrate in the president? When we shall have reached that state of things, the election and annual session of Congress will be a useless charge upon the people, and the whole business of government may be economically conducted by ukases and decrees. Congress does sometimes receive the suggestions, and opinions of the heads of departments, as to new laws. And, at the commencement of this session, in his annual report, the Secretary of the Treasury stated his reasons at large, not merely in favor of a bank, but in support of the renewal of the charter of the existing bank. Who could have believed that the responsible officer was communicating to Congress opinions directly adverse to those entertained by the president himself? When before has it happened, that the head of a department recommended the passage of a law which, being accordingly passed and presented to the president, is subjected to his veto? What sort of a bank it is, with a project of which the president would have deigned to furnish Congress, if they had applied to him, he has not stated. In the absence of such statement, we can only conjecture that it is his famous treasury bank, formerly recommended by him, from which the people have recoiled with the instinctive horror excited by the approach of the cholera. The message states, that ‘‘an investigation unwillingly conceded, and so restricted in time as necessarily to make it incomplete and unsatisfactory, discloses enough to excite suspicion and alarm.’’ As there is no prospect of the passage of this bill, the president’s objections notwithstanding, by a constitutional majority of two thirds, it can never reach the House of

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Representatives. The members of that House, and especially its distinguished chairman of the committee of ways and means, who reported the bill, are, therefore, cut off from all opportunity of defending themselves. Under these circumstances, allow me to ask how the president has ascertained that the investigation was unwillingly conceded? I have understood directly the contrary; and that the chairman, already referred to, as well as other members in favor of the renewal of the charter, promptly consented to and voted for the investigation. And we all know that those in support of the renewal could have prevented the investigation, and that they did not. But suspicion and alarm have been excited! SUSPICION AND ALARM! Against whom is this suspicion? The House, or the bank, or both? Mr. President, I protest against the right of any chief magistrate to come into either House of Congress, and scrutinize the motives of its members; to examine whether a measure has been passed with promptitude or repugnance; and to pronounce upon the willingness or unwillingness with which it has been adopted or rejected. It is an interference in concerns which partake of a domestic nature. The official and constitutional relations between the president and the two Houses of Congress subsist with them as organized bodies. His action is confined to their consummated proceedings, and does not extend to measures in their incipient stages, during their progress through the Houses, nor to the motives by which they are actuated. There are some parts of this message that ought to excite deep alarm; and that especially in which the president announces, that each public officer may interpret the Constitution as he pleases. His language is, ‘‘Each public officer, who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.’’ * * * ‘‘The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges; and on that point the president is independent of both.’’ Now, Mr. President, I conceive, with great deference, that the president has mistaken the purport of the oath to support the Constitution of the United States. No one swears to support it as he understands it, but to support it simply as it is in truth. All men are bound to obey the laws, of which the Constitution is the supreme; but must they obey them as they are, or as they understand them? If the obligation of obedience is limited and controlled by the measure of information; in other words, if the party is bound to obey the Constitution only as he understands it; what would be the consequence? The judge of an inferior court would disobey the mandate of a superior tribunal, because it was not in

50 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period conformity to the Constitution, as he understands it; a custom-house officer would disobey a circular from the Treasury department, because contrary to the Constitution, as he understands it; an American minister would disregard an instruction from the president, communicated from the Department of State, because not agreeable to the Constitution, as he understands it; and a subordinate officer in the army or navy, would violate the orders of his superior, because they were not in accordance with the Constitution, as he understands it. We should have nothing settled, nothing stable, nothing fixed. There would be general disorder and confusion throughout every branch of administration, from the highest to the lowest officers---universal nullification. For what is the doctrine of the president but that of South Carolina applied throughout the Union? The president independent both of Congress and the Supreme Court! only bound to execute the laws of the one and the decisions of the other, as far as they conform to the Constitution of the United States, as far as he understands it! Then it should be the duty of every president, on his installation into office, to carefully examine all the acts in the statute book, approved by his predecessors, and mark out those which he was resolved not to execute, and to which he meant to apply this new species of veto, because they were repugnant to the Constitution as he understands it. And, after the expiration of every term of the Supreme Court, he should send for the record of its decisions, and discriminate between those which he would, and those which he would not, execute, because they were or were not agreeable to the Constitution, as he understands it. There is another constitutional doctrine contained in the message, which is entirely new to me. It asserts that ‘‘the government of the United States have no constitutional power to purchase lands within the States,’’ except ‘‘for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;’’ and even for these objects, only ‘‘by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be.’’ Now sir, I had supposed that the right of Congress to purchase lands in any State was incontestable; and in point of fact, it probably at this moment owns land in every State of the Union, purchased for taxes, or as a judgment or mortgage creditor. And there are various acts of Congress which regulate the purchase and transfer of such lands. The advisers of the president have confounded the faculty of purchasing lands with the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction, which is restricted by the Constitution to the forts and other buildings described. The message presents some striking instances of discrepancy. First, it contests the right to establish one

bank, and objects to the bill that it limits and restrains the power of Congress to establish several. Second, it urges that the bill does not recognize the power of State taxation generally; and complains that facilities are afforded to the exercise of that power in respect to the stock held by individuals. Third, it objects that any bonus is taken, and insists that not enough is demanded. And fourth, it complains that foreigners have too much influence, and that stock transferred loses the privilege of representation in the elections of the bank, which, if it were retained, would give them more. Mr. President, we are about to close one of the longest and most arduous sessions of Congress under the present Constitution; and when we return among our constituents, what account of the operations of their government shall we be bound to communicate? We shall be compelled to say, that the Supreme Court is paralyzed, and the missionaries retained in prison in contempt of its authority, and in defiance of numerous treaties and laws of the United States; that the executive, through the Secretary of Treasury, sent to Congress a tariff bill which would have destroyed numerous branches of our domestic industry, and to the final destruction of all; that the veto has been applied to the bank of the United States, our only reliance for a sound and uniform currency; that the Senate has been violently attacked for the exercise of a clear constitutional power; that the House of Representatives have been unnecessarily assailed; and that the president has promulgated a rule of action for those who have taken the oath to support the Constitution of the United States, that must, if there be practical conformity to it, introduce general nullification, and end in the absolute subversion of the government.

2.7 Andrew Jackson, Second Annual Message, 1834 It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress that the benevolent policy of the Government, steadily pursued for nearly thirty years, in relation to the removal of the Indians beyond the white settlements is approaching to a happy consummation. Two important tribes have accepted the provision made for their removal at the last session of Congress, and it is believed that their example will induce the remaining tribes also to seek the same obvious advantages. The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the United States, to individual States, and to the Indians themselves. The pecuniary advantages

2.8 Chief John Ross, Cherokee Letter Protesting the Treaty of New Echota 51 which it promises to the Government are the least of its recommendations. It puts an end to all possible danger of collision between the authorities of the General and State Governments on account of the Indians. It will place a dense and civilized population in large tracts of country now occupied by a few savage hunters. By opening the whole territory between Tennessee on the north and Louisiana on the south to the settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the southwestern frontier and render the adjacent States strong enough to repel future invasions without remote aid. It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi and the western part of Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power. It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization and religion? The present policy of the Government is but a continuation of the same progressive change by a milder process. The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or have melted away to make room for the whites. The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward, and we now propose to acquire the countries occupied by the red men of the South and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense of the United States, to send them to land where their existence may be prolonged and perhaps made perpetual. Doubtless it will be painful to leave the graves of their fathers; but what do they more than our ancestors did or than our children are now doing? To better their condition in an unknown land our forefathers left all that was dear in earthly objects. Our children by thousands yearly leave the land of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions. Does Humanity weep at these painful separations from everything, animate and inanimate, with which the young heart has become entwined? Far from it. It is rather a source of joy that our country affords

scope where our young population may range unconstrained in body or in mind, developing the power and facilities of man in their highest perfection. These remove hundreds and almost thousands of miles at their own expense, purchase the lands they occupy, and support themselves at their new homes from the moment of their arrival. Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events which it can not control, the Indian is made discontented in his ancient home to purchase his lands, to give him a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of his removal, and support him a year in his new abode? How many thousands of our own people would gladly embrace the opportunity of removing to the West on such conditions! If the offers made to the Indians were extended to them, they would be hailed with gratitude and joy. And is it supposed that the wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, civilized Christian? Is it more afflicting to him to leave the graves of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children? Rightly considered, the policy of the General Government toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous. He is unwilling to submit to the laws of the States and mingle with their population. To save him from this alternative, or perhaps utter annihilation, the General Government kindly offers him a new home, and proposes to pay the whole expense of his removal and settlement.

2.8 Chief John Ross, Cherokee Letter Protesting the Treaty of New Echota, September 28, 1836 Red Clay Council Ground, Cherokee Nation To the Senate and House of Representatives: It is well known that for a number of years past we have been harassed by a series of vexations, which it is deemed unnecessary to recite in detail, but the evidence of which our delegation will be prepared to furnish. With a view to bringing our troubles to a close, a delegation was appointed on the 23rd of October, 1835, by the General Council of the nation, clothed with full powers to enter into arrangements with the Government of the United States, for the final adjustment of all our existing difficulties. The delegation failing to effect an arrangement with the United States commissioner, then in the nation, proceeded, agreeably to their instructions in that case, to Washington City, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with the authorities of the United States.

52 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period After the departure of the Delegation, a contract was made by the Rev. John F. Schermerhorn, and certain individual Cherokees, purporting to be a ‘‘treaty, concluded at New Echota, in the State of Georgia, on the 29th day of December, 1835, by General William Carroll and John F. Schermerhorn, commissioners on the part of the United States, and the chiefs, headmen, and people of the Cherokee tribes of Indians.’’ A spurious Delegation, in violation of a special injunction of the general council of the nation, proceeded to Washington City with this pretended treaty, and by false and fraudulent representations supplanted in the favor of the Government the legal and accredited Delegation of the Cherokee people, and obtained for this instrument, after making important alterations in its provisions, the recognition of the United States Government. And now it is presented to us as a treaty, ratified by the Senate, and approved by the President [Andrew Jackson], and our acquiescence in its requirements demanded, under the sanction of the displeasure of the United States, and the threat of summary compulsion, in case of refusal. It comes to us, not through our legitimate authorities, the known and usual medium of communication between the Government of the United States and our nation, but through the agency of a complication of powers, civil and military. By the stipulations of this instrument, we are despoiled of our private possessions, the indefeasible property of individuals. We are stripped of every attribute of freedom and eligibility for legal self-defence. Our property may be plundered before our eyes; violence may be committed on our persons; even our lives may be taken away, and there is none to regard our complaints. We are denationalized; we are disfranchised. We are deprived of membership in the human family! We have neither land nor home, nor resting place that can be called our own. And this is effected by the provisions of a compact which assumes the venerated, the sacred appellation of treaty. We are overwhelmed! Our hearts are sickened, our utterance is paralized, when we reflect on the condition in which we are placed, by the audacious practices of unprincipled men, who have managed their stratagems with so much dexterity as to impose on the Government of the United States, in the face of our earnest, solemn, and reiterated protestations. The instrument in question is not the act of our Nation; we are not parties to its covenants; it has not received the sanction of our people. The makers of it sustain no office nor appointment in our Nation, under the designation of Chiefs, Head men, or any other title, by which they hold, or could acquire, authority to

assume the reins of Government, and to make bargain and sale of our rights, our possessions, and our common country. And we are constrained solemnly to declare, that we cannot but contemplate the enforcement of the stipulations of this instrument on us, against our consent, as an act of injustice and oppression, which, we are well persuaded, can never knowingly be countenanced by the Government and people of the United States; nor can we believe it to be the design of these honorable and highminded individuals, who stand at the head of the Govt., to bind a whole Nation, by the acts of a few unauthorized individuals. And, therefore, we, the parties to be affected by the result, appeal with confidence to the justice, the magnanimity, the compassion, of your honorable bodies, against the enforcement, on us, of the provisions of a compact, in the formation of which we have had no agency.

2.9 John L. O’Sullivan, Manifest Destiny, 1839 The American people having derived their origin from many other nations, and the Declaration of National Independence being entirely based on the great principle of human equality, these facts demonstrate at once our disconnected position as regards any other nation; that we have, in reality, but little connection with the past history of any of them, and still less with all antiquity, its glories, or its crimes. On the contrary, our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity. It is so destined, because the principle upon which a nation is organized fixes its destiny, and that of equality is perfect, is universal. It presides in all the operations of the physical world, and it is also the conscious law of the soul---the self-evident dictates of morality, which accurately defines the duty of man to man, and consequently man’s rights as man. Besides, the truthful annals of any nation furnish abundant evidence, that its happiness, its greatness, its duration, were always proportionate to the democratic equality in its system of government. . . . What friend of human liberty, civilization, and refinement, can cast his view over the past history of the monarchies and aristocracies of antiquity, and not deplore that they ever existed? What philanthropist can contemplate the oppressions, the cruelties, and injustice

2.10 James K. Polk, Message to the Senate and House Concerning the Mexican-American War 53 inflicted by them on the masses of mankind, and not turn with moral horror from the retrospect? America is destined for better deeds. It is our unparalleled glory that we have no reminiscences of battle fields, but in defence of humanity, of the oppressed of all nations, of the rights of conscience, the rights of personal enfranchisement. Our annals describe no scenes of horrid carnage, where men were led on by hundreds of thousands to slay one another, dupes and victims to emperors, kings, nobles, demons in the human form called heroes. We have had patriots to defend our homes, our liberties, but no aspirants to crowns or thrones; nor have the American people ever suffered themselves to be led on by wicked ambition to depopulate the land, to spread desolation far and wide, that a human being might be placed on a seat of supremacy. We have no interest in the scenes of antiquity, only as lessons of avoidance of nearly all their examples. The expansive future is our arena, and for our history. We are entering on its untrodden space, with the truths of God in our minds, beneficent objects in our hearts, and with a clear conscience unsullied by the past. We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can. We point to the everlasting truth on the first page of our national declaration, and we proclaim to the millions of other lands, that ‘‘the gates of hell’’---the powers of aristocracy and monarchy---‘‘shall not prevail against it.’’ The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High---the Sacred and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere---its roof the firmament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, comprising hundreds of happy millions, calling, owning no man master, but governed by God’s natural and moral law of equality, the law of brotherhood---of ‘‘peace and good will amongst men.’’. . . Yes, we are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of States, the grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and while truth sheds its effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the one and subverting the other. We must onward to the fulfilment of our mission---to the entire development of the principle of our organization---freedom of conscience, freedom of person,

freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality of freedom and equality. This is our high destiny, and in nature’s eternal, inevitable decree of cause and effect we must accomplish it. All this will be our future history, to establish on earth the moral dignity and salvation of man---the immutable truth and beneficence of God. For this blessed mission to the nations of the world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America been chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings, hierarchs, and oligarchs, and carry the glad tidings of peace and good will where myriads now endure an existence scarcely more enviable than that of beasts of the field. Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity?

2.10 James K. Polk, Message to the Senate and House Concerning the Mexican-American War, May 11, 1846 To the Senate and House of Representatives: The existing state of the relations between the United States and Mexico renders it proper that I should bring the subject to the consideration of Congress. In my message at the commencement of your present session the state of these relations; the causes which led to the suspension of diplomatic intercourse between the two countries in March, 1845, and the long-continued and unredressed wrongs and injuries committed by the Mexican Government on citizens of the United States in their persons and property were briefly set forth. As the facts and opinions which were then laid before you were care fully considered, I can not better express my present convictions of the condition of affairs up to that time than by referring you to that communication. The strong desire to establish peace with Mexico on liberal and honorable terms, and the readiness of this Government to regulate and adjust our boundary and other causes of difference with that power on such fair and equitable principles as would lead to permanent relations of the most friendly nature, induced me in September last to seek the reopening of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Every measure adopted on our part had for its object the furtherance of these desired results. In communicating to Congress a succinct statement of the injuries which we had suffered from Mexico, and which have been accumulating during a period of more than twenty years, every

54 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period expression that could tend to inflame the people of Mexico or defeat or delay a pacific result was carefully avoided. An envoy of the United States repaired to Mexico with full powers to adjust every existing difference. But though present on the Mexican soil by agreement between the two Governments, invested with full powers, and bearing evidence of the most friendly dispositions, his mission has been unavailing. The Mexican Government not only refused to receive him or listen to his propositions, but after a long-continued series of menaces have at last invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our own soil. It now becomes my duty to state more in detail the origin, progress, and failure of that mission. In pursuance of the instructions given in September last, an inquiry was made on the 13th of October, 1845, in the most friendly terms, through our consul in Mexico, of the minister for foreign affairs, whether the Mexican Government would receive an envoy from the United States intrusted with full powers to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two Governments, with the assurance that should the answer be in the affirmative such an envoy would be immediately dispatched to Mexico. The Mexican minister on the 15th of October gave an affirmative answer to this inquiry, requesting at the same time that our naval force at Vera Cruz might be withdrawn, lest its continued presence might assume the appearance of menace and coercion pending the negotiations. This force was immediately withdrawn. On the 10th of November, 1845, Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, was commissioned by me as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to Mexico, and was intrusted with full powers to adjust both the questions of the Texas boundary and of indemnification to our citizens. The redress of the wrongs of our citizens naturally and inseparably blended itself with the question of boundary. The settlement of the one question in any correct view of the subject involves that of the other. I could not for a moment entertain the idea that the claims of our much-injured and long-suffering citizens, many of which had existed for more than twenty years, should be postponed or separated from the settlement of the boundary question. Mr. Slidell arrived at Vera Cruz on the 30th of November, and was courteously received by the authorities of that city. But the Government of General Herrera was then tottering to its. fall. The revolutionary party had seized upon the Texas question to effect or hasten its overthrow. Its determination to restore friendly relations with the United States, and to receive our minister to negotiate for the settlement of this question, was violently assailed, and was made the great theme of

denunciation against it. The Government of General Herrera, there is good reason to believe, was sincerely desirous to receive our minister; but it yielded to the storm raised by its enemies, and on the 21st of December refused to accredit Mr. Slidell upon the most frivolous pretexts. These are so fully and ably exposed in the note of Mr. Slidell of the 24th of December last to the Mexican minister of foreign relations, herewith transmitted, that I deem it unnecessary to enter into further detail on this portion of the subject. Five days after the date of Mr. Slidell’s note General Herrera yielded the Government to General Paredes without a struggle, and on the 30th of December resigned the Presidency. This revolution was accomplished solely by the army, the people having taken little part in the contest; and thus the supreme power in Mexico passed into the hands of a military leader. Determined to leave no effort untried to effect an amicable adjustment with Mexico, I directed Mr. Slidell to present his credentials to the Government of General Paredes and ask to be officially received by him. There would have been less ground for taking this step had General Paredes come into power by a regular constitutional succession. In that event his administration would have been considered but a mere constitutional continuance of the Government of General Herrera, and the refusal of the latter to receive our minister would have been deemed conclusive unless an intimation had been given by General Paredes of his desire to reverse the decision of his predecessor. But the Government of General Paredes owes its existence to a military revolution, by which the subsisting constitutional authorities had been subverted. The form of government was entirely changed, as well as all the high functionaries by whom it was administered. Under these circumstances, Mr. Slidell, in obedience to my direction, addressed a note to the Mexican minister of foreign relations, under date of the 1st of March last, asking to be received by that Government in the diplomatic character to which he had been appointed. This minister in his reply, under date of the 12th of March, reiterated the arguments of his predecessor, and in terms that may be considered as giving just grounds of offense to the Government and people of the United States denied the application of Mr. Slidell. Nothing therefore remained for our envoy but to demand his passports and return to his own country. Thus the Government of Mexico, though solemnly pledged by official acts in October last to receive and accredit an American envoy, violated their plighted faith and refused the offer of a peaceful adjustment of our difficulties. Not only was the offer rejected, but the

2.10 James K. Polk, Message to the Senate and House Concerning the Mexican-American War 55 indignity of its rejection was enhanced by the manifest breach of faith in refusing to admit the envoy who came because they had bound themselves to receive him. Nor can it be said that the offer was fruitless from the want of opportunity of discussing it; our envoy was present on their own soil. Nor can it be ascribed to a want of sufficient powers; our envoy had full powers to adjust every question of difference. Nor was there room for complaint that our propositions for settlement were unreasonable; permission was not even given our envoy to make any proposition whatever. Nor can it be objected that we, on our part, would not listen to any reasonable terms of their suggestion; the Mexican Government refused all negotiation, and have made no proposition of any kind. In my message at the commencement of the present session I informed you that upon the earnest appeal both of the Congress and convention of Texas I had ordered an efficient military force to take a position between the Nueces and the Del Norte. This had become necessary to meet a threatened invasion of Texas by the Mexican forces, for which extensive military preparations had been made. The invasion was threatened solely because Texas had determined, in accordance with a solemn resolution of the Congress of the United States, to annex herself to our Union, and under these circumstances it was plainly our duty to extend our protection over her citizens and soil. This force was concentrated at Corpus Christi, and remained there until after I had received such information from Mexico as rendered it probable, if not certain, that the Mexican Government would refuse to receive our envoy. Meantime Texas, by the final action of our Congress, had become an integral part of our Union. The Congress of Texas, by its act of December 19, 1836, had declared the Rio del Norte to be the boundary of that Republic. Its jurisdiction had been extended and exercised beyond the Nueces. The country between that river and the Del Norte had been represented in the Congress and in the convention of Texas, had thus taken part in the act of annexation itself, and is now included within one of our Congressional districts. Our own Congress had, moreover, with great unanimity, by the act approved December 31, 1845, recognized the country beyond the Nueces as a part of our territory by including it within our own revenue system, and a revenue officer to reside within that district has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It became, therefore, of urgent necessity to provide for the defense of that portion of our country. Accordingly, on the I3th of January last instructions were issued to the general in command of these troops to occupy the left bank of the Del Norte. This river,

which is the southwestern boundary of the State of Texas, is an exposed frontier. From this quarter invasion was threatened; upon it and in its immediate vicinity, in the judgment of high military experience, are the proper stations for the protecting forces of the Government. In addition to this important consideration, several others occurred to induce this movement. Among these are the facilities afforded by the ports at Brazos Santiago and the mouth of the Del Norte for the reception of supplies by sea, the stronger and more healthful military positions, the convenience for obtaining a ready and a more abundant supply of provisions, water, fuel, and forage, and the advantages which are afforded by the Del Norte in forwarding supplies to such posts as may be established in the interior and upon the Indian frontier. The movement of the troops to the Del Norte was made by the commanding general under positive instructions to abstain from all aggressive acts toward Mexico or Mexican citizens and to regard the relations between that Republic and the United States as peaceful unless she should declare war or commit acts of hostility indicative of a state of war. He was specially directed to protect private property and respect personal rights. The Army moved from Corpus Christi on the 11th of March, and on the 28th of that month arrived on the left bank of the Del Norte opposite to Matamoras, where it encamped on a commanding position, which has since been strengthened by the erection of fieldworks. A depot has also been established at Point Isabel, near the Brazos Santiago, 30 miles in rear of the encampment. The selection of his position was necessarily confided to the judgment of the general in command. The Mexican forces at Matamoras assumed a belligerent attitude, and on the 12th of April General Ampudia, then in command, notified General Taylor to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and to retire beyond the Nueces River, and in the event of his failure to comply with these demands announced that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question. But no open act of hostility was committed until the 14th of April. On that day General Arista, who had succeeded to the command of the Mexican forces, communicated to General Taylor that he considered hostilities commenced and should prosecute them. A party of dragoons of 63 men and officers were on the same day dispatched from the American camp up the Rio del Norte, on its left bank, to ascertain whether the Mexican troops had crossed or were preparing to cross the river, became engaged with a large body of these troops, and after a short affair, in which some 16 were killed and wounded, appear to have been surrounded

56 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period and compelled to surrender. The grievous wrongs perpetrated by Mexico upon our citizens throughout a long period of years remain unredressed, and solemn treaties pledging her public faith for this redress have been disregarded. A government either unable or unwilling to enforce the execution of such treaties fails to perform one of its plainest duties. Our commerce with Mexico has been almost annihilated. It was formerly highly beneficial to both nations, but our merchants have been deterred from prosecuting it by the system of outrage and extortion which the Mexican authorities have pursued against them, whilst their appeals through their own Government for indemnity have been made in vain. Our forbearance has gone to such an extreme as to be mistaken in its character. Had we acted with vigor in repelling the insults and redressing the injuries inflicted by Mexico at the commencement, we should doubtless have escaped all the difficulties in which we are now involved. Instead of this, however, we have been exerting our best efforts to propitiate her good will. Upon the pretext that Texas, a nation as independent as herself, thought proper to unite its destinies with our own she has affected to believe that we have severed her rightful territory, and in official proclamations and manifestoes has repeatedly threatened to make war upon us for the purpose of reconquering Texas. In the meantime we have tried every effort at reconciliation. The cup of forbearance had been exhausted even before the recent information from the frontier of the Del Norte. But now, after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war. As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country. Anticipating the possibility of a crisis like that which has arrived, instructions were given in August last, as a precautionary measure against invasion or threatened invasion, authorizing General Taylor, if the emergency required, to accept volunteers, not from Texas only, but from the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and corresponding letters were addressed to the respective governors of those States. These instructions were repeated, and in January last, soon after the incorporation of Texas into our Union of States, General Taylor was further authorized by the President to make a requisition upon the

executive of that State for such of its militia force as may be needed to repel invasion or to secure the country against apprehended invasion. On the 2d day of March he was again reminded, in the event of the approach of any considerable Mexican force, promptly and efficiently to use the authority with which he was clothed to call to him such auxiliary force as he might need. War actually existing and our territory having been invaded, General Taylor, pursuant to authority vested in him by my direction, has called on the governor of Texas for four regiments of State troops, two to be mounted and two to serve on foot, and on the governor of Louisiana for four regiments of infantry to be sent to him as soon as practicable. In further vindication of our rights and defense of our territory, I involve the prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. To this end I recommend that authority should be given to call into the public service a large body of volunteers to serve for not less than six or twelve months unless sooner discharged. A volunteer force is beyond question more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers, and it is not to be doubted that a number far beyond that required would readily rush to the field upon the call of their country. I further recommend that a liberal provision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies and munitions of war. The most energetic and prompt measures and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and successful termination. In making these recommendations I deem it proper to declare that it is my anxious desire not only to terminate hostilities speedily, but to bring all matters in dispute between this Government and Mexico to an early and amicable adjustment; and in this view I shall be prepared to renew negotiations whenever Mexico shall be ready to receive propositions or to make propositions of her own. I transmit herewith a copy of the correspondence between our envoy to Mexico and the Mexican minister for foreign affairs, and so much of the correspondence between that envoy and the Secretary of State and between the Secretary of War and the general in command on the Del Norte as is necessary to a full understanding of the subject. JAMES K. POLK

2.11 Henry Clay, Speech on the Mexican-American War 57

2.11 Henry Clay, Speech on the Mexican-American War, 1847 The day is dark and gloomy, unsettled and uncertain, like the condition of our country, in regard to the unnatural war with Mexico. The public mind is agitated and anxious, and is filled with serious apprehensions as to its indefinite continuance, and especially as to the consequences which its termination may bring forth, menacing the harmony, if not the existence, of our Union . . . War, pestilence, and famine, by the common consent of mankind, are the three greatest calamities which can befal our species; and war, as the most direful, justly stands foremost and in front. Pestilence and famine, no doubt for wise although inscrutable purposes, are inflictions of Providence, to which it is our duty, therefore, to bow with obedience, humble submission and resignation. Their duration is not long, and their ravages are limited. They bring, indeed, great affliction whilst they last, but society soon recovers from their effects. War is the voluntary work of our own hands, and whatever reproaches it may deserve should be directed to ourselves. When it breaks out, its duration is indefinite and unknown---its vicissitudes are hidden from our view. In the sacrifice of human life, and in the waste of human treasure, in its losses and in its burthens, it affects both belligerent nations; and its sad effects of mangled bodies, of death, and of desolation, endure long after its thunders are hushed in peace. War unhinges society, disturbs its peaceful and regular industry, and scatters poisonous seeds of disease and immorality, which continue to germinate and diffuse their baneful influence long after it has ceased. Dazzling by its glitter, pomp and pageantry, it begets a spirit of wild adventure and romantic enterprise, and often disqualifies those who embark in it, after their return from the bloody fields of battle, from engaging in the industrious and peaceful vocations of life. We are informed by a statement which is apparently correct, that the number of our countrymen slain in this lamentable Mexican war, although it has yet been of only 18 months existence, is equal to one half of the whole of the American loss during the seven years war of the Revolution! And I venture to assert that the expenditure of treasure which it has occasioned, when it shall come to be fairly ascertained and footed up, will be found to be more than half of the pecuniary cost of the war of our independence. And this is the condition of the party whose arms have been every where and constantly victorious!

How did we unhappily get involved in this war? It was predicted as the consequence of the annexation of Texas to the United States. If we had not Texas, we should have no war. The people were told that if that event happened, war would ensue. They were told that the war between Texas and Mexico had not been terminated by a treaty of peace; that Mexico still claimed Texas as a revolted province: and that, if we received Texas in our Union, we took along with her, the war existing between her and Mexico. And the Minister of Mexico [Juan N. Almonte] formally announced to the Government at Washington, that his nation would consider the annexation of Texas to the United States as producing a state of war. But all this was denied by the partisans of annexation. They insisted we should have no war, and even imputed to those who foretold it, sinister motives for their groundless prediction. But, notwithstanding a state of virtual war necessarily resulted from the fact of annexation of one of the belligerents to the United States, actual hostilities might have been probably averted by prudence, moderation and wise statesmanship. If General Taylor had been permitted to remain, where his own good sense prompted him to believe he ought to remain, at the point of Corpus Christi; and, if a negotiation had been opened with Mexico, in a true spirit of amity and conciliation, war possibly might have been prevented. But, instead of this pacific and moderate course, whilst Mr. Slidell was bending his way to Mexico with his diplomatic credentials, General Taylor was ordered to transport his cannon, and to plant them, in a warlike attitude, opposite to Matamoras, on the east bank of the Rio Bravo; within the very disputed territory, the adjustment of which was to be the object of Mr. Slidell’s mission. What else could have transpired but a conflict of arms? Thus the war commenced, and the President after having produced it, appealed to Congress. A bill was proposed to raise 50,000 volunteers, and in order to commit all who should vote for it, a preamble was inserted falsely attributing the commencement of the war to the act of Mexico. I have no doubt of the patriotic motives of those who, after struggling to divest the bill of that flagrant error, found themselves constrained to vote for it. But I must say that no earthly consideration would have ever tempted or provoked me to vote for a bill, with a palpable falsehood stamped on its face. Almost idolizing truth, as I do, I never, never, could have voted for that bill. . . . This is no war of defence, but one unnecessary and of offensive aggression. It is Mexico that is defending her fire-sides, her castles and her altars, not we.

58 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period And how different also is the conduct of the whig party of the present day from that of the major part of the federal party during the war of 1812! Far from interposing any obstacles to the prosecution of the war, if the Whigs in office are reproachable at all, it is for having lent too ready a facility to it, without careful examination into the objects of the war. And, out of office, who have rushed to the prosecution of the war with more ardor and alacrity than the Whigs? Whose hearts have bled more freely than those of the Whigs?---Who have more occasion to mourn the loss of sons, husbands, brothers, fathers, than whig parents, whig wives and whig brothers, in this deadly and unprofitable strife . . . A declaration of war is the highest and most awful exercise of sovereignty.---The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to declare war, and grant letters of marque and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and water, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces. Thus we perceive that the principal power, in regard to war, with all its ancillary attendants, is granted to Congress. Whenever called upon to determine upon the solemn question of peace or war, Congress must consider and deliberate and decide upon the motives, objects and causes of the war. And, if a war be commenced without any previous declaration of its objects, as in the case of the existing war with Mexico, Congress must necessarily possess the authority, at any time, to declare for what purposes it shall be further prosecuted. If we suppose Congress does not possess the controlling authority attributed to it; if it be contended that a war having been once commenced, the President of the United States may direct it to the accomplishment of any objects he pleases, without consulting and without any regard to the will of Congress, the Convention will have utterly failed in guarding the nation against the abuses and ambition of a single individual. Either Congress, or the President, must have the right of determining upon the objects for which a war shall be prosecuted. There is no other alternative. If the President possess it and may prosecute it for objects against the will of Congress, where is the difference between our free government and that of any other nation which may be governed by an absolute Czar, Emperor, or King? . . . It may be urged that the President and Senate possess the treaty making power, without any express limitation as to its exercise; that the natural and ordinary termination of a war is by a treaty of peace; and therefore, that the President and Senate must possess the power to decide what stipulations and conditions shall

enter into such a treaty. But it is not more true that the President and Senate possess the treaty making power, without limitation, than that Congress possesses the war making power, without restriction. These two powers then ought to be so interpreted as to reconcile the one with the other; and, in expounding the constitution, we ought to keep constantly in view the nature and structure of our free government, and especially the great object of the Convention in taking the war-making power out of the hands of a single man and placing it in the safer custody of the representatives of the whole nation. The desirable reconciliation between the two powers is effected by attributing to Congress the right to declare what shall be the objects of war, and to the President the duty of endeavoring to obtain those objects by the direction of the national force and by diplomacy. I am broaching no new and speculative theory. The Statute book of the United States is full of examples of prior declarations by Congress of the objects to be attained by negotiations with Foreign Powers, and the archives of the Executive Department furnish abundant evidence of the accomplishment of those objects, or the attempt to accomplish them, by subsequent negotiation. Prior to the declaration of the last war against Great Britain, in all the restrictive measures which Congress adopted, against the two great belligerent Powers of Europe, clauses were inserted in the several acts establishing them, tendering to both or either of the belligerents the abolition of those restrictions if they would repeal their hostile Berlin and Milan decrees and Orders in Council, operating against our commerce and navigation. And these acts of Congress were invariably communicated, through the Executive, by diplomatic notes, to France and Great Britain, as the basis upon which it was proposed to restore friendly intercourse with them. So, after the termination of the war, various acts of Congress were passed, from time to time, offering to Foreign Powers the principle of reciprocity in the commerce and navigation of the United States with them. Out of these acts have sprung a class, and a large class, of treaties (four or five of which were negotiated, whilst I was in the department of State,) commonly called reciprocity treaties concluded under all the Presidents, from Mr. Madison to Mr. Van Buren, inclusive. And, with regard to commercial treaties, negotiated without the sanction of prior acts of Congress, where they contained either appropriations or were in conflict with unrepealed statutes, it has been ever held as the republican doctrine from Mr. Jay’s treaty down to the present time, that the passage of acts of Congress was necessary to secure the execution of those treaties. If in the matter of Foreign Commerce, in respect to which

2.11 Henry Clay, Speech on the Mexican-American War 59 the power vested in Congress to regulate it and the treaty making power may be regarded as concurrent, Congress can previously decide the objects to which negotiation shall be applied, how much stronger is the case of war, the power to declare which is confided exclusively to Congress? I conclude, therefore, Mr. President and Fellow-Citizens, with entire confidence, that Congress has the right either at the beginning or during the prosecution of any war, to decide the objects and purposes for which it was proclaimed, or for which it ought to be continued. And, I think, it is the duty of Congress, by some deliberate and authentic act, to declare for what objects the present war shall be longer prosecuted. I suppose that the President would not hesitate to regulate his conduct by the pronounced will of Congress, and to employ the force and the diplomatic power of the nation to execute that will. But, if the President should decline or refuse to do so, and, in contempt of the supreme authority of Congress, should persevere in waging the war, for other objects than those proclaimed by Congress, then it would be the imperative duty of that body to vindicate its authority, by the most stringent, and effectual, and appropriate measures. And, if, on the contrary, the enemy should refuse to conclude a treaty, containing stipulations securing the objects, designated by Congress, it would become the duty of the whole government to prosecute the war, with all the national energy, until those objects were obtained by a treaty of peace. There can be no insuperable difficulty in Congress making such an authoritative declaration. Let it resolve, simply, that the war shall, or shall not, be a war of conquest; and, if a war of conquest, what is to be conquered. Should a resolution pass, disclaiming the design of conquest, peace would follow, in less than sixty days, if the President would conform to his constitutional duty. . . . I will not attribute to the President of the United States any such design; but I confess that I have been shocked and alarmed by manifestations of it in various quarters. Of all the dangers and misfortunes which could befall this nation, I should regard that of its becoming a warlike and conquering power the most direful and fatal. History tells the mournful tale of conquering nations and conquerors. The three most celebrated conquerors, in the civilized world, were Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon. The first, after overrunning a large portion of Asia, and sighing and lamenting that there were no more worlds to subdue, met a premature and ignoble death . . . Their sad lot was immense sacrifice of life, heavy and intolerable burdens, and the ultimate loss of liberty itself.

That the power of the United States is competent to the conquest of Mexico, is quite probable. But it could not be achieved without frightful carnage, dreadful sacrifices of human life, and the creation of an onerous national debt; nor could it be completely effected, in all probability, until after the lapse of many years. It would be necessary to occupy all its strongholds, to disarm its inhabitants, and to keep them in constant fear and subjection. To consummate the work, I presume that standing armies, not less than a hundred thousand men, would be necessary, to be kept perhaps always in the bosom of their country. These standing armies, revelling in a foreign land, and accustomed to trample upon the liberties of a foreign people, at some distant day, might be fit and ready instruments, under the lead of some daring and unprincipled chieftain, to return to their country and prostrate the public liberty. Supposing the conquest to be once made, what is to be done with it? Is it to be governed, like Roman Provinces, by Proconsuls? Would it be compatible with the genius, character, and safety of our free institutions, to keep such a great country as Mexico, with a population of not less that nine millions, in a state of constant military subjection? Shall it be annexed to the United States: Does any considerate man believe it possible that two such immense countries, with territories of nearly equal extent, with populations so incongruous, so different in race, in language, in religion and in laws, could be blended together in one harmonious mass, and happily governed by one common authority? Murmurs, discontent, insurrections, rebellion, would inevitably ensue, until the incompatible parts would be broken asunder, and possibly, in the frightful struggle, our present glorious Union itself would be dissevered or dissolved. We ought not to forget the warning voice of all history, which teaches the difficulty of combining and Of all the possessions which appertain to man, in his collective or individual condition, none should be preserved and cherished, with more sedulous and unremitting care, than that of an unsullied character. It is impossible to estimate it too highly, in society, when attached to an individual, nor can it be exaggerated or too greatly magnified in a nation. Those who lose or are indifferent to it become just objects of scorn and contempt. Of all the abominable transactions, which sully the pages of history none exceed in enormity that of the dismemberment and partition of Poland, by the three great Continental Powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.---Ages may pass away, and centuries roll around, but as long as human records endure all mankind will unite in execrating the rapacious and

60 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period detestable deed. That was accomplished by overwhelming force, and the unfortunate existence of fatal dissensions and divisions in the bosom of Poland.---Let us avoid affixing to our name and national character a similar, if not worse, stigma. I am afraid that we do not now stand well in the opinion of other parts of christendom. Repudiation has brought upon us much reproach. All the nations, I apprehend, look upon us, in the prosecution of the present war, as being actuated by a spirit of rapacity, and an inordinate desire for territorial aggrandizement . . . I have embodied, Mr. President and fellow-citizens, the sentiments and opinions which I have endeavored to explain and enforce in a series of resolutions which I beg now to submit to your consideration and judgment. They are the following: 1. Resolved, as the opinion of this meeting, that the primary cause of the present unhappy war, existing between the United States of America, and the United States of the Republic of Mexico, was the annexation of Texas to the former; and that the immediate occasion of hostilities between the two republics arose out of the order of the President of the United States for the removal of the army under the command of General Taylor, from its position at Corpus Christi to a point opposite to Matamoras, on the East bank of the Rio Bravo, within territory claimed by both Republics, but then under the jurisdiction of that of Mexico, and inhabited by its citizens; and that the order of the President for the removal of the army to that point, was improvident and unconstitutional, it being without the concurrence of Congress, or even any consultation with it, although it was in session: but that Congress having, by subsequent acts, recognized the war thus brought into existence without its previous authority or consent, the prosecution of it became thereby National. 2. Resolved, That, in the absence of any formal and public declaration by Congress, of the objects for which the war ought to be prosecuted, the President of the United States, as Chief Magistrate, and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, is left to the guidance of his own judgment to prosecute it for such purposes and objects as he may deem the honor and interest of the nation to require. 3. Resolved, That, by the Constitution of the United States, Congress, being invested with the power to declare war, and grant letters of marque and

reprizal, to make rules concerning captures on land and water, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces, has the full and complete war making power of the United States; and, so possessing it, has a right to determine upon the motives, causes and objects of any war, when it commences, or at any time during the progress of its existence. 4. Resolved, as the further opinion of this meeting, that it is the right and duty of Congress to declare, by some authentic act, for what purposes and objects the existing war ought to be further prosecuted; that it is the duty of the President, in his official conduct, to conform to such a declaration of Congress; and that, if, after such declaration, the President should decline or refuse to endeavor, by all the means, civil, diplomatic, and military, in his power, to execute the announced will of Congress, and, in defiance of its authority, should continue to prosecute the war for purposes and objects other than those declared by that body, it would become the right and duty of Congress to adopt the most efficacious measures to arrest the further progress of the war, taking care to make ample provision for the honor, the safety and security of our armies in Mexico, in every contingency. And, if Mexico should decline or refuse to conclude a treaty with us, stipulating for the purposes and objects so declared by Congress, it would be the duty of the Government to prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, until they were attained by a treaty of peace. 5. Resolved, That we view with serious alarm, and are utterly opposed to any purpose of annexing Mexico to the United States, in any mode, and especially by conquest; that we believe the two nations could not be happily governed by one common authority, owing to their great difference of race, law, language and religion, and the vast extent of their respective territories, and large amount of their respective populations; that such a union, against the consent of the exasperated Mexican people, could only be effected and preserved by large standing armies, and the constant application of military force---in other words, by despotic sway exercised over the Mexican people, in the first instance, but which, there would be just cause to apprehend, might, in process of time, be extended over the people of the United States. That we deprecate, therefore, such

2.12 Seneca Falls Declaration a union, as wholly incompatible with the genius of our Government, and with the character of free and liberal institutions; and we anxiously hope that each nation may be left in the undisturbed possession of its own laws, language, cherished religion and territory, to pursue its own happiness, according to what it may deem best for itself. 6. Resolved, That, considering the series of splendid and brilliant victories achieved by our brave armies and their gallant commanders, during the war with Mexico, unattended by a single reverse, The United States, without any danger of their honor suffering the slightest tarnish, can practice the virtues of moderation and magnanimity towards their discomfited foe. We have no desire for the dismemberment of the United States of the Republic of Mexico, but wish only a just and proper fixation of the limits of Texas. 7. Resolved, That we do, positively and emphatically, disclaim and disavow any wish or desire, on our part, to acquire any foreign territory whatever, for the purpose of propagating slavery, or of introducing slaves from the United States, into such foreign territory. 8. Resolved, That we invite our fellow citizens of the United States, who are anxious for the restoration of the blessings of peace, or, if the existing war shall continue to be prosecuted, are desirous that its purpose and objects shall be defined and known; who are anxious to avert present and future perils and dangers, with which it may be fraught; and who are also anxious to produce contentment and satisfaction at home, and to elevate the national character abroad, to assemble together in their respective communities, and to express their views, feelings, and opinions.

2.12 Seneca Falls Declaration, 1848 When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course. We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by

61

their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, and to insist upon the institution of a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of the women under this government, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to demand the equal station to which they are entitled. The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise. He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no voice. He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most ignorant and degraded men---both natives and foreigners. Having deprived her of this first right of a citizen, the elective franchise, thereby leaving her without representation in the halls of legislation, he has oppressed her on all sides. He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns. He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as she can commit many crimes with impunity, provided they be done in the presence of her husband. In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming to all intents and purposes, her master---the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.

62 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women---the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his hands. After depriving her of all rights as a married woman, if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her to support a government which recognizes her only when her property can be made profitable to it. He has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction which he considers most honorable to himself. As a teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known. He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her. He allows her in Church, as well as State, but a subordinate position, claiming Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some exceptions, from any public participation in the affairs of the Church. He has created a false public sentiment by giving to the world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from society, are not only tolerated, but deemed of little account in man. He has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, claiming it as his right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that belongs to her conscience and to her God. He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life. Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of onehalf the people of this country, their social and religious degradation---in view of the unjust laws above mentioned, and because women do feel themselves aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights, we insist that they have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States. In entering upon the great work before us, we anticipate no small amount of misconception, misrepresentation, and ridicule; but we shall use every instrumentality within our power to effect our object. We shall employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and National legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in our behalf. We hope this Convention will be

followed by a series of Conventions embracing every part of the country. Source: E. C. Stanton, S. B. Anthony, and M. J. Gage, eds., History of Women’s Suffrage, Vol. 1 (1887), 70. Rochester, New York: Charles Mann.

2.13 Sojourner Truth, ‘‘Ain’t I A Woman?’’ 1851 The Classic Report Several ministers attended the second day of the Woman’s Rights Convention, and were not shy in voicing their opinion of man’s superiority over women. One claimed ‘‘superior intellect,’’ one spoke of the ‘‘manhood of Christ,’’ and still another referred to the ‘‘sin of our first mother.’’ Suddenly, Sojourner Truth rose from her seat in the corner of the church. ‘‘For God’s sake, Mrs. Gage, don’t let her speak!’’ half a dozen women whispered loudly, fearing that their cause would be mixed up with Abolition. Sojourner walked to the podium and slowly took off her sunbonnet. Her six-foot frame towered over the audience. She began to speak in her deep, resonant voice: ‘‘Well, children, where there is so much racket, there must be something out of kilter, I think between the Negroes of the South and the women of the North---all talking about rights---the white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what’s all this talking about?’’ Sojourner pointed to one of the ministers. ‘‘That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody helps me any best place. And ain’t I a woman?’’ Sojourner raised herself to her full height. ‘‘Look at me! Look at my arm.’’ She bared her right arm and flexed her powerful muscles. ‘‘I have plowed, I have planted and I have gathered into barns. And no man could head me. And ain’t I a woman?’’ ‘‘I could work as much, and eat as much as man--when I could get it---and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a woman? I have borne children and seen most of them sold into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me. And ain’t I a woman?’’ The women in the audience began to cheer wildly. She pointed to another minister. ‘‘He talks about this thing in the head. What’s that they call it?’’ ‘‘Intellect,’’ whispered a woman nearby. ‘‘That’s it, honey. What’s intellect got to do with women’s rights or black folks’ rights? If my cup won’t

2.14 George Fitzhugh, The Universal Law of Slavery 63 hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn’t you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?’’ ‘‘That little man in black there! He says women can’t have as much rights as men. ‘Cause Christ wasn’t a woman. She stood with outstretched arms and eyes of fire. ’’Where did your Christ come from?’’ ‘‘Where did your Christ come from?’’ she thundered again. ‘‘From God and a Woman! Man had nothing to do with him!’’ The entire church now roared with deafening applause. ‘‘If the first woman God ever made was strong enough to turn the world upside down all alone, these women together ought to be able to turn it back and get it right-side up again. And now that they are asking to do it the men better let them.’’ Note: Sojourner Truth gave her famous ‘‘Ain’t I a Woman?’’ speech at the 1851 Women’s Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio. (The women’s rights movement grew in large part out of the antislavery movement.) No formal record of the speech exists, but Frances Gage, an abolitionist and president of the Convention, recounted Truth’s words. There is debate about the accuracy of this account, because Gage did not record the it until 1863 and her record differs somewhat from newspaper accounts of 1851. It is Gage’s report that endures, however, and it is clear that, whatever the exact words, ‘‘Ain’t I a Woman?’’ made a great impact at the Convention and has become a classic expression of women’s rights.

2.14 George Fitzhugh, The Universal Law of Slavery, 1849 He the Negro is but a grown up child, and must be governed as a child, not as a lunatic or criminal. The master occupies toward him the place of parent or guardian. We shall not dwell on this view, for no one will differ with us who thinks as we do of the negro’s capacity, and we might argue till dooms-day in vain, with those who have a high opinion of the negro’s moral and intellectual capacity. Secondly. The negro is improvident; will not lay up in summer for the wants of winter; will not accumulate in youth for the exigencies of age. He would become an insufferable burden to society. Society has the right to prevent this, and can only do so by subjecting him to domestic slavery. In the last place, the negro race is inferior to the white race, and living in their midst, they would be far outstripped or outwitted in the chaos

of free competition. Gradual but certain extermination would be their fate. We presume the maddest abolitionist does not think the negro’s providence of habits and money-making capacity at all to compare to those of the whites. This defect of character would alone justify enslaving him, if he is to remain here. In Africa or the West Indies, he would become idolatrous, savage and cannibal, or be devoured by savages and cannibals. At the North he would freeze or starve. We would remind those who deprecate and sympathize with negro slavery, that his slavery here relieves him from a far more cruel slavery in Africa, or from idolatry and cannibalism, and every brutal vice and crime that can disgrace humanity; and that it christianizes, protects, supports and civilizes him; that it governs him far better than free laborers at the North are governed. There, wife-murder has become a mere holiday pastime; and where so many wives are murdered, almost all must be brutally treated. Nay, more; men who kill their wives or treat them brutally, must be ready for all kinds of crime, and the calendar of crime at the North proves the inference to be correct. Negroes never kill their wives. If it be objected that legally they have no wives, then we reply, that in an experience of more than forty years, we never yet heard of a negro man killing a negro woman. Our negroes are not only better off as to physical comfort than free laborers, but their moral condition is better. The negro slaves of the South are the happiest, and, in some sense, the freest people in the world. The children and the aged and infirm work not at all, and yet have all the comforts and necessaries of life provided for them. They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care nor labor. The women do little hard work, and are protected from the despotism of their husbands by their masters. The negro men and stout boys work, on the average, in good weather, not more than nine hours a day. The balance of their time is spent in perfect abandon. Besides’ they have their Sabbaths and holidays. White men, with so much of license and liberty, would die of ennui; but negroes luxuriate in corporeal and mental repose. With their faces upturned to the sun, they can sleep at any hour; and quiet sleep is the greatest of human enjoyments. ‘‘Blessed be the man who invented sleep.’’ ’Tis happiness in itself---and results from contentment with the present, and confident assurance of the future. A common charge preferred against slavery is, that it induces idleness with the masters. The trouble, care and labor, of providing for wife, children and slaves, and of properly governing and administering the whole affairs of the farm, is usually borne on small estates by

64 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period the master. On larger ones, he is aided by an overseer or manager. If they do their duty, their time is fully occupied. If they do not, the estate goes to ruin. The mistress, on Southern farms, is usually more busily, usefully and benevolently occupied than any one on the farm. She unites in her person, the offices of wife, mother, mistress, housekeeper, and sister of charity. And she fulfills all these offices admirably well. The rich men, in free society, may, if they please, lounge about town, visit clubs, attend the theatre, and have no other trouble than that of collecting rents, interest and dividends of stock. In a well constituted slave society, there should be no idlers. But we cannot divine how the capitalists in free society are to put to work. The master labors for the slave, they exchange industrial value. But the capitalist, living on his income, gives nothing to his subjects. He lives by mere exploitations.

2.15 Daniel Webster, The Constitution and the Union, 1850 Mr. President, I wish to speak to-day, not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American, and a member of the Senate of the United States. It is fortunate that there is a Senate of the United States; a body not yet moved from its propriety, not lost to a just sense of its own dignity and its own high responsibilities, and a body to which the country looks, with confidence, for wise, moderate, patriotic, and healing counsels. It is not to be denied that we live in the midst of strong agitations, and are surrounded by very considerable dangers to our institutions and government. The imprisoned winds are let loose. The East, the North, and the stormy South combine to throw the whole sea into commotion, to toss its billows to the skies, and disclose its profoundest depths. I do not affect to regard myself, Mr. President, as holding, or as fit to hold, the helm in this combat with the political elements; but I have a duty to perform, and I mean to perform it with fidelity, not without a sense of existing dangers, but not without hope. I have a part to act, not for my own security or safety, for I am looking out for no fragment upon which to float away from the wreck, if wretch there must be, but for the good of the whole, and the preservation of all; and there is that which will keep me to my duty during this struggle, whether the sun and the stars shall appear, or shall not appear for many days. I speak to-day for the preservation of the Union. ‘‘Hear my for my cause.’’ I speak to-day, out of a solicitous and anxious heart, for the restoration to the country

of that quiet and that harmony which make the blessings of this Union so rich, and so dear to us all. Slavery.---Slavery has existed in the world from time immemorial. There was slavery in the earliest periods of history, among the Oriental nations. There was slavery among the Jews; the theocratic government of that people issued no injunction against it. There was slavery among the Greeks; and the ingenious philosophy of the Greek’s found, or sought to find, a justification for it exactly upon the grounds which have been assumed for such a justification in this country; that is, a natural and original difference among the races of mankind, and the inferiority of the black or colored race to the white. The Greeks justified their system of slavery upon that idea, precisely. They held that African and some of the Asiatic tribes to be inferior to the white race; but they did not show, I think, by any close process of logic, that, if this were true, the more intelligent and the stronger had therefore a right to subjugate the weaker. The more manly philosophy and jurisprudence of the Romans placed the justification of slavery on entirely different grounds. The Roman jurists, from the first and down to the fall of the empire, admitted that slavery was against the natural law, by which, as they maintained, all men, of whatsoever clime, color, or capacity, were equal; but they justified slavery, first, upon the ground and authority of the law of nations, arguing, and arguing truly, that at that day the conventional law of nations admitted that captives in war, whose lives, according to the notions of the times, were at the absolute disposal of the captors, might, in exchange for exemption from death, be made slaves for life, and that such servitude might descend to their posterity. The jurists of Rome also maintained, that, by the civil law, there might be servitude or slavery, personal and hereditary; first, by the voluntary act of an individual, who might sell himself into slavery; secondly, by his being reduced into a state of slavery by his creditors, in satisfaction of his debts; and, thirdly, by being placed in a state of servitude or slavery for crime. At the introduction of Christianity, the Roman world was full of slaves, and I suppose there is to be found no injunction against the relation between man and man in the teachings of the Gospel of Jesus Christ or of any of his Apostles. The object of the instruction imparted to mankind by the founder of Christianity was to touch the heart, purify the soul, and improve the lives of individual men. That object went directly to the first fountain of all the political and social relations of the human race, as well as of all true religious feeling, the individual heart and mind of man. Just Wars.---I do not deny that there may be just wars. There certainly are; but it was the remark of an

2.15 Daniel Webster, The Constitution and the Union eminent person, not many years ago, on the other side of the Atlantic, that it is one of the greatest reproaches to human nature that wars are sometimes just. The defence of nations sometimes causes a just war against the injustice of other nations. In this state of sentiment upon the general nature of slavery lies the cause of a great part of those unhappy divisions, exasperations, and reproaches which find vent and support in different parts of the Union. Slavery Not in Constitution.---The term slave, or slavery, is not used in the Constitution. The Constitution does not require that ‘‘fugitive slaves’’ shall be delivered up. It requires that persons held to service in one State, and escaping into another, shall be delivered up. Mr. Madison opposed the introduction of the term slave, or slavery, into the Constitution; for he said that he did not wish to see it recognized by the Constitution of the United States of America that here could be property in men. Exclusion of Slavery.---Wherever there is a substantive good to be done, wherever there is a foot of land to be prevented from becoming slave territory, I am ready to assert the principle of the exclusion of slavery. I am pledged to it from the year 1837; I have been pledged to it again and again; and I will perform those pledges; but I will not do a thing unnecessarily that wounds the feelings of others, or that does discredit to my own understanding. Secession.---Secession! Peaceable secession! Sir, your eyes and mine are never destined to see that miracle. The dismemberment of this vast country without convulsion! The breaking up of the fountains of the great deep without ruffling the surface! Who is so foolish, I beg everybody’s pardon, as to expect to see any such thing? Sir, he who sees these States, now revolving in harmony around a common centre, and expects to see them quit their places and fly off without convulsion, may look the next hour to see the heavenly bodies rush from their spheres, and jostle against each other in the realms of space, without causing the wreck of the universe. There can be no such thing as a peaceable secession. Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility. Is the great Constitution under which we live, covering this whole country, is it to be thawed and melted away by secession, as the snows on the mountain melt under the influence of a vernal sun, disappear almost unobserved, and run off? No, sir! I will not state what might produce the disruption of the Union; but, sir, I see as plainly as I see the sun in heaven what that disruption itself must produce; I see that it must produce war, and such a war as I will not describe, in its twofold character. Peaceable secession! Peaceable secession! The concurrent agreement of all the members of this great

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republic to separate! A voluntary separation, with alimony on one side and on the other. Why, what would be the result? Where is the line to be drawn? What States are to secede? What is to remain American? What am I to be? An American no longer? Am I to become a sectional man, a local man, a separatist, with no country in common with the gentlemen who sit around me here, or who fill the other house of Congress? Heaven forbid! Where is the flag of the republic to remain? Where is the eagle still to tower? Or is he to cower, and shrink, and fall to the ground? Why, sir, our ancestors, our fathers and our grandfathers, those of them that are yet living amongst us with prolonged lives, would rebuke and reproach us; and our children and our grandchildren would cry out shame upon us, if we of this generation should dishonor these ensigns of the power of the government and the harmony of that Union which is every day felt among us with so much joy and gratitude. What is to become of the army? What is to become of the navy? What is to become of the public lands? How is each of the thirty States to defend itself? I know, although the idea has not been stated distinctly, there is to be, or it is supposed possible that there will be, a Southern Confederacy. I do not mean, when I allude to this statement, that nay one seriously contemplates such a state of things. I do not mean to say that it is true, but I have heard it suggested elsewhere, that the idea has been entertained, that, after the dissolution of this Union, a Southern Confederacy might be formed. I am sorry, sir, that it has ever been thought of, talked of, or dreamed of, in the wildest flights of human imagination. But the idea, so far as it exists, must be of a separation, assigning the slave States to one side and the free States to the other. Sir, I may express myself too strongly, perhaps, but there are impossibilities in the natural as well as in the physical world, and I hold the idea of a separation of these States, those that are free to form one government, and those that are free to form one government, and those that are slave-holding to form another, as such an impossibility. We could not separate the States by any such line, if we were to draw it. We could not sit down here to-day and draw a line of separation that would satisfy any five men in the country. There are natural causes that would keep and tie us together, and there are social and domestic relations which we could not break if we would, and which we should not if we could. Liberty and Union, Fresh Air of.---And now, Mr. President, instead of speaking of the possibility or utility of secession, instead of dwelling in those caverns of darkness, instead of groping with those ideas so full of all that is horrid and horrible, let us come out into the

66 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period light of day; let us enjoy the fresh air of Liberty and Union; let us cherish those hopes which belong to us; let us devote ourselves to those great objects that are fit for our consideration and our action; let us raise our conceptions to the magnitude and the importance of the duties that devolve upon us; let our comprehension be as broad as the country for which we act, our aspirations as high as its certain destiny; let us not be pigmies in a case that calls for men. Never did there devolve on any generation of men higher trusts than now devolve upon us, for the preservation of this Constitution and the harmony and peace of all who are destined to live under it. Let us make our generation one of the strongest and brightest links in that golden chain which is destined, I fondly believe, to grapple the people of all the States to this Constitution for ages to come. We have a great, popular, constitutional government, guarded, by law and by judicature, and defended by the affections of the whole people. No monarchical throne presses these States together, no iron chain of military power encircles them; they live and stand under a government popular in its form, representative in it, character, founded upon principles of equality, and so constructed, we hope, as to last forever. In all its history it has been beneficent; it has trodden down no man’s liberty and patriotism; its yet youthful veins are full of enterprise, courage, and honorable love of glory and renown. Large before, the country has now, by recent events become vastly larger. This republic now extends, with a vast breadth, across the whole continent. The two great seas of the world wash the one and the other shore. We realize, on a mighty scale, the beautiful description of the ornamental border of the buckler of Achilles: Now, the broad shield complete, the artist crowned With his last hand, and poured the ocean round; In living silver seemed the waves to roll, And beat the buckler’s verge, and bound the whole.

2.16 Augustus Washington, African Colonization---By a Man of Color, July 3, 1851 To the Editors of The Tribune: . . . Ever since the annexation of Texas and the success and triumph of American arms on the plains of Mexico I have been looking in vain for some home for Afric-Americans more congenial to their feelings and prejudice than Liberia. The Canadas, the West Indies,

Mexico, British Guiana and other parts of South America have all been brought under review. And yet I have been unable to get rid of a conviction, long since entertained and often expressed, that if the colored people of this country ever find a home on earth for the developement of their manhood and intellect, it will first be in Liberia or some other parts of Africa. A continent larger than North America is lying waste for want of the hand of science and industry. A land whose bowels are filled with mineral and agricultural wealth, and on whose bosom reposes in exuberance and wild extravagance all the fruits and productions of a tropical clime. The providence of God will not permit a land so rich in all the elements of wealth and greatness to remain much longer without civilized inhabitants. Every one who has traced the history of missions in Africa and watched the progress of that little Republic of AfricAmericans on the western coast, must be convinced that the colored men are more peculiarly adapted and must eventually be the means of civilizing, redeeming and saving that continent if ever that is done at all. Encouraged and supported by American benevolence and philanthropy, I know no people better suited to this great work none whose duty more it is. Our servile and degraded condition in this country, the history of the past, and the light that is pouring in upon me from every source fully convinces me that this is our true, our highest and happiest destiny, and the sooner we commence this glorious work the sooner will ‘light spring up in darkness and the wilderness and the solitary place be glad, and the deserts rejoice and blossom as the rose.’ I am aware that nothing except the Fugitive Slave Law can be more startling to the free colored citizens of the Northern States, than the fact that any man among them whom they have regarded as intelligent and sound in faith should declare his convictions and influence in favor of African Colonization. But the novelty of the thing does not prove it false, nor that he who dare reject a bad education and break loose from long established prejudices may not have the most conclusive reasons for such a course. I am aware, too, of the solemn responsibility of my present position. It must result in some good or great evil. I maintain that clinging to long cherished prejudices and fostering hopes that can never be realized, the leaders of the colored people in this country have failed to discharge a great and important duty to their race. Seeing this, though a mere private business man, with a trembling pen I come forward alone, joining with friend and foe in moving the wheel of a great enterprise, which though unpopular with those it designs to

2.16 Augustus Washington, African Colonization---By a Man of Color benefit, must result eventually in the redemption and enfranchisement of the African race . . . For 400 years the avarice, fraud and oppression of Europeans and their descendents have been preying upon the children of Africa and her descendents in America. Says my eloquent correspondent, in writing upon this subject: ‘‘I know this was the soil on which I was born; but I have nothing to glorify this as my country. I have no pride of ancestry to point back to. Our forefathers did not come here as did the Pilgrim fathers, in search of a place where they could enjoy civil and religious liberty. No; they were cowardly enough to allow themselves to be brought manacled and fettered as slaves, rather than die on their native shores resisting their oppressors.’’ In the language of Dr. Todd, ‘‘If the marks of humanity are not blotted out from this race of miserable men, it is not because oppression has not been sufficiently legalized, and avarice been allowed to pursue its victims till the grave became a sweet asylum.’’ During the past thirty years two influential and respectable associations have arisen in our behalf, each claiming to be the most benevolent, and each seemingly opposed to the intentions and purposes of the other. The American Colonization Society on the one hand proposed to benefit us by the indirect means of planting a Colony on the western coast of Africa, as an Asylum for the free colored people and manumitted slaves of the United States; and by this means also to send the blessings of civilization and religion to the benighted sons of that continent. The principal obstacle in the way of their success has been that the free colored people, as a body, everywhere, have denounced the whole scheme as wicked and mischievous, and resolved not to leave this country; while those who have gone to that Colony, from a state of Slavery, as the condition of freedom, have been least able to contribute to the knowledge and greatness of a new country, and impart civilization and the arts and sciences to its heathen inhabitants . . . The Abolitionists, on the other hand, proposed by moral means the immediate emancipation of the slave, and the elevation of the free colored people in the land of their birth. And this they did at a time which tried men’s souls. Theirs was a platform on which none dared stand who were not willing to indure scorn, reproach, disgrace, lynch law and even death for the sake of oppressed Americans. At first, interest, reputation, office nor profit, but the reverse, were the reward of an Abolitionist. Now that Anti-Slavery has become popular with many of the American people, it assumes another name, and is converted into political capital. Even Free Soilism was not so much designed to make

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room for our liberties, as to preserve unimpaired the liberties of the whites. The Abolitionists have not yet accomplished anything which we can see to be so definite and practical. Yet they have divested themselves of personal prejudices, aroused the nation to a sense of its injustice and wrongs toward the colored people, encouraged them in improving and obtaining education here, broken down many arbitrary and proscriptive usages in their treatment, and convinced this nation and England that they are a people capable of moral, social and political elevation, and entitled to equal rights with any other community. Both of these benevolent societies might perhaps have accomplished more good, if they had wasted less ammunition in firing at each other . . . For our own part, under the existing state of things, we cannot see why any hostility should exist between those who are true Abolitionists and that class of Colonizationists, who are such from just and benevolent motives. Nor can we see a reason why a man of pure and enlarged philanthropy may not be in favor of both, unless his devotion to one should cause him to neglect the other. Extremes in any case are always wrong. It is rare to find that all the members of any association, untrammelled by interest, act solely from high moral principle and disinterested benevolence. The history of the world, civil, sacred and profane, shows that some men have, in all ages, espoused popular and benevolent causes, more or less influenced by prejudice or selfishness. Human nature, with its imperfections, remains the same. Ever since the adoption of the Constitution, the Government and people of this country, as a body, have pursued but one policy toward our race. In every contest between the great political parties we have been the losers. But this result it is reasonable to expect in a Republic whose Constitution guarantees protection alike to our peculiar and our free institutions---thus securing the rights and liberties of one class at the expense of the liberties of another. Besides this, Texas and all the States that have since come into the Union have surrounded us with political embarrassments. Every State that has lately revised or altered her Constitution has been more liberal in extending rights to the white and less se to the colored man. In view of these facts, I assume as a fixed principle that it is impossible for us to develop our moral and intellectual capacities as a distinct people, under our present social and political disabilities; and judging by the past and present state of things, there is no reason to hope that we can do it in this country in future . . . And, hence, we are driven to the conclusion that the friendly and mutual separation of the two races is not

68 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period only necessary to the peace, happiness and prosperity of both, but indispensable to the preservation of the one and the glory of the other. While we would thus promote the interests of two great continents, and build up another powerful Republic, as an asylum for the oppressed, we would, at the same time, gratify national prejudices. We should be the last to admit that the colored man here, by nature and birth, is inferior in intellect, but by education and circumstances he may be. We could name many moral and intelligent colored young men in New-York, Philadelphia, and Boston, whose talents and genius far excel our own, and those of a majority of the hundreds of Saxon students with whom we have at different times been associated---men who, if liberally educated, would operate like leaven on our whole people, waken responses in the unexplored regions of Africa, and pour new light on the Republic of letters---but who, for the want of means and an unchained intellect, will probably live and die unknown, unhonored and unsung . . . Whatever may have been the objections to Colonization in former times, I call upon colored people of this country to investigate the subject now under its present auspices. When I consider the kind of treatment they have received from their professed friends in America, I do not blame them in the past for exclaiming ‘‘God deliver us from our friends and we will take care of our enemies.’’ AUGUSTUS WASHINGTON Hartford, July 3, 1851

2.17 Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, 1852 Fellow Citizens, I am not wanting in respect for the fathers of this republic. The signers of the Declaration of Independence were brave men. They were great men, too---great enough to give frame to a great age. It does not often happen to a nation to raise, at one time, such a number of truly great men. The point from which I am compelled to view them is not, certainly, the most favorable; and yet I cannot contemplate their great deeds with less than admiration. They were statesmen, patriots and heroes, and for the good they did, and the principles they contended for, I will unite with you to honor their memory. . . . . . . Fellow-citizens, pardon me, allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here to-day? What have I, or those I represent, to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political

freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us? and am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits and express devout gratitude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us? Would to God, both for your sakes and ours, that an affirmative answer could be truthfully returned to these questions! Then would my task be light, and my burden easy and delightful. For who is there so cold, that a nation’s sympathy could not warm him? Who so obdurate and dead to the claims of gratitude, that would not thankfully acknowledge such priceless benefits? Who so stolid and selfish, that would not give his voice to swell the hallelujahs of a nation’s jubilee, when the chains of servitude had been torn from his limbs? I am not that man. In a case like that, the dumb might eloquently speak, and the ‘‘lame man leap as an hart.’’ But such is not the state of the case. I say it with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I am not included within the pale of glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. Do you mean, citizens, to mock me, by asking me to speak to-day? If so, there is a parallel to your conduct. And let me warn you that it is dangerous to copy the example of a nation whose crimes, towering up to heaven, were thrown down by the breath of the Almighty, burying that nation in irrevocable ruin! I can to-day take up the plaintive lament of a peeled and woe-smitten people! ‘‘By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down. Yea! we wept when we remembered Zion. We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof. For there, they that carried us away captive, required of us a song; and they who wasted us required of us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion. How can we sing the Lord’s song in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth.’’ Fellow-citizens, above your national, tumultuous joy, I hear the mournful wail of millions! whose chains, heavy and grievous yesterday, are, to-day, rendered more intolerable by the jubilee shouts that reach them.

2.17 Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro If I do forget, if I do not faithfully remember those bleeding children of sorrow this day, ‘‘may my right hand forget her cunning, and may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!’’ To forget them, to pass lightly over their wrongs, and to chime in with the popular theme, would be treason most scandalous and shocking, and would make me a reproach before God and the world. My subject, then, fellow-citizens, is American slavery. I shall see this day and its popular characteristics from the slave’s point of view. Standing there identified with the American bondman, making his wrongs mine, I do not hesitate to declare, with all my soul, that the character and conduct of this nation never looked blacker to me than on this 4th of July! Whether we turn to the declarations of the past, or to the professions of the present, the conduct of the nation seems equally hideous and revolting. America is false to the past, false to the present, and solemnly binds herself to be false to the future. Standing with God and the crushed and bleeding slave on this occasion, I will, in the name of humanity which is outraged, in the name of liberty which is fettered, in the name of the constitution and the Bible which are disregarded and trampled upon, dare to call in question and to denounce, with all the emphasis I can command, everything that serves to perpetuate slavery---the great sin and shame of America! ‘‘I will not equivocate; I will not excuse’’; I will use the severest language I can command; and yet not one word shall escape me that any man, whose judgment is not blinded by prejudice, or who is not at heart a slaveholder, shall not confess to be right and just. But I fancy I hear some one of my audience say, ‘‘It is just in this circumstance that you and your brother abolitionists fail to make a favorable impression on the public mind. Would you argue more, and denounce less; would you persuade more, and rebuke less; your cause would be much more likely to succeed.’’ But, I submit, where all is plain there is nothing to be argued. What point in the anti-slavery creed would you have me argue? On what branch of the subject do the people of this country need light? Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. There are seventytwo crimes in the State of Virginia which, if committed by a black man (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the punishment of death; while only two of the same crimes will subject a white man to the like punishment. What is this but the acknowledgment that the

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slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being? The manhood of the slave is conceded. It is admitted in the fact that Southern statute books are covered with enactments forbidding, under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read or to write. When you can point to any such laws in reference to the beasts of the field, then I may consent to argue the manhood of the slave. When the dogs in your streets, when the fowls of the air, when the cattle on your hills, when the fish of the sea, and the reptiles that crawl, shall be unable to distinguish the slave from a brute, then will I argue with you that the slave is a man! For the present, it is enough to affirm the equal manhood of the Negro race. Is it not astonishing that, while we are ploughing, planting, and reaping, using all kinds of mechanical tools, erecting houses, constructing bridges, building ships, working in metals of brass, iron, copper, silver and gold; that, while we are reading, writing and ciphering, acting as clerks, merchants and secretaries, having among us lawyers, doctors, ministers, poets, authors, editors, orators and teachers; that, while we are engaged in all manner of enterprises common to other men, digging gold in California, capturing the whale in the Pacific, feeding sheep and cattle on the hillside, living, moving, acting, thinking, planning, living in families as husbands, wives and children, and, above all, confessing and worshipping the Christian’s God, and looking hopefully for life and immortality beyond the grave, we are called upon to prove that we are men! Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? that he is the rightful owner of his own body? You have already declared it. Must I argue the wrongfulness of slavery? Is that a question for Republicans? Is it to be settled by the rules of logic and argumentation, as a matter beset with great difficulty, involving a doubtful application of the principle of justice, hard to be understood? How should I look to-day, in the presence of Americans, dividing, and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom? speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively. To do so, would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding. There is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven that does not know that slavery is wrong for him. What, am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of their liberty, to work them without wages, to keep them ignorant of their relations to their fellow men, to beat them with sticks, to flay their flesh with the lash, to load their limbs with irons, to hunt them with dogs, to sell them at auction, to sunder their families, to knock out their teeth, to burn their flesh, to starve them into obedience and submission to

70 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period their masters? Must I argue that a system thus marked with blood, and stained with pollution, is wrong? No! I will not. I have better employment for my time and strength than such arguments would imply. What, then, remains to be argued? Is it that slavery is not divine; that God did not establish it; that our doctors of divinity are mistaken? There is blasphemy in the thought. That which is inhuman, cannot be divine! Who can reason on such a proposition? They that can, may; I cannot. The time for such argument is passed. At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. O! had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, to-day, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke. For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake. The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced. What, to the American slave, is your 4th of July? I answer; a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your denunciation of tyrants, brass fronted impudence; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are, to Him, mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy---a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a nation on the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody than are the people of the United States, at this very hour. Go where you may, search where you will, roam through all the monarchies and despotisms of the Old World, travel through South America, search out every abuse, and when you have found the last, lay your facts by the side of the everyday practices of this nation, and you will say with me, that, for revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival. . . . . . . Allow me to say, in conclusion, notwithstanding the dark picture I have this day presented, of the state of the nation, I do not despair of this country. There are forces in operation which must inevitably work the downfall of slavery. ‘‘The arm of the Lord is not shortened,’’ and the doom of slavery is certain. I, therefore,

leave off where I began, with hope. While drawing encouragement from ‘‘the Declaration of Independence,’’ the great principles it contains, and the genius of American Institutions, my spirit is also cheered by the obvious tendencies of the age. Nations do not now stand in the same relation to each other that they did ages ago. No nation can now shut itself up from the surrounding world and trot round in the same old path of its fathers without interference. The time was when such could be done. Long established customs of hurtful character could formerly fence themselves in, and do their evil work with social impunity. Knowledge was then confined and enjoyed by the privileged few, and the multitude walked on in mental darkness. But a change has now come over the affairs of mankind. Walled cities and empires have become unfashionable. The arm of commerce has borne away the gates of the strong city. Intelligence is penetrating the darkest corners of the globe. It makes its pathway over and under the sea, as well as on the earth. Wind, steam, and lightning are its chartered agents. Oceans no longer divide, but link nations together. From Boston to London is now a holiday excursion. Space is comparatively annihilated.---Thoughts expressed on one side of the Atlantic are distinctly heard on the other. The far off and almost fabulous Pacific rolls in grandeur at our feet. The Celestial Empire, the mystery of ages, is being solved. The fiat of the Almighty, ‘‘Let there be Light,’’ has not yet spent its force. No abuse, no outrage whether in taste, sport or avarice, can now hide itself from the all-pervading light. The iron shoe, and crippled foot of China must be seen in contrast with nature. Africa must rise and put on her yet unwoven garment. ’Ethiopia, shall, stretch. out her hand unto God.’’ In the fervent aspirations of William Lloyd Garrison, I say, and let every heart join in saying it: God speed the year of jubilee The wide world o’er! When from their galling chains set free, Th’ oppress’d shall vilely bend the knee, And wear the yoke of tyranny Like brutes no more. That year will come, and freedom’s reign, To man his plundered rights again Restore. God speed the day when human blood Shall cease to flow! In every clime be understood, The claims of human brotherhood, And each return for evil, good,

2.18 Dred Scott v. Sandford Not blow for blow; That day will come all feuds to end, And change into a faithful friend Each foe. God speed the hour, the glorious hour, When none on earth Shall exercise a lordly power, Nor in a tyrant’s presence cower; But to all manhood’s stature tower, By equal birth! That hour will come, to each, to all, And from his Prison-house, to thrall Go forth. Until that year, day, hour, arrive, With head, and heart, and hand I’ll strive, To break the rod, and rend the gyve, The spoiler of his prey deprive--So witness Heaven! And never from my chosen post, Whate’er the peril or the cost, Be driven.

2.18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 [1856] Dred Scott PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JOHN F. A. SANDFORD (excerpt). ON A WRIT OF ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI DECISION REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. . . . The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution. It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the

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court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves . . . The situation of this population was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in social connections or in government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws. We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings . . . It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted. In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States . . . It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot make him a member of this community by making him a member of its own. And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or description of persons, who were not intended to be embraced in this

72 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period new political family, which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it. The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts? The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts. It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded. It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States. And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or

citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms. In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion . . . The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive: It begins by declaring that, ‘‘when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.’’ It then proceeds to say: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’’

2.18 Dred Scott v. Sandford The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation. Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men---high in literary acquirements---high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection. This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language . . . But there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed. One of these clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves until the year 1808, if it thinks proper. And the importation which it thus sanctions was unquestionably of persons of the race of which we are speaking, as the traffic in slaves in the United States had always been confined to them. And by the other provision the States pledge themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master, by delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found within their respective territories. By the first above-mentioned clause, therefore, the right to purchase and hold this

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property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty years by the people who framed the Constitution. And by the second, they pledge themselves to maintain and uphold the right of the master in the manner specified, as long as the Government they then formed should endure. And these two provisions show, conclusively, that neither the description of persons therein referred to, nor their descendants, were embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution; for certainly these two clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen . . . Indeed, when we look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be extended to them. It is very true, that in that portion of the Union where the labor of the negro race was found to be unsuited to the climate and unprofitable to the master, but few slaves were held at the time of the Declaration of Independence; and when the Constitution was adopted, it had entirely worn out in one of them, and measures had been taken for its gradual abolition in several others. But this change had not been produced by any change of opinion in relation to this race; but because it was discovered, from experience, that slave labor was unsuited to the climate and productions of these States: for some of the States, where it had ceased or nearly ceased to exist, were actively engaged in the slave trade, procuring cargoes on the coast of Africa, and transporting them for sale to those parts of the Union where their labor was found to be profitable, and suited to the climate and productions. And this traffic was openly carried on, and fortunes accumulated by it, without reproach from the people of the States where they resided. And it can hardly be supposed that, in the States where it was then countenanced in its worst form---that is, in the seizure and transportation--the people could have regarded those who were emancipated as entitled to equal rights with themselves . . . It is impossible, it would seem, to believe that the great men of the slaveholding States, who took so large a share in framing the Constitution of the United States, and exercised so much influence in procuring its adoption, could have been so forgetful or regardless of their own safety and the safety of those who trusted and confided in them . . . This brings us to examine by what provision of the Constitution the present Federal Government, under its delegated and restricted powers, is authorized to acquire territory outside of the original limits of the

74 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period United States, and what powers it may exercise therein over the person or property of a citizen of the United States, while it remains a Territory, and until it shall be admitted as one of the States of the Union. There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States. That power is plainly given; and if a new State is admitted, it needs no further legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself defines the relative rights and powers, and duties of the State, and the citizens of the State, and the Federal Government. But no power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character. And indeed the power exercised by Congress to acquire territory and establish a Government there, according to its own unlimited discretion, was viewed with great jealousy by the leading statesmen of the day. And in the Federalist (No. 38) written by Mr. Madison, he speaks of the acquisition of the Northwestern Territory by the confederated States, by the cession from Virginia, and the establishment of a Government there, as an exercise of power not warranted by the Articles of Confederation, and dangerous to the liberties of the people. And he urges the adoption of the Constitution as a security and safeguard against such an exercise of power. We do not mean, however, to question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all the departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority; and as the propriety of admitting a new State is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power to acquire territory for that purpose, to be held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition to become a State upon an equal footing with the other States, must rest upon the same discretion. It is a question for the political department of the Government, and not the judicial . . . Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed that citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the General Government, and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to impose.

The principle upon which our Governments rest, and upon which alone they continue to exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent within their own limits in their internal and domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a General Government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of the several States, and exercising supreme authority within the scope of the powers granted to it, throughout the dominion of the United States . . . At the time when the Territory in question was obtained by cession from France, it contained no population fit to be associated together and admitted as a State; and it therefore was absolutely necessary to hold possession of it, as a Territory belonging to the United States, until it was settled and inhabited by a civilized community capable of self-government, and in a condition to be admitted on equal terms with the other States as a member of the Union. But, as we have before said, it was acquired by the General Government, as the representative and trustee of the people of the United States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their common and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States, acting through their agent and representative, the Federal Government, who in fact acquired the Territory in question, and the Government holds it for their common use until it shall be associated with the other States as a member of the Union. But until that time arrives, it is undoubtedly necessary that some Government should be established, in order to organize society, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property; and as the people of the United States could act in this matter only through the Government which represented them, and the through which they spoke and acted when the Territory was obtained, it was not only within the scope of its powers, but it was its duty to pass such laws and establish such a Government as would enable those by whose authority they acted to reap the advantages anticipated from its acquisition, and to gather there a population which would enable it to assume the position to which it was destined among the States of the Union. The power to acquire necessarily carries with it the power to preserve and apply to the purposes for which it was acquired. The form of government to be established necessarily rested in the discretion of Congress. It was their duty to establish the one that would be best suited for the protection and security of the citizens of the United States, and other inhabitants who might be authorized to take up their abode there, and that must always depend upon the existing condition of the Territory, as to the number and character of its

2.19 William Lloyd Garrison, Dred Scott and Disunion inhabitants, and their situation in the Territory. In some cases a Government, consisting of persons appointed by the Federal Government, would best subserve the interests of the Territory, when the inhabitants were few and scattered, and new to one another. In other instances, it would be more advisable to commit the powers of self-government to the people who had settled in the Territory, as being the most competent to determine what was best for their own interests. But some form of civil authority would be absolutely necessary to organize and preserve civilized society, and prepare it to become a State; and what is the best form must always depend on the condition of the Territory at the time, and the choice of the mode must depend upon the exercise of a discretionary power by Congress, acting within the scope of its constitutional authority, and not infringing upon the rights of person or rights of property of the citizen who might go there to reside, or for any other lawful purpose. It was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it must be held and governed in like manner, until it is fitted to be a State. But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and form of Government. The powers of the Government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. And when the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal Government enters into possession in the character impressed upon it by those who created it. It enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own existence, and by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it; and it cannot, when it enters a Territory of the United States, put off its character, and assume discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it. It cannot create for itself a new character separated from the citizens of the United States, and the duties it owes them under the provisions of the Constitution. The Territory being a part of the United States, the Government and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights defined and marked out; and the Federal Government can exercise no power over his person or property, beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved . . . It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference between property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States. And

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the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which Governments may exercise over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument. . . . if the Constitution recognises the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government. Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words---too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights. We have so far examined the case, as it stands under the Constitution of the United States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal Government . . . Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

2.19 William Lloyd Garrison, Dred Scott and Disunion, March 12, 1858 We are here to enter our indignant protest against the Dred Scott decision---against the infamous Fugitive Slave Law---against all unjust and oppressive enactments, with reference to complexional distinctions---

76 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period against the alarming aggressions of the Slave Power upon the rights of the people of the North---and especially against the existence of the slave system at the South, from which all these have naturally sprung, as streams of lava from a burning volcano. We are here to reiterate the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence, and to call for their practical enforcement throughout our land. We are here to declare that the men who, like CRISPUS ATTUCKS, were ready to lay down their lives to secure American Independence, and the blessings of liberty---who, in every period of our history, at all times, and in all parts of the country, on the land and on the sea, have ever been prompt in the hour of peril to fill ‘‘the deadly, imminent breach,’’ pour out their blood like water, and repel the minions of foreign tyranny from our shores---are not the men to be denied the claims of human nature, or the rights of citizenship. Alas! what have they reaped for all their patriotic toils and sufferings but contumely, proscription, ostracism? O, shame on this cruelly unjust and most guilty nation! I trust in God that no colored men will ever again be found ready to fight under its banner, however great the danger that may menace it from abroad, until their rights are first secured, and every slave be set free. If they have no scruples in using the sword in defence of liberty, let them at least refuse to draw it in behalf of those who despise and oppress them. Our work is before us. It is to disseminate light---to change public opinion---to plead every man with his neighbor---to insist upon justice---to demand equal rights---to ‘‘crush out’’ slavery wherever it exists in the land. Let Massachusetts lead the van. Let her be true to the cause of freedom, cost what it may. She has done well in saying that the Fugitive Slave Law shall not be executed on her soil---at least, not without the intervention of a jury trial. That is one step in the right direction. She has decreed, that none of her official servants shall at the same time be a Slave Commissioner under the United States; and hence the duty of removing Judge Loring for disobedience and contumacy. I am confident we shall all soon have the satisfaction of seeing him walk the plank overboard. (Loud cheering.) But there is one thing more to be done. Massachusetts must not tolerate a slave-hunter on her soil---nor a Slave Commissioner---nor allow a human being to be put on trial to decide whether he has a right to himself, or is the property of another---but she must transform every slave into a free man as soon as he comes within her borders. (Renewed cheering.) We shall be told that this is equivalent to a dissolution of the Union. Be it so! Give us Disunion with

liberty and a good conscience, rather than Union with slavery and moral degradation. What! shall we shake hands with those who buy, sell, torture, and horribly imbrute their fellow-creatures, and trade in human flesh! God forbid! Every man should respect himself too much to keep such company. We must break this wicked affiance with men-stealers, or all is lost. By all the sacred memories of the past---by all that was persistent, courageous, unconquerable in the great struggle for American Independence---by the blood of ATTUCKS and his martyred associates in King Street---by the death of WARREN and the patriotic slain on Bunker Hill---by the still higher and better examples of ancient apostles and martyrs---let us here renew our solemn pledge, that, come what may, we will not lay down our arms until liberty is proclaimed throughout all the land, to all the inhabitants thereof. (Pro-longed applause.)

2.20 John Brown, Speech to the Court at His Trial, November 2, 1859 I have, may it please the court, a few words to say. In the first place, I deny everything but what I have all along admitted---the design on my part to free the slaves. I intended certainly to have made a clean thing of that matter, as I did last winter when I went into Missouri and there took slaves without the snapping of a gun on either side, moved them through the country, and finally left them in Canada. I designed to have done the same thing again on a larger scale. That was all I intended. I never did intend murder, or treason, or the destruction of property, or to excite or incite slaves to rebellion, or to make insurrection. I have another objection; and that is, it is unjust that I should suffer such a penalty. Had I interfered in the manner which I admit, and which I admit has been fairly proved (for I admire the truthfulness and candor of the greater portion of the witnesses who have testified in this case)---had I so interfered in behalf of the rich, the powerful, the intelligent, the so-called great, or in behalf of any of their friends---either father, mother, brother, sister, wife, or children, or any of that class---and suffered and sacrificed what I have in this interference, it would have been all right; and every man in this court would have deemed it an act worthy of reward rather than punishment. This court acknowledges, as I suppose, the validity of the law of God. I see a book kissed here which I suppose to be the Bible, or at least the New Testament. That teaches me that all things whatsoever I would that men should do to me, I should do even so to them. It teaches

2.21 William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance me, further, to ‘‘remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them.’’ I endeavored to act up to that instruction. I say I am yet too young to understand that God is any respecter of persons. I believe that to have interfered as I have done---as I have always freely admitted I have done---in behalf of His despised poor was not wrong, but right. Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my blood further with the blood of my children and with the blood of millions in this slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments---I submit; so let it be done! Let me say one word further. I feel entirely satisfied with the treatment I have received on my trial. Considering all the circumstances it has been more generous than I expected. But I feel no consciousness of guilt. I have stated that from the first what was my intention and what was not. I never had any design against the life of any person, nor any disposition to commit treason, or excite slaves to rebel, or make any general insurrection. I never encouraged any man to do so, but always discouraged any idea of that kind. Let me say also a word in regard to the statements made by some of those connected with me. I her it has been stated by some of them that I have induced them to join me. But the contrary is true. I do not say this to injure them, but as regretting their weakness. There is not one of them but joined me of his own accord, and the greater part of them at their own expense. A number of them I never saw, and never had a word of conversation with till the day they came to me; and that was for the purpose I have stated. Now I have done. Note: This was John Brown’s last speech during his trial by the Commonwealth of Virginia in Charles Town, Virginia (now part of West Virginia). Brown was executed December 2, 1859. An interesting fact of history is that, on the evening before Brown was executed, a group of soldiers slept in the courtroom. One of them was John Wilkes Booth. Brown was, of course, executed for seizing the federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry in October 1859 for the purpose of arming slaves for an insurrection.

2.21 William Lloyd Garrison, John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, December 16, 1859 A word upon the subject of Peace. I am a non-resistant---a believer in the inviolability of human life, under

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all circumstances; I, therefore, in the name of God, disarm John Brown, and every slave at the South. But I do not stop there; if I did, I should be a monster. I also disarm, in the name of God, every slaveholder and tyrant in the world. (Loud applause.) For wherever that principle is adopted, all fetters must instantly melt, and there can be no oppressed, and no oppressor, in the nature of things. How many agree with me in regard to the doctrine of the inviolability of human life? How many non-resistants are there here to-night? (A single voice---‘‘I.’’) There is one! (Laughter.) Well, then, you who are otherwise are not the men to point the finger at John Brown, and cry ‘‘traitor’’---judging you by your own standard. (Applause.) Nevertheless, I am a non-resistant, and I not only desire, but have labored unremittingly to effect the peaceful abolition of slavery, by an appeal to the reason and conscience of the slaveholder; yet, as a peace man---an ‘‘ultra’’ peace man---I am prepared to say, ‘‘Success to every slave insurrection at the South, and in every slave country.’’ (Enthusiastic applause.) And I do not see how I compromise or stain my peace profession in making that declaration. Whenever there is a contest between the oppressed and the oppressor,---the weapons being equal between the parties,---God knows that my heart must be with the oppressed, and always against the oppressor. Therefore, whenever commenced, I cannot but wish success to all slave insurrections. (Loud applause.) I thank God when men who believe in the right and duty of wielding carnal weapons are so far advanced that they will take those weapons out of the scale of despotism, and throw them into the scale of freedom. It is an indication of progress, and a positive moral growth; it is one way to get up to the sublime platform of non-resistance; and it is God’s method of dealing retribution upon the head of the tyrant. Rather than see men wearing their chains in a cowardly and servile spirit, I would, as an advocate of peace, much rather see them breaking the head of the tyrant with their chains. Give me, as a non-resistant, Bunker Hill, and Lexington, and Concord, rather than the cowardice and servility of a Southern slave plantation. The verdict of the world, whether ‘‘resistance to tyrants is obedience to God,’’ has been rendered in the affirmative in every age and clime. Whether the weapons used in the struggle against despotism have been spiritual or carnal, that verdict has been this: Glory to those who die in Freedom’s cause! Courts, judges, can inflict no brand of shame, Or shape of death, to shroud them from applause! No, manglers of the martyr’s earthly frame,

78 The Age of Jackson and the Antebellum Period Your hangmen fingers cannot touch his fame! Long trains of ill may pass, unheeded, dumb--But Vengeance is behind, and Justice is to come! (Loud applause.) We have been warmly sympathizing with John Brown all the way through, from the time of his arrest till now. Now he no longer needs our sympathy, for he is beyond suffering, and wears the victor’s crown. Are we to grow morbid over his death, to indulge in sentimental speech, to content ourselves with an outburst of emotional feeling, and not to come up to the work of abolishing slavery? I confess, I am somewhat apprehensive in regard to this powerful and wide-spread excitement, lest there may follow an exhaustion of the system, a disastrous reaction, in consequence of neglecting to make it directly subservient to the cause of emancipation by earnest and self-sacrificing effort. I see in every slave on the Southern plantation a living John Brown---one to be sympathized with far more than ever John Brown needed sympathy, whether in the jail or on the scaffold at Charlestown. I see four millions of living John Browns needing our thoughts, our sympathies, our prayers, our noblest exertions to strike off their fetters. And, by God’s help, will we not do it? What can we do? I do not know that we can do any thing for Virginia. She seems past all salvation---to have been ‘‘given over to believe a lie that she may be damned.’’ But here we stand, with our feet upon the old Pilgrim ground; and I ask the sons of the Fathers, are we not competent to make the old Bay State free to all who tread its soil? (Enthusiastic applause.) Are we to have another Anthony Burns rendition? (‘‘No!’’ ‘‘No!’’) Shall we allow any more slave-hunting from Berkshire to Barnstable? (‘‘No!’’ ‘‘No!’’) No? How, then, will you prevent it? You must make that decree a matter of record, through your representatives in the State House; and if you want to do an effectual work tomorrow, and to consummate John Brown’s object as far as you can, see to it that you put your names to the petition to the Legislature, now in circulation, asking that body to declare that, henceforth, no human being shall be regarded, tried or treated as a slave within the limits of this Commonwealth. (Immense applause.) But that is ‘‘treason,’’ (laughter,) and John Brown was a ‘‘traitor.’’ The Boston Post and the Boston Courier are very anxious to discover who were the instigators of the Harper’s Ferry rebellion. Most disinterested and patriotic journals! When you read any of their editorials on this subject, just look at the bottom and see in staring capitals---‘‘SOLD TO THE DEVIL, AND PAID FOR.’’ (Laughter and applause.) Who instigated John Brown? Let us see. It must have been Patrick Henry, who said---and he was a Virginian---‘‘Give me liberty, or give me death!’’ Why do they

not dig up his bones, and give them to the consuming fire, to show their abhorrence of his memory? It must have been Thomas Jefferson---another Virginian---who said of the bondage of the Virginia slaves, that ‘‘one hour of it is fraught with more misery than ages of that which our fathers rose in rebellion to oppose’’---and who, as the author of the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed it to be ‘‘a SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH, that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with AN INALIENABLE RIGHT TO LIBERTY.’’ (Applause.) Beyond all question, it must have been VIRGINIA HERSELF, who, by her coat of arms, with its terrible motto, ‘‘Sic semper tyrannis,’’ asserts the right of the oppressed to trample their oppressors beneath their feet, and, if necessary, consign them to a bloody grave! Herein John Brown found the strongest incitement and the fullest justification. Who instigated the deed at Harper’s Ferry? The people whose motto is, ‘‘Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God’’---and whose exulting talk is of Bunker Hill and Yorktown, and the deeds of their REVOLUTIONARY sires! Nay, we must go back to the source of life itself:---‘‘So God created man in his own image; male and female created he them.’’ Thus making an ‘‘irrepressible conflict’’ between the soul of man and tyranny from the beginning, and confirming what Lord Brougham so eloquently uttered years ago---‘‘Tell me not of rights; talk not of the property of the planter in his slaves. I deny the right; I acknowledge not the property. The principles, the feelings of our nature rise in rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to the understanding or to the heart, the sentence is the same that rejects it. In vain you tell me of laws that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments of human codes---the same throughout the world, the same in all time---it is the law written by the finger of God upon the heart of man; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men despise fraud, and loathe rapine, and abhor blood, they will reject with indignation the wild and guilty phantasy that man can hold property in man.’’ (Loud applause.) We have a natural right, therefore, to seek the abolition of slavery throughout the globe. It is our special duty to make Massachusetts free soil, so that the moment the fugitive slave stands upon it, he shall take his place in the ranks of the free. God commands us to ‘‘hide the outcast, and bewray not him that wandereth.’’ I say, LET THE WILL OF GOD BE DONE! That is ‘‘the head and front’’ of my ‘‘fanaticism’’! That is the extent of my ‘‘infidelity’’! That comprehends all of my ‘‘treason’’! THE WILL OF GOD BE DONE! (Great applause.)

Section 3 The Civil War and Reconstruction

Introduction

almost as daunting as the four years of fighting. Reconstruction confronted national political leaders with three divisive issues: (1) the terms for readmitting secessionist southern states to the Union; (2) the political, legal, and economic status of African Americans in the occupied South; and (3) the civil status of former leaders of the Confederacy. Conflict over these issues triggered fierce struggles between the presidency and Congress in Washington as well as violent resistance and antiblack terrorism in many southern states. White southern Democrats defeated Republican opponents and took control of their states during the 1870s, leading to a so-called redemption of the South that left African Americans disenfranchised and subject to draconian racial segregation, economic marginalization, and white intimidation and violence. Reconstruction effectively ended when President Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican who lost the popular vote in 1876 but still gained the White House through controversial means, agreed to remove federal troops from the South. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The Civil War was the greatest challenge to the survival and character of the American constitutional order. For Abraham Lincoln and his political allies, the unprecedented and gruesome struggle to preserve that order raised fundamental questions about the meaning of liberal democracy and demanded no less than a transformation of American political and social life. ‘‘Fellowcitizens, we cannot escape history,’’ Lincoln told the public in December of 1862. ‘‘In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free---honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best, hope of earth.’’ His vision of a ‘‘new birth of freedom’’ would find expression in new constitutional obligations of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment granting all Americans the ‘‘privileges and immunities of citizenship,’’ ‘‘due process,’’ and ‘‘equal protection of the law;’’ and the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteeing African Americans the right to vote. Yet the difficulties of reconstructing the Union proved

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Documents

When their in-dependence was achieved, and it became necessary for them to crystallize their several powers into one general government, instead of abolishing what Mr. Madison’ justly characterized as ‘‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man,’’ they proceeded to make that oppression organic, by granting to it certain constitutional guaranties, whereby it should derive nourishment, defence and security from the whole body politic. This was the result of a compromise, in order to make the Union complete and enduring. . . . What shall be said, then, of those who insist upon ignoring the question of slavery as not involved in this deadly feud, and maintain that the only issue is, the support of the government and the preservation of the Union? Surely, they are ‘‘fools and blind’’; for it is slaveholders alone who have conspired to seize the one, and overturn the other. As long as the enslavement of a single human being is sanctioned in the land, the curse of God will rest upon it. That it may go well with us, let us break every yoke! It alters nothing to say, that the South is guilty of unparalleled perfidy and treason. Granted! But why overlook the cause of all this? That cause is SLAVERY! If that be not removed, how is it possible to escape the consequences? Suppose we succeed in ‘‘conquering a peace,’’ leaving things as they were; in due time, a still more fearful volcanic explosion will follow. As between the North and the South, the conflict cannot long be doubtful; for, in point of numbers, resources, energy, courage, and valor, the latter can

3.1 William Lloyd Garrison, The War---Its Cause and Cure, May 3, 1861 Eighty-five years ago, the war-cry of ‘‘INDEPENDENCE’’ rang throughout all the American Colonies, and a united people took up arms to sunder their connection forever with the mother country. The latter had been guilty of a long series of aggressions and usurpations toward the former, indicating ‘‘a design to reduce them under absolute bondage,’’ and had haughtily disregarded all appeals to her sense of justice. As between the parties, they were in the right, and she flagrantly in the wrong. On the 4th of July, 1776, in justification of their course, they published their world-famous Declaration of Independence, in which they held ‘‘these truths to be self-evident:---that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’’ At that time, they held in the galling chains of chattel servitude half a million of slaves! By the standard which they had erected, and by the eternal law of justice, their first duty obviously was to ‘‘proclaim liberty throughout all the land to all the inhabitants thereof.’’ Instead of doing this, they went through their seven years’ struggle, mingling the clanking of fetters, and the crack of the slave whip, and the groans of their imbruted victims with their cries for liberty and their shouts of victory! It was a revolting spectacle, and a horrible paradox, admitting of no justification, or even apology.

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82 The Civil War and Reconstruction bear no comparison with the former. But, after the subjugation of the South, what then? Will that bring reconciliation? Is the old ‘‘covenant with death’’ to be renewed, and the ‘‘agreement with hell’’ to stand as hitherto? Is a slave representation still to be allowed on the floor of Congress? Are fugitive slaves still to be hunted as freely in the old Bay State as in Carolina? Are slave insurrections still to be quelled by the strong arm of the general government, if required? Are the ‘‘stars and stripes’’ still to represent fifteen slave as well as nineteen free States, and still to wave over four millions of crouching, marketable human chattels? Is lynch law still to be administered to all Northern men at the South who prefer freedom to slavery? Is freedom of speech still to be mobbed afresh, and the moral agitation for the overthrow of slavery again branded as fanaticism, and forcibly suppressed if possible? If so, then better that the flag be forever furled! If so, then accursed be such a political structure, from foundation to top-stone! If so, then hundreds of millions of dollars will have been spent, and rivers of blood shed, to none other than an evil purpose! It is true, Mr. Stephen A. Douglas says, in a recent speech delivered at Columbus, Ohio---‘‘The issue is not the negro; this question is above all the negroes in Christendom; it involves the freedom and independence of the ten millions, soon to be a hundred millions, of free white men in this valley.’’ Other prominent men have uttered the same heartless and absurd declaration. As rationally might Pharaoh and the Egyptians have averred, while tormented with the lice, blains, murrain, and other judgments sent upon them for their cruel oppression of the children of Israel, ‘‘The issue is not the Jew’’! It was the Jew then, and it is the negro now---involving in his enslavement the most tremendous consequences to his enslavers, and a direful visitation to the whole country. ‘‘For the oppression of the poor, for the sighing of the needy, now will I arise, saith the Lord; I will set him in safety from him that puffeth at him. ’’ Ours should be the penitent confession of the brethren of Joseph: ‘‘We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear; THEREFORE IS THIS DISTRESS COME UPON US.’’ Now, we solemnly maintain, that it is the most deplorable infatuation to aim to restore the old order of things. No blessing can attend it. God has frowned upon it, and, through judgment, provided a way of escape. Nothing is more clear than that an ‘‘irrepressible conflict’’ between slavery and freedom must continue. It is useless to deny that the Union is dissolved,

and every slave State virtually in rebellion against the government. Let there be no more compromise. In humbling the Southern conspirators, let the government, UNDER THE WAR POWER, either proclaim emancipation to all in bondage, or else take measures for a final and complete separation between the free and slave States. Unquestionably, the former course would be justified by the exigencies of the country, and be the readiest way to bring the war to a close, and the traitors to terms. It would also be the greatest boon that could possibly be bestowed upon the South. But if this measure be deemed questionable, then for a free, independent Northern republic, leaving the South to her fate! Out of the slave system comes this terrible civil war, with whatever ghastly horrors may follow in its train. So Divine Justice has ordered it, that both North and South may be scourged for their transcendant [sic] iniquity in tolerating such a system in the land. Is it not so, Mr. Edward Everett, Mr. Millard Fillmore, Mr. Franklin Pierce, Mr. Stephen Arnold Douglas---Democrats and Republicans all? Say, are they freemen or slaveholders who have perfidiously captured forts, arsenals, magazines, mints, revenue cutters, steamships, and custom-houses, and are now plotting the seizure of the Capital? Men of the North! is it not your mission, in this campaign, to make it possible for a free government and a glorious Union to exist, by decreeing the extinction of slavery as utterly antagonistical to both? No class of human beings living have such claims upon your sympathy, justice, and benevolent intervention, as the slaves of the South. No cause is so sacred as theirs. In Heaven’s name, do nothing to keep them longer in their chains! Do everything rightfully in your power those chains to sunder! If this war shall put an end to that execrable system, it will be more glorious in history than that of the Revolution. If it shall leave it unscathed, and in full operation,---even though Southern treason may for a time be ‘‘crushed out,’’---there will be nothing to look for but heavier judgments and an irrevocable doom! ‘‘For the sword of the Lord shall devour from the one end of the land to the other: no flesh shall have peace. . . . O house of David, thus saith the Lord, Execute judgment in the morning, and deliver him that is spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor, lest my fury go out like fire, and burn that none can quench it, BECAUSE OF THE EVIL OF YOUR DOINGS. . . . Undo the heavy burdens, break every yoke, and let the oppressed go free; then shalt thou be like a watered garden, and like a fountain whose waters fail not; and they that shall be of thee shall build the old waste places; thou shalt be called,

3.2 Jefferson Davis, Farewell Speech on the Senate Floor THE REPAIRER OF THE BREACH, THE RESTORER OF PATHS TO DWELL IN.’’

3.2 Jefferson Davis, Farewell Speech on the Senate Floor, January 21, 1861 I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion does not invite me to go into argument; and my physical condition would not permit me to do so, if it were otherwise; and yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of the State I here represent on an occasion as solemn as this. It is known to Senators who have served with me here that I have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of State sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the Union. Therefore, if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation, or without an existing necessity, I should still, under my theory of the Government, because of my allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have been bound by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled them then that, if the state of things which they apprehended should exist when their Convention met, they should take the action which they have now adopted. I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligation by the nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union, against the agent of the States. It is only to be justified when the agent has violated his constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to judge for itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals to the other states of the Union for a decision; but, when the States themselves and when the people of the States have so acted as to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, then, and then

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for the first time, arises the doctrine of secession in its practical application. A great man who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often been arraigned for want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deepseated attachment to the Union---his determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other States---that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only to be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the States for their judgement. Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be justified upon the basis that the states are sovereign. There was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent whomsoever. I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise; and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this last occasion, to present to the Senate. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession that the name of a great man whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth has been invoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase, ‘‘to execute the laws,’’ was an expression which General Jackson applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States, and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms---at least, it is a great mis-apprehension of the case---which cites that expression for application to a State which has withdrawn from the Union. You may make war on a foreign state. If it be the purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a State which has withdrawn from the Union; but there are no laws of the United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded State. A State, finding herself in the condition in which Mississippi has judged she is---in which her safety requires that she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the Union---surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be many), deprives herself of the advantages (and they are

84 The Civil War and Reconstruction known to be great), severs all the ties of affection (and they are close and enduring), which have bound her to the Union; and thus divesting herself of every benefit---taking upon herself every burden---she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her limits. I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not influenced in my opinions because the case is my own, I refer to that time and that occasion as containing the opinion which I then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I then said that if Massachusetts---following her purpose through a stated line of conduct---chose to take the last step, which separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but I will say to her, Godspeed, in memory of the kind associations which once existed between her and the other States. It has been a conviction of pressing necessity---it has been a belief that we are to be deprived in the Union of the rights which our fathers bequeathed to us---which has brought Mississippi to her present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions; and the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to maintain the position of the equality of the races. That Declaration is to be construed by the circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The communities were declaring their independence; the people of those communities were asserting that no man was born---to use the language of Mr. Jefferson---booted and spurred, to ride over the rest of mankind; that men were created equal---meaning the men of the political community; that there was no divine right to rule; that no man inherited the right to govern; that there were no classes by which power and place descended to families; but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each member of the body politic. These were the great principles they announced; these were the purposes for which they made their declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how happened it that among the items of arraignment against George III was that he endeavored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our slaves? Had the Declaration announced that the

negroes were free and equal, how was the prince to be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their connection with the mother-country? When our Constitution was formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we find provision made for that very class of persons as property; they were not put upon the equality of footing with white men---not even upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion of three-fifths. So stands the compact which binds us together. Then, Senators, we recur to the principles upon which our Government was founded; and when you deny them, and when you deny us the right to withdraw from a Government which, thus perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our independence and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility to others, not to injure any section of the country, not even for our own pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solemn motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children. I find in myself perhaps a type of the general feeling of my constituents towards yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward you, Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you, whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom I cannot now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well; and such, I feel, is the feeling of the people whom I represent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel that I but express their desire when I say I hope, and they hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part. They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring disaster on every portion of the country, and, if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and thus, putting our trust in God and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may. In the course of my service here, associated at different times with a variety of Senators, I see now around me some with whom I have served long; there have been points of collision, but, whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has

3.4 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address 85 not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unencumbered by the remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury offered. Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to bid you a final adieu.

3.3 The Homestead Act, May 20, 1862 AN ACT to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain. Be it enacted, That any person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who shall have filed his declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws of the United States, and who has never borne arms against the United States Government or given aid and comfort to its enemies, shall, from and after the first of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be entitled to enter one quarter-section or a less quantity of unappropriated public lands, upon which said person may have filed a pre-emption claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, be subject to pre-emption at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or less, per acre; or eighty acres or less of such unappropriated lands, at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, to be located in a body, in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public lands, and after the same shall have been surveyed: Provided, That any person owning or residing on land may, under the provisions of this act, enter other land lying contiguous to his or her said land, which shall not, with the land so already owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate one hundred and sixty acres. Sec. 2. That the person applying for the benefit of this act shall, upon application to the register of the land office in which he or she is about to make such entry, make affidavit before the said register or receiver that he or she is the head of a family, or is twenty-one or more years of age, or shall have performed service in the Army or Navy of the United States, and that he has never borne arms against the Government of the United States or given aid and comfort to its enemies, and that such application is made for his or her exclusive use and benefit, and that said entry is made for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not, either directly or indirectly, for the use or benefit of

any other person or persons whomsoever; and upon filing the said affidavit with the register or receiver, and on payment of ten dollars, he or she shall thereupon he permitted to enter the quantity of land specified: Provided, however, That no certificate shall be given or patent issued therefor until the expiration of five years from the date of such entry; and if, at the expiration of such time, or at any time within two years thereafter, the person making such entry---or if he be dead, his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs or devisee; or in case of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in case of her death---shall prove by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the affidavit aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States; then, in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time a citizen of the United States, shall be entitled to a patent, as in other cases provided for by law: And provided, further, That in case of the death of both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children under twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall inure to the benefit of said infant child or children, and the executor, administrator, or guardian may, at any time within two years after the death of the surviving parent, and in accordance with the laws of the State in which such children for the time being have their domicile, sell said land for the benefit of said infants, but for no other purpose; and the purchaser shall acquire the absolute title by the purchase, and be entitled to a patent from the United States, and payment of the office fees and sum of money herein specified. Source: www.geocities.com/Heartland/Bluffs/ 3010/homestd

3.4 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 1863 Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

86 The Civil War and Reconstruction But in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead who struggled here have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us---that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion---that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.

3.5 Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863 Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit: ‘‘That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. ‘‘That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.’’

Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixtythree, and in accordance with my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth[)], and which excepted parts, are for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight

3.6 Frederick Douglass, The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America 87 hundred and sixty three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh. By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

3.6 Frederick Douglass, The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America, June 1863 . . . You and I have witnessed many attempts to put this Negro question out of the pale of popular thought and discussion, and have seen the utter vanity of all such attempts.---It has baffled all the subtle contrivances of an ease loving and selfish priesthood, and has constantly refused to be smothered under the soft cushions of a canting and heartless religion. It has mocked and defied the compromising cunning of so called statesmen, who would have gladly postponed our present troubles beyond our allotted space of life and bequeath them as a legacy of sorrow to our children. But this wisdom of the crafty is confounded and their counsels brought to naught. A divine energy, omniscient and omnipotent, acting through the silent, solemn and all pervading laws of the universe, irresistible, unalterable and eternal, has ever more forced this mighty question of the Negro upon the attention of the country and the world. What shall be done with the Negro? meets us not only in the street, in the Church, in the Senate, and in our State Legislatures; but in our diplomatic correspondence with foreign nations, and even on the field of battle, where our brave sons and brothers are striking for Liberty and country, or for honored graves. This question met us before the war; it meets us during the war, and will certainly meet us after the war, unless we shall have the wisdom, the courage, and the nobleness of soul to settle the status of the Negro, on the solid and immovable bases of Eternal justice. I stand here tonight therefore, to advocate what I conceive to be such a solid basis, one that shall fix our peace upon a rock. Putting aside all the hay, wood and stubble of expediency, I shall advocate for the Negro, his most full and complete adoption into the great national family of America. I shall demand for him the most perfect civil and political equality, and that he shall enjoy all the rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by any other members of the body politic. I weigh my words and I mean all I say, when I contend as I do contend, that this is the only solid, and final

solution of the problem before us. It is demanded not less by the terrible exigencies of the nation, than by the Negro himself for the Negro and the nation, are to rise or fall, be killed or cured, saved or lost together. Save the Negro and you save the nation, destroy the Negro and you destroy the nation, and to save both you must have but one great law of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity for all Americans without respect to color. . . . we have had sixty years of compromising servility on the part of the North to the slave power of the South. We have dishonored our manhood and lied in our throats to defend the monstrous abomination. Yet this greedy slave power, with every day of his shameless truckling on our part became more and more exacting, unreasonable, arrogant and domineering, until it has plunged the country into a war such as the world never saw before, and I hope never will see again. Having now tried, with fearful results, the wisdom of reputed wise men, it is now quite time that the American people began to view this question in the light of other ideas than the cold and selfish ones which have hitherto enjoyed the reputation of being wise and practicable, but which are now proved to be entirely and absolutely impracticable. The progress of the nation downward has been rapid as all steps down-ward are apt to be. First. We found the Golden Rule impracticable. Second. We found the Declaration of Independence very broadly impracticable. Third. We found the Constitution of the United States, requiring that the majority shall rule, is impracticable. Fourth. We found that the union was impracticable. The golden rule did not hold the slave tight enough. The Constitution did not hold the slave tight enough. The Declaration of Independence did not hold the slave at all, and the union was a loose affair and altogether impracticable. Even the Democratic party bowed and squatted lower than all other parties, became at last weak and impracticable, and the slaveholders broke it up as they would an abolition meeting. Nevertheless: I am aware that there are such things as practicable and impracticable, and I will not ignore the objections, which may be raised against the policy which I would have the nation adopt and carry out toward my enslaved and oppressed fellow countrymen. . . . Now, I hold that there is but one way of wisely disposing of the colored race, and that is to do them right and justice. It is not only to break the chains of their bondage and accord to them personal liberty, but it is to admit them to the full and complete enjoyment of civil and political Equality.

88 The Civil War and Reconstruction The mere abolition of slavery is not the end of the law for the black man, or for the white man. To emancipate the bondman from the laws that make him a chattel, and yet subject him to laws and deprivations which will inevitably break down his spirit, destroy his patriotism and convert him into a social pest, will be little gain to him and less gain to the country. One of the most plausible arguments ever made for slavery, is that which assumes that those who argue for the freedom of the Negro, do not themselves propose to treat him as an equal fellow citizen. The true course is to look this matter squarely in the face and determine to grant the entire claims of justice and liberty keeping back no part of the price. But the question comes not only from those who hate the colored race, but from some who are distinguished for their philanthropy: can this thing be done? can the white and colored people of America ever be blended into a common nationality under a system of equal Laws? Mark, I state the question broadly and fairly. It respects civil and political equality, in its fullest and best sense: can such equality ever be practically enjoyed? The question is not can there be social equality? That does not exist anywhere.---There have been arguments to show that no one man should own more property than another. But no satisfactory conclusion has been reached. So there are those who talk about social Equality, but nothing better on that subject than ‘‘pursuit,’’ the right of pursuit has been attained. The question is not whether the colored man is mentally equal to his white brother, for in this respect there is no equality among white men themselves. The question is not whether colored men will be likely to reach the Presidential chair. I have no trouble here: for a man may live quite a tolerable life without ever breathing the air of Washington. But the question is: Can the white and colored people of this country be blended into a common nationality, and enjoy together, in the same country, under the same flag, the inestimable blessings of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, as neighborly citizens of a common country? I answer most unhesitatingly, I believe they can. In saying this I am not blind to the past. I know it well. As a people we have moved about among you like dwarfs among giants---too small to be seen. We were morally, politically and socially dead. To the eye of doubt and selfishness we were far beyond the resurrection trump. All the more because I know the past. All the more, because I know the terrible experience of the

slave, and the depressing power of oppression, do I believe in the possibility of a better future for the colored people of America. Let me give a few of the reasons for the hope that is within me. The first is, despite all theories and all disparagements, the Negro is a man. By every fact, by every argument, by every rule of measurement, mental, moral or spiritual, by everything in the heavens above and in the earth beneath which vindicates the humanity of any class of beings, the Negro’s humanity is equally vindicated. The lines which separate him from the brute creation are as broad, distinct and palpable, as those which define and establish the very best specimens of the Indo-Caucasian race. I will not stop here to prove the manhood of the Negro. His virtues and his vices, his courage and his cowardice, his beauties and his deformities, his wisdom and his folly, everything connected with him, attests his manhood . . . The foundation of all governments and all codes of laws is in the fact that man is a rational creature, and is capable of guiding his conduct by ideas of right and wrong, of good and evil, by hope of reward and fear of punishment. Can any man doubt that the Negro answers this description? Do not all the laws ever passed concerning him imply that he is just such a creature? I defy the most malignant accuser to prove that there is a more law abiding people anywhere than are the colored people. I claim for the colored man that he possesses all the natural conditions and attributes essential to the character of a good citizen. He can understand the requirements of the law and the reason of the law. He can obey the law, and with his arm and life defend and execute the law. The preservation of society, the protection of persons and property are the simple and primary objects for which governments are instituted among men. There certainly is nothing in the ends sought, nor in the character of the means by which they are to be attained, which necessarily excludes colored men. I see no reason why we may not, in time, co-operate with our white fellow-countrymen in all the labors and duties of upholding a common government, and sharing with them in all the advantages and glory of a common nationality. That the interests of all the people would be promoted by the full participation of colored men in the affairs of government seems very plain to me. The American government rests for support, more than any other government in the world, upon the loyalty and patriotism of all its people. The friendship and affection of her black sons and daughters, as they increase in

3.6 Frederick Douglass, The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America 89 virtue and knowledge, will be an element of strength to the Republic too obvious to be neglected and repelled. I predict, therefore, that under an enlightened public sentiment, the American people will cultivate the friendship, increase the usefulness and otherwise advance the interests of the colored race. They will be as eager to extend the rights and dignity of citizenship as they have hitherto been eager to deny those rights. But a word as to objections. The constitution is interposed. It always is. Let me tell you something. Do you know that you have been deceived and cheated? You have been told that this government was intended from the beginning for white men, and for white men exclusively; that the men who formed the Union and framed the Constitution designed the permanent exclusion of the colored people from the benefits of those institutions. Davis, Taney and Yancey, traitors at the south, have propagated this statement, while their copperhead echoes at the north have repeated the same. There never was a bolder or more wicked perversion of the truth of history. So far from this purpose was the mind and heart of your fathers, that they desired and expected the abolition of slavery. They framed the Constitution plainly with a view to the speedy downfall of slavery. They carefully excluded from the Constitution any and every word which could lead to the belief that they meant it for persons of only one complexion. The Constitution, in its language and in its spirit, welcomes the black man to all the rights which it was intended to guarantee to any class of the American people. Its preamble tells us for whom and for what it was made. But I am told that the ruling class in America being white, it is impossible for men of color ever to become a part of the ‘‘body politic.’’ With some men this seems a final statement, a final argument, which it is utterly impossible to answer. It conveys the idea that the body politic is a rather fastidious body, from which everything offensive is necessarily excluded. I, myself, once had some high notions about this body politic and its high requirements, and of the kind of men fit to enter it and share its privileges. But a day’s experience at the polls convinced me that the ‘‘body politic’’ is not more immaculate than many other bodies. That in fact it is a very mixed affair. I saw ignorance enter, unable to read the vote it cast. I saw the convicted swindler enter and deposit his vote. I saw the gambler, the horse jockey, the pugilist, the miserable drunkard just lifted from the gutter, covered with filth, enter and deposit his vote. I saw Pat, fresh from the Emerald Isle, requiring two

sober men to keep him on his legs, enter and deposit his vote for the Democratic candidate amid the loud hurrahs of his fellow-citizens. The sight of these things went far to moderate my ideas about the exalted character of what is called the body politic, and convinced me that it could not suffer in its composition even should it admit a few sober, industrious and intelligent colored voters . . . The war upon the colored voters, and the war upon the Union, originated with the same parties, at the same time, and for the same guilty purpose of rendering slavery perpetual, universal and all controlling in the affairs of the nation. Let this object be defeated and abandoned, let the country be brought back to the benign objects set forth in the preamble of the Constitution, and the colored man will easily find his way into the body politic, and be welcome in the jury box as well as at the ballot box. I know that prejudice largely prevails, and will prevail to some extent long after slavery shall be abolished in this country, but the power of prejudice will be broken when slavery is once abolished. There is not a black law on the statute book of a single free state that has not been placed there in deference to slavery existing in the slave states. But it is said that the Negro belongs to an inferior race. Inferior race! This is the apology, the philosophical and ethnological apology for all the hell-black crimes ever committed by the white race against the blacks and the warrant for the repetition of those crimes through all times. Inferior race! It is an old argument. All nations have been compelled to meet it in some form or other since mankind have been divided into strong and weak, oppressors and oppressed. Whenever and wherever men have been oppressed and enslaved, their oppressors and enslavers have in every in-stance found a warrant for such oppression and enslavement in the alleged character of their victims. The very vices and crimes which slavery generates are usually charged as the peculiar characteristic of the race enslaved. When the Normans conquered the Saxons, the Saxons were a coarse, unrefined, inferior race. When the United States wants to possess herself of Mexican territory, the Mexicans are an inferior race. When Russia wants a share of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks are an inferior race, the sick man of Europe. So, too, when England wishes to impose some new burden on Ireland, or excuse herself for refusing to remove some old one, the Irish are denounced as an inferior race. But this is a monstrous argument . . . That men can resort to it shows that when the human mind is once completely under the dominion of pride and

90 The Civil War and Reconstruction selfishness, the reasoning faculties are inverted if not subverted. I should like to know what constitutes inferiority and the standard of superiority. Must a man be as wise as Socrates, as learned as Humbolt, as profound as Bacon, or as eloquent as Charles Sumner, before he can be reckoned among superior men? Alas! if this were so, few even of the most cultivated of the white race could stand the test. Webster was white and had a large head, but all white men have not large heads. The Negro is black and has a small head, but all Negroes have not small heads. What rule shall we apply to all these heads? Why this: Give all an equal chance to grow. But I am told that the Irish element in this country is exceedingly strong, and that that element will never allow colored men to stand upon an equal political footing with white men. I am pointed to the terrible outrages committed from time to time by Irishmen upon Negroes. The mobs at Detroit, Chicago, Cincinnati, and New York, are cited as proving the unconquerable aversion of the Irish towards the colored race. Well, my friends, I admit that the Irish people are among our bitterest persecutors. In one sense it is strange, passing strange, that they should be such, but in another sense it is quite easily accounted for. It is said that a Negro always makes the most cruel Negro driver, a northern slaveholder the most rigorous master, and the poor man suddenly made rich becomes the most haughty insufferable of all purse-proud fools . . . There are signs of this good time coming all around us. Slavery has overleapt itself.---Having taken the sword it is destined to perish by the sword, and the long despised Negro is to bear an honorable part in the salvation of himself and the country by the same blow. It has taken two years to convince the Washington Government, of the wisdom of calling the black man to participate in the gigantic effort now making to save the country. Even now they have not fully learned it--but learn it they will, and learn it they must before this tremendous war shall be ended.---Massachusetts, glorious old Massachusetts, has called the black man to the honor of bearing arms, and a thousand are already enrolled. Now what will be the effect? Suppose colored men are allowed to fight the battles of the Republic. Suppose they do fight and win victories as I am sure they will, what will be the effect upon themselves? Will not the country rejoice in such victories? and will it not extend to the colored man the praise due to his bravery? Will not the colored man himself soon begin to take a more hopeful view of his own destiny?

The fact is, my friends, we are opening a new account with the American people and with the whole human family. Hitherto we have been viewed and have viewed ourselves, as an impotent and spiritless race, having only a mission of folly and degradation before us. Tonight we stand at the portals of a new world, a new life and a new destiny. We have passed through the furnace and have not been consumed. During more than two centuries and a half, we have survived contact with the white race. We have risen from the small number of twenty, to the large number of five millions, living and increasing, where other tribes are decreasing and dying. We have illustrated the fact, that the two most opposite races of men known to ethnological science, can live in the same latitudes, longitudes, and altitudes, and that so far as natural causes are concerned there is reason to believe that we may permanently live under the same skies, brave the same climates, and enjoy Liberty, equality and fraternity in a common country.

3.7 Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865 Fellow-Countrymen: At this second appearing to take the oath of the Presidential office there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement somewhat in detail of a course to be pursued seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself, and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured. On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it, all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without war---seeking to dissolve the Union and divide effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would make war rather than

3.8 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Destructive Male 91 let the nation survive, and the other would accept war rather than let it perish, and the war came. One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. ‘‘Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.’’ If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‘‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’’ With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

3.8 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Destructive Male, 1868 Speech delivered at the Woman’s Suffrage Convention of 1868, Washington, D.C. I urge a sixteenth amendment, because ‘‘manhood suffrage,’’ or a man’s government, is civil, religious, and social disorganization. The male element is a destructive force, stern, selfish, aggrandizing, loving war, violence, conquest, acquisition, breeding in the material and moral world alike discord, disorder, disease, and death. See what a record of blood and cruelty the pages of history reveal! Through what slavery, slaughter, and sacrifice, through what inquisitions and imprisonments, pains and persecutions, black codes and gloomy creeds, the soul of humanity has struggled for the centuries, while mercy has veiled her face and all hearts have been dead alike to love and hope! The male element has held high carnival thus far; it has fairly run riot from the beginning, overpowering the feminine element everywhere, crushing out all the diviner qualities in human nature, until we know but little of true manhood and womanhood, of the latter comparatively nothing, for it has scarce been recognized as a power until within the last century. Society is but the reflection of man himself, untempered by woman’s thought; the hard iron rule we feel alike in the church, the state, and the home. No one need wonder at the disorganization, at the fragmentary condition of everything, when we remember that man, who represents but half a complete being, with but half an idea on every subject, has undertaken the absolute control of all sublunary matters. People object to the demands of those whom they choose to call the strong-minded, because they say ‘‘the right of suffrage will make the women masculine.’’ That is just the difficulty in which we are involved today. Though disfranchised, we have few women in the best sense; we have simply so many reflections, varieties, and dilutions of the masculine gender. The strong, natural characteristics of womanhood are repressed and ignored in dependence, for so long as man feeds woman she will try to please the giver and adapt herself to his condition. To keep a foothold in society, woman must be as near like man as possible, reflect his ideas, opinions, virtues, motives, prejudices, and vices. She must respect his statutes, though they strip her of every inalienable right, and conflict with that higher law written by the finger of God on her own soul.

92 The Civil War and Reconstruction She must look at everything from its dollar-and-cent point of view, or she is a mere romancer. She must accept things as they are and make the best of them. To mourn over the miseries of others, the poverty of the poor, their hardships in jails, prisons, asylums, the horrors of war, cruelty, and brutality in every form, all this would be mere sentimentalizing. To protest against the intrigue, bribery, and corruption of public life, to desire that her sons might follow some business that did not involve lying, cheating, and a hard, grinding selfishness, would be arrant nonsense. In this way man has been molding woman to his ideas by direct and positive influences, while she, if not a negation, has used indirect means to control him, and in most cases developed the very characteristics both in him and herself that needed repression. And now man himself stands appalled at the results of his own excesses, and mourns in bitterness that falsehood, selfishness, and violence are the law of life. The need of this hour is not territory, gold mines, railroads, or specie payments but a new evangel of womanhood, to exalt purity, virtue, morality, true religion, to lift man up into the higher realms of thought and action. We ask woman’s enfranchisement, as the first step toward the recognition of that essential element in government that can only secure the health, strength, and prosperity of the nation. Whatever is done to lift woman to her true position will help to usher in a new day of peace and perfection for the race. In speaking of the masculine element, I do not wish to be understood to say that all men are hard, selfish, and brutal, for many of the most beautiful spirits the

world has known have been clothed with manhood; but I refer to those characteristics, though often marked in woman, that distinguish what is called the stronger sex. For example, the love of acquisition and conquest, the very pioneers of civilization, when expended on the earth, the sea, the elements, the riches and forces of nature, are powers of destruction when used to subjugate one man to another or to sacrifice nations to ambition. Here that great conservator of woman’s love, if permitted to assert itself, as it naturally would in freedom against oppression, violence, and war, would hold all these destructive forces in check, for woman knows the cost of life better than man does, and not with her consent would one drop of blood ever be shed, one life sacrificed in vain. With violence and disturbance in the natural world, we see a constant effort to maintain an equilibrium of forces. Nature, like a loving mother, is ever trying to keep land and sea, mountain and valley, each in its place, to hush the angry winds and waves, balance the extremes of heat and cold, of rain and drought, that peace, harmony, and beauty may reign supreme. There is a striking analogy between matter and mind, and the present disorganization of society warns us that in the dethronement of woman we have let loose the elements of violence and ruin that she only has the power to curb. If the civilization of the age calls for an extension of the suffrage, surely a government of the most virtuous educated men and women would better represent the whole and protect the interests of all than could the representation of either sex alone.

Section 4 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism

Introduction

point. Animated primarily by the ruthless pricing and practices of railroad monopolies, agrarian and mercantile interests organized to demand government intervention to regulate the rail carriers. When their early successes with state regulation were nullified by the Supreme Court as violating the Constitution’s interstate commerce clause, the political contest between the people and the corporations shifted to the national level. This populist movement succeeded in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. Corporate corruption of elected officials and conservative activists on the Court ultimately convinced populists that petitioning the powers that be for redress of their grievances would not succeed. Thus they organized the Populist Party, nominating William Jennings Bryan for president in 1896. Populists merged into the Democratic Party in 1900 and again Bryan was their standard bearer. The 1896 election solidified the partisan division in America between the Republicans who supported corporate growth and an imperialistic foreign policy, and the Democrats who championed the interests of rural America and a more inward-looking international posture. Despite the Republican stranglehold on the presidency and Congress from 1896--1912, the elevation of the contest often characterized as a struggle between big business and the people was the context in which women’s suffrage, immigration policy, labor organizing, and the Progressive agenda of civil service and electoral reform played out.

In the decades following the Civil War, the American economy and society passed through a roughly forty year period of transformation in which the political system was tested severely. Looking back over this era of explosive industrial expansion from his vantage point in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt observed that government ‘‘was called upon to aid in the consummation of this new dream. There was, however, a shadow over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the talents of men of tremendous will and tremendous ambition, since by no other force could the problems of financing and engineering and new developments be brought to a consummation.’’ The men of ‘‘tremendous will and tremendous ambition’’ such as Astor, Carnegie, Fisk, Gould, Harriman, Morgan, Rockefeller, and Vanderbilt defined the gilded age with their concentrations of wealth and influence. These robber barons’ creation of highly productive industrial and financial infrastructure, however, pulverized the economic position of farmers and smaller business. Massive waves of immigration providing cheap labor, the growth of cities, the closing of the frontier, the rise of national corporations, and the construction of continental transportation and communications systems all combined to magnify and intensify the socioeconomic impact of industrialization. Not surprisingly, the governmental institutions created in 1787 strained to accommodate the new economic facts of life in the late 19th century and to do so while protecting the individuals and interests that had prospered up to that 93

94 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism From the perspective of political development, the gilded age and the populist response brought into sharp relief the limitations of the original constitutional and party institutions. While with the exception of the slavery issue, the Constitution provided Americans with the means to find an equilibrium between their freedoms and the power of the central government, the rise of corporate and financial power in the late 19th century threw our political mechanisms wildly out of balance.

The founders had not contemplated the emergence of a national concentration of power represented by industrialists: the very principles of freedom and private property rights intended to protect individuals from government insulated corporations from popular demands to enlist their government in efforts to preserve jobs and communities that individual citizens cherished. ---Richard A. Harris

Documents

by the Constitution of the United States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the storage of grain in warehouses at Chicago and other places in the State having not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, ‘‘in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different owners is mixed together, or in which grain is stored in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels cannot be accurately preserved.’’ It is claimed that such a law is repugnant---

4.1 Chief Joseph, On Surrender to the U.S. Army, 1877 Tell General Howard I know his heart. What he told me before, I have it in my heart. I am tired of fighting. Our Chiefs are killed; Looking Glass is dead, Ta Hool Hool Shute is dead. The old men are all dead. It is the young men who say yes or no. He who led on the young men is dead. It is cold, and we have no blankets; the little children are freezing to death. My people, some of them, have run away to the hills, and have no blankets, no food. No one knows where they are---perhaps freezing to death. I want to have time to look for my children, and see how many of them I can find. Maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my Chiefs! I am tired; my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands I will fight no more forever.

1. To that part of sect. 8, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States which confers upon Congress the power ‘‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States’’; 2. To that part of sect. 9 of the same article which provides that ‘‘no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another’’; and 3. To that part of amendment 14 which ordains that no State shall ‘‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’

4.2 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 [1876] MUNN v. ILLINOIS. October Term, 1876 Munn v. State of Illinois 94 U.S. 113 [1876] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The question to be determined in this case is whether the general assembly of Illinois can, under the limitations upon the legislative power of the States imposed

We will consider the last of these objections first. Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The courts ought not to declare one to be unconstitutional, unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained. The Constitution contains no definition of the word ‘‘deprive,’’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine its signification, therefore, it is necessary to 95

96 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism ascertain the effect which usage has given it, when employed in the same or a like connection. While this provision of the amendment is new in the Constitution of the United States, as a limitation upon the powers of the States, it is old as a principle of civilized government. It is found in Magna Charta, and, in substance if not in form, in nearly or quite all the constitutions that have been from time to time adopted by the several States of the Union. By the Fifth Amendment, it was introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the national government, and by the Fourteenth, as a guaranty against any encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the legislatures of the States . . . When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. ‘‘A body politic,’’ as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, ‘‘is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.’’ This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government. . . . From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, ‘‘are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.’’ Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington ‘‘to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping

of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread,’’ 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, ‘‘to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers,’’ 9 id. 224, sect. 2. From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment does not change the law in this particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation. This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what without its operative effect. Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution protects, we find that when private property is ‘‘affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.’’ This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control . . . In later times, the same principle came under consideration in the Supreme Court of Alabama. That court was called upon, in 1841, to decide whether the power granted to the city of Mobile to regulate the weight and price of bread was unconstitutional, and it was contended that ‘‘it would interfere with the right of the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling in the mode his judgment might dictate’’; but the court said, ‘‘there is no motive . . . for this interference on the part of the legislature with the lawful actions of individuals, or the mode in which private property shall be enjoyed, unless such calling affects the public interest, or private property is employed in a manner which directly affects the body of the people. Upon this principle, in this State, tavern- keepers are licensed; . . . and the County Court

4.2 Munn v. Illinois 97 is required, at least once a year, to settle the rates of innkeepers. Upon the same principle is founded the control which the legislature has always exercised in the establishment and regulation of mills, ferries, bridges, turnpike roads, and other kindred subjects.’’ Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. N. S. 140. From the same source comes the power to regulate the charges of common carriers, which was done in England as long ago as the third year of the reign of William and Mary, and continued until within a comparatively recent period. And in the first statute we find the following suggestive preamble, to wit: ‘‘And whereas divers wagoners and other carriers, by combination amongst themselves, have raised the prices of carriage of goods in many places to excessive rates, to the great injury of the trade: Be it, therefore, enacted,’’ etc. 3 W. & M. c. 12, 24; 3 Stat. at Large (Great Britain), 481. Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested . . . For this purpose we accept as true the statements of fact contained in the elaborate brief of one of the counsel of the plaintiffs in error. From these it appears that ‘‘the great producing region of the West and Northwest sends its grain by water and rail to Chicago, where the greater part of it is shipped by vessel for transportation to the seaboard by the Great Lakes, and some of it is forwarded by railway to the Eastern ports. . . . Vessels, to some extent, are loaded in the Chicago harbor, and sailed through the St. Lawrence directly to Europe. . . . The quantity [of grain] received in Chicago has made it the greatest grain market in the world. This business has created a demand for means by which the immense quantity of grain can be handled or stored, and these have been found in grain warehouses, which are commonly called elevators, because the grain is elevated from the boat or car, by machinery operated by steam, into the bins prepared for its reception, and elevated from the bins, by a like process, into the vessel or car which is to carry it on. . . . In this way the largest traffic between the citizens of the country north and west of Chicago and the citizens of the country lying on the Atlantic coast north of Washington is in grain which passes through the elevators of Chicago. In this way the trade in grain is carried on by the inhabitants of seven or eight of the great States of the West with four or five of the States lying on the sea-shore, and forms the largest part of inter-state commerce in these States. The grain warehouses or elevators in Chicago are immense structures, holding from 300,000 to 1,000,000 bushels at one time, according to size. They are divided into bins of large capacity and great

strength. . . . They are located with the river harbor on one side and the railway tracks on the other; and the grain is run through them from car to vessel, or boat to car, as may be demanded in the course of business. It has been found impossible to preserve each owner’s grain separate, and this has given rise to a system of inspection and grading, by which the grain of different owners is mixed, and receipts issued for the number of bushels which are negotiable, and redeemable in like kind, upon demand. This mode of conducting the business was inaugurated more than twenty years ago, and has grown to immense proportions. The railways have found it impracticable to own such elevators, and public policy forbids the transaction of such business by the carrier; the ownership has, therefore, been by private individuals, who have embarked their capital and devoted their industry to such business as a private pursuit.’’ In this connection it must also be borne in mind that, although in 1874 there were in Chicago fourteen warehouses adapted to this particular business, and owned by about thirty persons, nine business firms controlled them, and that the prices charged and received for storage were such ‘‘as have been from year to year agreed upon and established by the different elevators or warehouses in the city of Chicago, and which rates have been annually published in one or more newspapers printed in said city, in the month of January in each year, as the established rates for the year then next ensuing such publication.’’ Thus it is apparent that all the elevating facilities through which these vast productions ‘‘of seven or eight great States of the West’’ must pass on the way ‘‘to four or five of the States on the seashore’’ may be a ‘‘virtual’’ monopoly. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see why, if the common carrier, or the miller, or the ferryman, or the innkeeper, or the wharfinger, or the baker, or the cartman, or the hackney-coachman, pursues a public employment and exercises ‘‘a sort of public office,’’ these plaintiffs in error do not. They stand, to use again the language of their counsel, in the very ‘‘gateway of commerce,’’ and take toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly ‘‘tends to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use. . . .’’ We conclude, therefore, that the statute in question is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that there is no error in the judgment. In passing upon this case we have not been unmindful of the vast importance of the questions involved. This and cases of a kindred character were argued before us more than a year ago by most eminent counsel, and in a manner worthy of their well-earned reputations. We have kept the cases long under advisement, in order

98 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism that their decision might be the result of our mature deliverations. Judgment affirmed.

4.3 Susan B. Anthony, Social Purity, March 14, 1875 Chicago, Illinois Though women, as a class, are much less addicted to drunkenness and licentiousness than men, it is universally conceded that they are by far the greater sufferers from these evils. Compelled by their position in society to depend on men for subsistence, for food, clothes, shelter, for every chance even to earn a dollar, they have no way of escape from the besotted victims of appetite and passion with whom their lot is cast. They must endure, if not endorse, these twin vices, embodied, as they so often are, in the person of father, brother, husband, son, employer. No one can doubt that the sufferings of the sober, virtuous woman, in legal subjection to the mastership of a drunken, immoral husband and father over herself and children, not only from physical abuse, but from spiritual shame and humiliation, must be such as the man himself can not possibly comprehend. It is not my purpose to harrow your feelings by attempt at depicting the horrible agonies of mind and body that grow out of these monster social evils. They are already but too well known. Scarce a family throughout our broad land but has had its peace and happiness marred by one or the other, or both. That these evils exist, we all know; that something must be done, we as well know; that the old methods have failed, that man, alone, has proved himself incompetent to eradicate, or even regulate them, is equally evident. It shall be my endeavor, therefore, to prove to you that we must now adopt new measures and bring to our aid new forces to accomplish the desired end . . . The roots of the giant evil, intemperance, are not merely moral and social; they extend deep and wide into the financial and political structure of the government; and whenever women, or men, shall intelligently and seriously set themselves about the work of uprooting the liquor traffic, they will find something more than tears and prayers needful to the task. Financial and political power must be combined with moral and social influence, all bound together in one earnest, energetic, persistent force. The prosecutions on our courts for breach of promise, divorce, adultery, bigamy, seduction, rape; the

newspaper reports every day of every year of scandals and outrages, of wife murders and paramour shooting, of abortions and infanticides, are perpetual reminders of men’s incapacity to cope successfully with this monster evil of society. The statistics of New York show the murder of professional prostitutes in that city to be over twenty thousand. Add to these the thousands and tens of thousands of Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, New Orleans, St. Louis, Chicago, San Francisco, and all our cities, great and small, from ocean to ocean, and what a holocaust of the womanhood of this nation is sacrificed to the insatiate Moloch of lust. And yet more: those myriads of wretched women, publicly known as prostitutes, constitute but a small portion of the numbers who actually tread the paths of vice and crime. For, as the oftbroken ranks of the vast army of common drunkards are steadily filled by the boasted moderate drinkers, so are the ranks of professional prostitution continually replenished by discouraged, seduced deserted unfortunates, who can no longer hide the terrible secret of their lives. The Albany Law Journal, of December 1876, says: ‘‘The laws of infanticide must be a dead letter in the District of Columbia. According to the reports of the local officials, the dead bodies of infants, still-born and murdered, which have been found during the past year, scattered over parks and vacant lots in the city of Washington, are to be numbered by hundreds.’’ In 1869 the Catholics established a Foundling Hospital in New York City. At the close of the first six months Sister Irene reported thirteen hundred little waifs laid in the basket at her door. That meant thirteen hundred of the daughters of New York, with trembling hands and breaking hearts, trying to bury their sorrow and their shame from the world’s cruel gaze. That meant thirteen hundred mothers’ hopes blighted and blasted. Thirteen hundred Rachels weeping for their children because they were not! Nor is it womanhood alone that is thus fearfully sacrificed. For every betrayed woman, there is always the betrayer, man. For every abandoned woman, there is always one abandoned man and oftener many more. It is estimated that there are 50,000 professional in London, and Dr. Ryan calculates that there are 400,000 men in that city directly or indirectly connected with them, and that this vice causes the city an annual expenditure of $40,000,000 . . . To license certain persons to keep brothels and saloons is but to throw around them and their traffic the shield of law, and thereby to blunt the edge of all moral and social efforts against them. Nevertheless, in

4.3 Susan B. Anthony, Social Purity every large city, brothels are virtually licensed. When ‘‘Maggie Smith’’ is made to appear before the police court at the close of each quarter, to pay her fine of $10, $25 or $100, as an inmate or a keeper of a brothel, and allowed to continue her vocation, so long as she pays her fine, that is license. When a grand jury fails to find cause for indictment against a well-known keeper of a house of ill-fame, that too, is permission for her and all her class to follow their trade, against the statue laws of the State, and with impunity. The work of woman is not to lessen the severity or the certainty of the penalty for the violation of the moral law, but to prevent this violation by the removal of the causes, which lead to it. These causes are said to be wholly different with the sexes. The acknowledged incentive to this vice on the part of man is his own abnormal passion; while on the part of woman, in the great majority of causes, it is conceded to be destitution---absolute want of the necessaries of life. Lecky, the famous historian of European morals, says: ‘‘The statistics of prostitution show that a great proportion of those women who have fallen into it have been impelled by the most extreme poverty, in many instances verging on starvation.’’ All other conscientious students of this terrible problem, on both continents, agree with Mr. Lecky. Hence, there is no escape from the conclusion that, while woman’s want of bread induces her to purpose this vice, man’s love of the vice itself leads him into it and holds him there. While statistics show no lessening of the passional demand on the part of man, they reveal a most frightful increase of the temptations, the necessities, on the part of woman. In the olden times, when the daughters of the family, as well as the wife, were occupied with useful and profitable work in the household, getting the meals and washing the dishes three times in every day of every year, doing the baking, the brewing, the washing and the ironing, the whitewashing, the butter and cheese and soap making, the mending and the making of clothes for the entire family, the carding, spinning and weaving of the cloth---when everything to eat, to drink and to wear was manufactured in the home, almost no young women ‘‘went out to work.’’ But now, when nearly all these handicrafts are turned over to men and to machinery, tens of thousands, nay, millions, of the women of both hemispheres are thrust into the world’s outer market of work to earn their own subsistence. Society, ever slow to change its conditions, presents to these millions but few and meager chances. Only the barest necessaries, and oftentimes not even those, can be purchased with the proceeds of the most excessive and exhausting labor . . .

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Clearly, then, the first step forward solving this problem is to this vast army of poverty-stricken women who now crowd our cities, above the temptation, the necessity, to sell themselves, in marriage or out, for bread and shelter. To do that, girls, like boys, must be educated to some lucrative employment; women, like men, must have equal chances to earn a living. If the plea that poverty is the cause of woman’s prostitution be not true, perfect equality of chances to earn honest bread will demonstrate the falsehood by removing that pretext and placing her on the same plane with man. Then, if she is found in the ranks of vice and crime, she will be there for the same reason that man is and, from an object of pity, she, like him, will become a fit subject of contempt. From being the party sinned against, she will become an equal sinner, if not the greater of the two. Women, like men, must not only have ‘‘fair play’’ in the world of work and self-support, but, like men, must be eligible to all the honors and emoluments of society and government. Marriage, to women as to men, must be a luxury, not a necessity; an incident of life, not all of it. And the only possible way to accomplish this great change is to accord to women equal power in the making, shaping and controlling of the circumstances of life. That equality of rights and privileges is vested in the ballot, the symbol of power in a republic. Hence, our first and most urgent demand--that women shall be protected in the exercise of their inherent, personal, citizen’s right to a voice in the government, municipal, state, national. Alexander Hamilton said one hundred years ago, ‘‘Give to a man the right over my subsistence, and he has power over my whole moral being.’’ No one doubts the truth of this assertion as between man and man; while, as between man and woman, not does almost no one believes it, but the masses of people deny it. Any yet it is the fact of man’s possession of this right over woman’s subsistence which gives to him the power to dictate to her a moral code vastly higher and purer than the one he chooses for himself. Not less true is it, that the fact of woman’s dependence on man for her subsistence renders her utterly powerless to exact from him the same high moral code she chooses for herself. Of the 8,000,000 women over twenty-one years of age in the United States, 800,000, one out of every ten, are unmarried, and fully one-half of the entire number, or 4,000,000, support themselves wholly or in part by the industry of their own hands and brains. All of these married or single have to ask man, as an individual, a corporation, or a government, to grant to them even the privilege of hard work and small pay. The ten of thousands of poor but respectable young girls soliciting

100 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism copying, clerkships, shop work, teaching, must ask of men, and not seldom receive in response, ‘‘Why work for a living? There are a the ways!’’ Whoever controls work and wages, controls morals. Therefore, we must have women employers, superintendents, legislators; wherever girls go to seek the means of subsistence, there must be some woman. Nay, more; we must have women preachers, lawyers, doctors---that wherever women go to seek counsel---spiritual, legal, physical---there, too, they will be sure to find the best and noblest of their own sex to minister to them . . . Marriage never will cease to be a wholly unequal partnership until the law recognizes the equal ownership in the joint earnings and possessions. The true relation of the sexes never can be attained until woman is free and equal with man. Neither in the making nor executing of the laws regulating these relations has woman’s had the slightest voice. The statutes for marriage and divorce, for adultery, breach of promise, seduction, rape, bigamy, abortion, infanticide---all were made by men. They, alone, decide who are guilty of violating these laws and what shall be their punishment, with judge, jury and advocate all men, with no woman’s voice heard in our courts, save as accused or witness, and in many cases the married woman is denied the poor privilege of testifying as to her own guilt or innocence of the crime charged against her. Since the days of Moses and the prophets, men and ministers have preached the law of ‘‘visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and the children’s children, to the third and fourth generations.’’ But with absolute power over woman and all the conditions of life for the whole 6,000 years, man has proved his utter inability either to put away his own iniquities, or to cease to hand them down from generation to generation; hence, the only hope of reform is in sharing this absolute power with some other than himself, and that other must be woman. When no longer a subject, but an equal---a free and independent sovereign, believing herself created primarily for her own individual happiness and development and secondarily for man’s, precisely as man believes himself created first for his own enjoyment and second for that of woman---she will constitute herself sole umpire in the sacred domain of motherhood. Then, instead of feeling it her Christian duty to live with a drunken, profligate husband, handing down to her children his depraved appetites and passions, she will know that God’s curse will be upon her and her children if she flee not from him as from a pestilence. It is worse than folly, it is madness, for woman to delude themselves with the idea that their children will

escape the terrible penalty of the law. The taint of their birth will surely follow them. For pure women to continue to devote themselves to their man-appointed mission of visiting the dark purlieus of society and struggling to reclaim the myriads of badly-born human beings swarming there, is as hopeless as would be an attempt to ladle the ocean with a teaspoon; as unphilosophical as was the undertaking of the old American Colonization Society, which, with great labor and pains and money, redeemed from slavery and transported to Liberia annually 400 negroes; or the Fugitive Slave Societies, which succeeded in running off to Canada, on their ‘‘under-ground railroads,’’ some 40,000 in a whole quarter of a century. While those good men were thus toiling to rescue the 400 or the 40,000 individual victims of slavery, each day saw hundreds and each year thousands of human beings born into the terrible condition of chattelism. All see and admit now what none but the Abolitionists saw then, that the only effectual work was the entire overthrow of the system of slavery; the abrogation of the law which sanctioned the right of property in man . . . Thus, wherever you go, you find the best women, in and out of the churches, all absorbed in establishing or maintaining benevolent or reform institutions; charitable societies, soup-houses, ragged schools, industrial schools, mite societies, mission schools---at home and abroad---homes and hospitals for the sick, the aged, the friendless, the foundling, the fallen; asylums for the orphans, the blind, the deaf and dumb, the insane, the inebriate, the idiot. The women of this century are neither idle nor indifferent. They are working with might and main to mitigate the evils which stare them in the face on every side, but much their work is without knowledge. It is aimed at the effects, not the cause; it is plucking the spoiled fruit; it is lopping off the poisonous branches of the deadly upas tree, which but makes the root more vigorous in sending out new shoots ion every direction. A right understanding of physiological law teaches us that the cause must be removed; the tree must be girdled; the tap-root must be severed. The tap-root of our social dilemma ties deep down at the very foundations of society. It is woman’s dependence. It is woman’s subjection. Hence, the first and only efficient work must be to emancipate woman from her enslavement. The wife must no longer echo the poet Milton’s ideal Eve, when she adoringly said to Adam, ‘‘God, thy law; thou, mine!’’ She must feel herself accountable to God alone for every act, fearing and obeying no man, save where his will is in line with her own highest idea of divine law.

4.4 Blanche Bruce, Speech in the Senate

4.4 Blanche Bruce, Speech in the Senate, March 31, 1876 The conduct of the late election in Mississippi affected not merely the fortunes of partisans-as the same were necessarily involved in the defeat or success of the respective parties to the contest-but put in question and jeopardy the sacred rights of the citizen; and the investigation contemplated in the pending resolution has for its object not the determination of the question whether the offices shall be held and the public affairs of that State be administered by democrats or republicans, but the higher and more important end, the protection in all their purity and significance of the political rights of the people and the free institutions of the country. The evidence in hand and accessible will show beyond peradventure that in many parts of the State corrupt and violent influences were brought to bear upon the registrars of voters, thus materially affecting the character of the voting or poll lists; upon the inspectors of election, prejudicially and unfairly thereby changing the number of votes cast; and, finally, threats and violence were practiced directly upon the masses of voters in such measures and strength as to produce grave apprehensions for their personal safety and as to deter them from the exercise of their political franchises. It will not accord with the laws of nature or history to brand colored people a race of cowards. On more than one historic field, beginning in 1776 and coming down to this centennial year of the Republic, they have attested in blood their courage as well as a love of liberty---I ask Senators to believe that no consideration of fear or personal danger has kept us quiet and forbearing under the provocations and wrongs that have so sorely tried our souls. But feeling kindly toward our white fellow-citizens, appreciating the good purposes and politics of the better classes, and, above all, abhorring a war of races. we determined to wait until such time as an appeal to the good sense and justice of the American people could be made. The sober American judgment must obtain in the South as elsewhere in the Republic, that the only distinction upon which parties can be safely organized and in harmony with our institutions are differences of opinion relative to principles and policy of government, and that differences of religion nationality, or race can neither with safety nor propriety be permitted for a moment to enter into the party contests of the day. The unanimity with which the colored voters act

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with a pany is not referable to any race prejudice on their pan. On the contrary. They invite the political cooperation of their white brethren, and vote as a unit because proscribed as such. They deprecate the establishment of the color line by the opposition, not only because the act is unwise and wrong in principle, but because it isolates them from the white men of the South, and forces them, in sheer self-protection and against their inclination, to act seemingly upon the basis of a race prejudice that they neither respect nor entertain. As a class they are free from prejudices, and have no uncharitable suspicions against their white fellow-citizens, whether native born or settlers from the Northern States. They not only recognize the equality of citizenship and the right of every man to hold, without proscription any position of honor and trust to which the confidence of the people may elevate him; but owing nothing to race, birth, or surroundings, they, above all other classes in the community, are interested to see prejudices drop out of both politics and the business of the country, and success in life proceed only upon the integrity and merit of the man who seeks it. . . . But withal, as they progress in intelligence and appreciation of the dignity of their prerogatives as citizens, they, as an evidence of growth begin to realize the significance of the proverb, ‘‘When thou doest well for thyself, men shall praise thee;’’ and are disposed to exact the same protection and concession of rights that are conferred upon other citizens by the Constitution, and that, too, without the humiliation involved in the enforced abandonment of their political convictions. I have confidence, not only in this country and her institutions, but in the endurance, capacity, and destiny of my people. We will, as opportunity offers and ability serves, seek our places, sometimes in the field of letters, arts, sciences, and the professions. More frequently mechanical pursuits will attract and elicit our efforts; more still of my people will find employment and livelihood as the cultivators of the soil. The bulk of this people---by surroundings, habits, adaptation, and choice---will continue to find their homes in the South, and constitute the masses of its yeomanry. We will there probably, of our own volition and more abundantly than in the past, produce the great staples that will contribute to the basis of foreign exchange, aid in giving the nation a balance of trade, and minister to the wants and comfort and build up the prosperity of the whole land. Whatever our ultimate position in the composite civilization of the Republic and whatever varying fortunes attend our career, we will not forget our instincts for freedom nor our love of country.

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4.5 Henry George, The Paradox of Capitalist Growth, 1879 The present century has been marked by a prodigious increase in wealth producing power. The utilization of steam and electricity, the introduction of improved processes and labor-saving machinery, the greater subdivision and grander scale of production, the wonderful facilitation of exchanges, have multiplied enormously the effectiveness of labor. At the beginning of this marvelous era it was natural to expect, and it was expected, that labor-saving inventions would lighten the toil and improve the condition of the laborer; that the enormous increase in the power of producing wealth would make real poverty a thing of the past. Could a man of the last century---a Franklin or a Priestly---have seen, in a vision of the future, the steamship taking the place of the sailing vessel, the railroad train of the wagon, the reaping machine of the scythe, the threshing machine of the flail; could have heard the throb of the engines that in obedience to human will, and for the satisfaction of human desire, exert a power greater than that of all the men and all the beats of burden of the earth combined; could he have seen the forest tree transformed into finished lumber---into doors, sashes, blinds, boxes, or barrels, with hardly the touch of a human hand; the great workshops where boots and shoes are turned out by the case with less labor than the old-fashioned cobbler could have put on a sole; the factories where, under the eye of a girl, cotton becomes cloth faster than hundreds of stalwart weavers could have turned it out with their handlooms; could he have seen steam hammers shaping mammoth shafts and might anchors, and delicate machinery making tiny watches; the diamond drill cutting through the heart of the rocks, and coal oil sparing the whale; could he have realized the enormous saving of labor resulting from improved facilities of exchange and communication---sheep killed in Australia eaten fresh in England. And the order given by the London banker in the afternoon executed in San Francisco in the morning of the same day; could he have conceived of the hundred thousand improvements which these only suggest. What would he have inferred as the social condition of mankind? . . . . . . Out of these bounteous material conditions he would have seen arising. As necessary sequences, moral conditions realizing the golden age of which mankind has always dreamed. Youth no longer stunted and starved; age no longer harried by avarice; the child at play with the tiger; the man with the muck-rake

drinking in the glory of the stars. Foul things fled, fierce things tame; discord turned to harmony! For how could there be greed where all had enough? How could the vice, the crime, the ignorance, the brutality, that spring from poverty and fear of poverty, exist where poverty had vanished? Who should crouch where all were freemen; who oppress where all were peers? . . . Now, however, we are coming into collision with facts which there can be no mistaking. From all parts of the civilized world com complaints of industrial depression; of labor condemned to involuntary idleness; of capital massed and wasting; of pecuniary distress among business men; of want and pain, all the keen, maddening anguish, that to great masses of men are involved in the words ‘‘hard times,’’ afflict the world today. This state things, common to communities differing so widely in situation, in political institutions, in fiscal and financial systems, in density of population and in social organization, can hardly be accounted for by local causes. . . . That there is a common cause, and that it is either what we call material progress or something closely connected with material progress, becomes more than an inference when it is noted that the phenomena we class together and speak of as industrial depression are but intensifications of phenomena which always accompany material progress, and which show themselves more clearly and strongly as material progress goes on . . . Just as . . . a community realizes the conditions which all civilized communities are striving for, and advances in the scale of material progress---just as closer settlement and a more intimate connection with the rest of the world, and greater utilization of laborsaving machinery, make possible greater economies in production and exchange, and wealth in consequence increases, not merely in the aggregate, but in proportion to population---so does poverty take a darker aspect. Some get an infinitely better and easier living, but others find it hard to get a living at all. The ‘‘tramp’’ comes with the locomotive, and almshouses and prisons are as surely the marks of ‘‘material progress’’ as are costly dwellings, rich warehouses, and magnificent churches. Upon streets lighted with gas and patrolled by uniformed policemen, beggars wait for the passer-by, and in the shadow of college, and library, and museum, are gathering the more hideous Huns and fiercer Vandals of whom Macaulay prophesied. This fact---the great fact that poverty and all its concomitants show themselves in communities just as they develop into the conditions toward which material

4.6 Chinese Exclusion Act 103 progress tends---proves that the social difficulties existing wherever a certain stage of progress has been reached, do not arise from local circumstances, but are, in some way or another, engendered by progress itself. And, unpleasant as it may be to admit it, it is at last becoming evident that the enormous increase in productive power which has marked the present century and is still going on with accelerating ratio, has no tendency to extirpate poverty or lighten the burdens of those compelled to toil. It simply widens the gulf between Dives and Lazarus, and makes the struggle for existence more intense. The march of invention has clothed mankind with powers of which a century ago the boldest imagination could not have dreamed. But in factories where labor-saving machinery has reached its most wonderful development, little children are at work; wherever the new forces are anything like fully utilized, large classes are maintained by charity or live on the verge of recourse to it; amid the greatest accumulations of wealth, men die of starvation, and puny infants suckle dry breasts; while everywhere the greed of gain, the worship of wealth, shows the force of the fear of want. The promised land flies before us like the mirage. The fruits of the tree of knowledge turn as we grasp them to apples of Sodom that crumble at the touch. It is true that wealth has been greatly increased, and that the average of comfort, leisure, and refinement has been raised; but these gains are not general. In them the lowest class do not share. I do not mean that the condition of the lowest class has nowhere nor in anything been improved; but that there is nowhere any improvement which can be credited to increase productive power. I mean that the tendency of what we call material progress is in nowise to improve the condition of the lowest class in the essentials of healthy, happy human life. Nay, more, that it is still further to depress the condition of the lowest class. The new forces, elevation in their nature through they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being force, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down . . . This association of poverty with progress is the great enigma of our times. It is the central fact from which spring industrial, social, and political difficulties that perplex the world, and with which statesmanship and philanthropy and education grapple in vain. From it come the clouds that overhang the future of the most

progressive and self-reliant nations. It is the riddle which the Sphinx of Fate puts to our civilization, and which not to answer is to be destroyed. So long as all the increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to build up great fortunes, to increase luxury and make sharper the contrast between the House of Have and the House of Want, progress is not real and cannot be permanent. The reaction must come. The tower leans from its foundations, and every new story but hastens the final catastrophe. To educate men who must be condemned to poverty, is but to make the restive; to base on a state of most glaring social inequality political institutions under which men theoretically equal, is to stand a pyramid on its apex . . .

4.6 Chinese Exclusion Act, May 6, 1882 Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof: Therefore, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten years next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or having so come after the expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States. SEC. 2. That the master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within the United States on such vessel, and land or permit to be landed, any Chinese laborer, from any foreign port or place, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 for each and every such Chinese laborer so brought, and may be also imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year. SEC. 3. That the two foregoing sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the 17th day of November, 1880, or who shall have come into the same before the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act . . . SEC. 4. That for the purpose of properly identifying Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the 17th day of November, 1880, or who shall have come into the same before the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and in order to furnish them with the proper evidence of their right to go from

104 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism and come to the United States of their free will and accord, as provided by the treaty between the United States and China dated November 17, 1880, the collector of customs of the district from which any such Chinese laborer shall depart from the United States shall, in person or by deputy, go on board each vessel having on board any such Chinese laborer and cleared or about to sail from his district for a foreign port, and on such vessel make a list of all such Chinese laborers, which shall be entered in registry-books to be kept for that purpose, in which shall be stated the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, physical marks or peculiarities, and all facts necessary for the identification of each of such Chinese laborers, which books shall be safely kept in the custom-house; and every such Chinese laborer so departing from the United States shall be entitled to, and shall receive, free of any charge or cost upon application therefor, from the collector or his deputy, at the time such list is taken a certificate, signed by the collector or his deputy and attested by his seal of office, in such form as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, which certificate shall contain a statement of the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, personal description, and facts of identification of the Chinese laborer to whom the certificate is issued, corresponding with the said list and registry in all particulars . . . SEC. 5. That any Chinese laborer mentioned in section four of this act being in the United States, and desiring to depart from the United States by land, shall have the right to demand and receive, free of charge or cost, a certificate of identification similar to that provided for in section four of this act to be issued to such Chinese laborers as may desire to leave the United States by water; and it is hereby made the duty of the collector of customs of the district next adjoining the foreign country to which said Chinese laborer desires to go to issue such certificate, free of charge or cost, upon application by such Chinese laborer, and to enter the same upon registry-books to be kept by him for the purpose, as provided for in section four of this act. SEC. 6. That in order to the faithful execution of articles one and two of the treaty in this act before mentioned, every Chinese person other than a laborer who may be entitled by said treaty and this act to come within the United States, and who shall be about to come to the United States, shall be identified as so entitled by the Chinese Government in each case, such identity to be evidenced by a certificate issued under the authority of said government, which certificate shall be in the English language or (if not in the English language) accompanied by a translation into

English, stating such right to come, and which certificate shall state the name, title, or official rank, if any, the age, height, and all physical peculiarities, former and present occupation or profession, and place of residence in China of the person to whom the certificate is issued and that such person is entitled conformably to the treaty in this act mentioned to come within the United States . . . SEC. 7. That any person who shall knowingly and falsely alter or substitute any name for the name written in such certificate or forge any such certificate, or knowingly utter any forged or fraudulent certificate, or falsely personate any person named in any such certificate, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not exceeding $1,000, and imprisoned in a penitentiary for a term of not more than five years. SEC. 8. That the master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any foreign port or place shall, at the same time he delivers a manifest of the cargo, and if there be no cargo, then at the time of making a report, of the entry of the vessel pursuant to law, in addition to the other matter required to be reported, and before landing, or permitting to land, any Chinese passengers, deliver and report to the collector of customs of the district in which such vessels shall have arrived a separate list of all Chinese passengers taken on board his vessel at any foreign port or place, and all such passengers on board the vessel at that time . . . SEC. 9. That before any Chinese passengers are landed from any such vessel, the collector, or his deputy, shall proceed to examine such passengers, comparing the certificates with the list and with the passengers; and no passenger shall be allowed to land in the United States from such vessel in violation of law . . . SEC. 11. That any person who shall knowingly bring into or cause to be brought into the United States by land, or who shall knowingly aid or abet the same, or aid or abet the landing in the United States from any vessel of any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter the United states, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding $1,000, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year. SEC. 12. That no Chinese person shall be permitted to enter the United States by land without producing to the proper officer of customs the certificate in this act required of Chinese persons seeking to land from a vessel . . . SEC. 13. That this act shall not apply to diplomatic and other officers of the Chinese Government traveling

4.7 Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case 105 upon the business of that government, whose credentials shall be taken as equivalent to the certificate in this act mentioned, and shall exempt them and their body and household servants from the provisions of this act as to other Chinese persons. SEC. 14. That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed. SEC. 15. That he words ‘‘Chinese laborers,’’ wherever used in this act, shall be construed to mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining. Approved, May 6, 1882.

4.7 Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case, October 22, 1883 . . . The cause which has brought us here to-night is neither common nor trivial. Few events in our national history have surpassed it in magnitude, importance and significance. It has swept over the land like a moral cyclone, leaving moral desolation in its track. We feel it, as we felt the furious attempt, years ago, to force the accursed system of slavery upon the soil of Kansas, the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Bill, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the Dred Scott decision. I look upon it as one more shocking development of that moral weakness in high places which has attended the conflict between the spirit of liberty and the spirit of slavery from the beginning, and I venture to predict that it will be so regarded by after-coming generations. Far down the ages, when men shall wish to inform themselves as the real state of liberty, law, religion and civilization in the United States at this juncture of our history, they will overhaul the proceedings of the Supreme Court, and read the decision declaring the Civil Rights Bill unconstitutional and void . . . To come a little nearer to the case now before us. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the exercise of its high and vast constitutional power, has suddenly and unexpectedly decided that the law intended to secure to colored people the civil rights guaranteed to them by the following provision of the Constitution of the United States, is unconstitutional and void. Here it is: ‘‘No State,’’ says the 14th Amendment, ‘‘shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ Now, when a bill has been discussed for weeks and months, and even years, in the press and on the platform, in Congress and out of Congress; when it has been calmly debated by the clearest heads, and the most skillful and learned lawyers in the land; when every argument against it has been over and over again carefully considered and fairly answered; when its constitutionality has been especially discussed, pro and con; when it has passed the United States House of Representatives, and has been solemnly enacted by the United States Senate, perhaps the most imposing legislative body in the world; when such a bill has been submitted to the Cabinet of the Nation, composed of the ablest men in the land; when it has passed under the scrutinizing eye of the Attorney-General of the United States; when the Executive of the Nation has given to it his name and formal approval; when it has taken its place upon the statute-book, and has remained there for nearly a decade, and the country has largely assented to it, you will agree with me that the reasons for declaring such a law unconstitutional and void, should be strong, irresistible and absolutely conclusive. Inasmuch as the law in question is a law in favor of liberty and justice, it ought to have had the benefit of any doubt which could arise as to its strict constitutionality. This, I believe, will be the view taken of it, not only by laymen like myself, but by eminent lawyers as well. All men who have given any thought to the machinery, the structure, and practical operation of our Government, must have recognized the importance of absolute harmony between its various departments of powers and duties. They must have seen clearly the mischievous tendency and danger to the body politic of any antagonisms between its various branches. To feel the force of this thought, we have only to remember the administration of President Johnson, and the conflict which then took place between the National Executive and the National Congress, when the will of the people was again and again met by the Executive veto, and when the country seemed upon the verge of another revolution. No patriot, however bold, can wish for his country a repetition of those gloomy days . . . We cannot, however, overlook the fact that though not so intended, this decision has inflicted a heavy calamity upon seven millions of the people of this country, and left them naked and defenceless against the action of a malignant, vulgar, and pitiless prejudice.

106 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism It presents the United States before the world as a Nation utterly destitute of power to protect the rights of its own citizens upon its own soil. It can claim service and allegiance, loyalty and life, of them, but it cannot protect them against the most palpable violation of the rights of human nature, rights to secure which, governments are established. It can tax their bread and tax their blood, but has no protecting power for their persons. Its National power extends only to the District of Columbia, and the Territories--where the people have no votes-and where the land has no people. All else is subject to the States. In the name of common sense, I ask, what right have we to call ourselves a Nation, in view of this decision, and this utter destitution of power? In humiliating the colored people of this country, this decision has humbled the Nation. It gives to a South Carolina, or a Mississippi, Rail-road Conductor, more power than it gives to the National Government. He may order the wife of the Chief Justice of the United States into a smoking-car full of hirsute men and compel her to go and listen to the coarse jests of a vulgar crowd. It gives to a hotel-keeper who may, from a prejudice born of the rebellion, wish to turn her out at midnight into the darkness of the storm, power to compel her to go. In such a case, according to this decision of the Supreme Court, the National Government has no right to interfere. She must take her claim for protection and redress, not to the Nation, but to the State, and when the State, as I understand it, declares there is upon its Statute book, no law for her protection, the function and power of the National Government is exhausted, and she is utterly without redress. Bad, therefore, as our case is under this decision, the evil principle affirmed by the court is not wholly confined to or spent upon persons of color. The wife of Chief Justice Waite---I speak of respectfully---is protected to-day, not by law, but solely by the accident of her color. So far as the law of the land is concerned, she is in the same condition as that of the humblest colored woman in the Republic. The difference between colored and white, here, is, that the one, by reason of color, needs legal protection, and the other, by reason of color, does not need protection. It is nevertheless true, that manhood is insulted, in both cases. No man can put a chain about the ankle of his fellow man, without at last finding the other end of it fastened about his own neck . . . To-day, our Republic sits as a Queen among the nations of the earth. Peace is within her walls of plenteousness within her palaces, but he is a bolder and a far more hopeful man than I am, who will affirm that

this peace and prosperity will always last. History repeats itself. What has happened once may happen again. The Negro, in the Revolution, fought for us and with us. In the war of 1812 Gen. Jackson, at New Orleans, found it necessary to call upon the colored people to assist in its defence against England. Abraham Lincoln found it necessary to call upon the Negro to defend the Union against rebellion, and the Negro responded gallantly in all cases. Our legislators, our Presidents, and our judges should have a care, lest, by forcing these people outside of law, they destroy that love of country which is needful to the Nation’s defense in the day of trouble. I am not here, in this presence, to discuss the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of this decision of the Supreme Court. The decision may or may not be constitutional. That is a question for lawyers, and not for laymen, and there are lawyers on this platform as learned, able, and eloquent as any who have appeared in this case before the Supreme Court, or as any in the land. To these I leave the exposition of the Constitution; but I claim the right to remark upon a strange and glaring inconsistency with former decisions, in the action of the court on this Civil Rights Bill. It is a new departure, entirely out of the line of the precedents and decisions of the Supreme Court at other times and in other directions where the rights of colored men were concerned . . . It has viewed both the Constitution and the law with a strict regard to their letter, but without any generous recognition of their broad and liberal spirit. Upon those narrow principles the decision is logical and legal, of course. But what I complain of, and what every lover of liberty in the United States has a right to complain of, is this sudden and causeless reversal of all the great rules of legal interpretation by which this Court was governed in other days, in the construction of the Constitution and of laws respecting colored people . . . Fellow-citizens! While slavery was the base line of American society, while it ruled the church and the state, while it was the interpreter of our law and the exponent of our religion, it admitted no quibbling, no narrow rules of legal or scriptural interpretations of Bible or Constitution. It sternly demanded its pound of flesh, no matter how much blood was shed in the taking of it. It was enough for it to be able to show the intention to get all it asked in the Courts or out of the Courts. But now slavery is abolished. Its reign was long, dark and bloody. Liberty now, is the base line of the Republic. Liberty has supplanted slavery, but I fear it has not supplanted the spirit or power of slavery. Where slavery was strong, liberty is now weak.

4.7 Frederick Douglass, The Civil Rights Case 107 O for a Supreme Court of the United States which shall be as true to the claims of humanity as the Supreme Court formerly was to the demands of slavery! When that day comes, as come it will, a Civil Rights Bill will not be declared unconstitutional and void, in utter and flagrant disregard of the objects and intentions of the National legislature by which it was enacted, and of the rights plainly secured by the Constitution. This decision of the Supreme Court admits that the Fourteenth Amendment is a prohibition on the States. It admits that a State shall not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but commits the seeming absurdity of allowing the people of a State to do what it prohibits the State itself from doing. It used to be thought that the whole was more than a part; that the greater included the less, and that what was unconstitutional for a State to do was equally unconstitutional for an individual member of a State to do. What is a State, in the absence of the people who compose it? Land, air and water. That is all. As individuals, the people of the State of South Carolina may stamp out the rights of the Negro wherever they please, so long as they do not do so as a State. All the parts can violate the Constitution, but the whole cannot. It is not the act itself, according to this decision, that is unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality of the case depends wholly upon the party committing the act. If the State commits it, it is wrong, if the citizen of the State commits it, it is right. O consistency, thou art indeed a jewel! What does it matter to a colored citizen that a State may not insult and outrage him, if a citizen of a State may? The effect upon him is the same, and it was just this effect that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly intended by that article to prevent. It was the act, not the instrument, which was prohibited. It meant to protect the newly enfranchised citizen from injustice and wrong, not merely from a State, but from the individual members of a State. It meant to give him the protection to which his citizenship, his loyalty, his allegiance, and his services entitled him, and this meaning, and this purpose, and this intention, is now declared unconstitutional and void, by the Supreme Court of the United States. I say again, fellow-citizens, O for a Supreme Court which shall be as true, as vigilant, as active, and exacting in maintaining laws enacted for the protection of human rights as in other days was that Court for the destruction of human rights! It is said that this decision will make no difference in the treatment of colored people; that the Civil Rights

Bill was a dead letter, and could not be enforced. There is some truth in all this, but it is not the whole truth. That bill, like all advance legislation, was a banner on the outer wall of American liberty, a noble moral standard, uplifted for the education of the American people. There are tongues in trees, books, in the running brooks,---sermons in stones. This law, though dead, did speak. It expressed the sentiment of justice and fair play, common to every honest heart. Its voice was against popular prejudice and meanness. It appealed to all the noble and patriotic instincts of the American people. It told the American people that they were all equal before the law; that they belonged to a common country and were equal citizens. The Supreme Court has hauled down this flag of liberty in open day, and before all the people, and has thereby given joy to the heart of every man in the land who wishes to deny to others what he claims for himself. It is a concession to race pride, selfishness and meanness, and will be received with joy by every upholder of caste in the land, and for this I deplore and denounce that decision ... When a colored man is in the same room or in the same carriage with white people, as a servant, there is no talk of social equality, but if he is there as a man and a gentleman, he is an offence. What makes the difference? It is not color, for his color is unchanged. The whole essence of the thing is a studied purpose to degrade and stamp out the liberties of a race. It is the old spirit of slavery, and nothing else. To say that because a man rides in the same car with another, he is therefore socially equal, is one of the wildest absurdities. When I was in England, some years ago, I rode upon highways, byways, steamboats, stage coaches, omnibuses; I was in the House of Commons, in the House of Lords, in the British Museum, in the Coliseum, in the National Gallery, everywhere; sleeping sometimes in rooms where lords and dukes had slept; sitting at tables where lords and dukes were sitting; but I never thought that those circumstances made me socially the equal of lords and dukes. I hardly think that some of our Democratic friends would be regarded among those lords as their equals. If riding in the same car makes one equal, I think that the little poodle I saw sitting in the lap of a lady was made equal by riding in the same car. Equality, social equality, is a matter between individuals. It is a reciprocal understanding. I don’t think when I ride with an educated polished rascal, that he is thereby made my equal, or when I ride with a numbskull that it makes me his equal, or makes him my equal. Social equality does not necessarily follow from civil equality, and yet for the purpose of a hell black and damning

108 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism prejudice, our papers still insist that the Civil Rights Bill is a Bill to establish social equality. If it is a Bill for social equality, so is the Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men have equal rights; so is the Sermon on the Mount, so is the Golden Rule, that commands us to do to others as we would that others should do to us; so is the Apostolic teaching, that of one blood God has made all nations to dwell on all the face of the earth; so is the Constitution of the United States, and so are the laws and customs of every civilized country in the world; for no where, outside of the United States, is any man denied civil rights on account of his color.

4.8 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward, 1888 ‘‘You have not yet told me what was the answer to the riddle which you found,’’ I said. ‘‘I am impatient to know by what contradiction of natural sequence the peace and prosperity which you now seem to enjoy could have been the outcome of an era like my own.’’ ‘‘Excuse me,’’ replied my host, ‘‘but do you smoke?’’ It was not till our cigars were lighted and drawing well that he resumed. ‘‘Since you are in the humor to talk rather than to sleep, as I certainly am, perhaps I cannot do better than to try to give you enough idea of our modern industrial system to dissipate at least the impression that there is any mystery about the process of its evolution. The Bostonians of your day had the reputation of being great askers of questions, and I am going to show my descent by asking you one to begin with. What should you name as the most prominent feature of the labor troubles of your day?’’ ‘‘Why, the strikes, of course,’’ I replied. ‘‘Exactly; but what made the strikes so formidable?’’ ‘‘The great labor organizations.’’ ‘‘And what was the motive of these great organizations?’’ ‘‘The workmen claimed they had to organize to get their rights from the big corporations,’’ I replied. ‘‘That is just it,’’ said Dr. Leete; ‘‘the organization of labor and the strikes were an effect, merely, of the concentration of capital in greater masses than had ever been known before. Before this concentration began, while as yet commerce and industry were conducted by innumerable petty concerns with small capital, instead of a small number of great concerns with vast capital, the individual workman was relatively important and

independent in his relations to the employer. Moreover, when a little capital or a new idea was enough to start a man in business for himself, workingmen were constantly becoming employers and there was no hard and fast line between the two classes. Labor unions were needless then, and general strikes out of the question. But when the era of small concerns with small capital was succeeded by that of the great aggregations of capital, all this was changed. The individual laborer, who had been relatively important to the small employer, was reduced to insignificance and powerlessness over against the great corporation, while at the same time the way upward to the grade of employer was closed to him. Self-defense drove him to union with his fellows.’’ ‘‘The records of the period show that the outcry against the concentration of capital was furious. Men believed that it threatened society with a form of tyranny more abhorrent than it had ever endured. They believed that the great corporations were preparing for them the yoke of a baser servitude than had ever been imposed on the race, servitude not to men but to soulless machines incapable of any motive but insatiable greed. Looking back, we cannot wonder at their desperation, for certainly humanity was never confronted with a fate more sordid and hideous than would have been the era of corporate tyranny which they anticipated.’’ ‘‘Meanwhile, without being in the smallest degree checked by the clamor against it, the absorption of business by ever larger monopolies continued. In the United States there was not, after the beginning of the last quarter of the century, any opportunity whatever for individual enterprise in any important field of industry, unless backed by a great capital. During the last decade of the century, such small businesses as still remained were fast-failing survivals of a past epoch, or mere parasites on the great corporations, or else existed in fields too small to attract the great capitalists. Small businesses, as far as they still remained, were reduced to the condition of rats and mice, living in holes and corners, and counting on evading notice for the enjoyment of existence.’’ ‘‘The fact that the desperate popular opposition to the consolidation of business in a few powerful hands had no effect to check it proves that there must have been a strong economical reason for it. The small capitalists, with their innumerably petty concerns, had in fact yielded the field to the great aggregations of capital, because they belonged to a day of small things and were totally incompetent to the demands of an age of steam and telegraphs and the gigantic scale of its

4.8 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward 109 enterprises. To restore the former order of things, even if possible, would have involved returning to the day of stagecoaches. Oppressive and intolerable as was the regime of the great consolidations of capital, even its victims, while they cursed it, were forced to admit the prodigious increase of efficiency which had been imparted to the national industries, the vast economies effected by concentration of management and unity of organization, and to confess that since the new system had taken the place of the old the wealth of the world had increased at a rate before undreamed of. To be sure this vast increase had gone chiefly to make the rich richer, increasing the gap between them and the poor; but the fact remained that, as a means merely of producing wealth, capital had been proved efficient in proportion to its consolidation. The restoration of the old system with the subdivision of capital, if it were possible, might indeed bring back a greater equality of conditions, with more individual dignity and freedom, but it would be at the price of general poverty and the arrest of material progress.’’ ‘‘Was there, then, no way of commanding the services of the mighty wealth-producing principle of consolidated capital without bowing down to a plutocracy like that of Carthage? As soon as men began to ask themselves these questions, they found the answer ready for them. The movement toward the conduct of business by larger and larger aggregations of capital, the tendency toward monopolies, which had been so desperately and vainly resisted, was recognized at last, in its true significance, as a process which only needed to complete its logical evolution to open a golden future to humanity.’’ ‘‘Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their profit, were intrusted to a single syndicate representing the people, to be conducted in the common interest for the common profit. The nation, that is to say, organized as the one great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place of all other capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in which all previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a monopoly in the profits and economies of which all citizens shared. The epoch of trusts had ended in The Great Trust. In a word, the people of the United States concluded to assume the conduct of their own business, just as one hundred odd years before they had assumed the conduct of their

own government, organizing now for industrial purposes on precisely the same grounds that they had then organized for political purposes.’’. . . ‘‘Such a stupendous change as you describe,’’ said I, ‘‘did not, of course, take place without great bloodshed and terrible convulsions.’’ ‘‘On the contrary,’’ replied Dr. Leete, ‘‘there was absolutely no violence. The change had been long foreseen. Public opinion had become fully ripe for it, and the whole mass of the people was behind it. There was no more possibility of opposing it by force than by argument. On the other hand the popular sentiment toward the great corporations and those identified with them had ceased to be one of bitterness, as they came to realize their necessity as a link, a transition phase, in the evolution of the true industrial system. The most violent foes of the great private monopolies were now forced to recognize how invaluable and indispensable had been their office in educating the people up to the point of assuming control of their own business. Fifty years before, the consolidation of the industries of the country under national control would have seemed a very daring experiment to the most sanguine. But by a series of object lessons, seen and studied by all men, the great corporations had taught the people an entirely new set of ideas on this subject. They had seen for many years syndicates handling revenues greater than those of states, and directing the labors of hundreds of thousands of men with an efficiency and economy unattainable in smaller operations. It had come to be recognized as an axiom that the larger the business the simpler the principles that can be applied to it; that, as the machine is truer than the hand, so the system, which in a great concern does the work of the master’s eye in a small business, turns out more accurate results. Thus it came about that, thanks to the corporations themselves, when it was proposed that the nation should assume their functions, the suggestion implied nothing which seemed impracticable even to the timid. To be sure it was a step beyond any yet taken, a broader generalization, but the very fact that the nation would be the sole corporation in the field would, it was seen, relieve the undertaking of many difficulties with which the partial monopolies had contended.’’ Dr. Leete ceased speaking, and I remained silent, endeavoring to form some general conception of the changes in the arrangements of society implied in the tremendous revolution which he had described. Finally I said, ‘‘The idea of such an extension of the functions of government is, to say the least, rather overwhelming.’’ ‘‘Extension!’’ he repeated, ‘‘where is the extension?’’

110 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism ‘‘In my day,’’ I replied, ‘‘it was considered that the proper functions of government, strictly speaking, were limited to keeping the peace and defending the people against the public enemy, that is, to the military and police powers.’’ ‘‘And, in heaven’s name, who are the public enemies?’’ exclaimed Dr. Leete. ‘‘Are they France, England, Germany, or hunger, cold, and nakedness? In your day governments were accustomed, on the slightest international misunderstanding, to seize upon the bodies of citizens and deliver them over by hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation, wasting their treasures the while like water; and all this oftenest for no imaginable profit to the victims. We have no wars now, and our governments no war powers, but in order to protect every citizen against hunger, cold, and nakedness, and provide for all his physical and mental needs, the function is assumed of directing his industry for a term of years. No, Mr. West, I am sure on reflection you will perceive that it was in your age, not in ours, that the extension of the functions of governments was extraordinary. Not even for the best ends would men now allow their governments such powers as were then used for the most maleficent.’’ ‘‘Leaving comparisons aside,’’ I said, ‘‘the demagoguery and corruption of our public men would have been considered, in my day, insuperable objections to any assumption by government of the charge of the national industries. We should have thought that no arrangement could be worse than to entrust the politicians with control of the wealth-producing machinery of the country. Its material interests were quite too much the football of parties as it was.’’ ‘‘No doubt you were right,’’ rejoined Dr. Leete, ‘‘but all that is changed now. We have no parties or politicians, and as for demagoguery and corruption, they are words having only an historical signfficance.’’ ‘‘Human nature itself must have changed very much,’’ I said. ‘‘Not at all,’’ was Dr. Leete’s reply, ‘‘but the conditions of human life have changed, and with them the motives of human action. The organization of society with you was such that officials were under a constant temptation to misuse their power for the private profit of themselves or others. Under such circumstances it seems almost strange that you dared entrust them with any of your affairs. Nowadays, on the contrary, society is so constituted that there is absolutely no way in which an official, however ill disposed, could possibly make any profit for himself or any one else by a misuse of his power. Let him be as bad an official as you please, he cannot be a corrupt one. There is no motive

to be. The social system no longer offers a premium on dishonesty. But these are matters which you can only understand as you come, with time, to know us better.’’ ‘‘But you have not yet told me how you have settled the labor problem. It is the problem of capital which we have been discussing,’’ I said. ‘‘After the nation had assumed conduct of the mills, machinery, railroads, farms, mines, and capital in general of the country, the labor question still remained. In assuming the responsibilities of capital the nation had assumed the difficulties of the capitalist’s position.’’ ‘‘The moment the nation assumed the responsibilities of capital those difficulties vanished,’’ replied Dr. Leete. ‘‘The national organization of labor under one direction was the complete solution of what was, in your day and under your system, justly regarded as the insoluble labor problem. When the nation became the sole employer, all the citizens, by virtue of their citizenship, became employees, to be distributed according to the needs of industry.’’ ‘‘That is,’’ I suggested, ‘‘you have simply applied the principle of universal military service, as it was understood in our day, to the labor question.’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ said Dr. Leete, ‘‘that was something which followed as a matter of course as soon as the nation had become the sole capitalist. The people were already accustomed to the idea that the obligation of every citizen, not physically disabled, to contribute his military services to the defense of the nation was equal and absolute. That it was equally the duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of industrial or intellectual services to the maintenance of the nation was equally evident, though it was not until the nation became the employer of labor that citizens were able to render this sort of service with any pretense either of universality or equity. No organization of labor was possible when the employing power was divided among hundreds or thousands of individuals and corporations, between which concert of any kind was neither desired, nor indeed feasible. It constantly happened then that vast numbers who desired to labor could find no opportunity, and on the other hand, those who desired to evade a part or all of their debt could easily do so.’’ ‘‘Service, now, I suppose, is compulsory upon all,’’ I suggested. ‘‘It is rather a matter of course than of compulsion,’’ replied Dr. Leete. ‘‘It is regarded as so absolutely natural and reasonable that the idea of its being compulsory has ceased to be thought of. He would be thought to be an incredibly contemptible person who should need compulsion in such a case. Nevertheless, to speak of

4.9 The Interstate Commerce Act 111 service being compulsory would be a weak way to state its absolute inevitableness. Our entire social order is so wholly based upon and deduced from it that if it were conceivable that a man could escape it, he would be left with no possible way to provide for his existence. He would have excluded himself from the world, cut himself off from his kind, in a word, committed suicide.’’ ‘‘Is the term of service in this industrial army for life?’’ ‘‘Oh, no; it both begins later and ends earlier than the average working period in your day. Your workshops were filled with children and old men, but we hold the period of youth sacred to education, and the period of maturity, when the physical forces begin to flag, equally sacred to ease and agreeable relaxation. The period of industrial service is twenty-four years, beginning at the close of the course of education at twenty-one and terminating at forty-five. After fortyfive, while discharged from labor, the citizen still remains liable to special calls. In case of emergencies causing a sudden great increase in the demand for labor, till he reaches the age of fifty-five, but such calls are rarely, in fact almost never, made. The fifteenth day of October of every year is what we call Muster Day, because those who have reached the age of twenty-one are then mustered into the industrial service, and at the same time those who, after twenty-four years service, have reached the age of forty-five, are honorably mustered out. It is the great day of the year with us, whence we reckon all other events, our Olympiad, save that it is annual.’’

4.9 The Interstate Commerce Act, 1887 Be it enacted . . ., That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a common control, management, or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the

United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country: Provided, however, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to any State or Territory as aforesaid. The term ‘‘railroad’’ as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease; and the term ‘‘transportation’’ shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage. All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. Sec. 2. That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful. Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of

112 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business. Sec. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the Commission appointed under the provisions of this act, such common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation by the Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of this act. Sec. 5. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to enter into any contract, agreement, or combination with any other common carrier or carriers for the pooling of freights of different and competing railroads, or to divide between them the aggregate or net proceeds of the earnings of such railroads, or any portion thereof; and in any case of an agreement for the pooling of freights as aforesaid, each day of its continuation shall be deemed a separate offense. Sec. 6. That every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall print and keep for public inspection schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the transportation of passengers and property which any such common carrier has established and which are in force at the time upon its railroad, as defined by the first section of this act. . . . No advance shall be made in the rates, fares, and charges which have been established and published as aforesaid by any common carrier in compliance with the requirements of this section, except after ten days’ public notice, which shall plainly state the changes proposed to be made in the schedule then in force, and the time when the increased rates, fares, or charges will go into effect. . . .

And when any such common carrier shall have established and published its rates, fares, and charges in compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any services in connection therewith, than is specified in such published schedule of rates, fares, and charges as may at the time be in force. Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall file with the Commission hereinafter provided for copies of its schedules of rates, fares, and charges which have been established and published in compliance with the requirements of this section, and shall promptly notify said Commission of all changes made in the same. Every such common carrier shall also file with said Commission copies of all contracts, agreements, or arrangements with other common carriers in relation to any traffic affected by the provisions of this act to which it may be a party. . . . Sec. 9. That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction. . . . Sec. 10. That any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or, wherever such common carrier is a corporation, any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee, agent, or person acting for or employed by such corporation, who, alone or with any other corporation, company, person, or party, . . . shall be guilty of any infraction of this act, or shall aid or abet therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not to exceed five thousand dollars for each offense. Sec. 11. That a Commission is hereby created and established to be known as the Inter-State Commerce Commission, which shall be composed of five Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commissioners first appointed under this act shall continue in office for the term of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from January 1, 1887, the term of each to be designated by the President; but their successors shall be appointed for terms of six years. . . .

4.10 The Sherman Antitrust Act 113 Any Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Not more than three of the Commissioners shall be appointed from the same political party. No person in the employ of or holding any official relation to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or owning stock or bonds thereof, or who is in any manner pecuniarily interested therein, shall enter upon the duties of or hold such office. Said Commissioners shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. No vacancy in the Commission shall impair the right of the remaining Commissioners to exercise all the powers of the Commission. Sec. 12. That the Commission hereby created shall have authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created; and for the purposes of this act the Commission shall have power to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents under the provisions of this section. . . . Sec. 13. That any person, firm, corporation, or association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing society, or any body politic or municipal organization complaining of anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, in contravention of the provisions thereof, may apply to said Commission by petition, which shall briefly state the facts; whereupon a statement of the charges thus made shall be forwarded by the Commission to such common carrier, who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint or to answer the same in writing within a reasonable time, to be specified by the Commission. . . . If there shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate the matters complained of in such manner and by such means as it shall deem proper. Said Commission shall in like manner investigate any complaint forwarded by the railroad commissioner or railroad commission of any State or Territory, at the request of such commissioner or commission, and may

institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and to the same effect as though complaint had been made. . . . Sec. 16. That whenever any common carrier, . . . shall violate or refuse to neglect to obey any lawful order or requirement of the Commission on this act named, it shall be the duty of the Commission, and lawful for any company or person interested in such order or requirement, to apply, in a summary way, by petition, to the circuit court of the United States sitting in equity in the judicial district in which the common carrier complained of has its principal office, or in which the violation or disobedience of such order or requirements shall happen, alleging such violation or disobedience, as the case may be; and the said court shall have power to hear and determine the matter, on such short notice to the common carrier complained of as the court shall deem reasonable. . . . Sec. 20. That the Commission is hereby authorized to require annual reports from all common carriers subject to the provisions of this act, fix the time and prescribe the manner in which such reports shall be made, and to require from such carriers specific answers to all questions upon which the Commission may need information. Such reports shall also contain such information in relation to rates or regulations concerning fares or freights, or agreements, arrangements, or contracts with other common carriers, as the Commission may require; and the said Commission may, within its discretion, for the purpose of enabling it the better to carry out the purposes of this act, prescribe (if in the opinion of the Commission it is practicable to prescribe such uniformity and methods of keeping accounts) a period of time within which all common carriers subject to the provisions of this act shall have, as near as may be, a uniform system of accounts, and the manner in which such accounts shall be kept. . . .

4.10 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890 Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise; or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

114 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Sec. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any States or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the courts shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decrees, the court many at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises. Sec. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under Section four of this act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof. Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of

transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law. Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Sec. 8. That the word ‘‘person,’’ or ‘‘persons,’’ wherever used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, and the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.

4.11 Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 1889 Objections to the foundations upon which society is based are not in order, because the condition of the race is better with these than with any others which have been tried. Of the effect of any new substitutes proposed we cannot be sure. The Socialist or Anarchist who seeks to overturn present conditions is to be regarded as attacking the foundation upon which civilization itself rests, for civilization took its start from the day when the capable, industrious workman said to his incompetent and lazy fellow, ‘‘If thou dost not sow, thou shalt not reap,’’ and thus ended primitive Communism by separating the drones from the bees. One who studies this subject will soon be brought face to face with the conclusion that upon the sacredness of property civilization itself depends the right of the laborer to his hundred dollars in the savings bank, and equally the legal right of the millionaire to his millions. To those who propose to substitute Communism for this intense Individualism, the answer therefore is: The race has tried that. All progress from that barbarous day to the present time has resulted from its displacement. Not evil, but good, has come to the race from the accumulation of wealth by those who have had the ability and energy to produce it. But even if we admit for a moment that it might be better for the race to discard its present foundation, Individualism, that it is a nobler ideal that man should labor, not for himself alone, but

4.11 Andrew Carnegie, Wealth in and for a brotherhood of his fellows, and share with them all in common . . . even admit all this, and a sufficient answer is, This is not evolution, but revolution. It necessitates the changing of human nature itself---a work of eons, even if it were good to change it, which we cannot know. It is not practicable in our day or in our age. Even if desirable theoretically, it belongs to another and long-succeeding sociological stratum. Our duty is with what is practicable now. . . . It is criminal to waste our energies in endeavoring to uproot, when all we can profitably or possibly accomplish is to bend the universal tree of humanity a little in the direction most favorable to the production of good fruit under existing circumstances. We might as well urge the destruction of the highest existing type of man because he failed to reach our ideal as to favor the destruction of Individualism, Private Property, the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, and the Law of Competition; for these are the highest result of human experience, the soil in which society so far has produced the best fruit. Unequally or unjustly. perhaps, as these laws sometimes operate, and imperfect as they appear to the Idealist, they are, nevertheless. Like the highest type of man, the best and most valuable of all that humanity has yet accomplished. We start, then, with a condition of affairs under which the best interests of the race are promoted, but, which inevitably gives wealth to the few. Thus far, accepting conditions as they exist, the situation can be surveyed and pronounced good. The question then arises, and, if the foregoing be correct, it is the only question with which we have to deal. What is the proper mode of administering wealth after the laws upon which civilization is founded have thrown it into the hands of the few? And it is of this great question that I believe I offer the true solution. It will be understood that fortunes are here spoken of, not moderate sums saved by many years of effort, the returns from which are required for the comfortable maintenance and education of families. This is not wealth, but only competence, which it should be the aim of all to acquire. There are but three modes in which surplus wealth can be disposed of. It can be left to the families of the decedents; or it can be bequeathed for public purposes; or finally, it can be administered during their lives by its possessors. Under the first and second modes most of the wealth of the world that has reached the few has hitherto been applied. Let us in turn consider each of these modes. The first is the most injudicious. In monarchical countries, the estates and the greatest portion of the wealth are left to the first son, that the vanity of

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the parent may be gratified by the thought that his name and title are to descend to succeeding generations unimpaired. The condition of this class in Europe today teaches the futility of such hopes or ambitions. The successors have become impoverished through their follies, or from the fall in the value of land. Even in Great Britain the strict law of entail has been found inadequate to maintain the status of an hereditary class. Its soil is rapidly passing into the hands of the stranger. Under republican institutions the division of property among the children is much fairer, but the question which forces itself upon thoughtful men in all lands is: Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches that, generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they should be so burdened. Neither is it well for the state. Beyond providing for the wife and daughters moderate sources of income, and very moderate allowances indeed, if any, for the sons, men may well hesitate, for it is no longer questionable that great sums bequeathed often work more for the injury than for the good of the recipients. Wise men will soon conclude that, for the best interests of the members of their families, and of the state, such bequests are an improper use of their means. It is not suggested that men who have failed to educate their sons to earn a livelihood shall cast them adrift in poverty. If any man has seen fit to rear his sons With a view to their living idle lives, or, what is highly commendable, has instilled in them the sentiment that they are in a position to labor for public ends without reference to pecuniary considerations, then, of course, the duty of the parent is to see that such are provided for in moderation. There are instances of millionaires’ sons unspoiled by wealth, who, being rich, still perform great services in the community. Such are the very salt of the earth, as valuable as, unfortunately, they are rare. It is not the exception, however, but the rule, that men must regard; and, looking at the usual result of enormous sums conferred upon legatees, the thoughtful man must shortly say, ‘‘I would as soon leave my son a curse as the almighty dollar,’’ and admit to himself that it is not the welfare of the children, but family pride, which inspires these enormous legacies. As to the second mode, that of leaving wealth at death for public uses, it may be said that this is only a means for the disposal of wealth, provided a man is content to wait until he is dead before he becomes of much good in the world. Knowledge of the results of legacies bequeathed is not calculated to inspire the

116 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism brightest hopes of much posthumous good being accomplished. The cases are not few in which the real object sought by the testator is not attained, nor are they few in which his real wishes are thwarted. In many cases the bequests are so used as to become only monuments of his folly. It is well to remember that it requires the exercise of not less ability than that which acquired the wealth to use it so as to be really beneficial to the community. Besides this, it may fairly be said that no man is to be extolled for doing what he cannot help doing, nor is he to be thanked by the community to which he only leaves wealth at death. Men who leave vast sums in this way may fairly be thought men who would not have left it at all, had they been able to take it with them. The memories of such cannot be held in grateful remembrance, for there is no grace in their gifts. It is not to be wondered at that such bequests seem so generally to lack the blessing. The growing disposition to tax more and more heavily large estates left at death is a cheering indication of the growth of a salutary change in public opinion. The State of Pennsylvania now takes-subject to some exceptions- one tenth of the property left by its citizens. The budget presented in the British Parliament the other day proposes to increase the death-duties; and, most significant of all, the new tax is to be a graduated one. Of all forms of taxation, this seems the wisest. Men who continue hoarding great sums all their lives, the proper use of which for public ends would work good to the community, should be made to feel that the community, in the form of the state, cannot thus be deprived of its proper share. By taxing estates heavily at death the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s unworthy life. It is desirable that nations should go much further in this direction. Indeed, it is difficult to set bounds to the share of a rich man’s estate which should go at his death to the public through the agency of the state, and by all means such taxes should be graduated, beginning at nothing upon moderate sums to dependents, and increasing rapidly as the amounts swell. . . . This policy would work powerfully to induce the rich man to attend to the administration of wealth during his life, which is the end that society should always have in view, as being by far the most fruitful for the people. Nor need it be feared that this policy would sap the root of enterprise and render men less anxious to accumulate, for, to the class whose ambition it is to leave great fortunes and be talked about after their death, it will attract even more attention, and, indeed, be a somewhat nobler ambition to have enormous sums paid over to the state from their fortunes.

There remains, then, only one mode of using great fortunes; but in this we have the true antidote for the temporary unequal distribution of wealth, the reconciliation of the rich and the poor-a reign of harmonyanother ideal, differing, indeed, from that of the Communist in requiring only the further evolution of existing conditions, not the total overthrow of our civilization. It is founded upon the present most intense individualism, and the race is prepared to put it in practice by degrees whenever it pleases. Under its sway we shall have an ideal state, in which the surplus wealth of the few will become, in the best sense, the property of the many, because administered for the common good; and this wealth, passing through the hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the elevation of our race than if it had been distributed in small sums to the people themselves. Even the poorest can be made to see this, and to agree that great sums gathered by some of their fellow-citizens and spent for public purposes, from which the masses reap the principal benefit, are more valuable to them than if scattered among them through the course of many years in trifling amounts.

4.12 Populist Party Platform, July 1892 The People’s party, more commonly known as the Populist party, was organized in St. Louis in 1892 to represent the common folk---especially farmers---against the entrenched interests of railroads, bankers, processers, corporations, and the politicians in league with such interests. At its first national convention in Omaha in July 1892, the party nominated James K. Weaver for president and ratified the so-called Omaha Platform, drafted by Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota. Assembled upon the 116th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, the People’s Party of America, in their first national convention, invoking upon their action the blessing of Almighty God, put forth in the name and on behalf of the people of this country, the following preamble and declaration of principles:

Preamble The conditions which surround us best justify our cooperation; we meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized; most of the States have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling

4.12 Populist Party Platform 117 places to prevent universal intimidation and bribery. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right to organize for selfprotection, imported pauperized labor beats down their wages, a hireling standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down, and they are rapidly degenerating into European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are badly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these, in turn, despise the Republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes---tramps and millionaires. The national power to create money is appropriated to enrich bond-holders; a vast public debt payable in legal-tender currency has been funded into gold-bearing bonds, thereby adding millions to the burdens of the people. Silver, which has been accepted as coin since the dawn of history, has been demonetized to add to the purchasing power of gold by decreasing the value of all forms of property as well as human labor, and the supply of currency is purposely abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise, and enslave industry. A vast conspiracy against mankind has been organized on two continents, and it is rapidly taking possession of the world. If not met and overthrown at once it forebodes terrible social convulsions, the destruction of civilization, or the establishment of an absolute despotism. We have witnessed for more than a quarter of a century the struggles of the two great political parties for power and plunder, while grievous wrongs have been inflicted upon the suffering people. We charge that the controlling influences dominating both these parties have permitted the existing dreadful conditions to develop without serious effort to prevent or restrain them. Neither do they now promise us any substantial reform. They have agreed together to ignore, in the coming campaign, ever issue but one. They propose to drown the outcries of a plundered people with the uproar of a sham battle over the tariff, so that capitalists, corporations, national banks, rings, trusts, watered stock, the demonetization of silver and the oppressions of the usurers may all be lost sight of. They propose to sacrifice our homes, lives, and children on the altar of mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure corruption funds from the millionaires.

Assembled on the anniversary of the birthday of the nation, and filled with the spirit of the grand general and chief who established our independence, we seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of the ‘‘plain people,’’ with which class it originated. We assert our purposes to be identical with the purposes of the National Constitution; to form a more perfect union and establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. . . . Our country finds itself confronted by conditions for which there is not precedent in the history of the world; our annual agricultural productions amount to billions of dollars in value, which must, within a few weeks or months, be exchanged for billions of dollars’ worth of commodities consumed in their production; the existing currency supply is wholly inadequate to make this exchange; the results are falling prices, the formation of combines and rings, the impoverishment of the producing class. We pledge ourselves that if given power we will labor to correct these evils by wise and reasonable legislation, in accordance with the terms of our platform. We believe that the power of government---in other words, of the people---should be expanded (as in the case of the postal service) as rapidly and as far as the good sense of an intelligent people and the teaching of experience shall justify, to the end that oppression, injustice, and poverty shall eventually cease in the land. . . .

Platform We declare, therefore--First.---That the union of the labor forces of the United States this day consummated shall be permanent and perpetual; may its spirit enter into all hearts for the salvation of the republic and the uplifting of mankind. Second.---Wealth belongs to him who creates it, and every dollar taken from industry without an equivalent is robbery. ‘‘If any will not work, neither shall he eat.’’ The interests of rural and civil labor are the same; their enemies are identical. Third.---We believe that the time has come when the railroad corporations will either own the people or the people must own the railroads; and should the government enter upon the work of owning and managing all railroads, we should favor an amendment to the constitution by which all persons engaged in the government service shall be placed under a civilservice regulation of the most rigid character, so as to

118 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism prevent the increase of the power of the national administration by the use of such additional government employees. FINANCE.---We demand a national currency, safe, sound, and flexible issued by the general government only, a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and that without the use of banking corporations; a just, equitable, and efficient means of distribution direct to the people, at a tax not to exceed 2 per cent, per annum, to be provided as set forth in the sub-treasury plan of the Farmers’ Alliance, or a better system; also by payments in discharge of its obligations for public improvements. 1. We demand free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1. 2. We demand that the amount of circulating medium be speedily increased to not less than $50 per capita. 3. We demand a graduated income tax. 4. We believe that the money of the country should be kept as much as possible in the hands of the people, and hence we demand that all State and national revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government, economically and honestly administered. We demand that postal savings banks be established by the government for the safe deposit of the earnings of the people and to facilitate exchange. TRANSPORTATION.---Transportation being a means of exchange and a public necessity, the government should own and operate the railroads in the interest of the people. The telegraph and telephone, like the postoffice system, being a necessity for the transmission of news, should be owned and operated by the government in the interest of the people. LAND.---The land, including all the natural sources of wealth, is the heritage of the people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes, and alien ownership of land should be prohibited. All land now held by railroads and other corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only. Expressions of Sentiments Your Committee on Platform and Resolutions beg leave unanimously to report the following: Whereas, Other questions have been presented for our consideration, we hereby submit the following, not as a part of the Platform of the People’s Party, but as resolutions expressive of the sentiment of this Convention.

1. RESOLVED, That we demand a free ballot and a fair count in all elections and pledge ourselves to secure it to every legal voter without Federal Intervention, through the adoption by the States of the unperverted Australian or secret ballot system. 2. RESOLVED, That the revenue derived from a graduated income tax should be applied to the reduction of the burden of taxation now levied upon the domestic industries of this country. 3. RESOLVED, That we pledge our support to fair and liberal pensions to ex-Union soldiers and sailors. 4. RESOLVED, That we condemn the fallacy of protecting American labor under the present system, which opens our ports to the pauper and criminal classes of the world and crowds out our wage-earners; and we denounce the present ineffective laws against contract labor, and demand the further restriction of undesirable emigration. 5. RESOLVED, That we cordially sympathize with the efforts of organized workingmen to shorten the hours of labor, and demand a rigid enforcement of the existing eight-hour law on Government work, and ask that a penalty clause be added to the said law. 6. RESOLVED, That we regard the maintenance of a large standing army of mercenaries, known as the Pinkerton system, as a menace to our liberties, and we demand its abolition. . . . 7. RESOLVED, That we commend to the favorable consideration of the people and the reform press the legislative system known as the initiative and referendum. 8. RESOLVED, That we favor a constitutional provision limiting the office of President and VicePresident to one term, and providing for the election of Senators of the United States by a direct vote of the people. 9. RESOLVED, That we oppose any subsidy or national aid to any private corporation for any purpose. 10. RESOLVED, That this convention sympathizes with the Knights of Labor and their righteous contest with the tyrannical combine of clothing manufacturers of Rochester, and declare it to be a duty of all who hate tyranny and oppression to refuse to purchase the goods made by the

4.13 Samuel Gompers, Letter to Judge Grosscup on Strikes said manufacturers, or to patronize any merchants who sell such goods.

4.13 Samuel Gompers, Letter to Judge Grosscup on Strikes, 1894 You say that as you stated in your charge to the Grand Jury, you believe in labor Organizations within such lawful and reasonable limits as will make them a service to the laboring man, and not a menace to the lawful institutions of the country. I have had the pleasure of reading your charge to the Grand Jury, and have only partially been able to discover how far you believe in labor Organizations. You would certainly have no objection officially or personally to workingmen organizing, and in their meetings discuss perhaps ‘‘the origin of man,’’ benignly smiling upon each other, and declaring that all existing things are right, going to their wretched homes to find some freedom in sleep from gnawing hunger. You would have them extol the virtues of monopolists and wreckers of the people’s welfare. You would not have them consider seriously the fact that more than two millions of their fellows are unemployed, and though willing and able, cannot find the opportunity to work, in order that they may sustain themselves, their wives and their children. You would not have them consider seriously the fact that Pullman who has grown so rich from the toil of his workingmen, that he can riot in luxury, while he heartlessly turns these very workmen out of their tenements into the streets and leave to the tender mercies of corporate greed. Nor would you have them ponder upon the hundreds of other Pullmans of different names. You know, or ought to know, that the introduction of machinery is turning into idleness thousands, faster than new industries are founded, and yet, machinery certainly should not be either destroyed or hampered in its full development. The laborer is a man, he is made warm by the same sun and made cold-yes, colder-by the same winter as you are. He has a heart and brain, and feels and knows the human and paternal instinct for those depending upon him as keenly as do you. What shall the workers do? Sit idly by and see the vast resources of nature and the human mind be utilized and monopolized for the benefit of the comparative few? No. The laborers must learn to think and act, and soon, too, that only by the power of organization, and common concert of action, can either their manhood be maintained, their rights to life (work to

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sustain it) be recognized, and liberty and rights secured. Since you say that you favor labor organizations within certain limits, will you kindly give to thousands of your anxious fellow citizens what you believe the workers could and should do in their organizations to solve this great problem? Not what they should not do. You have told us that. I am not one of those who regards the entire past as a failure. I recognize the progress made and the improved conditions of which nearly the entire civilized world are the beneficiaries. I ask you to explain, however, that if the wealth of the whole world is, as you say, ‘‘pre-eminently and beneficially the nation’s wealth,’’ how is it that thousands of able-bodied, willing, earnest men and women are suffering the pangs of hunger? We may boast of our wealth and civilization, but to the hungry man and woman and child our progress is a hollow mockery, our civilization a sham, and our ‘‘national wealth’’ a chimera. You recognize that the industrial forces set in motion by steam and electricity have materially changed the structure of our civilization. You also admit that a system has grown up where the accumulations of the individual have passed from his control into that of representative combinations and trusts, and that the tendency in this direction is on the increase. How, then, can you consistently criticize the workingmen for recognizing that as individuals they can have no influence in deciding what the wages, hours of toil and conditions of employment shall be? You evidently have observed the growth of corporate wealth and influence. You recognize that wealth, in order to become more highly productive, is concentrated into fewer hands, and controlled by representatives and directors, and yet you sing the old siren song that the workingman should depend entirely upon his own ‘‘individual effort.’’ The school of laissez faire, of which you seem to be a pronounced advocate, has produced great men in advocating the theory of each for himself, and his Satanic Majesty taking the hindermost, but the most pronounced advocates of your school of thought in economics have, when practically put to the test, been compelled to admit that combination and organization of the toiling masses are essential both to prevent the deterioration and to secure an improvement in the condition of the wage earners. If, as you say, the success of commercial society depends upon the full play of competition, why do not you and your confreres turn your attention and direct the shafts of your attacks against the trusts and

120 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism corporations, business wreckers and manipulators in the food products---the necessities of the people. Why garland your thoughts in beautiful phrase when speaking of these modern vampires, and steep your pen in gall when writing of the laborers’ efforts to secure some of the advantages accruing from the concentrated thought and genius of the ages? One becomes enraptured in reading the beauty of your description of modern progress. Could you have had in mind the miners of Spring Valley or Pennsylvania, or the clothing workers of the sweat shops of New York or Chicago when you grandiloquently dilate, ‘‘Who is not rich to-day when compared with his ancestors of a century ago? The steamboat and the railroad bring to his breakfast table the coffees of Java and Brazil, the fruits from Florida and California, and the steaks from the plains. The loom arrays him in garments and the factories furnish him with a dwelling that the richest contemporaries of his grandfather would have envied. With health and industry he is a prince.’’ Probably you have not read within the past year of babies dying of starvation at their mothers’ breasts. More than likely the thousands of men lying upon the bare stones night after night in the City Hall of Chicago last winter escaped your notice. You may not have heard of the cry for bread that was sounded through this land of plenty by thousands of honest men and women. But should these and many other painful incidents have passed you by unnoticed, I am fearful that you may learn of them with keener thoughts with the coming sleets and blasts of winter. You say that ‘‘labor cannot afford to attack capital.’’ Let me remind you that labor has no quarrel with capital, as such. It is merely the possessors of capital who refuse to accord to labor the recognition, the right, the justice which is the laborers’ due, with whom we contend. See what is implied by your contemptuous reference to the laborer when you ask, ‘‘Will the conqueror destroy his trophy?’’ Who ever heard of a conqueror marching unitedly with his trophy, as you would have them? But if by your comparison you mean that the conqueror is the corporation, the trust, the capitalist class, and ask then whether they would destroy their trophy, I would have you ask the widows and orphans of the thousands of men killed annually through the avarice of railroad corporations refusing to avail themselves of modern appliances in coupling and other improvements on their railroads. Inquire from the thousands of women and children whose husbands or fathers were suffocated or crushed

in the mines through the rapacious greed of stockholders clamoring for more dividends. Investigate the sweating dens of the large cities. Go to the mills, factories, through the country. Visit the modern tenement houses or hovels in which thousands of workers are compelled to eke out an existence. Ask these whether the conqueror (monopoly) cares whether his trophy (the laborers) is destroyed or preserved. Ascertain from employers whether the laborer is not regarded the same as a machine, thrown out as soon as all the work possible has been squeezed out of him. Are you aware that all the legislation ever secured for the ventilation or safety of mines, factory or workshop is the result of the efforts of organized labor? Do you know that the trade unions were the shield for the seven-year-old children from being the conqueror’s trophy until they become somewhat older? And that the reformatory laws now on the statute books, protecting or defending the trophies of both sexes, young and old, from the fond care of the conquerors, were wrested from Congresses, legislatures and parliaments despite the Pullmans, the Jeffries, the Ricks, the Tafts, the Williams, the Woods, or the Grosscups. By what right, sir, do you assume that the labor organizations do not conduct their affairs within lawful limits, or that they are a menace to the lawful institutions of the country? Is it because some thoughtless or overzealous member at a time of great excitement and smarting under a wrong may violate under a law or commit an improper act? Would you apply the same rule to the churches, the other moral agencies and organizations that you do to the organizations of labor? If you did, the greatest moral force of life today, the trade unions, would certainly stand out the clearest, brightest and purest. Because a certain class (for which you and a number of your colleagues on the bench seem to be the special pleaders) have a monopoly in their lines of trade, I submit that this is no good reason for their claim to have a monopoly on true patriotism or respect for the lawful institutions of the country. Year by year man’s liberties are trampled under foot at the bidding of corporations and trusts, rights are invaded and law perverted. In all ages wherever a tyrant has shown himself he has always found some willing judge to clothe that tyranny in the robes of legality, and modern capitalism has proven no exception to the rule. You may not know that the labor movement as represented by the trades unions, stands for right, for justice, for liberty. You may not imagine that the issuance of an injunction depriving men of a legal as well as a natural right

4.14 William Allen White, ‘‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?’’ 121 to protect themselves, their wives and little ones, must fail of its purpose. Repression or oppression never yet succeeded in crushing the truth or redressing a wrong. In conclusion let me assure you that labor will organize and more compactly than ever and upon practical lines, and despite relentless antagonism, achieve for humanity a nobler manhood, a more beautiful womanhood and a happier childhood.

4.14 William Allen White, ‘‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?’’ August 16, 1896 Today the Kansas Department of Agriculture sent out a statement which indicates that Kansas has gained less than two thousand people in the past year. There are about two hundred and twenty-five thousand families in the state, and there were about ten thousand babies born in Kansas, and yet so many people have left the state that the natural increase is cut down to less than two thousand net. This has been going on for eight years. If there had been a high brick wall around the state eight years ago, and not a soul had been admitted or permitted to leave, Kansas would be a half million souls better off than she is today. And yet the nation has increased in population. In five years ten million people have been added to the national population, yet instead of gaining a share of this---say, half a millionKansas has apparently been a plague spot and, in the very garden of the world, has lost population by tenthousands every year. Not only has she lost population, but she has lost money. Every moneyed man in the state who could get out without loss has gone. Every month in every community sees someone who has a little money pack up and leave the state. This has been going on for eight years. Money has been drained out all the time. In towns where ten years ago there were three or four or half a dozen money-lending concerns, stimulating industry by furnishing capital, there is now none, or one or two that are looking after the interests and principal already outstanding. No one brings any money into Kansas any more. Which community knows over one or two men who have moved in with more than $5,000 in the past three years? And what community cannot count half a score of men in that time who have left, taking all the money they could scrape together? Yet the nation has grown rich; other states have increased in population and wealthier neighboring states. Missouri has gained over two million, while

Kansas has been losing half a million. Nebraska has gained in wealth and population while Kansas has gone downhill. Colorado has gained every way, while Kansas has lost every way since 1888. What’s the matter with Kansas? There is no substantial city in the state. Every big town save one has lost in population. Yet Kansas City, Omaha, Lincoln, St. Louis, Denver, Colorado Springs, Sedalia, the cities of the Dakotas, St. Paul and Minneapolis and Des Moines---all cities and towns in the West-have steadily grown. Take up the Government Blue Book and you will see that Kansas is virtually off the map. Two or three little scrubby consular places in yellow-fever-stricken communities that do not aggregate ten thousand dollars a year is all the recognition that Kansas has. Nebraska draws about one hundred thousand dollars; little old North Dakota draws about fifty thousand dollars; Oklahoma doubles Kansas; Missouri leaves her a thousand miles behind; Colorado is almost seven times greater than Kansas---the whole west is ahead of Kansas. Take it by any standard you please, Kansas is not in it. Go east and you hear them laugh at Kansas; go west and they sneer at her; go south and they ‘‘cuss’’ her; go north and they have forgotten her. Go into any crowd of intelligent people gathered anywhere on the globe, and you will find the Kansas man on the defensive. The newspaper columns and magazines once devoted to praise of her, to boastful facts and startling figures concerning her resources, are now filled with cartoons, jibes and Pefferian speeches. Kansas just naturally isn’t in it. She has traded places with Arkansas and Timbuctoo. What’s the matter with Kansas? We all know; yet here we are at it again. We have an old mossback Jacksonian who snorts and howls because there is a bathtub in the state house; we are running that old jay for Governor. We have another shabby, wild-eyed, rattle-brained fanatic who has said openly in a dozen speeches that ‘‘the rights of tee user are paramount to the rights of the owner’’; we are running him for Chief Justice, so that capital will come tumbling over itself to get into the state. We have raked the old ash heap of failure in the state and found an old human hoop-skirt who has failed as a businessman, who has failed as an editor, who has failed as a preacher, and we are going to run him for Congressmanat-Large. He will help the looks of the Kansas delegation at Washington. Then we have discovered a kid without a law practice and have decided to run him for Attorney General. Then, for fear some hint that the state had

122 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism become respectable might percolate through the civilized portions of the nation, we have decided to send three or four harpies out lecturing, telling the people that Kansas is raising hell and letting the corn go to weeds. Oh, this is a state to be proud of! We are a people who can hold up our heads! What we need is not more money, but less capital, fewer white shirts and brains, fewer men with business judgment, and more of those fellows who boast that they are ‘‘just ordinary clodhoppers, but they know more in a minute about finance than John Sherman’’; we need more men who are ‘‘posted,’’ who can bellow about the crime of ’73, who hate prosperity, and who think, because a man believes in national honor, he is a tool of Wall Street. We have had a few of them---some hundred fifty thousand---but we need more. We need several thousand gibbering idiots to scream about the ‘‘Great Red Dragon’’ of Lombard Street. We don’t need population, we don’t need wealth, we don’t need well-dressed men on the streets, we don’t need standing in the nation, we don’t need cities on the fertile prairies; you bet we don’t! What we are after is the money power. Because we have become poorer and ornerier and meaner than a spavined, distempered mule, we, the people of Kansas, propose to kick; we don’t care to build up, we wish to tear down. ‘‘There are two ideas of government,’’ said our noble Bryan at Chicago. ‘‘There are those who believe that if you just legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous, this prosperity will leak through on those below. The Democratic idea has been that if you legislate to make the masses prosperous their prosperity will find its way up and through every class which rests upon them.’’ That’s the stuff! Give the prosperous man the dickens! Legislate the thriftless man into ease, whack the stuffings out of the creditors and tell debtors who borrowed the money five years ago when money ‘‘per capita’’ was greater than it is now, that the contraction of currency gives him a right to repudiate. Whoop it up for the ragged trousers; put the lazy, greasy fizzle, who can’t pay his debts, on an altar, and bow down and worship him. Let the state ideal be high. What we need is not the respect of our fellow men, but the chance to get something for nothing. Oh, yes, Kansas is a great state. Here are people fleeing from it by the score every day, capital going out of the state by the hundreds of dollars; and every industry but farming paralysed, and that crippled, because its products have to go across the ocean before they can find a laboring man at work who can afford to buy them. Let’s don’t stop this year. Let’s drive all the

decent, self-respecting men out of the state. Let’s keep the old clodhoppers who know it all. Let’s encourage the man who is ‘‘posted.’’ He can talk, and what we need is not mill hands to eat our meat, nor factory hands to eat our wheat, nor cities to oppress the farmer by consuming his butter and eggs and chickens and produce. What Kansas needs is men who can talk, who have large leisure to argue the currency question while their wives wait at home for that nickel’s worth of bluing. What’s the matter with Kansas? Nothing under the shining sun. She is losing wealth, population and standing. She has got her statesmen, and the money power is afraid of her. Kansas is all right. She has started in to raise hell, as Mrs. Lease advised, and she seems to have an over-production. But that doesn’t matter. Kansas never did believe in diversified crops. Kansas is all right. There is absolutely nothing wrong with Kansas. ‘‘Every prospect pleases and only man is vile.’’

4.15 William Jennings Bryan, Cross of Gold, July 9, 1896 Speech delivered at the Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Illinois Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Convention: I would be presumptuous, indeed, to present myself against the distinguished gentleman to whom you have listened if this were a mere measuring of abilities, but this is not a contest between persons. The humblest citizen in all the land, when clad in the armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the hosts of error. I come to speak to you in defense of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty---the cause of humanity. When this debate is concluded, a motion will be made to lay upon the table the resolution offered in commendation of the Administration, and also the resolution offered in condemnation of the Administration. We object to bringing this question down to the level of persons. The individual is but an atom; he is born, he acts, he dies; but principles are eternal; and this has been a contest over a principle. Never before in the history of this country has there been witnessed such a contest as that through which we have just passed. Never before in the history of American politics has a great issue been fought out as this issue has been, by the voters of a great party. On the fourth of March, 1895, a few Democrats, most of them members of Congress, issued an address

4.15 William Jennings Bryan, Cross of Gold to the Democrats of the nation, asserting that the money question was the paramount issue of the hour; declaring that a majority of the Democratic party had the right to control the action of the party on this paramount issue; and concluding with the request that the believers in the free coinage of silver in the Democratic party should organize, take charge of, and control the policy of the Democratic party. Three months later, at Memphis, an organization was perfected, and the silver Democrats went forth openly and courageously proclaiming their belief, and declaring that, if successful, they would crystallize into a platform the declaration which they had made. Then began the conflict. With a zeal approaching the zeal which inspired the Crusaders who followed Peter the Hermit, our silver Democrats went forth from victory unto victory until they are now assembled, not to discuss, not to debate, but to enter up the judgment already rendered by the plain people of this country. In this contest brother has been arrayed against brother, father against son. The warmest ties of love, acquaintance, and association have been disregarded; old leaders have been cast aside when they have refused to give expression to the sentiments of those whom they would lead, and new leaders have sprung up to give direction to this cause of truth. Thus has the contest been waged, and we have assembled here under as binding and solemn instructions as were ever imposed upon representatives of the people. We do not come as individuals. As individuals we might have been glad to compliment the gentleman from New York, but we know that the people for whom we speak would never be willing to put him in a position where he could thwart the will of the Democratic party. I say it was not a question of persons; it was a question of principle, and it is not with gladness, my friends, that we find ourselves brought into conflict with those who are now arrayed on the other side. The gentleman who preceded me spoke of the state of Massachusetts; let me assure him that not one present in all this Convention entertains the least hostility to the people of the state of Massachusetts, but we stand here representing people who are the equals, before the law, of the greatest citizens in the state of Massachusetts. When you [Bryan points to gold delegates] come before us and tell us that we are about to disturb your business interests, we reply that you have disturbed our business interests by your course. We say to you that you have made the definition of a business man too limited in its application. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer; the attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a

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great metropolis; the merchant at the crossroads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New York; the farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, who begins in spring and toils all summer, and who by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of the country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the Board of Trade and bets upon the price of grain; the miners who go down a thousand feet into the earth, or climb two thousand feet upon the cliffs, and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured into the channels of trade are as much businessmen as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world. We come to speak of this broader class of business men.

We have petitioned . . . We have entreated . . . We have begged . . . We beg no longer; we entreat no more; We petition no more! We defy them! Ah, my friends, we say not one word against those who live upon the Atlantic Coast, but the hardy pioneers who have braved all the dangers of the wilderness, who have made the desert to blossom as the rose---the pioneers away out there [Bryan points westward], who rear their children, ear to Nature’s heart, where they can mingle their voices with the voices of the birds---out there where they have erected school houses for the education of their young, churches where they praise their Creator, and cemeteries where they rest the ashes of their dead---these people, we say, are as deserving of the consideration of our party as any people in this country. It is for these people that we speak. We do not come as aggressors. Our war is not a war of conquest; we are fighting in the defense of our homes, our families, and our posterity. We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned; we have entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded; we have begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more! We defy them! The gentleman from Wisconsin has said that he fears a Robespierre. My friends, in this land of the free you need not fear that a tyrant will spring up from among the people. What we need is an Andrew Jackson to stand, as Jackson stood, against the encroachments of organized wealth. They say that we are opposing national bank currency; it is true. If you will read what Thomas Benton

124 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism said, you will find he said that, in searching history, he could find but one parallel to Andrew Jackson; that was Cicero, who destroyed the conspiracy of Catiline and saved Rome. Benton said that Cicero only did for Rome what Jackson did for us when he destroyed the bank conspiracy and saved America. We say in our platform that we believe that the right to coin and issue money is a function of government. We believe it. We believe that it is a part of sovereignty, and can no more with safety be delegated to private individuals than we could afford to delegate to private individuals the power to make penal statutes or levy taxes. Mr. Jefferson, who was once regarded as a good Democratic authority, seems to have differed in opinion from the gentleman who has addressed us on the part of the minority. Those who are opposed to this proposition tell us that the issue of paper money is a function of the bank, and that the government ought to go out of the banking business. I stand with Jefferson, rather than with them, and tell them, as he did that the issue of money is a function of government, and that the banks ought to go out of the governing business. They complain about the plank which declares against life tenure in office. They have tried to strain it to mean that which it does not mean. What we oppose by that plank is the life tenure which is being built up in Washington and which excludes from participation in official benefits the humbler members of society. And now, my friends, let me come to the paramount issue. If they ask us why it is that we say more on the money question than we say upon the tariff question, I reply that, if protection has slain its thousands, the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands. If they ask us why we do not embody in our platform all the things that we believe in, we reply that when we have restored the money of the Constitution all other necessary reforms will be possible; but that until this is done there is no other reform that can be accomplished. Mr. McKinley was nominated at St. Louis upon a platform which declared for the maintenance of the gold standard until it can be changed into bi-metalism by international agreement. Mr. McKinley was the most popular man among the Republicans, and three months ago everybody in the Republican party prophesied his election. How is it today? Why, the man who was once pleased to think that he looked like Napoleon---that man shudders today when he remembers that he was nominated on the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo. Not only that, but as he listens he can hear with ever-increasing distinctness the sound of the waves as they beat upon the lonely shores of St. Helena.

No private character, however pure, no personal popularity, however great, can protect from the avenging wrath of an indignant people a man who will declare that he is in favor of fastening the gold standard upon this country, or who is willing to surrender the right of self-government and place the legislative control of our affairs in the hands of foreign potentates and powers. We go forth confident that we shall win. Why? Because upon the paramount issue of this campaign there is not a spot of ground upon which the enemy will dare to challenge battle. If they tell us that the gold standard is a good thing, we shall point to their platform and tell them that their platform pledges the party to get rid of the gold standard and substitute bimetalism. If the gold standard is a good thing, why try to get rid of it? I call your attention to the fact that some of the very people who are in this Convention today and who tell us that we ought to declare in favor of international bi-metalism---thereby declaring that the gold standard is wrong and that the principle of bimetalism is better---these very people four months ago were open and avowed advocates of the gold standard, and were then telling us that we could not legislate two metals together, even with the aid of all the world. If the gold standard is a good thing, we ought to declare in favor of its retention and not in favor of abandoning it; and if the gold standard is a bad thing why should we wait until other nations are willing to help us to let go? Here is the line of battle, and we care not upon which issue they force the fight; we are prepared to meet them on either issue or on both. If they tell us that the gold standard is the standard of civilization, we reply to them that this, the most enlightened of all the nations of the earth, has never declared for a gold standard and that both the great parties this year are declaring against it. If the gold standard is the standard of civilization, why, my friends, should we not have it? If they come to meet us on that issue we can present the history of our nation. More than that; we can tell them that they will search the pages of history in vain to find a single instance where the common people of any land have ever declared themselves in favor of the gold standard. They can find where the holders of fixed investments have declared for a gold standard, but not where the masses have. Mr. Carlisle said in 1878 that this was a struggle between ‘‘the idle holders of idle capital’’ and ‘‘the struggling masses, who produce the wealth and pay the taxes of the country’’ and, my friends, the question we are to decide is: Upon which side will the Democratic

4.16 Jane Addams, ‘‘The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements’’ party fight; upon the side of ‘‘the idle holders of idle capital’’ or upon the side of ‘‘the struggling masses?’’ That is the question which the party must answer first, and then it must be answered by each individual hereafter. The sympathies of the Democratic party, as shown by the platform, are on the side of the struggling masses who have ever been the foundation of the Democratic party. There are two ideas of government. There are those who believe that, if you will only legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous, their prosperity will leak through on those below. The Democratic idea, however, has been that if you legislate to make the masses prosperous, their prosperity will find its way up through every class which rests upon them. You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard; we reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country. My friends, we declare that this nation is able to legislate for its own people on every question, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on earth; and upon that issue we expect to carry every state in the Union. I shall not slander the inhabitants of the fair state of Massachusetts nor the inhabitants of the state of New York by saying that, when they are confronted with the proposition, they will declare that this nation is not able to attend to its own business. It is the issue of 1776 over again. Our ancestors, when but three millions in number, had the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation; shall we, their descendants, when we have grown to seventy millions, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers? No, my friends, that will never be the verdict of our people. Therefore, we care not upon what lines the battle is fought. If they say bi-metalism is good, but that we cannot have it until other nations help us, we reply that, instead of having a gold standard because England has, we will restore bi-metalism, and then let England have bi-metalism because the United States has it. If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we will fight them to the uttermost. Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: ‘‘You shall not press

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down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns! You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!’’

4.16 Jane Addams, ‘‘The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements,’’ 1892 . . . It is not difficult to see that although America is pledged to the democratic ideal, the view of democracy has been partial, and that its best achievement thus far has been pushed along the line of the franchise. Democracy has made little attempt to assert itself in social affairs. We have refused to move beyond the position of its eighteenth-century leaders, who believed that political equality alone would secure all good to all men. We conscientiously followed the gift of the ballot hard upon the gift of freedom to the negro, but we are quite unmoved by the fact that he lives among us in a practical social ostracism. We hasten to give the franchise to the immigrant from a sense of justice, from a tradition that he ought to have it, while we dub him with epithets deriding his past life or present occupation, and feel no duty to invite him to our houses. We are forced to acknowledge that it is only in our local and national politics that we try very hard for the ideal so dear to those who were enthusiasts when the century was young. We have almost given it up as our ideal in social intercourse. There are city wards in which many of the votes are sold for drinks and dollars; still there is a remote pretence, at least a fiction current, that a man’s vote is his own . . . . . . Our consciences are becoming tender in regard to the lack of democracy in social affairs. We are perhaps entering upon the second phase of democracy, as the French philosophers entered upon the first, somewhat bewildered by its logical conclusions. The social organism has broken down through large districts of our great cities . . . We find working-men organized into armies of producers because men of executive ability and business sagacity have found it to their interests thus to organize them. But these workingmen are not organized socially; although living in crowded tenement-houses, they are living without a corresponding social contact. The chaos is as great as it would be were they working in huge factories without foreman or superintendent. Their ideas and resources are cramped. The desire for higher social pleasure is extinct. They have no share in the traditions and social energy which make for progress. Too often their only place of meeting is a saloon, their only host a bartender; a local demagogue forms their public opinion.

126 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism Men of ability and refinement, of social power and university cultivation, stay away from them . . . It is constantly said that because the masses have never had social advantages they do not want them, that they are heavy and dull, and that it will take political or philanthropic machinery to change them. This divides a city into rich and poor; into the favored, who express their sense of the social obligation by gifts of money, and into the unfavored, who express it by clamoring for a ‘‘share’’-both of them actuated by a vague sense of justice . . . It is inevitable that those who feel most keenly this insincerity and partial living should be our young people, our so-called educated young people who accomplish little toward the solution of this social problem, and who bear the brunt of being cultivated into unnourished, oversensitive lives. They have been shut off from the common labor by which they live and which is a great source of moral and physical health. They feel a fatal want of harmony between their theory and their lives, a lack of co-ordination between thought and action. I think it is hard for us to realize how seriously many of them are taking to the notion of human brotherhood, how eagerly they long to give tangible expression to the democratic ideal. These young men and women, longing to socialize their democracy, are animated by certain hopes. These hopes may be loosely formulated thus: that if in a democratic country nothing can be permanently achieved save through the masses of the people, it will be impossible to establish a higher political life than the people themselves crave; that it is difficult to see how the notion of a higher civic life can be fostered save through common intercourse; that the blessings which we associate with a life of refinement and cultivation can be made universal and must be made universal if they are to be permanent; that the good we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain, is floating in mid-air, until it is secured for all of us and incorporated into our common life. These hopes are responsible for results in various directions, pre-eminently in the extension of educational advantages. We find that all educational matters are more democratic in their political than in their social aspects. The public schools in the poorest and most crowded wards of the city are inadequate to the number of children, and many of the teachers are illprepared and overworked; but in each ward there is an effort to secure public education. The schoolhouse itself stands as a pledge that the city recognizes and endeavors to fulfill the duty of educating its children. But what becomes of these children when they are no

longer in public schools? Many of them never come under the influence of a professional teacher nor a cultivated friend after they are twelve. Society at large does little for their intellectual development . . . The University Extension movement---certainly when it is closely identified with Settlements---would not confine learning to those who already want it, or to those who, by making an effort, can gain it, or to those among whom professional educators are already at work, but would take it to the tailors of East London and the dock-laborers of the Thames. It requires tact and training, love of learning, and the conviction of the justice of its diffusion to give it to people whose intellectual faculties are untrained and disused. But men in England are found who do it successfully, and it is believed there are men and women in America who can do it. I also believe that the best work in University Extension can be done in Settlements, where the teaching will be further socialized, where the teacher will grapple his students, not only by formal lectures, but by every hook possible to the fuller intellectual life which he represents. This teaching requires distinct methods, for it is true of people who have been allowed to remain undeveloped and whose faculties are inert and sterile, that they cannot take their learning heavily. It has to be diffused in a social atmosphere. Information held in solution, a medium of fellowship and goodwill can be assimilated by the dullest. If education is, as Froebel defined it, ‘‘deliverance,’’ deliverance of the forces of the body and mind, then the untrained must first be delivered from all constraint and rigidity before their faculties can be used. Possibly one of the most pitiful periods in the drama of the much-praised young American who attempts to rise in life is the time when his educational requirements seem to have locked him up and made him rigid. He fancies himself shut off from his uneducated family and misunderstood by his friends. He is bowed down by his mental accumulations and often gets no farther than to carry them through life as a great burden. Not once has he had a glimpse of the delights of knowledge. Intellectual life requires for its expansion and manifestation the influence and assimilation of the interests and affections of others. Mazzini, that greatest of all democrats, who broke his heart over the condition of the South European peasantry, said: ‘‘Education is not merely a necessity of true life by which the individual renews his vital force in the vital force of humanity; it is a Holy Communion with generations dead and living, by which be fecundates all his faculties. When he is withheld from this Communion for generations, as the Italian peasant has been, we point our finger at him

4.16 Jane Addams, ‘‘The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements’’ and say, ‘He is like a beast of the field; he must be controlled by force.’’’ Even to this it is sometimes added that it is absurd to educate him, immoral to disturb his content. We stupidly use again the effect as an argument for a continuance of the cause. It is needless to say that a Settlement is a protest against a restricted view of education, and makes it possible for every educated man or woman with a teaching faculty to find out those who are ready to be taught. The social and educational activities of a Settlement are but differing manifestations of the attempt to socialize democracy, as is the existence of the settlement itself. . . . We have in America a fast-growing number of cultivated young people who have no recognized outlet for their active faculties. They bear constantly of the great social maladjustment, but no way is provided for them to change it, and their uselessness bangs about them heavily. Huxley declares that the sense of uselessness is the severest shock which the human system can sustain, and that, if persistently sustained, it results in atrophy of function. These young people have had advantages of college, of European travel and economic study, but they are sustaining this shock of inaction. They have pet phrases, and they tell you that the things that make us all alike are stronger than the things that make us different. They say that all men are united by needs and sympathies far more permanent and radical than anything that temporarily divides them and sets them in opposition to each other. If they affect art, they say that the decay in artistic expression is due to the decay in ethics, that art when shut away from the human interests and from the great mass of humanity is self-destructive. They tell their elders with all the bitterness of youth that if they expect success from them in business, or politics, or in whatever lines their ambition for them has run, they must let them consult all of humanity; that they must let them find out what the people want and bow they want it. It is only the stronger young people, however, who formulate this. Many of them dissipate their energies in socalled enjoyment. Others, not content with that, go on studying and go back to college for their second degrees, not that they are especially fond of study, but because they want something definite to do, and their powers have been trained in the direction of mental accumulation. Many are buried beneath mere mental accumulation with lowered vitality and discontent. Walter Besant says they have had the vision that Peter bad when he saw the great sheet let down from heaven, wherein was neither clean nor unclean. He calls it the sense of humanity. It is not philanthropy or benevolence. It is a thing fuller and wider than either of these.

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This young life, so sincere in its emotion and good phrases and yet so undirected, seems to me as pitiful as the other great mass of destitute lives. One is supplementary to the other, and some method of communication can surely be devised. Mr. Barnett, who urged the first Settlement---Toynbee Hall, in East London---recognized this need of outlet for the young men of Oxford and Cambridge, and hoped that the Settlement would supply the communication. It is easy to see why the Settlement movement originated in England, where the years of education are more constrained and definite than they are here, where class distinctions are more rigid. The necessity of it was greater there, but we are fast feeling the pressure of the need and meeting the necessity for Settlements in America. Our young people feel nervously the need of putting theory into action, and respond quickly to the Settlement form of activity. . . . The impulse to share the lives of the poor, the desire to make social service, irrespective of propaganda, express the spirit of Christ, is as old as Christianity itself. We have no proof from the records themselves that the early Roman Christians, who strained their simple art to the point of grotesqueness in their eagerness to record a ‘‘good news’’ on the walls of the catacombs, considered this ‘‘good news’’ a religion. Jesus had no set of truths labelled ‘‘Religious.’’ On the contrary, his doctrine was that all truth is one, that the appropriation of it is freedom. His teaching bad no dogma to mark it off from truth and action in general. He himself called it a revelations life. These early Roman Christians received the Gospel message, a command to love all men, with a certain joyous simplicity. The image of the Good Shepherd is blithe and gay beyond the gentlest shepherd of Greek mythology; the hart no longer pants, but rushes to the water brooks. The Christians looked for the continuous revelation, but believed what Jesus said, that this revelation to be held and made manifest must be put into terms of action; that action is the only medium man has for receiving and appropriating truth. ‘‘If any man will do His will, be shall know of the doctrine.’’ That Christianity has to be revealed and embodied in the line of social progress is a corollary to the simple proposition that man’s action is found in his social relationships in the way in which he connects with his fellows, that his motives for action are the zeal and affection with which be regards his fellows. By this simple process was created a deep enthusiasm for humanity, which regarded man as at once the organ and object of revelation; and by this process came about that wonderful fellowship, that true democracy

128 The Gilded Age and the Rise of Populism of the early Church, that so captivates the imagination. The early Christians were pre-eminently nonresistant. They believed in love as a cosmic force. There was no iconoclasm during the minor peace of the Church. They did not yet denounce, nor tear down temples, nor preach the end of the world. They grew to a mighty number, but it never occurred to them, either in their weakness or their strength, to regard other men for an instant as their foes or as aliens. The spectacle of the Christians loving all men was the most astounding Rome bad ever seen. They were eager to sacrifice themselves for the weak, for children and the aged. They identified themselves with slaves and did not avoid the plague. They longed to share the common lot that they might receive the constant revelation. It was a new treasure which the early Christians added to the sum of all treasures, a joy hitherto unknown in the world, the joy of finding the Christ which lieth in each man, but which no man can unfold save in fellowship. A happiness ranging from the heroic to the pastoral enveloped them. They were to possess a revelation as long as life had new meaning to unfold, new action to propose. I believe that there is a distinct turning among many young men and women toward this simple acceptance of Christ’s message. They resent the assumption that Christianity is a set of ideas which belong to the religious consciousness, whatever that may be, that it is a thing to be proclaimed and instituted apart from the social life of the community. They insist that it shall seek a simple and natural expression in the social organism itself. The Settlement movement is only one manifestation of that wider humanitarian movement which

throughout Christendom, but pre-eminently in England, is endeavoring to embody itself, not in a sect, but in society itself. Tolstoi has reminded us all very forcibly of Christ’s principle of non-resistance. His formulation has been startling and his expression has deviated from the general movement, but there is little doubt that be has many adherents, men and women who are philosophically convinced of the futility of opposition, we believe that evil can be overcome only with good and cannot be opposed. If love is the creative force of the universe, the principle which binds men together, and by their interdependence on each other makes them human, just so surely is anger and the spirit of opposition the destructive principle of the universe, that which tears down, thrusts men apart, and makes them isolated and brutal. . . . It is quite impossible for me to say what proportion or degree the subjective necessity, which led to the opening of Hull House, combined the three trends: first the desire to interpret democracy in social terms; secondly, the impulse beating at the very source of our lives urging us to aid in the race progress; and, thirdly, the Christian movement toward Humanitarianism. It is difficult to analyze a living thing; the analysis is at best imperfect. Many more motives may blend with the three trends; possibly the desire for a new form of social success due to the nicety of imagination, which refuses worldly pleasures unmixed with the joys of self-sacrifice; possibly a love of approbation, so vast that is it not content with the treble clapping of delicate hands, but wishes also to bear the bass notes from toughened palms, may mingle with these.

Section 5 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s

Introduction

lous economic trusts, and other excesses of a rapidly growing, industrial society. They also called for greater equality for women and for ethnic, religious, and racial minorities. By contrast, ‘‘social control’’ activists were preoccupied by such causes as immigration restriction, sterilization, crime control, and prohibition of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. The momentous 1912 presidential election revealed other fault lines between Progressives supporting Theodore Roosevelt and New Nationalism, which envisioned greater regulatory centralization, and those backing Woodrow Wilson and New Freedom, which resisted more national authority in favor stronger state-level controls and antitrust measures. American entry into World War I derailed many of the social and economic reform aspirations of ‘‘social justice’’ activists like Jane Addams, but it reinforced social conformist goals by repressing Germans, pacifists, and others who challenged ‘‘100 percent Americanism,’’ while closing the gates to most newcomers. The Roaring Twenties brought renewed economic growth and prosperity to Americans who turned away from global affairs and the vigorous reform impulses that animated political life at the turn of the century. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The Progressive Era was a period of vigorous debate and reform in response to the economic and social dislocations of modernizing American society from roughly the 1890s until U.S. entry into World War I. Its name is derived from the host of so-called Progressive political, economic, and social reforms that were championed during these years. The Progressives tended to converge in their disdain of what they considered to be corrupt party machines and in their support for efficient municipal government, civil service reform, and more direct democratic methods such as the initiative, the referendum, and the direct primary. They also expressed faith that scientific expertise could provide precise and effective solutions to nettlesome social problems, resulting in an institutionalized role for experts in federal bureaucracies, congressional committees, commissions, and the policy-making process generally. In truth, however, Progressivism represented a disparate set of political and policy goals that reflected a significant divide among various Progressive activists of the time. For instance, advocates of ‘‘social justice’’ reform favored new government initiatives to address problems of poverty, child labor, inadequate wages and working conditions, unscrupu-

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Documents

5.1 Booker T. Washington, Democracy and Education, September 30, 1896

the honor or dishonor of our nation---yea, the very existence of the government. The North and West are divided. There are five million votes to be cast in the South, and of this number one half are ignorant. Not only are one half the voters ignorant, but, because of this ignorant vote, corruption, dishonesty in a dozen forms have crept into the exercise of the political franchise. . . . The time may not be far off when to this kind of jury we shall have to look for the verdict that is to decide the course of our democratic institutions. When a great national calamity stares us in the face, we are, I fear, too much given to depending on a short campaign of education to do on the hustings what should have been accomplished in the schoolroom. With this preliminary survey, let us examine with more care the work to be done in the South before all classes will be fit for the highest duties of citizenship. In reference to my own race I am confronted with some embarrassment at the outset because of the various and conflicting opinions as to what is to be its final place in our economic and political life. Within the last thirty years---and, I might add, within the last three months---it has been proven by eminent authority that the Negro is increasing in numbers so fast that it is only a question of a few years before he will far outnumber the white race in the South, and it has also been proven that the Negro is fast dying out and it is only a question of a few years before he will have completely disappeared. It has also been proven that crime among us is on the increase and that crime is on the decrease; that education helps the Negro, that

Address before the Institute of Arts and Sciences, Brooklyn, New York Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is said that the strongest chain is no stronger than its weakest link. In the Southern part of our country there are twenty-two millions of your brethren who are bound to you by ties which you cannot tear asunder if you would. The most intelligent man in your community has his intelligence darkened by the ignorance of a fellow citizen in the Mississippi bottoms. The most wealthy in your city would be more wealthy but for the poverty of a fellow being in the Carolina rice swamps. The most moral and religious among you has his religion and morality modified by the degradation of the man in the South whose religion is a mere matter of form or emotionalism. The vote in your state that is cast for the highest and purest form of government is largely neutralized by the vote of the man in Louisiana whose ballot is stolen or cast in ignorance. When the South is poor, you are poor; when the South commits crime, you commit crime. My friends, there is no mistake; you must help us to raise the character of our civilization or yours will be lowered. . . . Can you make your intelligence affect us in the same ratio that our ignorance affects you? Let us put a not improbable case, one that involves peace or war, 131

132 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s education also hurts him; that he is fast leaving the South and taking up his residence in the North and West, and that the tendency of the Negro is to drift to the lowlands of the Mississippi bottoms. It has been proven that as a slave laborer he produced less cotton than a free man. It has been proven that education unfits the Negro for work. . . . In the midst of this confusion there are a few things of which I feel certain that furnish a basis for thought and action. I know . . . that, whether in slavery or freedom, we have always been loyal to the Stars and Stripes, that no schoolhouse has been opened for us that has not been filled; that 1,500,000 ballots that we have the right to cast are as potent for weal and woe as the ballot cast by the whitest and most influential man in your commonwealth. . . . I fear that the wisest and most interested have not fully comprehended the task which American slavery has laid at the doors of the Republic. Few, I fear, realize what is to be done before the seven million of my people in the South can be made a safe, helpful, progressive part of our institutions. The South, in proportion to its ability, has done well, but this does not change facts. Let me illustrate what I mean by a single example. In spite of all that has been done, I was in a county in Alabama a few days ago where there are some thirty thousand colored people and about seven thousand whites; in this county not a single public school for Negroes has been open this year longer than three months, not a single colored teacher has been paid more than fifteen dollars a month for his teaching. Not one of these schools was taught in a building worthy of the name of schoolhouse. In this county the state or public authorities do not own a dollar’s worth of school property---not a schoolhouse, a blackboard, or a piece of crayon. Each colored child had spent on him this year for his education about fifty cents, while one of your children had spent on him this year for education not far from twenty dollars. And yet each citizen of this county is expected to share the burdens and privileges of our democratic form of government just as intelligently and conscientiously as the citizens of your beloved Kings County. A vote in this county means as much to the nation as a vote in the city of Boston. . . . I have referred to industrial education as a means of fitting the millions of my people in the South for the duties of citizenship. Until there is industrial independence it is hardly possible to have a pure ballot. In the country districts of the Gulf states it is safe to say that not more than one black man in twenty owns the land he cultivates. Where so large a proportion of the people

are dependent, live in other people’s houses, eat other people’s food, and wear clothes they have not paid for, it is a pretty hard thing to tell how they are going to vote. My remarks thus far have referred mainly to my own race. But there is another side. The longer I live and the more I study the question, the more I am convinced that it is not so much a problem as to what you will do with the Negro as what the Negro will do with you and your civilization. . . . The educators, the statesmen, the philanthropists have never comprehended their duty toward the millions of poor whites in the South who were buffeted for two hundred years between slavery and freedom, between civilization and degradation, who were disregarded by both master and slave. It needs no prophet to tell the character of our future civilization when the poor white boy in the country districts of the South receives one dollar’s worth of education and your boy twenty dollars’ worth, when one never enters a library or reading room and the other has libraries and reading rooms in every ward and town. When one hears lectures and sermons once in two months and the other can hear a lecture or sermon every day in the year. When you help the South you help yourselves. . . . Some years ago a bright young man of my race succeeded in passing a competitive examination for a cadetship at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. Says the young man, Mr. Henry Baker, in describing his stay at this institution: ‘‘I was several times attacked with stones and was forced finally to appeal to the officers, when a marine was detailed to accompany me across the campus and from the mess hall at meal times. My books were mutilated, my clothes were cut and in some instances destroyed, and all the petty annoyances which ingenuity could devise were inflicted upon me daily, and during seamanship practice aboard the Dale attempts were often made to do me personal injury while I would be aloft in the rigging. No one ever addressed me by name. I was called the Moke usually, the Nigger for variety. I was shunned as if I were a veritable leper, and received curses and blows as the only method my persecutors had of relieving the monotony.’’ Not once during the two years, with one exception, did any one of the more than four hundred cadets enrolled ever come to him with a word of advice, counsel, sympathy, or information. . . . The one exception was in the case of a Pennsylvania boy, who stealthily brought him a piece of his birthday cake at twelve o’clock one night. The act so surprised Baker that his suspicions were aroused, but these were dispelled by

5.2 Albert J. Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire 133 the donor, who read to him a letter which he had received from his mother, from whom the cake came, in which she requested that a slice be given to the colored cadet who was without friends. I recite this incident not for the purpose merely of condemning the wrong done a member of my race; no, no, not that. I mention the case, not for the one cadet, but for the sake of the four hundred cadets, for the sake of the four hundred American families, the four hundred American communities whose civilization and Christianity these cadets represented. Here were four hundred and more young men representing the flower of our country, who had passed through our common schools and were preparing themselves at public expense to defend the honor of our country. And yet, with grammar, reading, and arithmetic in the public schools, and with lessons in the arts of war, the principles of physical courage at Annapolis, both systems seemed to have utterly failed to prepare a single one of these young men for real life, that he could be brave enough, Christian enough, American enough, to take this poor defenseless black boy by the hand in open daylight and let the world know that he was his friend. Education, whether of black man or white man, that gives one physical courage to stand in front of the cannon and fails to give him moral courage to stand up in defense of right and justice is a failure. . . . My friends, we are one in this country. The question of the highest citizenship and the complete education of all concerns nearly ten million of my own people and over sixty million of yours. We rise as you rise; when we fall you fall. When you are strong we are strong; when we are weak you are weak. There is no power than can separate our destiny. The Negro can afford to be wronged; the white man cannot afford to wrong him. . . . If a white man steals a Negro’s ballot it is the white man who is permanently injured. Physical death comes to the one Negro lynched in a county, but death of the morals---death of the soul---comes to the thousands responsible for the lynching. We are a patient, humble people. We can afford to work and wait. There is plenty in this country for us to do. Away up in the atmosphere of goodness, forbearance, patience, long-suffering, and forgiveness the workers are not many or overcrowded. If others would be little we can be great. If others would be mean we can be good. If others would push us down we can help push them up. Character, not circumstances, makes the man. . . . During the next half-century and more my race must continue passing through the severe American

crucible. We are to be tested in our patience, in our forbearance, our power to endure wrong, to withstand temptation, to succeed, to acquire and use skill, our ability to compete, to succeed in commerce; to disregard the superficial for the real, the appearance for the substance; to be great and yet the servant of all. This, this is the passport to all that is best in the life of our republic, and the Negro must possess it or be debarred. In working out our destiny, while the main burden and center of activity must be with us, we shall need in a large measure the help, the encouragement, the guidance that the strong can give the weak. Thus helped, we of both races in the South shall soon throw off the shackles of racial and sectional prejudice and rise above the clouds of ignorance, narrowness, and selfishness into that atmosphere, that pure sunshine, where it will be our highest ambition to serve man, our brother, regardless of race or past conditions.

5.2 Albert J. Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire, 1898 MR. PRESIDENT, the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever, ‘‘territory belonging to the United States,’’ as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond the Philippines are China’s illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling out regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world. This island empire is the last land left in all the oceans. If it should prove a mistake to abandon it, the blunder once made would be irretrievable. If it proves a mistake to hold it, the error can be corrected when we will. Every other progressive nation stands ready to relieve us. But to hold it will be no mistake. Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. She is nearer to us than to England, Germany, or Russia, the commercial powers of the present and

134 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s the future. They have moved nearer to China by securing permanent bases on her borders. The Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East. . . . Here, then, senators, is the situation. Two years ago there was no land in all the world which we could occupy for any purpose. Our commerce was daily turning toward the Orient, and geography and trade developments made necessary our commercial empire over the Pacific. And in that ocean we had no commercial, naval, or military base. Today, we have one of the three great ocean possessions of the globe, located at the most commanding commercial, naval, and military points in the Eastern seas, within hail of India, shoulder to shoulder with China, richer in its own resources than any equal body of land on the entire globe, and peopled by a race which civilization demands shall be improved. Shall we abandon it? That man little knows the common people of the republic, little understands the instincts of our race who thinks we will not hold it fast and hold it forever, administering just government by simplest methods. We may trick up devices to shift our burden and lessen our opportunity; they will avail us nothing but delay. We may tangle conditions by applying academic arrangements of self-government to a crude situation; their failure will drive us to our duty in the end. The military situation, past, present, and prospective, is no reason for abandonment. Our campaign has been as perfect as possible with the force at hand. We have been delayed, first, by a failure to comprehend the immensity of our acquisition; and, second, by insufficient force; and, third, by our efforts for peace. In February, after the treaty of peace, General Otis had only 3,722 officers and men whom he had a legal right to order into battle. The terms of enlistment of the rest of his troops had expired, and they fought voluntarily and not on legal military compulsion. It was one of the noblest examples of patriotic devotion to duty in the history of the world. Those who complain do so in ignorance of the real situation. We attempted a great task with insufficient means; we became impatient that it was not finished before it could fairly be commenced; and I pray we may not add that other element of disaster, pausing in the work before it is thoroughly and forever done. That is the gravest mistake we could possibly make, and that is the only danger before us. Our Indian wars would have been shortened, the lives of soldiers and settlers saved, and the Indians themselves benefited had we made continuous and decisive war; and any other kind of war is criminal because ineffective. We acted toward the Indians as though we feared them, loved them,

hated them---a mingling of foolish sentiment, inaccurate thought, and paralytic purpose. . . . Mr. President, that must not be our plan. This war is like all other wars. It needs to be finished before it is stopped. I am prepared to vote either to make our work thorough or even now to abandon it. A lasting peace can be secured only by overwhelming forces in ceaseless action until universal and absolutely final defeat is inflicted on the enemy. To halt before every armed force, every guerrilla band opposing us is dispersed or exterminated will prolong hostilities and leave alive the seeds of perpetual insurrection. . . . Mr. President, reluctantly and only from a sense of duty am I forced to say that American opposition to the war has been the chief factor in prolonging it. Had Aguinaldo not understood that in America, even in the American Congress, even here in the Senate, he and his cause were supported; had he not known that it was proclaimed on the stump and in the press of a faction in the United States that every shot his misguided followers fired into the breasts of American soldiers was like the volleys fired by Washington’s men against the soldiers of King George, his insurrection would have dissolved before it entirely crystallized. . . . All this has aided the enemy more than climate, arms, and battle. Senators, I have heard these reports myself; I have talked with the people; I have seen our mangled boys in the hospital and field; I have stood on the firing line and beheld our dead soldiers, their faces turned to the pitiless southern sky, and in sorrow rather than anger I say to those whose voices in America have cheered those misguided natives on to shoot our soldiers down, that the blood of those dead and wounded boys of ours is on their hands, and the flood of all the years can never wash that stain away. In sorrow rather than anger I say these words, for I earnestly believe that our brothers knew not what they did. But, senators, it would be better to abandon this combined garden and Gibraltar of the Pacific, and count our blood and treasure already spent a profitable loss than to apply any academic arrangement of selfgovernment to these children. They are not capable of self-government. How could they be? They are not of a self-governing race. They are Orientals, Malays, instructed by Spaniards in the latter’s worst estate. They know nothing of practical government except as they have witnessed the weak, corrupt, cruel, and capricious rule of Spain. What magic will anyone employ to dissolve in their minds and characters those impressions of governors and governed which three centuries of misrule has created? What alchemy will change the Oriental quality of their blood and set the self-

5.2 Albert J. Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire 135 governing currents of the American pouring through their Malay veins? How shall they, in the twinkling of an eye, be exalted to the heights of self-governing peoples which required a thousand years for us to reach, Anglo-Saxon though we are? Let men beware how they employ the term ‘‘selfgovernment.’’ It is a sacred term. It is the watchword at the door of the inner temple of liberty, for liberty does not always mean self-government. Self-government is a method of liberty---the highest, simplest, best---and it is acquired only after centuries of study and struggle and experiment and instruction and all the elements of the progress of man. Self-government is no base and common thing to be bestowed on the merely audacious. It is the degree which crowns the graduate of liberty, not the name of liberty’s infant class, who have not yet mastered the alphabet of freedom. Savage blood, Oriental blood, Malay blood, Spanish example---are these the elements of self-government? We must act on the situation as it exists, not as we would wish it. I have talked with hundreds of these people, getting their views as to the practical workings of self-government. The great majority simply do not understand any participation in any government whatever. The most enlightened among them declare that self-government will succeed because the employers of labor will compel their employees to vote as their employer wills and that this will insure intelligent voting. I was assured that we could depend upon good men always being in office because the officials who constitute the government will nominate their successors, choose those among the people who will do the voting, and determine how and where elections will be held. . . . The men we send to administer civilized government in the Philippines must be themselves the highest examples of our civilization. I use the word ‘‘examples,’’ for examples they must be in that word’s most absolute sense. They must be men of the world and of affairs, students of their fellowmen, not theorists nor dreamers. They must be brave men, physically as well as morally. They must be as incorruptible as honor, as stainless as purity, men whom no force can frighten, no influence coerce, no money buy. Such men come high, even here in America. But they must be had. Better pure military occupation for years than government by any other quality of administration. Better abandon this priceless possession, admit ourselves incompetent to do our part in the world-redeeming work of our imperial race; better now haul down the flag of arduous deeds for civilization and run up the flag of reaction and decay than to apply academic

notions of self-government to these children or attempt their government by any but the most perfect administrators our country can produce. I assert that such administrators can be found. . . . Mr. President, self-government and internal development have been the dominant notes of our first century; administration and the development of other lands will be the dominant notes of our second century. And administration is as high and holy a function as self-government, just as the care of a trust estate is as sacred an obligation as the management of our own concerns. Cain was the first to violate the divine law of human society which makes of us our brother’s keeper. And administration of good government is the first lesson in self-government, that exalted estate toward which all civilization tends. Administration of good government is not denial of liberty. For what is liberty? It is not savagery. It is not the exercise of individual will. It is not dictatorship. It involves government, but not necessarily self-government. It means law. First of all, it is a common rule of action, applying equally to all within its limits. Liberty means protection of property and life without price, free speech without intimidation, justice without purchase or delay, government without favor or favorites. What will best give all this to the people of the Philippines---American administration, developing them gradually toward selfgovernment, or self-government by a people before they know what self-government means? The Declaration of Independence does not forbid us to do our part in the regeneration of the world. If it did, the Declaration would be wrong, just as the Articles of Confederation, drafted by the very same men who signed the Declaration, was found to be wrong. The Declaration has no application to the present situation. It was written by self-governing men for self-governing men. It was written by men who, for a century and a half, had been experimenting in selfgovernment on this continent, and whose ancestors for hundreds of years before had been gradually developing toward that high and holy estate. The Declaration applies only to people capable of self- government. How dare any man prostitute this expression of the very elect of self-governing peoples to a race of Malay children of barbarism, schooled in Spanish methods and ideas? And you who say the Declaration applies to all men, how dare you deny its application to the American Indian? And if you deny it to the Indian at home, how dare you grant it to the Malay abroad? The Declaration does not contemplate that all government must have the consent of the governed. It announces that man’s ‘‘inalienable rights are life,

136 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are established among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that when any form of government becomes destructive of those rights, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.’’ ‘‘Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’’ are the important things; ‘‘consent of the governed’’ is one of the means to those ends. If ‘‘any form of government becomes destructive of those ends, it is the night of the people to alter or abolish it,’’ says the Declaration. ‘‘Any forms’’ includes all forms. Thus the Declaration itself recognizes other forms of government than those resting on the consent of the governed The word ‘‘consent’’ itself recognizes other forms, for ‘‘consent’’ means the understanding of the thing to which the ‘‘consent’’ is given; and there are people in the world who do not understand any form of government. And the sense in which ‘‘consent’’ is used in the Declaration is broader than mere understanding; for ‘‘consent’’ in the Declaration means participation in the government ‘‘consented’’ to. And yet these people who are not capable of ‘‘consenting’’ to any form of government must be governed. And so the Declaration contemplates all forms of government which secure the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Self-government, when that will best secure these ends, as in the case of people capable of self-government; other appropriate forms when people are not capable of selfgovernment. And so the authors of the Declaration themselves governed the Indian without his consent; the inhabitants of Louisiana without their consent; and ever since the sons of the makers of the Declaration have been governing not by theory but by practice, after the fashion of our governing race, now by one form, now by another, but always for the purpose of securing the great eternal ends of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, not in the savage but in the civilized meaning of those terms---life, according to orderly methods of civilized society; liberty regulated by law; pursuit of happiness limited by the pursuit of happiness by every other man. If this is not the meaning of the Declaration, our government itself denies the Declaration every time it receives the representative of any but a republican form of government, such as that of the sultan, the czar, or other absolute autocrats, whose governments, according to the opposition’s interpretation of the Declaration, are spurious governments because the people governed have not ‘‘consented’’ to them. Senators in opposition are estopped from denying our constitutional power to govern the Philippines as

circumstances may demand, for such power is admitted in the case of Florida, Louisiana, Alaska. How, then, is it denied in the Philippines? Is there a geographical interpretation to the Constitution? Do degrees of longitude fix constitutional limitations? Does a thousand miles of ocean diminish constitutional power more than a thousand miles of land? The ocean does not separate us from the field of our duty and endeavor---it joins us, an established highway needing no repair and landing us at any point desired. The seas do not separate the Philippine Islands from us or from each other. The seas are highways through the archipelago, which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to construct if they were land instead of water. Land may separate men from their desire; the ocean, never. Russia has been centuries in crossing Siberian wastes; the Puritans cross the Atlantic in brief and flying weeks. If the Boers must have traveled by land, they would never have reached the Transvaal; but they sailed on liberty’s ocean; they walked on civilization’s untaxed highway, the welcoming sea. Our ships habitually sailed round the Cape and anchored in California’s harbors before a single trail had lined the desert with the whitening bones of those who made it. No! No! The ocean unites us; steam unites us; electricity unites us; all the elements of nature unite us to the region where duty and interest call us. There is in the ocean no constitutional argument against the march of the flag, for the oceans, too, are ours. With more extended coastlines than any nation of history; with a commerce vaster than any other people ever dreamed of, and that commerce as yet only in its beginnings; with naval traditions equaling those of England or of Greece, and the work of our Navy only just begun; with the air of the ocean in our nostrils and the blood of a sailor ancestry in our veins; with the shores of all the continents calling us, the Great Republic before I die will be the acknowledged lord of the world’s high seas. And over them the republic will hold dominion, by virtue of the strength God has given it, for the peace of the world and the betterment of man. No; the oceans are not limitations of the power which the Constitution expressly gives Congress to govern all territory the nation may acquire. The Constitution declares that ‘‘Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States.’’ Not the Northwest Territory only; not Louisiana or Florida only; not territory on this continent only but any territory anywhere belonging to the nation. The founders of the nation were not provincial. Theirs was the geography of the world. They were

5.2 Albert J. Beveridge, In Support of an American Empire 137 soldiers as well as landsmen, and they knew that where our ships should go our flag might follow. They had the logic of progress, and they knew that the republic they were planting must, in obedience to the laws of our expanding race, necessarily develop into the greater republic which the world beholds today, and into the still mightier republic which the world will finally acknowledge as the arbiter, under God, of the destinies of mankind. And so our fathers wrote into the Constitution these words of growth, of expansion, of empire, if you will, unlimited by geography or climate or by anything but the vitality and possibilities of the American people: ‘‘Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States.’’ The power to govern all territory the nation may acquire would have been in Congress if the language affirming that power had not been written in the Constitution; for not all powers of the national government are expressed. Its principal powers are implied. The written Constitution is but the index of the living Constitution. Had this not been true, the Constitution would have failed; for the people in any event would have developed and progressed. And if the Constitution had not had the capacity for growth corresponding with the growth of the nation, the Constitution would and should have been abandoned as the Articles of Confederation were abandoned. For the Constitution is not immortal in itself, is not useful even in itself. The Constitution is immortal and even useful only as it serves the orderly development of the nation. The nation alone is immortal. The nation alone is sacred. The Army is its servant. The Navy is its servant. The President is its servant. This Senate is its servant. Our laws are its methods. Our Constitution is its instrument. . . . Mr. President, this question is deeper than any question of party politics; deeper than any question of the isolated policy of our country even; deeper even than any question of constitutional power. It is elemental. It is racial. God has not been preparing the Englishspeaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and selfadmiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine

mission of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace. The judgment of the Master is upon us: ‘‘Ye have been faithful over a few things; I will make you ruler over many things.’’ What shall history say of us? Shall it say that we renounced that holy trust, left the savage to his base condition, the wilderness to the reign of waste, deserted duty, abandoned glory, forget our sordid profit even, because we feared our strength and read the charter of our powers with the doubter’s eye and the quibbler’s mind? Shall it say that, called by events to captain and command the proudest, ablest, purest race of history in history’s noblest work, we declined that great commission? Our fathers would not have had it so. No! They founded no paralytic government, incapable of the simplest acts of administration. They planted no sluggard people, passive while the world’s work calls them. They established no reactionary nation. They unfurled no retreating flag. That flag has never paused in its onward march. Who dares halt it now---now, when history’s largest events are carrying it forward; now, when we are at last one people, strong enough for any task, great enough for any glory destiny can bestow? How comes it that our first century closes with the process of consolidating the American people into a unit just accomplished, and quick upon the stroke of that great hour presses upon us our world opportunity, world duty, and world glory, which none but the people welded into an invisible nation can achieve or perform? Blind indeed is he who sees not the hand of God in events so vast, so harmonious, so benign. Reactionary indeed is the mind that perceives not that this vital people is the strongest of the saving forces of the world; that our place, therefore, is at the head of the constructing and redeeming nations of the earth; and that to stand aside while events march on is a surrender of our interests, a betrayal of our duty as blind as it is base. Craven indeed is the heart that fears to perform a work so golden and so noble; that dares not win a glory so immortal. Do you tell me that it will cost us money? When did Americans ever measure duty by financial standards? Do you tell me of the tremendous toil required to overcome the vast difficulties of our task? What mighty work for the world, for humanity, even for ourselves has ever been done with ease? Even our bread must we eat by the sweat of our faces. Why are we charged with power such as no people ever knew if we are not to use it in a work such as no people ever wrought? Who will dispute the divine meaning of the fable of the talents?

138 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s Do you remind me of the precious blood that must be shed, the lives that must be given, the broken hearts of loved ones for their slain? And this is indeed a heavier price than all combined. And, yet, as a nation, every historic duty we have done, every achievement we have accomplished has been by the sacrifice of our noblest sons. Every holy memory that glorifies the flag is of those heroes who have died that its onward march might not be stayed. It is the nation’s dearest lives yielded for the flag that makes it dear to us; it is the nation’s most precious blood poured out for it that makes it precious to us. That flag is woven of heroism and grief, of the bravery of men and women’s tears, of righteousness and battle, of sacrifice and anguish, of triumph and of glory. It is these which make our flag a holy thing. Who would tear from that sacred banner the glorious legends of a single battle where it has waved on land or sea? What son of a soldier of the flag whose father fell beneath it on any field would surrender that proud record for the heraldry of a king? In the cause of civilization, in the service of the republic anywhere on earth, Americans consider wounds the noblest decorations man can win, and count the giving of their lives a glad and precious duty. Pray God that spirit never falls. Pray God the time may never come when Mammon and the love of ease shall so debase our blood that we will fear to shed it for the flag and its imperial destiny. Pray God the time may never come when American heroism is but a legend like the story of the Cid. American faith in our mission and our might a dream dissolved, and the glory of our mighty race departed. And that time will never come. We will renew our youth at the fountain of new and glorious deeds. We will exalt our reverence for the flag by carrying it to a noble future as well as by remembering its ineffable past. Its immortality will not pass, because everywhere and always we will acknowledge and discharge the solemn responsibilities our sacred flag, in its deepest meaning, puts upon us. And so, senators, with reverent hearts, where dwells the fear of God, the American people move forward to the future of their hope and the doing of His work. Mr. President and senators, adopt the resolution offered that peace may quickly come and that we may begin our saving, regenerating, and uplifting work. Adopt it, and this bloodshed will cease when these deluded children of our islands learn that this is the final word of the representatives of the American people in Congress assembled. Reject it, and the world, history, and the American people will know where to

forever fix the awful responsibility for the consequences that will surely follow such failure to do our manifest duty. How dare we delay when our soldiers’ blood is flowing? Source: Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st Session. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1924, 704-712.

5.3 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Evolution of Negro Leadership, July 16, 1901 In every generation of our national life, from Phillis Wheatley to Booker Washington, the Negro race in America has succeeded in bringing forth men whom the country, at times spontaneously, at times in spite of itself, has been impelled to honor and respect. Mr. Washington is one of the most striking of these cases, and his autobiography is a partial history of the steps which made him a group leader, and the one man who in the eyes of the nation typified at present more nearly than all others the work and worth of his nine million fellows. The way in which groups of human beings are led to choose certain of their number as their spokesmen and leaders is at once the most elementary and the nicest problem of social growth. History is but the record of this group leadership; and yet how infinitely changeful is its type and history! And of all types and kinds, what can be more instructive than the leadership of a group within a group---that curious double movement where real progress may be negative and actual advance be relative retrogression? All this is the social student’s inspiration and despair. When sticks and stones and beasts form the sole environment of a people, their attitude is ever one of determined opposition to, and conquest of, natural forces. But when to earth and brute is added an environment of men and ideas, then the attitude of the imprisoned group may take three main forms: a feeling of revolt and revenge; an attempt to adjust all thought and action to the will of the greater group; or, finally, a determined attempt at self-development, self---realization, in spite of environing discouragements and prejudice. The influence of all three of these attitudes is plainly to be traced in the evolution of race leaders among American negroes. Before 1750 there was but the one motive of revolt and revenge which animated the terrible Maroons and veiled all the Americas in fear of insurrection. But the liberalizing tendencies of the latter half of the eighteenth century brought the first

5.3 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Evolution of Negro Leadership thought of adjustment and assimilation in the crude and earnest songs of Phillis and the martyrdom of Attucks and Salem. The cotton---gin changed all this, and men then, as the Lyman Abbotts of to---day, found a new meaning in human blackness. A season of hesitation and stress settled on the black world as the hope of emancipation receded. Forten and the free Negroes of the North still hoped for eventual assimilation with the nation; Allen, the founder of the great African Methodist Church, strove for unbending self---development, and the Southern freedmen followed him; while among the black slaves at the South arose the avenging Nat Turner, fired by the memory of Toussaint the Savior. So far, Negro leadership had been local and spasmodic; but now, about 1840, arose a national leadership---a dynasty not to be broken. Frederick Douglass and the moral revolt against slavery dominated Negro thought and effort until after the war. Then, with the sole weapon of self---defense in perilous times, the ballot, which the nation gave the freedmen, men like Langston and Bruce sought to guide the political fortunes of the blacks, while Payne and Price still clung to the old ideal of self---development. Then came the reaction. War memories and ideals rapidly passed, and a period of astonishing commercial development and expansion ensued. A time of doubt and hesitation, of storm and stress, overtook the freedmen’s sons; and then it was that Booker Washington’s leadership began. Mr. Washington came with a clear simple programme, at the psychological moment; at a time when the nation was a little ashamed of having bestowed so much sentiment on Negroes and was concentrating its energies on Dollars. The industrial training of Negro youth was not an idea originating with Mr. Washington, nor was the policy of conciliating the white South wholly his. But he first put life, unlimited energy, and perfect faith into this programme; he changed it from an article of belief into a whole creed; he broadened it from a by--path into a veritable Way of Life. And the method by which he accomplished this is an interesting study of human life. Mr. Washington’s narrative gives but glimpses of the real struggle which he has had for leadership. First of all, he strove to gain the sympathy and cooperation of the white South, and gained it after that epoch---making sentence spoken at Atlanta: ‘‘In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.’’ This conquest of the South is by all odds the most notable thing in Mr. Washington’s career. Next to this comes his achievement in gaining place and

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consideration in the North. Many others less shrewd and tactful would have fallen between these two stools; but as Mr. Washington knew the heart of the South from birth and training, so by singular insight he intuitively grasped the spirit of the age that was dominating the North. He learned so thoroughly the speech and thought of triumphant commercialism and the ideals of material prosperity that he pictures as the height of absurdity a black boy studying a French grammar in the midst of weeds and dirt. One wonders how Socrates or St. Francis of Assissi would receive this! And yet this very singleness of vision and thorough oneness with his age is a mark of the successful man. It is as though Nature must needs make men a little narrow to give them force. At the same time, Mr. Washington’s success, North and South, with his gospel of Work and Money, raised opposition to him from widely divergent sources. The spiritual sons of the Abolitionists were not prepared to acknowledge that the schools founded before Tuskegee, by men of broad ideals and self-sacrificing souls, were wholly failures, or worthy of ridicule. On the other hand, among his own people Mr. Washington found deep suspicion and dislike for a man on such good terms with Southern whites. Such opposition has only been silenced by Mr. Washington’s very evident sincerity of purpose. We forgive much to honest purpose which is accomplishing something. We may not agree with the man at all points, but we admire him and cooperate with him so far as we conscientiously can. It is no ordinary tribute to this man’s tact and power, that, steering as he must amid so many diverse interests and opinions, he to--day commands not simply the applause of those who believe in his theories, but also the respect of those who do not. Among the Negroes, Mr. Washington is still far from a popular leader. Educated and thoughtful Negroes everywhere are glad to honor him and aid him, but all cannot agree with him. He represents in Negro thought the old attitude of adjustment to environment, emphasizing the economic phase; but the two other strong currents of feeling, descended from the past, still oppose him. One is the thought of a small but not unimportant group, unfortunate in their choice of spokesman, but nevertheless of much weight, who represent the old ideas of revolt and revenge, and see in migration alone an outlet for the Negro people. The second attitude is that of the large and important group represented by Dunbar, Tanner, Chesnut, Miller, and the Grimkes, who, without any single definite programme, and with complex aims, seek nevertheless that self-development and self-realization in all lines of

140 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s human endeavor which they believe will eventually place the Negro beside the other races. While these men respect the Hampton---Tuskegee idea to a degree, they believe it falls far short of a complete programme. They believe, therefore, also in the higher education of Fisk and Atlanta Universities; they believe in self-assertion and ambition; and they believe in the right of suffrage for blacks on the same terms with whites. Such is the complicated world of thought and action in which Mr. Booker Washington has been called of God and man to lead, and in which he has gained so rare a meed of success. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois. Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.

5.4 Lincoln Steffens, Major Problems in the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, 1904 When I set out on my travels, an honest New Yorker told me honestly that I would find that the Irish, the Catholic Irish, were at the bottom of it all everywhere. The fist city I went to was St. Louis, a German city. The next was Minneapolis, a Scandinavian city, with a leadership of New Englanders. Then came Pittsburg, Scotch Presbyterian, and that was what my New York friend was. ‘‘Ah, but they are all foreign populations,’’ I heard. The next city was Philadelphia, the purest American community of all, and the most hopeless. And after that came Chicago and New York, both mongrelbred, but the one triumph of reform, the other the best example of good government that I had seen. The ‘‘foreign element’’ excuse is one of the hypocritical lies that save us from the clear sight of ourselves. Another such conceit of our egotism is that which deplores our politics and lauds our business. This is the wail of the typical American citizen. Now, the typical American citizen is the business man. The typical business man is a bad citizen; he is busy. If he is a ‘‘big business man’’ and very busy, he does not neglect, he is busy with politics, oh, very busy and very businesslike. I found him buying boodlers in St. Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pittsburg, sharing with bosses in Philadelphia, deploring reform in Chicago, and beating good government with corruption funds in New York. He is a self-righteous fraud, this big business man. He is the chief source of corruption, and it were a boon if he would neglect politics, But he is not the business man that neglects

politics; that worth is the good citizen, the typical business man. He too is busy; he is the one that has no use and therefore no time for politics. When his neglect has permitted bad government to go so far that he can be stirred to action, he is unhappy, and he looks around for a cure that shall be quick, so that he may hurry back to the shop. Naturally, too, when he talks politics, he talks shop. His patent remedy is quack; it is business. ‘‘Give us a business man,’’ he says (‘‘like me,’’ he means). ‘‘Let him introduce business methods into politics and government; then I shall be left alone to attend to my business.’’ There is hardly and office from United States Senator down to Alderman in any part of the country to which the business man has not been elected; yet politics remains corrupt, government pretty bad, and the selfish citizen has to hold himself in readiness like the old volunteer firemen to rush forth at any hour, in any weather, to prevent the fire; and he goes out sometimes and he puts out the fire (after the damage is done) and he goes back to the shop sighing for the business man in politics. The business man has failed in politics as he has in citizenship. Why? Because politics is business. That’s what’s the matter with it, That’s what’s the matter with everything,---art literature, religion, journalism, law, medicine,---they’re all business, and all---as you see them, Make politics a sport, as they do in England, or a profession, as they do in Germany, and we’ll have---well, something else than we have now,---if we want it, which is another question . . . But do the people want good government? Tammany says they don’t. Are the people honest? Are the people better than Tammany? Are they better than the merchant and the politician? . . . No, the contemned methods of our despised politics are the mast methods of our braggart business, and the corruption that shocks us in public affairs we proactive ourselves in our private concerns. There is no essential difference between the pull that gets your wife into society or for your book a favorable review, and that which gets a heeler into office, a thief out of jail, a rich man’s son on the board of directors of a corporation; none between the corruption of a labor union, a bank, and a political machine; none between a dummy director of a trust and the caucus-bound member of a legislature; none between a labor boss like Sam Parks, a boss of banks like John D. Rockefeller, a boss is not a political, he is an American institution, the product of a freed people that have not the spirit to be free. And it’s all a moral weakness; a weakness right where we think we are strongest. Oh, we are good---on

5.5 Lochner v. The People of New York Sunday, and we are ‘‘fearfully patriotic’’ on the Fourth of July. But the bribe we pay to the janitor to prefer our interests to the landlord’s, is the little brother of the bribe passed to the alderman to sell a city street, and the father of the air-brake stock assigned to the president of a railroad to have this life-saving invention adopted on his road. And as for graft, railroad passes, saloon and bawdy-house blackmail, and watered democratic institutions and our republican form of government, of our grand Constitution and our just laws. We are a free and sovereign people, we govern ourselves and the government is ours. But that is the point. We are responsible, not our leaders, since we follow them. We let them divert our loyalty from the United States to some ‘‘party’’ and we let them boss the party and turn our municipal democracies into autocracies and our republican nation into a plutocracy. We cheat our government and we let our leaders loot it, and we let them wheedle and bribe our sovereignty from us. True, they pass for us strict laws, but we are content to let them pass also bad laws, giving away public property in exchange; and our good, and often impossible, laws we break our own laws and rob our own government, the lady at the customhouse, the lyncher with his rope, and the captain of industry with his bribe and his rebate. The spirit of graft and of lawlessness is the American spirit . . . We Americans may have failed. We may be mercenary and selfish. Democracy with us may be impossible and corruption inevitable, but . . . we can stand the truth; that there is pride in the character of American citizenship; and that this pride may be a power in the land. So this little volume (The Shame of the Cities), a record of shame and yet of self-respect, a disgraceful confession, yet a declaration of honor, is dedicated, in all good faith, to the accused---to all the citizens of all the cities in the United States.

5.5 Lochner v. The People of New York, 198 U.S. 45 [1905] Joseph Lochner, Plff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (excerpt). No. 292. Argued February 23, 24, 1905. Decided April 17, 1905. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to

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purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified as a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals following that occupation. Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, providing that no employees shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day, is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract in relation to labor, and, as such, it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution. . . . MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of the facts, delivered the opinion of the court: The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in error violated the 110th section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the state of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. There is nothing in any of the opinions delivered in this case, either in the supreme court or the court of appeals of the state, which construes the section, in using the word ‘‘required,’’ as referring to any physical force being used to obtain the labor of an employee. It is assumed that the word means nothing more than the requirement arising from voluntary contract for such labor in excess of the number of hours specified in the statute. There is no pretense in any of the opinions that the statute was intended to meet a case of involuntary labor in any form. All the opinions assume that there is no real distinction, so far as this question is concerned, between the words ‘‘required’’ and ‘‘permitted.’’ The mandate of the statute, that ‘‘no employee shall be required or permitted to work,’’ is the substantial equivalent of an enactment that ‘‘no employee shall contract or agree to work,’’ more than ten hours per day; and, as there is no provision for special emergencies, the statute is mandatory in all cases. It is not an act merely fixing the number of hours which shall constitute a legal day’s work, but an absolute prohibition upon the employer permitting, under any

142 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s circumstances, more than ten hours’ work to be done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the extra money which would arise from his working more than the prescribed [198 U.S. 45, 53] time, but this statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee to earn it. The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. Under that provision no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right. There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the state in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the 14th Amendment was not designed to interfere. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191. The state, therefore, has power to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of contracts, and in regard to them the Federal Constitution offers no protection. If the contract be one which the state, in the legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the 14th Amendment. Contracts in violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state government, or a contract to let one’s property for immoral purposes, or to do any other unlawful act, could obtain no protection from the Federal Constitution, as coming under the liberty of [198 U.S. 45, 54] person or of free contract. Therefore, when the state, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between persons who are sui juris (both employer and

employee), it becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail, the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring, or from entering into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state. This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise of the police powers of the states in many cases which might fairly be considered as border ones, and it has, in the course of its determination of questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such statutes, on the ground of their violation of the rights secured by the Federal Constitution, been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the application of which has resulted, in numerous instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus assailed. Among the later cases where the state law has been upheld by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. A provision in the act of the legislature of Utah was there under consideration, the act limiting the employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings, to eight hours per day, ‘except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger.’ It also limited the hours of labor in smelting and other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals to eight hours per day, except in like cases of emergency. The act was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the state. A review of many of the cases on the subject, decided by this and other courts, is given in the opinion. It was held that the kind of employment, mining, smelting, etc., and the character of the employees in such kinds of labor, were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the state to interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation [198 U.S. 45, 55] from the observations of the supreme court of Utah in that case was made by the judge writing the opinion of this court, and approved: ‘The law in question is confined to the protection of that class of people engaged in labor in underground mines, and in smelters and other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. This law applies only to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending underground mining and work in smelters, and other works for the reduction and refining of ores. Therefore it is not necessary to discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix the hours of labor in other employments.’ It will be observed that, even with regard to that class of labor, the Utah statute provided for cases of emergency wherein the provisions of the statute would not apply. The statute now before this court has no

5.6 Muller v. State of Oregon emergency clause in it, and, if the statute is valid, there are no circumstances and no emergencies under which the slightest violation of the provisions of the act would be innocent . . . It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the state. There is no dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the health, or the safety of the people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be. The claim of the police power would be a mere pretext, become another and delusive name for the supreme sovereignty of the state to be exercised free from constitutional restraint. This is not contended for. In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned, and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family? Of course the liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the [198 U.S. 45, 57] court for that of the legislature. If the act be within the power of the state it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: Is it within the police power of the state? and that question must be answered by the court. The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state. Viewed in the light of a purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the question of health, we think that a law like the one

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before us involves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act. The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not affect any other portion of the public than those who are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of the hours of labor does not come within the police power on that ground. It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail, the power of the state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health, does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes [198 U.S. 45, 58] with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.

5.6 Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 [1908] CURT MULLER, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF OREGON (excerpt). No. 107. Argued January 15, 1908. Decided February 24, 1908. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court: On February 19, 1903, the legislature of the state of Oregon passed an act (Session Laws 1903, p. 148) the first section of which is in these words: ‘‘Sec. 1. That no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as to permit the employment of females at any time so that they shall not work more than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any one day.’’ Sec. 3 made a violation of the provisions of the prior sections a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $25. On September 18, 1905,

144 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s an information was filed in the circuit court of the state for the county of Multnomah, charging that the defendant ‘‘on the 4th day of September, A. D. 1905, in the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon, then and there being the owner of a laundry, known as the Grand Laundry, in the city of Portland, and the employer of females therein, did then and there unlawfully permit and suffer one Joe Haselbock, he, the said Joe Haselbock, then and there being an overseer, superintendent, and agent of said Curt Muller, in the said Grand Laundry, to require a female, to wit, one Mrs. E. Gotcher, to work more than ten hours in said laundry on said 4th day of September, A. D. 1905, contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Oregon.’’ A trial resulted in a verdict against the defendant, who was sentenced to pay a fine of $10. The supreme court of the state affirmed the conviction (48 Or. 252, 85 Pac. 855), whereupon the case was brought here on writ of error. The single question is the constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant was convicted, so far as it affects the work of a female in a laundry. That it does not conflict with any provisions of the state Constitution is settled by the decision of the supreme court of the state. The contentions of the defendant, now plaintiff in error, are thus stated in his brief: (1) Because the statute attempts to prevent persons sui juris from making their own contracts, and thus violates the provisions of the 14th Amendment, as follows: ‘‘No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ (2) Because the statute does not apply equally to all persons similarly situated, and is class legislation. (3) The statute is not a valid exercise of the police power. The kinds of work prescribed are not unlawful, nor are they declared to be immoral or dangerous to the public health; nor can such a law be sustained on the ground that it is designed to protect women on account of their sex. There is no necessary or reasonable connection between the limitation prescribed by the act and the public health, safety, or welfare.’’

It is the law of Oregon that women, whether married or single, have equal contractual and personal rights with men. As said by Chief Justice Wolverton, in First Nat. Bank v. Leonard, 36 Or. 390, 396, 59 Pac. 873, 874, after a review of the various statutes of the state upon the subject: ‘‘We may therefore say with perfect confidence that, with these three sections upon the statute book, the wife can deal, not only with her separate property, acquired from whatever source, in the same manner as her husband can with property belonging to him, but that she may make contracts and incur liabilities, and the same may be enforced against her, the same as if she were a feme sole. There is now no residuum of civil disability resting upon her which is not recognized as existing against the husband. The current runs steadily and strongly in the direction of the emancipation of the wife, and the policy, as disclosed by all recent legislation upon the subject in this state, is to place her upon the same footing as if she were a feme sole, not only with respect to her separate property, but as it affects her right to make binding contracts; and the most natural corollary to the situation is that the remedies for the enforcement of liabilities incurred are made coextensive and coequal with such enlarged conditions.’’ It thus appears that, putting to one side the elective franchise, in the matter of personal and contractual rights they stand on the same plane as the other sex. Their rights in these respects can no more be infringed than the equal rights of their brothers. We held in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, that a law providing that no laborer shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a day was not as to men a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor, and as such was in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution. That decision is invoked by plaintiff in error as decisive of the question before us. But this assumes that the difference between the sexes does not justify a different rule respecting a restriction of the hours of labor. In patent cases counsel are apt to open the argument with a discussion of the state of the art. It may not be amiss, in the present case, before examining the constitutional question, to notice the course of legislation, as well as expressions of opinion from other than judicial sources. In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis for the defendant in error is a very copious collection of

5.6 Muller v. State of Oregon all these matters, an epitome of which is found in the margin. While there have been but few decisions bearing directly upon the question, the following sustain the constitutionality of such legislation: Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. 120 Mass. 383; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 400, 406, 58 L.R.A. 825, 91 N. W. 421; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 59 L.R.A. 342, 92 Am. St. Rep. 930, 70 Pac. 52; Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 17; against them is the case of Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L.R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 40 N. E. 454. The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief that woman’s physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil. Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular government which otherwise would be lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long-continued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge. It is undoubtedly true, as more than once declared by this court, that the general right to contract in relation to one’s business is part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution; yet it is equally well settled that this liberty is not absolute and extending to all contracts, and that a state may, without conflicting with the provisions of the 14th Amendment, restrict in many respects the individual’s power of contract. Without stopping to discuss at length the extent to which a state may act in this respect, we refer to the following cases in which the question has been considered: Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lochner v. New York, supra. That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time

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on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race. Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength, may, without conflicting with the provisions and this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As minors, thought not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved. Education was long denied her, and while now the doors of the schoolroom are opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even with that and the consequent increase of capacity for business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her brother. Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right. Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and there are many respects in which she has an advantage over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him. Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functionshaving in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by

146 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. We have not referred in this discussion to the denial of the elective franchise in the state of Oregon, for while that may disclose a lack of political equality in all things with her brother, that is not of itself decisive. The reason runs deeper, and rests in the inherent difference between the two sexes, and in the different functions in life which they perform. For these reasons, and without questioning in any respect the decision in Lochner v. New York, we are of the opinion that it cannot be adjudged that the act in question is in conflict with the Federal Constitution, so far as it respects the work of a female in a laundry, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is affirmed.

Isthmian Canal Convention

5.7 The Panama Canal Treaty (Convention between the United States and Panama), November 18, 1903

Article I

For the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Signed at Washington, D.C. Ratification advised by the Senate, February 23, 1904. Ratified by the President, February 25, 1904. Ratified by Panama, December 2, 1903. Ratifications exchanged at Washington, February 26, 1904. Proclaimed, February 26, 1904. By the President of the United States of America. A Proclamation Whereas, a Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama to insure the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at Washington, on the eighteenth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and three, the original of which Convention, being in the English language, is word for word as follows:

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama being desirous to insure the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Congress of the United States of America having passed an act approved June 28, 1902, in furtherance of that object, by which the President of the United States is authorized to acquire within a reasonable time the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of such territory being actually vested in the Republic of Panama, the high contracting parties have resolved for that purpose to conclude a convention and have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries, The President of the United States of America, John Hay, Secretary of State, and The Government of the Republic of Panama, Philippe Bunau--Varilla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, thereunto specially empowered by said government, who after communicating with each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.

Article II The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity, the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean low water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific Ocean to a distance of three marine miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not be included within this grant. The Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity, the use, occupation and control of any other lands and waters outside of the zone above described which may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal or of any

5.7 The Panama Canal Treaty (Convention between the United States and Panama) auxiliary canals or other works necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said enterprise. The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United States in perpetuity, all islands within the limits of the zone above described and in addition thereto, the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra and Flamenco.

Article III The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement, and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise, if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.

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owners of private lands or private property of any kind by reason of the grants contained in this treaty or by reason of the operations of the United States, its agents or employees, or by reason of the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal or of the works of sanitation and protection herein provided for, shall be appraised and settled by a joint Commission appointed by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Panama, whose decisions as to such damages shall be final and whose awards as to such damages shall be paid solely by the United States. No part of the work on said Canal or the Panama railroad or on any auxiliary works relating thereto and authorized by the terms of this treaty shall be prevented, delayed or impeded by or pending such proceedings to ascertain such damages. The appraisal of said private lands and private property and the assessment of damages to them shall be based upon their value before the date of this convention.

Article IV

Article VII

As rights subsidiary to the above grants the Republic of Panama grants in perpetuity, to the United States the right to use the rivers, streams, lakes and other bodies of water within its limits for navigation, the supply of water or waterpower or other purposes, so far as the use of said rivers, streams, lakes and bodies of water and the waters thereof may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States within the limits of the cities of Panama and Colon and their adjacent harbors and within the territory adjacent thereto the right to acquire by purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands, buildings, water rights or other properties necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation and protection of the Canal and of any works of sanitation, such as the collection and disposition of sewage and the distribution of water in the said cities of Panama and Colon, which, in the discretion of the United States may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal and railroad. All such works of sanitation, collection and disposition of sewage and distribution of water in the cities of Panama and Colon shall be made at the expense of the United States, and the Government of the United States, its agents or nominees shall be authorized to impose and collect water rates and sewage rates which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest and the amortization of the principal of the cost of said works within a period of fifty years and upon the expiration of said term of fifty years the system of sewers and water works shall revert to and become the properties of the cities of Panama and Colon respectively, and the use of the water shall be free to the inhabitants of Panama and Colon, except to the extent that water rates may be necessary for the operation and maintenance of said system of sewers and water.

Article V The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity, a monopoly for the construction, maintenance and operation of any system of communication by means of canal or railroad across its territory between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

Article VI The grants herein contained shall in no manner invalidate the titles or rights of private land holders or owners of private property in the said zone or in or to any of the lands or waters granted to the United States by the provisions of any Article of this treaty, nor shall they interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through the said zone or over any of the said lands or waters unless said rights of way or private rights shall conflict with rights herein granted to the United States in which case the rights of the United States shall be superior. All damages caused to the

148 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s The Republic of Panama agrees that the cities of Panama and Colon shall comply in perpetuity, with the sanitary ordinances whether of a preventive or curative character prescribed by the United States and in case the Government of Panama is unable or fails in its duty to enforce this compliance by the cities of Panama and Colon with the sanitary ordinances of the United States the Republic of Panama grants to the United States the right and authority to enforce the same. The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order.

Article VIII The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all rights which it now has or hereafter may acquire to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railroad Company as a result of the transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of Columbia to the Republic of Panama over the Isthmus of Panama and authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties and concessions as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or part of the shares of that company; but the public lands situated outside of the zone described in Article II of this treaty now included in the concessions of both said enterprises and not required in the construction or operation of the Canal shall revert to the Republic of Panama except any property now owned by or in the possession of said companies within Panama or Colon or the ports or terminals thereof.

Article IX The United States agrees that the ports at either entrance of the Canal and the waters thereof, and the Republic of Panama agrees that the towns of Panama and Colon shall be free for all time so that there shall not be imposed or collected custom house tolls, tonnage, anchorage, lighthouse, wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues or any other charges or taxes of any kind upon any vessel using or passing through the Canal or belonging to or employed by the United States, directly or indirectly, in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the main Canal, or auxiliary works, or upon the cargo, officers, crew, or passengers of any such vessels, except such tolls and charges as may be imposed by the United States for the use of the Canal and other works,

and except tolls and charges imposed by the Republic of Panama upon merchandise destined to be introduced for the consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, and upon vessels touching at the ports of Colon and Panama and which do not cross the Canal. The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to establish in such ports and in the towns of Panama and Colon such houses and guards as it may deem necessary to collect duties on importations destined to other portions of Panama and to prevent contraband trade. The United States shall have the right to make use of the towns and harbors of Panama and Colon as places of anchorage, and for making repairs, for loading, unloading, depositing, or transshipping cargoes either in transit or destined for the service of the Canal and for other works pertaining to the Canal.

Article X The Republic of Panama agrees that there shall not be imposed any taxes, national, municipal, departmental, or of any other class, upon the Canal, the railways and auxiliary works, tugs and other vessels employed in the service of the Canal, store houses, work shops, offices, quarters for laborers, factories of all kinds, warehouses, wharves, machinery and other works, property, and effects appertaining to the Canal or railroad and auxiliary works, or their officers or employees, situated within the cities of Panama and Colon, and that there shall not be imposed contributions or charges of a personal character of any kind upon officers, employees, laborers, and other individuals in the service of the Canal and railroad and auxiliary works.

Article XI The United States agrees that the official dispatches of the Government of the Republic of Panama shall be transmitted over any telegraph and telephone lines established for canal purposes and used for public and private business at rates not higher than those required from officials in the service of the United States.

Article XII The Government of the Republic of Panama shall permit the immigration and free access to the lands and workshops of the Canal and its auxiliary works of all employees and workmen of whatever nationality under contract to work upon or seeking employment upon or in any wise connected with the said Canal and its auxiliary works, with their respective families, and all such persons shall be free and exempt from the military service of the Republic of Panama.

5.7 The Panama Canal Treaty (Convention between the United States and Panama)

Article XIII The United States may import at any time into the said zone and auxiliary lands, free of custom duties, imposts, taxes, or other charges, and without any restrictions, any and all vessels, dredges, engines, cars, machinery, tools, explosives, materials, supplies, and other articles necessary and convenient in the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the Canal and auxiliary works, and all provisions, medicines, clothing, supplies, and other things necessary and convenient for the officers, employees, workmen and laborers in the service and employ of the United States and for their families. If any such articles are disposed of for use outside of the zone and auxiliary lands granted to the United States and within the territory of the Republic, they shall be subject to the same import or other duties as like articles imported under the laws of the Republic of Panama.

Article XIV As the price or compensation for the rights, powers and privileges granted in this convention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the United States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States on the exchange of the ratification of this convention and also an annual payment during the life of this convention of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine years after the date aforesaid. The provisions of this Article shall be in addition to all other benefits assured to the Republic of Panama under this convention. But no delay or difference of opinion under this Article or any other provisions of this treaty shall affect or interrupt the full operation and effect of this convention in all other respects.

Article XV The joint commission referred to in Article VI shall be established as follows: The President of the United States shall nominate two persons and the President of the Republic of Panama shall nominate two persons and they shall proceed to a decision; but in case of disagreement of the Commission (by reason of their being equally divided in conclusion), an umpire shall be appointed by the two Governments who shall render the decision. In the event of the death, absence, or incapacity of a Commissioner or Umpire, or of his omitting, declining or ceasing to act, his place shall be filled by the

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appointment of another person in the manner above indicated. All decisions by a majority of the Commission or by the umpire shall be final.

Article XVI The two Governments shall make adequate provision by future agreement for the pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery within said zone and auxiliary lands to the authorities of the Republic of Panama of persons charged with the commitment of crimes, felonies, or misdemeanors without said zone and for the pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery without said zone to the authorities of the United States of persons charged with the commitment of crimes, felonies and misdemeanors within said zone and auxiliary lands.

Article XVII The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use of all the ports of the Republic open to commerce as places of refuge for any vessels employed in the Canal enterprise, and for all vessels passing or bound to pass through the Canal which may be in distress and be driven to seek refuge in said ports. Such vessels shall be exempt from anchorage and tonnage dues on the part of the Republic of Panama.

Article XVIII The Canal, when constructed, and the entrances thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be opened upon the terms provided for by Section I of Article three of, and in conformity with all the stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on November 18, 1901.

Article XIX The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to transport over the Canal, its vessels and its troops and munitions of war in such vessels at all times without paying charges of any kind. The exemption is to be extended to the auxiliary railway for the transportation of persons in the service of the Republic of Panama, or of the police force charged with the preservation of public order outside of said zone, as well as to their baggage, munitions of war and supplies.

Article XX If by virtue of any existing treaty in relation to the territory of the Isthmus of Panama, whereof the

150 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s obligations shall descend or be assumed by the Republic of Panama, there may be any privilege or concession in favor of the Government or the citizens and subjects of a third power relative to an interoceanic means of communication which in any of its terms may be incompatible with the terms of the present convention, the Republic of Panama agrees to cancel or modify such treaty in due form, for which purpose it shall give to the said third power the requisite notification within the term of four months from the date of the present convention, and in case the existing treaty contains no clause permitting its modifications or annulment, the Republic of Panama agrees to procure its modification or annulment in such form that there shall not exist any conflict with the stipulations of the present convention.

through the New Panama Canal Company, including any property and rights which might or may in the future either by lapse of time, forfeiture or otherwise, revert to the Republic of Panama under any contracts or concessions, with said Wyse, the Universal Panama Canal Company, the Panama Railroad Company and the New Panama Canal Company. The aforesaid rights and property shall be and are free and released from any present or reversionary interest in or claims of Panama and the title of the United States thereto upon consummation of the contemplated purchase by the United States from the New Panama Canal Company, shall be absolute, so far as concerns the Republic of Panama, excepting always the rights of the Republic specifically secured under this treaty.

Article XXI

Article XXIII

The rights and privileges granted by the Republic of Panama to the United States in the preceding Articles are understood to be free of all anterior debts, liens, trusts, or liabilities, or concessions or privileges to other Governments, corporations, syndicates or individuals, and consequently, if there should arise any claims on account of the present concessions and privileges or otherwise, the claimants shall resort to the Government of the Republic of Panama, and no to the United States for any indemnity or compromise which may be required.

If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships that make use of the same, or the railways and auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes.

Article XXII The Republic of Panama renounces and grants to the United States, the participation to which it might be entitled in the future earnings of the Canal under Article XV of the concessionary contract with Lucien N. B. Wyse, now owned by the New Panama Canal Company and any all other rights or claims of a pecuniary nature arising under or relating to said concession, or arising under or relating to the concessions to the Panama Railroad Company or any extension or modification thereof; and it likewise renounces, confirms and grants to the United States, now and hereafter, all the rights and property reserved in the said concessions which otherwise would belong to Panama at or before the expiration of the terms of ninety---nine years of the concessions granted to or held by the above mentioned party and companies, and all right, title and interest which it now has or may hereafter have, in and to the lands canal, works, property and rights held by the said companies under said concessions or otherwise, and acquired or to be acquired by the United States from or

Article XXIV No change either in the Government or in the laws and treaties of the Republic of Panama shall, without the consent of the United States, affect any right of the United States under the present convention, or under any treaty stipulation between the two countries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the subject matter of this convention. If the Republic of Panama shall hereafter enter as a constituent into any other Government or into any union or confederation of states, so as to merge her sovereignty or independence in such Government, union or confederation, the rights of the United States under this convention shall not be in any respect lessened or impaired.

Article XXV For the better performance of the engagements of this convention and to the end of the efficient protection of the Canal and the preservation of its neutrality, the Government of the Republic of Panama will sell or lease to the United States lands adequate and necessary for the naval or coaling stations on the Pacific coast and on the western Caribbean coast of the Republic at

5.8 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Chapter I) 151 certain points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

Article XXVI This convention when signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties shall be ratified by the respective Governments and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington at the earliest date possible. If faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their respective seals. Done at the City of Washington, the 18th day of November in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and three. John Hay. [seal.] P. Bunau Varilla. [seal.] And whereas the said Convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and four. Now, therefore, be it known that I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-sixth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-eighth. [seal] Theodore Roosevelt. By the President: John Hay, Secretary of State.

5.8 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Chapter I), 1913 The Old Order Changeth There is one great basic fact which underlies all the questions that are discussed on the political platform at the present moment. That singular fact is that nothing is done in this country as it was done twenty years ago. . . . The life of the nation has grown infinitely varied. It does not centre now upon questions of governmental structure or of the distribution of governmental powers. It centres upon questions of the very structure

and operation of society itself, of which government is only the instrument. Our development has run so fast and so far along the lines sketched in the earlier day of constitutional definition, has so crossed and interlaced those lines, has piled upon them such novel structures of trust and combination, has elaborated within them a life so manifold, so full of forces which transcend the boundaries of the country itself and fill the eyes of the world, that a new nation seems to have been created which the old formulas do not fit or afford a vital interpretation of. We have come upon a very different age from any that preceded us. We have come upon an age when we do not do business in the way in which we used to do business,---when we do not carry on any of the operations of manufacture, sale, transportation, or communication as men used to carry them on. There is a sense in which in our day the individual has been submerged. In most parts of our country men work, not for themselves, not as partners in the old way in which they used to work, but generally as employees,---in a higher or lower grade,---of great corporations. There was a time when corporations played a very minor part in our business affairs, but now they play the chief part, and most men are the servants of corporations. You know what happens when you are the servant of a corporation. You have in no instance access to the men who are really determining the policy of the corporation. If the corporation is doing the things that it ought not to do, you really have no voice in the matter and must obey the orders, and you have oftentimes with deep mortification to co-operate in the doing of things which you know are against the public interest. Your individuality is swallowed up in the individuality and purpose of a great organization . . . Now this is nothing short of a new social age, a new era of human relationships, a new stage-setting for the drama of life . . . So what we have to discuss is, not wrongs which individuals intentionally do,---I do not believe there are a great many of those,---but the wrongs of a system. I want to record my protest against any discussion of this matter which would seem to indicate that there are bodies of our fellow-citizens who are trying to grind us down and do us injustice. There are some men of that sort. I don’t know how they sleep o’ nights, but there are men of that kind. Thank God, they are not numerous. The truth is, we are all caught in a great economic system which is heartless . . . . . . American industry is not free, as once it was free; American enterprise is not free; the man with only

152 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s a little capital is finding it harder to get into the field, more and more impossible to compete with the big fellow. Why? Because the laws of this country do not prevent the strong from crushing the weak. That is the reason, and because the strong have crushed the weak the strong dominate the industry and the economic life of this country . . . What this country needs above everything else is a body of laws which will look after the men who are on the make rather than the men who are already made. Because the men who are already made are not going to live indefinitely, and they are not always kind enough to leave sons as able and as honest as they are. The originative part of America, the part of America that makes new enterprises, the part into which the ambitious and gifted workingman makes his way up, the class that saves, that plans, that organizes, that presently spreads its enterprises until they have a national scope and character,---that middle class is being more and more squeezed out by the processes which we have been taught to call processes of prosperity. Its members are sharing prosperity, no doubt; but what alarms me is that they are not originating prosperity. No country can afford to have its prosperity originated by a small controlling class . . . We used to think in the old-fashioned days when life was very simple that all that government had to do was to put on a policeman’s uniform, and say, ‘‘Now don’t anybody hurt anybody else.’’ We used to say that the ideal of government was for every man to be left alone and not interfered with, except when he interfered with somebody else; and that the best government was the government that did as little governing as possible. That was the idea that obtained in Jefferson’s time. But we are coming now to realize that life is so complicated that we are not dealing with the old conditions, and that the law has to step in and create new conditions under which we may live, the conditions which will make it tolerable for us to live . . . When you offer the securities of a great corporation to anybody who wishes to purchase them, you must open that corporation to the inspection of everybody who wants to purchase . . . If we believe that fraud lies in wait for us, we must have the means of determining whether our suspicions are well founded or not. Similarly, the treatment of labor by the great corporations is not what it was in Jefferson’s time. Whenever bodies of men employ bodies of men, it ceases to be a private relationship. So that when courts hold that workingmen cannot peaceably dissuade other workingmen from taking employment, as was held in a notable case in New Jersey, they simply show that their minds and

understandings are lingering in an age which has passed away. This dealing of great bodies of men with other bodies of men is a matter of public scrutiny, and should be a matter of public regulation. Similarly, it was no business of the law in the time of Jefferson to come into my house and see how I kept house. But when my house, when my so-called private property, became a great mine, and men went along dark corridors amidst every kind of danger in order to dig out of the bowels of the earth things necessary for the industries of a whole nation, and when it came about that no individual owned these mines, that they were owned by great stock companies, then all the old analogies absolutely collapsed and it became the right of the government to go down into these mines to see whether human beings were properly treated in them or not; to see whether accidents were properly safeguarded against; to see whether modern economical methods of using these inestimable riches of the earth were followed or were not followed . . . We are in a new world, struggling under old laws. As we go inspecting our lives to-day, surveying this new scene of centralized and complex society, we shall find many more things out of joint. . . . Our government has been for the past few years under the control of heads of great allied corporations with special interests. It has not controlled these interests and assigned them a proper place in the whole system of business; it has submitted itself to their control. As a result, there have grown up vicious systems and schemes of governmental favoritism (the most obvious being the extravagant tariff), far-reaching in effect upon the whole fabric of life, touching to his injury every inhabitant of the land, laying unfair and impossible handicaps upon competitors, imposing taxes in every direction, stifling everywhere the free spirit of American enterprise. Now this has come about naturally; as we go on we shall see how very naturally. It is no use denouncing anybody, or anything, except human nature. Nevertheless, it is an intolerable thing that the government of the republic should have got so far out of the hands of the people; should have been captured by interests which are special and not general. In the train of this capture follow the troops of scandals, wrongs, indecencies, with which our politics swarm . . . All over the Union people are coming to feel that they have no control over the course of affairs. I live in one of the greatest States in the union, which was at one time in slavery. Until two years ago we had witnessed with increasing concern the growth in New

5.9 Keating-Owen Child Labor Act 153 Jersey of a spirit of almost cynical despair. Men said: ‘‘We vote; we are offered the platform we want; we elect the men who stand on that platform, and we get absolutely nothing.’’ So they began to ask: ‘‘What is the use of voting? We know that the machines of both parties are subsidized by the same persons, and therefore it is useless to turn in either direction.’’ This is not confined to some of the state governments and those of some of the towns and cities. We know that something intervenes between the people of the United States and the control of their own affairs at Washington. It is not the people who have been ruling there of late. Why are we in the presence, why are we at the threshold, of a revolution? Because we are profoundly disturbed by the influences which we see reigning in the determination of our public life and our public policy. There was a time when America was blithe with self-confidence. She boasted that she, and she alone, knew the processes of popular government; but now she sees her sky overcast; she sees that there are at work forces which she did not dream of in her hopeful youth . . . The old order changeth---changeth under our very eyes, not quietly and equably, but swiftly and with the noise and heat and tumult of reconstruction . . . We stand in the presence of a revolution,---not a bloody revolution; America is not given to the spilling of blood,---but a silent revolution, whereby America will insist upon recovering in practice those ideals which she has always professed, upon securing a government devoted to the general interest and not to special interests. We are upon the eve of a great reconstruction. It calls for creative statesmanship as no age has done since that great age in which we set up the government under which we live, that government which was the admiration of the world until it suffered wrongs to grow up under it which have made many of our own compatriots question the freedom of our institutions and preach revolution against them. I do not fear revolution. I have unshaken faith in the power of America to keep its self-possession. Revolution will come in peaceful guise, as it came when we put aside the crude government of the Confederation and created the great Federal Union which governs individuals, not States, and which has been these hundred and thirty years our vehicle of progress. Some radical changes we must make in our law and practice. Some reconstructions we must push forward, which a new age and new circumstances impose upon us. But we can do it all in calm and sober fashion, like statesmen and patriots.

5.9 Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, 1916 Sixty-fourth Congress of the United States of America; At the First Session AN ACT To prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, any article or commodity the product of any mine or quarry situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or any article or commodity the product of any mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen years and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven o’clock postmeridian, or before the hour of six o’clock antemeridian: Provided, That a prosecution and conviction of a defendant for the shipment or delivery for shipment of any article or commodity under the conditions herein prohibited shall be a bar to any further prosecution against the same defendant for shipments or deliveries for shipment of any such article or commodity before the beginning of said prosecution. SEC. 2. That the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor shall constitute a board to make and publish from time to time uniform rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this Act. SEC. 3. That for the purpose of securing proper enforcement of this Act the Secretary of Labor, or any person duly authorized by him, shall have authority to enter and inspect at any time mines quarries, mills, canneries, workshops, factories, manufacturing establishments, and other places in which goods are produced or held for interstate commerce; and the Secretary of Labor shall have authority to employ such assistance for the purposes of this Act as may from time to time be authorized by appropriation or other law. SEC. 4. That it shall be the duty of each district attorney to whom the Secretary of Labor shall report any

154 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s violation of this Act, or to whom any State factory or mining or quarry inspector, commissioner of labor, State medical inspector or school-attendance officer, or any other person shall present satisfactory evidence of any such violation to cause appropriate proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted in the proper courts of the United States without delay for the enforcement of the penalties in such cases herein provided: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply to bona fide boys’ and girls’ canning clubs recognized by the Agricultural Department of the several States and of the United States. SEC. 5. That any person who violates any of the provisions of section one of this Act, or who refuses or obstructs entry or inspection authorized by section three of this Act, shall for each offense prior to the first conviction of such person under the provisions of this Act, be punished by a fine of not more than $200, and shall for each offense subsequent to such conviction be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000, nor less than $100, or by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That no dealer shall be prosecuted under the provisions of this Act for a shipment, delivery for shipment, or transportation who establishes a guaranty issued by the person by whom the goods shipped or delivered for shipment or transportation were manufactured or produced, resident in the United States, to the effect that such goods were produced or manufactured in a mine or quarry in which within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom no children under the age of sixteen years were employed or permitted to work, or in a mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment in which within thirty days prior to the removal of such goods therefrom no children under the ages of fourteen years were employed or permitted to work, nor children between the ages of fourteen years and sixteen years employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day or more than six days in any week or after the hour of seven o’clock postmeridian o before the hour of six o’clock antemeridian; and in such event, if the guaranty contains any false statement or a material fact the guarantor shall be amenable to prosecution and to the fine or imprisonment provided by this section for violation of the provisions of this Act. Said guaranty, to afford the protection above provided, shall contain the name and address of the person giving the same: And provided further, That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall be prosecuted under this Act for the shipment, delivery for shipment, or transportation of a product of any mine, quarry, mill, cannery,

workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, if the only employment therein within thirty days prior to the removal of such product therefrom, of a child under the age of sixteen years has been that of a child as to whom the producer, or manufacturer has in; good faith procured, at the time of employing such child, and has since in good faith relied upon and kept on file a certificate, issued in such form, under such conditions, any by such persons as may be prescribed by the board, showing the child to be of such an age that the shipment, delivery for shipment, or transportation was not prohibited by this Act. Any person who knowingly makes a false statement or presents false evidence in or in relation to any such certificate or application therefor shall be amenable to prosecution and to the fine or imprisonment provided by this section for violations of this Act. In any State designated by the board, an employment certificate or other similar paper as to the age of the child, issued under the laws of that State and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall have the same force and effect as a certificate herein provided for. SEC. 6. That the word ‘‘person’’ as used in this Act shall be construed to include any individual or corporation or the members of any partnership or other unincorporated association. The term ‘‘ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce’’ as used in this Act means to transport or to ship or deliver for shipment from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to or through any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia or to any foreign country; and in the case of a dealer means only to transport or to ship or deliver for shipment from the State, Territory or district of manufacture or production. SEC. 7. That this Act shall take effect from and after one year from the date of its passage. Approved, September 1, 1916.

5.10 Carrie Chapman Catt, The Crisis, 1916 Atlantic City, New Jersey I have taken for my subject, ‘‘The Crisis,’’ because I believe that a crisis has come in our movement which, if recognized and the opportunity seized with vigor, enthusiasm and will, means the final victory of our great cause in the very near future. I am aware that some suffragists do not share this belief; they see no signs nor symptoms today which were not present yesterday; no manifestations in the year 1916 which differ

5.10 Carrie Chapman Catt, The Crisis significantly from those in the year 1910. To them, the movement has been a steady, normal growth from the beginning and must so continue until the end. I can only defend my claim with the plea that it is better to imagine a crisis where none exists than to fail to recognize one when it comes; for a crisis is a culmination of events which calls for new considerations and new decisions. A failure to answer the call may mean an opportunity lost, a possible victory postponed. The object of the life of an organized movement is to secure its aim. Necessarily, it must obey the law of evolution and pass through the stages of agitation and education and finally through the stage of realization. As one has put it: ‘‘A new idea floats in the air over the heads of the people and for a long, indefinite period evades their understanding but, by and by, when through familiarity, human vision grows clearer, it is caught out of the clouds and crystalized into law.’’ Such a period comes to every movement and is its crisis. In my judgment, that crucial moment, bidding us to renewed consecration and redoubled activity has come to our cause. I believe our victory hangs within our grasp, inviting us to pluck it out of the clouds and establish it among the good things of the world. If this be true, the time is past when we should say: ‘‘Men and women of America, look upon that wonderful idea up there; see, one day it will come down.’’ Instead, the time has come to shout aloud in every city, village and hamlet, and in tones so clear and jubilant that they will reverberate from every mountain peak and echo from shore to shore: ‘‘The woman’s Hour has struck.’’ Suppose suffragists as a whole do not believe a crisis has come and do not extend their hands to grasp the victory, what will happen? Why, we shall all continue to work and our cause will continue to hang, waiting for those who possess a clearer vision and more daring enterprise. On the other hand, suppose we reach out with united earnestness and determination to grasp our victory while it still hangs a bit too high? Has any harm been done? None! Therefore, fellow suffragists, I invite your attention to the signs which point to a crisis and your consideration of plans for turning the crisis into victory. FIRST: We are passing through a world crisis. All thinkers of every land tell us so; and that nothing after the great war will be as it was before. Those who profess to know, claim that 100 millions of dollars are being spent on the war every day and that 2 years of war have cost 50 billions of dollars or 10 times more than the total expense of the American Civil War. Our own country has sent 35 millions of dollars abroad for relief expenses.

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Were there no other effects to come from the world’s war, the transfer of such unthinkably vast sums of money from the usual avenues to those wholly abnormal would give so severe a jolt to organized society that it would vibrate around the world and bring untold changes in its wake. But three and a half millions of lives have been lost. The number becomes the more impressive when it is remembered that the entire population of the American Colonies was little more than three and one-half millions. These losses have been the lives of men within the age of economic production. They have been taken abruptly from the normal business of the world and every human activity from that of the humblest, unskilled labor to art, science and literature has been weakened by their loss. Millions of other men will go to their homes, blind, crippled and incapacitated to do the work they once performed. The stability of human institutions has never before suffered so tremendous a shock. Great men are trying to think out the consequences but one and all proclaim that no imagination can find color or form bold enough to paint the picture of the world after the war. British and Russian, German and Austrian, French and Italian agree that it will lead to social and political revolution throughout the entire world. Whatever comes, they further agree that the war presages a total change in the status of women. . . . Women by the thousands have knocked at the doors of munition factories and, in the name of patriotism, have begged for the right to serve their country there. Their services were accepted with hesitation but the experiment once made, won reluctant but universal praise. An official statement recently issued in Great Britain announced that 660,000 women were engaged in making munitions in that country alone. In a recent convention of munition workers, composed of men and women, a resolution was unanimously passed informing the government that they would forego vacations and holidays until the authorities announced that their munition supplies were sufficient for the needs of the war and Great Britain pronounced the act the highest patriotism. Lord Derby addressed such a meeting and said, ‘‘When the history of the war is written, I wonder to whom the greatest credit will be given; to the men who went to fight or to the women who are working in a way that many people hardly believed that it was possible for them to work.’’ Lord Sydenham added his tribute. Said he, ‘‘It might fairly be claimed that women have helped to save thousands of lives and to change the entire aspect of the war. Wherever intelligence, care and close attention have been needed, women have distinguished themselves.’’ A writer in the London Times

156 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s of July 18, 1916, said: ‘‘But, for women, the armies could not have held the field for a month; the national call to arms could not have been made or sustained; the country would have perished of inanition and disorganization. If, indeed, it be true that the people have been one, it is because the genius of women has been lavishly applied to the task of reinforcing and complementing the genius of men. The qualities of steady industry, adaptability, good judgement and concentration of mind which men do not readily associate with women have been conspicuous features.’’ On fields of battle, in regular and improvised hospitals, women have given tender and skilled care to the wounded and are credited with the restoration of life to many, heroism and self-sacrifice have been frankly acknowledged by all the governments; but their endurance, their skill, the practicality of their service, seem for the first time, to have been recognized by governments as ‘‘war power’’. So, thinking in war terms, great men have suddenly discovered that women are ‘‘war assets’’. Indeed, Europe is realizing, as it never did before, that women are holding together the civilization for which men are fighting. A great search-light has been thrown upon the business of nation-building and it has been demonstrated in every European land that it is a partnership with equal, but different responsibilities resting upon the two partners. It is not, however, in direct war work alone that the latent possibilities of women have been made manifest. In all the belligerent lands, women have found their way to high posts of administration where no women would have been trusted two years ago and the testimony is overwhelming that they have filled their posts with entire satisfaction to the authorities. They have dared to stand in pulpits (once too sacred to be touched by the unholy feet of a woman) and there, without protest, have appealed to the Father of All in behalf of their stricken lands. They have come out of the kitchen where there was too little to cook and have found a way to live by driving cabs, motors and streetcars. Many a woman has turned her hungry children over to a neighbor and has gone forth to find food for both mothers and both families of children and has found it in strange places and occupations. Many a drawingroom has been closed and the maid who swept and dusted it is now cleaning streets that the health of the city may be conserved. Many a woman who never before slept in a bed of her own making, or ate food not prepared by paid labor, is now sole mistress of parlor and kitchen. In all the warring countries, women are postmen [sic], porters, railway conductors, ticket, switch and

signal men. Conspicuous advertisements invite women to attend agricultural, milking and motor-car schools. They are employed as police in Great Britain and women detectives have recently been taken on the government staff. In Berlin, there are over 3,000 women streetcar conductors and 3,500 women are employed on the general railways. In every city and country, women are doing work for which they would have been considered incompetent two years ago. The war will soon end and the armies will return to their native lands. To many a family, the men will never come back. The husband who returns to many a wife, will eat no bread the rest of his life save of her earning. What then, will happen after the war? Will the widows left with families to support cheerfully leave their well-paid posts for those commanding lower wages? Not without protest! Will the wives who now must support crippled husbands give up their skilled work and take up the occupations which were open to them before the war? Will they resignedly say: ‘‘The woman who has a healthy husband who can earn for her, has a right to tea and raisin cake, but the woman who earns for herself and a husband who has given his all to his country, must be content with butterless bread?’’ Not without protest! On the contrary, the economic axiom, denied and evaded for centuries, will be blazoned on every factory, counting house and shop: ‘‘Equal pay for equal work’’; and common justice will slowly, but surely enforce that law. The European woman has risen. She may not realize it yet, but the woman ‘‘doormat’’ in every land has unconsciously become a ‘‘doorjamb’’! She will have become accustomed to her new dignity by the time the men come home. She will wonder how she ever could have been content lying across the threshold now that she discovers the upright jamb gives so much broader and more normal a vision of things. The men returning may find the new order a bit queer but everything else will be strangely unfamiliar too, and they will soon grow accustomed to all the changes together. The ‘‘jamb’’ will never descend into a ‘‘door-mat’’ again. The male and female anti-suffragists of all lands will puff and blow at the economic change which will come to the women of Europe. They will declare it to be contrary to Nature and to God’s plan and that somebody ought to do something about it. Suffragists will accept the change as the inevitable outcome of an unprecedented world’s cataclysm over which no human agency had any control and will trust in God to adjust the altered circumstances to the eternal evolution of human

5.10 Carrie Chapman Catt, The Crisis society. They will remember that in the long run, all things work together for good, for progress and for human weal. The economic change is bound to bring political liberty. From every land, there comes the expressed belief that the war will be followed by a mighty, oncoming wave of democracy for it is now well known that the conflict has been one of governments, of kings and Czars, Kaisers and Emperors; not of peoples. The nations involved have nearly all declared that they are fighting to make an end of wars. New and higher ideals of governments and of the rights of the people under them, have grown enormously during the past two years. Another tide of political liberty, similar to that of 1848, but of a thousandfold greater momentum, is rising from battlefield and hospital, from camp and munitions factory, from home and church which, great men of many lands, tell us, is destined to sweep over the world. On the continent, the women say, ‘‘It is certain that the vote will come to men and women after the war, perhaps not immediately but soon. In Great Britain, which was the storm centre of the suffrage movement for some years before the war, hundreds of bitter, active opponents have confessed their conversion on account of the war services of women. Already, three great provinces of Canada, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchawan [sic], have given universal suffrage to their women in sheer generous appreciation of their war work. Even Mr. Asquith, world renouned [sic] for his immovable opposition to the Parliamentary suffrage for British women, has given evidence of a change of view. Some months ago, he announced his amazement at the utterly unexpected skill, strength and resource developed by the women and his gratitude for their loyalty and devotion. Later, in reply to Mrs. Henry Fawcett, who asked if woman suffrage would be included in a proposed election bill, he said that when the war should end, such a measure would be considered without prejudice carried over from events prior to the war. A public statement issued by Mr. Asquith in August, was couched in such terms as to be interpreted by many as a pledge to include women in the next election bill. . . . So it happens that above the roar of cannon, the scream of shrapnel and the whirr of aeroplanes, one who listens may hear the cracking of the fetters which have long bound the European woman to outworn conventions. It has been a frightful price to pay but the fact remains that a womanhood, well started on the way to final emancipation, is destined to step forth from the war. It will be a bewildered, troubled and grief-stricken womanhood with knotty problems of life

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to solve, but it will be freer to deal with them than women have ever been before. ‘‘The Woman’s Hour has struck.’’ It has struck for the women of Europe and for those of all the world. The significance of the changed status of European women has not been lost upon the men and women of our land; our own people are not so unlearned in history, nor so lacking in National pride that they will allow the Republic to lag long behind the Empire, presided over by the descendant of George the Third. If they possess the patriotism and the sense of nationality which should be the inheritance of an American, they will not wait until the war is ended but will boldly lead in the inevitable march of democracy, our own American specialty. Sisters, let me repeat, the Woman’s Hour has struck! SECOND: As the most adamantine rock gives way under the constant dripping of water, so the opposition to woman suffrage in our own country has slowly disintegrated before the increasing strength of our movement. Turn backward the pages of our history! Behold, brave Abbie Kelley rotten-egged because she, a woman, essayed to speak in public. Behold the Polish Ernestine Rose startled that women of free America drew aside their skirts when she proposed that they should control their own property. Recall the saintly Lucretia Mott and the legal-minded Elizabeth Cady Stanton, turned out of the [W]orld’s Temperance convention in London and conspiring together to free their sex from the world’s stupid oppressions. Remember the gentle, sweet-voiced Lucy Stone, egged because she publicly claimed that women had brains capable of education. Think upon Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell, snubbed and boycotted by other women because she proposed to study medicine. Behold Dr. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, standing in sweet serenity before an Assembly of howling clergymen, angry that she, a woman dared to attend a Temperance Convention as a delegate. Revere the intrepid Susan B. Anthony mobbed from Buffalo to Albany because she demanded fair play for women. These are they who builded with others the foundation of political liberty for American women. Those who came after only laid the stones in place. Yet, what a wearisome task even that has been! Think of the wonderful woman who has wandered from village to village, from city to city, for a generation compelling men and women to listen and to reflect by her matchless eloquence. Where in all the world’s history has any movement among men produced so invincible an advocate as our own Dr. Anna Howard Shaw? Those whom she has led to the light are Legion. Think, too, of the consecration, the self-denial, the never-failing

158 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s constancy of that other noble soul set in a frail but unflinching body,---the heroine we know as Alice Stone Blackwell! A woman who never forgets, who detects the slightest flaw in the weapons of her adversary, who knows the most vulnerable spot in his armor, presides over the Woman’s Journal and, like a lamp in a lighthouse, the rays of her intelligence, farsightedness and clear-thinking have enlightened the world concerning our cause. The names of hundreds of other brave souls spring to memory when we pause to review the long struggle. The hands of many suffrage master-masons have long been stilled; the names of many who laid the stones have been forgotten. That does not matter. The main thing is that the edifice of woman’s liberty nears completion. It is strong, indestructible. All honor to the thousands who have helped in the building. The four Corner-stones of the foundations were laid long years ago. We read upon the first: ‘‘We demand for women education, for not a high school or college is open to her’’; upon the second, ‘‘We demand for women religious liberty for in few churches is she permitted to pray or speak’’; upon the third, ‘‘We demand for women the right to own property and an opportunity to earn an honest living. Only six, poorlypaid occupations are open to her, and if she is married, the wages she earns are not hers’’; upon the fourth, ‘‘We demand political freedom and its symbol, the vote.’’ The stones in the foundation have long been overgrown with the moss and mould of time, and some there are who never knew they were laid. Of late, four capstones at the top have been set to match those in the base, and we read upon the first: ‘‘The number of women who are graduated from high schools, colleges and universities is legion’’; upon the second, ‘‘The Christian Endeavor, that mighty, undenominational church militant, asks the vote for the women and the Methodist Episcopal Church, and many another, joins that appeal’’; upon the third, ‘‘Billions of dollars worth of property are earned [and] owned by women; more than 8 millions of women are wage-earners. Every occupation is open to them’’; upon the fourth: ‘‘Women vote in 12 States; they share in the determination of 91 electoral votes.’’ After the cap-stones and cornice comes the roof. Across the empty spaces, the rooftree has been flung and fastened well in place. It is not made of stone but of two planks,---planks in the platform of the two majority parties, and these are well supported by planks in the platforms of all minority parties. And we who are the builders of 1916, do we see a crisis? Standing upon these planks which are stretched across the top-most peak of this edifice of woman’s

liberty, what shall we do? Over our heads, up there in the clouds, but tantalizing [sic] near, hangs the roof of our edifice,---the vote. What is our duty? Shall we spend time in admiring the capstones and cornice? Shall we lament the tragedies which accompanied the laying of the cornerstones? or, shall we, like the builders of old, chant, ‘‘Ho! all hands, all hands, heave to! All hands, heave to!’’ and while we chant, grasp the overhanging roof and with a long pull, a strong pull and a pull together, fix it in place forevermore? Is the crisis real or imaginary? If it be real, it calls for action, bold, immediate and decisive. Let us then take measure of our strength. Our cause has won the endorsement of all political parties. Every candidate for the presidency is a suffragist. It has won the endorsement of most churches; it has won the hearty approval of all great organizations of women. It was won the support of all reform movements; it has won the progressives of every variety. The majority of the press in most States is with us. Great men in every political party, church and movement are with us. The names of the greatest men and women of art, science, literature and philosophy, reform, religion and politics are on our lists. We have not won the reactionaries of any party, church or society, and we never will. From the beginning of things, there have been Antis. The Antis drove Moses out of Egypt; they crucified Christ who said, ‘‘Love thy neighbor as thyself’’ [Matt. 19:19, 22:39]; they have persecuted Jews in all parts of the world; they poisoned Socrates, the great philosopher; they cruelly persecuted Copernicus and Galileo, the first great scientists; they burned Giordano Bruno at the stake because he believed the world was round; they burned Savonarola who warred upon church corruption; they burned Eufame McIlyane [sic] because she used an anaesthetic; they burned Joan d’Arc for a heretic; they have sent great men and women to Siberia to eat their hearts out in isolation; they burned in effigy William Lloyd Garrison; they egged Abbie Kelley and Lucy Stone and mobbed Susan B. Anthony. Yet, in proportion to the enlightenment of their respective ages, these Antis were persons of intelligence and honest purpose. They were merely deaf to the call of Progress and were enraged because the world insisted upon moving on. Antis male and female there still are and will be to the end of time. Give to them a prayer of forgiveness for they know not what they do; and prepare for the forward march. We have not won the ignorant and illiterate and we never can. They are too undeveloped mentally to understand that the institutions of today are not those of yesterday nor will be those of tomorrow.

5.11 Herbert Croly, Promise of American Life 159 We have not won the forces of evil and we never will. Evil has ever been timorous and suspicious of all change. It is an instinctive act of self-preservation which makes it fear and consequently oppose votes for women. As the Hon. Champ Clark said the other day: ‘‘Some good and intelligent people are opposed to woman suffrage; but all the ignorant and evil-minded are against it.’’ These three forces are the enemies of our cause. Before the vote is won, there must and will be a gigantic final conflict between the forces of progress, righteousness and democracy and the forces of ignorance, evil and reaction. That struggle may be postponed, but it cannot be evaded or avoided. There is no question as to which side will be the victor. Shall we play the coward, then, and leave the hard knocks for our daughters, or shall we throw ourselves into the fray, bare our own shoulders to the blows, and thus bequeath to them a politically liberated womanhood? We have taken note of our gains and of our resources! and they are all we could wish. Before the final struggle, we must take cognizance of our weaknesses. Are we prepared to grasp the victory? Alas, no! our movement is like a great Niagara with a vast volume of water tumbling over its ledge but turning no wheel. Our organized machinery is set for the propagandistic stage and not for the seizure of victory. Our supporters are spreading the argument for our cause; they feel no sense of responsibility for the realization of our hopes. Our movement lacks cohesion, organization, unity and consequent momentum. . . . There are thousands of other women who have never learned of the earlier struggles of our movement. They found doors of opportunity open to them on every side. They found well-paid posts awaiting the qualified woman and they have availed themselves of all these blessings; almost without exception they believe in the vote but they feel neither gratitude to those who opened the doors through which they have entered to economic liberty nor any sense of obligation to open other doors for those who come after. There are still others who, timorously looking over their shoulders to see if any listeners be near, will tell us they hope we will win and win soon but they are too frightened of Mother Grundy to help. There are others too occupied with the small things of life to help. They say they could find time to vote but not to work for the vote. There are men, too, millions of them, waiting to be called. These men and women are our reserves. They are largely unorganized and untrained soldiers with little responsibility toward our movement. Yet these reserves must be mobilized. The final struggle needs their numbers and the

momentum those numbers will bring. Were never another convert made, there are suffragists enough in this country, if combined, to make so irresistible a driving force that victory might be seized at once. How can it be done? By a simple change of mental attitude. If we are to seize the victory, that change must take place in this hall, here and now!. . . If you believe with me that a crisis has come to our movement,---if you believe that the time for final action is now, if you catch the rosy tints of the coming day, what does it mean to you? Does it not give you a thrill of exaltation; does the blood not course more quickly through your veins; does it not bring a new sense of freedom, of joy and of determination? Is it not true that you who wanted a little time ago to lay down the work because you were weary with long service, now, under the compelling influence of a changed mental attitude, are ready to go on until the vote is won. The change is one of spirit! Aye, and the spiritual effect upon you will come to others. Let me borrow an expression from Hon. John Finlay: What our great movement needs now is a ‘‘mobilization of spirit’’---the jubilant, glad spirit of victory. Then let us sound a bugle call here and now to the women of the Nation: ‘‘The Woman’s Hour has struck.’’ Let the bugle sound from the suffrage headquarters of every State at the inauguration of a State campaign. Let the call go forth again and, again and yet again. Let it be repeated in every article written, in every speech made, in every conversation held. Let the bugle blow again and yet again. The Political emancipation of our sex call[s] you, women of, America, arise! Are you content that others shall pay the price of your liberty? Women in schools and counting house, in shops and on the farm, women in the home with babes at their breasts and women engaged in public careers will hear. The veins of American women are not filled with milk and water. They are neither cowards nor slackers. They will come. They only await the bugle call to learn that the final battle is on.

5.11 Herbert Croly, Promise of American Life, 1909 It is fortunate, consequently, that one reformer can be named whose work has tended to give reform the dignity of a constructive mission. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt’s behavior at least is not dictated by negative conception of reform. During the course of an extremely active and varied political career he has,

160 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s indeed, been all kinds of a reformer. His first appearance in public life, as a member of the Legislature of New York, coincided with an outbreak of dissatisfaction over the charter of New York City; and Mr. Roosevelt’s name was identified with the bills which began the revision of that very much revised instrument. Somewhat later, as one of the Federal Commissioners, Mr. Roosevelt made a most useful contribution to the more effective enforcement of the Civil Service Law. Still later, as Police Commissioner of New York City, he had his experience of reform by means of unregenerate instruments and administrative lies. Then, as Governor of the State of New York, he was instrumental in securing the passage of a law taxing franchises as real property and thus faced for the first time and in a preliminary way the many-headed problem of the trusts. Finally, when an accident placed him in the Presidential chair, he consistently used the power of the Federal government and his own influence and popularity for the purpose of regulating the corporations in what he believed to be the public interest. No other American has had anything like so varied and so intimate an acquaintance with the practical work of reform as has Mr. Roosevelt; and when, after more than twenty years of such experience, he adds to the work of administrative reform the additional task of political and economic reconstruction, his originality cannot be considered the result of innocence. Mr. Roosevelt’s reconstructive policy does not go very far in purpose or achievement, but limited as it is, it does tend to give the agitation for reform the benefit of a much more positive significance and a much more dignified task. Mr. Roosevelt has imparted a higher and more positive significance to reform, because throughout his career he has consistently stood for an idea, from which the idea of reform cannot be separated---namely, the national idea. He has, indeed, been even more of a nationalist than he has a reformer. His most important literary work was a history of the beginning of American national expansion. He has treated all public questions from a vigorous, even from an extreme, national standpoint. No American politician was more eager to assert the national interest against an actual or a possible foreign enemy; and not even William R. Hearst was more resolute to involve his country in a war with Spain. Fortunately, however, his aggressive nationalism did not, like that of so many other statesmen, faint from exhaustion as soon as there were no more foreign enemies to defy. He was the first political leader of the American people to identify the national principle with an ideal of reform. He was the first to realize that an American statesman could no longer really represent the national

interest without becoming a reformer. Mr. Graver Cleveland showed a glimmering of the necessity of this affiliation; but he could not carry it far, because, as a sincere traditional Democrat, he could not reach a clear understanding of the meaning either of reform or of nationality. Mr. Roosevelt, however, divined that an American statesman who eschewed or evaded the work of reform came inevitably to represent either special and local interests or else a merely Bourbon political tradition, and in this way was disqualified for genuinely national service. He divined that the national principle involved a continual process of internal reformation; and that the reforming idea implied the necessity of more efficient national organization. Consequently, when he became President of the United States and the official representative of the national interest of the country, he attained finally his proper sphere of action. He immediately began the salutary and indispensable work of nationalizing the reform movement. The nationalization of reform endowed the movement with new vitality and meaning. What Mr. Roosevelt really did was to revive the Hamiltonian ideal of constructive national legislation. During the whole of the nineteenth century that ideal, while by no means dead, was disabled by associations and conditions from active and efficient service. Not until the end of the Spanish War was a condition of public feeling created, which made it possible to revive Hamiltonianism. That war and its resulting policy of extraterritorial expansion, so far from hindering the process of domestic amelioration, availed, from the sheer force of the national aspirations it aroused, to give a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform. It made Americans more sensitive to a national idea and more conscious of their national responsibilities, and it indirectly helped to place in the Presidential chair the man who, as I have said, represented both the national idea and the spirit of reform. The sincere and intelligent combination of those two ideas is bound to issue in the Hamiltonian practice of constructive national legislation. Of course Theodore Roosevelt is Hamiltonian with a difference. Hamilton’s fatal error consisted in his attempt to make the Federal organization not merely the effective engine of the national interest, but also a bulwark against the rising tide of democracy. The new Federalism or rather new Nationalism is not in any way inimical to democracy. On the contrary, not only does Mr. Roosevelt believe himself to be an unimpeachable democrat in theory, but he has given his fellow-countrymen a useful example of the way in which a college-bred and a well-to-do man can become by

5.11 Herbert Croly, Promise of American Life 161 somewhat forcible means a good practical democrat. The whole tendency of his programme is to give a democratic meaning and purpose to the Hamiltonian tradition and method. He proposes to use the power and the resources of the Federal government for the purpose of making his countrymen a more complete democracy in organization and practice; but he does not make these proposals, as Mr. Bryan does, gingerly and with a bad conscience. He makes them with a frank and full confidence in an efficient national organization as the necessary agent of the national interest and purpose. He has completely abandoned that part of the traditional democratic creed which tends to regard the assumption by the government of responsibility, and its endowment with power adequate to the responsibility as inherently dangerous and undemocratic. He realizes that any efficiency of organization and delegation of power which is necessary to the promotion of the American national interest must be helpful to democracy. More than any other American political leader, except Lincoln, his devotion both to the national and to the democratic ideas is thorough-going and absolute. As the founder of a new national democracy, then, his influence and his work have tended to emancipate American democracy from its Jeffersonian bondage. They have tended to give a new meaning to popular government by endowing it with larger powers, more positive responsibilities, and a better faith in human excellence. Jefferson believed theoretically in human goodness, but in actual practice his faith in human nature was exceedingly restricted. Just as the older aristocratic theory had been to justify hereditary political leadership by considering the ordinary man as necessarily irresponsible and incapable, so the early French democrats, and Jefferson after them, made faith in the people equivalent to a profound suspicion of responsible official leadership. Exceptional power merely offered exceptional opportunities for abuse. He refused, as far as he could, to endow special men, even when chosen by the people, with any opportunity to promote the public welfare proportionate to their abilities. So far as his influence has prevailed the government of the country was organized on the basis of a cordial distrust of the man of exceptional competence, training, or independence as a public official. To the present day this distrust remains the sign by which the demoralizing influence of the Jeffersonian democratic creed is most plainly to be traced. So far as it continues to be influential it destroys one necessary condition of responsible and efficient government, and it is bound to paralyze any attempt to make the national organization

adequate to the promotion of the national interest. Mr. Roosevelt has exhibited his genuinely national spirit in nothing so clearly as in his endeavor to give to men of special ability, training, and eminence a better opportunity to serve the public. He has not only appointed such men to office, but he has tried to supply them with an administrative machinery which would enable them to use their abilities to the best public advantage; and he has thereby shown a faith in human nature far more edifying and far more genuinely democratic than that of Jefferson or Jackson. Mr. Roosevelt, however, has still another title to distinction among the brethren of reform. He has not only nationalized the movement, and pointed it in the direction of a better conception of democracy, but he has rallied to its banner the ostensible, if not the very enthusiastic, support of the Republican party. He has restored that party to some sense of its historic position and purpose. As the party which before the War had insisted on making the nation answerable for the solution of the slavery problem, it has inherited the tradition of national responsibility for the national good; but it was rapidly losing all sense of its historic mission, and, like the Whigs, was constantly using its principle and its prestige as a cloak for the aggrandizement of special interests. At its worst it had, indeed, earned some claim on the allegiance of patriotic Americans by its defense of the fiscal system of the country against Mr. Bryan’s well-meant but dangerous attack, and by its acceptance after the Spanish War of the responsibilities of extra-territorial expansion; but there was grave danger that its alliance with the ‘‘vested’’ interests would make it unfaithful to its past as the party of responsible national action. It escaped such a fate only by an extremely narrow margin; and the fact that it did escape is due chiefly to the personal influence of Theodore Roosevelt. The Republican party is still very far from being a wholly sincere agent of the national reform interest. Its official leadership is opposed to reform; and it cannot be made to take a single step in advance except under compulsion. But Mr. Roosevelt probably prevented it from drifting into the position of an anti-reform party---which if it had happened would have meant its ruin, and would have damaged the cause of national reform. A Republican party which was untrue to the principle of national responsibility would have no reason for existence; and the Democratic party, as we have seen, cannot become the party of national responsibility without being faithless to its own creed. Source: Promise of American Life. 1909. New York: Macmillan & Co., 167--171.

162 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s

5.12 Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, 1910 . . . Our country---this great Republic---means nothing unless it means the triumph of a real democracy, the triumph of popular government, and, in the long run, of an economic system under which each man shall be guaranteed the opportunity to show the best that there is in him. That is why the history of America is now the central feature of the history of the world; for the world has set its face hopefully toward our democracy; and, O my fellow citizens, each one of you carries on your shoulders not only the burden of doing well for the sake of your country, but the burden of doing well and of seeing that this nation does well for the sake of mankind. There have been two great crises in our country’s history: first, when it was formed, and then, again, when it was perpetuated; and, in the second of these great crises---in the time of stress and strain which culminated in the Civil War, on the outcome of which depended the justification of what had been done earlier, you men of the Grand Army, you men who fought through the Civil War, not only did you justify your generation, but you justified the wisdom of Washington and Washington’s colleagues. If this Republic had been founded by them only to be split asunder into fragments when the strain came, then the judgment of the world would have been that Washington’s work was not worth doing. It was you who crowned Washington’s work, as you carried to achievement the high purpose of Abraham Lincoln . . . Of that generation of men to whom we owe so much, the man to whom we owe most is, of course, Lincoln. Part of our debt to him is because he forecast our present struggle and saw the way out. He said: ‘‘I hold that while man exists it is his duty to improve not only his own condition, but to assist in ameliorating mankind.’’ And again: ‘‘Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration.’’ If that remark was original with me, I should be even more strongly denounced as a Communist agitator than I shall be anyhow. It is Lincoln’s. I am only quoting it; and that is one side; that is the side the capitalist should hear. Now, let the working man hear his side. ‘‘Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any other rights. . . . Nor should this lead to

a war upon the owners of property. Property is the fruit of labor; . . . property is desirable; is a positive good in the world.’’ And then comes a thoroughly Lincolnlike sentence: ‘‘Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another, but let him work diligently and build one for himself, thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe from violence when built.’’ It seems to me that, in these words, Lincoln took substantially the attitude that we ought to take; he showed the proper sense of proportion in his relative estimates of capital and labor, of human rights and property rights. Above all, in this speech, as in many others, he taught a lesson in wise kindliness and charity; an indispensable lesson to us of to-day. But this wise kindliness and charity never weakened his arm or numbed his heart. We cannot afford weakly to blind ourselves to the actual conflict which faces us to-day. The issue is joined, and we must fight or fail . . . At many stages in the advance of humanity, this conflict between the men who possess more than they have earned and the men who have earned more than they possess is the central condition of progress. In our day it appears as the struggle of freemen to gain and hold the right of self-government as against the special interests, who twist the methods of free government into machinery for defeating the popular will. At every stage, and under all circumstances, the essence of the struggle is to equalize opportunity, destroy privilege, and give to the life and citizenship of every individual the highest possible value both to himself and to the commonwealth. That is nothing new. All I ask in civil life is what you fought for in the Civil War . . . Practical equality of opportunity for all citizens, when we achieve it, will have two great results. First, every man will have a fair chance to make of himself all that in him lies; to reach the highest point to which his capacities, unassisted by special privilege of his own and unhampered by the special privilege of others, can carry him, and to get for himself and his family substantially what he has earned. Second, equality of opportunity means that the commonwealth will get from every citizen the highest service of which he is capable. No man who carries the burden of the special privileges of another can give to the commonwealth that service to which it is fairly entitled. I stand for the square deal. But when I say that I am for the square deal, I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good service. One word of warning,

5.12 Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism 163 which, I think, is hardly necessary in Kansas. When I say I want a square deal for the poor man, I do not mean that I want a square deal for the man who remains poor because he has not got the energy to work for himself. If a man who has had a chance will not make good, then he has got to quit. And you men of the Grand Army, you want justice for the brave man who fought, and punishment for the coward who shirked his work. Is that not so? Now, this means that our government, National and State, must be freed from the sinister influence or control of special interests. Exactly as the special interests of cotton and slavery threatened our political integrity before the Civil War, so now the great special business interests too often control and corrupt the men and methods of government for their own profit. We must drive the special interests out of politics. That is one of our tasks to-day. Every special interest is entitled to justice---full, fair, and complete---and, now, mind you, if there were any attempt by mob-violence to plunder and work harm to the special interest, whatever it may be, that I most dislike, and the wealthy man, whomsoever he may be, for whom I have the greatest contempt, I would fight for him, and you would if you were worth your salt. He should have justice. For every special interest is entitled to justice, but not one is entitled to a vote in Congress, to a voice on the bench, or to representation in any public office. The Constitution guarantees protection to property, and we must make that promise good. But it does not give the right of suffrage to any corporation. The true friend of property, the true conservative, is he who insists that property shall be the servant and not the master of the commonwealth; who insists that the creature of man’s making shall be the servant and not the master of the man who made it. The citizens of the United States must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they have called into being. There can be no effective control of corporations while their political activity remains. To put an end to it will be neither a short nor an easy task, but it can be done. We must have complete and effective publicity of corporate affairs, so that the people may know beyond peradventure whether the corporations obey the law and whether their management entitles them to the confidence of the public. It is necessary that laws should be passed to prohibit the use of corporate funds directly or indirectly for political purposes; it is still more necessary that such laws should be thoroughly enforced. Corporate expenditures for political purposes, and especially such expenditures by public-service

corporations, have supplied one of the principal sources of corruption in our political affairs. It has become entirely clear that we must have government supervision of the capitalization, not only of public-service corporations, including, particularly, railways, but of all corporations doing an interstate business. I do not wish to see the nation forced into the ownership of the railways if it can possibly be avoided, and the only alternative is thoroughgoing and effective legislation, which shall be based on a full knowledge of all the facts, including a physical valuation of property. This physical valuation is not needed, or, at least, is very rarely needed, for fixing rates; but it is needed as the basis of honest capitalization . . . I believe that the officers, and, especially, the directors, of corporations should be held personally responsible when any corporation breaks the law. Combinations in industry are the result of an imperative economic law which cannot be repealed by political legislation. The effort at prohibiting all combination has substantially failed. The way out lies, not in attempting to prevent such combinations, but in completely controlling them in the interest of the public welfare. For that purpose the Federal Bureau of Corporations is an agency of first importance. Its powers, and, therefore, its efficiency, as well as that of the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be largely increased . . . The people of the United States suffer from periodical financial panics to a degree substantially unknown to the other nations, which approach us in financial strength. There is no reason why we should suffer what they escape. It is of profound importance that our financial system should be promptly investigated, and so thoroughly and effectively revised as to make it certain that hereafter our currency will no longer fail at critical times to meet our needs. It is hardly necessary to me to repeat that I believe in an efficient army and a navy large enough to secure for us abroad that respect which is the surest guaranty of peace . . . Of conservation I shall speak more at length elsewhere. Conservation means development as much as it does protection. I recognize the right and duty of this generation to develop and use the natural resources of our land; but I do not recognize the right to waste them, or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come after us. I ask nothing of the nation except that it so behave as each farmer here behaves with reference to his own children . . . Of all the questions which can come before this nation, short of the actual preservation of its existence in a great war, there is none which compares in

164 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s importance with the great central task of leaving this land even a better land for our descendants than it is for us, and training them into a better race to inhabit the land and pass it on. Conservation is a great moral issue, for it involves the patriotic duty of insuring the safety and continuance of the nation. Let me add that the health and vitality of our people are at least as well worth conserving as their forests, waters, lands, and minerals, and in this great work the national government must bear a most important part. . . . I do not ask for the overcentralization; but I do ask that we work in a spirit of broad and far-reaching nationalism where we work for what concerns our people as a whole. We are all Americans. Our common interests are as broad as the continent. I speak to you here in Kansas exactly as I would speak in New York or Georgia, for the most vital problems are those which affect us all alike. The National Government belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole American people are interested, that interest can be guarded effectively only by the National Government. The betterment which we seek must be accomplished, I believe, mainly through the National Government . . . I believe in shaping the ends of government to protect property as well as human welfare. Normally, and in the long run, the ends are the same; but whenever the alternative must be faced, I am for men and not for property, as you were in the Civil War. I am far from underestimating the importance of dividends; but I rank dividends below human character. Again, I do not have any sympathy with the reformer who says he does not care for dividends. Of course, economic welfare is necessary, for a man must pull his own weight and be able to support his family. I know well that the reformers must not bring upon the people economic ruin, or the reforms themselves will go down in the ruin. But we must be ready to face temporary disaster, whether or not brought on by those who will war against us to the knife. Those who oppose reform will do well to remember that ruin in its worst form is inevitable if our national life brings us nothing better than swollen fortunes for the few and the triumph in both politics and business of a sordid and selfish materialism . . . The object of government is the welfare of the people. The material progress and prosperity of a nation are desirable chiefly so long as they lead to the moral and material welfare of all good citizens. Just in proportion as the average man and woman are honest, capable of sound judgment and high ideals, active in public affairs---but, first of all, sound in their home,

and the father and mother of healthy children whom they bring up well---just so far, and no farther, we may count our civilization a success. We must have---I believe we have already---a genuine and permanent moral awakening, without which no wisdom of legislation or administration really means anything; and, on the other hand, we must try to secure the social and economic legislation without which any improvement due to purely moral agitation is necessarily evanescent. Let me again illustrate by a reference to the Grand Army. You could not have won simply as a disorderly and disorganized mob. You needed generals; you needed careful administration of the most advanced type; and a good commissary---the cracker line. You well remember that success was necessary in many different lines in order to bring about general success. You had to have the administration at Washington good, just as you had to have the administration in the field; and you had to have the work of the generals good. You could not have triumphed without the administration and leadership; but it would all have been worthless if the average soldier had not had the right stuff in him. He had to have the right stuff in him, or you could not get it out of him. In the last analysis, therefore, vitally necessary though it was to have the right kind of organization and the right kind of generalship, it was even more vitally necessary that the average soldier should have the fighting edge, the right character. So it is in our civil life. No matter how honest and decent we are in our private lives, if we do not have the right kind of law and the right kind of administration of the law, we cannot go forward as a nation. That is imperative; but it must be an addition to, and not a substitute for, the qualities that make us good citizens. In the last analysis, the most important elements in any man’s career must be the sum of those qualities which, in the aggregate, we speak of as character. If he has not got it, then no law that the wit of man can devise, no administration of the law by the boldest and strongest executive, will avail to help him. We must have the right kind of character---character that makes a man, first of all, a good man in the home, a good father, and a good husband---that makes a man a good neighbor. You must have that, and, then, in addition, you must have the kind of law and the kind of administration of the law which will give to those qualities in the private citizen the best possible chance for development. The prime problem of our nation is to get the right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have progress, and our public men must be genuinely progressive.

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive?

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? 1912 In his recent speech at Philadelphia President Taft stated that he was a Progressive, and this raises the question as to what a Progressive is. More is involved than any man’s say-so as to himself. A well-meaning man may vaguely think of himself as a Progressive without having even the faintest conception of what a Progressive is. Both vision and intensity of conviction must go to the make-up of any man who is to lead the forward movement, and mildly good intentions are utterly useless as substitutes. The essential difference, as old as civilized history, is between the men who, with fervor and broad sympathy and imagination, stand for the forward movement, the men who stand for the uplift and betterment of mankind, and who have faith in the people, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the men of narrow vision and small sympathy, who are not stirred by the wrongs of others. With these latter stand also those other men who distrust the people, and many of whom not merely distrust the people, but wish to keep them helpless so as to exploit them for their own benefit. The difference has never been more accurately set forth than in a lecture by the great English writer, Mr. J.A. Froude, delivered some forty-five years ago, and running as follows: Two kinds of men . . . appear as leaders in time of change . . . On one side there are the . . . men who have no confidence in the people---who have no passionate convictions---men who believe that all wholesome reforms proceed downward from the educated to the multitudes; who regard with contempt, qualified by terror, appeals to the popular conscience or to popular intelligence. Opposite to these are the men of faith---and by faith I do not mean belief in dogmas, but belief in goodness, belief in justice, in righteousness . . . They are no contented with looking for what may be useful or pleasant to themselves; they look by quite other methods for what is honorable, for what is good, for what is just. They believe that if they can find out that, then all hazards, in spite of all present consequences to themselves, that is to be preferred. When the air is heavy with impostors, and men live only to make money . . . and the kingdom of heaven is bought and sold, and all that is high and pure in man is smothered by corruption, fire of the same kind bursts out in higher natures with a fierceness which cannot be controlled; and confident in truth and right, they call

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fearlessly on the seven thousand in Israel who have not bowed the knee to Baal to rise and stand by them. They do not ask whether those whom they address have wide knowledge of history or science or philosophy; they ask rather that they shall be honest, that they shall be brave. They know well that conscience is no exceptional privilege of the great or the cultivated, that to be generous and unselfish is no prerogative of rank or intellect. We of today who stand for the Progressive movement here in the United States are not wedded to any particular kind of machinery, save solely as means to the end desired. Our aim is to secure the real and no the nominal rule of the people. With this purpose in view, we propose to do away with whatever in our government tends to secure to privilege, and to the great sinister special interests, a rampart from behind which they can beat back the forces that strive for social and industrial justice, and frustrate the will of the people. For this purpose we believe in securing for the people the direct election of United States Senators, exactly as the people have already secured in actual practice the direct election of the President. We believe in securing for the people the right of nominating candidates for office, from the President down, by direct primaries, because the convention system, good in its day, has been twisted from its purpose, so that the delegates to the conventions, when chosen under the present methods by pressure of money and patronage, often deliberately misrepresent instead of representing the popular will. We believe in securing to the people the exercise of a real and not merely a nominal control over their representatives in office, this control over their representatives in office, this control to include the power to secure the enactment of laws which the people demand, and the rejection of laws to which the people are opposed, if, after due effort, it is found impossible to get from the Legislature and the courts a real representation of the deliberate popular judgment in these matters. But these and kindred measures are merely machinery, and each community must judge for itself as to the machinery which its needs make necessary. The object, however, must be the same everywhere; that is, to give the people real control, and to have the people exercise this control in a spirit of the broadest sympathy and broadest desire to secure social and industrial justice for every man and woman, so that the work of all of us may be done and the lives of all of us lived under conditions which will tend to increase the dignity, the worth, and the efficiency of each individual.

166 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s If in any State the courts, in addition to doing justice in the ordinary cases between man and man, have striven to help and not hamper the people in their efforts to secure social and industrial justice in a far broader sense for the people as a whole, then in that community there may be no need for change as regards them. But where, in any community, as in my own State of New York, for instance, the highest court of the State, because of its adherence to outworn, to dead and gone systems of philosophy, and its lack of understanding of and sympathy with the living, the vital needs of those in the community whose needs are greatest, becomes a bulwark of privilege and most effective of all means for preventing the people from working in efficient fashion for true justice, then I hold that the power, after due deliberation and in Constitutional fashion, to have their judgment made efficient and their interpretation of the Constitution made binding upon their servants the judges no less than upon their servants the legislators and executives. Every man who fights fearlessly and effectively against special privilege in any form is to that extent a Progressive Every man who, directly or indirectly, upholds privilege and favors the special interests, whether he acts from evil motives or merely because he is puzzle-headed or dull of mental vision or lacking in social sympathy, or whether he simply lacks interest in the subject, is a reactionary. Every man is to that extent a Progressive if he stands for any form of social justice, whether it securing proper protection for factory girls against dangerous machinery, for securing a proper limitation of hours of labor for women and children in industry, for securing proper living conditions for those who dwell in the thickly crowded regions of our great cities, for helping, so far as legislators can help, all the conditions of work and life for wage-workers in great centers of industry, or for helping by the action both of the National and State governments, so far as conditions will permit, the men and women who dwell in the open country to increase their efficiency both in production on their farms and in business arrangements for the marketing of their produce, and also to increase the opportunities to give the best possible expression to their social life. The man is a reactionary, whatever may be his professions and no matter how excellent his intentions, who opposes these movements, or who, if in high place, takes no interest in them and does not earnestly lead them forward. When, in deference to the reactionaries in Congress, the President put a stop to the work of the Country Life Commission, so that for three years the National

Government has done little but mark time, or indeed to step backward, as regards this movement, then, no matter how good his intentions, his actions ranged him against the Progressive side. When the President supports those courts which declare that the people have no power to do social justice by enacting laws such as those I have above outlined, and when he opposes the effort to give to the sober judgment of the people due effect, as against the decisions of a reactionary court, then he shows himself a reactionary. When the President characterizes a moderate proposal to render effective the sober judgment of the American people, as against indefensible and reactionary court decisions in favor of the privileged classes, as ‘‘laying the ax at the foot of the tree of well-ordered freedom,’’ then the President is standing against the sane and moderate movement for social justice; he is standing in favor of privilege; and he thereby ranks himself against the Progressives, against the cause of justice for the helpless and the wronged, and on the side of the reactionaries, on the side of the beneficiaries of privilege and injustice. Four years ago the Progressives supported Mr. Taft for President, and he was opposed by such representatives of special privilege as Mr. Penrose of Pennsylvania, Mr. Aldrich of Rhode Island, Mr. Gallinger of New Hampshire, and Messrs. Lorimer, Cannon, and McKinley of Illinois; and he was opposed by practically all the men of the stamp of Messrs. Guggenheim and Evans in Colorado, Mr. Cox in Ohio, and Mr. Patrick Calhoun of San Francisco. These men were not progressives then, and they do not pretend to be Progressives now. But, unlike the President, they know who is a Progressive and who is not. They know that he is not a Progressive. Their judgment in this matter is good. After three and a half years of association with and knowledge of the President, these and their fellows are now the President’s chief supporters; and they and the men who feel and act as they do in business and in politics give him the great bulk of his strength. The President says that he is a Progressive. These men know him well and have studied his actions for three years, and they regard him as being precisely the kind of Progressive whom they approve---that is, as not a Progressive at all. Now, the progressiveness that meets and merits the cordial approval of these gentlemen is not the kind of progressiveness which we on our side champion. However good the President’s intentions, I believe that his actions have shown that he is entitled to the support of precisely these men. Take the most important bit of legislation enacted by the last Republican Congress---

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? the Rate Bill. When this bill was submitted by the Administration, it was a thoroughly mischievous measure, which would have undone the good work that has been accomplished in the control of the great railways during the last twenty years. In that shape it was reported out of the Senate committee by its ardent champion, Senator Aldrich. In that shape it was championed by all those gentlemen whom I have mentioned who had it in their power to give such support. But the Progressives in the Senate amended the bill, against the determined opposition of the reactionary friends of the Administration. They made it a good bill by striking out the chief features of the bill as the reactionaries framed it. They made but one mistake. They left in the bill the provision for a Commerce Court; and in its actual workings this feature of the bill has proved thoroughly mischievous, and should be repealed. The gentlemen in question and their allies cordially approve the administration of the Pure Food and Drugs Bill during the last three years, which has resulted in Dr. Wiley’s resigning, because, as he says in print, the situation has become intolerable, and ‘‘the fundamental principles of the Food and Drugs Act had one by one been paralyzed and discredited.’’ He specifically mentioned among the interests engaged in the manufacture of misbranded or adulterated foods which had escaped from the control of the Bureau the interests engaged in ‘‘the manufacture of so-called whisky from alcohol, colors, and flavors.’’ The gentlemen I have named and the great interests back of them, and their allies, like, Mr. Tawney, of Minnesota, were responsible for the President’s abandoning the Country Life and Conservation Commissions, which had cost the Government nothing and had rendered invaluable service to the country; and they also cordially approved the nomination of Mr. Ballinger to the position of Secretary of the Interior. For two years the Administration did everything in its power to undo the most valuable work that had been done in Conservation, especially in securing to the people the right to regulate water power franchise in the public interest. This effort became so flagrant and the criticism so universal that it was finally abandoned even by the Administration itself. As for the efforts to secure social justice in industrial matters, by securing child labor legislation, for instance, the Administration simply abandoned them completely. Alike in its action and in its inaction, the conduct of the Administration during the last three years has been such as to merit the support and approval of Messrs. Aldrich, Gallinger, Penrose, Lorimer, Cox, Guggenheim, and the other gentlemen I have mentioned. I do not

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wonder that they support it, but I do not regard an Administration which has merited and which receives such support as being entitled and which receives such support as being entitled to call itself Progressive, no matter with what elasticity the work may be stretched. No men have been closer or more interested students of the career of President Taft than these men, no men better understand its real significance, no men better appreciate what the effect of the continuance of this Administration for another four years would mean. I believe that their judgment upon the Administration and upon what its continuance would mean to the people can be accepted, and I think that their judgment, as shown by the extreme recklessness of their actions in trying to secure the President’ renomination, gives us an accurate gauge as to what the Administration merits from the people, and what the action of the people should be. There is no question that in many States these gentlemen and those now allied with them are well aware that the majority of the people are against them, but they have set themselves to work by hook or by brook to overcome that majority. Under ordinary circumstances, in an ordinary political contest among politicians of substantially the same stamp, they would undoubtedly prefer to follow the majority of the people. They do not do so in this instance because they realize fully that the interests they champion are antagonistic to the interest of the people, and that on this occasion the line-up is clean-cut between the people on one side, and on the other the political bosses and all who represent special privilege and the evil alliance of big business with politics. The Republican party is now facing a great crisis. It is to decide whether it will be, as in the days of Lincoln, the party of the plain people, the party of progress, the party of social and industrial justice; or whether it will be the party of privilege and of special interests, the heir to those who were Lincoln’s most bitter opponents, the party that represents the great interest within and with out Wall Street which desire through their control over the servants of the pubic to be kept immune from punishment when they do wrong and to be given privileges to which they are not entitled. The big business concern that is both honest and far-sighted will, I believe, in the end favor our effort to secure thorough-going supervision and control over industrial big business, just as we have now secured it over the business of inter-State transportation and the business of banking under the National law. We do not propose to do injustice to any man, but we do propose adequately to guarantee the people against injustice by

168 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s the mighty corporations which make up the predominant and characteristic feature of modern industrial life. Prosperity can permanently come to this country only on a basis of honesty and of fair treatment for all. Those men of enormous wealth who bitterly oppose every species of effective control by the people, through their Governmental agents, over the business use of that wealth are, I verily believe, most short-sighted as to their own ultimate interests. They should welcome such effort, they should welcome every effort to make them observe and to assist them in observing the law, so that their activities shall be helpful and not harmful to the American people. Most surely if the wise and moderate control we advocate does not come, then some day these men or their descendants will have to face the chance of some movement of really dangerous and drastic character being direct against them. The very wealthy men who oppose this action illustrate the undoubted truth that some of them men who have the money touch, some of the men who can amass enormous fortunes, possess an ability as specialized and non-indicative of other forms of ability as the ability to play chess exceptionally well, or to add up four columns of figures at once. The men of wealth of this type are not only hostile to the interest of the country, but hostile to their own interests; their great business ability is unaccompanied by even the slightest ability to read the signs of the times or understand the temper of the American people. I stand for the adequate control, the real control, of all big business, and especially of all monopolistic big business where it proves unwise or impossible to break up the monopoly. There is a grim irony in the effect that has been produced upon Wall Street by the complete breakdown of the prosecutions against various trusts, notably the Standard Oil and Tobacco Trusts, under the Sherman Law. I have always insisted that, while the Sherman Law should be kept upon the books so as to be used wherever possible against monopoly, yet that it is by itself wholly unable to afford the relief demanded by the American people as against all the great corporations actually or potentially guilty of anti-social practices. Wall Street was at first flurried by the decisions in the Oil and Tobacco Trust cases. But as regards the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, Wall Street has now caught up with the Administration. The President has expressed his entire satisfaction with the Anti-Trust Law, and now that the result of the prosecutions under it has been to strengthen the

Standard Oil and Tobacco Trusts, to increase the value of their stocks, and, at least in the case of the Standard Oil, to increase the price to the consumer, Wall Street is also showing in practical fashion its satisfaction with the workings of the law, by its antagonism to us who intend to establish a real control of big business which shall not harm legitimate business, but shall really, and not nominally, put a stop to the evil practices of evil combinations. The President has stated that he distrusts ‘‘impulsive action’’ by the public. I certainly greatly prefer deliberate action by the public, and in every proposal I have ever made I have always provided for such deliberate action. But I prefer even impulsive action by the public to action by the politicians against the interests of the public, whether this action be taken in tricky haste or with tricky deliberation. The President has warned us against soap-box primaries. At least these primaries are better than the primaries which represented the ‘‘impulsive action? Of the postmasters in States like Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, when these ’’impulsive’’ postmasters held their conventions at the earliest possible date, so as to affect the result in other States of the Union where there is a genuine Republican party. I see by the press that in your own State [Kentucky] the postmasters have been warned to resign their leadership in the party committees; but, if the statements in the press are correct, the resignations are not demanded with any ‘‘impulsiveness.’’ On the contrary, they have been asked with such leisurely deliberation that the day for holding the primaries will have passed before the request becomes effective. Now, gentlemen, if the newspaper reports are correct, such a request is a good deal worse than a sham. We are in a period of change; we are fronting a great period of further change. Never was the need more imperative for men of vision who are also men of action. Disaster is ahead of us if we trust to the leadership of the men whose hearts are seared and whose eyes are blinded, who believe that we can find safety in dull timidity and dull action, The unrest cannot be quieted by the ingenious trickery of those who profess to advance by merely marking time. It cannot be quieted by demanding only the prosperity which is to come to those who have little. There must be material prosperity; they are enemies of all of us who wantonly or unwisely interfere with or disregard it; but it can come in permanent shape only if obtained in accordance with not against the spirit of justice and of righteousness. Clouds hover about the horizon throughout the civilized world. But here in America the fault is our own if the sky above us is not clear. We have a continent on

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? which to work out or destiny. Out people, our men and women, are fit to face the mighty days. If we fail, the failure will be lamentable; for not only shall we fail for ourselves, but our failure will wreck the fond desires of all throughout the world who look toward us with the eager hope that there, in this great Republic, it shall be proved, from ocean to ocean, that the people can rule themselves, and, thus ruling, can give liberty and do justice both to themselves and to others. The present contest is but a phrase of the larger struggle. Assuredly the fight will go on. Our opponents, representing the brute power of ceded privilege, can win only by using the led captains of mercenary politics, and the crooked financiers who stand behind those led captains, and those newspapers which those financiers and politicians own, influence, or control. They can win only by playing upon the timidity or the shortsightedness or the mere lack of knowledge of worthy citizens, and by misleading them into supporting for the moment the powers that prey, the powers of pillage, the dread powers that exploit the people for their own purpose, and that turn popular government into a sinister sham. Certain big men, who, alas have sometimes perverted the courts to their own uses, now tell us that it is impious to speak of the people’s insisting upon justice being done by the courts. We answer that with all our might we will uphold the courts against lawlessness; and that we also intend to see that in their turn the courts give justice to all. We say, in the words of Lincoln, that we must prevent wrong ‘‘being done either by Congress or courts. The people of these United States are rightful masters of both Congress and courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who prevent the Constitution.’’ Again, Lincoln stated our case today when he said, in the course of his joint debate with Douglas, ‘‘That is the real issue. That is the issue which will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles---right and wrong--throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time. The one is the common right of humanity, the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says: You toil and work and earn bread and I’ll eat it. No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who bestrides the people of his own nation and lives from the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.’’

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And of course this applies no more to the slaveowner or to the foreign despot than to the present-day American citizen who oppresses others by the abuse of special privilege, be his wealth great or little, be he the multi-millionaire owner of railways and mines and factories who forgets his duties to those who earn him his bread while earning their own, or be he only the owner of a foul little sweatshop in which he grinds dollars from the excessive and underpaid labor of haggard women. We who stand for the cause of progress, for the cause of the uplift of humanity and the betterment of mankind, are pledged to eternal war against tyranny and wrong, by the few or by the many, by a plutocracy or by a mob. We stand for justice and for fair play; fearless and confident we face the coming years, for we know that ours are the banners of justice and that all men who wish well to the people must fight under them. We fight to make this country a better place to live in for those who have been harshly treated by fat; and if we succeed, it will also be a better place to live in for those who have been treated. None of us can really prosper permanently if masses of men and women are ground down and forced to lead starved and sordid lives. So that their souls are crippled like their bodies and the fine edge of their every feeling is blunted. I ask that those of us to whom Providence, to whom fate, has been kind, remember that each must be his brother’s keeper, and that all must feel their obligation to the less fortunate who work beside us in the strain and press of our eager modern life. I ask justice for the weak for their sakes, and I ask it also for the sake of our own children, and of our children’s children who are to come after us. This country will not be a good place for any of us to live in if it is not a reasonably good place for all of us to live in. When I plead the cause of the crippled brakeman on a railway, of the overworked girl in a factory, of the stunted child toiling at inhuman labor, or all who work excessively or in unhealthy surroundings, of the family dwelling in the squalor of a noisome tenement, of the worn out farmer in regions where the farms are worn our also; when I protest against the unfair profits of unscrupulous and conscienceless men, or against the greedy exploitation of the helpless by the beneficiaries of privilege---in all these case I am not only fighting for the weak, I am also fighting for the strong. The sons of all of us will pay in the future if we of the present do not do justice in the present. If the fathers amuse others to eat bitter bread, the teeth of their own sons shall be set on edge. Our cause is the cause of justice for all, in the interest

170 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s of all. Surely there was never a more noble cause; surely there was never a cause in which it was better worth while to spend and be spent.

A Covenant with The People This declaration is our covenant with the people, and we hereby bind the party and its candidates in State and Nation to the pledges made herein.

Progressive Platform of 1912 The conscience of the people, in a time of grave national problems, has called into being a new party, born of the nation’s sense of justice. We of the Progressive party here dedicate ourselves to the fulfillment of the duty laid upon us by our fathers to maintain the government of the people, by the people and for the people whose foundations they laid. We hold with Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln that the people are the masters of their Constitution, to fulfill its purposes and to safeguard it from those who, by perversion of its intent, would convert it into an instrument of injustice. In accordance with the needs of each generation the people must use their sovereign powers to establish and maintain equal opportunity and industrial justice, to secure which this Government was founded and without which no republic can endure. This country belongs to the people who inhabit it. Its resources, its business, its institutions and its laws should be utilized, maintained or altered in whatever manner will best promote the general interest. It is time to set the public welfare in the first place. The Old Parties Political parties exist to secure responsible government and to execute the will of the people. From these great tasks both of the old parties have turned aside. Instead of instruments to promote the general welfare, they have become the tools of corrupt interests which use them impartially to serve their selfish purposes. Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of the statesmanship of the day. The deliberate betrayal of its trust by the Republican party, the fatal incapacity of the Democratic party to deal with the new issues of the new time, have compelled the people to forge a new instrument of government through which to give effect to their will in laws and institutions. Unhampered by tradition, uncorrupted by power, undismayed by the magnitude of the task, the new party offers itself as the instrument of the people to sweep away old abuses, to build a new and nobler commonwealth.

The Rule of The People The National Progressive party, committed to the principles of government by a self-controlled democracy expressing its will through representatives of the people, pledges itself to secure such alterations in the fundamental law of the several States and of the United States as shall insure the representative character of the government. In particular, the party declares for direct primaries for the nomination of State and National officers, for nation-wide preferential primaries for candidates for the presidency; for the direct election of United States Senators by the people; and we urge on the States the policy of the short ballot, with responsibility to the people secured by the initiative, referendum and recall. Amendment of Constitution The Progressive party, believing that a free people should have the power from time to time to amend their fundamental law so as to adapt it progressively to the changing needs of the people, pledges itself to provide a more easy and expeditious method of amending the Federal Constitution. Nation and State Up to the limit of the Constitution, and later by amendment of the Constitution, it found necessary, we advocate bringing under effective national jurisdiction those problems which have expanded beyond reach of the individual States. It is as grotesque as it is intolerable that the several States should by unequal laws in matter of common concern become competing commercial agencies, barter the lives of their children, the health of their women and the safety and well being of their working people for the benefit of their financial interests. The extreme insistence on States’ rights by the Democratic party in the Baltimore platform demonstrates anew its inability to understand the world into which it has survived or to administer the affairs of a union of States which have in all essential respects become one people. Equal Suffrage The Progressive party, believing that no people can justly claim to be a true democracy which denies

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? political rights on account of sex, pledges itself to the task of securing equal suffrage to men and women alike. Corrupt Practices We pledge our party to legislation that will compel strict limitation of all campaign contributions and expenditures, and detailed publicity of both before as well as after primaries and elections. Publicity and Public Service We pledge our party to legislation compelling the registration of lobbyists; publicity of committee hearings except on foreign affairs, and recording of all votes in committee; and forbidding federal appointees from holding office in State or National political organizations, or taking part as officers or delegates in political conventions for the nomination of elective State or National officials. The Courts The Progressive party demands such restriction of the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and public policy. To secure this end, it pledges itself to provide: 1. That when an Act, passed under the police power of the State is held unconstitutional under the State Constitution, by the courts, the people, after an ample interval for deliberation, shall have an opportunity to vote on the question whether they desire the Act to become law, notwithstanding such decision. 2. That every decision of the highest appellate court of a State declaring an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional on the ground of its violation of the Federal Constitution shall be subject to the same review by the Supreme Court of the United States as is now accorded to decisions sustaining such legislation. Administration of Justice The Progressive party, in order to secure to the people a better administration of justice and by that means to bring about a more general respect for the law and the courts, pledges itself to work unceasingly for the reform of legal procedure and judicial methods. We believe that the issuance of injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes should be prohibited when such injunctions would not apply when no labor disputes existed.

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We also believe that a person cited for contempt in labor disputes, except when such contempt was committed in the actual presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere with the proper administration of justice, should have a right to trial by jury.

Social and Industrial Justice The supreme duty of the Nation is the conservation of human resources through an enlightened measure of social and industrial justice. We pledge ourselves to work unceasingly in State and Nation for: Effective legislation looking to the prevention of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, involuntary unemployment, and other injurous effects incident to modern industry; The fixing of minimum safety and health standards for the various occupations, and the exercise of the public authority of State and Nation, including the Federal Control over interstate commerce, and the taxing power, to maintain such standards; The prohibition of child labor; Minimum wage standards for working women, to provide a ‘‘living wage’’ in all industrial occupations; The general prohibition of night work for women and the establishment of an eight hour day for women and young persons; One day’s rest in seven for all wage workers; The eight hour day in continuous twenty-four hour industries; The abolition of the convict contract labor system; substituting a system of prison production for governmental consumption only; and the application of prisoners’ earnings to the support of their dependent families; Publicity as to wages, hours and conditions of labor; full reports upon industrial accidents and diseases, and the opening to public inspection of all tallies, weights, measures and check systems on labor products; Standards of compensation for death by industrial accident and injury and trade disease which will transfer the burden of lost earnings from the families of working people to the industry, and thus to the community; The protection of home life against the hazards of sickness, irregular employment and old age through the adoption of a system of social insurance adapted to American use; The development of the creative labor power of America by lifting the last load of illiteracy from American youth and establishing continuation schools for industrial education under public control and

172 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s encouraging agricultural education and demonstration in rural schools; The establishment of industrial research laboratories to put the methods and discoveries of science at the service of American producers; We favor the organization of the workers, men and women, as a means of protecting their interests and of promoting their progress. Department of Labor We pledge our party to establish a department of labor with a seat in the cabinet, and with wide jurisdiction over matters affecting the conditions of labor and living. Country Life The development and prosperity of country life are as important to the people who live in the cities as they are to the farmers. Increase of prosperity on the farm will favorably affect the cost of living, and promote the interests of all who dwell in the country, and all who depend upon its products for clothing, shelter and food. We pledge our party to foster the development of agricultural credit and co-operation, the teaching of agriculture in schools, agricultural college extension, the use of mechanical power on the farm, and to re-establish the Country Life Commission, thus directly promoting the welfare of the farmers, and bringing the benefits of better farming, better business and better living within their reach. High Cost of Living The high cost of living is due partly to worldwide and partly to local causes; partly to natural and partly to artificial causes. The measures proposed in this platform on various subjects such as the tariff, the trusts and conservation, will of themselves remove the artificial causes. There will remain other elements such as the tendency to leave the country for the city, waste, extravagance, bad system of taxation, poor methods of raising crops and bad business methods in marketing crops. To remedy these conditions requires the fullest information and based on this information, effective government supervision and control to remove all the artificial causes. We pledge ourselves to such full and immediate inquiry and to immediate action to deal with every need such inquiry discloses. Health We favor the union of all the existing agencies of the Federal Government dealing with the public health into

a single national health service without discrimination against or for any one set of therapeutic methods, school of medicine, or school of healing with such additional powers as may be necessary to enable it to perform efficiently such duties in the protection of the public from preventable diseases as may be properly undertaken by the Federal authorities, including the executing of existing laws regarding pure food, quarantine and cognate subjects, the promotion of vital statistics and the extension of the registration area of such statistics, and co-operation with the health activities of the various States and cities of the Nation. Business We believe that true popular government, justice and prosperity go hand in hand, and, so believing, it is our purpose to secure that large measure of general prosperity which is the fruit of legitimate and honest business, fostered by equal justice and by sound progressive laws. We demand that the test of true prosperity shall be the benefits conferred thereby on all the citizens, not confined to individuals or classes, and that the test of corporate efficiency shall be the ability better to serve the public; that those who profit by control of business affairs shall justify that profit and that control by sharing with the public the fruits thereof. We therefore demand a strong National regulation of inter-State corporations. The corporation is an essential part of modern business. The concentration of modern business, in some degree, is both inevitable and necessary for national and international business efficiency. But the existing concentration of vast wealth under a corporate system, unguarded and uncontrolled by the Nation, has placed in the hands of a few men enormous, secret, irresponsible power over the daily life of the citizen---a power insufferable in a free Government and certain of abuse. This power has been abused, in monopoly of National resources, in stock watering, in unfair competition and unfair privileges, and finally in sinister influences on the public agencies of State and Nation. We do not fear commercial power, but we insist that it shall be exercised openly, under publicity, supervision and regulation of the most efficient sort, which will preserve its good while eradicating and preventing its ill. To that end we urge the establishment of a strong Federal administrative commission of high standing, which shall maintain permanent active supervision over industrial corporations engaged in inter-State commerce, or such of them as are of public importance, doing for them what the Government now does for the

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? National banks, and what is now done for the railroads by the Inter-State Commerce Commission. Such a commission must enforce the complete publicity of those corporation transactions which are of public interest; must attack unfair competition, false capitalization and special privilege, and by continuous trained watchfulness guard and keep open equally all the highways of American commerce. Thus the business man will have certain knowledge of the law, and will be able to conduct his business easily in conformity therewith; the investor will find security for his capital; dividends will be rendered more certain, and the savings of the people will be drawn naturally and safely into the channels of trade. Under such a system of constructive regulation, legitimate business, freed from confusion, uncertainty and fruitless litigation, will develop normally in response to the energy and enterprise of the American business man. We favor strengthening the Sherman Law by prohibiting agreement to divide territory or limit output; refusing to sell to customers who buy from business rivals; to sell below cost in certain areas while maintaining higher prices in other places; using the power of transportation to aid or injure special business concerns; and other unfair trade practices. Patents We pledge ourselves to the enactment of a patent law which will make it impossible for patents to be suppressed or used against the public welfare in the interests of injurious monopolies. Inter-State Commerce Commission We pledge our party to secure to the Inter-State Commerce Commission the power to value the physical property of railroads. In order that the power of the commission to protect the people may not be impaired or destroyed, we demand the abolition of the Commerce Court. Currency We believe there exists imperative need for prompt legislation for the improvement of our National currency system. We believe the present method of issuing notes through private agencies is harmful and unscientific. The issue of currency is fundamentally a Government function and the system should have as basic principles soundness and elasticity. The control should be lodged with the Government and should be

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protected from domination or manipulation by Wall Street or any special interests. We are opposed to the so-called Aldrich currency bill, because its provisions would place our currency and credit system in private hands, not subject to effective public control. Commercial Development The time has come when the Federal Government should co-operate with manufacturers and producers in extending our foreign commerce. To this end we demand adequate appropriations by Congress, and the appointment of diplomatic and consular officers solely with a view to their special fitness and worth, and not in consideration of political expediency. It is imperative to the welfare of our people that we enlarge and extend our foreign commerce. In every way possible our Federal Government should co-operate in this important matter. Germany’s policy of co-operation between government and business has, in comparatively few years, made that nation a leading competitor for the commerce of the world. Conservation The natural resources of the Nation must be promptly developed and generously used to supply the people’s needs, but we cannot safely allow them to be wasted, exploited, monopolized or controlled against the general good. We heartily favor the policy of conservation, and we pledge our party to protect the National forests without hindering their legitimate use for the benefit of all the people. Agricultural lands in the National forests are, and should remain, open to the genuine settler. Conservation will not retard legitimate development. The honest settler must receive his patent promptly, without hindrance, rules or delays. We believe that the remaining forests, coal and oil lands, water powers and other natural resources still in State or National control (except agricultural lands) are more likely to be wisely conserved and utilized for the general welfare if held in the public hands. In order that consumers and producers, managers and workmen, now and hereafter, need not pay toll to private monopolies of power and raw material, we demand that such resources shall be retained by the State or Nation, and opened to immediate use under laws which will encourage development and make to the people a moderate return for benefits conferred. In particular we pledge our party to require reasonable compensation to the public for water power rights hereafter granted by the public.

174 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s We pledge legislation to lease the public grazing lands under equitable provisions now pending which will increase the production of food for the people and thoroughly safeguard the rights of the actual homemaker. Natural resources, whose conservation is necessary for the National welfare, should be owned or controlled by the Nation. Good Roads We recognize the vital importance of good roads and we pledge our party to foster their extension in every proper way, and we favor the early construction of National highways. We also favor the extension of the rural free delivery service. Alaska The coal and other natural resources of Alaska should be opened to development at once. They are owned by the people of the United States, and are safe from monopoly, waste or destruction only while so owned. We demand that they shall neither be sold nor given away, except under the Homestead Law, but while held in Government ownership shall be opened to use promptly upon liberal terms requiring immediate development. Thus the benefit of cheap fuel will accrue to the Government of the United States and to the people of Alaska and the Pacific Coast; the settlement of extensive agricultural lands will be hastened; the extermination of the salmon will be prevented and the just and wise development of Alaskan resources will take the place of private extortion or monopoly. We demand also that extortion or monopoly in transportation shall be prevented by the prompt acquisition, construction or improvement by the Government of such railroads, harbor and other facilities for transportation as the welfare of the people may demand. We promise the people of the Territory of Alaska the same measure of legal self-government that was given to other American territories, and that Federal officials appointed there shall be qualified by previous bona-fide residence in the Territory.

Waterways The rivers of the United States are the natural arteries of this continent. We demand that they shall be opened to traffic as indispensable parts of a great Nation-wide system of transportation, in which the Panama Canal will be the central link, thus enabling the whole interior of the United States to share with the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards in the benefit derived from the canal.

It is a National obligation to develop our rivers, and especially the Mississippi and its tributaries, without delay, under a comprehensive general plan covering each river system from its source to its mouth, designed to secure its highest usefulness for navigation, irrigation, domestic supply, water power and the prevention of floods. We pledge our party to the immediate preparation of such a plan, which should be made and carried out in close and friendly co-operation between the Nation, the States and the cities affected. Under such a plan, the destructive floods of the Mississippi and other streams, which represent a vast and needless loss to the Nation, would be controlled by forest conservation and water storage at the headwaters, and by levees below; land sufficient to support millions of people would be reclaimed from the deserts and the swamps, water power enough to transform the industrial standings of whole States would be developed, adequate water terminals would be provided, transportation by river would revive, and the railroads would be compelled to co-operate as freely with the boat lines as with each other. The equipment, organization and experience acquired in constructing the Panama Canal soon will be available for the Lakes-to-the-Gulf deep waterway and other portions of this great work, and should be utilized by the Nation in co-operation with the various States, at the lowest net cost to the people. Panama Canal The Panama Canal, built and paid for by the American people, must be used primarily for their benefit. We demand that the canal shall be so operated as to break the transportation monopoly now held and misused by the transcontinental railroads by maintaining sea competition with them; that ships directly or indirectly owned or controlled by American railroad corporations shall not be permitted to use the canal, and that American ships engaged in coastwise trade shall pay no tolls. The Progressive party will favor legislation having for its aim the development of friendship and commerce between the United States and Latin-American nations. Tariff We believe in a protective tariff which shall equalize conditions of competition between the United States and foreign countries, both for the farmer and the manufacturer, and which shall maintain for labor an adequate standard of living.

5.13 Theodore Roosevelt, Who Is a Progressive? Primarily the benefit of any tariff should be disclosed in the pay envelope of the laborer. We declare that no industry deserves protection which is unfair to labor or which is operating in violation of Federal law. We believe that the presumption is always in favor of the consuming public. We demand tariff revision because the present tariff is unjust to the people of the United States. Fair dealing toward the people requires an immediate downward revision of those schedules wherein duties are shown to be unjust or excessive. We pledge ourselves to the establishment of a nonpartisan scientific tariff commission, reporting both to the President and to either branch of Congress, which shall report, first, as to the costs of production, efficiency of labor, capitalization, industrial organization and efficiency and the general competitive position in this country and abroad of industries seeking protection from Congress; second, as to the revenue producing power of the tariff and its relation to the resources of Government; and, third, as to the effect of the tariff on prices, operations of middlemen, and on the purchasing power of the consumer. We believe that this commission should have plenary power to elicit information, and for this purpose to prescribe a uniform system of accounting for the great protected industries. The work of the commission should not prevent the immediate adoption of acts reducing these schedules generally recognized as excessive. We condemn the Payne-Aldrich bill as unjust to the people. The Republican organization is in the hands of those who have broken, and cannot again be trusted to keep, the promise of necessary downward revision. The Democratic party is committed to the destruction of the protective system through a tariff for revenue only---a policy which would inevitably produce widespread industrial and commercial disaster. We demand the immediate repeal of the Canadian Reciprocity Act.

Inheritance and Income Tax We believe in a graduated inheritance tax as a National means of equalizing the obligations of holders of property to Government, and we hereby pledge our party to enact such a Federal law as will tax large inheritances, returning to the States an equitable percentage of all amounts collected. We favor the ratification of the pending amendment to the Constitution giving the Government power to levy an income tax.

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Peace and National Defense The Progressive party deplores the survival in our civilization of the barbaric system of warfare among nations with its enormous waste of resources even in time of peace, and the consequent impoverishment of the life of the toiling masses. We pledge the party to use its best endeavors to substitute judicial and other peaceful means of settling international differences. We favor an international agreement for the limitation of naval forces. Pending such an agreement, and as the best means of preserving peace, we pledge ourselves to maintain for the present the policy of building two battleships a year. Treaty Rights We pledge our party to protect the rights of American citizenship at home and abroad. No treaty should receive the sanction of our Government which discriminates between American citizens because of birthplace, race, or religion, or that does not recognize the absolute right of expatriation. The Immigrant Through the establishment of industrial standards we propose to secure to the able-bodied immigrant and to his native fellow workers a larger share of American opportunity. We denounce the fatal policy of indifference and neglect which has left our enormous immigrant population to become the prey of chance and cupidity. We favor Governmental action to encourage the distribution of immigrants away from the congested cities, to rigidly supervise all private agencies dealing with them and to promote their assimilation, education and advancement. Pensions We pledge ourselves to a wise and just policy of pensioning American soldiers and sailors and their widows and children by the Federal Government. And we approve the policy of the southern States in granting pensions to the ex-Confederate soldiers and sailors and their widows and children. Parcel Post We pledge our party to the immediate creation of a parcel post, with rates proportionate to distance and service. Civil Service We condemn the violations of the Civil Service Law under the present administration, including the

176 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s coercion and assessment of subordinate employees, and the President’s refusal to punish such violation after a finding of guilty by his own commission; his distribution of patronage among subservient congressmen, while withholding it from those who refuse support of administration measures; his withdrawal of nominations from the Senate until political support for himself was secured, and his open use of the offices to reward those who voted for his renomination. To eradicate these abuses, we demand not only the enforcement of the civil service act in letter and spirit, but also legislation which will bring under the competitive system postmasters, collectors, marshals, and all other non-political officers, as well as the enactment of an equitable retirement law, and we also insist upon continuous service during good behavior and efficiency. Government Business Organization We pledge our party to readjustment of the business methods of the National Government and a proper coordination of the Federal bureaus, which will increase the economy and efficiency of the Government service, prevent duplications, and secure better results to the taxpayers for every dollar expended.

Government Supervision Over Investments The people of the United States are swindled out of many millions of dollars every year, through worthless investments. The plain people, the wage earner and the men and women with small savings, have no way of knowing the merit of concerns sending out highly colored prospectuses offering stock for sale, prospectuses that make big returns seem certain and fortunes easily within grasp. We hold it to be the duty of the Government to protect its people from this kind of piracy. We, therefore, demand wise, carefully thought out legislation that will give us such Governmental supervision over this matter as will furnish to the people of the United States this much-needed protection, and we pledge ourselves thereto. Conclusion On these principles and on the recognized desirability of uniting the Progressive forces of the Nation into an organization which shall unequivocally represent the Progressive spirit and policy we appeal for the support of all American citizens, without regard to previous political affiliations.

5.14 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, 1918 It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the objects it has in view. We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world’s peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this: 1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

5.14 Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded

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and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development. 11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. 12. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright

178 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world---the new world in which we now live---instead of a place of mastery.

5.15 W. E. B. Du Bois, President Harding and Social Equality, 1921 For fifty years we who, pro and con, have discussed the Negro Problem, have been skulking behind a phrase--‘‘Social Equality.’’ Today President Harding’s speech, like sudden thunder in blue skies, ends the hiding and drives us all into the clear light of truth. We had our excuses perhaps in the past: about every problem of human relations lurks a penumbra of shadowing possibilities, which we would not discuss. It seems unnecessary, inappropriate, beside the point. And so defenders of the higher training of women have hesitated to explore sex freedom for females; and lovers of democracy have declined to consider the possibility of the masses voting their own wages. It is not that we have denied the ensuing problems that shadow our main object, but we have said with a certain truth: sufficient unto the present tangle is the obvious evil thereof. Let us follow the clear light and afterward turn to other darkness. But sometimes this becomes suddenly impossible. Sometimes the so---considered minor problem is so tremendous and insistent that it leaps to the fore and demands examination and honest facing, This is particularly so when we have not simply ignored the problem but have deliberately and cynically lied about it, denied it, and said not that ‘‘Social Equality’’ was not a pertinent and pressing problem; but rather that it was no problem at all.

The Birmingham Speech And now comes President Harding’s Birmingham speech when unwittingly or deliberately the President brings the crisis. We may no longer dodge nor hesitate. We must all, black or white, Northerner or Southerner, stand in the light and speak plain words. The President must not for a moment be blamed because, when invited to the semi-centennial of a great

southern city of industry, he talked of the Negro instead of the results of profitable mining. There is but one subject in the South. The Southerners themselves can speak no other, think no other, act no other. The eternal and inevitable southern topic is and has been an will be the Black Man. Moreover, the President laid down three theses with which no American can disagree without a degree of self-stultification almost inconceivable, namely: 1. The Negro must vote on the same terms that white folk vote. 2. The Negro must be educated. 3. The Negro must have economic Justice. The sensitive may note that the President qualified these demands somewhat, even dangerously, and yet they stand out so clearly in his speech that he must be credited with meaning to give them their real significance. And in this the President made a braver, clearer utterance than Theodore Roosevelt ever dared to make or than William Taft or William McKinley ever dreamed of. For this let us give him every ounce of credit he deserves.

Social Equality But President Harding did not stop here. Indeed he did not begin here. Either because he had no adequate view of the end of the fatal path he was treading of because, in his desire to placate the white South, he was careless of consequences, he put first on his program of racial settlement a statement which could have been understood and was understood and we fear was intended to be understood to pledge the nation, the Negro race and the world to a doctrine so utterly inadmissible in the twentieth century, in a Republic of free citizens and in an age of Humanity that one stands aghast as the motives and the reasons for the pronouncement. It may to some seem that this statement is overdrawn. Some puzzled persons may say: but Negros themselves have told me that they repudiate ‘‘Social Equality’’ and amalgamation of race; in fact, right there at Birmingham, Negro applause of the President was audible. All this does not minimize---rather it emphasizes the grave crisis precipitated by the President’s speech. It emphasizes the fact of our mental skulking or transparent and deliberate dishonesty in deal with the Negro. Social equality may mean two things. The obvious and clear meaning is the right of a human being to accept companionship with his fellow on terms of equal and reciprocal courtesy. In this sense the term is

5.15 W. E. B. Du Bois, President Harding and Social Equality understood and defended by modern men. It has not been denied by any civilized man since the French Revolution. It is the foundation of democracy and to bring it into being, the world when through revolution, war, murder and hell. But there is another narrow, stilted and unreal meaning, that is sometimes dragged from these words, namely: Social Equality is the right to demand private social companionship with another. Or to put it more simply: the real meaning of ‘‘Social Equality’’ is eligibility to association with men, and the forced and illogical meaning is the right to demand private association with any particular person. Such a demand as the latter is idiotic and was never made by an sane person; while on the contrary, for any person to admit that his character is such that he is physically and morally unfit to talk or travel or eat with his fellow---men, or that he has no desire to associate with decent people, would be an admission which none but a leper, a criminal or a liar could possibly make. It is the very essence of self respect and human equality and it carries with it no jot of arrogance or assumption---it is simply Homo Sum.

Self-Deception Despite this, for fifty years the Southern white man has said to the Negro: Do you mean to say that you consider yourself fit to associate with white people? And the Negro has answered; but the question which he answered was not the one asked, but rather the other totally different question: Do you mean to say that you want to force your friendship and company on persons who do not want them? The answer to this is obviously an emphatic and indignant No. But when the Negro said No, he knew that he was not answering the question of the white man intended to ask and the white man knew that the Negro knew this, and that he himself had purposely asked a question of double and irreconcilable meaning, when he said, ‘‘Do you want Social Equality?’’ And so this undeceiving deception has gone on for fifty years until the President of the United States, throwing caution to the winds, has either boldly or unwittingly announced as a national policy that ‘‘men of both races may well stand uncompromisingly against every suggestion of Social Equality.’’ Or in other words, that no man, no matter how civilized, decent or gifted he may be, shall be permitted to associate with his fellow men on terms of equality or want to associate with them, if he be a Negro or of Negro descent.

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Let us sweep away all quibbling: Let us assume that the President was sane and serious and could not and did not mean by ‘‘social equality’’ anything so inconceivable as the right of a man to invite himself to another man’s dinner table. No. Mr. Harding meant that the American Negro must acknowledge that it was a wrong and a disgrace for Booker T. Washington to dine with President Roosevelt! The answer to this inconceivably dangerous and undemocratic demand must come with the unanimous ring of 12 million voices, enforced by the voice of every American who believes in Humanity. Let us henceforward frankly admit that which we hitherto have always known; that no system of social uplift which begins by denying the manhood of a man can end by giving him a free ballot, a real education and a just wage.

Race Equality Let us confess that the pseudo-science to which the President unhappily referred as authority, and the guilty philanthropy which has greedily leveled racial barriers and now seeks with the bloodstained hands of a Lugard to rearrange them so that profit may emerge and manhood be dammed---let us confess that all this is vain, wrong and hypocritical and that every honest soul today who seeks peace, disarmament and the uplift of all men must say with the Pan-African Congress: ‘‘The absolute equality of races,---physical, political and social---is the founding stone of world peace and human advancement. No one denies great differences of gift, capacity and attainment among individuals of all races, but the voice of science, religion and practical politics is one in denying the God-appointed existence of superior races, or of races naturally and inevitably and eternally inferior.’’ To deny this fact is to throw open the door of the world to a future of hatred, war and murder such as never yet has staggered a bowed and crucified humanity. How can a man bring himself to conceive that the majority of mankind---Chinese, Japanese, Indians and Negroes are going to stand up and acknowledge to the world that they are unfit to be men or to associate with men, when they know they are men?

Amalgamation But President Harding does not stop even here. He declares ‘‘Racial amalgamation there cannot be.’’ What does the President mean? Does he mean that the White and Negro races in this land never have mixed? There are by census reports

180 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s over two million acknowledged mulattoes in the United States today; and without doubt there are, in fact, no less than four million persons with white and Negro blood. Does he mean that there is no amalgamation today? Between 1850 and 1921 the mulattoes have increased over 400 per cent. Does he mean there will be no future amalgamation? How does he know? Or does he mean that it would be better for Whites and Blacks not to amalgamate? If he meant that, why did he not say so plainly? And if he had said so, 99 percent of the Negroes would agree with him. We have no asked amalgamation; we have resisted it. It has been forced on us by brute strength, ignorance, poverty, degradation and fraud. It is the white race, roaming the world, that has left its trail of bastards and outraged women and then raised holy hands to heaven and deplored ‘‘race mixture.’’ No, we are not demanding and do not amalgamation, but the reasons are ours and not yours. It is not because we are unworthy of intermarriage---either physically or mentally or morally. It is not because the mingling of races has not and will not bring mighty offspring in its Dumas and Pushkin and Coleridge-Taylor and Booker Washington. It is because no real men accept any alliance except on terms of absolute equal regard and because we are abundantly satisfied with out own race and blood. And at the same time we say and as free men must say that whenever two human beings of any nation or race desire each other in marriage, the denial of their legal right to marry is not simply wrong---it is lewd.

Segregation and Race Pride And this brings us to the last word of President Harding: He says this in one breath: Especially would I appeal to the self respect of the colored race. I would inculcate in it the wish to improve itself as a distinct race with a heredity, a set of traditions, an array of aspirations all its own. Out of such racial ambitions and pride will come natural segregations. The one thing we must sedulously avoid is the development of group and class organizations in this country. There has been a time when we heard too much about the labor vote, the business vote, the Irish vote, the Scandinavian vote, the Italian vote, and so on. But the demagogues who would array class against class and group against group have fortunately found little to reward their efforts. Is the President calling himself a demagogue? Does he not realize the logical contradictions of his thought?

Can he not see his failure to recognize the Universal in the Particular, the menace of all group exclusiveness and segregation in the forced segregation of American Negroes? Can he not in this day of days with foreigners of every race flocking to Washington and the eyes of a blood---weary world strained after them---can he not realize the vast, the awful implications of this appeal to the Frankenstein of race exclusiveness---that hateful thing which has murdered peace and culture and nations? Does he not hear the answer that leaps to our lips? For when Warren Harding or any white man comes to teach Negroes pride of race, we answer that our pride is our business and not theirs, and a thing they would better fear rather than evoke: For the day that Black men love Black men simply because they are Black, is the day they will hate White men simply because they are White. And then, God help us all!

5.16 Ellison DuRant Smith, Shut the Door, April 9, 1924 It seems to me the point as to this measure---and I have been so impressed for several years---is that the time has arrived when we should shut the door. We have been called the melting pot of the world. We had an experience just a few years ago, during the great World War, when it looked as though we had allowed influences to enter our borders that were about to melt the pot in place of us being the melting pot. I think that we have sufficient stock in America now for us to shut the door, Americanize what we have, and save the resources of America for the natural increase of our population. We all know that one of the most prolific causes of war is the desire for increased land ownership for the overflow of a congested population. We are increasing at such a rate that in the natural course of things in a comparatively few years the landed resources, the natural resources of the country, shall be taken up by the natural increase of our population. It seems to me the part of wisdom now that we have throughout the length and breadth of continental America a population which is beginning to encroach upon the reserve and virgin resources of the country to keep it in trust for the multiplying population of the country. I do not believe that political reasons should enter into the discussion of this very vital question. It is of greater concern to us to maintain the institutions of America, to maintain the principles upon which this

5.16 Ellison DuRant Smith, Shut the Door Government is founded, than to develop and exploit the underdeveloped resources of the country. There are some things that are dearer to us, fraught with more benefit to us, than the immediate development of the undeveloped resources of the country. I believe that our particular ideas, social, moral, religious, and political, have demonstrated, by virtue of the progress we have made and the character of people that we are, that we have the highest ideals of any member of the human family or any nation. We have demonstrated the fact that the human family, certainty the predominant breed in America, can govern themselves by a direct government of the people. If this Government shall fail, it shall fail by virtue of the terrible law of inherited tendency. Those who come from the nations which from time immemorial have been under the dictation of a master fall more easily by the law of inheritance and the inertia of habit into a condition of political servitude than the descendants of those who cleared the forests, conquered the savage, stood at arms and won their liberty from their mother country, England. I think we now have sufficient population in our country for us to shut the door and to breed up a pure, unadulterated American citizenship. I recognize that there is a dangerous lack of distinction between people of a certain nationality and the breed of the dog. Who is an American? Is he an immigrant from Italy? Is he an immigrant from Germany? If you were to go abroad and some one were to meet you and say, ‘‘I met a typical American,’’ what would flash into your mind as a typical American, the typical representative of that new Nation? Would it be the son of an Italian immigrant, the son of a German immigrant, the son of any of the breeds from the Orient, the son of the denizens of Africa? We must not get our ethnological distinctions mixed up with out anthropological distinctions. It is the breed of the dog in which I am interested. I would like for the Members of the Senate to read that book just recently published by Madison Grant, The Passing of a Great Race. Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in the world of the pure, unadulterated Anglo-Saxon stock; certainly the greatest of any nation in the Nordic breed. It is for the preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized us that I would make this not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries, but a country to assimilate and perfect that splendid type of manhood that has made America the foremost Nation in her progress and in her power, and yet the youngest of all the nations. I myself believe that the preservation of her institutions depends upon us now taking counsel with

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our condition and our experience during the last World War. Without offense, but with regard to the salvation of our own, let us shut the door and assimilate what we have, and let us breed pure American citizens and develop our own American resources. I am more in favor of that than I am of our quota proposition. Of course, it may not meet the approbation of the Senate that we shall shut the door---which I unqualifiedly and unreservedly believe to be our duty---and develop what we have, assimilate and digest what we have into pure Americans, with American aspirations, and thoroughly familiar with the love of American institutions, rather than the importation of any number of men from other countries. If we may not have that, then I am in favor of putting the quota down to the lowest possible point, with every selective element in it that may be. The great desideratum of modern times has been education not alone book knowledge, but that education which enables men to think right, to think logically, to think truthfully, men equipped with power to appreciate the rapidly developing conditions that are all about us, that have converted the world in the last 50 years into a brand new world and made us masters of forces that are revolutionizing production. We want men not like dumb, driven cattle from those nations where the progressive thought of the times has scarcely made a beginning and where they see men as mere machines; we want men who have an appreciation of the responsibility brought about by the manifestation of the power of that individual. We have not that in this country to-day. We have men here to-day who are selfishly utilizing the enormous forces discovered by genius, and if we are not careful as statesmen, if we are not careful in our legislation, these very masters of the tremendous forces that have been made available to us will bring us under their domination and control by virtue of the power they have in multiplying their wealth. We are struggling to-day against the organized forces of man’s brain multiplied a million times by materialized thought in the form of steam and electricity as applied in the everyday affairs of man. We have enough in this country to engage the brain of every lover of his country in solving the problems of a democratic government in the midst of the imperial power that genius is discovering and placing in the hands of man. We have population enough to-day without throwing wide our doors and jeopardizing the interests of this country by pouring into it men who willingly become the slaves of those who employ them in manipulating these forces of nature, and they few reap the enormous benefits that accrue therefrom.

182 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s We ought to Americanize not only our population but our forces. We ought to Americanize our factories and our vast material resources, so that we can make each contribute to the other and have an abundance for us under the form of the government laid down by our fathers. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Harris] has introduced an amendment to shut the door. It is not a question of politics. It is a question of maintaining that which has made you and me the beneficiaries of the greatest hope that ever burned in the human breast for the most splendid future that ever stood before mankind, where the boy in the gutter can look with confidence to the seat of the Presidency of the United States; where the boy in the gutter can look forward to the time when, paying the price of a proper citizen, he may fill a seat in this hall; where the boy to-day poverty-stricken, standing in the midst of all the splendid opportunities of America, should have and, please God, if we do our duty, will have an opportunity to enjoy the marvelous wealth that the genius and brain of our country is making possible for us all. We do not want to tangle the skein of America’s progress by those who imperfectly understand the genius of our Government and the opportunities that lie about us. Let up keep what we have, protect what we have, make what we have the realization of the dream of those who wrote the Constitution. I am more concerned about that than I am about whether a new railroad shall be built or whether there shall be diversified farming next year or whether a certain coal mine shall be mined. I would rather see American citizenship refined to the last degree in all that makes America what we hope it will be than to develop the resources of America at the expense of the citizenship of our country. The time has come when we should shut the door and keep what we have for what we hope our own people to be. Source: Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1924, Vol. 65, 5961--5962.

5.17 League of Nations Debate in the Senate, June 28, 1919 Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I have received from the press a copy of a letter which has been given out, I understand, and which I think, as the senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hitchcock] has not offered it, should be read at this time before we vote. . . .

The White House, Washington, 18 November 18, 1,919. My Dear Senator: You were good enough to bring me word that the Democratic senators supporting the treaty expected to hold a conference before the final vote on the Lodge resolution of ratification and that they would be glad to receive a word of counsel from me. I should hesitate to offer it in any detail, but I assume that the senators only desire my judgment upon the all-important question of the final vote on the resolution containing the many reservations by Senator Lodge. On that I cannot hesitate, for, in my opinion, the resolution in that form does not provide for ratification but, rather, for the nullification of the treaty. I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification. I understand that the door will probably then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification. I trust that all true friends of the treaty will refuse to support the Lodge resolution. Cordially and sincerely yours, (Signed) WOODROW WILSON. Hon. G. M. Hitchcock, United States Senate. Mr. President, I think comment is superfluous, and I shall make none. . . . Mr. Robinson. Mr. President, for reasons very different from those asserted by the senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Knox], it is my purpose to vote against the pending resolution of ratification incorporating reservations adopted by a majority of Senators. During several months, to the exclusion of nearly all other important business, the Senate has had under consideration the treaty of peace with Germany. It now seems probable, unless the advocates of unqualified ratification and so-called reservation senators reconcile differences, that the result of our labors may be failure. The Senate is about to vote on an alleged resolution of ratification, a resolution which, it seems to me, does not ratify but which, in fact and in legal effect, constitutes a rejection of this treaty. All senators recognize the importance of the vote soon to be taken. This vote invites the judgment of the people of this country, and, indeed, the judgment of all mankind, upon the policy implied in the resolution of ratification incorporating reservations agreed to by the majority. Many of us are convinced that the adoption of the pending resolution, as I have already stated, will accomplish no useful purpose. The senator from

5.17 League of Nations Debate in the Senate Massachusetts [Mr. Lodge] has had read into the Record a letter issued by the President, in which that officer, representing a part of the treaty-making power, declares that the pending resolution of ratification cannot accomplish ratification; that it is, in fact, rejection of the treaty; and therefore it is futile to adopt the resolution. The statement that the resolution of ratification will in fact defeat the treaty will occasion no regret to the senators who from the beginning have advocated its rejection. They have apparently succeeded, temporarily at least, in accomplishing indirectly what could not be done openly and frankly. Through alleged reservations, which will not likely be accepted by other parties to the treaty, they seek to exclude the United States from fellowship with her late allies and from membership in the League of Nations. In almost every line of the reservations is implied antagonism of senators toward the President. Suspicion and mistrust of the nations associated with this government in the recent war are reflected by the reservations, sometimes poorly concealed, often clearly evinced. The avowed purpose is to completely repudiate every obligation of this government to encourage and sustain the new and feeble states separated, by our assistance during the war, from their former sovereignties by withholding from them the moral and military power of the United States. To me it seems regrettable beyond expression that senators who desire to improve the treaty and who desire also that it shall become effective should lend their assistance to a course in which the avowed enemies of the League of Nations must find unbounded gratification and pleasure. Is it not unpardonable for friends of the treaty to couple with the resolution of ratification conditions designed to deprive the Executive of his constitutional functions? It is worse than idle---it seems to me hypocritical---to impose terms and conditions which make the exchange of ratifications impracticable, if not impossible. Membership in the League of Nations is treated, in the reservations, with so little dignity and as of such slight importance as to authorize its termination by the passage of a mere concurrent resolution of Congress. This attempt to deny to the President participation in withdrawal by this government from the League and to vest that authority solely in the two houses of Congress in disregard of the plain provision of the Constitution displays a spirit of narrow opposition to the executive unworthy of the subject and unworthy of the Senate of the United States. The requirement that before ratification by the United States shall become effective the reservations

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adopted by the Senate must be approved by three of the four principal allied powers is designed to make difficult the exchange of ratifications. Mr. President, it can have no other purpose; it can accomplish no other end. The reservation respecting Article 10 nullifies the most vital provision in the League of Nations contract. It absolves the United States from any obligation to assist in enforcing the terms of peace, an obligation that the leader of the majority in his speech to this body on the 23rd day of August, 1918, and again in December of the same year, asserted as one which the United States cannot without dishonor avoid or escape. No senator can doubt that the repudiation by the United States of the undertaking in Article 10 to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of the other members of the League weakens, if it does not destroy, one of the principal agencies or means provided by the League for the prevention of international war. . . . As the measure now comes before the Senate it comes with the open declaration of the Executive, who is the sole agency through whom this government may exchange ratifications, that that act will not be accomplished. It comes with the recognition of the fact by the Senators who favor the treaty that the reservations are of such a nature that they will not be accepted by other nations. Make no mistake about it. The Senate should either ratify this treaty unqualifiedly or upon such terms and conditions as will justify the Executive and enable him speedily to conclude peace by an exchange of ratifications. The resolution of the senator from Massachusetts incorporating the reservations as agreed upon will probably result in the refusal of the Executive to attempt to procure the consent and approval of three of the four principal allied powers. If he should make the attempt, it is plain that our self-respecting allies will not accept the terms and conditions which we seek to impose by these reservations. Why, then, Mr. President, should the resolution proposed by the senator from Massachusetts be agreed to? Every senator knows that it cannot effectuate peace. The senator from Massachusetts himself on last Sunday issued a statement to the press in which he declared that ‘‘The treaty is dead.’’ I call now upon the friends of the treaty to take charge of the corpse. By their action they can revitalize it. The enemies of the treaty, senators who do not favor its ratification, have controlled the proceedings of the Senate heretofore. It is time now that those of us who

184 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s favor the treaty, and we have the necessary number, should get together and ratify it. Mr. Borah. Mr. President, I am not misled by the debate across the aisle into the view that this treaty will not be ratified. I entertain little doubt that sooner or later---and entirely too soon---the treaty will be ratified with the League of Nations in it; and I am of the opinion with the reservations in it as they are now written. There may possibly be some change in verbiage in order that there may be a common sharing of parentage, but our friends across the aisle will likely accept the League of Nations with the reservations in substance as now written. I think, therefore, this moment is just as appropriate as any other for me to express my final views with reference to the treaty and the League of Nations. It is perhaps the last opportunity I shall have to state, as briefly as I may, my reasons for opposing the treaty and the League. Mr. President, after Mr. Lincoln had been elected President, before he assumed the duties of the office and at a time when all indications were to the effect that we would soon be in the midst of civil strife, a friend from the city of Washington wrote him for instructions. Mr. Lincoln wrote back in a single line, ‘‘Entertain no compromise; have none of it.’’ That states the position I occupy at this time and which I have, in a humble way, occupied from the first contention in regard to this proposal. My objections to the League have not been met by the reservations. I desire to state wherein my objections have not been met. Let us see what our attitude will be toward Europe and what our position will be with reference to the other nations of the world after we shall have entered the League with the present reservations written therein. With all due respect to those who think that they have accomplished a different thing and challenging no man’s intellectual integrity or patriotism, I do not believe the reservations have met the fundamental propositions which are involved in this contest. When the League shall have been formed, we shall be a member of what is known as the Council of the League. Our accredited representative will sit in judgment with the accredited representatives of the other members of the League to pass upon the concerns, not only of our country but of all Europe and all Asia and the entire world. Our accredited representatives will be members of the Assembly. They will sit there to represent the judgment of these 110 million people---more then---just as we are accredited here to represent our constituencies. We cannot send our representatives to sit in council with the representatives of the other great nations of

the world with mental reservations as to what we shall do in case their judgment shall not be satisfactory to us. If we go to the Council or to the Assembly with any other purpose than that of complying in good faith and in absolute integrity with all upon which the Council or the Assembly may pass, we shall soon return to our country with our self-respect forfeited and the public opinion of the world condemnatory. Why need you gentlemen across the aisle worry about a reservation here or there when we are sitting in the Council and in the Assembly and bound by every obligation in morals, which the President said was supreme above that of law, to comply with the judgment which our representative and the other representatives finally form? Shall we go there, Mr. President, to sit in judgment, and in case that judgment works for peace join with our allies, but in case it works for war withdraw our cooperation? How long would we stand as we now stand, a great republic commanding the respect and holding the leadership of the world, if we should adopt any such course? So, sir, we not only sit in the Council and in the Assembly with our accredited representatives, but bear in mind that Article 11 is untouched by any reservation which has been offered here: and with Article 11 untouched and its integrity complete, Article 10 is perfectly superfluous. If any war or threat of war shall be a matter of consideration for the League, and the League shall take such action as it deems wise to deal with it, what is the necessity of Article 10? Will not external aggression be regarded as a war or threat of war? If the political independence of some nation in Europe is assailed will it be regarded as a war or threat of war? Is there anything in Article 10 that is not completely covered by Article 11? It remains complete, and with our representatives sitting in the Council and the Assembly, and with Article 11 complete, and with the Assembly, and the Council having jurisdiction of all matters touching the peace of the world, what more do you need to bind the United States if you assume that the United States is a nation of honor? We have said, Mr. President, that we would not send our troops abroad without the consent of Congress. Pass by now for a moment the legal proposition. If we create executive functions, the executive will perform those functions without the authority of Congress. Pass that question by and go to the other question. Our members of the Council are there. Our members of the Assembly are there. Article 11 is complete, and it authorizes the League, a member of which is our representative, to deal with matters of peace and war, and

5.17 League of Nations Debate in the Senate the League through its Council and its Assembly, deals with the matter, and our accredited representative joins with the others in deciding upon a certain course which involves a question of sending troops. What will the Congress of the United States do? What right will it have left, except the bare technical right to refuse, which as a moral proposition it will not dare to exercise? Have we not been told day by day for the last nine months that the Senate of the United States, a coordinate part of the treaty-making power, should accept this league as it was written because the wise men sitting at Versailles had so written it, and has not every possible influence and every source of power in public opinion been organized and directed against the Senate to compel it to do that thing? How much stronger will be the moral compulsion upon the Congress of the United States when we ourselves have endorsed the proposition of sending our accredited representatives there to vote for us? . . . Mr. President, if you have enough territory, if you have enough material, if you have enough subject peoples to trade upon and divide, there will be no difficulty about unanimous consent. Do our Democratic friends ever expect any man to sit as a member of the Council or as a member of the Assembly equal in intellectual power and in standing before the world with that of our representative at Versailles? Do you expect a man to sit in the Council who will have made more pledges, and I shall assume made them in sincerity, for self-determination and for the rights of small peoples than had been made by our accredited representatives And yet, what became of it? The unanimous consent was obtained nevertheless. But take another view of it. We are sending to the Council one man. That one man represents 110 million people. Here, sitting in the Senate, we have two from every state in the Union, and over in the other house we have representatives in accordance with population, and the responsibility is spread out in accordance with our obligations to our constituency. But now we are transferring to one man the stupendous power of representing the sentiment and convictions of 110 million people in tremendous questions which may involve the peace or may involve the war of the world. However you view the question of unanimous consent, it does not protect us. What is the result of all this? We are in the midst of all of the affairs of Europe. We have entangled ourselves with all European concerns. We have joined in alliance with all the European nations which have thus

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far joined the League and all nations which may be admitted to the League. We are sitting there dabbling in their affairs and intermeddling in their concerns. In other words, Mr. President---and this comes to the question which is fundamental with me---we have forfeited and surrendered, once and for all, the great policy of ‘‘no entangling alliances’’ upon which the strength of this republic has been founded for 150 years. My friends of reservations, tell me where is the reservation in these articles which protects us against entangling alliances with Europe? Those who are differing over reservations, tell me what one of them protects the doctrine laid down by the Father of his Country. That fundamental proposition is surrendered, and we are a part of the European turmoils and conflicts from the time we enter this League. Let us not underestimate that. There has never been an hour since the Venezuelan difficulty that there has not been operating in this country, fed by domestic and foreign sources, a powerful propaganda for the destruction of the doctrine of no entangling alliances. . . . You have put in here a reservation upon the Monroe Doctrine. I think that, insofar as language could protect the Monroe Doctrine, it has been protected. But as a practical proposition, as a working proposition, tell me candidly, as men familiar with the history of your country and of other countries, do you think that you can intermeddle in European affairs; and, second, never to permit Europe to [interfere in our affairs]. When Mr. Monroe wrote to Jefferson, he asked him his view upon the Monroe Doctrine, and Mr. Jefferson said, in substance, our first and primary obligation should be never to interfere in European affairs; and, second, never to permit Europe to interfere in our affairs. He understood, as every wise I and practical man understands, that if we intermeddle in her affairs, if we help to adjust her conditions, inevitably and remorselessly Europe then will be carried into our affairs, in spite of anything you can write upon paper. We cannot protect the Monroe Doctrine unless we protect the basic principle upon which it rests, and that is the Washington policy. I do not care how earnestly you may endeavor to do so, as a practical working proposition your League will come to the United States. Will you permit me to digress long enough to read a paragraph from a great French editor upon this particular phase of the matter, Mr. Stephen Lausanne, editor of Le Matin, of Paris? When the Executive Council of the League of Nations fixes ‘‘the reasonable limits of the armament of

186 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s Peru’’; when it shall demand information concerning the naval program of Brazil: when it shall tell Argentina what shall be the measure of the ‘‘contribution to the armed forces to protect the signatures of the social covenant’’; when it shall demand the immediate registration of the treaty between the United States and Canada at the seat of the League, it will control, whether it wills or no, the destinies of America. And when the American states shall be obliged to take a hand in every war or menace of war in Europe (Art. 11), they will necessarily fall afoul of the fundamental principle laid down by Monroe, which was that Americans should never take part in a European war. If the League takes in the world, then Europe must mix in the affairs of America; if only Europe is included, then America will violate of necessity her own doctrine by intermixing in the affairs of Europe. If the League includes the affairs of the world, does it not include the affairs of all the World? Is there any limitation of the jurisdiction of the Council or of the Assembly upon the question of peace or war? Does it not have now, under the reservations, the same as it had before, the power to deal with all matters of peace or war throughout the entire world? How shall you keep from meddling in the affairs of Europe or keep Europe from meddling in the affairs of America? Mr. President, there is another and even a more commanding reason why I shall record my vote against this treaty. It imperils what I conceive to be the underlying, the very first principles of this republic. It is in conflict with the right of our people to govern themselves, free from all restraint, legal or moral, of foreign powers. It challenges every tenet of my political faith. If this faith were one of my own contriving, if I stood here to assert principles of government of my own evolving, I might well be charged with intolerable presumption, for we all recognize the ability of those who urge a different course. But I offer in justification of my course nothing of my own save the deep and abiding reverence I have for those whose policies I humbly but most ardently support. I claim no merit save fidelity to American principles and devotion to American ideals as the were wrought out from time to time by those who built the republic and as they have been extended and maintained throughout these years. In opposing the treaty I do nothing more than decline to renounce and tear out of my life the sacred traditions which throughout fifty years have been translated into my whole intellectual and moral being. I will not, I cannot, give up my belief that America must, not alone for the happiness of her own people but for the moral guidance and greater contentment of

the world, be permitted to live her own life. Next to the tie which binds a man to his God is the tie which binds a man to his country; and all schemes, all plans, however ambitious and fascinating they seem in their proposal, but which would embarrass or entangle and impede or shackle her sovereign will, which would compromise her freedom of action, I unhesitatingly put behind me. . . . If we have erred we have erred out of too much love for those things which from childhood you and we together have been taught to revere---yes, to defend, even at the cost of limb and life. If we have erred it is because we have placed too high an estimate upon the wisdom of Washington and Jefferson, too exalted an opinion upon the patriotism of the sainted Lincoln. And blame us not therefore if we have, in our limited vision, seemed sometimes bitter and at all times uncompromising, for the things for which we have spoken, feebly spoken, the things which we have endeavored to defend, have been the things for which your fathers and our fathers were willing to die. . . . You cannot yoke a government whose fundamental maxim is that of liberty to a government whose first law is that of force and hope to preserve the former. These things are in eternal war, and one must ultimately destroy the other. You may still keep for a time the outward form, you may still delude yourself, as others have done in the past, with appearances and symbols, but when you shall have committed this republic to a scheme of world control based upon force, upon the combined military force of the four great nations of the world, you will have soon destroyed the atmosphere of freedom, of confidence in the self-governing capacity of the masses, in which alone a democracy may thrive. We may become one of the four dictators of the world, but we shall no longer be master of our own spirit. And what shall it profit us as a nation if we shall go forth to the dominion of the earth and share with others the glory of world control and lose that fine sense of confidence in the people, the soul of democracy? Look upon the scene as it is now presented. Behold the task we are to assume, and then contemplate the method by which we are to deal with this task. Is the method such as to address itself to a government ‘‘conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal’’? When this league, this combination, is formed, four great powers representing the dominant people will rule one-half of the inhabitants of the globe as subject peoples---rule by force, and we shall be a party to the rule of force. There is no other way by which you can keep people in subjection.

5.17 League of Nations Debate in the Senate You must either give them independence, recognize their rights as nations to live their own life and to set up their own form of government, or you must deny them these things by force. . . . But your treaty does not mean peace far, very far, from it. If we are to judge the future by the past, it means war. Is there any guarantee of peace other than the guarantee which comes of the control of the warmaking power by the people? Yet what great rule of democracy does the treaty leave unassailled? The people in whose keeping alone you can safely lodge the power of peace or war nowhere, at no time and in no place, have any voice in this scheme for world peace. Autocracy which has bathed the world in blood for centuries reigns supreme. Democracy is everywhere excluded. This, you say, means peace. Can you hope for peace when love of country is disregarded in your scheme, when the spirit of nationality is rejected, even scoffed at? Yet what law of that moving and mysterious force does your treaty not deny? With a ruthlessness unparalleled, your treaty in a dozen instances runs counter to the divine law of nationality. Peoples who speak the same languages kneel at the same ancestral tombs, moved by the same traditions, animated by a common hope are torn asunder, broken in Pieces, divided, and parceled out to antagonistic nations. And this you call justice. This, you cry, means peace. Peoples who have dreamed of independence, struggled and been patient, sacrificed and been hopeful, peoples who were told that through this peace conference they should realize the aspirations of centuries, have again had their hopes dashed to earth. One of the most striking and commanding figures in this war, soldier and statesman, turned away from the peace table at Versailles declaring to the world, ‘‘The promise of the new life, the victory of the great humane ideals for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasure without stint, the fulfillment of their aspirations toward a new international order and a fairer and better world, are not written into the treaty.’’ No; your treaty means injustice. It means slavery. It means war. And to all this you ask this republic to become a party. You ask it to abandon the creed under which it has grown to power and accept the creed of autocracy, the creed of repression and force. Mr. President, I turn from this scheme based upon force to another scheme, planned 143 years ago in old Independence Hall, in the city of Philadelphia, based upon liberty. I like it better. I have become so accustomed to believe in it that it is difficult for me to reject it out of hand. I have difficulty in subscribing to the new creed of oppression, the creed of dominant and

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subject peoples. I feel a reluctance to give up the belief that all men are created equal the eternal principle in government that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. I cannot get my consent to exchange the doctrine of George Washington for the doctrine of Frederick the Great translated into mendacious phrases of peace. I go back to that serene and masterful soul who pointed the way to power and glory for the new and then weak republic, and whose teachings and admonitions even in our majesty and dominance we dare not disregard. I know well the answer to my contention. It has been piped about of late from a thousand sources--venal sources, disloyal sources, sinister sources---that Washington’s wisdom was of his day only and that his teachings are out of fashion---things long since sent to the scrap heap of history---that while he was great in character and noble in soul he was untrained in the arts of statecraft and unlearned in the science of government. The puny demagogue, the barren editor, the sterile professor now vie with each other in apologizing for the temporary and commonplace expedients which the Father of his Country felt constrained to adopt in building a republic! What is the test of statesmanship? Is it the formation of theories, the utterance of abstract and incontrovertible truths, or is it the capacity and the power to give to a people that concrete thing called liberty, that vital and indispensable thing in human happiness called free institutions, and to establish over all and above all the blessed and eternal reign of order and law? If this be the test, where shall we find another whose name is entitled to be written beside the name of Washington? His judgment and poise in the hour of turmoil and peril, his courage and vision in times of adversity, his firm grasp of fundamental principles, his almost inspired power to penetrate the future and read there the result, the effect of policies, have never been excelled, if equaled, by any of the world’s commonwealth builders. Peter the Great, William the Silent, and Cromwell the Protector, these and these alone perhaps are to be associated with his name as the builders of states and the founders of governments. But in exaltation of moral purpose, in the unselfish character of his work, in the durability of his policies, in the permanency of the institutions which he more than anyone else called into effect, his service to mankind stands out separate and apart in a class by itself. The works of these other great builders, where are they now? But the work of Washington is still the most potent influence for the advancement of civilization and the freedom of the race.

188 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s Reflect for a moment over his achievements. He led the Revolutionary Army to victory. He was the very first to suggest a union instead of a confederacy. He presided over and counseled with great wisdom the Convention which framed the Constitution. He guided the government through its first perilous years. He gave dignity and stability and honor to that which was looked upon by the world as a passing experiment, and, finally, my friends, as his own peculiar and particular contribution to the happiness of his countrymen and to the cause of the republic, he gave us his great foreign policy under which we have lived and prospered and strengthened for nearly a century and a half. This policy is the most sublime confirmation of his genius as a statesman. It was then, and it now is, an indispensable part of our whole scheme of government. It is today a vital, indispensable element in our entire plan, purpose, and mission as a nation. To abandon it is nothing less than a betrayal of the American people. I say betrayal deliberately, in view of the suffering and the sacrifice which will follow in the wake of such a course. But under the stress and strain of these extraordinary days, when strong men are being swept down by the onrushing, forces of disorder and change, when the most sacred things of life, the most cherished hopes of a Christian world seem to yield to the mad forces of discontent---just such days as Washington passed through when the mobs of Paris, wild with new liberty and drunk with power, challenged the established institutions of all the world, but his steadfast soul was unshaken---under these conditions come again we are about to abandon this policy so essential to our happiness and tranquillity as a people and our stability as a government. No leader with his commanding influence and his unequalling courage stands forth to stem the current. But what no leader can or will do, experience, bitter experience, and the people of this country in whose keeping, after all, thank God, is the republic, will ultimately do. If we abandon his leadership and teachings, we will go back. We will return to this policy. Americanism shall not, cannot, die. We may go back in sackcloth and ashes, but we will return to the faith of the fathers. America will live her own life. The independence of this republic will have its defenders. Thousands have suffered and died for it, and their sons and daughters are not of the breed who will be betrayed into the hands of foreigners. The noble face of the Father of his Country, so familiar to every boy and girl, looking out from the walls of the Capitol in stern reproach, will call those who come here for public service to a reckoning.

The people of our beloved country will finally speak, and we will return to the policy which we now abandon. America disenthralled and free in spite of all these things will continue her mission in the cause of peace, of freedom, and of civilization. Source: Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (1919-1921), 8768--8769, 8777--8778, 8781--8784.

5.18 Warren Harding, Return to Normalcy, March 14, 1920 There isn’t anything the matter with world civilization, except that humanity is viewing it through a vision impaired in a cataclysmal war. Poise has been disturbed, and nerves have been racked, and fever has rendered men irrational; sometimes there have been draughts upon the dangerous cup of barbarity, and men have wandered far from safe paths, but the human procession still marches in the right direction. America’s present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but serenity; not the dramatic, but the dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise; not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality. It is one thing to battle successfully against world domination by military autocracy, because the infinite God never intended such a program, but it is quite another thing to revise human nature and suspend the fundamental laws of life and all of life’s acquirements . . . This republic has its ample tasks. If we put an end to false economics which lure humanity to utter chaos, ours will be the commanding example of world leadership today. If we can prove a representative popular government under which a citizenship seeks what it may do for the government rather than what the government may do for individuals, we shall do more to make democracy safe for the world than all armed conflict ever recorded. The world needs to be reminded that all human ills are not curable by legislation, and that quantity of statutory enactment and excess of government offer no substitute for quality of citizenship. The problems of maintained civilization are not to be solved by a transfer of responsibility from citizenship to government, and no eminent page in history was ever drafted by the standards of mediocrity. More, no government is worthy of the name which is directed

5.19 William E. Borah, On the Necessity for Naval Disarmament 189 by influence on the one hand, or moved by intimidation on the other . . . My best judgment of America’s needs is to steady down, to get squarely on our feet, to make sure of the right path. Let’s get out of the fevered delirium of war, with the hallucination that all the money in the world is to be made in the madness of war and the wildness of its aftermath. Let us stop to consider that tranquillity at home is more precious than peace abroad, and that both our good fortune and our eminence are dependent on the normal forward stride of all the American people.

5.19 William E. Borah, On the Necessity for Naval Disarmament, 1921 Despite her military defeat, Germany, by reason of the shortsighted and blundering policies of the allied and associated powers, may yet secure economic dominance in Europe. Defeat has resulted in Germany’s being deprived of her army and her navy. The burden of armaments has been forced from the backs of the German people. They may now devote their energies and their talents to agriculture, to industry, to the arts, to the things which constitute the real wealth and strength of a people. Their genius will find expression, not in arms, or on the military field, but in improved machinery and cooperative industry. Every ounce of effort which they put forth will be along lines which produce something, which add wealth to the community, which make for contentment and prosperity to the people, which insure greater physical prowess and a higher brain power. On the other hand, the allied and associated powers are carrying a vast burden because of their great armies and navies. These burdens are being increased upon a stupendous scale. Hundreds of thousands of their people are to be engaged in lines which produce nothing, add no wealth to the community, make not for health, growth and happiness, but for display, parade and possibly for destruction and death. The German people are compelled to preserve their energies for things which count. The allied and associated powers are burying their people under intolerable taxes, discouraging industry, sterilizing human energy, and breeding discontent through their ever-enlarging plans for increased armaments . . . France has an army of 800,000 men. The exact cost for maintaining this great army I do not know, but one

can imagine how stupendous it is. The British army and navy combined call for an expenditure much larger than our own. Thus, while Germany has her billions of reparation, the allied and associated powers are spending their billions for their armies and navies---we alone expending as much for our army and navy as the entire reparation claims against Germany. The business men of this country must realize, more keenly, perhaps, than anyone else just now, what these armament expenditures and the taxes thereby imposed mean to business of the future. There is little encouragement for men of business capacity to plan and strive for success when they realize, as they must, that their profits are to be taken for taxes, and that those taxes, when collected, are to be expended, not for things which make for wealth and development, but for sheer waste and sterility. We shall not enjoy that resiliency and revival in business which we are entitled to experience in this country until taxes are brought within reason. And taxes can not be reduced until expenditures are brought within reason. And public expenditures can not be reduced until outlays for armaments are brought within reason. All that is being done and said just now about reducing the expenses of the Government in other departments and along other lines will amount to very little so far as lifting the burden of the taxpayer is concerned, unless we also cut most savagely the expenditures for armaments, for there is where the vast sum of money goes. Neither can we wait, nor need we wait, until all questions about which nations may hold differing views are settled before we begin to limit our armament expenditures. There are now three nations in absolute dominance of the seas---the United States, Great Britain and Japan. These three nations are the only nations which are building vast navies. They are now actually engaged in a naval race. They are building navies with, mad speed and piling taxes upon the people at a rate and to an amount never before dreamed of in time of peace, and seldom in time of war. To say that these building programs shall go forward, that these taxes shall continue to be increased, and the burdens under which the people are breaking shall be augmented until all international questions about which nations and peoples may hold different views are settled, is to say that there is to be no disarmament. Disarmament should not be postponed, or subordinated, or made incident to the settling and adjusting of all international questions. It should be made the controlling, dominating question. It is the most vital problem in the world today. Unless disarmament is

190 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s effectuated, there is no possible relief from the economic conditions under which we are now suffering. And any plan, or any program, which makes the question of disarmament a subordinate, or incidental proposition, rather than the main and controlling proposition, will result in the future, as it has in the past, in no relief to the taxpayers and no relief from war. There are many obstacles to overcome before we can achieve disarmament, or any pronounced limitation of armaments. I do not underestimate the difficulty of overcoming these obstacles. But the obstacle which seems to me the greatest, the obstacle which seems to me the most difficult to master, is one which we will not admit exists, and that is the reliance which we have come to have on force as the only power left on earth with which to govern men. Mr. Hughes, the Premier of Australia, declared in an interview that we must adjust every question touching the Pacific before we can consider the question of disarmament---that there can be no disarmament until all these questions are amicably arranged and settled. This is to declare in another way that we propose to settle these questions ultimately by force in case we fail to settle them satisfactorily to ourselves through negotiations. It is the old practice attributed to the Kaiser of rattling the sword at the conference table. It is, as everyone under-stands, a threat. In other words, the real reliance for ultimate settlement is upon force and the covert threat of its use is, as of old, at hand. As a conferee thinketh in his heart, so is he. This is the system which has been tried by the diplomats for three hundred years, and instead of resulting in disarmament, it has resulted in continued and increasing armaments. If all nations having interest in the Pacific would disarm, or limit their armaments to a point of real defense---or, at least, to the point where it could no longer be said that an actual naval race was on---might it not be possible to adjust these questions more satisfactorily, more effectually, and more easily in the court of reason and conscience and under the compelling power of public opinion? Is it necessary to have this threat of ultimate force pronouncedly a part of every conference? Is it wise to have the hammers and anvils going on the outside of the conference to the extent that the din of building battleships will deafen the voices of the conferees? The fact is that while we thought we had conquered militarism, it has apparently conquered us. The barbarous creed of Bernhardi has become the accepted rule of the parliaments and congresses and conferences of the new world, as well as the old. The thing which is paralyzing the energies and dissipating the moral forces

of the whole human family today and retarding every effort toward peace, driving us to the very brink of chaos and barbarism, is the fact that governments are still worshipping at the throne of militarism. There is to them no God but force. Before the war we had great faith in the commanding influence of justice and the power of public opinion. I have before me now an interesting editorial in which it is urged that it is useless to talk of disarming until the causes of war are removed. One of the most prolific causes of war is huge armaments. An armed world is a fighting world. Naval competition engenders suspicion, fear, hatred, war. If there should be twenty years of intense naval rivalry between the United States and Japan, any sterile, promontory or irrelevant rock in the Pacific might give rise to war. There will always be questions of commercial rivalry, matters of difference between nations, and this rivalry and these differences will always lead easily to war when the nations are armed for war. If you wish to make it improbable that differences will lead to conflict, first reduce armaments, which always inspire war, and prevent naval competition which is a daily, everpresent, taunting suggestion of war. I understand fully that there may be circumstances and conditions in which an appeal to force is not only necessary but righteous. But to deify force, to make it the dominating factor, to have it ever present, to sit at conference with your finger pointing back over your shoulder to your armies and navies, to intrude into every settlement, and to announce to the world that it is your ultimate reliance, is barbaric---and it is none the less barbaric when it is practiced by professedly Christian nations. For myself, I refuse to concede time-force is the only power left, or that it should be the dominating and controlling power. It cannot be possible. Reason and justice must still have their place in the affairs of the world, and if leaders and statesmen are strong enough to place their reliance upon them, they will go far. I venture to declare, in the face of professional militarists, that no nation can long defy the public opinion of the civilized world---and especially no government can long defy the public opinion of their own people. And if this conference is conducted as an appeal to the public opinion of the world and to the public opinions of the peoples of the respective countries, it will accomplish far more than if it is conducted under the constant threat of dominating armaments . . . Source: ‘‘Disarmament.’’ Nation’s Business IX. (September 1921): 7--8.

5.20 Margaret Sanger, The Children’s Era 191

5.20 Margaret Sanger, The Children’s Era, 1925 Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: My subject is ‘‘The Children’s Era.’’ The Children’s Era! This makes me think of Ellen Key’s book---The Century of the Child. Ellen Key hoped that this twentieth century was to be the century of the child. The twentieth century, she said, would see this old world of ours converted into a beautiful garden of children. Well, we have already lived through a quarter of this twentieth century. What steps have we taken toward making it the century of the child? So far, very, very few. Why does the Children’s Era still remain a dream of the dim and the distant future? Why has so little been accomplished?---in spite of all our acknowledged love of children, all our generosity, all our good-will, all the enormous spending of millions on philanthropy and charities, all our warm-hearted sentiment, all our incessant activity and social consciousness? Why? Before you can cultivate a garden, you must know something about gardening. You have got to give your seeds a proper soil in which to grow. You have got to give them sunlight and fresh air. You have got to give them space and the opportunity (if they are to lift their flowers to the sun), to strike their roots deep into that soil. And always---do not forget this---you have got to fight weeds. You cannot have a garden, if you let weeds overrun it. So, if we want to make this world a garden for children, we must first of all learn the lesson of the gardener. So far we have not been gardeners. We have only been a sort of silly reception committee, a reception committee at the Grand Central Station of life. Trainload after trainload of children are coming in, day and night---nameless refugees arriving out of the Nowhere into the Here. Trainload after trainload---many unwelcome, unwanted, unprepared for, unknown, without baggage, without passports, most of them without pedigrees. These unlimited hordes of refugees arrive in such numbers that the reception committee is thrown into a panic---a panic of activity. The reception committee arouses itself heroically, establishes emergency measures: milk stations, maternity centers, settlement houses, playgrounds, orphanages, welfare leagues, and every conceivable kind of charitable effort. But still trainloads of children keep on coming---human weed crop up that spread so fast in this sinister struggle for existence, that the overworked committee becomes exhausted, inefficient, and can think of no way out. When we protest against this immeasurable, meaningless waste of motherhood and child-life; when we

protest against the ever-mounting cost to the world of asylums, prisons, homes for the feeble-minded, and such institutions for the unfit, when we protest against the disorder and chaos and tragedy of modern life, when we point out the biological corruption that is destroying the very heart of American life, we are told that we are making merely an ‘‘emotional’’ appeal. When we point the one immediate practical way toward order and beauty in society, the only way to lay the foundations of a society composed of happy children, happy women, and happy men, they call this idea indecent and immoral. It is not enough to clean up the filth and disorder of our overcrowded cities. It is not enough to stop the evil of Child Labor---even if we could! It is not enough to decrease the rate of infantile mortality. It is not enough to open playgrounds, and build more public schools in which we can standardize the mind of the young. It is not enough to throw millions upon millions of dollars into charities and philanthropies. Don’t deceive ourselves that by so doing we are making the world ‘‘Safe for Children.’’ Those of you who have followed the sessions of this Conference must, I am sure, agree with me that the first real stop toward the creation of a Children’s Era must lie in providing the conditions of healthy life for children not only before birth but even more imperatively before conception. Human society must protect its children---yes, but prenatal care is most essential! The child-to-be, as yet not called into being, has rights no less imperative. We have learned in the preceding sessions of this Conference that, if we wish to produce strong and sturdy children, the embryo must grow in a chemically healthy medium. The blood stream of the mother must be chemically normal. Worry, strain, shock, unhappiness, enforced maternity, may all poison the blood of the enslaved mother. This chemically poisoned blood may produce a defective baby---a child foredoomed to idiocy, or feeble-mindedness, crime, or failure. Do I exaggerate? Am I taking a rare exception and making it a general rule? Our opponents declare that children are conceived in love, and that every newborn baby converts its parents to love and unselfishness. My answer is to point to the asylums, the hospitals, the ever-growing institutions for the unfit. Look into the family history of those who are feeble-minded; or behind the bars of jails and prisons. Trace the family histories; find out the conditions under which they were conceived and born, before you attempt to persuade us that reckless breeding has nothing to do with these grave questions.

192 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s There is only one way out. We have got to fight for the health and happiness of the Unborn Child. And to do that in a practical, tangible way, we have got to free women from enforced, enslaved maternity. There can be no hope for the future of civilization, no certainty of racial salvation, until every woman can decide for herself whether she will or will not become a mother, and when and how many children she cares to bring into the world. That is the first step. I would like to suggest Civil Service examinations for parenthood! Prospective parents after such an examination would be given a parenthood license, proving that they are physically and mentally fit to be the fathers and mothers of the next generation. This is an interesting idea---but then arises the questions ‘‘Who is to decide?’’ ‘‘Would there be a jury, like a play jury?’’ Would a Republican administration give parenthood permits only to Republicans---or perhaps only to Democrats? The more you think of governmental interference, the less it works out. Take this plan of civil service examination for parenthood. It suggests Prohibition: there might even be bootlegging in babies! No, I doubt the advisability of governmental sanction. The problem of bringing children into the world ought to be decided by those most seriously involved--those who run the greatest risks; in the last analysis--by the mother and the child. If there is going to be any Civil Service examination, let it be conducted by the Unborn Child, the Child-to-be. Just try for a moment to picture the possibilities of such an examination. When you want a cook or housemaid, you go to an employment bureau. You have to answer questions. You have to exchange references. You have to persuade the talented cook that you conduct a proper well-run household. Children ought to have at least the same privilege as cooks. Sometimes in idle moments I like to think it would be a very good scheme to have a bureau of the Childto-be. At such a bureau of the unborn, the wise child might be able to find out a few things about its father---and its mother. Just think for a moment of this bureau where prospective parents might apply for a baby. Think of the questions they would be asked by the agent of the unborn or by the baby itself. First: ‘‘Mr. Father, a baby is an expensive luxury. Can you really afford one?’’ ‘‘Have you paid for your last baby yet?’’ ‘‘How many children have you already? Six? You must have your hands full. Can you take care of so many?’’ ‘‘Do you look upon children as a reward---or a penalty?’’

‘‘How are your ductless glands---well balanced?’’ Can you provide a happy home for one! A sunny nursery? Proper food?’’ ‘‘What’s that you say? Ten children already? Two dark rooms in the slums?’’ ‘‘No, thank you! I don’t care to be born at all if I cannot be well-born. Good-bye!’’ And if we could organize a society for the prevention of cruelty to unborn children, we would make it a law that children should be brought into the world only when they were welcome, invited, and wanted; that they would arrive with a clean bill of health and heritage; that they would possess healthy, happy, wellmated, and mature parents. And there would be certain conditions of circumstances which would preclude parenthood. These conditions, the presence of which would make parenthood a crime, are the following: 1. Transmissible disease 2. Temporary disease 3. Subnormal children already in the family 4. Space out between births 5. Twenty-three years as a minimum age for parents 6. Economic circumstances adequate 7. Spiritual harmony between parents. In conclusion, let me repeat: We are not trying to establish a dictatorship over parents. We want to free women from enslavery and unwilling motherhood. We are fighting for the emancipation for the mothers of the world, of the children of the world, and the children to be. We want to create a real Century of the Child--usher in a Children’s Era. We can do this by handling the terrific gift of life in bodies fit and perfect as can be fashioned. Help us to make this Conference, which as aroused so much interest, the turning point toward this era. Only so can you help in the creation of the future.

5.21 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism, October 22, 1928 This campaign now draws near to a close. The platforms of the two parties defining principles and offering solutions of various national problems have been presented and are being earnestly considered by our people. After four months’ debate it is not the Republican Party which finds reason for abandonment of any of

5.21 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism the principles it has laid down or of the views it has expressed for solution of the problems before the country. The principles to which it adheres are rooted deeply in the foundations of our national life and the solutions which it proposed are based on experience with government and a consciousness that it may have the responsibility for placing those solutions into action. In my acceptance speech I endeavored to outline the spirit and ideals with which I would propose to carry that platform into administration. Tonight, I will not deal with the multitude of issues which have been already well canvassed, I propose rather to discuss some of those more fundamental principles and ideals upon which I believe the Government of the United States should be conducted . . . As a nation we came out of the war with great losses. We made no profits from it. The apparent increases in wages were fictitious. We were poorer as a nation when we emerged from it. Yet during these last eight years we have recovered from these losses and increased our national income by over one-third even if we discount the inflation of the dollar. While some individuals have grown rich, yet that there has been a wide diffusion of our gain in wealth and income is marked by a hundred proofs. I know of no better test of the improved conditions of the average family than the combined increase of life and industrial insurance, building and loan assets, and savings deposits. These are the financial agents of the average man. These alone have in seven years increased by nearly 100 per cent to the gigantic sum of over 50 billions of dollars, or nearly one-six of our whole national wealth. In addition to these evidences of larger savings our people are steadily increasing their spending for higher standards of living. Today there are almost 9 automobiles for each 10 families, where seven and a half years ago only enough automobiles were running to average less than 4 for each 10 families. The slogan of progress is changing from the full dinner pail to the full garage. Our people have more to eat, better things to wear, and better homes. We have even gained in elbow room in our homes, for the increase of residential floor space is over 25 per cent with less than 10 per cent increase in our number of people. We have increased the security of his job to every man and woman. We have decreased the fear of old age, the fear of poverty, the fear of unemployment and these are fears which have always been amongst the greatest calamities of human kind. All this progress means far more than greater creature comforts. It finds a thousand interpretations into a greater and fuller life. In all this we have steadily reduced the sweat in human labor. A score of new

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helps save the drudgery of the home. In seven years we have added 25 per cent more electric power to the elbow of every worker, and farther promoted him from a carrier of burdens to a director of machines. Our hours of labor are lessened; our leisure has increased. We have expanded our parks and playgrounds. We have nearly doubled our attendance at games. We pour into outdoor recreation in every direction. The visitors at our national parks have trebled and we have so increased the number of sportsmen fishing in our streams and lakes that the longer time between bites is becoming a political issue. In these seven and one-half years the radio has brought music and laughter, education and political discussion to almost every fireside. Springing from our prosperity with its greater freedom, its vast endowment of scientific research and the greater resources with which to care for public health, we have according to our insurance actuaries during this short period since the war lengthened the span of life by nearly eight years. We have reduced infant mortality, we have vastly decreased the days of illness and suffering in the life of every man and woman. We have improved the facilities for the care of the crippled and helpless and deranged. From our increasing resources we have expanded our educational system in eight years from an outlay of 1,200 millions to 2,700 millions of dollars. The education of our youth has become almost the largest and certainly our most important activity. From our ability to free youth from toil we have increased the attendance in our grade schools by 14 per cent, in our high schools by 80 per cent, and in institutions of higher learning by 95 per cent. Today we have more youth in these institutions of higher learning twice over than all the rest of the world put together. We have made progress in literature, art and in public taste. I do not need to recite more figures and more evidence. There is not a person within the sound of my voice that does not know the profound progress which our country has made in this period. Every man and woman knows that their comfort, their hopes and their confidence for the future are higher this day than they were seven and one-half years ago. Your city has been an outstanding beneficiary of this great progress. With its suburbs it has, during the last seven and a half years grown by over a million and a half of people, until it has become the largest metropolitan district of all the world. Here you have made abundant opportunity not only for the youth of the land but for the immigrant from foreign shores. This city is the commercial center of the United States. It is the commercial agent of the American people. It is

194 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s a great organism of specialized skill and leadership in finance, industry and commerce, which reaches every spot in our country. Its progress and its beauty are the pride of the whole American people. It leads our nation in the largest size of its benevolences, in art, in music, literature and drama. It has come to have a greater voice, than any other city in the United States. But when all is said and done the very life, progress and prosperity of this city is wholly dependent on the prosperity of the 110,000,000 people who dwell in our mountains and valleys across the 3,000 miles to the Pacific Ocean. Every activity of this city is sensitive to every evil and every favorable tide that sweeps this great nation of ours. Be there a slackening of industry in any part of the country it affects New York far more than the rest of the country. In a time of depression onequarter of all the unemployed in the United States can be numbered in this city. In a time of prosperity the citizens of the great interior of our country pour into your city for business and entertainment at the rate of 200,000 a day. In fact so much is this city the reflex of the varied interests of our country that the concern of every one of your citizens for national stability, for national prosperity and for national progress is far greater than any other single part of our country.

Contributions to Progress It detracts nothing from the character and energy of the American people, it minimizes in no degree the quality of their accomplishments to say that the policies of the Republican Party have played a large part in the building of this progress of these last seven and one-half years. I can say with emphasis that without the wise policies which the Republican Party has brought into action in this period, no such progress would have been possible. The first responsibility of the Republican Administration was to renew the march of progress from its collapse by the war. That task involved the restoration of confidence in the future and the liberation and stimulation of the constructive energies of our people. It is not my purpose to enter upon a detailed recitation of the history of the great constructive measures of the past seven and a half years. It is sufficient to remind you of the restoration of employment to the millions who walked your streets in idleness to remind you of the creation of the budget system; the reduction of six billions of national debt which gave the impulse of that vast sum returned to industry and commerce; the four sequent reductions of

taxes and thereby the lift to the living of every family; the enactment of an adequate protective tariff and immigration laws which have raised and safeguarded our wages from floods of goods or labor from foreign countries; the creation of credit facilities and many aids to agriculture; the building up of foreign trade; the care of veterans, the development of aviation, of radio, of our inland waterways, our highways; the expansion of scientific research, of welfare activities, safer highways, safer mines, outdoor recreation, in better homes, in public health and the care of children. Nor do I need remind you that Government today deals with an economic and social system vastly more intricate and delicately adjusted than ever before. It now must be kept in perfect tune if we would not, through dislocation, have a breakdown in employment and in standards of living of our people. The Government has come to more and more touch this delicate web at a thousand points. Yearly the relations of Government to national prosperity becomes more and more intimate. It has only by keen large vision and cooperation by the Government that stability in business and stability in employment has been maintained during this past seven and a half years. Never has there been a period when the Federal Government has given such aid and impulse to the progress of our people, not alone to economic progress but to development of those agencies which make for moral and spiritual progress. But in addition to this great record of contributions of the Republican Party to progress, there has been a further fundamental contribution---a contribution perhaps more important than all the others---and that is the resistance of the Republican Party to every attempt to inject the Government into business in competition with its citizens. After the war, when the Republican Party assumed administration of the country, we were faced with the problem of determination of the very nature of our national life. Over 150 years we have builded up a form of self-government and we had builded up a social system which is peculiarly our own. It differs fundamentally from all others in the world. It is the American system. It is just as definite and positive a political and social system as has ever been developed on earth. It is founded upon the conception that selfgovernment can be preserved only by decentralization of Government in the State and by fixing local responsibility; but further than this, it is founded upon the social conception that only through ordered liberty, freedom and equal opportunity to the individual will his initiative and enterprise drive the march of progress.

5.21 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism During the war we necessarily turned to the Government to solve every difficult economic problem---the Government having absorbed every energy of our people to war there was no other solution. For the preservation of the State the Government became a centralized despotism which undertook responsibilities, assumed powers, exercised rights, and took over the business of citizens. To large degree we regimented our whole people temporarily into a socialistic state. However justified it was in time of war if continued in peace time it would destroy not only our system but progress and freedom in our own country and throughout the world. When the war closed the most vital of all issues was whether Governments should continue war ownership and operation of many instrumentalities of production and distribution. We were challenged with the choice of the American system ‘‘rugged individualism’’ or the choice of a European system of diametrically opposed doctrines---doctrines of paternalism and state socialism. The acceptance of these ideas meant the destruction of self-government through centralization of government; it meant the undermining of initiative and enterprise upon which our people have grown to unparalleled greatness. The Democratic administration cooperated with the Republican Party to demobilize many of her activities and the Republican Party from the beginning of its period of power resolutely turned its face away from these ideas and these war practices, back to our fundamental conception of the state and the rights and responsibilities of the individual. Thereby it restored confidence and hope in the American people, it freed and stimulated enterprise, it restored the Government to its position as an umpire instead of a player in the economic game. For these reasons the American people have gone forward in progress while the rest of the world is halting and some countries have even gone backwards. If anyone will study the causes which retarded recuperation of Europe, he will find much of it due to the stifling of private initiative on one hand, and overloading of the Government with business on the other. I regret, however, to say that there has been revived in this campaign a proposal which would be a long step to the abandonment of our American system, to turn to the idea of government in business. Because we are faced with difficulty and doubt over certain national problems which we are faced---that is prohibition, farm relief and electrical power---our opponents propose that we must to some degree thrust government into these businesses and in effect adopt state socialism as a solution.

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There is, therefore submitted to the American people the question---Shall we depart from the American system and start upon a new road. And I wish to emphasize this question on this occasion. I wish to make clear my position on the principles involved for they go to the very roots of American life in every act of our Government. I should like to state to you the effect of the extension of government into business upon our system of self government and our economic system. But even more important is the effect upon the average man. That is the effect on the very basis of liberty and freedom not only to those left outside the fold of expanded bureaucracy but to those embraced within it. When the Federal Government undertakes a business, the state governments are at once deprived of control and taxation of that business; when the state government undertakes a business it at once deprived the municipalities of taxation and control of that business. Business requires centralization; self government requires decentralization. Our government to succeed in business must become in effect a despotism. There is thus at once an insidious destruction of self government. Moreover there is a limit to human capacity in administration. Particularly is there a limit to the capacity of legislative bodies to supervise governmental activities. Every time the Federal Government goes into business 530 Senators and Congressmen become the Board of Directors of that business. Every time a state government goes into business 100 or 200 state senators and assemblymen become directors of that business. Even if they were supermen, no bodies of such numbers can competently direct that type of human activities which requires instant decision and action. No such body can deal adequately with all sections of the country. And yet if we would preserve government by the people we must preserve the authority of our legislators over the activities of our Government. We have trouble enough with log rolling in legislative bodies today. It originates naturally from desires of citizens to advance their particular section or to secure some necessary service. It would be multiplied a thousand-fold were the Federal and state governments in these businesses. The effect upon our economic progress would be even worse. Business progressiveness is dependent on competition. New methods and new ideas are the outgrowth of the spirit of adventure of individual initiative and of individual enterprise. Without adventure there is no progress. No government administration can rightly speculate and take risks with taxpayers’ money. But even more important than this--leadership in business must be through the sheer rise of

196 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s ability and character. That rise can take place only in the free atmosphere of competition. Competition is closed by bureaucracy. Certainly political choice is a feeble basis for choice of leaders to conduct a business. There is no better example of the practical incompetence of government to conduct business than the history of our railways. Our railways in the year before being freed from Government operation were not able to meet the demands for transportation. Eight years later we find our them under private enterprise, transporting 15 per cent more goods and meeting every demand for service. Rates have been reduced by 15 per cent and net earnings increased from less than 1 per cent on their valuation to about 5 per cent. Wages of employees have improved by 13 per cent. The wages of railway employees are 2 per cent above pre-war. The wages of Government employees are today . . . will check their figure definitely tomorrow but probably about 70% per cent above pre-war. That should be a sufficient sermon upon the efficiency of Government operation. But we can examine this question from the point of view of the person who gets a Government job and is admitted into the new bureaucracy. Upon that subject let me quote from a speech of that great leader of labor, Samuel Gompers, delivered in Montreal in 1920, a few years before his death. He said: ‘‘I believe there is no man to whom I would take second position in my loyalty to the Republic of the United States, and yet I would not give it more power over the individual citizenship of our country. . . . ‘‘It is a question of whether it shall be Government ownership or private ownership under control. . . . If I were in the minority of one in this convention, I would want to cast my vote so that the men of labor shall not willingly enslave themselves to Government authority in their industrial effort for freedom. . . . ‘‘Let the future tell the story of who is right or who is wrong; who has stood for freedom and who has been willing to submit their fate industrially to the Government.’’ I would amplify Mr. Gompers’ statement. These great bodies of Government employees would either comprise political machines at the disposal of the party in power, or alternatively to prevent this the Government by stringent civil-service rules must debar its employees from their full rights as free men. If it would keep employees out of politics, its rules must strip them of all right to expression of opinion. It is easy to conceive that they might become so large a body as by their votes to dictate to the Government and their political rights need be further reduced. It must strip them of the

liberty to bargain for their own wages, for no Government employee can strike against his Government and thus the whole people. It makes a legislative body with all its political currents their final employer. That bargaining does not rest upon economic need or economic strength but on political potency. But what of those who are outside the bureaucracy? What is the effect upon their lives of the Government on business and these hundreds of thousands more officials? At once their opportunities in life are limited because a large area of activities are removed from their participation. Further the Government does not tolerate amongst its customers the freedom of competitive reprisals to which private corporations are subject. Bureaucracy does not spread the spirit of independence; it spreads the spirit of submission into our daily life, penetrates the temper of our people; not with the habit of powerful resistance to wrong, but with the habit of timid acceptance of the irresistible might. Bureaucracy is ever desirous of spreading its influence and its power. You cannot give to a government the mastery of the daily working life of a people without at the same time giving it mastery of the peoples’ souls and thoughts. Every expansion of government means that government in order to protect itself from political consequences of its errors and wrongs is driven onward and onward without peace to greater and greater control of the country’s press and platform. Free speech does not live many hours after free industry and free commerce die. It is false liberalism that interprets itself into the Government operation of business. The bureaucratization of our country would poison the very roots of liberalism that is free speech, free assembly, free press, political equality and equality of opportunity. It is the road, not to more liberty, but to less liberty. Liberalism should be found not striving to spread bureaucracy, but striving to set bounds to it. True liberalism seeks freedom first in the confident belief that without freedom the pursuit of all other blessings and benefits is vain. That belief is the foundation of all American progress, political as well as economic. Liberalism is a force truly of the spirit, a force proceeding from the deep realization that economic freedom cannot be sacrificed if political freedom is to be preserved. Even if governmental conduct of business could give us more efficiency instead of giving us decreased efficiency, the fundamental objection to it would remain unaltered and unabated. It would destroy political equality. It would cramp and cripple mental and spiritual energies of our people. It would dry up

5.21 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism the spirit of liberty and progress. It would extinguish equality of opportunity, and for these reasons fundamentally and primarily it must be resisted. For a hundred and fifty years liberalism has found its true spirit in the American system, not in the European systems. I do not wish to be misunderstood in this statement. I am defining a general policy! It does not mean that our government is to part with one iota of its national resources without complete protection to the public interest. I have already stated that where the government is engaged in public works for purposes of flood control, of navigation, of irrigation, of scientific research or national defense that, or in pioneering a new art, it will at times necessarily produce power or commodities as a by-product. But they must be by-products, not the major purpose. Nor do I wish to be misinterpreted as believing that the United States is free-for-all and the devil-take-thehindmost. The very essence of equality of opportunity is that there shall be no domination by any group or trust or combination in this republic, whether it be business or political. It demands economic justice as well as political and social justice. It is no system to laissez faire. There is but one consideration in testing these proposals---that is public interest. I do not doubt the sincerity of those who advocate these methods of solving our problems. I believe they will give equal credit to our honesty. If I believed that the adoption of such proposals would decrease taxes, cure abuses or corruption, would produce better service, decrease rates or benefit employees; If I believed they would bring economic equality, would stimulate endeavor, would encourage invention and support individual initiative, would provide equality of opportunity; If I believed that these proposals would not wreck our democracy but would strengthen the foundations of social and spiritual progress in America---or if they would do a few of these things---then I would not hesitate to accept these proposals, stupendous as they are, even though such acceptance would result in the governmental operation of all our power and the buying and selling of the products of our farms or any other product. But it is not true that such benefits would result to the public. The contrary would be true. I feel deeply on this subject because during the war I had some practical experience with governmental operation and control. I have witnessed not only at home but abroad the many failures of government in business. I have seen its tyrannies, its injustices, its undermining of the very instincts which carry our people forward to progress. I have witnessed the lack of advance, the lowered standards of living, the depressed

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spirits of people working under such a system. My objection is based not upon theory or upon a failure to recognize wrong or abuse but because I know that the adoption of such methods would strike at the very roots of American life and would destroy the very basis of American progress. Our people have the right to know whether we can continue to solve our great problems without abandonment of our American system. I know we can. We have demonstrated that our system is responsive enough to meet any new and intricate development in our economic and business life. We have demonstrated that we can maintain our democracy as master in its own house and that we can preserve equality of opportunity and individual freedom. In the last fifty years we have discovered that mass production will produce articles for us at half the cost that obtained previously. We have seen the resultant growth of large units of production and distribution. This is big business. Business must be bigger for our tools are bigger, our country is bigger. We build a single dynamo of a hundred thousand horsepower. Even fifteen years ago that would have been a big business all by itself. Yet today advance in production requires that we set ten of these units together. Our great problem is to make certain that while we maintain the fullest use of the large units of business yet that they shall be held subordinate to the public interest. The American people from bitter experience have a rightful fear that these great units might be used to dominate our industrial life and by illegal and unethical practices destroy equality of opportunity. Years ago the Republican Administration established the principle that such evils could be corrected by regulation. It developed methods by which abuses could be prevented and yet the full value of economic advance retained for the public. It insisted that when great public utilities were clothed with the security of part monopoly, whether it be railways, power plants, telephones or what not, then there must be the fullest and most complete control of rates, services, and finances by governmental agencies. These businesses must be conducted with glass pockets. In the development of our great production industry, the Republican Party insisted upon the enactment of a law that not only would maintain competition but would destroy conspiracies to dominate and limit the equality of opportunity amongst our people. One of the great problems of government is to determine to what extent the Government itself shall interfere with commerce and industry and how much it shall leave to individual exertion. It is just as important

198 The Progressive Era, World War I, and the 1920s that business keep out of government as that government keep out of business. No system is perfect. We have had abuses in the conduct of business that every good citizen resents. But I insist that the results show our system better than any other and retains the essentials of freedom. As a result of our distinctly American system our country has become the land of opportunity to those born without inheritance not merely because of the wealth of its resources and industry but because of this freedom of initiative and enterprise. Russia has natural resources equal to ours. Her people are equally industrious but she has not had the blessings of 150 years of our form of government and of our social system. The wisdom of our forefathers in their conception that progress must be the sum of the progress of free individuals has been reenforced by all of the great leaders of the country since that day. Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, Wilson, and Coolidge have stood unalterably for these principles. By adherence to the principles of decentralization, self-government, ordered liberty, and opportunity and freedom to the individual our American experiment has yielded a degree of wellbeing unparalleled in all the world. It has come nearer to the abolition of poverty, to the abolition of fear of want that humanity has ever reached before. Progress of the past seven years is the proof of it. It furnishes an answer to those who would ask us to abandon the system by which this has been accomplished. There is a still further road to progress which is consonant with our American system---a method that reinforces our individualism by reducing, not increasing, Government interference in business. In this country we have developed a higher sense of cooperation than has ever been known before. This has come partly as the result of stimulation during the war, partly from the impulses of industry itself. We have ten thousand examples of this cooperative tendency in the enormous growth of the associational activities during recent years. Chambers of commerce, trade associations, professional associations, labor unions, trade councils, civic associations, farm cooperatives---these are all so embracing that there is scarcely an individual in our country who does not belong to one or more of them. They represent every phase of our national life both on the economic and the welfare side. They represent a vast ferment toward conscious cooperation. While some of them are selfish and narrow, the majority of them recognize a responsibility to the public as well as to their own interest. The government in its obligation to the public can through skilled specialists cooperate with these various

associations for the accomplishment of high public purposes. And this cooperation can take two distinct directions. The first is in the promotion of constructive projects of public interest, such as the elimination of waste in industry, the stabilization of business and development of scientific research. It can contribute to reducing unemployment and seasonal employment. It can by organized cooperation assist and promote great movements for better homes, for child welfare and for recreation. The second form that this cooperation can take is in the cure of abuses and the establishment of a higher code of ethics and a more strict standard in its conduct of business. One test of our economic and social system is its capacity to cure its own abuses. New abuses and new relationships to the public interest will occur as long as we continue to progress. If we are to be wholly dependent upon government to cure every evil we shall by this very method have created an enlarged and deadening abuse through the extension of bureaucracy and the clumsy and incapable handling of delicate economic forces. And much abuse has been and can be cured by inspiration and cooperation, rather than by regulation of the government. Nor is this any idealistic proposal. For the last seven years the Department of Commerce has carried this into practice in hundreds of directions and every single accomplishment of this character minimizes the necessity for government interference with business. All this is possible because of the cooperative spirit and ability at team play in the American people. There is here a fundamental relief from the necessity of extension of the government into every avenue of business and welfare and therefore a powerful implement for the promotion of progress. I wish to say something more on what I believe is the outstanding ideal in our whole political, economic and social system---that is equality of opportunity. We have carried this ideal farther into our life than has any other nation in the world. Equality of opportunity is the right of every American, rich or poor, foreign or native born, without respect to race or faith or color, to attain that position in life to which his ability and character entitle him. We must carry this ideal further than to economic and political fields alone. The first steps to equality of opportunity are that there should be no child in America that has not been born and does not live under sound conditions of health, that does not have full opportunity for education from the beginning to the end of our institutions, that is not free from injurious labor, that does not have stimulation to accomplish to the fullest of its capacities.

5.21 Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism It is a matter for concern to our Government that we shall strengthen the safeguards to health, that we shall strengthen the bureaus given to research, that we shall strengthen our educational system at every point, that we shall develop cooperation by our Federal Government with state governments and with the voluntary bodies of the country that we may bring not only better understanding but action in these matters. Furthermore, equality of opportunity in my vision requires an equal opportunity to the people in every section of our country. In these past few years some groups in our country have lagged behind others in the

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march of progress. They have not had the same opportunity. I refer more particularly to those engaged in the textile, coal and in the agricultural industries. We can assist in solving these problems by cooperation of our Government. To the agricultural industry we shall need advance initial capital to assist them, to stabilize and conduct their own industry. But this proposal is that they shall conduct it themselves, not by the Government. It is in the interest of our cities that we shall bring agriculture into full stability and prosperity. I know you will cooperate gladly in the faith that in the common prosperity of our country lies its future.

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Section 6 The New Deal

Introduction

Dealers, the closing of the frontier and the economic uncertainties introduced by industrial capitalism meant that the government must forcefully guarantee a ‘‘new social contract’’ providing all Americans with a basic structure of economic security. The cornerstone of the new federal welfare state developed by New Dealers was Social Security. The Social Security Act of 1935 created old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The New Deal also spurred industrial unionism by protecting the right of unions to collectively bargain. The transformation of American governing principles, political institutions, and public policies during the Roosevelt years was fortified by a majority electoral coalition that included labor unions, big city machines, African Americans, Catholics and Jews, farmers, and southern whites. This New Deal coalition would dominate U.S. electoral politics for almost a half-century. During the 1940s, Roosevelt saw liberal internationalism and its emphasis on international rights as the logical partner to New Deal liberalism in domestic politics. In the early 21st century, the New Deal remains the touchstone of political debate over the fundamental role and purpose of government in American life. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

When Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) ascended to the presidency in 1933, the economic disaster of the Great Depression left 15 million Americans (roughly onethird of the national workforce) unemployed, the New York Stock Exchange closed its doors, and all banks were closed in 32 states. Proclaiming that the people want ‘‘action, and action now,’’ Roosevelt initiated a flurry of legislation and programs designed to provide direct relief, encourage economic recovery, and reform the financial system. The number of federal government agencies, programs, and commitments ushered in as part of FDR’s New Deal agenda was staggering, from the Works Progress Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Tennessee Valley Authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Recovery Administration, and Farm Security Administration. Yet even as Roosevelt and his supporters sought to address the immediate crisis, their sights were set on sweeping and enduring political reform. Whereas traditional, laissez-faire liberalism emphasized unregulated markets and individual selfreliance, Roosevelt’s New Deal philosophy asserted that an active and strong national state was necessary to countervail the enormous power of concentrated economic interests in modern America. For New

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Documents

More important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence, and an equally great number toil with little return. Only a foolish optimist can deny the dark realities of the moment. Yet our distress comes from no failure of substance. We are stricken by no plague of locusts. Compared with the perils which our forefathers conquered because they believed and were not afraid, we have still much to be thankful for. Nature still offers her bounty and human efforts have multiplied it. Plenty is at our doorstep, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply. Primarily this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind’s goods have failed, through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure, and abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men. True they have tried, but their efforts have been cast in the pattern of an outworn tradition. Faced by failure of credit they have proposed only the lending of more money. Stripped of the lure of profit by which to induce our people to follow their false leadership, they have resorted to exhortations, pleading tearfully for restored confidence. They know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers. They have no vision, and when there is no vision the people perish. The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit.

6.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933 I am certain that my fellow Americans expect that on my induction into the Presidency I will address them with a candor and a decision which the present situation of our Nation impels. This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need we shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today. This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself---nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory. I am convinced that you will again give that support to leadership in these critical days. In such a spirit on my part and on yours we face our common difficulties. They concern, thank God, only material things. Values have shrunken to fantastic levels; taxes have risen; our ability to pay has fallen; government of all kinds is faced by serious curtailment of income; the means of exchange are frozen in the currents of trade; the withered leaves of industrial enterprise lie on every side; farmers find no markets for their produce; the savings of many years in thousands of families are gone. 203

204 The New Deal Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money; it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy and moral stimulation of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits. These dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men. Recognition of the falsity of material wealth as the standard of success goes hand in hand with the abandonment of the false belief that public office and high political position are to be valued only by the standards of pride of place and personal profit; and there must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business which too often has given to a sacred trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing. Small wonder that confidence languishes, for it thrives only on honesty, on honor, on the sacredness of obligations, on faithful protection, on unselfish performance; without them it cannot live. Restoration calls, however, not for changes in ethics alone. This Nation asks for action, and action now. Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem if we face it wisely and courageously. It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of a war, but at the same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and reorganize the use of our natural resources. Hand in hand with this we must frankly recognize the overbalance of population in our industrial centers and, by engaging on a national scale in a redistribution, endeavor to provide a better use of the land for those best fitted for the land. The task can be helped by definite efforts to raise the values of agricultural products and with this the power to purchase the output of our cities. It can be helped by preventing realistically the tragedy of the growing loss through foreclosure of our small homes and our farms. It can be helped by insistence that the Federal, State, and local governments act forthwith on the demand that their cost be drastically reduced. It can be helped by the unifying of relief activities which today are often scattered, uneconomical, and unequal. It can be helped by national planning for and supervision of all forms of transportation and of communications and other utilities which have a definitely public character. There are many ways in which it can be helped, but it can never be helped merely by talking about it. We must act and act quickly. Finally, in our progress toward a resumption of work we require two safeguards against a return of the evils

of the old order; there must be a strict supervision of all banking and credits and investments; there must be an end to speculation with other people’s money, and there must be provision for an adequate but sound currency. There are the lines of attack. I shall presently urge upon a new Congress in special session detailed measures for their fulfillment, and I shall seek the immediate assistance of the several States. Through this program of action we address ourselves to putting our own national house in order and making income balance outgo. Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustment, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment. The basic thought that guides these specific means of national recovery is not narrowly nationalistic. It is the insistence, as a first consideration, upon the interdependence of the various elements in all parts of the United States---a recognition of the old and permanently important manifestation of the American spirit of the pioneer. It is the way to recovery. It is the immediate way. It is the strongest assurance that the recovery will endure. In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor---the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others---the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we can not merely take but we must give as well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline, because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger good. This I propose to offer, pledging that the larger purposes will bind upon us all as a sacred obligation with a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife. With this pledge taken, I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems.

6.2 Henry A. Wallace, A Declaration of Interdependence Action in this image and to this end is feasible under the form of government which we have inherited from our ancestors. Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations. It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure. I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption. But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis---broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. For the trust reposed in me I will return the courage and the devotion that befit the time. I can do no less. We face the arduous days that lie before us in the warm courage of the national unity; with the clear consciousness of seeking old and precious moral values; with the clean satisfaction that comes from the stem performance of duty by old and young alike. We aim at the assurance of a rounded and permanent national life. We do not distrust the future of essential democracy. The people of the United States have not failed. In their need they have registered a mandate that they want direct, vigorous action. They have asked for discipline and direction under leadership. They have made me the present instrument of their wishes. In the spirit of the gift I take it. In this dedication of a Nation we humbly ask the blessing of God. May He protect each and every one of us. May He guide me in the days to come.

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6.2 Henry A. Wallace, A Declaration of Interdependence, May 13, 1933 A speech delivered by radio The new Farm Act, which the President signed yesterday, initiates a program for a general advance of buying power. It is not an isolated advance in a restricted sector; it is part of a large attack on the whole problem of depression. Agriculture and tradesmen must make their way together out of a wilderness of economic desolation and waste. This new machinery will not work itself. The farmers and the distributors of foodstuffs must use it, and make it work. The government can help map lines of march, and can see that the interest of no one group is advanced out of line with the interest of all. But government officials cannot and will not go out and work for private businesses. A farm is a private business; so is a farmers’ cooperative; and so are all the great links in the food distributing chain. Government men cannot and will not go out and plow down old trails for agriculture, or build for the distributing industries new roads out of the woods. The growers, the processors, the carriers and sellers of food must do that for themselves. Following trade agreements, openly and democratically arrived at, with the consumer represented and protected from gouging, these industries must work out their own salvation. This emergency Adjustment Act makes it lawful and practical for them to get together and do so. It provides for a control of production to accord with actual need, and for an orderly distribution of essential supplies. In the end, we envision programs of planned land use; and we must turn our thought to this end immediately; for many thousands of refugees from urban pinch and hunger are turning, with little or no guidance, to the land. A tragic number of city families are reoccupying abandoned farms, farms on which born farmers, skilled, patient, and accustomed to doing with very little, were unable to make a go of it. In consequence of this back-flow there are now thirty-two million people on the farms of the United States, the greatest number ever recorded in our history. Some of those who have returned to farming will find their place there, but most of them, I fear, will not. I look to a day when men and women will be able to do in the country the work that they have been accustomed to doing in the city; a day when we shall have more industrial workers out in the open where there is room to live. I look to a decentralization of industry; but in

206 The New Deal this respect we shall have to make haste slowly. We do not need any more farmers out in the country now. We do need there more people with some other means of livelihood, buying, close at hand, farm products; enriching and making more various the life of our open-country and village communities. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to apply, excise taxes on the processing of these products, and to pay the money thus derived to farmers who agree to enter upon programs of planned production, and who abide by that agreement. These processing taxes will be put on gradually. Few, if any, will be levied before fall; and then we shall make them as light as we can and yet bring about the required reduction in acreage. In no case will taxes be levied on products purchased for the unemployed. What it amounts to is an advance toward higher prices all along the line. Current proposals for government cooperation with industry are really at one with this Farm Act. Unless we can get re-employment going, lengthen payrolls, and shorten breadlines, no effort to lift prices can last very long. Our first effort as to agriculture will be to adjust production downward, with safe margins to provide enough food for all. This effort we shall continue until such time as diminishing stocks raise prices to a point where the farmer’s buying power will be as high as it was in the pre-war years, 1909 to 1914. The reason that we chose that period is because the prices farmers got for their crops, in those years, and the prices they paid for manufactured goods and urban services most nearly approached an equitable relationship. There was thus a balance between our major producing groups. At that time there was not the terrific disparity between rural and, urban purchasing power which now exists and which is choking the life out of all forms of American business. We do not propose to reduce agricultural production schedules to a strictly domestic basis. Our foreign trade has dwindled to a mere trickle; but we still have some foreign customers for cotton, tobacco, and certain foodstuffs; we want to keep that trade and to get more foreign trade, if we can. The immediate job is to organize American agriculture to reduce its output to domestic need plus that amount which we can export at a profit. If the world tide, turns and world trade revives, we still can utilize to excellent advantage our crop adjustment and controlled distribution setup. We can find out how much they really want over there, and at what price; and then we can take off the brakes and step on the gas.

The first sharp downward adjustment is necessary because during the past years we have defiantly refused to face an overwhelming reality. In consequence, changed world conditions bear down on us so heavily as to threaten our national life. Ever since 1920, hundreds of thousands of farm families have had to do without civilized roads and services which in normal times they were glad and eager to buy. Since 1929, millions of farm people have had to patch their garments, store their cars and tractors, deprive their children of educational opportunities, and cease, as farmers, to improve their practices and their property. They have been forced to let their homes and other buildings stand bare and unpainted, eaten by time and the weather. They have been driven toward peasant, or less than peasant, standards; they have been forced to adopt frontier methods of bare sustenance at a time when, in the old surging, unlimited sense of the word, we have no longer a frontier. When the farmer gets higher prices, he will start spending. He will have to. He needs things. He needs new shoes and clothing for all the family, so that his children can go to school in any weather with dry feet, protected bodies, and a decent American feeling of equality and pride. He needs paint and roofing, fencing, machinery and so on, endlessly. To reorganize agriculture, co-operatively, democratically, so that the surplus lands on which men and women now are toiling, wasting their time, wearing out their lives to no good end, shall be taken out of production---that is a tremendous task. The adjustment we seek calls first of all for a mental adjustment, a willing, reversal, of driving, pioneer opportunism and ungoverned laissez-faire. The ungoverned push of rugged individualism perhaps had an economic justification in the days when we had all the West to surge upon and conquer; but this country has filled up now, and grown up. There are no more Indians to fight. No more land worth taking may be had for the grabbing. We must experience a change of mind and heart. The frontiers that challenge us now are of the mind and spirit. We must blaze new trails in scientific accomplishment, in the peaceful arts and industries. Above all, we must blaze new trails in the direction of a controlled economy, common sense, and social decency. There have been delays in the passage of this Act. Meanwhile the planting season has advanced, and our assigned task of adjusting production to effective demand has become infinitely more difficult. We cannot proceed as if this were the middle of winter.

6.3 Father Coughlin, The National Union for Social Justice 207 Perhaps our wisest course will be to concentrate on those commodities most in need of adjustment, and on which the adjustment decided upon, this late in the season, can be practical and effective. To help us in these determinations, we shall have here in Washington within a few days representatives of agriculture and representatives of the processing and distributing trades. Bearing their recommendations in mind, we shall decide just what action to take, and when to take it. As each decision is made we shall get it out directly and publicly to the farmers affected, and launch organization efforts throughout the Nation. Unless as we lift farm prices we also unite to control production, this plan will not work for long. The only way we can effectively control production for the long pull is for you farmers to organize, and stick, and do it yourselves. This Act offers you promise of a balanced abundance, a shared prosperity, and a richer life. It will work, if you will make it yours, and make it work. I hope that you will come to see in this Act, as I do now, a Declaration of Interdependence, a recognition of our essential unity and of our absolute reliance one upon another. Source: Henry A. Wallace. 1944. Democracy Reborn. ed. Russell Lord, 43. New York: Reynall and Hitchcock.

6.3 Father Coughlin, The National Union for Social Justice, November 11, 1934 SIXTEEN years ago this afternoon, my friends, I mingled with thousands of my fellow citizens who were celebrating the termination of a war that was fought to end wars. As I look back upon these years---years identified with the Peace Treaty of Versailles, with the League of Nations, with assassinations of men in high office, with the birth of Bolshevism, with repudiations of debts and with universal poverty---I honestly believe that in all history such destruction of ideals and such miscarriage of justice were never chronicled save during the years which witnessed the assassination of Christ. Instead of making the world safe for democracy, the bells which tolled their message sixteen years ago this afternoon were sounding its requiem. Instead of announcing that here was the end of all war, we were being ushered into a new conflict too terrible to contemplate.

No nation and but few individuals have escaped the atrocities identified with the last sixteen years. Waste and destruction of property, the desolation of homes and farms, the decay of factories and industries, which are associated with this period through which we have passed, are beyond our reckoning. They were years when innocent civilians of all countries were bowed down by the regimented forces of greed, of selfishness, of crass ignorance and of obstinacy Thus, it is almost with a cynical smile that we hope for peace when we recognize the feverish efforts of every great nation as they are busy manufacturing cannons and shells, war ships and lethal gases. The stage is being set for the last act of that tragedy which will mark the passing of a prostituted civilization unless our course is suddenly changed. Peace conferences and naval conferences failed miserably as did the hypocritical efforts of the League of Nations. In their laboratories of destruction the chemists of greed and of poverty, of hate and of lying propaganda are mingling their poisons of warfare. The old diplomacies, the ancient rivalries which were left wounded unto death upon the battle fields of Flanders today are rising in their ghostly forms to sound a new call to arms. To these menaces we are not blind. Their ghastly presence must not be ignored. I. On this Sunday following the signal political victory of the new deal, perhaps, my friends, you are expectant to hear soft words of praise and glorification. I shall not be one, either today or at any future date, to break down your confidence in the outcome of this new deal. My constant prayer is for its success. Soft words and insincere praise, however, must have no more place at this present hour than had our empty rejoicing sixteen years ago. Thus, I wish to reassert my belief that, although the old Republican party with its rugged individualism is as dead as Benedict Arnold, nevertheless, it is true that the Democratic party, now composed of progressive men and women of all political affiliations, is merely on trial. Two years hence it will leave the courtroom of public opinion vindicated and with a new lease on life, or will be condemned to political death if it fails to answer the simple question of why there is want in the midst of plenty. Truly, democracy itself is on trial. It has been given the final mandate to face the real causes of this depression and to end them instead of temporizing with useless efforts for the preservation of a system, both economic and political, which once before watered the fields of Europe with blood and the highways of America with tears. Today the American people are the judge and jury who will support this Administration and accord it a sportman’s chance to make good. It has already

208 The New Deal subscribed to the principle that human rights must take precedence over financial rights. It recognizes that these rights far outweigh in the scales of justice either political rights or so-called constitutional rights. It appears to be an Administration determined to read into the Constitution the definition of social justice which is already expressed within its very preamble. There we are taught that the object of this Government is to establish justice, to insure domestic tranquility, to promote the general welfare and to provide the blessings of liberty for ourselves and for our posterity. The task confronting this government consists first, in recognizing and utilizing this constitutional truth; and second, in eliminating and destroying, once and for all, the well known and well established unconstitutional causes of this depression. This afternoon I plan to address you on its first cause viewed from a material standpoint. II. This has to do with a just and living annual wage for all citizens who care to earn their own livelihood. I will deal with the substantial error associated with modern industrialism---an error which, if not eradicated, will logically lead us into the perpetuation of the dole system and thence into communism. After all, the economic analysis of communism teaches us that the State is absolutely supreme; is absolute master and proprietor of all material goods; is the sole industrialist and capitalist, and its citizens are the recipients of chocolate coated doles. Communism is nothing more than a candied pill of glorified ‘‘doleism.’’ Thus, at the outset of this discussion, let me rehearse for you a few facts relative to the history of labor and of industry, of production and of unemployment. As we turn back the pages which tell us the story of the World War, we are convinced that it was one organized and operated for commercial purposes and commercial gains. Every cannon forged, every shell exploded was trade-marked with the sign of decadent capitalism. It was a war fought to make the world safe for Wall Street and for the international bankers. Are you not aware of the fact that in 1914 England’s financial and commercial supremacy were in jeopardy due to the rapid advance of German commerce? Are you ignorant of the fact that during the first two years of the World War the United States industrialists and bankers had poured billions of credit dollars into the war chests of Great Britain? Need I remind you of the pleading on the part of English statesmen for us to enter the war or of the letters sent by Ambassador Page to President Wilson demanding that we should join the allies for the sole reason of preserving our bankers’ foreign investments---bankers, who in league with England, had wagered on the losing

horse; powerful bankers who, in a few months after the outbreak of hostilities, perverted the mind of President Wilson to such an extent that, although elected to his high office on the promise of keeping us out of the war, he now submitted to the fallacy that it was more sacred to protect the capitalistic dollar than to preserve the life of a mother’s son! The years in which all this was happening were identified with the date when the monstrous dragon of want had been slain by the new St. George of modern scientific machinery. Before the advent of the World War we were not troubled with the problem of unemployment. Eighteen or twenty years ago industry was well operated under a system of economics devised for the upkeep of a civilization which, until then; was engaged in solving the problem of production. With our clumsy machinery and unskilled mechanics we could not produce enough shoes, bath tubs, locomotives, motor cars or, for that matter, any other mass production commodity to supply the practical demands of a world which was still struggling to free itself from the deprivations of the past. By 1914 Watt and his steam engine, Edison and his electric motor and the thousand inventors who followed them had not completely conquered the problem of want in the midst of need---the problem of production. Now what has all this to do with the World War of 1914 and with the present depression which was born in 1918? Be patient for a moment and I shall try to weave a few thoughts relative to this subject into a simple fabric of understanding. For the first two years of the war we found practically the full manpower of France, of England, of Italy, of Belgium and of the European allies clothed in the uniforms of soldiers. This meant that the flower of European youth ceased to be producers. This meant that suddenly the production power of Europe was perverted into a force of destruction.

6.4 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 1935 Liberalism has long been accustomed to onslaughts proceeding from those who oppose social change. It has long been treated as an enemy by those who wish to maintain the status quo. But today these attacks are mild in comparison with indictments proceeding from those who want drastic social changes effected in a twinkling of an eye, and who believe that violent overthrow of existing institutions is the right method of effecting the required changes. From current assaults, I select two as typical: ‘‘A liberal is one who

6.4 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action gives lip approval to the grievances of the proletariat, but who at the critical moment invariably runs to cover on the side of the masters of capitalism.’’ Again, a liberal is defined as ‘‘one who professes radical opinions in private but who never acts upon them for fear of losing entree into the courts of the mighty and respectable.’’ Such statements might be cited indefinitely. They indicate that, in the minds of many persons, liberalism has fallen between two stools, so that it is conceived as the refuge of those unwilling to take a decided stand in the social conflicts going on. It is called mealy--mouthed, a milk---and---water doctrine and so on. Popular sentiment, especially in this country, is subject to rapid changes of fashion. It was not a long time ago that liberalism was a term of praise; to be liberal was to be progressive, forward---looking, free from prejudice, characterized by all admirable qualities. I do not think, however, that this particular shift can be dismissed as a mere fluctuation of intellectual fashion. Three of the great nations of Europe have summarily suppressed the civil liberties for which liberalism valiantly strove, and in few countries of the Continent are they maintained with vigor. It is true that none of the nations in question has any long history of devotion to liberal ideals. But the new attacks proceed from those who profess they are concerned to change not to preserve old institutions. It is well known that everything for which liberalism stands is put in peril in times of war. In a world crisis, its ideals and methods are equally challenged; the belief spread that liberalism flourishes only in times of fair social weather. It is hardly possible to refrain from asking what liberalism really is; what elements, if any, of permanent value it contains, and how these values shall be maintained and developed in the conditions the world now faces. On my own account, I have raised these questions. I have wanted to find out whether it is possible for a person to continue, honestly and intelligently, to be a liberal, and if the answer be in the affirmative, what kind of liberal faith should be asserted today. Since I do not suppose that I am the only one who has put such questions to himself, I am setting forth the conclusions to which my examination of the problem has led me. If there is danger, on one side, of cowardice and evasion, there is danger on the other side of losing the sense of historic perspective and of yielding precipitately to short---time contemporary currents, abandoning in panic things of enduring and priceless value. The natural beginning of the inquiry in which we are engaged is consideration of the origin and past development of liberalism. It is to this topic that the present chapter is devoted. The conclusion reached from a

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brief survey of history, namely, that liberalism has had a chequered career, and that it has meant in practice things so different as to be opposed to one another, might perhaps have been anticipated without prolonged examination of its past. But location and description of the ambiguities that cling to the career of liberalism will be of assistance in the attempt to determine its significance for today and tomorrow. The use of the words liberal and liberalism to denote a particular social philosophy does not appear to occur earlier than the first decade of the nineteenth century. But the thing to which the words are applied is older. It might be traced back to Greek thought; some of its ideas, especially as tot the importance of the free play of intelligence, may be found notably expressed in the funeral oration attributed to Pericles. But for the present purpose it is not necessary to go back of John Locke, the philosopher of the ‘‘glorious revolution’’ of 1688. The outstanding points of Locke’s version of liberalism are that governments are instituted to protect the rights that belong to individuals prior to political organization of social relations. These rights are those summed up a century later in the American Declaration of Independence: the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Among the ‘‘natural’’ rights especially emphasized by Locke is that of property, originating, according to him, in the fact that an individual has ‘‘mixed’’ himself, through his labor, with some natural hitherto unappropriated object. This view was directed against levies on property made by rules without authorization from the representatives of the people. The theory culminated in justifying the right of revolution. Since governments are instituted to protect the natural rights of individuals, they lose claim to obedience when they invade and destroy these rights instead of safeguarding them: a doctrine that well served the aims of our forefathers in their revolt against British rule, and that also found an extended application in the French Revolution of 1789. The impact of this earlier liberalism is evidently political. Yet one of Locke’s greatest interests was to uphold toleration in an age when intolerance was rife, persecution of dissenters in faith almost the rule, and when wars, civil and between nations, had a religious color. In serving the immediate needs of England---and then those of other countries in which it was desired to substitute representative for arbitrary government---it bequeathed to later social thought a rigid doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization. It gave a directly practical import to the older semi-theological and semi-metaphysical conception of natural law as supreme over positive law

210 The New Deal and gave a new version of the old idea that natural law is the counterpart of reason, being disclosed by the natural light with which man is endowed. The whole temper of this philosophy is individualistic in the sense in which individualism is opposed to organized social action. It held to the primacy of the individual over the state not only in time but in moral authority. It defined the individual in terms of liberties of thought and action already possessed by him in some mysterious ready---made fashion, and which it was the sole business of the state to safeguard. Reason was also made an inherent endowment of the individual, expressed in men’s moral relations to one another, but not sustained and developed because of these relations. It followed that the great enemy of individual liberty was thought to be government because of its tendency to encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals. Later liberalism inherited this conception of a natural antagonism between the individual and organized society. There still lingers in the minds of some the notion that there are two different ‘‘spheres’’ of action and of rightful claims; that of political society and that of the individual, and that in the interest of the latter the former must be as contracted as possible. Not till the second half of the nineteenth century did the idea arise that government might and should be an instrument for securing and extending the liberties of individuals. This later aspect of liberalism is perhaps foreshadowed in the clauses of our Constitution that confer upon Congress power to provide for ‘‘public welfare’’ as well as for public safety. . . . The idealistic philosophy taught that men are held together by the relations that proceed from and that manifest an ultimate cosmic mind. It followed that the basis of society and the state is shared intelligence and purpose, not force nor yet self-interest. The state is a moral organism, of which government is one organ. Only by participating in the common purpose as it works for the common good can individual human beings realize their true individualities and become truly free. The state is but one organ among many of the Spirit and Will that holds all things together and that makes human beings members of one another. It does not originate the moral claim of individuals to the full realization of their potentialities as vehicles of objective thought and purpose. Moreover, the motives it can directly appeal to are not of the highest kind. But it is the business of the state to protect all forms and to promote all modes of human association in which the moral claims of the members of society are embodied and which serve as the means of voluntary self--realization. Its business is negatively to remove the

obstacles that stand in the way of individuals coming to consciousness of themselves for what they are, and positively to promote the cause of public education. Unless the state does this work it is no state. These philosophical liberals pointed out the restrictions, economic and political, which prevent many, probably majority, of individuals from the voluntary intelligent action by which they may become what they are capable of becoming. The teachings of this new liberal school affected the thoughts and actions of multitudes who did not trouble themselves to understand the philosophical doctrine that underlay it. They served to break down the idea that freedom is something that individuals have as a ready---made possession, and to instill the idea that it is something to be achieved, while the possibility of the achievement was shown to be conditioned by the institutional medium in which an individual lives. These new liberals fostered the idea that the state has the responsibility for creating institutions under which individuals can effectively realize the potentialities that are theirs. Thus from various sources and under various influences there developed an inner split in liberalism. This cleft is one cause of the ambiguity from which liberalism still suffers and which explains a growing impotency. These are still those who call themselves liberals who define liberalism in terms of the old opposition between the province of organized social action and the province of purely individual initiative and effort. In the name of liberalism they are jealous of every extension of governmental activity. They may grudgingly concede the need of special measures of protection and alleviation undertaken by the state at times of great social stress, but they are the confirmed enemies of social legislation (even prohibition of child labor), as standing measures of political policy. Wittingly or unwittingly, they still provide the intellectual system of apologetics for the existing economic regime, which they strangely, it would seem ironically, uphold as a regime of individual liberty for all. But the majority who call themselves liberals today are committed to the principle that organized society must use its powers to establish the conditions under which the mass of individuals can possess actual as distinct from merely legal liberty. They define their liberalism in the concrete in terms of a program of measures moving toward this end. They believe that the conception of the state which limits the activities of the latter to keeping order as between individuals and to securing redress for one person when another person infringes the liberty existing law has given him, is in effect simply a justification of the brutalities

6.4 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action and inequities of the existing order. Because of this internal division within liberalism its later history is wavering and confused. The inheritance of the past still causes many liberals, who believe in a generous use of the powers of organized society to change the terms on which human beings associate together, to stop short with merely protective and alleviatory measures---a fact that partly explains why another school always refers to ‘‘reform’’ with scorn. It will be the object of the next chapter to portray the crisis in liberalism, the impasse in which it now almost finds itself, and through criticism of the deficiencies of earlier liberalism to suggest the way in which liberalism may resolve the crisis, and emerge as a compact, aggressive force. . . . When it became evident that disparity, not equality, was the actual consequence of laissez faire liberalism, defenders of the latter developed a double system of justifying apologetics. Upon one front, they fell back upon the natural inequalities of individuals in psychological and moral make-up, asserting that inequality of fortune and economic status is the ‘‘natural’’ and justifiable consequence of the free play of these inherent differences. Herbert Spencer even erected this idea into a principle of cosmic justice, based upon the idea of the proportionate relation existing between cause and effect. I fancy that today there are but few who are hardy enough, even admitting the principle of natural inequalities, to assert that the disparities of property and income bear any commensurate ratio to inequalities in the native constitution of individuals. If we suppose that there is in fact such a ratio, the consequences are so intolerable that the practical inference to be drawn is that organized social effort should intervene to prevent the alleged natural law from taking full effect. The other line of defense is unceasing glorification of the virtues of initiative, independence, choice and responsibility, virtues that centre in and proceed from individuals as such. I am one who believes that we need more, not fewer, ‘‘rugged individuals’’ and it is in the name of rugged individualism that I challenge the argument. Instead of independence, there exists parasitical dependence on a wide scale---witness the present need for the exercise of charity, private and public, on a vast scale. The current argument against the public dole on the ground that it pauperizes and demoralizes those who receive it has an ironical sound when it comes from those who would leave intact the conditions that cause the necessity for recourse to the method of support of millions at public expense. Servility and regimentation are the result of control by the

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few of access to means of productive labor on the part of the many. An even more serious objection to the argument is that it conceives of initiative, vigor, independence exclusively in terms of their least significant manifestation. They are limited to exercise in the economic area. The meaning of their exercise in connection with the cultural resources of civilization, in such matters as companionship, science and art, is all but ignored. It is at this last point in particular that the crisis of liberalism and the need for a reconsideration of it in terms of the genuine liberation of individuals are most evident. The enormous exaggeration of material and materialistic economics that now prevails at the expense of cultural values, is not itself the result of earlier liberalism. But, as was illustrated in the personal crisis through which Mill passed, it is an exaggeration which is favored, both intellectually and morally, by fixation of the early creed. This fact induces a natural transition from the concept of liberty to that of the individual. The underlying philosophy and psychology of earlier liberalism led to a conception of individuality as something ready--made, already possessed, and needing only the removal of certain legal restrictions to come into full play. It was not conceived as a moving thing, something that is attained only by continuous growth. Because of this failure, the dependence in fact of individuals upon social conditions was made little of. It is true that some of the early liberals, like John Stuart Mill, made much of the effect of ‘‘circumstances’’ in producing differences among individuals. But the use of the word and idea of ‘‘circumstances’’ is significant. It suggests---and the context bears out the suggestion---that social arrangements and institutions were thought of as things that operate from without, not entering in any significant way into the internal make-up and growth of individuals. Social arrangements were treated not as positive forces but as external limitations. Some passages in Mill’s discussion of the logic of the social sciences are pertinent. ‘‘Men in a state of society are still men; their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into a different kind of substance, as hydrogen and oxygen differ from water . . . Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of individual men.’’ And again he says: ‘‘The actions and feelings of men in the social state are entirely governed by psychological laws.’’ There is an implication in these passages that liberals will be the last to deny. This implication is directly in line with Mill’s own revolt against the creed in

212 The New Deal which he was educated. As far as the statements are a warning against attaching undue importance to merely external institutional changes, to changes that do not enter into the desires, purposes and beliefs of the very constitution of individuals, they express an idea to which liberalism is committed by its own nature. But Mill means something at once less and more than this. While he would probably have denied that he held to the notion of a state of nature in which individuals exist prior to entering into a social state, he is in fact giving a psychological version of that doctrine. Individuals, it is implied, have a full-blown psychological and moral nature, having its own set laws, independently of their association with one another. It is the psychological laws of this isolated human nature from which social laws are derived and into which they may be resolved. His own illustration of water in its difference from hydrogen and oxygen on separation might have taught him better, if it had not been for the influence of a prior dogma. That the human infant is modified in mind and character by his connection with others in family life and that the modification continues throughout life as his connections with others broaden, is as true as that hydrogen is modified when it combines with oxygen. If we generalize the meaning of this fact, it is evident that while there are native organic or biological structures that remain fairly constant, the actual ‘‘laws’’ of human nature are laws of individuals in association, not of beings in a mythical condition apart from association. In other words, liberalism that takes its profession of the importance of individuality with sincerity must be deeply concerned about the structure of human association. For the latter operates to affect negatively and positively, the development of individuals. Because a wholly unjustified idea of opposition between individuals and society has become current, and because its currency has been furthered by the underlying philosophy of individualistic liberalism, there are many who in fact are working for social changes such that rugged individuals may exist in reality, that have become contemptuous of the very idea of individuality, while others support in the name of individualism institutions that militate powerfully against the emergence and growth of beings possessed of genuine individuality. . . . Humanly speaking, the crisis in liberalism was a product of particular historical events. Soon after liberal tenets were formulated as eternal truths, it became an instrument of vested interests in opposition to further social change, a ritual of lip---service, or else was shattered by new forces that came in. Nevertheless, the ideas of liberty, of individuality and of freed

intelligence have an enduring value, a value never more needed than now. It is the business of liberalism to state these values in ways, intellectual and practical, that are relevant to present needs and forces. If we employ the conception of historic relativity, nothing is clearer than that the conception of historic relativity, nothing is clearer than that the conception of liberty is always relative to forces that at a given time and place are increasingly felt to be oppressive. Liberty in the concrete signifies release from the impact of particular oppressive forces; emancipation from something once taken as a normal part of human life but now experienced as bondage. At one time, liberty signified liberation from chattel slavery; at another time, release of a class from serfdom. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries it meant liberation from despotic dynastic rule. A century later it meant release of industrialists from inherited legal customs that hampered the rise of new forces of production. Today, it signifies liberation from material insecurity and from the coercions and repressions that prevent multitudes from participation in the vast cultural resources that are at hand. The direct impact of liberty always has to do with some class or group that is suffering in a special way from some form of constraint exercised by the distribution of powers that exists in contemporary society. Should a classless society ever come into being the formal concept of liberty would lose its significance, because the fact for which it stands would have become an integral part of the established relations of human beings to one another. Until such a time arrives liberalism will continue to have a necessary social office to perform. Its task is the mediation of social transitions. This phrase may seem to some to be a virtual admission that liberalism is a colorless ‘‘middle of the road’’ doctrine. Not so, even though liberalism has sometimes taken that form in practice. We are always dependent upon the experience that has accumulated in the past and yet there are always new forces are to operate and the new needs to be satisfied, a reconstruction of the patterns of old experience. The old and the new have forever to be integrated with each other, so that the values of old experience may become the servants and instruments of new desires and aims. We are always possessed by habits and customs, and this fact signifies that we are always influenced by the inertia and the momentum of forces temporally outgrown but nevertheless still present with us as a part of our being. Human life gets set in patterns, institutional and moral. But change is also with us and demands the constant remaking of old habits and old ways of thinking, desiring and acting.

6.4 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action The effective ration between the old and the stabilizing and the new and disturbing is very different at different times. Sometimes whole communities seem to be dominated by custom, and changes are produced only by irruptions and invasions from outside. Sometimes, as a present, change is so varied and accelerated that customs seem to be dissolving before our very eyes. But be the ratio little or great, there is always an adjustment to be made, and as soon as the need for it becomes conscious, liberalism has a function and a meaning. It is not that liberalism creates the need, but that the necessity for adjustment defines the office of liberalism. For the only adjustment that does not have to be made over again, and perhaps even under more unfavorable circumstances than when it was first attempted, is that effected through intelligence as a method. In its large sense, this remaking of the old through union with the new is precisely what intelligence is. It is conversion of past experience into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in the future and that indicate how to realize what is desired. Every problem that arises, personal or collective, simple or complex, is solved only by selecting material from the store of knowledge amasses in past experience and by bringing into play habits already formed. But the knowledge and the habits have to be modified to meet the new conditions that have arisen. In collective problems, the habits that are involved are traditions and institutions. The standing danger is either that they will be acted upon implicitly, without reconstruction to meet new conditions, or else that there will be an impatient and blind rush forward, directed only by some dogma rigidly adhered to. The office of intelligence in every problem that either a person or a community meets is to effect a working connection between old habits, customs, institutions, beliefs, and new conditions. What I have called the mediating function of liberalism is all one with the work of intelligence. This fact is the root, whether it be consciously realized or not, of the emphasis placed by liberalism upon the role of freed intelligence as the method of directing social action. Objections that are brought against liberalism ignore the fact that the only alternatives to dependence upon intelligence are either drift and casual improvisation, or the use of coercive force stimulated by unintelligent emotion and fanatical domatism---the latter being intolerant by its very constitution. The objection that the method of intelligence has been tried and failed is wholly aside from the point, since the crux of the present situation is that it has not been tried under such

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conditions as now exist. It has not been tried at any time with use of all the resources that scientific material and the experimental method now put at our disposal. It is also said that intelligence is cold and that persons are moved to new ways of acting only by emotion, just as habit makes them adhere to old ways. Of course, intelligence does not generate action except as it is enkindled by feeling. But the notion that there is some inherent opposition between emotion and intelligence is a relic of the notion of mind that grew up before the experimental method of science had emerged. For the latter method signifies the union of ideas with action, a union that is intimate; and action generates and supports emotion. Ideas that are framed to be put into operation for the sake of guiding action are imbued with all the motional force that attaches to the ends proposed for action, and are accompanied with all the excitement and inspiration that attends the struggle to realize the ends proposed for action, and are accompanied with all the excitement and inspiration that attends the struggle to realize the ends. Since the ends of liberalism are liberty and the opportunity of individuals to secure full realization of their potentialities, all of the emotional intensity that belongs to these ends gathers about the ideas and acts that are necessary to make them real. Again, it is said that the average citizen is not endowed with the degree of intelligence that the use of it as a method demands. This objection, supported by alleged scientific findings about heredity and by impressive statistics concerning the intelligence quotient of the average citizen, rests wholly upon the old notion that intelligence is a ready-made possession of individuals. The last stand of oligarchical and anti-social seclusion is perpetuation of this purely individualistic notion of intelligence. The reliance of liberalism is not upon the mere abstraction of a native endowment unaffected by social relationships, but upon the fact that native capacity is sufficient to enable the average individual to respond to and to use the knowledge and the skill that are embodied in the social conditions in which he lives, moves and has his being. There are few individuals who have the native capacity that was required to invent the stationary steam-engine, locomotive, dynamo or telephone. But there are none so mean that they cannot intelligently utilize these embodiments of intelligence once they are a part of the organized means of associated living. The indictments that are drawn against the intelligence of individuals are in truth indictments of a social order that does not permit the average individual to have access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth

214 The New Deal of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes. There does not now exist the kind of social organization that even permits the average human being to share the potentially available social intelligence. Still else is there a social order that has for one of its chief purposes the establishment of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate and use what is at hand. Back of the appropriation by the few of the material resources of society lies the appropriation by the few in behalf of their own ends of the cultural, the spiritual, resources that are the product not of the individuals who have taken possession but of the cooperative work of humanity. It is useless to talk about the failure of democracy until the source of its failure has been grasped and steps are taken to bring about that type of social organization that will encourage the socialized extension of intelligence. The crisis in liberalism, as I said at the outset, proceeds from the fact that after early liberalism had done its work, society faced a new problem, that of social organization. Its work was to liberate a group of individuals, representing the new science and the new forces of productivity, from customs, ways of thinking, institutions, that were oppressive of the new modes of social action, however useful they may have been in their day. The instruments of analysis, of criticism, of dissolution, that were employed were effective for the work of release. But when it came to the problem of organizing the new forces and the individuals whose modes of life they radically altered into a coherent social organization, possessed of intellectual and moral directive power, liberalism was well-nigh impotent. The rise of national polities that pretend to represent the order, discipline and spiritual authority that will counteract social disintegration is a tragic comment upon the unpreparedness of older liberalism to deal with the new problem which its very success precipitated. But the values of freed intelligence, of liberty, of opportunity for every individual to realize the potentialities of which he is possessed, are too precious to be sacrificed to a regime of despotism, especially when the regime is in such large measure merely the agent of a dominant economic class in its struggle to keep and extend the gains it has amassed at the expense of genuine social order, unity, and development. Liberalism has to gather itself together to formulate the ends to which it is devoted in terms of means that are relevant to the contemporary situation. The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively

controlled and used in the interest of the effect liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that constitute society. Such a social order cannot be established by an unplanned and external convergence of the actions of separate individuals, each of whom is bent on personal private advantage. This idea is the Achilles heel of early liberalism. The idea that liberalism cannot maintain its ends and at the same time reverse its conception of the means by which they are to be attained is folly. The ends can now be achieved only by reversal of the means to which early liberalism was committed. Organized social planning, put into effect for the creation of an order in which industry and finance are socially directed in behalf of institutions that provide the material basis for the cultural liberation and growth of individuals, is now the sole method of social action by which liberalism can realize its professed aims. Such planning demands in turn a new conception and logic of freed intelligence as a social force. To these phases of a renascent liberalism, I turn in the chapter that follows.

6.5 Huey Long, Speech to the American People, March 7, 1935 Washington, D.C. . . . The trouble with the Roosevelt administration is that when their schemes and isms have failed, these things I told them not to do and voted not to do, that they think it will help them to light out on those of us who warned them in the beginning that the tangled messes and noble experiments would not work. The Roosevelt administration has had its way for two years. They have been allowed to set up or knock down anything and everybody. There was one difference between [Herbert] Hoover and Roosevelt. Hoover could not get the Congress to carry out the schemes he wanted to try. We managed to lick him on a roll call in the United States Senate time after time. But, different with Mr. Roosevelt. He got his plans through Congress. But on cold analysis they were found to be the same things Hoover tried to pass and failed. The kitchen cabinet that sat in to advise Hoover was not different from the kitchen cabinet which advised Roosevelt. Many of the persons are the same. Many of those in Roosevelt’s kitchen cabinet are of the same men or set of men who furnished employees to sit in the kitchen cabinet to advise Hoover. Maybe you see a little change in the man waiting on the tables, but back in the kitchen the same set of cooks

6.5 Huey Long, Speech to the American People are fixing up the victuals for us that cooked up the mess under Hoover. Why, do you think this Roosevelt’s plan for plowing up cotton, corn, and wheat; and for pouring milk in the river, and for destroying and burying hogs and cattle by the millions, all while people starve and go naked--do you think those plans were the original ideas of this Roosevelt administration? If you do, you are wrong. The whole idea of that kind of thing first came from Hoover’s administration. Don’t you remember when Mr. Hoover proposed to plow up every fourth row of cotton? We laughed him into scorn. President Roosevelt flayed him for proposing such a thing in the speech which he made from the steps of the capitol in Topeka, Kans. And so we beat Mr. Hoover on his plan. But when Mr. Roosevelt started on his plan, it was not to plow up every fourth row of cotton as Hoover tried to do. Roosevelt’s plan was to plow up every third row of cotton, just one-twelfth more cotton to be plowed up than Hoover proposed. Roosevelt succeeded in his plan. So it has been that while millions have starved and gone naked; so it has been that while babies have cried and died for milk; so it has been that while people have begged for meat and bread, Mr. Roosevelt’s administration has sailed merrily along, plowing under and destroying the things to eat and to wear, with teardimmed eyes and hungry souls made to chant for this new deal so that even their starvation dole is not taken away, and meanwhile the food and clothes craved by their bodies and souls go for destruction and ruin. What is it? Is it government? Maybe so. It looks more like St. Vitus dance. . . . It was under this NRA and the other funny alphabetical combinations which followed it that we ran the whole country into a mares nest. The Farleys and Johnsons combed the land with agents, inspectors, supervisors, detectives, secretaries, assistants, etc., all armed with the power to arrest and send to jail whomever they found not living up to some rule in one of these 900 catalogs. One man whose case reached the Supreme Court of the United States was turned loose because they couldn’t even find the rule he was supposed to have violated in a search throughout the United States. And now it is with PWA’s, CWA’s, NRA’s, AAA’s, J-UG’s, G-IN’s, and every other flimsy combination that the country finds its affairs and business tangled to where no one can recognize it. More men are now out of work than ever; the debt of the United States has gone up another $10 billion. There is starvation; there is homelessness; there is misery on every hand and

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corner, but mind you, in the meantime, Mr. Roosevelt has had his way. He is one man that can’t blame any of his troubles on HUEY LONG. He has had his way. Down in my part of the country if any man has the measles he blames that on me; but there is one man that can’t blame anything on anybody but himself, and that is Mr. Franklin De-La-No Roosevelt. And now, on top of that, they order war on me because nearly 4 years ago I told Hoover’s crowd it wouldn’t do and because 3 years ago I told Roosevelt and his crowd it wouldn’t do. In other words, they are in a rage at HUEY LONG because I have said, ‘‘I told you so.’’ I am not overstating the conditions now prevailing in this country. In their own words they have confessed all I now say or ever have said. Mr. Roosevelt and even Mrs. Roosevelt have bewailed the fact that food, clothes, and shelter have not been provided for the people. Even Gen. Hugh S. Johnson said in his speech of Monday night that there are 80 million people in America who are badly hurt or wrecked by this depression. Mr. Harry Hopkins, who runs the relief work, says the dole roll has risen now to 22,375,000 persons, the highest it has ever been. And now, what is there for the Roosevelt crowd to do but to admit the facts and admit further that they are now on their third year, making matters worse instead of better all the time? No one is to blame, except them, for what is going on because they have had their way. And if they couldn’t change the thing in over two years, now bogged down worse than ever, how could anyone expect any good of them hereafter? God save us two more years of the disaster we have had under that gang. Now, my friends, when this condition of distress and suffering among so many millions of our people began to develop in the Hoover administration, we knew then what the trouble was and what we would have to do to correct it. I was the first man to say publicly---but Mr. Roosevelt followed in my tracks a few months later and said the same thing. We said that all of our trouble and woe was due to the fact that too few of our people owned too much of our wealth. We said that in our land, with too much to eat, and too much to wear, and too many houses to live in, too many automobiles to be sold, that the only trouble was that the people suffered in the land of abundance because too few controlled the money and the wealth and too many did not have money with which to buy the things they needed for life and comfort. . . . The 125 million people of America have seated themselves at the barbecue table to consume the products which have been guaranteed to them by their Lord

216 The New Deal and Creator. There is provided by the Almighty what it takes for them all to eat; yea, more. There is provided more than what is needed for all to eat. But the financial masters of America have taken off the barbecue table 90 percent of the food placed thereon by God, through the labors of mankind, even before the feast begins, and there is left on that table to be eaten by 125 million people less than should be there for 10 million of them. What has become of the remainder of those things placed on the table by the Lord for the use of us all? They are in the hands of the Morgans, the Rockefellers, the Mellons, the Baruches, the Bakers, the Astors, and the Vanderbilts---600 families at the most either possessing or controlling the entire 90 percent of all that is in America. They cannot eat the food, they cannot wear the clothes, so they destroy it. They have it rotted; they plow it up; they pour it into the rivers; they bring destruction through the acts of mankind to let humanity suffer; to let humanity go naked; to let humanity go homeless, so that nothing may occur that will do harm to their vanity and to their greed. Like the dog in the manger, they command a wagon load of hay, which the dog would not allow the cow to eat, though he could not eat it himself. So now, ladies and gentlemen, we come to that plan of mine for which I have been so roundly denounced and condemned by such men as Mr. Farley, Mr. Robinson, and Gen. Hugh S. Johnson, and other spellers and speakers and spoilers of the Roosevelt administration. It is for the redistribution of wealth and for guaranteeing comforts and conveniences to all humanity out of this abundance in our country. I hope none will be horrorstricken when they hear me say that we must limit the size of the big man’s fortune in order to guarantee a minimum of fortune, life and comfort to the little man; but, if you are, think first that such is the declaration on which Roosevelt rode into the nomination and election of President. While my urgings are declared by some to be the average of a madman, and by such men as General Johnson as insincere bait of a pied piper, if you will listen to me you will find that it is restating the laws handed down by God to man; you will find that it was the exact provision of the contract and law of the Pilgrim Fathers who landed at Plymouth in 1620. Here’s what the Pilgrim Fathers said in the contract with the early settlers in the year 1620. I read you article 5 from that contract: ‘‘5. That at ye end of ye 7. years, ye capital & profits, viz. the houses, lands, goods, and chattels, be equally divided betwixt ye adventurers, and planters; which done, every man shall be free from

other of them of any debt or detriment concerning this adventure.’’ So the Pilgrim Fathers wrote into the covenant to do just exactly what the Bible said to do, that they should have an equal division of the wealth every seven years. I don’t go that far; I merely advocate that no man be allowed to become so big that he makes paupers out of a million other people. You will find that it is the cornerstone on which nearly every religion since the beginning of man has been founded. You will find that it was urged by Bacon, Milton, and Shakespeare in England, by Socrates, Plato, Theognis, and other wisest of men in Greece, by Pope Pius XI in the Vatican, by the world’s greatest inventor, Marconi in Italy, by Daniel Webster, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Jackson, William Jennings Bryan, and Theodore Roosevelt in the United States, as well as by nearly all of the thousands of great men whose names are yet mentioned in history. The principle was not only the mainspring of Roosevelt’s nomination and election, but in the closing speech of Herbert Hoover at Madison Square Garden in November 1932, even Hoover said: ‘‘My conception of America is a land where men and women may walk in ordered liberty, where they may enjoy the advantages of wealth, not concentrated in the hands of a few but diffused through the lives of all.’’ And so now I come to give you again that plan, taken from these leaders of all times and from the Bible, for the sponsoring of which I am labeled America’s menace, madman, pied piper, and demagogue. I propose: First. That every big fortune shall be cut down immediately by a capital levy tax to where no one will own more than a few million dollars, as a matter of fact, to where no one can very long own a fortune in excess of about three to four millions of dollars. I propose that the surplus of all the big fortunes, above the few millions to any one person at the most, shall go into the United States ownership. How would we get all these surplus fortunes into the United States Treasury? Not hard to do. We would not do it by making everyone sell what he owned; no. We would send everyone a questionnaire. On that he would list the properties he owns, lands and houses, stocks and bonds, factories and patents, and so on. Every man would place his appraisal on his property, which the Government would review and maybe change on some items. On that appraisal the big fortune holder would say out of what property he would retain the few millions allowed to him, the balance to go to the United States. Say

6.5 Huey Long, Speech to the American People Mr. Henry Ford should allow that he owned all the stock of the Ford Motor Co., worth, say, $2 billion; he could claim, say $4 million of the Ford stock, but $1,996,000,000 would go to the United States. Say the Rockefeller fortune was listed at $10 billion in oil stocks, bank stocks, money, and stores. Each Rockefeller could say whether he wanted his limit in either the money, oil, or bank stocks, but about nine billion and eight hundred million would go to the Government. And so, in this way, the Government of the United States would come into the possession of about twofifths of its wealth, which on normal values would be worth, say, $165 billion. Then we would turn to the inventories of the 25 million families of America. All those who showed properties and money clear of debts that were above $5,000 and up to the limit of a few millions would not be touched. But those showing less than $5,000 to the family free of debt would be added to, so that every family would start life again with homestead possessions of at least a home and the comforts needed for a home, including such things as a radio and an automobile. These things would go to every family as a homestead, not to be sold either for debts or taxes or even by consent of the owner except by the consent of the court or Government, and then only on condition that the court hold it to be spent for the purpose of buying another home and comforts thereof. Such would mean that the $165 billion or more taken from big fortunes would have about $100 billion of it used to provide all with the comforts of home and living. The Government might have to issue warrants for claim and location, or even currency to be retired from such property as was claimed, but all that is a detail not impractical to get these homes into the hands of the people. So America would start again with millionaires, but no multi-millionaires or billionaires; with some poor, but none too poor to be denied the comforts of life. America, however, would still have maybe a $65 billion balance from these big fortunes not yet used to set up the poor people. What would we do with that? Wait a moment. I am coming to that, too. Second. We propose that after homes and comforts of homes have been set up for the families of the country, that we shall turn our attention to the children and the youth of the land, providing first for their education and training. We would not have to worry about the problem of child labor, because the very first thing which we would place in front of every child would be not only a comfortable home during his early years but the opportunity for education

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and training, not only through the grammar school and the high school but through college and to include vocational and professional training for every child. If necessary, that would include the living cost of that child while he attended college, if one should be too distant for him to live at home and conveniently attend, as would be the case with many of those living in the rural areas. We now have an educational system, and in States like Louisiana---and it is the best one---where school books are furnished free to every child and where transportation by bus is given to every student, however far he may live from a grammar or high school; there is a fairly good assurance of education through grammar and high school for the child whose father and mother have enough at home to feed and clothe them. But when it comes to a matter of college education, except in few cases the right to a college education is determined at this day and time by the financial ability of the father and mother to pay for the cost and the expense of a college education. It don’t make any difference how brilliant a boy or girl may be, that don’t give them the right to a college education in America today. Now, Gen. Hugh Johnson says I am indeed a very smart demagogue, a wise and dangerous menace. But I am one of those who didn’t have the opportunity to secure a college education or training. We propose that the right to education and the extent of education shall be determined and gauged not so much by the financial ability of the parents but by the mental ability and energy of a child to absorb the learning at a college. This should appeal to General Johnson, who says I am a smart man, since, had I enjoyed the learning and college training which my plan would provide for others, I might not have fallen into the path of the dangerous menace and demagogue that he has now found me to be. Remember, we have $65 billion to account for that would lie in the hands of the United States, even after providing home comforts for all families. We will use a large part of it immediately to expand particularly the colleges and universities of this country. You would not know the great institutions like Yale, Harvard, and Louisiana State University. Get ready for a surprise. College enrollments would multiply 1,000 percent. We would immediately call in the architects and engineers, the idle professors and scholars of learning. We would send out a hurry call because the problem of providing college education for all of the youth would start a fusillade of employment which might suddenly and immediately make it possible for us to shorten the

218 The New Deal hours of labor, even as we contemplate in the balance of our program. And how happy the youth of this land would be tomorrow morning if they knew instantly their right to a home and the comforts of a home and to complete college and professional training and education were assured! I know how happy they would be, because I know how I would have felt had such a message been delivered to my door. I cannot deliver that promise to the youth of this land tonight, but I am doing my part. I am standing the blows; I am hearing the charges hurled at me from the four quarters of the country. It is the same fight which was made against me in Louisiana when I was undertaking to provide the free school books, free busses, university facilities, and things of that kind to educate the youth of that State as best I could. It is the same blare which I heard when I was undertaking to provide for the sick and the afflicted. When the youth of this land realizes what is meant and what is contemplated the billingsgate and the profanity of all the Farleys and Johnsons in America can’t prevent the light of truth from hurling itself in understandable letters against the dark canopy of the sky. Now, when we have landed at the place where homes and comforts are provided for all families and complete education and training for all young men and women, the next problem is what about our income to sustain our people thereafter. How shall that be arranged to guarantee all the fair share of what soul and body need to sustain them conveniently. That brings us to our next point. We propose: No. 3. We shall shorten the hours of labor by law so much as may be necessary that none will be worked too long and none unemployed. We shall cut the hours of toil to 30 hours per week, maybe less; we may cut the working year to 11 months’ work and 1 month’s vacation; maybe less. If our great improvement programs show we need more labor than we may have, we will lengthen the hours as convenience requires. At all events, the hours for production will be gauged to meet the market for consumption. We will need all our machinery for many years, because we have much public improvement to do; and, further, the more use that we may make of them, the less toil will be required for all of us to survive in splendor. Now, a minimum earning would be established for any person with a family to support. It would be such a living which one, already owning a home, could maintain a family in comfort, of not less than $2,500 per year to every family.

And now by reason of false statements made, particularly by Mr. Arthur Brisbane and Gen. Hugh S. Johnson, I must make answer to show you that there is more than enough in this country and more than enough raised and made every year to do what I propose. Mr. Brisbane says I am proposing to give every person $15,000 for a home and its comforts, and he says that would mean the United States would have to be worth over a trillion dollars. Why make that untrue statement, Mr. Brisbane? You know that is not so. I do not propose any home and comfort of $15,000 to each person---it is a minimum of $5,000 to every family, which would be less than $125 billion, which is less than one-third of this Nation’s wealth in normal times of $400 billion. General Johnson says that my proposal is for $5,000 guaranteed earning to each family, which he says would cost from four to five hundred millions of dollars per year, which he says is four times more than our whole national income ever has been. Why make such untrue statements, General Johnson? Must you be a false witness to argue your point? I do not propose $5,000 income per year to each family. I propose a minimum of from $2,000 to $2,500 income per year to each family. For 25 million families that minimum income per family would require from $50 billion to $60.6 billion. In the prosperous days we have had nearly double that for income some years already, which allowed plenty for the affluent; but with the unheard prosperity we would have, if all our people could buy what they need, our national income would be double what it has ever been. The Wall Street writer and statistician says we could have an income of at least $10,000 to every family in goods if all worked short hours and none were idle. According to him, only one-fourth of the average income would carry out my plan. And now I come to the remainder of the plan. We propose: No. 4. That agricultural production will be cared for in the manner specified in the Bible. We would plow under no crops; we would burn no corn; we would spill no milk into the river; we would shoot no hogs; would slaughter no cattle to be rotted. What we would do is this: We would raise all the cotton that we could raise, all the corn that we could raise, and everything else that we could raise. Let us say, for example, that we raised more cotton than we could use. But here again I wish to surprise you when I say that if everyone could buy all the towels, all the sheets, all

6.5 Huey Long, Speech to the American People the bedding, all the clothing, all the carpets, all the window curtains, and all of everything else he reasonably needs; America would consume 20 million bales of cotton per year without having to sell a bale to the foreign countries. The same would be true of the wheat crop, and of the corn crop, and of the meat crop. Whenever everyone could buy the things he desires to eat, there would be no great excess in any of those food supplies. But for the sake of the argument, let us say, however, that there would be a surplus. And I hope there will be, because it will do the country good to have a big surplus. Let us take cotton as an example. Let us say that the United States will have a market for 10 million bales of cotton and that we raise 15 million bales of cotton. We will store 5 million bales in warehouses provided by the Government. If the next year we raise 15 million bales of cotton and only need 10, we will store another 5 million bales of cotton, and the Government will care for that. When we reach the year when we have enough cotton to last for twelve or eighteen months, we will plant no more cotton for that next year. The people will have their certificates of the Government which they can cash in for that year for the surplus, or if necessary, the Government can pay for the whole 15 million bales of cotton as it is produced every year; and when the year comes that we will raise no cotton, we will not leave the people idle and with nothing to do. That is the year when, in the cotton States, we will do our public improvement work that needs to be done so badly. We will care for the flood-control problems; we will extend the electricity lines into rural areas; we will widen roads and build more roads; and if we have a little time left, some of us can go back and attend a school for a few months and not only learn some of the things we have forgotten but we can learn some things that they have found out about that they didn’t know anything about when we were children. Now the example of what we would do about cotton is the same policy we would follow about all other crops. This program would necessitate the building of large storage plants, both heated and cold storage, and warehouses in all the counties of America, and that building program alone would take up all the idle people that America has today. But the money spent would go for good and would prevent any trouble happening in the future. And then there is another good thing. If we would fill these warehouses, then if there were to come a year of famine there would be enough on hand to feed and clothe the people of the Nation. It would be

219

the part of good sense to keep a year or two of stock on hand all the time to provide for an emergency, maybe to provide for war or other calamity. I give you the next step in our program: No. 5. We will provide for old-age pensions for those who reach the age of 60 and pay it to all those who have an income of less than $1,000 per year or less than $10,000 in property or money. This would relieve from the ranks of labor those persons who press down the price for the use of their flesh and blood. Now the person who reaches the age of 60 would already have the comforts of home as well as something else guaranteed by reason of the redistribution that had been made of things. They would be given enough more to give them a reasonably comfortable existence in their declining days. However, such would not come from a sales tax or taxes placed upon the common run of people. It would be supported from the taxes levied on those with big incomes and the yearly tax that would be levied on big fortunes, so that they would always be kept down to a few million dollars to any one person. No. 6. We propose that the obligations which this country owes to the veterans of its wars, including the soldiers’ bonus and to care for those who have been either incapacitated or disabled, would be discharged without stint or unreasonable limit. I have always supported each and every bill that has had to do with the payment of the bonus due to the ex-service men. I have always opposed reducing the allowances which they have been granted. It is an unfair thing for a country to begin its economy while big fortunes exist by inflicting misery on those who have borne the burden of national defense. Now, ladies and gentlemen, such is the shareour-wealth movement. What I have here stated to you will be found to be approved by the law of our Divine Maker. You will find it in the Book of Leviticus, from the twenty-fifth to the twenty-seventh chapters. You will find it in the writings of King Solomon. You will find it in the teachings of Christ. You will find it in the words of our great teachers and statesmen of all countries and of all times. If you care to write to me for such proof, I shall be glad to furnish it to you, free of expense, by mail. Will you not organize a share-our-wealth society in your community tonight or tomorrow to place this plan into law? You need it; your people need it. Write me, wire to me; get into this work with us if you believe we are right. Help to save humanity. Help to save this country. If you wish a copy of this speech or a copy of any other speech I have made, write me and it will be

220 The New Deal forwarded to you. You can reach me always in Washington, D. C. I thank you.

6.6 Social Security Act, 1935 The Social Security Act (Act of August 14, 1935) [H. R. 7260] An act to provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

Title I. Grants to States for Old-Age Assistance Appropriation SECTION 1. For the purpose of enabling each State to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to aged needy individuals, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1936, the sum of $49,750,000, and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year thereafter a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Social Security Board established by Title VII (hereinafter referred to as the Board), State plans for old-age assistance.

State Old-Age Assistance Plans SEC. 2. (a) A State plan for old-age assistance must (1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them; (2) provide for financial participation by the State; (3) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer the plan, or provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to supervise the administration of the plan; (4) provide for granting to any individual, whose claim for old-age assistance is denied, an opportunity for a fair hearing before such State agency; (5) provide such methods of

administration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of office, and compensation of personnel) as are found by the Board to be necessary for the efficient operation of the plan; (6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the Board may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the Board may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports; and (7) provide that, if the State or any of its political subdivisions collects from the estate of any recipient of old-age assistance any amount with respect to old-age assistance furnished him under the plan, one-half of the net amount so collected shall be promptly paid to the United States. Any payment so made shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the appropriation for the purposes of this title. (b) The Board shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a), except that it shall not approve any plan which imposes, as a condition of eligibility for old-age assistance under the plan: (1) An age requirement of more than sixty-five years, except that the plan may impose, effective until January 1, 1940, an age requirement of as much as seventy years; or (2) Any residence requirement which excludes any resident of the State who has resided therein five years during the nine years immediately preceding the application for oldage assistance and has resided therein continuously for one year immediately preceding the application; or (3) Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen of the United States . . .

Title II. Federal Old-Age Benefits Old-Age Reserve Account Section 201. (a) There is hereby created an account in the Treasury of the United States to be known as the Old-Age Reserve Account hereinafter in this title called the Account. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Account for each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, an amount sufficient as an annual premium to provide for the payments required under this title, such amount to be determined on a reserve basis in accordance with accepted actuarial principles, and based upon such tables of mortality as the Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time adopt, and upon an interest rate of 3 per centum per annum compounded annually. The Secretary of the Treasury shall submit annually to the Bureau of the Budget an estimate of the appropriations to be made to the Account.

6.6 Social Security Act 221

Old-Age Benefit Payments SEC. 202. (a) Every qualified individual (as defined in section 210) shall be entitled to receive, with respect to the period beginning on the date he attains the age of sixty-five, or on January 1, 1942, whichever is the later, and ending on the date of his death, an old-age benefit (payable as nearly as practicable in equal monthly installments) as follows: (1) If the total wages (as defined in section 210) determined by the Board to have been paid to him, with respect to employment (as defined in section 210) after December 31, 1936, and before he attained the age of sixty-five, were not more than $3,000, the old-age benefit shall be at a monthly rate of one-half of 1 per centum of such total wages; (2) If such total wages were more than $3,000, the old-age benefit shall be at a monthly rate equal to the sum of the following: (A) One-half of 1 per centum of $3,000; plus (B) One-twelfth of 1 per centum of the amount by which such total wages exceeded $3,000 and did not exceed $45,000; plus (C) One-twenty-fourth of 1 per centum of the amount by which such total wages exceeded $45,000.

Payments Upon Death SEC. 203. (a) If any individual dies before attaining the age of sixty-five, there shall be paid to his estate an amount equal to 3 per centum of the total wages determined by the Board to have been paid to him, with respect to employment after December 31, 1936. (b) If the Board finds that the correct amount of the old-age benefit payable to a qualified individual during his life under section 202 was less than 3 per centum of the total wages by which such old-age benefit was measurable, then there shall be paid to his estate a sum equal to the amount, if any, by which such 3 per centum exceeds the amount (whether more or less than the correct amount) paid to him during his life as old-age benefit. (c) If the Board finds that the total amount paid to a qualified individual under an old-age benefit during his life was less than the correct amount to which he was entitled under section 202, and that the correct amount of such old-age benefit was 3 per centum or more of the total wages by which such old-age benefit was measurable, then there shall be paid to his estate a sum equal to the amount, if any, by which the correct amount of the old-age benefit exceeds the amount which was so paid to him during his life.

Payments to Aged Individuals Not Qualified for Benefits SEC. 204. (a) There shall be paid in a lump sum to any individual who, upon attaining the age of sixty-five, is not a qualified individual, an amount equal to 3 per centum of the total wages determined by the Board to have been paid to him, with respect to employment after December 31, 1936, and before he attained the age of sixty-five. (b) After any individual becomes entitled to any payment under subsection (a), no other payment shall be made under this title in any manner measured by wages paid to him, except that any part of any payment under subsection (a) which is not paid to him before his death shall be paid to his estate.

Amounts of $500 or Less Payable to Estates SEC. 205. If any amount payable to an estate under section 203 or 204 is $500 or less, such amount may, under regulations prescribed by the Board, be paid to the persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto under the law of the State in which the deceased was domiciled, without the necessity of compliance with the requirements of law with respect to the administration of such estate . . .

Title III. Grants to States for Unemployment Compensation Administration Appropriation SECTION 301. For the purpose of assisting the States in the administration of their unemployment compensation laws, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $4,000,000, and for each fiscal year thereafter the sum of $49,000,000, to be used as hereinafter provided.

Title IV. Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children Appropriation SECTION 401. For the purpose of enabling each State to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $24,750,000, and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year thereafter a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Board, State plans for aid to dependent children.

222 The New Deal

State Plans for Aid to Dependent Children SEC. 402. (a) A State plan for aid to dependent children must (1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them; (2) provide for financial participation by the State; (3) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer the plan, or provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to supervise the administration of the plan; (4) provide for granting to any individual, whose claim with respect to aid to a dependent child is denied, an opportunity for a fair hearing before such State agency; (5) provide such methods of administration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of office, and compensation of personnel) as are found by the Board to be necessary for the efficient operation of the plan; and (6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form and containing such information, as the Board may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the Board may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports. (b) The Board shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) except that it shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid or (2) who was born within the State within one year immediately preceding the application, if its mother has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.

Payment to States SEC. 403. (a) From the sums appropriated therefor, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay to each State which has an approved plan for aid to dependent children, for each quarter, beginning with the quarter commencing July 1, 1935, an amount, which shall be used exclusively for carrying out the State plan, equal to onethird of the total of the sums expended during such quarter under such plan, not counting so much of such expenditure with respect to any dependent child for any month as exceeds $18, or if there is more than one dependent child in the same home, as exceeds $18 for any month with respect to one such dependent child and $12 for such month with respect to each of the other dependent children. (b) The method of computing and paying such amounts shall be as follows: (1) The Board shall, prior

to the beginning of each quarter, estimate the amount to be paid to the State for such quarter under the provisions of subsection (a), such estimate to be based on (A) a report filed by the State containing its estimate of the total sum to be expended in such quarter in accordance with the provisions of such subsection and stating the amount appropriated or made available by the State and its political subdivisions for such expenditures in such quarter, and if such amount is less than two-thirds of the total sum of such estimated expenditures, the source or sources from which the difference is expected to be derived, (B) records showing the number of dependent children in the State, and (C) such other investigation as the Board may find necessary. (2) The Board shall then certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount so estimated by the Board, reduced or increased, as the case may be, by any sum by which it finds that its estimate for any prior quarter was greater or less than the amount which should have been paid to the State for such quarter, except to the extent that such sum has been applied to make the amount certified for any prior quarter greater or less than the amount estimated by the Board for such prior quarter. (3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall thereupon, through the Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department and prior to audit or settlement by the General Accounting Office, pay to the State, at the time or times fixed by the Board, the amount so certified . . .

Title V. Grants to States for Maternal and Child Welfare Part 1. Maternal and Child Health Services Appropriation Section 501. For the purpose of enabling each State to extend and improve, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, services for promoting the health of mothers and children, especially in rural areas and in areas suffering from severe economic distress, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $3,800,000. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Chief of the Children s Bureau, State plans for such services . . . Part 2. Services for Crippled Children Appropriation SEC. 511. For the purpose of enabling each State to extend and improve (especially in rural areas and in areas suffering from severe economic distress), as far as practicable under the conditions in such State,

6.6 Social Security Act 223 services for locating crippled children and for providing medical, surgical, corrective, and other services and care, and facilities for diagnosis, hospitalization, and aftercare, for children who are crippled or who are suffering from conditions which lead to crippling, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $2,850,000. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Chief of the Children s Bureau, State plans for such services . . . Part 3. Child Welfare Services SEC. 521. (a) For the purpose of enabling the United States, through the Children’s Bureau, to cooperate with State public-welfare agencies establishing, extending, and strengthening, especially in predominantly rural areas, public-welfare services (hereinafter in this section referred to as child-welfare services) for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and neglected children, and children in danger of becoming delinquent, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year, beginning with the year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $1,500,000. Such amount shall be allotted by the Secretary of Labor for use by cooperating State public-welfare agencies on the basis of plans developed jointly by the State agency and the Children s Bureau, to each State, $10,000, and the remainder to each State on the basis of such plans, not to exceed such part of the remainder as the rural population of such State bears to the total rural population of the United States. The amount so allotted shall be expended for payment of part of the cost of district, county or other local child-welfare services in areas predominantly rural, and for developing State services for the encouragement and assistance of adequate methods of community child-welfare organization in areas predominantly rural and other areas of special need. The amount of any allotment to a State under this section for any fiscal year remaining unpaid to such State at the end of such fiscal year shall be available for payment to such State under this section until the end of the second succeeding fiscal year. No payment to a State under this section shall be made out of its allotment for any fiscal year until its allotment for the preceding fiscal year has been exhausted or has ceased to be available. (b) From the sums appropriated therefore and the allotments available under subsection (a) the Secretary of Labor shall from time to time certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amounts to be paid to the States,

and the Secretary of the Treasury shall, through the Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department and prior to audit or settlement by the General Accounting Office, make payments of such amounts from such allotments at the time or times specified by the Secretary of Labor. Part 4. Vocational Rehabilitation SEC. 531. (a) In order to enable the United States to cooperate with the States and Hawaii in extending and strengthening their programs of vocational rehabilitation of the physically disabled, and to continue to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Act entitled An Act to provide for the promotion of vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or otherwise and their return to civil employment, approved June 2, 1920, as amended (U.S.C., title 29, ch. 4; U.S.C., Supp. VII title 29, secs. 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, and 40), there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1936, and June 30, 1937, the sum of $841,000 for each such fiscal year in addition to the amount of the existing authorization, and for each fiscal year thereafter the sum of $1,938,000. Of the sums appropriated pursuant to such authorization for each fiscal year, $5,000 shall be apportioned to the Territory of Hawaii and the remainder shall be apportioned among the several States in the manner provided in such Act of June 2, 1920, as amended. (b) For the administration of such Act of June 2, 1920, as amended, by the Federal agency authorized to administer it, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1936, and June 30, 1937, the sum of $22,000 for each such fiscal year in addition to the amount of the existing authorization, and for each fiscal year thereafter the sum of $102,000.

Title VIII. Taxes with Respect to Employment Income Tax on Employees SECTION 801. In addition to other taxes, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon the income of every individual a tax equal to the following percentages of the wages (as defined in section 811) received by him after December 31, 1936, with respect to employment (as defined in section 811) after such date: (1) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1937, 1938, and 1939, the rate shall be 1 per centum. (2) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1940, 1941, and 1942, the rate shall 1 per centum. (3) With respect to employment

224 The New Deal during the calendar years 1943, 1944, and 1945, the rate shall be 2 per centum. (4) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1946, 1947, and 1948, the rate shall be 2 per centum. (5) With respect to employment after December 31, 1948, the rate shall be 3 per centum.

Deduction of Tax From Wages SEC. 802. (a) The tax imposed by section 801 shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid. Every employer required so to deduct the tax is hereby made liable for the payment of such tax, and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any such payment made by such employer. (b) If more or less than the correct amount of tax imposed by section 801 is paid with respect to any wage payment, then, under regulations made under this title, proper adjustments, with respect both to the tax and the amount to be deducted, shall be made, without interest, in connection with subsequent wage payments to the same individual by the same employer.

Adjustment of Employers Tax SEC. 805. If more or less than the correct amount of tax imposed by section 804 is paid with respect to any wage payment, then, under regulations made under this title, proper adjustments with respect to the tax shall be made, without interest, in connection with subsequent wage payments to the same individual by the same employer . . .

Title X. Grants to States for Aid to the Blind Appropriation SECTION 1001. For the purpose of enabling each State to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy individuals who are blind, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, the sum of $3,000,000, and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year thereafter a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Social Security Board, State plans for aid to the blind.

Deductibility from Income Tax SEC. 803. For the purposes of the income tax imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act of 1934 or by any Act of Congress in substitution therefore, the tax imposed by section 801 shall not be allowed as a deduction to the taxpayer in computing his net income for the year in which such tax is deducted from his wages.

Excise Tax on Employers SEC. 804. In addition to other taxes, every employer shall pay an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to the following percentages of the wages (as defined in section 811) paid by him after December 31, 1936, with respect to employment (as defined in section 811) after such date: (1) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1937, 1938, and 1939, the rate shall be 1 per centum. (2) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1940, 1941, and 1942, the rate shall be 1 per centum. (3) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1943, 1944, and 1945, the rate shall be 2 per centum. (4) With respect to employment during the calendar years 1946, 1947, and 1948, the rate shall be 2 per centum. (5) With respect to employment after December 31, 1948, the rate shall be 3 per centum.

6.7 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Negro and Social Change, December 12, 1935 Address delivered at the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the founding of the National Urban League, Baltimore, Maryland Governor Nice, Mayor Jackson, members of the Urban League, and friends: It is a pleasure to be with you tonight to celebrate this twenty-fifth anniversary of the Urban League, because of the purpose for which the League was founded---better understanding and cooperation of both the white and Negro races in order that they may live better together and make this country a better place to live in. Much that I am going to say tonight would apply with equal force to any of us living in this country. But our particular concern tonight is with one of the largest race groups in the country---the Negro race. We have a great responsibility here in the United States because we offer the best example that exists perhaps today throughout the world, of the fact that if different races know each other they may live peacefully together. On the whole, we in this country live peacefully together though we have many different

6.7 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Negro and Social Change races making up the citizenry of the United States. The fact that we have achieved as much as we have in understanding of each other, is no reason for feeling that our situation and our relationship are so perfect that we need not concern ourselves about making them better. In fact we know that many grave injustices are done throughout our land to people who are citizens and who have an equal right under the laws of our country, but who are handicapped because of their race. I feel strongly that in order to wipe out these inequalities and injustices, we must all of us work together; but naturally those who suffer the injustices are most sensitive of them, and are therefore bearing the brunt of carrying through whatever plans are made to wipe out undesirable conditions. Therefore in talking to you tonight, I would like to urge first of all that you concentrate your effort on obtaining better opportunities for education for the Negro people throughout the country. You must be able to understand the economic condition and the changes which are coming, not only in our own country, but throughout the world, and this, without better education than the great majority of Negro people have an opportunity to obtain today, is not possible. And without an improvement which will allow better work and better understanding, it will be difficult to remove the handicaps under which some of you suffer. I marvel frequently at the patience with which those who work for the removal of bad conditions face their many disappointments. And I would like to pay tribute tonight to the many leaders amongst the colored people, whom I know and admire and respect. If they are apt at times to be discouraged and downhearted, I can only offer them as consolation, the knowledge that all of us who have worked in the past, and are still working for economic and social betterment, have been through and will continue to go through many periods of disappointment. But as we look back over the years, I have come to realize that what seemed to be slow and halting advances, in the aggregate make quite a rapid march forward. I believe, of course, that for our own good in this country, the Negro race as a whole must improve its standards of living, and become both economically and intellectually of higher calibre. The fact that the colored people, not only in the South, but in the North as well, have been economically at a low level, has meant that they have also been physically and intellectually at a low level. Economic conditions are responsible for poor health in children. And the fact that tuberculosis and pneumonia and many other diseases have taken a heavier toll amongst our colored groups, can be

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attributed primarily to economic conditions. It is undoubtedly true that with an improvement in economic condition it will still be necessary not only to improve our educational conditions for children, but to pay special attention to adult education along the line of better living. For you cannot expect people to change overnight, when they have had poor conditions, and adjust themselves to all that we expect of people living as they should live today throughout our country. This holds good for all underprivileged people in our country and in other countries. For instance, not long ago I was talking to a woman from England, a social worker, who told me that she had found it was not sufficient to give people better housing, to give them better wages; that you also had to have some leadership and education in how to live in those houses and how to use the better wages. And I have seen that proved in the last few years in some of the mining sections of our country. The stock is good American stock, but they have had long years of hard times, and some of the communities that I happen to know have been given good houses and a little economic security, but no leadership. And another community that I know has had both education from nursery school up, and leadership, and adult education. And someone said to me the other day in comparing a number of communities, that the particular community where this leadership has been given, was Paradise compared to all the others. So that I think I am right when I say that it is not just enough to give people who have suffered a better house and better wages. You must give them education and understanding and training before you can expect them to take up their full responsibility. I think that we realize the desirability today of many social changes; but we also must realize that in making these changes and bridging the gap between the old life and the new, we have to accept the responsibility and assume the necessary burden of giving assistance to the people who have not had their fair opportunity in the past. One thing I want to speak about tonight because I have had a number of people tell me that they felt the Government in its new efforts and programs was not always fair to the Negro race. And I want to say quite often, it is not the intention of those at the top, and as far as possible I hope that we may work together to eliminate any real injustice. No right-thinking person in this country today who picks up a paper and reads that in some part of the country the people have not been willing to wait for the due processes of law, but have gone back to the

226 The New Deal rule of force, blind and unjust as force and fear usually are, can help but be ashamed that we have shown such a lack of faith in our own institutions. It is a horrible thing which grows out of weakness and fear, and not out of strength and courage; and the sooner we as a nation unite to stamp out any such action, the sooner and the better will we be able to face the other nations of the world and to uphold our real ideals here and abroad. We have long held in this country that ability should be the criterion on which all people are judged. It seems to me that we must come to recognize this criterion in dealing with all human beings, and not place any limitations upon their achievements except such as may be imposed by their own character and intelligence. This is what we work for as an ideal for the relationship that must exist between all the citizens of our country. There is no reason why all of the races in this country should not live together each of them giving from their particular gift something to the other, and contributing an example to the world of ‘‘peace on earth, good will toward men.’’

6.8 Herbert Hoover, This Challenge to Liberty, October 30, 1936 Denver, Colorado Part I We are near the end of this debate. More than in any election for two generations we are voting on the direction which American civilization will take. The press and the radio have been alive with discussion. It is not alone public men and women who are engaged in this debate. It is between the farmers in the field, the workers at the bench, the women in their homes, the men in their offices. They have met at the store, at the filling station and the street corner. It is a magnificent thing that a whole people should engage in this discussion. For such debate is the most precious safeguard of free men that the world has yet discovered. A whole people with the ballot in their hands possess the most conclusive and unlimited power ever entrusted to humanity. If that power is exercised rightly, then America will prosper morally, spiritually, and in its daily occupations. If it is exercised under the spell of hate or selfish purpose or under intimidation it will drive this nation upon the rocks of destruction.

These issues are too great and the stakes too large for us to examine these questions in any mean or smearing fashion. I have said the problems we face penetrate to the very center of economic, social, and governmental life. The only field which we have not entered in this debate is the field of sportsmanship. I could wish we had some of that in the campaign. If the Republic is to head in the right direction we must get at the real issues. We must dismiss the shadow boxing of a political campaign. We must dismiss secondary questions of governmental policy. We must strip our problems down to the great issue before the country. Speaking just four years ago tonight in closing the Presidential campaign of 1932, I said: ‘‘This campaign is more than a contest between two men. It is more than a contest between two parties. It is a contest between two philosophies of government. . . . ‘‘We must go deeper than platitudes and emotional appeals of the public platform in the campaign, if we will penetrate to the full significance of the changes which our opponents are attempting to float upon the wave of distress and discontent from the difficulties we are passing through.’’ That night I spoke for the regeneration of the American System---the American plan of true liberalism in contrast with the philosophy of the New Deal---and I continued: . . . ‘‘you cannot extend the mastery of government over the daily life of a people without somewhere making it master of people’s souls and thoughts. . . . Every step in that direction poisons the very roots of liberalism. It poisons political equality, free speech, free press, and equality of opportunity. It is the road not to more liberty but to less liberty. True liberalism is found not in striving to spread bureaucracy, but in striving to set bounds to it. True liberalism seeks all legitimate freedom first in the confident belief that without such freedom the pursuit of other blessings is in vain.’’ And in that address four years ago I said: ‘‘The spirit of liberalism is to create free men; it is not the regimentation of men.’’

Part II Through four years of experience this New Deal attack upon free institutions has emerged as the transcendent issue in America. All the men who are seeking for mastery in the world today are using the same weapons. They sing the same songs. They all promise the joys of Elysium without effort. But their philosophy is founded on the

6.8 Herbert Hoover, This Challenge to Liberty coercion and compulsory organization of men. True liberal government is founded on the emancipation of men. This is the issue upon which men are imprisoned and dying in Europe right now. The rise of this issue has dissolved our old party lines. The New Deal repudiation of Democracy has left the Republican Party alone the guardian of the Ark of the Covenant with its charter of freedom. The tremendous import of this issue, the peril to our country has brought the support of the ablest leaders of the Democratic Party. It is no passing matter which enlists side by side the fighting men who have opposed each other over many years. It is the unity demanded by a grave danger to the Republic. Their sacrifice to join with us has no parallel in American history since the Civil War. There run through my mind great words from the Battle Hymn of the Republic: in the watchfires of a hundred circling camps They have builded them an altar. I realize that this danger of centralized personal government disturbs only thinking men and women. But surely the NRA and the AAA alone, should prove what the New Deal philosophy of government means even to those who don’t think. In these instances the Supreme Court, true to their oaths to support the Constitution, saved us temporarily. But Congress in obedience to their oaths should never have passed these acts. The President should never have signed them. But far more important than that, if these men were devoted to the American system of liberty they never would have proposed acts based on the coercion and compulsory organization of men. Freedom does not die from frontal attack. It dies because men in power no longer believe in a system based upon Liberty Mr. Roosevelt on this eve of election has started using the phrases of freedom. He talks sweetly of personal liberty, of individualism, of the American system, of the profit system. He says now that he thinks well of capitalism, and individual enterprise. His devotion to private property seems to be increasing. He has suddenly found some good economic royalists. And he is a staunch supporter of the Constitution. Two days ago he rededicated the Statue of Liberty in New York. She has been the forgotten woman. Four years ago we also heard many phrases which turned out not to mean what they were thought to have meant. In order that we may be sure this time will Mr. Roosevelt reply in plain words:

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Does he propose to revive the nine acts which the Supreme Court has rejected as invasions of the safeguards of free men? Has he abandoned his implied determination to change the Constitution? Why not tell the American people before election what change he proposes? Does he intend to stuff the Court itself? Why does the New Deal not really lay its cards on the table? But their illegal invasions of the Constitution are but the minor artillery with which this New Deal philosophy of government is being forced upon us. They are now using a more subtle and far more effective method of substituting personal power and centralized government for the institutions of free men. It is not by violation of the Constitution that they are making headway today. It is through taking vast sums of the people’s money and then manipulating its spending to build up personal power. By this route relief has been centralized in their hands. By this route government has entered into business in competition with the citizen. In his way a score of new instruments of public power have been created. By this route the ordinary functions of government have been uselessly expanded with a double bookkeeping to conceal it. Public funds are used right and left to subsidize special groups of our citizens and special regions of the country. At public expense there is a steady drip of propaganda to poison the public mind. Through this spending there grows a huge number of citizens with a selfish vested interest in continuing this centralization of power. It has also made millions of citizens dependent upon the government. Thus also have been built huge political bureaucracies hungry for more power. This use of money has enabled the independence of members of Congress to be sapped by the pork barrel. It has subtly undermined the rights and the responsibility of States and local governments. Out of all this we see government daily by executive orders instead of by open laws openly arrived at. The New Deal taxes are in forms which stifle the growth of small business and discourage new enterprise. By stifling private enterprise the field is tilled for further extension of government enterprise. Intricate taxes are interpreted by political bureaucrats who coerce and threaten our business men. By politically managed currency the President has seized the power to alter all wages, all prices, all debts, all savings at will. But that is not the worst. They are creating personal power over votes. That crushes the first safeguard of liberty.

228 The New Deal Does Mr. Roosevelt not admit all this in his last report on the state of the Union: ‘‘We have built up new instruments of public power’’ which he admits could ‘‘provide shackles for the liberties of the people.’’ Does freedom permit any man or any government any such power? Have the people ever voted for these shackles? Has he abandoned this ‘‘new order,’’ this ‘‘planned economy’’ that he has so often talked about? Will he discharge these associates of his who daily preached the ‘‘new order’’ but whom he does not now allow to appear in this campaign? Is Mr. Roosevelt not asking for a vote of confidence on these very breaches of liberty? Is not this very increase in personal power the suicide road upon which every democratic government has died from the time of Greece and Rome down to the dozen liberal governments that have perished in Europe during this past twenty years?

Part III I gave the warning against this philosophy of government four years ago from a heart heavy with anxiety for the future of our country. It was born from many years’ experience of the forces moving in the world which would weaken the vitality of American freedom. It grew in four years of battle as President to uphold the banner of free men. And that warning was based on sure ground from my knowledge of the ideas that Mr. Roosevelt and his bosom colleagues had covertly embraced despite the Democratic Platform. Those ideas were not new. Most of them had been urged upon me. During my four years powerful groups thundered at the White House with these same ideas. Some were honest, some promising votes, most of them threatening reprisals, and all of them yelling ‘‘reactionary’’ at us. I rejected the notion of great trade monopolies and price fixing through codes. That could only stifle the little business man by regimenting him under his big brother. That idea was born of certain American Big Business and grew up to be the NRA. I rejected the schemes of ‘‘economic planning’’ to regiment and coerce the farmer. That was born of a Roman despot fourteen hundred years ago and grew up into the AAA. I refused national plans to put the government into business in competition with its citizens. That was born of Karl Marx.

I vetoed the idea of recovery through stupendous spending to prime the pump. That was born of a British professor. I threw out attempts to centralize relief in Washington for politics and social experimentation. I defeated other plans to invade State rights, to centralize power in Washington. Those ideas were born of American radicals. I stopped attempts at currency inflation and repudiation of government obligation. That was robbery of insurance-policy holders, savings-banks depositors and wage earners. That was born of the early Brain Trusters. I rejected all these things because they would not only delay recovery but because I knew that in the end they would shackle free men. Rejecting these ideas we Republicans had erected agencies of government which did start our country to prosperity without the loss of a single atom of American freedom. All the ardent peddlers of these Trojan horses received sympathetic hearings from Mr. Roosevelt and joined vociferously in his election. Men are to be judged by the company they keep. Our people did not recognize the gravity of the issue when I stated it four years ago. That is no wonder, for the day Mr. Roosevelt was elected Recovery was in progress, the Constitution was untrampled, the integrity of the government and the institutions of freedom were intact. It was not until after the election that the people began to awake. Then the realization of intended tinkering with the currency drove bank depositors into the panic that greeted Mr. Roosevelt’s inauguration. Recovery was set back for two years, and hysteria was used as the bridge to reach the goal of personal government.

Part IV I am proud to have carried the banner of free men to the last hour of the term my countrymen entrusted it to me. It matters nothing in the history of a race what happens to those who in their time have carried the banner of free men. What matters is that the battle shall go on. The people know now the aims of this New Deal philosophy of government. We propose instead leadership and authority in government within the moral and economic framework of the American System. We propose to hold to the Constitutional safeguards of free men.

6.8 Herbert Hoover, This Challenge to Liberty We propose to relieve men from fear, coercion and spite that are inevitable in personal government. We propose to demobilize and decentralize all this spending upon which vast personal power is being built. We propose to amend the tax laws so as not to defeat free men and free enterprise. We propose to turn the whole direction of this country toward liberty, not away from it. The New Dealers say that all this that we propose is a worn-out System; that this machine age requires new measures for which we must sacrifice some part of the freedom of men. Men have lost their way with a confused idea that governments should run machines. Man-made machines cannot be of more worth than men themselves. Free men made these machines. Only free spirits can master them to their proper use. The relation of our government with all these questions is complicated and difficult. They rise into the very highest ranges of economics, statesmanship, and morals. And do not mistake. Free government is the most difficult of all government. But it is everlastingly true that the plain people will make fewer mistakes than any group of men no matter how powerful. But free government implies vigilant thinking and courageous living and self-reliance in a people. Let me say to you that any measure which breaks our dykes of freedom will flood the land with misery.

The Social Field In the field which is more largely social our first American objective should be the protection of the health, the assurance of the education and training of every child in our land. We want children kept out of our factories. We want them kept in school. We want every character-building agency to surround them, including good homes. Freedom can march only upon the feet of educated, healthy and happy children. We want a land of health, and greater recreation for everybody. We want more opportunity for the creation and care of beauty and those things which satisfy the spirit. The Economic Field In the field which is more largely economic our first objective must be to provide security from poverty and want. We want security in living for every home. We want to see a nation built of home-owners and farmowners. We want to see their savings protected. We want to see them in steady jobs.

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These are the first economic securities of human beings. We want to see more and more of them insured against death and accident, unemployment and old age. We want them all secure. The American system of liberty has driven toward these ideals for a century and a half. We realize that one-quarter of our people are not able today to have the standards we desire. But we are proud of a system that has given security and comfort to three-quarters of our families and in which even the under quarter ranks higher than that of any nation in the world. National wisdom and national ideals require that we constantly develop the economic forces which will lift this one-quarter of our people. It requires that we at the same time attain greater stability to employment and to agriculture in the other three-quarters. This is no occasion to elaborate the details of a program. But surely we must dump the whole New Deal theory of restriction of production, of code monopolies, of constantly higher prices for manufactured goods. We must reject their currency and credit policies? which will repeat our calamities of booms and depressions with greater heights and depths. We must reduce spending and amend the forms of taxation which now destroy enterprise and employment. We hold overswollen fortunes must be distributed through pressure of taxes. We hold the first essential is to improve constantly our machines and methods. That will create plenty and make it cheaper. That will enable the under quarter of our people to obtain more goods. Thereby we give increasing employment to everybody. We hold that this can be done only by private industry and not by government. We hold it can be done only by rewarding men for skill and merit. We hold it can be done only through the energizing force of competition. We hold that we must direct the mind of the nation to the elimination of wastes. There is waste in this government. There is waste in natural resources. There is waste in production and distribution. There is waste in labor conflicts. There is the worst of all waste in human beings. If we turn national effort to this instead of listening to ways to get something for nothing, we will attain not only security, but we will also raise comfort to levels never before envisioned. And above all we can do it and be free. It may be that some super mind can tell us what to do each day for our own good or can even force us to do it. But we haven’t seen any indication of such mind among the New Dealers. This country moves forward because each individual of all these millions, each

230 The New Deal thinking for himself, using his own best judgment, using his own skill and experience, becomes expert in bettering his family and his community. To do that they must captain their own souls. No man will be the captain of his own soul if a Tugwell manages it for him. Doubtless some one will at once arise and shout wicked capitalism, laissez-faire, special privilege, or wolfish individualism. These are the illuminated pumpkins of tomorrow night’s New Deal Hallowe’en. We hold a rule of free men which overrides all such nonsense. That is, free men must have equal rights and equal opportunities. For that the government must be the vigorous umpire. But we want a Judge Landis, we do not want a Simon Legree. You might think that reform and change to meet new conditions of life are discoveries of the New Deal. Free men have always applied reform. We have been reforming and changing ever since George Washington. Democracy is not static. It is a living force. Every new idea, every new invention offers opportunity for both good and evil. We are in need of reform every day in the week as long as men are greedy for money or power. We need a whole list of reforms right now, including the reform of these people who have created a gigantic spoils system as a method of seizing political power.

Part V Many of the problems discussed in this campaign concern our material welfare. That is right. But there are things far more important to a nation than material welfare. It is possible to have a prosperous country under a dictatorship. It is not possible to have a free country. No great question will ever be settled in dollars and cents. Great questions must be settled on moral grounds and the tests of what makes free men. What is the nation profited if it shall gain the whole world and lose its own soul? We want recovery. Not alone economic recovery. We must have moral recovery. And there are many elements in this. We must re-establish truth and morals in public life. No people will long remain a moral people under a government that repudiates its obligations, that uses public funds to corrupt the people, that conceals its actions by double bookkeeping. We must have government that builds stamina into communities and men. That makes men instead of mendicants. We must stop this softening of thrift, selfreliance and self-respect through dependence on

government. We must stop telling youth that the country is going to the devil and they haven’t a chance. We must stop this dissipating the initiative and aspirations of our people. We must revive the courage of men and women and their faith in American liberty. We must recover these spiritual heritages of America. All this clatter of class and class hate should end. Thieves will get into high places as well as low places and they should both be given economic security---in jail. But they are not a class. This is a classless country. If we hold to our unique American ideal of equal opportunity there can never be classes or masses in our country. To preach these class ideas from the White House is new in American life. There is no employing class, no working class, no farming class. You may pigeonhole a man or woman as a farmer or a worker or a professional man or an employer or even a banker. But the son of the farmer will be a doctor or a worker or even a banker, and his daughter a teacher. The son of a worker will be an employer---or maybe President. And certainly the sons of even economic royalists have a bad time holding the title of nobility. The glory of our country has been that every mother could look at the babe in her arms with confidence that the highest position in the world was open to it. The transcendent issue before us today is free men and women. How do we test freedom? It is not a catalogue of political rights. It is a thing of the spirit. Men must be free to worship, to think, to hold opinions, to speak without fear. They must be free to challenge wrong and oppression with surety of justice. Freedom conceives that the mind and spirit of man can be free only if he be free to pattern his own life, to develop his own talents, free to earn, to spend, to save, to acquire property as the security of his old age and his family. Freedom demands that these rights and ideals shall be protected from infringement by others, whether men or groups, corporations or governments. The conviction of our fathers was that all these freedoms come from the Creator and that they can be denied by no man or no government or no New Deal. They were spiritual rights of men. The prime purpose of liberal government is to enlarge and not to destroy these freedoms. It was for that purpose that the Constitution of the United States was enacted. For that reason we demand that the safeguards of freedom shall be upheld. It is for this reason that we demand that this country should turn its direction from a system of personal centralized government to the ideals of liberty. And again I repeat that statement of four years ago---‘‘This campaign is more than a contest between

6.9 John L. Lewis, Labor and the Nation 231 two men. It is a contest between two philosophies of government.’’ Whatever the outcome of this election that issue is set. We shall battle it out until the soul of America is saved.

6.9 John L. Lewis, Labor and the Nation, September 1937 Washington D.C. Out of the agony and travail of economic America the Committee for Industrial Organization was born. To millions of Americans exploited without stint by corporate industry and socially debased beyond the understanding of the fortunate, its coming was as welcomed as the dawn to the night watcher. To a lesser group of Americans, infinitely more fortunately situated, blessed with larger quantities of the world’s goods and insolent in their assumption of privilege, its coming was heralded as a harbinger of ill, sinister of purpose, of unclean methods and non-virtuous objectives. But the Committee for Industrial Organizations is here. It is now henceforth a definite instrumentality, destined greatly to influence the lives of our people and the internal and external course of the republic. This is true only because the purposes and objectives of the Committee for Industrial Organization find economic, social, political and moral justification in the hearts of the millions who are its members and the millions more who support it. The organization and constant onward sweep of this movement exemplifies the resentment of the many toward the selfishness, greed and the neglect of the few. The workers of the nation were tired of waiting for corporate industry to right their economic wrongs, to alleviate their social agony and to grant them their political rights. Despairing of fair treatment, they resolved to do something for themselves. They, therefore, have organized a new labor movement, conceived within the principles of the national bill of rights and committed to the proposition that the workers are free to assemble in their own forums, voice their own grievances, declare their own hopes and contract on even terms with modern industry for the sale of their only material possession---their labor. The Committee for Industrial Organization has a numerical enrollment of 3,718,000 members. It has 32 affiliated national and international unions. Of this number 11 unions account for 2,765,000 members. This

group is organized in the textile, auto, garment, lumber, rubber, electrical manufacturing, power, steel, coal and transport industries. The remaining membership exists in the maritime, oil production and refining, ship building, leather, chemical, retail, meat packing, vegetable canning, metalliferous mining, miscellaneous manufacturing, agricultural labor, and service and miscellaneous industries. Some 200,000 workers are organized into 507 chartered local unions not yet attached to a national industrial union. This record bespeaks progress. It is a development without precedent in our own country. Some of this work was accomplished with the enlightened cooperation or the tolerant acquiescence of employers who recognized that a new labor movement was being forged and who were not disposed, in any event, to flout the law of the land. On the other hand, much of this progress was made in the face of violent and deadly opposition which reached its climax in the slaughter of workers paralleling the massacres of Ludlow and Homestead. In the steel industry the corporations generally have accepted collective bargaining and negotiated wage agreements with the Committee for Industrial Organization. Eighty-five per cent of the industry is thus under contract and a peaceful relationship exits between the management and the workers. Written wage contracts have been negotiated with 399 steel companies covering 510,000 men. One thousand thirty-one local lodges in 700 communities have been organized. Five of the corporations in the steel industry elected to resist collective bargaining and undertook to destroy the steel workers’ union. These companies filled their plants with industrial spies, assembled depots of guns and gas bombs, established barricades, controlled their communities with armed thugs, leased the police power of cities and mobilized the military power of a state to guard them against the intrusion of collective bargaining within their plants. During this strike 18 steel workers were either shot to death or had their brains clubbed out by police, or armed thugs in the pay of the steel companies. In Chicago, Mayor Kelly’s police force was successful in killing ten strikers before they could escape the fury of the police, shooting eight of them in the back. One hundred sixty strikers were maimed and injured by police clubs, riot guns and gas bombs and were hospitalized. Hundreds of strikers were arrested, jailed, treated with brutality while incarcerated and harassed by succeeding litigation. None but strikers were murdered, gassed, injured, jailed or maltreated. No one had

232 The New Deal to die except the workers who were standing for the right guaranteed them by the Congress and written in the law. The infamous Governor Davey, of Ohio, successful in the last election because of his reiterated promises of fair treatment to labor, used the military power of the Commonwealth on the side of the Republican Steel Company and the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company. Nearly half of the staggering military expenditure incident to the crushing of this strike in Ohio was borne by the federal government through the allocation of financial aid to the military establishment of the state. The steel workers have now buried their dead, while the widows weep and watch their orphaned children become objects of public charity. The murder of these unarmed men has never been publicly rebuked by any authoritative officer of the state or federal government. Some of them, in extenuation, plead lack of jurisdiction, but murder as a crime against the moral code can always be rebuked without regard to the niceties of legalistic jurisdiction by those who profess to be the keepers of the public conscience. Shortly after Kelly’s police force in Chicago had indulged in their bloody orgy, Kelly came to Washington looking for political patronage. That patronage was forthcoming and Kelly must believe that the killing of the strikers is no liability in partisan politics. Meanwhile, the steel puppet Davey is still Governor of Ohio, but not for long I think---not for long. The people of Ohio may be relied upon to mete our political justice to one who has betrayed his state, outraged the public conscience and besmirched the public honor. While the men of the steel industry were going through blood and gas in defense of their rights and their homes and their families, elsewhere on the farflung C.I.O. front the hosts of labor were advancing and intelligent and permanent progress was being made. In scores of industries plant after plant and company after company were negotiating sensible working agreements. The men in the steel industry who sacrificed their all were nor merely aiding their fellows at home but were adding strength to the cause of their comrades in all industry. Labor was marching toward the goal of industrial democracy and contributing constructively toward a more rational arrangement of our domestic economy. Labor does not see industrial strife. It wants peace, but a peace with justice. In the long struggle for labor’s rights it has been patient and forbearing. Sabotage and destruction syndicalism have had no part in the American labor movement. Workers have kept faith in

American institutions. Most of the conflicts, which have occurred have been when labor’s right to live has been challenged and denied. If there is to be peace in our industrial life let the employer recognize his obligation to his employees---at least to the degree set forth in existing statutes. Ordinary problems affecting wages, hours, and working conditions, in most instances, will quickly respond to negotiation in the council room. The United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and similar groups representing industry and financial interests, are rendering a disservice to the American people in their attempts to frustrate the organization of labor and in their refusal to accept collective bargaining as one of our economic institutions. These groups are encouraging a systematic organization of vigilante groups to fight unionization under the sham pretext of local interests. They equip these vigilantes with tin hats, wooden clubs, gas masks and lethal weapons and train them in the arts of brutality and oppression. They bring in snoops, finks, hatchet gangs and Chowderhead Cohens to infest their plants and disturb the communities. Fascist organizations have been launched and financed under the shabby pretext that the C.I.O. movement is communistic. The real breeders of discontent and alien doctrines of government and philosophies subversive of good citizenship are such as these who take the law into their own hands. No tin-hat brigade of goose-stepping vigilantes or bibble-babbling mob of blackguarding and corporation paid scoundrels will prevent the onward march of labor, or divert its purpose to play its natural and rational part in the development of the economic, political and social life of our nation. Unionization, as opposed to communism, presupposes the relation of employment; it is based upon the wage system and it recognizes fully and unreservedly the institution of private property and the right to investment profit. It is upon the fuller development of collective bargaining, the wider expansion of the labor movement, the increased influence of labor in our national councils, that the perpetuity of our democratic institutions must largely depend. The organized workers of America, free in their industrial life, conscious partners in production, secure in their homes and enjoying a decent standard of living, will prove the finest bulwark against the intrusion of alien doctrines of government. Do those who have hatched this foolish cry of communism in the C.I.O. fear the increased influence of

6.10 Harry Hopkins, America’s Economic Problem labor in our democracy? Do they fear its influence will be cast on the side of shorter hours, a better system of distributed employment, better homes for the underprivileged, social security for the aged, a fairer distribution of the national income? Certainly the workers that are being organized want a voice in the determination of these objectives of social justice. Certainly labor wants a fairer share in the national income. Assuredly labor wants a larger participation in increased productive efficiency. Obviously the population is entitled to participate in the fruits of the genius of our men of achievement in the field of the material sciences. Labor has suffered just as our farm population has suffered from a viciously unequal distribution of the national income. In the exploitation of both classes of workers has been the source of panic and depression, and upon the economic welfare of both rests the best assurance of a sound and permanent prosperity. In this connection let me call attention to the propaganda which some of our industrialists are carrying on among the farmers. By pamphlets in the milk cans or attached to machinery and in countless other ways of direct and indirect approach, the farmers of the nation are being told that the increased price of farm machinery and farm supplies is due to the rising wage level brought about by the Committee for Industrial Organization. And yet it is the industrial millions of this country who constitute the substantial market for all agricultural products. The interest of the two groups are mutually dependent. It is when the pay roll goes down that the farmer’s realization is diminished, so that his loans become overdue at the bank and the arrival of the tax collector is awaited with fear. On the other hand it is the prosperity of the farmer that quickness the tempo of manufacturing activities and brings buying power to the millions of urban and industrial workers. As we view the years that have passed this has always been true and it becomes increasingly imperative that the farm population and the millions of workers in industry must learn to combine their strength for the attainment of mutual and desirable objectives and at the same time learn to guard themselves against the sinister propaganda of those who would divide and exploit them. Under the banner of the Committee for Industrial Organization American labor is on the march. Its objectives today are those it had in the beginning: to strive for the unionization of our unorganized millions of workers and for the acceptance of collective bargaining as a recognized American institution. It seeks peace with the industrial world. It seeks cooperation and mutuality of effort with the

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agricultural population. It would avoid strikes. It would have its rights determined under the law by the peaceful negotiations and contract relationships that are supposed to characterize American commercial life. Until an aroused public opinion demands that employers accept that rule, labor has no recourse but to surrender its rights or struggle for their realization with its own economic power. The objectives of this movement are not political in a partisan sense. Yet it is true that a political party which seeks the support of labor and makes pledges of good faith to labor must, in equity and good conscience, keep that faith and redeem those pledges. The spectacle of august and dignified members of Congress, servants of the people and agents of the republic, skulking. in hallways and closets, hiding their faces in a party caucus to prevent a quorum from acting upon a labor measure, is one that emphasizes the perfidy of politicians and blasts the confidence of labor’s millions in politician’s promises and statesmen’s vows. Labor next year cannot avoid the necessity of a political assay of the work and. deeds of its so-called friends and its political beneficiaries. It must determine who are its friends in the arena of politics as elsewhere. It feels that its cause is just and that its friends should not view its struggle with neutral detachment or intone constant criticism of its activities. Those who chant their praises of democracy but who lose no chance to drive their knives into labor’s defenseless back must feel the weight of labor’s woe even as its open adversaries must ever feel the thrust of labor’s power. Labor, like Israel, has many sorrows. Its women weep for their fallen and they lament for the future of the children of the race. It ill behooves one who has supped at labor’s table and who has been sheltered in labor’s house to curse with equal fervor and fine impartiality both labor and its adversaries when they become locked in deadly embrace. I repeat that labor seeks peace and guarantees its own loyalty, but the voice of labor, insistent upon its rights, should not be annoying to the ears of justice or offensive to the conscience of the American people.

6.10 Harry Hopkins, America’s Economic Problem, August 5, 1938 I am going to talk to you tonight about what the President recently called the Nation’s Economic Problem Number one. I’m going to tell you what I think the problem is. Tell of some of the things our Government

234 The New Deal has done about it and of what it is going to do about it in the future. Because I am going to speak plainly and frankly I know some people may not like some of the things I shall say. I don’t think that is important if what I say is constructive and based upon the realism of facts. I mention it at all only because I don’t want these people to becloud the situation by raising the cry of sectionalism or of partisan politics. My interests and my responsibilities are national--not sectional. Therefore, what I shall say about conditions in the South will be from a national rather than a southern point of view. And what we have done and shall do to improve these conditions will be from the standpoint of the best interests of the nation as a whole. What you have done and are doing in the face of economic and political handicaps which have prevailed since the War between the States constitutes a saga of human accomplishment of which you can forever be proud. The South is moving forward with the Nation. Left flat upon its economic back at the end of the War between the States, it faced its difficulties. It set about to rebuild its life from these ruins. It has sought to make education available for all of its youth, white and black. I know the great work of the father of our Chairman, B. B. Comer. Comer, while Governor of Alabama, achieved what was then the difficult goal of a high school for every county in Alabama. You have made significant moves to safeguard the health of your people. Of your wealth you spent a greater proportion for education, health and public welfare than any section of the nation. Your problem is not one of lack of understanding or of determination to secure the highest possible standard of living for all the people. The problem is economic. It is lack of purchasing power. The problem centers in the fact that so much of the profits of your labor are drained off into the hands of the absentee owners of your factories, your lands, your forests, your mines, and even of your banks. The problem is intensified by the concentration of financial power in the hands of too few people and with few exceptions these few people do not live in the South or spend their money there. The South, with one-fourth of the population, receives one-seventh of the national income. With onefourth of the people, it has less than one-thirtieth of the life insurance. The incomes of this one-fourth of the people produce but one-fourteenth of the total income tax revenue. If the combined bank deposits of the United States had been distributed in June 1933 on a per capita basis,

every person in the North would have received $419, every person in the West $222, and every person in the South only $81. In ten Southern States, retail stores sell less than half as much goods per person as they sell in the nation’s twelve richest states. It is certainly not that the other regions have superior resources or superior people. In 1860 the South was rich and prosperous. Crushed by the Civil War and the incredibly vicious period of Reconstruction, it beat its indomitable way back to a measure of prosperity in the next forty years. But the economic and industrial march of other sections had been going steadily ahead---and the South has never regained her relative position. The South was an exploited region---a region lacking capital, whose operations were financed from the outside; a region which produced raw materials for distant factories, snipped them to those factories, and bought back the finished goods at manufactured costs---if it could. There are many factors which have held it back. The after-effects of the Civil War itself, the whole trend of the development of our industrial economy, the tariff, the railroads and the effects of the one-crop system. The history of the railroad is a significant part of this story. The railway structure of the nation assumed its general outline from 1860 to 1875, when the South was prostrate. The transcontinental lines were laid out to bring tribute from producing to manufacturing areas. And this was done with public subsidy. For every mile of transcontinental track built on the plains, the government gave the railroad company 20 sections of good land. These land-grant railroads were given a total area of land larger than the Republic of France. In addition, the government advanced federal money ranging from $16,000 to $48,000 per mile. These roads subsidized by the government were so built as to choke off the river traffic and subordinate the advantages of the West and South. Later the freight rate structure was planned to clinch the industrial supremacy of the North and East. It still stands, and today’s rate differentials penalize both southern railroads and southern shippers. Northern manufacturers have a rate advantage of about 39 per cent over Southern manufacturers who want to snip the same products into the rich and populous North and East. When I hear criticisms of today’s public spending, I often wonder if people realize how much pumppriming the government did in those early days, and on what a tremendous scale. The giving away of the public domain was nothing but pump-priming. It was

6.10 Harry Hopkins, America’s Economic Problem Federal subsidy for buying-power. If a man turned farmer, the government would give him a free homestead. If he turned miner, he could have free gold if he could find it. Cattlemen got free grass. Manufacturers were given patents, and a high protective tariff, And yet today some people try to create the impression that Federal spending to help people and business is something strange and new. Our traditional tariff policy, desirable as it may be to protect industry in all parts of the country, has worked to the disadvantage of the people of the South, because while they sold their agricultural products in an unprotected world market, they had to buy their manufactured products in a protected domestic market. The tariff puts a double handicap on the South. It makes it difficult for foreign shippers to send goods here in exchange for our export crops of cotton and tobacco. At the same time, it increases the prices of manufactured products which the South must buy. I do not say this is in any sense wrong; I merely say the entire situation has handicapped the South. A monopoly of cotton was the principal asset which the South possessed in 1865 to start it on the road to recovery---and millions of Southern families have depended on this monopoly for most of their cash. This dependence on cotton brought with it serious drawbacks. I need not comment to this audience on the disadvantages of one-crop agriculture. King Cotton is not too kind to his subjects when they serve him to the exclusion of other crops, A recent study of tenant farmers showed that their incomes increased most, not with the amount of cotton produced, but with the amount of food they raised for home consumption. It is a tragedy that a land of varied soils, long sunny seasons and bounteous rainfall should contain thousands of families which suffer from malnutrition. The share cropper system was the only logical system for the South to turn to after the Civil War, in order to use the land and labor with limited capital. The evidence is accumulating, however, that it may have outlived its usefulness. It has given us a shifting population constantly on the move and little concerned with the preservation of the fertility of the soil, There is an often repeated story of an interview between a landlord and a share cropper. It runs something like this: Farm Tenant. ‘‘How about fixing that leaky roof over at the place? His Landlord. ‘‘Why ask me to fix it?’’ ‘‘Well, it’s your place, ain’t it?’’ ‘‘Yes, but it’s leaking on you.’’ ‘‘Well, it won’t be next year.’’

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As a part of one-crop agriculture and share cropping you have inherited a credit system that is a millstone around the neck of everyone who handles cotton. Months before the crop is harvested the tenant owes the landlord, the landlord owes the merchant, the merchant owes the local banker, and the local banker owes the banker in some distant financial center. Cumulative interest is taken all the way along the line, and the wonder is not that the profits have been small, but that there have been any profits at all. In addition to the long-time ills of southern agriculture the World War further weakened the position of the South by converting the nation as a whole from a debtor to a creditor nation. As long as we owed Europe money and bought manufactured goods from them, they were glad to accept raw cotton and tobacco as payment. Now that they owe us money, it is much more difficult to sell them raw materials. There are exceptions in those places where one of your greatest Tennesseans has been able to work out reciprocal trade treaties. With tolerance, patience and clear vision, Secretary Hull has made a magnificent record of achievement in the face of the fierce struggle of many nations to become economically selfsufficient. A significant trend in the plantation area is the advent of the machine. On thousands of farms the tractor is replacing the mule. While this is in the interest of efficiency, it throws thousands out of work. What has been the result of these economic handicaps? Average incomes for tenant farmers of $312 in good years and still less in lean years. Total per capita personal incomes of $365 as against $881 in the Northeast. Many people who after a lifetime of honest toil can look forward only to an old age of dependence, diets for thousands consisting of grits, greens and gravy. Houses for more thousands that are not fit for human habitation. A lack of adequate health and education facilities which should be the heritage of every American boy and girl. Only those who are willfully blind fail to see that millions dwell in poverty. I think most of us dwell too long on the causes of the South’s difficulties and too briefly on what is to be done about them. Much has been done in the past five years by the only agency which can step beyond state lines and act as an equalizer---the Federal Government. These things have been done in the course of the general program of the New Deal as applied to the country as a whole. Now the President, recognizing certain problems as being particularly and peculiarly

236 The New Deal serious to the South, has directed a frontal attack to solve them. I am in Memphis today because of this. I have been meeting with the administrators of these eleven southern states, discussing with them what measures the WPA can take to further the President’s purposes. I had already given these state administrators authority to add a total of 200,000 persons to WPA rolls pending the time when labor would be needed for picking cotton. This was done to provide supplementary income to workers at a period when income from private sources would be at its lowest ebb, that is when crops were laid by. We intend to close out this employment in picking time, and to open it up again when the harvest is over. There are hundreds of thousands of people in the rural areas of the South who are not earning a decent living from agriculture. These people have no work between seasons. They want work. There is work to be done. I believe, therefore, as a matter of permanent policy two things should be done. First: that the head of every farm family whose income is inadequate should be given employment a few months each year to supplement his agricultural income. Two: While I intend to see that these jobs go to people who need them, I propose to modify the procedure of certification for work and to substitute in its place of employment system which will remove the offensive stigma of relief from these people. Their need is plain; their will to work has been proven; their incomes must, and will be, raised. This policy reflects the clear intention of the Congress. I do not believe that this supplementary work is a final answer to the problems of agricultural workers in the South, but I am convinced that any permanent satisfactory solution is going to be a long time in the making. In the meantime, there are vital human problems in the South which cannot wait. They tend to retard progress all over the nation. We are therefore determined to move at once. If the per capita net income of farm families in the South could be brought up to the level of farmers’ incomes in the rest of the country, the pool of new purchasing power thus created would absorb twice as many goods as we exported to all foreign countries in 1935. What are some of the things that have been done up to now? The CCC has taken thousands of unemployed young men off the streets and used their energies to preserve the soil and forest assets of the Nation. Hundreds of thousands of old people no longer tremble in fear and shame-faced dependency. The bone and sinew of those old people made the very mortar in the

foundation of this Nation. The terrible injustice of leaving them as objects of charity after their material usefulness has gone is being righted. Much has been done for them; more will be done. The rural rehabilitation program was started when nearly 400,000 families were on relief in the cotton counties. It was realized that the mere handing out of relief did not rehabilitate a farmer, so in 1934 the Government started making loans to down-and-out farmers instead of giving a dole. We can be proud of the magnificent work of the Soil Conservation Service in its cooperation with thousands of farmers to preserve the land. Here on the banks of the mighty but muddy Mississippi we need no statistics as to the thousands of tons of precious topsoil carried away daily by water. All we have to do is to walk over to the bluff and watch the farms of twenty states floating down to the Gulf. As for the WPA, I cannot help but feel satisfaction and pride in the contributions to better life and better living that it has made. I think about the fact that it has employed jobless teachers who made it possible for one million illiterate grown people in this country to read and write. It has built, with the sinews of men who had no jobs, enough farm-to-market roads to reach about five times around the world. The WPA has built sorely needed water and sewer systems, schools, parks and libraries for thousands of communities, large and small. It has provided school lunches for an army of undernourished children. It has fought malaria all over the South and has advanced the battle against this disease by thirty years. All those efforts of Federal agencies are good beginnings, but they are only beginnings. We must go on or we will go backward; there is no standing still. We shall not turn our backs on the relief of distress--upon the use of idle manpower for public works, upon social security, soil conservation, rehabilitation of farmers. I don’t think these things are ruining the country. I think they are making it more truly democratic, and a far better place in which to live. I think they are protecting it from foreign ideologies which we instinctively shun. One of the most important and expensive crops in the country is the crop of children. It takes as long to mature such a crop as it does a fast-growing forest, and it needs constant care. To bring the average youth on a farm up to the age of 18 costs his family and his community about $2,500. On this basis the South has spent billions of dollars over the past 20 years in rearing and training workers for other sections.

6.11 Mary McLeod Bethune, What Does American Democracy Mean to Me? Let us put it another way. The increase in our population is now coming almost entirely from the Nation’s farms, and southern farms are producing far more than their share of this increase. The farm homes of the Nation receive only nine per cent of the national income, and on that they must bring up 31 per cent of the Nation’s children. The disadvantage on Southern farms alone is even worse than that. A state like California, with few children and great wealth, has six times as much economic power behind each school child as a state like Mississippi, with many children and little wealth. It is not lack of interest which holds back education in the South, it is lack of taxable wealth, The South taxes itself for education more heavily per dollar of wealth than other sections, but the final result yields a comparatively small amount to build schools, pay teachers and bear the costs of modern education. Now these children do not all stay at home after they grow up. A great many of them go to distant cities. They are, in fact, ‘‘exported,’’ but the rural sections which paid to raise them get no return in wealth for their loss. The burdened rural areas cannot afford to give them really good schooling, and they move to the cities, unskilled and poorly equipped, to compete with the lower levels of industrial labor. We need a thoroughgoing equalization of educational opportunity. Here is a boy---a future American citizen---who by accident is born in a section which can’t afford to give him a good education. He has two strikes on him before he starts no matter where he goes or what he tries to do, and the heavy handicap is in no sense his own fault. The best way to equalize this is by use of the broad taxing powers of the nation to levy taxes where the wealth is and redistribute the educational expenditures where the children are. As it is in education, so it is in public health. Equalization of opportunity to lead a healthy life and to receive the benefits of modern hospitals and adequate medical care is again the job of the equitable distribution of public expenditures. Most of the areas with highest infant death-rates and deaths of mothers in child birth are in the South. Typhoid, malaria and pellagra are predominantly Southern diseases. They are subject to control by the energetic application of public measures. The great majority of the Southern counties do not have the wealth to provide these services. The South needs industry. The South needs more industrial wage earners to buy its fare produce and to build prosperous cities. To got these things the South

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needs cheaper power and needs it badly. I think that it is coming to the South. Here in the Tennessee Valley it has arrived, In the entire region served by the T.V.A. industrialization is growing apace---largely by reason of cheap power, I am sure the South does not want low-wage industries. Wages paid in a community stay in the community. Profits paid to absentee stockholders go wherever the stockholder lives, and do not contribute to local trade or help to bear the local tax burden. From a sectional viewpoint, therefore, the wagesand-hours legislation, aside from providing a better living for the wage earner, is a guarantee that a larger share of the production of industry will stay at home. I am mindful that if another President had spoken as President Roosevelt did about the South, you might put it down as just another political speech. But you know that his record is one of action. I happen to know that he is determined, with the aid of like-minded people in the South to overcome the forces which have retarded the development of the South. Note: For release to morning papers. The following address was delivered by Harry L. Hopkins, Works Progress Administrator, from Station WREC, Memphis, Tennessee, over a nationwide hookup of the Columbia Broadcasting System at 8:30 P.M., CST.

6.11 Mary McLeod Bethune, What Does American Democracy Mean to Me? November 23, 1939 America’s Town Meeting of the Air, New York City Democracy is for me, and for 12 million black Americans, a goal towards which our nation is marching. It is a dream and an ideal in whose ultimate realization we have a deep and abiding faith. For me, it is based on Christianity, in which we confidently entrust our destiny as a people. Under God’s guidance in this great democracy, we are rising out of the darkness of slavery into the light of freedom. Here my race has been afforded [the] opportunity to advance from a people 80 percent illiterate to a people 80 percent literate; from abject poverty to the ownership and operation of a million farms and 750,000 homes; from total disfranchisement to participation in government; from the status of chattels to recognized contributors to the American culture.

238 The New Deal As we have been extended a measure of democracy, we have brought to the nation rich gifts. We have helped to build America with our labor, strengthened it with our faith and enriched it with our song. We have given you Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Booker T. Washington, Marian Anderson and George Washington Carver. But even these are only the first fruits of a rich harvest, which will be reaped when new and wider fields are opened to us. The democratic doors of equal opportunity have not been opened wide to Negroes. In the Deep South, Negro youth is offered only one-fifteenth of the educational opportunity of the average American child. The great masses of Negro workers are depressed and unprotected in the lowest levels of agriculture and domestic service, while the black workers in industry are barred from certain unions and generally assigned to the more laborious and poorly paid work. Their housing and living conditions are sordid and unhealthy. They live too often in terror of the lynch mob; are deprived too often of the Constitutional right of suffrage; and are humiliated too often by the denial of civil liberties. We do not believe that justice and common decency will allow these conditions to continue. Our faith in visions of fundamental change as mutual respect and understanding between our races come in

the path of spiritual awakening. Certainly there have been times when we may have delayed this mutual understanding by being slow to assume a fuller share of our national responsibility because of the denial of full equality. And yet, we have always been loyal when the ideals of American democracy have been attacked. We have given our blood in its defense-from Crispus Attucks on Boston Commons to the battlefields of France. We have fought for the democratic principles of equality under the law, equality of opportunity, equality at the ballot box, for the guarantees of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We have fought to preserve one nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Yes, we have fought for America with all her imperfections, not so much for what she is, but for what we know she can be. Perhaps the greatest battle is before us, the fight for a new America: fearless, free, united, morally re-armed, in which 12 million Negroes, shoulder to shoulder with their fellow Americans, will strive that this nation under God will have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, for the people and by the people shall not perish from the earth. This dream, this idea, this aspiration, this is what American democracy means to me.

Section 7 World War II and Postwar America

Introduction

both in leading the war effort and in conceptualizing postwar security regimes including the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. It would be up to his successor, Harry Truman, to make the fateful decision to drop atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to support war crimes trials at Nuremberg, and to manage the radical shift in our relationship with the Soviet Union from wartime ally to cold war foe. The perceived existential challenge posed by Soviet ambitions played a brought about a frantic response at home, rekindling fears of communist revolution and manifesting themselves in the McCarthy hearings of the 1950s. Truman’s enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and his lead role in the establishment of NATO and the Marshall Plan clearly set the nation on a course to develop and maintain a larger military establishment than at any time in its history. As much as any period of genuine war, permanent state of hostility between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the cold war served to greatly enhance the status of the presidency. It also lead Dwight Eisenhower, at the end of his second term, to famously alert us the power of a new military industrial complex. Economic policy in the postwar period reflected Americans’ confidence in their government’s ability to address policy challenges. In 1946, the Congress passed and President Truman signed the Full Employment Act, establishing full employment as a national policy goal. In another sweeping piece of legislation, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, popularly known as the

If World War II marked the end of the New Deal period, it also marked the beginning of the United States’ emergence as an international power, a shift that would have profound implications for the way Americans viewed their national government. In fact, the perceived success of Franklin Roosevelt in organizing society and prosecuting the War not only established the United States as the ‘‘leader of the free world,’’ but also opened up the prospect of higher expectations and broader possibilities for the role of government in creating a more perfect union domestically. In many respects, World War II and the postwar period both ended American isolationism and ratified a long-brewing shift in our political culture from a classical liberal stance in which government posed the greatest threat to individual freedom to a modern liberal view in which government had a positive and almost limitless role to play in providing for the general welfare. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Hitler’s subsequent declaration of war on the United States, America quickly transitioned from its role as the arsenal of democracy to total social and economic mobilization for a war in the European and Pacific theatres. On the domestic front, there was full engagement and sacrifice from all Americans. The internment of Japanese Americans, was, however, a deeply disturbing aspect of the efforts on the home front. Although Roosevelt did not live to see the final surrender of the Axis powers, he was the central player 239

240 World War II and Postwar America G.I. Bill, the federal government created a series of national entitlement programs to subsidize education and housing for returning veterans. This legislation went far beyond the historical approaches of providing pensions or bonuses and health care. More importantly the apparent success of the G.I. Bill in expanding homeownership and access to higher education created both a more egalitarian society and one in which the federal government was viewed as having new responsibilities to ensure democratic outcomes as well as democratic processes.

While the 1950s were a period of relative quiescence in terms of national social policy, issues of racial inequality constrained by the Great Depression and the War were beginning to percolate in southern states. Just as importantly, in the fifties the postwar baby boom and a newly affluent society were setting the stage for social movements and wrenching political transformations that would follow quickly on the heels of a decade widely derided as a time of stability and conformity exemplified by The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit or Leave It to Beaver. ---Richard A. Harris

Documents

Since the beginning of our American history, we have been engaged in change---in a perpetual peaceful revolution---a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions---without the concentration camp or the quick-lime in the ditch. The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society. This nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women; and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them. Our strength is our unity of purpose. To that high concept there can be no end save victory.

7.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms (Address to Congress), January 6, 1941 In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression---everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way---everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want---which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants---everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear---which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb. To that new order we oppose the greater conception---the moral order. A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.

7.2 Wendell Wilkie, A Warning on Isolationism, January 8, 1941 Speech delivered before the Women’s National Republican Club, Hotel Astor, New York City Mrs. Hays, members of the Women’s National Republican Club, I am delighted to be here, not alone as the last candidate on the Republican ticket for President of the United States, but also to thank each one of you personally for what you did in that crusade which we conducted just before Nov. 5. There is considerable 241

242 World War II and Postwar America solace in defeat. Not long ago I was reading the autobiography of Henry Watterson, that sparkling editor of The Louisville Courier-Journal. His father was a Congressman prior to the Civil War, and Henry spent much of his time in Washington with his father and was a great friend of many notables, among whom his greatest friend was Stephen Arnold Douglas who, as you know, was an outstanding leader in American public life. The boys were sitting around the table one night, perhaps imbibing more than they should, and one of them said, ‘‘What do you think has happened---Steve Douglas wants to be President of the United States.’’ Another spoke up, ‘‘Well, if Steve Douglas wants to be President we will have to go out and work for him. But I don’t for the life of me know why he wants to be President at 44 years of age and have to be good for the rest of his life.’’ The American people relieved me of the necessity of being good for the balance of my life. I am greatly concerned about the Republican party---because in my judgment it is the only political organization in the United States today that can possibly ultimately bring back to the American people those principles that made this government great. It is the only political organization in the United States that can possibly restore to this country the system of free enterprise and individual liberty which transposed this country from a wilderness to the greatest industrial nation with a higher standard of living than that of any other country in the world and which offers over a period of years, when the rewards of this system are more widely diffused among the people, the ultimate hope of mankind for liberty and well-being. And my concern about the Republican party and its place in this country is such that instead of speaking mere pleasantries to you I decided to speak to you very frankly of what I believe should be the Republican party’s position in this most critical moment in the long and magnificent history of liberty. I do not presume to speak for all in the party; I speak as Wendell Willkie to you fellow-Republicans saying what is in my heart and what I think will ultimately bring the Republican party to full power in the American system of government. Whether we like it or not America cannot remove itself from the world. Every development in the art of transportation, every development in the art of communication has reduced the size of the world so that the world today actually is no larger than the thirteen original colonies were when we established our system of liberty in the United States. And much as we would like to withdraw within ourselves and much as we

would like to disregard the rest of the world---we cannot. ’We cannot be indifferent to what happens in Europe. We cannot forget the fighting men of Britain. They are defending our liberty as well as theirs. If they are permitted to fail I say to you quite deliberately that I do not believe liberty can survive here. I take issue with all who say we can survive with freedom in a totalitarian world. I want to say to you even though some of you may disagree with me, and I say it to you with all the emphasis of my being, that if Britain falls before the onslaught of Hitlerism, it will be impossible over a period of time to preserve the free way of life in America. There has been a bill introduced in Congress to give the President quite extraordinary power to deal with the present crisis, and as I said last Sunday, this bill must be modified in several respects and particularly in one---the extraordinary power granted must automatically come back to the people on a definite date. I have listened this afternoon to the suggestions of Jim Wadsworth with whom, whether or not you all agree, you must say of him that of all the men in public life he has most consistently stood for what he believes, irrespective of the consequences. I have listened to some of his suggested amendments and I think they are wise suggestions to consider. I have also reviewed the suggestion of Kenneth Simpson, member of Congress from New York, and I think his suggestions are wise ones. But let me say to you that if the Republican party in the year of 1941 makes a blind opposition to this bill and allows itself to be presented to the American people as the isolationist party, it will never again gain control of the American government. I beg of you---I plead with you---you people who believe as I do in our great system of government---please do not in blind opposition---do not because of hate of an individual--and of all persons in the United States I have least cause to hold a brief for him---forget the critical world situation which confronts us and in which America is a part. We are fortunate to be represented in Congress---we Republicans---by very able and outstanding men. It is their duty and if I have any persuasive ability with them, I beg of them to debate and consider the bill and each of its provisions carefully. I urge you likewise to call upon them to examine the bill with utmost scrutiny and debate it thoroughly but in the final analysis after justifiable criticism urge them not to vote to render America or its Chief Executive impotent to preserve liberty in Britain---not alone because we are sympathetic with Britain’s economic, social and cultural

7.4 Executive Order No. 9066 (Japanese Internment) way of life but primarily because in her preservation of that way of life the hope of preserving it in America will be assured. May I say to you as my considered judgment that America will not stay out of the war merely by persons asserting bravely in speeches that she will not go into the war. We will, however, stay out of the war, in my judgment, if the men of Britain are supported to the utmost and immediately. This can only be done by the granting of enlarged powers to the President to deal not alone with the international situation but with the building of the materials and instruments of combat. Republicans of 1941, you who gave to me the rarest privilege that could come to any man, the privilege of leading the greatest cause of this century in a great crusade---I call upon you now to rise to the opportunity of preserving the blessed principles of freedom and the preserving of the Republican party so that it may be an effective instrumentality in the solution of both our domestic and our international problems. If during this critical period we play a wise and proper part America in the near future will call us the truly gallant and brave defenders of America into power. Let us not fail.

7.3 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pearl Harbor Speech (Declaration of War), December 8, 1941 To the Congress of the United States Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941---a date which will live in infamy---the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with the government and its emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese ambassador to the United States and his colleagues delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack. It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time, the Japanese government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

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The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu. Yesterday, the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night, Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last night, the Japanese attacked Wake Island. This morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island. Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation. As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces---with the unbounding determination of our people---we will gain the inevitable triumph---so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, Dec. 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.

7.4 Executive Order No. 9066 (Japanese Internment), 1941 Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against

244 World War II and Postwar America sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104); Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas. I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies. I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services. This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under

Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder. Franklin D. Roosevelt The White House, February 19, 1942.

7.5 Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights, July 13, 1942 NAACP Wartime Conference, Chicago, Illinois On last night we heard a clear statement of some of the problems facing us today. My job tonight is to point out a part of the general program to secure full citizenship rights. The struggle for full citizenship rights can be speeded by enforcement of existing statutory provisions protecting our civil rights. The attack on discrimination by use of legal machinery has only scratched the surface. An understanding of the existing statutes protecting our civil rights is necessary if we are to work towards enforcement of these statutes. The titles ‘‘civil rights’’ and ‘‘civil liberties’’ have grown to include large numbers of subjects, some of which are properly included under these titles and others which should not be included. One legal treatise has defined the subject of civil rights as follows: ‘‘In its broadest sense, the term civil rights includes those rights which are the outgrowth of civilization, the existence and exercise of which necessarily follow from the rights that repose in the subjects of a country exercising self-government.’’ The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution are prohibitions against action by the states and state officers violating civil rights. In addition to these provisions of the United States Constitution and a few others, there are several statues of the United States which also attempt to protect the rights of individual citizens against private persons as well as public officers. Whether these provisions are included under the title of ‘‘civil rights’’ or ‘‘civil

7.5 Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights 245 liberties’’ or any other subject is more or less unimportant as long as we bear in mind the provisions themselves. All of the statues, both federal and state, which protect the individual rights of Americans are important to Negroes as well as other citizens. Many of these provisions, however, are of peculiar significance to Negroes because of the fact that in many instances these statutes are the only protection to which Negroes can look for redress. It should also be pointed out that many officials of both state and federal governments are reluctant to protect the rights of Negroes. It is often difficult to enforce our rights when they are perfectly clear. It is practically impossible to secure enforcement of any of our rights if there is any doubt whatsoever as to whether or not a particular statute applies to the particular state of facts. As to law enforcement itself, the rule as to most American citizens is that if there is any way possible to prosecute individuals who have willfully interfered with the rights of other individuals such prosecution is attempted. However, when the complaining party is a Negro, the rule is usually to look for any possible grounds for not prosecuting. It is therefore imperative that Negroes be thoroughly familiar with the rights guaranteed them by law in order that they may be in a position to insist that all of their fundamental rights as American citizens be protected. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting any action of state officials denying due process or the equal protection of its laws, and the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting discrimination by the states in voting, are well-known to all of us. In addition to these provisions of the Constitution, there are the so-called Federal ‘‘Civil Rights Statutes’’ which include several Acts of Congress such as the Civil Rights Act and other statutes which have been amended from time to time and are now grouped together in several sections of the United States Code. The original Civil Rights Act was passed in Congress in 1866, but was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson the same year. It was, however, passed over the veto. It was reintroduced and passed in 1870 because there was some doubt as to its constitutionality, having been passed before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The second bill has been construed several times and has been held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court, which in one case stated that ‘‘the plain objects of these statutes, as of the Constitution which authorized them, was to place the colored race, in respect to civil rights, upon a level with

the whites. They made the rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two races exactly the same.’’ The Thirteenth and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, along with the civil rights statutes, protect the following rights: 1. Slavery is abolished and peonage is punishable as a federal crime. (13th Amendment). 2. All persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens and no state shall make or enforce any law abridging their privileges and immunities, or deny them equal protection of the law. (14th Amendment). 3. The right of citizens to vote cannot be abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race or color. (15th Amendment). 4. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right to enforce contracts, or sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings as is enjoyed by white citizens. 5. All persons shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to no other. 6. All citizens shall have the same right in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey property. 7. Every person who, under color of statutes, custom or usage, subjects any citizen of the United States or person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws is liable in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress. 8. Citizens possessing all other qualifications may not be disqualified from jury service in federal or state courts on account of race or color; any officer charged with the duty of selection or summoning of jurors who shall exclude citizens for reasons of race or color shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 9. A conspiracy of two or more persons to deprive any person or class of persons of any rights guaranteed by Constitution and laws is punishable as a crime and the conspirators are also liable in damages. Most of these provisions only protect the citizen against wrongdoing by public officials, although the

246 World War II and Postwar America peonage statutes and one or two others protect against wrongs by private persons. Despite the purposes of these Acts which the United States Supreme Court insisted in 1879 ‘‘make the rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two races exactly the same,’’ the experience of all of us points to the fact that this purpose has not as yet been accomplished. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, in certain sections of this country, especially in the deep South, judges, prosecutors and members of grand and petit juries, have simply refused to follow the letter or spirit of these provisions. Very often it happens that although the judge and prosecutor are anxious to enforce the laws, members of the jury are reluctant to protect the rights of Negroes. A third reasons is that many Negroes themselves for one reason or another hesitate to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the United States Constitution and statutes. These statutes protecting our civil rights in several instances provide for both criminal and civil redress. Some are criminal only and others are for civil action only. Criminal prosecution for violation of the federal statutes can be obtained only through the United States Department of Justice. Up through and including the administration of Attorney General Homer S. Cummings, Negroes were unable to persuade the U.S. Department of Justice to enforce any of the civil rights statutes where Negroes were the complaining parties. The NAACP and its staff made repeated requests and in many instances filed detailed statements and briefs requesting prosecution for lynch mobs, persons guilty of peonage and other apparent violations of the federal statues. It was not until the administration of Attorney General Frank Murphy that any substantial efforts were made to enforce the civil rights statutes as they apply to Negroes. Attorney General Murphy established a Civil Rights Section in the Department of Justice. During the present administration of Attorney General Francis Biddle there have been several instances of prosecution of members of lynch mobs for the first time in the history of the United States Department of Justice. There have also been numerous successful prosecutions of persons guilty of peonage and slavery. However, other cases involving the question of beating and killing of Negro soldiers by local police officers, the case involving the action of Sheriff Tip Hunter, of Brownsville, Tennessee, who killed at least one Negro citizen and forced several others to leave town, the several cases of refusal to permit qualified Negroes to vote, as well as other cases, have received the attention of the Department of Justice only to the extent of

‘‘investigating.’’ Our civil rights as guaranteed by the federal statutes will never become a reality until the U.S. Department of Justice decides that it represents the entire United States and is not required to fear offending any section of the country which believes that it has the God-given right to be above the laws of the United States Supreme Court. One interesting example of the apparent failure to enforce the criminal statues is that although the statute making it a crime to exclude persons from jury service because of race or colored was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1879, and is still on the statute books, there have been no prosecutions by the Department of Justice in recent years for the obvious violations of these statues. The Department of Justice has most certainly on several occasions been put on notice as to these violations by the many cases carried to the Supreme Court by the NAACP and in which cases the Supreme Court has reversed the convictions on the ground that Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service. One wholehearted prosecution of a judge or other official for excluding Negroes from jury service because of their race would do more to make that particular law a reality than dozens of other cases merely reversing the conviction of individual defendants. There are, however, certain bright spots in the enforcement of the federal statues. In addition to the lynching and peonage cases handled by the Washington office of the Department of Justice, there have been a few instances of courageous United States Attorneys in such places as Georgia who have vigorously prosecuted police officers who have used the power of their office as a cloak for beating up Negro citizens. As a result of the recent decision in the Texas primary case, it is possible to use an example of criminal prosecution under the civil rights statues by taking a typical case of the refusal to permit the Negroes to vote in the Democratic Primary elections. Let us see how a prosecution is started: In Waycross, Georgia, for example, we will suppose a Negro elector on July 4, 1944 went to the polls with his tax receipt and demanded to vote in the Democratic Primary. He should, of course, have witnesses with him. Let us also assume that the election official refused to let him vote solely because of his race or color. As a matter of law, the election officials violated a federal criminal law and are subject to fine and imprisonment. But how should the voter or the organized Negro citizens, or the local NAACP branch go about trying to get the machinery of criminal justice in motion? Of course, the details of what happens must be

7.5 Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights 247 put in writing and sworn to by the person who tried to vote and also by his witnesses. Then the matter must be placed before the United States Attorney. This is the federal district attorney. I wonder how many of the delegates here know who is the United States Attorney for their district, or even where his office is. Every branch should know the United States Attorney for that area, even if a delegation goes in just to get the same vigor as used in enforcing other criminal statues. But back to the voting case. The affidavits must be presented to the United States Attorney with a demand that he investigate and place the evidence before the Federal Grand Jury. At the same time, copies of the affidavits and statements in the case should be sent to the National Office. We will see that they get to the Attorney General in Washington. I wish that I could guarantee to you that the Attorney General would put pressure on local United States Attorneys who seem reluctant to prosecute. At least we can assure you that we will give the Attorney General no rest unless he gets behind these reluctant United States attorneys throughout the South. There is no reasons why a hundred clear cases of this sort should not be placed before the United States Attorneys and the Attorney General every year until the election official discover that it is both wiser and safer to follow the United States laws than to violate them. It is up to us to see that these officials of the Department of Justice are called upon to act again and again wherever there are violations of the civil rights statutes. Unfortunately, there are plenty of such cases. It is equally unfortunate that there are not enough individuals and groups presenting these cases and demanding action. The responsibility for enforcement of the civil provisions of the civil rights statutes rests solely with the individual. In the past we have neglected to make full use of these statues. Although they have been on the books since 1870, there were very few cases under these statues until recent years. Whereas in the field of general law there are many, many precedents for all other types of action, there are very few precedents for the protection of civil liberties. The most important of the civil rights provisions is the one which provides that ‘‘every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.’’ Under this statue any officer of a state, county or municipality who while acting in an official capacity, denies to any citizen or person within the state any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws is subject to a civil action. This statue has been used to equalize teachers’ salaries and to obtain bus transportation for Negro school children. It can be used to attack every form of discrimination against Negroes by public school systems. The statute has also been used to enjoin municipalities from refusing to permit Negroes to take certain civil service examinations and to attack segregation ordinances of municipalities. It can likewise be used to attack all types of discrimination against Negroes by municipalities as well as by states themselves. This statute, along with other of the civil rights statues, can be used to enforce the right to register and vote throughout the country. The threats of many of the bigots in the South to disregard the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent Texas Primary decision has not intimidated a single person. The United States Supreme Court remains the highest court in this land. Election officials in states affected by this decision will either let Negroes vote in the Democratic Primaries, or they will be subjected to both criminal and civil prosecution under the civil rights statutes. In every state in the deep South Negroes have this year attempted to vote in the primary elections. Affidavits concerning the refusal to permit them to vote in Alabama, Florida and Georgia have already been sent to the United States Department of Justice. We will insist that theses election officials be prosecuted and will also file civil suits against the guilty officials. It can be seen from these examples that we have just begun to scratch the surface in the fight for full enforcement of these statues. The NAACP can move no faster than the individuals who have been discriminated against. We only take up cases where we are requested to do so by persons who have been discriminated against. Another crucial problem is the ever-present problem of segregation. Whereas the principle has been established by cases handled by the NAACP that neither stats nor municipalities can pass ordinances segregating residences by race, the growing problem today is the problem of segregation by means of restrictive covenants, whereby private owners band together to prevent Negro occupancy of particular neighborhoods. Although this problem is particularly acute in Chicago, it is at the same time growing in intensity throughout

248 World War II and Postwar America the country. It has the full support of the real estate boards in the several cities, as well as most of the banks and other leading agencies. The legal attack on this problem has met with spotty success. In several instances restrictive covenants have been declared invalid because the neighborhood has changed, or for other reasons. Other cases have been lost. However, the NAACP is in the process of preparing a detailed memorandum and will establish procedure which will lead to an all-out legal attack on restrictive covenants. Whether or not this attack will be successful cannot be determined at this time. The National Housing Agency and the Federal Public Housing Authority have established a policy of segregation in federal public housing projects. A test case has been filed in Detroit, Michigan, and is still pending in the local federal courts. The Detroit situation is the same as in other sections of the country. Despite the fact that the Housing Authority and other agencies insist that they will maintain separate but equal facilities, it never develops that the separate facilities are equal in all respects. In Detroit separate projects were built and it developed that by the first of this year every single white family in the area eligible for public housing had been accommodated and there were still some 45,000 Negroes inadequately housed and with no units open to them. This is the inevitable result of ‘‘separate but equal’’ treatment. I understand that in Chicago a public housing project to be principally occupied by Negroes is being opposed by other Negroes on the ground that it will depreciate their property. It is almost unbelievable that Negroes would oppose public housing for the same reason used by real estate boards and other interests who are determined to keep Negroes in slum areas so that they may be further exploited. The NAACP is in favor of public housing and works toward that end every day. It will continue to do so despite real estate boards and other selfish interests opposing public housing whether they be white or Negro. The NAACP is, of course, opposed to segregation in public housing and will continue to fight segregation in public housing. We should also be mindful of the several so-called civil rights statues in the several states. There are civil rights acts in at least 18 states, all of which are in the North and Midwest. These states are in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. California provides only for civil action. Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, and Ohio have

both civil and criminal provisions. In New Jersey the only action is a criminal action, or an action for penalty in the name of the state, the amount of the penalty going to the state. In those states not having civil rights statutes it is necessary that every effort be made to secure passage of one. In states having weak civil rights statutes efforts should be made to have them strengthened. In states with reasonably strong civil rights statutes, like Illinois and New York, it is necessary that every effort be made to enforce them. The Chicago branch has the record of more successful prosecutions for violation of the local civil rights statute than any other branch of the NAACP. In New York City resorting to the enforcement of the criminal provisions has greatly lessened the number of cases. Outside of New York City there are very few successful cases against the civil rights statutes because of the fact that members of the jury are usually reluctant to enforce the statutes. I understand the same is true for Illinois. The only method of counteracting this vicious practice is by means of educating the general public, from which juries are chosen, to the plight of the Negro. It should also be pointed out that many of our friends of other races not as loud and vociferous as the enemies of our race. In Northern and Mid-Western cities it repeatedly happens that a prejudiced Southerner on entering a hotel or restaurant, seeing Negroes present makes an immediate and loud protest to the manager. It is very seldom that any of our friends go to the managers of places where Negroes are excluded and complain to them of this fact. Quite a job can be done if our friends of other races will only realize the importance of this problem and get up from their comfortable chairs and actually go to work on the problem. Thus it seems clear that although it is necessary and vital to all of us that we continue our program for additional legislation to guarantee and enforce certain of our rights, at the same time we must continue with ever-increasing vigor to enforce those few statutes, both federal and state, which are now on the statute books. We must not be delayed by people who say ‘‘the time is not ripe,’’ nor should we proceed with caution for fear of destroying the ‘‘status quo.’’ Persons who deny to us our civil rights should be brought to justice now. Many people believe the time is always ‘‘ripe’’ to discriminate against Negroes. All right then---the time is always ‘‘ripe’’ to bring them to justice. The responsibility for the enforcement of these statutes rests with every American citizen regardless of race or color. However, the real job has to be done by the Negro

7.6 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) 249 population with whatever friends of the other races are willing to join us.

7.6 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), 1944 AN ACT To provide Federal Government aid for the readjustment in civilian life of returning World War II veterans. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre8entatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ‘‘Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.’’

Title I Chapter I. Hospitalization, Claims, and Procedures SEC. 100. The Veterans’ Administration is hereby declared to be an essential war agency and entitled, second only to the War and Navy Departments, to priorities in personnel, equipment, supplies, and material under any laws, Executive orders, and regulations pertaining to priorities, and in appointments of personnel from civil-service registers the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs is hereby granted the same authority and discretion as the War and Navy Departments and the United States Public Health Service: Provided, That the provisions of this section as to priorities for materials shall apply to any State institution to be built for the care or hospitalization of veterans. SEC. 101. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs and the Federal Board of Hospitalization are hereby authorized and directed to expedite and complete the construction of additional hospital facilities for war veterans, and to enter into agreements and contracts for the use by or transfer to the Veterans’ Administration of suitable Army and Navy hospitals after termination of hostilities in the present war or after such institutions are no longer needed by the armed services; and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs is hereby authorized and directed to establish necessary regional offices, sub-offices, branch offices, contact units, or other subordinate offices in centers of population where there is no Veterans’ Administration facility, or where such a facility is not readily available or accessible: Provided, That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $500,000,000 for the construction of additional hospital facilities. SEC. 102. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs and the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy are

hereby granted authority to enter into agreements and contracts for the mutual use or exchange of use of hospital and domiciliary facilities, and such supplies, equipment, and material as may be needed to operate properly such facilities, or for the transfer, without reimbursement of appropriations, of facilities, supplies, equipment, or material necessary and proper for authorized care for veterans, except that at no time shall the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs enter into any agreement which will result in a permanent reduction of Veterans’ Administration hospital and domiciliary beds below the number now established or approved, plus the estimated number required to meet the load of eligibles under laws administered by the Veterans’ Administration, or in any way subordinate or transfer the operation of the Veterans’ Administration to any other agency of the Government. Nothing in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, or any other Act, shall be construed to prevent the transfer or detail of any commissioned, appointed or enlisted personnel from the armed forces to the Veterans Administration subject to agreements between the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy and the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs: Provided, That no such detail shall be made or extend beyond six months after the termination of the war. SEC.103. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall have authority to place officials and employees designated by him in such Army and Navy installations as may be deemed advisable for the purpose of adjudicating disability claims of, and giving aid and advice to, members of the Army and Navy who are about to be discharged or released from active service. SEC. 104. No person shall be discharged or released from active duty in the armed forces until his certificate of discharge or release from active duty and final pay, or a substantial portion thereof, are ready for delivery to him or to his next of kin or legal representative; and no person shall be discharged or released from active service on account of disability until and unless he has executed a claim for compensation, pension, or hospitalization, to be filed with the Veterans’ Administration or has signed a statement that he has had explained to him the right to file such claim: Provided, That this section shall not preclude immediate transfer to a veterans’ facility for necessary hospital care, nor preclude the discharge of any person who refuses to sign such claim or statement: And provided further, That refusal or failure to file a claim shall be without prejudice to any right the veteran may subsequently assert.

250 World War II and Postwar America Any person entitled to a prosthetic appliance shall be entitled, in addition, to necessary fitting and training, including institutional training, in the use of such appliance, whether in a Service or a Veterans’ Administration hospital, or by out-patient treatment, including such service under contract. SEC. 105. No person in the armed forces shall be required to sign a statement of any nature relating to the origin, incurrence, or aggravation of any disease or injury he may have, and any such statement against his own interest signed at any time, shall be null and void and of no force and effect. . . . Source: U.S. Statutes at Large, 58 Stat. L. 284.

7.7 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech), March 5, 1946 Delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri President McClure, ladies and gentlemen, and last, but certainly not least, the President of the United States of America: I am very glad indeed to come to Westminster College this afternoon, and I am complimented that you should give me a degree from an institution whose reputation has been so solidly established. The name ‘‘Westminster’’ somehow or other seems familiar to me. I feel as if I have heard of it before. Indeed now that I come to think of it, it was at Westminster that I received a very large part of my education in politics, dialectic, rhetoric, and one or two other things. In fact we have both been educated at the same, or similar, or, at any rate, kindred establishments. It is also an honor, ladies and gentlemen, perhaps almost unique, for a private visitor to be introduced to an academic audience by the President of the United States. Amid his heavy burdens, duties, and responsibilities---unsought but not recoiled from---the President has traveled a thousand miles to dignify and magnify our meeting here to-day and to give me an opportunity of addressing this kindred nation, as well as my own countrymen across the ocean, and perhaps some other countries too. The President has told you that it is his wish, as I am sure it is yours, that I should have full liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these anxious and baffling times. I shall certainly avail

myself of this freedom, and feel the more right to do so because any private ambitions I may have cherished in my younger days have been satisfied beyond my wildest dreams. Let me however make it clear that I have no official mission or status of any kind, and that I speak only for myself. There is nothing here but what you see. I can therefore allow my mind, with the experience of a lifetime, to play over the problems which beset us on the morrow of our absolute victory in arms, and to try to make sure with what strength I have that what has gained with so much sacrifice and suffering shall be preserved for the future glory and safety of mankind. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American Democracy. For with primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. If you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here and now, clear and shining for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the after-time. It is necessary that the constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall rule and guide the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must, and I believe we shall, prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement. President McClure, when American military men approach some serious situation they are wont to write at the head of their directive the words ‘‘over-all strategic concept.’’ There is wisdom in this, as it leads to clarity of thought. What then is the over-all strategic concept which we should inscribe to-day? It is nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and progress, of all the homes and families of all the men and women in all the lands. And here I speak particularly of the myriad cottage or apartment homes where the wage-earner strives amid the accidents and difficulties of life to guard his wife and children from privation and bring the family up the fear of the Lord, or upon ethical conceptions which often play their potent part. To give security to these countless homes, they must be shielded form two gaunt marauders, war and tyranny. We al know the frightful disturbance in which the ordinary family is plunged when the curse of war swoops down upon the bread-winner and those for whom he works and contrives. The awful ruin of Europe, with all its vanished glories, and of large parts of Asia glares us in the eyes. When the designs of

7.7 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech) wicked men or the aggressive urge of mighty States dissolve over large areas the frame of civilized society, humble folk are confronted with difficulties with which they cannot cope. For them is all distorted, all is broken, all is even ground to pulp. When I stand here this quiet afternoon I shudder to visualize what is actually happening to millions now and what is going to happen in this period when famine stalks the earth. None can compute what has been called ‘‘the unestimated sum of human pain’’. Our supreme task and duty is to guard the homes of the common people from the horrors and miseries of another war. We are all agreed on that. Our American military colleagues, after having proclaimed their ‘‘over-all strategic concept’’ and computed available resources, always proceed to the next step---namely, the method. Here again there is widespread agreement. A world organization has already been erected for the prime purpose of preventing war. UNO, the successor of the League of Nations, with the decisive addition of the United States and all that that means, is already at work. We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung up, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel. Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments for self-preservation we must be certain that our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but upon a rock. Anyone can see with his eyes open that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we did in the two world wars---though not, alas, in the interval between them---I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common purpose in the end. I have, however, a definite and practical proposal to make for action. Courts and magistrates may be set up but they cannot function without sheriffs and constables. The United Nations Organization must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force. In such a matter we can only go step by step, but we must begin now. I propose that each of the Powers and States should be invited to dedicate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organization. These squadrons would be trained and prepared in their own countries, but would move around in rotation from one country to another. They would wear the uniforms of their own countries but with different badges. They would not be required to act against their own nation, but in other respects they would be directed by the world organization. This might be started on a modest scale and it would grow as

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confidence grew. I wished to see this done after the first world war, and I devoutly trust that it may be done forthwith. It would nevertheless, ladies and gentlemen, be wrong and imprudent to entrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb, which the United States, great Britain, and Canada now share, to the world organization, while still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world. No one country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it, are present largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and some Communist or neo-Facist State monopolized for the time being these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world, with consequences appalling to human imagination. God has willed that this shall not be and we have at least a breathing space to set our world house in order before this peril has to be encountered: and even then, if no effort is spared, we should still possess so formidable a superiority as to impose effective deterrents upon its employment, or threat of employment, by others. Ultimately, when the essential brotherhood of man is truly embodied and expressed in a world organization with all the necessary practical safeguards to make it effective, these powers would naturally be confided to that world organization. Now I come to the second of the two marauders, to the second danger which threatens the cottage homes, and the ordinary people---namely, tyranny. We cannot be blind to the fact that the liberties enjoyed by individual citizens throughout the United States and throughout the British Empire are not valid in a considerable number of countries, some of which are very powerful. In these States control is enforced upon the common people by various kinds of all-embracing police governments to a degree which is overwhelming and contrary to every principle of democracy. The power of the State is exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact oligarchies operating through a privileged party and a political police. It is not our duty at this time when difficulties are so numerous to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries which we have not conquered in war. but we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law

252 World War II and Postwar America find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence. All this means that the people of any country have the right, and should have the power by constitutional action, by free unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of government under which they dwell; that freedom of speech and thought should reign; that courts of justice, independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and custom. Here are the title deeds of freedom which should lie in every cottage home. Here is the message of the British and American peoples to mankind. Let us preach what we practice---let us practice what we preach. though I have now stated the two great dangers which menace the home of the people, War and Tyranny, I have not yet spoken of poverty and privation which are in many cases the prevailing anxiety. But if the dangers of war and tyranny are removed, there is no doubt that science and cooperation can bring in the next few years, certainly in the next few decades, to the world, newly taught in the sharpening school of war, an expansion of material well-being beyond anything that has yet occurred in human experience. Now, at this sad and breathless moment, we are plunged in the hunger and distress which are the aftermath of our stupendous struggle; but this will pass and may pass quickly, and there is no reason except human folly or sub-human crime which should deny to all the nations the inauguration and enjoyment of an age of plenty. I have often used words which I learn fifty years ago from a great Irish-American orator, a friend of mine, Mr. Bourke Cockran, ‘‘There is enough for all. The earth is a generous mother; she will provide in plentiful abundance food for all her children if they will but cultivate her soil in justice and peace.’’ So far I feel that we are in full agreement. Now, while still pursing the method---the method of realizing our over-all strategic concept, I come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say. Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America. Ladies and gentlemen, this is no time for generality, and I will venture to the precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the

continuance of the intimate relations between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings. Already we use together a large number of islands; more may well be entrusted to our joint care in the near future. the United States has already a Permanent Defense Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to the British Commonwealth and the Empire. This Agreement is more effective than many of those which have been made under formal alliances. This principle should be extended to all the British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens, and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to works together for the high and simple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come---I feel eventually there will come---the principle of common citizenship, but that we may be content to leave to destiny, whose outstretched arm many of us can already clearly see. There is however an important question we must ask ourselves. Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with our over-riding loyalties to the World Organization? I reply that, on the contrary, it is probably the only means by which that organization will achieve its full stature and strength. There are already the special United States relations with Canada that I have just mentioned, and there are the relations between the United States and the South American Republics. We British have also our twenty years Treaty of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with Soviet Russia. I agree with Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that it might well be a fifty years treaty so far as we are concerned. We aim at nothing but mutual assistance and collaboration with Russia. The British have an alliance with Portugal unbroken since the year 1384, and which produced fruitful results at a critical moment in the recent war. None of these clash with the general interest of a world agreement, or a world organization; on the contrary, they help it. ‘‘In my father’s house are many mansions.’’ Special associations between members of the United Nations which have no

7.7 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech) aggressive point against any other country, which harbor no design incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, far from being harmful, are beneficial and, as I believe, indispensable. I spoke earlier, ladies and gentlemen, of the Temple of Peace. Workmen from all countries must build that temple. If two of the workmen know each other particularly well and are old friends, if their families are intermingled, if they have ‘‘faith in each other’s purpose, hope in each other’s future and charity towards each other’s shortcomings’’---to quote some good words I read here the other day---why cannot they work together at the common task as friends and partners? Why can they not share their tools and thus increase each other’s working powers? Indeed they must do so or else the temple may not be built, or, being built, it may collapse, and we should all be proved again unteachable and have to go and try to learn again for a third time in a school of war incomparably more rigorous than that from which we have just been released. The dark ages may return, the Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might now shower immeasurable material blessings upon mankind, may even bring about its total destruction. Beware, I say; time may be short. Do not let us take the course of allowing events to drift along until it is too late. If there is to be a fraternal association of the kind of I have described, with all the strength and security which both our countries can derive from it, let us make sure that that great fact is known to the world, and that it plays its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace. There is the path of wisdom. Prevention is better than the cure. A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately light by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshall Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain---and I doubt not here also---towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome, or should welcome, constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people

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on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you. It is my duty to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone---Greece with its immortal glories---is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westward, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered. If no the Soviet Government tries, by separate action, to build up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the American and British zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts---and facts they are---this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor

254 World War II and Postwar America is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice in our own lifetime we have seen the United States, against their wished and their traditions, against arguments, the force of which it is impossible not to comprehend, twice we have seen them drawn by irresistible forces, into these wars in time to secure the victory of the good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and devastation have occurred. Twice the United State has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to find the war; but now war can find any nation, wherever it may dwell between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe, within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with our Charter. That I feel opens a course of policy of very great importance. In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In Italy the Communist Party is seriously hampered by having to support the Communist-trained Marshal Tito’s claims to former Italian territory at the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong France. All my public life I never last faith in her destiny, even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith now. However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. These are somber facts for anyone to have recite on the morrow a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains. The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The Agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when

the Japanese war was expected by the best judges to last for a further 18 months from the end of the German war. In this country you all so well-informed about the Far East, and such devoted friends of China, that I do not need to expatiate on the situation there. I have, however, felt bound to portray the shadow which, alike in the west and in the east, falls upon the world. I was a minister at the time of the Versailles treaty and a close friend of Mr. Lloyd-George, who was the head of the British delegation at Versailles. I did not myself agree with many things that were done, but I have a very strong impression in my mind of that situation, and I find it painful to contrast it with that which prevails now. In those days there were high hopes and unbounded confidence that the wars were over and that the League of Nations would become allpowerful. I do not see or feel that same confidence or event he same hopes in the haggard world at the present time. On the other hand, ladies and gentlemen, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided of falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

7.8 George Marshall, Harvard Commencement Speech (The Marshall Plan) 255 Last time I saw it all coming and I cried aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken here and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind. there never was a war in history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented in my belief without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous and honored today; but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool. We surely, ladies and gentlemen, I put it to you, surely, we must not let it happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, by reaching a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections. There is the solution which I respectfully offer to you in this Address to which I have given the title, ‘‘The Sinews of Peace’’. Let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Because you see the 46 millions in our island harassed about their food supply, of which they only grow one half, even in war-time, or because we have difficulty in restarting our industries and export trade after six years of passionate war effort, do not suppose we shall not come through these dark years of privation as we have come through the glorious years of agony. Do not suppose that half a century from now you will not see 70 or 80 millions of Britons spread about the world united in defense of our traditions, and our way of life, and of the world causes which you and we espouse. If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary there will be an overwhelming assurance of security. If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength seeking no one’s land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men; if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the highroads of the future will

be clear, not only for our time, but for a century to come. Source: ‘‘The Sinews of Peace,’’ in Sources of World History, ed. Mark A. Kishlansky. New York, Harper Collins, 1995, 298--302.

7.8 George Marshall, Harvard Commencement Speech (The Marshall Plan), June 5, 1947 Speech Delivered at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the longsuffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world. In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace

256 World War II and Postwar America settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen. There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which lie cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which arc urgently needed for, reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down. The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products---principally from America--are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question. Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in

the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations. An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome. Source: The Department of State Bulletin XV1, no. 415 (June 15, 1947): 1159--1160.

7.9 Harry S. Truman, Address before a Joint Session of Congress (The Truman Doctrine)

7.9 Harry S. Truman, Address before a Joint Session of Congress (The Truman Doctrine), March 12, 1947 Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States: The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife. When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible. Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order

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and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration. The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government. The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece. We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required. It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece selfsupporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish. No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always

258 World War II and Postwar America visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people. The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now. Greece’s neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations. To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading

part in establishing the United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments. At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of

7.10 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Struggle for Human Rights 259 grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together. This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States

contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world---and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

7.10 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Struggle for Human Rights, September 28, 1948 Paris, France I have come this evening to talk with you on one of the greatest issues of our time---that is the preservation of human freedom. I have chosen to discuss it here in France, at the Sorbonne, because here in this soil the roots of human freedom have long ago struck deep and here they have been richly nourished. It was here the Declaration of the Rights of Man was proclaimed, and the great slogans of the French Revolution---liberty, equality, fraternity---fired the imagination of men. I have chosen to discuss this issue in Europe because this has been the scene of the greatest historic battles between freedom and tyranny. I have chosen to discuss it in the early days of the General Assembly because the issue of human liberty is decisive for the settlement of outstanding political differences and for the future of the United Nations. The decisive importance of this issue was fully recognized by the founders of the United Nations at San Francisco. Concern for the preservation and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms stands at the heart of the United Nations. Its Charter is distinguished by its preoccupation with the rights and welfare of individual men and women. The United Nations has made it clear that it intends to uphold human

260 World War II and Postwar America rights and to protect the dignity of the human personality. In the preamble to the Charter the keynote is set when it declares: ‘‘We the people of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and . . . to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.’’ This reflects the basic premise of the Charter that the peace and security of mankind are dependent on mutual respect for the rights and freedoms of all. One of the purposes of the United Nations is declared in article 1 to be: ‘‘to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’’ This thought is repeated at several points and notably in articles 55 and 56 the Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the United Nations for the promotion of ‘‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’’ The Human Rights Commission was given as its first and most important task the preparation of an International Bill of Rights. The General Assembly, which opened its third session here in Paris a few days ago, will have before it the first fruit of the Commission’s labors in this task, that is the International Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration was finally completed after much work during the last session of the Human Rights Commission in New York in the spring of 1948. The Economic and Social Council has sent it without recommendation to the General Assembly, together with other documents transmitted by the Human Rights Commission. It was decided in our Commission that a Bill of Rights should contain two parts: 1. A Declaration which could be approved through action of the Member States of the United Nations in the General Assembly. This declaration would have great moral force, and would say to the peoples of the world ‘‘this is what we hope human rights may mean to all people in the years to come.’’ We have put down here the rights that we consider basic for individual human beings the world over to have. Without them, we feel

that the full zdevelopment of individual personality is impossible. 2. The second part of the bill, which the Human Rights Commission has not yet completed because of the lack of time, is a covenant which would be in the form of a treaty to be presented to the nations of the world. Each nation, as it is prepared to do so, would ratify this covenant and the covenant would then become binding on the nations which adhere to it. Each nation ratifying would then be obligated to change its laws wherever they did not conform to the points contained in the covenant. This covenant, of course, would have to be a simpler document. It could not state aspirations, which we feel to be permissible in the Declaration. It could only state rights which could be assured by law and it must contain methods of implementation, and no state ratifying the covenant could be allowed to disregard it. The methods of implementation have not yet been agreed upon, nor have they been given adequate consideration by the Commission at any of its meetings. There certainly should be discussion on the entire question of this world Bill of Human Rights and there may be acceptance by this Assembly of the Declaration if they come to agreement on it. The acceptance of the Declaration, I think, should encourage every nation in the coming months to discuss its meaning with its people so that they will be better prepared to accept the covenant with a deeper understanding of the problems involved when that is presented, we hope, a year from now and, we hope, accepted. The Declaration has come from the Human Rights Commission with unanimous acceptance except for four abstentions---the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. The reason for this is a fundamental difference in the conception of human rights as they exist in these states and in certain other Member States in the United Nations. In the discussion before the Assembly, I think it should be made crystal clear what these differences are and tonight I want to spend a little time making them clear to you. It seems to me there is a valid reason for taking the time today to think carefully and clearly on the subject of human rights, because in the acceptance and observance of these rights lies the root, I believe, of our chance of peace in the future, and for the strengthening of the United Nations organization to the point where it can maintain peace in the future.

7.10 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Struggle for Human Rights 261 We must not be confused about what freedom is. Basic human rights are simple and easily understood: freedom of speech and a free press; freedom of religion and worship; freedom of assembly and the right of petition; the right of men to be secure in their homes and free from unreasonable search and seizure and from arbitrary arrest and punishment. We must not be deluded by the efforts of the forces of reaction to prostitute the great words of our free tradition and thereby to confuse the struggle. Democracy, freedom, human rights have come to have a definite meaning to the people of the world which we must not allow any nation to so change that they are made synonymous with suppression and dictatorship. There are basic differences that show up even in the use of words between a democratic and a totalitarian country. For instance ‘‘democracy’’ means one thing to the U.S.S.R. and another the U.S.A. and, I know, in France. I have served since the first meeting of the nuclear commission on the Human Rights Commission, and I think this point stands out clearly. The U.S.S.R. Representatives assert that they already have achieved many things which we, in what they call the ‘‘bourgeois democracies’’ cannot achieve because their government controls the accomplishment of these things. Our government seems powerless to them because, in the last analysis, it is controlled by the people. They would not put it that way---they would say that the people in the U.S.S.R. control their government by allowing their government to have certain absolute rights. We, on the other hand, feel that certain rights can never be granted to the government, but must be kept in the hands of the people. For instance, the U.S.S.R. will assert that their press is free because the state makes it free by providing the machinery, the paper, and even the money for salaries for the people who work on the paper. They state that there is no control over what is printed in the various papers that they subsidize in this manner, such, for instance, as a trade-union paper. But what would happen if a paper were to print ideas which were critical of the basic policies and beliefs of the Communist government.? I am sure some good reason would be found for abolishing the paper. It is true that there have been many cases where newspapers in the U.S.S.R. have criticized officials and their actions and have been responsible for the removal of those officials, but in doing so they did not criticize anything which was fundamental to Communist beliefs. They simply criticized methods of doing things, so one must differentiate between things which are permissible, such as criticism of any individual or of the

manner of doing things, and the criticism of a belief which would be considered vital to the acceptance of Communism. What are the differences, for instance, between trade-unions in the totalitarian states and in the democracies? In the totalitarian state a trade-union is an instrument used by the government to enforce duties, not to assert rights. Propaganda material which the government desires the workers to have is furnished by the trade-unions to be circulated to their members. Our trade-unions, on the other hand, are solely the instrument of the workers themselves. They represent the workers in their relations with the government and with management and they are free to develop their own opinions without government help or interference. The concepts of our trade-unions and those in totalitarian countries are drastically different. There is little mutual understanding. I think the best example one can give of this basic difference of the use of terms is ‘‘the right to work.’’ The Soviet Union insists that this is a basic right which it alone can guarantee because it alone provides full employment by the government. But the right to work in the Soviet Union means the assignment of workers to do whatever task is given to them by the government without an opportunity for the people to participate in the decision that the government should do this. A society in which everyone works is not necessarily a free society and may indeed be a slave society; on the other hand, a society in which there is widespread economic insecurity can turn freedom into a barren and vapid right for millions of people. We in the United States have come to realize it means freedom to choose one’s job, to work or not to work as one desires. We, in the United States, have come to realize, however, that people have a right to demand that their government will not allow them to starve because as individuals they cannot find work of the kind they are accustomed to doing and this is a decision brought about by public opinion which came as a result of the great depression in which many people were out of work, but we would not consider in the United States that we had gained any freedom if we were compelled to follow a dictatorial assignment to work where and when we were told. The right of choice would seem to us an important, fundamental freedom. I have great sympathy with the Russian people. They love their country and have always defended it valiantly against invaders. They have been through a period of revolution, as a result of which they were for a time cut off from outside contact. They have not lost their resulting suspicion of other countries and the

262 World War II and Postwar America great difficulty is today that their government encourages this suspicion and seems to believe that force alone will bring them respect. We, in the democracies, believe in a kind of international respect and action which is reciprocal. We do not think others should treat us differently from the way they wish to be treated. It is interference in other countries that especially stirs up antagonism against the Soviet Government. If it wishes to feel secure in developing its economic and political theories within its territory, then it should grant to others that same security. We believe in the freedom of people to make their own mistakes. We do not interfere with them and they should not interfere with others. The basic problem confronting the world today, as I said in the beginning, is the preservation of human freedom for the individual and consequently for the society of which he is a part. We are fighting this battle again today as it was fought at the time of the French Revolution and as the time of the American Revolution. The issue of human liberty is as decisive now as it was then. I want to give you my conception of what is meant in my country by freedom of the individual. Long ago in London during a discussion with Mr. Vyshinsky, he told me there was no such things as freedom for the individual in the world. All freedom of the individual was conditioned by the rights of other individuals. That of course, I granted. I said: ‘‘We approach the question from a different point of view/we here in the United Nations are trying to develop ideals which will be broader in outlook, which will consider first the rights of man, which will consider what makes man more free; not governments, but man.’’ The totalitarian state typically places the will of the people second to decrees promulgated by a few men at the top. Naturally there must always be consideration of the rights of others; but in a democracy this is not a restriction. Indeed, in our democracies we make our freedoms secure because each of us is expected to respect the rights of others and we are free to make our own laws. Freedom for our peoples is not only a right, but also a tool. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of information, freedom of assembly--these are not just abstract ideals to us; they are tools with which we create a way of life, a way of life in which we can enjoy freedom. Sometimes the processes of democracy are slow, and I have knows some of our leaders to say that a benevolent dictatorship would accomplish the ends desired in a much shorter time than it takes to go through the democratic processes of discussion and the slow formation of public opinion. But there is no way of insuring

that a dictatorship will remain benevolent or that power once in the hands of a few will be returned to the people without struggle or revolution. This we have learned by experience and we accept the slow processes of democracy because we know that shortcuts compromise principles on which no compromise is possible. The final expression of the opinion of the people with us is through free and honest elections, with valid choices on basic issues and candidates. The secret ballot is an essential to free elections but you must have a choice before you. I have heard my husband say many times that a people need never lose their freedom if they kept their right to a secret ballot and if they used that secret ballot to the full. Basic decisions of our society are made through the expressed will of the people. That is why when we see these liberties threatened, instead of falling apart, our nation becomes unified and our democracies come together as a unified group in spite of our varied backgrounds and many racial strains. In the United States we have a capitalistic economy. That is because public opinion favors that type of economy under the conditions in which we live. But we have imposed certain restraints; for instance, we have antitrust laws. These are the legal evidence of the determination of the American people to maintain an economy of free competition and not to allow monopolies to take away the people’s freedom. Our trade-unions grow stronger because the people come to believe that this is the proper way to guarantee the rights of the workers and that the right to organize and to bargain collectively keeps the balance between the actual producer an the investor of money and the manage in industry who watches over the man who works with this hands and who produces the materials which are out tangible wealth. In the United States we are old enough not to claim perfection. We recognize that we have some problems of discrimination but we finds steady progress being made in the solution of these problems. Through normal democratic processes we are coming to understand our needs and how we can attain full equality for all our people. Free discussion on the subject is permitted. Our Supreme Court has recently rendered decisions to clarify a number of our laws to guarantee the rights of all. The U.S.S.R. claims it has reached a point where all races within her borders are officially considered equal and have equal rights and they insist that they have no discrimination where minorities are concerned. This is a laudable objective but there are other aspects of the development of freedom for the

7.10 Eleanor Roosevelt, The Struggle for Human Rights 263 individual which are essential before the mere absence of discrimination is worth much, and these are lacking in the Soviet Union. Unless they are being denied freedoms which they want and which they see other people have, people do not usually complain of discrimination. It is these other freedoms---the basic freedoms of speech, of the press, of religion and conscience, of assembly, of fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest and punishment, which a totalitarian government cannot safely give its people and which give meaning to freedom from discrimination. It is my belief, and I am sure it is also yours, that the struggle for democracy and freedom is a critical struggle, for their preservation is essential to the great objective of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. Among free men the end cannot justify the means. We know the patterns of totalitarianism---the single political party, the control of schools, press, radio, the arts, the sciences, and the church to support autocratic authority; these are the age-old patterns against which men have struggled for three thousand years. These are the signs of reaction, retreat, and retrogression. The United Nations must hold fast to the heritage of freedom won by the struggle of its people; it must help us to pass it on to generations to come. The development of the ideal of freedom and its translation into the everyday life of the people in great areas of the earth is the product of the efforts of many peoples. It is the fruit of a long tradition of vigorous thinking and courageous action. No one race and on one people can claim to have done all the work to achieve greater dignity for human beings and great freedom to develop human personality. In each generation and in each country there must be a continuation of the struggle and new steps forward must be taken since this is preeminently a field in which to stand still its to retreat. The field of human rights is not one in which compromise on fundamental principles are possible. The work of the Commission on Human Rights is illustrative. The Declaration of Human Rights provides: ‘‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own.’’ The Soviet Representative said he would agree to this right if a single phrase was added to it--‘‘in accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of that country.’’ It is obvious that to accept this would be not only to compromise but to nullify the right stated. This case forcefully illustrates the importance of the proposition that we must ever be alert not to compromise fundamental human rights merely for the sake of reaching unanimity and thus lose them.

As I see it, it is not going to be easy to attain unanimity with respect to our different concepts of government and human rights. The struggle is bound to be difficult and one in which we must be firm but patient. If we adhere faithfully to our principles I think it is possible for us to maintain freedom and to do so peacefully and without recourse to force. The future must see the broadening of human rights throughout the world. People who have glimpsed freedom will never be content until they have secured it for themselves. In a truest sense, human rights are a fundamental object of law and government in a just society. Human rights exist to the degree that they are respected by people in relations with each other and by governments in relations with their citizens. The world at large is aware of the tragic consequences for human beings ruled by totalitarian systems. If we examine Hitler’s rise to power, we see how the chains are forged which keep the individual a slave and we can see many similarities in the way things are accomplished in other countries. Politically men must be free to discuss and to arrive at as many facts as possible and there must beat least a two-party system in a country because when there is only one political party, too many things can be subordinated to the interests of that one party and it becomes a tyrant and not an instrument of democratic government. The propaganda we have witnessed in the recent past, like that we perceive in these days, seeks to impugn, to undermine, and to destroy the liberty and independence of peoples. Such propaganda poses to all peoples the issue whether to doubt their heritage of rights and therefore to compromise the principles by which they live, or try to accept the challenge, redouble their vigilance, and stand steadfast in the struggle to maintain and enlarge human freedoms. People who continue to be denied the respect to which they are entitled as human beings will not acquiesce forever in such denial. The Charter of the United Nations is a guiding beacon along the way to the achievement of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. The immediate test is not only to the extent to which human rights and freedoms have already been achieved, but the direction in which the world is moving. Is there a faithful compliance with the objectives of the Charter if some countries continue to curtail human rights and freedoms instead of to promote the universal respect for an observance of human rights and freedoms for all as called for by the Charter? The place to discuss the issue of human rights is in the forum of the United Nations. The United Nations has been set up as the common meeting ground for

264 World War II and Postwar America nations, where we can consider together our mutual problems and take advantage of our differences in experience. It is inherent in our firm attachment to democracy and freedom that we stand always ready to use the fundamental democratic procedures of honest discussion and negotiation. It is now as always our hope that despite the wide differences in approach we face in the world today, we can with mutual good faith in the principles of the united Nations Charter, arrive at a common basis of understanding. We are here to join the meetings of this great international Assembly which meets in your beautiful capital of Paris. Freedom for the individual is an inseparable part of the cherished traditions of France. As one of the Delegates from the United States I pray Almighty God that we may win another victory here for the rights and freedoms of all men.

7.11 Executive Order No. 9981 (Desegregation of the Armed Forces), 1948 Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity In the Armed Forces. WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense: NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. 2. There shall be created in the National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be composed of seven members to be designated by the President.

3. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the Armed Services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. The Committee shall confer and advise the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and shall make such recommendations to the President and to said Secretaries as in the judgment of the Committee will effectuate the policy hereof. 4. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Committee in its work, and to furnish the Committee such information or the services of such persons as the Committee may require in the performance of its duties. 5. When requested by the Committee to do so, persons in the armed services or in any of the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall testify before the Committee and shall make available for use of the Committee such documents and other information as the Committee may require. 6. The Committee shall continue to exist until such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive order. Harry Truman The White House July 26, 1948

7.12 Robert Taft, Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, July 26, 1949 . . . Why did I vote against the Atlantic Pact? I wanted to vote for it---at least I wanted to vote to let Russia know that if she attacked western Europe, the United States would be in the war. I believe that would be a deterrent to war. . . . We issued just this warning in the Monroe Doctrine, and though we were a much less powerful nation, it prevented aggression against Central and South America. That was only a President’s message to Congress, and there were no treaty obligations, and no arms for other nations. But it was one of the most effective peace measures in the history of the world. I would favor a Monroe Doctrine for western Europe.

7.13 North Atlantic Treaty But the Atlantic Pact goes much further. It obligates us to go to war if at any time during the next 20 years anyone makes an armed attack on any of the 12 nations. Under the Monroe Doctrine we could change our policy at any time. We could judge whether perhaps one of the countries had given cause for the attack. Only Congress could declare a war in pursuance of the doctrine. Under the new pact the President can take us into war without Congress. But, above all the treaty is a part of a much larger program by which we arm all these nations against Russia . . . A joint military program has already been made. . . . It thus becomes an offensive and defensive military alliance against Russia. I believe our foreign policy should be aimed primarily at security and peace, and I believe such an alliance is more likely to produce war than peace. A third world war would be the greatest tragedy the world has ever suffered. Even if we won the war, we this time would probably suffer tremendous destruction, our economic system would be crippled, and we would lose our liberties and free system just as the Second World War destroyed the free systems of Europe. It might easily destroy civilization on this earth. . . . There is another consideration. If we undertake to arm all the nations around Russia from Norway on the north to Turkey on the south, and Russia sees itself ringed about gradually by so-called defensive arms from Norway and Denmark to Turkey and Greece, it may form a different opinion. It may decide that the arming of western Europe, regardless of its present purpose, looks to an attack upon Russia. Its view may be unreasonable, and I think it is. But from the Russian standpoint it may not seem unreasonable. They may well decide that if war is the certain result, that war might better occur now rather than after the arming of Europe is completed . . . How would we feel if Russia undertook to arm a country on our border; Mexico, for instance? Furthermore, can we afford this new project of foreign assistance? I think I am as much against Communist aggression as anyone, both at home and abroad; certainly more than a State Department which has let the Communists overrun all of China. . . . But we can’t let them scare us into bankruptcy and the surrender of all liberty, or let them determine our foreign policies. We are already spending $15,000,000,000 on our armed forces and have the most powerful Air Force in the world and the only atomic bomb. That, and our determination to go to war if Europe is attacked, ought to be sufficient to deter an attack by armed force.

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We are spending $7,000,000,000 a year on economic aid to build up those countries to a condition of prosperity where communism cannot make internal progress. Shall we start another project whose cost is incalculable, at the very time when we have a deficit of 1,800,000,000 dollars and a prospective deficit of three to five billion? The one essential defense against communism is to keep this country financially and economically sound. If the President is unwilling to recommend more taxes for fear of creating a depression, then we must have reached the limit of our taxpaying ability and we ought not to start a new and unnecessary building project . . . But, finally, I believe there is only one real hope of peace in the world to come---an association of nations binding itself to abide by a law governing nations and administered by a court of legal justice. Such a judicial finding must not be subject to veto by any nation and there must be an international force to enforce the court’s decree. Such a plan can only succeed if the public opinion of the world is educated to insist on the enforcement of justice. The United Nations looks in this direction but it can be improved and should be. This pact might have set up such a system between the nations of western Europe. It unfortunately did not do so. We should undertake to make it a model to which the United Nations may later conform. But as set up, it is a step backward---a military alliance of the old type where we have to come to each others’ assistance no matter who is to blame, and with ourselves the judges of the law.

7.13 North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, Washington, D.C. The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a

266 World War II and Postwar America manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7 The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8 Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

Article 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

7.15 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech

Article 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatories.

7.14 Senate Resolution on the Censure of Sen. Joseph McCarthy, 1954 Resolved, That the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, failed to cooperate with the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration in clearing up matters referred to that subcommittee which concerned his conduct as a Senator and affected the honor of the Senate and,

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instead, repeatedly abused the subcommittee and its members who were trying to carry out assigned duties, thereby obstructing the constitutional processes of the Senate, and that this conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, is contrary to senatorial traditions and is hereby condemned. Sec 2. The Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, in writing to the chairman of the Select Committee to Study Censure Charges (Mr. Watkins) after the Select Committee had issued its report and before the report was presented to the Senate charging three members of the Select Committee with ‘‘deliberate deception’’ and ‘‘fraud’’ for failure to disqualify themselves; in stating to the press on November 4, 1954, that the special Senate session that was to begin November 8, 1954, was a ‘‘lynch-party’’; in repeatedly describing this special Senate session as a ‘‘lynch bee’’ in a nationwide television and radio show on November 7, 1954; in stating to the public press on November 13, 1954, that the chairman of the Select Committee (Mr. Watkins) was guilty of ‘‘the most unusual, most cowardly things I’ve ever heard of’’ and stating further: ‘‘I expected he would be afraid to answer the questions, but didn’t think he’d be stupid enough to make a public statement’’; and in characterizing the said committee as the ‘‘unwitting handmaiden,’’ ‘‘involuntary agent’’ and ‘‘attorneys-in-fact’’ of the Communist Party and in charging that the said committee in writing its report ‘‘imitated Communist methods---that it distorted, misrepresented, and omitted in its effort to manufacture a plausible rationalization’’ in support of its recommendations to the Senate, which characterizations and charges were contained in a statement released to the press and inserted in the Congressional Record of November 10, 1954, acted contrary to senatorial ethics and tended to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute, to obstruct the constitutional processes of the Senate, and to impair its dignity; and such conduct is hereby condemned. Source: 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Resolution 301 (December 2, 1954).

7.15 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961 My fellow Americans: Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony,

268 World War II and Postwar America the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor. This evening I come to you with a message of leavetaking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen. Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all. Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation. My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years. In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II. We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America’s leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III. Throughout America’s adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to

sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad. Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology---global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger is poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle---with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment. Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research---these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel. But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs---balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage---balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration. The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV. A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

7.15 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence---economic, political, even spiritual---is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

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The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system---ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V. Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society’s future, we---you and I, and our government---must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI. Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield. Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war---as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years---I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

270 World War II and Postwar America Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII. So---in this my last good night to you as your President---I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future. You and I---my fellow citizens---need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation’s great goals. To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America’s prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love. Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1960. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1035--1040.

542 U.S. 507

Section 8 The 1960s

Introduction

political decisions. This demand manifested itself in protests or even violence at the national level and community organizing at the local level. The anger at America’s failure to achieve its democratic ideals that animated students and black militants was ratcheted up with the successive assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and Bobby Kennedy. While the more extreme actions of the antiwar and civil rights movements drew sharp responses from traditional political leaders and from law enforcement, the policy system did respond. The sixties witnessed enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, Medicare, and a host of so-called Great Society programs that defined Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. The antiwar movement led by Students for a Democratic Society gathered such momentum by the end of the decade that President Johnson decided not to run for re-election in 1968, this coming after his landslide victory in 1964. Richard Nixon’s electoral victory in 1968 was framed around an increasing polarization in society based on voters’ orientations to the war effort in Vietnam, law and order concerns stemming from violence in increasingly segregated urban settings, and debates about the democratic character of the political system. This divide, exacerbated by George Wallace’s presidential candidacy under the American Independent party banner, would define the political landscape for decades to come. It blew apart the old liberal New Deal coalition as southerners and many blue-collar voters who were attracted to the Democratic Party’s pro-labor

At the time of John F. Kennedy’s inauguration, it would have been difficult to imagine that in less than a decade the nation would be convulsed by racial tensions, the U.S. military would suffer defeat at the hands of a Third World nation (albeit one supplied by the Soviet Union), a Democratic Party convention would be marred by violence, that four national leaders would be assassinated, an American would walk on the moon, communications satellites would revolutionize media and information transfer, or that DNA would be reproduced and engineered. In the middle of the decade known simply as ‘‘the sixties’’ writer and social critic Susan Sontag observed that as the baby boom generation came of age and went away to college in unprecedented numbers, they became the cutting edge of a harsh attack on the ‘‘establishment.’’ But unlike earlier generations of radicals, the ‘‘new left’’ followed a strategy of exposing the hypocrisy of American liberalism and subverting the conservative cultural morays of American society. A slogan of this movement, ‘‘Question Authority!’’ seemed to encapsulate the baby boom generation’s revulsion with a political system that invested billions of dollars and tens of thousands of their lives on a war in Southeast Asia while poverty and racial discrimination defined the nation’s political and economic institutions. At the heart of the new left critique was a demand for participatory democracy; that is, a direct voice in policymaking for individuals who would be affected by 271

272 The 1960s and egalitarian economic agenda were alienated by its increasing attention to desegregation and affirmative action, as well as its embrace of antiwar criticism which, in their view, dishonored Vietnam veterans and the military in general. Thus the solid South, as well as socially conservative blue-collar voters, began to peel away from the Democrats. Republican presidential candidates would increasingly benefit from a southern

vote and would find fertile ground among blue-collar voters if they could frame elections around social rather than economic issues. The major political impact of the 1968 election and its partisan polarization, however, was the growth of independent, swing voters who could be swayed more by candidate personality and issues than allegiance to one party or another. ---Richard A. Harris

Documents

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge---and more. To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do---for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder. To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own’ freedom---and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside. To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required---not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge---to convert our good words into good deeds---in a new alliance for progress---to assist free

8.1 John F. Kennedy, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961 Vice President Johnson, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Chief Justice, President Eisenhower, Vice president Nixon, President Truman, Reverend Clergy, fellow citizens: We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom---symbolizing an end as well as a beginning---signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago. The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe-the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God. We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans---born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage---and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

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274 The 1960s men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house. To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support---to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective---to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak---and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run. Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental selfdestruction. We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient, beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course---both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind’s final war. So let us begin anew---remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate. Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us. Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms---and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations. Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths and encourage the arts and commerce. Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah---to ‘‘undo the heavy burdens . . . (and) let the oppressed go free.’’ And if a beach-head of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin. In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was rounded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe. Now the trumpet summons us again---not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need---not as a call to battle, though embattled we are---but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, ‘‘rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation’’---a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself. Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort? In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility---I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it---and the glow from that fire can truly light the world. And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you---ask what you can do for your country. My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man. Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be our own.

8.2 Statement upon Signing Executive Order No. 10924 (Establishing the Peace Corps), March 1, 1961 I have today signed an Executive Order providing for the establishment of a Peace Corps on a temporary pilot basis. I am also sending to Congress a message proposing

8.3 John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Missile Crisis authorization of a permanent Peace Corps. This Corps will be a pool of trained American men and women sent overseas by the U.S. Government or through private institutions and organizations to help foreign countries meet their urgent needs for skilled manpower. It is our hope to have 500 or more people in the field by the end of the year. The initial reactions to the Peace Corps proposal are convincing proof that we have, in this country, an immense reservoir of such men and women---anxious to sacrifice their energies and time and toil to the cause of world peace and human progress. In establishing our Peace Corps we intend to make full use of the resources and talents of private institutions and groups. Universities, voluntary agencies, labor unions and industry will be asked to share in this effort---contributing diverse sources of energy and imagination---making it clear that the responsibility for peace is the responsibility of our entire society. We will only send abroad Americans who are wanted by the host country---who have a real job to do---and who are qualified to do that job. Programs will be developed with care, and after full negotiation, in order to make sure that the Peace Corps is wanted and will contribute to the welfare of other people. Our Peace Corps is not designed as an instrument of diplomacy or propaganda or ideological conflict. It is designed to permit our people to exercise more fully their responsibilities in the great common cause of world development. Life in the Peace Corps will not be easy. There will be no salary and allowances will be at a level sufficient only to maintain health and meet basic needs. Men and women will be expected to work and live alongside the nationals of the country in which they are stationed--doing the same work, eating the same food, talking the same language. But if the life will not be easy, it will be rich and satisfying. For every young American who participates in the Peace Corps---who works in a foreign land---will know that he or she is sharing in the great common task of bringing to man that decent way of life which is the foundation of freedom and a condition of peace. Note: The president departed substantially from this written text in his spoken remarks.

8.3 John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 22, 1962 Good evening, my fellow citizens. This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of

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the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence had established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purposes of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning (October 16) at 9:00 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail. The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city on the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area. Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far---and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared. This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base---by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction---constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviet on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation. The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the

276 The 1960s existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, ‘‘The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes,’’ and, and I quote the Soviet Government, ‘‘There is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba,’’ and that, I quote the Government, ‘‘The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.’’ That statement was false. Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive build-up was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, ‘‘pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba,’’ that, and I quote him, ‘‘training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive,’’ and that ‘‘if it were otherwise,’’ Mr. Gromyko went on, ‘‘the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance.’’ That statement also was false. Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull’s eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines. In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger---although it should be noted the

nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat. But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles---in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy---this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil---is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required---and it is underway; and those actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth---but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced. Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

8.3 John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Second:

Seventh and finally:

I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in their communique of October 3 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that the interests of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction---by returning to his Government’s own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba---by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis--and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions. This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful---without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides---including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union, for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples. But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat---or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week---must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed--including in particular the brave people of West Berlin---will be met by whatever action is needed. Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as ---one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a stand-by alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles six and eight of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements---and the nations of this Hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

278 The 1960s conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas---and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war, the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil. These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom. Many times in the past Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free---free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere. My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead--months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high---but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission. Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right---not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

8.4 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement, 1962 Introduction: Agenda for a Generation We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world: the only one with the atom bomb, the least scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United Nations that we thought would distribute Western influence throughout the world. Freedom and equality for each individual, government of, by, and for the people---these American values we found good, principles by which we could live as men. Many of us began maturing in complacency. As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract ‘‘others’’ we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time. We might deliberately ignore, or avoid, or fail to feel all other human problems, but not these two, for these were too immediate and crushing in their impact, too challenging in the demand that we as individuals take the responsibility for encounter and resolution . . . Some would have us believe that Americans feel contentment amidst prosperity---but might it not better be called a glaze above deeply felt anxieties about their role in the new world? And if these anxieties produce a developed indifference to human affairs, do they not as well produce a yearning to believe there is an alternative to the present, that something can be done to change circumstances in the school, the workplaces, the bureaucracies, the government? It is to this latter yearning, at once the spark and engine of change, that we direct our present appeal. The search for truly democratic alternatives to the present, and a commitment to social experimentation with them, is a worthy and fulfilling human enterprise, one which moves us and, we hope, others today. On such a basis do we offer this document of our convictions and analysis: as an effort in understanding and changing the conditions of humanity in the late twentieth century, an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man attaining determining influence over his circumstances of life . . . Men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, unreason, and submission to authority. The goal of man and society should be human independence: a

8.4 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic: a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved: one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability and willingness to learn. This kind of independence does not mean egoistic individualism---the object is not to have one’s way so much as it is to have a way that is one’s own. Nor do we deify man---we merely have faith in his potential. Human relationships should involve fraternity and honesty. Human interdependence is contemporary fact; human brotherhood must be willed however, as a condition of future survival and as the most appropriate form of social relations. Personal links between man and man are needed, especially to go beyond the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind men only as worker to worker, employer to employee, teacher to student, American to Russian. Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today. These dominant tendencies cannot be overcome by better personnel management, nor by improved gadgets, but only when a love of man overcomes the idolatrous worship of things by man. As the individualism we affirm is not egoism, the selflessness we affirm is not self-elimination. On the contrary, we believe in generosity of a kind that imprints one’s unique individual qualities in the relation to other men, and to all human activity. Further, to dislike isolation is not to favor the abolition of privacy; the latter differs from isolation in that it occurs or is abolished according to individual will. Finally, we would replace power and personal uniqueness rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity. As a social system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation. In a participatory democracy, the political life would be based in several root principles:

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• that decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings; • that politics be seen positively, as the art of collectively creating an acceptable pattern of social relations; • that politics has the function of bringing people out of isolation and into community, thus being a necessary, though not sufficient, means of finding meaning in personal life; • that the political order should serve to clarify problems in a way instrumental to their solution; it should provide outlets for the expression of personal grievance and aspiration; opposing views should be organized so as to illuminate choices and facilities the attainment of goals; channels should be commonly available to related men to knowledge and to power so that private problems---from bad recreation facilities to personal alienation---are formulated as general issues. The economic sphere would have as its basis the principles: • that work should involve incentives worthier than money or survival. It should be educative, not stultifying; creative, not mechanical; self-direct, not manipulated, encouraging independence; a respect for others, a sense of dignity and a willingness to accept social responsibility, since it is this experience that has crucial influence on habits, perceptions and individual ethics; • that the economic experience is so personally decisive that the individual must share in its full determination; • that the economy itself is of such social importance that its major resources and means of production should be open to democratic participation and subject to democratic social regulation. Like the political and economic ones, major social institutions---cultural, education, rehabilitative, and others---should be generally organized with the wellbeing and dignity of man as the essential measure of success. In social change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent because it requires generally the transformation of the target, be it a human being or a community of people, into a depersonalized object of hate. It is imperative that the means of violence be abolished and the institutions---local, national, international---

280 The 1960s that encourage nonviolence as a condition of conflict be developed. These are our central values, in skeletal form. It remains vital to understand their denial or attainment in the context of the modern world . . .

Politics without Publics The American political system is not the democratic model of which its glorifiers speak. In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, and consolidating the irresponsible power of military and business interests. A crucial feature of the political apparatus in America is that greater differences are harbored within each major party than the differences existing between them. Instead of two parties presenting distinctive and significant differences of approach, what dominates the system if a natural interlocking of Democrats from Southern states with the more conservative elements of the Republican party . . . The party overlap, however, is not the only structural antagonist of democracy in politics. First, the localized nature of the party system does not encourage discussion of national and international issues: thus problems are not raised by and for people, and political representatives usually are unfettered from any responsibilities to the general public except those regarding parochial matters. Second, whole constituencies are divested of the full political power they might have: many Negroes in the South are prevented from voting, migrant workers are disenfranchised by various residence requirements, some urban and suburban dwellers are victimized by gerrymandering, and poor people are too often without the power to obtain political representation. Third, the focus of political attention is significantly distorted by the enormous lobby force, composed predominantly of business interests, spending hundreds of millions each year in an attempt to conform facts about productivity, agriculture, defense, and social services, to the wants of private economic groupings. What emerges from the party contradictions and insulation of privately held power is the organized political stalemate: calcification dominates flexibility as the principle of parliamentary organization, frustration is the expectancy of legislators intending liberal reform, and Congress becomes less and less central to national decision-making, especially in the area of foreign policy. In this context, confusion and blurring is built into the formulation of issues, long-range

priorities are not discussed in the rational manner needed for policymaking, the politics of personality and ‘‘image’’ become a more important mechanism than the construction of issues in a way that affords each voter a challenging and real option. The American voter is buffeted from all directions by pseudo-problems, by the structurally-initiated sense that nothing political is subject to human mastery. Worried by his mundane problems which never get solved, but constrained by the common belief that politics is an agonizingly slow accommodation of views, he quits all pretense of bothering . . . In such a setting of status quo politics, where most if not all government activity is rationalized in Cold War anti-communist terms, it is somewhat natural that discontented, superpatriotic groups would emerge through political channels and explain their ultra-conservatism as the best means of Victory over Communism. They have become a politically influential force within the Republican Party, at a national level through Senator Goldwater, and at a local level through their important social and economic roles. Their political views are defined generally as the opposite of the supposed views of communists: complete individual freedom in the economic sphere, non-participation by the government in the machinery of production. But actually ‘‘anticommunism’’ becomes an umbrella by which to protest liberalism, internationalism, welfarism, the active civil rights and labor movements. It is to the disgrace of the United States that such a movement should become a prominent kind of public participation in the modern world---but, ironically, it is somewhat to the interests of the United States that such a movement should be a public constituency pointed toward realignment of the political parties, demanding a conservative Republican Party in the South and an exclusion of the ‘‘leftist’’ elements of the national GOP.

The Economy American capitalism today advertises itself as the Welfare State. Many of us comfortably expect pensions, medical care, unemployment compensation, and other social services in our lifetimes. Even with one-fourth of our productive capacity unused, the majority of Americans are living in relative comfort---although their nagging incentive to ‘‘keep up’’ makes them continually dissatisfied with their possessions. In many places, unrestrained bosses, uncontrolled machines, and sweatshop conditions have been reformed or abolished and suffering tremendously relieved. But in spite of the benign yet obscuring effects of the New Deal reforms

8.4 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement and the reassuring phrases of government economists and politicians, the paradoxes and myths of the economy are sufficient to irritate our complacency and reveal to us some essential causes of the American malaise . . . Within existing arrangements, the American business community cannot be said to encourage a democratic process nationally. Economic minorities not responsible to a public in any democratic fashion make decisions of a more profound importance than even those made by Congress. Such a claim is usually dismissed by respectful and knowing citations of the ways in which government asserts itself as keeper of the public interest at times of business irresponsibility. But the real, as opposed to the mythical, range of government ‘‘control’’ of the economy includes only:

1. some limited ‘‘regulatory’’ powers---which usually just ratify industry policies or serve as palliatives at the margins of significant business activity; 2. a fiscal policy built upon defense expenditures as pump-priming ‘‘public works’’---without a significant emphasis on ‘‘peaceful public works’’ to meet social priorities and alleviate personal hardships; 3. limited fiscal and monetary weapons which are rigid and have only minor effects, and are greatly limited by corporate veto: tax cuts and reforms; interest rate control (used generally to tug on investment by hurting the little investor most); tariffs which protect noncompetitive industries with political power and which keep less-favored nations out of the large trade mainstream, as the removal of barriers reciprocally with the Common Market may do disastrously to emerging countries outside of Europe; wage arbitration, the use of government coercion in the name of ‘‘public interest’’ to hide the tensions between workers and business production controllers; price controls, which further maintains the status quo of big ownership and flushes out little investors for the sake of ‘‘stability’’; 4. very limited ‘‘poverty-solving’’ which is designed for the organized working class but not the shutout, poverty-stricken migrants, farm workers, the indigent unaware of medical care or the lowermiddle class person riddled with medical bills, the ‘‘unhireables’’ of minority groups or workers over 45 years of age, etc.

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5. regional development programs---such as the Area Redevelopment Act---which have been only ‘‘trickle down’’ welfare programs without broad authority for regional planning and development and public works spending. The federal highway program has been more significant than the ‘‘depressed areas’’ program in meeting the needs of people, but is generally too remote and does not reach the vicious circle of poverty itself. In short, the theory of government ‘‘countervailing’’ business neglects the extent to which government influence is marginal to the basic production decisions, the basic decision-making environment of society, the basic structure or distribution and allocation which is still determined by major corporations with power and wealth concentrated among the few . . . The Military-Industrial Complex. The most spectacular and important creation of the authoritarian and oligopolistic structure of economic decision-making in America is the institution called ‘‘the military-industrial complex’’ by former President Eisenhower, the powerful congruence of interest and structure among military and business elites which affects so much of our development and destiny. Not only is ours the first generation to live with the possibility of world-wide cataclysm---it is the first to experience the actual social preparation for cataclysm, the general militarization of American society. In 1948 Congress established Universal Military Training, the first peacetime conscription. The military became a permanent institution. Four years earlier, General Motor’s Charles E. Wilson had heralded the creation of what he called the ‘‘permanent war economy,’’ the continuous use of military spending as a solution to economic problems unsolved before the post-war boom, most notably the problem of the seventeen million jobless after eight years of the New Deal. This has left a ‘‘hidden crisis’’ in the allocation of resources by the American economy. Since our childhood these two trends---the rise of the military and the installation of a defense-based economy---have grown fantastically. The Department of Defense, ironically the world’s largest single organization, is worth $160 billion, owns 32 million acres of America and employs half the 7.5 million persons directly dependent on the military for subsistence, has an $11 billion payroll which is larger than the net annual income of all American corporations. Defense spending in the Eisenhower era totaled $350 billions and President Kennedy entered office pledged to go even beyond the present defense allocation of

282 The 1960s sixty cents from every public dollar spent. Except for a war-induced boom immediately after ‘‘our side’’ bombed Hiroshima, American economic prosperity has coincided with a growing dependence on military outlay---from 1941 to 1959 America’s Gross National Product of $5.25 trillion included $700 billion in goods and services purchased for the defense effort, about one-seventh of the accumulated GNP. This pattern has included the steady concentration of military spending among a few corporations. In 1961, 86 percent of Defense Department contracts were awarded without competition. The ordnance industry of 100,000 people is completely engaged in military work; in the aircraft industry, 94 percent of 750,000 workers are linked to the war economy; shipbuilding, radio and communications equipment industries commit forty percent of their work to defense; iron and steel, petroleum, metalstamping and machine shop products, motors and generators, tools and hardware, copper, aluminum and machine tools industries all devote at least 10 percent of their work to the same cause. The intermingling of Big Military and Big Industry is evidenced in the 1,400 former officers working for the 100 corporations who received nearly all the $21 billion spent in procurement by the Defense Department in 1961. The overlap is most poignantly clear in the case of General Dynamics, the company which received the best 1961 contracts, employed the most retired officers (187), and is directed by a former Secretary of the Army. A Fortune magazine profile of General Dynamics said: ‘‘The unique group of men who run Dynamics are only incidentally in rivalry with other U.S. manufacturers, with many of whom they actually act in concert. Their chief competitor is the USSR. The core of General Dynamics corporate philosophy is the conviction that national defense is a more or less permanent business.’’ Little has changed since Wilson’s proud declaration of the Permanent War Economy back in the 1944 days when the top 200 corporations possessed 80 percent of all active prime war-supply contracts . . . Automation, Abundance, and Challenge. But while the economy remains relatively static in its setting of priorities and allocation of resources, new conditions are emerging with enormous implications: the revolution of automation, and the replacement of scarcity by the potential of material abundance. Automation, the process of machines replacing men in performing sensory, motoric and complex logical tasks, is transforming society in ways that are scarcely comprehensible. By 1959, industrial production regained its 1957 ‘‘pre-recession’’ level---but with

750,000 fewer workers required. In the Fifties as a whole, national production enlarged by 43 percent but the number of factory employees remained stationary, seven-tenths of one percent higher than in 1947. Automation is destroying whole categories of work--impersonal thinkers have efficiently labeled this ‘‘structural unemployment’’---in blue-collar, service, and even middle management occupations. In addition it is eliminating employment opportunities for a youth force that numbers one million more than it did in 1950, and rendering work far more difficult both to find and do for people in the forties and up. The consequences of this economic drama, strengthened by the force of post-war recessions, are momentous: five million becomes an acceptable unemployment tabulation, and misery, uprootedness and anxiety become the lot of increasing numbers of Americans . . .

The Individual in the Warfare State Business and politics, when significantly militarized, affect the whole living condition of each American citizen. Worker and family depend on the Cold War for life. Half of all research and development is concentrated on military ends. The press mimics conventional cold war opinion in its editorials. In less than a full generation, most Americans accept the militaryindustrial structure as ‘‘the way things are.’’ War is still pictured as one more kind of diplomacy, perhaps a gloriously satisfying kind . . . Past senselessness permits present brutality; present brutality is prelude to future deeds of still greater inhumanity; that is the moral history of the twentieth century, from the First World War to the present. A half-century of accelerating destruction has flattened out the individual’s ability to make moral distinction, it has made people understandably give up, it has forced private worry and public silence. To a decisive extent, the means of defense, the military technology itself, determines the political and social character of the state being defended---that is, defense mechanism themselves in the nuclear age alter the character of the system that creates them for protection. So it has been with American, as her democratic institutions and habits have shriveled in almost direct proportion to the growth of her armaments. Decisions about military strategy, including the monstrous decision to go to war, are more and more the property of the military and the industrial arms race machine, with the politicians assuming a ratifying role instead of a determining one. This is increasingly a fact not just because of the installation of the permanent

8.4 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement military, but because of constant revolutions in military technology. The new technologies allegedly require military expertise, scientific comprehension, and the mantle of secrecy. As Congress relies more and more on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the existing chasm between people and decision-makers becomes irreconcilably wide, and more alienating in its effects . . . What are the governing policies which supposedly justify all this human sacrifice and waste? With few exceptions they have reflected the quandaries and confusion, stagnation and anxiety, of a stalemated nation in a turbulent world. They have shown a slowness, sometimes a sheer inability to react to a sequence of new problems . . .

The Colonial Revolution While weapons have accelerated man’s opportunity for self-destruction, the counter-impulse to life and creation are superbly manifest in the revolutionary feelings of many Asian, African and Latin American peoples. Against the individual initiative and aspiration, and social sense of organicism characteristic of these upsurges, the American apathy and stalemate stand in embarrassing contrast . . . What has America done? During the years 1955--57 our total expenditures in economic aid were equal to one-tenth of one percent of our total Gross National Product. Prior to that time it was less; since then it has been a fraction higher. Immediate social and economic development is needed---we have helped little, seeming to prefer to create a growing gap between ‘‘have’’ and ‘‘have not’’ rather than to usher in social revolutions which would threaten our investors and out military alliances. The new nations want to avoid power entanglements that will open their countries to foreign domination---and we have often demanded loyalty oaths. They do not see the relevence of uncontrolled free enterprise in societies without accumulated capital and a significant middle class---and we have looked calumniously on those who would not try ‘‘our way’’. They seek empathy---and we have sided with the old colonialists, who now are trying to take credit for ‘‘giving’’ all the freedom that has been wrested from them, or we ‘‘empathize’’ when pressure absolutely demands it. With rare variation, American foreign policy in the Fifties was guided by a concern for foreign investment and a negative anti-communist political stance linked to a series of military alliances, both undergirded by military threat. We participated unilaterally---usually through the Central Intelligence Agency---in

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revolutions against governments in Laos, Guatemala, Cuba, Egypt, Iran. We permitted economic investment to decisively affect our foreign policy: fruit in Cuba, oil in the Middle East, diamonds and gold in South Africa (with whom we trade more than with any African nation). More exactly: America’s ‘‘foreign market’’ in the late Fifties, including exports of goods and services plus overseas sales by American firms, averaged about $60 billion annually. This represented twice the investment of 1950, and it is predicted that the same rates of increase will continue. The reason is obvious: Fortune said in 1958, ‘‘foreign earnings will be more than double in four years, more than twice the probable gain in domestic profits’’. These investments are concentrated primarily in the Middle East and Latin America, neither region being an impressive candidate for the long-run stability, political caution, and lower-class tolerance that American investors typically demand . . . Ever since the colonial revolution began, American policy makers have reacted to new problems with old ‘‘gunboat’’ remedies, often thinly disguised. The feeble but desirable efforts of the Kennedy administration to be more flexible are coming perhaps too late, and are of too little significance to really change the historical thrust of our policies. The hunger problem is increasing rapidly mostly as a result of the worldwide population explosion that cancels out the meager triumphs gained so far over starvation. The threat of population to economic growth is simply documented: in 1960--70 population in Africa south of the Sahara will increase 14 percent; in South Asia and the Far East by 22 percent; in North Africa 26 percent; in the Middle East by 27 percent; in Latin America 29 percent. Population explosion, no matter how devastating, is neutral. But how long will it take to create a relation of thrust between America and the newly-developing societies? How long to change our policies? And what length of time do we have? The world is in transformation. But America is not. It can race to industrialize the world, tolerating occasional authoritarianisms, socialisms, neutralisms along the way---or it can slow the pace of the inevitable and default to the eager and self-interested Soviets and, much more importantly, to mankind itself. Only mystics would guess we have opted thoroughly for the first. Consider what our people think of this, the most urgent issue on the human agenda. Fed by a bellicose press, manipulated by economic and political opponents of change, drifting in their own history, they grumble about ‘‘the foreign aid waste’’, or about ‘‘that beatnik down in Cuba’’, or how ‘‘things will get us by’’ . . .

284 The 1960s thinking confidently, albeit in the usual bewilderment, that Americans can go right on like always, five percent of mankind producing forty percent of its goods . . .

Discrimination

opposed to the 41 occupations offered to the white student. Furthermore, in spite of the 1954 Supreme Court decision, 80 percent of all ‘‘nonwhites’’ educated actually, or virtually, are educated under segregated conditions. And only one of 20 ‘‘nonwhite’’ students goes to college as opposed to the 1:10 ratio for white students.

Our America is still white. Consider the plight, statistically, of its greatest nonconformists, the ‘‘nonwhites’’ (a Census Bureau designation).

7. Voting: While the white community is registered above two-thirds of its potential, the ‘‘nonwhite’’ population is registered below one-third of its capacity (with even greater distortion in areas of the Deep South).

1. Literacy: One of every four ‘‘nonwhites’’ is functionally illiterate; half do not complete elementary school; one in five finishes high school or better. But one in twenty whites is functionally illiterate; four of five finish elementary school; half go through high school or better.

Even against this background, some will say progress is being made. The facts bely it, however, unless it is assumed that America has another century to deal with its racial inequalities. Others, more pompous, will blame the situation on ‘‘those people’s inability to pick themselves up’’, not understanding the automatic way in which such a system can frustrate reform efforts and diminish the aspirations of the oppressed. The oneparty system in the South, attached to the DixiecratRepublican complex nationally, cuts off the Negro’s independent powers as a citizen. Discrimination in employment, along with labor’s accomodation to the ‘‘lily-white’’ hiring practises, guarantees the lowest slot in the economic order to the ‘‘nonwhite.’’ North or South, these oppressed are conditioned by their inheritance and their surroundings to expect more of the same: in housing, schools, recreation, travel, all their potential is circumscribed, thwarted and often extinguished. Automation grinds up job opportunities, and ineffective or non-existent retraining programs make the already-handicapped ‘‘nonwhite’’ even less equipped to participate in ‘‘technological progress.’’ . . . It has been said that the Kennedy administration did more in two years than the Eisenhower administration did in eight. Of this there can be no doubt. But it is analogous to comparing whispers to silence when positively stentorian tones are demanded. President Kennedy lept ahead of the Eisenhower record when he made his second reference to the racial problem; Eisenhower did not utter a meaningful public statement until his last month in office when he mentioned the ‘‘blemish’’ of bigotry . . . While corrupt politicians, together with business interests happy with the absence of organized labor in Southern states and with the $50 billion in profits that results from paying the Negro half a ‘‘white wage’’, stymie and slow fundamental progress, it remains to be

2. Salary: In 1959 a ‘‘nonwhite’’ worker could expect to average $2,844 annually; a ‘‘nonwhite’’ family, including a college-educated father, could expect to make $5,654 collectively. But a white worker could expect to make $4,487 if he worked alone; with a college degree and a family of helpers he could expect $7,373. The approximate Negro-white wage ratio has remained nearly level for generations, with the exception of the World War II employment ‘‘boom’’ which opened many better jobs to exploited groups. 3. Work: More than half of all ‘‘nonwhites’’ work at laboring or service jobs, including one-fourth of those with college degrees; one in 20 works in a professional or managerial capacity. Fewer than one in five of all whites are laboring or service workers, including one in every 100 of the college-educated; one in four is in professional or managerial work. 4. Unemployment: Within the 1960 labor force of approximately 72 million, one of every 10 ‘‘nonwhites’’ was unemployed. Only one of every 20 whites suffered that condition. 5. Housing: The census classifies 57 percent of all ‘‘nonwhite’’ houses substandard, but only 27 percent of white-owned units so exist. 6. Education: More than fifty percent of America’s ‘‘nonwhite’’ high school students never graduate. The vocational and professional spread of curriculum categories offered ‘‘nonwhites’’ is 16 as

8.4 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement appreciated that the ultimate wages of discrimination are paid by individuals and not by the state. Indeed the other sides of the economic, political and sociological coins of racism represent their more profound implications in the private lives, liberties and pursuits of happiness of the citizen. While hungry nonwhites the world around assume rightful dominance, the majority of Americans fight to keep integrated housing out of the suburbs. While a fully interracial world becomes a biological probability, most Americans persist in opposing marriage between the races. While cultures generally interpenetrate, white America is ignorant still of nonwhite America---and perhaps glad of it. The white lives almost completely within his immediate, close-up world where things are tolerable, there are no Negroes except on the bus corner going to and from work, and where it is important that daughter marry right. White, like might, makes right in America today. Not knowing the ‘‘nonwhite’’, however, the white knows something less than himself. Not comfortable around ‘‘different people’’, he reclines in whiteness instead of preparing for diversity. Refusing to yield objective social freedoms to the ‘‘nonwhite’’, the white loses his personal subjective freedom by turning away ‘‘from all these damn causes.’’ White American ethnocentrism at home and abroad reflect most sharply the self-deprivation suffered by the majority of our country which effectively makes it an isolated minority in the world community of culture and fellowship. The awe inspired by the pervasiveness of racism in American life is only matched by the marvel of its historical span in American traditions. The national heritage of racial discrimination via slavery has been a part of America since Christopher Columbus’ advent on the new continent. As such, racism not only antedates the Republic and the thirteen Colonies, but even the use of the English language in this hemisphere. And it is well that we keep this as a background when trying to understand why racism stands as such a steadfast pillar in the culture and custom of the country. Racial-xenophobia is reflected in the admission of various racial stocks to the country. From the nineteenth century Oriental Exclusion Acts to the most recent up-dating of the Walter-McCarren Immigration Acts the nation has shown a continuous contemptuous regard for ‘‘nonwhites.’’ More recently, the tragedies of Hiroshima and Korematsu, and our cooperation with Western Europe in the United Nations add treatment to the thoroughness of racist overtones in national life . . .

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Towards American Democracy Every effort to end the Cold War and expand the process of world industrialization is an effort hostile to people and institutions whose interests lie in perpetuation of the East-West military threat and the postponement of change in the ‘‘have not’’ nations of the world. Every such effort, too, is bound to establish greater democracy in America. The major goals of a domestic effort would be: 1. America must abolish its political party stalemate. Two genuine parties, centered around issues and essential values, demanding allegiance to party principles shall supplant the current system of organized stalemate which is seriously inadequate to a world in flux . . . 2. Mechanisms of voluntary association must be created through which political information can be imparted and political participation encouraged. Political parties, even if realigned, would not provide adequate outlets for popular involvement. Institutions should be created that engage people with issues and express political preference, not as now with huge business lobbies which exercise undemocratic power, but which carry political influence (appropriate to private, rather than public, groupings) in national decision-making enterprise. Private in nature, these should be organized around single issues (medical care, transportation systems reform, etc.), concrete interest (labor and minority group organizations), multiple issues or general issues . . . 3. Institutions and practices which stifle dissent should be abolished, and the promotion of peaceful dissent should be actively promoted. The first Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, thought, religion and press should be seen as guarantees, not threats, to national security . . . 4. Corporations must be made publicly responsible. It is not possible to believe that true democracy can exist where a minority utterly controls enormous wealth and power . . . We can no longer rely on competition of the many to insure that business enterprise is responsive to social needs . . . 5. The allocation of resources must be based on social needs. A truly ‘‘public sector’’ must be established, and its nature debated and planned. At present the majority of America’s ‘‘public sector’’, the largest part of our public spending,

286 The 1960s is for the military. When great social needs are so pressing, our concept of ‘‘government spending’’ is wrapped up in the ‘‘permanent war economy’’ . . .

8.5 George C. Wallace, Statement and Proclamation on Integrating the University of Alabama, June 11, 1963 As Governor and Chief Magistrate of the State of Alabama I deem it to be my solemn obligation and duty to stand before you representing the rights and sovereignty of this State and its peoples. The unwelcomed, unwanted, unwarranted and force-induced intrusion upon the campus of the University of Alabama today of the might of the Central Government offers frightful example of the oppression of the rights, privileges and sovereignty of this State by officers of the Federal Government. This intrusion results solely from force, or threat of force, undignified by any reasonable application of the principle of law, reason and justice. It is important that the people of this State and nation understand that this action is in violation of rights reserved to the State by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alabama. While some few may applaud these acts, millions of Americans will gaze in sorrow upon the situation existing at this great institution of learning. Only the Congress makes the law of the United States. To this date no statutory authority can be cited to the people of this Country which authorizes the Central Government to ignore the sovereignty of this State in an attempt to subordinate the rights of Alabama and millions of Americans. There has been no legislative action by Congress justifying this intrusion. When the Constitution of the United States was enacted, a government was formed upon the premise that people, as individuals are endowed with the rights of life, liberty, and property, and with the right of selfgovernment. The people and their local self-governments formed a Central Government and conferred upon it certain stated and limited powers. All other powers were reserved to the states and to the people. Strong local government is the foundation of our system and must be continually guarded and maintained. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. This amendment sustains the right of self-government and grants the State of Alabama the right to enforce its laws and regulate its internal affairs. This nation was never meant to be a unit of one . . . but a united [sic] of the many . . . this is the exact reason our freedom loving forefathers established the states, so as to divide the rights and powers among the states, insuring that no central power could gain master government control. There can be no submission to the theory that the Central Government is anything but a servant of the people. We are a God-fearing people---not government-fearing people. We practice today the free heritage bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers. I stand here today, as Governor of this sovereign State, and refuse to willingly submit to illegal usurpation of power by the Central Government. I claim today for all the people of the State of Alabama those rights reserved to them under the Constitution of the United States. Among those powers so reserved and claimed is the right of state authority in the operation of the public schools, colleges and Universities. My action does not constitute disobedience to legislative and constitutional provisions. It is not defiance---for defiance sake, but for the purpose of raising basic and fundamental constitutional questions. My action is raising a call for strict adherence to the Constitution of the United States as it was written---for a cessation of usurpation and abuses. My action seeks to avoid having state sovereignty sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Further, as the Governor of the State of Alabama, I hold the supreme executive power of this State, and it is my duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The illegal and unwarranted actions of the Central Government on this day, contrary to the laws, customs and traditions of this State is calculated to disturb the peace. I stand before you here today in place of thousands of other Alabamians whose presence would have confronted you had I been derelict and neglected to fulfill the responsibilities of my office. It is the right of every citizen, however humble he may be, through his chosen officials of representative government to stand courageously against whatever he believes to be the exercise of power beyond the Constitutional rights conferred upon our Federal Government. It is this right which

8.6 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream 287 I assert for the people of Alabama by my presence here today. Again I state---this is the exercise of the heritage of the freedom and liberty under the law---coupled with responsible government. Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises, and in my official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, I do hereby make the following solemn proclamation: WHEREAS, the Constitution of Alabama vests the supreme executive powers of the State in the Governor as the Chief Magistrate, and said Constitution requires of the Governor that he take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and, WHEREAS, the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10, reserves to the States respectively or to the people, those powers not delegated to the United States; and, WHEREAS, the operation of the public school system is a power reserved to the State of Alabama under the Constitution of the United States and Amendment 10 thereof; and, WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Governor of the State of Alabama to preserve the peace under the circumstances now existing, which power is one reserved to the State of Alabama and the people thereof under the Constitution of the United States and Amendment 10 thereof. NOW, THEREFORE, I, George C. Wallace, as Governor of the State of Alabama, have by my action raised issues between the Central Government and the Sovereign State of Alabama, which said issues should be adjudicated in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and now being mindful of my duties and responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Alabama, and seeking to preserve and maintain the peace and dignity of this State, and the individual freedoms of the citizens thereof, do hereby denounce and forbid this illegal and unwarranted action by the Central Government. George C. Wallace GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA

8.6 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, August 28, 1963 Delivered on the steps at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C. Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand signed the Emancipation

Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of captivity. But one hundred years later, we must face the tragic fact that the Negro is still not free. One hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro is still languishing in the corners of American society and finds himself an exile in his own land. So we have come here today to dramatize an appalling condition. In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check which has come back marked ‘‘insufficient funds.’’ But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. So we have come to cash this check---a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice. We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the time to open the doors of opportunity to all of God’s children. Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood. It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment and to underestimate the determination of the Negro. This sweltering summer of the Negro’s legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning. Those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. There will be

288 The 1960s neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges. But there is something that I must say to my people who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice. In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force. The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny and their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. We cannot walk alone. And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall march ahead. We cannot turn back. There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, ‘‘When will you be satisfied?’’ We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro’s basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one. We can never be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream. I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you have come fresh from narrow cells. Some of you have come from areas where your quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive. Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana, go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of despair. I say to you today, my friends, that in spite of the difficulties and frustrations of the moment, I still have

a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal.’’ I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at a table of brotherhood. I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a desert state, sweltering with the heat of injustice and oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice. I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream today. I have a dream that one day the state of Alabama, whose governor’s lips are presently dripping with the words of interposition and nullification, will be transformed into a situation where little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls and walk together as sisters and brothers. I have a dream today. I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. This is our hope. This is the faith with which I return to the South. With this faith we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day. This will be the day when all of God’s children will be able to sing with a new meaning, ‘‘My country, ’tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing. Land where my fathers died, land of the pilgrim’s pride, from every mountainside, let freedom ring.’’ And if America is to be a great nation this must become true. So let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire. Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York. Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania!

8.7 Civil Rights Act 289 Let freedom ring from the snowcapped Rockies of Colorado! Let freedom ring from the curvaceous peaks of California! But not only that; let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia! Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee! Let freedom ring from every hill and every molehill of Mississippi. From every mountainside, let freedom ring. When we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God’s children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, ‘‘Free at last! free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!’’

8.7 Civil Rights Act, 1964 Public Law 88-352 Date: 02 JUL 64 88th Congress, H.R. 7152 An Act To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ‘‘Civil Rights Act of 1964.’’

Title I. Voting Rights SEC. 101. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), as amended by section 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stat. 637), and as further amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stat. 90), is further amended as follows: (a) Insert ‘‘1’’ after ‘‘(a)’’ in subsection (a) and add at the end of subsection (a) the following new paragraphs: ‘‘(2) No person acting under color of law shall---

‘‘(A) in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any Federal election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote; ‘‘(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election; or ‘‘(C) employ any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any Federal election unless (i) such test is administered to each individual and is conducted wholly in writing, and (ii) a certified copy of the test and of the answers given by the individual is furnished to him within twenty-five days of the submission of his request made within the period of time during which records and papers are required to be retained and preserved pursuant to title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974---74e; 74 Stat. 88): Provided, however, That the Attorney General may enter into agreements with appropriate State or local authorities that preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests in accordance with the provisions of applicable State or local law, including such special provisions as are necessary in the preparation, conduct, and maintenance of such tests for persons who are blind or otherwise physically handicapped, meet the purposes of this subparagraph and constitute compliance therewith . . .

Title III. Desegregation of Public Facilities SEC. 301. (a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing signed by an individual to the effect that he is being deprived of or threatened with the loss of his right to the equal protection of the laws, on account of his race, color, religion, or national origin, by being denied equal utilization of any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any State or subdivision thereof, other than a public school or public college as defined in section 401 of title IV hereof, and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an

290 The 1960s action will materially further the orderly progress of desegregation in public facilities, the Attorney General is authorized to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section. The Attorney General may implead as defendants such additional parties as are or become necessary to the grant of effective relief hereunder . . .

Title IV. Desegregation of Public Education . . . Suits by the Attorney General SEC. 407. (a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing--(1) signed by a parent or group of parents to the effect that his or their minor children, as members of a class of persons similarly situated, are being deprived by a school board of the equal protection of the laws, or (2) signed by an individual, or his parent, to the effect that he has been denied admission to or not permitted to continue in attendance at a public college by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin, and the Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the institution of an action will materially further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education, the Attorney General is authorized, after giving notice of such complaint to the appropriate school board or college authority and after certifying that he is satisfied that such board or authority has had a reasonable time to adjust the conditions alleged in such complaint, to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section, provided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to

another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards. The Attorney General may implead as defendants such additional parties as are or become necessary to the grant of effective relief hereunder . . .

Title VI. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs SEC. 601. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. SEC. 602. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full

8.7 Civil Rights Act 291 written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report. SEC. 603. Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 602 shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any requirement imposed pursuant to section 602, any person aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and such action shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of that section. SEC. 604. Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to authorize action under this title by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. SEC. 605. Nothing in this title shall add to or detract from any existing authority with respect to any program or activity under which Federal financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of insurance or guaranty.

Title VII. Equal Employment Opportunity . . . Discrimination Because of Race, Color, Religion, Sex, or National Origin SEC. 703. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (3) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer

for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (4) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization--(5) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (6) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (7) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. (8) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training . . .

Other Unlawful Employment Practices SEC. 704. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed, any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.

292 The 1960s (b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for employment by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission SEC. 705. (a) There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political party, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. One of the original members shall be appointed for a term of one year, one for a term of two years, one for a term of three years, one for a term of four years, and one for a term of five years, beginning from the date of enactment of this title, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of five years each, except that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Commission, and one member to serve as Vice Chairman. The Chairman shall be responsible on behalf of the Commission for the administrative operations of the Commission, and shall appoint, in accordance with the civil service laws, such officers, agents, attorneys, and employees as it deems necessary to assist it in the performance of its functions and to fix their compensation in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949, as amended. The Vice Chairman shall act as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or in the event of a vacancy in that office . . .

Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices SEC. 706. (a) Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved, or a

written charge has been filed by a member of the Commission where he has reasonable cause to believe a violation of this title has occurred (and such charge sets forth the facts upon which it is based) that an employer, employment agency, or labor organization has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall furnish such employer, employment agency, or labor organization (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘respondent’’) with a copy of such charge and shall make an investigation of such charge, provided that such charge shall not be made public by the Commission. If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such endeavors may be made public by the Commission without the written consent of the parties, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding. Any officer or employee of the Commission, who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year . . . In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority. In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice

8.8 Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention occurring in a State or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days (provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective day of such State or local law), unless a shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law to remedy the practice alleged . . .

8.8 Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 1964 Speech delivered at the Cow Palace, San Francisco, California . . . The good Lord raised this mighty Republic to be a home for the brave and to flourish as the land of the free-not to stagnate in the swampland of collectivism, not to cringe before the bully of communism. Now, my fellow Americans, the tide has been running against freedom. Our people have followed false prophets. We must, and we shall, return to proven ways---not because they are old, but because they are true. We must, and we shall, set the tide running again in the cause of freedom. And this party, with its every action, every word, every breath, and every heartbeat, has but a single resolve, and that is freedom. Freedom made orderly for this nation by our constitutional government. Freedom under a government limited by laws of nature and of nature’s God. Freedom balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the slavery of the prison cell; balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the license of the mob and of the jungle. Now, we Americans understand freedom; we have earned it, we have lived for it, and we have died for it. This nation and its people are freedom’s models in a searching world. We can be freedom’s missionaries in a doubting world. But, ladies and gentlemen, first we must renew freedom’s mission in our own hearts and in our own homes.

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During four, futile years the administration which we shall replace has distorted and lost that faith. it has talked and talked and talked and talked the words of freedom, but it has failed and failed and failed in the works of freedom. Now failure cements the wall of shame in Berlin; failures blot the sands of shame at the Bay of Pigs; failures marked the slow death of freedom in Laos; failures infest the jungles of Vietnam; and failures haunt the houses of our once great alliances and undermine the greatest bulwark ever erected by free nations, the NATO community. Failures proclaim lost leadership, obscure purpose, weakening wills, and the risk of inciting our sworn enemies to new aggressions and to new excesses. And because of this administration we are tonight a world divided. We are a nation becalmed. We have lost the brisk pace of diversity and the genius of individual creativity. We are plodding at a pace set by centralized planning, red tape, rules without responsibility, and regimentation without recourse. Rather than useful jobs in our country, people have been offered bureaucratic make-work; rather than moral leadership, they have been given bread and circuses; they have been given spectacles, and, yes, they’ve even been given scandals. Tonight there is violence in our streets, corruption in our highest offices, aimlessness among our youth, anxiety among our elderly; and there’s a virtual despair among the many who look beyond material success toward the inner meaning of their lives. And where examples of morality, should be set, the opposite is seen. Small men seeking great wealth or power have too often and too long turned even the highest levels of public service into mere personal opportunity. Now, certainly simple honesty is not too much to demand of men in government. We find it in most. Republicans demand it from everyone. They demand it from everyone no matter how exalted or protected his position might be. The growing menace in our country tonight, to personal safety, to life, to limb and property, in homes, in churches, on the playgrounds and places of business, particularly in our great cities, is the mounting concern---or---should be-of every thoughtful citizen in the United States. Security from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression, is the most elementary and fundamental purpose of any government, and a government that cannot fulfill this purpose is one that cannot long command the loyalty of its citizens . . .

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The 1960s

Now, we Republicans see all this as more-much more-than the rest: of mere political differences or mere political mistakes. We see this as the result of a fundamentally and absolutely wrong view of man, his nature and his destiny. Those who seek to live your lives for you, to take your liberty in return for relieving you of yours, those who elevate the state and downgrade the citizen, must see ultimately a world in which earthly power can be substituted for divine will. And this nation was founded upon the rejection of that notion and upon the acceptance of God as the author of freedom. Now, those who seek absolute power, even though they seek it to do what they regard as good, are simply demanding the right to enforce their own version of heaven on earth, and let me remind you they are the very ones who always create the most hellish tyranny. Absolute power does corrupt, and those who seek it must be suspect and must be opposed. Their mistaken course stems from false notions, ladies and gentlemen, of equality. Equality, rightly understood as our founding fathers understood it, leads to liberty and to the emancipation of creative differences; wrongly understood, as it has been so tragically in our time, it leads first to conformity and then to despotism . . . And I needn’t remind you---but I will---that it’s been during Democratic years that our strength to deter war has been stilled and even gone into a planned decline. it has been during Democratic years that we have weakly stumbled into conflicts, timidly refusing to draw our own lines against aggression, deceitfully refusing to tell even our people of our full participation and tragically letting our finest men die on battlefields unmarked by purpose, unmarked by pride or the prospect of victory. Yesterday it was Korea; tonight it is Vietnam. Make no bones of this. Don’t try to sweep this under the rug. We are at war in Vietnam. And yet the president, who is the commander in chief of our forces, refuses to say---refuses to say, mind you---whether or not the objective over there is victory, and his secretary of defense continues to mislead and misinformation the American people, and enough of it has gone by. And I needn’t remind you-but I will-it has been during Democratic years that a billion persons were cast into Communist captivity and their fate cynically sealed. Today, today in our beloved country, we have an administration which seems eager to deal with communism in every coin known-from gold to wheat, from

consulates to confidence, and even human freedom itself. Now, the Republican cause demands that we brand communism as the principal disturber of peace in the world today. Indeed, we should brand it as the only significant disturber of the peace. And we must make clear that until its goals of conquest are absolutely renounced and its rejections with all nations tempered, communism and the governments it now controls are enemies of every man on earth who is or wants to be free. Now, we here in America can keep the peace only if we remain strong. Only if we keep our eyes open and keep our guard up can we prevent war. And I want to make this abundantly clear---I don’t intend to let peace or freedom be torn from our grasp because of lack of strength, or lack of will---and that I promise you Americans. I believe that we must look beyond the defense of freedom today to its extension tomorrow. I believe that the communism which boasts it will bury us will instead give way to the forces of freedom. And I can see in the distant and yet recognizable future the outlines of a world worthy our dedication, our every risk, our every effort, our every sacrifice along the way. Yes, a world that will redeem the suffering of those will be liberated from tyranny. I can see, and I suggest that all thoughtful men must contemplate, the flowering of an Atlantic civilization, the whole world of Europe reunified and free, trading openly across its borders, communicating openly across the world. It is a goal far, far more meaningful than a moon shot. It’s a truly inspiring goal for all free men to set for themselves during the latter half of the twentieth century. I can also see, and all free men must thrill to, the events of this Atlantic civilization joined by a straight ocean highway to the United States. What a destiny! What a destiny can be ours to stand as a great central pillar linking Europe, the Americans, and the venerable and vital peoples and cultures of the Pacific! I can see a day when all the Americas, North and South, will be linked in a mighty system-a system in which the errors and misunderstandings of the past will be submerged one by one in a rising tide of prosperity and interdependence. We know that the misunderstandings of centuries are not to be wiped away in a day or wiped away in an hour. But we pledge, we pledge, that human sympathywhat our neighbors to the south call an attitude of simpatico---no less than enlightened self’-interest will be our guide.

8.8 Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention And I can see this Atlantic civilization galvanizing and guiding emergent nations everywhere. Now, I know this freedom is not the fruit of every soil. I know that our own freedom was achieved through centuries by unremitting efforts by brave and wise men. And I know that the road to freedom is a long and a challenging road, and I know also that some men may walk away from it, that some men resist challenge, accepting the false security of governmental paternalism. And I pledge that the America I envision in the years ahead will extend its hand in help in teaching and in cultivation so that all new nations will be at least encouraged to go our way, so that they will not wander down the dark alleys of tyranny or to the dead-end streets of collectivism. My fellow Republicans, we do no man a service by hiding freedom’s light under a bushel of mistaken humility. I seek an American proud of its past, proud of its ways, proud of its dreams, and determined actively to proclaim them. But our examples to the world must, like charity, begin at home. In our vision of a good and decent future, free and peaceful, there must be room, room for the liberation of the energy and the talent of the individual, otherwise our vision is blind at the outset. We must assure a society here which while never abandoning the needy, or forsaking the helpless, nurtures incentives and opportunity for the creative and the productive. We must know the whole good is the product of many single contributions. And I cherish the day when our children once again will restore as heroes the sort of men and women who, unafraid and undaunted, pursue the truth, strive to cure disease, subdue and make fruitful our natural environment, and produce the inventive engines of production-science and technology. This nation, whose creative people have enhanced this entire span of history, should again thrive upon the greatness of all those things which we-we as individual citizens-can and should do. During Republican years, this again will be a nation of men and women, of families proud of their role, jealous of their responsibilities, unlimited in their aspirations nation where all who can will be self-reliant. We Republicans see in our constitutional form of government the great framework which assures the orderly but dynamic fulfillment of the whole man as the great reason for instituting orderly government in the first place. We see in private property and in economy based upon and fostering private property the one way to

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make government a durable ally of the whole man rather than his determined enemy. We see in the sanctity of private property the only durable foundation for constitutional government in a free society. And beyond all that we see and cherish diversity of ways, diversity of thoughts, of motives, and accomplishments. We don’t seek to live anyone’s life for him. We only seek to secure his rights, guarantee him opportunity, guarantee him opportunity to strive, with government performing only those needed and constitutionally sanctioned tasks which cannot otherwise be performed. We Republicans seek a government that attends to its inherent responsibilities of maintaining a stable monetary and fiscal climate, encouraging a free and a competitive economy, and enforcing law and order. Thus do we seek inventiveness, diversity, and creative difference within a stable order, for we Republicans define government’s role where needed at many, many levels---preferably, though, the one closest to the people involved: our towns and our cities, then our counties, then our states, then our regional contacts, and only then the national government. That, let me remind you, is the land of liberty built by decentralized power. On it also we must have balance between the branches of government at every level. Balance, diversity, creative difference-these are the elements of Republican equation. Republicans agree, Republicans agree heartily to disagree on many, many of their applications. But we have never disagreed on the basic fundamental issues of why you and I are Republicans. This is a party---this Republican party is a party for free men. Not for blind followers and not for conformists. Back in 1858 Abraham Lincoln said this of the Republican party-and I quote him because he probably could have said it during the last week or so-it was composed of strained, discordant, and even hostile elements. End of the quote, in 1958 [sic]. Yet all of these elements agreed on paramount objective: to arrest the progress of slavery, and place it in the course of ultimate extinction. Today, as then, but more urgently and more broadly than then, the task of preserving and enlarging freedom at home and safeguarding it from the forces of tyranny abroad is great enough to challenge all our resources and to require all our strength. Anyone who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those, those who do not care for our cause, we don’t expect to enter our ranks, in any case. And let our Republicanism so focused and so dedicated not be

296 The 1960s made fuzzy and futile by unthinking and stupid labels. I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue! The beauty of the very system we Republicans are pledged to restore and revitalize, the beauty of this federal system of ours, is in its reconciliation of diversity with unity. We must not see malice in honest differences of opinion, and no matter how great, so long as they are not inconsistent with the pledges we have given to each other in and through our Constitution. Our Republican cause is not to level out the world or make its people conform in computer-regimented sameness. Our Republican cause is to free our people and light the way for liberty throughout the world. Ours is a very human cause for very humane goals. This party, its good people, and its unquestionable devotion to freedom will not fulfill the purposes of this campaign which we launch here now until our cause has won the day, inspired the world, and shown the way to a tomorrow worthy of all our yesteryears. I repeat, I accept your nomination with humbleness, with pride, and you and I are going to fight for the goodness of our land. Thank you.

8.9 Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, April 3, 1964 Cleveland, Ohio Mr. Moderator, Brother Lomax, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies: I just can’t believe everyone in here is a friend, and I don’t want to leave anybody out. The question tonight, as I understand it, is ‘‘The Negro Revolt, and Where Do We Go From Here?’’ or What Next?’’ In my little humble way of understanding it, it points toward either the ballot or the bullet. Before we try and explain what is meant by the ballot or the bullet, I would like to clarify something concerning myself. I’m still a Muslim; my religion is still Islam. That’s my personal belief. Just as Adam Clayton Powell is a Christian minister who heads the Abyssinian Baptist Church in New York, but at the same time takes part in the political struggles to try and bring about rights to the black people in this country; and Dr. Martin Luther King is a Christian minister down in Atlanta, Georgia, who heads another organization fighting for the civil rights of black people in this country; and Reverend Galamison, I guess you’ve heard of him, is another Christian minister in New York who

has been deeply involved in the school boycotts to eliminate segregated education; well, I myself am a minister, not a Christian minister, but a Muslim minister; and I believe in action on all fronts by whatever means necessary. Although I’m still a Muslim, I’m not here tonight to discuss my religion. I’m not here to try and change your religion. I’m not here to argue or discuss anything that we differ about, because it’s time for us to submerge our differences and realize that it is best for us to first see that we have the same problem, a common problem, a problem that will make you catch hell whether you’re a Baptist, or a Methodist, or a Muslim, or a nationalist. Whether you’re educated or illiterate, whether you live on the boulevard or in the alley, you’re going to catch hell just like I am. We’re all in the same boat and we all are going to catch the same hell from the same man. He just happens to be a white man. All of us have suffered here, in this country, political oppression at the hands of the white man, economic exploitation at the hands of the white man, and social degradation at the hands of the white man. Now in speaking like this, it doesn’t mean that we’re anti-white, but it does mean we’re anti-exploitation, we’re anti-degradation, we’re anti-oppression. And if the white man doesn’t want us to be anti-him, let him stop oppressing and exploiting and degrading us. Whether we are Christians or Muslims or nationalists or agnostics or atheists, we must first learn to forget our differences. If we have differences, let us differ in the closet; when we come out in front, let us not have anything to argue about until we get finished arguing with the man. If the late President Kennedy could get together with Khrushchev and exchange some wheat, we certainly have more in common with each other than Kennedy and Khrushchev had with each other. If we don’t do something real soon, I think you’ll have to agree that we’re going to be forced either to use the ballot or the bullet. It’s one or the other in 1964. It isn’t that time is running out---time has run out! . . . Well, I am one who doesn’t believe in deluding myself. I’m not going to sit at your table and watch you eat, with nothing on my plate, and call myself a diner. Sitting at the table doesn’t make you a diner, unless you eat some of what’s on that plate. Being here in America doesn’t make you an American. Being born here in America doesn’t make you an American. Why, if birth made you American, you wouldn’t need any legislation; you wouldn’t need any amendments to the Constitution; you wouldn’t be faced with civil-rights filibustering in Washington, D.C., right now. They don’t

8.9 Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet 297 have to pass civil-rights legislation to make a Polack an American. No, I’m not an American. I’m one of the 22 million black people who are the victims of Americanism. One of the 22 million black people who are the victims of democracy, nothing but disguised hypocrisy. So, I’m not standing here speaking to you as an American, or a patriot, or a flag-saluter, or a flag-waver---no, not I. I’m speaking as a victim of this American system. And I see America through the eyes of the victim. I don’t see any American dream; I see an American nightmare. These 22 million victims are waking up. Their eyes are coming open. They’re beginning to see what they used to only look at. They’re becoming politically mature. They are realizing that there are new political trends from coast to coast. As they see these new political trends, it’s possible for them to see that every time there’s an election the races are so close that they have to have a recount. They had to recount in Massachusetts to see who was going to be governor, it was so close. It was the same way in Rhode Island, in Minnesota, and in many other parts of the country. And the same with Kennedy and Nixon when they ran for president. It was so close they had to count all over again. Well, what does this mean? It means that when white people are evenly divided, and black people have a bloc of votes of their own, it is left up to them to determine who’s going to sit in the White House and who’s going to be in the dog house. ltz was the black man’s vote that put the present administration in Washington, D.C. Your vote, your dumb vote, your ignorant vote, your wasted vote put in an administration in Washington, D.C., that has seen fit to pass every kind of legislation imaginable, saving you until last, then filibustering on top of that. And your and my leaders have the audacity to run around clapping their hands and talk about how much progress we’re making. And what a good president we have. If he wasn’t good in Texas, he sure can’t be good in Washington, D.C. Because Texas is a lynch state. It is in the same breath as Mississippi, no different; only they lynch you in Texas with a Texas accent and lynch you in Mississippi with a Mississippi accent. And these Negro leaders have the audacity to go and have some coffee in the White House with a Texan, a Southern cracker---that’s all he is---and then come out and tell you and me that he’s going to be better for us because, since he’s from the South, he knows how to deal with the Southerners. What kind of logic is that? Let Eastland be president, he’s from the South too. He should be better able to deal with them than Johnson.

In this present administration they have in the House of Representatives 257 Democrats to only 177 Republicans. They control two-thirds of the House vote. Why can’t they pass something that will help you and me? In the Senate, there are 67 senators who are of the Democratic Party. Only 33 of them are Republicans. Why, the Democrats have got the government sewed up, and you’re the one who sewed it up for them. And what have they given you for it? Four years in office, and just now getting around to some civil-rights legislation. Just now, after everything else is gone, out of the way, they’re going to sit down now and play with you all summer long---the same old giant con game that they call filibuster. All those are in cahoots together. Don’t you ever think they’re not in cahoots together, for the man that is heading the civil-rights filibuster is a man from Georgia named Richard Russell. When Johnson became president, the first man he asked for when he got back to Washington, D.C., was ‘‘Dicky’’---that’s how tight they are. That’s his boy, that’s his pal, that’s his buddy. But they’re playing that old con game. One of them makes believe he’s for you, and he’s got it fixed where the other one is so tight against you, he never has to keep his promise. So it’s time in 1964 to wake up. And when you see them coming up with that kind of conspiracy, let them know your eyes are open. And let them know you--something else that’s wide open too. It’s got to be the ballot or the bullet. The ballot or the bullet. If you’re afraid to use an expression like that, you should get on out of the country; you should get back in the cotton patch; you should get back in the alley. They get all the Negro vote, and after they get it, the Negro gets nothing in return. All they did when they got to Washington was give a few big Negroes big jobs. Those big Negroes didn’t need big jobs, they already had jobs. That’s camouflage, that’s trickery, that’s treachery, window-dressing. I’m not trying to knock out the Democrats for the Republicans. We’ll get to them in a minute. But it is true; you put the Democrats first and the Democrats put you last. Look at it the way it is. What alibis do they use, since they control Congress and the Senate? What alibi do they use when you and I ask, ‘‘Well, when are you going to keep your promise?’’ They blame the Dixiecrats. What is a Dixiecrat? A Democrat. A Dixiecrat is nothing but a Democrat in disguise. The titular head of the Democrats is also the head of the Dixiecrats, because the Dixiecrats are a part of the Democratic Party. The Democrats have never kicked the Dixiecrats out of the party. The Dixiecrats bolted themselves once, but the Democrats didn’t put them out. Imagine, these

298 The 1960s lowdown Southern segregationists put the Northern Democrats down. But the Northern Democrats have never put the Dixiecrats down. No, look at that thing the way it is. They have got a con game going on, a political con game, and you and I are in the middle. It’s time for you and me to wake up and start looking at it like it is, and trying to understand it like it is; and then we can deal with it like it is. . . . In the North, they do it a different way. They have a system that’s known as gerrymandering, whatever that means. It means when Negroes become too heavily concentrated in a certain area, and begin to gain too much political power, the white man comes along and changes the district lines. You may say, ‘‘Why do you keep saying white man?’’ Because it’s the white man who does it. I haven’t ever seen any Negro changing any lines. They don’t let him get near the line. It’s the white man who does this. And usually, it’s the white man who grins at you the most, and pats you on the back, and is supposed to be your friend. He may be friendly, but he’s not your friend. So, what I’m trying to impress upon you, in essence, is this: You and I in America are faced not with a segregationist conspiracy, we’re faced with a government conspiracy. Everyone who’s filibustering is a senator---that’s the government. Everyone who’s finagling in Washington, D.C., is a congressman--that’s the government. You don’t have anybody putting blocks in your path but people who are a part of the government. The same government that you go abroad to fight for and die for is the government that is in a conspiracy to deprive you of your voting rights, deprive you of your economic opportunities, deprive you of decent housing, deprive you of decent education. You don’t need to go to the employer alone, it is the government itself, the government of America, that is responsible for the oppression and exploitation and degradation of black people in this country. And you should drop it in their lap. This government has failed the Negro. This so-called democracy has failed the Negro. And all these white liberals have definitely failed the Negro. So, where do we go from here? First, we need some friends. We need some new allies. The entire civilrights struggle needs a new interpretation, a broader interpretation. We need to look at this civil-rights thing from another angle---from the inside as well as from the outside. To those of us whose philosophy is black nationalism, the only way you can get involved in the civil-rights struggle is give it a new interpretation. That old interpretation excluded us. It kept us out. So, we’re giving a new interpretation to the civil-rights struggle,

an interpretation that will enable us to come into it, take part in it. And these handkerchief-heads who have been dillydallying and pussy footing and compromising---we don’t intend to let them pussyfoot and dillydally and compromise any longer. . . . The black nationalists, those whose philosophy is black nationalism, in bringing about this new interpretation of the entire meaning of civil rights, look upon it as meaning, as Brother Lomax has pointed out, equality of opportunity. Well, we’re justified in seeking civil rights, if it means equality of opportunity, because all we’re doing there is trying to collect for our investment. Our mothers and fathers invested sweat and blood. Three hundred and ten years we worked in this country without a dime in return---I mean without a dime in return. You let the white man walk around here talking about how rich this country is, but you never stop to think how it got rich so quick. It got rich because you made it rich. You take the people who are in this audience right now. They’re poor. We’re all poor as individuals. Our weekly salary individually amounts to hardly anything. But if you take the salary of everyone in here collectively, it’ll fill up a whole lot of baskets. It’s a lot of wealth. If you can collect the wages of just these people right here for a year, you’ll be rich---richer than rich. When you look at it like that, think how rich Uncle Sam had to become, not with this handful, but millions of black people. Your and my mother and father, who didn’t work an eight-hour shift, but worked from ‘‘can’t see’’ in the morning until ‘‘can’t see’’ at night, and worked for nothing, making the white man rich, making Uncle Sam rich. This is our investment. This is our contribution, our blood. Not only did we give of our free labor, we gave of our blood. Every time he had a call to arms, we were the first ones in uniform. We died on every battlefield the white man had. We have made a greater sacrifice than anybody who’s standing up in America today. We have made a greater contribution and have collected less. Civil rights, for those of us whose philosophy is black nationalism, means: ‘‘Give it to us now. Don’t wait for next year. Give it to us yesterday, and that’s not fast enough.’’ I might stop right here to point out one thing. Whenever you’re going after something that belongs to you, anyone who’s depriving you of the right to have it is a criminal. Understand that. Whenever you are going after something that is yours, you are within your legal rights to lay claim to it. And anyone who puts forth any effort to deprive you of that which is yours, is breaking the law, is a criminal. And this was pointed

8.9 Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet 299 out by the Supreme Court decision. It outlawed segregation. Which means segregation is against the law. Which means a segregationist is breaking the law. A segregationist is a criminal. You can’t label him as anything other than that. And when you demonstrate against segregation, the law is on your side. The Supreme Court is on your side. Now, who is it that opposes you in carrying out the law? The police department itself. With police dogs and clubs. Whenever you demonstrate against segregation, whether it is segregated education, segregated housing, or anything else, the law is on your side, and anyone who stands in the way is not the law any longer. They are breaking the law; they are not representatives of the law. Any time you demonstrate against segregation and a man has the audacity to put a police dog on you, kill that dog, kill him, I’m telling you, kill that dog. I say it, if they put me in jail tomorrow, kill that dog. Then you’ll put a stop to it. Now, if these white people in here don’t want to see that kind of action, get down and tell the mayor to tell the police department to pull the dogs in. That’s all you have to do. If you don’t do it, someone else will. . . . The political philosophy of black nationalism means that the black man should control the politics and the politicians in his own community; no more. The black man in the black community has to be re-educated into the science of politics so he will know what politics is supposed to bring him in return. Don’t be throwing out any ballots. A ballot is like a bullet. You don’t throw your ballots until you see a target, and if that target is not within your reach, keep your ballot in your pocket. The political philosophy of black nationalism is being taught in the Christian church. It’s being taught in the NAACP. It’s being taught in CORE meetings. It’s being taught in SNCC Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee meetings. It’s being taught in Muslim meetings. It’s being taught where nothing but atheists and agnostics come together. It’s being taught everywhere. Black people are fed up with the dillydallying, pussyfooting, compromising approach that we’ve been using toward getting our freedom. We want freedom now, but we’re not going to get it saying ‘‘We Shall Overcome.’’ We’ve got to fight until we overcome. The economic philosophy of black nationalism is pure and simple. It only means that we should control the economy of our community. Why should white people be running all the stores in our community? Why should white people be running the banks of our community? Why should the economy of our community be in the hands of the white man? Why? If a

black man can’t move his store into a white community, you tell me why a white man should move his store into a black community. The philosophy of black nationalism involves a re-education program in the black community in regards to economics. Our people have to be made to see that any time you take your dollar out of your community and spend it in a community where you don’t live, the community where you live will get poorer and poorer, and the community where you spend your money will get richer and richer. Then you wonder why where you live is always a ghetto or a slum area. And where you and I are concerned, not only do we lose it when we spend it out of the community, but the white man has got all our stores in the community tied up; so that though we spend it in the community, at sundown the man who runs the store takes it over across town somewhere. He’s got us in a vise. So the economic philosophy of black nationalism means in every church, in every civic organization, in every fraternal order, it’s time now for our people to be come conscious of the importance of controlling the economy of our community. If we own the stores, if we operate the businesses, if we try and establish some industry in our own community, then we’re developing to the position where we are creating employment for our own kind. Once you gain control of the economy of your own community, then you don’t have to picket and boycott and beg some cracker downtown for a job in his business. The social philosophy of black nationalism only means that we have to get together and remove the evils, the vices, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other evils that are destroying the moral fiber of our community. We our selves have to lift the level of our community, the standard of our community to a higher level, make our own society beautiful so that we will be satisfied in our own social circles and won’t be running around here trying to knock our way into a social circle where we’re not wanted. So I say, in spreading a gospel such as black nationalism, it is not designed to make the black man re-evaluate the white man---you know him already---but to make the black man re-evaluate himself. Don’t change the white man’s mind---you can’t change his mind, and that whole thing about appealing to the moral conscience of America---America’s conscience is bankrupt. She lost all conscience a long time ago. Uncle Sam has no conscience. They don’t know what morals are. They don’t try and eliminate an evil because it’s evil, or because it’s illegal, or because it’s immoral; they eliminate it only

300 The 1960s when it threatens their existence. So you’re wasting your time appealing to the moral conscience of a bankrupt man like Uncle Sam. If he had a conscience, he’d straighten this thing out with no more pressure being put upon him. So it is not necessary to change the white man’s mind. We have to change our own mind. You can’t change his mind about us. We’ve got to change our own minds about each other. We have to see each other with new eyes. We have to see each other as brothers and sisters. We have to come together with warmth so we can develop unity and harmony that’s necessary to get this problem solved ourselves. How can we do this? How can we avoid jealousy? How can we avoid the suspicion and the divisions that exist in the community? I’ll tell you how. I have watched how Billy Graham comes into a city, spreading what he calls the gospel of Christ, which is only white nationalism. That’s what he is. Billy Graham is a white nationalist; I’m a black nationalist. But since it’s the natural tendency for leaders to be jealous and look upon a powerful figure like Graham with suspicion and envy, how is it possible for him to come into a city and get all the cooperation of the church leaders? Don’t think because they’re church leaders that they don’t have weaknesses that make them envious and jealous---no, everybody’s got it. It’s not an accident that when they want to choose a cardinal, as Pope I over there in Rome, they get in a closet so you can’t hear them cussing and fighting and carrying on. Billy Graham comes in preaching the gospel of Christ. He evangelizes the gospel. He stirs everybody up, but he never tries to start a church. If he came in trying to start a church, all the churches would be against him. So, he just comes in talking about Christ and tells everybody who gets Christ to go to any church where Christ is; and in this way the church cooperates with him. So we’re going to take a page from his book. Our gospel is black nationalism. We’re not trying to threaten the existence of any organization, but we’re spreading the gospel of black nationalism. Anywhere there’s a church that is also preaching and practicing the gospel of black nationalism, join that church. If the NAACP is preaching and practicing the gospel of black nationalism, join the NAACP. If CORE is spreading and practicing the gospel of black nationalism, join CORE. Join any organization that has a gospel that’s for the uplift of the black man. And when you get into it and see them pussyfooting or compromising, pull out of it because that’s not black nationalism. We’ll find another one. And in this manner, the organizations will increase in number and in quantity and in quality, and by

August, it is then our intention to have a black nationalist convention which will consist of delegates from all over the country who are interested in the political, economic and social philosophy of black nationalism. After these delegates convene, we will hold a seminar; we will hold discussions; we will listen to everyone. We want to hear new ideas and new solutions and new answers. And at that time, if we see fit then to form a black nationalist party, we’ll form a black nationalist party. If it’s necessary to form a black nationalist army, we’ll form a black nationalist army. It’ll be the ballot or the bullet. It’ll be liberty or it’ll be death. It’s time for you and me to stop sitting in this country, letting some cracker senators, Northern crackers and Southern crackers, sit there in Washington, D.C., and come to a conclusion in their mind that you and I are supposed to have civil rights. There’s no white man going to tell me anything about my rights. Brothers and sisters, always remember, if it doesn’t take senators and congressmen and presidential proclamations to give freedom to the white man, it is not necessary for legislation or proclamation or Supreme Court decisions to give freedom to the black man. You let that white man know, if this is a country of freedom, let it be a country of freedom; and if it’s not a country of freedom, change it. . . . Last but not least, I must say this concerning the great controversy over rifles and shotguns. The only thing that I’ve ever said is that in areas where the government has proven itself either unwilling or unable to defend the lives and the property of Negroes, it’s time for Negroes to defend themselves. Article number two of the constitutional amendments provides you and me the right to own a rifle or a shotgun. It is constitutionally legal to own a shotgun or a rifle. This doesn’t mean you’re going to get a rifle and form battalions and go out looking for white folks, although you’d be within your rights---I mean, you’d be justified; but that would be illegal and we don’t do anything illegal. If the white man doesn’t want the black man buying rifles and shotguns, then let the government do its job. That’s all. And don’t let the white man come to you and ask you what you think about what Malcolm says---why, you old Uncle Tom. He would never ask you if he thought you were going to say, ‘‘Amen!’’ No, he is making a Tom out of you.’’ So, this doesn’t mean forming rifle clubs and going out looking for people, but it is time, in 1964, if you are a man, to let that man know. . . . No, if you never see me another time in your life, if I die in the morning, I’ll die saying one thing: the ballot or the bullet, the ballot or the bullet.

8.10 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Great Society 301 If a Negro in 1964 has to sit around and wait for some cracker senator to filibuster when it comes to the rights of black people, why, you and I should hang our heads in shame. You talk about a march on Washington in 1963, you haven’t seen anything. There’s some more going down in ’64. And this time they’re not going like they went last year. They’re not going singing ‘‘We Shall Overcome.’’ They’re not going with white friends. They’re not going with placards already painted for them. They’re not going with round-trip tickets. They’re going with one way tickets. And if they don’t want that nonnonviolent army going down there, tell them to bring the filibuster to a halt. The black nationalists aren’t going to wait. Lyndon B. Johnson is the head of the Democratic Party. If he’s for civil rights, let him go into the Senate next week and declare himself. Let him go in there right now and declare himself. Let him go in there and denounce the Southern branch of his party. Let him go in there right now and take a moral stand---right now, not later. Tell him, don’t wait until election time. If he waits too long, brothers and sisters, he will be responsible for letting a condition develop in this country which will create a climate that will bring seeds up out of the ground with vegetation on the end of them looking like something these people never dreamed of. In 1964, it’s the ballot or the bullet. Thank you.

8.10 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Great Society, 1964 President Hatcher, Governor Romney, Senators McNamara and Hart, Congressmen Meader and Staebler, and other members of the fine Michigan delegation, members of the graduating class, my fellow Americans: It is a great pleasure to be here today. This university has been coeducational since 1870, but I do not believe it was on the basis of your accomplishments that a Detroit high school girl said, ‘‘In choosing a college, you first have to decide whether you want a coeducational school or an educational school.’’ Well, we can find both here at Michigan, although perhaps at different hours. I came out here today very anxious to meet the Michigan student whose father told a friend of mine that his son’s education had been a real value. It stopped his mother from bragging about him.

I have come today from the turmoil of your Capital to the tranquility of your campus to speak about the future of your country. The purpose of protecting the life of our Nation and preserving the liberty of our citizens is to pursue the happiness of our people. Our success in that pursuit is the test of our success as a Nation. For a century we labored to settle and to subdue a continent. For half a century we called upon unbounded invention and untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all of our people. The challenge of the next half century is whether we have the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American civilization. Your imagination, your initiative, and your indignation will determine whether we build a society where progress is the servant of our needs, or a society where old values and new visions are buried under unbridled growth. For in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society. The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time. But that is just the beginning. The Great Society is a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich his mind and to enlarge his talents. It is a place where leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared cause of boredom and restlessness. It is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community. It is a place where man can renew contact with nature. It is a place which honors creation for its own sake and for what it adds to the understanding of the race. It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods. But most of all, the Great Society is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished work. It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labor. So I want to talk to you today about three places where we begin to build the Great Society---in our cities, in our countryside, and in our classrooms. Many of you will live to see the day, perhaps 50 years from now, when there will be 400 million Americans---four-fifths of them in urban areas. In the remainder of this century urban population will double,

302 The 1960s city land will double, and we will have to build homes, highways, and facilities equal to all those built since this country was first settled. So in the next 40 years we must re-build the entire urban United States. Aristotle said: ‘‘Men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain together in order to live the good life.’’ It is harder and harder to live the good life in American cities today. The catalog of ills is long: there is the decay of the centers and the despoiling of the suburbs. There is not enough housing for our people or transportation for our traffic. Open land is vanishing and old landmarks are violated. Worst of all expansion is eroding the precious and time honored values of community with neighbors and communion with nature. The loss of these values breeds loneliness and boredom and indifference. Our society will never be great until our cities are great. Today the frontier of imagination and innovation is inside those cities and not beyond their borders. New experiments are already going on. It will be the task of your generation to make the American city a place where future generations will come, not only to live but to live the good life. I understand that if I stayed here tonight I would see that Michigan students are really doing their best to live the good life. This is the place where the Peace Corps was started. It is inspiring to see how all of you, while you are in this country, are trying so hard to live at the level of the people. A second place where we begin to build the Great Society is in our countryside. We have always prided ourselves on being not only America the strong and America the free, but America the beautiful. Today that beauty is in danger. The water we drink, the food we eat, the very air that we breathe, are threatened with pollution. Our parks are overcrowded, our seashores overburdened. Green fields and dense forests are disappearing. A few years ago we were greatly concerned about the ‘‘Ugly American.’’ Today we must act to prevent an ugly America. For once the battle is lost, once our natural splendor is destroyed, it can never be recaptured. And once man can no longer walk with beauty or wonder at nature his spirit will wither and his sustenance be wasted. A third place to build the Great Society is in the classrooms of America. There your children’s lives will be shaped. Our society will not be great until every young mind is set free to scan the farthest reaches of thought and imagination. We are still far from that goal.

Today, 8 million adult Americans, more than the entire population of Michigan, have not finished 5 years of school. Nearly 20 million have not finished 8 years of school. Nearly 54 million---more than one quarter of all America---have not even finished high school. Each year more than 100,000 high school graduates, with proved ability, do not enter college because they cannot afford it. And if we cannot educate today’s youth, what will we do in 1970 when elementary school enrollment will be 5 million greater than 1960? And high school enrollment will rise by 5 million. College enrollment will increase by more than 3 million. In many places, classrooms are overcrowded and curricula are outdated. Most of our qualified teachers are underpaid, and many of our paid teachers are unqualified. So we must give every child a place to sit and a teacher to learn from. Poverty must not be a bar to learning, and learning must offer an escape from poverty. But more classrooms and more teachers are not enough. We must seek an educational system which grows in excellence as it grows in size. This means better training for our teachers. It means preparing youth to enjoy their hours of leisure as well as their hours of labor. It means exploring new techniques of teaching, to find new ways to stimulate the love of learning and the capacity for creation. These are three of the central issues of the Great Society. While our Government has many programs directed at those issues, I do not pretend that we have the full answer to those problems. But I do promise this: We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the world to find those answers for America. I intend to establish working groups to prepare a series of White House conferences and meetings---on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on other emerging challenges. And from these meetings and from this inspiration and from these studies we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society. The solution to these problems does not rest on a massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the strained resources of local authority. They require us to create new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities. Woodrow Wilson once wrote: ‘‘Every man sent out from his university should be a man of his Nation as well as a man of his time.’’ Within your lifetime powerful forces, already loosed, will take us toward a way of life beyond the realm of

8.11 National Organization of Women (NOW), Statement of Principles our experience, almost beyond the bounds of our imagination. For better or for worse, your generation has been appointed by history to deal with those problems and to lead America toward a new age. You have the chance never before afforded to any people in any age. You can help build a society where the demands of morality, and the needs of the spirit, can be realized in the life of the Nation. So, will you join in the battle to give every citizen the full equality which God enjoins and the law requires, whatever his belief, or race, or the color of his skin? Will you join in the battle to give every citizen an escape from the crushing weight of poverty? Will you join in the battle to make it possible for all nations to live in enduring peace---as neighbors and not as mortal enemies? Will you join in the battle to build the Great Society, to prove that our material progress is only the foundation on which we will build a richer life of mind and spirit? There are those timid souls who say this battle cannot be won; that we are condemned to a soulless wealth. I do not agree. We have the power to shape the civilization that we want. But we need your will, your labor, your hearts, if we are to build that kind of society. Those who came to this land sought to build more than just a new country. They sought a new world. So I have come here today to your campus to say that you can make their vision our reality. So let us from this moment begin our work so that in the future men will look back and say: It was then, after a long and weary way, that man turned the exploits of his genius to the full enrichment of his life. Thank you. Good-bye.

8.11 National Organization of Women (NOW), Statement of Principles, 1966 American women in the 1960s were hardly a minority, and in fact constituted 51 percent of the population. But they began to identify with members of smaller, oppressed groups and to demand liberation and equality. Sexual discrimination was so subtle and so embedded in the fabric of American society that when the new feminists began to argue for greater equality, they triggered a great deal of hostility and anger. Yet within a fairly short time, the new women’s movement had made significant strides, winning legislation that

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guaranteed equal pay for equal work, forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of gender and securing court victories that struck down generationsold forms of discrimination. Undoubtedly a key element in this awakening was the entry or return to the job market of millions of women. There they not only secured a measure of economic independence, but came face to face with deeply ingrained patterns of sexual discrimination. Women were barred---informally but nonetheless effectively--from certain types of jobs, often ones that paid better or had greater promotional opportunities. They discovered that even when they were working, society expected them also to meet certain stereotypical obligations in the home, while excusing men from sharing in childcare and household work. A key event was the 1963 publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, in which she detailed the ways society kept women in an inferior status. The book did not so much cause feminism as give voice to a movement already under way. By that time John Kennedy had already established the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, and later in the year secured passage of the Equal Pay Act. In 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act extended to women significant protections against discrimination. Against this backdrop Friedan and other feminists---including some men---joined together in 1966 to create NOW, the National Organization for Women. In the beginning, NOW directed most of its resources toward the needs of working women. It denounced the exclusion of women from professions, politics and other areas of society because of antiquated male views about women. It exposed and attacked legal and economic discrimination, such as bank practices that denied married women credit in their own names. By the end of the decade, NOW claimed more than 15,000 members. The NOW Statement of Purpose defined the mainstream of the modern feminist movement, and even while many women---and men---decried the label, they noted that they agreed with NOW’s basic demand, that women in the workforce be treated equally with men, receiving equal pay for equal work and enjoying access to jobs and promotions to which their talents entitled them. For further reading: Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963); Susan M. Hartman, From Margin to Mainstream: Women and American Politics Since 1960 (1989); Winifred Wandersee, On the Move: American Women in the 1970s (1988); Nancy Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism (1987).

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NOW Statement of Purpose We, men and women who hereby constitute ourselves as the National Organization for Women, believe that the time has come for a new movement toward true equality for all women in America, and toward a fully equal partnership of the sexes, as part of the worldwide revolution of human rights now taking place within and beyond our national borders. The purpose of NOW is to take action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men. We believe the time has come to move beyond the abstract argument, discussion and symposia over the status and special nature of women which has raged in America in recent years; the time has come to confront, with concrete action, the conditions that now prevent women from enjoying the equality of opportunity and freedom of choice which is their right as individual Americans, and as human beings. NOW is dedicated to the proposition that women first and foremost are human beings, who, like all other people in our society, must have the chance to develop their fullest human potential. We believe that women can achieve such equality only by accepting to the full the challenges and responsibilities they share with all other people in our society, as part of the decisionmaking mainstream of American political, economic and social life. We organize to initiate or support action, nationally or in any part of this nation, by individuals or organizations, to break through the silken curtain of prejudice and discrimination against women in government, industry, the professions, the churches, the political parties, the judiciary, the labor unions, in education, science, medicine, law, religion and every other field of importance in American society. . . . There is no civil rights movement to speak for women, as there has been for Negroes and other victims of discrimination. The National Organization for Women must therefore begin to speak. We believe that the power of American law, and the protection guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to the civil rights of all individuals, must be effectively applied and enforced to isolate and remove patterns of sex discrimination, to ensure equality of opportunity in employment and education, and equality of civil and political rights and responsibilities on behalf of women, as well as for Negroes and other deprived groups. We realize that women’s problems are linked to many broader questions of social justice; their solution

will require concerted action by many groups. Therefore, convinced that human rights for all are indivisible, we expect to give active support to the common cause of equal rights for all those who suffer discrimination and deprivation, and we call upon other organizations committed to such goals to support our efforts toward equality for women. We do not accept the token appointment of a few women to high-level positions in government and industry as a substitute for a serious continuing effort to recruit and advance women according to their individual abilities. To this end, we urge American government and industry to mobilize the same resources of ingenuity and command with which they have solved problems of far greater difficulty than those now impeding the progress of women. We believe that this nation has a capacity at least as great as other nations, to innovate new social institutions which will enable women to enjoy true equality of opportunity and responsibility in society, without conflict with their responsibilities as mothers and homemakers. In such innovations, America does not lead the Western world, but lags by decades behind many European countries. We do not accept the traditional assumption that a woman has to choose between marriage and motherhood, on the one hand, and serious participation in industry or the professions on the other. We question the present expectation that all normal women will retire from job or profession for ten or fifteen years, to devote their full time to raising children, only to reenter the job market at a relatively minor level. This in itself is a deterrent to the aspirations of women, to their acceptance into management or professional training courses, and to the very possibility of equality of opportunity or real choice, for all but a few women. Above all, we reject the assumption that these problems are the unique responsibility of each individual woman, rather than a basic social dilemma which society must solve. True equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for women requires such practical and possible innovations as a nationwide network of child-care centers, which will make it unnecessary for women to retire completely from society until their children are grown, and national programs to provide retraining for women who have chosen to care for their own children full time. We believe that it is as essential for every girl to be educated to her full potential of human ability as it is for every boy---with the knowledge that such education is the key to effective participation in today’s economy and that, for a girl as for a boy, education can only be

8.12 Paul Potter (Students for a Democratic Society President), Vietnam Anti-War Speech serious where there is expectation that it will be used in society. We believe that American educators are capable of devising means of imparting such expectations to girl students. Moreover, we consider the decline in the proportion of women receiving higher and professional education to be evidence of discrimination. This discrimination may take the form of quotas against the admission of women to colleges and professional schools; lack of encouragement by parents, counselors and educators; denial of loans or fellowships; or the traditional or arbitrary procedures in graduate and professional training geared in terms of men, which inadvertently discriminate against women. We believe that the same serious attention must be given to high school dropouts who are girls as to boys. We reject the current assumptions that a man must carry the sole burden of supporting himself, his wife, and family, and that a woman is automatically entitled to lifelong support by a man upon her marriage, or that marriage, home and family are primarily woman’s world and responsibility---hers, to dominate, his to support. We believe that a true partnership between the sexes demands a different concept of marriage, an equitable sharing of the responsibilities of home and children and of the economic burdens of their support. We believe that proper recognition should be given to the economic and social value of homemaking and child care. To these ends, we will seek to open a reexamination of laws and mores governing marriage and divorce, for we believe that the current state of ‘‘halfequality’’ between the sexes discriminates against both men and women, and is the cause of much unnecessary hostility between the sexes. We believe that women must now exercise their political rights and responsibilities as American citizens. They must refuse to be segregated on the basis of sex into separate-and-not-equal ladies’ auxiliaries in the political parties, and they must demand representation according to their numbers in the regularly constituted party committees---at local, state, and national levels--and in the informal power structure, participating fully in the selection of candidates and political decisionmaking, and running for office themselves. In the interests of the human dignity of women, we will protest and endeavor to change the false image of women now prevalent in the mass media, and in the texts, ceremonies, laws, and practices of our major social institutions. Such images perpetuate contempt for women by society and by women for themselves. We are similarly opposed to all policies and practices--in church, state, college, factory, or office---which, in the guise of protectiveness, not only deny opportunities

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but also foster in women self-denigration, dependence, and evasion of responsibility, undermine their confidence in their own abilities and foster contempt for women. NOW will hold itself independent of any political party in order to mobilize the political power of all women and men intent on our goals. We will strive to ensure that no party, candidate, President, senator, governor, congressman, or any public official who betrays or ignores the principle of full equality between the sexes is elected or appointed to office. If it is necessary to mobilize the votes of men and women who believe in our cause, in order to win for women the final right to be fully free and equal human beings, we so commit ourselves. We believe that women will do most to create a new image of women by acting now, and by speaking out in behalf of their own equality, freedom, and human dignity---not in pleas for special privilege, nor in enmity toward men, who are also victims of the current half-equality between the sexes---but in an active, selfrespecting partnership with men. By so doing, women will develop confidence in their own ability to determine actively, in partnership with men, the conditions of their life, their choices, their future and their society.

8.12 Paul Potter (Students for a Democratic Society President), Vietnam Anti-War Speech, 1965 MOST OF US grew up thinking that the United States was a strong but humble nation, that involved itself in world affairs only reluctantly, that respected the integrity of other nations and other systems, and that engaged in wars only as a last resort. This was a nation with no large standing army, with no design for external conquest, that sought primarily the opportunity to develop its own resources and its own mode of living. If at some point we began to hear vague and disturbing things about what this country had done in Latin America, China, Spain and other places, we somehow remained confident about the basic integrity of this nation’s foreign policy. The Cold War with all of its neat categories and black and white descriptions did much to assure us that what we had been taught to believe was true. But in recent years, the withdrawal from the hysteria of the Cold War era and the development of a more aggressive, activist foreign policy have done much to force many of us to rethink attitudes that were deep

306 The 1960s and basic sentiments about our country. The incredible war in Vietnam has provided the razor, the terrifying sharp cutting edge that has finally severed the last vestige of illusion that morality and democracy are the guiding principles of American foreign policy. The saccharine self righteous moralism that promises the Vietnamese a billion dollars of economic aid at the very moment we are delivering billions for economic and social destruction and political repression is rapidly losing what power it might ever have had to reassure us about the decency of our foreign policy. The further we explore the reality of what this country is doing and planning in Vietnam the more we are driven toward the conclusion of Senator Morse that the United States may well be the greatest threat to peace in the world today. That is a terrible and bitter insight for people who grew up as we did---and our revulsion at that insight, our refusal to accept it as inevitable or necessary, is one of the reasons that so many people have come here today. The President says that we are defending freedom in Vietnam. Whose freedom? Not the freedom of the Vietnamese. The first act of the first dictator, Diem, the United States installed in Vietnam, was to systematically begin the persecution of all political opposition, non Communist as well as Communist. The first American military supplies were not used to fight Communist insurgents; they were used to control, imprison or kill any who sought something better for Vietnam than the personal aggrandizement, political corruption and the profiteering of the Diem regime. The elite of the forces that we have trained and equipped are still used to control political unrest in Saigon and defend the latest dictator from the people. And yet in a world where dictatorships are so commonplace and popular control of government so rare, people become callous to the misery that is implied by dictatorial power. The rationalizations that are used to defend political despotism have been drummed into us so long that we have somehow become numb to the possibility that something else might exist. And it is only the kind of terror we see now in Vietnam that awakens conscience and reminds us that there is something deep in us that cries out against dictatorial suppression. The pattern of repression and destruction that we have developed and justified in the war is so thorough that it can only be called cultural genocide. I am not simply talking about napalm or gas or crop destruction or torture, hurled indiscriminately on women and children, insurgent and neutral, upon the first suspicion of rebel activity. That in itself is horrendous and

incredible beyond belief. But it is only part of a larger pattern of destruction to the very fabric of the country. We have uprooted the people from the land and imprisoned them in concentration camps called ‘‘sunrise villages.’’ Through conscription and direct political intervention and control, we have destroyed local customs and traditions, trampled upon those things of value which give dignity and purpose to life. What is left to the people of Vietnam after 20 years of war? What part of themselves and their own lives will those who survive be able to salvage from the wreckage of their country or build on the ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘security’’ our Great Society offers them in reward for their allegiance? How can anyone be surprised that people who have had total war waged on themselves and their culture rebel in increasing numbers against that tyranny? What other course is available? And still our only response to rebellion is more vigorous repression, more merciless opposition to the social and cultural institutions which sustain dignity and the will to resist. Not even the President can say that this is a war to defend the freedom of the Vietnamese people. Perhaps what the President means when he speaks of freedom is the freedom of the American people. WHAT IN FACT has the war done for freedom in America? It has led to even more vigorous governmental efforts to control information, manipulate the press and pressure and persuade the public through distorted or downright dishonest documents such as the White Paper on Vietnam. It has led to the confiscation of films and other anti war material and the vigorous harassment by the FBI of some of the people who have been most outspokenly active in their criticism of the war. As the war escalates and the administration seeks more actively to gain support for any initiative it may choose to take, there has been the beginnings of a war psychology unlike anything that has burdened this country since the 1950s. How much more of Mr. Johnson’s freedom can we stand? How much freedom will be left in this country if there is a major war in Asia? By what weird logic can it be said that the freedom of one people can only be maintained by crushing another? In many ways this is an unusual march because the large majority of people here are not involved in a peace movement as their primary basis of concern. What is exciting about the participants in this march is that so many of us view ourselves consciously as participants as well in a movement to build a more. decent society. There are students here who have been involved in protests over the quality and kind of

8.12 Paul Potter (Students for a Democratic Society President), Vietnam Anti-War Speech education they are receiving in growingly bureaucratized, depersonalized institutions called universities; there are Negroes from Mississippi and Alabama who are struggling against the tyranny and repression of those states; there are poor people here Negro and white from Northern urban areas who are attempting to build movements that abolish poverty and secure democracy; there are faculty who are beginning to question the relevance of their institutions to the critical problems facing the society. Where will these people and the movements they are a part of be if the President is allowed to expand the war in Asia? What happens to the hopeful beginnings of expressed discontent that are trying to shift American attention to long neglected internal priorities of shared abundance, democracy and decency at home when those priorities have to compete with the all consuming priorities and psychology of a war against an enemy thousands of miles away? The President mocks freedom if he insists that the war in Vietnam is a defense of American freedom. Perhaps the only freedom that this war protects is the freedom of the warhawks in the Pentagon and the State Department to experiment with counter insurgency and guerilla warfare in Vietnam. Vietnam, we may say, is a laboratory ran by a new breed of gamesmen who approach war as a kind of rational exercise in international power politics. It is the testing ground and staging area for a new American response to the social revolution that is sweeping through the impoverished downtrodden areas of the world. It is the beginning of the American counter revolution, and so far no one none of us not the N.Y. Times, nor 17 Neutral Nations, nor dozens of worried allies, nor the United States Congress have been able to interfere with the freedom of the President and the Pentagon to carry out that experiment. THUS FAR the war in Vietnam has only dramatized the demand of ordinary people to have some opportunity to make their own lives, and of their unwillingness, even under incredible odds, to give up the struggle against external domination. We are told, however, that the struggle can be legitimately suppressed since it might lead to the development of a Communist system, and before that ultimate menace all criticism is supposed to melt. This is a critical point and there are several things that must be said here not by way of celebration, but because I think they are the truth. First, if this country were serious about giving the people of Vietnam some alternative to a Communist social revolution, that opportunity was sacrificed in 1954 when we helped to

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install Diem and his repression of non Communist movements. There is no indication that we were serious about that goal that we were ever willing to contemplate the risks of allowing the Vietnamese to choose their own destinies. Second, those people who insist now that Vietnam can be neutralized are for the most part looking for a sugar coating to cover the bitter bill. We must accept the consequences that calling for an end of the war in Vietnam is in fact allowing for the likelihood that a Vietnam without war will be a self styled Communist Vietnam. Third, this country must come to understand that creation of a Communist country in the world today is not an ultimate defeat. If people are given the opportunity to choose their own lives it is likely that some Of them will choose what we have called ‘‘Communist systems.’’ We are not powerless in that situation. Recent years have finally and indisputably broken the myth that the Communist world is monolithic and have conclusively shown that American power can be significant in aiding countries dominated by greater powers to become more independent and self determined. And yet the war that we are creating and escalating in Southeast Asia is rapidly eroding the base of independence of North Vietnam as it is forced to turn to China and the Soviet Union, involving them in the war and involving itself in the compromises that that implies. Fourth, I must say to you that I would rather see Vietnam Communist than see it under continuous subjugation of the ruin that American domination has brought. But the war goes on; the freedom to conduct that war depends on the dehumanization not only of Vietnamese people but of Americans as well; it depends on the construction of a system of premises and thinking that insulates the President and his advisors thoroughly and completely from the human consequences of the decisions they make. I do not believe that the President or Mr. Rusk or Mr. McNamara or even McGeorge Bundy are particularly evil men. If asked to throw napalm on the back of a ten year old child they would shrink in horror but their decisions have led to mutilation and death of thousands and thousands of people. What kind of system is it that allows good men to make those kinds of decisions? What kind of system is it that justifies the United States or any country seizing the destinies of the Vietnamese people and using them callously for its own purpose? What kind of system is it that disenfranchises people in the South, leaves millions upon millions of people throughout the country impoverished and excluded from the mainstream and promise of American society, that creates faceless and

308 The 1960s terrible bureaucracies and makes those the place where people spend their lives and do their work, that consistently puts material values before human values and still persists in calling itself free and still persists in finding itself fit to police the world? What place is there for ordinary men in that system and how are they to control it, make it bend itself to their wills rather than bending them to its? We must name that system. We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it. For it is only when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow or all the incalculable, innumerable more subtle atrocities that are worked on people all over---all the time. How do you stop a war then? If the war has its roots deep in the institutions of American society, how do you stop it? Do you march to Washington? Is that enough? Who will hear us? How can you make the decision makers hear us, insulated as they are, if they cannot hear the screams of a little girl burnt by napalm? I believe that the administration is serious about expanding the war in Asia. The question is whether the people here are as serious about ending it. I wonder what it means for each of us to say we want to end the war in Vietnam---whether, if we accept the full meaning of that statement and the gravity of the situation, we can simply leave the march and go back to the routines of a society that acts as if it were not in the midst of a grave crisis. Maybe we, like the President, are insulated from the consequences of our own decision to end the war. Maybe we have yet really to listen to the screams of a burning child and decide that we cannot go back to whatever it is we did before today until that war has ended. There is no simple plan, no scheme or gimmick that can be proposed here. There is no simple way to attack something that is deeply rooted in the society. If the people of this country are to end the war in Vietnam, and to change the institutions which create it, then the people of this country must create a massive social movement and if that can be built around the issue of Vietnam then that is what we must do. By a social movement I mean more than petitions or letters of protest, or tacit support of dissident Congressmen; I mean people who are willing to change their lives, who are willing to challenge the system, to take the problem of change seriously. By a social movement I mean an effort that is powerful enough to make the country understand that our problems are not in

Vietnam, or China or Brazil or outer space or at the bottom of the ocean, but are here in the United States. What we must do is begin to build a democratic and humane society in which Vietnams are unthinkable, in which human life and initiative are precious. The reason there are twenty thousand people here today and not a hundred or none at all is because five years ago in the South students began to build a social movement to change the system. The reason there are poor people, Negro and white, housewives, faculty members, and many others here in Washington is because that movement has grown and spread and changed and reached out as an expression of the broad concerns of people throughout the society. The reason the war and the system it represents will be stopped, if it is stopped before it destroys all of us, will be because the movement has become strong enough to exact change in the society. Twenty thousand people, the people here, if they were serious, if they were willing to break out of their isolation and to accept the consequences of a decision to end the war and commit themselves to building a movement wherever they are and in whatever way they effectively can, would be, I’m convinced, enough. To build a movement rather than a protest or some series of protests, to break out of our insulations and accept the consequences of our decisions, in effect to change our lives, means that we can open ourselves to the reactions of a society that believes that it is moral and just, that we open ourselves to libeling and persecution, that we dare to be really seen as wrong in a society that doesn’t tolerate fundamental challenges. It means that we desert the security of our riches and reach out to people who are tied to the mythology of American power and make them part of our movement. We must reach out to every organization and individual in the country and make them part of our movement. But that means that we build a movement that works not simply in Washington but in communities and with the problems that face people throughout the society. That means that we build a movement that understands Vietnam in all its horror as but a symptom of a deeper malaise, that we build a movement that makes possible the implementation of the values that would have prevented Vietnam, a movement based on the integrity of man and a belief in man’s capacity to tolerate all the weird formulations of society that men may choose to strive for; a movement that will build on the new and creative forms of protest that are beginning to emerge, such as the teach in, and extend their efforts and intensify them; that we will build a movement that will find ways to support the increasing

8.13 Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence numbers of young men who are unwilling to and will not fight in Vietnam; a movement that will not tolerate the escalation or prolongation of this war but will, if necessary, respond to the administration war effort with massive civil disobedience all over the country, that will wrench the country into a confrontation with the issues of the war; a movement that must of necessity reach out to all these people in Vietnam or elsewhere who are struggling to find decency and control for their lives. For in a strange way the people of Vietnam and the people on this demonstration are united in much more than a common concern that the war be ended. In both countries there are people struggling to build a movement that has the power to change their condition. The system that frustrates these movements is the same. All our lives, our destinies, our very hopes to live, depend on our ability to overcome that system.

8.13 Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence, April 4, 1967 Speech delivered at a meeting of Clergy and Laity Concerned at Riverside Church, New York City I come to this magnificent house of worship tonight because my conscience leaves me no other choice. I join with you in this meeting because I am in deepest agreement with the aims and work of the organization which has brought us together: Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. The recent statement of your executive committee are the sentiments of my own heart and I found myself in full accord when I read its opening lines: ‘‘A time comes when silence is betrayal.’’ That time has come for us in relation to Vietnam. The truth of these words is beyond doubt but the mission to which they call us is a most difficult one. Even when pressed by the demands of inner truth, men do not easily assume the task of opposing their government’s policy, especially in time of war. Nor does the human spirit move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within one’s own bosom and in the surrounding world. Moreover when the issues at hand seem as perplexed as they often do in the case of this dreadful conflict we are always on the verge of being mesmerized by uncertainty; but we must move on . . .

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Over the past two years, as I have moved to break the betrayal of my own silences and to speak from the burnings of my own heart, as I have called for radical departures from the destruction of Vietnam, many persons have questioned me about the wisdom of my path. At the heart of their concerns this query has often loomed large and loud: Why are you speaking about war, Dr. King? Why are you joining the voices of dissent? Peace and civil rights don’t mix, they say. Aren’t you hurting the cause of your people, they ask? And when I hear them, though I often understand the source of their concern, I am nevertheless greatly saddened, for such questions mean that the inquirers have not really known me, my commitment or my calling. Indeed, their questions suggest that they do not know the world in which they live. In the light of such tragic misunderstandings, I deem it of signal importance to try to state clearly, and I trust concisely, why I believe that the path from Dexter Avenue Baptist Church---the church in Montgomery, Alabama, where I began my pastorate---leads clearly to this sanctuary tonight . . .

The Importance of Vietnam Since I am a preacher by trade, I suppose it is not surprising that I have seven major reasons for bringing Vietnam into the field of my moral vision. There is at the outset a very obvious and almost facile connection between the war in Vietnam and the struggle I, and others, have been waging in America. A few years ago there was a shining moment in that struggle. It seemed as if there was a real promise of hope for the poor--both black and white---through the poverty program. There were experiments, hopes, new beginnings. Then came the buildup in Vietnam and I watched the program broken and eviscerated as if it were some idle political plaything of a society gone mad on war, and I knew that America would never invest the necessary funds or energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as adventures like Vietnam continued to draw men and skills and money like some demonic destructive suction tube. So I was increasingly compelled to see the war as an enemy of the poor and to attack it as such. Perhaps the more tragic recognition of reality took place when it became clear to me that the war was doing far more than devastating the hopes of the poor at home. It was sending their sons and their brothers and their husbands to fight and to die in extraordinarily high proportions relative to the rest of the population. We were taking the black young men who had been crippled by our society and sending them eight

310 The 1960s thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in southwest Georgia and East Harlem. So we have been repeatedly faced with the cruel irony of watching Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools. So we watch them in brutal solidarity burning the huts of a poor village, but we realize that they would never live on the same block in Detroit. I could not be silent in the face of such cruel manipulation of the poor. My third reason moves to an even deeper level of awareness, for it grows out of my experience in the ghettoes of the North over the last three years--especially the last three summers. As I have walked among the desperate, rejected and angry young men I have told them that Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems. I have tried to offer them my deepest compassion while maintaining my conviction that social change comes most meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they asked---and rightly so---what about Vietnam? They asked if our own nation wasn’t using massive doses of violence to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today---my own government. For the sake of those boys, for the sake of this government, for the sake of hundreds of thousands trembling under our violence, I cannot be silent . . . Now, it should be incandescently clear that no one who has any concern for the integrity and life of America today can ignore the present war. If America’s soul becomes totally poisoned, part of the autopsy must read Vietnam. It can never be saved so long as it destroys the deepest hopes of men the world over. So it is that those of us who are yet determined that America will be are led down the path of protest and dissent, working for the health of our land. As if the weight of such a commitment to the life and health of America were not enough, another burden of responsibility was placed upon me in 1964; and I cannot forget that the Nobel Prize for Peace was also a commission---a commission to work harder than I had ever worked before for ‘‘the brotherhood of man.’’ This is a calling that takes me beyond national allegiances, but even if it were not present I would yet have to live with the meaning of my commitment to the ministry of Jesus Christ. To me the relationship of this ministry to the making of peace is so obvious that

I sometimes marvel at those who ask me why I am speaking against the war. Could it be that they do not know that the good news was meant for all men---for Communist and capitalist, for their children and ours, for black and for white, for revolutionary and conservative? Have they forgotten that my ministry is in obedience to the one who loved his enemies so fully that he died for them? What then can I say to the ‘‘Vietcong’’ or to Castro or to Mao as a faithful minister of this one? Can I threaten them with death or must I not share with them my life? Finally, as I try to delineate for you and for myself the road that leads from Montgomery to this place I would have offered all that was most valid if I simply said that I must be true to my conviction that I share with all men the calling to be a son of the living God. Beyond the calling of race or nation or creed is this vocation of sonship and brotherhood, and because I believe that the Father is deeply concerned especially for his suffering and helpless and outcast children, I come tonight to speak for them . . .

Strange Liberators And as I ponder the madness of Vietnam and search within myself for ways to understand and respond to compassion my mind goes constantly to the people of that peninsula. I speak now not of the soldiers of each side, not of the junta in Saigon, but simply of the people who have been living under the curse of war for almost three continuous decades now. I think of them too because it is clear to me that there will be no meaningful solution there until some attempt is made to know them and hear their broken cries. They must see Americans as strange liberators. The Vietnamese people proclaimed their own independence in 1945 after a combined French and Japanese occupation, and before the Communist revolution in China. They were led by Ho Chi Minh. Even though they quoted the American Declaration of Independence in their own document of freedom, we refused to recognize them. Instead, we decided to support France in its reconquest of her former colony. Our government felt then that the Vietnamese people were not ‘‘ready’’ for independence, and we again fell victim to the deadly Western arrogance that has poisoned the international atmosphere for so long. With that tragic decision we rejected a revolutionary government seeking self-determination, and a government that had been established not by China (for whom the Vietnamese have no great love) but by clearly indigenous forces that included some Communists. For

8.13 Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence the peasants this new government meant real land reform, one of the most important needs in their lives. For nine years following 1945 we denied the people of Vietnam the right of independence. For nine years we vigorously supported the French in their abortive effort to recolonize Vietnam. Before the end of the war we were meeting eighty percent of the French war costs. Even before the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, they began to despair of the reckless action, but we did not. We encouraged them with our huge financial and military supplies to continue the war even after they had lost the will. Soon we would be paying almost the full costs of this tragic attempt at recolonization. After the French were defeated it looked as if independence and land reform would come again through the Geneva agreements. But instead there came the United States, determined that Ho should not unify the temporarily divided nation, and the peasants watched again as we supported one of the most vicious modern dictators---our chosen man, Premier Diem. The peasants watched and cringed as Diem ruthlessly routed out all opposition, supported their extortionist landlords and refused even to discuss reunification with the north. The peasants watched as all this was presided over by U.S. influence and then by increasing numbers of U.S. troops who came to help quell the insurgency that Diem’s methods had aroused. When Diem was overthrown they may have been happy, but the long line of military dictatorships seemed to offer no real change---especially in terms of their need for land and peace. The only change came from America as we increased our troop commitments in support of governments which were singularly corrupt, inept and without popular support. All the while the people read our leaflets and received regular promises of peace and democracy---and land reform. Now they languish under our bombs and consider us---not their fellow Vietnamese---the real enemy. They move sadly and apathetically as we herd them off the land of their fathers into concentration camps where minimal social needs are rarely met. They know they must move or be destroyed by our bombs. So they go---primarily women and children and the aged. They watch as we poison their water, as we kill a million acres of their crops. They must weep as the bulldozers roar through their areas preparing to destroy the precious trees. They wander into the hospitals, with at least twenty casualties from American firepower for one ‘‘Vietcong’’-inflicted injury. So far we may have killed a million of them---mostly children. They wander

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into the towns and see thousands of the children, homeless, without clothes, running in packs on the streets like animals. They see the children, degraded by our soldiers as they beg for food. They see the children selling their sisters to our soldiers, soliciting for their mothers. What do the peasants think as we ally ourselves with the landlords and as we refuse to put any action into our many words concerning land reform? What do they think as we test our latest weapons on them, just as the Germans tested out new medicine and new tortures in the concentration camps of Europe? Where are the roots of the independent Vietnam we claim to be building? Is it among these voiceless ones? We have destroyed their two most cherished institutions: the family and the village. We have destroyed their land and their crops. We have cooperated in the crushing of the nation’s only non-Communist revolutionary political force---the unified Buddhist church. We have supported the enemies of the peasants of Saigon. We have corrupted their women and children and killed their men. What liberators? Now there is little left to build on---save bitterness. Soon the only solid physical foundations remaining will be found at our military bases and in the concrete of the concentration camps we call fortified hamlets. The peasants may well wonder if we plan to build our new Vietnam on such grounds as these? Could we blame them for such thoughts? We must speak for them and raise the questions they cannot raise. These too are our brothers. Perhaps the more difficult but no less necessary task is to speak for those who have been designated as our enemies. What of the National Liberation Front---that strangely anonymous group we call VC or Communists? What must they think of us in America when they realize that we permitted the repression and cruelty of Diem which helped to bring them into being as a resistance group in the south? What do they think of our condoning the violence which led to their own taking up of arms? How can they believe in our integrity when now we speak of ‘‘aggression from the north’’ as if there were nothing more essential to the war? How can they trust us when now we charge them with violence after the murderous reign of Diem and charge them with violence while we pour every new weapon of death into their land? Surely we must understand their feelings even if we do not condone their actions. Surely we must see that the men we supported pressed them to their violence. Surely we must see that our own computerized plans of destruction simply dwarf their greatest acts.

312 The 1960s How do they judge us when our officials know that their membership is less than twenty-five percent Communist and yet insist on giving them the blanket name? What must they be thinking when they know that we are aware of their control of major sections of Vietnam and yet we appear ready to allow national elections in which this highly organized political parallel government will have no part? They ask how we can speak of free elections when the Saigon press is censored and controlled by the military junta. And they are surely right to wonder what kind of new government we plan to help form without them---the only party in real touch with the peasants. They question our political goals and they deny the reality of a peace settlement from which they will be excluded. Their questions are frighteningly relevant. Is our nation planning to build on political myth again and then shore it up with the power of new violence? Here is the true meaning and value of compassion and nonviolence when it helps us to see the enemy’s point of view, to hear his questions, to know his assessment of ourselves. For from his view we may indeed see the basic weaknesses of our own condition, and if we are mature, we may learn and grow and profit from the wisdom of the brothers who are called the opposition. So, too, with Hanoi. In the north, where our bombs now pummel the land, and our mines endanger the waterways, we are met by a deep but understandable mistrust. To speak for them is to explain this lack of confidence in Western words, and especially their distrust of American intentions now. In Hanoi are the men who led the nation to independence against the Japanese and the French, the men who sought membership in the French commonwealth and were betrayed by the weakness of Paris and the willfulness of the colonial armies. It was they who led a second struggle against French domination at tremendous costs, and then were persuaded to give up the land they controlled between the thirteenth and seventeenth parallel as a temporary measure at Geneva. After 1954 they watched us conspire with Diem to prevent elections which would have surely brought Ho Chi Minh to power over a united Vietnam, and they realized they had been betrayed again. When we ask why they do not leap to negotiate, these things must be remembered. Also it must be clear that the leaders of Hanoi considered the presence of American troops in support of the Diem regime to have been the initial military breach of the Geneva agreements concerning foreign troops, and they remind us

that they did not begin to send in any large number of supplies or men until American forces had moved into the tens of thousands. Hanoi remembers how our leaders refused to tell us the truth about the earlier North Vietnamese overtures for peace, how the president claimed that none existed when they had clearly been made. Ho Chi Minh has watched as America has spoken of peace and built up its forces, and now he has surely heard of the increasing international rumors of American plans for an invasion of the north. He knows the bombing and shelling and mining we are doing are part of traditional pre-invasion strategy. Perhaps only his sense of humor and of irony can save him when he hears the most powerful nation of the world speaking of aggression as it drops thousands of bombs on a poor weak nation more than eight thousand miles away from its shores . . .

This Madness Must Cease Somehow this madness must cease. We must stop now. I speak as a child of God and brother to the suffering poor of Vietnam. I speak for those whose land is being laid waste, whose homes are being destroyed, whose culture is being subverted. I speak for the poor of America who are paying the double price of smashed hopes at home and death and corruption in Vietnam. I speak as a citizen of the world, for the world as it stands aghast at the path we have taken. I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours . . . The world now demands a maturity of America that we may not be able to achieve. It demands that we admit that we have been wrong from the beginning of our adventure in Vietnam, that we have been detrimental to the life of the Vietnamese people. The situation is one in which we must be ready to turn sharply from our present ways. In order to atone for our sins and errors in Vietnam, we should take the initiative in bringing a halt to this tragic war. I would like to suggest five concrete things that our government should do immediately to begin the long and difficult process of extricating ourselves from this nightmarish conflict: 1. End all bombing in North and South Vietnam. 2. Declare a unilateral cease-fire in the hope that such action will create the atmosphere for negotiation. 3. Take immediate steps to prevent other battlegrounds in Southeast Asia by curtailing our

8.13 Martin Luther King, Jr., Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence military buildup in Thailand and our interference in Laos. 4. Realistically accept the fact that the National Liberation Front has substantial support in South Vietnam and must thereby play a role in any meaningful negotiations and in any future Vietnam government. 5. Set a date that we will remove all foreign troops from Vietnam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva agreement . . .

Protesting the War Meanwhile we in the churches and synagogues have a continuing task while we urge our government to disengage itself from a disgraceful commitment. We must continue to raise our voices if our nation persists in its perverse ways in Vietnam. We must be prepared to match actions with words by seeking out every creative means of protest possible . . . There is something seductively tempting about stopping there and sending us all off on what in some circles has become a popular crusade against the war in Vietnam. I say we must enter the struggle, but I wish to go on now to say something even more disturbing. The war in Vietnam is but a symptom of a far deeper malady within the American spirit, and if we ignore this sobering reality we will find ourselves organizing clergy- and laymen-concerned committees for the next generation. They will be concerned about Guatemala and Peru. They will be concerned about Thailand and Cambodia. They will be concerned about Mozambique and South Africa. We will be marching for these and a dozen other names and attending rallies without end unless there is a significant and profound change in American life and policy. Such thoughts take us beyond Vietnam, but not beyond our calling as sons of the living God. In 1957 a sensitive American official overseas said that it seemed to him that our nation was on the wrong side of a world revolution. During the past ten years we have seen emerge a pattern of suppression which now has justified the presence of U.S. military ‘‘advisors’’ in Venezuela. This need to maintain social stability for our investments accounts for the counter-revolutionary action of American forces in Guatemala. It tells why American helicopters are being used against guerrillas in Colombia and why American napalm and green beret forces have already been active against rebels in Peru. It is with such activity in mind that the words of the late John F. Kennedy come back to haunt us. Five years ago

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he said, ‘‘Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.’’ Increasingly, by choice or by accident, this is the role our nation has taken---the role of those who make peaceful revolution impossible by refusing to give up the privileges and the pleasures that come from the immense profits of overseas investment. I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a ‘‘thing-oriented’’ society to a ‘‘personoriented’’ society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered. A true revolution of values will soon cause us to question the fairness and justice of many of our past and present policies. n the one hand we are called to play the good Samaritan on life’s roadside; but that will be only an initial act. One day we must come to see that the whole Jericho road must be transformed so that men and women will not be constantly beaten and robbed as they make their journey on life’s highway. True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar; it is not haphazard and superficial. It comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring. A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth. With righteous indignation, it will look across the seas and see individual capitalists of the West investing huge sums of money in Asia, Africa and South America, only to take the profits out with no concern for the social betterment of the countries, and say: ‘‘This is not just.’’ It will look at our alliance with the landed gentry of Latin America and say: ‘‘This is not just.’’ The Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them is not just. A true revolution of values will lay hands on the world order and say of war: ‘‘This way of settling differences is not just.’’ This business of burning human beings with napalm, of filling our nation’s homes with orphans and widows, of injecting poisonous drugs of hate into veins of people normally humane, of sending men home from dark and bloody battlefields physically handicapped and psychologically deranged, cannot be reconciled with wisdom, justice and love. A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death. America, the richest and most powerful nation in the world, can well lead the way in this revolution of

314 The 1960s values. There is nothing, except a tragic death wish, to prevent us from reordering our priorities, so that the pursuit of peace will take precedence over the pursuit of war . . .

8.14 Mario Savio, Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 1967 Well I ask you to consider---if this is a firm, and if the Board of Regents are the Board of Directors, and if President Kerr in fact is the manager, then I tell you something---the faculty are a bunch of employees and we’re the raw material! But we’re a bunch of raw materials that don’t mean to be---have any process upon us. Don’t mean to be made into any product! Don’t mean---Don’t mean to end up being bought by some clients of the University, be they the government, be they industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We’re human beings! And that---that brings me to the second mode of civil disobedience. There’s a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you can’t take part! You can’t even passively take part! And you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus---and you’ve got to make it stop! And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it---that unless you’re free the machine will be prevented from working at all!! That doesn’t mean---I know it will be interpreted to mean, unfortunately, by the bigots who run The Examiner, for example---That doesn’t mean that you have to break anything. One thousand people sitting down some place, not letting anybody by, not [letting] anything happen, can stop any machine, including this machine! And it will stop!! We’re gonna do the following---and the greater the number of people, the safer they’ll be and the more effective it will be. We’re going, once again, to march up to the 2nd floor of Sproul Hall. And we’re gonna conduct our lives for awhile in the 2nd floor of Sproul Hall. We’ll show movies, for example. We tried to get---and [they] shut them off. Unfortunately, that’s tied up in the court because of a lot of squeamish moral mothers for a moral America and other people on the outside. The same people who get all their ideas out of the San Francisco Examiner. Sad, sad. But, Mr. Landau---Mr. Landau has gotten us some other films. Likewise, we’ll do something---we’ll do something which hasn’t occurred at this University in a good long time! We’re going to have real classes up there! They’re

gonna be freedom schools conducted up there! We’re going to have classes on [the] 1st and 14th amendments!! We’re gonna spend our time learning about the things this University is afraid that we know! We’re going to learn about freedom up there, and we’re going to learn by doing!! Now, we’ve had some good, long rallies. [Organizers tell Mario that Joan Baez has arrived.] (Just one moment.) We’ve had some good, long rallies. And I think I’m sicker of rallies than anyone else here. She’s not going to be long. I’d like to introduce one last person---one last person before we enter Sproul Hall. Yeah. And the person is Joan Baez.

8.15 Judith Gabree, Letter to Staughton Lynd on His Article ‘‘A Good Society,’’ 1968 In his recent article ‘‘A Good Society’’ (Guardian, May 18th) Staughton Lynd raises two main questions about women’s liberation: why women’s liberation has ‘come to the fore’ and what the connection is between this new movement and white response to ghetto rebellion. Now that a male hero of the left has said it, women’s rights is to be taken seriously---it’s what to rap about. But was it taken seriously? Sure, after the disclaimers and qualifications, women’s rights look as safe as any man interested in protecting male supremacy could wish. Leaving the family intact, not even Warren Hinkle let alone Staughton Land would be threatened. The question of the impetus for the liberation of women is explained by Lynd as a matter of the movement’s growing up. I doubt that many women would explain it that way. No institution in this society, much less the campus, allows sexual equality for women. We women who experienced life on campus know how vital our education was considered (it wasn’t), we know that grad schools don’t want us (except in traditional professions), we know that the movement bought the traditional roles bit too. (Men may not have noticed women’s exploitation before they considered having children but we could not escape it.) We have watched men organize, speak, conduct workshops and write about the movement for us for years; we watched while we organized (the food, papers), spoke (answering the phones, and sometimes to each other---but not often enough) and sat in workshops and maybe read articles (though men usually didn’t know what we thought about all that). But our time was not lost. We learned that we must organize for our own liberation.

8.16 Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention Historically, there is a close parallel in the development of the early abolitionist women who also learned their lessons well gaining skills and belief in human equality. Their failures serve as a second lesson: to work in other peopled vineyards and neglect your own is wrong. Until black power, we lacked the courage to declare our struggle as primary. (It is traditional for women to be told to put aside their needs for the needs of others.) Like these earlier women, we have raised our consciousness through our involvement in the movement. What are the sins of women’s liberation? The reader is reassured that women’s liberation is not a ‘‘diversion’’ or an ‘‘indulgence.’’ But we have, according to Lynd, used the wrong words (exploitation rather than a euphemism), and challenged the prior right of Mere Important Issues (Is that the point? I don’t remember men folk worrying about whether blacks or the poor or Indians came first in the struggle for human dignity), ignore ‘‘proper channels’’ (the refuge offered by relationship with men). What about movement relationships? Even in permanent ones, he works and she keeps house and babies or she gets a job so he can work in the movement. Exceptions are rare; most others temporary. In essence ‘‘A Good Society’’ rationalizes a place in the movement for women’s liberation a safe place that won’t shake any priorities men folk have decided. Male definitions about what women’s liberation means, couldn’t possibly mean, where it counts and where it doesn’t, where the struggle will be fought ant who the enemy is. (Lynd acknowledges struggles which pit black against white, soldier against officer, wageworker against capitalist, but young people and women against patriarchal authority, no. Is the oppressor or agent of oppression so difficult to recognize?) We’ve had enough of male answers to women’s problems. And not having women heroes on the left now we will make our own answers. If we have anything to say to movement men at this point it is---Fuck Male Standards! We don’t care what you want. And if you want to be liberated, go tell it to men. We can make our own movement. JUDITH GABREE

8.16 Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, August 8, 1968 Mr. Chairman, delegates to this convention, my fellow Americans. Sixteen years ago I stood before this

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convention to accept your nomination as the running mate of one of the greatest Americans of out time or any time---Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eight years ago I had the highest honor of accepting your nomination for President of the United States. Tonight I again proudly accept that nomination for President of the United States. But I have news for you. This time there’s a difference---this time we’re going to win. We’re going to win for a number of reasons. . . . We’re going to win because you have nominated as my running mate a statesman of the first rank who will be a great campaigner, and one who is fully qualified to undertake the new responsibilities that I shall give to the next Vice President of the United States. And he is a man who fully shares my conviction and yours that after a period of 40 years when power has gone from the cities and the states to the Government in Washington, D. C., it’s time to have power go back from Washington to the states and to the cities of this country all over America. We’re going to win because at a time that America cries out for the unity that this Administration has destroyed, the Republican party, after a spirited contest for its nomination for President and Vice President, stands united before the nation tonight. . . . My fellow Americans, most important we’re going to win because our cause is right. We make history tonight, not for ourselves but for the ages. The choice we make in 1968 will determine not only the future of America but the future of peace and freedom in the world for the last third of the 20th century, and the question that we answer tonight: can America meet this great challenge? Let us listen to America to find the answer to that important question. As we look at America, we see cities enveloped in flame. We hear sirens in the night. We see Americans fighting on distant battlefields abroad. We see Americans hating each other; fighting each other; killing each other at home. And as we see and hear these things, millions of us cry out in anguish: Did we come all this way for this? Did American boys die in Normandy and Korea and in Valley Forge for this? Listen to the answers to those questions. It is another voice, it is a quiet voice in the tumult of shouting. It is the voice of the great majority of Americans---the forgotten Americans, the non shouters, the non demonstrators. They’re not racists or sick; they’re not guilty of the crime that plagues the land; they are black, they are white; they’re native born and foreign born; they’re young, they’re old.

316 The 1960s They work in American factories, they run American businesses. They serve in government; they provide most of the soldiers who die to keep it free. They give drive to the spirit of America. They give lift to the American dream. They give steel to the backbone of America. They’re good people. They’re decent people; they work and save and they pay their taxes and they care. Like Theodore Roosevelt, they know that this country will not be a good place for any of us to live in unless it’s a good place for all of us to live in. And this I say, this I say to you tonight, is the real voice of America. In this year 1968, this is the message it will broadcast to America and to the world. Let’s never forget that despite her faults, America is a great nation. And America is great because her people are great. With Winston Churchill we say, we have not journeyed all the way, across the centuries, across the oceans, across the plains, across the prairies because we are made of sugar candy. America’s in trouble today not because her people have failed, but because her leaders have failed. And what American needs are leaders to match the greatness of her people. And this great group of Americans---the forgotten Americans and others---know that the great question Americans must answer by their votes in November is this: Whether we shall continue for four more years the policies of the last five years. And this is their answer, and this is my answer to that question: When the strongest nation in the world ca???? own for four years in a war in Vietnam with no end in sight, when the richest nation in the world can’t manage its own economy, when the nation with the greatest tradition of the rule of law is plagued by unprecedented lawlessness, when a nation has been known for a century for equality of opportunity is torn by unprecedented racial violence, and when the President of the United States cannot travel abroad or to any major city at home without fear of a hostile demonstration-then it’s time for new leadership for the United States of America. Thank you. My fellow Americans, tonight I accept the challenge and the commitment to provide that new leadership for America and I ask you to accept it with me. . . . We’ve had enough of big promises and little action. The time has come for an honest government in the United States of America. And so tonight I do not promise the millennium in the morning. I don’t promise that we can eradicate poverty and end discrimination and eliminate all

danger of wars in the space of four or even eight years. But I do promise action. A new policy for peace abroad, a new policy for peace and progress and justice at home. Look at our problems abroad. Do you realize that we face the stark truth that we are worse off in every area of the world tonight than we were when President Eisenhower left office eight years ago? That’s the record. And there is only one answer to such a record of failure, and that is the complete house cleaning of those responsible for the failures and that record. The answer is the complete reappraisal of America’s policies in every section of the world. We shall begin with Vietnam. We all hope in this room that there’s a chance that current negotiations may bring an honorable end to that war. And we will say nothing during this campaign that might destroy that chance. But if the war is not ended when the people choose in November, the choice will be clear. Here it is: For four years this Administration has had at its disposal the greatest military and economic advantage that one nation has ever had over another in a war in history. For four years America’s fighting men have set a record for courage and sacrifice unsurpassed in our history. For four years this Administration has had the support of the loyal opposition for the objective of seeking an honorable end to the struggle. Never has so much military and economic and diplomatic power been used so ineffectively. And if after all of this time, and all of this sacrifice, and all of this support, there is still no end in sight, then I say the time has come for the American people to turn to new leadership not tied to the mistakes and policies of the past. That is what we offer to America. And I pledge to you tonight that the first priority foreign policy objective of our next Administration will be to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam. We shall not stop there. We need a policy to prevent more Vietnams. All of America’s peace-keeping institutions and all of America’s foreign commitments must be reappraised. Over the past 25 years, America has provided more than $150-billion in foreign aid to nations abroad. In Korea, and now again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, most of the men to help the people of those countries defend themselves against aggression. Now we’re a rich country, we’re a strong nation, we’re a populous nation but there are 200 million Americans and there are two billion people that live in the free world, and I say the time has come for other nations in the free world to

8.16 Richard M. Nixon, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention bear their fair share of the burden of defending peace and freedom around this world. What I call for is not a new isolationism. It is a new internationalism in which America enlists its allies and its friends around the world in those struggles in which their interest is as great as ours. . . . And as we commit the new policies for America tonight, let me make one further pledge---For five years hardly a day has gone by when we haven’t read or heard a report of the American flag being spit on, and our embassy being stoned, a library being burned, or an ambassador being insulted someplace in the world, and each incident reduced respect for the United States until the ultimate insult inevitably occurred. And I say to you tonight that when respect for the United States of America falls so low that a fourth-rate military power like Korea will seize an American naval vessel in the high seas, it’s time for new leadership to restore respect for the United States of America. Thank you very much. My friends, America is a great nation. It is time we started to act like a great nation around the world. It’s ironic to note, when we were a small nation, weak militarily and poor economically, America was respected. And the reason was that America stood for something more powerful than military strength or economic wealth. The American Revolution was a shining example of freedom in action which caught the imagination of the world, and today, too often, America is an example to be avoided and not followed. A nation that can’t keep the peace at home won’t be trusted to keep the peace abroad. A President who isn’t treated with respect at home will not be treated with respect abroad. And a nation which can’t manage its own economy can’t tell others how to manage theirs. If we are to restore prestige and respect for America abroad, the place to begin is at home in the United States of America. My friends, we live in an age of revolution in America and in the world. And to find the answers to our problems, let us turn to a revolutions revolution that will never grow old, the world’s greatest continuing revolution, the American Revolution. The American Revolution was and is dedicated to progress. But our founders recognized that the first requisite of progress is order. Now there is no quarrel between progress and order because neither can exist without the other. So let us have order in America, not the order that suppresses dissent and discourages change but the

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order which guarantees the right to dissent and provides the basis for peaceful change. And tonight it’s time for some honest talk about the problem---of order in the United States. Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them, but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country. Let those who have the responsibility to enforce our laws, and our judges who have the responsibility to interpret them, be dedicated to the great principles of civil rights. But let them also recognize that the first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence. And that right must be guaranteed in this country. And if we are to restore order and respect for law in this country, there’s one place we’re going to begin: We’re going to have a new Attorney General of the United States of America. I pledge to you that our new Attorney General will be directed by the President of the United States to launch a war against organized crime in this country. I pledge to you that the new Attorney General of the United States will be an active belligerent against the loan sharks and the numbers racketeers that rob the urban poor in our cities. I pledge to you that the new Attorney General will open a new front against the pill peddlers and the narcotics peddlers who are corrupting the lives of the children of this country. Because, my friends, let this message come through clear from what I say tonight. Time is running out for the merchants of crime and corruption in American society. The wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the future in the United States of America. . . . And to those who say that law and order is the code word for racism, here is a reply: Our goal is justice-justice for every American. If we are to have respect for law in America, we must have laws that deserve respect. Just as we cannot have progress without order, we cannot have order without progress. And so as we commit to order tonight, let us commit progress. And this brings me to the clearest choice among the issues of this campaign. For the past five years we have been deluged by Government programs for the unemployed, programs for the cities, programs for the poor, and we have reaped from these programs an ugly harvest of frustrations, violence and failure across the land. And now our opponents will be offering more of the same---more billions for Government jobs, Government housing,

318 The 1960s Government welfare. I say it’s time to quit pouring billions of dollars into programs that have failed in the United States of America. To put it bluntly, we’re on the wrong road and it’s time to take a new road to progress. Again we turn to the American Revolution for our answers. The war on poverty didn’t begin five years ago in this country, it began when this country began. It’s been the most successful war on poverty in the history of nations. There’s more wealth in America today, more broadly shared than in any nation in the world. We are a great nation. And we must never forget how we became great. America is a great nation today, not because of what government did for people, but because of what people did for themselves over 190 years in this country. And so it is time to apply the lessons of the American Revolution to our present problems. Let us increase the wealth of America so we can provide more generously for the aged and for the needy and for all those who cannot help themselves. But for those who are able to help themselves, what we need are not more millions on welfare rolls but more millions on payrolls in the United States of America. Instead of Government jobs and Government housing and Government welfare, let Government use its tax and credit policies to enlist in this battle the greatest engine of progress ever developed in the history of man---American private enterprise. Let us enlist in this great cause the millions of Americans in volunteer organizations who will bring a dedication to this task that no amount of money can ever buy. And let us build bridges, my friends, build bridges to human dignity across that gulf that separates black American from white America. Black Americans---no more than white Americansdo not want more Government programs which perpetuate dependency. They don’t want to be a colony in a nation. They want the pride and the self-respect and the dignity that can only come if they have an equal chance to own their own homes, to own their own businesses, to be managers and executives as well as

workers, to have a piece of the action in the exciting ventures of private enterprise. . . . This is the kind of a day I see for America . . . I see a day when Americans are once again proud of their flag; when once again at home and abroad it is honored as the world’s greatest symbol of liberty and justice. I see a day when the President of the United States is respected and his office is honored because it is worthy of respect and worthy of honor. I see a day when every child in this land, regardless of his background, has a chance for the best education that our wisdom and schools can provide, and an equal chance to go just as high as his talents will take him. I see a day when life in rural America attracts people to the country rather than driving them away. I see a day when we can look back on massive breakthroughs in solving the problems of slums and pollution and traffic which are choking our cities to death. I see a day when our senior citizens and millions of others will plan for the future with the assurance that their government is not going to rob them of their savings by destroying the value of their dollar. I see a day when we will again have freedom from fear in America and freedom from fear in the world. I see a day when our nation is at peace and the world is at peace and everyone on earth---those who hope, those who aspire, those who crave liberty will look to America as the shining example of dreams achieved. My fellow Americans, this is the cause I ask you to vote for. This is the cause I ask you to work for. This is the cause I ask you to commit to not just for victory in November but beyond that to a new Administration because the time when one man or a few leaders could save America is gone. We need tonight nothing less than the total commitment and the total mobilization of the American people if we are to succeed. Government can pass laws but respect for law can come only from people who take the law into their hearts and their minds and not into their hands. . . . The time has come for us to leave the valley of despair and climb the mountain so that we may see the glory of the dawn, a new day for America, a new dawn for peace and freedom to the world.

Section 9 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution

Introduction

Building momentum at the end of the 1960s, a second wave of feminism energized women in the 1970s around reproductive rights issues and workplace equity. In 1973, the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade overturned state laws banning abortions and articulated a right to privacy that established a woman’s right to choose an abortion. Thus the Supreme Court, along with Congress seemed to be advancing a liberal democratic agenda despite presidential electoral trends. Although the Court placed certain restrictions on the exercise of abortion rights, the Roe decision galvanized socially conservative religious opposition and effectively translated into a reservoir of political support for the Republican Party, which positioned itself as receptive to overturning the decision. In addition, while religious fundamentalists attacked Roe on moral grounds, Republicans also objected to the decision as an example of overreaching judicial activism. As the Democratic Party generally aligned itself with feminist proponents of choice, many of its economically liberal but socially conservative rank and file were attracted to the National Republican standard. This mobilization of religious conservatism combined with traditional Republican opposition to big government to build a coalition that the GOP could leverage first in national elections and eventually at the state level in the South. The Democratic presidential campaigns also lost support in the 1970s as George McGovern’s candidacy and the Carter Administration’s shift from a strong military posture to an emphasis on human rights in foreign policy allowed Republican critics to paint the

A great irony of the 1970s is that exactly as the national coalition FDR forged in the New Deal was coming unraveled, modern liberal policymaking was coming to full flower in Congress. Nixon’s crushing defeat of George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election signaled the success of the Republican Party’s ‘‘southern strategy’’ of appealing to voters from the old Confederacy by convincing them that the Democratic Party had abandoned them for a radical leftwing and anti-American philosophy. While Nixon’s resignation in the wake of the Watergate Scandal effectively doomed the candidacy of his successor, Gerald Ford, Democrat Jimmy Carter’s victory in 1976 was more notable for its razor thin margin under such circumstances than for a reconstitution of the New Deal coalition at the national level. At the same time stable Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, bolstered by the accession to senior leadership positions of a younger, more liberal cadre of legislators, generated a spate of laws in the areas of environmental and consumer protection and created a set of new federal agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the National Highway and Traffic Safety Council, and the Surface Mining and Reclamation Agency. All of this activity reflected the old New Deal formula of establishing greater executive branch capacity to administer new legislative programs aimed at safeguarding individuals from socio-economic dislocations. 319

320 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution Party as ‘‘soft on defense.’’ This image was reinforced by the Iranian Hostage Crisis of November 1979 in which the Carter Administration appeared helpless and ineffective. Buoyed by his spirited challenge to Gerald Ford in the 1976 Republican primaries, Ronald Reagan organized a successful presidential campaign in 1980 built on the critique that the Democrats were ‘‘out of the mainstream’’ on both foreign and defense policy. In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention of 1980, Reagan articulated a vision for America that spoke of increased military spending, reductions in federal regulation, a 30 percent tax cut, and family values. Adding insult to injury, Reagan

even sited Franklin Roosevelt approvingly, reinforcing his message that the Democratic Party had veered off course and abandoned its core constituencies, which he was welcoming into the Republican coalition. While this vision swept Jimmy Carter out of office after one term and provided the basis for tax cuts and increases in the defense budget, it never led to the radical cuts in the size of the federal government or created a lasting Republican majority to supplant the New Deal coalition. It did, however, put the brakes on the development of new federal programs and recalibrated the policy process by placing liberals on the defensive. ---Richard A. Harris

Documents

(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.

9.1 The National Environmental Policy Act, 1969 As amended (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982) An Act to establish a national policy for the environment, to provide for the establishment of a Council on Environmental Quality, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.’’

Purpose Sec. 2 [42 USC § 4321]. The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.

(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may---

Title I Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy

1. fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;

Sec. 101 [42 USC § 4331]. 321

322 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution 2. assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 3. attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 4. preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice; 5. achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and 6. enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. (a) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. Sec. 102 [42 USC § 4332]. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall--(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man’s environment; (B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations; (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on---

i. the environmental impact of the proposed action, ii. any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, iii. alternatives to the proposed action, iv. the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and v. any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes; (A) Any detailed statement required under subparagraph (C) after January 1, 1970, for any major Federal action funded under a program of grants to States shall not be deemed to be legally insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a State agency or official, if: 1. the State agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and has the responsibility for such action, 2. the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and participates in such preparation, 3. the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such statement prior to its approval and adoption, and 4. after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official provides early notification to, and solicits the views of, any other State or any Federal land management entity of any action or any alternative thereto which may have significant impacts upon such State or

9.2 Richard M. Nixon, Speech on ‘‘Vietnamization’’ (The Nixon Doctrine) affected Federal land management entity and, if there is any disagreement on such impacts, prepares a written assessment of such impacts and views for incorporation into such detailed statement. The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official of his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire statement or of any other responsibility under this Act; and further, this subparagraph does not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction.

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Nothing in section 102 [42 USC § 4332] or 103 [42 USC § 4333] shall in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State agency. Sec. 105 [42 USC § 4335]. The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies.

(A) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;

9.2 Richard M. Nixon, Speech on ‘‘Vietnamization’’ (The Nixon Doctrine), November 3, 1969

(B) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind’s world environment;

Good evening, my fellow Americans: Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battle-front in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

(C) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment; (D) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of resource-oriented projects; and (E) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act. Sec. 103 [42 USC § 4333]. All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this Act and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this Act. Sec. 104 [42 USC § 4334].

• The war had been going on for 4 years. • 31,000 Americans had been killed in action. • The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. • 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

324 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution • No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. • The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad. In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war. But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam. Now, many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. Any many others I among them have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be

a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. • They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps. • We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. • With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North. For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but through-out the world. Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: ’’ . . . we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. ‘‘We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.’’ President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude. • A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. • Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

9.2 Richard M. Nixon, Speech on ‘‘Vietnamization’’ (The Nixon Doctrine) • This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war. For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront. . . . We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression. Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: ‘‘When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.’’. . . Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia: • First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. • Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. • Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybody’s business not just America’s business. And it is particularly the

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responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. • After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. • The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops. Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office. • Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. • Most important United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater. I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

326 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at the time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be. My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

• I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. • Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary a plan in which we will withdraw all our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world. In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people. We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: ‘‘Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.’’ Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause,

9.3 Betty Friedan, Testimony before the Senate against the Nomination of Judge Carswell prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society. And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters. • I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. • But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world. • And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth. I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter. I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership. Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for

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peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism. And so tonight to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris. Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that. Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: ‘‘This is the war to end war.’’ His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man. Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated the goal of a just and lasting peace. As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it. I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers. Thank you and goodnight.

9.3 Betty Friedan, Testimony before the Senate against the Nomination of Judge Carswell and the ‘‘Sex Plus’’ Doctrine, 1970 I am here to testify before this committee to oppose Judge Carswell’s appointment to Supreme Court Justice on the basis of his proven insensitivity to the problems of the 53 percent of United States citizens who are women, and specifically on the basis of his explicit discrimination in a circuit court decision in 1969 against working mothers.

328 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution I speak in my capacity as national president of the National Organization for Women, which has led the exploding new movement in this country for ‘‘full equality for women in truly equal partnership with men,’’ and which was organized in 1966 to take action to break through discrimination against women in employment, education, government and in all fields of American life. On October 13, 1969, in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Carswell was party to a most unusual judiciary action which would permit employers, in defiance of the law of the land as embodied in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to refuse to hire women who have children. The case involved Mrs. Ida Phillips, who was refused employment by Martin Marietta Corporation as an aircraft assembler because she had pre-school aged children, although the company said it would hire a man with pre-school aged children. This case was considered a clear-cut violation of the law which forbids job discrimination on the grounds of sex as well as race. The E.E.O.C., empowered to administer Title VII, filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mrs. Phillips; an earlier opinion of the Fifth Circuit filed in May upholding the company was considered such a clear violation of the Civil Rights Act by Chief Judge John Brown that he vacated the opinion and asked to convene the full court to consider the case. Judge Carswell voted to deny a rehearing of the case, an action which in effect would have permitted employers to fire the 4.1 million working mothers in the U.S. today who have children under six. They comprise 38.9 percent of the nearly 10.6 million mothers in the labor force today. In his dissent to this ruling in which Judge Carswell claimed no sex discrimination was involved, Chief Judge Brown said: ‘‘The case is simple. A woman with pre-school aged children may not be employed, a man with pre-school children may. The distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The question then arises: Is this sex related? To the simple query, the answer is just as simple: Nobody---and this includes judges, Solomonic or life-tenured---has yet seen a male mother. A mother, to over-simplify the simplest biology, must then be a woman. ‘‘It is the fact of the person being a mother---i.e., a woman---not the age of the children, which denies employment opportunity to a woman which is open to men.’’ It is important for this committee to understand the dangerous insensitivity of Judge Carswell to sex discrimination, when the desire and indeed the necessity

of women to take a fully equal place in American society has already emerged as one of the most explosive issues in the 1970’s, entailing many new problems which will ultimately have to be decided by the Supreme Court. According to government figures, over 25 percent of mothers who have children under six are in the labor force today. Over 85 percent of them work for economic reasons. Over half a million are widowed, divorced or separated. Their incomes are vitally important to their children. Perhaps even more important, as a portent of the future, is the fact that there has been an astronomical increase in the last three decades in the number of working mothers. Between 1950 and the most recent compilation of government statistics, the number of working mothers in the United States nearly doubled. For every mother of children who worked in 1940, ten mothers are working today, an increase from slightly over 1.5 million to nearly 11 million. In his pernicious action, Judge Carswell not only flaubted the Civil Rights Act, designed to end the job discrimination which denied women, along with other minority groups, equal opportunity in employment, but specifically defied the policy of this administration to encourage women in poverty, who have children, to work by expanding day-care centers, rather than having them depend on the current medieval welfare system which perpetuates the cycle of poverty from generation to generation. Mothers and children today comprise 80 percent of the welfare load in major cities. Judge Carswell justified discrimination against such women by a peculiar doctrine of ‘‘sex plus,’’ which claimed that discrimination which did not apply to all women but only to women who did not meet special standards---standards not applied to men---was not sex discrimination. In his dissent, Chief Judge Brown said, ‘‘the sex plus rule in this case sows the seed for future discrimination against black workers through making them meet extra standards not imposed on whites.’’ The ‘‘sex plus’’ doctrine would also penalize the very women who most need jobs. Chief Judge Brown said, ‘‘Even if the ’sex plus’ rule is not expanded, in its application to mothers of preschool children, it will deal a serious blow to the objectives of Title VII. If the law against sex discrimination means anything, it must protect employment opportunities for those groups of women who most need jobs because of economic necessity. Working mothers of pre-schoolers are such a group. Studies show that, as compared to women with older children or no children,

9.3 Betty Friedan, Testimony before the Senate against the Nomination of Judge Carswell these mothers of pre-school children were much more likely to have gone to work because of pressing need . . . because of financial necessity and because their husbands are unable to work. Frequently, these women are a key or only source of income for their families. Sixty-eight percent of working women do not have husbands present in the household, and two-thirds of these women are raising children in poverty. Moreover, a barrier to jobs for mothers of pre-schoolers tends to harm non-white mothers more then white mothers.’’ I am not a lawyer, but the wording of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act so clearly conveys its intention to provide equal job opportunity to all oppressed groups, including women---who today in America earn on the average less than half the earnings of men---that only outright sex discrimination or sexism, as we new feminists call it, can explain Judge Carswell’s ruling. Human rights are indivisible, and I, and those for whom I speak, would oppose equally the appointment to the Supreme Court of a racist judge who had been totally blind to the humanity of black men and women since 1948, as the appointment of a sexist judge totally blind to the humanity of women in 1969. To countenance outright sexism, not only in words, but by judicial flaunting of the law in an appointee to the Supreme Court in 1970, when American women--not in the hundreds or thousands but in the millions--are finally beginning to assert their human rights, is unconscionable. I trust that you gentlemen of the committee do not share Judge Carswell’s inability to see women as human beings, too. I will, however, put these questions to you. How would you feel if in the event you were not reelected, you applied for a job at some company or law firm or university, and were told you weren’t eligible because you had a child? How would you feel if your sons were told explicitly or implicitly that they could not get or keep certain jobs if they had children? Then how do you feel about appointing to the Supreme Court a man who has said your daughters may not hold a job if they have children? The economic misery and psychological conflicts entailed for untold numbers of American women, and their children and husbands, by Judge Carswell’s denial of the protection of a law that was enacted for their benefit suggest only a faint hint of the harm that would be done in appointing such a sexually backward judge to the Supreme Court. For during the next decade I can assure you that the emerging revolution of the no-longer-quite-so-silent majority will pose many

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pressing new problems to our society, problems which will inevitably come before the courts and which indeed will probably preoccupy the Supreme Court of the 1970’s as did questions arising from the civil rights movement in the 1960’s. It is already apparent from decisions made by judges in other circuit courts that Judge Carswell is unusually blind in the matter of sex prejudice and that his blindness will make it impossible for him to judge fairly the cases of sex prejudice that will surely come up. Recently, courts have begun to outlaw forms of discrimination against women long accepted in society. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (convened as a three-judge court without Judge Carswell), on March 4, 1969, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone ruled that weight-lifting limitations barring women, but not men, from jobs, were illegal under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on September 26, 1969, in Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co. ruled that, if retained, a weight-lifting test must apply to ALL employees, male and female, and that each individual must be permitted to ‘‘bid on and fill any job which his or her seniority entitled him or her.’’ Separate seniority lists for men and women were forbidden. Here are a few existing instances of discrimination against women, that are or will be before the courts: 1. In New York City, male, but not female, teachers are paid for their time spent on jury duty. 2. In Syracuse, New York, male, but not female, teachers are paid for athletic coaching. 3. In Syracuse, an employer wants to challenge the rule that forbids her to hire female employees at night in violation of New York State restrictive laws. 4. In Pennsylvania, a woman has requested help in obtaining a tax deduction for household help necessary for her to work. 5. In Arizona, a female law professor is fighting a rule that forbids her to be hired by the same university that employs her husband in another department. 6. In California, a wife is challenging a community property law which makes it obligatory for a husband to control their joint property. 7. And all over the country the E.E.O.C. regulation, which made it illegal to have separate want ads for males and females, have not been followed by most newspapers.

330 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution The Honorable Shirley Chisholm, a national board member of NOW, has summed it all up in her statement that she has been more discriminated against as a woman than as a black. It would show enormous contempt for every woman of this country and contempt for every black American, as well as contempt for the Supreme Court itself, if you confirm Judge Carswell’s appointment.

9.4 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 [1973] San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, San Antonio Independent School District et al. v. Rodriguez et al. (excerpt) APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 71-1332. Argued October 12, 1972 Decided March 21, 1973 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. . . . This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary [411 U.S. 1, 5] schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. They brought a class action on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The complaint [411 U.S. 1, 6] was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. In December 1971 the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406 U.S. 966 (1972). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the District Court . . . In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [1954], a unanimous Court recognized that ‘‘education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.’’ Id., at 493. What was said there in

the context of racial discrimination has lost none of its vitality with the passage of time: ‘‘Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our [411 U.S. 1, 30] recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’’ Ibid. This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (BURGER, C. J.), 237, 238-239 (WHITE, J.), [1972]; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 [1963] (BRENNAN, J.); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 [1948] (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 [1925]; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [1923]; Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 [1907]. Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education. We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that ‘‘the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society’’ cannot be doubted. But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice [411 U.S. 1, 31] Harlan, dissenting from the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate travel, admonished that ‘‘[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights.’’ Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 655, 661. In his view, if the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated, depending on a majority’s view of the importance of the interest affected, we would have gone ‘‘far toward making this Court a ’superlegislature.’’’ Ibid. We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence. But MR. JUSTICE STEWART’S response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice

9.4 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez Harlan’s concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental-rights rationale employed in the Court’s equal protection decisions: ‘‘The Court today does not ‘pick out particular human activities, characterize them as ’’fundamental,‘‘ and give them added protection. . . .’ To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.’’ Id., at 642. (Emphasis in original.) MR. JUSTICE STEWART’S statement serves to underline what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained: ‘‘[I]n moving from State to State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.’’ Id., at 634. (Emphasis in original.) [411 U.S. 1, 32] The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance, and the Court’s decision, therefore, did not require an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of that right.. . . Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State’s social and economic legislation. It is appellees’ contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The ‘‘marketplace of ideas’’ is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive information becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge.

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A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation [411 U.S. 1, 36] of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed. We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual’s rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be pursued by a implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures [411 U.S. 1, 37] in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees’ argument might have if a State’s financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where---as is true in the present case---no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process. Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and illhoused are among the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. If so, appellees’ thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. Normet, supra.

332 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court’s finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has [411 U.S. 1, 38] applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which ‘‘deprived,’’ ‘‘infringed,’’ or ‘‘interfered’’ with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 536; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 338343. A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 [1966], expresses well the salient point: ‘‘This is not a complaint that Congress . . . has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone’s right to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others similarly situated]. . . . ‘‘[T]he federal law in question] does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. . . . We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected . . . was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is [411 U.S. 1, 39] inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a ‘statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,’ . . . that a legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time,’ . . . and that ‘reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . .’ ’’ Id., at 656--657. (Emphasis in original.) The Texas system of school financing is not unlike the federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today---including the decisions permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and

creating and continuously expanding state aid---was implemented in an effort to extend public education and to improve its quality. Of course, every reform that benefits some more than others may be criticized for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State’s efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution. [411 U.S. 1, 40] It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the inappropriateness of the strict-scrutiny test. A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the State’s judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished against such interferences with the State’s fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: ‘‘The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . [411 U.S. 1, 41] It has . . . been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. . . .’’ Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 [1940].

9.5 Roe v. Wade See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940). Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. [411 U.S. 1, 42] In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court’s lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of ‘‘intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems.’’ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 487. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that ‘‘there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,’’ and that, within the limits of rationality, ‘‘the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems’’ should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S., at 546--547. On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the major [411 U.S. 1, 43] sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education---an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public education. And the question regarding the most effective relationship between state boards of education and local school boards, in terms of their respective responsibilities and degrees of control, is now undergoing searching re-examination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for all time even

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by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of everchanging conditions. [411 U.S. 1, 44] It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State’s laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While ‘‘[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which this Court examines state action,’’ it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State . . .

9.5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 [1973] Roe et al. v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County Appeal From the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (excerpt) No. 70-18. Argued December 13, 1971 Reargued October 11, 1972 Decided January 22, 1973 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue. We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion

334 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion. In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem. Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 [1905]: ‘‘[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.’’

I The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 11911194 and 1196 of the State’s Penal Code.These make it a crime to ‘‘procure an abortion,’’ as therein defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to ‘‘an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.’’ Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. . . .

II Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion ‘‘performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions’’; that she was unable to get a ‘‘legal’’ abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her

pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue ‘‘on behalf of herself and all other women’’ similarly situated. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe’s action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients’ rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments . . .’

V The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal ‘‘liberty’’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 [1965]; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 [1972]; id., at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.

VI It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at

9.5 Roe v. Wade any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century. 1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that at the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal abortions were severely punished. We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, and that ‘‘it was resorted to without scruple.’’ The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome’s prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father’s right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. 2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described as the Father of Medicine, the ‘‘wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art,’’ and the ‘‘most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity,’’ who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear: ‘‘I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. 3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before ‘‘quickening’’---the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy ---was not an indictable offense. The absence of a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines

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variously approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus became ‘‘formed’’ or recognizably human, or in terms of when a ‘‘person’’ came into being, that is, infused with a ‘‘soul’’ or ‘‘animated.’’ A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. This was ‘‘mediate animation.’’ Although Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was agreement, however, that prior to this point the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to Aquinas’ definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was echoed by later common-law scholars and found its way into the received common law in this country. 4. Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it homicide. But the later and predominant view, following the great common-law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman ‘‘quick with childe’’ is ‘‘a great misprision, and no murder.’’ Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter (though not murder), ‘‘modern law’’ took a less severe view. A recent review of the common-law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common-law crime. This is of some importance because while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, others followed Coke in stating that abortion of a quick fetus was a ‘‘misprision,’’ a term they translated to mean ‘‘misdemeanor.’’ That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently

336 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus. 5. The English statutory law. England’s first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 1, a capital crime, but in 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the ‘‘quickening’’ distinction . . . A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v. Bourne, 1939. 1 K. B. 687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to ‘‘the case where a child is killed by a wilful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature.’’ Id., at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act’s use of the word ‘‘unlawfully,’’ imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother’s life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase ‘‘preserving the life of the mother’’ broadly, that is, ‘‘in a reasonable sense,’’ to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother’s health, and instructed the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted in a good-faith belief that the abortion was necessary for this purpose. Id., at 693-694. The jury did acquit. 6. Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a) ‘‘that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,’’ or (b) ‘‘that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.’’ The Act also provides that, in making this determination,

‘‘account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.’’ It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion ‘‘is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.’’ 7. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century was the pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 that part of Lord Ellenborough’s Act that related to a woman ‘‘quick with child.’’ The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a crime in that State only in 1860. In 1828, New York enacted legislation that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it ‘‘shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose.’’ By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, only eight American States had statutes dealing with abortion. It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother’s life, that provision soon disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for that purpose. 8. Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950’s, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother. The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to preserve the mother’s health. Three

9.6 Richard M. Nixon, Resignation Speech States permitted abortions that were not ‘‘unlawfully’’ performed or that were not ‘‘without lawful justification,’’ leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. In the past several years, however, a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, 230.3, set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205. 9. It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy. 10. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period . . . It is with these interests, and the weight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned.

VIII The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 [1891], the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 [1969]; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 [1968], Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 [1967], Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 [1886], see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v.

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Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 [1923]. These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘‘fundamental’’ or ‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’’ Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 [1937], are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 [1967]; procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 [1942]; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 . . .

9.6 Richard M. Nixon, Resignation Speech, August 8, 1974 Good evening. This is the 37th time I have spoken to you from this office, where so many decisions have been made that shaped the history of this Nation. Each time I have done so to discuss with you some matter that I believe affected the national interest. In all the decisions I have made in my public life, I have always tried to do what was best for the Nation. Throughout the long and difficult period of Watergate, I have felt it was my duty to persevere, to make every possible effort to complete the term of office to which you elected me. In the past few days, however, it has become evident to me that I no longer have a strong enough political base in the Congress to justify continuing that effort. As long as there was such a base, I felt strongly that it was necessary to see the constitutional process through to its conclusion, that to do otherwise would be unfaithful to the spirit of that deliberately difficult process and a dangerously destabilizing precedent for the future. But with the disappearance of that base, I now believe that the constitutional purpose has been served, and there is no longer a need for the process to be prolonged. I would have preferred to carry through to the finish whatever the personal agony it would have involved, and my family unanimously urged me to do so. But the interest of the Nation must always come before any personal considerations. From the discussions I have had with Congressional and other leaders, I have concluded that because of the Watergate matter I might not have the support of the Congress that I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties of this office in the way the interests of the Nation would require.

338 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution I have never been a quitter. To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad. To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home. Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office. As I recall the high hopes for America with which we began this second term, I feel a great sadness that I will not be here in this office working on your behalf to achieve those hopes in the next 2 1/2 years. But in turning over direction of the Government to Vice President Ford, I know, as I told the Nation when I nominated him for that office 10 months ago, that the leadership of America will be in good hands. In passing this office to the Vice President, I also do so with the profound sense of the weight of responsibility that will fall on his shoulders tomorrow and, therefore, of the understanding, the patience, the cooperation he will need from all Americans. As he assumes that responsibility, he will deserve the help and the support of all of us. As we look to the future, the first essential is to begin healing the wounds of this Nation, to put the bitterness and divisions of the recent past behind us, and to rediscover those shared ideals that lie at the heart of our strength and unity as a great and as a free people. By taking this action, I hope that I will have hastened the start of that process of healing which is so desperately needed in America. I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision. I would say only that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some were wrong, they were made in what I believed at the time to be the best interest of the Nation. To those who have stood with me during these past difficult months, to my family, my friends, to many others who joined in supporting my cause because they believed it was right, I will be eternally grateful for your support. And to those who have not felt able to give me your support, let me say I leave with no bitterness toward

those who have opposed me, because all of us, in the final analysis, have been concerned with the good of the country, however our judgments might differ. So, let us all now join together in affirming that common commitment and in helping our new President succeed for the benefit of all Americans. I shall leave this office with regret at not completing my term, but with gratitude for the privilege of serving as your President for the past 5 1/2 years. These years have been a momentous time in the history of our Nation and the world. They have been a time of achievement in which we can all be proud, achievements that represent the shared efforts of the Administration, the Congress, and the people. But the challenges ahead are equally great, and they, too, will require the support and the efforts of the Congress and the people working in cooperation with the new Administration. We have ended America’s longest war, but in the work of securing a lasting peace in the world, the goals ahead are even more far-reaching and more difficult. We must complete a structure of peace so that it will be said of this generation, our generation of Americans, by the people of all nations, not only that we ended one war but that we prevented future wars. We have unlocked the doors that for a quarter of a century stood between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. We must now ensure that the one quarter of the world’s people who live in the People’s Republic of China will be and remain not our enemies but our friends. In the Middle East, 100 million people in the Arab countries, many of whom have considered us their enemy for nearly 20 years, now look on us as their friends. We must continue to build on that friendship so that peace can settle at last over the Middle East and so that the cradle of civilization will not become its grave. Together with the Soviet Union we have made the crucial breakthroughs that have begun the process of limiting nuclear arms. But we must set as our goal not just limiting but reducing and finally destroying these terrible weapons so that they cannot destroy civilization and so that the threat of nuclear war will no longer hang over the world and the people. We have opened the new relation with the Soviet Union. We must continue to develop and expand that new relationship so that the two strongest nations of the world will live together in cooperation rather than confrontation. Around the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, in the Middle East, there are millions of people

9.7 Gerald Ford Pardons Richard Nixon who live in terrible poverty, even starvation. We must keep as our goal turning away from production for war and expanding production for peace so that people everywhere on this earth can at last look forward in their children’s time, if not in our own time, to having the necessities for a decent life. Here in America, we are fortunate that most of our people have not only the blessings of liberty but also the means to live full and good and, by the world’s standards, even abundant lives. We must press on, however, toward a goal of not only more and better jobs but of full opportunity for every American and of what we are striving so hard right now to achieve, prosperity without inflation. For more than a quarter of a century in public life I have shared in the turbulent history of this era. I have fought for what I believed in. I have tried to the best of my ability to discharge those duties and meet those responsibilities that were entrusted to me. Sometimes I have succeeded and sometimes I have failed, but always I have taken heart from what Theodore Roosevelt once said about the man in the arena, ‘‘whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes short again and again because there is not effort without error and shortcoming, but who does actually strive to do the deed, who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumphs of high achievements and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly.’’ I pledge to you tonight that as long as I have a breath of life in my body, I shall continue in that spirit. I shall continue to work for the great causes to which I have been dedicated throughout my years as a Congressman, a Senator, a Vice President, and President, the cause of peace not just for America but among all nations, prosperity, justice, and opportunity for all of our people. There is one cause above all to which I have been devoted and to which I shall always be devoted for as long as I live. When I first took the oath of office as President 5 1/2 years ago, I made this sacred commitment, to ‘‘consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace among nations.’’ I have done my very best in all the days since to be true to that pledge. As a result of these efforts, I am confident that the world is a safer place today, not only for the people of America but for the people of all nations, and that all of our children have a better chance than before of living in peace rather than dying in war.

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This, more than anything, is what I hoped to achieve when I sought the Presidency. This, more than anything, is what I hope will be my legacy to you, to our country, as I leave the Presidency. To have served in this office is to have felt a very personal sense of kinship with each and every American. In leaving it, I do so with this prayer: May God’s grace be with you in all the days ahead. President Richard Nixon---August 8, 1974

9.7 Gerald Ford Pardons Richard Nixon, 1974 Ladies and gentlemen: I have come to a decision which I felt I should tell you and all of my fellow American citizens, as soon as I was certain in my own mind and in my own conscience that it is the right thing to do. I have learned already in this office that the difficult decisions always come to this desk. I must admit that many of them do not look at all the same as the hypothetical questions that I have answered freely and perhaps too fast on previous occasions. My customary policy is to try and get all the facts and to consider the opinions of my countrymen and to take counsel with my most valued friends. But these seldom agree, and in the end, the decision is mine. To procrastinate, to agonize, and to wait for a more favorable turn of events that may never come or more compelling external pressures that may as well be wrong as right, is itself a decision of sorts and a weak and potentially dangerous course for a President to follow. I have promised to uphold the Constitution, to do what is right as God gives me to see the right, and to do the very best that I can for America. I have asked your help and your prayers, not only when I became President but many times since. The Constitution is the supreme law of our land and it governs our actions as citizens. Only the laws of God, which govern our consciences, are superior to it. As we are a nation under God, so I am sworn to uphold our laws with the help of God. And I have sought such guidance and searched my own conscience with special diligence to determine the right thing for me to do with respect to my predecessor in this place, Richard Nixon, and his loyal wife and family. Theirs is an American tragedy in which we all have played a part. It could go on and on and on, or someone must write the end to it. I have concluded that only I can do that, and if I can, I must.

340 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution There are no historic or legal precedents to which I can turn in this matter, none that precisely fit the circumstances of a private citizen who has resigned the Presidency of the United States. But it is common knowledge that serious allegations and accusations hang like a sword over our former President’s head, threatening his health as he tries to reshape his life, a great part of which was spent in the service of this country and by the mandate of its people. After years of bitter controversy and divisive national debate, I have been advised, and I am compelled to conclude that many months and perhaps more years will have to pass before Richard Nixon could obtain a fair trial by jury in any jurisdiction of the United States under governing decisions of the Supreme Court. I deeply believe in equal justice for all Americans, whatever their station or former station. The law, whether human or divine, is no respecter of persons; but the law is a respecter of reality. The facts, as I see them, are that a former President of the United States, instead of enjoying equal treatment with any other citizen accused of violating the law, would be cruelly and excessively penalized either in preserving the presumption of his innocence or in obtaining a speedy determination of his guilt in order to repay a legal debt to society. During this long period of delay and potential litigation, ugly passions would again be aroused. And our people would again be polarized in their opinions. And the credibility of our free institutions of government would again be challenged at home and abroad. In the end, the courts might well hold that Richard Nixon had been denied due process, and the verdict of history would even be more inconclusive with respect to those charges arising out of the period of his Presidency, of which I am presently aware. But it is not the ultimate fate of Richard Nixon that most concerns me, though surely it deeply troubles every decent and every compassionate person. My concern is the immediate future of this great country. In this, I dare not depend upon my personal sympathy as a longtime friend of the former President, nor my professional judgment as a lawyer, and I do not. As President, my primary concern must always be the greatest good of all the people of the United States whose servant I am. As a man, my first consideration is to be true to my own convictions and my own conscience. My conscience tells me clearly and certainly that I cannot prolong the bad dreams that continue to reopen a chapter that is closed. My conscience tells me that

only I, as President, have the constitutional power to firmly shut and seal this book. My conscience tells me it is my duty, not merely to proclaim domestic tranquility but to use every means that I have to insure it. I do believe that the buck stops here, that I cannot rely upon public opinion polls to tell me what is right. I do believe that right makes might and that if I am wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference. I do believe, with all my heart and mind and spirit, that I, not as President but as a humble servant of God, will receive justice without mercy if I fail to show mercy. Finally, I feel that Richard Nixon and his loved ones have suffered enough and will continue to suffer, no matter what I do, no matter what we, as a great and good nation, can do together to make his goal of peace come true. Now, therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from July (January) 20, 1969, through August 9, 1974. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this eighth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-ninth. Gerald R. Ford September 8, 1974

9.8 Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, June 1977 Commencement speech given at Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana Nation: to provide more efficiently for the needs of our people, to demonstrate---against the dark faith of our times---that our Government can be both competent and more humane. But I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and understand.

9.8 Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Foreign Policy 341 I have a quiet confidence in our own political system. Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people. We are confident that democracy’s example will be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life. We are confident that the democratic methods are the most effective, and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad. We are confident of our own strength, so we can seek substantial mutual reductions in the nuclear arms race. And we are confident of the good sense of American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the voices of 215 million, and not just of an isolated handful. Democracy’s great recent successes---in India, Portugal, Spain, Greece---show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced. Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I’m glad that that’s being changed. For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We’ve fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence. By the measure of history, our Nation’s 200 years are very brief, and our rise to world eminence is briefer still. It dates from 1945, when Europe and the old international order lay in ruins. Before then, America was largely on the periphery of world affairs. But since then, we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs. Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders. In less than a generation, we’ve seen the world change dramatically. The daily lives and aspirations of most human beings have been transformed. Colonialism is nearly gone. A new sense of national identity now exists in almost 100 new countries that have been formed in the last generation. Knowledge has become more widespread. Aspirations are higher. As more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice. The world is still divided by ideological disputes, dominated by regional conflicts, and threatened by danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights. It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy---a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision. We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world. We can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue---confidently---our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead. Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival and our belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals. We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement, resting on five cardinal principles. I’ve tried to make these premises clear to the American people since last January. Let me review what we have been doing and discuss what we intend to do. First, we have reaffirmed America’s commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has even seen. No common

342 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our Nation stands for more than financial prosperity. This does not mean that we can conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and which will always be imperfect---a world that is complex and confused and which will always be complex and confused. I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine’s ‘‘Common Sense’’ to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s ‘‘I Have a Dream.’’ In the life of the human spirit, words are action, much more so than many of us may realize who live in countries where freedom of expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian nations understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted. Nonetheless, we can already see dramatic, worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature that we once had. The great democracies are not free because we are strong and prosperous. I believe we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free. Throughout the world today, in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights. And I believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that debate, that contention alive. No other country is as well-qualified as we to set an example. We have our own shortcomings and faults, and we should strive constantly and with courage to make sure that we are legitimately proud of what we have. Second, we’ve moved deliberately to reinforce the bonds among our democracies. In our recent meetings in London, we agreed to widen our economic cooperation, to promote free trade, to strengthen the world’s monetary system, to seek ways of avoiding nuclear proliferation. We prepared constructive proposals for the forthcoming meetings on North-South problems of poverty, development, and global well-being. And we agreed on joint efforts to reinforce and to modernize our common defense.

You may be interested in knowing that at this NATO meeting, for the first time in more than 25 years, all members are democracies. Even more important, all of us reaffirmed our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system. Our spirit of confidence is spreading. Together, our democracies can help to shape the wider architecture of global cooperation. Third, we’ve moved to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race. This race is not only dangerous, it’s morally deplorable. We must put an end to it. I know it will not be easy to reach agreements. Our goal is to be fair to both sides, to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security. We desire a freeze on further modernization and production of weapons and a continuing, substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as well. We want a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, a prohibition against all chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites, and arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. We hope that we can take joint steps with all nations toward a final agreement eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death. We will persist in this effort. Now, I believe in detente with the Soviet Union. To me it means progress toward peace. But the effects of detente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state’s military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola. Cooperation also implies obligation. We hope that the Soviet Union will join with us and other nations in playing a larger role in aiding the developing world, for common aid efforts will help us build a bridge of mutual confidence in one another. Fourth, we are taking deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Through wide-ranging consultation with leaders of the countries involved---Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt---we have found some areas of agreement and some movement toward consensus. The negotiations must continue. Through my own public comments, I’ve also tried to suggest a more flexible framework for the discussion of the three key issues which have so far been so intractable: the nature of a comprehensive peace---what is peace; what does it mean to the Israelis; what does it mean to their Arab neighbors; secondly, the relationship between security and borders---how can the dispute over border delineations be established and settled

9.8 Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Foreign Policy 343 with a feeling of security on both sides; and the issue of the Palestinian homeland. The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it’s derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace. We will continue to promote a settlement which all of us need. Our own policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, we expect Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, which they have previously accepted. This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster not only for the Middle East but, perhaps, for the international political and economic order as well. And fifth, we are attempting, even at the risk of some friction with our friends, to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and the worldwide spread of conventional weapons. At the recent summit, we set in motion an international effort to determine the best ways of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful use while reducing the risks that its products will be diverted to the making of explosives. We’ve already completed a comprehensive review of our own policy on arms transfers. Competition in arms sales is inimical to peace and destructive of the economic development of the poorer countries. We will, as a matter of national policy now in our country, seek to reduce the annual dollar volume of arms sales, to restrict the transfer of advanced weapons, and to reduce the extent of our co-production arrangements about weapons with foreign states. And just as important, we are trying to get other nations, both free and otherwise, to join us in this effort. But all of this that I’ve described is just the beginning. It’s a beginning aimed towards a clear goal: to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances. We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We need their friendship and cooperation in a common effort as the structure of world power changes.

More than 100 years ago, Abraham Lincoln said that our Nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry. Most nations share our faith that, in the long run, expanded and equitable trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here now. The Western democracies, the OPEC nations, and the developed Communist countries can cooperate through existing international institutions in providing more effective aid. This is an excellent alternative to war. We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other nations in this hemisphere---to the north and to the south. We do not need another slogan. Although these are our close friends and neighbors, our links with them are the same links of equality that we forge for the rest of the world. We will be dealing with them as part of a new, worldwide mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations. It’s important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China. We see the American and Chinese relationship as a central element of our global policy and China as a key force for global peace. We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on the problems that confront all mankind. And we hope to find a formula which can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us. Finally, let me say that we are committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in southern Africa. The time has come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order, recognizing that in a democratic system the rights of the minority must also be protected. To be peaceful, change must come promptly. The United States is determined to work together with our European allies and with the concerned African States to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside interference. Let me conclude by summarizing: Our policy is based on an historical vision of America’s role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to

344 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution serve mankind. And it is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.

9.9 Cesar Chavez, On Organizing Farm Workers, 1979 Mr. Chavez: After 3 months of striking in 1979 we have come to the conclusion very little progress has been made in the last 40 years. In the 1930’s when the farm workers tried to organize a strike, they were looked upon and treated by the local power structures in the rural communities as unAmerican, as subversive, and as some sort of criminal element. We today are looked upon pretty much the same way. Just as in the 1930s, when a strike occurred, they were called criminal whether they be in Salinas, Calexico, Monterey County, Imperial County, or in Delano and Bakersfield, Calif. When a union strikes, it becomes then not simply a labor-management dispute as you see in other cases, but in our experience it becomes then on one side the workers, on the other side agribusiness and all of the local institutions, political and social, organize then to break the strike---the police, the sheriffs, the courts, the schools, the boards of supervisors, city councils. Not only that, but the State or Federal agencies that reside within those rural areas, are also greatly influenced by this overwhelming political power. The agribusiness industry wields the political power and uses it to break our strikes and destroy the union. They have two standards of conduct against Mexicans and against unions. As long as we, Mexican farm workers, keep our place and do our work we are tolerated, but if the Mexican worker joins a union, if he stands up for justice and if he dares to strike, then all the local institutions feel duty-bound to defend what they consider to be their ideal of the American way of life. These communities, then, do not know what to do with us and they don’t know what to do without us. . . . For so many years we have been involved in agricultural strikes; organizing almost 30 years as a worker, as an organizer, and as president of the union---and for all these almost 30 years it is apparent that when the farm workers strike and their strike is successful, the employers go to Mexico and have unlimited, unrestricted use of illegal alien strikebreakers to break the strike. And, for over 30 years, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has looked the other way and assisted in the strikebreaking.

I do not remember one single instance in 30 years where the Immigration service has removed strikebreakers. . . . The employers use professional smugglers to recruit and transport human contraband across the Mexican border for the specific act of strikebreaking. . . . We have observed all these years the Immigration Service has a policy as it has been related to us, that they will not take sides in any agricultural labor dispute. . . . They have not taken sides means permitting the growers to have unrestricted use of illegal aliens as strikebreakers, and if that isn’t taking sides, I don’t know what taking sides means. The growers have armed their foremen. They have looked to professional agencies to provide them unlimited numbers of armed guards recruited from the streets, young men who are not trained, many of them members of the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party . . . who are given a gun and a club and a badge and a canister of tear gas and the authority and permission to go and beat our people up, frighten them, maim them, and try to break the strike by using this unchecked raw power against our people. . . . Source: Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1997.

9.10 Ronald Reagan, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 1980 Detroit, Michigan Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice President to be, this convention, my fellow citizens of this great nation: With a deep awareness of the responsibility conferred by your trust, I accept your nomination for the presidency of the United States. I do so with deep gratitude, and I think also I might interject on behalf of all of us, our thanks to Detroit and the people of Michigan and to this city for the warm hospitality they have shown. And I thank you for your wholehearted response to my recommendation in regard to George Bush as a candidate for vice president. I am very proud of our party tonight. This convention has shown to all America a party united, with positive programs for solving the nation’s problems; a party ready to build a new consensus with all those across the land who share a community of values embodied in these words: family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom.

9.10 Ronald Reagan, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention I know we have had a quarrel or two, but only as to the method of attaining a goal. There was no argument about the goal. As president, I will establish a liaison with the 50 governors to encourage them to eliminate, where it exists, discrimination against women. I will monitor federal laws to insure their implementation and to add statutes if they are needed. More than anything else, I want my candidacy to unify our country; to renew the American spirit and sense of purpose. I want to carry our message to every American, regardless of party affiliation, who is a member of this community of shared values. Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a weakened defense and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity. The major issue of this campaign is the direct political, personal and moral responsibility of Democratic Party leadership---in the White House and in Congress---for this unprecedented calamity which has befallen us. They tell us they have done the most that humanly could be done. They say that the United States has had its day in the sun; that our nation has passed its zenith. They expect you to tell your children that the American people no longer have the will to cope with their problems; that the future will be one of sacrifice and few opportunities. My fellow citizens, I utterly reject that view. The American people, the most generous on earth, who created the highest standard of living, are not going to accept the notion that we can only make a better world for others by moving backwards ourselves. Those who believe we can have no business leading the nation. I will not stand by and watch this great country destroy itself under mediocre leadership that drifts from one crisis to the next, eroding our national will and purpose. We have come together here because the American people deserve better from those to whom they entrust our nation’s highest offices, and we stand united in our resolve to do something about it. We need rebirth of the American tradition of leadership at every level of government and in private life as well. The United States of America is unique in world history because it has a genius for leaders---many leaders---on many levels. But, back in 1976, Mr. Carter said, ‘‘Trust me.’’ And a lot of people did. Now, many of those people are out of work. Many have seen their savings eaten away by inflation. Many others on fixed incomes, especially the elderly, have watched helplessly

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as the cruel tax of inflation wasted away their purchasing power. And, today, a great many who trusted Mr. Carter wonder if we can survive the Carter policies of national defense. ‘‘Trust me’’ government asks that we concentrate our hopes and dreams on one man; that we trust him to do what’s best for us. My view of government places trust not in one person or one party, but in those values that transcend persons and parties. The trust is where it belongs---in the people. The responsibility to live up to that trust is where it belongs, in their elected leaders. That kind of relationship, between the people and their elected leaders, is a special kind of compact. Three hundred and sixty years ago, in 1620, a group of families dared to cross a mighty ocean to build a future for themselves in a new world. When they arrived at Plymouth, Massachusetts, they formed what they called a ‘‘compact’’; an agreement among themselves to build a community and abide by its laws. The single act---the voluntary binding together of free people to live under the law---set the pattern for what was to come. A century and a half later, the descendants of those people pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor to found this nation. Some forfeited their fortunes and their lives; none sacrificed honor. Four score and seven years later, Abraham Lincoln called upon the people of all America to renew their dedication and their commitment to a government of, for and by the people. Isn’t it once again time to renew our compact of freedom; to pledge to each other all that is best in our lives; all that gives meaning to them---for the sake of this, our beloved and blessed land? Together, let us make this a new beginning. Let us make a commitment to care for the needy; to teach our children the values and the virtues handed down to us by our families; to have the courage to defend those values and the willingness to sacrifice for them. Let us pledge to restore, in our time, the American spirit of voluntary service, of cooperation, of private and community initiative; a spirit that flows like a deep and mighty river through the history of our nation. As your nominee, I pledge to restore to the federal government the capacity to do the people’s work without dominating their lives. I pledge to you a government that will not only work well, but wisely; its ability to act tempered by prudence and its willingness to do good balanced by the knowledge that

346 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution government is never more dangerous than when our desire to have it help us blinds us to its great power to harm us. The first Republican president once said, ‘‘While the people retain their virtue and their vigilance, no administration by any extreme of wickedness or folly can seriously injure the government in the short space of four years.’’ If Mr. Lincoln could see what’s happened in these last three-and-a-half years, he might hedge a little on that statement. But, with the virtues that our legacy as a free people and with the vigilance that sustains liberty, we still have time to use our renewed compact to overcome the injuries that have been done to America these past three-and-a-half years. First, we must overcome something the present administration has cooked up: a new and altogether indigestible economic stew, one part inflation, one part high unemployment, one part recession, one part runaway taxes, one party deficit spending and seasoned by an energy crisis. It’s an economic stew that has turned the national stomach. Ours are not problems of abstract economic theory. Those are problems of flesh and blood; problems that cause pain and destroy the moral fiber of real people who should not suffer the further indignity of being told by the government that it is all somehow their fault. We do not have inflation because---as Mr. Carter says---we have lived too well. The head of a government which has utterly refused to live within its means and which has, in the last few days, told us that this year’s deficit will be $60 billion, dares to point the finger of blame at business and labor, both of which have been engaged in a losing struggle just trying to stay even. High taxes, we are told, are somehow good for us, as if, when government spends our money it isn’t inflationary, but when we spend it, it is. Those who preside over the worst energy shortage in our history tell us to use less, so that we will run out of oil, gasoline, and natural gas a little more slowly. Conservation is desirable, of course, for we must not waste energy. But conservation is not the sole answer to our energy needs. America must get to work producing more energy. The Republican program for solving economic problems is based on growth and productivity. Large amounts of oil and natural gas lay beneath our land and off our shores, untouched because the present administration seems to believe the American people would rather see more regulation, taxes and controls than more energy.

Coal offers great potential. So does nuclear energy produced under rigorous safety standards. It could supply electricity for thousands of industries and millions of jobs and homes. It must not be thwarted by a tiny minority opposed to economic growth which often finds friendly ears in regulatory agencies for its obstructionist campaigns. Make no mistake. We will not permit the safety of our people or our environment heritage to be jeopardized, but we are going to reaffirm that the economic prosperity of our people is a fundamental part of our environment. Our problems are both acute and chronic, yet all we hear from those in positions of leadership are the same tired proposals for more government tinkering, more meddling and more control---all of which led us to this state in the first place. Can anyone look at the record of this administration and say, ‘‘Well done?’’ Can anyone compare the state of our economy when the Carter Administration took office with where we are today and say, ‘‘Keep up the good work?’’ Can anyone look at our reduced standing in the world today and say, ‘‘Let’s have four more years of this?’’ I believe the American people are going to answer these questions the first week of November and their answer will be, ‘‘No---we’ve had enough.’’ And, then it will be up to us---beginning next January 20th---to offer an administration and congressional leadership of competence and more than a little courage. We must have the clarity of vision to see the difference between what is essential and what is merely desirable, and then the courage to bring our government back under control and make it acceptable to the people. It is essential that we maintain both the forward momentum of economic growth and the strength of the safety net beneath those in society who need help. We also believe it is essential that the integrity of all aspects of Social Security are preserved. Beyond these essentials, I believe it is clear our federal government is overgrown and overweight. Indeed, it is time for our government to go on a diet. Therefore, my first act as chief executive will be to impose an immediate and thorough freeze on federal hiring. Then, we are going to enlist the very best minds from business, labor and whatever quarter to conduct a detailed review of every department, bureau and agency that lives by federal appropriations. We are also going to enlist the help and ideas of many dedicated and hard working government employees at all levels who want a more efficient government as much as the rest of us

9.10 Ronald Reagan, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention do. I know that many are demoralized by the confusion and waste they confront in their work as a result of failed and failing policies. Our instructions to the groups we enlist will be simple and direct. We will remind them that government programs exist at the sufferance of the American taxpayer and are paid for with money earned by working men and women. Any program that represents a waste of their money---a theft from their pocketbooks---must have that waste eliminated or the program must go--by executive order where possible; by congressional action where necessary. Everything that can be run more effectively by state and local government we shall turn over to state and local government, along with the funding sources to pay for it. We are going to put an end to the money merry-go-round where our money becomes Washington’s money, to be spent by the states and cities exactly the way the federal bureaucrats tell them to. I will not accept the excuse that the federal government has grown so big and powerful that it is beyond the control of any president, any administration or Congress. We are going to put an end to the notion that the American taxpayer exists to fund the federal government. The federal government exists to serve the American people. On January 20th, we are going to reestablish that truth. Also on that date we are going to initiate action to get substantial relief for our taxpaying citizens and action to put people back to work. None of this will be based on any new form of monetary tinkering or fiscal sleight-of-hand. We will simply apply to government the common sense we all use in our daily lives. Work and family are at the center of our lives; the foundation of our dignity as a free people. When we deprive people of what they have earned, or take away their jobs, we destroy their dignity and undermine their families. We cannot support our families unless there are jobs; and we cannot have jobs unless people have both money to invest and the faith to invest it. There are concepts that stem from an economic system that for more than 200 years has helped us master a continent, create a previously undreamed of prosperity for our people and has fed millions of others around the globe. That system will continue to serve us in the future if our government will stop ignoring the basic values on which it was built and stop betraying the trust and good will of the American workers who keep it going. The American people are carrying the heaviest peacetime tax burden in our nation’s history---and it will grow even heavier, under present law, next

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January. We are taxing ourselves into economic exhaustion and stagnation, crushing our ability and incentive to save, invest and produce. This must stop. We must halt this fiscal self-destruction and restore sanity to our economic system. I have long advocated a 30 percent reduction in income tax rates over a period of three years. This phased tax reduction would begin with a 10 percent ‘‘down payment’’ tax cut in 1981, which the Republicans and Congress and I have already proposed. A phased reduction of tax rates would go a long way toward easing the heavy burden on the American people. But, we should not stop here. Within the context of economic conditions and appropriate budget priorities during each fiscal year of my presidency, I would strive to go further. This would include improvement in business depreciation taxes so we can stimulate investment in order to get plants and equipment replaced, put more Americans back to work and put our nation back on the road to being competitive in world commerce. We will also work to reduce the cost of government as a percentage of our gross national product. The first task of national leadership is to set honest and realistic priorities in our policies and our budget and I pledge that my administration will do that. When I talk of tax cuts, I am reminded that every major tax cut in this century has strengthened the economy, generated renewed productivity and ended up yielding new revenues for the government by creating new investment, new jobs and more commerce among our people. The present administration has been forced by us Republicans to play follow-the-leader with regard to a tax cut. But, in this election year we must take with the proverbial ‘‘grain of salt’’ any tax cut proposed by those who have given us the greatest tax increase in our history. When those in leadership give us tax increases and tell us we must also do with less, have they thought about those who have always had less--especially the minorities? This is like telling them that just as they step on the first rung of the ladder of opportunity, the ladder is being pulled out from under them. That may be the Democratic leadership’s message to the minorities, but it won’t be ours. Our message will be: we have to move ahead, but we’re not going to leave anyone behind. Thanks to the economic policies of the Democratic Party, millions of Americans find themselves out of work. Millions more have never even had a fair chance to learn new skills, hold a decent job, or secure for themselves and their families a share in the prosperity of this nation.

348 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution It is time to put America back to work; to make our cities and towns resound with the confident voices of men and women of all races, nationalities and faiths bringing home to their families a decent paycheck they can cash for honest money. For those without skills, we’ll find a way to help them get skills. For those without job opportunities, we’ll stimulate new opportunities, particularly in the inner cities where they live. For those who have abandoned hope, we’ll restore hope and we’ll welcome them into a great national crusade to make America great again! When we move from domestic affairs and cast our eyes abroad, we see an equally sorry chapter on the record of the present administration. • As Soviet combat brigade trains in Cuba, just 90 miles from our shores. • A Soviet army of invasion occupies Afghanistan, further threatening our vital interests in the Middle East. • America’s defense strength is at its lowest ebb in a generation, while the Soviet Union is vastly outspending us in both strategic and conventional arms. • Our European allies, looking nervously at the growing menace from the East, turn to us for leadership and fail to find it. • And, incredibly more than 50 of our fellow Americans have been held captive for over eight months by a dictatorial foreign power that holds us up to ridicule before the world. Adversaries large and small test our will and seek to confound our resolve, but we are given weakness when we need strength; vacillation when the times demand firmness. The Carter Administration lives in the world of make-believe. Every day, drawing up a response to that day’s problems, troubles, regardless of what happened yesterday and what will happen tomorrow. The rest of us, however, live in the real world. It is here that disasters are overtaking our nation without any real response from Washington. This is make-believe, self-deceit and---above all--transparent hypocrisy. For example, Mr. Carter says he supports the volunteer army, but he lets military pay and benefits slip so low that many of our enlisted personnel are actually

eligible for food stamps. Re-enlistment rates drop and, just recently, after he fought all week against a proposal to increase the pay of our men and women in uniform, he helicoptered to our carrier, the U.S.S. Nimitz, which was returning from long months of duty. He told the crew that he advocated better pay for them and their comrades! Where does he really stand, now that he’s back on shore? I’ll tell you where I stand. I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration, but I do favor pay and benefit levels that will attract and keep highly motivated men and women in our volunteer forces and an active reserve trained and ready for an instant call in case of an emergency. There may be a sailor at the helm of the ship of state, but the ship has no rudder. Critical decisions are made at times almost in comic fashion, but who can laugh? Who was not embarrassed when the administration handed a major propaganda victory in the United Nations to the enemies of Israel, our staunch Middle East ally for three decades, and them claim that the American vote was a ‘‘mistake,’’ the result of a ‘‘failure of communication’’ between the president, his secretary of state, and his U.N. ambassador? Who does not feel a growing sense of unease as our allies, facing repeated instances of an amateurish and confused administration, reluctantly conclude that America is unwilling or unable to fulfill its obligations as the leader of the free world? Who does not feel rising alarm when the question in any discussion of foreign policy is no longer, ‘‘Should we do something?’’ but ‘‘Do we have the capacity to do anything?’’ The administration which has brought us to this state is seeking your endorsement for four more years of weakness, indecision, mediocrity and incompetence. No American should vote until he or she has asked, is the United States stronger and more respected now than it was three-and-a-half years ago? Is the world today a safer place in which to live? It is the responsibility of the president of the United States, in working for peace, to insure that the safety of our people cannot successfully be threatened by a hostile foreign power. As president, fulfilling that responsibility will be my number one priority. We are not a warlike people. Quite the opposite. We always seek to live in peace. We resort to force infrequently and with great reluctance---and only after we have determined that it is absolutely necessary. We are awed---and rightly so---by the forces of destruction at loose in the world in this nuclear era. But neither can we be naive or foolish. Four times in my lifetime

9.10 Ronald Reagan, Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention America has gone to war, bleeding the lives of its young men into the sands of beachheads, the fields of Europe and the jungles and rice paddies of Asia. We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted. We simply cannot learn these lessons the hard way again without risking our destruction. Of all the objectives we seek, first and foremost is the establishment of lasting world peace. We must always stand ready to negotiate in good faith, ready to pursue any reasonable avenue that holds forth the promise of lessening tensions and furthering the prospects of peace. But let our friends and those who may wish us ill take note: the United States has an obligation to its citizens and to the people of the world never to let those who would destroy freedom dictate the future course of human life on this planet. I would regard my election as proof that we have renewed our resolve to preserve world peace and freedom. This nation will once again be strong enough to do that. This evening marks the last step---save one---of a campaign that has taken Nancy and me from one end of this great land to the other, over many months and thousands of miles. There are those who question the way we choose a president; who say that our process imposes difficult and exhausting burdens on those who seek the office. I have not found it so. It is impossible to capture in words the splendor of this vast continent which God has granted as our portion of this creation. There are no words to express the extraordinary strength and character of this breed of people we call Americans. Everywhere we have met thousands of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans from all economic conditions and walks of life bound together in that community of shared values of family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom. They are concerned, yes, but they are not frightened. They are disturbed, but not dismayed. They are the kind of men and women Tom Paine had in mind when he wrote---during the darkest days of the American Revolution---‘‘We have it in our power to begin the world over again.’’ Nearly 150 years after Tom Paine wrote those words, an American president told the generation of the Great Depression that it had a ‘‘rendezvous with destiny.’’ I believe that this generation of Americans today has a rendezvous with destiny. Tonight, let us dedicate ourselves to renewing the American compact. I ask you not simply to ‘‘Trust me,’’ but to trust your values---our values---and to hold me responsible for living up to them. I ask you to trust that

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American spirit which knows no ethnic, religious, social, political, regional, or economic boundaries; the spirit that burned with zeal in the hearts of millions of immigrants from every corner of the Earth who came here in search of freedom. Some say that spirit no longer exists. But I have seen it---I have felt it---all across the land; in the big cities, the small towns and in rural America. The American spirit is still there, ready to blaze into life if you and I are willing to do what has to be done; the practical, down-to-earth things that will stimulate our economy, increase productivity and put America back to work. The time is now to resolve that the basis of a firm and principled foreign policy is one that takes the world as it is and seeks to change it by leadership and example; not by harangue, harassment or wishful thinking. The time is now to say that while we shall seek new friendships and expand and improve others, we shall not do so by breaking our word or casting aside old friends and allies. And, the time is now to redeem promises once made to the American people by another candidate, in another time and another place. He said, ‘‘For three long years I have been going up and down this country preaching that government---federal, state, and local--costs too much. I shall not stop that preaching. As an immediate program of action, we must abolish useless offices. We must eliminate unnecessary functions of government . . . we must consolidate subdivisions of government and, like the private citizen, give up luxuries which we can no longer afford.’’ ‘‘I propose to you, my friends, and through you that government of all kinds, big and little be made solvent and that the example be set by the president of the United State and his Cabinet.’’ So said Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his acceptance speech to the Democratic National Convention in July 1932. The time is now, my fellow Americans, to recapture our destiny, to take it into our own hands. But, to do this will take many of us, working together. I ask you tonight to volunteer your help in this cause so we can carry our message throughout the land. Yes, isn’t now the time that we, the people, carried out these unkempt promises? Let us pledge to each other and to all America on this July day 48 years later, we intend to do just that. I have thought of something that is not part of my speech and I’m worried over whether I should do it. Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a

350 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe freely: Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people of Southeast Asia, of Cuba and Haiti, the victims of drought and famine in Africa, the freedom fighters of Afghanistan and our own countrymen held in savage captivity. I’ll confess that I’ve been a little afraid to suggest what I’m going to suggest---I’m more afraid not to--that we begin our crusade joined together in a moment of silent prayer. God bless America.

9.11 Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981 Senator Hatfield, Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. President, Vice President Bush, Vice President Mondale, Senator Baker, Speaker O’Neill, Reverend Moomaw, and my fellow citizens: To a few of us here today this is a solemn and most momentous occasion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every 4-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle. Mr. President, I want our fellow citizens to know how much you did to carry on this tradition. By your gracious cooperation in the transition process, you have shown a watching world that we are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other, and I thank you and your people for all your help in maintaining the continuity which is the bulwark of our Republic. The business of our nation goes forward. These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions. We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history. It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people. Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity.

But great as our tax burden is, it has not kept pace with public spending. For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children’s future for the temporary convenience of. the present. To continue this long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals. You and I, as individuals, can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but for only a limited period of time. Why, then, should we think that collectively, as a nation, we’re not bound by that same limitation? We must act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no misunderstanding: We are going to begin to act, beginning today. The economic ills we suffer have come upon us over several decades. They will not go away in days, weeks, or months, but they will go away. They will go away because we as Americans have the capacity now, as we’ve had in the past, to do whatever needs to be done to preserve this last and greatest bastion of freedom. In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem. From time to time we’ve been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. Well, if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else? All of us together, in and out of government, must bear the burden. The solutions we seek must be equitable, with no one group singled out to pay a higher price. We hear much of special interest groups. Well, our concern must be for a special interest group that has been too long neglected. It knows no sectional boundaries or ethnic and racial divisions, and it crosses political party lines. It is made up of men and women who raise our food, patrol our streets, man our mines and factories, teach our children, keep our homes, and heal us when we’re sick---professionals, industrialists, shopkeepers, clerks, tabbies, and truck drivers. They are, in short, ‘‘We the people,’’ this breed called Americans. Well, this administration’s objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that provides equal opportunities for all Americans, with no barriers born of bigotry or discrimination. Putting America back to work means putting all Americans back to work. Ending inflation means freeing all Americans from the terror of runaway living costs. All must share in the productive work of this ‘‘new beginning,’’ and all must share in the bounty of a revived economy. With the idealism and fair play which are the core of

9.11 Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address 351 our system and our strength, we can have a strong and prosperous America, at peace with itself and the world. So, as we begin, let us take inventory. We are a nation that has a government---not the other way around. And this makes us special among the nations of the Earth. Our government has no power except that granted it by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of government, which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government. Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it’s not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work---work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it. If we look to the answer as to why for so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on Earth, it was because here in this land we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before. Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on Earth. The price for this freedom at times has been high, but we have never been unwilling to pay that price. It is no coincidence that our present troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of government. It is time for us to realize that we’re too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams. We’re not, as some would have us believe, doomed to an inevitable decline. I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing. So, with all the creative energy at our command, let us begin an era of national renewal. Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us renew our faith and our hope. We have every right to dream heroic dreams. Those who say that we’re in a time when there are not heroes, they just don’t know where to look. You can see heroes every day going in and out of factory gates. Others, a handful in number, produce enough food to feed all of us and then the world beyond. You meet heroes across a counter, and they’re on both sides of that counter.

There are entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith in an idea who create new jobs, new wealth and opportunity. They’re individuals and families whose taxes support the government and whose voluntary gifts support church, charity, culture, art, and education. Their patriotism is quiet, but deep. Their values sustain our national life. Now, I have used the words ‘‘they’’ and ‘‘their’’ in speaking of these heroes. I could say ‘‘you’’ and ‘‘your,’’ because I’m addressing the heroes of whom I speak--you, the citizens of this blessed land. Your dreams, your hopes, your goals are going to be the dreams, the hopes, and the goals of this administration, so help me God. We shall reflect the compassion that is so much a part of your makeup. How can we love our country and not love our countrymen; and loving them, reach out a hand when they fall, heal them when they’re sick, and provide opportunity to make them self-sufficient so they will be equal in fact and not just in theory? Can we solve the problems confronting us? Well, the answer is an unequivocal and emphatic ‘‘yes.’’ To paraphrase Winston Churchill, I did not take the oath I’ve just taken with the intention of presiding over the dissolution of the world’s strongest economy. In the days ahead I will propose removing the roadblocks that have slowed our economy and reduced productivity. Steps will be taken aimed at restoring the balance between the various levels of government. Progress may be slow, measured in inches and feet, not miles, but we will progress. It is time to reawaken this industrial giant, to get government back within its means, and to lighten our punitive tax burden. And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles there will be no compromise. On the eve of our struggle for independence a man who might have been one of the greatest among the Founding Fathers, Dr. Joseph Warren, president of the Massachusetts Congress, said to his fellow Americans, ‘‘Our country is in danger, but not to be despaired of. . . . On you depend the fortunes of America. You are to decide the important questions upon which rests the happiness and the liberty of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves.’’ Well, I believe we, the Americans of today, are ready to act worthy of ourselves, ready to do what must be done to ensure happiness and liberty for ourselves, our children, and our children’s children. And as we renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom.

352 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment. We will match loyalty with loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial relations. We will not use our friendship to impose on their sovereignty, for our own sovereignty is not for sale. As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever. Our forbearance should never be misunderstood. Our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will. When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength. Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today’s world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors. I’m told that tens of thousands of prayer meetings are being held on this day, and for that I’m deeply grateful. We are a nation under God, and I believe God intended for us to be free. It would be fitting and good, I think, if on each Inaugural Day in future years it should be declared a day of prayer. This is the first time in our history that this ceremony has been held, as you’ve been told, on this West Front of the Capitol. Standing here, one faces a magnificent vista, opening up on this city’s special beauty and history. At the end of this open mall are those shrines to the giants on whose shoulders we stand. Directly in front of me, the monument to a monumental man, George Washington, father of our country. A man of humility who came to greatness reluctantly. He led America out of revolutionary victory into infant nationhood. Off to one side, the stately memorial to Thomas Jefferson. The Declaration of Independence flames with his eloquence. And then, beyond the Reflecting Pool, the dignified columns of the Lincoln Memorial. Whoever would understand in his heart the meaning of America will find it in the life of Abraham Lincoln. Beyond those monuments to heroism is the Potomac River, and on the far shore the sloping hills of Arlington National Cemetery, with its row upon row of simple

white markers bearing crosses or Stars of David. They add up to only a tiny fraction of the price that has been paid for our freedom. Each one of those markers is a monument to the kind of hero I spoke of earlier. Their lives ended in places called Belleau Wood, The Argonne, Omaha Beach, Salerno, and halfway around the world on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin Reservoir, and in a hundred rice paddies and jungles of a place called Vietnam. Under one such marker lies a young man, Martin Treptow, who left his job in a small town barbershop in 1917 to go to France with the famed Rainbow Division. There, on the western front, he was killed trying to carry a message between battalions under heavy artillery fire. We’re told that on his body was found a diary. On the flyleaf under the heading, ‘‘My Pledge,’’ he had written these words: ‘‘America must win this war. Therefore I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone.’’ The crisis we are facing today does not require of us the kind of sacrifice that Martin Treptow and so many thousands of others were called upon to make. It does require, however, our best effort and our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that together with God’s help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us. And after all, why shouldn’t we believe that? We are Americans. God bless you, and thank you.

9.12 Jesse Jackson, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 1984 Tonight we come together bound by our faith in a mighty God, with genuine respect and love for our country, and inheriting the legacy of a great Party, the Democratic Party, which is the best hope for redirecting our nation on a more humane, just, and peaceful course. This is not a perfect party. We are not a perfect people. Yet, we are called to a perfect mission. Our mission: to feed the hungry; to clothe the naked; to house the homeless; to teach the illiterate; to provide jobs for the jobless; and to choose the human race over the nuclear race.

9.12 Jesse Jackson, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech We are gathered here this week to nominate a candidate and adopt a platform which will expand, unify, direct, and inspire our Party and the nation to fulfill this mission. My constituency is the desperate, the damned, the disinherited, the disrespected, and the despised. They are restless and seek relief. They have voted in record numbers. They have invested the faith, hope, and trust that they have in us. The Democratic Party must send them a signal that we care. I pledge my best not to let them down. There is the call of conscience, redemption, expansion, healing, and unity. Leadership must heed the call of conscience, redemption, expansion, healing, and unity, for they are the key to achieving our mission. Time is neutral and does not change things. With courage and initiative, leaders change things . . . America is not like a blanket---one piece of unbroken cloth, the same color, the same texture, the same size. America is more like a quilt: many patches, many pieces, many colors, many sizes, all woven and held together by a common thread. The white, the Hispanic, the black, the Arab, the Jew, the woman, the native American, the small farmer, the businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the old, the lesbian, the gay, and the disabled make up the American quilt. Even in our fractured state, all of us count and fit somewhere. We have proven that we can survive without each other. But we have not proven that we can win and make progress without each other. We must come together. From Fannie Lou Hamer in Atlantic City in 1964 to the Rainbow Coalition in San Francisco today; from the Atlantic to the Pacific, we have experienced pain but progress, as we ended American apartheid laws. We got public accommodations. We secured voting rights. We obtained open housing, as young people got the right to vote. We lost Malcolm, Martin, Medgar, Bobby, John, and Viola. The team that got us here must be expanded, not abandoned. Twenty years ago, tears welled up in our eyes as the bodies of Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney were dredged from the depths of a river in Mississippi. Twenty years later, our communities, black and Jewish, are in anguish, anger, and pain. Feelings have been hurt on both sides. There is a crisis in communications. Confusion is in the air. But we cannot afford to lose our way. We may agree to agree; or agree to disagree on issues; we must bring back civility to these tensions. We are co-partners in a long and rich religious history---the Judeo-Christian traditions. Many blacks and Jews have a shared passion for social justice at home

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and peace abroad. We must seek a revival of the spirit, inspired by a new vision and new possibilities. We must return to higher ground. We are bound by Moses and Jesus, but also connected with Islam and Mohammed. These three great religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, were all born in the revered and holy city of Jerusalem. We are bound by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Rabbi Abraham Heschel, crying out from their graves for us to reach common ground. We are bound by shared blood and shared sacrifices. We are much too intelligent, much too bound by our Judeo-Christian heritage, much too victimized by racism, sexism, militarism, and anti-Semitism, much too threatened as historical scapegoats to go on divided one from another. We must turn from finger pointing to clasped hands. We must share our burdens and our joys with each other once again. We must turn to each other and not on each other and choose higher ground. Twenty years later, we cannot be satisfied by just restoring the old coalition. Old wine skins must make room for new wine. We must heal and expand. The Rainbow Coalition is making room for Arab Americans. They, too, know the pain and hurt of racial and religious rejection. They must not continue to be made pariahs. The Rainbow Coalition is making room for Hispanic Americans who this very night are living under the threat of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill; and farm workers from Ohio who are fighting the Campbell Soup Company with a boycott to achieve legitimate workers’ rights. The Rainbow is making room for the Native American, the most exploited people of all, a people with the greatest moral claim amongst us. We support them as they seek the restoration of their ancient land and claim amongst us. We support them as they seek the restoration of land and water rights, as they seek to preserve their ancestral homeland and the beauty of a land that was once all theirs. They can never receive a fair share for all they have given us. They must finally have a fair chance to develop their great resources and to preserve their people and their culture. The Rainbow Coalition includes Asian Americans, now being killed in our streets---scapegoats for the failures of corporate, industrial, and economic policies. The Rainbow is making room for the young Americans. Twenty years ago, our young people were dying in a war for which they could not even vote. Twenty years later, young America has the power to stop a war in Central America and the responsibility to vote in great numbers. Young America must be politically

354 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution active in 1984. The choice is war or peace. We must make room for young America. The Rainbow includes disabled veterans. The color scheme fits in the Rainbow. The disabled have their handicap revealed and their genius concealed; while the able-bodied have their genius revealed and their disability concealed. But ultimately, we must judge people by their values and their contribution. Don’t leave anybody out. I would rather have Roosevelt in a wheelchair than Reagan on a horse. The Rainbow is making room for small farmers. They have suffered tremendously under the Reagan regime. They will either receive 90 percent parity or 100 percent charity. We must address their concerns and make room for them. The Rainbow includes lesbians and gays. No American citizen ought be denied equal protection from the law. We must be unusually committed and caring as we expand our family to include new members. All of us must be tolerant and understanding as the fears and anxieties of the rejected and the party leadership express themselves in many different ways. Too often what we call hate---as if it were some deeply-rooted philosophy or strategy---is simply ignorance, anxiety, paranoia, fear, and insecurity. To be strong leaders, we must be long-suffering as we seek to right the wrongs of our Party and our nation. We must expand our Party, heal our Party, and unify our Party. That is our mission in 1984. We are often reminded that we live in a great nation---and we do. But it can be greater still. The Rainbow is mandating a new definition of greatness. We must not measure greatness from the mansion down, but the manger up. Jesus said that we should not be judged by the bark we wear but by the fruit that we bear. Jesus said that we must measure greatness by how we treat the least of these . . . The victory for the Rainbow Coalition in the Platform debates today was not whether we won or lost, but that we raised the right issues. We could afford to lose the vote; issues are non-negotiable. We could not afford to avoid raising the right questions. Our selfrespect and our moral integrity were at stake. Our heads are perhaps bloody, but not bowed. Our back is straight. We can go home and face our people. Our vision is clear. When we think, on this journey from slave-ship to championship, that we have gone from the planks of the Boardwalk in Atlantic City in 1964 to fighting to help write the planks in the platform in San Francisco in ’84, there is a deep and abiding sense of joy in our souls in spite of the tears in our eyes. Though there are missing planks, there is a solid

foundation upon which to build. Our party can win, but we must provide hope which will inspire people to struggle and achieve; provide a plan that shows a way out of our dilemma and then lead the way. In 1984, my heart is made to feel glad because I know there is a way out---justice. The requirement for rebuilding America is justice. The linchpin of progressive politics in our nation will not come from the North; they, in fact, will come from the South. That is why I argue over and over again. We look from Virginia around to Texas, there’s only one black Congressperson out of 115. Nineteen years later, we’re locked out of the Congress, the Senate and the Governor’s mansion. What does this large black vote mean? Why do I fight to win second primaries and fight gerrymandering and annexation and at-large [elections]. Why do we fight over that? Because I tell you, you cannot hold someone in the ditch unless you linger there with them. Unless you linger there. If you want a change in this nation, you enforce that Voting Rights Act. We’ll get 12 to 20 Black, Hispanics, female and progressive congresspersons from the South. We can save the cotton, but we’ve got to fight the boll weevils. We’ve got to make a judgment. We’ve got to make a judgment. It is not enough to hope ERA will pass. How can we pass ERA? If Blacks vote in great numbers, progressive Whites win. It’s the only way progressive Whites win. If Blacks vote in great numbers, Hispanics win. When Blacks, Hispanics, and progressive Whites vote, women win. When women win, children win. When women and children win, workers win. We must all come up together. We must come up together. Thank you. For all of our joy and excitement, we must not save the world and lose our souls. We should never shortcircuit enforcing the Voting Rights Act at every level. When one of us rise[s], all of us will rise. Justice is the way out. Peace is the way out. We should not act as if nuclear weaponry is negotiable and debatable. In this world in which we live, we dropped the bomb on Japan and felt guilty, but in 1984 other folks [have] also got bombs. This time, if we drop the bomb, six minutes later we, too, will be destroyed. It’s not about dropping the bomb on somebody. It is about dropping the bomb on everybody. We must choose to develop minds over guided missiles, and think it out and not fight it out. It’s time for a change. Our foreign policy must be characterized by mutual respect, not by gunboat diplomacy, big stick diplomacy, and threats. Our nation at its best feeds the hungry. Our nation at its worst, at its worst, will mine the

9.13 Mario Cuomo, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech harbors of Nicaragua, at its worst will try to overthrow their government, at its worst will cut aid to American education and increase the aid to El Salvador; at its worst, our nation will have partnerships with South Africa. That’s a moral disgrace. It’s a moral disgrace. It’s a moral disgrace. We look at Africa. We cannot just focus on Apartheid in Southern Africa. We must fight for trade with Africa, and not just aid to Africa. We cannot stand idly by and say we will not relate to Nicaragua unless they have elections there, and then embrace military regimes in Africa overthrowing democratic governments in Nigeria and Liberia and Ghana. We must fight for democracy all around the world and play the game by one set of rules. Peace in this world. Our present formula for peace in the Middle East is inadequate. It will not work. There are 22 nations in the Middle East. Our nation must be able to talk and act and influence all of them. We must build upon Camp David, and measure human rights by one yard stick. In that region we have too many interests and too few friends . . . Young America, dream. Choose the human race over the nuclear race. Bury the weapons and don’t burn the people. Dream---dream of a new value system. Teachers who teach for life and not just for a living; teach because they can’t help it. Dream of lawyers more concerned about justice than a judgeship. Dream of doctors more concerned about public health than personal wealth. Dream of preachers and priests who will prophesy and not just profiteer. Preach and dream! Our time has come. Our time has come. Suffering breeds character. Character breeds faith. In the end, faith will not disappoint. Our time has come. Our faith, hope, and dreams will prevail. Our time has come. Weeping has endured for nights, but now joy cometh in the morning. Our time has come. No grave can hold our body down. Our time has come. No lie can live forever. Our time has come. We must leave racial battle ground and come to economic common ground and moral higher ground. America, our time has come. We come from disgrace to amazing grace. Our time has come. Give me your tired, give me your poor, your huddled masses who yearn to breathe free and come November, there will be a change because our time has come.

9.13 Mario Cuomo, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 1984 Thank you very much. On behalf of the great Empire State and the whole family of New York, let me thank you for the great

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privilege of being able to address this convention. Please allow me to skip the stories and the poetry and the temptation to deal in nice but vague rhetoric. Let me instead use this valuable opportunity to deal immediately with the questions that should determine this election and that we all know are vital to the American people. Ten days ago, President Reagan admitted that although some people in this country seemed to be doing well nowadays, others were unhappy, even worried, about themselves, their families, and their futures. The President said that he didn’t understand that fear. He said, ‘‘Why, this country is a shining city on a hill.’’ And the President is right. In many ways we are a shining city on a hill. But the hard truth is that not everyone is sharing in this city’s splendor and glory. A shining city is perhaps all the President sees from the portico of the White House and the veranda of his ranch, where everyone seems to be doing well. But there’s another city; there’s another part to the shining the city; the part where some people can’t pay their mortgages, and most young people can’t afford one; where students can’t afford the education they need, and middle-class parents watch the dreams they hold for their children evaporate. In this part of the city there are more poor than ever, more families in trouble, more and more people who need help but can’t find it. Even worse: There are elderly people who tremble in the basements of the houses there. And there are people who sleep in the city streets, in the gutter, where the glitter doesn’t show. There are ghettos where thousands of young people, without a job or an education, give their lives away to drug dealers every day. There is despair, Mr. President, in the faces that you don’t see, in the places that you don’t visit in your shining city. In fact, Mr. President, this is a nation---Mr. President you ought to know that this nation is more a ‘‘Tale of Two Cities’’ than it is just a ‘‘Shining City on a Hill.’’ Maybe, maybe, Mr. President, if you visited some more places; maybe if you went to Appalachia where some people still live in sheds; maybe if you went to Lackawanna where thousands of unemployed steel workers wonder why we subsidized foreign steel. Maybe---Maybe, Mr. President, if you stopped in at a shelter in Chicago and spoke to the homeless there; maybe, Mr. President, if you asked a woman who had been denied the help she needed to feed her children because you said you needed the money for a tax break for a millionaire or for a missile we couldn’t afford to use.

356 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution Maybe---Maybe, Mr. President. But I’m afraid not. Because the truth is, ladies and gentlemen, that this is how we were warned it would be. President Reagan told us from the very beginning that he believed in a kind of social Darwinism. Survival of the fittest. ‘‘Government can’t do everything,’’ we were told, so it should settle for taking care of the strong and hope that economic ambition and charity will do the rest. Make the rich richer, and what falls from the table will be enough for the middle class and those who are trying desperately to work their way into the middle class. You know, the Republicans called it ‘‘trickle-down’’ when Hoover tried it. Now they call it ‘‘supply side.’’ But it’s the same shining city for those relative few who are lucky enough to live in its good neighborhoods. But for the people who are excluded, for the people who are locked out, all they can do is stare from a distance at that city’s glimmering towers. It’s an old story. It’s as old as our history. The difference between Democrats and Republicans has always been measured in courage and confidence. The Republicans---The Republicans believe that the wagon train will not make it to the frontier unless some of the old, some of the young, some of the weak are left behind by the side of the trail. ‘‘The strong’’---‘‘The strong,’’ they tell us, ‘‘will inherit the land.’’ We Democrats believe in something else. We democrats believe that we can make it all the way with the whole family intact, and we have more than once. Ever since Franklin Roosevelt lifted himself from his wheelchair to lift this nation from its knees---wagon train after wagon train---to new frontiers of education, housing, peace; the whole family aboard, constantly reaching out to extend and enlarge that family; lifting them up into the wagon on the way; blacks and Hispanics, and people of every ethnic group, and native Americans---all those struggling to build their families and claim some small share of America. For nearly 50 years we carried them all to new levels of comfort, and security, and dignity, even affluence. And remember this, some of us in this room today are here only because this nation had that kind of confidence. And it would be wrong to forget that. So, here we are at this convention to remind ourselves where we come from and to claim the future for ourselves and for our children. Today our great Democratic Party, which has saved this nation from depression, from fascism, from racism, from corruption, is called upon to do it again---this time to save the nation from confusion and division, from the threat of eventual fiscal disaster, and most of all from the fear of a nuclear holocaust.

That’s not going to be easy. Mo Udall is exactly right---it won’t be easy. And in order to succeed, we must answer our opponent’s polished and appealing rhetoric with a more telling reasonableness and rationality. We must win this case on the merits. We must get the American public to look past the glitter, beyond the showmanship to the reality, the hard substance of things. And we’ll do it not so much with speeches that sound good as with speeches that are good and sound; not so much with speeches that will bring people to their feet as with speeches that will bring people to their senses. We must make---We must make the American people hear our ‘‘Tale of Two Cities.’’ We must convince them that we don’t have to settle for two cities, that we can have one city, indivisible, shining for all of its people. Now, we will have no chance to do that if what comes out of this convention is a babel of arguing voices. If that’s what’s heard throughout the campaign, dissident sounds from all sides, we will have no chance to tell our message. To succeed we will have to surrender some small parts of our individual interests, to build a platform that we can all stand on, at once, and comfortably---proudly singing out. We need---We need a platform we can all agree to so that we can sing out the truth for the nation to hear, in chorus, its logic so clear and commanding that no slick Madison Avenue commercial, no amount of geniality, no martial music will be able to muffle the sound of the truth. And we Democrats must unite. We Democrats must unite so that the entire nation can unite, because surely the Republicans won’t bring this country together. Their policies divide the nation into the lucky and the left-out, into the royalty and the rabble. The Republicans are willing to treat that division as victory. They would cut this nation in half, into those temporarily better off and those worse off than before, and they would call that division recovery. Now, we should not---we should not be embarrassed or dismayed or chagrined if the process of unifying is difficult, even wrenching at times. Remember that, unlike any other Party, we embrace men and women of every color, every creed, every orientation, every economic class. In our family are gathered everyone from the abject poor of Essex County in New York, to the enlightened affluent of the gold coasts at both ends of the nation. And in between is the heart of our constituency---the middle class, the people not rich enough to be worry-free, but not poor enough to be on welfare; the middle class---those people who work for a living because they have to, not

9.13 Mario Cuomo, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech because some psychiatrist told them it was a convenient way to fill the interval between birth and eternity. White collar and blue collar. Young professionals. Men and women in small business desperate for the capital and contracts that they need to prove their worth. We speak for the minorities who have not yet entered the mainstream. We speak for ethnics who want to add their culture to the magnificent mosaic that is America. We speak---We speak for women who are indignant that this nation refuses to etch into its governmental commandments the simple rule ‘‘thou shalt not sin against equality,’’ a rule so simple--I was going to say, and I perhaps dare not but I will. It’s a commandment so simple it can be spelled in three letters: E.R.A. We speak---We speak for young people demanding an education and a future. We speak for senior citizens. We speak for senior citizens who are terrorized by the idea that their only security, their Social Security, is being threatened. We speak for millions of reasoning people fighting to preserve our environment from greed and from stupidity. And we speak for reasonable people who are fighting to preserve our very existence from a macho intransigence that refuses to make intelligent attempts to discuss the possibility of nuclear holocaust with our enemy. They refuse. They refuse, because they believe we can pile missiles so high that they will pierce the clouds and the sight of them will frighten our enemies into submission. Now we’re proud of this diversity as Democrats. We’re grateful for it. We don’t have to manufacture it the way the Republicans will next month in Dallas, by propping up mannequin delegates on the convention floor. But we, while we’re proud of this diversity, we pay a price for it. The different people that we represent have different points of view. And sometimes they compete and even debate, and even argue. That’s what our primaries were all about. But now the primaries are over and it is time, when we pick our candidates and our platform here, to lock arms and move into this campaign together. If you need any more inspiration to put some small part of your own difference aside to create this consensus, then all you need to do is to reflect on what the Republican policy of divide and cajole has done to this land since 1980. Now the President has asked the American people to judge him on whether or not he’s fulfilled the promises he made four years ago. I believe, as Democrats, we ought to accept that challenge. And just for a moment let us consider what he has said and what he’s done.

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Inflation---Inflation is down since 1980, but not because of the supply-side miracle promised to us by the President. Inflation was reduced the old-fashioned way: with a recession, the worst since 1932. Now how did we---We could have brought inflation down that way. How did he do it? 55,000 bankruptcies; two years of massive unemployment; 200,000 farmers and ranchers forced off the land; more homeless---more homeless than at any time since the Great Depression in 1932; more hungry, in this world of enormous affluence, the United States of America, more hungry; more poor, most of them women. And---And he paid one other thing, a nearly 200 billion dollar deficit threatening our future. Now, we must make the American people understand this deficit because they don’t. The President’s deficit is a direct and dramatic repudiation of his promise in 1980 to balance the budget by 1983. How large is it? The deficit is the largest in the history of the universe. It---President Carter’s last budget had a deficit less than one-third of this deficit. It is a deficit that, according to the President’s own fiscal adviser, may grow to as much 300 billion dollars a year for ‘‘as far as the eye can see.’’ And, ladies and gentlemen, it is a debt so large---that is almost one-half of the money we collect from the personal income tax each year goes just to pay the interest. It is a mortgage on our children’s future that can be paid only in pain and that could bring this nation to its knees. Now don’t take my word for it---I’m a Democrat. Ask the Republican investment bankers on Wall Street what they think the chances of this recovery being permanent are. You see, if they’re not too embarrassed to tell you the truth, they’ll say that they’re appalled and frightened by the President’s deficit. Ask them what they think of our economy, now that it’s been driven by the distorted value of the dollar back to its colonial condition. Now we’re exporting agricultural products and importing manufactured ones. Ask those Republican investment bankers what they expect the rate of interest to be a year from now. And ask them---if they dare tell you the truth---you’ll learn from them, what they predict for the inflation rate a year from now, because of the deficit. Now, how important is this question of the deficit. Think about it practically: What chance would the Republican candidate have had in 1980 if he had told the American people that he intended to pay for his socalled economic recovery with bankruptcies, unemployment, more homeless, more hungry, and the largest government debt known to humankind? If he had told

358 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution the voters in 1980 that truth, would American voters have signed the loan certificate for him on Election Day? Of course not! That was an election won under false pretenses. It was won with smoke and mirrors and illusions. And that’s the kind of recovery we have now as well. But what about foreign policy? They said that they would make us and the whole world safer. They say they have. By creating the largest defense budget in history, one that even they now admit is excessive---by escalating to a frenzy the nuclear arms race; by incendiary rhetoric; by refusing to discuss peace with our enemies; by the loss of 279 young Americans in Lebanon in pursuit of a plan and a policy that no one can find or describe. We give money to Latin American governments that murder nuns, and then we lie about it. We have been less than zealous in support of our only real friend---it seems to me, in the Middle East---the one democracy there, our flesh and blood ally, the state of Israel. Our---Our policy---Our foreign policy drifts with no real direction, other than an hysterical commitment to an arms race that leads nowhere---if we’re lucky. And if we’re not, it could lead us into bankruptcy or war. Of course we must have a strong defense! Of course Democrats are for a strong defense. Of course Democrats believe that there are times that we must stand and fight. And we have. Thousands of us have paid for freedom with our lives. But always---when this country has been at its best---our purposes were clear. Now they’re not. Now our allies are as confused as our enemies. Now we have no real commitment to our friends or to our ideals---not to human rights, not to the refuseniks, not to Sakharov, not to Bishop Tutu and the others struggling for freedom in South Africa. We---We have in the last few years spent more than we can afford. We have pounded our chests and made bold speeches. But we lost 279 young Americans in Lebanon and we live behind sand bags in Washington. How can anyone say that we are safer, stronger, or better? That---That is the Republican record. That its disastrous quality is not more fully understood by the American people I can only attribute to the President’s amiability and the failure by some to separate the salesman from the product. And, now---now---now it’s up to us. Now it’s up to you and to me to make the case to America. And to remind Americans that if they are not happy with all that the President has done so far, they should consider how much worse it will be if he is left to his radical

proclivities for another four years unrestrained. Unrestrained. Now, if---if July---if July brings back Ann Gorsuch Burford---what can we expect of December? Where would---Where would another four years take us? Where would four years more take us? How much larger will the deficit be? How much deeper the cuts in programs for the struggling middle class and the poor to limit that deficit? How high will the interest rates be? How much more acid rain killing our forests and fouling our lakes? And, ladies and gentlemen, please think of this---the nation must think of this: What kind of Supreme Court will we have? Please. [beckons audience to settle down] We---We must ask ourselves what kind of court and country will be fashioned by the man who believes in having government mandate people’s religion and morality; the man who believes that trees pollute the environment; the man that believes that---that the laws against discrimination against people go too far; a man who threatens Social Security and Medicaid and help for the disabled. How high will we pile the missiles? How much deeper will the gulf be between us and our enemies? And, ladies and gentlemen, will four years more make meaner the spirit of the American people? This election will measure the record of the past four years. But more than that, it will answer the question of what kind of people we want to be. We Democrats still have a dream. We still believe in this nation’s future. And this is our answer to the question. This is our credo: We believe in only the government we need, but we insist on all the government we need. We believe in a government that is characterized by fairness and reasonableness, a reasonableness that goes beyond labels, that doesn’t distort or promise to do things that we know we can’t do. We believe in a government strong enough to use words like ‘‘love’’ and ‘‘compassion’’ and smart enough to convert our noblest aspirations into practical realities. We believe in encouraging the talented, but we believe that while survival of the fittest may be a good working description of the process of evolution, a government of humans should elevate itself to a higher order. We---Our---Our government---Our government should be able to rise to the level where it can fill the gaps that are left by chance or by a wisdom we don’t fully understand. We would rather have laws written by the patron of this great city, the man called the

9.13 Mario Cuomo, Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech ‘‘world’s most sincere Democrat,’’ St. Francis of Assisi, than laws written by Darwin. We believe---We believe as Democrats, that a society as blessed as ours, the most affluent democracy in the world’s history, one that can spend trillions on instruments of destruction, ought to be able to help the middle class in its struggle, ought to be able to find work for all who can do it, room at the table, shelter for the homeless, care for the elderly and infirm, and hope for the destitute. And we proclaim as loudly as we can the utter insanity of nuclear proliferation and the need for a nuclear freeze, if only to affirm the simple truth that peace is better than war because life is better than death. We believe in firm---We believe in firm but fair law and order. We believe proudly in the union movement. We believe in a---We believe---We believe in privacy for people, openness by government. We believe in civil rights, and we believe in human rights. We believe in a single---We believe in a single fundamental idea that describes better than most textbooks and any speech that I could write what a proper government should be: the idea of family, mutuality, the sharing of benefits and burdens for the good of all, feeling one another’s pain, sharing one another’s blessings---reasonably, honestly, fairly, without respect to race, or sex, or geography, or political affiliation. We believe we must be the family of America, recognizing that at the heart of the matter we are bound one to another, that the problems of a retired school teacher in Duluth are our problems; that the future of the child---that the future of the child in Buffalo is our future; that the struggle of a disabled man in Boston to survive and live decently is our struggle; that the hunger of a woman in Little Rock is our hunger; that the failure anywhere to provide what reasonably we might, to avoid pain, is our failure. Now for 50 years---for 50 years we Democrats created a better future for our children, using traditional Democratic principles as a fixed beacon, giving us direction and purpose, but constantly innovating, adapting to new realities: Roosevelt’s alphabet programs; Truman’s NATO and the GI Bill of Rights; Kennedy’s intelligent tax incentives and the Alliance for Progress; Johnson’s civil rights; Carter’s human rights and the nearly miraculous Camp David Peace Accord. Democrats did it---Democrats did it and Democrats can do it again. We can build a future that deals with our deficit. Remember this, that 50 years of progress under our principles never cost us what the last four

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years of stagnation have. And we can deal with the deficit intelligently, by shared sacrifice, with all parts of the nation’s family contributing, building partnerships with the private sector, providing a sound defense without depriving ourselves of what we need to feed our children and care for our people. We can have a future that provides for all the young of the present, by marrying common sense and compassion. We know we can, because we did it for nearly 50 years before 1980. And we can do it again, if we do not forget---if we do not forget that this entire nation has profited by these progressive principles; that they helped lift up generations to the middle class and higher; that they gave us a chance to work, to go to college, to raise a family, to own a house, to be secure in our old age and, before that, to reach heights that our own parents would not have dared dream of. That struggle to live with dignity is the real story of the shining city. And it’s a story, ladies and gentlemen, that I didn’t read in a book, or learn in a classroom. I saw it and lived it, like many of you. I watched a small man with thick calluses on both his hands work 15 and 16 hours a day. I saw him once literally bleed from the bottoms of his feet, a man who came here uneducated, alone, unable to speak the language, who taught me all I needed to know about faith and hard work by the simple eloquence of his example. I learned about our kind of democracy from my father. And I learned about our obligation to each other from him and from my mother. They asked only for a chance to work and to make the world better for their children, and they--they asked to be protected in those moments when they would not be able to protect themselves. This nation and this nation’s government did that for them. And that they were able to build a family and live in dignity and see one of their children go from behind their little grocery store in South Jamaica on the other side of the tracks where he was born, to occupy the highest seat, in the greatest State, in the greatest nation, in the only world we would know, is an ineffably beautiful tribute to the democratic process. And---And ladies and gentlemen, on January 20, 1985, it will happen again---only on a much, much grander scale. We will have a new President of the United States, a Democrat born not to the blood of kings but to the blood of pioneers and immigrants. And we will have America’s first woman Vice President, the child of immigrants, and she---she---she will open with one magnificent stroke, a whole new frontier for the United States. Now, it will happen. It will happen if we make it happen; if you and I make it happen. And I ask you

360 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution now, ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters, for the good of all of us, for the love of this great nation, for the family of America, for the love of God: Please, make this nation remember how futures are built. Thank you and God bless you.

9.14 Ronald Reagan, Tear Down This Wall, 1987 Berlin, Germany Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the City Hall. Well, since then two other presidents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. And today I, myself, make my second visit to your city. We come to Berlin, we American presidents, because it’s our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we’re drawn here by other things as well: by the feeling of history in this city, more than 500 years older than our own nation; by the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determination. Perhaps the composer Paul Lincke understood something about American presidents. You see, like so many presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do: Ich hab noch einen Koffer in Berlin. [I still have a suitcase in Berlin.] Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.] Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same---still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting

across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar. President von Weizsacker has said, ‘‘The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed.’’ Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph. In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air-raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State---as you’ve been told---George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: ‘‘Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’’ In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: ‘‘The Marshall Plan is helping here to strengthen the free world.’’ A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy, France, Belgium---virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded. In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty---that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled. Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any

9.14 Ronald Reagan, Tear Down This Wall 361 city in Germany---busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of parkland. Where a city’s culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there’s abundance--food, clothing, automobiles---the wonderful goods of the Ku’damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But my friends, there were a few things the Soviets didn’t count on---Berliner Herz, Berliner Humor, ja, und Berliner Schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner Schnauze.] In the 1950s, Khrushchev predicted: ‘‘We will bury you.’’ But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind---too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent---and I pledge to you my

country’s efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counter-deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counter-deployment, there were difficult days---days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city---and the Soviets later walked away from the table. But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then---I invite those who protest today---to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons. While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative--research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city,

362 The 1970s and the Reagan Revolution Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is transforming the globe. In the Philippines, in South and Central America, democracy has been given a rebirth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets are working miracle after miracle of economic growth. In the industrialized nations, a technological revolution is taking place---a revolution marked by rapid, dramatic advances in computers and telecommunications. In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that separate people, to create a safe, freer world. And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meeting place of East and West, to make a start. Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement. And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world. To open Berlin still further to all Europe, East and West, let us expand the vital air access to this city, finding ways of making commercial air service to Berlin more convenient, more comfortable, and more economical. We look to the day when West Berlin can become one of the chief aviation hubs in all central Europe. With our French and British partners, the United States is prepared to help bring international meetings to Berlin. It would be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site of United Nations meetings, or world conferences on human rights and arms control or other issues that call for international cooperation. There is no better way to establish hope for the future than to enlighten young minds, and we would be honored to sponsor summer youth exchanges, cultural events, and other programs for young Berliners

from the East. Our French and British friends, I’m certain, will do the same. And it’s my hope that an authority can be found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from young people of the Western sectors. One final proposal, one close to my heart: Sport represents a source of enjoyment and ennoblement, and you may have noted that the Republic of Korea--South Korea---has offered to permit certain events of the 1988 Olympics to take place in the North. International sports competitions of all kinds could take place in both parts of this city. And what better way to demonstrate to the world the openness of this city than to offer in some future year to hold the Olympic games here in Berlin, East and West? In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have built a great city. You’ve done so in spite of threats---the Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly there’s a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe there’s something deeper, something that involves Berlin’s whole look and feel and way of life---not mere sentiment. No one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties of life in Berlin but chose to accept them, that continues to build this good and proud city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian presence that refuses to release human energies or aspirations. Something that speaks with a powerful voice of affirmation, that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love--love both profound and abiding. Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship. The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love and of worship an affront. Years ago, before the East Germans began rebuilding their churches, they erected a secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower’s one major flaw, treating the glass sphere at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the sun strikes that sphere---that sphere that towers over all Berlin---the light makes the sign of the cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself, symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot be suppressed.

9.14 Ronald Reagan, Tear Down This Wall 363 As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner: ‘‘This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality.’’ Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom. And I would like, before I close, to say one word. I have read, and I have been questioned since I’ve been

here about certain demonstrations against my coming. And I would like to say just one thing, and to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if they have ever asked themselves that if they should have the kind of government they apparently seek, no one would ever be able to do what they’re doing again. Thank you and God bless you all. Ronald Reagan June 12, 1987

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Section 10 Contemporary American Politics

Introduction

cultural divide between Bush and Gore supporters. For a time, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a new source of unity both in Washington and among the American people. The social scientist Robert Putnam discovered in a poll a few months after the attacks that ‘‘levels of political consciousness and engagement are substantially higher than they were a year ago in the United States,’’ adding that greater proportions of Americans expressed trust in their local and national governments, political and community leaders, and neighbors. This period of national unity proved fleeting, as domestic policy struggles, the 2004 election, and the war in Iraq renewed familiar partisan and ideological struggles. At the heart of the contemporary political debate lies an irreconcilable conflict between ever-increasing demands on an already expansive American state and traditional antipathies toward big government in a nation that cher-ishes individual liberty. The documents that follow speak directly to these enduring tensions. ---Daniel J. Tichenor

The modern American state was constructed in response to three daunting crises of the 20th century: the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War struggle against Communism. Now at the beginning of the 21st century, the nation must address a variety of daunting problems that include environmental degradation and energy dependence, various forms of discrimination at home, domestic and international terrorism, and the challenges and possibilities of economic globalization. At the same time, the contemporary period has witnessed a political reaction against the national state generally, as witnessed by the 1994 Republican Contract with America, and against specific policies in such areas as welfare, education, and affirmative action. Partisan polarization has stood in the way of health care, Social Security, and tax reform, and fueled the first impeachment of a U.S. president since Andrew Johnson during Reconstruction. The acrimonious 2000 presidential election and its still more contentious resolution revealed a vast

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Documents

final bonus, oil imports will be reduced significantly, enhancing our energy security. These sorely needed benefits will, of course, not be achieved for free. Significant costs are involved, and these costs highlight the importance of the innovative, market-based features the President proposed, and which the Congress accepted in the final bill signed today. These features assure that the bill’s benefits will be achieved at the lowest possible cost to the nation. They include the acid rain allowance trading program, which fosters least-cost pollution reductions; the cleanfuel credit trading and emissions trading programs, which allow refiners and automakers to meet requirements at least cost; fees on smog-causing emissions which promote efficiency and pollution prevention; and incentives for early reductions which will accelerate the achievement of environmental benefits. It was the attractiveness of these innovative features that helped the President break the clean air logjam, and it is these features that will allow us to achieve the environmental goals of this bill in a way the country can live with economically. As the sheer size of the final printed bill indicates, this highly complex legislation was hammered out over many months---indeed, many years---and is the culmination of hard and dedicated work by many people both in and outside the government. I commend all who played a part in making this bill a reality. The President’s pathbreaking initiative was coordinated by the White House working group under the direction of Roger Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic

10.1 William K. Reilly, Announcement of Clean Air Amendments Act, 1990 The following statement was issued by EPA Administrator William K. Reilly today following the President’s signing of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: During his 1988 campaign, the President vowed to amend the Nation’s clean air laws, saying that ‘‘every American expects and deserves to breathe clean air.’’ The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, signed into law today, triumphantly fulfill that pledge. Through his leadership, the President broke the 13-year clean air stalemate by submitting an innovative, market-based bill which will achieve the nation’s environmental goals in the most effective manner. The benefits of this bill are enormous. Acid rain emissions will be cut almost in half; 30 million tons of toxic chemicals will be prevented from fouling the air every year; and all areas of the country will finally have the means to attain air quality standards on a realistic schedule. As a result, air toxics risk will be slashed by three-quarters, and health problems will be reduced significantly, including cancer risk, respiratory disease, heart ailments and reproductive disorders. Damage to lakes, streams, parks and forests, as well as harm to buildings, monuments and other structures, will also be slowed or stopped. One of the most dramatic effects will be an increase in visibility: people will be able to see farther from Maine to Georgia, where sulfates are responsible for half the haze. As a

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368 Contemporary American Politics and Domestic Policy; key participants included Boyden Gray, legal counsel to the President; Robert Grady, of the Office of Management and Budget; Richard Schmalensee, of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors; John Schmitz, legal counsel; Linda Stuntz, Department of Energy; and Teresa Gorman, Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development. Special thanks go to William G. Rosenberg, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, for managing EPA’s role. Many of the ideas behind the President’s original proposal stem from over five years of planning by EPA, including staff from the Office of Air and Radiation, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Congressional Affairs, the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, and the Office of Enforcement. Ideas also came from other agencies, including the Department of Justice and the Department of Energy, as well as from outside groups, notably including the Clean Air Coalition, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Counsel. The President’s initiative reflects the EPA staff experience in working with these new ideas; the result, which is preserved largely intact in the bill signed today, is a tribute to the willingness of these experienced staff to adapt to the President’s innovative, market-based policy direction and to use the new ideas to craft a dramatic advance in the course of environmental regulation. Turning the President’s initiative into finished legislation was an enormous task and was achieved only through the hard work of the Congress, ably led by Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and Senator Minority Leader Bob Dole, and by Speaker of the House Tom Foley and Congressman Bob Michel, House Minority Leader. Without the extraordinary efforts of the key members---Senators Burdick, Baucus, Chafee and Simpson, and Congressmen Dingell, Lent, Waxman and Madigan---and their staffs, working literally thousands of hours during conference committee alone the impossible task of reconciling the various interests could not have been achieved. The final result is a law which will undoubtedly serve as a model for regulatory reform across the board, leading to the widespread use of market approaches here and abroad. We now begin the big job of achieving the goals mandated by this landmark legislation. As we move toward full implementation, we can be proud to know we are working to fulfill the President’s pledge: that every American shall breathe clean air. Source: ‘‘EPA Administrator Reilly Hails Signing of New Clean Air Act,’’ Environmental Protection Agency press release, November 15, 1990.

10.2 Americans with Disabilities Act, 1990 An Act To establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America assembled, that this Act may be cited as the ‘‘Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.’’ ***

Findings and Purposes SEC. 12101. [Section 2] (a) Findings. The Congress finds that--(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older; (2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services; (4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination; (5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;

10.2 Americans with Disabilities Act 369 (6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; (7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society; (8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and (9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. (b) Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter--(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day to day by people with disabilities . . .

Discrimination SEC. 12112. [Section 102] (a) General rule. No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b) Construction. As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term ‘‘discriminate’’ includes--(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs); (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control; (4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association; (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or

370 Contemporary American Politics (B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant; (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). (c) Covered entities in foreign countries. (1) In general. It shall not be unlawful under this section for a covered entity to take any action that constitutes discrimination under this section with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with this section would cause such covered entity to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located. (2) Control of corporation (A) Presumption. If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice that constitutes discrimination under this section and is engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer. (B) Exception. This section shall not apply with respect to the foreign operations of

an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer. (C) Determination. For purposes of this paragraph, the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based on (i)

the interrelation of operations;

(ii) the common management; (iii) the centralized control of labor relations; and (iv) the common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the corporation. (d) Medical examinations and inquiries. (1) In general. The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and inquiries. (2) Preemployment. (A) Prohibited examination or inquiry. Except as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability. (B) Acceptable inquiry. A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions. (3) Employment entrance examination. A covered entity may require a medical examination after an offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the results of such examination, if--(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability; (B) information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record, except that

10.2 Americans with Disabilities Act 371 (i) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations; (ii) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, if the disability might require emergency treatment; and (iii) government officials investigating compliance with this chapter shall be provided relevant information on request; and (C) the results of such examination are used only in accordance with this subchapter. (4) Examination and inquiry. (A) Prohibited examinations and inquiries. A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. (B) Acceptable examinations and inquiries. A covered entity may conduct voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program available to employees at that work site. A covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-related functions. (C) Requirement. Information obtained under subparagraph (B) regarding the medical condition or history of any employee are subject to the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (3).

Defenses SEC. 12113. [Section 103] (a) In general. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards,

tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter. (b) Qualification standards. The term ‘‘qualification standards’’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. (c) Religious entities. (1) In general. This subchapter shall not prohibit a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. (2) Religious tenets requirement. Under this subchapter, a religious organization may require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization. (d) List of infectious and communicable diseases. (1) In general. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, not later than 6 months after July 26, 1990 [the date of enactment of this Act], shall--(A) review all infectious and communicable diseases which may be transmitted through handling the food supply; (B) publish a list of infectious and communicable diseases which are transmitted through handling the food supply; (C) publish the methods by which such diseases are transmitted; and (D) widely disseminate such information regarding the list of diseases and their modes of transmissibility to the general public. Such list shall be updated annually. (2) Applications. In any case in which an individual has an infectious or communicable disease that is transmitted to others through the handling of food, that is included on the list developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under paragraph (1), and which cannot be eliminated by

372 Contemporary American Politics reasonable accommodation, a covered entity may refuse to assign or continue to assign such individual to a job involving food handling. (3) Construction. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt, modify, or amend any State, county, or local law, ordinance, or regulation applicable to food handling which is designed to protect the public health from individuals who pose a significant risk to the health or safety of others, which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, pursuant to the list of infectious or communicable diseases and the modes of transmissibility published by the Secretary of Health and Human Services . . .

Enforcement SEC. 12117. [Section 107] (a) Powers, remedies, and procedures. The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title [sections 705, 706, 707, 709 and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title [section 106], concerning employment. (b) Coordination. The agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment discrimination under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.] shall develop procedures to ensure that administrative complaints filed under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are dealt with in a manner that avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements under this subchapter and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Commission, the Attorney General, and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs shall establish such coordinating mechanisms (similar to provisions contained in the joint regulations promulgated by the Commission and the Attorney General at part 42 of title 28 and part 1691 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs dated January 16, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg. 7435, January 23, 1981)) in regulations implementing this subchapter and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 not later than 18 months after July 26, 1990 [the date of enactment of this Act].

10.3 George H. W. Bush, Desert Storm Speech on the Invasion of Iraq, January 16, 1991 Just two hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged. This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait---a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations---was crushed; its people, brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined. This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic---diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States, and many, many other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend, in a last-ditch effort, the Secretary-General of the United Nations went to the Middle East with peace in his heart---his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution---have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail. As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein’s nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam’s artillery and tanks will be destroyed. Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by targeting Saddam’s vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan.

10.3 George H. W. Bush, Desert Storm Speech on the Invasion of Iraq 373 Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein’s forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, and then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf. Some may ask: Why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait. While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities---and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children. While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction---a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait. While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy. The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces arrayed against him. While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war. I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nation resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side. Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations: Leave Kuwait, or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.

Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations---countries from 5 continents, Europe and Asia, Africa, and the Arab League---have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave. Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum. This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order---a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful---and we will be---we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.’s founders. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. Thomas Paine wrote many years ago: ‘‘These are the times that try men’s souls.’’’ Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor. No President can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the Nation’s finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they’re there. And listen to what they say, for they’ve said it better than any President or Prime Minister ever could.

374 Contemporary American Politics Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, ‘‘Let’s free these people, so we can go home and be free again.’’’ And he’s right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam’s henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all. Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said: ‘‘There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn’t the kind of world we’re going to want to live in.’’ Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d Airborne: ‘‘ ‘We’re here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we’re doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years. It’s better to deal with this guy now than five years from now.’’ And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she says, ‘‘If we let him get away with this, who knows what’s going to be next?’’ I have called upon Hollywood and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades-in-arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching tonight: When the troops we’ve sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them home as soon as possible. Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf, and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.

As a result of the exposure of these operations, Attorney General Edwin Meese III sought the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute possible crimes arising from them. The Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed Lawrence E. Walsh as Independent Counsel on December 19, 1986, and charged him with investigating: (1) the direct or indirect sale, shipment, or transfer since in or about 1984 down to the present, of military arms, materiel, or funds to the government of Iran, officials of that government, persons, organizations or entities connected with or purporting to represent that government, or persons located in Iran; (2) the direct or indirect sale, shipment, or transfer of military arms, materiel or funds to any government, entity, or person acting, or purporting to act as an intermediary in any transaction referred to above; (3) the financing or funding of any direct or indirect sale, shipment or transfer referred to above; (4) the diversion of proceeds from any transaction described above to or for any person, organization, foreign government, or any faction or body of insurgents in any foreign country, including, but not limited to Nicaragua; (5) the provision or coordination of support for persons or entities engaged as military insurgents in armed conflict with the government of Nicaragua since 1984. This is the final report of that investigation.

Overall Conclusions

10.4 Lawrence Walsh, Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report, 1993 Executive Summary In October and November 1986, two secret U.S. Government operations were publicly exposed, potentially implicating Reagan Administration officials in illegal activities. These operations were the provision of assistance to the military activities of the Nicaraguan contra rebels during an October 1984 to October 1986 prohibition on such aid, and the sale of U.S. arms to Iran in contravention of stated U.S. policy and in possible violation of arms-export controls. In late November 1986, Reagan Administration officials announced that some of the proceeds from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran had been diverted to the contras.

The investigations and prosecutions have shown that high-ranking Administration officials violated laws and executive orders in the Iran/contra matter. Independent Counsel concluded that: • the sales of arms to Iran contravened United States Government policy and may have violated the Arms Export Control Act.i • the provision and coordination of support to the contras violated the Boland Amendment ban on aid to military activities in Nicaragua; • the policies behind both the Iran and contra operations were fully reviewed and developed at the highest levels of the Reagan Administration; • although there was little evidence of National Security Council level knowledge of most of the

10.4 Lawrence Walsh, Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report actual contra-support operations, there was no evidence that any NSC member dissented from the underlying policy keeping the contras alive despite congressional limitations on contra support; • the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of, among others, President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, and national security advisers Robert C. McFarlane and John M. Poindexter; of these officials, only Weinberger and Shultz dissented from the policy decision, and Weinberger eventually acquiesced by ordering the Department of Defense to provide the necessary arms; and • large volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically and willfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials. • following the revelation of these operations in October and November 1986, Reagan Administration officials deliberately deceived the Congress and the public about the level and extent of official knowledge of and support for these operations. In addition, Independent Counsel concluded that the off-the-books nature of the Iran and contra operations gave line-level personnel the opportunity to commit money crimes.

The Basic Facts of Iran/contra The Iran/contra affair concerned two secret Reagan Administration policies whose operations were coordinated by National Security Council staff. The Iran operation involved efforts in 1985 and 1986 to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East through the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, despite an embargo on such sales. The contra operations from 1984 through most of 1986 involved the secret governmental support of contra military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional prohibition of this support. The Iran and contra operations were merged when funds generated from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to support the contra effort in Nicaragua. Although this ‘‘diversion’’ may be the most dramatic aspect of Iran/contra, it is important to emphasize that both the Iran and contra operations, separately, violated United States policy and law. The ignorance of the ‘‘diversion’’ asserted by President Reagan and his Cabinet officers on the National Security Council in no

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way absolves them of responsibility for the underlying Iran and contra operations. The secrecy concerning the Iran and contra activities was finally pierced by events that took place thousands of miles apart in the fall of 1986. The first occurred on October 5, 1986, when Nicaraguan government soldiers shot down an American cargo plane that was carrying military supplies to contra forces; the one surviving crew member, American Eugene Hasenfus, was taken into captivity and stated that he was employed by the CIA. A month after the Hasenfus shootdown, President Reagan’s secret sale of U.S. arms to Iran was reported by a Lebanese publication on November 3. The joining of these two operations was made public on November 25, 1986, when Attorney General Meese announced that Justice Department officials had discovered that some of the proceeds from the Iran arms sales had been diverted to the contras. When these operations ended, the exposure of the Iran/contra affair generated a new round of illegality. Beginning with the testimony of Elliott Abrams and others in October 1986 and continuing through the public testimony of Caspar W. Weinberger on the last day of the congressional hearings in the summer of 1987, senior Reagan Administration officials engaged in a concerted effort to deceive Congress and the public about their knowledge of and support for the operations. Independent Counsel has concluded that the President’s most senior advisers and the Cabinet members on the National Security Council participated in the strategy to make National Security staff members McFarlane, Poindexter and North the scapegoats whose sacrifice would protect the Reagan Administration in its final two years. In an important sense, this strategy succeeded. Independent Counsel discovered much of the best evidence of the cover-up in the final year of active investigation, too late for most prosecutions . . .

The Operational Conspiracy The operational conspiracy was the basis for Count One of the 23-count indictment returned by the Grand Jury March 16, 1988, against Poindexter, North, Secord, and Hakim. It charged the four with conspiracy to defraud the United States by deceitfully: (1) supporting military operations in Nicaragua in defiance of congressional controls; (2) using the Iran arms sales to raise funds to be spent at the direction of North, rather than the U.S. Government; and (3) endangering the Administration’s hostage-release effort by overcharging Iran for the arms to

376 Contemporary American Politics generate unauthorized profits to fund the contras and for other purposes. The charge was upheld as a matter of law by U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell even though the Justice Department, in a move that Judge Gesell called ‘‘unprecedented,’’ filed an amicus brief supporting North’s contention that the charge should be dismissed. Although Count One was ultimately dismissed because the Reagan Administration refused to declassify information necessary to North’s defense, Judge Gesell’s decision established that high Government officials who engage in conspiracy to subvert civil laws and the Constitution have engaged in criminal acts. Trial on Count One would have disclosed the Government-wide activities that supported North’s Iran and contra operations . . .

The Flow of Funds The illegal activities of the private citizens involved with the North and Secord operations are discussed in detail in Part V. The off-the-books conduct of the two highly secret operations circumvented normal Administration accountability and congressional oversight associated with covert ventures and presented fertile ground for financial wrongdoing. There were several funding sources for the contras’ weapons purchases from the covert-action Enterprise formed by North, Secord and Hakim: (1) donations from foreign countries; (2) contributions from wealthy Americans sympathetic to President Reagan’s contra support policies; and (3) the diversion of proceeds from the sale of arms to Iran. Ultimately, all of these funds fell under the control of North, and through him, Secord and Hakim . . .

Agency Support of the Operations Following the convictions of those who were most central to the Iran/contra operations, Independent Counsel’s investigation focused on the supporting roles played by Government officials in other agencies and the supervisory roles of the NSC principals. The investigation showed that Administration officials who claimed initially that they had little knowledge about the Iran arms sales or the illegal contra-resupply operation North directed were much better informed than they professed to be. The Office of Independent Counsel

obtained evidence that Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz and White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, among others, held back information that would have helped Congress obtain a much clearer view of the scope of the Iran/contra matter. Contemporaneous notes of Regan and Weinberger, and those dictated by Shultz, were withheld until they were obtained by Independent Counsel in 1991 and 1992.

The White House and Office of the Vice President As the White House section of this report describes in detail, the investigation found no credible evidence that President Reagan violated any criminal statute. The OIC could not prove that Reagan authorized or was aware of the diversion or that he had knowledge of the extent of North’s control of the contra-resupply network. Nevertheless, he set the stage for the illegal activities of others by encouraging and, in general terms, ordering support of the contras during the October 1984 to October 1986 period when funds for the contras were cut off by the Boland Amendment, and in authorizing the sale of arms to Iran, in contravention of the U.S. embargo on such sales. The President’s disregard for civil laws enacted to limit presidential actions abroad---specifically the Boland Amendment, the Arms Export Control Act and congressional-notification requirements in covert-action laws--created a climate in which some of the Government officers assigned to implement his policies felt emboldened to circumvent such laws . . .

The Role of CIA Officials Director Casey’s unswerving support of President Reagan’s contra policies and of the Iran arms sales encouraged some CIA officials to go beyond legal restrictions in both operations. Casey was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team when the Boland Amendment in October 1984 forced the CIA to refrain from direct or indirect aid. He also supported the North-Secord combination in the Iran arms sales, despite deep reservations about Secord within the CIA hierarchy . . .

State Department Officials In 1990 and 1991, Independent Counsel received new documentary evidence in the form of handwritten notes suggesting that Secretary Shultz’s congressional testimony painted a misleading and incorrect picture of his knowledge of the Iran arms sales. The subsequent

10.4 Lawrence Walsh, Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report investigation focused on whether Shultz or other Department officials deliberately misled or withheld information from congressional or OIC investigators. The key notes, taken by M. Charles Hill, Shultz’s executive assistant, were nearly verbatim, contemporaneous accounts of Shultz’s meetings within the department and Shultz’s reports to Hill on meetings the secretary attended elsewhere. The Hill notes and similarly detailed notes by Nicholas Platt, the State Department’s executive secretary, provided the OIC with a detailed account of Shultz’s knowledge of the Iran arms sales. The most revealing of these notes were not provided to any Iran/contra investigation until 1990 and 1991. The notes show that---contrary to his early testimony that he was not aware of details of the 1985 arms transfers---Shultz knew that the shipments were planned and that they were delivered. Also in conflict with his congressional testimony was evidence that Shultz was aware of the 1986 shipments . . .

Secretary Weinberger and Defense Department Officials Contrary to their testimony to the presidentially appointed Tower Commission and the Select Iran/contra Committees of Congress, Independent Counsel determined that Secretary Weinberger and his closest aides were consistently informed of proposed and actual arms shipments to Iran during 1985 and 1986. The key evidence was handwritten notes of Weinberger, which he deliberately withheld from Congress and the OIC until they were discovered by Independent Counsel in late 1991. The Weinberger daily diary notes and notes of significant White House and other meetings contained highly relevant, contemporaneous information that resolved many questions left unanswered in early investigations . . .

The Reagan, Bush and Casey Segments The Independent Counsel Act requires a report as to persons not indicted as well as those indicted. Because of the large number of persons investigated, those discussed in individual sections of this report are limited to those as to whom there was a possibility of indictment. In addition there are separate sections on President Reagan and President Bush because, although criminal proceedings against them were always unlikely, they were important subjects of the investigation, and their activities were important to the action taken with respect to others.

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CIA Director Casey is a special case. Because Casey was hospitalized with a fatal illness before Independent Counsel was appointed, no formal investigation of Casey was ever undertaken by the OIC. Casey was never able to give his account, and he was unable to respond to allegations of wrongdoing made about him by others, most prominently North, whose veracity is subject to serious question. Equally important, fundamental questions could not be answered regarding Casey’s state of mind, the impact, if any, of his fatal illness on his conduct and his intent . . . Observations and Conclusions This report concludes with Independent Counsel’s observations and conclusions. He observes that the governmental problems presented by Iran/contra are not those of rogue operations, but rather those of Executive Branch efforts to evade congressional oversight. As this report documents, the competing roles of the attorney general---adviser to the President and top law-enforcement officer---come into irreconcilable conflict in the case of high-level Executive Branch wrongdoing. Independent Counsel concludes that congressional oversight alone cannot correct the deficiencies that result when an attorney general abandons the law-enforcement responsibilities of that office and undertakes, instead, to protect the President. Independent Counsel asks the Congress to review the difficult and delicate problem posed to the investigations and prosecutions by congressional grants of immunity to principals. While recognizing the important responsibility of Congress for investigating such matters thoroughly, Congress must realize that grants of use immunity to principals in such highly exposed matters as the Iran/contra affair will virtually rule out successful prosecution. Independent Counsel also addresses the problem of implementing the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) in cases steeped in highly classified information, such as many of the Iran/contra prosecutions. Under the Act, the attorney general has unrestricted discretion to decide whether to declassify information necessary for trial, even in cases in which Independent Counsel has been appointed because of the attorney general’s conflict of interest. This discretion is inconsistent with the perceived need for independent counsel, particularly in cases in which officers of the intelligence agencies that classify information are under investigation. This discretion gives the attorney general the power to block almost any potentially embarrassing

378 Contemporary American Politics prosecution that requires the declassification of information. Independent Counsel suggests that the attorney general implement standards that would permit independent review of a decision to block a prosecution of an officer within the Executive Branch and legitimate congressional oversight.

10.5 William Jefferson Clinton, Memphis Church of Christ Address, November 13, 1993 Thank you. Please sit down. Well, Bishop Ford, Mrs. Mason, Bishop Owens, and Bishop Anderson; my bishops, Bishop Walker and Bishop Lindsey. Come here, Bishop. Now, if you haven’t had Bishop Lindsey’s barbecue, you haven’t had barbecue. And if you haven’t heard Bishop Walker attack one of my opponents, you have never heard a political speech. I am glad to be here. You have touched my heart. You’ve brought tears to my eyes and joy to my spirit. Last year I was with you over at the convention center. Two years ago your bishops came to Arkansas, and we laid a plaque at the point in Little Rock, Arkansas, at 8th and Gaines, where Bishop Mason received the inspiration for the name of this great church. Bishop Brooks said from his pulpit that I would be elected President when most people thought I wouldn’t survive. I thank him, and I thank your faith, and I thank your works, for without you I would not be here today as your President. Many have spoken eloquently and well, and many have been introduced. I want to thank my good friend Governor McWherter and my friend Mayor Herenton for being with me today; my friend Congressman Harold Ford, we are glad to be in his congressional district. I would like to, if I might, introduce just three other people who are Members of the Congress. They have come here with me, and without them it’s hard for me to do much for you. The President proposes and the Congress disposes. Sometimes they dispose of what I propose, but I’m happy to say that according to a recent report in Washington, notwithstanding what you may have heard, this Congress has given me a higher percentage of my proposals than any first-year President since President Eisenhower. And I thank them for that. So let me introduce my good friend, a visitor to Tennessee, Congressman Bill Jefferson from New Orleans, Louisiana---please stand up; and an early supporter of my campaign, Congressman Bob Clement from

Tennessee, known to many of you; and a young man who’s going to be coming back to the people of Tennessee and asking them to give him a promotion next year, Congressman Jim Cooper from Tennessee, and a good friend. Please welcome him. You know, in the last 10 months, I’ve been called a lot of things, but nobody’s called me a bishop yet. When I was about 9 years old, my beloved and now departed grandmother, who was a very wise woman, looked at me and she said, ‘‘You know, I believe you could be a preacher if you were just a little better boy.’’ Proverbs says, ‘‘A happy heart doeth good like medicine, but a broken spirit dryeth the bone.’’ This is a happy place, and I am happy to be here. I thank you for your spirit. By the grace of God and your help, last year I was elected President of this great country. I never dreamed that I would ever have a chance to come to this hallowed place where Martin Luther King gave his last sermon. I ask you to think today about the purpose for which I ran and the purpose for which so many of you worked to put me in this great office. I have worked hard to keep faith with our common efforts: to restore the economy, to reverse the politics of helping only those at the top of our totem pole and not the hardworking middle class or the poor; to bring our people together across racial and regional and political lines, to make a strength out of our diversity instead of letting it tear us apart; to reward work and family and community and try to move us forward into the 21st century. I have tried to keep faith. Thirteen percent of all my Presidential appointments are African-Americans, and there are five African-Americans in the Cabinet of the United States, 2 1/2 times as many as have ever served in the history of this great land. I have sought to advance the right to vote with the motor voter bill, supported so strongly by all the churches in our country. And next week it will be my great honor to sign the restoration of Religious Freedoms Act, a bill supported widely by people across all religions and political philosophies to put back the real meaning of the Constitution, to give you and every other American the freedom to do what is most important in your life, to worship God as your spirit leads you. I say to you, my fellow Americans, we have made a good beginning. Inflation is down. Interest rates are down. The deficit is down. Investment is up. Millions of Americans, including, I bet, some people in this room, have refinanced their homes or their business loans just in the last year. And in the last 10 months, this economy has produced more jobs in the private sector than in the previous four years.

10.5 William Jefferson Clinton, Memphis Church of Christ Address 379 We have passed a law called the Family Leave law, which says you can’t be fired if you take a little time off when a baby’s born or a parent’s sick. We know that most Americans have to work, but you ought not to have to give up being a good parent just to take a job. If you can’t succeed as a worker and a parent, this country can’t make it. We have radically reformed the college loan program, as I promised, to lower the cost of college loans and broaden the availability of it and make the repayment terms easier. And we have passed the national service law that will give in three years---three years from now, a hundred thousand young Americans the chance to serve their communities at home, to repair the frayed bonds of community, to build up the needs of people at the grassroots, and at the same time, earn some money to pay for a college education. It is a wonderful idea. On April the 15th when people pay their taxes, somewhere between 15 and 18 million working families on modest incomes, families with children and incomes of under 23,000 dollars, will get a tax cut, not a tax increase, in the most important effort to ensure that we reward work and family in the last 20 years. 50 million American parents and their children will be advantaged by putting the Tax Code back on the side of working American parents for a change. Under the leadership of the First Lady, we have produced a comprehensive plan to guarantee health care security to all Americans. How can we expect the American people to work and to live with all the changes in a global economy, where the average 18year-old will change work seven times in a lifetime, unless we can simply say we have joined the ranks of all the other advanced countries in the world; you can have decent health care that’s always there, that can never be taken away? It is time we did that, long past time. I ask you to help us achieve that. But we have so much more to do. You and I know that most people are still working harder for the same or lower wages, that many people are afraid that their job will go away. We have to provide the education and training our people need, not just for our children but for our adults, too. If we cannot close this country up to the forces of change sweeping throughout the world, we have to at least guarantee people the security of being employable. They have to be able to get a new job if they’re going to have to get a new job. We don’t do that today, and we must, and we intend to proceed until that is done. We have to guarantee that there will be some investment in those areas of our country, in the inner cities

and in the destitute rural areas in the Mississippi Delta, of my home State and this State and Louisiana and Mississippi and other places like it throughout America. It’s all very well to train people, but if they don’t have a job, they can be trained for nothing. We must get investment into those places where the people are dying for work. And finally, let me say, we must find people who will buy what we have to produce. We are the most productive people on earth. That makes us proud. But what that means is that every year one person can produce more in the same amount of time. Now, if fewer and fewer people can produce more and more things, and yet you want to create more jobs and raise people’s incomes, you have to have more customers for what it is you’re making. And that is why I have worked so hard to sell more American products around the world; why I have asked that we be able to sell billions of dollars of computers we used not to sell to foreign countries and foreign interests, to put our people to work; why next week I am going all the way to Washington State to meet with the President of China and the Prime Minister of Japan and the heads of 13 other Asian countries, the fastest growing part of the world, to say, ‘‘We want to be your partners. We will buy your goods, but we want you to buy ours, too, if you please.’’ That is why. That is why I have worked so hard for this North American trade agreement that Congressman Ford endorsed today and Congressman Jefferson endorsed and Congressman Cooper and Congressman Clement, because we know that Americans can compete and win only if people will buy what it is we have to sell. There are 90 million people in Mexico. Seventy cents of every dollar they spend on foreign goods, they spend on American goods. People worry fairly about people shutting down plants in America and going not just to Mexico but to any place where the labor is cheap. It has happened. What I want to say to you, my fellow Americans, is nothing in this agreement makes that more likely. That has happened already. It may happen again. What we need to do is to keep the jobs here by finding customers there. That’s what this agreement does. It gives us a chance to create opportunity for people. I would never---There are people---I have friends in this audience, people who are ministers from my State, fathers and sons, people---I’ve looked out all over this vast crowd and I see people I’ve known for years. They know I spent my whole life working to create jobs. I would never knowingly do anything that would take a job away from the American people. This agreement will make more jobs. Now, we can also leave it if it

380 Contemporary American Politics doesn’t work in six months. But if we don’t take it, we’ll lose it forever. We need to take it, because we have to do better. But I guess what I really want to say to you today, my fellow Americans, is that we can do all of this and still fail unless we meet the great crisis of the spirit that is gripping America today. When I leave you, Congressman Ford and I are going to a Baptist church near here to a town meeting he’s having on health care and violence. I tell you, unless we do something about crime and violence and drugs that is ravaging the community, we will not be able to repair this country. If Martin Luther King, who said, ‘‘Like Moses, I am on the mountaintop, and I can see the promised land, but I’m not going to be able to get there with you, but we will get there’’---if he were to reappear by my side today and give us a report card on the last 25 years, what would he say? ‘‘You did a good job,’’ he would say, ‘‘voting and electing people who formerly were not electable because of the color of their skin. ‘‘You have more political power and that is good.’’ ‘‘You did a good job,’’ he would say, ‘‘letting people who have the ability to do so live wherever they want to live, go wherever they want to go in this great country.’’ ‘‘You did a good job,’’ he would say, ‘‘elevating people of color into the ranks of the United States Armed Forces to the very top or into the very top of our Government.’’ ‘‘You did a very good job,’’ he would say. He would say, ‘‘You did a good job creating a black middle class of people who really are doing well, and the middle class is growing more among African-Americans than among non-AfricanAmericans.’’ You did a good job; you did a good job in opening opportunity.’’ But he would say, ‘‘I did not live and die to see the American family destroyed. I did not live and die to see 13-year-old boys get automatic weapons and gun down 9-year-olds just for the kick of it. I did not live and die to see young people destroy their own lives with drugs and then build fortunes destroying the lives of others. That is not what I came here to do.’’ ‘‘I fought for freedom,’’ he would say, ‘‘but not for the freedom of people to kill each other with reckless abandon, not for the freedom of children to have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and abandon them as if they don’t amount to anything. I fought for people to have the right to work but not to have whole communities and people abandoned. This is not what I lived and died for.’’ My fellow Americans, he would say, ‘‘I fought to stop white people from being so filled with hate that

they would wreak violence on black people. I did not fight for the right of black people to murder other black people with reckless abandon.’’ The other day the Mayor of Baltimore, a dear friend of mine, told me a story of visiting the family of a young man who had been killed---18 years old, on Halloween. He always went out with little bitty, kids so they could trick-or-treat safely. And across the street from where they were walking on Halloween, a 14-year-old boy gave a 13-year-old boy a gun and dared him to shoot the 18-year-old boy, and he shot him dead. And the Mayor had to visit the family. In Washington, DC, where I live, your nation’s Capital, the symbol of freedom throughout the world, look how that freedom is being exercised. The other night a man came along the street and grabbed a 1-year-old child and put the child in his car. The child may have been the child of the man. And two people were after him, and they chased him in the car, and they just kept shooting with reckless abandon, knowing that baby was in the car. And they shot the man dead, and a bullet went through his body into the baby’s body, and blew the little bootie off the child’s foot. The other day on the front page of our paper, the nation’s Capital, are we talking about world peace or world conflict? No, big article on the front page of the Washington Post about an 11-year-old child planning her funeral: ‘‘These are the hymns I want sung. This is the dress I want to wear. I know I’m not going to live very long.’’ That is not the freedom---the freedom to die before you’re a teenager is not what Martin Luther King lived and died for. More than 37,000 people die from gunshot wounds in this country every year. Gunfire is the leading cause of death in young men. And now that we’ve all gotten so cool that everybody can get a semiautomatic weapon, a person shot now is three times more likely to die than 15 years ago, ’cause they’re likely to have three bullets in them. A hundred and sixty thousand children stay home from school every day because they are scared they will be hurt in their schools. The other day I was in California at a town meeting, and a handsome young man stood up and said, ‘‘Mr. President, my brother and I, we don’t belong to gangs. We don’t have guns. We don’t do drugs. We want to go to school. We want to be professionals. We want to work hard. We want to do well. We want to have families. And we changed our school because the school we were in was so dangerous. So when we showed up to the new school to register, my brother and I were standing in line and somebody ran into the school and started shooting a gun. My brother was shot

10.5 William Jefferson Clinton, Memphis Church of Christ Address 381 down standing right in front of me at the safer school.’’ The freedom to do that kind of thing is not what Martin Luther King lived and died for, not what people gathered in this hallowed church for the night before he was assassinated in April of 1968. If you had told anybody who was here in that church on that night that we would abuse our freedom in that way, they would have found it hard to believe. And I tell you, it is our moral duty to turn it around. And now I think finally we have a chance. Finally, I think, we have a chance. We have a pastor here from New Haven, Connecticut. I was in his church with Reverend Jackson when I was running for President on a snowy day in Connecticut to mourn the deaths of children who had been killed in that city. And afterward we walked down the street for more than a mile in the snow. Then, the American people were not ready. People would say, ‘‘Oh, this is a terrible thing, but what can we do about it?’’ Now when we read that foreign visitors come to our shores and are killed at random in our fine State of Florida, when we see our children planning their funerals, when the American people are finally coming to grips with the accumulated weight of crime and violence and the breakdown of family and community and the increase in drugs and the decrease in jobs, I think finally we may be ready to do something about it. And there is something for each of us to do. There are changes we can make from the outside in; that’s the job of the President and the Congress and the Governors and the mayors and the social service agencies. Then there’s some changes we’re going to have to make from the inside out, or the others won’t matter. That’s what that magnificent song was about, isn’t it? Sometimes there are no answers from the outside in; sometimes all the answers have to come from the values and the stirrings and the voices that speak to us from within. So we are beginning. We are trying to pass a bill to make our people safer, to put another 100,000 police officers on the street, to provide boot camps instead of prisons for young people who can still be rescued, to--to provide more safety in our schools, to restrict the availability of these awful assault weapons, to pass the Brady Bill and at least require people to have their criminal background checked before they get a gun, and to say, if you’re not old enough to vote and you’re not old enough to go to war, you ought not to own a handgun, and you ought not to use one unless you’re on a target range. We want to pass a health care bill that will make drug treatment available for everyone. And we also

have to do it, we have to have drug treatment and education available to everyone and especially those who are in prison who are coming out. We have a drug czar now in Lee Brown, who was the police chief of Atlanta, of Houston, of New York, who understands these things. And when the Congress comes back next year, we will be moving forward on that. We need this crime bill now. We ought to give it to the American people for Christmas. And we need to move forward on all these other fronts. But I say to you, my fellow Americans, we need some other things as well. I do not believe we can repair the basic fabric of society until people who are willing to work have work. Work organizes life. It gives structure and discipline to life. It gives meaning and selfesteem to people who are parents. It gives a role model to children. The famous African-American sociologist William Julius Wilson has written a stunning book called ‘‘The Truly Disadvantaged’’ in which he chronicles in breathtaking terms how the inner cities of our country have crumbled as work has disappeared. And we must find a way, through public and private sources, to enhance the attractiveness of the American people who live there to get investment there. We cannot, I submit to you, repair the American community and restore the American family until we provide the structure, the values, the discipline, and the reward that work gives. I read a wonderful speech the other day given at Howard University in a lecture series funded by Bill and Camille Cosby, in which the speaker said, I grew up in Anacostia years ago. Even then it was all black, and it was the very poor neighborhood. But you know, when I was a child in Anacostia, a 100 percent African-American neighborhood, a very, poor neighborhood, we had a crime rate that was lower than the average of the crime rate of our city. Why? Because we had coherent families. We had coherent communities. The people who filled the church on Sunday lived in the same place they went to church The guy that owned the drugstore lived clown the street. The person that owned the grocery store lived in our community. We were whole. And I say to you, we have to make our people whole again. This church has stood for that. Why do you think you have five million members in this country? Because people know you are filled with the Spirit of God to do the right thing in this life by them. So I say to you, we have to make a partnership, all the Government agencies, all the business folks; but

382 Contemporary American Politics where there are no families, where there is no order, where there is no hope, where we are reducing the size of our armed services because we have won the cold war, who will be there to give structure, discipline, and love to these children? You must do that. And we must help you. Scripture says, ‘‘You are the salt of the earth’’ and ‘‘the light of the world,’’ that if ‘‘your light shines before men’’ they will ‘‘give glory to the Father in heaven.’’ That is what we must do. That is what we must do. How would we explain it to Martin Luther King if he showed up today and said, ‘‘Yes, we won the cold war. Yes, the biggest threat that all of us grew up under, communism and nuclear war, communism gone, nuclear war receding. Yes, we developed all these miraculous technologies. Yes, we all got a VCR in our home; it’s interesting. Yes, we get 50 channels on the cable. Yes, without regard to race, if you work hard, play by the rules, you get into a service academy or a good college, you’ll do just great.’’ How would we explain to him all these kids getting killed and killing each other? How would we justify the things that we permit that no other country in the world would permit? How could we explain that we gave people the freedom to succeed, and we created conditions in which millions abuse that freedom to destroy the things that make life worth living and life itself? We cannot. And so I say to you today, my fellow Americans, you gave me this job, and we’re making progress on the things you hired me to do. But unless we deal with the ravages of crime and drug[s] and violence and unless we recognize that it’s due to the breakdown of the family, the community, and the disappearance of jobs, and unless we say some of this cannot be done by Government, because we have to reach deep inside to the values, the spirit, the soul, and the truth of human nature, none of the other things we seek to do will ever take us where we need to go. So in this pulpit, on this day, let me ask all of you in your heart to say: We will honor the life and the work of Martin Luther King. We will honor the meaning of our church. We will, somehow, by God’s grace, we will turn this around. We will give these children a future. We will take away their guns and give them books. We will take away their despair and give them hope. We will rebuild the families and the neighborhoods and the communities. We won’t make all the work that has gone on here benefit just a few. We will do it together by the grace of God. Thank you.

10.6 Republican Contract with America, 1994 As Republican Members of the House of Representatives and as citizens seeking to join that body we propose not just to change its policies, but even more important, to restore the bonds of trust between the people and their elected representatives. That is why in this era of official evasion and posturing, we offer instead a detailed agenda for national renewal, a written commitment with no fine print. This year’s election offers the chance, after four decades of one-party control, to bring to the House a new majority that will transform the way Congress works. That historic change would be the end of government that is too big, to intrusive, and too easy with the public’s money. It can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith of the American family. Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we intend to act ‘‘with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right.’’ To restore accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves. On the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government: FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress; SECOND, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse; THIRD, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third; FORTH, limit the terms of all committee chairs; FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee; SIXTH, require committee meetings to be open to the public; SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase; EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting. Thereafter, within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, we shall bring to the House Floor the following bills, each to be given full and open debate, each to be given a clear and fair vote and each to be immediately available this day for public inspection and scrutiny.

10.7 William Jefferson Clinton, Oklahoma Bombing Memorial Prayer Service Address 383

The Fiscal Responsibility Act

The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act

A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment and a legislative line-item veto to restore fiscal responsibility to an out-of-control Congress, requiring them to live under the same budget constraints as families and businesses.

Small business incentives, capital gains cuts and indexation, neutral cost recovery, risk assessment/costbenefit analysis, strengthening the Regulatory Flexibility Act and unfounded mandate reform to create jobs and raise worker wages.

The Taking Back Our Streets Act An anti-crime package including stronger truth-in-sentencing, ‘‘good faith’’ exclusionary rule exemptions, effective death penalty provisions, and cuts in social spending for this summer’s ‘‘crime’’ bill to fund prison construction and additional law enforcement to keep people secure in their neighborhoods and kids safe in their schools.

The Personal Responsibility Act Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough twoyears-and-out provision with work requirements to promote individual responsibility.

The Family Reinforcement Act Child support enforcement, tax incentives for adoption, strengthening rights of parents in their children’s education, stronger child pornography laws, and an elderly dependent care tax credit to reinforce the central role of families in American society.

The American Dream Restoration Act A $500 per child tax credit, begin repeal of the marriage tax penalty, and creation of American Dream Savings Accounts to provide middle class tax relief.

The National Security Restoration Act No U.S. troops under U.N. command and restoration of the essential parts of our national security funding to strengthen our national defense and maintain our credibility around the world.

The Senior Citizens Fairness Act Raise the Social Security earnings limit, which currently forces seniors out of the work force, repeal the 1993 tax hikes on Social Security benefits and provide tax incentives for private long-term care insurance to let Older Americans keep more of what they have earned over the years.

The Common Sense Legal Reform Act ‘‘Loser pays’’ laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless tide of litigation.

The Citizen Legislature Act A first-ever vote on term limits to replace career politicians with citizen legislators. Further, we will instruct the House Budget Committee to report to the floor and we will work to enact additional budget savings, beyond the budget cuts specifically included in the legislation described above, to ensure that the Federal budget deficit will be less than it would have been without the enactment of these bills. Respecting the judgment of our fellow citizens as we seek their mandate for reform, we hereby pledge our names to this Contract with America.

10.7 William Jefferson Clinton, Oklahoma Bombing Memorial Prayer Service Address, 1995 Thank you very much, Governor Keating and Mrs. Keating, Reverend Graham, to the families of those who have been lost and wounded, to the people of Oklahoma City, who have endured so much, and the people of this wonderful state, to all of you who are here as our fellow Americans. I am honored to be here today to represent the American people. But I have to tell you that Hillary and I also come as parents, as husband and wife, as people who were your neighbors for some of the best years of our lives. Today our nation joins with you in grief. We mourn with you. We share your hope against hope that some may still survive. We thank all those who have worked so heroically to save lives and to solve this crime--those here in Oklahoma and those who are all across this great land, and many who left their own lives to come here to work hand in hand with you. We pledge

384 Contemporary American Politics to do all we can to help you heal the injured, to rebuild this city, and to bring to justice those who did this evil. This terrible sin took the lives of our American family, innocent children in that building, only because their parents were trying to be good parents as well as good workers; citizens in the building going about their daily business; and many there who served the rest of us---who worked to help the elderly and the disabled, who worked to support our farmers and our veterans, who worked to enforce our laws and to protect us. Let us say clearly, they served us well, and we are grateful. But for so many of you they were also neighbors and friends. You saw them at church or the PTA meetings, at the civic clubs, at the ball park. You know them in ways that all the rest of America could not. And to all the members of the families here present who have suffered loss, though we share your grief, your pain is unimaginable, and we know that. We cannot undo it. That is God’s work. Our words seem small beside the loss you have endured. But I found a few I wanted to share today. I’ve received a lot of letters in these last terrible days. One stood out because it came from a young widow and a mother of three whose own husband was murdered with over 200 other Americans when Pan Am 103 was shot down. Here is what that woman said I should say to you today: The anger you feel is valid, but you must not allow yourselves to be consumed by it. The hurt you feel must not be allowed to turn into hate, but instead into the search for justice. The loss you feel must not paralyze your own lives. Instead, you must try to pay tribute to your loved ones by continuing to do all the things they left undone, thus ensuring they did not die in vain. Wise words from one who also knows. You have lost too much, but you have not lost everything. And you have certainly not lost America, for we will stand with you for as many tomorrows as it takes. If ever we needed evidence of that, I could only recall the words of Governor and Mrs. Keating: ‘‘If anybody thinks that Americans are mostly mean and selfish, they ought to come to Oklahoma. If anybody thinks Americans have lost the capacity for love and caring and courage, they ought to come to Oklahoma.’’ To all my fellow Americans beyond this hall, I say, one thing we owe those who have sacrificed is the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces which gave rise to this evil. They are forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, our way of life. Let us teach our children that the God of comfort is

also the God of righteousness: Those who trouble their own house will inherit the wind. Justice will prevail. Let us let our own children know that we will stand against the forces of fear. When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk against it. When there is talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against it. In the face of death, let us honor life. As St. Paul admonished us, Let us ‘‘not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.’’ Yesterday, Hillary and I had the privilege of speaking with some children of other federal employees--children like those who were lost here. And one little girl said something we will never forget. She said, ‘‘We should all plant a tree in memory of the children.’’ So this morning before we got on the plane to come here, at the White House, we planted that tree in honor of the children of Oklahoma. It was a dogwood with its wonderful spring flower and its deep, enduring roots. It embodies the lesson of the Psalms---that the life of a good person is like a tree whose leaf does not wither. My fellow Americans, a tree takes a long time to grow, and wounds take a long time to heal. But we must begin. Those who are lost now belong to God. Some day we will be with them. But until that happens, their legacy must be our lives. Thank you all, and God bless you.

10.8 William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Statement on Welfare Reform Bill, August 22, 1996 The White House Office of the Press Secretary Today, I have signed into law H.R. 3734, the ‘‘Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.’’ While far from perfect, this legislation provides an historic opportunity to end welfare as we know it and transform our broken welfare system by promoting the fundamental values of work, responsibility, and family. This Act honors my basic principles of real welfare reform. It requires work of welfare recipients, limits the time they can stay on welfare, and provides child care and health care to help them make the move from welfare to work. It demands personal responsibility, and puts in place tough child support enforcement measures. It promotes family and protects children. This bipartisan legislation is significantly better than the bills that I vetoed. The Congress has removed many

10.8 William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Statement on Welfare Reform Bill 385 of the worst provisions of the vetoed bills and has included many of the improvements that I sought. I am especially pleased that the Congress has preserved the guarantee of health care for the poor, the elderly, and the disabled. Most important, this Act is tough on work. Not only does it include firm but fair work requirements, it provides $4 billion more in child care than the vetoed bills---so that parents can end their dependency on welfare and go to work---and maintains health and safety standards for day care providers. The bill also gives States positive incentives to move people into jobs and holds them accountable for maintaining spending on welfare reform. In addition, it gives States the ability to create subsidized jobs and to provide employers with incentives to hire people off welfare. The Act also does much more to protect children than the vetoed bills. It cuts spending on childhood disability programs less deeply and does not unwisely change the child protection programs. It maintains the national nutritional safety net, by eliminating the Food Stamp annual spending cap and the Food Stamp and School Lunch block grants that the vetoed bills contained. In addition, it preserves the Federal guarantee of health care for individuals who are currently eligible for Medicaid through the AFDC program or are in transition from welfare to work. Furthermore, this Act includes the tough personal responsibility and child support enforcement measures that I proposed 2 years ago. It requires minor mothers to live at home and stay in school as a condition of assistance. It cracks down on parents who fail to pay child support by garnishing their wages, suspending their driver’s licenses, tracking them across State lines, and, if necessary, making them work off what they owe. For these reasons, I am proud to have signed this legislation. The current welfare system is fundamentally broken, and this may be our last best chance to set it straight. I am doing so, however, with strong objections to certain provisions, which I am determined to correct. First, while the Act preserves the national nutritional safety net, its cuts to the Food Stamp program are too deep. Among other things, the Act reinstates a maximum on the amount that can be deducted for shelter costs when determining a household’s eligibility for Food Stamps. This provision will disproportionately affect low-income families with children and high housing costs. Second, I am deeply disappointed that this legislation would deny Federal assistance to legal immigrants and their children, and give States the option of doing

the same. My Administration supports holding sponsors who bring immigrants into this country more responsible for their well-being. Legal immigrants and their children, however, should not be penalized if they become disabled and require medical assistance through no fault of their own. Neither should they be deprived of food stamp assistance without proper procedures or due regard for individual circumstances. Therefore, I will direct the Immigration and Naturalization Service to accelerate its unprecedented progress in removing all bureaucratic obstacles that stand in the way of citizenship for legal immigrants who are eligible. In addition, I will take any possible executive actions to avoid inaccurate or inequitable decisions to cut off food stamp benefits---for example, to a legal immigrant who has performed military service for this country or to one who has applied for and satisfied all the requirements of citizenship, but is awaiting governmental approval of his or her application. In addition to placing an undue hardship on affected individuals, denial of Federal assistance to legal immigrants will shift costs to States, localities, hospitals, and medical clinics that serve large immigrant populations. Furthermore, States electing to deny these individuals assistance could be faced with serious constitutional challenges and protracted legal battles. I have concerns about other provisions of this legislation as well. It fails to provide sufficient contingency funding for States that experience a serious economic downturn, and it fails to provide Food Stamp support to childless adults who want to work, but cannot find a job or are not given the opportunity to participate in a work program. In addition, we must work to ensure that States provide in-kind vouchers to children whose parents reach the 5-year Federal time limit without finding work. This Act gives States the responsibility that they have sought to reform the welfare system. This is a profound responsibility, and States must face it squarely. We will hold them accountable, insisting that they fulfill their duty to move people from welfare to work and to do right by our most vulnerable citizens, including children and battered women. I challenge each State to take advantage of its new flexibility to use money formerly available for welfare checks to encourage the private sector to provide jobs. The best antipoverty program is still a job. Combined with the newly increased minimum wage and the Earned Income Tax Credit---which this legislation maintains---H.R. 3734 will make work pay for more Americans. I am determined to work with the Congress in a bipartisan effort to correct the provisions of this

386 Contemporary American Politics legislation that go too far and have nothing to do with welfare reform. But, on balance, this bill is a real step forward for our country, for our values, and for people on welfare. It should represent not simply the ending of a system that too often hurts those it is supposed to help, but the beginning of a new era in which welfare will become what it was meant to be: a second chance, not a way of life. It is now up to all of us---States and cities, the Federal Government, businesses and ordinary citizens---to work together to make the promise of this new day real. WILLIAM J. CLINTON THE WHITE HOUSE, August 22, 1996.

10.9 William Jefferson Clinton Articles of Impeachment, 1998 Resolution Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors. Resolved, That William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors and that the following articles of impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate: Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

Article I In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that: On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before a Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and

misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.

Article III In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding. The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme included one or more of the following acts: (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading. (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness

10.10 Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that proceeding. (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against him. (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to him. (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that judge. (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness. (7) On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law

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and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.

10.10 Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech, February 21, 2000 Speech announcing Ralph Nader’s candidacy for the Green Party’s nomination for president, Washington, D.C. Today I wish to explain why, after working for years as a citizen advocate for consumers, workers, taxpayers, and the environment, I am seeking the Green Party’s nomination for president. A crisis of democracy in our country convinces me to take this action. Over the past twenty years, big business has increasingly dominated our political economy. This control by the corporate government over our political government is creating a widening ‘‘democracy gap.’’ Active citizens are left shouting their concerns over a deep chasm between them and their government. This state of affairs is a world away from the legislative milestones in civil rights, the environment, and health and safety of workers and consumers seen in the sixties and seventies. At that time, informed and dedicated citizens powered their concerns through the channels of government to produce laws that bettered the lives of millions of Americans. Today we face grave and growing societal problems in health care, education, labor, energy, and the environment. These are problems for which active citizens have solutions, yet their voices are not carrying across the democracy gap. Citizen groups and individual thinkers have generated a tremendous capital of ideas, information, and solutions to the point of surplus, while our government has been drawn away from us by a corporate government. Our political leadership has been hijacked. Citizen advocates have no other choice but to close the democracy gap by direct political means. Only effective national political leadership will restore the responsiveness of government to its citizenry. Truly progressive political movements do not just produce more good results, they enable a flowering of

388 Contemporary American Politics progressive citizen movements to effectively advance the quality of our neighborhoods and communities outside of politics. I have a personal distaste for the trappings of modern politics, in which incumbents and candidates daily extol their own inflated virtues, paint complex issues with trivial brushstrokes, and propose plans quickly generated by campaign consultants. But I can no longer stomach the systemic political decay that has weakened our democracy. I can no longer watch people dedicate themselves to improving their country while their government leaders turn their backs, or worse, actively block fair treatment for citizens. It is necessary to launch a sustained effort to wrest control of our democracy from the corporate government and restore it to the political government under the control of citizens. This campaign will challenge all Americans who are concerned with systemic imbalances of power and the undermining of our democracy, whether they consider themselves progressives, liberals, conservatives, or others. Presidential elections should be a time for deep discussions among the citizenry regarding the downto-earth problems and injustices that are not addressed because of the gross power mismatch between the narrow vested interests and the public or common good. The unconstrained behavior of big business is subordinating our democracy to the control of a corporate plutocracy that knows few self-imposed limits to the spread of its power to all sectors of our society. Moving on all fronts to advance narrow profit motives at the expense of civic values, large corporate lobbies and their law firms have produced a commanding, multifaceted, and powerful juggernaut. They flood public elections with cash, and they use their media conglomerates to exclude, divert, or propagandize. They brandish their willingness to close factories here and open them abroad if workers do not bend to their demands. By their control in Congress, they keep the federal cops off the corporate crime, fraud, and abuse beats. They imperiously demand and get a wide array of privileges and immunities: tax escapes, enormous corporate welfare subsidies, federal giveaways, and bailouts. They weaken the common law of torts in order to avoid their responsibility for injurious wrongdoing to innocent children, women, and men. Abuses of economic power are nothing new. Every major religion in the world has warned about societies allowing excessive influences of mercantile or commercial values. The profiteering motive is driven and single-minded. When unconstrained, it can override or erode community, health, safety, parental nurturing,

due process, clean politics, and many other basic social values that hold together a society. Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Supreme Court Justices Louis Brandeis and William Douglas, among others, eloquently warned about what Thomas Jefferson called ‘‘the excesses of the monied interests’’ dominating people and their governments. The struggle between the forces of democracy and plutocracy has ebbed and flowed throughout our history. Each time the cycle of power has favored more democracy, our country has prospered (‘‘a rising tide lifts all boats’’). Each time the cycle of corporate plutocracy has lengthened, injustices and shortcomings proliferate. In the sixties and seventies, for example, when the civil rights, consumer, environmental, and women’s rights movements were in their ascendancy, there finally was a constructive responsiveness by government. Corporations, such as auto manufacturers, had to share more decision making with affected constituencies, both directly and through their public representatives and civil servants. Overall, our country has come out better, more tolerant, safer, and with greater opportunities. The earlier nineteenth-century democratic struggles by abolitionists against slavery, by farmers against large oppressive railroads and banks, and later by new trade unionists against the brutal workplace conditions of the early industrial and mining era helped mightily to make America and its middle class what they are today. They demanded that economic power subside or be shared. Democracy works, and a stronger democracy works better for reputable, competitive markets, equal opportunity, and higher standards of living and justice. Generally, it brings out the best performances from people and from businesses. A plutocracy---rule by the rich and powerful---on the other hand, obscures our historical quests for justice. Harnessing political power to corporate greed leaves us with a country that has far more problems than it deserves, while blocking ready solutions or improvements from being applied. It is truly remarkable that for almost every widespread need or injustice in our country, there are citizens, civic groups, small and medium-size businesses, and farms that have shown how to meet these needs or end these injustices. However, all the innovative solutions in the world will accomplish little if the injustices they address or the problems they solve have been shoved aside because plutocracy reigns and democracy wanes. For all optimistic Americans, when their issues are thus swept from the table, it becomes civic mobilization time.

10.10 Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech Consider the economy, which business commentators say could scarcely be better. If, instead of corporate yardsticks, we use human yardsticks to measure the performance of the economy and go beyond the quantitative indices of annual economic growth, structural deficiencies become readily evident. The complete dominion of traditional yardsticks for measuring economic prosperity masks not only these failures but also the inability of a weakened democracy to address how and why a majority of Americans are not benefiting from this prosperity in their daily lives. Despite record economic growth, corporate profits, and stock market highs year after year, a stunning array of deplorable conditions still prevails year after year. For example: • A majority of workers are making less now, inflation adjusted, than in 1979. • Over 20 percent of children were growing up in poverty during the past decade, by far the highest among comparable Western countries. • The minimum wage is lower today, inflation adjusted, than in 1968. • American workers are working longer and longer hours---on average an additional 163 hours per year, compared to twenty years ago-with less time for family and community. • Many full-time family farms cannot make a living in a market of giant buyer concentration and industrial agriculture. • The public works (infrastructure) are crumbling, with decrepit schools and clinics, library closings, antiquated mass transit, and more. • Corporate welfare programs, paid for largely by middle-class taxpayers and amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars per year, continue to rise along with government giveaways of taxpayer assets such as public forests, minerals, and new medicines. • Affordable housing needs are at record levels while secondary mortgage market companies show record profits. • The number of Americans without health insurance grows every year. • There have been twenty-five straight years of growing foreign trade deficits ($270 billion in 1999). • Consumer debt is at an all-time high, totaling over $6 trillion. • Personal bankruptcies are at a record level.

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• Personal savings are dropping to record lows and personal assets are so low that Bill Gates’s net worth is equal to that of the net assets of the poorest 120 million Americans combined. • The tiny federal budgets for the public’s health and safety continue to be grossly inadequate. • Motor vehicle fuel efficiency averages are actually declining and, overall, energy conservation efforts have slowed, while renewable energy takes a backseat to fossil fuel and atomic power subsidies. • Wealth inequality is greater than at any time since World War II. The top 1 percent of the wealthiest people have more financial wealth than the bottom 90 percent of Americans combined, the worst inequality among large Western nations. • Despite annual declines in total business liability costs, business lobbyists drive for more privileges and immunities for their wrongdoing. It is permissible to ask, in the light of these astonishing shortcomings during a period of touted prosperity, what the state of our country would be should a recession or depression occur? One import of these contrasts is clear: Economic growth has been decoupled from economic progress for many Americans. In the early 1970s, our economy split into two tiers. Whereas once economic growth broadly benefited the majority, now the economy has become one wherein ‘‘a rising tide lifts all yachts,’’ in the words of Jeff Gates, author of The Ownership Solution. Returns on capital outpaced returns on labor, and job insecurity increased for millions of seasoned workers. In the seventies, the top three hundred CEOs paid themselves forty times the entry-level wage in their companies. Now the average is over four hundred times. This in an economy where impoverished assembly line workers suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome frantically process chickens that pass them in a continuous flow, where downsized white- and blue-collar employees are hired at lesser compensation, if they are lucky, where the focus of top business executives is no longer to provide a service that attracts customers but rather to acquire customers through mergers and acquisitions. How long can the paper economy of speculation ignore its effects on the real economy of working families? Pluralistic democracy has enlarged markets and created the middle class. Yet the short-term monetized minds of the corporatists are bent on weakening, defeating, diluting, diminishing, circumventing, coopting, or corrupting all traditional countervailing

390 Contemporary American Politics forces that have saved American corporate capitalism from itself. Regulation of food, automobiles, banks, and securities, for example, strengthened these markets along with protecting consumers and investors. Antitrust enforcement helped protect our country from monopoly capitalism and stimulated competition. Trade unions enfranchised workers and helped mightily to build the middle class for themselves, benefiting also nonunion laborers. Producer and consumer cooperatives helped save the family farm, electrified rural areas, and offered another model of economic activity. Civil litigation---the right to have your day in court---helped deter producers of harmful products and brought them to some measure of justice. At the same time, the public learned about these hazards. Public investment---from naval shipyards to Pentagon drug discoveries against infectious disease to public power authorities---provided yardsticks to measure the unwillingness of big business to change and respond to needs. Even under a rigged system, shareholder pressures on management sometimes have shaken complacency, wrongdoing, and mismanagement. Direct consumer remedies, including class actions, have given pause to crooked businesses and have stopped much of this unfair competition against honest businesses. Big-business lobbies opposed all of this progress strenuously, but they finally lost and America gained. Ultimately, so did a chastened but myopic business community. Now, these checkpoints face a relentless barrage from rampaging corporate titans assuming more control over elected officials, the workplace, the marketplace, technology, capital pools (including workers’ pension trusts), and educational institutions. One clear sign of the reign of corporations over our government is that the key laws passed in the sixties and seventies that we use to curb corporate misbehavior would not even pass through congressional committees today. Planning ahead, multinational corporations shaped the World Trade Organization’s autocratic and secretive governing procedures so as to undermine nontrade health, safety, and other living standard laws and proposals in member countries. Up against the corporate government, voters find themselves asked to choose between look-alike candidates from two parties vying to see who takes the marching orders from their campaign paymasters and their future employers. The money of vested interests nullifies genuine voter choice and trust. Our elections have been put out for auction to the highest bidder.

Public elections must be publicly financed, and it can be done with well-promoted voluntary checkoffs and free TV and radio time for ballot-qualified candidates. Workers are disenfranchised more than any time since the 1920s. Many unions stagger under stagnant leadership and discouraged rank and file. Furthermore, weak labor laws actually obstruct new trade union organization and leave the economy with the lowest percentage of workers unionized in more than sixty years. Giant multinationals are pitting countries against one another and escaping national jurisdictions more and more. Under these circumstances, workers are entitled to stronger labor organizing laws and rights for their own protection in order to deal with highly organized corporations. At a very low cost, government can help democratic solution building for a host of problems that citizens face, from consumer abuses to environmental degradation. Government research and development generated whole new industries and company startups and created the Internet. At the least, our government can facilitate the voluntary banding together of interested citizens into democratic civic institutions. Such civic organizations can create more level playing fields in the banking, insurance, real estate, transportation, energy, health care, cable TV, educational, public service, and other sectors. Let’s call this the flowering of a deep-rooted democratic society. A government that funnels your tax dollars to corporate welfare kings in the form of subsidies, bailouts, guarantees, and giveaways of valuable public assets can at least invest in promoting healthy democracy. Taxpayers have very little legal standing in the federal courts and little indirect voice in the assembling and disposition of taxpayer revenues. Closer scrutiny of these matters between elections is necessary. Facilities can be established to accomplish a closer oversight of taxpayer assets and how tax dollars (apart from social insurance) are allocated. This is an arena that is, at present, shaped heavily by corporations that, despite record profits, pay far less in taxes as a percent of the federal budget than in the 1950s and 60s. The ‘‘democracy gap’’ in our politics and elections spells a deep sense of powerlessness by people who drop out, do not vote, or listlessly vote for the ‘‘least worst’’ every four years and then wonder why after another cycle the ‘‘least worst’’ gets worse. It is time to redress fundamentally these imbalances of power. We need a deep initiatory democracy in the embrace of its citizens, a usable brace of democratic tools that brings the best out of people, highlights the humane

10.10 Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech ideas and practical ways to raise and meet our expectations and resolve our society’s deficiencies and injustices. A few illustrative questions can begin to raise our expectations and suggest what can be lost when the few and powerful hijack our democracy: • Why can’t the wealthiest nation in the world abolish the chronic poverty of millions of working and nonworking Americans, including our children? • Are we reversing the disinvestment in our distressed inner cities and rural areas and using creatively some of the huge capital pools in the economy to make these areas more livable, productive, and safe? • Are we able to end homelessness and wretched housing conditions with modern materials, designs, and financing mechanisms, without bank and insurance company redlining, to meet the affordable housing needs of millions of Americans? • Are we getting the best out of known ways to spread renewable, efficient energy throughout the land to save consumers money and to head off global warming and other land-based environmental damage from fossil fuels and atomic energy? • Are we getting the best out of the many bright and public-spirited civil servants who know how to improve governments but are rarely asked by their politically appointed superiors or members of Congress? • Are we able to provide wide access to justice for all aggrieved people so that we apply rigorously the admonition of Judge Learned Hand, ‘‘If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou Shall Not Ration Justice’’? • Can we extend overseas the best examples of our country’s democratic processes and achievements instead of annually using billions in tax dollars to subsidize corporate munitions exports, as Republican Senator Mark Hatfield always used to decry? • Can we stop the giveaways of our vast commonwealth assets and become better stewards of the public lands, better investors of trillions of dollars in worker pension monies, and allow broader access to the public airwaves and other assets now owned by the people but controlled by corporations?

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• Can we counter the coarse and brazen commercial culture, including television that daily highlights depravity and ignores the quiet civic heroisms in its communities, a commercialism that insidiously exploits childhood and plasters its logos everywhere? • Can we plan ahead as a society so we know our priorities and where we wish to go? Or do we continue to let global corporations remain astride the planet, corporatizing everything, from genes to education to the Internet to public institutions, in short, planning our futures in their image? If a robust civic culture does not shape the future, corporatism surely will. To address these and other compelling challenges, we must build a powerful, self-renewing civil society that focuses on ample justice so we do not have to desperately bestow limited charity. Such a culture strengthens existing civic associations and facilitates the creation of others to watch the complexities and technologies of a new century. Building the future also means providing the youngest of citizens with citizen skills that they can use to improve their communities. This is the foundation of our campaign, to focus on active citizenship, to create fresh political movements that will displace the control of the Democratic and Republican parties, two apparently distinct political entities that feed at the same corporate trough. They are in fact simply the two heads of one political duopoly, the DemRep Party. This duopoly does everything it can to obstruct the beginnings of new parties, including raising ballot access barriers, entrenching winner-take-all voting systems, and thwarting participation in debates at election times. As befits its name, the Green Party, whose nomination I seek, stands for the regeneration of American politics. The new populism that the Green Party represents involves motivated, informed voters who comprehend that ‘‘freedom is participation in power,’’ to quote the ancient Roman orator Cicero. When citizen participation flourishes, as this campaign will encourage it to do, human values can tame runaway commercial imperatives. The myopia of the short-term bottom line so often debases our democratic processes and our public and private domains. Putting human values first helps to make business responsible and to put government on the right track. It is easy and true to say that this deep democracy campaign will be an uphill one. However, it is also true

392 Contemporary American Politics that widespread reform will not flourish without a fairer distribution of power for the key roles of voter, citizen, worker, taxpayer, and consumer. Comprehensive reform proposals from the corporate suites to the nation’s streets, from the schools to the hospitals, from the preservation of small farm economies to the protection of privacies, from livable wages to sustainable environments, from more time for children to less time for commercialism, from waging peace and health to averting war and violence, from foreseeing and forestalling future troubles to journeying toward brighter horizons, will wither while power inequalities loom over us. Why are campaigns just for candidates? I would like the American people to hear from individuals such as Edgar Cahn (Time Dollars for neighborhoods), Nicholas Johnson (television and telecommunications), Paul Hawken, Amory and Hunter Lovins (energy and resource conservation), Dee Hock (on chaordic organizations), James MacGregor Burns and John Gardner (on leadership), Richard Grossman (on the American history of corporate charters and personhood), Jeff Gates (on capital sharing), Robert Monks (on corporate accountability), Ray Anderson (on his company’s pollution and recycling conversions), Johnnetta Cole, Troy Duster, and Yolanda Moses (on race relations), Richard Duran (on minority education), Lois Gibbs (on community mobilization against toxics), Robert McIntyre (on tax justice), Hazel Henderson (on redefining economic development), Barry Commoner and David Brower (on fundamental environmental regeneration), Wendell Berry (on the quality of living), Tony Mazzochi (on a new agenda for labor), and law professor Richard Parker (on a constitutional popular manifesto). These individuals are a small sampling of many who have so much to say but seldom get through the ever more entertainment-focused media. (Note: Mention of these people does not imply their support for this campaign.) Our political campaign will highlight active and productive citizens who practice democracy often in the most difficult of situations. I intend to do this in the District of Columbia, whose citizens have no fullvoting representation in Congress or other rights accorded to states. The scope of this campaign is also to engage as many volunteers as possible to help overcome ballot barriers and to get the vote out. In addition it is designed to leave a momentum after Election Day for the various causes that committed people have worked so hard to further. For the Greens know that political parties need also to work between elections to make elections meaningful. The focus on

fundamentals of broader distribution of power is the touchstone of this campaign. As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis declared for the ages, ‘‘We can have a democratic society or we can have great concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. We cannot have both.’’ Thank you.

10.11 USA Patriot Act, 2001 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate) Title I---Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism SEC. 101. COUNTERTERRORISM FUND. (a) ESTABLISHMENT; AVAILABILITY. There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States a separate fund to be known as the ‘Counterterrorism Fund’, amounts in which shall remain available without fiscal year limitation--(1) to reimburse any Department of Justice component for any costs incurred in connection with--(A) reestablishing the operational capability of an office or facility that has been damaged or destroyed as the result of any domestic or international terrorism incident; (B) providing support to counter, gate, or prosecute domestic or tional terrorism, including, limitation, paying rewards in tion with these activities; and

investiinternawithout connec-

(C) conducting terrorism threat assessments of Federal agencies and their facilities; and (2) to reimburse any department or agency of the Federal Government for any costs incurred in connection with detaining in foreign countries individuals accused of acts

10.11 USA Patriot Act 393 of terrorism that violate the laws of the United States.

Asia, must be protected, and that every effort must be taken to preserve their safety;

(b) NO EFFECT ON PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS. Subsection (a) shall not be construed to affect the amount or availability of any appropriation to the Counterterrorism Fund made before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans be condemned; and

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS. (a) FINDINGS. findings:

Congress

makes

the

following

(1) Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia play a vital role in our Nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of every American. (2) The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States should be and are condemned by all Americans who value freedom. (3) The concept of individual responsibility for wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and applies equally to all religious, racial, and ethnic groups. (4) When American citizens commit acts of violence against those who are, or are perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim descent, they should be punished to the full extent of the law. (5) Muslim Americans have become so fearful of harassment that many Muslim women are changing the way they dress to avoid becoming targets. (6) Many Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have acted heroically during the attacks on the United States, including Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a 23-year-old New Yorker of Pakistani descent, who is believed to have gone to the World Trade Center to offer rescue assistance and is now missing. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that--(1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South

(3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.

SEC. 103. INCREASED FUNDING FOR THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. There are authorized to be appropriated for the Technical Support Center established in section 811 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132) to help meet the demands for activities to combat terrorism and support and enhance the technical support and tactical operations of the FBI, $200,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004. SEC. 104. REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE PROHIBITION IN CERTAIN EMERGENCIES. Section 2332e of title 18, United States Code, is amended--(1) by striking ‘2332c’ and inserting ‘2332a’; and (2) by striking ‘chemical’. SEC. 105. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ELECTRONIC CRIME TASK FORCE INITIATIVE. The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take appropriate actions to develop a national network of electronic crime task forces, based on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force model, throughout the United States, for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment systems. SEC. 106. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY. Section 203 of the International Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) is amended--(1) in subsection (a)(1)--(A) at the end of subparagraph (A) (flush to that subparagraph), by striking; ‘and’ and inserting a comma and the following: ‘by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;’; (B) in subparagraph (B)--(i) by inserting, ‘block during the pendency of an investigation’ after ‘investigate’; and

394 Contemporary American Politics (ii) by striking ‘interest;’ and inserting ‘interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and’; (C) by striking ‘by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’; and (D) by inserting at the end the following: ‘(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.’; and (2) by inserting at the end the following: ‘(c) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.’.

Title II---Enhanced Surveillance Procedures SEC. 201. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM. Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--(1) by redesignating paragraph (p), as so redesignated by section 434(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1274), as paragraph (r); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (p), as so redesignated by section 201(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009-565), the following new paragraph: ‘(q) any criminal violation of section 229 (relating to chemical weapons); or sections 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332d, 2339A, or 2339B of this title (relating to terrorism); or’. SEC. 202. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE OFFENSES. Section 2516(1)(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘and section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), and inserting ‘section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), a felony violation of section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse),’. SEC. 203. AUTHORITY TO SHARE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION. (a) AUTHORITY TO INFORMATION-

SHARE

GRAND

JURY

(1) IN GENERAL. Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows: ‘(C)(i) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made--(I) ‘when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; (II) ‘when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury; (III) ‘when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another Federal grand jury; (IV) ‘when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of State criminal law, to an appropriate official of a State or subdivision of a State for the purpose of enforcing such law; or (V) ‘when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign

10.11 USA Patriot Act 395 intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. ‘(ii) If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct. ‘(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made. ‘(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term ‘foreign intelligence information’ means--(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--‘(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; ‘(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or ‘(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power; or ‘(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.’

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. Rule 6(e)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended by striking ‘(e)(3)(C)(i)’ and inserting ‘(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)’. (b) AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL INTERCEPTION INFORMATION(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT. Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following: ‘(6) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney for the Government, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in subsection (19) of section 2510 of this title), to assist the official who is to receive that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.’. (2) DEFINITION. Section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by--(A) in paragraph (17), by striking ‘and’ after the semicolon; (B) in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting ; ‘and’; and (C) by inserting at the end the following: ‘(19) ‘foreign intelligence information’ means--‘(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--‘(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; ‘(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or ‘(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or ‘(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--‘(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or ‘(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.’

396 Contemporary American Politics (c) PROCEDURES. The Attorney General shall establish procedures for the disclosure of information pursuant to section 2517(6) and Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that identifies a United States person, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)). (d) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. (1) IN GENERAL. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) or foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (2) DEFINITION. In this subsection, the term ‘foreign intelligence information’ means--(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or (B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

10.12 American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU on the Patriot Act, 2002 The USA PATRIOT ACT and Government Actions That Threaten Our Civil Liberties (ACLU) With great haste and secrecy and in the name of the ‘‘war on terrorism,’’ Congress passed legislation that

gives the Executive Branch sweeping new powers that undermine the Bill of Rights and are unnecessary to keep us safe. This 342-page USA PATRIOT Act was passed on October 26, 2001, with little debate by Members of Congress, most of whom did not even read the bill. The Administration then initiated a flurry of executive orders, regulations, and policies and practices that also threatened our rights. New legislation and government actions take away our freedom Expands terrorism laws to include ‘‘domestic terrorism’’ which could subject political organizations to surveillance, wiretapping, harassment, and criminal action for political advocacy. Expands the ability of law enforcement to conduct secret searches, gives them wide powers of phone and Internet surveillance, and access to highly personal medical, financial, mental health, and student records with minimal judicial oversight. Allows FBI Agents to investigate American citizens for criminal matters without probable cause of crime if they say it is for ‘‘intelligence purposes.’’ Permits non-citizens to be jailed based on mere suspicion and to be denied re-admission to the US for engaging in free speech. Suspects convicted of no crime may be detained indefinitely in six month increments without meaningful judicial review. The USA PATRIOT Act: First Amendment---Freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and the press. Fourth Amendment---Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Fifth Amendment---No person to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Sixth Amendment---Right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, right to be informed of the facts of the accusation, right to confront witnesses and have the assistance of counsel. Eighth Amendment---No excessive bail or cruel and unusual punishment shall be imposed. Fourteenth Amendment---All persons (citizens and noncitizens) within the US are entitled to due process and the equal protection of the laws. What rights are being threatened? • 8,000 Arab and South Asian immigrants have been interrogated because of their religion or ethnic background, not because of actual wrongdoing. • Thousands of men, mostly of Arab and South Asian origin, have been held in secretive federal custody for weeks and months, sometimes without any charges filed against them. The government has refused to publish their names and whereabouts, even when ordered to do so by the courts.

10.13 George W. Bush, White House Report on No Child Left Behind Act 397 • The press and the public have been barred from immigration court hearings of those detained after September 11th and the courts are ordered to keep secret even that the hearings are taking place.

10.13 George W. Bush, White House Report on No Child Left Behind Act, 2001

• The government is allowed to monitor communications between federal detainees and their lawyers, destroying the attorney-client privilege and threatening the right to counsel.

Foreword

• New Attorney General Guidelines allow FBI spying on religious and political organizations and individuals without having evidence of wrongdoing. • President Bush has ordered military commissions to be set up to try suspected terrorists who are not citizens. They can convict based on hearsay and secret evidence by only twothirds vote. • American citizens suspected of terrorism are being held indefinitely in military custody without being charged and without access to lawyers.

New Federal Executive Branch Actions This lack of due process and accountability violates the rights extended to all persons, citizensand noncitizens, by the Bill of Rights. It resurrects the illegal COINTELPRO-type programs of the ’50’s, ’60’s, and ’70’s, where the FBI sought to disrupt and discredit thousands of individuals and groups engaged in legitimate political activity. The American Civil Liberties Union, along with thousands of organizations and individuals concerned with protecting our civil rights and civil liberties, is campaigning to ensure that our rights are not a casualty of the war on terrorism. Join us in this effort to regain our hard-won freedoms.

Bipartisan education reform will be the cornerstone of my Administration. The quality of our public schools directly affects us all as parents, as students, and as citizens. Yet too many children in America are segregated by low expectations, illiteracy, and self-doubt. In a constantly changing world that is demanding increasingly complex skills from its workforce, children are literally being left behind. It doesn’t have to be this way. Bipartisan solutions are within our reach. If our country fails in its responsibility to educate every child, were likely to fail in many other areas. But if we succeed in educating our youth, many other successes will follow throughout our country and in the lives of our citizens. This blueprint represents part of my agenda for education reform. Though it does not encompass every aspect of the education reforms I plan to propose, this blueprint will serve as a framework from which we can all work together Democrat, Republican, and Independent to strengthen our elementary and secondary schools. Taken together, these reforms express my deep belief in our public schools and their mission to build the mind and character of every child, from every background, in every part of America. And I am very open to working with Members of Congress who have additional ideas to meet our shared goals. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that no child is left behind . . .

Executive Summary • Support a resolution in your city rejecting the USA PATRIOT Act, joining your city with others across the country in upholding the Bill of Rights. • Contact your elected representatives and the President to express your opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act. • Send letters to local newspapers. Organize discussions in your schools, organizations and religious institutions. What can be done? Become a member of the ACLU. Because freedom can’t protect itself. For more information, go to www.aclu.org/ safeandfree.

‘‘If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.’’ Thomas Jefferson, 1816

Transforming the Federal Role in Education So That No Child is Left Behind As America enters the 21st Century full of hope and promise, too many of our neediest students are being left behind.

398 Contemporary American Politics Today, nearly 70 percent of inner city fourth graders are unable to read at a basic level on national reading tests. Our high school seniors trail students in Cyprus and South Africa on international math tests. And nearly a third of our college freshmen find they must take a remedial course before they are able to even begin regular college level courses. Although education is primarily a state and local responsibility, the federal government is partly at fault for tolerating these abysmal results. The federal government currently does not do enough to reward success and sanction failure in our education system. Since 1965, when the federal government embarked on its first major elementary-secondary education initiative, federal policy has strongly influenced America’s schools. Over the years Congress has created hundreds of programs intended to address problems in education without asking whether or not the programs produce results or knowing their impact on local needs. This ‘‘program for every problem’’ solution has begun to add up---so much so that there are hundreds of education programs spread across 39 federal agencies at a cost of $120 billion a year. Yet, after spending billions of dollars on education, we have fallen short in meeting our goals for educational excellence. The academic achievement gap between rich and poor, Anglo and minority is not only wide, but in some cases is growing wider still. In reaction to these disappointing results, some have decided that there should be no federal involvement in education. Others suggest we merely add new programs into the old system. Surely, there must be another way a way that points to a more effective federal role. The priorities that follow are based on the fundamental notion that an enterprise works best when responsibility is placed closest to the most important activity of the enterprise, when those responsible are given greatest latitude and support, and when those responsible are held accountable for producing results. This education blueprint will:

• Reduce Bureaucracy and Increase Flexibility: Additional flexibility will be provided to states and school districts, and flexible funding will be increased at the local level. • Empower Parents: Parents will have more information about the quality of their child’s school. Students in persistently low-performing schools will be given choice. Though these priorities do not address reforms in every federal education program, they do address a general vision for reforming the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and linking federal dollars to specific performance goals to ensure improved results. Details about other programs and priorities will be provided at a later date. Our priorities in this blueprint consist of seven performance-based titles: I. Improving the academic performance of disadvantaged students II. Boosting teacher quality III. Moving limited English proficient students to English fluency IV. Promoting informed parental choice and innovative programs V. Encouraging safe schools for the 21st Century VI. Increasing funding for Impact Aid VII. Encouraging freedom and accountability There will be additional funds targeted to needy schools and districts. States and school districts will have the flexibility to produce results, and may lose funds if performance goals are not met. In America, no child should be left behind. Every child should be educated to his or her full potential. This proposal sets forth the Presidents proposed framework to accomplish that goal. This Administration will work with Congress to ensure that this happens quickly, and in a bipartisan manner.

• Increase Accountability for Student Performance: States, districts and schools that improve achievement will be rewarded. Failure will be sanctioned. Parents will know how well their child is learning, and that schools are held accountable for their effectiveness with annual state reading and math assessments in grades 3-8.

The Policy The Administration’s education reform agenda is comprised of the following key components, many of which would be implemented during the re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA): Closing the Achievement Gap:

• Focus on What Works: Federal dollars will be spent on effective, research based programs and practices. Funds will be targeted to improve schools and enhance teacher quality.

• Accountability and High Standards. States, school districts, and schools must be accountable for ensuring that all students, including disadvantaged

10.13 George W. Bush, White House Report on No Child Left Behind Act 399 students, meet high academic standards. States must develop a system of sanctions and rewards to hold districts and schools accountable for improving academic achievement. • Annual Academic Assessments. Annual reading and math assessments will provide parents with the information they need to know how well their child is doing in school, and how well the school is educating their child. Further, annual data is a vital diagnostic tool for schools to achieve continuous improvement. With adequate time for planning and implementation, each state may select and design assessments of their choosing. In addition, a sample of students in each state will be assessed annually with the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 4th and 8th grade assessment in reading and math. • Consequences for Schools that Fail to Educate Disadvantaged Students. Schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress for disadvantaged students will first receive assistance, and then come under corrective action if they still fail to make progress. If schools fail to make adequate yearly progress for three consecutive years, disadvantaged students may use Title I funds to transfer to a higher-performing public or private school, or receive supplemental educational services from a provider of choice. Improving Literacy by Putting Reading First: • Focus on Reading in Early Grades. States that establish a comprehensive reading program anchored in scientific research from kindergarten to second grade will be eligible for grants under a new Reading First initiative. • Early Childhood Reading Instruction. States participating in the Reading First program will have the option to receive funding from a new ‘‘Early Reading First’’ program to implement researchbased pre-reading methods in pre-school programs, including Head Start centers. Expanding Flexibility, Reducing Bureaucracy:

multiple grant applications and incur the associated administrative burdens to obtain education technology funding. • Reduction in Bureaucracy. Overlapping and duplicative categorical grant programs will be consolidated and sent to states and school districts. • New State and Local Flexibility Options. A charter option for states and districts committed to accountability and reform will be created. Under this program, charter states and districts would be freed from categorical program requirements in return for submitting a five-year performance agreement to the Secretary of Education and being subject to especially rigorous standards of accountability. Rewarding Success and Sanctioning Failure: • Rewards for Closing the Achievement Gap. High performing states that narrow the achievement gap and improve overall student achievement will be rewarded. • Accountability Bonus for States. Each state will be offered a one-time bonus if it meets accountability requirements, including establishing annual assessments in grades 3-8, within two years of enacting this plan. • ‘‘No Child Left Behind’’ School Rewards. Successful schools that have made the greatest progress in improving the achievement of disadvantaged students will be recognized and rewarded with ‘‘No Child Left Behind’’ bonuses. • Consequences for Failure. The Secretary of Education will be authorized to reduce federal funds available to a state for administrative expenses if a state fails to meet their performance objectives and demonstrate results in academic achievement. Promoting Informed Parental Choice: • School Reports to Parents. Parents will be enabled to make informed choices about schools for their children by being given access to school-byschool report cards on student achievement for all groups of students.

• Title I Flexibility. More schools will be able to operate Title I schoolwide programs and combine federal funds with local and state funds to improve the quality of the entire school.

• Charter Schools. Funding will be provided to assist charter schools with start-up costs, facilities, and other needs associated with creating highquality schools.

• Increased Funds to Schools for Technology. E-rate funds and technology grant funds will be consolidated and distributed to schools through states and local districts based on need. This will also ensure that schools no longer have to submit

• Innovative School Choice Programs and Research. The Secretary of Education will award grants for innovative efforts to expand parental choice, as well as to conduct research on the effects of school choice.

400 Contemporary American Politics Improving Teacher Quality: • All Students Taught by Quality Teachers. States and localities will be given flexibility in the use of federal funds so that they may focus more on improving teacher quality. States will be expected to ensure that all children are taught by effective teachers. • Funding What Works. High standards for professional development will be set to ensure that federal funds promote research-based, effective practice in the classroom. • Strengthening Math and Science Education. K-12 math and science education will be strengthened through math and science partnerships for states to work with institutions of higher education to improve instruction and curriculum. Making Schools Safer for the 21st Century: • Teacher Protection. Teachers will be empowered to remove violent or persistently disruptive students from the classroom. • Promoting School Safety. Funding for schools will be increased to promote safety and drug prevention during and after school. States will be allowed to give consideration to religious organizations on the same basis as other nongovernmental organizations when awarding grants for after-school programs. • Rescuing Students from Unsafe Schools. Victims of school-based crimes or students trapped in persistently dangerous schools will be provided with a safe alternative. States must report to parents and the public whether a school is safe. • Supporting Character Education. Additional funds will be provided for Character Education grants to states and districts to train teachers in methods of incorporating character-building lessons and activities into the classroom.

Achieving Equality through High Standards and Accountability Title I (Part A: Closing the Achievement Gap for Disadvantaged Students) Overview The federal government can, and must, help close the achievement gap between disadvantaged students and their peers.

To meet that goal, the federal investment in Title I must be spent more effectively and with greater accountability. This proposal changes current law by requiring that states, school districts and schools receiving Title I funds ensure that students in all student groups meet high standards. Schools must have clear, measurable goals focused on basic skills and essential knowledge. Requiring annual state assessments in math and reading in grades 3-8 will ensure that the goals are being met for every child, every year. Annual testing in every grade gives teachers, parents and policymakers the information they need to ensure that children will reach academic success. Schools that fail to make sufficient progress should receive special assistance. Students should not be forced to attend persistently failing schools, and they must at some point be freed to attend adequate schools. Under this plan, disadvantaged students will not be required to sacrifice their education and future for the sake of preserving the status quo. Accountability for student performance must be accompanied by local control and flexibility. If schools are to be held to high standards, they must have the freedom to meet those standards. Summary of Proposals Close the achievement gap for disadvantaged students by providing states additional assistance and flexibility in return for implementing rigorous accountability for results: Sets High Standards. Most states have established standards for what students should know in reading and math. This proposal requires that states also set challenging content standards in history and science. Establishes Annual Assessments for Every Child in Grades 3-8. Annual reading and math assessments will provide parents with the information they need to know how well their child is doing in school, and how well the school is educating their child. With adequate time to plan and implement, states may select and design assessments of their choosing. The only requirement would be that the results in student achievement would be comparable from year to year. States will have three years to develop and implement the assessments. Federal funds will cover the cost of developing these assessments. Requires Progress Reports on All Student Groups. In keeping with current law, states will be required to report student assessment results to parents. In order to hold schools accountable for improving the performance of all students, these results must also be reported to the public disaggregated by race, gender, English

10.14 Grutter v. Bollinger et al. 401 language proficiency, disability, and socio-economic status. Expects Adequate Yearly Progress for Disadvantaged Students. Under current law, districts must determine whether each Title I school is making adequate yearly progress based on whether its students are meeting state content and performance standards. The status quo does not ensure, however, that disadvantaged students within each school make progress. Under this proposal, a states definition of adequate yearly progress must apply specifically to disadvantaged students, as well as to the overall student population. This expectation will serve to hold schools and districts accountable for improving the performance of disadvantaged students and to help educators, parents and others discern whether achievement gaps are closing. Helps States with Technical Assistance Funds to Help Turn Around Low-Performing Schools. Federal funds will be available to states and districts to augment their efforts to provide capacity building and technical assistance to schools identified as needing improvement. State technical assistance provided with these funds must be grounded in scientifically-based research. Increases Flexibility for Schools. Flexibility will be increased by lowering the schoolwide poverty threshold from 50 percent to 40 percent, so that more schools can combine their federal dollars to improve the quality of the school. Provides Corrective Action for Low-Performing Schools and Districts. Schools and districts that have not made adequate yearly progress for one academic year will be identified by the district or state as needing improvement. Immediately after identification, these schools will receive assistance to improve performance: • If the identified school still has not met adequate yearly progress after two years, the district must implement corrective action and offer public school choice to all students in the failing school. • If the school fails to make adequate progress after three years, disadvantaged students within the school may use Title I funds to transfer to a higher performing public or private school, or receive supplemental educational services from a provider of choice. All non-public providers receiving federal money will be subject to appropriate standards of accountability. • Students may continue to attend a school of choice for the duration of the time they would have attended the failing school. Choice options must continue to be offered until two years after

the school is no longer identified as being in need of improvement. • There will be an appropriate transition period for schools that have already been identified as needing improvement under current law. Rewards Schools and States That Narrow the Achievement Gap. Schools and states that make significant progress in closing the achievement gap will be honored with awards from a ‘‘No Child Left Behind’’ school bonus fund and an ‘‘Achievement in Education’’ state bonus fund. Puts in Place Consequences for Failure. States that fail to make adequate yearly progress for their disadvantaged students will be subject to losing a portion of their administrative funds. Sanctions will be based on a states failure to narrow the achievement gap in meeting adequate yearly progress requirements in math and reading in grades 3 through 8. Progress on state assessments will be confirmed by state results on an annual sampling of 4th and 8th grade students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in math and reading. Protects Homeschools and Private Schools. Federal requirements do not apply to home schools or private schools. Protections in current law would be maintained.

10.14 Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 539 U.S. 306 [2003] Grutter v. Bollinger et al. (excerpt) CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 02-241. Argued April 1, 2003 Decided June 23, 2003 JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful . . . The Law School ranks among the Nation’s top law schools. It receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of around 350 students. Seeking to ‘‘admit a group of students who individually and collectively are among the most capable,’’ the Law School looks for individuals with ‘‘substantial promise for success in law school’’ and ‘‘a strong likelihood of succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of others.’’ App. 110. More broadly, the Law School seeks ‘‘a mix of students

402 Contemporary American Politics with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other.’’ Ibid. In 1992, the dean of the Law School charged a faculty committee with crafting a written admissions policy to implement these goals. In particular, the Law School sought to ensure that its efforts to achieve student body diversity complied with this Court’s most recent ruling on the use of race in university admissions. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). Upon the unanimous adoption of the committee’s report by the Law School faculty, it became the Law School’s official admissions policy. The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential ‘‘to contribute to the learning of those around them.’’ App. 111. The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School. Id., at 83-84, 114-121. In reviewing an applicant’s file, admissions officials must consider the applicant’s undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score because they are important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school. Id., at 112. The policy stresses that ‘‘no applicant should be admitted unless we expect that applicant to do well enough to graduate with no serious academic problems.’’ Id., at 111. The policy makes clear, however, that even the highest possible score does not guarantee admission to the Law School. Id., at 113. Nor does a low score automatically disqualify an applicant. Ibid. Rather, the policy requires admissions officials to look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that are important to the Law School’s educational objectives. Id., at 114. Socalled ‘‘ ‘soft’ variables’’ such as ‘‘the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection’’ are all brought to bear in assessing an ‘‘applicant’s likely contributions to the intellectual and social life of the institution.’’ Ibid. The policy aspires to ‘‘achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.’’ Id., at 118. The policy does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for ‘‘substantial weight’’ in the admissions process, but instead recognizes

‘‘many possible bases for diversity admissions.’’ Id., at 118, 120. The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School’s longstanding commitment to ‘‘one particular type of diversity,’’ that is, ‘‘racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.’’ Id., at 120. By enrolling a ‘‘ ‘critical mass’ of [underrepresented] minority students,’’ the Law School seeks to ‘‘ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School.’’ Id., at 120-121. The policy does not define diversity ‘‘solely in terms of racial and ethnic status.’’ Id., at 121. Nor is the policy ‘‘insensitive to the competition among all students for admission to the [L]aw [S]chool.’’ Ibid. Rather, the policy seeks to guide admissions officers in ‘‘producing classes both diverse and academically outstanding, classes made up of students who promise to continue the tradition of outstanding contribution by Michigan Graduates to the legal profession.’’ Ibid. B Petitioner Barbara Grutter is a white Michigan resident who applied to the Law School in 1996 with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score. The Law School initially placed petitioner on a waiting list, but subsequently rejected her application. In December 1997, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Law School, the Regents of the University of Michigan, Lee Bollinger (Dean of the Law School from 1987 to 1994, and President of the University of Michigan from 1996 to 2002), Jeffrey Lehman (Dean of the Law School), and Dennis Shields (Director of Admissions at the Law School from 1991 until 1998). Petitioner alleged that respondents discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d; and Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1981 . . .

II A We last addressed the use of race in public higher education over 25 years ago. In the landmark Bakke case, we reviewed a racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100 seats in a medical school class for members of certain minority groups. 438 U. S. 265 (1978). The decision produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the Court. Four Justices

10.14 Grutter v. Bollinger et al. 403 would have upheld the program against all attack on the ground that the government can use race to ‘‘remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.’’ Id., at 325 (joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other Justices avoided the constitutional question altogether and struck down the program on statutory grounds. Id., at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell provided a fifth vote not only for invalidating the setaside program, but also for reversing the state court’s injunction against any use of race whatsoever. The only holding for the Court in Bakke was that a ‘‘State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.’’ Id., at 320. Thus, we reversed that part of the lower court’s judgment that enjoined the university ‘‘from any consideration of the race of any applicant.’’ Ibid. Since this Court’s splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell’s views on permissible race-conscious policies. See, e.g., Brief for Judith Areen et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13 (law school admissions programs employ ‘‘methods designed from and based on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke’’); Brief for Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae 27 (‘‘After Bakke, each of the amici (and undoubtedly other selective colleges and universities as well) reviewed their admissions procedures in light of Justice Powell’s opinion . . . and set sail accordingly’’). We therefore discuss Justice Powell’s opinion in some detail. Justice Powell began by stating that ‘‘[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.’’ Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289-290. In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental decisions ‘‘touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.’’ Id., at 299. Under this exacting standard, only one of the interests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell’s scrutiny.

First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in ‘‘ ‘reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession’ ’’ as an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id., at 306-307. Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties ‘‘who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.’’ Id., at 310. Third, Justice Powell rejected an interest in ‘‘increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved,’’ concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances the program under review was not ‘‘geared to promote that goal.’’ Id., at 306, 310. Justice Powell approved the university’s use of race to further only one interest: ‘‘the attainment of a diverse student body.’’ Id., at 311. With the important proviso that ‘‘constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded,’’ Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that ‘‘long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.’’ Id., at 312, 314 . . .

B The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall ‘‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §2. Because the Fourteenth Amendment ‘‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’’ all ‘‘governmental action based on race---a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited--should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.’’ Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe~ na, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are a ‘‘free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’’ Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It follows from that principle that ‘‘government may treat people differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons.’’ Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe~ na, 515 U. S., at 227. We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’’ Ibid. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. ‘‘Absent searching

404 Contemporary American Politics judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures,’’ we have no way to determine what ‘‘classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.’’ Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to ‘‘ ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.’’ Ibid. Strict scrutiny is not ‘‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’’ Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe~ na, supra, at 237 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, ‘‘whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.’’ 515 U. S., at 229-230. But that observation ‘‘says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.’’ Id., at 230. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied . . .

III A With these principles in mind, we turn to the question whether the Law School’s use of race is justified by a compelling state interest. Before this Court, as they have throughout this litigation, respondents assert only one justification for their use of race in the admissions process: obtaining ‘‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.’’ Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. In other words, the Law School asks us to recognize, in the context of higher education, a compelling state interest in student body diversity. We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School’s argument has been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke. It is true that some language in those opinions might be read to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based governmental action. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493 (plurality opinion)

(stating that unless classifications based on race are ‘‘strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility’’). But we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. Nor, since Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in the context of public higher education. Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225 (1985); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 96, n. 6 (1978); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell, J.). We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S., at 603 . . . As part of its goal of ‘‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse,’’ the Law School seeks to ‘‘enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.’’ Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 13. The Law School’s interest is not simply ‘‘to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’’ Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional. Ibid . . . These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions policy promotes ‘‘cross-racial understanding,’’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’’ App. to Pet.

10.14 Grutter v. Bollinger et al. 405 for Cert. 246a. These benefits are ‘‘important and laudable,’’ because ‘‘classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’’ when the students have ‘‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’’ Id., at 246a, 244a. The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’’ . . . These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae 3-4. What is more, highranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘‘[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,’’ a ‘‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.’’ . . . In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. As we have recognized, law schools ‘‘cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.’’ See Sweatt v. Painter, supra, at 634. Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America. The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’’ Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. 30. To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students. Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular

professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters. The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a ‘‘critical mass’’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body . . . The Law School’s current admissions program considers race as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race. Because a lottery would make that kind of nuanced judgment impossible, it would effectively sacrifice all other educational values, not to mention every other kind of diversity. So too with the suggestion that the Law School simply lower admissions standards for all students, a drastic remedy that would require the Law School to become a much different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its educational mission. The United States advocates ‘‘percentage plans,’’ recently adopted by public undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and California to guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in every high school in the State. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-18. The United States does not, however, explain how such plans could work for graduate and professional schools. More-over, even assuming such plans are race-neutral, they may preclude the university from conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university. We are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission . . .

IV In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Consequently, petitioner’s statutory claims based on Title VI and 42 U. S. C. §1981 also fail. See Bakke, supra, at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (‘‘Title VI . . . proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment’’); General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 389-391

406 Contemporary American Politics (1982) (the prohibition against discrimination in §1981 is co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause). The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, accordingly, is affirmed. It is so ordered.

10.15 George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on a Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 2003 THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. The Supreme Court will soon hear arguments in a case about admission policies and student diversity in public universities. I strongly support diversity of all kinds, including racial diversity in higher education. But the method used by the University of Michigan to achieve this important goal is fundamentally flawed. At their core, the Michigan policies amount to a quota system that unfairly rewards or penalizes perspective students, based solely on their race. So, tomorrow my administration will file a brief with the court arguing that the University of Michigan’s admissions policies, which award students a significant number of extra points based solely on their race, and establishes numerical targets for incoming minority students, are unconstitutional. Our Constitution makes it clear that people of all races must be treated equally under the law. Yet we know that our society has not fully achieved that ideal. Racial prejudice is a reality in America. It hurts many of our citizens. As a nation, as a government, as individuals, we must be vigilant in responding to prejudice wherever we find it. Yet, as we work to address the wrong of racial prejudice, we must not use means that create another wrong, and thus perpetuate our divisions. America is a diverse country, racially, economically, and ethnically. And our institutions of higher education should reflect our diversity. A college education should teach respect and understanding and goodwill. And these values are strengthened when students live and learn with people from many backgrounds. Yet quota systems that use race to include or exclude people from higher education and the opportunities it offers are divisive, unfair and impossible to square with the Constitution. In the programs under review by the Supreme Court, the University of Michigan has established an admissions process based on race. At the undergraduate level, African American students and some Hispanic students and Native American students receive 20 points out of a maximum of 150, not because of

any academic achievement or life experience, but solely because they are African American, Hispanic or Native American. To put this in perspective, a perfect SAT score is worth only 12 points in the Michigan system. Students who accumulate 100 points are generally admitted, so those 20 points awarded solely based on race are often the decisive factor. At the law school, some minority students are admitted to meet percentage targets while other applicants with higher grades and better scores are passed over. This means that students are being selected or rejected based primarily on the color of their skin. The motivation for such an admissions policy may be very good, but its result is discrimination and that discrimination is wrong. Some states are using innovative ways to diversify their student bodies. Recent history has proven that diversity can be achieved without using quotas. Systems in California and Florida and Texas have proven that by guaranteeing admissions to the top students from high schools throughout the state, including low income neighborhoods, colleges can attain broad racial diversity. In these states, race-neutral admissions policies have resulted in levels of minority attendance for incoming students that are close to, and in some instances slightly surpass, those under the old racebased approach. We should not be satisfied with the current numbers of minorities on Americans college campuses. Much progress has been made; much more is needed. University officials have the responsibility and the obligation to make a serious, effective effort to reach out to students from all walks of life, without falling back on unconstitutional quotas. Schools should seek diversity by considering a broad range of factors in admissions, including a student’s potential and life experiences. Our government must work to make college more affordable for students who come from economically disadvantaged homes. And because we’re committed to racial justice, we must make sure that America’s public schools offer a quality education to every child from every background, which is the central purpose of the education reforms I signed last year. America’s long experience with the segregation we have put behind us and the racial discrimination we still struggle to overcome requires a special effort to make real the promise of equal opportunity for all. My administration will continue to actively promote diversity and opportunity in every way that the law permits. Thank you very much.

10.16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

10.16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) YASER ESAM HAMDI and ESAM FOUAD HAMDI, as Next Friend of YASER ESAM HAMDI PETITIONERS v. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARYOF DEFENSE, et al. (excerpt) ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [June 28, 2004] JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer join. At this difficult time in our Nation’s history, we are called upon to consider the legality of the Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an ‘‘enemy combatant’’ and to address the process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge his classification as such. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner’s detention was legally authorized and that he was entitled to no further opportunity to challenge his enemycombatant label. We now vacate and remand. We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.

I On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network used hijacked commercial airliners to attack prominent targets in the United States. Approximately 3,000 people were killed in those attacks. One week later, in response to these ‘‘acts of treacherous violence,’’ Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to ‘‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks’’ or ‘‘harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.’’ Authorization for Use of Military Force (‘‘the AUMF’’), 115 Stat. 224. Soon thereafter, the President ordered United States Armed Forces to Afghanistan, with a mission to subdue al Qaeda and quell the Taliban regime that was known to support it. This case arises out of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up arms with the Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi. Born

407

an American citizen in Louisiana in 1980, Hamdi moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a child. By 2001, the parties agree, he resided in Afghanistan. At some point that year, he was seized by members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to the United States military. The Government asserts that it initially detained and interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan before transferring him to the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. In April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi is an American citizen, authorities transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he remained until a recent transfer to a brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contends that Hamdi is an ‘‘enemy combatant,’’ and that this status justifies holding him in the United States indefinitely--without formal charges or proceedings---unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is warranted . . .

II The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as ‘‘enemy combatants.’’ There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the ‘‘enemy combatant’’ that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was ‘‘ ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ ’’ in Afghanistan and who ‘‘ ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ ’’ there. Brief for Respondents 3. We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized. The Government maintains that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such authority, however, because we agree with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF . . . The AUMF authorizes the President to use ‘‘all necessary and appropriate force’’ against ‘‘nations, organizations, or persons’’ associated with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 224. There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist

408 Contemporary American Politics network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘‘necessary and appropriate force’’ Congress has authorized the President to use. The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘‘universal agreement and practice,’’ are ‘‘important incident[s] of war.’’ Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., at 28. The purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again. Naqvi, Doubtful Prisonerof-War Status, 84 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 571, 572 (2002) (‘‘[C]aptivity in war is ‘neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war’’’ (quoting decision of Nuremberg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 229 (1947)); W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920) (‘‘The time has long passed when ‘no quarter’ was the rule on the battlefield.. . . It is now recognized that ‘Captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,’ but ‘merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal character.’ . . . ‘A prisoner of war is no convict; his imprisonment is a simple war measure.’ ’’ (citations omitted); cf. In re Territo, 156 F. 2d 142, 145 (CA9 1946) (‘‘The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on must be removed as completely as practicable from the front, treated humanely, and in time exchanged, repatriated, or otherwise released’’ (footnotes omitted)). There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant. In Quirin, one of the detainees, Haupt, alleged that he was a naturalized United States citizen. 317 U. S., at 20. We held that ‘‘[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war.’’ Id., at 37-38. While Haupt was tried for violations of the law of war, nothing in Quirin suggests that his citizenship would have precluded his mere detention for the duration of the relevant hostilities. See id., at 30-31. See also Lieber Code, 153, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Order No. 100 (1863), reprinted in 2 Lieber, Miscellaneous Writings, p. 273 (contemplating, in code binding the Union Army

during the Civil War, that ‘‘captured rebels’’ would be treated ‘‘as prisoners of war’’). Nor can we see any reason for drawing such a line here. A citizen, no less than an alien, can be ‘‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’’ and ‘‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States,’’ Brief for Respondents 3; such a citizen, if released, would pose the same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict. In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘‘necessary and appropriate force,’’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here. Hamdi objects, nevertheless, that Congress has not authorized the indefinite detention to which he is now subject. The Government responds that ‘‘the detention of enemy combatants during World War II was just as ‘indefinite’ while that war was being fought.’’ Id., at 16. We take Hamdi’s objection to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the date on which the conflict will end, but to the substantial prospect of perpetual detention. We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the ‘‘war on terror,’’ although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, ‘‘given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement.’’ Ibid. The prospect Hamdi raises is therefore not far-fetched. If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life. It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities ... Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite or perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of ‘‘necessary and appropriate force’’ to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding

10.16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 409 may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan . . . Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 125 (1866), does not undermine our holding about the Government’s authority to seize enemy combatants, as we define that term today. In that case, the Court made repeated reference to the fact that its inquiry into whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction to try and punish Milligan turned in large part on the fact that Milligan was not a prisoner of war, but a resident of Indiana arrested while at home there. Id., at 118, 131. That fact was central to its conclusion. Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have been different. The Court’s repeated explanations that Milligan was not a prisoner of war suggest that had these different circumstances been present he could have been detained under military authority for the duration of the conflict, whether or not he was a citizen . . .

III Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status. Hamdi argues that he is owed a meaningful and timely hearing and that ‘‘extra-judicial detention [that] begins and ends with the submission of an affidavit based on thirdhand hearsay’’ does not comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brief for Petitioners 16. The Government counters that any more process than was provided below would be both unworkable and ‘‘constitutionally intolerable.’’ Brief for Respondents 46. Our resolution of this dispute requires a careful examination both of the writ of habeas corpus, which Hamdi now seeks to employ as a mechanism of judicial review, and of the Due Process Clause, which informs the procedural contours of that mechanism in this instance. A Though they reach radically different conclusions on the process that ought to attend the present proceeding, the parties begin on common ground. All agree that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States. U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2 (‘‘The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the

public Safety may require it’’). Only in the rarest of circumstances has Congress seen fit to suspend the writ . . .

1 It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case. Hamdi’s ‘‘private interest . . . affected by the official action,’’ ibid., is the most elemental of liberty interests---the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 80 (1992) (‘‘Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action’’); see also Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600 (1979) (noting the ‘‘substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily’’). ‘‘In our society liberty is the norm,’’ and detention without trial ‘‘is the carefully limited exception.’’ Salerno, supra, at 755. ‘‘We have always been careful not to ‘minimize the importance and fundamental nature’ of the individual’s right to liberty,’’ Foucha, supra, at 80 (quoting Salerno, supra, at 750), and we will not do so today. Nor is the weight on this side of the Mathews scale offset by the circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior, for ‘‘[i]t is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,’’ Jones v. United States, 463 U. S. 354, 361 (1983) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted), and at this stage in the Mathews calculus, we consider the interest of the erroneously detained individual. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259 (1978) (‘‘Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property’’); see also id., at 266 (noting ‘‘the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed,’’ and emphasizing that ‘‘the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions’’) . . .

2 On the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States. As discussed above, supra, at 10, the law of war and the realities of combat may render such detentions both necessary and appropriate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those realities. Without doubt,

410 Contemporary American Politics our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of the courts ‘‘to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs’’); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (acknowledging ‘‘broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war’’). The Government also argues at some length that its interests in reducing the process available to alleged enemy combatants are heightened by the practical difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like process. In its view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. Brief for Respondents 46-49. To the extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened procedures, they are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.

3 Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad . . . With due recognition of these competing concerns, we believe that neither the process proposed by the Government nor the process apparently envisioned by the District Court below strikes the proper constitutional balance when a United States citizen is detained in the United States as an enemy combatant. That is, ‘‘the risk of erroneous deprivation’’ of a detainee’s liberty interest is unacceptably high under the Government’s proposed rule, while some of the ‘‘additional or substitute procedural safeguards’’ suggested by the District Court are unwarranted in light of their limited ‘‘probable value’’ and the burdens they may impose on the military in such cases. Mathews, 424 U. S., at 335. We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant

must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) . . . ‘‘For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’ It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ’’ Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965) (other citations omitted)). These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded. At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria. A burdenshifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant. In the words of Mathews, process of this sort would sufficiently address the ‘‘risk of erroneous deprivation’’ of a detainee’s liberty interest while eliminating certain procedures that have questionable additional value in light of the burden on the Government. 424 U. S., at 335.2 We think it unlikely that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts. The parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized. The Government has made clear in its briefing that documentation regarding battlefield detainees already is kept in the ordinary

10.17 Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, Outsourcing America course of military affairs. Brief for Respondents 3-4. Any factfinding imposition created by requiring a knowledgeable affiant to summarize these records to an independent tribunal is a minimal one. Likewise, arguments that military officers ought not have to wage war under the threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged combatant’s acts. This focus meddles little, if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war, inquiring only into the appropriateness of continuing to detain an individual claimed to have taken up arms against the United States. While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 233-234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (‘‘[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled’’); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 401 (1932) (‘‘What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions’’). In sum, while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.

D In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to

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the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U. S., at 587. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake . . . Because we conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification, the proposed ‘‘some evidence’’ standard is inadequate. Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short . . .

10.17 Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, Outsourcing America, March 11, 2004 After two decades of devastation of the U.S. manufacturing sector and the permanent loss of millions of high-wage, good benefit, middle-class jobs, America is now threatened with a similar hollowing out of its service sector. Among the millions of service jobs threatened, now high paying, professional and technical career opportunities are also at serious risk due to the growing off-shoring trend. These losses are already contributing significantly to the current jobs crisis and further decline of the middle class, even as the Bush Administration endorses the exodus of so many American jobs as a ‘‘good thing,’’ as the administration stated in a report by the Council of Economic Advisors signed by the president. The labor movement has fought the flawed trade and tax policies of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s that rewarded companies for shipping American manufacturing jobs overseas. Today, we stand united in opposition to outsourcing away our best service-sector jobs as well. Like Americans everywhere, we believe that American corporations have a moral obligation to create and to keep good jobs in America. We support raising living standards around the world, but we steadfastly reject and resist any notion that improving living standards elsewhere requires sacrificing good jobs and living standards for American workers and their families. When manufacturing jobs started moving overseas in larger numbers, American workers were told by free trade ideologues not to worry, that the U.S. comparative advantage was in services---especially high-tech

412 Contemporary American Politics and other knowledge-based industries. We were assured that the new global division of labor was both natural and benign: we would keep the high-paying, highskilled jobs, while the workers in developing countries would do the actual work of making things. Displaced workers were smugly told to simply acquire new and better skills and more education in order to succeed in the changing American economy. Many workers did, but now they find that knowledge and talent can’t compete against the chase for higher profits and cheaper labor in the new global marketplace. Current trends in exporting these jobs and projections of its rapid acceleration threaten millions of highly skilled, well-educated workers. In the neverending pursuit of the lowest cost labor and the most exploitative working conditions, each month corporations are laying off tens of thousands of workers in the U.S. and shifting work in high tech, accounting, engineering, financial services, marketing, research, architecture, insurance, health care, telecommunications, the entertainment industry and other areas to offshore locations. The export of these professional and technical jobs affects both back office and front office occupations and operations. Even state and local governments are outsourcing taxpayer-supported public contracts---sometimes underwritten with federal grants---to firms that send the work overseas. Communities around the nation are seeing their best and brightest---once presumed to be insulated from the ravages of ‘‘free trade’’---devastated as they find themselves out of work, out of luck, and on the unemployment lines. Recent studies and analyses predict dire consequences should current trends continue unabated. What these reports make clear is that any work that can be digitized and transmitted through cyber-space is a target for export: Forrester Research Inc. predicts that American employers will move about 3.3 million white-collar service jobs and $136 billion in wages overseas in the next 15 years, up from $4 billion in 2000. Gartner Inc., a high-tech forcasting firm, estimates that 10 percent of computer services and software jobs will be moved overseas by the end of this year. A survey by Deloitte Research found that the world’s 100 largest financial services firms expect to shift $356 billion worth of operations and about two million jobs to low-wage countries over the next five years. The study also revealed that one-third of all major financial institutions in the world are already utilizing offshore outsourcing, with 75 percent reporting that they would be doing so within the next 24 months.

A recent study by INPUT Research, a market research firm in Reston, VA, projects that outsourcing of state and local government technology contracts will grow from $10 billion last year to $23 billion in 2008. A report published by the University of California at Berkeley projects that some 14 million jobs are at risk of being outsourced overseas, and that job losses will likely exceed what the Forrester study reports. Forrester, the Berkeley study says, ‘‘translates to a little over 250,000 [lost jobs] per year, a number that seems conservative, based on the rate of outsourcing over the last few years, the experience of outsourcing in manufacturing, the increasing ability of an increasing number of countries to compete for these jobs, the higher tradability of services due to better communications, increasing use of English and U.S. standards in business and commerce.’’ To support this contention, tabulations by the authors of the Berkeley report of Indian newspapers and business journals for just the month of July 2003 estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 new outsourcingrelated jobs were announced by U.S. firms. In the same month, there were 2,087 mass layoffs carried out by U.S. employers resulting in a loss of 226,435 jobs. Lost employment due to off-shoring across many industries has already had a severe impact on the U.S. labor market, stalled economic recovery and left policymakers alarmed about long-term prospects for job restoration. The August issue of a Federal Reserve Bank publication, ‘‘Current Issues in Economics and Finances,’’ determined that in the most recent downturn (beginning in March of 2001 and ending in November of 2001), 79 percent of the job losses were reported to be structural (permanent) and only 21 percent were cyclical (temporary). This compares to 49 percent and 51 percent, respectively, during the economic downturns of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Over time, much of this shift has been directly attributable to manufacturing jobs lost overseas that aren’t coming back. Despite the ongoing and permanent loss of good jobs, President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) recently opined that ‘‘when a good or service is produced more cheaply abroad, it makes more sense to import it than make or provide it domestically.’’ The CEA chairman, Greg Mankiw, went on to say ‘‘Outsourcing is just a new way of doing international trade . . . More things are tradable than were tradable in the past and that’s a good thing.’’ In other words, sending high paying U.S. jobs overseas is a centerpiece of Bush Administration economic policy. The off-shoring tidal wave also portends disastrous consequences for the U.S. trade deficit---which, at 5

10.17 Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, Outsourcing America percent of GDP already has global financial markets apprehensive. For 2003, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit hit more than half-a-trillion dollars---an all-time record. While this deficit has grown steadily since the early 1990s, our surplus in services has traditionally offset some of the goods deficit explosion. But the services surplus---at $88 billion just six years ago---began to decline in 2000 and in 2003 was only $60 billion. This downward slide is largely due to growth in imports of private services, which almost certainly reflects the white-collar outsourcing that has already been taking place. President Bush insults America’s professionals--many of whom are among the best educated in the world---by insisting that the rush to ship more jobs offshore is spurred by a lack of domestic skills or education. To the contrary, in June 2003, significantly more degrees were conferred in all categories than in the mid-1980s, as young people heeded advice to acquire more education. The trend toward increased qualification will continue: the Department of Education projects a steady and substantial annual increase in the number of associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, doctoral and first professional degrees conferred between 2004 and 2012, amounting to a total of 23,584,000 new degrees. Similarly, off-shoring jobs is not spurred by a lack of qualified workers, as there are more than enough. The unemployment rate for electrical, electronic, computer hardware and computer software engineers rose to 7 percent in the first quarter of 2003. Contrast this with the 1980s, when the unemployment rate for all workers reached 9.5 percent but fewer than 2 percent of electrical engineers were unemployed. Meanwhile unemployment among tech workers stands at a staggering 9 percent. The corporate drive to take advantage of workers with few rights and limited opportunities not only harms American workers, it drags workers everywhere into a race to the bottom. In India, services exporters are already setting up shop in rural areas rather than Bangalore to save money, and Indian firms are already setting up centers in China, where labor costs are a fraction of those at home. This perverse competition--based on the employer’s ability to keep wages artificially low by violating workers’ rights rather than the workforce’s skills and productivity---puts workers everywhere at risk and threatens the long-term health of the global economy. While off-shoring by companies wanting to exploit workers in other countries instead of hiring U.S. workers and graduates will be difficult to deter, public policies that aid and abet runaway

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corporations must change, and the U.S. must proactively develop a coherent and comprehensive employment policy: Tax Policies---Federal tax policies that encourage shipping U.S. jobs overseas must be replaced by tax incentives focused on job creation here. State and local corporate tax relief to ‘‘create jobs’’ often represents nothing more than tax giveaways for little, if any, job creation. Where they exist, these tax inducements should be targeted to companies that support their own communities with jobs that pay good wages and benefits and denied to companies that cause economic harm through off-shoring. Procurement---Federal, state and local contracts for services worth hundreds of billions of dollars should assure that American taxpayers are not subsidizing the flight of U.S. jobs. Economic Development---Taxpayer-funded economic incentives to corporations, often provided through direct grants designed to spur local job creation, must be carefully monitored by state and local governments to ensure that these subsidies are not awarded to businesses that export job opportunities. Given the off-shoring threat, it is now more important than ever to amend these programs to assure that they: 1) create family wage jobs with adequate benefits and provide solid protections for workers’ rights, including the right to organize into unions; 2) include effective disclosure requirements and oversight mechanisms; and 3) guarantee that government entities can ‘‘clawback’’ funds from a company that fails to meet its jobs targets. Research and Development---Government R&D funds should be denied to companies that transfer the technology, intellectual property and other byproducts of this investment overseas. Tax dollars that pay for this research should be invested in strengthening the national economy and creating domestic employment. Trade Agreements---Trade agreements must be fundamentally reformed to include enforceable protections for the rights of all workers---whether in manufacturing, agriculture, or services---to form independent unions, bargain with their employers, and reject child labor, forced labor and discrimination. Trade agreements should also allow appropriate space for countries to implement legitimate tax and procurement policies that support job creation in domestically oriented production, and for countries to implement safeguards and other trade remedies in response to import surges and unfair trade practices in the services sector.

414 Contemporary American Politics Guest Worker Visa Programs---Visa programs like H-1B and L-1 are in effect technology transfer pipelines that enable foreign professionals to gain knowledge and core competencies here and then take them, along with American jobs, when they return home. Employers take advantage of these programs to exploit foreign workers during their time in the U.S., and then to facilitate shipping jobs overseas. These programs---a major culprit behind the off-shoring epidemic---need major reform. Security---Export control laws need to be assessed and, if necessary, revised to assure that they can prevent the transfer of highly sensitive technology and other resources that could be adapted for purposes contrary to U.S. security or economic interests. Privacy---Privacy laws must assure that consumers’ highly sensitive, personal financial, medical, tax and other information is protected. At a minimum, companies trafficking in such data should be required to secure written authorization from the consumer before it is launched into cyberspace. Transparency---For services, consumers have the right to demand the same level of protection as they have under product disclosure laws. Customers dealing with help desks, call centers, reservation systems, etc. have the right to know with whom they are talking, which country they are calling, and have the right to have their call rerouted back to the U.S. if they so desire. Data Collection---More extensive federally funded research must be conducted on an ongoing basis to better understand the full scope of the off-shoring problem, and the federal government must put in place adequate data collection programs on jobs that move off-shore. This research should, among other things, include precise analysis of the economic costs of off-shoring, such as the loss of federal, state and local taxes and the increased burden to other taxpayers, the decline in purchasing power and its ripple effects on communities, as well as the social expenditures necessary to help unemployed workers and their families. Institutional Research---Tax-funded government and university research should not advance off-shoring strategies that export jobs. If work is done that promotes off-shoring, it should be funded by corporations, not taxpayers. Trade Adjustment Assistance---Currently, displaced service-sector workers are not eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance benefits, which only cover workers producing a tangible good. The TAA program needs to

be expanded to include service-sector workers, while also improved and fully funded, so that all displaced workers, in manufacturing and services, can receive the income support and training they are entitled to. Moreover, given funding shortfalls even under the program as limited to goods-producing workers, funding should be boosted significantly, so that every eligible worker is guaranteed to receive assistance and training benefits under the program. Other issues also need to be addressed. Our health care system adds significantly to the cost of doing business and makes U.S. products and services uncompetitive, even with the economies of developed nations. Health care reform is long overdue and, if we are to compete effectively in the global economy, it is imperative that the problem of sky-high health care costs be fixed. The WARN Act should be simplified and its coverage should be broadened. It should also be amended to require companies that lay off 15 or more workers to send their jobs overseas provide at least three months’ notice of the shutdown to appropriate federal, state and local agencies responsible for helping dislocated workers. Advance notice helps workers and policymakers understand where potential intervention strategies may be useful and provides essential information about off-shore trends. Finally, education and training programs need to be fully funded---not slashed---as is proposed under President Bush’s current budget, and new approaches must be developed to help highly educated professionals who are made jobless because their jobs have been off-shored. America’s workers now know that the Bush Administration will do nothing to stop the off-shoring tidal wave. It’s up to the Congress, as well as state and local governments, to take immediate action on those policy initiatives to dissuade corporations from pursuing business strategies that will further weaken the already fragile U.S. economy. Inaction means that millions of other workers and their families will pay the ultimate economic price of losing their job, their dignity and their way of life. Inaction means the continued wreckage of the American middle class, and inaction means continued distortion of the global economy to benefit corporations at the expense of workers everywhere. Our professional and technical workers have made enormous personal sacrifices to gain the education and training necessary to achieve well-compensated and secure jobs. They have contributed substantially to the nation’s economy and our standard of living. They

10.18 Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group Report deserve better than to be cast aside by corporations in the global chase for more easily exploited labor. They deserve effective and timely action by their government to confront the off-shoring crisis.

10.18 Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group Report, December 6, 2006 There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests. Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support. No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can Iraq’s many problems. The United States has long-term relationships and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group present a new approach because we believe there is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’s credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and hopeful future. What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans can

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and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure---as is any course of action in Iraq---if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus. We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have contributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside and outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank the members of the expert working groups, and staff from the sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the Study Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in a spirit of generosity and bipartisanship. In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the American people, we dedicate it to the men and women---military and civilian---who have served and are serving in Iraq, and to their families back home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficult sacrifices. Every American is indebted to them. We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their country, and the members of the Coalition Forces who have stood with us and with the people of Iraq. The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected. The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.

416 Contemporary American Politics If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized. During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.

External Approach The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability. The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key states in and outside the region should form a support group to reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own. Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq. The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the ArabIsraeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all

fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria. As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq.

Internal Approach The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny. The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq. It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an openended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

10.18 Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group Report As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education of forces that have returned to the United States in order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment over the next five years. The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement of specific objectives---or milestones---on national reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens---and the citizens of the United States and other countries---that it deserves continued support. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones. If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its

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willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq. The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United States of America can emerge stronger. James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton

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Index

Adams, Abigail Letter to John Adams on Women Rights, 11 Adams, John Abigail Adams Letter on Women Rights to, 11 Addams, Jane ‘‘Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements,’’ 125--128 ‘‘Ain’t I A Woman?,’’ 62--63 American Civil Liberties Union on the Patriot Act, 396--397 Americans with Disabilities Act, 368--372 Anthony, Susan B. Social Purity, 98--100 Anti-Federalist No. 7, 13--14 Articles of Impeachment, 386--387 Banneker, Benjamin Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 14--16 Bellamy, Edward Looking Backward, 108--111 The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 312--313 Bethune, Mary McLeod What Does American Democracy Mean to Me?, 237--238 Beveridge, Albert In support of an American Empire, 133--138 Borah, William E. On the Necessity for Naval Disarmament, 189--190 Brown, John Speech to the Court at His Trial, 76--77

Bruce, Blanche Speech in the Senate, 101 Bryan, William Jennings Cross of Gold, 122--125 Bush, George H. W. Desert Storm Speech on the Invasion of Iraq, 372--374 Remarks by the President on a Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 406 White House Report on No Child Left Behind Act, 397--401 Carnegie, Andrew Wealth, 114--116 Carter, Jimmy human rights and foreign policy, 340--344 Catt, Carrie Chapman The Crisis, 154--159 Chavez, Cesar On Organizing Farm Workers, 344 Chinese Exclusion Act, 103--105 Churchill, Winston The Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain speech), 250--255 Civil Rights Act, 289--293 Clay, Henry Speech on Jackson’s Veto of the Bank Bill in the Senate, 46--50 Speech on the Mexican-American War, 57--61 Clinton, William Jefferson Articles of Impeachment, 386--387 Memphis Church of Christ Address, 378--382

419

Oklahoma Bombing Memorial Prayer Service Address, 383--384 Presidential Statement on Welfare Reform Bill, 384--386 Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group Report, letter from, 415--417 Columbian Centinel, 25 Common Sense, 7--11 Coughlin, Father The National Union for Social Justice, 207--208 Croly, Herbert Promise of American life, 159--161 Cuomo, Mario Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 355--360 Davis, Jefferson Farewell Speech on the Senate Floor, 83--85 Dewey, John liberalism and social action, 208--214 Douglass, Frederick The Civil Rights Case, 105--108 The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, 68--71 The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America, 87--90 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 71--75 Du Bois, W. E. B. The Evolution of Negro Leadership, 138--140 President Harding and Social Equality, 178--180

420 Index Eisenhower, Dwight D. Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 267--270 Emancipation Proclamation, 86--87 Executive Council of AFL-CIO, Outsourcing America, 411--415 Executive Order No. 9066 (Japanese Internment), 243--244 Executive Order No. 9981 (Desegregation of the Armed Forces), 264 Fitzhugh, George The Universal Law of Slavery, 63--64 Fourteen Points, 176--178 Friedan, Betty Testimony before the Senate against the Nomination of Judge Carswell and the ‘‘Sex Plus’’ Doctrine, 327--330 Gabree, Judith Letter to Staughton Lynd on His Article ‘‘A Good Society,’’ 314--315 Garrison, Henry Lloyd John Brown and the Principle of Nonresistance, 77--78 Garrison, William Lloyd Dred Scott and Disunion, 75--76 The War---Its Cause and Cure, 81--83 George, Henry The Paradox of Capitalist Growth, 102--103 Gerald Ford Pardoning Richard Nixon, 339--340 Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, 6--7 Goldwater, Barry Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 293--296 Gompers, Samuel Letter to Judge Grosscup on Strikes, 119--121 Grosscup, Judge Samuel Gompers Letter on Strikes to, 119--121 Grutter v. Bollinger et al., 401--406 Harding, Warren A Return to Normalcy, 188--189 Henry, Patrick Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, 6--7 Homestead Act, 85 Hoover, Herbert Rugged Individualism, 192--199 This Challenge to Liberty, 226--231 Hopkins, Harry America’s Economic Problem, 233--237

Interstate Commerce Act, 111--113 Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report, 374--378 Jackson, Andrew Second Annual Message, 50--51 veto message regarding the Bank of the United States, 45--46 Jackson, Jesse Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, 352--355 Jefferson, Thomas Notes on the State of Virginia, 11--13 Johnson, Lyndon B. The Great Society, 301--303 Jones, Absalom Sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade, 24--25 Joseph, Chief on Surrender to the U.S. Army, 95 Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, 153--154 Kennedy, John F. Address on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 275--278 First Inaugural Address, 273--274 The Kentucky Resolutions, 23--24 King, Martin Luther, Jr. Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break the Silence, 309--314 I Have a Dream, 287--289 League of Nations Debate in the Senate, 182--188 Lewis, John L. Labor and the Nation, 231--233 Lincoln, Abraham Emancipation Proclamation, 86--87 Gettysburg Address, 85--86 Second Inaugural Address, 90--91 Lochner v. The People of New York, 141--143 Long, Huey Speech to the American People, 214--220 Lynd, Staughton Judith Gabree letter on ‘‘A Good Society’’ to, 313--314 Malcolm X The Ballot or the Bullet, 296--301 Marshall, George Harvard Commencement Speech (The Marshall Plan), 255--256 Marshall, Thurgood The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights, 244--249 The Mayflower Compact, 3 Muller v. State of Oregon, 143--146 Munn v. Illinois, 95--98

Nader, Ralph Green Party Presidential Nomination Speech, 387--392 National Environmental Policy Act, 321--323 National Organization of Women (NOW), Statement of Principles, 303--304 New England, threat of secession Columbian Centinel, 25 The New Freedom (Chapter I), 151--153 Nixon, Richard M. Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 315--318 resignation speech, 337--339 speech on ‘‘Vietnamization’’ (The Nixon Doctrine), 323--327 North Atlantic Treaty, 265--267 O’Sullivan, John L. Manifest Destiny, 52--53 Otis, James The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, 4--6 Paine, Thomas Common Sense, 7--11 The Panama Canal Treaty (Convention between the United States and Panama), 146--151 The Paradox of Capitalist Growth, 102--103 Penn, William union plan, 3--4 Polk, James K. Message to the Senate and House Concerning the Mexican-American War, 53--56 Populist Party platform, 116--119 Potter, Paul Vietnam Anti-War Speech, 305--309 Reagan, Ronald First Inaugural Address, 350--352 Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican National Convention, 344--350 Tear Down This Wall, 360--363 Reilly, William K. Announcement of Clean Air Amendments Act, 367--368 Republican Contract with America, 382--383 The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, 4--6 Roe v. Wade, 333--337 Roosevelt, Eleanor The Negro and Social Change, 224--226 The Struggle for Human Rights, 259--264

Index Roosevelt, Franklin D. First Inaugural Address, 203--205 The Four Freedoms (Address to Congress), 241 Pearl Harbor Speech (Declaration of War), 243 Roosevelt, Theodore The New Nationalism, 162--164 Who Is a Progressive?, 165--176 Ross, Chief John Cherokee Letter Protesting the Treaty of New Echota, 51--52 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 330--333 Sanger, Margaret The Children’s Era, 191--192 Savio, Mario The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 314 Senate Resolution on the Censure of Sen. Joseph McCarthy, 267 Seneca Falls Declaration, 61--62 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), 249--250 Sherman Antitrust Act, 113--114 Smith, Ellison DuRant Shut the Door, 180--182 Social Security Act, 220--224 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady The Destructive Male, 91--92 Statement upon Signing Executive Order No. 10924 (Establishing the Peace Corps), 274--275

Steffens, Lincoln Major Problems in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 140--141 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement, 278--285 Taft, Robert Speech on the North Atlantic Treaty, 264--265 Tocqueville, Alexis de Democracy in America ‘‘Government of the Democracy in America,’’ 36--41 ‘‘The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races That Inhabit the Territory of the United States,’’ 29--33 ‘‘What Are the Chances of Duration of the American Union, and What Dangers Threaten It’’ 33--36 Truman, Harry S. Address before a Joint Session of Congress (The Truman Doctrine), 257--259 Truth, Sojourner ‘‘Ain’t I A Woman?,’’ 62--63 Turner, Frederick Jackson Significance of the Frontier in American History, 41--45 union plan, 3--4 USA Patriot Act, 392--396

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Wallace, George C. Statement and Proclamation on Integrating the University of Alabama, 286--287 Wallace, Henry A Declaration of Interdependence, 205--207 Walsh, Lawrence Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report, 374--378 Washington, Augustus African Colonization---By A Man of Color, 66--68 Washington, Booker T. Democracy and Education, 131--133 Washington, George Farewell Address, 16--23 Wealth, 114--116 Webster, Daniel The Constitution and the Union speech, 64--66 ‘‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?,’’ 121--122 White, William Allen ‘‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?,’’ 121--122 Wilkie, Wendell A Warning On Isolationism, 241--243 Wilson, Woodrow Fourteen Points, 176--178 The New Freedom (Chapter I), 151--153 Yaser Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 407--411