A History of Russian Christianity (Vol IV) Tsar Nicholas II to Gorbachev's Edict on the Freedom of Conscience

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CHRISTIANITY Volume IV

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CHRISTIANITY Volume IV The Orthodox Church 1894 to 1990 Tsar Nicholas II to Gorbachev's Edict on the Freedom of Conscience Daniel H. Shubin

Algora Publishing New York

© 2006 by Algora Publishing All Rights Reserved www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87586-443-0 (softcover) ISBN: 0-87586-444-9 (hardcover) ISBN: 0-87586-445-7 (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data — Shubin, Daniel H. A history of Russian Christianity / Daniel H. Shubin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-87586-443-0 (pbk.: alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-444-9 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-445-7 (ebook) 1. Russia (Federation)—Church history. I. Title. BR932.S55 2004 274.7—dc22 2004012764

Cover photograph: Officials Gather for the Millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church Religious and political officials attend a ceremony at the Moscow Bolshoi Theatre to celebrate the millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church. Raissa Gorbachev (R), wife of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of USSR's Communist Party, sits at a desk among Orthodox priests. Image: © Jacques Langevin/CORBIS SYGMA Date Photographed: June 10, 1988 Location Information: Moscow, Russia, USSR

Printed in the United States

To my wife, Anna Marie M. Shubin, without whose support this series would never have materialized.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROLOGUE I. INTRODUCTION II. SOURCES III. ABBREVIATIONS

1 1 2 2

PART 9

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THE CLOSE OF THE SYNODAL ERA 162. TSAR NICHOLAS II ALEXANDROVICH 163. MYSTIC GRIGORI EFIMOVICH RASPUTIN 164. CLOSE OF THE SYNODAL ERA 165. THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF 1917

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PART 10

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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH DURING THE SOVIET ERA 166. VLADIMIR LENIN AND SOCIALISM AND RELIGION 167. RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET ERA 168. INITIAL SOVIET OPPRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 169. THE REGIONAL COUNCILS OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF 1918 170. PATRIARCH TIKHON — THE FIRST YEAR 171. EVENTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR 172. THE EXAMINATION OF RELICS 173. ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS IN UKRAINE 174. THE KARLOVTZI CONFERENCE 175. BEGINNINGS OF THE RENOVATIONIST MOVEMENT 176. THE APPROPRIATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL VALUABLES 177. THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHTY-SIX 178. THE RENOVATIONIST MOVEMENT

29 29 34 36

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7 7 13 16

43 47 54 57 60 64 65 71 82 88

A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 179. THE SYNODAL CHURCH 180. THE LAST YEAR OF PATRIARCH TIKHON 181. METROPOLITAN PETER 182. THE GRIGORIAN DISSENSION 183. METROPOLITAN AGAFANGEL 184. METROPOLITAN SERGEI AS PATRIARCHAL DEPUTY 185. THE SOVIET RED TERROR 186. EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II 187. PATRIARCH SERGEI 188. PATRIARCH ALEKSEI I 189. THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS 190. PATRIARCH PIMEN 191. PATRIARCH ALEKSEI II AND THE EDICT OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

98 107 112 117 120 123 134 145 150 155 162 167 173

APPENDIX 192. FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOLOVETSKI MONASTERY

177 177

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS IN ENGLISH

181

INDEX

183

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PROLOGUE I. INTRODUCTION This fourth volume covers the history of the Russian Orthodox Church during the twentieth century. This account begins at the ascension of Tsar Nicholas II Alexandrovich to the throne of Imperial Russia on October 21, 1894 and concludes October 1, 1990, with the issuance of the Edict of Freedom of Conscience by the government of Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. All the preliminary notes located in the prologue of the earlier volumes apply to this volume as well. The dates utilized are Old Style in Section 9 (Imperial Russia), and New Style in Section 10 (Soviet Russia). Some of the ROC documents quoted have both dates, in which case the new calendar dates are given in parenthesis. The Soviets renamed many cities in Russia to magnify themselves, and in order to erase the memory of Imperial Russia and its heroes; many of the old names have been brought back in recent years. The city of St. Petersburg, founded by Tsar Peter the Great in 1703 and renamed Petrograd in 1914, in 1924 was renamed Leningrad after Vladimir Lenin, which name it held until the dissolution of the Soviet Union; it is now again called St. Petersburg. Tsaritzyn was renamed Stalingrad, after Joseph Stalin, in 1925, and then Volgograd in 1961. Konigsburg was renamed Kaliningrad in 1946 after Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. Ekaterinburg, where the royal family was executed, was renamed Sverdlovsk in 1924 after Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, and recently reverted to Ekaterinburg. Nizhni-Novgorod was renamed Gorki after the famous Russian author Maxim Gorki, in 1932. The city Perm was named Molotov from 1940 to 1957 after

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and then was returned to Perm. Samara was renamed Kuibishev in 1935 after Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibishev, and was just recently renamed Samara. Simbirsk was renamed Ulyanovsk in 1924 after Vladimir Lenin’s patronymic, Ulyanov. Vyatka was renamed Kirov in 1934 after Sergei Mironovich Kirov, and then was recently renamed Vyatka. From 1937-1957 the Siberian city Orenburg was called Chkalov, after the famous Soviet aviator Valeri Pavlovich Chkalov. Another city north of Gorki, Vasilyovo, was renamed Chkalovsk in 1937, because the famous aviator was born there. In 1968, the city Gzhatsk near Smolensk was renamed Gagarin after the famous Soviet cosmonaut. Another city near Samarkand, Erzhar, was also renamed in 1974 to Gagarin in his honor. The author has attempted to include the former name of a city if it was changed by the Soviets.

II. SOURCES The author has relied on the following Russian-language sources in writing this fourth volume of the history of Russian Christianity. Miliukov, Pavel Nikolaevich, Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kulturi, volume 2, Paris, 1930 Regelson, Lev, Tragediya Russkoi Tserkvi, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1996. Shakarovski, Mikhail Vitalyevich, Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov pri Staline i Khrushcheve, Moscow, 1999. Smolich, Igor K., Istoriya Russkoi Tserkvi, 1700-1917, 2 volumes, 1996, Moscow. Tzipin, Protopriest Vladislav, Istoriya Russkoi Tserkvi, 1917-1997, 1997, Moscow.

English sources are noted in the bibliography.

III. ABBREVIATIONS Admin At-Gen Cheka Eccl GPU Metr Patr

Administration Attorney-General [of the Holy Synod] Cherez-Vichainoi Commissariat (Soviet Secret Police) Ecclesiastical Gosudarstvennoi Politicheski Upravlenia (State Government) Metropolitan Patriarch

2

Political

Prologue ROC UOC VTsIK

Russian Orthodox Church Ukrainian Orthodox Church Vse-Rossiyski Tsentralni Ispolnitelni Komitet (All-Russia Central Executive Committee) SovNarKomSovetski Narodny Kommissariat (Soviet National Department)

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PART 9

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THE CLOSE OF THE SYNODAL ERA 162. TSAR NICHOLAS II ALEXANDROVICH With the ascension of Tsar Nicholas II Alexandrovich (October 21, 1894– March 3, 1917), autocracy as a principle of national dignity again endured the crises, triumphing over anti-monarchist revolutionaries, and he ascended the throne as an autocrat in the tradition of previous tsars. He was unlike any of his predecessors since Tsar Peter I, in that he was devoted to the Russian Orthodox Church and considered himself a Christian monarch. He was far from the religious indifference of his grandfather Alexandr II or the religious complacency of his father Alexandr III and great-grandfather Nicholas I, his namesake. To his last breath, Nicholas II felt that he was anointed of God, selected to be more than an Orthodox king, more than a Russian emperor, and was destined to emulate Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich of the 17th century. With such a temperament, the new tsar could have normalized imperial-ecclesiastical relations, if he had surrounded himself with competent supporters. The primary character flaw of Tsar Nicholas was that he was unable to discern the motives of people. He often failed to trust the trustworthy and relied on those who were disreputable and unreliable. Tsar Nicholas accepted his father’s conservative principles, but he could not ignore the widespread demands for reform. It became an important principle for Tsar Nicholas to modify the legal rights of the sectarians and foreign denominations which by now had become firmly rooted in Russia. Because of political tension increasing in the country, Tsar Nicholas II issued a decree on December

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 12, 1904. One paragraph of this decree dealt with freedom of worship, and presented to native and foreign denominations the freedom to practice their religion and rites according to their tenets, and allowing them missionary work without interference from the ROC. The decree had little effect in actual practice because it was suppressed by the At-Gen of the Holy Synod, Konstantine Pobedonostsev, who personally stated, “The decree of December 12, 1904, is not directed toward the guarantee of freedom of worship, but only to toleration in matters of confession. The Orthodox Church remains reverently honored, pre-eminent, and official.” A rebuttal to the imperial report, viewing the decree from another perspective, was published by Metr. Antoni Vadkovski, who claimed, “The Orthodox Church does not even possess the freedoms that are now supposed to be rewarded to these other churches and denominations.” In his report to the Committee of Ministers, Metr. Antoni listed the following items that they considered important to the success and sovereignty of the ROC. 1. The need to resolve the un-canonical structure of ecclesiastical government (this referred to the Holy Synod.) 2. The need to establish an ecclesiastical council as a characteristic rule of the ROC. 3. The need to hold a regional ecclesiastical council in the near future. 4. The selection of a patriarch who would lead the ROC under the auspices of ecclesiastical councils. The report concluded with a harsh criticism of the bureaucracy of Synodal government under the supervision of the At-Gen. By going directly to the Committee of Ministers, and circumventing At-Gen Pobedonostsev, Metr Antoni hoped to be able to gain their support. Pobedonostsev’s response was predictable. He categorically rejected the idea of reinstituting a patriarchate. The era of the patriarchate was a period characterized by “mortified ritualistic formalism,” as he described it. He also considered the prelates who comprised the Holy Synod to be of a sufficient number and representation to meet any demands of an ecclesiastical council of all diocesan bishops. The president of the Committee of Ministers, Sergei Yulyevich Witte, wrote a response in rebuttal to Pobedonostsev, issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on February 18, 1905. During the course of subsequent discussions among the Ministers regarding the matter of the future of the ROC, Pobedonostsev found himself isolated. To save whatever remnant of authority Pobedonostsev could, he submitted a report to Tsar Nicholas on March 13, 1905, requesting that the matter be transferred from the Committee of Ministers to the Holy Synod and under his auspices.

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The Close of the Synodal Era Metr. Antoni Vadkovski wasted no time. He held private meetings of the Holy Synod on March 15, 18, and 22, whose purpose was to compose a report to be delivered to Tsar Nicholas. The report especially underscored the necessity of reforming the mutual relationship between the ROC and Imperial Russia. They proposed placing a patriarch at the head of the Holy Synod in lieu of an Attorney-General, and summoning a regional council of all Russian prelates. The council would select a patriarch and discuss and resolve problems related to the ROC. Metr. Antoni and his circle completed their report and submitted it to the tsar without the involvement or approval of Pobedonostsev. The fact that Metr. Antoni Vadkovski was able to secure the approval of Metr. Vladimir of Moscow and Metr. Flavian of Kiev, and gain a personal audience with the tsar, signified the dusk of Pobedonostsev’s triumph. But the At-Gen did not sit back with hands folded; he proceeded with vengeance. The tsar’s response was provided on March 31, 1905. He did not debate the necessity of summoning a regional council, but felt that it was out of place during the present turbulent era and suggested that it would be considered at some future (unspecified) date. The Synodal prelates went along with his response but were still not willing to abandon the topic. Nonetheless, the decree led to further legislation regarding freedom of worship. From January 1, to March 1, 1905, the Committee of Ministers held six conferences regarding the decree of December 12, 1904 and issued the several recommendations, including the following excerpts. 0

1. To recognize that departure from the Orthodox faith into another Christian faith or denomination is not subject to persecution, and should not be accompanied by any deprivation of personal or civil rights (Article 1.1). 2. To open all houses of worship that had been closed as a result of administrative orders (Article III A). 3. To remove administrative orders that suppressed the rights of Old Believers and sectarians in regard to their service in the Empire or society (Article V). Tsar Nicholas II accepted the above recommendations and an edict was issued April 17, 1905, entitled, “Regarding Confirmation of the Rule of Tolerance of Religion,” which became the primary legislation regarding religious toleration (freedom) for the subsequent 12 years until the end of Imperial Russia. This edict preserved the privileges of the ROC in regard to missionary work, but coincidentally removed the obstacles that had kept the Old Believers and sectarians from developing their religious communities without interference by the ROC. Its

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV publication was a relief to millions of sectarians and dissenters and adherents of new and foreign denominations, at the time at least 20% of the population. Finally, they were able to practice their religion and disseminate their tenets as they saw fit, without fear of reprisal from either the ROC or imperial officials. A second edict, complementary to this one, was issued on October 17, 1906. This edict detailed the provisions for the registration of individual congregations in order to be officially recognized by the imperial government. Metr. Antoni continued to exert his influence on the other members of the Holy Synod and on July 27, 1905, he managed to send out a circular letter to all diocesan prelates. The letter took the form of an inquiry requesting their input on the type of ecclesiastical reforms they felt were necessary, and which should be presented at an all-Russia council of prelates. Political events in the country made the need for reform in the ROC all the more urgent. An imperial Edict issued October 17, 1905 created the State Duma as a legislative organ, essentially turning Russia into a constitutional monarchy. Two days later, Pobedonostsev was involuntarily retired from his office of At-Gen of the Holy Synod and he was immediately replaced by A.D. Obolenski, a moderate conservative. On December 17, Tsar Nicholas summoned the three senior members of the Holy Synod for an audience, to assist him in composing an imperial edict calling for an ecclesiastical council of the entire ROC. A special committee was formed December 27, 1905, to make preliminary plans for such an event. At the head of this special committee was Metr. Antoni Vadkovski. Meetings were held from March 8 to December 15, 1906. Tsar Nicholas approved the committee’s report on April 27, 1907, but the actual summons of the regional council was postponed for some indefinite term, for the same reason previously stipulated — the political instability of Russia. In reality, however, the postponement was imposed because of the intervention of the successive Attorneys-General of the Holy Synod of the period: Obolenski (1905-1906), Shirinski-Shikhmatov (1906), and Izvolski (1906-1909). The religious-political environment was becoming anarchic, fraught with internal conflicts. The royal family and the Ministry of Internal Affairs felt that an ecclesiastical council would endanger the political stability of the country. Voices at the first State Duma likewise raised fears should such a council be convened. On the other hand, popular newspapers and magazines vehemently criticized the politics of the state and episcopacy. Radical groups of the White clergy, who were very liberal, and also members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, were outspoken in their attacks on the imperial government at the second

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The Close of the Synodal Era State Duma. Other groups of clergy, who were members of the extreme rightwing, interceded on behalf of the autocratic imperial monarchy. Sermons were preached to large audiences regarding the awesome judgment of God upon Imperial Russia, including noteworthy examples by Metr. Vladimir of Moscow on October 17, 1907, and Archbishop Antoni Khrapovitzki of St. Petersburg on February 20, 1908. The clergy of the ROC began to splinter, each group having its own agenda for reform or political action. As there was no way for the Holy Synod to explain to the people that not every sermon reflected the official position of the ROC, confusion was widespread. All of this further hampered the plans to put in place an all-Russia ecclesiastical council. After the indefinite postponement of the regional ecclesiastical council, the imperial government found itself in difficult straits in its relationship to the State Duma, which criticized the ecclesiastical politics of the royal family. President of the Committee of Ministers Peter A. Stolypin held to the traditional position of the imperial government. He addressed the second State Duma on March 6, 1907, saying, “The government should remain as it always has been in its relation to the Orthodox Church,… but is obligated to include freedom of conscience in legislature as a rule of Christian government.” In a subsequent speech given May 22, 1909, at the third State Duma, Stolypin stated that patriarchal authority had been transferred to the Holy Synod, which had the responsibility of administration over the ROC. This statement suppressed any plans for a regional council of the ROC for another eight years. The attempt at reform of the ROC in 1905-1906 created the Group of 32, consisting of liberal clergy who wanted a thorough modernization of the ROC. They were the younger generation of clergy who were involved in revolutionary activities and were influenced by socialist trends that were arriving in Russia from Europe. The Group included proto-pope Alexandr Vvedenski, who became the prime organizer of the Living Church under the Soviets. (The Black Hundreds, the ultra-conservative and para-military arm of the ROC, were the antithesis to the Group of 32.) The event that became known as Bloody Sunday merits some space in this chapter. Father Giorgi Gapon (1870-1906) was born in Bliaki, Poltava Province, Ukraine, of a peasant family who had acquired some property after the abolition of feudalism in 1863. From age 15 he attended Poltava Seminary and after graduation he became a parish priest. Gapon married and had two children, but his wife died after four years of marriage. Gapon then entered Petersburg Theo-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV logical Academy in 1898, leaving the children for his parents to raise. While engaged in his studies, Gapon became a priest at a parish church in St. Petersburg on Vasilyevski Island, and then was assigned to the St. Petersburg Red Cross in 1902 as a type of chaplain. During this period he joined the Society for Religious and Moral Instruction and became involved in improving the life of St. Petersburg’s working class population. Gapon was very sincere and dedicated to his work, and was eventually noticed by prelates. Bishop Sergei Stradovodski, Rector of the Petersburg Academy, recommended tonsure to Gapon, so that he could be consecrated as a bishop and continue his social work within the hierarchy of the ROC. Gapon, however, declined the recommendation. Gapon’s involvement with the Workman’s Association led him to accept the role of organizer for a Procession of the Cross to the Winter Palace of the Tsar in order to present him a petition. Gapon apparently was very sincere in his belief that “the little father,” Tsar Nicholas II, was inherently good and inclined toward the support the prosperity and welfare of his subjects, and that he could not refuse a petition presented to him by a local priest at the head of an ecclesiastical procession of peasants and workers and their families. The date selected was January 9, 1905, which coincidentally was just shortly after a general strike of workers in St Petersburg and about a week after the surrender of the Russian garrison at Port Arthur in the Far East, ending the Russo-Japanese War. Gapon and an estimated 30,000 demonstrators — although no real figure is available — did not imagine that the soldiers would fire on a peaceful procession. The workers and their families dressed in their Sunday best, and walked carrying icons and singing ecclesiastical hymns, and carrying large portraits of Tsar Nicholas and Tsarina Alexandra. Any revolutionary identification, such as red flags or weapons, was forbidden. In his petition, Gapon requested better working conditions, better salaries for workers, and a better way to resolve grievances. Unbeknown to them, the Tsar was not at the Winter Palace, but had left St. Petersburg for Tsarskoe Selo to enjoy a weekend of rest and relaxation with his family. He left, however, 12,000 soldiers to guard the palace and the streets of St. Petersburg. On the morning of Sunday, January 9, 1905, as the procession approached the Winter Palace after several detours through the streets of St. Petersburg, soldiers attacked the demonstrators, firing at them and stabbing them with their swords. Several bystanders, women and children, were also killed and wounded. The total number of dead was about 200, with about 800 wounded. The day was

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The Close of the Synodal Era memorialized in history as Bloody Sunday. This incident incited malice towards the Tsar and ignited several more workers’ strikes throughout the nation. Father Gapon, disillusioned with the attempted presentation of the petition and his efforts on behalf of the oppressed workers, left Russia. He first traveled to nearby Finland and then to Geneva, Switzerland, where he joined an underground revolutionary group. But Gapon could not adapt to their proposed violent tactics and so left them. Having gained considerable fame as a result of his role in Bloody Sunday, he traveled about Europe before returning to Russia in December 1905. Due to his experience with the workers’ unions and ROC, he was invited by Minister Witte to work in the government. Fr Giorgi Gapon was murdered in March 1906 by the secret police aligned with socialist revolutionaries.

163. MYSTIC GRIGORI EFIMOVICH RASPUTIN The appearance of Grigori Rasputin in the higher circles of Russian society deepened the rift between the State Duma and the Holy Synod. The figure of staritz (elder) Grigori Rasputin was a provocation that united all opposition parties and increased the pressure on imperial authority. Rasputin’s involvement with the royal family eventually created a sense of repulsion toward the monarchy among ROC clergymen, aristocrats, and subjects alike. Some individuals sided with Rasputin and were swept upward with this ambitious rising star, while his opponents saw him as a comfortable target for their anti-imperial attacks. Rasputin played on the mysticism that was popular among the Russian elite and their pre-occupation with ascetic monks. The phenomenon of Rasputin’s rise to prominence is related to another manifestation of Russian asceticism: the many unusual “fools in Christ” of early ages, some of whom were sincere and others who were not. Initially, people considered Rasputin a genuine fool in Christ who sought perfection in self-humiliation and in the subjection of his will to the will of God. Tsar Nicholas met Rasputin in 1906, and immediately recognized him as a man of pure faith. Others referred to Rasputin as a holy devil. Metr. Evlogi characterized Rasputin in the following terms: He was a Siberian vagrant seeking God and asceticism. And along with this he was a person dissolute and defiled, possessing a nature of demonic strength. Right from the beginning, he combined tragedy in his life and soul: extreme asceticism and orthodox zeal was intermittent with his decline into the abyss of hell.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV In modern terms, Rasputin might be described as an uncultured psychotherapist who would manipulate his patients once he gained their trust, more than any type of mystic or man of God. Living in Siberia, with a wife and five children, Rasputin developed an ability to reduce tension and calm people’s fears and anxieties, even under the worst of circumstances. This talent worked to his benefit as he eased the tensions of the royal family that resulted from the leukemia afflicting the tsarevich, Alexis Nikolayevich. Once Rasputin made his inroads into the personal affairs of the royal family, and gained their trust as a staritz — a contemporary fool for Christ — they began to allow him more influence in the affairs of the ROC and the Holy Synod. Rasputin lived a paradoxical double-life. In the morning Rasputin could be found in the private company of a prostitute whom he had propositioned on the streets of St Petersburg, while later that same day he might be at Tsarskoe Selo “healing” the Tsarevich Alexis of his leukemia and acting as a divine counselor to the royal parents. Rasputin took advantage of the political instability and upheavals of the era. He was able to gain his greatest power and influence during the years of World War I, when Tsar Nicholas was at the front. Rasputin then manipulated Tsarina Alexandra Feodorevna — a German — to his advantage. In this manner, Rasputin was able to take control of the Holy Synod. His decisions especially extended to the post of At-Gen and the Tsar began to accept only Rasputin’s recommendations for any new attorney-general. In retrospect, it was the candidate who was supportive of Rasputin and had his favor that was assigned the post of administrative head of the ROC. Ambitious clerics and prelates seeking a means of ascending the ecclesiastical ladder attached themselves to Rasputin, hoping his influence would provide them a promotion or career advancement. Such petty clerics and prelates would do Rasputin’s bidding at his whim and defended him against critics, which only increased his political-ecclesiastical influence. Rasputin’s influence on the royal family and those around them is obvious in the vengeance of Rasputin toward At-Gen S.M. Lukianov, who was fired as a result of his effort to ameliorate the strife between the Holy Synod and the new State Duma. The recommendation of Rasputin to the Tsar and Tsarina for the post of attorney-general of the Holy Synod was Vladimir K. Sabler, a German converted to Russian Orthodoxy, whom Rasputin felt would be in his best interests, and to replace the existing Lukianov. Some delegates of the State Duma stated that Sable’s ecclesiastical politics undermined the authority of the tsar, while others verbally attacked the At-Gen himself. Because of his associ-

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The Close of the Synodal Era ation with Grigori Rasputin, At-Gen Sabler significantly complicated the ecclesiastical-political position of the government. The malicious influence of Rasputin extended not only over Sabler, but over a significant circle of social and bureaucratic leaders. Metr. Antoni Vadkovski, president of the Holy Synod, died November 2, 1912 and Metr. Vladimir Bogoyavlenski succeeded him. He was able to firmly establish himself as a formidable opponent to the machinations of At-Gen Sabler and Rasputin, but this only lasted a short period as the beginning of World War I forced ROC matters to the back burner. Rasputin already had his own intentions to silence Metr. Vladimir. All of this, of course, did not help the dedicated prelates who comprised the Holy Synod. Eventually At-Gen Sabler — as a result of his German roots — was terminated and replaced by Alexandr D. Samarin, but he only lasted three months himself before being ousted by the political intrigues of Rasputin. During these years, from 1912-1916, several confederates of Rasputin were elevated to the episcopacy and then were installed as members of the Holy Synod. Rasputin arranged the transfer of the influential Metr. Vladimir Bogoyavlenski to Kiev, while Archbishop Pitirim Oknov of Vladikavkaz (an obscure diocese in the Caucasus) was elevated to Metropolitan of St. Petersburg. Rasputin’s intrigues were also directly involved in the ordination of the aged Makari Nevski to metropolitan of Moscow, and who was so old that he was unable to conduct his duty or any ecclesiastical rites. Rasputin also made arrangements for Varnava Nakropin to become bishop of Tobolsk. These three men simultaneously became members of the Holy Synod, which now, for all practical purposes, was under the control of Rasputin. Rasputin’s reach also overshadowed the next two Attorneys-General: A.N. Volzhin and N.P. Rayev, each of whose tenure was less than a year. Even though several prelates attempted to expose Rasputin as a sacerdotal fraud, most were afraid because of his increased authority in the higher circles of ROC affairs. Two men worth mentioning in this history are Bishop Hermogen of Saratov and Monk Iliodor Trufanov, a famous missionary and preacher from Tsaritzyn (later Stalingrad). On June 16, 1914, a frantic and fanatic woman, Khionia Guseva, attempted to kill Rasputin with a knife. She considered him a false prophet and antichrist who should be executed.1 Monk Iliodor was connected in the conspiracy to murder Rasputin and he fled Russia July 6, 1914 for 1. Radzinsky, The Rasputin File, pg. 255-256.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Finland. He then moved to Norway, where he wrote a book about Rasputin, titled The Holy Devil. Iliodor returned to Russia for a short period in about 1920, joining the restorationist movement, but then he migrated to the USA in about 1924 to escape the increasing Soviet persecution of ROC prelates. He entered a monastery in New York and remained there until his death in 1952. Due to Bishop Hermogen’s attempt to expose Rasputin, he was exiled by order of the Holy Synod to Zhirovetz Monastery in December 1911. But his future was not as secure as monk Iliodor’s. Hermogen was murdered by Bolshevik revolutionaries in July 1918. Grigori Rasputin himself was murdered on December 17, 1916, by Prince Felix Felixovich Yusupov, who was married to Irina Alexandrovna, a niece of Tsar Nicholas, and this event freed Russia from one major factor that had been contributing to the ineffectiveness of the royal family’s leadership. Due to rumors that a massive cache of jewels was hidden in Rasputin’s coffin, buried in a special sepulcher at Tsarskoe Selo, soldiers exhumed the coffin in January 1917. No jewels or valuables were found. The coffin was then removed from the premises by order of the officials of the Provisional Government and stored in a warehouse in Petrograd. The decision was made due to the association of Rasputin with the royal family. It was removed about a month or so later to be buried at some unrecorded place to avoid his grave becoming a shrine for his devotees. However, on the night of March 11, 1917, Rasputin’s corpse was cremated and his ashes were scattered in the wind.2

164. CLOSE OF THE SYNODAL ERA In the twelve years after the retirement of Konstantin Pobedonostsev from his 25-year tenure as At-Gen of the Holy Synod, ten individuals would fill the same office. Their tenure would range from four years to less than two months. It was the most destabilizing period of the ROC since its introduction into Russia a thousand years earlier. The foundations of the ROC slowly eroded during this period as it lost its state-provided security and sacerdotal monopoly, while at the same time it was being undermined by external forces and decaying due to internal strife.

2. ibid. pp. 258-259, 493-499.

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The Close of the Synodal Era The initial successor to Pobedonostsev was A.D. Obolenski (October 19, 1905-April 14, 1906); he only held office eight months. Next was A.A. ShirinskiShikhmatov, who lasted less than two months (April 24-June 9, 1906). His successor P.P. Izvolski (June 9, 1906-February 6, 1909) was able to accomplish something during his three-year tenure, but he focused his primary efforts on curbing the persecution of sectarians. None of these individuals had the stamina of Pobedonostsev, and in no manner distinguished themselves. Next was S.M. Lukianov (February 6, 1909—May 2, 1911). Lukianov, during his two-year tenure, attempted to mend the intolerable relations between the Holy Synod and the State Duma, but he accomplished little and was forced to resign. By this time since the retirement of Pobedonostsev, the Holy Synod had attracted considerable censure and had fallen into discredit. Next was Vladimir Karlovich Sabler (May 2, 1911—June 5, 1915), who had the longest tenure of any At-Gen after Pobedonostsev. He had been a lawyer and had served as legal counsel under Pobedonostsev for the Holy Synod since 1881. Sabler was a loyal and dedicated member of the ROC despite his German roots. Nonetheless, the members of the State Duma were against him. Sabler had been selected by those who were influenced by Grigori Rasputin, and which ensured opposition from the State Duma. He attempted to return to the regimentation of his mentor, and was able to develop a friendly and respectful relationship with the bishops of the Holy Synod. Initially, Sabler was able to acquire an imperial Edict dated February 28, 1912 for the organization of a pre-council meeting to make arrangements for a regional council of the ROC, to be held at a date to be approved by Tsar Nicholas II. His authority weakened, though, later in his tenure, and especially when tension with Germany began as a result of the political conflicts in the Balkans. There was no end to criticism of the ROC by the State Duma. Metr. Evlogi Giorgievski of Kholmsk, a member of the Holy Synod, 1908-1912, and a delegate to the third State Duma from the Nationalist Party, recorded the impediments that enveloped the ROC during the period of Sable’s tenure as At-Gen: The humiliation of the church, its subjection to imperial authority, was strongly felt in the Synod. The Attorney-General was a member of the Committee of Ministers, but his voice was not recognized as the opinion of the church by the others. Every committee meeting had its own agenda, which was also influenced by other high political spheres. The Attorney-General then directed the activities of the Synod in accord with those directives he received. The Synod had no person, no voice that would rise on its behalf, and the members had no ability to do so. The government silenced them entirely. The senior official of imperial authority suppressed the freedom of the church, from top to bottom. This imposed silence and

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV subjection to the state created an attitude in the Synod that was unnatural, one opposite to the age-old ecclesiastical rules of Orthodoxy.

Nonetheless, Metr. Evlogi was obligated to support the At-Gen in the State Duma. During elections of delegates for the fourth State Duma, At-Gen Sabler concocted the idea of creating a special ecclesiastical political party out of the ROC priesthood, and he attempted to draw Metr. Evlogi into it; but Evlogi refused to be part of it, convinced that political clericalism would only be detrimental to the ROC. The strife of the era, especially the clandestine involvement of Rasputin in the affairs of the Holy Synod, rendered Sabler ineffective. The beginning of World War 1 with Germany caused many government officials to become suspicious of the German Sabler, regardless of his competency, and he was dismissed in favor of someone who had a Russian surname. One French visitor to Russia, Y.M. Purishkevich, spoke publicly about Sabler on March 5, 1912, and his speech was recorded as follows: Neither those on the left, nor the revolutionaries, nor the Social-Democrats, nor the Cadets, nor the Labor Party; none of them has inflicted as much damage on the Orthodox Church over the past three to four years or even ten years, as has the present Attorney-General.

With the growing opposition to imperial authority, delegates of the various parties of the State Duma began criticizing the ROC for its insolvency and instability, created as a result of the ecclesiastical politics of the royal family and the rapid rotation of Attorneys-General. They now demanded, all the more urgently, radical improvements within the ROC that would enable it to survive the massive upheavals affecting Russian society. Delegates addressed the State Duma citing “the need to liberate the church, to free the church from all external, foreign, and incompatible influences. The church must not be a tool in the hands of the state.” But these desperate last-minute efforts were all to no avail. The Russian Imperial state had cut the head off from the body of the ROC, emaciated its torso, wounded it beyond its ability to heal, allowed its enemies to infect it, and then provided no medicine or consolation for it. The Attorneys-General of the Holy Synod could accomplish little in the years 1914-1917, because the First World War continually interfered, not to mention the intervention of Rasputin into ROC affairs. Sabler was replaced by Alexandr D. Samarin, a member of a respected aristocratic Moscovite family. During his three months in office (July 5-September 26, 1915), he was dominated by the clique of ROC clergy manipulated by Ras-

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The Close of the Synodal Era putin. Samarin was a member of the Moscow Academy, very dedicated to the ROC and a Slavophile. He was selected because he represented the moderately liberal circles, and he considered it his duty to begin to wrest control away from Rasputin. This put Samarin at odds with Tsarina Aleksandra Feodorevna, who was by now completely under Rasputin’s sway. Samarin was soon relieved of his office. Following Samarin was A.N. Volzhin (October 1, 1915-August 7, 1916). He was a provincial governor and an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but due to disagreements with Metr. Pitirim of St. Petersburg, he too was forced out of office before he was able to accomplish much. Next was N.P. Rayev (August 30, 1916 - March 3, 1917), the last favorite of Rasputin’s sycophants. He lasted six months until the upheavals of February 1917 and the abdication of Tsar Nicholas, when he resigned for his own safety. The murder of Grigori Rasputin on December 17, 1916 by Prince Felix Yusupov removed from Russia one major cause of strife and discord, much to the relief of many, but the damage already done to both ROC administration and the monarchy was irreparable. Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne on March 3, 1917. The monarchialautocratic rule of Russia that stretched back to the era of the first tsar, Ivan III Vasilich, incurred its demise. Although it had been a semi-constitutional monarchy since 1905, Imperial authority now passed into the hands of the temporary Provisional Government until the next State Duma could be summoned. On March 7, the new Provisional Government was formed and on the same day Vladimir N. Lvov was selected as At-Gen to replace the Rasputin-associate Rayev. The new At-Gen, V.N. Lvov, moved fast but he lasted just four months (March 7—July 24, 1917). He had been a member of the State Duma and had worked at one of the State Duma Ministries that coordinated efforts with the Holy Synod. Lvov was an enemy of Rasputin, and was very liberal with nondenominational inclinations. At the first session of the Holy Synod, just a day after his selection, he personally fired metropolitans Pitirim of Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) and Makari of Moscow, because they were associates of the Rasputin circle. On March 15, Lvov threatened to dismiss the rest of the Holy Synod and create a new one. The prelates informed him that this would be “uncanonical.” But the Provisional Government stood behind Lvov, and he dismissed all the remaining members of the Holy Synod, except for Archbishop Sergei Stragorodski of Finland (later Patr. Sergei). After Easter recess a new Holy Synod was created, now comprised of Archbishop Sergei, Archbishop

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Agafangel of Yaroslav, Bishop Mikhail Bogdanov of Samara, Bishop Andrei Yukhtomski of Ufa (in the Siberian Urals), Archbishop and Exarch of Georgia Platon Rozhdestvenski, and four proto-popes. When an upset occurred in the Cabinet of Ministers in July 1917, Lvov was likewise removed from his office. He was replaced by Anton Vasilyevich Kartashyov,3 the last At-Gen of the Holy Synod (July 25-August 5, 1917). His tenure was only for 10 days, until the Provisional Government abolished the Department of the Orthodox Denomination on August 5, 1917. This simultaneously eliminated the offices of the At-Gen and the Most-Holy Governing Synod. A new State department within the Provisional Government was then created, called the Ministry of Denominations. This new department was responsible for handling the administrative affairs of the ROC and for the administration of all sectarian groups and denominations in Russia. Kartashyov was elected to fill the temporary post of Minister of Religions, but he refused the title of attorney-general.

165. THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF 1917 Shortly after Lvov was installed as the new At-Gen in March 1917, the Provisional Government legislated three measures that it intended to implement in regard to Christianity in Russia: 0

1. Recognition of freedom of conscience, including evangelism, for all religions and denominations; 2. Ecclesiastical reform of the ROC with the intent of making the ROC independent and self-governing; 3. Removal of the imperial government as the subsidy of the ROC, and removal of the ROC’s privileges as the official state religion. The Provisional Government’s proposal regarding the autonomy of the ROC was far from materialization, as they took further control over its affairs, working closely with the liberal and democratic At-Gen Lvov. The newlyformed Holy Synod was able to accept proposition #2, but not #1 or #3. However, the Provisional Government could not legislate otherwise, because it considered itself purely secular and non-denominational, but wanted the ROC

3. Kartashyov migrated to Paris shortly after the Civil war, where he wrote his 2-volume Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Tserkvi (Notes on the History of the Russian Church), used in previous volumes of his history.

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The Close of the Synodal Era to modernize, hoping that these measures would act as a catalyst. The Provisional Government also sought to abolish the office of At-Gen of the Holy Synod in order to separate the ROC from state subsidy and sponsorship; it could not do so immediately, but eventually did. The association and communication between the parish clergy and diocesan bishops had suffered throughout the history of the ROC, but now, with the reorganization of the Holy Synod and its reconstitution by a new liberal and modern constituency under Lvov in March 1917, the relationship further eroded. Many parish clergy could not accept the resignation of the Tsar, while other parish clergy banded together and demanded the resignation of their diocesan bishops — or just ran them out of town. Some local parishes replaced them with monastic priests, while some dioceses no longer saw a need for a bishop at all and preferred to function independently. In other regions, the Diocesan Consistory defended their Episcopal authority and forced the local parishes to subject themselves to their order under threat or use of force. Such actions left many parishioners offended and bitter toward ROC prelates. The increase of socialist propaganda combined with the internal disruption of the Holy Synod turned more people against the ROC and left others apathetic toward it. The entire diocesan administration of the ROC was on the brink of dissolution during the era of the Provisional Government. A few remnants of the Group of 32 formed the All-Russian Democratic Clerical Union to push for reforms to modernize the ROC. They sent circular letters to parish clergy in the provinces to gain their support, promoting socialism as the most promising way forward for Russia. The political ideas of the Group of 32 were thoroughly interwoven with their concept of Christianity, but the attempt failed because the concepts of the Clerical Union were foreign or just plain unintelligible to the typical parish priest. A second group of ROC clergy in Petrograd founded the Union of Progressive Petrograd Clergy, which had a similar but more moderate plan for the modernization of the ROC. This group likewise fell by the wayside. On April 29, 1917, the Holy Synod sent a circular letter to bishops, prelates and parish clergy, announcing an intended Regional Council of the ROC, and aiming to begin the selection of delegates. Meetings were held in Moscow to plan the agenda and the provisions they hoped to enact for the Church’s modernization in the light of the new political developments in Russia. Some of the preliminary work that was accomplished back in 1905 was utilized for the new council. On July 9, a circular letter was again distributed, this one announcing

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV that the Regional Council was scheduled to begin August 15, on the Holiday of the Assumption of the Theotokos. Just two days before the start of the Regional Council, Archbishop Tikhon Belavin was ordained as Metr. of Moscow to replace the dismissed Makari, while Venyamin Kazanski was ordained Metr. of Petrograd to replace the dismissed Pitirim. During the course of the preparatory meetings of the ROC Regional Council, the Provisional Government issued two edicts of immense impact on the ROC. The edict of July 14, 1917 expanded the provisions of the Edict of April 17, 1905 and gave the right of freedom of conscience and worship to every person once he attained the age of 14. For all intents and purposes, this meant full religious liberty for all residents of Russia, with all religions acquiring parity (although atheism was not recognized). Included in the edict was the provision that a person’s religious or denominational affiliation would no longer play a role in government employment. The second edict came on July 20 and transferred all schools supported by public funds to the control of the Ministry of Education. This included 37,000 schools operated by the ROC, one-third of all those in Russia, because the ROC had been subsidized by the state. In addition, the edict stipulated that religious education was no longer mandatory in state-run schools, but was to be optional. As far as the ROC was concerned, these edicts were an infringement of its privileges as well as an illegal intervention of the Provisional Government into the sphere of ROC administration. Prelates who gathered at the preliminary meetings of the Regional Council realized that the ROC was losing more of its authority in the provinces and parishes with this loss of administration over local education. ROC prelates quickly divined that a war was underway as a result of these two edicts, and they would have to fight for their lives with the Provisional Government. The first working meeting of the ROC Regional Council began as scheduled on August 17 at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Metr. Vladimir Bogoyavlenski was chairman. The council consisted of 564 delegates, divided into 250 clergy and 314 laypersons, which represented all 73 dioceses of Russia. There would be a total of three sessions, of which only the first will be discussed here (the other two sessions belong to the Soviet Era). News reached Moscow on October 28, 1917, of the usurpation of state authority by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd the previous day. Sixty delegates proposed that the Council immediately cease its debates and vote on the estab-

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The Close of the Synodal Era lishment of a patriarchate. The following four points which had been discussed prior were voted on and passed: 0

1. The supreme authority in the ROC is the Regional Council. 2. A patriarchate will be established and the ROC will be administered by his office. 3. The patriarch will be the first among equals of ROC prelates. 4. The patriarch and all departments of the ROC administration are subject to the provisions legislated by the Regional Council. The four points were ratified on November 4, but by that time many delegates had abandoned in fear for their safety as a result of revolution foaming in the streets and gun fire between Red Troops and those of the Provisional Government. Less than half of the delegates remained to vote on the issue of the patriarchate, which they did on October 31, 1917. The three candidates gaining the most votes were Archbishop Antoni Khrapovitzki of Kharkov, Archbishop Arseni Stadnitzki of Novgorod, and Metr. Tikhon Belavin of Moscow. On the evening of November 4, the three ballots were placed in a sealed box on the altar at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. The respected 90-year-old hieromonk Aleksei Stavrovski of the Zosima Hermitage made the selection the following day. He drew from the box the ballot with the name of Tikhon of Moscow, and on November 21, 1917, Metr. Tikhon was ordained as the 12th patriarch of Moscow and all Russia at the Uspenski Cathedral inside the Moscow Kremlin. (The Regional Council was able to acquire permission from Bolshevik officials in Moscow to hold the commemorative event at the traditional shrine.) Following his ordination, Patr. Tikhon led the traditional Procession of the Cross about the Kremlin under the eyes of Bolshevik Red Guard soldiers guarding the citadel. Within days after the ordination of Patr. Tikhon, five prelates were ordained as metropolitans: Antoni Khrapovitzki of Kharkov, Arseni Stadnitzki of Novgorod, Agafangel Preobrazhenski of Yaroslav, Yakov Pyatnitzki of Kazan, and Sergei Stragorodski of Finland. The relationship of the ROC to the new government was decided at the Regional Council on October 28, but was not posted until December 2, until the patriarchate was confirmed. The following are the main points: • The ROC will have the primacy in Russia as opposed to any other religion or denomination. • The ROC has freedom of education, discipline, and ecclesiastical administration, and is independent of the state in these areas.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV • All ROC parish schools will remain under ROC administration, while state-operated schools will have religious instruction provided by the ROC. • All ROC ecclesiastical property and paraphernalia are unassailable by the state. • The ROC will continue to be subsidized by the state. • The state recognizes the ordinances and decisions of the ROC as legally enforceable, and will support their observance in the country. • The head of the state will be a member of the ROC, as will also the Minister of Religion and Minister of National Education. • The ROC has the right to perform marriages and permit divorces, which will be recognized by the state. • No member of the ROC is permitted to leave until he reaches maturity, when he decides to marry. The first session of the Regional Council concluded with the creation of two additional administrative bodies within the ROC to assist the patriarchate. These two were the Sacred Synod (to replace the Holy Synod), and the Supreme Eccl. Council. Similar to its predecessor, the Sacred Synod was to consist of the patriarch and 12 members, and was to handle doctrine, education, liturgy, the diocesan consistory, ordination and discipline, and seminaries. The Supreme Eccl. Council would consist of 15 members: half would be prelates and half laypersons. This body would handle the infrastructure, and regular administrative and financial matters. The two bodies separated sacerdotal matters from the institutional. The Regional Council also decreed that the patriarch would be subject to the decisions of the Sacred Synod, where his position was first among equals. As optimistic as the delegates were at this first session of the Regional Council, it was a futile attempt to restore at one session all the accumulated damage caused by Tsar Peter the Great’s reform and the 200 years of administration of the ROC by the Holy Synod. Their aspirations were admirable, although foolish. It was ludicrous and vain for the delegates to imagine that the Provisional Government much less the Soviet government, now in firm control, would accept such dictates from an archaic institution crumbling at its very foundations. The narrow-minded and over-confident ROC delegates were apparently quite unaware of the intents and goals of the Soviets, or the extent of their authority in Russia by the time the Council drew to a close. They actually believed that they could implement their decisions under the new government, and conciliate the new administration of the ROC with the new atheist state. But this was not to occur. The Soviet government took little notice of the

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The Close of the Synodal Era Regional Council and discarded its proceedings. Even before the end of the first session, the Soviets issued decrees that voided several of their decisions. The first session of the Regional Council ended December 9, 1917, and the delegates returned home for the Christmas holidays. The second session was to resume January 20, 1918.

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PART 10

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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH DURING THE SOVIET ERA 166. VLADIMIR LENIN AND SOCIALISM AND RELIGION When Vladimir Ilyich Lenin spoke about religion, he was referring to institutionalized religion, and specifically the one that had dominated Russia for over 900 years: the Russian Orthodox Church. This institution had been wholeheartedly supported by imperial Russia as the official state religion, and any others were persecuted or suppressed at the behest of the ROC. The tri-pillar foundation of Russia, “Nationalism, Aristocracy, Orthodoxy,” was the motto of the 19th century Imperial state. The reader should note that whenever Lenin and other Soviet officials reference religion, the Church, or God, it is the ROC that is to be understood, and the manner they interpreted and implemented Christianity (the sectarians and Protestant denominations in Russia were incidental). The thoughts of Lenin regarding institutional religion are summarized in his own words: The economic oppression of the workers inevitably calls forth and engenders every kind of political oppression and social humiliation, the coarsening and darkening of the spiritual and moral life of the masses. The workers may secure a greater or lesser degree of political liberty to fight for their economic emancipation, but no amount of liberty will rid them of poverty, unemployment, and oppression until the power of capital is overthrown. Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation. Impotence of the exploited classes in their struggle against the exploiters just as inevitably gives rise to the belief in a better life after death as impotence of the savage in his battle with nature gives rise to belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those who toil and

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labor of others are taught by religion to practice charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze, in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man. But a slave who has become conscious of his slavery and has risen to struggle for his emancipation has already half ceased to be a slave. The modern class-conscious worker, reared by large-scale factory industry and enlightened by urban life, contemptuously casts aside religious prejudices, leaves heaven to the priests and bourgeois bigots, and tries to win a better life for himself here on earth. The proletariat of today takes the side of socialism, which enlists science in the battle against the fog of religion, and frees the workers from their belief in life after death by welding them together to fight in the present for a better life on earth. Religion must be declared a private affair. In these words socialists usually express their attitude towards religion. But the meaning of these words should be accurately defined to prevent any misunderstanding. We demand that religion be held a private affair so far as the state is concerned. But by no means can we consider religion a private affair so far as our Party is concerned. Religion must be of no concern to the state, and religious societies must have no connection with governmental authority. Everyone must be absolutely free to profess any religion he pleases, or no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule. Discrimination among citizens on account of their religious convictions is wholly intolerable. Even the bare mention of a citizen’s religion in official documents should unquestionably be eliminated. No subsidies should be granted to the established church, nor state allowances made to ecclesiastical and religious societies. These should become absolutely free associations of like-minded citizens, associations independent of the state. Only the complete fulfillment of these demands can put an end to the shameful and accursed past when the church lived in feudal dependence on the state, and Russian citizens lived in feudal dependence on the established church, when medieval, inquisitorial laws (to this day remaining in our criminal codes and on our statute-books) were in existence and were applied, persecuting men for their belief or disbelief, violating men’s consciences, and linking cozy government jobs and government-derived incomes with the dispensation of this or that dope by the established church. Complete separation of Church and State is what the socialist proletariat demands of the modern state and the modern church.4

To understand the rationale of Lenin and other Soviet leaders in legislating the liquidation of the ROC as an institution, the reader must understand the effect that the ROC had on imperial Russia. This will make plain its repulsion to Lenin and other leaders whose goal was to promote Russia as a supreme power and stable empire with an advanced society and industry. Russia in 1914, the year beginning World War I, was behind European countries in every area of 4. Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, Socialism and Religion, December 3, 1905, Lenin Collected Works, Volume 10, pages 83-87, Progress Publishers, 1965, Moscow.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era national development: industry, education, construction, military, economy, transportation, agriculture, culture, and especially morality and ethics. The living conditions of Russia’s 90% peasant and rural population were squalid. The literacy rate of the country in general was hardly 50%, while infant mortality averaged 40%, and up to 60% in the colder regions of Siberia. The lifespan of the average Russian was about 60. Lenin’s goal was to advance Russia to a high level of success and progress in each of the categories mentioned, and provide individual prosperity for the population of Russia. To achieve this goal, the concepts of Marxism would have to be implemented, and any obstacles that impeded progress would by necessity be removed. The two primary obstacles were the Imperial government and the ROC. The first was easily removed; the second would take more time and effort. (The sectarians were little affected during the first two decades of communism in Russia, since Lenin did not view them as having a deleterious effect on Russian advancement and most of them were apolitical.) Lenin viewed the institution of the ROC as an impediment to the success and prosperity of the population of the new Soviet state. He felt that many of the ills of society had been condoned or promoted, or even created, by the ROC. This institution, which claimed to be the personification of God on earth, was the reason Russia, as an Imperial state, was destitute and aimless. The ROC, as Lenin claimed, was parasitic. It provided no enterprising or commercial benefit to the economy of Russia, but was subsidized by the Imperial government. The Imperial government had subsidized the ROC Holy Synod on an annual basis. Monasteries were extremely wealthy and its residents lived in comfort and without providing anything to society in return. Monasteries and parishes acquired income from their patrimony, which was still in effect, from the businesses it owned, and from contributions it gathered from pilgrims and visitors. The schools operated by the ROC failed miserably to raise the educational level of the population, and many of the funds allocated for diocesan education by the Imperial government were embezzled by diocesan prelates. Soviet officials viewed the rites and sacerdotalism of the ROC as nothing more than a fraud perpetrated on the ignorant masses by clergy, and providing them nothing to improve their standard of living, health, morality, ethic or literacy. The mode of life of monks, nuns, and monastic clergy was plagued with immorality and alcoholism, which drew Russia further into a moral abyss. Because of its own lack of morality, the ROC was unable to cope with the vices of gambling and prostitution, as well as abortion and venereal disease, all of which were rampant in

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Russian society, and the life-long suffering and death that resulted. As far as the Soviets were concerned, icons, especially those considered miracle-working, and relics of saints, especially those considered imperishable, were nothing more than a hoax perpetrated on parishioners, and tools used to mesmerize them into giving contributions. Lenin was also convinced that the ROC suppressed progress and advancement in Russia, stagnating the country in a medieval mire of superstition. The subjection of parishioners to rites lasting several hours induced lethargy, and so the people devolved into disparity and destitution. There was no motivation provided by the ROC for Russia to advance, and especially in education, because of their fear that such advancement would lead the people to abandon the ROC, and even expose the church leaders’ incompetence. The goal of the ROC, as Lenin viewed it, was the subjection of the people to it as a divine institution, and to keep them in a stupor of ecclesiastical servitude. Lenin in remonstrance pronounced the ROC an opiate, or a spiritual intoxicant, that desensitized the people to reality and the need for advancement. For all the above reasons, Lenin demanded the demise of the ROC as an institution. Lenin felt that with the improvement of education and the economy, people would on their own throw off the yoke of ecclesiastical bondage and superstition and would accept the Marxist view of the world. He was right, to a great extent, but not totally: even though the ROC as an institution was eliminated, faith in God persisted. For Lenin to achieve his goal, the Soviet state intervened to simultaneously slowly disintegrate and undermine the ROC by removing its ability to function as an institution. It is important to note that the ROC was not the primary concern of the Soviet state, because other areas of the new nation took precedence. Industry, education, economy, and agriculture were far more important concerns to the new-born Soviet state than religion, especially during the Civil War/World War I. Prosecution of ROC prelates and clergy proceeded slowly but systematically, as the circumstances required. (The views of Lenin in regard to institutionalized religion were similar to those of American political philosopher Thomas Paine. In his famous dissertation, The Age of Reason, 1794, Paine wrote, “All national institutions of churches, whether Jewish, Christian or Turkish, appear to me no other than human inventions set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolize power and profit.” Paine was a deist and directed his remonstrance at the Anglican Church.)

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era The purpose of the Soviet state’s initial legislation regarding the ROC was to cripple its operation. Initial edicts nationalized all ROC property and finances, including all ROC schools and seminaries, leaving them landless and without income. ROC clergy could no longer charge fees for the performance of rites, and the state subsidy was terminated. At the same time, the public schools stopped giving instruction in ROC tenets. As time progressed, Soviet officials initiated a divide and conquer approach to disrupt the organization internally. Soviet support of the restorationists antagonized the patriarchal church, and each side hurled anathemas and excommunicated the other. Then the restorationists split into three factions. As the prelates of the four groups were carving out portions of Russian ROC parishes for themselves, lower clergy were being exiled to Siberia and the concentration camps of northern Russia, executed, imprisoned, or being forced to assimilate into Soviet (atheistic) society. Prelates of one group would betray prelates of another group to Soviet officials, even to the point of having them executed. The restorationists’ prelates played into the Soviets’ hands and declared the end of monasticism in Russia and the closure of all monasteries and convents. Eventually, they all ended in exile themselves or else were executed. Then the divide and conquer approach — which was very successful — was used among ambitious patriarchal deputies or vicars. At one time the ROC had four patriarchal deputies, each denouncing the others and attempting to acquire ROC administrative control. During this period of internecine struggle for ecclesiastical supremacy, Soviet official were rapidly closing ROC churches due to apathy from parishioners, and exiling and executing prelates and parish clergy. Between the internal dissolution and its external persecution, the Soviet state achieved its goal of liquidating the ROC as an institution in Russia. In late summer 1939, only four prelates remained free, and somewhere between 300 and 500 churches were available for services in the entirety of the USSR. There were no monasteries, convents, seminaries or religious academies functioning by that year. The surviving churches were primarily in Ukraine and Belarus, where the oppression was less severe than in the Russian Federation, and some were kept open by Soviet officials solely for propaganda purposes, so that they could demonstrate to the Western world that worship was still free and active in the Soviet Union. Concessions made by the Soviets allowing freedoms and ecclesiastical development were due to political expediency, and did not reflect any sincere recognition of the religious needs of the population of Soviet Russia.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV (This likewise applies to the final Edict of Freedom of Conscience in 1990 under Mikhail Gorbachev.) It is important to note that belief in God was never annihilated in the Soviet Union, only the ROC as an institution. In 1937, a poll showed that about 57% of the respondents admitted Christian faith and participated in some sort of Christian rites, all accomplished underground. The sectarians and Protestants were considered non-pretentious and laws issued against religious organizations either did not affect them or were not enforced. (They are discussed in Volume 5 of this history.) It was not until the Red Terror began in 1932 that the Soviet state began the persecution of Protestants and the sectarians.

167. RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET ERA At the beginning of revolutionary upheavals in March 1917, the ROC was in a state of deep inner crisis. Superficially, it possessed impressive strength: it claimed 70% of the estimated 115-125 million population of Russia as its membership in 74 dioceses; with 78,000 churches and chapels; 120,000 priests, deacons and parish clergy; 130 bishops and prelates; 1,025 monasteries, convents, hermitages, and abbeys (other reports state 1,250); 95,000 monks, nuns and related monastic personnel; 25,500 parish schools; 57 religious schools and seminaries, and four religious academies. In European Russia, suburban clergy owned 1.3 million acres of prime city real estate, while parish clergy owned 6.8 million acres in the rural areas. In 1905, monasteries owned almost 20 million acres of land in European Russia, not including Siberia, where land was infinite. As a example of monastery real estate holdings, Solovetski Monastery owned 330,000 acres; St. Seraphim of Sarov Monastery near Tambov owned 870,000 acres; and Alexandr-Nevski Monastery of St. Petersburg owned almost 50,000 acres. The bank accounts held by monasteries were immense, more than twelve of them had 100,000 rubles in 1909. Nil Sorski Hermitage had 300,000 rubles; Solovetski had 320,000 rubles, while Novgorod Yurievski Monastery had 750,000 rubles. The income of certain clergy was immense. The income of Episcopal prelates varied from the Archbishop of Perm with an annual salary of 3,000 rubles, to the Metropolitan of Moscow with an annual salary of 35,000 rubles. Most prelates had annual salaries in the 5,000 to 10,000 range, and which depended on the size and income of the diocese. In St. Petersburg alone, the Virgin of Kazan Cathedral curator had an annual income of 5,700 rubles, with

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era three other clergy having annual incomes over 5,000. There were 201 clergy in St. Petersburg with annual incomes between 2,000 and 5,000 rubles, and 368 clergy with annual incomes of 1,000—2,000 rubles. This was during an era when the income of an average Russian was one ruble per day or less. Annual income from property and industry owned by the ROC in 1908 was 35 million rubles, while in 1912 reached 39.5 million rubles. In additional to all the above, the Holy Synod was also appropriated an annual budget from the Royal Treasury, beginning in 1722 under Tsar Peter I the Great in the amount of 30,625 rubles; and which increased to almost 1 million rubles in 1797; to 4 million rubles in 1850; to 10 million rubles in 1881; to 24 million rubles in 1901; and to a high of almost 63 million rubles in 1914. The total finances of the ROC invested in Russian banks in 1918 were 7.2 billion rubles, the amount confiscated by the Soviet government upon nationalization of ROC property. Likewise the confiscation of ecclesiastical treasures filled the coffers of the Soviet state treasury. During the second half of 1919, almost two million rubles were appropriated from St. Petersburg alone. The institution of the ROC, superficially strong but morally weak at the initiation of Soviet authority in November 1917, lost the respect of its own parishioners as time progressed. Although many were fervent believers in 1918 (as was demonstrated by tens of thousands of demonstrators in Petrograd and Moscow, and in other provincial capitals), the fervency declined as the internal struggle increased among prelates for control of the ROC. As the general population watched the prelates compromise with and capitulate to the atheist Soviets, and receive their sacerdotal promotions from them, many abandoned the institution of the ROC, having lost faith in their leadership. Although prelates felt the compromise was a necessity for ROC survival as an institution, parishioners viewed it otherwise. Russian Orthodoxy among the peasants then migrated underground to survive adulteration, while prelates became puppets of the Soviet state. Pavel Miliukov5 described the ROC dilemma in the following manner: The revolution met the Russian Church in a state of disarray. It could not have been otherwise, of course, taking into consideration all that we know about it. The 5. Pavel Nikolaievich Miliukov (1859-1943) was an organizer and leader of the Cadet (Constitutional-Democratic) political party and a member of the Third and Fourth Duma. In 1920 he migrated to Paris, France, where he later wrote his famous Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kultur (Outlines of History of Russian Culture), 1930, in 4 volumes, which is here quoted and utilized considerably in the History of Russian Christianity.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV immutability of dogma, administrative control over its religious facets, ritualism, the indifference of the masses to the spiritual content of the religion, all of this placed the religion in a complete contrast to revolutionary ideas. During Pobedonostsev’s and Sabler’s tenure, the influence of imperial authority and its protective ideology penetrated throughout the sphere of ecclesiastical life and finally paralyzed all living branches of spirituality. The Church was summoned to nurture the national masses in the Orthodox spirit in the ecclesiastical parish schools. The Supreme ecclesiastical administration was selected from persons who were prepared to serve the government and fulfill all the instructions of the Attorney-General. When the State Duma appeared and Russian social opinion divided along party lines, the church was officially directed to the service of the political party inclined toward the nationalists, which carried on the struggle for the restoration of the monarchy.

When Soviet political figures usurped authority on November 7, 1917 it is obvious that ROC prelates failed to see what kind of people they were now to deal with, and their intents. The new government was atheist and antithetical to the imperial regime in areas of polity and worship alike. Prelates at the Regional Council went ahead with business until military operations to take over the Moscow Kremlin drove many of the delegates to their home dioceses for safety. Less than half of the original delegates remained to participate in the final vote for a new patriarch. It was years before the prelates would genuinely realize the new regime’s authority and understand that the institution of the ROC was incompatible with the new Soviet atheistic ideology. Soviet officials played a cat and mouse game with ROC prelates, suggesting that they wanted the ROC to survive, or at least that they appeared to take a neutral position toward the ROC, when the opposite was actually true. Prelates frequently played into the Soviet officials’ hands, whether out of naivety, fear of reprisal, or personal ambition. It was only when they found themselves in a cattle car on its way to some concentration camp, or locked in a prison, or exiled to some forsaken wasteland, or standing in front of a firing squad, that the true intent and actual authority of the Soviet state dawned on them.

168. INITIAL SOVIET OPPRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH The first ROC prelate who became the victim of Soviet aggression was protopriest Iyoann Kochurov, who was from Chicago. His jurisdiction was the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. He and other priests were visiting Tsarskoe Selo, outside of Petrograd, when Red Guards arrived on November 8, 1917, and arrested them. Kochurov was shot and beaten to death.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era On November 8, the Moscow Kremlin fell to the Soviets after much street fighting and several people were killed or wounded. To attempt to curb the fighting, Metr. Platon of Revel and a delegation from the ROC Regional Council met with the new Soviet military-general of the Kremlin. Two ROC priests had been wounded in the crossfire: Dmitri Abashidze of Tavria and Nestor Anisimov of Kamchatka. Only Metr. Platon was allowed to meet with Commissar Solovyov, and the prelate pleaded on his knees to curb the violence. The commissar told him that his pleas were futile. Churches within the Kremlin were damaged by the Red troops and several imperial soldiers were killed trying to defend the sacred shrines. On November 24, 1917, the ROC Regional Council sent a letter to the Soviet military-general at the Kremlin: Enough blood of our brethren has been shed, enough malice and vengeance shown. There is no place on this earth for vengeance. Victors, whoever you are, and in whoever’s name you are fighting, do not defile yourselves further by spilling the blood of your brethren, by murdering the defenseless. Do not add further sorrow and shame to our fractured Homeland, already drenched with the blood of its own sons. Consider their unfortunate mothers and families and do not add more tears and sobbing by increasing bloodshed. Even you who deny God and His Church, stop for the sake of humanity. The Council also calls to you, the leaders of this movement, to utilize your influence to restrain the blood-thirsty drive of those who are drunk from the victory of their fratricide.

The same day the Regional Council issued a summons to ROC members in Russia, a call to repentance and a refutation of Soviet aggression. The following are excerpts: Great calamities have overcome our Homeland, and the cup of God’s wrath continues to be poured upon us, and we increase His righteous wrath because of new sins. In addition to all these misfortunes, internecine war has arisen and taken hold of the Russian land. One portion of the army and people, deceived by promises of earthly benefit and an immediately peace, has risen against the other portion, and now our land is drenched with the blood of our brethren. Russian rifles and cannons are not directed at our enemy, but at our own cities, ruthlessly toward the defenseless population, women and children. But all of this seems minor to the leaders of the internecine war. The attacks that have occurred against the Orthodox faith are thoroughly criminal, and in the presence of the Orthodox population and its history. People who have forgotten God attack each other like starving wolves. Where is our conscience, where is our mind? The seeds of antichrist have already been sown and the hearts of the people are poisoned with teachings that subvert belief in God, while instilling envy, greed, and infringement on the rights of others. It was no accident that Russian rifles struck the shrines of the Kremlin, wounding the hearts of our people so fervent in the faith of Orthodoxy. Along with the cathedrals of the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Kremlin, they are beginning to destroy the peaceful society of imperial Russia. They have become traitors to the Homeland. But atheists cannot keep any earthly realm intact. It will destroy itself as a result of inner conflict and party discord. For this reason, the government of Russia will fail as a result of demonic atheism. Before our own eyes the just judgment of God will be accomplished on the people who desecrate what is holy. Abandon the insanity and the iniquitous dream of the propagandists, you who are summoning the materialization of brotherly peace by using the path of worldwide internecine war. Return to the path of Christ! May God arise and scatter His enemies and may all who hate Him flee from His presence.

It was just two days after the ROC Regional Council issued its edict defining its relationship to the state, and while the council was still in its first session, that the new Soviet government issued the first of its decrees affecting the ROC. The Second Congress of Soviets on December 4, 1917 issued a decree on the nationalization of the land, which included all ROC churches and monasteries, their real estate holdings, and all businesses and industries that they owned or operated, as well as ecclesiastical treasures, artifacts, art and items of historical value, and ecclesiastical paraphernalia. Since banks and financial institutions were included in the decree, all ROC assets that were held in banks were frozen and became Soviet state property that day. On December 11, the Soviets transferred all schools that were under ROC administration to the Department of National Education. This included all seminaries and religious academies. On December 18, the ROC was deprived of its authority to register births and marriages. A decree of December 20 stated that ecclesiastical weddings were not prohibited but were a private event that possessed no civil or legal authority. A second decree issued on December 20 terminated state subsidies of the ROC, with the allowance for the clergy to terminate officially by the end of February. Two days later, December 22, the ROC Regional Council dismissed for the Christmas and New Year holidays. The delegates felt they had accomplished much of significance to curb the encroachment of the Soviets into areas of ROC jurisdiction, but the Soviet state casually discarded all the decrees of the council. To counterpoise the edict of the nationalization of ecclesiastical property, religious brotherhoods were created in Moscow, Samara, Kharkov, and Kiev, with various appellations. The Brethren of the Resurrection of Christ was formed in December 1917 in Kiev by the Psalm-reader Vasili Popov. About 57,000 Petrograd parishioners joined a religious fraternity dedicated to protecting the treasures of the Alexandr-Nevski Monastery, and especially the relics of that

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era ancient Russian leader. In Moscow, former Holy Synod At-Gen Alexandr D. Samarin organized the Union of United Parishes of the Orthodox Church. Soviet officials proceeded with the closure of ROC churches shortly after a preliminary draft of the edict on the Separation of the Church from the State was published in a local newspaper on December 31, 1917. The first item of confiscation on the Soviet’s agenda was the Synodal Publishing House in Petrograd. Metr. Veniamin Kazanski of Petrograd immediately wrote a letter addressed to the SovNarKom, warning that: The materialization of this proposal threatens the Russian Orthodox people with great sorrow and sufferings. I consider it my moral obligation to tell those people who are presently employed by the state to not execute the proposed decree on the appropriation of ecclesiastical property.

Once the decrees of the nationalization of ROC property were promulgated and Red Guard soldiers were organized to execute its provisions, several churches within the palace walls and private chapels were closed and the ROC publishing arm was confiscated. On January 13, 1918, Red guards demanded that monks vacate the premises of the Alexandr-Nevski Monastery, so that it could be converted into a hospital for the war wounded. The resident monks responded that they were willing to accept and care for the wounded, but they refused to leave the premises. On January 19, a squadron of Soviet sailors and Red guards arrived at the AlexandrNevski Monastery with an order signed by Commissar Kollonti to confiscate all ecclesiastical property. Refusing to yield monastery treasures to the intruders, Metr. Veniamin Kazanski and the monastery archimandrite, Bishop Prokopi, were arrested, along with the entire monastic community. An alarm bell was rung during the arrest, which summoned large crowds to the monastery, and the Red guards fled the premises. After the excitement subsided, the Soviet troops returned, threatened to shoot the monks if they did not leave the premises, and then began shooting. The crowd would not disperse. The soldiers stormed the premises of the Monastery to begin confiscation of ecclesiastical property but the monks resisted. Protopriest Peter Skipetrov, the venerated curator of the Cathedral of the Holy Martyrs Boris and Gleb, was pleading with Soviet guards when they shot him dead. A few monks were also killed in the resistance. This incident motivated Metr. Veniamin to organize a procession of the cross, or demonstration, with the participation of all Petrograd ROC churches as a protest to the Red Guards’ storming of the monastery. On February 3, 1918, an estimated 200,000-500,000 prelates, clergy, and parishioners left their respective

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV churches and gathered at the Alexandr-Nevski Monastery. They proceeded along Nevski Prospect to the Virgin of Kazan Cathedral. There, Metr. Veniamin gave a passionate sermon calling for reconciliation, and he performed a requiem for the late protopriest Peter Skipetrov. It is no wonder that two days later the Soviets published an edict that entirely crippled the ROC administration. A similar demonstration was held in Moscow on February 28. Anti-ecclesiastical atrocities such as the storming of the Alexandr-Nevski Monastery and the Kremlin churches were not to be ignored by the newlyordained Patr Tikhon. Although the second session of the ROC Regional Council was set to begin February 2, 1918, the ROC could not wait until then to begin active protest against the implementation of the December decrees nationalizing ROC and imperial property. On February 1, Patr. Tikhon, hearing of the bloody altercation at Alexandr-Nevski Monastery, published the proclamation excerpted below, excommunicating the participants of the invasion of the monastery and shooting of the monks. His second concern was fear of imminent civil war, and he hoped that this declaration would suppress the violence: Apparent and secret enemies of Christ’s truth have initiated a persecution of this truth, with a drive to destroy the work of Christ, and in place of Christian love they sow seeds of malice, hate and fratricide. Forgotten and trampled are the commandments of Christ dealing with love toward all our associates. News of terrors and brutal murders of innocents, and the sick lying in beds, reaches us every day. All of this occurs not only under the cover of darkness of night, but in broad daylight, and with an unheard-of measure of ruthless and brutal ferocity. Consider what is occurring, you insane people. Curb your butchery. Know that what you are doing is not only cruel, it is a satanic work, and for which all of you are subject to the fire of Gehenna in the future after-life, and your posterity will suffer a curse during their present earthly life. By the authority given us by God, we forbid you to partake of the Eucharist of Christ. We excommunicate you, since all you do is call yourself Christian and were baptized at birth to become members of the Orthodox Church. We adjure all of the faithful offspring of the Orthodox Church of Christ to not enter into any type of association with such monsters of humanity. Banish such people! The enemies of the Church have usurped authority over it using the power of fatal weapons. You must withstand them using the strength of your faith, and your cries. And if you must suffer for this work of Christ, we call upon you, beloved offspring of the Church, we call upon you to enter such sufferings together with the words of the holy Apostle. And you brethren, who are pastors and bishops, do not waste one more hour away from spiritual activity. With fervent zeal, call upon your offspring to defend the rights of the Orthodox Church, which are presently being trampled. Immedi-

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era ately create religious unions. We firmly hope that the enemies of the Church will be ashamed and scattered by the power of the cross of Christ.

Several demonstrations occurred as a result of Patr. Tikhon’s proclamations, and everyone knew what would occur thereafter. In Samara, the local clergy were arrested and placed in custody. In Voronezh, the crowd attacked a commissar sent to the local monastery and killed him. In Orel and Kharkov, Red troops fired on the ecclesiastical demonstrators. In Tula, eleven demonstrators were killed when Red troops fired on them. In Peshekhonski county, close to one hundred demonstrators were arrested, and some of them were executed by firing squad. In Sebastopol, priest Mikhail Chafranov was shot to death on the church’s porch after performing liturgy. Priest Konstantin Snyatinovski was murdered in Kievan Pereyaslav. The three sons of protopriest Pavel Dernov of Elabug were arrested, and their home was plundered during the night. In the prison the three sons were executed, while father Pavel was imprisoned. In the city Belyo, Smolensk province, the Psalm-reader Kolosov was executed. Red guards shot and killed parishioners who were protecting ecclesiastical paraphernalia at the Belogovski palace in Perm province. On February 6, Archbishop Silvestr was arrested while his housekeeper Nikolai Tsikuri was killed. It was on February 5, three days after the beginning of the Second Session of the ROC Regional Council, that the Soviets published the infamous decree “On the Separation of the Church from the State, and Schools from the Church.” This was a summary and conclusion of the decrees issued so far by the Soviet state in regard to the ROC, and consisted of the following, quoted verbatim: 0

1. The church is separate from the state. 2. Within the limits of the republic it is prohibited to publish any kind of local laws or orders which would hinder or limit the freedom of conscience, or would establish any kind of preference or privilege on the basis of the denominational adherence of the citizens. 3. Every citizen may adhere to any religion or adhere to none. Any limitations before the law related to adherence to any kind of faith or non-adherence to any faith are abolished. (Note: Any reference to religious adherence or non-adherence of citizens is to be removed from all official documents.) 4. No state or other public or social function before the law is to be accompanied by any religious customs or ceremonies. 5. Free practice of religious customs is guaranteed, in so far as it does not disturb the public peace and does not infringe upon the rights of Soviet Republic citizens. Local authorities have the right to take all necessary measures to guarantee in all such cases public peace and security.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 6. No one can shun his civil duties on religious grounds. Exemptions from these, on condition of substituting one form of civil service by another, in each separate case, must be granted by a decision of a people’s court. 7. The religious oath is abolished. In necessary cases only solemn promises are given. 8. Records of civil status are kept exclusively by the civil authorities, by departments of marriages and births. 9. The school is separated from the church; the teaching of religious tenets is not allowed in state, public, and private schools where secular subjects are taught. The citizen may teach or be taught religion in a private setting. 10. All ecclesiastical and religious societies are subject to the general conditions existing for voluntary societies and unions and do not enjoy any privileges or subsidies from the state, nor can they form local autonomous and selfgoverning bodies. 11. Compulsory collections or assessments for the benefit of ecclesiastical or religious societies, as well as measures of compulsion or punishment on the part of these societies over their members, is not permitted. 12. No ecclesiastical or religious society has the right to own property. They have no rights to be recognized as a legal entity. 13. All property of existing ecclesiastical and religious societies is declared the people’s property. Buildings and objects especially designated for divine services are given for free use to corresponding religious societies on the basis of special ordinance of the local or central state authorities.

The future ecclesiastical policy of the Soviet Union was clearly defined by the decree. It drew the line between the ROC and the Soviet state, and beginning this day, a new epoch began for the ROC in Soviet Russia. The delegates to the Second Session of the ROC Regional Council, however, were still blind to the intents of the Soviet state and proceeded with their ecclesiastical business without giving it any consideration. Their decrees, worked out in the course of the three sessions, would eventually turn out to be meaningless and their efforts futile, because they would have to harness all their strength just to survive. Pavel Miliukov described the reality of the edict. For all practical purposes, the separation of the Church from the state in Soviet Russia did not signify that the state wanted to assume a neutral position in its relationship to the Church. The communist state, rather, took the side of the adversary to religion and was committed to energetically fight against religion. One reason was that the Communist party was now merged together [with the state] during this regime. Paragraph 13 of the Russian Communist Program stated that, “The party strives toward the complete annihilation of the bond between the exploiting classes and organizations of religious propagandists. This contributes to the factual liberation of the laboring population from religious prejudices, and will organize extensive scientific-educational and antireligious propaganda.”

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era On March 15, 1918, a deputation from the Regional Council headed by A.D. Samarin presented the Commissar of Justice, N.D. Kurski, a remonstrance regarding the decreed Separation of the Church from the State: The religious contentment of 100 million of the Russian Orthodox population, which is without doubt a necessity for the welfare of the state, cannot be attained otherwise except by an annulment of all ordinances that infringe on the life and the freedom of the national religion.

The representative of SovNarKom, Mark Timofeevich Elizarov, admitted that the decree did contain some inconclusive and faulty formulations, but none that could not be resolved or deleted. Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, future Commissar of the Ministry of Propaganda, also attended the meeting. He promised that the registration of churches or religious fraternities would allow them rights and permit them to possess ecclesiastical property. This assurance by the officials present at the meeting, who stated that the Soviet state was benevolently inclined toward the ROC, encouraged only two delegates from the Regional Council: Professors Kuznetzov and Maligin.

169. THE REGIONAL COUNCILS OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF 1918 The Second Session of the ROC Regional Council began on February 2, 1918, with considerably fewer delegates than the first session (only 110), and only 24 were bishops, representing one third of the dioceses of Russia. Even though they did not have a quorum, they decided to proceed with new business and considered the decrees valid and enforceable on the ROC. Every delegate and prelate attending felt that he could be arrested any day during the council, the patriarch included. The question of patriarchal succession was the most important matter to be resolved. On February 7 a motion was made, and the council agreed, that the patriarch should select his immediate deputy and alternates, and as soon as possible, in case anything should remove him unexpectedly from his post. In this manner, someone would immediately assume patriarchal responsibilities. The names would be kept in utmost secrecy until necessity required their disclosure. Patr. Tikhon immediately fulfilled the request. During the meeting of February 7, Prince Evgeni Nikitich Trubetzkoi, a prominent Christian philosopher of the era, spoke in regard to the decree of the Separation of the Church from the State. He stated that the council had come to

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV the unanimous conclusion that they had incurred an act of open persecution of the ROC, and further proceeded to say: Even the Mongols had more respect for our holy faith than do these present legislators. If this should succeed, the entirety of holy Orthodox Russia will revert into the land of the antichrist. It is better to spill your blood and earn a martyr’s crown than to allow enemies to revile and profane the Orthodox faith. Take courage, holy Russia. Go to your Golgotha.

On February 10, the Regional Council took possession of the now-defunct Holy Synod offices in Petrograd. The Provisional government had earlier issued the order to allow the newly-formed ROC Sacred Synod and Supreme Eccl. Council to take possession of all its property. Without regard to the response of Soviet officials, the Regional Council appropriated 200 years of office equipment and records. Considerable time at the second session was spent on two points dealing with dioceses and parishes: one was their governance and the second was their improvement. The council ignored the edicts of the Soviets regarding the ROC in their entirety and proceeded as if nothing had changed since the era of the Provisional Government. The amount of energy spent on these issues was hardly appropriate with only 24 bishops present. The goal of improving diocesan government was their attempt “to return the Church to the ideal of Episcopal-community rule, to that protocol that appeared as ideal for the Church throughout its history.” Candidates for the episcopacy were to be monastic and at least 35 years old, or widowed priests who had decided to be tonsured as monks. The second item of ecclesiastical improvement dealt with parishes, to enliven parish activity and rally parishioners around the ROC during these difficult days. The parish was defined as a community of Orthodox Christians consisting of clergy and laypersons, residing in some locale, and congregating at a church which was part of a diocese. The parish was under the administration of a priest, while the parishes in a diocese were under the administration of the diocesan bishop. The council’s decree was intended to promote better communication between priest and parishioner, and between bishop and parish priest, and recommended local councils of all diocesan clergy twice a year. The issue of Edino-Veria (Unity-Belief) was also raised at this session. Prior to this time, Old Believers who wished to join Edino-Veria could do so, and they would be recognized as members of the ROC, and yet they could still adhere to the old rites and perform them at designated churches. However, even after 120 years, the ROC never allowed them to have their own bishop and to

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era ordain their own priests according to the old rites. At this session, the concession was finally made to allow the ordination of Edino-Veria bishops, and Russia was divided into five Edino-Veria cathedras, allowing for five bishops. The council did not allow them complete independence, and they were still subject to ROC bishops. On May 25, 1918, the first Edino-Veria Old Believer bishop was ordained in history: Semeon Shleyev of Okhtenski, and he was under the administrative rule of the metropolitan of Petrograd. Under the circumstances, no other Edino-Veria bishops were ordained. The final issue addressed at the second session was under what conditions a marriage could be dissolved by the ROC. Initially, only four reasons were allowed for a divorce to be sanctioned by the ROC: infidelity, abandonment, exile accompanied by the deprivation of subsistence, and non-consummation of the marriage. The following additional grounds were now proposed: leaving Orthodoxy, marital ineptitude or incompatibility, attempt on the life of the spouse, bigamy, incurable mental illness, venereal or some crippling disease, and spousal abuse. Eventually all the proposed reasons were adopted but the issue was moot to begin with, because the ROC was deprived the right to grant divorces by Soviet legislation. Divorces were now to be granted by the Soviet state upon request of one of the spouses, and for almost any reason. The last item on the agenda for the second session was the canonization of two prelates: Sofoniya of Irkutsk and Iosef Petrov (Joseph) of Astrakhan. Both were elevated to sainthood on April 18, 1918, and the session closed April 20. The council in retrospect decreed all of its proclamations as valid and enforceable even though less than one-forth of the original number of delegates had attended this second session. The third session of the ROC Regional Council opened July 2, 1918, with a few more delegates (118), but still fewer bishops, only 16, representing barely one-fifth the dioceses of Russia. The council was not allowed use of the Christ the Savior Cathedral and was hoping to use the large hall at the Moscow Religious Academy. However, for the three days prior to the beginning of the session, the facility was being utilized by the Commander of the Kremlin Guard to organize the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, or VTsIK (Vse-Rossiyski Tsentralni Ispolnitelni Komitet). Conversations with the SovNarKom and the Secretary of the Executive Committee yielded no results, and so the council was forced to meet at private homes. The first work of the third session was to develop a procedure for the selection and ordination of a patriarch under the Soviet regime. Apart from the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV earlier decision regarding the patriarch’s choice of a deputy, should he be suddenly removed from office, the council decided that a suitable replacement would be selected from one of the members of the Sacred Synod, with the approval of the Synod and the Supreme Eccl. Council. The next major item on the agenda was to overturn the decision of the Holy Synod of April 14, 1763, where Metr. Arseni Matzeevich had been condemned for his vociferous opposition to the secularization of ecclesiastical patrimony and reduced to the rank of a simple monk. This discussion also pertained to the priest Grigori Petrov, because of his political affiliation during the early days of the revolution. Priest Grigori was the leader of the demonstration that resulted in the massacre known as Bloody Sunday. The Council decided to posthumously absolve both of them of any wrongdoing and to reestablish them as pious prelates of the ROC. Considerable time was dedicated to improving the condition of ROC monasteries. The age for novitiates was set at 25 years, and any younger person wanting tonsure had to have the approval of the diocesan bishop. This decision overruled the resolutions of Tsar Peter I, who had set the minimum age for monks at age 50. The council confirmed that the selection of abbot or father superior rested with the monastic brothers, and the same applied to a convent: the mother superior would be selected by the nuns residing there. A separate person was assigned to handle the financial and institutional business of the monastery, apart from the father superior, and was to be approved by both the diocesan bishop and father superior. An important issue tackled by the council had to do with the requirement of communal living in the monasteries. The gulf between rich and poor individuals deciding to take monastic vows, and privileges for the wealthier monks, was apparent in many monasteries and posed a serious problem — as in earlier generations. The requirement for every monk to remain in the monastery he was tonsured at was also confirmed. Monks were not supposed to move from monastery to monastery. The council also issued a decree requesting churches to protect relics, icons and other sacred appurtenances from confiscation. A day was dedicated to commemorate those who had so far died as martyrs as a result of Soviet persecution: the Sunday during the fast of St. Peter (i.e. the second Sunday after Pentecost). The final matter discussed was in regard to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). The council permitted autonomy for the UOC, although the edicts of the ROC Regional Councils and patriarchate would also be imposed on the UOC.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era The final meeting of the third session ended abruptly on September 20, 1918, because the building where they were meeting was appropriated by Soviet officials for other purposes. Having labored an entire year, the council had still not nearly exhausted its agenda, and even so, none of the decisions of the Regional Council could be imposed or enforced, because the Soviet state had deprived the ROC of its power to do so and discarded all of its decrees and proclamations. The ROC as a corporate and legal body was essentially dissolved with the edict of the Separation of the Church from the State, and so prelates had no authority or means to enforce any of its own rules or regulations on parishes or parishioners, and monasteries were already in the process of being liquidated. The delegates still hoped for the best and decided to again meet during the spring of 1921.

170. PATRIARCH TIKHON — THE FIRST YEAR On February 28, the same day as the Moscow demonstration, Patr. Tikhon and the Regional Council issued a cooperative summons for the organization of laypersons into parish fraternities, which would be neither ecclesiastical nor religious. In extreme circumstances, such fraternities could claim themselves as associates of the ROC. At least the Regional Council hoped to circumvent the requisites of the decree to keep some parishes intact. On March 15, Patr. Tikhon issued a circular letter to all Orthodox members urging them to curb the internecine struggle, and he also called upon the leaders of the Soviet state to abandon any thoughts of capitulating to Germany in order to end the war. His letter was futile. On the following day the Treaty of BrestLitovsk was signed with Germany, Russia accepting all the conditions set by Germany in order to end the war. German troops in ships were moving from the Baltic Sea into the Gulf of Finland toward Petrograd. There was no time to lose, and so Lenin demanded that Trotsky accept the treaty on German terms. As a result of the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia lost the territory that was occupied by German military and its population. The new western boundary of Soviet Russia was essentially Germany’s eastern front. Russia lost Poland, Finland, the Baltic regions, and the western half of Belarus and Ukraine to Germany. Parts of Georgia and Armenia were ceded to Turkey. Russia lost 300,000 sq. miles of territory, 56 million residents (one third of its population). In August 1918, Soviet Russia also paid reparations to Germany in the amount of

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV six million German marks. (Most of the ceded territory and the Ukraine were recovered by Russia after the Treaty of Paris in November 1918.) Agitated over the loss of one-third of the membership of the ROC to the Germans, including churches and other ecclesiastical property located in the occupied territory, Patr. Tikhon remonstrated the next day in another circular letter of March 18, 1918. Blessed is peace among the nations, because all are brethren. The Lord summons us all to peacefully labor on earth. He has prepared His innumerable benefits and the Holy Church incessantly produces prayers for the peace of all the world, hoping that the rectitude of Christ will triumph on earth and unite warring brethren into one flock under the guidance of the one heavenly Shepherd. And the unfortunate Russian people, drawn into this fratricidal bloody war, impatiently thirst for peace, just as the people of God in the past thirsted for water in the intense heat of the wilderness. But we did not have a Moses who would have quenched the thirst of the people with a miracle of water. Our people did not call unto the Lord their benefactor for help, but instead upon people who have denied the faith and persecuted the Church of God. They have surfaced and have given the people peace. But is this the peace that the Church has prayed for, which the people thirst for? Meanwhile, the same discord continues among us, destroying our Fatherland. The internal internecine war has not only not ended, but increases in fury daily. Famine increases, but to suppress it, they want to drive peaceful residents out of the capital, not knowing where they will lay their heads. Workers are threatened with lay offs; those who return from the war front cannot find work. Pillage and murder is on the increase, and people turn to vigilantism as a struggle against crime. Will this newly-advertised peace curb the disorder of those crying to heaven? Will it not bring greater sorrows and misfortunes? Alas, the words of the prophet are justified, “They cry peace, peace, but there is no peace.” This is no peace and no joy for these seekers of peace. The holy Orthodox Church from ancient times has assisted the Russian people to gather and to magnify the Russian state, and cannot remain indifferent watching its destruction and ruin. This peace, subscribed to in the name of the Russian people, will not provide the nations brotherly cooperation. It contains no pledges of relief and reconciliation, but sows seeds of malice and odium. The embryo of new wars and evils for the entirety humanity is contained in it. To you, the deceived unfortunate Russian nation, my heart burns sorrowfully unto death as I view your difficult sufferings, while I sense further sorrows. We do not call upon you to rejoice over or celebrate this peace treaty, Orthodox people, but instead to repent and pray before the Lord. In the presence of the awesome judgment of God, presently being executed on our country, let us gather around Christ and His holy Church. Let us beseech the Lord, so that he might soften our hearts with brotherly love and strengthen them with courage, so that he might gift us men with intellect and wisdom. All of this, by the commands of God, would then resolve all of the evil that has occurred, would return the outcasts and gather those who have been scattered.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Soviet officials ignored the patriarch’s disapproval of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. On April 19, 1918, a special Soviet committee was formed within the Department of Justice, known as Department VIII (changed to Department V on March 4, 1920). The purpose of the new department was to execute the provisions of the decree of the Separation of the Church from the State, and liquidate the ROC. The first head of Department VIII was Peter Ananyevich Krasnikov, an active member of Lenin’s inner circle. Another important member of this department was Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, future Minister of Propaganda. By the beginning of June 1918, all home chapels, religious academies and seminaries in Moscow were closed, and an interdiction on teaching religion was placed on all private and public schools. On March 3, 1918, in Kostroma, “bandits” murdered protopriest Aleksei Andronikov, age 88. On the night of June 2, 1918, Bishop Hermogen of Tobolsk was thrown into the Tura River, where he drowned. On the night of June 4, Archbishop Andronik of Perm was arrested by a squadron of Soviet soldiers and taken out of town. He was forced to dig his own grave before he was executed. On the night of July 4, 1918, in Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), Soviet soldiers executed Tsar Nicholas II, his wife Tsarina Alexandra Feodorevna, their son Aleksei, daughters Olga, Tatyanna, Maria, and Anastasia, the doctor E.S. Botkin, the tsarina’s maid A.S. Demidora, the cook I.M. Kharitonov, and the valet A.E. Truppe. The bodies were taken out of town and were soaked with gasoline and cremated. Then sulfuric acid was poured over the remains, and what was left was dumped into a pit and covered with soil. At the Ekaterinburg prison, Prince V.A. Dolgorukov, General-Adjutant I.L. Tatishev, K.G. Nagorni (a sailor related to the royal family), and valets I.D. Sednev and V.F. Chelishev, were executed. Countess Gendrinova, and E.A. Sheider, an associate of the Romanov family, were taken to Perm were they were executed. On July 5, Elizaveta Feodorevna6, a nun called Varnava, Grand Prince Sergei Mikhailovich, Princes Igor Konstantinovich, Konstantin Konstantinovich, Iyoann Konstantinovich, and Count Vladimir Pavlovich Pale, were all executed near the city Alapaevsk. Sergei Mikhailovich was executed by a firing squad, while the rest were thrown alive into a deep pit and then covered with 6. Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Hesse, Sister of Tsarina Alexandra Feodorevna and husband of the late Sergei Alexandrovich, Tsar Nicholas II’s uncle.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV soil until they suffocated. The Tsar’s brother Grand Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich, his secretary N.N. Johnson, the valet P.F. Remiz, were also executed in Perm. Once news of the executions reached Moscow, Patr. Tikhon railed against the barbarity in a sermon: A horrible event occurred just a few days ago: the execution by firing squad of the former emperor Nikolai Alexandrovich. Our Supreme authorities, the imperial council, approved of this and recognized it as legitimate. But our Christian conscience, guided by the Word of God, cannot agree to it. We must, submitting to the instruction of the Word of God, condemn this act. Otherwise, the blood of those executed is on our hands along with those who performed these acts. Let them call us counter-revolutionaries because we take this stand, let them imprison us, let them shoot us also. We are ready to endure in hope.

In July 1918, Bishop Makari Gnevlshev of Vyazen was executed in Smolensk along with thirteen other men. They were killed by a firing squad while standing in front of a freshly dug pit. Shortly after, Bishop Lavrenti Knyazev of Balakhninsk was executed by firing squad and so were Bishops German Kosolanov of Volski and Varsonofei Lebedev of Kirilovski. On August 23, in Moscow, Bishop Efrem of Semingin, along with the famous ROC missionarypriest Iyoann Vostorgov, two former imperial officials N.A. Maklakov and A.N. Khvostov, the former president of the State Duma I.G. Scheflovitov, Senator S.P. Beletzki, a Roman Catholic priest named Lyutostanski, and his brother, were executed by firing squad. On the same day, in Petrograd, protopriest Filosof Ornatski, curator of the Virgin of Kazan Cathedral, and his two sons, were executed by firing squad, as were 31 affiliates of the ROC in Petrograd. The bodies were thrown into the water of the Gulf of Finland. On August 3, Mikhail Solomonovich Uritzki, head of the infamous and odious Petrograd Cheka (secret police), was assassinated by a Socialist revolutionary. In revenge, the venerated 90-year-old hieromonk Aleksei Stavrovski was arrested and taken to Kronshtadt, where he was executed by firing squad (he was the prelate who selected the patriarchal ballot at the First ROC Regional Council). At the same time, every tenth member of the ROC who was in custody at Kronshtadt was also executed. All of their bodies were thrown into the Gulf of Finland. In the village Plotov, Voronezh province, priest Iyakov Vladimirovich was murdered along with his wife and son. They were shot as they stood over a deep hole, into which they fell and were buried. In the city Chyorni, the Saratov diocesan missionary Lev Zakharovich Kuntzevich was shot: he was tied to a post

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era and his wife was forced to watch his execution. Then she and their son shared the same fate. A delegate to the ROC Regional Council, Alexandr Nitzi, was murdered in Ufa. At the Kronshtadt Naval Base, protopriest Grigori Pospelov was shot to death after he performed a requiem for some sailors who had been killed during the war against Germany. In Perm, the priest Peter Dyakonov was buried alive up to his neck, and then he was shot in the head. In the city Cherdin, in the northern Ural Mountains, Soviet guards poured cold water over protopriest Nikolai Konyukhov as he stood outdoors in the frost, until he froze to death. Priest Filipp Shatzki from Semirchya was locked in a school room, which was set on fire. Protopriest Evgraf Pletnev and his son Mikhail were thrown alive into the firebox of a steamship, and were cremated. Hieromonk Nektari Ivanov, an instructor at the Voronezh Seminary, had molten tin poured down his throat, and then wooden stakes were driven into his head. Archimandrite Aristarkh and hieromonk Rodion of the Nerukotvorenni Spassa Church in Borkha were scalped. Priest Feodor of Orenburg was tortured to death. Priest Ignati of Perm was arrested while performing liturgy, taken into the street and tied to a horse’s tail. The animal was released into a local field where he dragged the priest to his death. In Tobolsk diocese, priest Feodor Bogoyavlenski was taken into a field. The Red guards forced him to entertain them by playing on his harmonica, dancing and singing. Then they shot him. In September 1918, after the Red Army defeated Kazan, they entered the Zilantov Monastery. All the residents were lined up against the monastery wall and were executed by firing squad. Patr. Tikhon steered clear of any acts of violence, but at the same time was unable to remain an indifferent spectator to such atrocities. Unable to accomplish anything physically, he addressed a letter on November 6, 1918 (the day before the first anniversary of the usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks) to the Soviet Council of National Commissars, disclosing his feelings. The letter also touches on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: You have divided the entire nation into two camps which are battling one another, and have driven it into a fratricidal war that is unprecedented in cruelty. The love of Christ you have openly exchanged for hate, and in place of peace you have artificially ignited a class struggle. And the end of this war which you have conceived cannot be foreseen, because you strive using the efforts of Russian workers and peasants to gain the triumph of an imaginary worldwide revolution. Russia was not in need of the shameful peace treaty that you concluded with the outside enemy; but you needed it, you who conceived to inevitably destroy the domestic peace. No one feels safe, everyone is laboring under constant fear of inquisition, plunder, exile, arrest, execution. You murder bishops, priests, monks and nuns who are

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV not guilty of anything, except for some trumped-up and shallow, inconclusive charge of counter-revolutionary activity. Inhuman execution of Orthodox adherents is accompanied by your refusal to permit them to partake of the Eucharist, and the bodies of the deceased you refuse to deliver to relatives for a Christian funeral. You mock those who serve at the altar, requiring bishops to dig their own graves, and exile others to hard labor. You have placed your hands on ecclesiastical appurtenances, those acquired by generations of believers, and it did not bother you to desecrate their relics. Now to you do we address this word of admonishment; celebrate the anniversary of your consolidation of authority with the liberation of prisoners, the cessation of blood spilling, coercion, destruction, and oppression of religion. Turn not toward ruin, but to institute order and loyalty. Give some rest from this internecine war to the people, which they desire and have earned. Otherwise, you will have to answer for the righteous blood that you have shed, and you who took the sword will die by the sword.

Soviet officials took no note of his threats or admonishment, other than to begin making arrangements to silence him. On the night of November 24, Patr. Tikhon was placed under house arrest by order of the Soviet Central Committee, although no charges were brought against him. His cloister was searched and a sentry was ordered to stand at his door around the clock. The following month, Patr. Tikhon was taken to Cheka headquarters at the Lubyanka Prison in central Moscow, the former office of an insurance company. Protopresbyter Nikolai Lyubimov accompanied him. At the prison, Patr. Tikhon courteously greeted the Chekist Sorokin, who accepted a blessing from the patriarch. He was led into a large room where M.I. Latzis sat at a writing table. At his side was secretary Moskanin. The first question they asked the patriarch was, “Did you bestow a blessing on Admiral Kolchak through Bishop Nestor of Kamchatka?” The patriarch replied, “I know Nestor, but I did not send a blessing, nor could I have done so.” Latzis again asked, “How many letters have you sent?” The patriarch said, “Four,” and counted them off and their contents. Latzis asked, “Have you forgotten about the letter sent on the first anniversary of the October Revolution?” “I addressed that letter specifically to the SovNarKom, and it was not intended for general distribution,” answered the patriarch. When he was asked about his attitude to the state, he responded that he held to the views expounded in his letter to the SovNarKom just mentioned. The patriarch then added that he would change his attitude to the state if Soviet officials would change their attitude toward the ROC.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Latzis asked him next, “What are your political convictions? You, of course, are a monarchist.” Patr. Tikhon answered, “I ask you not to propose to me such questions, and I decline from answering them. I, of course, was a monarchist earlier, just as all of us were who lived in a monarchist country. And the political convictions which I hold at present mean nothing as far as you are convinced. I will disclose them when I voice my opinion in public regarding one form of government or another. But I will tell you that the patriarch will never carry on any agitation in favor of one form of government in Russia or another, and under no circumstances will he force or suppress anybody’s conscience during any public disclosure of opinion.” The inquisition ended with this statement. Latzis ordered that the patriarch be placed under house arrest, and a record kept of every visitor, which would then be routed to the Cheka. The patriarch was to be allowed to walk in his garden or perform services at his personal chapel, but could not attend any meetings without the prior approval of the Cheka. During this term of house arrest, Patr. Tikhon issued a circular letter on October 8, 1918 to ROC prelates, urging them to decline participation in political affairs and to subordinate themselves to Soviet authority. This included avoiding any violent opposition to or interference in the Soviet confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables. By the end of 1918, twenty-six monasteries were closed. In his New Year’s proclamation for 1919, Patr. Tikhon equated the revolutions of February and November of 1917 to the sorrowful attempt to build the tower of Babel. The previous year was the year of construction of Russian dominion. But, alas. Does it not remind us of the sorrowful attempt of the construction of Babylon? And our builders also want to construct for themselves a name through their reforms, and hope to benefit the unfortunate Russian nation with their decrees, and also the entire world, and even those nations more culturally advanced than ours. But they, as a result of these lofty intentions of theirs, will suffer the same fate as did the developers of Babel: instead of benefit, they will incur bitter disappointment. Wanting to make us rich and not lacking in anything, in reality they turn us into unfortunate, pitiful, destitute and naked people. Even though recently we possessed a great, mighty, strong Russia, one that was formidable to our enemies, they have assigned it a pathetic appellation, turned it into a desolate region, where one devours another in internecine war. When we read the Lamentations of Jeremiah, it is through his prophetic words that we weep over our dear homeland. What is the cause of such disorder and deficiency? It is because the Russian state is being built without God. Have we yet heard the holy name of the Lord from the lips of our rulers during their many counsels, meetings, and congresses? No. They depend only on their own strength. They want to make a name for themselves,

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV but not in the manner that our pious forefathers did, who gave credit not to themselves, but to the name of the Lord. As a result, the On-high will laugh at their plans and destroy their counsel. Genuinely, you are righteous Lord, because we were not submissive to Your word (Lam 1:18). The Church condemns such construction, and we decisively warn you that you will have no success at all, until the time that you finally remember God.

The patriarch’s sermon, the content of this New Year’s message, was recognized by members of the ROC as the voice of ecclesiastical intellect penetrating through the chaos of a land enveloped by civil war and still engaged along its western frontier in the vestiges of the world war. The population was also overwhelmed by revolutionary propaganda penetrating every facet of Russian life.

171. EVENTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR The civil war made communication with the diocesan bishops difficult for Patr. Tikhon, especially those dioceses that were occupied by the White Army. As a result, dioceses in Siberia and southern Russia created their own local ecclesiastical governments. In November 1918, an ecclesiastical council was held in Tomsk in Siberia, consisting of thirteen bishops from dioceses in the Volga, Ural Mountains, Siberia and Far East, including twenty-six delegates from dioceses that were occupied by Admiral Alexandr Vasilyevich Kolchak’s White Army. The presiding elder was Metr. Iyakov Pyatnitzki of Kazan, while vice-chairman was Bishop Veniamin Muratovski of Simbirsk. At the council, a temporary ecclesiastical administration was formed which primarily pertained to the dioceses under occupation by Kolchak, and Archbishop Silvestr Olshamski of Omsk was selected as head. After the defeat of Kolchak’s White Army by the Bolshevik Red Army, some of the bishops emigrated, while Bishops Veniamin of Simbirsk, Andrei of Ufa, Nikolai of Zlato-Ustovsk, and Irinarkh of Tobolsk, remained in Russia. Ukraine, which was able to acquire autonomy under the Provisional Government, was now aspiring to create its own independent national republic. The Caucasian states of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan had become independent nations in 1918. Finland severed ties with Russia, and so did the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This direction toward national independence also affected Christian denominations. As early as March 1917, immediately after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the formation of the Provisional Government,

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era the Georgian Orthodox Church proclaimed its independence from the ROC. Bishop Leonid Okropiridze was selected as deputy Katolicos until prelates and members could organize more formally. Patr. Tikhon, after his ordination, did not reject in principle the independence of the Georgian Orthodox Church, but expressed sorrow, stating that their separation was uncanonical. In another respect, the Armenian Orthodox Church had been independent since its formation in the 4th century, under the head of its own Katolicos. (Azerbaijan, the third Caucasus republic, is primarily Islamic). During the first session of the Regional Council in 1917, Patr. Tikhon requested that Georgian Orthodoxy subordinate itself to the ROC, but the Georgian Bishops Leonid, Kirion, Georgi, and Pire, ignored his request outright. These two Orthodox bodies were independent one from another until 1943. The ROC dioceses of Ukraine and south-west Russia, which were occupied by the White Army under General Anton Ivanovich Denikin, also held a council establishing an ecclesiastical administration to operate independently of Moscow. The council convened May 19-24, 1919, and Archbishop Mitrophan Simashkevich of Don diocese was its chairman. General Denikin gave the introductory speech to the council. The attending prelates supported the White Army, hoping they would defeat the Bolshevik Red Army and simultaneously rid Russia of atheism, which would allow them to again install the ROC as the national religion. A new ecclesiastical administration was formed for the dioceses in the region occupied by Denikin’s army, and Archbishop Mitrophan was elected its head, while Metr. Antoni Khrapovitzki of Kiev was elected as the new chairman of the ecclesiastical council. After the defeat of Denikin and the White Army by the Red Army in autumn of 1919, the following prelates abandoned Russia for Europe: Metr. Antoni Khrapovitzki of Kiev; Archbishops Evlogi Giorgievski of Volyn; Anastasi Gribanovsk of Kishinev; Georgi Yaroshevski of Minsk; Feofan Gavrilov of Kursk; Bishop Serafim Sobolev of Lubensk; many others also fled, fearing reprisals from the Soviets due to their support of the White Army. Archbishop Mitrofan went to Crimea to take refuge there, since it was still under control of the White Army under General Wrangle. After the fall of Sebastopol on November 15, 1920, several more ROC prelates migrated to Europe, including Bishops Feofan Bistrov and Veniamin Fedchenkov. Circumstances became very difficult for ROC clergy who had remained in the territories occupied by the White Army. After the victory of the Red Army, the Soviets considered the former loyalty of the clergy to the Whites as counter-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV revolutionary insurgency. Liturgies which had been performed and dedicated to the defeat of the Red Army served as the basis for Soviet officials to prosecute the ROC clergy. Those who had been ministering in White-occupied areas were all sentenced to execution or brutal torture for aiding and supporting the enemy. In October 1918, a 72-year-old simple parish priest of Stavropol was flogged to death because his grandsons were officers in the White Army. The priest Nikodin Redikultzev, from the village Kamen, Tomsk province, was brutally carved apart with a knife. Priest Alexandr Podolski from Vladimirovoi Station, Kuban diocese, was arrested for performing a liturgy for Cossacks prior to their attack on Red troops; he was chopped apart with an axe. A parishioner of his, who came to retrieve the body for burial, was killed by drunken soldiers. The priest of the village Solomenski, Stavropol diocese, Grigori Dmitriyevski, had his nose and ears severed by a bayonet, and then he was shot to death. On December 11, 1918, the episcopal vicar of Perm province, Feofan Ilyinski, was drowned in a local river. The former episcopal vicar of Novgorod diocese, Isidor Kolokotov, was killed in Samara and then impaled on a stake in public. On January 14, 1919, Bishop Platon Kulbish of Revel diocese, Estonia, was murdered in a cellar, together with protopriests N. Bezhanitzki and M. Bleiv. After the Soviets left the cellar, about 200 corpses, including that of a Lutheran bishop, were removed by local parishioners. Archbishop Mitrophan Krasnopolski and his vicar, Bishop Leonti Enotayevski, were executed by firing squad on June 23, 1919, by order of Soviet minister Sergei Mironovich Kirov. In December 1919, Archbishop Tikhon Nikanorov of Voronezh was hanged from the royal doors in the iconostas at the Mitrophan Monastery. In March 1921, Bishop Mefodi Krasnoperov of Petro-Pavlovsk was murdered. In Sebastopol, at the close of the civil war, former bishop of NizhniNovgorod, Iyoakim Leviski, was executed by a firing squad. In Kharkov diocese, during the six-month period from December 1918 through June 1919, 70 priests were executed for supporting the White Army. In Voronezh diocese, 160 priests were executed by the Red Army after the region was recovered from the Whites. In Kuban diocese, after the Whites’ defeat, 43 priests were executed; and also in Stavropol, 52 priests were executed. To attempt to mitigate the Red troops’ brutality toward ROC clergy in regions formerly occupied by the White Army, Patr. Tikhon composed two circular letters, on July 18 and October 8, 1919. He hoped that ROC clergy would withdraw from political activity and so deliver themselves from reprisal by the Red Army. As with his previous letters, these were futile attempts to curb the

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era inevitable. To compensate for the attrition of ROC prelates due to execution and exile, Patr. Tikhon ordained 14 new bishops in 1919, and 39 in 1921 (no figures were recorded for 1920). On June 13, 1919, Patr. Tikhon was attacked by a woman wielding a knife, P.K. Guseva, but he survived with a minor wound. This attack had a political motive: Guseva was the mother of two soldiers in the Red army. At her trial by a Soviet court, she was declared innocent by reason of insanity.

172. THE EXAMINATION OF RELICS On February 16, 1919, the Department of Justice issued an edict calling for the examination of all ecclesiastical relics. The investigation was to be performed by a special committee in the presence of ROC officials. The Soviets’ purpose was clear: if the body of the deceased prelate or saint was not in perfect form, preserved in its entirety, then it would be concluded that the ROC had been advertising such “incorruptible remains” as a deliberate fraud in order to deceive ignorant and superstitious parishioners. What Soviet officials failed to realize was that even if every sarcophagus was revealed to be filled with dust or decayed bones (or anything else, for that matter), it would not be adequate to convince any ROC adherent of the perpetration of a fraud. Since ROC adherents viewed this intrusion into the vaults of their venerated deceased as sacrilege and desecration, such an inquisition would only turn the people against the Soviet state even more, defeating its purpose. The Soviets nonetheless proceeded, figuring at least they could expose deception and arrest a few ROC clergy; and the work proceeded slowly. On the following day, Patr. Tikhon issued a circular letter to the diocesan bishops asking them to withstand this desecration of the remains of ROC saints. He requested them to “conduct an immediate investigation and make arrangements to eliminate any opportunity for discredit in the matter of the holy remains of the saints.” Given their fear of reprisal, the majority of ROC clergy did not interfere or oppose the Soviets’ examination of sepulchers and vaults. The first saint whose sepulcher was examined was Bishop Mitrophan of Voronezh, and this occurred the same day the edict was issued, February 16, 1919. Within a month, 28 examinations were conducted, and this moved Patr. Tikhon to address a letter of remonstrance to Vladimir Lenin: As a part of my obligation as a shepherd, I declare to you that every offense of the religious consciousness of the people will incur a subsequent sorrow among

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV them, a righteous indignation, and will stir up their emotions to a degree greater than would other calamities of life. This examination of remains compels us to rise to protect shrines from desecration and to proclaim to the people, “We must obey God rather than men.”

Unlike other letters from the patriarch to Soviet officials, which were ignored and discarded, this one had ramifications. In reprisal, the Virgin of Kazan Cathedral in Petrograd was converted into the Museum of Religion and Atheism, and the remains of several saints were brought there and placed on public display. This included the remains of prelate Joasaf of Belgorod. The sepulcher containing the remains of Sergei of Radonezh were opened April 11, 1919, only dust and decayed bones were to be found. On May 10, 1920, Patr. Tikhon again remonstrated to the SovNarKom, this time over their proposed closure of the Troitse-Sergeev Monastery in Zagorsk (today known as Sergeev Posad), and the transfer of the remains of Sergei of Radonezh to some Moscow museum for public display. We present you with this letter of appeal to inform you that the closure of monastery churches, and your intention of transferring his remains from there, tugs at our religious conscience. This action appears to be an intrusion of the civil authority into the inner life and beliefs of the Church, which is in contradiction with the decree of the separation of the church from the state, and the several declarations of the supreme central authorities regarding freedom of worship.

In response to Patr. Tikhon’s letter of May 10, the Department of Justice issued a circular letter to regional commanders regarding the transfer of saints’ remains to museums, and also stated: Every incidence that discloses charlatanry, trickery, falsification, and other criminal acts that arise from the exploitation of such obscurities on the part of the ministers of religions, demands judicial prosecution of all guilty persons.

Some ROC clergy opened sepulchers of saints on their own to examine their contents before the Soviets had a chance to do so, in order to remove anything that might be incriminating. Bishop Aleksei Simanski of Tikhvin, Archimandrites Nikodim and Anastasi, monks Gavriel and Mitrofan, protopriest Stoyanov, and hierodeacon Ioyanniki were arrested for doing this to a sepulcher at the Cathedral of Santa Sophia in Novgorod. They were brought to trial on November 1, 1920. The Soviet court sentenced Bishop Aleksei to five years imprisonment, and all the others to two- and three-year terms, although they received a last minute reprieve due to the victory of the Red army in the civil war. Some ROC clergy and activists were brought to trial for accusing Soviet officials of misconduct during the examination of the remains of Savva of Storozhev,

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era whose sepulcher was discovered to contain a cotton and wool doll. Protopriest Nikolai Tzvetkov, former Holy Synod At-Gen A.D. Samarin, members of the Sacred Synod G.A. Rachinski and N.D. Kuznetzov were brought to trial. Samarin and Kuznetzov were initially sentenced to execution by firing squad, but this was reduced to confinement at a concentration camp, “until the victory of the world proletariat over world imperialism,” as the sentence read. The others received various prison terms. By the autumn of 1920, 63 examinations were held in 14 dioceses: the vaults or sepulchers of venerated saints were opened publicly and the contents disclosed. The Soviet examiners documented their contents, and many of them did contain items bearing little resemblance to the remains of a saint. For example: the sepulcher of Evfrosinya of Suzdal contained a cloth doll or dummy with pieces of bone; that of Kirill of Bel-Ozersk contained a dummy in human shape; that of Pitirim of Tambov contained a metal dummy with wax-covered bones; that of Pavel of Obnorsk contained several boards, old coins, wood shavings, dirt, and bricks; while the sepulcher of Alexandr of Svir contained a wax figure. Some of the vaults contained mummified corpses, while the rest contained semi-decayed bones. On December 17, 1920, the sepulcher of Seraphim of Sarov was examined but Soviets officials discovered that the remains had already been removed by local ROC parishioners and placed in hiding. On April 8, 1920, Department V issued instructions to the ROC, for them not to celebrate holidays on normal workdays, but on those days when the population was not working, i.e. on a Soviet holiday. On May 10, Department V restricted the civil rights of ROC clergy because they did not have regular jobs, but rather, as they felt, squandered their time on monotonous and useless ceremonies. By the autumn of 1920, the nationalization of ecclesiastical property was completed. According to the account of the Department of Justice, 7.2 billion rubles were appropriated from ROC bank accounts and treasury, 2.2 million acres of land, and 1,112 industries and businesses. By the end of 1920, 537 monasteries were closed by Department V of the Department of Justice. In August 1920, the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee opened its doors with Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich as its chairman. He was one of Vladimir Lenin’s close friends, and a person thoroughly familiar with the Christian denominations of Russia. On November 12, 1920, the SovNarKom issued a directive for the creation of a political-educational committee that was

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV to be under the direction of Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, the wife of Vladimir Lenin (they married when they were in Siberia, both exiled for revolutionary activities). Anti-religious seminars were opened to prepare professional propagandists qualified in atheism and the exposure of religion. On November 20, 1920, the remaining members of both the Sacred Synod and Supreme Eccl. Council met with Patr. Tikhon. They composed written procedures in order for each diocese to be able to operate independently, or several dioceses to operate as a cooperative, in case ties with patriarchal offices in Moscow were severed or if the two ROC administrative bodies were disbanded by the Soviets. At the beginning of 1921, only Patr. Tikhon and three members remained of the original 13-member Sacred Synod: Metr. Sergei Stragorodski of Vladimir (later patriarch), Metr. Evsevi Nikolski of Krutitzk, and Archbishop Mikhail of Grodnensk, who was also patriarchal-exarch of Ukraine, even though they had already proclaimed their autonomy. Of the Supreme Eccl. Council, formerly consisting of 15 members, only three members remained: protopresbyter N. Kuibimov, and protopriests A. Stanislavski and Alexandr Kulechov.

173. ECCLESIASTICAL EVENTS IN UKRAINE In early November 1917, after the fall of the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks, Ukraine proclaimed itself an independent republic. Mikol Bessonov, formerly known as Bishop Nikon of Vologda, was selected as Minister of Confessions for Ukraine; he was infamous for his scandal with a young lady from the religious academy in his early career. After the Provisional Government assumed imperial authority, Bishop Nikon abandoned his cathedra, re-assumed his birth name, married his mistress, and moved to Kiev. He took up writing critiques and editorials on plays and theater attractions as his new vocation. Soon after their relocation, his wife was killed one night in an attempted robbery at their home. After Patr. Tikhon was ordained, a council of Ukrainian diocesan prelates under the chairmanship of Archbishop Aleksei Dorognitzin, a fiery preacher of Ukrainian nationalism, decided not to mention his name during liturgy. Patr. Tikhon, agitated by the course of events in Ukraine, ordained Vladimir Bogoyavlenski as metropolitan of Kiev on November 23, 1917, and dispatched him to his new cathedra, hoping he would settle the unrest. Arriving in Kiev, Metr. Vladimir made the acclaimed Pecher Monastery his residence. Immediately, Archbishop Aleksei also moved into the monastery, and into the cloister right

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era next door to the metropolitan, and began to turn the residents against Metr. Vladimir. With the initial preparations made for a Ukrainian Eccl. Council, Metr. Tikhon then dispatched Metr. Platon Rozhdestvenski of Tiflis and Metr. Antoni Khrapovitzki, and Archbishop Evlogi Giorgievski of Volyn, all of whom were attending the ROC Regional Council at the time, to Kiev to see what they could do. In December 1917, Archbishop Evlogi recommended Bessonov as Minister of Confession to Golubovich, the Minister of the Ukrainian Congress, hoping to gain his support to keep Ukrainian Orthodoxy unified with the ROC under jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate. Their opposition was led by Archbishop Aleksei Dorognitzin. The Kievan Eccl. Council opened January 20, 1918, with three groups vying for control: those who favored complete unity with the ROC under the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate, those advocating independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), and a few advocating semi-autonomy, which was a middle road: the UOC would be independent of ROC administration, yet still participate in ROC councils and accept their decrees. During the course of the council the Red Army attacked Kiev, and the attitude of the delegates immediately shifted. As volleys were directed at the city, the separatist group withdrew their demands, and on January 31 the council decided to close its doors. The separatist priest Marchev proposed a vote to settle the issue of autonomy: 150 voted against autonomy, and 60 were in favor. No decisions of any magnitude were mandated at the council. The Red Army entered Kiev on February 8, 1918, and installed a regiment of troops at the Pecher Monastery. On February 15, Red soldiers searched the Metr. Vladimir’s cloister. That night, five drunken Red soldiers broke into the metropolitan’s cloister, beat him up, and dragged him outside his residence and into their automobile. They drove about half-a-mile from the monastery gates and threw him out of the car and into the mud, shot him to death, and left him there. He was found the next morning lying on his back in a pool of blood. Local residents buried him. Kiev’s occupation by the Red Army was short lived, and the Germans again took occupation of the city within a couple of months. The German-supported regime was headed by Hetman (Ataman) Pavel Skoropadski. Just before Easter in 1918, Archbishop Evlogi received an order from Patr. Tikhon to select a metropolitan to fill the vacant Kievan cathedra. Several candidates were presented to delegates of the diocesan parishes, and the majority was

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV in favor of Metr. Antoni Khrapovitzki, who also received approval from hetman Skoropadski. A second session of the Kievan ecclesiastical council was opened in June 1918. Professor Vasili Vasilyevich Zenkovski7 was the new Minister of Confessions approved by the German-occupation officials, and he took a more moderate course and was more educated than the scandal-plagued Bessonov. The separatists, however, pressured him so hard that he quit his office. He was replaced by D.A. Lototzki, who favored independence from the ROC. At the council, Metr. Antoni and Archbishop Evlogi supported consolidation with Moscow, and were able to win over the delegates. The final resolution on July 22, 1918 was for the autonomy of the UOC, while it would accept as mandatory the edicts of ROC Regional Councils and Sacred Synod. The results, as unstable and confusing as they were, were short lasting with the threat of the civil war looming on the horizon. On December 14, 1918, Ukrainian nationalists under Semeon Vasilyevich Petluira, who aligned himself with Denikin and his White army, defeated the Germans in Kiev, and Skoropadski fled. The rest of Ukraine was in the hands of Denikin by February 1919. Now, with Kiev under Ukrainian control, Metr. Antoni of Kiev and Archbishop Evlogi of Volyn were arrested. However, by the intervention of Entente delegates, they were freed and somehow made their way to General Wrangel’s occupied territory in the Crimea. Petluira then declared the UOC autonomous and independent of the ROC. A new Synod was created and Archbishop Agapit Vishnevski of Ekaterinoslav was installed as its president. The first course of action was to prohibit the reciting of the names of Patr. Tikhon and Metr. Antoni of Kiev during liturgy. Kiev then fell a second time to the Bolshevik Red Army in the autumn of 1919. The UOC Synod collapsed. Archbishop Agapit was deprived of his cathedra and defrocked by Soviet officials. On May 6, 1920, during the Soviet-Polish War, the Polish army defeated Kiev and occupied it. UOC clergy of several local parishes again created a new Synod and expelled all the clergy who were affiliated with Moscow and the ROC, and they again claimed autonomy. The Poles’ victory was short. In June 1920, the Red army defeated the Polish army and re-occupied Kiev for the third time in two years, and the remaining ROC clergy fled, mostly to Europe. In 7. Zenkovski (1881-1962) migrated to Paris in 1919, where he later wrote his famous History of Russian Philosophy.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era October 1920, the Soviets accepted an armistice with Poland and took control of the entirety of Ukraine. On October 16, 1920, the ROC selected Archbishop Evlogi as director of the eastern European ROC churches, and he became part of the Karlovtzi Conference. Unlike the balance of Karlovtzi prelates, Evlogi attempted to remain loyal to Patr. Tikhon. Professor V.M. Chekhovski, former premier-minister under Petluira, exhibited considerable interest in ecclesiastical affairs. Initially part of the Socialist-Democratic Party of the Ukraine, he tried to have himself ordained as Kiev’s archbishop through a council of Ukrainian Orthodox Clergy. His attempt at elevating himself as head of the UOC failed when the Soviets occupied Kiev, but he persisted nonetheless. An ecclesiastical council convened beginning August 28, 1921, headed by Metr. Mikhail Ermakov of Brest and composed of Bishops Dmitri Verkitzki of Yuman, Nikolai Brailov of Cherkass, and Gregori Lisonski of Luben. Several local prelates and clergy pressured by moderates appealed to the council to extend extra-territorialism to their bishops. Since many Ukrainian bishops either migrated or were exiled, they hoped they could still exercise their episcopal administration, even in absentia. The council rejected the proposition. This group of clergy then summoned their own ecclesiastical council with Chekhovski at its head. The majority of these clergy advocated autonomy from the ROC. Prelate Mikhail Ermakov refused to attend or participate in the new council, although he attended once — in order to admonish them to disband. Unable to acquire the support of Metr. Mikhail, the new UOC council on October 10, 1921 ordained Vasili Lipkovski as metropolitan of all Ukraine at the Cathedral of Santa Sophia in Kiev. In essence, he was their choice to replace Mikhail Ermakov, who had been designated by Tikhon. In return, Metr. Vasili then ordained as bishop Nestor Sharayevski, a married man, which was unheard-of in Eastern Orthodox history. The two of them then began to ordain bishops to fill vacant cathedras in Ukraine: about 30 bishops were ordained, and several of them were either married or divorced. Metr. Mikhail pleaded with parishioners not to accept the ordinations, but his pleas were in vain. Some 1,500 parishes with three million parishioners joined the new autonomous UOC.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 174. THE KARLOVTZI CONFERENCE From November 21-December 3, 1921, a conference of ROC bishops, priests, and laypersons was held in Sremski Karlovtzi in Serbia (Yugoslavia), a small city fifty miles north of Belgrade on the road to Novi Sad. These clergy had immigrated to Serbia from Russia toward the end of the civil war, while the White Army was suffering crushing defeat by the Bolshevik Red Army. They referred to themselves as the Russian Emigré Ecclesiastical Council, and were under the presidency of the initial candidate to the Russian patriarchate, Antoni Khrapovitzki. The congress during their deliberations decided with a twothirds majority vote to favor the restoration of the monarchial Romanov dynasty. The popular demagogue of monarchialism, Markov, even publicly declared that the congress of Sremski Karlovtzi had the obligation to say what could not be said in the remaining ROC churches of Russia, because of the dangers that threaten the patriarch. The minority one-third vote did not disagree with the stance of the émigré conference regarding the return of the monarchy under the Romanovs but, as Metr. Evlogi stated, they did not feel that it was appropriate for the Karlovtzi conference to announce a political platform in the name of the entire ROC, much less claim that it had the obligation to accomplish what the Orthodox Church in Russia could not. The Karlovtzi Conference decrees implied that the ROC in Russia was in captivity, while they were free and so were obliged to take over administration. With statements such as this, it was easy for Soviet officials to accuse Patr Tikhon of communication with the Karlovtzi Conference. The conference also voiced support of the White army of General Wrangel, still undefeated at this time. The following year, Antoni Khrapovitzki turned to the Genoa Conference of April 10-May 19, 1922, with an appeal to intervene. He hoped that the entente delegates at Genoa, Italy — there to plan the economic restoration of the nations defeated in World War I — would pressure the Soviet delegates unto mitigating the oppression of the ROC. Krasnikov, a member of the Department of Justice, directly accused Patr. Tikhon of being in a secret alliance with the Karlovtzi conference and demanded that the patriarch excommunicate them for conspiracy and treason. Patr. Tikhon answered that he did not have the authority to excommunicate someone who was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Krasnikov’s accusation against Patr. Tikhon served as one of the primary reasons for his subsequent prosecution.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era On April 8, 1921, Patr. Tikhon and the Sacred Synod decreed that ROC churches in Europe submit to Archbishop Evlogi Giorgievski, and mention his name during liturgy, and that this should continue until normal ecclesiastical relations could be settled in Russia. On January 30, 1922, Patr. Tikhon and the Sacred Synod ordained Evlogi Giorgievski in absentia as metropolitan and administrator of European ROC churches. On April 14, 1922, Patr. Tikhon composed a letter addressed to Metr. Evlogi and presented its contents to the Sacred Synod for their review before sending it: I do not recognize the Karlovtzi Council of émigré clergy and laypersons as having canonical significance, and their letter regarding the reestablishment of the Romanov dynasty and turn to the Genoa Conference does not express the official voice of the Church.

As a result of their intrusion into political affairs, the patriarch included a motion requesting them to disband their émigré ROC administration. The émigré parishes, according to Patr. Tikhon, were to remain under his jurisdiction. On May 5, 1922, Patr. Tikhon and the Sacred Synod issued a decree to formally abolish the Karlovtzi ROC administration and to transfer the administration of émigré parishes to Metr. Evlogi.

175. BEGINNINGS OF THE RENOVATIONIST MOVEMENT The renovationist movement had its beginnings during the Provisional Government, when former Holy Synod At-Gen Vladimir Lvov created in Petrograd his All-Russia Union of Democratic Orthodox Clergy and Laypersons, and published his newspaper Golos Khrista (Voice of Christ). Many ROC clergy in the central Russian dioceses felt a need for a spiritual revolution in the ROC and a renewal of the entire corporate body. Not everyone in the ROC was satisfied with the restoration of the Patriarchate. When Tikhon was elected, the opposition, at the initiative of protopresbyter Giorgi Shavelski, decided to break with the ROC, dividing the body into two camps: renovationist and patriarchal. Patr. Tikhon labeled the renovationists “advocates of Kerenski inside the ecclesiastical fold,”8 and considered them demagogues. The renovationists, as they were known, attacked the traditional forms of ceremonial piety and the canonical structure of ecclesiastical administration — the patriarchate. In 1919, the movement made its home at the Church of Sts Zechariah and Elizabeth, where priest Alexandr Vvedenski was curator. He too had his own newspaper,

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Znamya Khrista (Banner of Christ), and was head of the Petrograd Group of Progressive Clergy. As protopriest Vvedenski would proclaim, “According to our way of thinking, severance from Tikhon must begin simultaneously in Petrograd, Kiev and Odessa.” However, Vvedenski realized that they could not do that any time soon because the renovationists did not have much sympathy in Moscow. That same year, priest Iyoann Egorov created a new renovationist group in Petrograd under the appellation of Religion in Unity with Life. At his parish church, he moved the altar from behind the iconostasis to the center of the church, changed the language from the archaic and obsolete Church Slavonic to contemporary Russian, and taught that ordination could be performed by personal inspiration. These were the initial reforms of the renovationist church. Priest Alexandr Boyarski in the city of Kolpin, south of Petrograd, organized a renovationist group that he called Friends of Ecclesiastical Reformation. The renovationists found considerable support in Bishop Antonin Granovski, who would perform liturgy in Moscow ROC churches with alluring innovations that attracted large crowds. Patr. Tikhon issued an interdiction toward the end of 1921 to curb Bishop Antonin from further performing liturgy. Vladimir Putyata, a bishop in Penza who was defrocked, deprived of his cathedra, and excommunicated from the ROC, “for insubordination to and contempt of canonical rules,” united disenchanted dissidents from the ROC into a union called the National Church. Later, he fell into disagreement with the renovationists, and with a small circle of supporters announced himself as Archbishop of the Urals. In 1928, Bishop Vladimir moved to Omsk with the few supporters who still remained with him in order to escape the Red Terror under Josef Stalin. In Tsaritzyn (later know as Stalingrad), former hieromonk Iliodor Trufanov, who returned to Russia from Europe, declared himself the founder of the New Living Church and new patriarch of all Russia. Iliodor demoralized the patriarchal faction by extending longevity to Soviet leaders, a traditional manner of Russian welcome. The Department of Internal Affairs approvingly acknowledged the above splinter groups, especially Iliodor’s, whom they described as 8. Alexandr Feodorovich Kerenski was Minister of Justice and later Prime Minister (after Sergei Witte) during the Provisional Government. He was active in the legislation that secularized the new Russian government and issued the edicts regarding freedom of conscience (religion) for all residents of Russia, and transferring all schools to under the administration of the Russian state, including ROC schools subsidized by the state.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era “openly striking the [ROC] ecclesiastical hierarchy directly in the forehead.” Especially beneficial to the Department were renegades from the ROC. The most adamant and vociferous of renovationist leaders and the spearhead of the movement was protopriest Alexandr Vvedenski. He was undoubtedly an educated man, although very superficial and alien to the religious circle of ROC prelates. Vvedenski was a mediocre orator and in his spare time was a musical-comedy actor; he was clean shaven with short hair and sported a small moustache. A university graduate, he became a priest in 1914. During the years 1914-1917, Vvedenski was a close associate of protopresbyter Giorgi Shavelski, and his sermons at the time were rather liberal. After 1917, the motif of his oratory became Christian socialism. Vvedenski explained his version of ecclesiology at the home of his friend Yuritzki, “Decipher the contemporary economic term capitalism, and assign it an evangelical appellation. This signifies the opulent person who, according to Christ, will not inherit eternal life. Translate the word proletariat into the evangelical language and it will refer to the lower-level and avoided Lazarus, whom the Lord came to save. And the Church must now definitely place such avoided lesser brethren on the path of salvation. It must condemn the injustice of capitalism from the religious — and not economic — point of view. This is why our renovationist movement accepts the religious-moral justice of the October Socialist upheaval. We tell everybody openly: it is not necessary to go against the authority of the working people.” When members of the patriarchal ROC noticed the number on the license plate of Vvedenski’s automobile, which was 999, they quickly identified him as possessing the mark of the beast, but inverting it in order to hide it. Another popular activist of the renovationists was Protopriest Vladimir Krasnitzki. Ten years earlier he was an exemplary Petersburg priest and a member of the democratic Union of the Russian People. While a student at the religious academy, he wrote a report titled, “Socialism is from the Devil.” While in 1917-1918, he published in the Petrograd Diocesan News an article calling for the extermination of the Bolsheviks. His philosophical metamorphosis occurred when the opportunity to join the renovationists arrived, which some also interpreted as his way of saving his soul from the devil. Krasnitzki then dedicated himself to the movement heart and soul. The person who initiated the renovationist movement in Moscow was S. Kalinovski. In 1905, he attempted to enter the Moscow Religious Academy, but during the entrance examinations, the examiners concluded that he did not even

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV qualify for the primary class of the seminary. Kalinovski was forced to abandon his dream of an ecclesiastical career. When World War I began and a shortage of military chaplains occurred, Kalinovski was able to acquire an ordination. He then substituted for a parish priest in a Moscow church, and remained there until the end of the war, never having to go to the front. He performed liturgy at his own discretion, often violating ecclesiastical tradition and canonical rules, inventing all types of innovations to mesmerize and gain the interest of his parishioners. Eventually, Metr. Evsevi Nikolski, who was assisting Patr. Tikhon in administrating the Moscow diocese, interdicted Kalinovski, forbidding him to perform any more liturgy, but he ignored the interdiction. Then Metr. Evsevi decided to conduct an investigation to acquire evidence in order to bring Kalinovski to an episcopal court for trial. Abut about this time, the offices of the patriarchate were searched by the Soviet secret police and the documents pertaining to Kalinovski’s trial were confiscated. Once Patr. Tikhon was arrested and the renovationists usurped ecclesiastical authority, Kalinovski began to play an important role. After several months expired, Kalinovski declared himself an atheist and joined the Soviet antireligious propaganda machine. Antonin Granovski, another active promoter of the renovationist group, was born in Poltava province and attended the Kiev Religious Academy. He stood out from among the other students in his studies and was soon tonsured as a monk. Antonin graduated from the academy in 1891 and became a teacher in several religious schools, and impressed both students and faculty with his scholarship. For a while he served as a rector of a religious academy in Moscow and resided at the Donskoi Monastery. He kept a bear in his cloister and took him along with him wherever he went. From Moscow he was transferred to Tula as an inspector at a seminary, where he quickly turned the students against him. After Tula, Antonin taught in Kholm, where he was cruel and cold and turned everyone against him. Metr. Evlogi reminisced about his personal acquaintance with Antonin in these years and said that he felt Antonin had some type of psychological illness. At the turn of the century, Antonin relocated to St. Petersburg and served in a censure committee; he wrote a treatise on the Book of Baruch and attended religious-philosophical conferences. In St. Petersburg, Antonin became friends with Vasili Vasilyevich Rozanov, the famous Russian philosopher, who called him a Leviathan. As a result of his excellent theological erudition and public speaking talent, Antonin was noticed by Metr. Antoni Vadkovski of Petersburg, and in 1903, Antonin Granovski was ordained as bishop of Narva, becoming at the same

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era time vicar of Petersburg. After the revolution of 1905 he refused to commemorate the name of Tsar Nicholas II during liturgy. He taught that the legislative, executive and judicial authorities were the earthly equivalent of the divine Trinity. As a result of such an unorthodox interpretation, he was forced to resign and was transferred to an isolated monastery in the Petersburg diocese. Then in 1913, he was ordained as bishop of Vladikavkaz in the very south of Russia. While there, bishop Antonin was diagnosed with leukemia, which forced him into retirement, and he relocated to the Bogo-Yavlenski Monastery in Moscow. During the Regional Council of 1917-1918, he wandered about the streets of Moscow in a torn and dilapidated monk’s cassock. When his old acquaintances recognized him, they felt sorry for him, because he had been forgotten. Often he spent nights sleeping on a street bench. Some ROC prelates considered him psychologically ill, or at least unpretentious and harmless. His rehabilitation occurred with the rise of the renovationist movement and his opportunity to join. Another prelate of the renovationist camp was Bishop Leonid Skobeev of Vernen. He had an extensive education in medicine, the military and legal disciplines, but only completed his religious studies half-way. Nonetheless, he was assigned as archimandrite at an isolated monastery, and he would perform liturgy at local parish churches on a regular basis. In 1921 he was ordained as Bishop of Vernen but never showed up at his diocesan capital. He went directly to Moscow, hoping for faster career advancement. There he joined the renovationists and as a sign of gratitude they elevated him to Bishop of Krutitzk in July 1922. They recognized his lack of ability and perhaps some other shortcomings, and so transferred him first to Penza, and then to Orel, but in March 1923, he was forced to retire completely. Patr. Tikhon referred to Leonid Skobeev as “the bishop of Sodom and Gomorrah,” as a result of his inappropriate conduct. Patr. Tikhon, under the circumstances, was helpless as dissenters splintered off to create their own ecclesiastical bodies. He wrote another circular letter as a reprimand on November 17, 1921, prohibiting the introduction of any innovations into liturgical or ecclesiastical practice. The divine beauty of ecclesiastical ceremonialism is truly edifying in its present form and since the time it was introduced ages ago by apostolic devotion, fervent prayer, the efforts of martyrs and the wisdom of the holy fathers, and has been sealed by the Church in its hierarchy, rules, and statutes. So it must be preserved inviolate in the holy Orthodox Russian Church as its greatest and holiest legacy.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Toward the end of 1921, Patr. Tikhon sent a letter of reprimand specifically to Bishop Victor Ostrovidov of Tomsk for implementing improvements in the liturgy. In autumn of 1921, Vladimir Lenin wrote to the Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, regarding a change in the approach to the ROC. With ecclesiastical property and finances appropriated by the Soviets, the civil war having ended, and the New Economic Policy (NEP) soon to be implemented, the Soviet approach was now to internally divide the ROC until it collapsed, rather than attacking it directly. Internal division would undermine their foundation, and atheistic and antireligious propaganda would wean away parishioners; churches and parishes would become vacant as a result of the new approach. At least in this manner, the ROC would be controlled by the Soviets, with ecclesiastical leaders as puppets. The Soviets were not in a hurry to accomplish the ROC’s total liquidation, the foremost item on their agenda being the rebuilding of the economy. The Soviets also had to develop relations with Europe, and open attacks on the ROC would not help their image; but they felt that at least a superficial appearance of a neutral position with the ROC would suffice for this purpose. At the beginning of 1922, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that the leadership of the ROC must be placed in the hands of clergy loyal to the Soviet regime following the advice of Lenin. This would create the appearance of normalized relations, while the plan of gradual liquidation was slowly unfolding. The following passage is a selection from a report presented March 21, 1922 to the GPU: The GPU has acquired considerable information indicating that certain local priests stand in opposition to the reactionary group comprising the Synod, and that they, because of canonical rules and for other reasons, cannot proceed abruptly against their supervisors. They feel that with the arrest of the members of the Synod, they will be presented the opportunity to create a new ecclesiastical council. Then they will be able to select persons to fill the positions of the patriarchal cathedra and Synod, whose inclination is more loyal to Soviet authority. The basis of the arrest of Tikhon and the most reactionary members of the Synod by the GPU and its local branches is adequate for this purpose. The GPU finds: (1) The arrest of the Synod and patriarch at the present time would be opportune. (2) To permit the [new] religious council to select a new Synod and patriarch at the present time would also be possible.

The proposition found fertile soil, although it was postponed for a month and a half. A second report written by Leon Trotsky, dated March 30, 1922, was confirmed without any debate by the Politburo and became the tactical and stra-

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era tegic program of the Soviet State regarding the renovationist clergy, designed to provide dissension within the ROC. Today we overthrow the counter-revolutionary members of the ecclesiastical clergy in whose hands rests the factual government of the Church. In this struggle we must rely on an interchangeable priesthood, and not engage them in politics, but in principle. We must first, install in its entirety dispensable priests, and openly tie their fate to the question of the appropriation of [ROC] valuables; second, compel them to execute this campaign of theirs within the Church to the point of a complete organizational rupture from the Black Hundreds-affiliated priesthood, to the point of their personal installation of a new council and new selection of prelates… while at the same time counteracting the dispensable group’s capabilities with those of the counter-revolutionary priests. Then, when they decide to convene a council, we must prepare a theoretical propaganda campaign against the renovationist church. To simply gloss over the bourgeois-reformation church will not succeed. It will be necessary, consequently, to treat it as an abortion.

The Black Hundreds were, as mentioned above, the ultra-conservative para-military arm of the patriarchal ROC faction. Thus, Soviet officials under Lenin, from the very outset, planned to take advantage of the renovationists and utilize them to achieve their goals. The Soviets knew that their support of the renovationists would last a few years, and when they had served their purpose it would be easy to get rid of them. The Soviets would praise them publicly and then later discard them like a used piece of equipment or abortion. It was easier to achieve their goal by manipulating the renovationist priests with their vain ambitions and getting them to fracture the ROC organization from inside, than to squash it from the outside. Other activists of note in the renovationist movement were former Holy Synod At-Gen Vladimir N. Lvov and professor B. Titlinov, who was a fiery opponent to the reintroduction of the patriarchate. Moderates among the renovationists were Alexandr Boyarski, a Petrograd priest who risked his life when he defended Metr. Veniamin of Petrograd at his trial. But the real power behind the renovationist movement was not its leaders Alexandr Vvedenski or Antonin Granovski, but a member of the Cheka, Evgeni Alexandrovich Tuchkov. Renovationist clergy would cynically refer to him as Abbot Tuchkov, while he preferred to call himself the Soviet Attorney-General of the ROC.

176. THE APPROPRIATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL VALUABLES Southeast European Russia faced a drought of unprecedented proportions beginning the summer of 1921 and which lasted through the summer of the fol-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV lowing year. In the regions of the lower Volga, along the Ural Mountains, the Caucasus and Crimea, and eastern Ukraine, in some 34 provinces overall, 23 million people faced starvation. The ruin of the economy and agriculture during the civil war aggravated the situation and hampered the region’s recovery. In the tradition of Soviet bureaucracy, efforts to transport food to the area were too late: by May 1922, over one million had died, and two million children were left orphans. Soviet officials turned to the ROC for a “contribution” to the state treasury, which they said would be used to purchase food. This was — as with all other business of the Soviets with the ROC — a ruse to further deplete ecclesiastical assets, since the Soviet treasury had already confiscated ROC real estate and bank accounts. As far as Soviet state fiscal condition was concerned, it had already confiscated the entire Romanov dynasty and Imperial treasuries, including ROC assets, and so had plenty of capital resources. Nonetheless, in about June 1921, Patr. Tikhon issued a circular letter asking for voluntary and personal contributions to mitigate the effects of the famine. He also sent letters to the Eastern Patriarchs, to Pope Benedict XV of Rome, to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and to the Bishop of York, requesting in the name of Christian love provisions and money to assist the famine-stricken. Under the presidency of Patr. Tikhon, the All-Russia Committee to Assist the Famine-Stricken (Pom-Gol) was organized as a channel for contributions, local and from abroad, to be directed into the famine fund. However, the activities and effectiveness of the Pom-Gol came under the scrutiny of the Supreme Soviet, and on August 27, 1921, the ROC administration was dissolved and all of its funds were confiscated and deposited into the state treasury. An amount of nine million rubles had been collected so far. In its place, Soviet officials organized a new Pom-Gol on December 9, 1921, which they called the Central Committee for Assistance of the Famine-stricken, now under the administration of the Supreme Soviet. The new committee approached Patr. Tikhon with a summons for the ROC to donate ecclesiastical valuables to the famine fund. The patriarch again complied with their request, and on February 19, 1922, issued a new summons to ROC parishes, requesting that they donate articles of value, as long as they were not directly part of liturgical paraphernalia. This summons was insufficient as far as the Soviets were concerned, and on February 23, 1922, an article appeared in the newspapers accusing ROC prelates of indifference towards the nation’s calamities.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Patr. Tikhon, agitated by the Soviets’ accusations, issued another circular letter on February 28 to all diocesan bishops and asked them to distribute it to all the parishes in their respective dioceses. Patr. Tikhon reminded them of the following: In December, the Government proposed to us that we act through the branches of our ecclesiastical administration — the Sacred Synod, Supreme Ecclesiastical Council, and Diocesan and Parish Clergy Councils — to donate money and provisions as a sign of our assistance for the hungry. Wanting to increase possible assistance to the population of the Volga basin who are dying from starvation, we deemed it necessary to advise ecclesiastical-parish councils and [monastic] communities to contribute to mitigate the plight of the starving by providing valuable ecclesiastical decor and objects which are not utilized in liturgy. We informed the Orthodox population of this in a special letter of February 6(19). But following this, on February 10(23), after serious attacks in state newspapers against [ROC] ecclesiastical leaders, the VTsIK,9 in order to provide additional material support, ordered the confiscation of all valuable items from the churches. From the Church’s point of view, acts of this type are sacrilege. Punishment for this sacrilege is excommunication for laypersons and unfrocking for clergy.

Later in February or early March 1922, the tormented Patr. Tikhon wrote a letter to Archimandrite Nikodim of the Yuryev Monastery in Novgorod, stating: We reject in anger and punish with excommunication from the Church any person who voluntarily contributes sacred vestments and bowls: what is given is not important, but to whom it is given.

After his letter was published in Izvestiya, Patr. Tikhon was arrested and placed in custody at Lubyanka Prison. During his inquisition (and the available record is meager), he was given a paper to read that stated that the Soviet government required “from citizen Belavin, as the responsible leader of the hierarchy,” his response to the accusation of counter-revolutionary activities. The primary inquisitor was Tuchkov. At the next inquiry, another Soviet official demanded that Patr. Tikhon turn over all the ecclesiastical valuables except the bare essentials. Patr. Tikhon answered, “All? Never!” Then another official, Samsonov, informed him that they intended to take judicial action against all the priests who had obstructed the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables, but the patriarch replied that he did not know their names and had no concrete knowledge of such incidents. The next set of questions dealt with the Karlovtzi ecclesiastical center, and this placed Patr. Tikhon in a most precarious position because they had advocated a return to the Romanov monarchy. 9. Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV When Patr. Tikhon returned from his inquisition by the Cheka, he told the priest who shared his cloister, “They questioned me very closely.” “And what will they do to you?” his roommate asked, quite agitated. “They swore to cut off my head,” answered the patriarch. The pressure was certainly being felt. On March 6, Metr. Veniamin Kazanski of Petrograd, along with I.M. Kovsharov, legal counsel of AlexandrNevski Monastery, went to Pom-Gol offices at the Smolny Institute in Petrograd, and assured them that ROC members and clergy would contribute items voluntarily, without the violent intrusion of Soviet soldiers. The metropolitan asked them to allow the presence of representatives of the clergy and parish and said they would work in cooperation with Soviet officials. Initially, Pom-Gol was inclined to the prelate’s suggestion and an article was published in the newspaper regarding an agreement reached between the Soviet Pom-Gol and the ROC. But the cooperative effort hardly lasted a few days, with Soviet officials ignoring the provisions of the agreement. Metr. Veniamin went to Pom-Gol again and insisted that they observe the agreement, but they refused to answer him. During Easter of 1922, Metr. Veniamin decided to contribute more than what was allowed by Patr. Tikhon. The metropolitan now allowed the confiscation of vestments, icon frames, and even icons, except for the most venerated, and all liturgical articles, except for those on the altar. The Pom-Gol officials took an inventory of the sacred articles of the churches still open in Petrograd, but the metropolitan feared resistance by parishioners. He sent protopriests Vvedenski and Boyarski to further discussions with Pom-Gol. They were able to acquire some concessions, and this compromise was also published in the local newspaper. Typical of Soviet officials, the agreement was ignored and soldiers began confiscating the most sacred of all objects in Petrograd. Crowds of parishioners and spectators gathered at the churches and attempted to prevent the theft of sacred ecclesiastical treasures. Soviet officials called on the police and local militia, which scattered the defenseless crowds. These incidents gave occasion for the Soviets to begin criminal proceedings against the ROC clergy and parishioners who participated in the resistance. A meeting was held March 20 for all prelates who were available between Moscow and Petrograd. Patr. Tikhon continued to voice resistance against coercive confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables, but many opposed him. The prelates were split into two factions: some agreed with Patr. Tikhon, and some preferred to submit to the decree of the Soviets. The primary advocates of coop-

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era eration with the Soviets were the renovationist clergy: Vvedenski, Krasnitzki, Boyarski, Platonov and Antonin Granovski. In fact, because of Bishop Antonin’s zeal in his remonstrance against Patr. Tikhon at this meeting, Soviet officials offered him a position at Pom-Gol, and he accepted. Meanwhile, the campaign of coercive confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables spread throughout the country. Soviet officials considered the letters of Patr. Tikhon illegal acts and increased their pressure on the ROC to yield valuable ecclesiastical paraphernalia to them. In an effort to mitigate the violence, Patr. Tikhon submitted to an interview by the newspaper Izvestiya to clarify the situation, which was printed in the March 28, 1922, issue. He stated: The Churches do not contain such a quantity of jewels and gold that they would provide a gigantic sum of money after their liquidation…. If our Churches do have some valuable articles in their treasuries, they are mainly of artistic and historical value.

When Soviet officials began to confiscate sacred articles from the ROC cathedral in the city of Shuya, located about 150 miles north-east of Moscow, a crowd of people ran up to the porch. The police attempted to disperse them, but then they returned and brought sharp wooden poles and stakes to use for defense. The police called in soldiers who fired at the crowds with their rifles. Several dozen were wounded and five lay dead in the square in front of the cathedral. On March 19, 1922, Vladimir Lenin composed a secret letter regarding the events at Shuya, which he considered another incident of opposition to Soviet authority by the influential Black Hundreds. Even though they were not involved, Lenin saw the opportunity to exploit the situation to the benefit of the Soviets. The event at Shuya should be connected with the announcement that the Russian News Agency recently sent to the newspapers, namely, the announcement that the Black Hundreds in Petrograd were preparing to defy the decree on the removal of property of value from the churches. If this fact is compared with what the papers report about the attitude of the clergy to the decree on the removal of church property in addition to what we know about the illegal proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, then it becomes perfectly clear that the Black Hundreds clergy, headed by its leader, with full deliberation is carrying out a plan at this very moment to destroy us decisively. I think that here our opponent is making a huge strategic error by attempting to draw us into a decisive struggle now when it is especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous to him. For us, on the other hand, precisely at the present moment we are presented with an exceptionally favorable, even unique, opportunity when we have a 99% chance to utterly defeat our enemy with complete success and guar-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV antee for ourselves the position we need for decades. Now and only now, when people are being eaten in famine-stricken areas, and hundreds if not thousands of corpses lie on the roads, we can, and therefore must, pursue the removal of church property with the most frenzied and ruthless energy and not hesitate to put down the least opposition. Now and only now, the vast majority of peasants will either be on our side, or at least will not be in a position to support to any decisive degree this handful of Black Hundreds clergy and reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie, who are willing and able to attempt to oppose this Soviet decree with a policy of force. We must pursue the removal of church property by any means necessary in order to secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles; do not forget the immense wealth of some monasteries and hermitages. Without this fund any government work in general, any economic build-up in particular, and any upholding of soviet principles in Genoa10 especially is completely unthinkable. In order to get our hands on this fund of several hundred million gold rubles, and perhaps even several hundred billion, we must do whatever is necessary. But to do this successfully is possible only now. All considerations indicate that later on we will fail to do this, for no other time besides that of desperate famine will give us such a mood among the general mass of peasants that would ensure us the sympathy of this group or, at least, would ensure us the neutralization of this group in the sense that victory in the struggle for the removal of church property unquestionably and completely will be on our side. Send to Shuya one of the most energetic, clear-headed, and capable members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) or some other representative of the central government, but one is better than several, giving him verbal instructions through one of the members of the Politburo. The instructions must come down to this, that in Shuya he must arrest more if possible but not less than several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local petty bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct or indirect participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of the VTsIK on the removal of property of value from churches. Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to Moscow and personally deliver a report to the full session of the Politburo or to two specially authorized members of the Politburo. On the basis of this report, the Politburo will give a detailed directive to the judicial authorities, also verbal, that the trial of the insurrectionists from Shuya, for opposing aid to the starving, should be carried out in utmost haste and should end not other than with the shooting of the very largest number of the most influential and dangerous of the Black Hundreds in Shuya, and, if possible, not only in this city but even in Moscow and several other ecclesiastical centers. I think that it is advisable for us not to touch Patriarch Tikhon himself, even though he undoubtedly headed this whole revolt of slave-holders.

On March 30, the Politburo accepted Lenin’s plan for the liquidation of the ROC using as a ruse the persecution of ROC clergy who were against appropriation of ecclesiastical valuables. The course of action was to be violent and rabid terror. By order of Vladimir Lenin all ROC members who had obstructed the confiscation at Shuya were arrested and sentenced to execution. In Smolensk, the Soviet Court sentenced priests Zalesski, Myasoedov, Pivovarov, and 10. Referring to the Genoa Conference of April 10-May 19, 1922.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Demidov to execution by firing squad. A total of 1,414 acts of violent confiscation occurred through the end of 1923. However, the idea that a trove of valuables could easily be acquired by this means was not belied by the final tally. The tales Vladimir Lenin wrote of hundreds of millions of rubles in treasures turned out to be myth. In the twelve months beginning November 1, 1922, when the project of confiscation actually began, only 964 antiquarian treasures of value were acquired, which had a final worth of 4.7 million rubles. The balance consisted of small liturgical utensils and tableware; most parish churches had little to begin with, and the Soviets had already liquidated the valuables of the larger cathedrals and monasteries some two years earlier. The income to the Soviets from this campaign was paltry compared to the assets previously confiscated from the ROC and the imperial Russian treasury. Trotsky took especial interest in the confiscation of liturgical treasures, and his plan was to route the funds into the development of his Red Army. Once the project was competed, three-fourths of the funds, about 3.5 million rubles, were transferred to the Soviet treasury for Trotsky’s use, while the balance went into Soviet provincial treasuries as a reserve against future emergencies. Very little, if any, of the funds went to alleviate the suffering of the famine-stricken populace. One of the members of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, announced in a circle of Soviet officials that the ROC ecclesiastical front was formidable to Soviet authority and should be treated as a battlefront, to be defeated using military tactics. Bukharin recommended that the war against the ROC be waged under the command of Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinski, a former official in the Cheka who was now Minister of Internal Affairs. (He was poisoned to death by Stalin’s henchmen in 1926.) Bukharin also insisted on the execution of Patr. Tikhon. On April 6, 1922, an article appeared in the newspaper Pravda (Truth), composed by twelve Petrograd priests including Vvedenski, Krasnitzki, Belkov, and Boyarski, containing accusations against their ROC brethren and clergy. The accusations pertained to their apparent indifference to the starving population, and suggested that they harbored counter-revolutionary intentions that they would publicly deny. On April 25, the day before a trial began for 54 defendants, the newspaper Izvestiya (News) printed a list of “enemies of the nation,” and the name at the top of the list was Patr. Tikhon. His letters had circulated to all of the open and functioning parishes throughout Russia, and their respective

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV clergy had refused to approve of the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables — although they avoided directly interfering in the process, if they could restrain themselves. On April 26, 1922, at one of the buildings of the Polytechnical Museum, judicial proceedings were held against 20 Moscow priests and 34 laypersons who were accused of inciting disorder while Soviet officials were attempting to confiscate valuables from Moscow churches. To support their prosecution, the Soviets called professor N.D. Kuznetzov, a social-ecclesiastical activist, as a witness. He testified that the canons that forbid use of liturgical utensils in areas other than liturgy only applied to cases where clergy and laypersons stole them for personal profit. According to Kuznetzov, the donation of sacred articles for charitable purposes is not condemned by these canons, and the patriarch and clergy would have acted within the canonical framework, if they had blessed the appropriation of liturgical paraphernalia from ROC churches. The 54 accused conducted themselves with dignity and complete intrepidity. Patr. Tikhon and Archbishop Nikandr were summoned as witnesses, and they testified on May 5. At the trial, prosecutor Bek asked the patriarch, “Do you consider that the Soviet government conducted itself inappropriately, and so you were compelled to issue your summons?” “Yes,” answered the patriarch. “Do you realize,” asked another prosecutor Krilenko, “that ecclesiastical property does not belong to the Church, according to Soviet law?” “According to Soviet law, but not according to ecclesiastical law,” replied the patriarch. “Your letter deals with ecclesiastical property. From the point of view of the law, it (the letter) is illegal,” said Krilenko. “You would know. You are the Soviet authority,” responded Patr. Tikhon. “And the word ‘thief’,” asked Krilenko, “What does it mean in Russian?” “A thief, that is a robber,” explained the patriarch. “So ‘holy-thief’ signifies one who robs holy places?” “Yes,” answered the patriarch. “Is this what you consider us?” asked Krilenko. “No. Forgive me,” replied Patr. Tikhon; and his testimony ended here. The court sentenced eleven of the accused to execution by firing squad. After the announcement of the sentence, Patr. Tikhon turned to the president of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, with a request for “the pardon of the convicted, because they were not the ones to compose the incriminating

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era letter, and did not display any opposition to confiscation, and were not involved in counter-revolutionary activities.” The court pardoned six men, while five of them, protopriests Alexandr Zaorzerski, Vasili Sokolov, Christofor Nadezhdin, hieromonk Makari Telegin, and the layperson Sergei Tikhomirov, were executed in the cellar of the Lubyanka prison. The court also issued an order for the prosecution of both Patr. Tikhon and Archbishop Nikandr; Soviet officials had long been preparing for this as a reprisal. Sometime in early May 1922, Moscow priest Kalinovski presented the Supreme Soviet with a detailed and well-defined plan for ROC-Soviet relations. They gladly accepted his proposal because, unknown to Kalinovski, it was a method of fulfilling Trotsky’s vision. Kalinovski proposed the creation of a special Department of ROC Affairs by the Supreme Soviet which would be headed by an ROC prelate. The special committee was supposed to defend those clergy and laypersons who were loyal to Soviet authority from ecclesiastical interdicts imposed by the patriarchal ROC. The committee would also observe the activities of the patriarchal ecclesiastical administration, and make sure that the Soviet state did not infringe on the religious sentiments of Orthodox believers. Immediately after the eleven Moscow priests and laypersons were sentenced, a group of renovationist clergy arrived in Moscow from Petrograd: protopriests Vvedenski, Boyarski, Belkov and Psalm-reader Stadnuik. Relatives of the condemned men asked the Petrograd clergy to intervene on their behalf and to appeal to the good nature of Soviet officials and acquire a pardon. On the evening of May 12, 1922, the Petrograd clergy-intermediaries appeared at Patr. Tikhon’s cloister, accompanied by two Cheka officers. Instead of discussing the question of a pardon for the sentenced clergy and laypersons, the visitors informed the patriarch that they would be able to acquire Soviet approval for summoning another ROC Regional Council on the condition that he resign from his cathedra. Patr. Tikhon replied that the patriarchate burdened him like a cross. “I would joyfully accept the removal of the patriarchate from my [responsibility] by the coming council, but for now I will transfer the authority to one of the elder prelates and depart from ecclesiastical administration.” The Petrograd priests proposed to Patr. Tikhon that he transfer authority to Bishop Antonin Granovski, who was residing at the Zaikonospasski Monastery, or to Bishop Leonid Skobeev, both of whom were renovationists. Patr. Tikhon categorically rejected both candidates, then interrupted the conversation and went into the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV adjoining room for a few minutes. When he returned he brought a letter with him addressed to Kalinin, president of the Soviet Union, codifying the transfer of ROC patriarchal authority to Metr. Veniamin of Petrograd or to Metr. Agafangel of Yaroslav as his deputy. The visitors placed an urgent call to Petrograd and were informed that Metr. Veniamin was unable to assume the responsibilities of patriarchal deputy. Having accomplished their purpose, the Petrograd visitors and Cheka officials left the patriarch’s cloister. On May 13, the day after the visit of the Petrograd priests and Cheka officials, Patr. Tikhon sent a letter to Metr. Agafangel, informing him of the transfer of ROC administration to him until a council could be convened and a permanent candidate be selected. The patriarch asked him to travel to Moscow as soon as possible. Protopriest Vladimir Krasnitzki delivered the letter to Yaroslav. Metr. Agafangel was ready to fulfill the wishes of the patriarch but Soviet officials intervened and prevented him from leaving Yaroslav. Meanwhile, Patr. Tikhon remained under house arrest, and no one was allowed to visit him without the consent of the GPU. Communication and association with ROC prelates and the remaining members of the Sacred Synod was abruptly severed. The renovationists, considering themselves masters of the situation, informed President Kalinin of the creation of a new ROC administration, now called the Supreme Eccl. Admin. (Verkhovni Tserkovni Upravleniye), in light of the estrangement of Patr. Tikhon from his patriarchal responsibilities. The day after their meeting, having fulfilled their assignment from the GPU, the renovationist clergy submitted for publication in Izvestiya a proclamation condemning “those prelates and those pastors who are guilty of organizing opposition to state authority by refusing to give them assistance for the famine-stricken, and interfering in other enterprises that were for the good of the working class. We consider it necessary to call a Regional Council immediately in order to bring to trial those guilty of ecclesiastical destruction, to resolve the question of ecclesiastical government, and to implement stable relations between [the ROC] and Soviet authority.” The article was subscribed by Bishop Antonin Granovski, Moscow priests S. Kalinovski and I. Borisov, V. Bikov, Petrograd priests Krasnitzki, Vvedenski, and Belkov, and Psalm-reader Stadniuk, and Saratov priests Rusanov and Ledovski. The article was published, May 14. On his own part, President Kalinin published the following statement on May 15:

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era The government of the RSFSR accepts as public knowledge the announcement of the patriarch regarding his temporary voluntary alienation. However, it (the State) cannot approve of the patriarch’s transfer of authority to a deputy, because the Soviet Constitution provides for the separation of the Church from the State.

On May 18, Vvedenski, Belkov, and Kalinovski again visited Patr. Tikhon in his cloister, requesting him to agree to a petition which they had composed themselves. The petition asked Patr. Tikhon to transfer the patriarchal chancellery to the renovationist group. The patriarch complied, under duress, and signed the document. Their rationale, as they stated in the pre-composed petition, was “so that that disruption, detrimental to the administration of the Church, would not continue. When your deputy arrives, he will immediately assume control and take charge. In order to continue the work of the chancellery, we will hire on a temporary basis any Moscow prelates who still have their freedom. They will continue until your deputy takes over as head and develops a new administration.” For all practical purposes, the renovationists were planning for their Supreme Eccl Admin to assume complete authority over the ROC. They had been informed on May 15, by President Kalinin, that Soviet officials were not going to permit Metr. Agafangel to leave Yaroslav and travel to Moscow. Patr. Tikhon had made it very clear what his thoughts were and whom he preferred to deal with, but after several inquisitions by Cheka officials he was compelled to again codify the succession of patriarchal deputies. This time he transferred ROC administration to Metr. Agafangel, with the assistance of secretary Numerov, upon his arrival in Moscow, while Moscow diocesan affairs were to be assumed by Bishop Innokenti of Klinski; but until his arrival in Moscow, Bishop Leonid of Vernen would handle matters along with secretary Nevski. However, Patr. Tikhon made no mention of arrangements to be made in case Metr. Agafangel was unable to travel to Moscow, and he was unaware that the Soviets had blocked him from leaving Yaroslav. As a result, the ambitious renovationists announced Patr. Tikhon’s resolution regarding the transfer of the patriarchal chancellery to them, which was essentially the transfer of ROC administration. The Petrograd clergy, after discussions with Bishops Leonid Skobeev and Antonin Granovski, announced the formation of their Supreme Eccl. Admin. with Antonin as its president. On May 31, 1922, Tuchkov signed the order for Soviet officials to move Patr. Tikhon from his residence at the Troitzi Palace to the Donskoi Monastery, still under house arrest. He was moved later that day, and his cloister was placed under strict guard: now he was completely isolated. That same day, Bishop

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Antonin Granovski moved into Patr. Tikhon’s former cloister at the Troitzi Palace, and the new Supreme Eccl. Admin. moved into the former patriarchal chancellery. On August 21, 1922, fourteen men were sentenced in Smolensk for interfering with Soviet confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables. Four were executed, while ten were sentenced to various terms of incarceration. Bishop Filipp Stavitzki, however, repented in order to circumvent punishment, and at the trial stated, “This socialist revolution, which has occurred here with us in Russia, is not only to uphold the rights of humanity, but is the beginning of the establishment on earth of the rectitude of Christ, the truth of the Gospel.” On September 25, 1922, Bishop Afanasi Sakharov was exiled to Komi Province for two years. A second group of ROC were tried, now in Moscow, for interfering with the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables: 23 were sentenced to various terms of incarceration. It was not only the ROC that suffered as a result of this confiscation. Roman Catholic churches were also raided. On March 26, 1923, Catholic Archbishop Tseplyak and twelve Roman Catholic priests were sentenced in Moscow for interfering with the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables at their respective churches. Archbishop Tseplyak and priest Butkevich were sentenced to death and the others were sentenced to long-term prison confinement. Several European Christian organizations sent telegrams to the Soviet Union on behalf of the condemned. Cardinal Bern, the Archbishop of Westminster, Pope Pius XI, and representatives of Switzerland, England, Germany, France, and Poland, all sent letters requesting amnesty. On March 30, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet modified the sentence of Archbishop Tseplyak to a ten-year incarceration, but he was released after six months. The sentence on Butkevich remained. On March 31, 1923, on the Saturday night before Easter Sunday, priest Butkevich was executed by a firing squad.

177. THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHTY-SIX Having occupied the patriarchal offices and taken over the publishing arm of the ROC, the renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin. feverishly attempted to enlist the support of clergy and parishioners. On May 23, 1922, the Supreme Eccl. Admin. organized its first rendezvous with the clergy of Moscow’s Khamovnicheski suburb, but the Moscovites categorically refused to recognize the

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era renovationists, considering them imposters. Collecting a small group of adherents, the renovationists began a publication called The Living Church, which quickly became the appellation of their movement. Two issues of The Living Church were published in May with Kalinovski as editor, with articles contributed by Antonin Granovski, Vvedenski, Krasnitzki and V.N. Lvov. Former At-Gen Lvov advised them to first of all remove their cassocks, cut their hair short and blend in with the general population. Krasnitzki wrote in the second issue of The Living Church that the platform of the renovationist movement was the liberation of the clergy from the debilitating burden of monasticism. Articles dealing with monasticism, under the heading, “Nest of Busy-Bodies,” appeared in subsequent issues. The instigators of the ROC dissension displayed exceptionally energetic activity in Petrograd. Vvedenski retained the hope that he could draw Metr. Veniamin Kazanski of Petrograd, his associate of previous years, into the dissension. Metr. Veniamin of Petrograd was born Vasili Pavlovich Kazanski in 1874 in Olonetz province. In 1895, while a student at the Petersburg Religious Academy he accepted tonsure as a monk, and within a year was ordained as a hieromonk. After concluding his studies in 1897, he began teaching at Rizhski Seminary, where Metr. Evlogi was rector, and they became friends. Soon after, Veniamin was promoted as a religious inspector in Kholm. In 1905, he was assigned as rector of the Petersburg Religious Academy, while on January 24, 1910, he was ordained as bishop of Gdov, which automatically made him fourth vicar of Petersburg diocese. As the other vicars faded into history through the years of political upheaval, Veniamin ascended to become bishop of Petersburg. After the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917, Veniamin was promoted to archbishop and on the eve of the ROC Regional Council of 1917-1918, he was elevated to metropolitan. On Saturday, May 25, 1922, Vvedenski visited Metr. Veniamin and presented to him Patr. Tikhon’s letter of May 18, which stated that Metr. Leonid of Vernen now had control of the Synodal chancellery. He suggested that Metr. Veniamin should accept this transition as valid and so should submit to the new renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin. The metropolitan reviewed the document. Not noticing the signature of Patr. Tikhon on it, he refused to acknowledge the validity of their administrative body. The following day, after Sunday liturgy, a letter written by Metr. Veniamin was read in all the Petrograd ROC churches. This letter accused the Petrograd renovationists of traveling to Moscow and illegally usurping the ROC adminis-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV tration. As a result of this, the letter stated, the mutinous priests Vvedenski and Belkov and all their confederates were excommunicated from the ROC, until they repented to the diocesan bishop (referring to himself). The day after, a Monday, two Cheka members appeared unannounced at the cloister of Metr. Veniamin along with Protopriest Vvedenski. The Metropolitan calmly said to the protopriest, “Father Alexandr, the two of us are not in the garden of Gethsemane.” There were 2 reasons for the purpose of their visit: first, to make the metropolitan yield the Petrograd diocesan chancellery to Vvedenski; and second, to arrest Metr. Veniamin. During the short visit and arrest, the metropolitan entrusted administration of the Petrograd diocese to his first vicar, Bishop Aleksei Simanski, not to Vvedenski. On June 4 or 5, episcopal-deputy Aleksei Simanski pleaded with parishioners in a circular letter to reconcile with the renovationists lest the ROC suffer disastrous consequences. Bishop Aleksei voided the issue of the renovationist clergy’s excommunication and admitted them back into the fold of the patriarchal ROC. The prelates and parish priests of Petrograd diocese found all the political intrigues confusing and frightening, regardless of the merits of the arguments. Bishop Artemi Ilyinski of Lug (Luzhski) without reservation recognized the renovationists Supreme Eccl. Admin, while Bishop Venedict Plotnikov of Ladoga (Ladozhski), who was a trustworthy assistant of Metr. Veniamin, valiantly defended the Petrograd diocese from the renovationists. As a result, Bishop Venedict was arrested and incarcerated at the Kronshtadt Prison. Bishop Innokenti Blagoveschenski of Kronshtadt, who was second vicar of Petrograd diocese, was also arrested and confined together with Bishop Venedict. Within a short while, Bishop Aleksei developed a large following as a result of his administration of Petrograd diocese. His moving sermons and reverent liturgies drew a crowd into his church. On July 6, by the decision of the Supreme Eccl. Admin, Protopriest Krasnitzki traveled to Petrograd and required Bishop Aleksei to recognize the Living Church without reservation. As much as Bishop Aleksei attempted to cooperate with them, he could not recognize their authority to replace the patriarchal ROC administration, so the bishop adamantly replied, “No.” In August, the following month, Bishop Aleksei was arrested and exiled to three years in Karakalinsk, Uzbekistan. About six months later, in January 1923, the remaining vicar of Petrograd diocese, Bishop Nikolai Yarushevich, who opposed recognition of the renovationists, was exiled to Komi Province, then known as Komi-Ziryanski Krai, in the far north-east of European Russia. This left Petrograd without an

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era ROC bishop. The wave of Petrograd arrests was a pathetic triumph for the renovationists. Of 123 open churches remaining in the city, 113 were immediately appropriated by the renovationists. Parishioners quickly sensed what had happened, became disillusioned and disenchanted, and the churches were soon vacant. On May 29, 1922, judicial proceedings began against 86 persons, including Metr. Veniamin Kazanski and Bishop Venedict Plotnikov, for interfering with the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables. The trial extended to July 4, and on July 5 the verdicts were read. Other defendants were the president of Petrograd parishes Professor Yuri Novitzki, Archimandrite Sergei Shien, Abbot Nikolai Chukov of the Virgin of Kazan Cathedral, Protopriest L.K. Bogoyavlenski, Protopriest Mikhail Cheltzov of Troitzi Cathedral, priests A.N. Tolstopyatov, M.N. Tikhomirov, and P.P. Livitzki, Professor of Canon Law V.N. Beneshevich, a director of Petrograd parishes Ivan Kovsharov, and an assortment of ROC seminary teachers, university professors and students, ROC elders, women, peasants, old men, and one Persian Mohammedan who happened incidentally to be standing near a church during a confiscation and was arrested along with all the rest. N.A. Elachich, Professor N.F. Ognyov, and Protopriest P.A. Kedrinski were initially summoned as witnesses, but they too were arrested after their interviews — which apparently were considered self-incriminating by Soviet inquisitors — and were included with the defendants. Metr. Veniamin was accused of interfering with ecclesiastical confiscations and of being in regular communication with the émigré ROC clergy, inciting them against Soviet authority. Veniamin hired Yakov S. Gurovich as his attorney; Soviet jurist Krasnikov was chief prosecutor. Metr. Veniamin conducted himself unpretentiously, even under intense pressure, and stated that he was innocent of the charges brought against him. He explained that he felt it was necessary to voluntarily contribute ecclesiastical valuables to assist the famine-stricken, but he could not bless any coercive or violent confiscation of liturgical paraphernalia. He also expounded on related issues, stating that he was aware of the Karlovtzi Council declarations, but nothing more; and as metropolitan, he had the right to excommunicate the renovationist priests, namely Vvedenski and Belkov, as rebellious and self-appointed. The judges pressured him to recant these statements, admit his guilt, and meet the prosecutors halfway; but the metropolitan remained firm in his statements. Following Metr. Veniamin, Yuri Petrovich Novitzki took the stand, proclaimed his innocence and testified that none of the activities of the ROC

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV councils were contrary to the interests of the Soviet state. Next came Ivan Mikhailovich Kovsharov, whose answers were rough and coarse. He knew already that he would be sentenced to death and so submitted to his fate. Both Archimandrite Sergei Shien and Bishop Venedict pleaded innocent and defended themselves calmly and almost nonchalantly, knowing that if they were not to be executed immediately, death awaited them anyway in Siberian exile or in some other forsaken place. The prosecutors, intently questioning the other Petrograd priests Nikolai Chukov, Mikhail Cheltzov, Leonid Bogoyavlenski, and Zenkevich, failed in their attempt to prove that they had deliberately incited parishioners to interfere with the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables. The prime witness for the prosecution was Protopriest Vvedenski. On the first day of the trial, as Vvedenski was leaving the court house, a hysterical woman threw a cobblestone at him and struck him right in the face, knocking out a couple of teeth. Due to his injury, Vvedenski gave his testimony by deposition, at home in his apartment. What startled the prosecutors as they were taking his deposition was a large portrait of Metr Veniamin hanging on the wall, with an inscription from the metropolitan, “To my great friend.” Unlike Vvedenski, the renovationist priest Boyarski initially provided testimony in favor of Metr. Veniamin and the other defendants, and as a result was quickly escorted out of the proceedings. Fear of reprisal led Vladimir Krasnitzki to provide testimony that was exactly what the prosecutors wanted. Valentinov, who attended the proceedings, recorded the conduct of Krasnitzki during his testimony. This one was obviously the judicial cut-throat, who had, as his task, to satisfy the vain arguments that were provided in place of evidence, with malicious insinuations and knowingly false generalizations. The words that proceeded from his viperous fangs were an obvious noose that he, while wearing a monk’s cassock and cross over his chest, tossed over the neck of each of the defendants, one by one. The lies, the defamation, the poisoned characterizations, the accusations of counter-revolutionary intentions, and none of them having to be proven, were all thrown at [the defendants] by a pillar of the Living Church.

After the witnesses finished giving their testimony, the debates began. The prosecutor Krasnikov, who later himself became a victim of a corrupt judicial proceeding, attempted to prove that the defendants were participants in counter-revolutionary agitation, and stated that the ROC as an institution was counter-revolutionary. On behalf of the defendants, Professor Zhizhilenko spoke, explaining in extreme clarity that according to Soviet law, the ROC could

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era not possibly be a counter-revolutionary organization as far as the matter at hand was concerned. Gurovich’s closing statement was made July 4, and focused on the impact their verdict would have on Soviet history: How will this issue end? What shall be said in the future of this impassionate story? History will record that in the spring of 1922, the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables occurred in Petrograd, in accord with the orders of the Soviet government, and the project was accomplished brilliantly, and with little serious altercation from adherents of the religion. What else will historians say, and who will record this indubitable fact? Will they say that Soviet authority found it absolutely necessary to shoot Veniamin, Metropolitan of Petrograd, and certain other persons? This will depend on your sentence. If the metropolitan perishes for his convictions, for his infinite loyalty to the people who believe in him, then it will be worse for Soviet authority than at present. The immutable law of history forewarns you, that faith grows, strengthens, and increases, on the blood of martyrs. Consider my conclusion. Think about it, and do not make martyrs of them.

Metr. Veniamin then made his final statement: I have always been a loyal son of my nation. I love and have always loved it. I have given my life for it, and I am fortunate that the nation has repaid me with the same love, and placed me in this post that I now hold in the Orthodox Church.

The following day, July 5, the verdicts were announced, but the general public was not allowed into the courtroom for fear of a violent reaction. The sentence was read: ten were to be executed by firing squad, 54 were sentenced to prison. The 22 by-standers who had been arrested were acquitted. The fact that so many were found guilty had a repercussion on Patr. Tikhon and implicated him of culpability in the crimes: he was equally guilty by reason of association. On August 10, 1922, six of the ten sentenced to execution received a pardon. On the night of August 12, Metr. Veniamin, archimandrite Sergei Shein, professor Yuri Novitzki, and Ivan Kovsharov, were executed by a firing squad. Taking advantage of the trial results and verdicts, the renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin. carried out its own sentence, and issued a document that was unprecedented in the history of the ROC, listing the following items. The former metropolitan of Petrograd, Veniamin, convicted of betrayal of his episcopal responsibility, is deprived of his sacerdotal and monastic rank. The president and members of the administration of Petrograd diocesan parishes: Novitzki, Kovsharov, Elachich, and Ognyov, who organized a struggle against state authority, are excommunicated from the ROC.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Members of the sacerdotal office: Bishop Venedict, Protopriests Leonid Bogoyavlenski, Chukov, Cheltzov, Archimandrite Sergei, found guilty of participating in the crimes of the above-mentioned persons, are involuntarily retired from their offices and defrocked.

During the year 1922, the GPU arrested, imprisoned and exiled about half the prelates of the patriarchal ROC, almost all of those who refused to accept the Supreme Eccl. Admin. of the Living Church. Among them were metropolitans Kirill of Kazan and Agafangel of Yaroslav, archbishops Nafanail of Kharkov, Nikandr of Krutitzk, bishops Zinovi of Tambov and Mark of Vladivostok, and several diocesan vicars. A decree of the Supreme Soviet of August 10, 1922, permitted administrative sentences of three-year exiles for any ROC clergy; this meant a trial was not needed and the decision was at the whim of local Soviet officials. By the middle of 1922, there were 231 judicial proceedings against ROC clergy regarding their interference in the confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables. The number of clergy convicted just in this period were 732, and the majority of them were executed by firing squad. Just in the years 1922-1923, a total of 8,100 ROC clergy, including monks and nuns, had been executed. Since May 19, 1922, Patr. Tikhon had been held under house arrest at his cloister at the Donskoi Monastery. He had an attendant in the cloister with him, Yakov Sergeevich Polusov, while outside the door stood a sentry from the Cheka, on guard around-the-clock, allowing no one inside the cloister without scrutiny and permission. Patr. Tikhon could only leave once a day for ten minutes, and then was only allowed on a balcony of the building that adjoined the monastery wall. A few dedicated and loyal pilgrims would give him letters to read — after they were censored by the sentry — and the patriarch would bless them for visiting. The patriarch was forbidden to conduct services or even attend services. After almost a year of isolation, on April 30, 1923, he forwarded a petition to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR asking them to permit him to perform liturgy at the Donskoi Monastery, at least on Good Friday and Easter. The petition was denied him. Instead, Patr. Tikhon was transferred again to Lubyanka Prison and placed in isolation.

178. THE RENOVATIONIST MOVEMENT On June 16, 1922, a memorandum was composed declaring retroactively that the renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin. conformed to canonical law, and was inviting all of Russian Orthodoxy to recognize its validity.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era We, Sergei, Metropolitan of Vladimir and Shuya, Evdokim, Archbishop of Nizhni-Gorod and Arzamas, and Seraphim, Archbishop of Kostroma and Galitzia, having reviewed the platform of the Supreme Eccl. Admin, and the canonical legitimacy of the administration, announce that we share in their entirety the intentions of the Supreme Eccl. Admin, and count it the sole, canonically legitimate, supreme ecclesiastical authority, and all decisions that evolve from it, we count legitimate and necessary in their entirety. We invite all true pastors and faithful sons of the Church to follow our example, and likewise other dioceses.

The publication of this invitation to The Living Church occurred during judicial proceedings against the 86. The article was quite effective under the circumstances, especially with renovationist clergy testifying against the patriarchal ROC clergy at the trial. At the beginning of June, 1922, Tuchkov traveled to Yaroslav to meet with patriarchal deputy Metr. Agafangel. He proposed that the prelate take over ROC administration, but added that this would only be allowed by the GPU if he would be willing to sever ties with Patr. Tikhon and censure his activities. Metr. Agafangel refused. To explain his dilemma to ROC prelates and parishes, Metr. Agafangel wrote a circular letter on June 18. The metropolitan described how on May 16 he received a letter from Patr. Tikhon informing him that because of the patriarch’s arrest he — Agafangel — was to assume the head of ROC administration until a Regional Council could be summoned. He noted that the patriarch had added that Metr. Agafangel’s selection was approved by Soviet officials and he was to travel to Moscow as soon as possible. However, the metropolitan explained that circumstances beyond his control had made it impossible to leave Yaroslav, that he was being restrained against his will from traveling. He then censured the Living Church for taking control of the ROC, and for instituting innovations and other practices foreign to the traditional mode of worship and conduct. It was apparent that Agafangel was being held in Yaroslav because of his refusal to concede to the demands of the GPU. After the above letter was published and distributed, Metr. Agafangel was arrested and exiled to Narimski Krai, in central Uzbekistan. Many ROC clergy did not share renovationist views, but recognized their authority out of fear of reprisal. They did not feel that it was worth their lives to defend the patriarchal ROC or defend their churches from the confiscation of valuables by the Soviets. By July, the following month, 36 of 73 diocesan bishops still remained loyal to Patr. Tikhon and refused to acknowledge the validity of the Living Church. The Supreme Eccl. Admin. then issued an order to retire from their cathedras any

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV diocesan bishop who would not recognize and submit to the authority of the Living Church. The order was directed specifically at several influential bishops, and as a result, some retired from their cathedra voluntarily, some submitted, and others stood firm. In place of those who were forced to retire, the Supreme Eccl. Admin. installed new bishops who were liberal and inclined toward support of the Living Church. With unabashed joy, priest Krasnitzki wrote in the June issue of The Living Church, “Protopriest father Nikolai Sobolev has the honor of being the first bishop of Russia who has ascended the cathedra without possessing monastic tonsure. The revolutionary element has gained the victory in Petrograd and on the ecclesiastical front.” The victory was actually gained by the Soviets, who would now use the precedence of a married episcopacy to justify liquidation of monasteries and convents through further decrees of the Living Church. The new generation of renovationist clergy were married or divorced, or else divorced or widowed and remarried; they shaved off their beards and wore their hair short — all of which were violations of the canons of Orthodoxy. Historian Valentinov wrote that the Soviets did not hide the fact that “the renovationist church, which is producing a progressive democratic environment using a portion of the clergy and parishioners, is only one of the first stages on the path of the liberation of the working population from the authority of ecclesiastical and religious intoxication.” The last phrase was an allusion to Lenin’s view of institutional religion as an opiate and intoxicant. At the same time, Living Church prelates announced to their parishioners, “May the days of the October Revolution, which has broken the chains of slavery, be blessed.” Pavel Miliukov described the renovationist movement in the following manner: The Living Church preached a transfer of the ROC from its traditional immobility to “a dynamic, life-giving, created progression, from one end to the other.” The renovationists required that soulless ceremonialism and liturgy cease, along with the despotism of episcopal authority. The White clergy, the married, must be allowed into the episcopacy. On this platform the Living Church held a regional council in Moscow on June 8, consisting of 146 delegates of the ROC, even though only 36 of them decided to join the Living Church. This is understandable when viewing more of the liberal platform of the Living Church which was presented at this council. The world, they said, was created by the will of God, but by a natural process of evolution. The church was both a divine and human community, created for the purpose of materializing divine rectitude on earth. The final awesome judgment, heaven, hell, must all be understood in ethical terms. Salvation is divine love motivating filial feelings within a person. God is a god of love, and not an awesome judge. Monastic asceticism, denial of the world and natural human desires, is

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era rejected. Salvation can only be attained by the path of conscientious fulfillment of our customary obligations. The family is the basis of moral life, and the female has rights equal to the male. The Living Church recognized the justice of the socialist revolution and the correctness of worldwide unification of working people to defend themselves from exploitation.

No one can deny that the Living Church platform contained traces of sincerity, but the ideas it promulgated were socialist and humanist, and not Christian doctrine. The educated prelates of traditional Orthodoxy categorically rejected the platform of the Living Church, and so did the less-educated parishioners, as well as superstitious and uncultured peasants. In essence, the Living Church was a humanist organization with a socialist lining. On July 6, 1922, the Supreme Eccl. Admin. requested the Department of Justice to initiate an inquisition into counter-revolutionary activities of an organization of laypersons at the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow. The Soviets complied with their request, and after a series of arrests at the cathedral, the Living Church took occupation of the premises. Priest Krasnitzki became curator of the cathedral. By a Soviet decree of August 10, 1922, all religious organizations that were not registered were to be closed. This immediately interrupted the ties of parishes with the administration of the patriarchal ROC, now deprived of the right of legal existence, since registration had never been acquired. Hurrying to legalize its rights as fast as it could, the renovationist Church summoned a new Regional Conference. The preparations were conducted in July by a commission headed by Vladimir Lvov. The regional conference of the Living Church was held August 6-16, 1922 at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, the grand edifice now occupied by the renovationists. Attending were 146 delegates from 25 dioceses out of a total of 73. From the beginning of the conference, different opinions contended. The moderate elements were satisfied with bringing the ROC out of the deadend that Patr. Tikhon had led it into with the struggle against the new Soviet regime. The majority wanted to proceed further under the chairmanship of Krasnitzki, and to elevate the married clergy to the detriment of the monastic. When the vote was taken regarding a married episcopacy, 37 were in favor, 36 against, and the rest abstained from voting, preferring to wait and watch before deciding. The council leaders demanded the delegates submit without reservation to the Supreme Eccl. Admin., immediately end the practice of mentioning the name of Patr. Tikhon during liturgy, close the monasteries, enroll a married episcopacy, and admit divorcees and second marriages into the priesthood. The final

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV issue of remarried and divorced clergy created dissension even within the dissenters. The renovationist leader Antonin Granovski and his supporters protested against such a radical modification, even though their overall goal was ecclesiastical modernization. When Bishop Antonin voiced his opposition on this matter, the majority of delegates discredited him and cursed him, and they ran him out of the council. (He later formed the Restoration Church, as a result.) The principal goal of the conference was not ecclesiastical reform, but to fulfill the dictates of the Soviets, which the Living Church was obliged to do in order to gain permission to hold the conference. Before the conference was over, the leaders issued a final declaration to the delegates, stating that the entire history of ecclesiastical struggle could be summarized as a social revolution. The ancient trends of the ROC were to be blamed for the woes of Russian society, and at the present they were cooperating with the enemies of the nation. The delegates of the conference accused the patriarch of initiating another civil war, now under the guise of the protection of ecclesiastical valuables, and depriving the famine-stricken of the mitigation of their plight. Patr. Tikhon’s actions, they stated, “overfilled the cup of patience of the believing sons of the Orthodox Church, which compelled them to utilize revolutionary measures for the renovation of the Church on the basis of Biblical principles and Apostolic traditions.” Before adjourning, plans were made for another conference to begin February 1, 1923. Just four days after the conclusion of the Living Church’s conference, on August 20, a minority group under the leadership of Antonin Granovski split off and formed their own ecclesiastical organization, which they named the Restoration Church. Most of their platform coincided with that of the Living Church, but they refused to reject monasticism and they placed restrictions on a married episcopacy. The moderate path of this group promoted its success every early after its formation. Thousands of priests joined it, as well as several Living Church prelates. On September 10, Living Church prelates ordained a married priest named Konstantin as bishop. After the ordination, Bishop Antonin Granovski of Moscow censured him and Krasnitzki for performing the ordination against the canons of the ROC. Irritated by Antonin Granovski’s treachery in leaving the Living Church and forming the Restoration Church, Antoni Khrapovitzki published an article in the October 10, 1922 issue of The Living Church, labeling him the enemy of the white priesthood, and calling him perverted, an alcoholic, and a nihilist, and asserting that he had been confined in an insane asylum in earlier

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era years. In response to the article, Metr. Antonin called the Living Church “a papal trade union that was discrediting the ascetic ideals of the Church, with the drive for only women, rewards, and money.” Shortly after the conference, in autumn 1922, the talented protopriests and renovationist leaders Alexandr Vvedenski and Boyarski left the Living Church, also disagreeing with its platform, and created their own group, which they named the Union of the Communities of the Ancient Apostolic Church. Their platform was similar to that of the Living Church: they preached socialism and called capitalism a mortal sin, and their goal was modernization; they called for more simplicity in worship, as opposed to the “papal materialism of the Living Church,” as Vvedenski called it. They separated from Granovski’s Restoration Church because their Apostolic Church accepted a married episcopacy and the remarriage of priests. Vvedenski’s schemes worked against the overall success of the renovationist movement. Protopriest Kondratyev, rector of the Petrograd Seminary, acquired and distributed a secret letter Vvedenski had written regarding his proposal to the Department of Internal Affairs, for them to take administrative measures against the members of the patriarchal church. Even though 37 of 73 diocesan bishops and half the ROC clergy of Moscow and Petrograd joined the renovationists, they barely had a handful of supporters from among the parishes. Renovationist churches were often empty during Sundays and ecclesiastical holidays. The Soviet state proceeded to prosecute prelates who would not submit to the new renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin., and they would be exiled or imprisoned by administrative order for failure to perform liturgy in a renovationist church. Several prominent prelates capitulated to the Soviet-sponsored renovationists: Metr. Kirill of Kazan, Metr. Nazari Kirillov of Kursk, Metr. Arseni of Novgorod, Archbishop Faddie Yuspenski of Astrakhan, and Bishop Victor of Tomsk. In response to the mass exodus of prelates to the renovationist camp, and the mass exodus to concentration camps or exile of those loyal to the patriarch, other patriarchal ROC prelates ordained replacements in secret. In 1922, 24 bishops were ordained by other diocesan prelates. A couple of dioceses claimed independence from the ROC to avoid capitulating to the renovationists; one of them was Metr. Melkhizedek Payevski of Belarus and Minsk. Toward the end of 1922, feeling that it was better for ROC parishioners not to partake of communion at all than to accept it from a renovationist priest, the remaining members of the ROC Sacred Synod issued a special decree stating that diocesan vicars were to sever ties with their bishops if they accepted the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV validity of the renovationist Supreme Eccl. Admin. In conclusion, the letter called the Living Church an assembly of thieves and criminals and stated, “Such men as Vvedenski, Krasnitzki, Belkov, and the others who stand with them, who claim ecclesiastical authority, are a church of inquisitors. These despots are strengthened not by words of love and conviction but by terror and coercion.” On December 6, 1922, Patr. Tikhon wrote a circular letter proclaiming anathema on the renovationist Supreme Eccl. Council, labeling it “An institution of the antichrist,” and stating, “They are sons of opposition to Divine rectitude and the holy ecclesiastical canons. By the authority given us by God, we anathemize the Supreme Eccl. Council and all those who are associated with them.” The letter was publicly read by Patr. Tikhon on December 19. New offspring of the renovationist movement were born in the provinces. In Penza in November 1922, the Free Laboring Church was formed by renovationist Archbishop Ioyanniki. Their goal was the fusion of all denominations into one and the unification of science and religion. They eliminated the iconostasis from their churches. In Saratov, a Living Church official named Koblev formed the Puritan Party of the Revolutionary Priesthood and Laypersons. This new movement was open even to those who did not accept the divinity of Jesus Christ. Continuing to use these tactics, the leaders of the Living Church initiated a purge of the ROC in order to guarantee for themselves a majority in the upcoming second conference. To allow more time for such preparations, the council was postponed to April 29, 1923. Vladimir Lvov took the initiative of executing the ecclesiastical purge, now that he was a member of the Supreme Eccl. Admin. In the August 2, 1922 issue of Izvestiya, Lvov wrote of the necessity of purging the ROC of all counter-revolutionary elements in order to be able to accomplish a reform. Quickly, the Soviets offered to participate in the purge because many clergy whom they considered counter-revolutionary were members of parish councils. The Petrograd diocesan executive committee decided to retire all clergy who would not recognize the Supreme Eccl. Admin. On December 13, 1922 in Moscow, 74 clergy were sentenced to prison. Similar patterns evolved in Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Ekaterinburg, and other diocesan capitals. By the beginning of the planned renovationist conference, 66 ROC bishops loyal to Patr. Tikhon had been exiled. The Living Church now proceeded to expel parish councils that stood against the renovationist platform, and to create new councils made up of members recommended by renovationist diocesan bishops. These delegates to

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era local parish councils had to adhere to Living Church principles. Soviet president Kalinin was asked by a deputation of the Living Church to invalidate agreements made between provincial Soviets and ROC parish councils. The churches of the old councils would then be confiscated. The systematic purge took about six months, and patriarchal church prelates were almost entirely alienated from the selection process for new candidates. They were either in prison, in exile, in local jails, or had emigrated. The few that remained boycotted the selection of candidates, considering the summons of another conference to be uncanonical. Of the 426 delegates who ended up attending, it is no surprise that only 66 belonged to the patriarchal church. The purge of the ROC provided the results the renovationists were looking for. On February 1, 1923, the new Soviet-supported Supreme Eccl. Council, now comprised of members of the three renovationist groups, announced their upcoming Second All-Russia Regional Council of the ROC. On April 27, 1923, newspapers published the Soviet decree requiring that churches be registered: In accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Central Executive Committee of August 3, 1922, no religious society, regardless of what denomination it might belong to, may open its doors for services without having registered at the Provincial Department of Administration or the Provincial Executive Commissariat.

The council convened May 2-8, 1923, initially at the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow, and then relocated to the Moscow Religious Seminary. This time renovationist Bishop Antonin Granovski was chairman. Of the 426 delegates, 287 were selected from the dioceses and 139 were designated by the Soviet-controlled Supreme Eccl. Council, and among them 62 bishops. The delegates were from the various branches of the ROC: 206 from the Living Church, 110 from the Ancient Apostolic; 35 from the Restoration Church; three had no affiliation and 66 were from the patriarchal church. Vvedenski gave the introductory speech, which included the following statement: Right now we are living in a moment of exceptional historical importance, when the world can hear from the church that capitalism is sin. The world must hear from the church that those who have proceeded to struggle against this evil are not cursed, but are blessed, and we must bless them who do not know the name of Christ with the name of Christ. The world must accept the rectitude of the communist revolution through the authority of the Church. This is honor, this is holiness, this is the very pinnacle the Russian Church can possibly attain.

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The first order of business was a questionnaire to be filled out by every delegate, asking them about their attitude toward Soviet authority and how to deal with Patr. Tikhon. Everyone answered the questionnaire in the manner expected, fearing arrest as a counter-revolutionary. The question regarding the defrocking of Patr. Tikhon was quickly resolved after a list of accusations against him was read aloud. He was to be deprived of his rank and his designation of patriarch, because he had directed all his moral and ecclesiastical authority to overthrowing the existing civil and social order of Russian life, which even threatened the very existence of the ROC. When the time came to vote, Krasnitzki announced his threat: “Whoever does not subscribe to this resolution will not leave this room to go anywhere except to prison!” The delegates signed, although five managed to abstain. The initial signature on the document of sacerdotal expulsion was that of Metr. Antonin Granovski of Moscow, and he was followed by 53 additional prelates. The conference also removed the anathema that Patr. Tikhon had placed on the Soviet state, and assigned him his civil name of Vasili Belavin in lieu of his monastic name. Krasnitzki followed the vote with a victory speech. The conference confirmed, “The world is divided into two camps: the capitalist-exploiters and the proletariat,” and it was only Soviet authority that had initiated the struggle against social evils. The conference also declared, “Capitalism is a mortal sin and that it is a sacred role for Christians to struggle against it.” The conference also acknowledged that Soviet authority was the materialization of the ideal of the Kingdom of God on earth. The motion to reestablish the patriarchate, the council stated, was a counter-revolutionary act, and the intent of the conference was to return the ROC to Episcopal government. That evening the conference sanctified the selection of married priests as bishops, and the next day they permitted second marriages for priests. The conference decreed that all monasteries be closed and replaced by communist fraternities, and convents likewise. Bishops and other ROC clergy who had emigrated from Russia were labeled counter-revolutionary and were excommunicated. A secondary decision was the adoption of the Gregorian calendar. Vvedenski was promoted to metropolitan. The council also promoted Antonin Granovski to Archbishop of Krutitzk, while Krasnitzki was promoted to a new official position known as Protopresbyter of the Russian Church. The conference took the initiative to reconstitute their new ROC Supreme Eccl. Council to replace their own earlier ecclesiastical administration: ten members were nominated from the Living Church, six from the Ancient Apostolic Church,

The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era and two from the Restoration Church. Of the 18 members, five were prelates, twelve were parish clergy, and one was a layperson. In addition to all the above, the conference admitted to the falsification of relics and condemned the fraud, and excommunicated all the members of the Karlovtzi Synod from the ROC. In sum, the conference fulfilled the expectation of the GPU in almost every respect. The Living Church was able to attain many of its own goals also, but at the expense of subjecting itself to Soviet control, and worse than even Tsar Peter I had expected. On May 4, a delegation headed by Metr. Peter Blinov of Siberia visited Patr. Tikhon at the Lubyanka Prison, where he had been transferred from house arrest at Donskoi Monastery. They delivered to him the resolution by which he was defrocked. The patriarch read it and signed it, adding the statement, “The council never summoned me. I do not know its competence, and so cannot recognize its legitimacy. Patr. Tikhon, Vasili Belavin. April 25/May 8, 1923.” Immediately and without hesitation, the renovationist leaders sent the letter to the Eastern Orthodox patriarchs informing them of the deposition of Patr. Tikhon. Later Patr. Tikhon informed visitors that the renovationist council had no more authority to deprive him of his cathedra “than two or three babki (old women) shopping at some bazaar.” The renovationist leaders went on discrediting Patr. Tikhon in every way they could, presenting him to the general public as having been involved in counter-revolutionary activities. As successful as the restorationist council felt it accomplished a reformation of the ROC, they failed to accomplish one of their most important underlying goals: to use the common attack on Patr. Tikhon to unify the three branches of the renovationist movement. There were other signs of division, as well. Antonin also resigned his titled of Metropolitan of Krutitzk in protest, feeling that his Renovationist Church was not adequately represented on the new administrative council. Sometime during autumn 1923, Bishop Trofim of Birsk distributed a circular letter against the renovationists, informing the parishes that “Bishops who ascend their cathedras with the help of the civil authority are ecclesiastical adulterers.” In contradistinction to the above attitude, on August 20, 1923, a representative of the patriarchate of Constantinople, Archimandrite Yakov, and of the patriarchate of Alexandria, Archimandrite Pavel, officially greeted the new council of the renovationists. On August 24, a letter from the Old Believer prelate Iyoann was read at a meeting of the renovationist Synod. The letter

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV stated that the Old Believers recognized the renovationists, and condemned Patr. Tikhon. Shortly after the conference Professor Titlinov, who was a renovationist supporter, published his opinion in a magazine, but he was not shy to admit the shortcomings of their movement. The vast majority of clergy and ecclesiastical parishes have no desire to recognize the new ecclesiastical administration. The names of the movement’s leaders have become odious to them. The turmoil created in the lower levels of the church has been so violent that some of the movement’s activists have been threatened with physical danger. Protopriest A.I. Vvedenski has already been struck in the head by a rock. It is a good thing that the police have come to their rescue to protect them from rocks and other objects thrown at them. Bishops and priests of the Living Church have not been able to perform liturgy calmly, or even show their presence in church or on the street. People gossip almost to the point of referring to them as antichrists.

A group of disenchanted parishioners beat up Krasnitzki right inside the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow. The priest Evdokimov, who was also a member of the Communist party, was murdered in Yaroslav in September 1922; Serebryakov, an official of the Living Church, was killed in Tsaritzyn (Stalingrad); the same occurred with the Living Church bishop Theodosei in Poltava, while parishioners in Odessa ran the Living Church bishop out of town.

179. THE SYNODAL CHURCH On March 16, 1923, Agranov of the Department of Justice visited Patr. Tikhon and informed him that he was being prosecuted for violation of Section 4 of the Soviet Criminal Code: conspiracy to overthrow Soviet authority, and inciting people to oppose the legislature of the new government. The evidence for the accusations stemmed from his letter of January 19, 1918, and all his letters since then. On April 6, 1923, Izvestiya published an announcement that the trial of Patr. Tikhon would begin April 11, on Wednesday during Easter week. A subsequent announcement on April 12 changed the trial date to June 17. The Soviets could not be satisfied with the relationship they had developed with the Living Church, since this was not their goal, but only one more step toward that goal. The Soviets also realized that to provide Patr. Tikhon an aura of martyrdom would defeat their purpose. At the same time, the patriarch also realized that now, especially given the consolidation of Soviet power after their victory in the civil war, there was no use in his continuing

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era without reconciliation. It was not in his best interests, or in the best interests of that portion of ROC that he represented. Patr. Tikhon was scheduled to go on trial June 17, and tickets had already been printed and distributed to officials, the press, and interested parties. All of a sudden, Soviet officials informed Patr. Tikhon that he would be released from prison if he would announce his confession according to a predetermined outline. On June 16, 1923, the day before his trial, he admitted his guilt and composed a confession, which he presented to the Department of Justice. Having been raised in a monarchical society, and having been under the influence of anti-Soviet persons up to the time of my arrest, I had developed a genuine attitude of malice toward Soviet authority, and on occasion this malice proceeded from a passive condition to one of active participation, for example: my anathema of the authorities due to my position on the Treaty of Brest in 1918, and finally, the summons against the decree on confiscation of ecclesiastical valuables in 1922. All of my anti-Soviet activities are listed in the file regarding my accusation in the Supreme Court, except for a few minor inaccuracies. Recognizing the correctness of the decision of the court to subject me to trial for the accusations against me, violations of the Criminal Code for anti-Soviet activities, I repent of these actions against the state, and ask the Supreme Court to pardon the present measures taken toward me, that is, to free me from custody. I declare to the Supreme Court that I, from now on, am not an enemy of Soviet authority. I finally and decisively separate myself from foreign and domestic, monarchical and White Army, counter-revolutionaries.

On June 25, after 38 days of solitary confinement at Lubyanka Prison, Patr. Tikhon was released from custody and he returned to Donskoi Monastery. Tuchkov himself personally dismissed the sentry from the door of Patr. Tikhon’s cell, and informed him that he was free to come and go as he pleased, and without any restraints on his associations. Patr. Tikhon’s confession and his release from custody generated perplexity and bewilderment in the ROC, both in Russia and abroad. This voluntary — or so they thought — pseudo-confession disheartened some and vexed others. The reason for the Soviet decision to abort the trial was only obvious: to avoid making a martyr of Patr. Tikhon and igniting loyal outrage among the population, thus generating resistance to Soviet suppression of the ROC. The patriarch’s decision to capitulate and compromise his convictions was based on the words of Apostle Paul in Phil 1:23-24: he felt the ROC would sustain the greater loss if he was to remain in custody (or worse) than to be released under any condition back into public view and ecclesiastical administration. Soon, a stream of pilgrims were passing through Donskoi Monastery, seeking a visit or at least a glimpse of the patriarch who, during the interval of his confinement, had already begun to develop an aura of martyrdom.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV On June 28, Patr. Tikhon distributed a circular letter to loyal parishes, stating, “I, of course, did not present myself as an admirer of the Soviet state. At the same time, I am far from being the type of enemy the ecclesiastical renovationists tried to portray. I do condemn any infringement of the authority of the Soviet state by anyone. Let all the foreign, émigré and domestic monarchists and White Army understand that I am not an enemy of Soviet authority.” A second circular was distributed three days later, in which Patr. Tikhon criticized the renovationists for creating dissension and instability, and especially criticized its cohesion with the Soviet state. Patr. Tikhon stated, “The Russian Orthodox Church is apolitical and from now on wants to be neither a White nor a Red Church. It must be and will be the sole unified Apostolic Church.” The renovationists were unable to comprehend why the Soviets had released Patr. Tikhon from custody one day before his trial and had allowed him to retain his cathedra as patriarch, which only embarrassed them. On June 21, 1923, Bishop Antonin quit his position as president of the newly-formed renovationist council, which discredited them even more. As a replacement, renovationist officials selected Bishop Evdokim Mecherski of Nizhni-Novgorod, but he accepted the post only on condition that the separate branches of the renovationists dissolve and reorganize into one. Another council of renovationist prelates was held in early August 1923 in Moscow. They realized that they were losing ground and were alarmed at the exodus of white clergy from their group, who were returning to the patriarchal church or to new offspring of the renovationist movement. At this council they abolished the existing Supreme Eccl. Council and created a new Synod to replace it. To make their new Synod appear canonical, it was comprised of twelve prelates. Although the chairmanship was assigned to Metr. Evdokim, the real power behind the new Synod was Alexandr Vvedenski. The Synod declared the dissolution of the Living Church, Restoration Church and Ancient Apostolic Church, and in their place the Synodal Church was formed. But it was neat and tidy only on paper. Vvedenski agreed to dissolve his Ancient Apostolic Church and join. Krasnitzki personally refused to, although the majority of the members of his Living Church did join Metr. Evdokim. Antonin also refused to join, although the majority of his Restoration Church did. Their platform was published in Izvestiya on August 12, 1923, which, for the most part, repeated the platform of their council of May 1922. Toward the end of August 1923, the new Synodal Church announced its platform in a letter, and stated that Patr. Tikhon was guilty in two areas: first, in that he did not recognize the new Soviet regime and authority — but he had

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era repented of that. The second was the damage he had done to the ROC in the meanwhile, which he had not admitted to or repented of. Disregarding the offensive tone of the Synodal Church’s letter for the sake of reconciliation, Patr. Tikhon was prepared to begin negotiations regarding their readmission to the patriarchal ROC. About this time, Bishop of Veria Ilarion Troitzki returned from exile and joined Patr. Tikhon. Ilarion also began discussions with Tuchkov to try to acquire relief from the requirement to register parish churches, and to reduce the taxes that were levied on churches and clergy by the Soviets. For ROC administration, Patr. Tikhon created a temporary Sacred Synod which was subject to his decisions (rather than the reverse, as decided at the Regional Council of 19171918). On August 27, 1923, Metr. Sergei Stragorodski of Vladimir publicly repented of his dissension (that of joining the renovationists). He was ordained metropolitan of Nizhni-Novgorod on March 24, 1923 to replace the unrepentant renovationist Evdokim Mecherski. The new Sacred Synod, which included Bishop Ilarion, immediately began a dialogue with Metr. Evdokim regarding the conditions and prerequisites to accomplish ROC ecclesiastical unity. The renovationists were not willing to concede in any areas. Metr. Evdokim seemed to feel he was in a strong position. He proposed that a Regional Council be summoned which would proceed under the chairmanship of Patr. Tikhon. At the very beginning of this council, the patriarch would remove himself as the head of the ROC, while the Council would remove the renovationist resolution to defrock him and then would retire him as a regular monk. The ROC delegates could not agree with such demands and the negotiations ended for the time being. At the end of September 1923, a conference of 27 ROC prelates was held at the Donskoi Monastery. Archbishop Seraphim Samuilovich reported on the progress of negotiations toward re-admitting the renovationists. Many were opposed to reunification in any event, given the harm the renovationists had caused the patriarchal ROC, and their alliance with the Soviet regime. The conference was turbulent and heated arguments were raised in both directions. Bishop Ilarion attempted to reconcile the disagreeing parties, explaining diplomatically that a future conference would establish the final conditions for their readmission. Bishop Ambrosi demanded that the ROC immediately terminate any discussions with the renovationists. Metr. Kirill of Kazan and Archbishops Peter Polyanski of Krutitzk and Grigori of Ekaterinburg agreed. A secret ballot

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV was taken to and the vast majority voted against any further discussion with Metr. Evdokim’s new Synod; they wanted to drop the matter entirely. In November 1923, Tuchkov summoned Patr. Tikhon to his office at the Department of Justice and urgently demanded that he reconcile his Sacred Synod with the renovationist Synod of Metr. Evdokim. Tuchkov then threatened the patriarch with arrest should he decide not to, but. Patr Tikhon replied with a decisive refusal. After his return to his office at Donskoi Monastery, the patriarch made arrangements in writing regarding the succession of patriarchal deputies should he indeed be arrested. His first selection for deputy was Metr. Agafangel of Yaroslav; the second was Metr. Kirill of Kazan. A few days later the GPU arrested Bishop Ilarion, the close friend of Patr. Tikhon and organizer of the reconciliation with the renovationists. During the week before Christmas 1923, he was transferred to a concentration camp at Kem in Karelia, in the far north-west of Russia, and shortly after to Solovetski Island. Soviet machinations continued to undermine and fracture the ROC, but did not always attain the success that they expected. In February 1923, the last diocesan vicar of Petrograd was arrested, Bishop Nikolai Yarushevich. Parishioners sized up the situation and stopped attending church altogether. Attempting to resolve the dilemma of the vacant Petrograd episcopacy, Patr. Tikhon in early October requested Bishop Feodor Pozdeyevski of VokoloLamsk, who was also coincidentally vicar of Moscow diocese, to administer Petrograd diocese, with the intention of elevating him to archbishop. But he declined. The diocesan administration was then assigned to Archbishop Manuel Lemeshevski of Lug (Luzhski), who had been ordained on September 23 of that year. He immediately went to work to reconcile with the renovationists. By December 1923, a considerable number of renovationist clergy in Petrograd diocese returned to the patriarchal ROC, and 85 of the 113 churches went with them. Such success did not go lightly with Soviet officials and Archbishop Manuel faced repercussions. Toward the end of January 1924, Tuchkov summoned Archbishop Manuel to Moscow for a meeting regarding the readmission of renovationist clergy into the patriarchal ROC. Their conversation was concluded with Tuchkov’s words, “There is no need to talk with prelates such as you. Prelates like you are lined up against a wall.” That day Archbishop Manuel returned to Petrograd, and just a few days later, by order of the Cheka, he was arrested. Soviet officials continued to encourage the renovationists. The venerated Spasso-Preobrazhenski Cathedral and Church of Sts Kosmi and Damian in Petrograd were confiscated

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era from the patriarchal ROC by the Soviets and handed to the renovationists. The priests and parishioners quickly left and the new occupants inherited a couple of vacant edifices. During the years of 1922-1923, ROC churches were routinely closed and renovated as movie theaters, clubs, and amusement centers. This mockery of the ROC then took an even more dramatic and fantastic form. The Soviets created the Komsomol (Young Communist League) Easter and Christmas parodies of the ROC. These were street processions of large numbers of young people wearing pseudo-ecclesiastical vestments while carrying signs containing profane slogans that parodied the holiday. They also carried grotesque dolls and sacrilegious portraits that were supposed to mimic icons. To further promote their atheistic propaganda, the magazine Bezbozhnik (Godless) began publication in 1923. Nikolai Bukharin, now a member of the Politburo, opened the inaugural address of the first issue with the statement, “To war against the gods. A single proletariat front against these charlatans.” In 1923, ROC prelates Zinovei Drozdov of Tambov, Ambrosi Polyanski, Amfolokhi Skvortzov, Anatoli Grisiuk, Vassian Pyatnitzki, Gavriel Abolimov, Evsevi Rozhdestvenski, Filipp Gumilevski, and Luka Voino-Yasenetzki were arrested. So were renovationist priests who had been readmitted to the patriarchal ROC: Artemi Ilyinski, Kiprian Komrovski, and Sofroni Starkkov; as well as thousands of parish priests and deacons, and the pious laypersons who stood by their sides. The primary place of exile and incarceration was the concentration camp that used to be Solovetski Monastery, in the far north. In December 1923, about 2,000 ROC clergy were imprisoned there. The most notorious of all camps of the Russian north-west was at the converted Golgotha-Raspyatski (Crucifixion) Hermitage on Anzerski Island in the White Sea, near Solovetski Island. Every inmate exiled there died from starvation, exposure to the elements, direct execution, or hard labor. On January 15, 1924, Patr. Tikhon and his Sacred Synod, now consisting of himself, and archbishops Peter of Krutitzk, Tikhon Obolenski of the Urals, and Seraphim Aleksandrov of Tver, issued a statement refusing to recognize the canonicity of the renovationist Synodal Church. Soon after, Patr. Tikhon issued a resolution instructing the clergy to mention Soviet authority during liturgy. Tuchkov heard of the resolution, and even though he considered the Sacred Synod illegal (because it was not registered with the state), he promised to deal more patiently with them. It was obvious that the purpose of Patr. Tikhon’s most recent resolution was to demonstrate ROC loyalty to the Soviet state; in

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV fact, many people felt that the patriarch had issued it under duress. Tuchkov had at the back of his mind to create another schism within the ROC, between those who would support and those who would oppose the patriarch’s latest resolution to include mention of the Soviet authority during liturgy, and then the Soviets could again take repressive measures against both sides. It was difficult for clergy to mention Soviet authority during liturgy with a clean conscience, so most priests recited it unintelligibly to their parishioners. In the magazine Revolution and Church, an article was published about a certain deacon named Nosov, who was announcing his resignation from the ministry — a position that had been personally bestowed upon him by Tsar Nicholas II — and becoming an honorable citizen of the Soviet Union. Nosov proudly stated in the article, “Ecclesiastical laws and prayers were installed by the dictate of tsars and capitalism. Away with militarism, monarchism, capitalism, and sacerdotalism. Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat.” A cartoon in Rabochie Moskve (Moscow Worker) of July 15, 1923 depicted Patr. Tikhon fist fighting with another priest who represented the renovationists, while a citizen stood by watching, with his hands in his pockets. The caption read, “Where two are fighting, the third has his hands free.” The inference was that the Soviet authorities had plenty of leisure to proceed reducing the numbers of churches and clergy while the patriarchal group and renovationist group were fighting between themselves for control over the ROC. On March 21, 1924, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet carried a motion ordering Patr. Tikhon and his associates to desist in their activities. On April 22, 1924, Patr. Tikhon met with Soviet President Kalinin and presented him an official letter petitioning for the registration of the Sacred Synod and local diocesan governments. The patriarch reminded him that prelates, whose activity had been curbed as a result of the resolution of the Presidium, “not only are not free, but are arrested and sent by administrative order to Bukhara” (a city in central Uzbekistan). The patriarch requested their freedom, but a positive response was not forthcoming. Further ecclesiastical dissension and incessant attacks on the patriarchal ROC by the renovationists moved Patr. Tikhon to again act against these “ecclesiastical criminals,” as he referred to them. On April 15, 1924, he interdicted bishops Evdokim Mecherski and Antonin Granovksi of the Synodal Church. A few renovationist clergy — fearing their own interdiction — were unsettled by this and sought to find common ground with the patriarchal ROC in order to be

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era reconciled with them. Patr. Tikhon’s interdiction met with Tuchkov’s approval, anything to generate more internal friction. As far as the patriarchal church was concerned, Patr. Tikhon’s only support came from northern Russia and Moscow. He realized that he would have to take action in the light of the advances made by the new Synodal Church, but any progress on his part required the permission of Soviet officials. Even though they had freed Patr. Tikhon from arrest and surveillance, they still posed an obstacle to his organization of a ROC central administration. Patr. Tikhon submitted a request for permission to summon a council and organize the administration of those dioceses that were still loyal to him. Soviet officials informed him that this would not be permitted if he continued to associate with counter-revolutionary elements and people who could not be trusted. As a sign of good faith, Soviet officials recommended he ally himself with Krasnitzki and the renovationists who had refused alliance with the new Synodal Church. Tikhon agreed. In March 1924, seeing that matters were not going well in the new Synodal Church, and hoping to take advantage of the situation to his own benefit, Krasnitzki arrived in Moscow from Petrograd. Over the subsequent six weeks he held several conversations with the patriarch, attempting to reach a compromise for his readmission. On May 19, 1924, Krasnitzki and the remaining members of his Living Church agreed to join the patriarchal church. He presented a formal repentance and request for readmission, and Patr. Tikhon signed the document. The two groups created a temporary ecclesiastical administration consisting of twelve members: Patr. Tikhon and five members selected by him, and Krasnitzki and five members selected by him. Of course, all of these plans incurred vehement opposition from Patr. Tikhon’s supporters. The associates of the patriarch could not accept Krasnitzki into their fold because they held him guilty of spilling the blood of martyr Metr. Veniamin Kazanski of Petrograd, because he had testified against him. Metr. Kirill of Kazan, after returning from his three-year exile in Komi Province, went to the patriarch and expressed his perplexity and sorrow over the readmission. Patr. Tikhon told him, “My heart convulses because so many prelates sit in prison, but they (the Soviets) have promised to free them if I accept Krasnitzki.” But Metr. Kirill begged him not to allow a man who had done so much harm to the patriarchal ROC to become part of ecclesiastical administration. Tuchkov heard about Metr. Kirill’s opposition to Krasnitzki, and soon the fearless and inflexible Metr. Kirill was again arrested and sentenced to exile.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Tikhon was soon forced to admit that this coalition of the patriarchal church with the Living Church was an abysmal failure. Krasnitzki, Bishop Iyoann Albinski, and his supporters put their tails between their legs and returned empty-handed to Petrograd. This incident also marked the end of any cooperation Patr. Tikhon might have received from the Soviet state. To strengthen the ROC internally, Patr. Tikhon promoted Peter Polyanski of Yaroslav and Tikhon Obolenski of the Urals to metropolitan. During 1924, ten ROC prelates who had defected to the renovationists returned to the patriarchal ROC. On September 11, 1924, Archbishop Seraphim Mescheryakov of Kostroma publicly repented of his dissension at the Church of John the Baptizer in the presence of the patriarch. Patr. Tikhon accepted his repentance, and Seraphim then announced his retirement. Hearing of this, Cheka officials had Metr. Seraphim arrested and he was exiled to Solovetski Island. Again realizing their loss of support from the ROC population, the renovationist Synodal Church took another approach to gain credibility. Bishop Evdokim’s Synod sent a circular letter to the Eastern Orthodox patriarchs and other heads of autocephalous Orthodox bodies, inviting them to reestablish association with the ROC — but presenting the Synodal Church as the official ROC. The results were positive for the Synodal Church. They easily swayed the Patriarch of Antioch in their direction; and on May 6, 1924, Patr. Grigori VII of Constantinople offered his support. The Patriarch of Alexandria followed shortly after Antioch, while the Patriarch of Jerusalem recognized the Synodal Church on July 19, 1926. On June 6, 1924, Patr. Tikhon received a letter from Archimandrite Vasili Dimopulo, the Moscow representative of Patr. Grigori VII of Constantinople. The letter conveyed a request that Patr. Tikhon vacate his patriarchal cathedra. For the sake of reuniting the dissension, and for the sake of your flock, you should yield and immediately depart from the government of the Church, which would be proper for a true and love-filled pastor having concern for the salvation of many, and at the same time, the patriarchate should be eliminated, at least temporarily, since it has engendered every abnormal condition, and is a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of peace and unity.

Patr. Tikhon responded in a letter, attempting to explain that his conclusions were incorrect, that he was playing into the hands of the renovationists who had illegally usurped ecclesiastical authority from him, the rightful head of the ROC. Patr. Tikhon also reminded Patr. Grigori that his predecessor, Patr. German V, and the other Eastern patriarchs had approved of the reestablishment of the Russian patriarchate and his ascension to its cathedra. After this exchange

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era of letters, Patr. Grigori severed association with Patr. Tikhon and recognized the Synodal Church as the official ROC. The other Eastern patriarchs followed his example. This was a serious blow to the patriarchal church. At the same time, the new Synodal Church was receiving financial support from the American Methodist Episcopal Church. Their representative, Edger Black, participated in their conference of 1923. The renovationist Synodal Church divided Russia into administrative regions in European Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Siberia, and the Far East. They held a Regional Conference June 10-18, 1924 with 466 delegates, which included 83 bishops. Patr. Grigori VII of Constantinople also attended the session and was designated Honorary President. The primary resolution at this session was to confirm the Synodal Church as “the sole canonical legal supreme organization of the government of the Russian Orthodox Church, in view of its recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarchs.” To gain the approval of Soviet officials, a resolution was passed that stated that the counter-revolutionary activities of the ROC had now terminated with the expulsion of Patr. Tikhon. To fill the vacant episcopacy of Petrograd, Veniamin Muratovski was elected, a long time ROC prelate who had just recently attached himself to Vvedenski, and his title became Metropolitan of Leningrad. On July 20, 1924, Metr. Vvedenski, whose title was now MetropolitanEvangelist, was pelted with rocks by disenchanted parishioners a second time.

180. THE LAST YEAR OF PATRIARCH TIKHON During 1924, the persecution of the patriarchal church continued with the same intensity. Over 66 prelates — half the patriarchal ROC episcopacy of Russia — was either imprisoned or in exile that year. Six of the most prominent were arrested by the GPU and exiled to Solovetski Island. Metr. Sergei Stragorodski was forbidden to leave Nizhni-Novgorod; Metr. Arseni of Novgorod was exiled to Bukhara, Uzbekistan; Metr. Agafangel of Yaroslav to Narim, near Tomsk, in Siberia; Metr. Mikhail of Kiev to Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Metr. Kirill was in exiled to Yust-Kulon in Komi Province. In Butirski Prison alone at least eight prelates languished. Half the clergy of Petrograd who were loyal to Patr. Tikhon had been arrested and sentenced to either prison or exile. In January 1924, priests Andronik Liubovich from Nikolayevski and Mikhail Novgorodtzev

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV and Emilian Schelchkov of Muravyevk were tortured to death in Amur Province in the Siberian Far East. On August 4-17, 1924, another conference was held in Sremski Karlovtzi, and the delegates confirmed their loyalty to Patr. Tikhon. Again the Karlovtzi group attempted to adopt the function of a temporary ROC administration as a result of the persecution of the ROC in the Soviet Union and the ascendance of the renovationists. They hoped to acquire the support of all the ROC parishes in Europe under their banner. Metr. Evlogi abandoned the conference and protested their decisions, claiming that only the patriarch had the authority to administrate the ROC, and not the Karlovtzi-associated prelates. Having announced his withdraw from involvement in the political affairs of the country with his acceptance of Soviet authority, Patr. Tikhon did not again raise his voice to defend the ROC until the Soviets’ antagonism became again unbearable. On September 24, 1924, the patriarch wrote the following letter to the Supreme Soviet. The Church at the present is affected by unprecedented disturbance by external forces, while surrounded by an atmosphere of suspicion and animosity. Dozens of bishops and hundreds of priests and laypersons without trial, and often without an explanation of the reason, are thrown into prison, exiled to distant provinces of the republic, and transferred from place to place. Orthodox bishops whom we have ordained are either not allowed to their dioceses or are banished from them as soon as they arrive, or are subject to arrest. The central administration of the Orthodox Church has fallen into disorder because the institution that was created by the patriarch of all-Russia is not registered, and even its chancellery and archives are locked and inaccessible. Churches are being closed, or turned into clubs and movie theaters, and those with a large number of parishioners are handed to the renovationist group, which then ends up with a meager attendance. The clergy is assessed a tax they are unable to bear, endure every oppression at their homes, and their children are refused attendance at educational institutions, and only because their fathers are priests.

On December 9, 1924, Patr. Tikhon suffered a serious setback: the person closest to him, the associate who had lived with him in his cloister during his term of house arrest, Yakov Sergeevich Polusov, was murdered. Robbers entered the domicile of the patriarch at Donskoi Monastery. While one stood on the porch, the other attacked Patr. Tikhon. The loyal attendant tried to defend the patriarch and intervened, pushing his body between the robber and the patriarch. The robber shot Polusov and he fell to the floor dead. The robbers grabbed some jackets that were handing on the wall to cover themselves and fled.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Over Tuchkov’s objections, Polusov’s body was buried along the outside wall of the Small Donskoi Cathedral. An article appeared in the next day’s issue of Izvestiya regarding the robbery, but not one word was mentioned about the shooting. Concluding that the robbery was an attempt on his own life, Patr. Tikhon wrote another ecclesiastical testament regarding his succession: first would be Metr. Kirill of Kazan, and if he could not accept the responsibilities of patriarchal deputy, then Metr. Agafangel of Yaroslav, and after him Metr. Peter of Krutitzk. After Polusov was killed, Patr. Tikhon’s health noticeably declined and he began to suffer from angina pectoris. He began to complain, “I was better off sitting in prison, because I would hope for freedom. But now that I have it, I am still unable to do anything. I send bishops to the south, and they end up in the north; I send them to the west and they turn them to the east.” (The reference to north is the concentration camps of the White Sea region and Komi Province, while the reference to east is Siberia and south-central Asia.) Doctors who attended the patriarch persistently recommended that he go to a hospital. On January 13, 1925, Patr. Tikhon was ready to be admitted to the Bakunin private clinic, and he was taken there by taxi. He was admitted as citizen Vasili Belavin but was treated personally by Doctor Bakunin, the owner of the clinic, and Professor Pletnev, a cardiologist. A stream of loyal visitors funneled through the clinic visiting the patriarch and requesting a blessing, and so did the other patients of the clinic, requesting his prayers for their operation and recovery. The Chekist Tuchkov also visited Patr. Tikhon, although this only made his recovery all the more difficult. Tuchkov had advised him to abandon ecclesiastical affairs and travel to the Russian south for recovery. Patr. Tikhon refused, and continued to struggle to administrate the ROC, especially in regard to bridging the gap between ROC persecution and Soviet authority. On February 28, 1925, Patr. Tikhon turned to the Supreme Soviet with a new petition about the registration of the Sacred Synod. As with previous petitions, this one was discarded; and if this was not enough, new charges by the GPU were leveled against the patriarch. He was accused of discrediting the Soviet state, a violation of Sections 59 and 73 of the Soviet Criminal Code. This indictment scheduled July 19, 1925 as the date for the patriarch’s execution. On March 20, a stomatologic operation was performed and the patriarch suffered from the inflammation of his gums, throat and tonsils, and his overall condition only became worse. On April 5, Patr. Tikhon was taken to the Cathedral of the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Bolshoi Vosneseniia (Great Ascension), where he participated in the ordination of Sergei Nikolski as bishop, and Last Rites were administered to him. While this was going on, Tuchkov was holding discussions with the Sacred Synod, and demanded that the patriarch issue a circular letter recognizing Soviet authority without any reservation and alienating himself from communication with the émigré clergy (the Karlovtzi Conference), and calling on the ROC membership to do the same. Metr. Peter, having taken charge of patriarchal affairs under the circumstances, insisted that Soviet authorities reassess their treatment of ROC clergy, permit the instruction of Christian worship, and give them permission to open religious schools. The negotiations were extremely difficult for both parties. Tuchkov demanded a statement from Patr. Tikhon and refused to concede to any of Metr. Peter’s requests. With the patriarch on his deathbed, Tuchkov threatened Metr. Peter if such a document were not acquired. Metr. Peter quickly understood the seriousness of the situation and met with the Sacred Synod, creating a draft of a patriarchal resolution. On the holiday of the Annunciation, April 7, 1925, Patr. Tikhon was taken to a special meeting of the Sacred Synod to finalize the contents of the document that would be to Tuchkov’s satisfaction. While Metr. Peter took the emended document back to Tuchkov for his review, Patr. Tikhon was returned to Bakunin clinic. Tuchkov made his emendations to the document, but Patr. Tikhon reviewed the document at the clinic about 10 o’clock that evening and found it unacceptable. When Metr. Peter left the patriarch’s bedside, his condition worsened. At 11:45 that evening, April 10, 1925, Patr. Tikhon passed away; he was 61 years of age. The patriarch was laid to rest at Donskoi Monastery in a solid oak casket on April 12, the holiday of the Entrance of the Lord into Jerusalem. On April 15, three days later, Izvestiya published a letter that was subscribed by the patriarch on the day of his death, and was titled his Last Will and Testament. The letter was also subscribed by Metr. Peter Polyanski and Metr. Tikhon of the Urals. Only the most important portion of the letter is included here: By the grace of God, humble Tikhon, patriarch of Moscow and all Russia. Grace and peace from our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ… In deference to the duty incumbent upon us to guard the purity of ecclesiastical life, seeking first of all the salvation of the people and the materialization in life of the eternal divine principles, we cannot but condemn those who, in forgetfulness of the divine ends, misuse their ecclesiastical position by giving themselves beyond measure to the human, and often degraded political game, sometimes even of a culpable character; therefore, in accordance with the duty of our office as primate, we

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era approve of appointing a special commission to be charged with the investigation, and if deemed proper, even removal of those prelates and priests who persist in their disruption and refuse to manifest a repentance of it before the Soviet government, and to bring such before the Court of the Orthodox Synod. At the same time, we must mention with a deep sorrow that certain sons of Russia, and even prelates and priests, have left the fatherland for various reasons, and already have occupied themselves in activities which in any case are injurious to our church. Making use of our name and our ecclesiastical authority, they have carried on harmful and counter-revolutionary activity. We positively declare that we have no connection with them, as our enemies accuse us of: they are strangers to us, and we condemn their harmful activity. They use our name and the name of the holy church in an unauthorized fashion and against the canons of our church, feigning to be solicitous about its welfare. The so-called Synod of Karlovtzi brought no blessing to the church or the nation, and we again confirm its condemnation, and hold it necessary to proclaim firmly and positively that any such further attempt will require extreme measures on our part, even to the interdiction of the ministry and trial by the tribunal of the Synod. In order to avoid such severe penalties, we call upon all prelates and priests abroad to cease their political activity in connection with the enemies of our nation, and to have the courage to return the fatherland and to speak the truth about themselves and the Church of God. Their activity should be investigated. They should give an account of themselves to the Orthodox ecclesiastical conscience. We order that a special commission should investigate the activity of the prelates and priests who have fled abroad, and especially of Metropolitan Antoni, former of Kiev; Platon, formerly of Odessa, as well as others, and immediately to prepare a statement concerning their activity. Their refusal to submit to our demand will oblige us to judge them in their absence…. May the Lord strengthen you all in devotion to the Orthodox faith, Church, and its Episcopacy. Patriarch Tikhon, Donskoi Monastery, April 7, 1925

Since the Last Will of Patr. Tikhon was published, many have been reluctant to accept its validity, claiming that its authors were actually Tuchkov and Metr. Peter, and that it was the version that the patriarch refused to sign just prior to his demise. It was Tuchkov who submitted the document and its forged signature to Izvestiya, and Metr. Peter and other ROC prelates testified to its validity out of fear of reprisal and for the overall good of the ROC. Nonetheless, the document contains no stipulation or testimony that could not have been gleaned from other statements and letters of Patr. Tikhon. Soviet authorities saw the value of this testament as a summary of his attitude toward the ROC, and presented it as a call for the ROC to adhere to the stipulations of the document even after his demise. They hoped this would inhibit the patriarch’s successors from resisting Soviet authority. Tuchkov had prepared his battle plan for dealing with Patr. Tikhon’s successors.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 181. METROPOLITAN PETER On the day of Patr. Tikhon’s funeral, a conference was held after the conclusion of the requiem. The document of succession that the patriarch had written shortly after the attempted murder was read to all the prelates. Since Metr. Kirill and Metr. Agafangel were in exile, the attending prelates, 58 total (essentially, every ROC prelate who was not in prison or in exile), agreed to recognize Metr. Peter Polyanski of Krutitzk as patriarchal deputy and they signed a document transferring patriarchal duties to him. The first to sign the document was Metr. Sergei Stragorodski of Nizhni-Novgorod. In his personal associations, Metr. Peter was courteous and kind, but this was not reflected in his temperament when it came to ecclesiastical administration, where he was firm and decisive. In comparison with Bishop Ilarion Troitzki, Metr. Peter was less compliant, in fact quite inflexible, in dealing with the intrigues of the renovationists; he had an acute mind, and a knack for discerning a person’s intentions. Tuchkov could not tolerate Ilarion, but he was deceived by the superficial mildness and humility of Metr. Peter, which struck him as evidence of a weak will. During the first few months of Metr. Peter’s administration of the ROC, Tuchkov took a wait-and-see approach, and did not restrict his freedom of activity or travel. Metr. Peter’s touchstone was his interview by the newspaper Izvestiya. The correspondent asked him, “There are rumors circulating that the Last Will of Patr. Tikhon is not authentic.” “These rumors,” replied Metr. Peter, “have no basis. Anyone who says that there is [a basis for doubt] is no more reliable than a hysterical woman loosed from Sukharevka Hospital. As far as the believers are concerned, they have no doubt as to the validity of the Last Will.” When the correspondent asked when Metr. Peter intended to execute a purge of counter-revolutionary clergy and Black-Hundreds, and summon a council to bring the émigré clergy to an episcopal trial, the metropolitan answered, “The will of Patr. Tikhon is sacred to me, as deputy of the patriarchal cathedra. But I alone am not competent to accomplish these points of his last will.” That was a way of signaling setting a condition for him to undertake such a purge: the creation of an ROC administrative body. Playing so boldly, Metr. Peter was on the brink of provoking another sentence of exile. Coincident with the outright persecution of the ROC was the rise of atheist propaganda. In 1925, the Union of Godless People (the name was

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era changed in 1929 to the Union of Militant Atheists) was organized under the guidance of the secretary of the Supreme Soviet, and Emelian M. Yaroslavski became its head. Within a year the Atheist Union listed 87,000 members. The dissension caused by the renovationist movement in its struggle for ecclesiastical supremacy acted as a catalyst for the success of the Atheist Union. The renovationists felt they had gained momentum with Patr. Tikhon’s death, because the ROC was unable to summon a council to select a successor. But their victory was far from materialization, as many renovationist prelates realized how severely they had over-rated their accomplishments: they were stuck with empty churches and poor parish priests, and surrounded by a population that had no trust in or respect for them. Professor Titlinov compared Moscow with the Pharisaic Jerusalem. An article in the first issue of the Kazan renovationist newspaper noted that expelled nuns roaming about the villages informed residents that renovationist priests had no right to perform baptisms, weddings or requiems. In some areas, traditional ROC adherents were chasing renovationist priests out of church. On April 11, 1925, the day before Patr. Tikhon’s funeral, renovationist Metr. Veniamin Muratovski and a group of prelates presented a petition for unity with the patriarchal ROC. They hoped to accomplish this at their forthcoming conference in autumn. One of the most zealous advocates of unification was protopriest Nikolai Chukov of Petrograd. While, from the side of the patriarchal ROC, Bishop Andrei Yukhtomski (who was exiled in Turkmenistan at the time) and Metr. Tikhon Obolenski of the Urals were strongly in favor. Equally zealous opponents were Metr. Kirill Smirnov of Kazan, although in exile deep in the Russian far north, and Metr. Sergei Stragorodski, who himself had just recently returned to the fold of the patriarchal ROC. Bishop Nektari Trezvinski of Vyatka diocese sent out a circular letter where he labeled the renovationists “enemies of God.” Aware that unity would mean subjection to the Evdokim Synod, Metr. Peter published on July 28, 1925 a letter categorically rejecting the offer of reunification. In his letter he labeled the renovationists “enemies of the ROC,” and likewise attacked Catholics, Uniates, Evangelicals and Baptists. The final sentence stated his conditions for reconciliation. Unification of those known as the renovationists to the holy Orthodox Church is possible only under the following conditions: if every one of them on an individual basis will recant his errors and provide a public repentance of his apostasy from

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV the Church. Then we will incessantly beseech the Lord God for Him to allow the return of these lost people to the bosom of the holy Orthodox Church.

The patriarchal deputy’s letter was effective in reducing doubt among the wavering ROC membership, and convinced them of his intent to follow in his predecessor’s vein and not succumb to the intrigues of the renovationists. Nonetheless, it was difficult to win a war this way, especially with Soviet authority supporting the renovationists. In the city of Kharkov, out of 27 churches still open for services, only three remained loyal to the Moscow patriarchate; in Kiev almost no churches were loyal. On October 1-10, 1925 the next All-Russia Regional Conference of the renovationist Synodal Church was held. About 300 delegates attended, divided into 106 prelates, 100 parish priests, and 100 laypersons. The honored guest of the conference was the representative of the Constantinople patriarchate, Archimandrite Vasili Dimopulo. A few delegates proposed a motion to send a delegation to Metr. Peter with the terms of reconciliation. Renovationist leader Vvedenski, however, had his own agenda, and announced, “There will be no conciliation with the Tikhonists; the protrusion of the Tikhon confederacy appears as a counter-revolutionary tumor in the Church. In order to deliver the Church from their policy, a surgical operation is necessary. Only then will peace occur in the church. The renovation cannot progress with the swelling effects of the Tikhon confederacy.” A resolution was composed by the dictate of Vvedenski, which stated, “The conference concludes that the Tikhonists constitute a continuous link with the monarchists, which threatens the Church with horrible ramifications, and rejects any conciliation with the protrusion of the Tikhonists.” Indirectly, and later in his resolution, Vvedenski urged the GPU to liquidate Metr. Peter. The concluding action of the conference was the creation of a Holy Administrative Synod, consisting of 35 individuals. Among the members were Evdokim Mescherski, the renovationist Metropolitan of all Siberia, and Metr. Pimen Pegov of the Ukrainian renovationist church. A Supreme Council was also created, composed of Metropolitan-Evangelist Vvedenski, protopriest Krasotkin, and Professor S. Zarin. Although Metr. Veniamin Muratovski was selected as president of both the Synod and Supreme Council, it was Vvedenski who held the real power. Tuchkov, knowing the vulnerability of the renovationists’ position and their unpopularity among the people, did not lose hope of being able to utilize Metr. Peter, whose loyal adherents were still the majority of Russian Orthodoxy,

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era to further his own interests. Intense negotiations began the first days of November 1925 between Metr. Peter and Tuchkov to address the dilemma of the ROC in its relationship to the Soviet state. They discussed the possibility of legalizing the ROC, and the registration of the Sacred Synod and diocesan government, all of which still had not been accomplished. Tuchkov demanded another declaration with a summons to all ROC adherents to cooperate with Soviet authority, including the expulsion of clergy who were useless for Soviet purposes. It would be necessary for the ROC also to censure the émigré clergy — referring to the Karlovtzi Conference — and to keep in close contact with the GPU through their trusted agent, himself. Metr. Peter insisted on the ROC’s independence in ecclesiastical affairs, but such claims fell on deaf ears. Finally, Metr. Peter realized he was never going to get anywhere and declared, “All of you are lying; you are not willing to concede anything from your end, all you do is make promises.” It is no wonder that the November 15 issue of Izvestiya published an article by a reporter called Telyakovski, containing accusations against Metr. Peter. The reporter claimed to have received information from renovationist clergy indicating that the metropolitan was involved in counter-revolutionary activities. Evidence was also provided to indicate that Metr. Peter was in close association with the Karlovtzi émigré clergy. The article also stated that Metr. Peter was a tool and a protégé of the émigré monarchists, despite the fact that he was very critical of the émigré clergy, just as Patr. Tikhon had been. Metr. Peter sent money to several prelates who were in exile and urged parishes and others to do the same. This charity toward those whom the GPU had exiled upset the Soviets tremendously. They now developed a plan to alienate Metr. Peter from his position as patriarchal deputy and provoke new dissent in the ROC, again by playing on the ego and ambition of other ROC prelates. The targets of the GPU were Bishops Boris Rukin of Mozhaisk and Grigori Yatzkovski of Ekaterinburg (now known as Sverdlovsk). Representatives of the GPU proposed to Bishop Boris that he form a preliminary Sacred Synod and present a petition to the Department of Internal Affairs on its behalf, requesting its legalization, while simultaneously emphasizing to the parishes of his diocese the need to give their fullest cooperation with the policy of the Soviet state. After this, said the GPU representative, their Sacred Synod, diocesan administrative council and ROC parishes, would be granted legalization. Bishop Boris swallowed the offer, hook, line and sinker.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Metr. Peter was approached by the GPU with a suggestion that he assist Bishop Boris, but he flatly refused. Bishop Boris, disregarding Metr. Peter’s refusal, continued his negotiations with the GPU, while coincidentally attempting to manipulate Metr. Peter into summoning a council of ROC prelates, which Bishop Boris hoped to use, with the support of the GPU, to estrange Metr. Peter from his position as patriarchal deputy. As before, Metr. Peter had no intention of betraying the ROC to the Soviets, and they were also well aware of this. In late November and early December, Bishops Ambrosi Polyanski, Tikhon Sharopov, Nikolai Dobronravov, Gurei Stepanov, Iosaf Yudalov, Pahomi Kedrova and Damaskin Tzedrik were arrested. Along with them two former Holy Synod Attorneys-General were also taken into custody: Vladimir Sabler and Alexandr Samarin. Foreseeing his own arrest, Metr. Peter composed two documents on December 5. The first named his successors as patriarchal deputy, and he cited again the two candidates who had been nominated by Patr. Tikhon, but who were unable to accept the position: Metr. Kirill of Kazan and Metr. Agafangel of Yaroslav. Meter Peter then added some candidates of his own: first, Metr. Arseni of Novgorod, and second, Metr. Sergei Stragorodski of Nizhni-Novgorod. The second letter was a backup of the same, but named Metr. Sergei first, and as his successors, Metr. Mikhail Ermakov of Kiev, and Archbishop Joseph Petrov of Rostov. Such directives were unprecedented in Orthodox history, but under the circumstances had become a necessity, especially given that Metr. Kirill and Metr. Agafangel were in exile. One of the accusations against Metr. Peter was that he had advocated the restitution of the monarchy. Soviet officials accused him of supporting the intention of Karlovtzi Conference to install Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaievich, a cousin of Tsar Nicholas II, as the new tsar of Russia. Just how all of this was to occur was never documented or detailed by the émigré ROC prelates, but Soviet officials claimed they had positive proof that Peter had blessed Grand Prince Nikolai via some type of correspondence. On December 10, 1925, Metr. Peter was arrested and placed in a jail cell at the Lubyanka Prison. After three weeks of confinement, he was transferred to Butirski Prison and placed in a holding cell with thirty criminals. After a term at the Butirski Prison, Metr. Peter was brought back to Lubyanka and placed in solitary confinement. Prelates loyal to Metr. Peter were arrested as well: Bishops Venedict Plotnikov of Petrograd, Nikolai Klementyev of Sestropetzki, Grigori Lebedev of Schlesselburg, and Inno-

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era kenti Tikhonov of Ladoga. A wave of arrests overtook Petrograd clergy loyal to Metr. Peter, as many as Soviet officials could locate, and laypersons as well.

182. THE GRIGORIAN DISSENSION On December 14, 1925, Metr. Sergei of Nizhni-Novgorod informed the vicar of Moscow diocese, Bishop Gavriel Krasnovski, by letter, of his assumption of the post of patriarchal deputy, which was entrusted to him by Metr. Peter. Although Metr. Sergei was unable to leave his diocesan capital because of restrictions placed upon him by Soviet officials, he nonetheless claimed the post and on December 30 began to exercise his new authority by ordaining protopriest Dmitri Lyubimov as Bishop of Gdov, and by assigning Bishop Peter Zverev as director of Moscow diocese. Metr. Peter having refused to capitulate to Soviet officials, Tuchkov implemented his next plan. On December 22, a group of prelates summoned by Archbishop Grigori of Ekaterinburg gathered at Donskoi Monastery and declared themselves independent of Metr. Sergei and his Sacred Synod. From among themselves, six prelates were selected who created a new temporary Supreme Eccl. Admin. Immediately the Department of Internal Affairs recognized the group and granted them legitimacy. When Metr. Sergei, the new patriarchal deputy, was approached by the GPU in order to negotiate a compromise, he refused. The GPU then arranged a meeting of Archbishop Grigori with Metr. Peter in prison. As Pavel Miliukov described the situation: Disregarding Metr. Sergei’s claim, on December 22, ten ROC prelates gathered at the Donskoi Monastery under the chairmanship of Archbishop Grigori Yatzkovski of Ekaterinburg. The new group became known as the Grigorians, and it soon became widely known that it was Tuchkov who had made the initial arrangements for the formation of the temporary Council shortly after Metr. Peter was arrested. They knew that Metr. Sergei had been nominated as patriarchal deputy, but discounted that because of his inability to travel to Moscow. Apparently these ten prelates did not agree with the way that Metr. Peter had conducted himself in representing the ROC to the Soviets. They felt Metr. Peter should have made arrangements to ameliorate the plight of the ROC under any conditions. The purpose of this meeting was the creation of a temporary Supreme Eccl. Council to administrate the ROC in the absence of a patriarch. It consisted of six prelates with Archbishop Grigori as chairman. To justify formation of the new administrative body, they sent a circular letter to the parishes remaining loyal to the patriarchal ROC. The letter ignored Metr. Sergei completely, and accepted the Last Will of Patr. Tikhon as valid. Since the designees noted in the patriarch’s Last Will were all in exile, Metropolitans Kirill, Agafangel and Peter, this gave them the authority to form a new administrative body.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV On the following day, Archbishop Grigori and a few prelates from the new Council presented a petition to the Department of Internal Affairs for the legalization of their new body. After ten days they received a response stating that the Department saw no obstacle for them to proceed with their temporary body until they could officially legalize it. On Orthodox Christmas, January 6, 1926, an interview with Archbishop Grigori was published in Izvestiya, wherein he thanked Soviet authorities for legalizing their ROC administrative body. Once he found out about the new Council, Metr. Sergei wrote a letter to Archbishop Grigori vehemently protesting their action, claiming that it circumvented legal ecclesiastical authority, referring to himself. Archbishop Grigori replied and in a very thorough manner presented their position, and even invited Metr. Sergei to become a member, even chairman, if he so desired (knowing well that Soviet officials would not allow him to leave Nizhni-Novgorod). To further the discussion, Archbishop Grigori dispatched Bishop Damian Voskresenski with the task of convincing Metr. Sergei that the members of their Council knew nothing of Metr. Peter’s last-minute arrangements regarding the succession. After Bishop Damian’s return to Moscow, Archbishop Grigori sent Metr. Sergei a telegram inviting him to Moscow. Frustrated by his predicament and extremely irritated, Metr. Sergei interdicted Archbishop Grigori and the entire Council, forbidding them to perform liturgy and informing them that they were now subject to prosecution by an episcopal court. The new Council then turned to Metr. Peter with a petition requesting him to annul the plenipotentiary of Metr. Sergei. On February 6, 1926, members of the new Council headed by Archbishop Grigori decided to meet with Metr. Peter at his prison cell in the Lubyanka. Tuchkov made arrangements for the visit and he and his confederates watched as the Grigorians played into their hands during the meeting. The Grigorians persistently demanded that Metr. Peter transfer authority to them, because only they were recognized by Soviet authorities; neither Patr. Tikhon nor Metr. Peter had been able to accomplish that, and Metr. Sergei would not be able to do it, either. They claimed that only they had the ability to normalize relations with Soviet authority. In the end, Metr. Peter had no choice but to give into their demands. Held in solitary confinement, he was uninformed of current ecclesiastical events and was unable to defend himself. Metr. Peter therefore decided to make new arrangements for ROC administration: he selected three Grigorian prelates to work as a triumvirate: Archbishops Nikolai Dobronravov of Vladimir, Dmitri Belikov of Tomsk, and Grigori of Ekaterinoslav. The three would possess

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era a plenipotentiary equivalent to a patriarchal deputy. The Grigorian delegates deliberately deceived Metr. Peter, hiding from him the fact that Nikolai was imprisoned, while Dmitri was banned from traveling to Moscow (or anywhere else). Metr. Peter’s resolution was quickly interpreted by the Grigorians as his transfer of ROC administration to Archbishop Grigori, the only one of the three triumvirs who was free. Immediately, the new Council annulled Metr. Sergei’s assignment of Bishop Peter Zverev as director of Moscow diocese, and replaced him with Bishop Boris of Mozhaisk, a Grigorian and pawn of Tuchkov. On February 23, 1926, Archbishop Grigori again addressed a letter to Metr. Sergei, confirming Metr. Peter’s arrangements of February 6, and indicating that it was consistent with the spirit and letter of canon law, and forwarded him a copy of the resolution as evidence. In response, Metr. Sergei explained that Metr. Peter’s resolution was composed in a conditional form and clearly exposed his ignorance of recent events. For this reason, Metr. Sergei refused to accept the resolution and again insisted on his assignment as patriarchal deputy. On March 4, 1926, Metr. Peter wrote to Metr. Sergei from Lubyanka Prison, asking him to come to Moscow to discuss the issue with the new Grigorian Council. Metr. Peter sent another letter, this one to Tashkent, to the exiled Metr. Arseni of Novgorod, asking him also to come to Moscow to participate in the new Council. In case this was insufficient to intimidate Metr. Sergei, Archbishop Grigori sent him another letter, requesting his presence in Moscow, even though they all knew that Soviet officials were keeping him from leaving his diocesan capital. Metr. Sergei responded to Archbishop Grigori on March 18, again providing canonical grounds for the right and authority to interdict him and the other members of the new Supreme Council. Tuchkov acted behind the scenes, knowing that the longer the confusion and tug-of-war went on between ambitious prelates for ecclesiastical control, the deeper the rift would become and the sooner the ROC would collapse. Knowing that the validity of Archbishop Grigori’s assignment as head of the new Council was questionable and his position unstable, Tuchkov attempted to acquire more support for him from other prelates. In late fall of 1925, Archbishop Ilarion of Verei was transferred from the concentration camp at Solovetski Island to a jail in Yaroslav. After about six months in prison, Tuchkov offered Ilarion a free release if he would comply with the request to support the Grigorians. Archbishop Ilarion stated outright that he would “prefer to rot in prison, rather than become a traitor to Orthodoxy and migrate to the renovationists.” He remained in prison in Yaroslav, until a subsequent trial was held on

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV December 28, 1928. Archbishop Ilarion Troitzki was initially sentenced to an additional four-year term of incarceration, but this was increased to a life-term exile in Kazakhstan. Ilarion died of typhus shortly after his trial. The ROC episcopacy, alarmed by the discord surrounding the ecclesiastical administration, could not watch events unfold without acting. Bishop Vasili Zelentozov of Prilutsk dispatched a letter to Archbishop Grigori with a stern denunciation of his activities and expressing his support for Metr. Sergei. The letter expounded the legal basis for Metr. Sergei’s interdiction of the entire Grigorian Supreme Council. Along with Bishop Vasili’s signature were those of four additional prelates. On March 12, Metr. Sergei received a letter from Ukrainian exarch Metr. Mikhail, also signed by eight additional Ukrainian ROC prelates, expressing their unconditional support for his actions against the Grigorians. Other prelates voiced their support of Metr. Sergei on an individual basis, while Bishop Arkadi Ershov of Kungursk labeled the Grigorians “new enemies of Christ” and “power hungry.” Finally on April 25, 1926, 25 ROC prelates who still had their freedom addressed a letter to Metr. Sergei stating their agreement with his interdiction of the Grigorians. Even though he was confined by the Soviets to his diocesan capital, Metr. Sergei had the support of most of the free ROC episcopacy and parish clergy. Now was the time for Soviet officials to intervene, and on April 22, Cheka officials brought Metr. Sergei to GPU offices in Moscow. A few days later he was compelled to compose a written report of all his recent activities in regard to the Grigorians. The report was then forwarded to Metr. Peter, still incarcerated at the Lubyanka Prison. After reading the letter, and on the same day, Metr. Peter composed a letter in return to Metr. Sergei, annulling the plenipotentiary of the Grigorian temporary Supreme Council and reconfirming the transfer of administration of the ROC to Metr. Sergei. In the letter, Metr. Peter admitted his error in transferring the authority of a patriarchal deputy to a triumvir college with Archbishop Grigori at its head. For all practical purposes, the Grigorians fade away into history at this time.

183. METROPOLITAN AGAFANGEL The next step for Tuchkov in further fragmenting the ROC episcopacy was to play Metr. Agafangel against Metr. Sergei, which resulted in an comedy of errors and a succession of letters and correspondence between the two prelates

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era striving for ecclesiastical supremacy. Since Metr. Agafangel was nominated second, after Metr. Kirill, in Patr. Tikhon’s original Last Will, he would have precedence over Metr. Sergei. Tuchkov in mid-April 1926 traveled to Perm, where Metr. Agafangel was in exile, and proposed to allow him to assume ecclesiastical administration. With promises of freedom Tuchkov was fairly sure he could lure him into playing his game. Tuchkov presented a list of political crimes Metr. Peter was supposed to have committed, and then informed Metr. Agafangel that the GPU would not tolerate such a counter-revolutionary and criminal as Metr. Peter to head the ROC. Metr. Sergei, likewise, said Tuchkov, was under suspicion and was under Soviet surveillance. Besides, Metr. Agafangel had preeminence over both Metr. Sergei and Metr. Peter as patriarchal deputy according to Patr. Tikhon’s Last Will. Tuchkov promised Metr. Agafangel the legalization of ROC administration, which the other prelates had been unable to accomplish: the same promise that he had made to Archbishop Grigori. It was not difficult for Tuchkov to convince Metr. Agafangel of his rightful legacy, and ignite his dormant ambition to ascend to the top of the ecclesiastical pedestal. On April 18, Metr. Agafangel wrote a circular letter from Perm to all ROC parishes informing them that he was assuming the position of patriarchal deputy. The letter included the request that they recite his name during liturgy as supreme prelate of the ROC. On April 26, Metr. Agafangel sent a similar letter to Metr. Sergei. Metr. Sergei would have received this letter at the same time as the letter from Metr. Peter sent on April 22, which stated that Metr. Sergei was now patriarchal deputy with the conclusion of the Grigorian dissent. On April 27, Metr. Agafangel was released from exile in Perm and traveled to Yaroslav. Having heard of Metr. Agafangel’s usurpation of patriarchal authority — as Metr. Sergei considered the matter — he sent a letter to Perm, stating that Agafangel’s action was illegal, because Metr. Peter had never yielded his rights to the position and Sergei was acting as a subordinate to Metr. Peter. In conclusion, Metr. Sergei requested Metr. Agafangel to rescind his decision for the sake of ecclesiastical solidarity. But Metr. Agafangel had already left Perm before the letter arrived. Metr. Sergei sent another letter to Yaroslav on April 30 having the same content. Having secured special permission from the Department of Internal Affairs, Sergei and Agafangel met in Moscow two weeks later, on May 13. Tuchkov hoped that the discussion would result in Agafangel being named patriarchal deputy. He was morally and physically weaker, due to his age, than Sergei. And indeed, Metr. Sergei agreed to yield to Metr. Agafangel, but

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV requested that no official announcement should be made until the matter was approved by Metr. Peter, still incarcerated at Lubyanka Prison. The agreement now concluded, Soviet officials moved Agafangel back to Yaroslav, and Sergei to Nizhni-Novgorod. All of a sudden, three days later, May 16, Metr. Sergei realized that he had made a mistake in yielding to Metr. Agafangel, and sent him a letter expressing his concern. On May 20 Agafangel, who had not yet received the latest letter from Sergei, telegraphed Sergei from Yaroslav, telling him that he is still waiting for the written confirmation that Metr. Sergei was yielding the position to him. Sergei responded by telegraph, telling Agafangel that he had changed his mind. The next day, Agafangel telegraphed back with a threat that he would publish the document composed by Sergei on May 13, yielding the position to him, and demanding that Metr. Sergei withdraw from ROC administration. Again, just as after the ascension of the Grigorians, Tuchkov inserted his captive Metr. Peter into his ominous game. Peter had only received news of the progress of ecclesiastical events in bits and pieces, and only as much as Tuchkov deemed necessary for him to know. Tuchkov presented Peter a copy of the letter Agafangel wrote from Perm, stating his assumption of the patriarchal deputy position. Not aware of any other correspondence between Agafangel and Sergei, Peter wrote to Agafangel on May 22, congratulating him on accepting the position. Sergei still would not desist from his drive to return to the patriarchal deputy position, and on May 22, sent a fourth letter to Agafangel, telling him to withdraw. On May 24, Metr. Sergei sent a letter to Bishop Gotovtzev, director of Moscow diocese, informing him that Agafangel should rescind the position, that an interdict would be placed on him, and that he should be tried by an episcopal court. Sergei’s letters intimidated Agafangel, who then — not yet having received Peter’s congratulatory letter — telegraphed Sergei, “Proceed to administrate the Church. I prefer for the sake of peace to withdraw as deputy.” The following day, Agafangel received Peter’s congratulatory letter, and again changed his mind. On June 4, he sent a new letter to Sergei stating that he was accepting the position of patriarchal deputy based on Peter’s letter. Metr. Peter, still in Lubyanka Prison, wrote a second letter to confirm the transfer of the position to Agafangel, but added a footnote, stating that if he could not assume the position, then it would automatically pass to Sergei. The letter also affirmed the interdict on the prelates who were part of Archbishop Grigori’s Supreme Synod.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era This confusion in the highest strata of ecclesiastical government deeply alarmed the ROC episcopacy. Agafangel’s pretensions were justified in part by Patr. Tikhon’s Last Will, but upset the majority of ROC prelates nonetheless, especially because the provocateur in the matter was Tuchkov, who clearly had set up Agafangel to take advantage of his designation in Patr. Tikhon’s Last Will. The first to censure Agafangel was Bishop Vasili Zelentzov of Prilutsk. Another fifteen prelates who were in Moscow at the time joined Bishop Vasili. Immediately, Ukrainian ROC prelates and a majority of émigré prelates advised Agafangel that they supported Sergei. Convinced that Sergei’s estrangement would not be of any benefit to the ROC, Agafangel on June 17 wrote a letter to the GPU, resigning as patriarchal deputy. He cited old age and declining health as reasons. Not aware of Agafangel’s letter of resignation, 24 prelates met to prepare charges against him in an episcopal court trial for interdiction. In addition, Sergei wrote a fifth letter asking Agafangel to step down in order to delivery himself and the ROC from the necessity of a trial. Once Sergei and the other ROC prelates received notice of Agafangel’s resignation letter to the GPU, the matter was settled. The great victor was Tuchkov, who had played the ambitions of prelates against one another to further disrupt and destabilize the ROC. About this time, Metr. Peter was transferred to a monastery in Suzdal and remained incarcerated there.

184. METROPOLITAN SERGEI AS PATRIARCHAL DEPUTY On June 10, 1926, Metr. Sergei turned to the Department of Internal Affairs with a petition to legalize the ROC Sacred Synod. He requested the registration of the patriarchal chancellery and the diocesan councils, permission to convene episcopal conferences, and to publish a periodical, Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. Although Metr. Sergei’s intentions were commendable, he had not done enough to satisfy Soviet officials and his petition was rejected. Tuchkov wanted to set the same conditions for Sergei that he earlier had presented to Metr. Peter. Coincidentally, arrests and exile of ROC prelates increased, and Sergei was himself threatened with arrest. In a circular letter to ROC prelates issued the same day, Metr. Sergei stated that he “testified in the presence of Soviet authorities, a sincere readiness to be a complete law-observant citizen and to distance himself from every political party and activity.”

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV In August 1926, Metr. Sergei promoted Archbishop Joseph (Iyosif) of Rostov to metropolitan of Leningrad (formerly Petrograd) to replace the renovationist Metr. Veniamin Muratovski. On August 29, Metr. Joseph arrived in Leningrad. The local clergy and parishioners who met him at his arrival asked him to resign the cathedra in favor of Bishop Aleksei Simanski, who earlier had been vicar of Petrograd diocese, or at least to allow him a share in the administration of the diocese. Metr. Joseph refused their request. The new metropolitan only spent two days at his diocesan capital, and then returned to Rostov to tie up some loose ends. On September 1, Soviet officials informed Joseph that he was restricted to Rostov and forbidden to return to Leningrad. To compensate for the loss of prelates to exile, imprisonment and execution, Metr. Sergei ordained 21 bishops in 1926. Of those in exile that year, 24 were at Solovetski Island concentration camp. Metr. Sergei had to conduct his business from Nizhni-Novgorod, since he was still not able to leave. In view of this and given Metr. Peter’s failing health, during the autumn of 1926, prelates of the Sacred Synod came up with the idea of selecting a patriarch by secret ballot, feeling that a single individual at the head of the ROC would help put an end to the ecclesiastical dissolution that was in progress. It was obvious to them that no Regional Conference could be called, under the circumstances, so a different method would have to be found. The decision on how to accomplish the secret ballot was entrusted to bishops Pavlin Kroshechkin and Kornili Sobolew. Metr. Sergei was initially doubtful of its success, afraid that once news leaked out to the public, Soviet authorities would oppose it. After discussion with Bishop Pavlin and other advocates, Metr. Sergei conceded to their arrangements, but required that Metr. Peter be informed of all the proceedings. This request was never carried out. Bishop Pavlin, living in Moscow, still had considerable freedom, and he assigned the responsibility of traveling to ROC parishes throughout Soviet Russia to hieromonk Tavrian Batozski, and to the Kuvshinnikov family, father and son. They interviewed as many prelates reasonably possible and asked them whom they would vote for. By November 1926, the emissaries had acquired 72 signatures in favor of Metr. Kirill, who was also the first named in Patr. Tikhon’s list of deputies; and his term of exile was scheduled to end soon. Their choice was also supported by the prelates exiled to Solovetski Island. The GPU was not unaware of what was occurring and had the election committee under continuous surveillance. After Bishop Pavlin’s report was presented to the other prelates, the Kuvshinnikovs were arrested by Soviet authorities and documents related to the project were

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era confiscated. A wave of arrests immediately followed, and all the prelates who had subscribed to the election were taken into custody. Forty were exiled and 32 were incarcerated in local jails, including Bishop Pavlin. Metr. Kirill, who was in exile in Komi Province, was transferred to a prison in Vyatka (later known as Kirov). Metr. Sergei, still in Nizhni-Novgorod, was arrested and transferred to Moscow on foot attached to a chain-gang of common criminals. The primary Moscow prelates were interrogated by the GPU. Their typical response was that since the ROC was separated from the Soviet state, they felt the matter could be accomplished on their own without state intervention. Metr. Sergei was interrogated November 20, 1926. His answer was that the GPU was to have been informed once preliminary matters had been resolved as to the procedure for patriarchal selection. He was then returned to NizhniNovgorod and placed in custody at a local jail. Now, with Metropolitans Sergei, Peter, and Kirill all in custody, Metr. Joseph of Leningrad assumed the position of patriarchal deputy, even though he was still confined to Rostov. Fearing his own arrest, on December 8, Metr. Joseph sent a circular letter designating additional patriarchal deputies should he be “unable to execute his duties.” These were, in order of succession: Kornili Sobolew, Fadei Yuspenski, and Seraphim Samuilovich. If all four of them were arrested or exiled, Metr. Joseph stated that each diocese should operate independently or in unity with neighboring dioceses, at least temporarily. A few days later, Metr. Joseph was arrested. Bishop Kornili was already in prison; Bishop Fadei left Astrakhan for the journey to Moscow, but was kidnapped from the train by Soviet officials and taken to Kuznetzk, near Penza; the only remaining prelate on Metr. Joseph’s list was Bishop Seraphim Samuilovich of Uglich, and on December 13, he accepted the position. It was not until December 29 that Seraphim sent a circular letter to ROC parishes throughout Russia announcing his position as patriarchal deputy, but he was forced to remain in Uglich by order of Soviet officials. In the beginning of March 1927, the Department of Justice summoned Bishop Seraphim to Moscow, where he was locked up in Lubyanka Prison. While there, Tuchkov presented him with tough conditions for the legalization of the ROC. Bishop Seraphim responded that he could not review them in the absence of elder prelates. Tuchkov expressed an interest in knowing who would become deputy if he were not released from Lubyanka. The prelate answered, “The Lord God.” Three days later, Seraphim was released to return to Uglich.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Sometime in December 1926, Metr. Peter was moved from Suzdal and back to a cell at the Lubyanka. Tuchkov regularly offered to release him if he would resign as patriarchal deputy, but each time Tuchkov made him the offer, Peter categorically rejected it. During his confinement, Peter had related to a Roman Catholic priest (who was later released from Lubyanka) that he would never, under any circumstances, leave his ministry, and that he would be faithful to the ROC to his death. At the end of December, Metr. Peter was on his way to exile in Siberia, with short stops at prisons in Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Tuimensk. On January 1, 1927, while at Perm, he composed a circular letter, condemning the Grigorian “mutiny.” On January 21, while at a prison in Sverdlovsk, Archbishop Grigori was permitted to visit Peter. The Metropolitan demanded the complete dissolution of the Grigorian Supreme Synod, and their subjection to Metr. Sergei as patriarchal deputy. In February 1927, Peter was moved to a prison in Tobolsk, and at the beginning of March, he was transferred to the village Abalatzkoi, on the banks of the Irtish River, about 30 miles north of Tobolsk. Then he was moved to Obdorsk (today known as Salehard), at the mouth of the Ob River in north-west Siberia. His next place of exile was a hut in Khe, 120 miles away along the shore of the Gulf of Ob (Obskaya Guba), where he remained for the next three years. On March 20, 1927, Tuchkov released Metr. Sergei from jail and granted him the liberty to travel; he was now able to leave Nizhni-Novgorod and go to Moscow. On April 7, Bishop Seraphim handed Metr. Sergei the reins of ROC ecclesiastical administration. On May 7, Metr. Sergei again turned to the Department of Internal Affairs with a petition to legalize ROC ecclesiastical administration. For the negotiations, Sergei was taken to one of the Moscow prisons, probably Lubyanka or Butirski. He was threatened with the execution of his sisters, and ROC clergy in custody, unless he published a declaration in support of the Soviets, a condemnation of counter-revolutionary activities within and outside of Soviet Russia, an ecclesiastical interdict of the ROC émigré clergy, and the alienation of prelates who were not generating support for the Soviet regime from their respective diocesan episcopates. Soviet officials insisted that replacement candidates for the episcopacy had to be agreeable to the Department, and those prelates who had been arrested would have to be retired or interdicted from any further ministry. The Department also required that Soviet authority should be mentioned during liturgy. In turn, Sergei requested the legalization of their supreme, diocesan, and parish administrations, the opportunity to summon a Regional

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Council and elect a patriarch, open religious schools, and publish an ecclesiastical magazine. He also requested the release of imprisoned and exiled ROC clergy. (In 1990, Patr. Aleksei II informed the ROC membership that Sergei had been threatened with the execution of 100 prelates if he did not provide the document that the Soviets demanded.) On May 18, 1927, Sergei acquired the permission of Soviet authorities to legally organize a temporary Sacred Synod. That same day, Metr. Sergei held a conference of prelates whom he personally selected in order to create a new Sacred Synod from their midst: Seraphim Aleksandrov of Tver, Sevastian Vesti, Silvestr Bratonovski, Filipp Gumilevski, Aleksei Simanski, and Konstantin Dyakov. Included in the new Sacred Synod was Metr. Arseni Stadnitzki (who was in exile in Turkmenistan and unable to leave), and also two prelates who had recently returned from exile: Archbishops Anatoli Grisuik and Pavel Borisovski. On May 20, the Department issued a certificate of temporary registration for the Sacred Synod. Within a week, the new Synod published a circular letter to diocesan officials informing them that they should register with the local Soviet Commissariat. The Soviet officials’ primary demand was for Sergei to announce to all ROC parishes that they must support the Soviet state. On May 29, Sergei and the members of his newly-formed and registered Sacred Synod wrote a Declaration, convinced that this was in the best interests of the ROC. Five thousand copies were printed and sent to all ROC offices and parishes of Soviet Russia, and three weeks later it was printed in Izvestiya. The following two paragraphs highlight the important points of the Declaration. As of the present time, the lot of temporary deputy of the hierarchy of our Church has fallen to me, the unworthy metropolitan Sergei, and together with that lot there has fallen on me the obligation to continue the work of the deceased [Patr. Tikhon] and strive using all possible means to a peaceful organization of ecclesiastical affairs. My efforts in their direction, which Orthodox prelates share with me, will not remain unproductive. With my institution of a temporary patriarchal Sacred Synod, our hope in bringing our entire ecclesiastical government to its due level and order is strengthened, and the assurance in the possibility of a peaceful existence and our activity in the area of instruction grows…. What is most necessary for our Church and so most needed for us, those who want to place it on the path of legitimate and peaceful existence, which is the most important item for us at present, is that we, ecclesiastical ministers, show that we are not enemies of our Soviet state, but united with our nation and our government. We offer our prayers of gratitude to the Lord, who has been so benevolent toward our holy Church. We publicly express our gratitude also to the Soviet government for having such consideration for the religious needs of the Orthodox population. And in return, we assure the state that we will not utilize the trust provided us for evil designs. It is not in words but in actions that we must show

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV that we are trustworthy citizens of the Soviet Union, loyal toward Soviet authority. We want to be Orthodox and at the same time recognize the Soviet Union as our civic homeland, whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and whose misfortunes are our misfortunes.

The final paragraph of the document condemns the émigré clergy that formed the Karlovtzi Conference, and requests its complete loyalty to the Soviet state. If the émigré clergy did not take this step, Metr. Sergei stated, then they would be excommunicated from the ROC. Sergei’s decision was based on the premise that the Soviets would uphold their side of the negotiations. Only in the course of time did it become clear to Sergei that Soviet officials were not extending legitimacy to the ROC and honoring his request because of sincere motives. Clearly, this document was the condition set by Soviet authorities in order to grant superficial legitimacy to the new Sacred Synod, and the diocesan and parish administrations, but the Declaration by no means guaranteed the cohesion of the ROC as a corporate body, or reconciliation between the Soviet state and the ROC. It actually created further dissension and bewilderment at the parish level. Many priests reluctantly read the document in their parishes, understanding that it was unavoidable, while others flatly refused to read it and returned it to Sergei in Moscow, rejecting its validity. The document was subject to intense criticism, but, to save their own skin, most ROC clergy preferred to circumvent its contents through silence and inactivity. The vast majority of ROC adherents now considered Sergei a great traitor of the ROC. With the patriarchal deputy in Soviet hands, it was easier for them to proceed with further liquidation of the ROC. Two authors of the Declaration, Seraphim Alexandrov and Konstantin Dyakov, were executed by firing squad in 1937; another author, Anatoli Grisuik, died in a Soviet torture chamber in 1938. Nonetheless, the members of his new Sacred Synod heartily supported Metr. Sergei, including émigré prelates Evlogi Giorgievski, Elevferi Bogoyavlenski, Platon Rozhdestvenski, and Sergei Tikhomirov. Just as with Patr. Tikhon and his declaration of June 16, 1923, so it was with Metr. Sergei and his Declaration: apparently, he failed to foresee the impact of their capitulation to the demands of Soviet officials. Within a month of the publication of the Declaration, the patriarchal Sacred Synod was officially registered by the Department of Internal Affairs, and Metr. Sergei was recognized by the GPU as legitimate head of the ROC. Not long after, the Eastern Patriarchs recognized the legitimacy of Metr. Sergei and his Sacred Synod, rescinding their earlier recognition of the renovationist Synodal Church. Initially Patr. Damian of Jerusalem and Patr. Grigori of Antioch

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era sent their blessing, acknowledging Metr. Sergei and the Sacred Synod. In December 1927, Patr. Basil III of Constantinople approached Metr. Sergei in a letter requesting his reconciliation with the renovationist group. On October 7, 1927, Metr. Sergei presented the GPU with a petition for the amnesty and amelioration of the fate of imprisoned and exiled ROC clergy. As with past requests of this type, Soviet officials ignored it, and Tuchkov continued to keep the ROC on a very short leash. A few ROC clergy were released in 1927 and 1928, among them Bishops Zakhari Lobov, Juvenali Maslovski, Arkadi Ershov and Manuel Lemeshevski, but other ROC prelates were either imprisoned or exiled to replace them. The released prelates were either forced to retire or were sent to dioceses distant from their own by the Soviets, and were ordered to remain there. Metr. Sergei received letters protesting his new ecclesiastical policy, and requesting him to desist. Letters circulated throughout diocesan and parish offices critical of the Declaration and condemning the new policy. Bishop Vasili Zelentzev of Priluksk, who was earlier arrested and exiled to Solovetski Island, remonstrated against the Declaration. Some prelates who were disenchanted with the course that Metr. Sergei was taking voluntarily retired, for example, Seraphim Zvezdinski, along with Archbishop Zinovei Drozdov of Tambov, submitted letters of resignation to Sergei. Bishop Seraphim Zvezdinski, having received an order from Sergei to read the Declaration to his parish, stated outright that it would be morally wrong for him to do so. Archbishop Seraphim Samuilovich, who had earlier yielded the position of deputy to Sergei, likewise disagreed with his new policy. Bishop Victor Ostrovidov, vicar of Vyatka diocese, sent the Declaration back to Sergei and informed him that the Declaration was “nothing less than heresy and schism.” The following year, Bishop Victor was arrested and exiled to Solovetski Island, where he died in 1934. During the course of this conflict, the GPU went about its business of liquidating parishes as each side ignored the external enemy and concentrated on disavowing the other. (Monasteries had already been liquidated as a result of the conflict between the renovationist church and the patriarchal ROC.) One conflict that furthered ruptured the ROC as a result of the Metr. Sergei’s Declaration had to do with Metr. Joseph Petrov, who was still restrained from leaving Rostov to return to Leningrad to assume his cathedra. To rectify the situation, the Sacred Synod issued an order for Joseph to move to Odessa, to be their metropolitan, to replace Metr. Platon who had migrated to Europe. Joseph remonstrated and refused to go, calling the Synod “tsarist-Rasputinist.” To fill

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV the vacancy in the episcopacy of Yaroslav, Innokenti was ordained as bishop and he immediately insisted that Joseph depart the city for Odessa. Joseph refused to budge. On October 12, 1927, the Sacred Synod held another meeting and again issued an order for Joseph to leave for Odessa, which Soviet officials gave him permission to do, while Bishop Nikolai Yarushevich was assigned as temporary director of Leningrad diocese. Irritated at the orders of the Sacred Synod, Joseph wrote a letter to Sergei stating his refusal to leave to Odessa and accusing Sergei of leading the ROC into a schism. In conclusion, Joseph suggested that Sergei go back to Butirski Prison. Emotions and tempers were running high and the changes in diocesan leadership agitated all the clergy of Leningrad; many gathered together and voiced their disapproval of Sergei’s Declaration. Apart from Bishops Nikolai Yarushevich and Nikolai Klementyev, Sergei had no support in Leningrad. The prelates who opposed Sergei’s orders wrote a stern letter, saying, “Your Declaration appears as a necessity of the civil government, whose goal is the elimination of all religion. Your Declaration not only cannot be accepted by Orthodoxy on the basis of its content, but has created all the misfortunes that have befallen the Church.” The letter accused Metr. Sergei of manipulating prelates at the whim of Soviet officials and ignoring the needs of the ROC and his responsibility as patriarchal deputy. The letter had little effect, so the Leningrad clergy sent a delegation of four to Moscow to personally discuss the matter. Aware of his predicament with Soviet authorities, Sergei refused to budge on the issue of assigning Joseph to Odessa and likewise stood firm on his decision to assign Nikolai Yarushevich as director of Leningrad diocese. His adamancy vexed Leningrad clergy and laypersons alike. Returning from their unsuccessful discussions, the delegates called a conference of like-minded clergy in Leningrad and declared Metr. Sergei an apostate from the ROC, claiming that he had betrayed his sacerdotal ordination. They wrote a letter to Joseph, still residing at Yaroslav, asking him to bless their severance from the authority of Metr. Sergei. Acquiring a positive response, they met again on December 26 at the apartment of Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov. Bishop Nikolai Yarushevich, still loyal to the patriarchal ROC, was asked to attend, and representatives of the dissenting Leningrad clergy presented him a notice of severance from the authority of Metr. Sergei. Bishop Nikolai delivered the document to Metr. Sergei and the Sacred Synod. Immediately, the patriarchal prelates issued a resolution interdicting two of the dissenting bishops: Dmitri Lyubimov and Sergei Druzhinin. Bishop Nikolai then received a notice by mail;

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era the Sacred Synod had decided that he should interdict all of the clergy who had severed ties with the patriarchal ROC. Bishop Nikolai complied. The Leningrad clergy ignored the interdictions and proceeded to perform liturgy as usual, while Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov assigned himself the title of temporary director of Leningrad diocese. Attempting to curb further dissension, Metr. Sergei wrote a circular letter on December 31, 1927 with a plea for parishes and clergy not to sever ties with the Sacred Synod. On January 7, 1928, Metr. Joseph wrote to the dissenting clergy in Leningrad: For the censure and humiliation of Metr. Sergei’s recent activities, which are against the spirit and benefit of the holy Church of Christ, due to these external circumstances, we have no other means except for a decisive exodus from it, and to ignore its arrangements.

Eight churches responded positively to a summons from Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov of January 17, 1928 to join the dissension, and within a week, eleven more parishes joined. In reprisal, the Sacred Synod issued another resolution on January 25, affirming the earlier interdict and informing the dissenting clergy that they were now subject to trial by an episcopal court. Attempting to curb further dissension in Leningrad, the Sacred Synod selected Metr. Seraphim Chichagov to replace Bishop Nikolai Yarushevich. On February 2 a delegation from the Sacred Synod met with Metr. Joseph in Yaroslav, but the discussion was futile. The delegates went back to Moscow, and on February 6 Metr. Joseph joined a group of clergy in Yaroslav who were likewise protesting against Metr. Sergei as a result of his Declaration. On February 8, Metr. Joseph again approved of the dissension in a letter to Leningrad clergy. Unable to leave Yaroslav, Metr. Joseph assigned the administration of Leningrad diocese to Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov. In April, Joseph proceeded with an attempt to legalize his new group and wrote a letter to Tuchkov, asking him to allow him to return to Leningrad. The GPU declined his request. On March 8, Metr. Seraphim Chichagov arrived at his new diocesan capital and began performing liturgy at Preobrazhenski Cathedral. Seraphim sent a letter to Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov requesting a meeting to iron out the conflict, but Dmitri responded that the only metropolitan of Leningrad diocese that he recognized was Joseph. One ROC prelate who was a member of the Leningrad diocese, and who was not inclined toward either Joseph or Seraphim, was Bishop Manuel Lemeshevski, who returned in February to Moscow from

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Solovetski Island concentration camp. Seraphim saw the need for mending the strife in Leningrad and petitioned the GPU to allow Manuel to come to Leningrad. The GPU granted the request and Manuel arrived on April 28. Two days later, Manuel addressed a crowd of 200 adherents of Metr. Joseph, attempting to convince them to submit to the patriarchal ROC. Some threatened to separate from Metr. Sergei, while others saw the division as self-defeating, and decided to comply with Manuel’s proposal. This effort on the part of Manuel increased Seraphim’s stature. About this time, another dissension arose due to the intervention of Metr. Agafangel, the same prelate who recently had yielded the position of patriarchal deputy to Sergei. On March 6, 1928, Sergei received a letter from Agafangel, Joseph, and several other prelates of the Yaroslav-Rostov region, stating their refusal to recognize Sergei and his Sacred Synod any longer. They had decided to submit to the authority of Metr. Peter as patriarchal deputy, even though he was exiled at Khe at the time. Their decision was based on what they felt was a capitulation of the ROC to Soviet authorities, as expounded in the Declaration. The motive for the dissension of the Yaroslav prelates was expressed in Seraphim Samuilovich’s letter to Sergei: Over half a year has passed since the publication of the Declaration of July 29, 1927. The [events] since then testify that your hopes of a peaceful institution of our ecclesiastical affairs were futile, and your assurance in the possibility of peaceful activity and life within the bounds of the law were entirely unachievable. On the contrary, life has become even more difficult for the Orthodox believer. You promised to rescue two or three martyrs at a time and return them to their parishes. But look at the number of new martyrs, and we hear their voices from the banks of the Ob and Enesei [Rivers], the islands of the White Sea, from the deserts east of the Caspian Sea and the mountaintops of Turkestan. Do they not also touch your heart? Find the courage to admit your error, this fatal mistake of yours. If it be possible, issue a new declaration, one for ecclesiastical benefit and peace, and yield your rights and authority as deputy to another.

Other prelates from Leningrad, Kharkov, Voronezh, and Kiev, wrote similar letters to Sergei, and he replied to them refuting the basis of their justification and their pessimism. They were not persuaded. Bishop Jerofei Afonin, who aligned himself with the Yaroslav dissenters, was arrested by the GPU. Soviet officials were able to turn several of his parishioners against him, and they provided sufficient grounds to execute him by a firing squad in Veliki-Yustug diocese. To try to resolve the conflict, Metr. Sergei called a meeting of the Sacred Synod and dispatched one of its members to Yaroslav. He presented his case but

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era with little success. After his departure, Metr. Joseph and Seraphim Samuilovich were transferred by order of the GPU: Seraphim to Mogilo-Buinichski Monastery, and Joseph to Nikolo-Modenski Monastery, about 50 miles north-west from Yaroslav. Agafangel’s health declined rapidly. On March 27, Metr. Sergei held a meeting with the Sacred Synod, issuing an interdict and defrocking Metr. Joseph and all the prelates associated with his dissension in Leningrad, and also Bishops Seraphim Samuilovich, Valaam Ryashentzev and Evgeni Kobranov, who were confederates of Agafangel. To reconcile the matter with Agafangel, Metr. Sergei dispatched Archbishop Pavel Borisovski of Tver to him at Yaroslav with a letter informing him that the activities of the Yaroslav-Rostov prelates were indicative of an ecclesiastical schism, and begged him to reconsider his position. Agafangel denied all the accusations, although he agreed to a private and informal meeting with Sergei. At this meeting held early May in Yaroslav, five of the six points of Agafangel’s contention were minor and were resolved. The one point they could not resolve stemmed from the Declaration of Metr. Sergei, which Agafangel felt violated the canons of the ROC. He felt Sergei’s action inexcusable and intolerable. To resolve this final issue a second meeting was held on May 16, and Agafangel, due to his frail health, agreed to Sergei’s terms. The interdicts were removed from Seraphim Samuilovich, Varlaam Ryashentzev and Evgeni Kobranov. Agafangel’s role in the history of the ROC ends at this time; he died October 16, 1928 at the age of 74. Metr. Joseph was not so easily persuaded to capitulate, and in a letter dated July 24, 1928, he wrote to Bishop Dmitri Lyubimov, calling the prelates who reconciled with Sergei dissenters. Joseph felt the majority of the ROC were following after the new Annas and Caiaphas, the new betrayers of Christ; and he represented himself and others who would not submit to the Declaration of Sergei as following the example of the martyr protopriest Avvakum Petrovich. Soon after the dissension of Joseph and Agafangel, another arose as a result of the effort of Feodor Pozdeyevski, Father Superior of Holy Danilov Monastery in Moscow. About a half-dozen prelates joined the group, which was referred to as Danilovski. Another concurrent movement that was born in reaction to the Declaration of Sergei was that of the Mechevskis, who surrounded Sergei Mechev, prior of St. Nicholas Cathedral, which also consisted of only about a half-dozen prelates. Even in exile, Metr. Kirill Smirnov was a fiery opponent of Metr. Sergei. He wrote regular letters from Eniseisk in Siberia, criticizing Sergei’s approach.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Sergei responded with his letter of January 30, 1930, threatening Kirill, if he was to continue in his dissension, with involuntary retirement from his diocese of Kazan and a trial at an episcopal court, as soon as he was released from exile. Most laypersons knew nothing of the intervention of Soviet officials into the episcopal affairs of the ROC, and their only information came from their exposure to what was occurring at parish levels, which led them to further disenchantment toward their prelates, whether they were patriarchal or restorationist or otherwise. During the decade of the 1920s, parishioners were rampantly abandoning their churches while prelates were either being exiled or arrested, or striving for ecclesiastical supremacy. Such instability and strife in the ROC hierarchy created further dissensions, such as the Society of the Defense of Brotherly Love, formed in Yaroslav and Ryazan dioceses. It accepted Christians, Evangelicals, Mohammedans, and Jews. Another was the Society of Christian Brotherhood, a very loosely organized group of parishes scattered throughout central European Russia. It had no genuine platform apart from some modernization of their form of worship.

185. THE SOVIET RED TERROR It should have been quite possible to re-establish equilibrium in the ROC once it had acquired legalization under the condition of declaring loyalty to Soviet authority, but this imperial-ecclesiastical relationship was antithetical to the concepts of Leninism and Marxism, which called for the complete elimination of institutionalized religion. The years 1929-1930 saw increased physical persecution of the ROC as an institution. The goal of Soviet socialism was underscored in an article published by Izvestiya August 24, 1929. Religious ideology appears as one of the greatest obstacles on the path of social reconstruction of the world. Religion and socialism are incompatible objects. To be a private atheist, and not interfere with others, is completely inconsistent with the tactics of the Bolshevik, Marxist-Leninist proletariat. For religion to be a person’s private affair is a purely reformative attitude. Such a passive attitude is not permitted in the ranks of party members, or the Komsomol, or male and female workers, in the Red Army or, in general, in any of the higher strata of Soviet proletariat society.

On April 8, 1929, the Supreme Soviet issued a resolution regarding religious societies, which now restricted the ROC to performing rites within the confines of their churches. Educational and charity activities were categorically prohibited. The only religious instruction now permitted was by parents of their

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era children, privately in their homes. A new department called the Permanent Commission regarding Worship was formed by the Supreme Soviet for the surveillance of all religious groups and placed under the chairmanship of Peter Germogenovich Smidovich (d. 1935), Tuchkov’s replacement. The law of April 8 proceeded further on the restriction of discussion of religion and outlawed outdoor processions. These restrictions limited the ROC so tightly that its very existence became impossible. On May 22, 1929, the XVI Communist Party Congress altered Section 5 of the Soviet constitution, to assist in accomplishing this new legislation. The original constitution offered, “Freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda,” which applied to every Soviet citizen. Under the revised constitution the text read, “Freedom of religious confession and antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.” “Religious propaganda,” in the original constitution, referred to teaching or preaching of religious concepts, tenets or ecclesiastical history in public, including printed matter, as long as the entity in question was a legally-recognized ecclesiastical organization, such as the Soviet-controlled restorationists. Even though the constitution offered “freedom of religious confession,” the intent was diametrically opposite. The Soviets were deliberately vague and ambiguous in their edicts on religious freedoms, making it easier to claim a violation and to prosecute offenders. In the tradition of Soviet double-talk, “freedom of religious confession” was now interpreted strictly as a rite performed within a legally-recognized ecclesiastical organization. “Religious propaganda” according to the new edict was now prohibited. According to the revised constitution, just about any public display of religious sentiment — whether Christian or non-Christian — could also be construed as a violation of the constitution and prosecutable, including public recitation of prayer. Prior to this time, the Soviet edicts restricting religious freedom were primarily directed at the liquidation of the ROC as an institution, but now they were directed to all religion in the Soviet Union in general. Soviet persecution of the ROC began to incur repercussions from other countries, including a severe reprimand from the Archbishop of Canterbury. Pope Pius XI wrote a petition on February 1, 1930, to Soviet officials accusing them of sacrilege. To contend with the volley of repercussions from European Christian denominations, Soviet officials acted in the manner they felt most effective, and without having to change their goal or the means of attaining it. They compelled

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Metr. Sergei to give two interviews to refute the accusations of religious oppression in Soviet Russia. The first interview was held February 15, 1930 for correspondents of the Soviet press, and it was attended by Metr. Sergei and members of his Sacred Synod: Aleksei Simanski, Filipp Gumilevski and Pitirim Krilov. He complied, but only in order to bargain for an amelioration of the ROC’s difficult condition. Metr. Sergei publicly announced to the Soviet press that “there has never been and there does not exist now persecution of religion in the USSR,” and that according to the edict of the separation of the state from the church, “there is compete freedom for the confession of any religion.” In addition, he added that the law of April 8, 1929, “completely excludes even the minute appearance of any type of persecution against religion.” They told the press that some churches were being closed, not because of orders from Soviet officials, but because of the desire of the local residents, and in some cases, due to the parishioners themselves. The repression of ROC adherents and clergy that was imposed by Soviet authorities occurred not as a result of their religious convictions, but because of violations of Soviet laws. It was unfortunate, they said, that some clergy aligned themselves with enemies of Soviet authority, such as the White Army military leaders Kolchak and Denikin. The ROC delegates likewise publicly refused the financial support of foreign denominations. To satisfy the foreign press, Sergei gave an interview to representatives of an American newspaper and told them: The number of parishes depending on the patriarchal church reaches 30,000. Every parish, of course, has its own priest. The number of priests, naturally, is greater than the number of parishes, so that each parish has from one to three priests, and some even more. All of these parishes are under the spiritual guidance of 163 bishops, subject to the canonical rule of the patriarchate, not counting the many retired priests. We can confirm that the general number of parishioners of the Orthodox Church is several tens of millions. At the present time, the state of the Church is weak, but we hope that with the improvement of the economy, the state of our religion will improve. Of course, the rapid spread of atheism upsets us. But being sincerely in our belief, we are assured that divine light cannot be extinguished and that in the course of time it will be reborn in the hearts of people.

Later, Metr. Evlogi Giorgievski provided information on how the interview had been arranged. It seems that the Bolsheviks gave the text to metropolitan Sergei about a week before the interview and then held him in custody, in isolation. He was faced with the dilemma: tell the journalists that persecution of the Church exists, knowing that then all the prelates of the Tikhon church would be arrested and the ecclesiastical institution perish; or tell them that there is no persecution, and publicly show himself to be a liar. Metropolitan Sergei took the second choice. As a result he was

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era reprimanded for a lack of faith in the unassailability of the Church, and for thinking that the Church could not be saved except through use of deceit. But he could not fathom the Russian Church without prelates, priests or sacraments.

The validity of the figures provided by Sergei to the press can be compared with the Living Church, which in October 1925 had 12,593 parishes, 16,540 priests, and 192 bishops in 108 dioceses in the Soviet Union. By January 1, 1927, only 6,245 parishes remained with 10,815 clergy, and 140 bishops in 84 dioceses. On January 1, 1928, the Soviet Union contained two thirds as many parishes as before the revolution in 1917, renovationist churches included. In Moscow there were 500 churches in 1917, while only 87 were left by 1932. In 1930, only one ROC church was open for services in the entire of Orel diocese, while the cities Samara and Tambov each had only one functioning church. The closed churches were either entirely demolished to make way for apartments and industrial buildings or were converted into workshops, warehouses and clubs, while monasteries were converted into prisons and labor camps, or into socialist fraternity centers. On February 19, 1930, a couple of days after the interview with the foreign journalists, Metr. Sergei presented to Smidovich, the successor to Tuchkov, a list of needs and complaints. He stated that the children of clergy were being expelled from schools, and members of the ROC were excluded from professional unions. However, as with other requests, no noticeable changes occurred, although it did affect the severity of future legislation. On May 2, 1930, Josef Stalin published his infamous article, “Dizziness due to Success,” in Pravda, where he amplifies and flaunts the magnitude of the success of socialist atheism and reduction of the ROC. The years 1929-1931 saw the forced collectivization and the nationalization of peasant property, implemented by Soviet authorities to break the back of the Russian people. Coincident was a persecution of the ROC unprecedented in history. In February 1929, Central Committee Secretary Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich distributed a circular letter throughout the provinces, reprimanding Communist party members, the Komsomol, and members of professional unions, for their insufficient zeal in the task of eliminating religion. Kaganovich declared the ROC clergy to be ideologically opposed to Communist party interests, and said that the ROC’s purpose was to “mobilize all reactionary and semi-literate elements in order to counter-attack the legislation of Soviet authority and the Communist party.” Precise orders were relayed to the Union of Militant Atheists

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV and to the Administration of Literature and Art to defeat religious tendencies in these areas, while expanding the distribution of Soviet literature. The first major group of ROC clergy to be arrested and imprisoned or exiled under the revised constitution were the Soviet-supported members of the Metr. Joseph Petrov dissension. Bishops Dmitri Lyubimov, Aleksei Bui, Seraphim Samuilovich, Victor Ostrovidov and Damaskim Tzedrik were arrested and exiled to concentration camps (Metr. Joseph was already confined in Nikolo-Modenski Monastery). Those in Leningrad were also arrested: protopriests Vasili Veruizhski, Feodor Andreev, Iyoann Nikitin, Sergei Tikhomirov, Nikolai Prozorov, and the Mother Superior Kira. The repression of 1929-1931 affected the renovationist Synodal Church equally. The first item on the Soviet’s agenda was to deprive them of the edifice that they cherished most and which represented their recognition as the statesponsored ROC: the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow. In May 1930, the cathedral was set with explosives for demolition, and the beautiful dome roof of the structure collapsed. On January 1, 1931, the renovationists claimed 4,159 parishes in Russia, far fewer than the 6,245 in 1927. The renovationist leader, Metr. Veniamin Muratovski, died on May 6, 1930 at the age of 74. He was replaced by Metr. Vitali Vvedenski (no relationship to Alexandr Vvedenski), a dedicated prelate, but mediocre in his administrative ability. The Second Worldwide Congress of Atheists was held June 10-19, 1929, with 265 delegates attending, a small number relative to the size of the Union of Militant Atheists. Izvestiya, in the February 17, 1930 issue, claimed the Union had a membership of 2.5 million, with an age limit for membership lowered to 14. The Union staged protests against ROC churches: first confiscating bells, and second, destroying icons. Icons were destroyed by the wagonload in bonfires, along with books, manuscripts and entire monastery libraries. The inside décor of churches and cathedrals and chapels was removed and sent for refining and recycling. Most clergy refused to interfere with the plunder and pillage due to fear of reprisal. By January 1930, some 20,000 icons had been burned in bonfires. On May 15, 1932, the Union of Militant Atheists developed their first fiveyear plan. During the first year, they would close all the remaining religious schools (although only the renovationists had any left by this time). The second year they would implement a massive closure of churches, and prohibit the publication of religious material and the manufacture of ecclesiastical paraphernalia. In the third year they would exile the rest of the ROC clergy to Siberia. The fourth year was dedicated to the closure of any remaining churches, referring to

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era the sectarians. The fifth year was for clean-up and celebration of their success. They bragged of their goal, “The name of God will be forgotten on the territory of the USSR.” And gradually, the goals of the Union slowly materialized. By 1932 the membership of the Union of Militant Atheists reached a high of 5,670,000, although by 1938 it declined to two million, rather than the planned 22 million. People were fed up with the bureaucratic style of the work of the organization, its formality and its dry campaigns. Subscribers to the monthly magazine Godless numbered 230,000 in 1938, and 155,000 in 1939. The Anti-Religioznik became another mundane publication with 50,000 copies per month in 1940. During the summer of 1930, Metr. Peter’s health began to noticeably decline. On August 17, he was moved from Khe to Tobolsk and then to a prison in Sverdlovsk. Again, Peter was accused of anti-Soviet agitation among the Orthodox population. Soviet officials interrogated him under intense pressure on November 30, 1930, and demanded that he resign as patriarchal deputy. But he refused, and on March 27, 1931 he wrote a letter to the GPU telling them that he had no choice but to remain in his position in order to protect Metr. Sergei, who had acquired his authority from Peter. Nonetheless, hoping for some consolation, since they had moved him from Khe to Sverdlovsk already, on May 25 he petitioned the president of the GPU Menzhinski for his freedom. Their response was a resolution on July 23 to incarcerate him for five years in addition to the time he had already spent at Sverdlovsk prison. His personal condition worsened, and on January 14, 1931 he wrote to Tuchkov asking for some amelioration or transfer, unaware that he had already been replaced by Smidovich. Metr. Peter received no response, except that in the summer of 1932 his privilege to walk outdoors in the yard was repealed. He was now only allowed in a narrow and secluded courtyard for short periods to escape the summer asphyxiation in his cell. Peter continued to petition for his release, claiming his innocence of all charges, and voicing his loyalty to the Soviet government. The response to these letters was a transfer to a concentration camp in the northern Ural Mountains. He was deprived of his name and assigned the number 114, and was placed in solitary confinement. To somehow overcome, at least superficially, the stagnation of the Sacred Synod in the midst of such unprecedented persecution against the ROC, a conference was held on May 18, 1932. Four prelates were promoted to metropolitan: Aleksei Simanski of Leningrad, Anatoli Grisuik of Odessa, Pavel Borisovski of

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Yaroslav, and Konstantin Dyakov of Kharkov. At another Sacred Synod meeting, Metr. Sergei, who up until then was still metropolitan of Nizhni-Novgorod (now known as Gorki), was promoted to Metropolitan of Moscow on April 27, 1934. To compensate for the loss of ROC prelates to prison or exile, Metr. Sergei ordained a few new to take their places, but in a hardly comparable amount: two in 1921; three in 1930; seven in 1931; six in 1932; four in 1933; and two in 1934. In its apparent losing struggle for survival, the patriarchal ROC was dealt another blow with the withdrawal of the support of the Constantinople patriarchal administration. What made matters worse was that the representative of the Constantinople patriarchate, Archimandrite Vasili Dimopulo, had a very close association with the renovationist Synodal Church. Matters in Leningrad were also turbulent. On September 22, 1934, Metr. Seraphim Chichagov was forced to retire by order of Soviet officials. He was executed by firing squad three years later, on December 11, 1937. His replacement was to be Bishop Manuel Lemeshevski, but he refused the position, and Metr. Aleksei Simanski became Metropolitan of Leningrad. On December 20, 1934, Bishop Manuel was arrested and exiled to the Marienski concentration camp in Siberia. This increase in persecution did not create solidarity or unification in the remnants of the ROC. The associates of Metr. Joseph Petrov and a few dozen of his parishes in Leningrad diocese were still open for services, but most of them went underground. Metr. Kirill Smirnov, a very influential opponent of Metr. Sergei, settled in Gzhatsk (today known as Gagarin, near Smolensk) after he was released from exile. Other prelates who were likewise critical of Metr. Sergei corresponded with him from exile. They insisted that Metr. Kirill usurp Metr. Sergei, but Kirill declined to do so, but stipulated that he would attempt to step in after the death of Metr. Peter. Kirill was under intense surveillance by the GPU, and eventually new charges of counter-revolutionary activity were brought against him. He was arrested July 14, 1934 and taken to Butirski Prison in Moscow. Toward the end of 1934, Kirill was again exiled, this time to reside in Kazakhstan. The Grigorian dissension continued to survive in some dioceses of the central Urals region and Volga River basin, especially in Sverdlovsk and Ulyanovsk (formerly known as Simbirsk). The leader of the group, Archbishop Grigori Yatzkovski, died April 26, 1932. The following year, the next most active prelate of his group, Bishop Boris Rukin, committed suicide. The one remaining

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era prelate of the Grigorians who still remained free was Archbishop Peter Kholmogotzev. The repression of the early 1930s equally affected the renovationists. Alexandr Boyarski was arrested in 1934, and he died in prison. Metr. Tikhon Popov of Voronezh was arrested in 1934 and sentenced to a ten-year imprisonment. He was released in 1944 during World War II and returned to the patriarchal ROC. For some unrecorded reason, on April 29, 1935, the renovationist Supreme Synod issued a resolution to dissolve itself. This quietly occurred with no large conference or even public announcement. The prelates present at the meeting, Vitali Vvedenski, Mikhail Knazevski, Pavel Krasotkin, and Dmitri Adamov, transferred all administrative authority to Metr. Vitali and agreed that he be considered supreme hierarch. Immediately, Vitali dissolved all diocesan and parish councils. The few prelates who remained eventually assimilated into Soviet society. Metr. Juvenali Mashkoski returned on May 9, 1935 to the patriarchal ROC, while Metr. Nikolai Platonov of Leningrad (who eventually married), publicly renounced God and religion in 1938. Alexandr Vvedenski, who bestowed upon himself the title of metropolitan-evangelist, led a prosperous life in higher society. He wore elegant vestments with a miter embedded with jewels, and attended theaters and concerts. Vvedenski also divorced and remarried. The murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, secretary of the Central Committee of the USSR, on December 1, 1934 served as a catalyst to increase persecution in all strata of Soviet society, including purges of the Communist party, even though Josef Stalin was suspected in the plot. In 1935, ROC prelates Alexandr Kalinski, Iyoann Bogdanovski, Gavriel Gromnitzki, and Iyoann Levitzki were arrested and sent to concentration camps. John Sokolov and Konstantin Ordinski were arrested in Smolensk. On January 23, 1935, Bishop Panfili Lyaskovski was hanged. In 1936, prelates Filipp Gumilevski, Polikhomi Zapridin, Konstantin Ordinski, and Nikolai Katasonov were executed by firing squad. In Pereyaslav, protopriest Nikolai Stetzenko was tortured to death, while protopriests A. Ksenofont and N. Butnikov were executed by firing squad. In 1935 and 1936, Metr. Sergei performed five ordinations to replace lost ROC prelates. On May 18, 1935, the GPU issued a resolution and dissolved the ROC Sacred Synod. The only ROC administration that remained free in the Soviet Union in mid-1935 was Metr. Sergei and one diocesan vicar, Bishop Sergei Voskresenski.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Metr. Peter’s term of exile ended July 23, 1936, but a secret meeting of the Supreme Soviet extended his sentence an additional three years. Misinformation regarding Metr. Peter’s condition filtered through the Soviet Union, and many people thought that he had died. On September 11, 1936, Metr. Sergei received news that Metr. Peter had passed away. Arrangements were made by those prelates who were still free to enable Sergei to assume total administrative authority over the ROC with the passing of Peter. In January 1937, a requiem was performed on his behalf in Moscow at the Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral. Everyone was under the impression that Peter had died in a concentration camp in the northern Urals until a notice was published on October 2, 1937, announcing that Peter was now being sentenced to execution for his criticism of Soviet society. According to the account, inmate number 114 had been identified as an incorrigible enemy of the Soviet government who accused it of being responsible for the massive persecution of the ROC. On October 10, 1937, at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, Metr. Peter Polyanski was executed by firing squad. He was 75 years old. On December 5, 1936, the Supreme Soviet at the VIII Congress of the Communist Party announced a new constitution. The portion that applies to this history is Section 124, which codified the previous revision of May 22, 1929, and now read: In the goal of security for citizens, the freedom of conscience, the Church in the USSR is separated from the state and the school from the Church. The freedom of performance of religious worship, and freedom of antireligious propaganda, is recognized for all citizens.

The years of 1936-1939 were the apogee of Stalinist Red Terror, and affected tens of millions of Russians, including the sectarians who up to this time had for the most part been ignored. Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov, a member of the Supreme Soviet who had the responsibility for carrying out purges of the Communist Party, proposed to Stalin that all legislation permitting worship should be voided and eliminated. Stalin decided against any formal legislation, but called for the liquidation of the ROC hierarchy and all administrative personnel. In September 1937, metropolitans Joseph Petrov and Kirill Smirnov were exiled to the south of Kazakhstan and on the night of November 20, 1937, they were executed by firing squad. Bishop Evgeni Kobranov was executed, also in Kazakhstan, in October 1937. Metr. Sergei’s sister Alexandra was executed by firing squad that same year. During the year of 1937, about 8,000

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era ROC churches were closed, 70 dioceses were liquidated, and about 60 prelates were executed. Archbishop Venedict was arrested May 23, 1937, and executed later that year. Metr. Feofan Tulyakov of Nizhni-Novgorod was arrested July 25, 1937, and was executed October 4. Metr. Neofit Korobov was arrested in August and executed in November. Archbishop Alexandr Pokhvalinski and 13 priests were arrested together and then executed on December 11. Bishop Fostiri Maksimovski was arrested in December 1937 and froze to death on his way to a concentration camp at the Varnavinski prison. Metr. Konstantin Dyakov of Kiev was arrested in October 1937, and after 12 days of grueling interrogation was executed by firing squad. Metr. Anatoli Grisuik of Odessa was arrested in July 1936, and died in a torture chamber at a concentration camp on January 23, 1938. Ukrainian prelates Giorgi Deliev, Filaret Linchevski and Parfeni Bryanskikh were executed in 1937. Bishop Alexandr Petroshi died in 1939 at the KholodnoGorski Prison. ROC prelates were arrested on the most spurious and fantastic of charges, which led to their execution without a fair trial or even a hearing. Archbishop Seraphim Ostroyumov was accused of being the head of a band of counter-revolutionaries and terrorists. Archbishop Innokenti Nikiforov of Orel was arrested with 16 priests for “clerical-fascist conspiracy activities,” as the sentence read. Metr. Feofan Tulyakov was charged with 20 acts of arson and terrorism, while Neofit Korobov was accused of “active counter-revolutionary work directed at overthrowing Soviet authority and restoring capitalism in the USSR.” Bishop Manuel Lemeshevski was released from Marienski concentration camp in 1936 and wandered about Russia incognito. On April 8, 1939, he was apprehended and confined first at Lubyanka Prison, then Butirski Prison, and then was sentenced to ten years at Kanski concentration camp (he was released in 1945). The repression affected parish clergy equally. On one day, for example, February 17, 1938, six monks and two nuns were executed in Moscow. Alexandr Glagolev, rector of the Kiev Religious Academy, died under torture in 1937. In April 1938 in a village near Kharkov, protopriest Sergei Poselki, rector of the Church of Sts Kirill and Methodius, was executed. In September 1937, in the city Arzamas, Ukraine, priest Alexandr Chernoyutzan was arrested. On October 23, he and 36 of his parishioners were executed. Priest Pavel Florenski, one of the greatest of ROC theologians, was arrested in 1933 and exiled to Svobodni (Freedom) concentration camp in Siberia, and then was moved to Solovetski

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Island in 1937. After six months of solitary confinement, Pavel Florenski was executed by a firing squad on December 8, 1937. Among the renovationists, Metr. Peter Blinov of all Siberia, Metr. Peter Sergeev, and Metr. Vasili Chelyabinski of the Urals, were executed in 1937. By the end of 1937, almost every one of the renovationist clergy of Leningrad diocese was in custody. Yet, while all of his confederates were being imprisoned or executed, metropolitan-evangelist Alexandr Vvedenski had complete freedom and was living the life of Soviet high society. Various figures have been given as estimates to measure the extent of ROC persecution in the pre-war decades. Perhaps the most reliable figures are those of Dimitry Pospielovski, who has researched this period intensively for the ROC; he states that between 5,000 and 10,000 ROC clergy — prelates, priests and deacons — perished in the period 1918-1929, and an additional 45,000 in 19301939, either by execution, or in prison or concentration camp.11 Monks and nuns, and related monastic personnel, would include another 40,000 that perished under the Soviets.12 Another reputable source, the Commission for the Moscow Patriarchate, states that 80,000 ROC clergy of all ranks were executed. The clergy who survived were those who quickly retired and assimilated into Soviet society, or else migrated to Europe. By summer 1939, the ROC as an institution in the Soviet Union was liquidated, the Soviet state having attained its goal. The total number of ROC churches open for services in the entirety of the Soviet Union was over 300, but less than 500, by the end of August 1939. Of them, only 100 churches were in the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and the balance were located in the south-central Asian republics, Ukraine and Belarus, Soviet officials leaving them in place primarily to cater to foreigners and for propaganda purposes. Moscow had no more than 15 churches open, Leningrad had only five, while Odessa diocese had one church with no priest, and Tambov had two churches. In the Soviet Far East, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and all the eastern regions of Siberia, not a single ROC church was functioning. In Kiev diocese in 1917 there were 1,710 churches, 1,435 priests, 277 deacons, 1,410 psalm-readers, 23 monasteries and convents, and 5,139 monks and nuns. By summer of 1939, only two parish churches were open for services in Kiev diocese with a total of three priests, one deacon, and two psalm-

11. Pospielovsky, Dimitry, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, volume 1, pg 174-175. 12. Pospielovsky, Dimitry, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia, pg. 258-259

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era readers. The episcopacy was also reduced to nothing by the late summer of 1939, with only four prelates still free in all of Soviet Russia: patriarchal deputy Metr. Sergei Stragorodski, Metr. Aleksei Simanski of Leningrad, Metr. Sergei Voskresenski of Dmitrovski, and Archbishop Nikolai Yarushevich of Novgorod. An additional ten bishops were free but were reduced in responsibility and were assigned to local parish churches by Soviet authorities. Dioceses, as administrative entities within the ROC, ceased to exist by 1939. All monasteries and convents were likewise closed and their residents expelled. The persecution of the era forced dedicated adherents of the ROC to go underground or into a state of dormancy, in order to survive.13

186. EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the west and initiated World War II. About two weeks later, the Soviet army invaded Poland and occupied the eastern half of the country. The Soviet army expanded in personnel and force and by the summer of 1940, Soviet Russia had recovered all of the land it had lost in World War I: the Baltic republics, the balance of Belarus, the eastern half of Poland, Moldova, and the western portion of Ukraine. Russia also invaded Finland to acquire territory in Karelia and the Kola Peninsula. Although most of Poland and the other occupied regions were primarily Catholic or at least Eastern Rite Catholics (the Uniate Church), there were significant Russian Orthodox populations in some of these recaptured lands. Having to deal with the new mass of Orthodox population after the westward expansion of the Soviet Union, and wanting the involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Soviet state permitted Metr. Sergei to proceed in establishing his administration in the occupied territories. About 7,500,000 people had come under Soviet control, including 64 monasteries, 2042 parishes, 15 prelates, and six seminaries. Metr. Sergei did not hesitate to expand the hegemony of the ROC into these areas by ordaining new bishops aligned with the office of the Moscow patriarchate. Archimandrite Veniamin Novitzki became vicar of Russian-occupied Poland, while Panteleon Rudiki became Bishop of Lvov. Damaskin Maliuta became Bishop of Chernigov and Aleksei Sergeev Bishop of Kishinev. Many Uniate prelates migrated to the ROC, such as 13. Tzipin, Protopriest Vladislav, Istoriya Russkoi Tserkvi, 1917-199, pg. 254.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Archbishop Aleksei Paulusif of Tallinn. During the years of 1940-1941, 90% of functioning ROC churches were in the occupied regions. The main purpose of such a move was to engender the patriotism — rather than animosity — of the population toward the new political overlords, by allowing at least some limited religious freedom. In autumn of 1940, Metr. Sergei promoted Metr. Nikolai Yarushevich to temporary exarch of western Ukraine and Belarus, while Metr. Sergei Voskresenski became metropolitan of Lithuania in January 1941, and exarch of Latvia and Estonia in March. Four new bishops were also ordained for the western territories. But it was difficult for them to persuade the people to accept them, especially with a simultaneous repression of the ROC and the Catholics occurring in the same regions. Protopriests Ilarion Denisevich, Sergei Yarotzki, Alexandr Sakhovnya, Alexandr Martiniuk, and Meliton Matushevich, and hieromonk Sofroni, were executed either at local prisons or at concentration camps. The monastic residents of the famous Pochayev Monastery, near the city Ternopil in western Ukraine, numbering 300 in 1939, declined to eight by 1941. Once Soviet authority took firm control in the newly-occupied territories, ROC ecclesiastical property, finances and paraphernalia were quickly nationalized and confiscated. ROC priests were weighed with heavy taxation. As ROC prelates from Moscow infiltrated the occupied regions, so did the Union of Militant Atheism. To arm itself, the Union received 2.8 million rubles from Soviet authorities and they quickly spread their propaganda, the first wave beginning at Easter of 1940. On June 22, 1941, the German army crossed into Russian-occupied regions of Eastern Europe. That day, as soon as he heard of the invasion, Metr. Sergei issued a circular letter summoning the Russian people to defend the homeland. Fascist criminals have attacked our Homeland. The burden of Batu [Khan], the Teutonic knights, Carl the Swede, Napoleon, is repeated. These pitiful descendents of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity again want to attempt to place our nation on its knees before injustice. On this occasion, also, He will transform into dust the fascist malicious spirit. Let us remember the holy leaders of the Russian nation, for example Alexandr Nevski, Dmitri Donskoi, who laid down their lives for the people and our homeland. Let us remember the innumerable thousands of simple Orthodox soldiers. Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the nation. Together with it, it has also endured trial and was comforted by its successes. He will not abandon our nation even on this occasion. [The ROC] blesses the present national effort with a heavenly blessing. We should also remember the command of Christ: There is no greater love than to give up your life on behalf of your friend. (John 15:13.) The Church of Christ blesses all the Orthodox to proceed to defend the holy borders of our Homeland. The Lord will gift us victory.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era On June 26, Metr. Sergei performed a liturgy at Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral asking for a Russian victory over Germany. With the invasion proceeding rapidly, Metr. Sergei on October 26 considered evacuating Moscow to Orenburg (now known as Chkalov) in Siberia. The final decision was to move to Ulyanovsk (formerly Simbirsk), not quite as far east as Orenburg. Sergei and his entourage of about a half-dozen ROC prelates were to travel by railroad to Ulyanovsk. Soviet officials had earlier evacuated renovationist leader Alexandr Vvedenski from Leningrad to Moscow, and in order to further vex Sergei, Vvedenski and his associates were assigned to the same railroad car that Sergei was traveling in. Arriving in Ulyanovsk, Metr. Sergei and his associates were unable to find a place to stay, so they ended up residing in their railway car for about a week. Soviet officials, however, assigned Vvedenski a modest apartment in the city. Metr. Sergei finally located a small apartment along the edge of town and moved into it. He acquired the use of a small abandoned ROC parish church for services, and after some minor remodeling work, he moved into a room alongside the church. In Kulikova, a suburb of Ulyanovsk, another abandoned church, but one in better condition than the one given to Sergei, was assigned to Vvedenski. All in all, the renovationists were living in much better circumstances than the patriarchal group during their short refuge in Ulyanovsk. Unable to accomplish much physically, Metr. Sergei wrote several pastoral letters urging Orthodox Russians not to abandon the struggle against Germany. The patriotic stand taken by the ROC priesthood during the initial stages of the war did not go unnoticed by Soviet authorities. Beginning in early 1942, signs of amelioration of Soviet anti-ecclesiastical policy began to appear, although the gestures were more demonstrative than real, and their purpose was to consolidate Soviet patriotism during the war. On November 7, 1942, newspapers published a jubilee edition for the 25th Anniversary of the October Revolution. The issue included congratulatory articles from the Katolicos of Georgia, Kallistrat Tzintzadzi, Metr. Sergei, Metr. Nikolai Yarushevich of Kiev, and Alexandr Vvedenski, who now claimed the title of Supreme Hierarch of Russian Orthodoxy, in addition to that of Metropolitan-Evangelist. Metr. Sergei took the opportunity while in Ulyanovsk to expand the ROC in the region. Archbishop John Sokolov, who traveled to Ulyanovsk with Metr. Sergei, was promoted to metropolitan. Archbishop Aleksei Sergeev assumed the episcopacy of Ufa; Pitirim Sviridov became Bishop of Kuibishev (formerly known as Samara); Foti Tapiro, a former Grigorian, returned to the ROC and

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV was ordained as Bishop of Kuban and Krasnodar, regions in the Caucasus. Bishop Vasili Ratmirov, who had recently returned from the renovationists, was assigned to the episcopacy of Kaliningrad (formerly known as Konigsburg, Prussia), even though it was under German occupation at the time. Soviet authorities realized the value of ROC prelates in promoting national patriotism, and in order not to suppress the zeal for homeland defense they terminated the work of the Union of Militant Atheists in 1942. Its propaganda-publishing arm was closed down along with a few museums of religion and atheism (but not the converted Virgin of Kazan Cathedral in Leningrad or any of the important cathedrals). In 1943, Emilian Yaroslavski, the head of the Union of Militant Atheists, died and he was not replaced. The interest of foreign governments in Soviet affairs increased during the war years, and that included interest in the condition of the ROC. As a result, Metr. Sergei, with approval of Soviet officials, published in 1942 a book titled The Truth about Religion in Russia, especially for distribution abroad. Much like the interviews Sergei had given to journalists, the book was filled with half-truths and exaggerations. The overall purpose of the publication was to arouse sympathy for the Soviet Union while it was under invasion by Germany, and to engender American and European support for Russia in the war, especially the upcoming conferences of Stalin with Churchill and Roosevelt. Within a couple of months after the invasion, the German army occupied one-third of European Russia. The administration of the occupied territories was under Reich-minister Alfred Rosenberg. The German occupiers found the region ecclesiastically desolate, although a good majority of the population considered themselves Orthodox. The goal of the German occupation was to subject the Russians to their authority, and that, too, threatened the survival of the ROC. However, the German occupiers advertised themselves as crusaders against Communism, and so manipulated local ROC parish clergy to their own advantage. Adolph Hitler expressed it in the following manner: We must escape the situation of one church satisfying the religious needs of the greater region. Every village must be independent. If some villages decide to practice Black Magic, as do the Negroes or Indians, we will do nothing to hinder it. In short, our policy in the occupied regions is to encourage any and every form of belief and dissent.

The Orthodox population took advantage of the scant freedoms provided by the German occupiers during the first two years and rebuilt many churches. They were decorated with icons brought from homes, along with salvaged eccle-

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era siastical appurtenances. The German occupiers knew that their goal would be attained more easily if they did not repeat the massive repression conducted by the Soviets. Many Germans were Lutheran or Catholic, and they ignored the reconstruction of the ROC. But Nazi ideology, much like Leninism, was in contradistinction to the Christian teaching, and so the toleration provided the Orthodox population in instituting ecclesiastical worship was limited. Religious education was still prohibited in schools, while neo-pagan racism and nationalsocialism was promoted. In the Ukraine during German occupation, a group of ROC prelates met to form a new independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, just as they had attempted to do in the years following the October Revolution. The group was formed in October 1941, and Bishop Polikarp Sikorski of Lutz became UOC administrative head. On January 24, 1942, Policarp delivered a letter to German Reich-commissar von Vendelshtodt, which concluded with the following passage: I ask that you accept on behalf of the leader of the German people, Adolph Hitler, our desire for the fullness of his strength, both spiritual and physical, and likewise success in the defeat of his enemy, on both the eastern and western [fronts]. Together with all the believers, I will recite prayers unto the omnipotent God for such a victory.

As a result of his capitulation to German occupation officials, Policarp received financial support and limited freedom from them, while at the same time receiving censure from many Orthodox clergy. A meeting was held in Ulyanovsk on March 28, 1942, and a resolution was issued by the few ROC prelates residing there that interdicted Bishop Policarp from any further performance of rites, and if he were to ignore the resolution, then Policarp would be subject to defrocking. The resolution was signed by Metr. Sergei and ten prelates in Ulyanovsk. Overall, the almost one-year stay of Sergei and his ROC associates in their refuge in Ulyanovsk was mild and uneventful. Toward the end of August 1943, Soviet officials proposed to Metr. Sergei that he return to Moscow, now with the German army in retreat. He accepted the proposal. Metropolitans Aleksei Simanski and Nikolai Yarushevich met him at the Moscow train station on his arrival.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 187. PATRIARCH SERGEI On September 4, 1943, a representative of the SovNarKom telephoned Metr. Sergei and informed him of their desire for a meeting with the available ROC prelates at a date of their choosing, and within the next couple of weeks. Sergei thanked him for his concern for the ROC’s needs and expressed his desire to have the meeting without further delay. Sergei’s response was relayed to Stalin, who further discussed the matter with the director of the Soviet department that dealt with the counter-revolutionary activities of the ROC, G.G. Karpov, and they too decided not to delay the meeting. That evening at 9 o’clock, a government vehicle arrived at the residence of Metr. Sergei and took him and Aleksei Simanski and Nikolai Yarushevich to the Moscow Kremlin. They met with Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, for about two hours. Stalin asked Metr. Sergei if there was anything the ROC required to compensate them for their patriotic efforts during the war against Germany. Sergei answered that the most important matter at hand was the central administration of the ROC: eighteen years had passed since he was assigned the position of patriarchal deputy, and the Sacred Synod had not convened since 1935. Metr. Sergei requested permission to convene an episcopal conference to select a patriarch, and subsequently create a new Sacred Synod consisting of five or six prelates. Stalin wanted to know the specific title of the patriarch. Sergei stated, “Patriarch of Moscow and all Russ.” Stalin accepted the designation because of its connotation referring to ancient Russ, and then asked when such a conference could be convened, and inquired whether they needed financial support. Sergei informed Stalin that a conference could be held within a month. Stalin was impatient and after a few words with Karpov, they decided that the Soviet state would provide transportation to enable the prelates to hold a conference within the next few days. All agreed on the day of September 8. Sergei, however, wisely declined any Soviet subsidy of the ROC. The next topic was religious schools and seminaries. Sergei complained of a lack of candidates for sacerdotal orders. Stalin asked, “And why do you not have not candidates?” Aleksei and Nikolai were agitated at such a question, knowing that all seminaries and religious academies had been closed by Stalin’s order.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era But Sergei calmly responded, “We have no candidates for several reasons. One of them is that we prepare a young man to become a priest and then be becomes a marshal of the Soviet Union.” A small smile was displayed on Stalin’s face. He replied, “Yes, yes, of course. I was a seminarian. I heard of you at the time.” Stalin then began to reminisce about his years as a seminary student, and added that his mother to her dying day was saddened because he never became a priest. Stalin then agreed to permit them to open religious schools and seminaries. Metr. Sergei also asked about again printing the magazine Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. Stalin agreed. Sergei then asked about opening parish churches. Stalin merely stated that local priests should proceed to make such arrangements with the local Soviets. Metr. Sergei then asked Stalin about freeing ROC prelates who were being kept in exile, prison or concentration camps. Stalin only said, “Put that is writing and we will review it.” The conversation also touched on freedom of travel for clergy, a new residence for Sergei, and improvements in the fiscal state of the ROC, but little was agreed in these areas. Stalin then informed his guests of his intention to form a new department to handle the affairs of the ROC, and to install Karpov as head. This stunned the prelates, because they knew Karpov as a former Chekist; but nonetheless they told Stalin that they were pleased with his concern and were willing to accept Karpov as department head. At the conclusion of the meeting, Stalin told Molotov to prepare a text highlighting the events of the discussion for publication. As they were leaving, Stalin walked them to the door of his office and said, “Prelate, I will do all that I can for you at the present.” The most historic meeting between a prelate and a dictator in 20th century ROC history ended on a positive note. Four days later, on September 8, 1943, at Metr. Sergei’s new residence at the Chisti Crossing, an episcopal conference was held. It was attended by 19 prelates, those from non-occupied areas of Russia. Many of them traveled to Moscow on government-supplied military aircraft, and some of them were recently released from prison or concentration camp. Metr. Aleksei Simanski nominated Metr. Sergei as the one and only selection for patriarch, and all the other prelates unanimously agreed. The next issue was the formation of a Sacred Synod. The new Synod was to be comprised of six prelates: three permanent and three rotating. The rotating members would hold the position for six months, and then another diocesan bishop would be

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV selected. The initial permanent members were Metropolitans Aleksei of Leningrad and Nikolai of Kiev. The ordination of Sergei Stragorodski as Patriarch of Moscow and all Russ was performed at the Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral in Moscow on September 12, 1943, the holiday of the famous Russian hero Alexandr Nevski. Immediately, Patr. Sergei contacted the other Eastern Patriarchs and informed them of the historic event: Veniamin of Constantinople, Christofor of Alexandria, Alexander of Antioch, and Timotius of Jerusalem. Congratulatory letters were sent by the Eastern patriarchs in return and several others from Orthodox and nonOrthodox ecclesiastical heads, including Katolicos Kallistrat of the Georgian Orthodox Church, and Metr. Joseph of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Patr. Gavril of Serbia was incarcerated at the Dachau concentration camp at the time.) A delegation from the Anglican Church of England, headed by Archbishop of York, K.F. Garbett, visited Moscow September 19-28, 1943. Patr. Sergei was born Ivan Nikolaievich Stragorodski in Arzamas, Ukraine. His great-grandfather Sylvester Stragorodski was Bishop of Krutitzk during the reign of Empress Catherine II. His mother died shortly after his birth and he was raised as an orphan. In 1886, Ivan entered St. Petersburg Religious Academy, and on January 30, 1890, just prior to his graduation, he accepted tonsure and the new name of Sergei. He was simultaneously ordained as a hieromonk. From St. Petersburg, Sergei became an ROC missionary in China, where he quickly learned to speak Chinese. He stayed in China as a teacher of dogmatic theology until his return to St. Petersburg in autumn of 1893, when Sergei took a position as an instructor at the same academy he had graduated from. From 1894-1898, Sergei resided at Mt. Athos Monastery in Greece as a representative of the ROC with the title of archimandrite. He then returned to Russia and became rector of Petersburg Religious Academy. On February 25, 1901. Sergei was ordained as Bishop of Hamburg, although he never left Russia. On October 6, 1905, he was promoted to the episcopacy of Finland and Vyborg, now as archbishop. In 1917, after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, Sergei was elevated to Metropolitan of Nizhni-Novgorod and Vladimir, and became a member of the Holy Synod. For a short period in 1922-1923, he adhered to the renovationist group. On the same day as the episcopal conference of ROC prelates, a new Department of Affairs of the ROC was formed within the Soviet state bureaucracy, and G.G. Karpov was selected as chairman. Stalin personally entrusted Karpov with the responsibility to implement what he called a “concordat,” even though the provisions were inclined toward the Soviet state with no recourse for

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era the ROC if the Soviet state should renege on its promises. The concordat was a politically expedient gesture on the part of the Soviet state to promote further patriotism, which was necessary for resistance to German occupation and their defeat. Stalin realized that some concessions had to be made on his part to gain the full unquestioning support of the population of Russia, still reverently Orthodox, and that repression of the ROC during this crucial period was not in his best interests. After the end of the war, matters would revert to the ideology of an atheistic state and repression of the ROC would again be carried out. An important item on Karpov’s agenda was to make sure that the ROC did not exceed its allotted freedoms. Any anti-Soviet or unpatriotic elements were to be immediately uprooted, and especially anything that pertained to partisan groups in Russia working clandestinely against German occupation. The fear was that these groups would turn the Orthodox population against the Soviet state at the conclusion of the war. In many respects, Karpov continued the policy of his forerunner Tuchkov, but in a more diplomatic and less manipulative manner. On October 27, 1943, Patr. Sergei sent a letter to Karpov requesting the amnesty of some 25 prelates who had been arrested. Unknown to Sergei, all but one of them had already perished in Soviet concentration camps. To fill vacant cathedras, Sergei began ordaining bishops. Within the first year of his patriarchate, through March of 1944, 29 new bishops were ordained to fill vacant episcopacies. In regard to the issue of opening churches, one of the items discussed between Sergei and Stalin, the SovNarKom issued resolution #1325 on November 28, 1943. The resolution stated that Orthodox groups had to present a petition to the local Soviet Commissariat, which would then pass the request to the new Department of ROC Affairs. A decision would then be made. The procedure was deliberately time-consuming and cumbersome, especially since it was antithetical to the Soviet goal of the elimination of religion. Nonetheless, with the increase of diocesan bishops and their intervention, parish churches gradually opened. On September 12, 1943, the first issue of the renewed Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate was distributed with a run of 15,000 copies. Of course, Patr. Sergei was editor, as with his previous attempt at publishing the magazine. Four issues were published in 1943, and twelve in 1944, on a monthly basis. The indirect effect of the restoration of the patriarchate was the urgent need for reconciliation with the remnants of the renovationists. The movement had shown signs of deterioration about halfway through the war, and now with

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Soviet state recognition of the patriarchal ROC and support of Sergei as patriarch, many renovationist clergy sought a means of reconciliation and return. The first to step forward was Bishop Sergei Larin of Snevigorod, in 1943. Once Alexandr Vvedenski heard about Sergei Larin’s clandestine conversation with Metr. Nikolai Yarushevich, he had Larin transferred to Tashkent, Turkmenistan; he was later admitted into the ROC as a plain monk. Others, however, were more successful, such as Bishop Mikhail Postnikov, who was readmitted on March 2, 1944. Later, Bishops Vitali Vvedenski and Andrei Rastorguyev were reconciled. By mid-1944, only a handful of renovationist prelates remained and none of them had a parish or diocese to administrate. The most obstinate was Alexandr Vvedenski, who adamantly refused to budge from his position, although he was now Supreme Hierarch of a Christian denomination with no churches, members or administration. The Soviet army was not about to treat lightly ROC prelates of the German-occupied regions after the Germans were driven back by the Soviets. The prelates were aware of this, not having forgotten the reprisal of the Red Army on those who had supported the White Army and then remained in Russia after defeat. On August 23, 1943, Kharkov in the Ukraine was liberated from the Germans, and Ukrainian prelates withdrew into Europe, following the German army. Bishop Feofil Buldovski decided to stay behind. On November 12, Metr. Feofil was arrested, and he died on January 20, 1944 in a local prison. Any ROC clergy who remained in the Ukraine were arrested by the Red Army and imprisoned. Archbishop Damaskin Maliuta, head of the recently-formed autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, was arrested by Soviet troops in KamenetzPodolsk and was sent directly to a concentration camp in Siberia, where he died. The prelates arrested in the Ukraine after the withdrawal of German troops were charged as traitors due to their alleged collaboration with the Germans during the occupation. Bishops Veniamin Novitzki and Pankrati Gladkov were arrested and sent to concentration camps in Siberia. Pankrati died shortly after his arrival, while Veniamin survived until his release in 1956. On May 14, 1944, Patr. Sergei performed the ordination of Makari Dayev as Bishop of Mozhaisk at the Rizpolozhenski Cathedral. The next morning, Patr. Sergei awoke at about 6:00 AM, but he remained in bed. His roommate, Archimandrite Iyoann Razumov, walked into the patriarch’s bedroom an hour later to check on him and found him lifeless. Doctors attributed Patr. Sergei’s death on May 15 to a brain aneurysm. He was entombed the following day at the BogoYavlenski Cathedral.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era 188. PATRIARCH ALEKSEI I The testament of Patr. Sergei, composed October 12, 1941, was opened and read the afternoon of his death. He assigned the post of patriarchal deputy to Metr. Aleksei Simanski of Leningrad. The members of the Sacred Synod accepted the wishes of the late patriarch and Aleksei became temporary administrative head of the ROC until an episcopal conference could be convened to select a new patriarch. Immediately, Metr. Aleksei continued to fill vacant episcopacies with newly-ordained bishops. The first was Nikolai Chufarovski as Bishop of Poltava on May 21, just six days after Sergei’s death. Following him was Nikon Petin as Bishop of Voroshilovgrad, Joasaf Zhurmanov as Bishop of Simferopol and Tavria, Onisimus Festinatov as Bishop of Vladimir and Suzdal, Rafael Berezin as Bishop of Kaliningrad diocese (formerly Prussia), and Justin Maltzev as Bishop of Vologda. Between May 1944 and January 1945, ten bishops were ordained, increasing their number to almost 50, as many as before the beginning of the Red Terror in 1932. Parishes slowly opened: between January and November 1944, about 200 old parish churches were renovated and open for services. The last of the renovationist prelates, Grigori Chukov, Sergei Rumyantzev and Dmitri Lobanov, reconciled with the patriarchal ROC by the end of 1944. In August 1944, the Soviet Army liberated Moldova from German occupation and crossed into Romania. Metr. Efrem Tiginyan of Kishinev and other ROC prelates followed the German withdrawal into Europe, afraid of Soviet reprisal. Metr. Aleksei took advantage of the situation to ordain Jeronim Zakharov as the new Bishop of Kishinev and Moldova on December 31, 1944. On September 8, 1944, the Red Army crossed the border from Romania into Bulgaria and drove deeper into the center of the country without incurring any real resistance from the German army. In fact, the new government of Bulgaria terminated its union with Germany and declared war against it. The representative of the Bulgarian Church, Metr. Stefan, blessed the new state policy. Receiving news of the change in ecclesiastical affairs in Bulgaria, Metr. Aleksei approached the Metr. Stefan of Sophia with a letter of greeting and reconciliation. More religious freedom was provided in Moldova and Romania, because they were heavily Orthodox, and Soviet officials felt they would be loyal to their regime. In the fall of 1944, the Red Army liberated the Baltic Republics from German occupation. After the liberation, on March 5, 1945, Bishop Gregorian

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Chukov arrived in Tallinn and he was able to reconcile perishes of the Estonian Orthodox Church with the Moscow patriarchate. Bishop Pavel Dmitrovski was assigned the position of the new director of Tallinn and Estonia, and he decided to accept priests of both Russian and Estonian background. But the Soviets initiated repression of the activities of Catholic and Uniate clergy, because of fear that they would not be loyal to the Soviet government but rather to the Pope in Rome and their European associates. Six months after the demise of Patr. Sergei, the Sacred Synod had the opportunity to summon a regional conference whose purpose was to select a new patriarch. At the residence of the patriarch at the Chisti Crossing, November 21 through 23, 1944, an episcopal council was held, which included 50 bishops of the ROC. After preliminary arrangements were made, the regional conference opened December 21, 1945 at the Voskresenski Cathedral with 46 bishops attending. The total number of delegates from the Soviet Union numbered 204. Eastern patriarchs Christofor of Alexandria, Alexander III of Antioch, as well as the Georgian Katolicos Kallistrat, attended, and the conference agreed on the selection of Metr. Aleksei Simanski as the new patriarch of Russia. His ordination was performed February 4, 1945 at the Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral of Moscow. About 5,000 people attended. Patr. Aleksei was born Sergei Vladimirovich Simanski in Moscow on October 27, 1877. In 1900, Sergei entered the Moscow Religious Academy. On February 9, 1902, he took tonsure and became a monk. In September 16, 1906, Monk Aleksei was selected as Rector of Tula Seminary and was promoted to the rank of archimandrite, and then on April 28, 1913 he became Bishop of Tikhvin and Vicar of Novgorod Diocese. In February 19, 1921, he was promoted to vicar of Petrograd Diocese with the title of Bishop of Hamburg. On September 22, 1934, Aleksei Simanski became Metropolitan of Leningrad. On April 10, 1945, Patr. Aleksei met with Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov. Metr. Nikolai Yarushevich and protopriest Nikolai Kolchitzki, who handled the affairs of the Moscow patriarchate, also attended. They discussed the patriotic activities of the ROC which had been so essential in the final stages of the war against Germany. Stalin said that the Russian nation needed immense support from the ROC in order to establish the international position of the USSR and in order to develop international contacts. They also discussed the possibility of expanding the web of religious schools and developing more ecclesiastical activities. The clear reduction of persecution after the war was a benefit to the ROC.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era In early 1945, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, President of the Soviet Union, told a Soviet newspaper correspondent, “Of course, atheism remains our basic program; we will not deny that religion is an opiate, but we will progress slowly. In accordance with our constitution, we recognize the Church’s existence. We are not at war with it.” As a result of Patr. Aleksei’s effort promoting patriotism in the Soviet Union during World War II, President Kalinin awarded him a Communist order. During 1945–1946, the SovNarKom issued resolutions that pertained to the patriarchate, the diocesan administration, and parishes, allowing them the right to acquire means of transport, to buy and build homes, and to develop and manufacture ecclesiastical paraphernalia, but approval from the Soviet Department of ROC Affairs was needed on a case by case basis. By 1949, the ROC episcopacy consisted of 74 bishops, but even then it was still difficult to open churches. For example, in Kazakhstan in 1941, 21 petitions were made to open churches, but only four were granted. From 1944 to 1947, the ROC was allowed 1,270 additional parish churches. According to statistics published by the Department of ROC Affairs, by January 1, 1948, there were a total of 14,329 churches in Soviet Russia, although about 2,500 of them up to 1946 were part of the Uniate Church of Eastern Europe. On April 1, 1946, the ROC claimed 9,254 priests and other ecclesiastical officials. In 1948, 148 new churches were opened, and by January 1, 1949, the ROC had 14,477 operating parish churches throughout the Soviet Union, including Ukraine and the Baltic Republics. A report written by Karpov, published in 1946, stated, “For the satisfaction of the religious needs of believers in the Soviet Union, 22,000 Orthodox churches and houses of prayer are now operational.” Protopriest Andre Sergienko, in his brochure regarding the condition of the church in the Soviet Union, published in Paris in 1947, stated that the ROC in Soviet Russia had 25,000 churches open for services. However, the statistics were hardly reliable and the actual figures were kept secret, and even Patr. Aleksei did not know how many churches were open for services. Only the Department of ROC Affairs knew that, and they inflated the figures to give ROC prelates and foreign nations the appearance of widespread religious freedoms in the Soviet Union. In reality, however, the actual number in the Russian Federation (RFSFR) was more like 10 percent of the published numbers. For example, in Moscow that year there were only ten churches open for services, while in Kazan there were only five. In many large diocesan capitals, there were only one or sometimes two or three churches, often on the edges of town near a cemetery or some local town. Half the functioning ROC

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV churches in the Soviet Union were located in Ukraine, 7,547 in 1947, and with the balance concentrated in the western portion of the Soviet Union, Belarus and the Baltic Republics. The further east in a person would travel, the fewer churches they would find, and in the Soviet Far East there were none at all. In Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and all the eastern regions of Siberia, not a single ROC church was functioning. The churches of greatest historical and architectural value to the ROC still had not been given back to them. The Kremlin cathedrals in Moscow, as well as those in Leningrad, Kiev, and Novgorod, remained museums. By 1945, the renovationist movement had deteriorated and subsided. In Moscow its center was the Cathedral of St. Pimen the Great, where Alexander Vvedenski ministered, continuing to title himself Metropolitan and Supreme Hierarch of the ROC and dressing in sacerdotal vestments. They only had one parish in Ulyanovsk, remaining from his refuge there during German occupation. In June 1946, Alexander Vvedenski died. His funeral was held at the Cathedral of Pimen the Great on July 13, 1946. A few days after Vvedenski’s funeral, his cathedral was transferred to the administration of the Moscow patriarchate. Essentially, this event was the termination of the renovationist movement in the ROC that had begun in 1917. Other clergy who abandoned the ROC as a result of Declaration of Metr. Sergei in 1926, for example Bishop Afanasi Sakharov, reconciled themselves after the ascension of Patr. Aleksei. Afanasi’s example was taken by many others who had separated from the patriarchate and had formed catacomb communities. These were primarily concentrated in Voronezh and Tambov providences, in the northern Caucasus, in Kazakhstan, and Siberia. It is difficult to estimate the number of such communities and their members. Statistics regarding them were not reliable and were often contradictory. However, each community was most probably fewer than 1,000 members. Then there were the remnants of the Old Believer Priestless groups, which called themselves True Orthodox Christians. They created their own small communities, taking advantage of the edicts allowing greater religious freedom after World War II; however, they would not accept the jurisdiction of the Soviet state. On May 22, 1945, Patr. Aleksei departed on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land accompanied by Metr. Nikolai Yarushevich, Archbishop Vitali of Tula, and protopriest Kolchitzki. Aleksei worshiped at holy shrines in Jerusalem and its surroundings, visited the Mount of Olives in Gethsemane, and met with Patr.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Timotius of Jerusalem. On his return trip, Aleksei visited the Near East, Beirut, and Damascus, and met with Patr. Alexander III of Antioch. The victory of the Soviet Union in its liberation of the Balkan and Eastern European nations from German occupation opened the possibility of consolidating relations between the ROC with the Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches. In April 1945, a delegation from the ROC headed by Bishop Grigori Chukov of Pskov met in Sophia, Bulgaria, with Metr. Stephan. Bishop Grigori delivered a letter from Patr. Aleksei I, who congratulated Metr. Stephan on the establishment of canonical association of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church with the other Orthodox Churches. In April 1945, Patr. Aleksei directed and dispatched an ecclesiastical delegation headed by Bishop Sergei Larin to Yugoslavia. During his stay in Yugoslavia, Bishop Sergei united a large group of Russian priests and laypersons who had formerly been part of the Karlovtzi Conference. At this time, the ROC under Aleksei made significant strides in consolidating Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe into a cooperative effort, especially the orthodox communities of Romania and Albania. Beginning in 1948, and not long after the efforts of the Moscow patriarchate to unite the various Orthodox entities into a consolidated corporate body, matters turned for the worse. In 1947, the newspaper Komsomol Pravda mentioned that membership in the Komsomol was incompatible with faith in God. In that year, the Union for the Expansion of Political and Scientific Knowledge was established, which was to replace the Union of Militant Atheists, which had been disbanded earlier. In various cities, Soviet officials began to open Houses of Scientific Knowledge, whose purpose was to replace churches. It had been understood earlier, but since World War II began it was a policy only nominally observed, that in the socialist state education must be antireligious. What brought about this change in affairs in the Soviet Union since the negotiations between Stalin and Patriarch Sergei? In 1947, Mikhail Andreevich Suslov was Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and responsible for the state ideology. Stalin at the time of Suslov’s nomination counseled him to not forget the importance of atheist propaganda among the people, but had added that the question of religious repression was not the most important matter at the present time. In October 1947, at a secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet, the question of the relationship between the USSR and the ROC was discussed. The Central Committee decided to hold to its present course, feeling that the position of the ROC in the state must remain stable, but underscoring the point that among the com-

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV munists there must not be any misunderstanding in regard to the ideology of the party; they must remain atheist, and the ROC must follow and fulfill the interests of the state. The ROC would exist solely to supply international propaganda, which the Communist Party felt would be useful. ROC prelates would have no choice but to comply in order to preserve the meager religious freedoms that were provided them by the Soviet state. In September 1948, under the guidance of Suslov, another resolution was legislated, titled, Measures to Increase Antireligious Propaganda. This resolution stated that certain members of the communist party had drawn an erroneous conclusion: that they no longer had to wage a campaign of antireligious propaganda, and that religious belief would diminish and dissolve on its own. The resolution stated that the problem of overcoming religious prejudices and superstitions was of important significance in the period of transfer from socialism to communism. At the same time, not wishing to violate Stalin’s statement and striving to avoid separating or severing the ROC from the Soviet state, since it was so useful an entity, Suslov included in his resolution a warning that no communist party organization should interfere in matters of the infrastructure of religious communities or attempt to close them, but rather should promote antireligious propaganda to reduce religious fervency. The resolutions were secret and were not advertised or published in newspapers. The instruction to increase atheist propaganda became important at a Komsomol congress in 1949, and at meetings of the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet in 1950 and 1952. The theme of atheism was not discussed at a communist party congress in 1952; nonetheless, all the members of the communist party attending were secretly in concurrence on this point. Atheist publications were on the increase again, just as during the 1930s. In 1948, there were 381 issues of antireligious magazines and circulars totaling almost 19 million copies. In 1949, there were 689 issues totaling 26.7 million copies and in 1950, 700 issues with a total circulation comparably higher then that of 1949. The ugly face of persecution of ROC clergy again resurrected, and evolved into a serious and severe attack on the ROC, much more so than the onslaught of atheist propaganda. Another wave of arrests of ROC clergy began. On September 4, 1948, for example, Bishop Manuel Lemeshevski of Orenberg was arrested and on April 16, 1949 he was sentenced to ten years and was sent to a concentration camp in Moldova. At that concentration camp he had the company of Metr. Nester Anisimov, who was arrested in July 1948. That same year, the inspector of the Moscow Religious Academy Veniamin Milov was also

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era arrested. Prelates Dmitri Dudko and Peter Baktin were convicted of criticism against the Soviet state. Dmitri Dudko was sentenced to execution, but that was changed to 25 years in prison. At the same time, Moscow protopriest Nikolai Nikolski was arrested. In 1951, Moscow priest John Krestyankian was arrested and to five years at a concentration camp near Kuibishev. Even though as of January 1, 1949, the ROC claimed 14,477 operating churches according to Soviet official statistics, by January 1, 1953, they were down to 13,555, one thousand less. These churches were turned into clubs, theaters, warehouses, and workshops, and were used for commercial and entertainment uses. The repression of the clergy also caused a considerable decline in their numbers. In 1950, the ROC claimed 13,483 prelates and perish priests; by January 1, 1954, there were 11,912; a decrease of about 1,500. Nonetheless, the Soviet state continued to manipulate the ROC for its own interests, even while repressing it. The ROC was needed for international relations, especially with the beginning with the Cold War against the United States. ROC prelates were utilized to defend the interests of the Soviet state by proclaiming the nation’s desire for world peace, while at the same time the Soviets were cultivating procommunist groups, expanding the violent over-throw of governments throughout the world, and working to consolidate their grip on Eastern Europe. On March 25, 1949 Izvestiya ran an article by Patr. Aleksei I, supporting the initiative of the international committee of activists regarding the call for a worldwide congress for peace. The patriarch invited the other Orthodox Churches to raise their voices against all attempts and activities that violated the efforts of those seeking peace. In April, two weeks later after the creation of the North Atlantic Peace Treaty (NATO) in Paris, the Worldwide Congress of Adherents of Peace, which was to be an inter-denominational reconciliatory effort, was held. The Soviet delegation consisted of Metr. Nikolai of Krutitzk. The second meeting was in Moscow in August of that year. In 1950, Patr. Aleksei endorsed the prohibition of atomic weapons, because of their massive destructive capabilities. But at the same time that he was issuing a resolution for worldwide peace, Soviet officials were developing greater atomic weapons. In May of 1952, at the Troitse-Sergeev Monastery, representatives of all churches and religious corporate bodies of the USSR held a conference. The theme of their meeting was worldwide peace, and the timing was calculated as an attempt to mitigate the involvement of the USSR in the Korean War, and to give the appearance that the Soviet Union did not want to utilize atomic weapons in this war.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV 189. THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS Josef Stalin died March 5, 1952. The first months after Stalin’s death provided some amelioration of conditions for the Orthodox population of Russia and the administration of the ROC. Georgi Malenkov, who was second in command next to Stalin and ascended to the post of President of Soviet Ministers in the Soviet Union after his death, was highly influential in the first few months. But due to Communist Party politics, he was arrested for refusing to support Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, whose title was Marshal of the Soviet Union from 1945. The final victor in the power struggle of the highest levels of the Communist party was Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, and he immediately had Beria arrested and executed. Of all the Soviet leaders at the time, Khrushchev was most smitten with the idea of creating a communist utopia, and in his mind there was no place for religion. An edict was issued by the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet on July 7, 1954, indicating that Stalin’s program of 1943 was inappropriate and irreconcilable with the concepts and ideology of atheist socialism. The program that was taken by Stalin had entailed a loss of momentum for atheist propaganda in the Soviet Union and had allowed the ROC to increase in size, effectiveness, and participation in society, all of which Khrushchev saw as holding back the true development of the Soviet Union. He stated that the idea of ecclesiastical holidays, ceremonies, and especially the pilgrimage of Aleksei I to the holy land, were inappropriate and should not have been allowed. This new Soviet attack on the ROC received a wide negative response in the West and critical commentaries in the foreign press. Outrage in Europe and America undermined the authority of the Soviet leaders and helped lock the USSR in its isolation. Several Soviet leaders were united in their opposition to the new course of violent ROC suppression that Khrushchev attempted to impose, and this was brought to his attention. He also came to realize that he could not succeed in acquiring international recognition of the USSR while suppressing the ROC. Khrushchev had to emulate Stalin when, in the later part of his rule, he manipulated the ROC for propaganda purposes. Khrushchev on November 10, 1954 had a new resolution issued by the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet, stating that errors in antireligious propaganda fundamentally contradicted the program and the policy of the communist party in regard to worship and religious belief, because they violated the legislation of the party regarding freedom of religious confession. Khrushchev

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era realized that greater damage would be done to the Soviet Union if the practice of religion was not allowed as a private affair, as during the Red Purge by Stalin in the late 1930s. While the ROC was enjoying a minimum amount of freedom and was attending and promoting international peace conferences as the puppet of Soviet officials, Khrushchev could extend his arm of military weapon development, atomic weapons, and world-wide revolution, without being censured for religious persecution. During the mid-1950s, as a result of the reduced oppression, the ROC found itself in opportune circumstances to expand. First, there was the amnesty of many prelates and clergy who had earlier been exiled to concentration camps. On December 7, 1955, Archbishop Manuel Lemeshevski was released from prison in Moldova. In 1955, Veniamin Novitzki was released after twelve years in a concentration camp; at the age of 55, he looked like a ruined old man. Archimandrite Veniamin Milov, professor of the Moscow Religious Academy, who had been arrested in 1948, was released from concentration camp in 1954. Metr. Nester Anisimov was released in 1955. Bishop Afanasi Sakharov, who spent 21 years in a concentration camp, was released in 1954. In June 1956, a delegation from the Anglican Church of Great Britain arrived in Moscow for a meeting with the Russian Patriarchate. Archbishop of York Michael Ramsey met with Patr. Aleksei and Metr. Nikolai. In May of 1958, the ROC held a festive celebration, the 40th anniversary of the ordination of Patriarch Tikhon. It was attended by 27 bishops from Orthodox Churches outside of Russia and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, as well as representatives from other European churches, to celebrate the restoration of the patriarchate. This event, symbolizing ROC growth and success in Russia during the lenient years of Khrushchev, may have elicited greater attention from the outside world, a factor of over-confidence, but at the same time it created suspicion and made the ROC appear more of a threat to the Soviet ideology of atheism. On October 4, 1958, the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet issued a secret resolution regarding the need to increase the anti-religion propaganda campaign within the Soviet Union. The attitude of Soviet Russia reverted to that which was typical of the late 1920s, with an increase in antireligious literature, and parades, carnivals and spectacles, proceeding through the streets and squares of towns, ridiculing the ROC. The clergy of the ROC could not remain indifferent to the wave of aggressive ideology and the administrative war against them. In May 1958, Patr. Aleksei attempted to meet with Khrushchev to express his worries. He was

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV unable to gain an audience with Khrushchev; however he met with G.G. Karpov, chairman of the Department of ROC Affairs, at his residence in Odessa. The conversation between Karpov and Aleksei was of no benefit to the ROC. Karpov accused the ROC prelates of hiding income from the sale of ecclesiastical goods and art, and from the sale of candles and other commercial interests that the ROC had become involved in, although all the arguments were unfounded. Karpov likewise demanded that the number of monasteries be reduced. In 1957, the ROC had 73 dioceses. During the mid-1950s the episcopacy was less repressed and had greater opportunity to expand — but not significantly, because of difficulties created by the Soviet bureaucracy. On January 1, 1953, there were 13,355 ROC churches in the entirety of the Soviet Union; as of January 1, 1955, there were 13,432; not even an increase of 100; on January 1, 1956, 13,463 churches; while January 1, 1957, 13,477. In 1957, the actual number of ROC churches in the Russian Federation (RSFSR) was 3,790. The rest of them were in Ukraine, Belarus, Russian-occupied Poland, the Baltic republics, and the republics of south-central Asia. There were far fewer priests than churches, the official number being 3,694. Monasteries were again opened in Russia following the historical meeting of Josef Stalin and Patr. Sergei, and by 1945, the ROC had 101 monasteries and convents with 4,632 monks and nuns, but as with the churches, the majority were outside the RSFSR. When oppression began in these regions after the war, by January 1, 1948 the number of monastic centers in the entirety of the Soviet Union declined to 85. Due to the oppression under Khrushchev, by January 1, 1956 the number declined even further to 57; 20 of them were monasteries and 37 were convents. However in the RSFSR there were only 2 functioning monasteries: the Sergiev-Troitse and the Pskov Pecher, and no convents. Half the monasteries were in the Ukraine, where the repression was considerably less then in the Russian Federal Republic. Nonetheless, ROC prelates stilled hoped that the persecution would subside. On May 16, 1959, Patr. Aleksei and Metr. Nikolai again wrote to Khrushchev, informing him that the administrative measures against the church were illegal according to Soviet law: the repression of the clergy, closure of churches, and Soviet public demonstrations and parades which offended the religious beliefs of the people. Nothing occurred for a few months, and then Karpov replied, stating that the patriarch’s accusations against the Soviet regime in the letter could not be confirmed, and that Khrushchev could only accept the letter as being defamatory and slanderous of the Soviet regime.

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era On August 21, 1959, Pravda published an article “Against Religious Prejudices,” where, according to the words of Karpov, the method had already been determined by which scientific-atheistic propaganda should be disseminated. Pressure on the patriarchate became more and more fierce and relentless. The Soviets required the ROC to curb all philanthropic and charitable activities, even the payment of pensions to retired priests, and to curb the funneling of money or subsistence to the patriarchate, and funds to monasteries and parishes for renovation and remodeling. The persecution against the church involved measures that were very similar to those of the 1930s. There was a massive closure of churches in 1959, so that from 13,372 operating churches at the start of the year they were down to 13,008 by January 1, 1960. Most of those closed were in the out-lying villages. The clergy likewise declined, from 12,099 in 1959 to 11,407 the following year. By January 1, 1960, there were only 14 monasteries and 28 convents open in Soviet Russia. As the situation deteriorated and the ROC faced a clear danger, on December 10, 1959 Patr. Aleksei and Metr. Nikolai met again with Karpov. The delegates explained that the ROC was destitute. However, Karpov firmly declared that scientific-atheist propaganda had been disseminated and would continue to be disseminated, because it was the law of the land and the ideology of the Communist Party. He also informed them that scientific-atheist propaganda did not have as its purpose the discredit of the ROC, or its physical elimination. The goal of scientific-atheist propaganda consisted in the education of the Russian people, including believers, in the spirit of atheism. The Soviet regime saw no need to artificially support the declining number of ROC churches. On January 13, 1960, another resolution was issued by the Central Committee of the Supreme Soviet which initiated further persecution of Orthodox adherence in Soviet Russia, now on a house to house basis. On February 21, 1960, by a decree of the Supreme Soviet, Karpov was retired from his chairmanship of the Department of ROC Affairs. Apparently he had failed to sufficiently reduce Aleksei’s influence on the Russian people, and the Kremlin was tired of the patriarch’s attacks against the Soviet regime and his continual letters to the members of the Soviet leadership. Karpov was succeeded by Kuroedov, who took up new administrative and legal measures against the ROC, not only to undermine its influence in the country but to suppress the clergy’s efforts in opposition. The primary individual on Kuroedov’s list to suppress was Metr. Nikolai, and he insisted on having the metropolitan exiled from Moscow. This was something that could not be done publicly because Metr.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Nikolai had acquired enormous visibility and influence over the years since his meeting with Stalin in 1943. Kuroedov succeeded nonetheless and on May 22, 1960, Metr. Nikolai preformed his final liturgy and then he was transferred to Sukhumi, on eastern shore of the Black Sea, at the foot of the Caucasus Mountains. On December 13, 1961 Metr. Nikolai passed away. The number of parishes in Russian continued to decline. On January 1, 1961, there were 11,541, a decline of 1,437 from the previous year. On April 18, 1961, Patr. Aleksei, Metr. Pitirim and Archbishop Pimen of Tula, met with Kuroedov. The patriarch was very agitated, and began the conversation with a series of complaints about the activities on the part of the Soviets, particularly the closures of ROC churches in rural areas and the arrangements that directly threatened the ROC’s financial survival. As with other meetings with the predecessor of Kuroedov, there was little success from this latest discussion. Increasing their persecution of the ROC, the Soviets closed more churches and monasteries. At the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, Khrushchev gave a report stating that religion was now the chief and sole institution remaining as the ideological enemy of Marxism. Toward the end of 1963, by order of Khrushchev, the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee issued a plan on antireligious struggle called Measures to Confirm Atheist Education of the Population. Much as in the late 20s and early 30s, it was a massive campaign to promote atheism through the public school system and at the same time to expose the ROC as a sham and a charade. By 1963, the official number of churches in the Russian Federation (RSFSR) declined to 2,093; in the Ukraine, there were 5,114, with a few more in Belarus, Moldavia, the Baltic Republics, and south-central Asia. However, these figures must have been largely inflated because it was next to impossible to find a church in any city in the Russian Federation. In Kiev there were only eight churches and in Odessa there were nine churches. There was hardly one church each in Novgorod, Oral, Chernigov, and Riga. By 1964, only 18 monasteries and convents remained operating in the entirety of the Soviet Union. Even as the repression of the ROC progressed, in December 1960, Patr. Aleksei proceeded on a second pilgrimage to the Holy Land and to the holy places of the east. He met with Patriarchs Afanagor of Constantinople, Christofor of Alexandria, Theodosius VI of Antioch, and Benedict of Jerusalem. During Easter of 1962, Patriarch Aleksei visited the Balkan republics and met with Patriarchs German of Serbia, Justin of Romania, and Kirill of Bulgaria. He

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era also participated in June 1963 in the 1,000-year anniversary celebration of Mount Athos Monastery in Greece. On October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was purged from his position by Communist Party leaders. The new leadership, Alexei Nikolaievich Kosygin, President of the Soviet Union, and Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, did not immediately involve themselves in the religionatheism battle. The mantle of authority was passed to Mikhail Suslov, the political genius of Soviet atheistic ideology. His approach was to continue the struggle against religion without direct physical suppression or attacks against the institution of the ROC, but with the increase of scientific-atheist education, literature and propaganda. He believed that the more important issues for the success of the USSR were the economy and education, and that suppressing religion was not in the best interests of the Soviet Union. The first of the major changes came on December 8, 1965, a year after Khrushchev’s purge, when the Department of ROC Affairs was merged with the Department of Religious Affairs. The number of churches began to increase — 1966 had 7,523 parishes; but by 1971 it decreased again, to 7,274. The number of monasteries and convents remained relatively constant through the decade of the 1960s at about 18. Patr. Aleksei I continued to exert every effort to expand the ROC throughout Russia now that greater liberties were granted him by the Soviet regime. On April 17, 1970, Patriarch Aleksei died.

190. PATRIARCH PIMEN After his death, the Patriarchal Deputy position was filled in accordance with earlier ROC resolutions, and it was assigned to the eldest member of the Sacred Synod, Metr. Pimen Izvekov of Krutitzk. During a meeting of the Sacred Synod of May 15, 1970, the Synod decided to summon the episcopal clergy and all adherents of the ROC to perform a requiem on behalf of the deceased Patr. Aleksei, one year from the day of his death. On July 25, 1970, the Sacred Synod under the chairmanship of Metr. Pimen made arrangements for a regional ecclesiastical conference of the ROC in order to select a new patriarch. A new commission was formed in order to make the preliminary arrangements, and they held their preliminary meeting on March 26, 1971 at the Novo-Devichi Monastery. There was considerable discussion regarding the candidates for the patriarchate. The vast majority favored Metr. Pimen, but the Archbishop of Brussels,

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Vasili Krivoshein, also had his supporters. Some participants preferred a secret ballot and others were in favor of open voting. The Regional Council began May 20, 1971 at the Troitse-Sergeev Monastery, consisting of 236 members: 75 prelates, 85 parish priests, and 78 laypersons representing 67 dioceses within Russia and 14 dioceses outside of Russia, as well as monasteries and seminaries. A representative also appeared for the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church. Among the guests were representatives of other Autonomous Orthodox Churches, including Patr. Nicholas IV of Alexandria, Katolicos Efrem II of Georgia, Patr. Justinian of Romania, Metr. Maksim of Bulgaria, Metr. Vasili of Poland, Metr. Dorofius of Prague, and the general secretary of the World Council of Churches, U. K. Blake. Although many issues were on the agenda, including the administration of the ROC and its relationship with the Soviet state and with groups outside of Russia, education and seminaries, the primary focus of the conference was the selection of a new patriarch. On June 2, an open vote was taken beginning with the most recent prelate ordained in the ROC, Bishop Platon Lovankov of Samarkand, and ending with the eldest prelate within the ROC, Metro Nikodim of Leningrad. The vote was unanimous in favor of Metr. Pimen. The ordination of Metr. Pimen as Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia was held June 4, 1971 at the Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral in Moscow. After his ordination, the Sacred Synod proceeded on June 25 to assign the now vacant cathedra of Krutitzk to Archbishop Seraphim Nikitin. Patr. Pimen, for all practical purposes, continued the activity that was set by his predecessor, Patriarch Aleksei. Pimen was born Sergei Mikhailovich Izvekov on July 23, 1910 in the city of Vogorodsk, into a rather wealthy family. In 1925, when he finished middle school, Sergei Mikhailovich moved to Moscow, and at his young age accepted tonsure as a monk, taking the new name of Platon. On October 4, 1927, at the age of 17, he took a second tonsure and this time accepted the name of Pimen. After his tonsure, he became a director of the choir at the Moscow Cathedral of St. Pimen the Great, his namesake. On July 16, 1931, he was ordained as a hierodeacon and on January 25, 1932 as hieromonk. He became prior of the BogoYavlenski Cathedral of Moscow, where he remained for several years. In 1946, Pimen was moved to Odessa, where he was assigned as rector at Ilyinski Monastery, and in 1947 he became abbot. In 1949, under the direction of Patr. Aleksei, Pimen was assigned the position of abbot of Pskov Pecher Monastery. In 1950 he was elevated to the position of archimandrite. In 1961, he became bishop of Tula diocese, and then two years later became metropolitan of Krutitzk and a close

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era associate and friend of Patr. Aleksei. During the 1970s, ROC ecclesiastical life remained relatively stable and proceeded without any upheavals, as in the early years of the Khrushchev regime before the persecution began again. The state policy toward the ROC remained more or less the same as it was shortly after Khrushchev was purged. In 1975, the Central Committee issued a new resolution in regard to religious societies, granting some relief in the status and conditions of the church. In a change from the 1936 constitution, religious societies now had the right to acquire ecclesiastical paraphernalia, property, means of transportation (meaning automobiles, etc.), and to rent, build and buy buildings for their needs, as long as they followed normal legal channels. Essentially, this gave the ROC considerable new freedom. Two specific points were the following: “The religious societies now have the right to distribute contributions and gather voluntary contributions for the purpose of renovation and remodeling for their places of worship.” “Religious processions which are preformed, religious rites and ceremonies, outdoors and in public, and likewise in apartments and homes, are permitted, as long as the executive committee of the region gives approval for it.”

But there was nothing new compared to the earlier Soviet legislation that actually pertained to the legal status of religious societies. In 1977, a new constitution of the USSR was legislated under Leonid Brezhnev, now Premier of the USSR and Secretary-General of the Communist Party. Article 52 stated: Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to confess any religion, or not to confess any at all; to fulfill religious worship or to carry on atheist propaganda. To excite malice or hate in regard to religious convictions is prohibited. The church in the USSR is separated from the state and the school from the church.

Even then USSR citizens who were members of the ROC still did not have rights equal to those of the atheists. Equal rights were accorded regardless of nationality, race, and gender; however, the state still looked with disfavor on those who attended church. On October 26, 1977 Theodosei Dikun, Bishop of Poltava, made another effort in the defense of the ROC. He wrote to Premier Brezhnev, noting that even though certain freedoms had been extended to the ROC on paper, in practice conditions had scarcely improved. The wide scale persecutions under Khrushchev had not yet been ameliorated and it was still difficult for parishes to exercise their rights under the new legislation.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Some villages had to close their churches as a result of the population migration from rural areas to the cities, but new churches were hardly ever opened even in the cities because of bureaucratic obstacles. (At least, during the 1970s, churches were not being shut down in large numbers as in earlier decades.) In a report presented at a conference on May 6, 1978, Patr. Pimen stated that only four churches had been built and seven old churches reopened in the past several months — hardly sufficient enough to satisfy the needs of Russia’s large population. In the city of Gorki (formerly known as Nizhni Novgorod) with its one and a half million residents, there were only three churches. In 1978, five groups were formed in various regions of the city and they petitioned the local Soviets for access to churches that had been closed down. But their efforts were futile. In the far east of Siberia, the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sakhalin Islands, and the Kirill Islands, not one ROC church was available. People in Kamchatka who were members of the ROC petitioned for ten years to have a ROC church opened in the region, but they were always turned down. In 1971, the official statistics of the Department of Religious Affairs stated that there were 7,274 churches in the entirety of the USSR; by 1975, the quantity increased to 7,762 churches; while the number decreased in 1976 to 7,038; by 1981 it decreased again, to 7,007. But as in the era of Patr. Aleksei, the numbers were inflated for propaganda purposes: to give the impression that the ROC was not being oppressed by the Brezhnev government and that religious freedoms were being utilized by the general population without interference by Soviet officials. As the countryside lost population and the cities grew, churches continued to be shut down while it was nearly impossible to open a new church where demand was high. It was also difficult to find candidates for the priesthood. In 1971, the ROC had 6,234 parish priests; in the following year, 6,180; in 1975, 5,994. There were few candidates for the seminaries and it was hard for them to graduate and be placed in a church. In 1979, only 276 individuals were ordained as priests. In the beginning of the 1970s, fewer people were attending church then ten years earlier during the era of the Khrushchev persecution. During the 1970s monasteries held more or less steady, at about 20; even with the freedoms newly legislated, it was almost impossible to open a new monastery or to take over one that had been forced to close in earlier years. During the 1970s, the ROC became involved in organizations like the World Council of Churches. An ROC delegation headed by Metr. Juvanali of Krutitzk attended a WCC Congress session November through December 1975,

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era in Nairobi, Kenya. In October 1979, a Congress of the European Council of Churches met on the Island of Crete, and was attended by ROC representatives. Other meetings in Austria in March 1977, and in 1971 in Budapest, were also attended by representatives of the ROC. It was not until 1987 that the number of ROC parish churches began to increase in significant numbers. At that time also the famous monastery of Optina Pustin was re-opened. At the end of April 1988, Patr. Pimen and members of the Holy Synod met with Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who became Premier of the USSR and Secretary-General of the Communist Party in 1985. The premier said that the tragic events of the period of Stalin’s personality cult had had considerable detrimental effects on ecclesiastical organizations, but he was attempting to rectify the errors and to issue new legislation on the freedom of conscience that would improve the status of all religious societies and organizations in Soviet Russia. (As with the amelioration of ROC oppression in earlier times, the Gorbachev Soviet government was initiating such reforms, not for the sake of the ROC, but because the Communist Party felt this would be in the best interests of the Soviet state.) Patr. Pimen in response mentioned the importance of the upcoming celebration of the 1,000-year anniversary of the baptism of Russia, and noted that the ROC had always directed its efforts and its concern for the benefit of the entire nation of Russia. As a gesture of reconciliation between the Soviet state and the ROC, on May 26, 1988, by order of Gorbachev, Soviet officials at the Armory Chamber of the Kremlin gave back to ROC officials various sacred items that had been preserved in the Kremlin museum since the time of the Revolution in 1917. At the same time, the Kiev Pecher Monastery was given back to the ROC to be converted from a museum to a functioning religious institution. In 1986, the ROC had 6,794 parishes (down from 213 in 1981), but by 1987 the number had increased by 60. The commemoration of the 1,000-year anniversary of the introduction of Christianity into Russia (in 988) was indeed a great occasion in the history of the Church. A few years prior to 1988, the Sacred Synod formed a commission under the chairmanship of Patr. Pimen to coordinate activities related to the preparation of the jubilee. The patriarch asked the Soviet authorities for a monastery in Moscow to be utilized for the celebration, and in 1982 Brezhnev gave them back the Holy Danilov monastery. The facilities were remodeled entirely, and converted back from a tourist site to a proper reception room and service buildings; the monastery as a whole was remodeled for the new celebration. Evlogi Smirnov was named as archimandrite.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV The millennial anniversary of the baptism of Russia, held June 5-12, 1988, was the greatest ROC celebration of the entire 20th century in Soviet Russia, and was attended by ecclesiastical dignitaries from all over the world, including Patr. Ignatius IV of Antioch, Patr. Diodor of Jerusalem, Katolicos Elijah II of Georgia, Patr. Maksim of Bulgaria, Metr. Vasili of Poland, Metr. Dorofius of Prague, Metr. Feodosius of America, and several others from Europe. The attending ROC prelates met in a special commission and a report was issued by Metr. Juvenali on June 6, citing the need to canonize additional ROC saints. The candidates presented by the metropolitan were the venerated prince of Moscow Dmitri Donskoi, artist and icon painter Andrei Rublyev, scholar Maksim the Greek, Metr. Makari of Moscow, venerated scholar and ascetic Paisei Velichkovski, venerated female martyr Ksenia of St. Petersburg, venerated Abbot of Optina Pustin Monastery Ambrosi, and also the hermit Feofan Zatvornik. In conclusion, the report expressed the necessity of additional canonizations of ROC martyrs and confessors in the future. At a meeting on June 7, Metr. Vladimir Sobodon of Rostov gave a report on the basic measures of ecclesiastical life in the country. At the time of the millennial celebration, he stated that the ROC had 6, 893 perish churches; 67 dioceses in Russia, and nine outside of Russia; 74 bishops, 6,674 priests, 723 deacons; 22 monasteries and convents, which included 1,190 monks and nuns; and 2,000 students enrolled in ROC religious academies and seminaries (a figure that had not been attained since 1918). After the end of the celebration, further discussions were held with Soviet officials of the Kremlin in regard to the re-appropriation of churches that had been confiscated since 1917. During the first five months of 1988, 60 churches were opened; during the second half of 1988, 1,000 churches were opened, more than had ever occurred in any year since 1917 (even though the majority of these were in the Ukraine). Nonetheless, in the Russian Federation alone, on January 1, 1990, there were 3,120 ROC parish churches. Between 1988 and 1989, 29 new monasteries were opened. The number of functioning monasteries in the USSR was now at about 52, still considerably fewer than in 1917, but a great step in the recent expansion of ROC monasticism nonetheless. In October 9-11, 1989, an episcopal conference was held at the Holy Danilov Monastery in Moscow to discuss the ROC position on the new law regarding freedom of conscience which Soviet authorities were in process of developing. Several points that ROC prelates felt should be included in the new legislation of Freedom of Conscience were agreed on and were presented to the

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era Soviet officials. The first point was the legal status of the ROC and the suggestion that it should be recognized as a religious organization having the same rights as any other social organization in Soviet Russia. The second item was that as a religious organization the ROC should have the same rights as did the atheist organizations in regard to education and propaganda. If atheism was to continue to be propagated in Russia, then the ROC should have equal rights in regard to education, and publication and dissemination of literature. Third, the ROC wanted the right to conduct missionary work and charity work, which had been prohibited since 1918. Fourth, the ROC sought the freedom to publish and distribute religious literature. Fifth, the ROC wished to have access to information regarding the persecution of the ROC since 1918, which had been withheld from them and the general public, and which was stored in secret Soviet archives. The final point was to end the discrimination against ROC clergy lay-people who worked for the ROC, including an end to the punitive taxes levied against them, and the wish that they should be considered nothing less than equal with all the other Soviet citizens in the country. After so many frustrations, this time their wishes were granted, as will be seen below. After about twenty years as Patriarch of All Russia, Pimen passed away May 3, 1990, at 3 o’clock in the afternoon at his residence at the Chisti Crossing. On May 6, he was entombed in a crypt at the Uspenski Cathedral at the TroitseSergeev Monastery, nearby his predecessor, Aleksei I.

191. PATRIARCH ALEKSEI II AND THE EDICT OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE On the day Patr. Pimen died, May 3, 1990, a meeting of the Sacred Synod was held. At this meeting Metr. Filaret of Kiev was selected as patriarchal deputy. They also made plans to convene a regional ROC ecclesiastical conference in order to select a new patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia. On June 6, at the patriarchal residence at the Holy-Danilov Monastery, the Episcopal Conference was held. Ninety-two bishops of the ROC attended, and of them 75 were eligible candidates for the Patriarchal office. They had to be 40 years of age or older, and had to be citizens of the USSR. During the first electoral round, Metr. Aleksei of Leningrad received the most votes (37). Metr. Vladimir of Rostov came in second, with 34 votes, while Metr. Filaret of Kiev and Metr. Juvenali of Krutitzk each received 25 votes. The semi-final vote was taken on June 7, with Metr. Aleksei of Leningrad receiving 139 votes; Metr. Vladimir of Rostov, 107

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV votes; and Metr. Filaret of Kiev, 66 votes. In the final vote, Metr. Aleksei received the majority of 166 votes. On June 10, at Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral in Moscow, Aleksei was ordained Patriarch of Russia. The newest patriarch was born Aleksei Mikhailovich Ridiger on February 23, 1939, in the city Tallinn, Estonia. At the age of 17, he went to the Leningrad religious seminary but was not allowed to enter because of his young age. He waited there until the following year, and at the age of 18 entered the seminary. By 1950, he was an assistant priest. In 1953, he was tonsured as a monk and was assigned as abbot of the Bogo-Yavlenski Church in the city Iyevin in Estonia, where he remained until 1957. On August 17, 1958, Aleksei was promoted to protopriest; and on March 30, 1959, he became assistant vicar of Tallinn Diocese. On August 14, 1961, Aleksei was ordained as bishop of Tallinn and Estonia; on September 3, 1961, he was ordained as archbishop of Yaroslav. On June 23, 1964, Aleksei became archbishop of Tallinn, and began to head the affairs of the Moscow patriarchate later that year. Through 1986, he lived in Moscow and took care of the affairs of the Moscow patriarchate under Patr. Pimen. On July 29, 1986, Metr. Aleksei was assigned the episcopacy of Leningrad diocese where he remained until his ordination as patriarch. Patr. Aleksei II communicated with Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the USSR, regarding the ROC’s critical attitude toward the new legislation regarding of Law of Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, and he provided the Church’s input in regard to the new law. The report was accepted by the Soviet Duma and many of the ideas were incorporated. On October 1, 1990, the new law was issued by the Soviet government. The important part was Article 6, which stated that, “Religious organizations that are registered in the normal legal manner can provide religious education of children and adults, create religious schools and groups, and also provide religious education in other forms.” The law forbid the use of military or any other force against any type of worship, and the law did permit the performance of religious rites in hospitals, hotels, homes for the elderly, as well as in prisons and in concentration camps, and stated that the administration of these religious societies would be agreeable and conducive to ROC clergy. This new law was the first real relief the ROC had since its humiliation and subjection to the state by Tsar Peter I. A second law was issued the following month, November 1990, by the Russian Federation, which was in effect until the year 2000, when another law on Freedom of Conscience was issued in Russia. Through 1990, the ROC was able to continue to acquire more churches, essentially those that had

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The Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet Era been closed down earlier. Continual contributions from the local population gave them the ability to restore them. The Russian nation still has strides to take to guarantee freedom of conscience and worship for all citizens. Much as with the era of the Provisional Government, the ROC presently takes the approach of promoting itself as the national religion and is pressuring the government to legalize it as such. Because of the tight association between the Russian state and the ROC, both historically and politically, legislation in this area favors the ROC. Minority Christian denominations, and those imported from Europe and America — Adventists, Mormons, Baptists, Pentecostals, etc. — have been subtly suppressed in legislation. The Russian government in the latest series of legislation is inclined toward the recognition of native Russian denominations, because of their fear of damage to the nation should foreign denominations be allotted the same freedoms. *** The deciding factor that led Patriarchs Tikhon and Sergei, and the many metropolitans and other prelates, to compromise their principles and capitulate to the demands of the Soviet state was the need to secure the survival of the ROC as an institution. Their Church could not exist without edifices, altars, icons, the performance of rites, and the ecclesiastical appurtenances that pertained to their traditional form of worship. They could not fathom an ROC without priests and their vestments, the sacerdotal hierarchy, and recognition as the national religious institution of Russia. But the compromises they made lost the ROC the respect of the population and led to its liquidation by the Soviet state. The unanswerable question believers will debate for all posterity is whether, in retrospect, the better choice would have been for these supreme prelates to suffer complete martyrdom by refusing to betray the honor of the ROC to the Soviet state, and rather to depend on the invisible God in heaven to maintain its existence and restore it in the future. *** The fifth volume of this History of Russian Christianity will deal with the Sectarians and Protestants, and a few non-Christian religions, of the Soviet era.

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APPENDIX 192. FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOLOVETSKI MONASTERY Somewhere at the end of the wide world, on the shores of the icebound sea, where eight months in the year winter reigns, where for months the sun does not appear, there stands the God-protected Convent of Zosimo-Savvatievo. — A Solovetski Monastery Monk

The Solovetski Islands are a small archipelago of six large islands, and several smaller ones, located in the White Sea at the entrance to Onega Bay, just below the Arctic Circle (65o N lat., 36o E. long.). The islands are 60 sea miles east of Kem and 166 sea miles west of Archangel. The largest is Solovetski Island (“Solovki” for short); others are Anzorski, Bolshoi (Great) Muksolmski, Malyi (Small) Muksolmski, Zayatski, and Kond Island. Solovetski, the largest, is 17 miles long and 11 miles wide with an area of about 150 square miles. The island is covered with pine and spruce forests along with about 300 small lakes and marshes. During winter the island is barely accessible, due to the cold and icy climate. Only for a few months in late summer is access possible by boat. Solovetski Monastery was founded in 1429 by Saint Hermann and Saint Savvatiev (Sabatias), monks from the Kiril-Belozersk Monastery. The first church was built by Saint Zosima in 1436. Most of the buildings of the monastery were built between 1558 and 1566 during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. To encourage them in developing the area, the Tsar patronized the monks of the

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV monastery with grants of land that eventually totaled about 300,000 acres. Other churches were added later with the final one in 1834. One side of the monastery borders Blagopoluchi (Benevolent) Bay and the opposite side Svyatoi Ozero (Holy Lake). Surrounding the monastery grounds is a wall 35 to 40 feet high and 15 to 18 feet thick. The wall, about 1,100 yards in perimeter, encloses an area of close to eight acres. The monastery walls have seven gates and eight towers, built between 1584 and 1594. With the completion of the walls Solovetski Monastery became an impregnable fortress. When the Russian Civil War broke out shortly after the October Revolution, Solovki was occupied by about 700 monks along with 1,000 workers of various trades and fields. The Soviet Red Army reached the monastery island in late 1918, and took control of the facilities. Some monks were executed, others were assigned to incarceration in other prisons, and a few joined the Red Army. In the tradition of Russian atrocities, the grounds were pillaged and everything of value — primarily artworks, gold and silver, and money — was confiscated and taken to Moscow. The library and archives were also partially transferred to Moscow. A Soviet official, B.D. Grekov, handled the movement of documents and other items from Solovki in 1919-1921. In five months the grounds were ruined. The constructive efforts of over 400 years were transformed into desolation in a few months. It is not clear how many residents remained on the island, but by late 1920 the monastery was a wasteland. Grekov’s reports led the Soviets to consider using the monastery as a concentration camp for political prisoners — by 1921, all the existing prisons in the interior of the country were already filled. The reports also of the many industries and financial advantage in the operations and management of the businesses gave greater impetus to the Soviets in establishing Solovetski Monastery as the first and primary forced labor camp of the 1920s. Slave prison labor could then be used in these industries to boost the Soviet economy. A new Soviet ministry was instituted, the Northern Camps of Special Designation (SLON — Severnoi Lagar Osobennoi Naznachenia), to manage prisons in the northwest. Solovetski Island became the core of these prisons, a kind of Alcatraz. The first group arrived in May of 1922. They were officers of the defeated White Army. Following them came the sailors from the rebellion at Kronshtadt Naval Base, which occurred in March of 1921. Several members of the clergy, monks and priests, were also exiled to Solovki at this time. By the end of

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Appendix 1922, Solovki had a population of about 2,000 inmates, including 50 priests and monks (now as inmates). In July of 1923 an estimated 4,000 people were in forced labor under the administration of Solovki, including 400 of the religious order. In 1925 about 7,000 inmates were confined on the island and by 1929 about 20,000. The central monastery grounds at Solovki were the main camp along with two others on the island: Savvatievski Hermitage and the Sekirnoi Mountain Hermitage. The islands Gr. Maksolmi, Anzorski and Kond also had concentration camps. Much as in tsarist Russia, the prisoners were all enemies of the state — violators of Soviet law. They were mainly divided into three classes: criminal (thieves, murderers, etc.), political (anti-Soviet, White Army, etc.), and religious (remnants of the Orthodox Clergy). A number of women were also exiled to Solovki, who inevitably ended up as prostitutes (which profession many of them had pursued earlier) for the camp officials and guards. With about 2,000 prisoners housed on the monastery grounds in May of 1923, it was practically inevitable that a mutiny would occur. Some went on hunger strikes, and newly-relocated prisoners tried to file a set of demands. The conditions at Solovetski Island along with the forced labor regime were beyond any endurance, worse than any of the prisons on mainland Soviet Russia. The neglect of the buildings left the prisoners exposed to the elements and condemned to martyrdom. A fire broke out in some barracks alongside the Uspenski Tower at 2 o’clock in the morning on May 26, 1923. It lasted three days. Most of the buildings were damaged or destroyed (out of 30 buildings, seven were entirely razed including the cathedral and bell tower). Along with the buildings, all that was left of the library and archives were destroyed, along with munitions, treasures and artifacts. The loss was estimated at 70,000 rubles in gold at that time (about $60 million at the present exchange rate). According to Soviet accounts, arson was suspected: official reports indicated that the fire was started by “counterrevolutionaries” from among the monks — about 50 in these barracks at the time. In reality, ROC clergy probably started the fire to destroy the monastery, rather than allow the atheistic Soviets to desecrate such a sacred shrine by using it as a concentration camp. The buildings were repaired by inmates as part of their forced labor. Several hundred inmates were executed — including a massacre on December 19, 1923 — and conditions worsened for those left behind. Needless to say, no reprimands were ever received from Moscow.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Since it was almost impossible to escape from Solovetski — and since the facilities were so suitable — it was an opportune site for a forced labor camp and the Soviets used it as such throughout the 1930s. Most of the prisoners endured only one or two years due to the harsh climate coupled with the demands of penal labor. Records of incarceration at Solovki end about 1940, coincidentally about the same time that forced labor was increasingly needed in Siberia for gold mining and other forms of development in the frozen wastelands to the east. This is only an assumption. We will probably never know about the termination of Solovetski as a concentration camp. In 1974, the Solovetski Islands were designated a State architectural, historical and natural preserve.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS IN ENGLISH Casey, Robert Pierce, Religion in Russia, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946. Cummingham, James, W. A Vanquished Hope, St Vladimir’s Press, New York, 1981. Curtiss, John Shelton, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, Little, Brown and Co. Boston, 1953. Davis, Nathaniel, A Long Walk to Church, Westview Press, 2003. Figes, Orlando, A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924. Penguin Books, 1996. Hecker, Julius F., Religion and Communism, Hyperion Press, Westport, CT, 1933. Hecker, Julius F., Religion under the Soviets, Vanguard Press, New York, 1927. Hill, Kent R., The Puzzle of the Soviet Church, Multnomah Press, Portland, OR, 1989. Hosking, Geoffrey, Russia, People and Empire, Harvard University Press, 1977. Lincoln, W. Bruce, The Romanovs, Autocrats of all the Russias, Anchor Books, 1981. Marshall, Richard H. (Ed.), Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971 Pipes, Richard, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution, Vintage Books, New York, 1996. Pospielovski, Dmitri, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia, St. Vladimir’s Press, New York, 1981. Pospielovsky, Dmitri, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, St. Vladimir’s Press, New York, 1984. Preobrazhensky, Alexandr (Ed.), The Russian Orthodox Church, 10th to 20th Centuries, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1988. Radzinsky, Edward, The Rasputin File, Anchor Books, New York, 2001. Raines, John (Ed.), Marx on Religion, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2002.

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Service, Robert, A History of Twentieth Century Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988. Simon, Gerhart, Church, State and Opposition in the USSR, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1974. Spinka, Matthew, The Church and the Russian Revolution, Macmillian Co. New York, 1927. Treadgold, Donald W., Twentieth Century Russia, Houghton Miffin Co, Boston, 1981. Troyat, Henri, Daily Life in Russia under the Last Tsar, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. 1979

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INDEX

Central Committee Soviet Union, 52, 59, 70, 72, 137, 141, 159–160, 162–163, 165–166, 169 Cheka, 2, 50, 52–53, 71, 74, 77, 79–81, 84, 88, 102, 106, 120 Christian socialism, 67 Communist Party, 70, 135, 142, 159, 162, 165– 167, 169, 171 constitution of the USSR, 169

A Agafangel, Metr., 20, 23, 80–81, 88–89, 102, 107, 109, 112, 116–117, 120–123, 132–133 Albania, 159 Aleksei II, Patr., 127, 173–174 Alexandra Feodorevna, 14, 49 Alexandr-Nevski Monastery, 34, 38–40, 74 All-Russia Central Executive Committee, 3, 45, 73, 76, 95 American Methodist Episcopal Church, 107 Ancient Apostolic Church, 93, 96, 100 Anglican Church, 32, 152, 163 Archbishop Joseph, 116, 124 Archbishop of Canterbury, 72, 135 Archbishop of Westminster, 82 Armenia, 47, 54 Armenian Orthodox Church, 55 atheism, 22, 38, 55, 60, 136–137, 148, 157, 160, 163, 165–167, 173 Azerbaijan, 54

D Declaration, 127–133, 158 Denikin, A.I., General, 55, 62, 136 Department of Internal Affairs, 66, 93, 115, 117– 118, 121, 123, 126, 128 Department V, 49, 59 Donskoi Monastery, 68, 81, 88, 97, 99, 101–102, 108, 110–111, 117 Dzerzhinski, Felix Edmundovich, 77

E Edino-Veria, 44 Elizaveta Feodorevna, 49 Estonia, 54, 56, 146, 156, 174 Evdokim Mecherski, 100–101, 104

B Belarus, 33, 47, 93, 107, 144–146, 158, 164, 166 Benedict XV, Pope, 72 Bezbozhnik (Godless), 103 Bishop of York, 72 Black Hundreds, 11, 71, 75–76 Bogo-Yavlenski Cathedral, 142, 147, 152, 154, 156, 168, 174 Bonch-Bruevich, Vladimir, 43, 49, 59 Boyarski, A.I., 66, 71, 74–75, 77, 79, 86, 93, 141 Brethren of the Resurrection of Christ, 38 Bukharin, Nikolai, 77, 103 Butirski Prison, 107, 116, 130, 140, 143

F Finland, 13, 16, 19, 23, 47, 50, 54, 145, 152 firing squad, 36, 41, 49–51, 56, 59, 77–78, 82, 87– 88, 128, 132, 140–144 Free Laboring Church, 94 Freedom of Conscience, 1, 34, 172–174 Friends of Ecclesiastical Reformation, 66

G

C

Georgia, 20, 47, 54, 147, 168, 172 Georgian Orthodox Church, 55, 152

Cathedral of Sts Zechariah and Elizabeth, 65

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A History of Russian Christianity, Vol. IV Germany, 17–18, 47, 51, 82, 145, 147–148, 150, 155–156 Giorgievski, Evlogi, 17, 55, 61, 65, 128, 136 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 1, 34, 171, 174 GPU (State Political Government), 2, 70, 80, 88–89, 97, 102, 107, 109, 114–117, 120–121, 123–125, 128–129, 131–133, 139–141 Granovski, Antonin, 66, 68, 71, 75, 79–83, 92– 93, 95–96 Grigori of Ekaterinburg, 101, 117 Grigori VII, Patr., 106–107 Grigorians, 117–120, 122, 141

79–81, 83–87, 90, 93–94, 102, 105–107, 113, 116, 124–125, 129–133, 138–141, 144, 147– 148, 152, 155–156, 158, 168, 173–174 Lithuania, 54, 146 Lubyanka Prison, 52, 73, 88, 97, 99, 116, 119–120, 122, 125, 143 Lvov, Vladimir, 65, 91, 94

M

Izvestiya, 73, 75, 77, 80, 94, 98, 100, 109–112, 115, 118, 127, 134, 138, 161

Moldova, 145, 155, 160, 163 Molotov, V.M., 1, 70, 150–151, 156 monasteries, 33–34, 38, 46–47, 53, 59, 76–77, 90–91, 96, 137, 144–145, 164–168, 170, 172 Mongols, 44 Moscow, 2, 9, 11, 15, 19, 21–23, 30, 34–38, 40, 45, 47, 49–50, 52, 55, 58, 60–62, 66–69, 74– 76, 78–83, 89–96, 98, 100, 102, 104–106, 110, 113–114, 117–126, 128, 130–131, 133, 137–138, 140, 142–147, 149–152, 156–161, 163, 165, 168, 171–174, 178–179, 181 Mount Athos Monastery, 167

J

N

H Hitler, Adolph, 148–149 Houses of Scientific Knowledge, 159

I

Narimski Krai, 89 National Church, 66 New Economic Policy (NEP), 70 Nicholas II, Tsar, 1, 7, 9, 12, 17, 19, 49, 54, 69, 83, 104, 116, 152 Nizhni-Novgorod, 1, 56, 100–101, 107, 112, 116– 118, 122, 124–126, 140, 143, 152

Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, 123, 151, 153

K Kalinovski, S., 67, 79–81, 83 Kamchatka, 37, 52, 144, 158, 170 Karlovtzi Congress, 63–65, 73, 85, 97, 108, 110– 111, 115–116, 128, 159 Karpov, G.G., 150–153, 157, 164–165 Katolicos, 55, 147, 152, 156, 168, 172 Kazanski, Veniamin, Metr., 39, 74, 83, 85, 105 Khrapovitzki, Antoni, 11, 23, 55, 61–62, 64, 92 Khrushchev, Nikolai Sergeich, 162–164, 166– 167, 169–170 Kirill of Kazan, 88, 93, 101–102, 105, 109, 116 Kirov, 2, 56, 125, 141 Kirov, S.M., 2, 56, 125, 141 Kolchak, Admiral, 52 Komi Province, 82, 84, 105, 107, 109, 125 Komsomol, 103, 134, 137, 159–160 Krasnikov, P.A., 49, 64, 85–86 Krasnitzki, Vladimir, 67, 75, 77, 80, 83–84, 86, 90–92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 105–106 Kremlin, 23, 36–37, 40, 45, 150, 158, 165, 171–172 Kuroedov, 165–166

O October Revolution, 52, 90, 147, 149, 178 Old Believers, 9, 44, 98 On the Separation of the Church from the State, 41

P Patr. Tikhon, 23, 40–41, 43, 47–48, 50–58, 60– 66, 68–70, 72–75, 77–81, 83, 87–89, 91–92, 94, 96–113, 115–118, 121, 123–124, 127–128 patriarchal church, 33, 93, 95, 100, 105–107, 136 Pavel Miliukov, 35, 42, 90, 117 Petluira, Semeon Vasilivich, 63 Petluira, Semeon Vasilyevich, 62 Petrograd (See Leningrad), 1, 16, 19, 21–22, 35– 36, 38–39, 44–45, 47, 50, 58, 65–67, 71, 74–75, 77, 79–81, 83–87, 90, 93–94, 102, 105–107, 113, 116, 124, 156 Pimen, Patr., 114, 158, 166–168, 170–171, 173–174 Pius XI, Pope, 82, 135 Platon, Metr., 20, 37, 56, 61, 111, 128–129, 168 Poland, 47, 63, 82, 145, 164, 168, 172 Politburo, 70, 76, 103 Polyanski, Peter, 101, 106, 110, 112, 142

L Latvia, 54, 146 Lenin, Vladimir, 1, 29–32, 47, 49, 57, 59, 70–71, 75–77, 90 Leningrad, 1, 11–12, 14, 16, 19, 21–22, 35–36, 38– 39, 44–45, 47, 50, 58, 65–68, 71, 74–75, 77,

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Index Pom-Gol, 72, 74–75 Pravda, 77, 137, 159, 165 Provisional Government, 16, 19–24, 44, 54, 60, 65–66, 175 Puritan Party of the Revolutionary Priesthood and Layperson, 94

St. Petersburg see Leningrad, 1, 11–12, 15, 19, 34, 68, 152, 172 Stalin, Josef, 1, 66, 77, 137, 141–142, 148, 150–153, 156, 159–160, 162–164, 166, 171 Stragorodski, Sergei, Metr., 19, 23, 60, 101, 107, 112–113, 116, 145, 152 Supreme Ecclesiastical Council, 73 Suslov, Mikhail Andreevich, 159–160, 167 Synodal Church, 98, 100, 103–107, 114, 128, 138, 140

R Rabochie Moskve (Moscow Worker), 104 Rasputin, Grigori Efimovich, 13–19, 181 Red Army, 51, 54–56, 61–62, 64, 77, 134, 154– 155, 178 Red Terror, 34, 66, 134, 142, 155 Regional Council, 20–25, 36–38, 40–47, 51, 55, 61–62, 69, 79–80, 83, 89, 95, 101, 127, 168 Religion in Unity with Life, 66 renovationists, 65–69, 71, 79–81, 83–84, 90–91, 93, 95, 97, 100–102, 104–106, 108, 112–114, 119, 138, 141, 144, 147–148, 153 Restoration Church, 92–93, 95, 97, 100 Revolution and Church, 104 Romania, 155, 159, 166, 168 Russian civil war, 40, 54, 56, 58, 62, 64, 70, 72, 92, 98 Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), 1, 3, 8–24, 29–67, 69–97, 99, 101–175, 179

T The Living Church, 83, 89–90, 92, 94, 97 Tikhon Obolenski, 103, 106, 113 Tikhon, Patriarch, Last Will and Testament of, 110 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 47, 51 Treaty of Paris, 48 Troitse-Sergeev Monastery, 58, 161, 168, 173 Trubetzkoi, E., Prince, 43 Tuchkov, Evgeni Alexandrovich, 71, 73, 81, 89, 99, 101–103, 105, 109–112, 114, 117–123, 125–126, 129, 131, 135, 137, 139, 153 Turkey, 47

U Ukraine, 11, 33, 47, 54–55, 60, 62–63, 72, 107, 143–146, 149, 152, 154, 157–158, 164, 166, 172 Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 3, 46, 61, 149, 154 Unia/Uniate Church, 145, 156–157 Union for the Expansion of Political and Scientific Knowledge, 159 Ural Mountains, 51, 54, 72, 139

S Sacred Synod, 24, 44, 46, 59–60, 62, 65, 73, 80, 93, 101–104, 109–110, 115, 117, 123–124, 127–133, 136, 139, 141, 150–151, 155–156, 167–168, 171, 173 Samarin, A.D., 15, 18–19, 39, 43, 59, 116 sectarians, 7, 9, 17, 29, 31, 34, 139, 142 Seraphim of Sarov Monastery, 34 Seraphim of Sarov, sepulcher of, 59 Seraphim Samuilovich, Archbishop, 101 Serbian Orthodox Church, 152 Sergei of Radonezh, 58 Shavelski, Giorgi, 65, 67 Siberia, 14, 31, 33–34, 54, 60, 97, 107, 109, 114, 126, 133, 138, 140, 143–144, 147, 154, 158, 170, 180 Simanski, Aleksei, 58, 84, 124, 127, 136, 139– 140, 145, 149–151, 155–156 Skoropadski, Pavel, 61–62 Society of Christian Brotherhood, 134 Society of the Defense of Brotherly Love, 134 Solovetski Monastery, 34, 103, 177–178 Soviet Union, 1, 33–34, 42, 80, 82, 104, 108, 128, 135, 137, 141–142, 144–145, 148, 151, 156– 157, 159, 161–164, 166–167, 181 Soviet-Polish War, 62 SovNarKom, 3, 39, 43, 45, 52, 58–59, 150, 153, 157 Sremski Karlovtzi, 64, 108

V Virgin of Kazan Cathedral, 34, 40, 50, 58, 85, 148 Vvedenski, Alexandr, 11, 65, 67, 71, 74–75, 77, 79–81, 83–86, 93–96, 98, 100, 107, 114, 138, 141, 144, 147, 154, 158

W White Army, 54–56, 64, 99–100, 136, 154, 178– 179 World Council of Churches, 168, 170 World War I, 14–15, 30, 32, 64, 68, 141, 145, 157–159 World War II, 141, 145, 157–159 Wrangel, Baron Pyotr Nik., General, 62, 64

Z Zenkovski, V.V., 62

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