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A History of International Political Theory
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A History of International Political Theory Ontologies of the International
Hartmut Behr Professor of International Politics, Newcastle University, UK
© Hartmut Behr 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–52486–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
To Mathias
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Contents Preface
ix
Acknowledgements
xi
Introduction The problematic and research questions Implications Conceptual remarks The structure of the book
1 1 5 11 17
Part I I.1
I.2
Universalism in Greek and Roman Antiquity and Christian Political Philosophy
Greek and Roman Antiquity 1. Thucydides 2. Cicero Christian Political Pragmatism and Ethical Universalism – Aurelius Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 1. Prolegomena 2. Political pragmatism in Augustine and Aquinas 3. Transcendental universalism and the intelligibility of order: Peace and justice
23 23 35 50 50 53 60
Part II Universalistic Thinking from Early Modern Times to Enlightenment II.1
II.2
Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy – Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria 1. Prolegomena 2. Universalistic human rights and their extension beyond Europe 3. Jurisdiction as landmark and guarantor for universal human rights and just war Universalistic Frameworks in Early Modern Political Theory 1. Niccolo Machiavelli 2. Thomas Hobbes 3. Immanuel Kant
vii
75 75 80 88 100 100 115 130
viii
Contents
Part III The Emergence of Particularism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries III.1
III.2
Philosophies of ‘National Interest’ 1. Hegel on ‘international law’ 2. National monumental historiography 3. Geopolitical thought Manufacturing Inter-National Cooperation – The English School 1. Hegelian legacies and the ‘international system’ 2. From Hegel to international cooperation?
141 141 152 161 177 177 186
Part IV The Triumph of Particularism in Twentieth-Century International Relations Theory IV.1
IV.2
Neo-Realism and the ‘Scientification’ of International Political Theory 1. Solipsistic ontology and epistemology 2. The inevitability of conflict ‘Misreadings’ in IR: Reassessing Morgenthau, Ideology Critique, and the Reification Problem 1. The ‘realism’ – neo-realism ‘unity’ 2. Explaining misreadings: Ideology critique and the reification of ‘the’ political Part V
V.1 V.2
197 198 207 210 211 219
Instead of A Conclusion – Towards Renewed Ontology(ies)
Universal, Universalistic – Universalized A Loss of Ethics, or the Reinvention of Universal Thinking in Global Politics? 1. Outline of an ethics of humanity in the international/world/global 2. Questions towards discourses on/of global politics
229 238 241 245
Notes
247
Bibliography
272
Name Index
293
Subject Index
297
Preface This book is motivated and informed by several concerns and approaches, and each can serve as an avenue to its themes and arguments. The further my writing progressed, the more and more perspectives and themes of this study came to mind, sometimes to a point which scared me and where I was wondering whether, and how, I could resist the temptation to pack too much into a single piece. The reason for this fear and wondering lies in the many miracles, surprises, and astonishments about the discipline of International Relations, experienced by someone who has not been trained in an US or British department/school of International Relations, but who, though sniffing the air of such places, has been educated in continental European academia as a student of political philosophy, history, and sociology. From such a (valuable) outsider’s position, some synoptic views might have arisen and may come to bear in this study which were otherwise eventually obstructed; and I dare to say that one sees many such miracles, surprises, and astonishments in and about IR, especially with regard to how the discipline invents and invented, defends and defended itself, particularly its US and UK artifacts. Such strategies of invention and defense always depend on myths, stories, and historiographies about the world (of international politics) and the discipline’s (and its representatives’) location in, and position towards, this world. And these myths, stories, and historiographies are the ‘material’ of miracles, surprises, and astonishments. To be more concrete – and the following are avenues to, and side arguments of, the core problematic of this study – my perspective was and still is wondering about the invention of a ‘realist tradition’ in international political thought and IR, which ostensibly started in Greek antiquity and culminated in the twentieth century. I was and I still am astonished by the prevalence and sustainability of this myth as well as by the methods and scholarly attitudes which stand behind those who tell the myth as well as those who believe this story. I was and I still am surprised about the historical and historiographical consciousness, inquiries, and beliefs which float around in IR about ‘structures’, ‘systems’, and ‘societies’ of international politics, their seeming realities, and thereby conditioned perceptions (and legitimizations) of power, war, and violence. I was and I still am astounded about the absence of ontological, epistemological, and ethical self-awareness of the discipline’s mainstream(s), the consequences of this absence, and the widespread domination of methodology and ideology over theory. And last but not least, I trust that the core argument of this study may be well connected with these miracles, surprises, and astonishments, and vice versa.
ix
x
Preface
This core argument consists in the observation of two fundamental ontological and epistemological shifts in the history of international political thought and International Relations Theory – from universal to universalistic and, even more decisive, from universalistic to particularistic thinking. These shifts concern nothing less than the manner and concepts of how we as individuals, academics, and politicians alike think about mankind and humanity, war and peace, the relations among political organizations, and the recognition of differences. The imaginations and concepts, which ‘we’ envision with regard to those questions, finally determine ‘our’ locus and positioning in and towards these themes, that is, whether ‘we’ think in universal or particularistic ontologies and epistemologies and with which consequences for mankind and humanity, war and peace, the relations among political organizations, and the recognition of differences; and which forms of agency ‘we’ can think of as academics and politicians to act upon such enduring problems. One might well understand – and I hope the reader will – the difficulty and the apprehension I experienced while I tried to cope with all these concerns in one book, which, however, arose and manifested as intellectual responses to the miracles, surprises and astonishments mentioned above. What I feel I can deliver is to throw some light on distracted but serious problems of which I think they are important for the discipline of IR and its self-awareness. If this book succeeds in delivering such a contribution, I shall be relieved, particularly because my considerations of the last years might then not only have helped me to see more clearly, but they might also inform other students of international politics about further perspectives on and problems of the academic field called IR. Blacksburg, VA, April 2009
Acknowledgements Drafting, conceptualizing, and finally writing a book depend on academic discourses, written and oral, as well as on eventual retreats in egocentrisms and loneliness. Both are embedded in social interaction inasmuch as discourses, on the one hand, need colleagues and academic friends who show themselves interested in one’s own work, topics, and arguments; and retreats, on the other hand, need to be accepted and even eventually encouraged by one’s social environment. Therefore, the end product of academic work is always indebted to colleagues, friends, and family for providing both forms of social interaction, and I am in the lucky position to have found both. I wish to express my gratitude to David B. Bobrow for his encouragement to proceed and investigate my initial questions and arguments; to Helmut Hubel and Manuel Froehlich for their invitation to the Guest Lecture Series of the Department of Political Science, University of Jena; to Harald Kleinschmidt and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science JSPS for their invitation to and funding of a visiting professorship at the University of Tsukuba in 2004/2005 while I had a chance to do intensive readings and to learn from many discussions with Harald; to Thom Brooks, Peter Jones, and Ian O’Flynn for their comments on written chapters and many discussions; to Felix Rösch and Joseph Turner for hints on literature and their interest in single arguments and chapters; to Mustapha Kamal Pasha for his invitation to the Sixth Century Politics Lecture Series at the University of Aberdeen, which provided an excellent forum for discussing a final version of my arguments; to Dietrich Jung and the Danish Institute of International Studies for their invitation to present my research and their delivery of an instructive forum for debate; to Michael C. Williams for his intellectual support, discussions of some of my main arguments, and his comments on the manuscript; to Rob Walker for his comments and engagement with my arguments throughout the manuscript; to Gemma d’Arcy Hughes, Alexandra Webster, and Renée Takken from Palgrave Macmillan for their support of this project and their professional guidance through the publication process; to the students of my classes on International Political Thought and International Relations Theory at Newcastle University for their lively participation in inspirational debates on single authors and concepts; to Ioannis Stivachtis, Bettina Koch, and Timothy Luke, Department of Political Science at the Virginia Institute of Technology, for providing collegial support and a great atmosphere while I was finishing the manuscript during my stay as visiting professor in Spring 2009 and their comments on single chapters and
xi
xii Acknowledgements
the whole manuscript; to the School of Geography, Politics, and Sociology at Newcastle University for granting me an extended research leave, which gave me the necessary time to finish the manuscript; as always and ever, Louisa; and last, but certainly not least, to my wife Manija for her great support of my work and her love.
Introduction
Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim shall become a universal Law whatever may be its end. (Immanuel Kant, On Perpetual Peace, Appendix) The substantive weal of the state is its weal as a particular state in its definite interests and condition ... Thus the government is a particular wisdom and not a universal providence ... in relation to other states, the principle justifying its wars and treaties, is not a general thought ... but the actually wronged or threatened weal in its definite particularity. (G. F. W. Hegel, Philosophy of Rights, §337)
The problematic and research questions The two quotes, which may serve as the starting point for my considerations, indicate a difference in thinking about international/inter-national politics that could hardly be more profound. Whereas the first statement, by Immanuel Kant, suggests universal law as the point of reference for individual action and politics, the second statement, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, claims that the particular well-being and interests of the state provide such referential framework. The question which immediately arises from this juxtaposition is whether these two statements, more or less arbitrarily, stand for just two different positions, such as there are endlessly many on a variety of topics in the history of political thought; or is there more substance to discover with regard to their distinctive difference about universalism and particularism? This study suggests that they represent indeed much more than just a juxtaposition of two individual standpoints, but rather a substantial historical shift in political thought when particularistic conceptualizations of inter-national politics started to prevail over universal and universalistic frameworks. 1
2
A History of International Political Theory
At first glance, the profound difference between these two frameworks, of which Kant and Hegel are just two representatives, lies in their diverse, and altered, ontology: while universal and universalistic ontologies have notions such as ‘humanity’, ‘humankind’, and ‘men’ in general as their final referential focus, particularistic ontologies of inter-national politics are ultimately focused on the individual nation-state, its welfare and power. The two different frameworks of universal/universalistic and particularistic thinking not only focus on different images of the world – one divided into individual, solipsistic units, the other constituted as a common assembly of peoples and political communities – but also are informed by different intellectual backgrounds. On the one side, we can observe a cosmos of universal anthropological, divine, legal, political, and ethical concepts which allow to establish a likewise universal focus on humanity, humankind, and men; on the other side, we find particularistic conceptions of a national self, ‘national interest’, national sovereignty, and, over all, national moralities which establish an ontology which is referentially focused on self-contained entities. This study will discuss the shift from universal and universalistic to particularistic ontologies and finally emphasize the emergence of national, particularistic moralities which are part of this shift and which contribute to a loss of ethics in inter-national political thought and theory in the twentieth century. This shift becomes obvious when we look at ideas on war and peace. The shift when particularistic notions began to dominate inter-national political thought and replace universal and universalistic frameworks involves, in addition to an ontological dimension, a transformation of epistemologies from holistic philosophies of order to structuralism and determinism. With the emergence and solidification of particularistic ontology, epistemological dogmas have become popular, which created dualisms between the own nation (‘the self’) and the other nation(s) out there; dualisms which rested on the precondition that such entities are constructed as anchoring ontological fixed points of inter-national politics in the first place. New epistemologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries believed incisively in the existence of external realities and their permanent structures, which provide the conditions and determinants for inter-national politics and foreign policy strategies of single nation-states. Paradoxically, however, such external realities and structures are constituted by nothing but by nation-states themselves. Here, in the nineteenth century, the (irresolvable, because epistemologically and ontologically grounded) quandary of the primacy between structure (anarchy) and agent (states’ agency), which not only typifies twentieth century ‘neo-realism’, but also largely influenced the theoretical discussions of the whole discipline, has been given birth. Finally, and as a consequence of particularistic ontology and epistemology, a distinct positivist methodology evolved throughout the nineteenth century and influenced the inter-national political theory to come, which, in contrast to
Introduction 3
traditional hermeneutic, interpretative, and speculative metaphysics, considered ‘external realities’, and thus structures of inter-national politics in general, as objective and objectifiable, measurable, and quantifiable. Particularistic ontology, epistemology, and methodology represent the legacies in which the establishment of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline, especially its neo-realist mainstream, is embedded. These legacies are very different from the myth about a perennial ‘realist’ tradition, which would trace throughout the history of political thought and would date back to Greek antiquity, a myth which was constructed by IR mainstream as a consequence of the particularistic paradigm and its ideologization. This paradigm is liable for selective (mis)readings of political thought and contemporary ‘dissident voices’ – which were and are, even though well positioned within the discipline, critical towards the mainstream (as, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau in the early decades of the discipline) – , ignoring and neglecting their universal and anti-particularistic frameworks. In the light of this development, this study will discuss authors and schools of political thought from Greek and Roman antiquity, the early and late Middle Ages, the early modern times, of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and finally from the discipline of IR, and contextualize them in the spectrum between universal, universalistic, and particularistic thinking.1 Throughout this discussion, the argument will be developed that particularistic ontology and epistemology are phenomena of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and that the discipline of IR is a child of these particularistic intellectual legacies as they primarily emerged through, and manifested in, Hegelian philosophy, national historiography, and geopolitical tenets; whereas until the end of the eighteenth century, we witness the dominance of modes of political thought which, with obviously different degrees and varying styles of universal and universalistic conceptualizations, retrieved their ontologies and epistemologies from visions of political order which transcend political communities and hence integrate them with reference to some general ‘common good’.2 Meanwhile, while the twentieth century has come to an end, a body of literature emerged in IR which is critical to our discipline’s theoretical and methodological development, asking for and claiming new approaches in an era of global politics. However, neither nationalism nor particularistic ontology appears to be outdated, neither in the discipline, nor in foreign policy conduct. The ontological, epistemological, and methodological shortfalls of particularistic, dualistic, and structuralist theorizing became nevertheless more and more obvious to the discipline. What does this mean for the problematique of universal and particularistic thinking? What are the ontological and epistemological frameworks of (post-positivist) theories of global politics, global society, and global justice? Do they, and do they want at all, revitalize and retrieve universal notions of politics? Or do they dispose over alternative frameworks, outside historical patterns of universalism and/or
4
A History of International Political Theory
particularism? These are questions, which arise and pressure for answers since those new theories look explicitly beyond the nation-state at global politics and society. What, so has to be asked finally with regard to the problematique of this study, are the practical implications and consequences of universal and/or particularistic ontologies and epistemologies in theorizing relations among ‘states’? This question touches upon one of the big themes in international political thought and IR: that of war and peace. How is peace thinkable, how can peace be theorized, and what are the political implications for peaceable politics in a world divided into monadic entities, which are perceived (and which perceive themselves) in structural opposition to other, likewise organized units? And is war a normal condition, a continuation of politics with different means (Clausewitz), in a world of, and under the ontological conditions of, dualistically constructed national interests? Is the jus ad bellum of sovereign nation-states a logical consequence of actors who seek – and who need to seek because of the ontological and epistemological architecture of dualistic conceptualizations of oppositional ‘self’ and ‘other’ – for permanent affirmation of their identity and power? What are the answers of authors who advocate universal and universalistic ontologies to the problem of war and peace among political communities? And how far do they differ from particularistic outlooks? These are the kind of questions around which this study and its discussions centre. An interesting coincidence is that the authors who shall be studied here to investigate patterns of universalism and particularism raise those questions themselves by thematizing war and peace, providing very different answers and considerations according to their fundamental ontological outlooks. Nevertheless, the discussion of thoughts on war and peace serves as an authentic foil which reflects the problematique of universal and particularistic theorizing, and vice versa. Debating different conceptualizations of war and peace, and related questions, throughout the history of international political thought and in IR should not preclude, however, any balanced assessment of the positives and negatives of both universal/universalistic and particularistic patterns. However, the argument made above about the emergence of particularistic thinking in the nineteenth century and its legacies in twentieth-century IR and a subsequent loss of universal ethics is inclined to conclude that a genuine conflict pattern exists of a world divided into national units and entities and to criticize its theoretical, and practical, affirmation by an intellectual climate of related ontologies and epistemologies. Saying this does not imply uncritical praise of universal and universalistic thinking or a naïve assumption that international political thought and practice based on, and informed by, these respective frameworks would be, or would have been, genuinely more peaceable. Nor does my argument imply that there would be some kind of linear, evident, or easy way
Introduction 5
from particularistic to universal/universalistic politics, or the other way around. I am also aware of the undesirable tendencies of both universalism/ universality and particularism, respectively, to develop either into political imperii or solipsism and nationalisms. There is, however, one theoretical consideration which leans towards the presumption that universal/universalistic notions are more conducive to international sociability and community among political bodies than particularistic ones: and that is with regard to the crucial question of How can we create international order which is common, sociable, and peaceable to all its members? What are the ontological and epistemological principles of such creation and construction? And can such creation succeed from the starting point of units construed as substantially singular, divided, and solipsistic? Here, universal and universalistic approaches have at least a heuristic advantage over particularistic concepts, and they yet seem epistemologically necessary to be principally able to create, open up, and mutually debate options for commonalities, common goods, and common order – according to the metaphor implied in the narration of Henry David Thoreau, a nineteenth-century American dissident in a culture of nationalism, about his conversation with an Indian, named Polis: ‘I have much to learn of the Indian, nothing of the missionary. I am not sure but all that would tempt me to teach the Indian my religion would be his promise to teach me his’ (quoted by Connolly, 1996, p. 149). Or, to quote R. B. J. Walker: ‘The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together’ (Walker, 1993, p. 7; italics mine) and hence to negotiate and renegotiate the current ontological and epistemological conditions under which such political ways and possibilities can be found. Implications What frameworks exist for theorizing and finally acting upon the problem of commonality and sociability among political bodies? Is it common interests, such as in security, development, environment, and so on? Is it shared political goals and common goods? Is it cultural heritage and values? Is it common ethics? Is it the similarity of domestic political systems which generate common agendas and goals in foreign politics? Is it their association with common legal standards? Is it shared economic interests? Is it international/inter-national law? Or are political bodies genuinely egocentric actors who link with others only because of temporary individual advantages and selfish interests? When we consult international/inter-national political thought, both historically and as it manifests in twentieth- and twenty-first-century IR Theory, we find a wide spectrum of very different answers. At the same time, the historical background of those answers is made up by a wide spectrum of different forms of ‘international’ order constituted by political
6
A History of International Political Theory
bodies as divergent as poleis and city states, empires, states and nationstates, and global polities. Regardless of their embedment in different historic epochs and sociopolitical contexts, however, there is a lasting debate in political thought and modern IR about the question of what grounds international co- operation and sociability.3 A historical perspective reminds us that political order can have very different shapes and can be constituted upon a multitude of principles; we also learn that what underpins the dominant paradigms of nineteenth-century inter-national political thought and twentieth-century International Politics/Relations,4 namely, the assumption that political bodies are organized as nation-states and are functionally similar (as the predominant neo-realist paradigm teaches), is far from being a historical truth or ‘structure’. There is no naturally or structurally set international/inter-national order and subsequently no evident answer to the questions mentioned above. The question of what constitutes international cooperation and sociability has been discussed by philosophers and politicians throughout human history, regardless of their social, political, and cultural differences. For students of political thought and IR, the question arises how to categorize those answers. Many categorizations have been made: the most prominent one is presumably Martin Wight’s differentiation of ‘rationalist’, ‘realist’, and ‘revolutionist’ approaches (Wight and Butterfield, 1967); others talk of patterns of international political theory such as ‘empirical realism’, ‘universal moral order’, and ‘historical reasoning’ (as Boucher, 1998). All such categorizations appear to operate along the basic differentiation and assume the existence of two basic trajectories in international political thought called ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ (or ‘moralism’ and ‘normativism’) and assign authors across history into one or the other camp. Instead of grouping authors into an ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ dichotomy or to identify common intellectual frameworks across history into which they can be pigeonholed, I agree with Edward Keene who criticizes the notion ‘that theories can be grouped into schools of thought or intellectual traditions’, an effort which had ‘occupied an extremely prominent place in the history of international political thought’ (Keene, 2005, p. 35) and who argues that ‘more attention needs to be paid to methods which help us to appreciate the importance of change and discontinuity in the field’ (of international political thought and IR theory; Keene, 2005, p. 5). In contrast to Keene, however, who puts emphasis on ‘the immediate historical context within which ideas about international politics have been developed’ and who is concerned ‘with identifying and explaining the fundamental ideas and concepts that thinkers have used to make sense of their international political environments’ (2005, p. 5), I shall suggest a different focus on genealogical shifts in the theorizing of international/international politics.6 Such a genealogy suggests two major shifts. First, we can observe a transformation which occurs at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the rise of nationalist thought and the
Introduction 7
nation-state as the prevailing pattern of political order. This transformation is characterized by the decline of universal thinking. Whereas international political thought prior to the nineteenth century showed strong tendencies to envision and to found unifying principles between political bodies, which created some form of communalities, connectedness, and ‘in-between’, inter-national thought arising at the beginning of the nineteenth century started increasingly to view political bodies as nationally self- contained and solipsistic political entities. Paradoxically, each of these units is being construed as an entity superior to other such entities. Such entities, as becomes most obvious in, and was set out by, the German philosopher Hegel, were thought of as being interested above anything else in their individual well-being.7 According to this particularistic ontology, cooperation and common politics shall only be initiated when, and as long as, they correspond with the particular interest of the individual state. This outlook means a fundamental break in constructing and thinking about international politics since political thought prior to this shift was informed by political, economic, legal, cultural, noetic, and, last but not least, ethical principles which apply, or should apply, universally to all political bodies and would thus create some form of universal unity among them.8 This first part of my categorization suggests a view on international political thought which is at odds with two mainstream assumptions widely popular in the discipline of IR. It shares, however, common views with an emerging body of critical literature in our field.9 This view is critical to the construction of a historically long-standing ‘realist’ tradition in international politics which is construed as dating back to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and as comprising authors like Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Contrary to this construction, it will be argued here that a realist understanding of international politics can be explicitly found in, however not before, Hegel while from Hegelian philosophy there is a direct line leading to the IR school of thought of neo-realism. What authors from such different times and political settings as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes – but also other pre-nineteenth-century authors as, for example, Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, and Immanuel Kant – have in common, and what at the same time differentiates their outlook from the way of viewing inter-national politics, which became predominant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (with some exceptions), is their ontology of connecting and unifying principles which are said to exist among political units and which refer to universal/universalistic doctrines. There is another important consequence of this interpretation, which affects our understanding of international politics and the construction of its history: It appears to be a popular assumption in, and reading of, international politics that different political principles operate ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ a political body. This assumption holds that there would be ‘order’ inside and ‘chaos’ and ‘anarchy’ outside, and that those principles ordering
8
A History of International Political Theory
a political body domestically would be repealed outside in the inter-national sphere. We will see, however, that this understanding is quite modern and emerged only because of the abandonment of premodern concepts of universal unity among states and of universal principles of political order which would operate both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In contrast, the modern outlook posits a plethora of atomistic sovereign states and thus replaced the belief in the existence of unifying, universal principles which are held to be valid for all politics. ‘When the modern state system arrived’, Jens Bartelson notes, ‘this distinction [between the domestic and the international; HB] has been integral to international political theory by marking it off from theories of domestic politics ... If the domestic “inside” gradually has become associated with the presence of unity, order, and peaceful progress, so the international “outside” has simultaneously been characterized by the absence of these conditions. It is the realm of plurality, anarchy, and war’ (Bartelson, 1995, p. 255; also Walker, 1993; Onuf, 1998). The modern ‘inside’-‘outside’ dichotomy and its solidification in international political thought throughout the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century is not only a contingent phenomenon due to the loss and abandonment of universal international thought, but it also ignores the politicohistorical reality of international politics, which throughout history was, aside from wars, also one of cooperation, treaty systems, and mutual cultural influences between communities. In addition to this, this dichotomy is ignorant of the reality of domestic politics which is, not less than international politics, characterized by violent struggles about the ‘right’ order (and problematizations of political legitimacy, resistance, social contracts, and common goods). Domestic politics is far from being ‘naturally’ ordered and peaceful. Thus, the ‘inside’-‘outside’ dichotomy is not only a narrowing and constricting intellectual feature in and of international politics, but also a misleading pattern to model political reality in general – not, however, for understanding the ontology and epistemology of modern IR. The subsequent question is now when this gradual association, which Bartelson observes, took place. The answer to this question can be given by repeating and reformulating the central argument of this study, namely, that this development and the respective divide between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ was foreign to political thought prior to the nineteenth century and is a result of particularistic ontology. Contrary to popular tenets in modern IR, which teach that Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes – to pick out three thinkers who are represented as paradigmatic founding fathers of realist thought – would represent such an ‘inside’-‘outside’ divide, this study aspires to demonstrate that all three ‘heroic figures’ developed principles of political order which operate both in domestic and international politics. These principles are thus of a general ordering character and transcend possible divides between an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. There is no ‘inside’-‘outside’
Introduction 9
distinction in Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, and the absence of such an ontology is much more the case in other pre-nineteenth-century philosophers, such as Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, las Casas, and Kant (as will be discussed here).10 There is, as stated above, a second shift in the genealogy of international/ inter-national political thought – a shift of which we are contemporarily witnesses and which can be traced back to the early 1990s. This shift finds its roots in ‘post-cold war’ and ‘new world order’ discussions. In a theoretical perspective, this shift is characterized by an emerging body of literature which draws mainstream assumptions of our discipline into question and critically reinterprets traditions of thought and individual thinkers. A primary focus of this critical debate is on ontological, and subsequently epistemological and methodological, questions of international political thought and IR. It has to be asked, in relation to the main questions of this study, whether this second shift is also about reestablishing universal political thought. Can we identify current efforts to (re)found and (re)intervene universal approaches in the study of global politics whose ontological focus is explicitly on phenomena beyond the nation-state and concentrates, for example, on global civil society and global justice? Did globalizations of politics bring universal thought back in, since there is increased cooperation among states and private actors across borders as well as an awareness of global problems which encourage, and even force, us to think beyond the political unit of nation-states and their self-interest? There might be two major objections to the argument of this study: First, it could be argued that there are also universal and universalistic approaches in the nineteenth and twentieth century; for example, the nineteenth century ‘standards of civilization’ (according to Fisch, 2005), Woodrow Wilson’s approach of inter-national democratization and the establishment of the League of Nations (very instructive here Ninkovich, 1994), or finally the building of the United Nations on explicitly universal standards of human rights and states’ equality. This objection might hold that the argument made in this study fails, and hence has to be taken very seriously. At first glance, this objection sounds reasonable. However, it is philosophically superficial because it equates metaphysical perceptions and conceptualizations of universal political order, as they were typical for pre-nineteenth century political thought, with an artificial universalization of political principles. To be more precise: Whereas the metaphysical perception of universalism and holistic concepts of political order are grounded in universal and universalistic ontologies, the proclamation of general standards in nineteenth-century international political thought and twentieth-century IR is based on individual political beliefs, particularistic ontology, and the assumption of their universalize-ability. They lack a universal backing which grounds in perceptions of transcendental principles of order.
10 A History of International Political Theory
I do not immediately sympathize here with one or the other mode – universal, universalistic, or particularistic – however, it seems important to elaborate their ontological differences as well as their respective epistemological consequences. It is especially with regard to those consequences that these differences become crucial because they dramatically influence the way of our thinking about and conceptualizing political order among states as well as dealing with current world problems. I will develop the argument that, whereas universal and universalistic thinking, even if it might be controversial with regard to distinct tenets, founds the possibility for international and intercultural dialogue and for agency across political bodies, particularistic thinking operates as a solipsistic discourse with which one can associate, or not. Particularistic ontology, on which universalizations regardless of their intentions are based, creates, in its epistemological consequence, dualistic worldviews. Whereas the ontological unit (in the sense of what is the basic unit and reference of focus for theorizing the international11) in pre-nineteenth-century thought emerged from some ordering principle beyond the individuality and particularity of the nation (such as universal ethics, eternal legal principles, divine laws, and so on) and thus has been universal in its own right, the ontological unit in post-nineteenth-century inter-national thought became the particular nation-state. Thus, if a particularistic unit represents the ontological foundation and reference, interconnectedness among political units can hardly be thought of on a universal basis, but either can be declined (in a nationalistic sense) or be drafted at best as a mosaic of single individual units which come together only on the basis of standards universalized by one or the other party (as in twentieth- century internationalisms). These standards, however, are not debatable on common grounds, but are only acceptable or not. Since politics and the creation of political order are – and this not only contemporarily in the twenty-first century but in principle – in need of cross-cultural and cross-national dialogue and agency in order to find ways of ‘living together’ in a common world, scholarly attempts to rethink and eventually to (re)invent universal approaches seem most relevant. Thus, without judging whether universalism or universalizations and particularism will finally make a ‘better’ world, it has to be acknowledged at least that principles based on universal ontologies enable a dialogue to debate over principles of common political order: there is a potential for discovering compatibility, commonalities, and joint socialization, whereas particularistic ontology creates exclusion, or at best forced assimilation.12 In the sense of Andrew Linklater, the challenging question for current international political theory is not whether to replace historic patterns of universal thought or to refer to hegemonic universalizations, but how to bridge national and cultural pluralisms in a globalized world and how to balance between pluralist identities and necessary universalisms (Linklater, 2000).
Introduction 11
This question can only be answered normatively and, I would argue, by a genealogical study of international/inter-national political thought and modern IR, investigating their ontologies with a special emphasis on universalism and particularism. I am aware that there might also be critique of my argument and approach from within the discipline of IR, mainly from its neo-realist mainstream. The major critique will presumably lie in the circumstance that, according to their reading,13 there is a well-established ‘realist’ tradition and realist agenda in international political thought on which current IR can draw and which comprises authors like Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes; a claim which here is declared to be invalid and a misreading (see also Behr/Heath, 2009). The argument about misreading shall claim that ideological interests of IR scholars, interests which emerged in the 1940s and 1950s and prevailed the discipline at least throughout the Cold War, can be declared responsible for constructing a ‘realist’ legacy by selective reading and idiosyncratic interpretation (more on that in the following section, ‘Conceptual remarks’). Therefore, neo-realism has to be understood as an ideological enterprise itself which constructed its narratives about its own past and its historical determination; and it can be further asked how far the establishment of IR as an academic discipline is the result of the particularizing and nationalizing of intellectual frameworks and ontologies in the nineteenth century. This study shares this suspicion with a few representatives of our discipline who would admit that IR scholarship, primarily in the United States, has entertained ‘kitchens of power’ designing and legitimizing US power strategies (as Stanley Hoffmann critically diagnosed IR in 1977 and as Miles Kahler reviewed our discipline 20 years later; Kahler, 1997).14 Conceptual remarks This book is an interpretative study which aims at elaborating a genealogy of the ontological unit of international/inter-national political thought and IR. Some of the authors discussed are unusual to the study of international politics, such as Cicero, Aurelius Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Bartolomé de las Casas, and Francisco de Vitoria; others, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes, who belong to the historical canon of International Politics/IR, will be presented in a new light. The interpretations of this study will use thoughts on war and peace as they can be found in each of the interpreted authors as an empirical mirror to illustrate the genealogical developments and shifts from universal and universalistic to particularistic thinking. It is evident that approaches to war and peace, including questions of the legitimization of war and ‘just war’ as well as of the possibilities for peace, differ widely throughout history due to divergent sociopolitical and intellectual contexts of specific authors; also universalism and particularism are not present in all of them to the same degree. Furthermore, grouping
12
A History of International Political Theory
them together in three hugely time-spanning blocks (roughly stated, Greek and Roman antiquity and [European] Middle Ages, [European] early modern times, and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) may show ignorance of the different cultural contexts of the authors and their writings as well as of individual voices resistant to prevailing mainstream patterns. It may also be inevitable that interpretations focusing on such huge compartments will be unfair to some parts of it. Nevertheless, it appears that the differentiation between universalism and particularism does apply as a category for understanding developments of international/inter-national political thought and modern IR. In a comparative methodological perspective, the analysis is a comparison of most divergent cases, which is usually deemed to be the heuristically most fruitful method of inquiry. Taking the variety of political orders throughout the targeted centuries (constituted by poleis, empires, city states, nation-states, and global polities) into consideration, it is particularly interesting to realize that, regardless of this variety, premodern authors seemed to share notions of ontological universalism and epistemological ‘meta-vocabulary’, whereas authors who wrote under the influence of the emerging and then consolidating political order of the nation state lost that notion and adhered to particularistic (national) ones. The discussions of single authors are sometimes based on comprehensive quotations from their original writings. I perceive this to be necessary because some authors will be re-interpreted in contrast to mainstream notions which often read selectively and ignore paragraphs which are here, however, seen as important. In order to illustrate the nature of their writings and statements according to the presented (re)interpretations, I think that eventual full quotations of distinct arguments are instructive and sometimes indispensable. It is hoped that the reader will thereby experience and encounter ‘another’ Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and so on, compared to image he or she might be familiar with. The interpretations in Parts I and II will discuss individual authors; Parts III and IV will focus on schools of thought (apart from Hegel in Part III). These changing perspectives can be explained by the historical development of inter-national political thought itself. The nineteenth and even more the twentieth century, when International Politics/IR became established as an academic discipline, witnessed an increase in both the amount and scope of scholarly work in the realm of humanities and social sciences. This increase was accompanied by a differentiation and systematization of the intellectual field. In contrast to earlier centuries when the writings of single philosophers appear – or are narrated to appear according to historical perceptions and constructions of subsequent posterities – as exclusively more outstanding, social sciences and humanities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries developed into academic schools of thought. Saying this does not deny that individual figures are (deemed as) more representative and sometimes more important than others due to their writings and
Introduction 13
activities to initiate or even found specific epistemologies and methodologies. The discussions of schools of thought in this study shall hence draw upon and emphasize certain authors more than others. I am aware that I will not be able to avoid some form of canonization and consequently may do injustice to some authors discussed here, but the amount of authors who could be discussed to represent inter-national political thought in the nineteenth century and IR in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is simply too huge to proceed with the same methodology of discussing single authors as in Parts I and II. The very selection of authors and schools does, of course, not claim to be comprehensive, and one might argue that important authors are missing and that those would be more relevant to the argument of this book than the authors actually discussed – so why de Vitoria and not Francisco Suárez; why las Casas and not Hugo Grotius; why Hobbes and not Justus Lipsius; why Halford Mackinder and not Friedrich Ratzel? Two rationales determined the selection of authors in this study. The first rationale is the assumption of their individual significance and their school’s general significance to stand for universal and/or particularistic ontologies. This rationale was enhanced by the idea that the authors also represent an interdisciplinary cross section, including traditions which contributed to the development of international/inter-national political thought in their own right or which directly influenced the ontology and epistemology of twentieth century IR, such as Roman universal-imperial thought (Cicero), Christian views of just war (Augustine and Aquinas), and international legal philosophy (las Casas, de Vitoria) in the first instance, and national historiography (represented here mainly by Heinrich von Treitschke, Jules Michelet, and Thomas B. Macaulay) and geopolitical thought (represented here primarily by Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman) in the second. The second rationale has to do with a conclusion of this study and its interpretation of the development of international/inter-national political thought and its intercourse with the discipline of IR in the twentieth century. This conclusion relates to my earlier observation about misreadings of authors of political thought in combination with the paradigmatic IR-ontology of ‘national interest’ and its inclination to construct and posit a consecutive and perennial history of ‘realist’ thought which is said to augment in neorealist theory. The main authors which were sacrificed on behalf of this interest were Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Thus, they not only belong to the canonized knowledge of IR, but also immediately appear in the focus of this study because they have been seized under the paradigm of particularistic ontology. The argument about misreadings does not claim to present a/the one and rightful or ‘authentic’ interpretation of the authors discussed. This claim would not only be presumptuous, but also unredeemable facing several hundreds of meters of bookshelves filled with interpretations on these authors from very different disciplines. What I rather intend to demonstrate is that
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A History of International Political Theory
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes can not be read as realists (or what ‘realism’ was assumed to be under the particularistic paradigm) because their thoughts are either clearly opposed to ‘realist’ tenets by sharing universal/ universalistic ontologies and by advocating ethical, normative principles. At least they are much more ambivalent in their claims about international politics than IR mainstream narratives want us to believe and thus cannot be used for the construction of a ‘realist’ tradition in international political thought. In methodological terms, the interpretations put forward here do not claim to reveal some authentic meaning of classical and modern texts, but rather to rule out certain IR interpretations due to their hermeneutic inexactness, biases, and ‘Whiggish’ accounts.15 What raised my initial suspicion of the construction of a realist legacy and the neo-realist and neoliberal misreadings and manipulation of a history of international thought16 can be explained by the following three examples (which will be discussed in greater detail in Parts I and II). First, when the mainstream of our discipline interprets Thucydides, scholars consequently neglect his reference to universal legal and ethical standards explaining and condemning the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Instead, they only refer to the pattern of Athenian hegemonic power growth which scared the Peloponnesian peoples so that they allied against Athens. This is, at best, a misunderstood interpretation which, however, fits perfectly, or has been made to fit, into neo-realist terms; at worst, this is an intentionally misread interpretation because the Athenian power growth is, according to Thucydides, just one reason for the Peloponnesian War. The other reason could be found in the break of legal commitments and ‘international law’ between Athens and Sparta – a point which is emphasized by classical philosophical studies, which would have destroyed, however, a ‘realist’ interpretation of Thucydides. Second, when IR mainstream scholars interpret (interpreted) Machiavelli, they primarily refer to The Prince, picturing Machiavelli as an all-out power politician; only a few pieces also refer to Machiavelli’s main work, The Discourses. This is not only a text selection, which only tells half of the story, but it also ignores a good part of widely established Machiavelliinterpretations which we know from political philosophy and political thought. These interpretations approach Machiavelli as a political sociologist who was interested in revealing the mechanisms of power as they operate both in principalities and republics. Thus, a sharp line is drawn between The Prince and The Discourses, each dealing with a different type of political order. This understanding is last, but not least, suggested by Machiavelli himself. Third, when mainstream IR/International Politics interprets (interpreted) Thomas Hobbes, the main question seems to be whether or not the ‘state of nature’ between individuals can be applied to relations among states. Although it has to be admitted that Hobbes makes statements according to
Introduction 15
which such an application may appear possible and international politics performs as a ‘war of every man against every man’, there are good reasons to doubt that this question is really central to interpreting Hobbesian international politics. I share this doubt, together with some critical reinterpretations in our discipline, because we find in Hobbes’s political philosophy – apart from the question whether the state of nature applies to states, and states can be treated analogous to individuals – an explicit mechanism among sovereignty, legitimacy, and security which operates between domestic and international politics – even if Hobbes addresses international politics only sporadically. As far as I can see, there are two publications which have their basic problematique in common with this study. These are Bartelson’s discussion of ‘internationalism’ (1995) and Linklater’s Critical Theory and World Politics (2007). Bartelson sees a ‘threat of the total fragmentation of the international system’ into atomistic nation-states – a complaint (and warning) which I share – and criticizes the ‘absence of any shared metavocabulary’ to overcome this fragmentation (Bartelson, 1995, p. 261). However, it appears that he does not see that such a ‘meta-vocabulary’ did indeed exist prior to the nineteenth century. Consequently, Bartelson shares the view of an anarchical structure of international politics, historic and present-day, and, missing a ‘meta-vocabulary’, he searches for compatible and interconnecting approaches of ‘internationalism’. In order to do so, he sees a profitable approach in Kant, although does not realize that Kant himself is part of a tradition of universal thinking, and that investigating this tradition would provide him with answers and insights conducive to his search for meta-vocabularies. Linklater explains his interest as investigating the ties that bind together the members of political communities and simultaneously separate them from the remainder of the human race ... [an investigation which is] linked by a specific interest in the relationship between the duties that individuals have to one another as citizens of separate states and the obligations they have to all other persons as members of humanity’; and he further declares ‘the relationship between >>community<< and >>cosmopolis<< is one of the central ethical and political questions of the time’. (Linklater, 2007, p. 1) Linklater views the pressing need to investigate this problematique as caused by increased transnational and global interconnectednesses between societies, cultures, and political communities why they would have ‘come under increased pressure to reflect on whether there are universal moral and political principles that can enable them to live together peacefully’ (ibid., p. 2). Thus, he asks the question of universalism and particularism in international politics. As valuable as his focus on this
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A History of International Political Theory
problem and his undertaking to retrieve intellectual possibilities to think the relation between particularistic communities and ‘the’ cosmopolis are as well as his observation is to be endorsed that ‘during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, major theorists of the sovereign state and international law did not make a sharp distinction between “internal” and “external” spheres of inquiry’ (ibid., p. 3), I have the feeling that his endeavour remains ambivalent or even limited by his reproduction of the narrative of an enlightened Western modernity according to which there is a consecutive intellectual history of ‘universalistic moral dispositions that have been inherited from the medieval world’ while the concern with the relationship between citizenship and humanity would be ‘at the heart of international political theory ever since’ (ibid., p. 2/3; emphasis mine). Although acknowledging traditions of universalistic thought and of respective holistic perspectives, this account ignores the fact that these universalistic and holistic traditions broke away with the beginning of particularistic theorizing, its solidifications throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the martial and violent manifestations of the modern nation-state. Therefore, it seems that his idea of a Western modernity remains a narrative and now, in the twenty-first century, the conditions of universal/universalistic theorizing in and about international politics and respective ethics have to be thoroughly reinvented, retrieved, or reformulated. I think, however, it is not possible, as I understand that Linklater does think, that the reflection on the dynamic between particularism and universalism can connect to (continuous) legacies lasting from the seventeenth or eighteenth century into our present days, or could simply replace universal or universalistic ontologies, epistemologies, and ethics; they might be lost and may have to be fundamentally reintroduced. I enthusiastically share with both Bartelson and Linklater their sense of the problem of universalism and particularism, their articulated need for normativity as well as for meta-vocabulary, and their request for universal/ universalistic dispositions in international political theory, including the conviction that many contemporary problems of international politics – such as climate change, sustainable development, global culture and civilization, and finally peace and war – require some kind of common references to humanity and general common goods in order to, if not find solutions to these problems, at least start some form of cross-cultural dialogue and find a shared language and vision of the world we live in. However, I choose the different way of a genealogy of international political thought and IR theory which emphasizes shifts and modifications rather than continuities, with the hope of contributing to the clarification of some of the conditions of the possibility for reintroducing notions of universal thinking and ethics in international political theory and IR. In doing so, I identify a major shift from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century through which international
Introduction 17
theory experienced fundamentally modified intellectual pillars explaining why narratives about a Western modernity from the seventeenth century or so into the twenty-first century are misguided. This problem persists whether the narratives are recounted from a neo-realist or neo-liberal perspective in the sense of celebrating sovereignty, progress, ‘the state’, state autonomy, and freedom (which was seldom a freedom for the people ‘within’ and even more seldom a freedom for ‘others’, such as neighbours); or criticized and deconstructed from a poststructuralist perspective while, although rightfully identifying and criticizing their endangerments of humanity, ignoring the fact that this narrative does not hold and is based on misreadings of international political and intellectual history for genealogical reasons in the first place. International political theory and IR have to comprehensively reorganize the acknowledgement, awareness, and criticism of their own legacies. I feel it may be worthwhile to provide two further explanations for the assortment of themes and fields in this study with regard to the omission of literature and debates on and of political economy/international political economy (IPE) as well as with regard to the time frame investigating the formation of ontologies in IR theory. Both aspects are interrelated in that they concern the selection of authors and literature discussed here (or not) and their treatment. To the second aspect first: ontological formations of and in IR theory according to which IR appears as the object of ontological scrutinization will be investigated mainly until the 1990s, roughly speaking. This investigation will be connecting to, and working with, the then increasingly emerging body of critical literature, however, will not expose this literature to the same scrutinizing process as the IR mainstream as it existed and dominated until the 1990s (and still seems to dominate mainly the US and UK disciplines until present day). Thus, the (hi)story told in this study could and should go on, just as every (hi) story told has a closing perspective and closing words. The same consideration applies to the first aspect, the taking into account of discourses on political economy and in IPE, both as objects of the scrutinization of the ontological formation of the international/inter-national and as commentators on such formation in international political thought and IR. Also here, there is not a substantial argument, but an architectural one with regard to the framing angles of this study and its arguments and approaches.
The structure of the book The book consists of five parts. During the course of the book a genealogy of international/inter-national political thought and IR from Greek and Roman antiquity up to the present day will be elaborated alongside the intellectual feature of universal, universalistic, and particularistic
18 A History of International Political Theory
thinking. Parts I and II are devoted to the study of universal and universalistic thinking from antiquity to the end of the eighteenth century; Part III, beginning with the discussion of Hegel, marks the historical shift from universal and universalistic thinking to particularism. This discussion leads into the twentieth century and then to Part IV, which problematizes the triumph of particularism in the twentieth century. In Part V, I summarize and further explain the differentiation between the universal, universalistic, and universalized and engage with two questions: does the historical decline of notions of universalities in international political thought and IR Theory involve and signify a loss of ethics in modern and present-day IR/International Politics? Since this question and its wording are based on the assumption that ethics (as it does in its traditional modes) would relate to anthropological, political, noetic, and legal universalities, the engagement with this question shall also include considerations of the possibility of an international political ethics which overcomes particularistic fragmentation(s) and is not grounded on universal, universalistic, and universalizing assumptions about the/a world or a/the other. Second, the concluding remarks will introduce the question whether theories on global society and global justice – since their focus aims explicitly beyond the particularity of the nation-state on ‘the’ global – revitalize universal frameworks; or can we observe new, alternative ontological frameworks beyond universalism and particularism? All parts are divided into two chapters. While in Parts I and II the chapters focus on single authors – I.1 on Thucydides and Cicero, I.2 on Aurelius Augustine and Thomas Aquinas; II.1 on Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria, and II.2 on Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant – the chapters in Parts III and IV focus, for the reasons discussed above, on schools of thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the problematization of their ontological frameworks – III.1 on the Hegelian philosophy of ‘national interest’, national monumental historiography, and geopolitical thought; III.2 on the English School; IV.1 on neo-realism and the scientification of International Political Theory; and IV.2 on misreadings in IR. Part V is divided as follows – V.1 on the differentiation between universal, universalistic, and universalized and V.2 on the loss of ethics and the question of a reinvention of universal thinking in global politics. I would like to make one final remark with regard to the reading of this book. Obviously, every author exposes his or her writing to some kind of publicity and thereby hands over his or her thoughts to criticism, review, and debate. There is no control over interpretative trajectories books may take. Although each author remains responsible for the text, he or she is not accountable for what may happen to the text. This is part of the nature of authorship, and even more so in our times of endless reproducibility of ‘texts’, which we have to accept. Nevertheless, I would like to
Introduction 19
ask the reader to give this book careful perusal by especially regarding the (sometimes extensive) endnotes as an important compendium and accompanying body of text to the main text. There are also comprehensive indexes, including the endnotes, which may help the reader to better access this study.
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Part I Universalism in Greek and Roman Antiquity and Christian Political Philosophy
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I.1 Greek and Roman Antiquity
1. Thucydides It is one of the popular, although ill-conceived, interpretations in IR to celebrate the Greek historian Thucydides as the first realist in international political thought. Neo-realists and neo-liberals in particular seem keen to promote this picture.17 Their narration goes as follows: Thucydides shares three common assumptions with twentieth century realism and neorealism: first, states are the key units in international politics; second, they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and third, they behave in ways that are rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms (see, for instance, Keohane, 1986, p. 7).18 With these views in common, so the narration continues, the neo-realist/neo-liberal paradigms of self-help and of the functional similarity of states could be located in a tradition of international political thought which traces back through the centuries to Greek Antiquity. Whatever might be the reason for this narration and for the keenness to construct historical legacies of realist thinking (for further discussion, see Part IV), a careful study of Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War suggests four obstacles to this mainstream interpretation. As Laurie M. Johnson Bagby demonstrates, Thucydides ‘departs from the realist position in both outlook and method by his methodology of (1) emphasizing the importance of what we might call “national character”, (2) highlighting the influence of the moral and intellectual character of individual leaders, (3) showing the importance of political rhetoric for action ... , and (4) showing that for him, moral judgements form an integral part of political analysis’ (Bagby, 1994, p. 133). Bagby’s fourth observation is especially relevant for analyzing Thucydides from a universalism-particularism perspective; and another relevant aspect must be added, which is not part of Bagby’s critique, but nevertheless represents an important objection against the neorealist misreading of Thucydides. Against Thucydides’s widely quoted reason why the Peloponnesian War 23
24 A History of International Political Theory
broke out, namely, because of the tremendous increase of Athenian power, its search for a hegemonic power position, and Sparta’s desire for security (all suit neo-realist reasons why states as particular and autonomous units wage war against each other), another motive seems to achieve a prominent status: Thucydides tells us that a treaty was broken between the Athenians and the Spartans and that was why they became hostile. There are convincing reasons to regard the violation of a treaty as the very reason for the Peloponnesian War, since the Spartans only reluctantly decided upon war and since they reacted only lackadaisically towards Athens’s power accumulation during the years before the war finally broke out. Hence, there must have been some decisive spark, which fuelled their decision to go to war beyond their fear due to the power growth of Athens. Thus, there are two objections to the mainstream IR interpretation of Thucydides which are most interesting here: first, the impact Thucydides ascribes to moral judgments in politics and second, the breach of a treaty which appears to be a major reason for the Peloponnesian War. When we further consider these two aspects, we have good reasons to understand Thucydides’s history of the Peloponnesian War not in neo-realist terms. On the contrary, we have to recognize that he narrated his history from a standpoint which criticized the warring parties from a universal perspective, rather than subscribing to the necessity and legitimacy of self-help, value-free and anti-ethical ‘realist’ arguments. Intervening and emphasizing the breach of a treaty as a vital reason for war, while at the same time excoriating the warring parties for not abiding by their previous treaty commitments, requires a universal and ethically based philosophy-of-right reference. And stressing the importance of moral judgments made by Athenian and Spartan leaders, as argued by Bagby, requires some normative outlook in Thucydides which can be derived only from general ethics. Contrary to neo-realist and IR mainstream interpretations, which do not differentiate between the analytical (or factual) and normative dimension of Thucydides’s history, Thucydides does not confine his thoughts on politics to the analysis of particular communities or their mutually particularistic interrelations. When he composes the history of the Peloponnesian War from both a philosophy-of-right perspective and an ethical outlook, he embeds his thoughts in universal projections of, and ideas on, international politics. The universalism-particularism feature thus illustrates most clearly that Thucydides is not a ‘realist’, nor is it an appropriate position to locate neo-realism in the legacies of Thucydidean thinking. Thucydides’s reference to universal legal standards explaining the reason for war Thucydides narrates his history of the Peloponnesian War as if it were one single and connected occurrence of 27 years, extending from 431 to 404 BC. Indeed, however, his contemporaries witnessed two wars: the so-called
Greek and Roman Antiquity 25
Archidamian or Ten Years War, which lasted from 431 to 421, and the Decelean or Ionian War, which lasted from 414 to 404. Accordingly, when we discuss Thucydides, we should, if not consider the two wars individually, at least ask why he subsumes the two wars into one: the Peloponnesian War. More importantly, however, we should distinguish the two incidents when we are interested in the cause(s) of the war(s), a question, which seems to fascinate present-day neo-realists who believe they have found another example of a structural pattern of power and security in Thucydides. Contrary to that belief, scholars of classical history, philology, and philosophy argue that Thucydides speaks of two circumstances which have caused the wars: on the one side, he stresses, surely, the power growth of the Athenian empire and its increasing hegemonic role in Hellas. On the other side, however, this appears not to be a structural cause that automatically led to war, but a period in which there have been negotiations between the Athenians and the Spartans as well as between their actual and potential allies. Thucydides tells us about these negotiations comprehensively in the form of several speeches and debates between their respective political and military representatives. The Melian Dialogue (5.83–113) might be the most famous one, but there is also the meticulously reported debate between Cleon and Diodotus (in 3.37–48; for a more detailed interpretation of the Melian dialogue see below), which refers to the sanctity of previous oaths, the value of promises, and the obligation of peace treaties – while each party accuses the other of having violated the mentioned principles. We hence learn that a system of treaties existed, based on the idea of legal principles ethically binding each party to stick to the treaties and to redeem its previous subscription to the principles agreed upon (in detail, see Wolf, 1956, who deals with this topic of Thucydides’s History in his Chapter III.2). Before rushing to war, and above all, beyond any independently given structural reasons which automatically forced the parties into war, the relations among city-states in Hellas were based upon a legal framework of mutually obligatory agreements. As Thucydides puts it very clearly, there were two causes of war: imperial power politics and the breach of treaties. The breach of treaties did not lead to knee-jerk reactions of warfare, but it was accompanied by negotiations, which Thucydides describes as assemblies in which the political leaders reciprocally aired and debated grievances about the other party having violated common principles. Raphael Sealey points to the Greek practice of hostile parties bringing forward grievances as justification for their preparation for warfare. He draws parallels between Thucydides’s History and Herodotus’s history of the Persian Wars: A modern historian may seek the causes of war in the objects, which the belligerents seek to attain, or in their passions, perhaps for vengeance or imperial expansion. Herodotus seeks the cause of war in a grievance or
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chain of grievances. His proneness towards this type of explanation can be accounted for. When a Greek state went to war, it ... recited a list of grievances as justification. And in 1.23.5 of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides would have conveyed that The Athenians and the Peloponnesians (broke) the Thirty Years Peace. There can be no doubt that this statement refers to his account of the quarrels over Corcyra and Potidaea [which are reported by Thucydides as an example of men abrogating ‘common principles’; see 3.84.3, and below]. The significance which Thucydides attributes to each of these quarrels has perhaps not been accurately appreciated ... It appears that Thucydides treated the quarrels ... as forming a chain of grievances of the Herodotean type.’ (Sealey, 1957a, p. 10) The crucial passage, in which Thucydides talks about the causes of the war, also should be quoted: All this came upon them [Thucydides is reporting about earthquakes and violence, even eclipses of the sun, droughts, and the plague] with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and the Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years’ truce made after the conquest of Euboea. As for why they broke the treaty, I have written down first the complaints and the disputes, so that no one may ever inquire whence so great a war arose among the Greeks. Now the most genuine cause, though least spoken of, was this: it was the Athenians, in my opinion, as they were growing great and furnishing an occasion of fear to the Lacedaemonians, who compelled the latter to go to war. But the complaints of each side, spoken of openly, were the following, complaints which led the parties to break the treaty and enter a state of war. (1.23.4–6; translation by Sealey, 1957b, p. 92)19 The breach of the treaty is once more emphasized by Thucydides when, some passages later, he reports four speeches from a Lacedaemonian meeting which resulted in the Spartan declaration that Athens had broken the peace treaty and was therefore committing an injustice (1.68–86). The Spartan reference to the treaty and Thucydides’s support for this view – after all he quotes the breach of the treaty as one reason of the general war, and even as the reason for the first, the Archidamian or Ten Years War (431 to 421) – highlight the Greek attitudes about justice and injustice in war and peace as it is expressed by the negotiation system of ‘complaints and grievances’. It furthermore symbolizes the guidelines of Thucydides’s composition of this system when he returns to the Spartan outlook on the war(s) in the seventh
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book of his History (7.18.2), and the nineteenth year of the war in Summer 413, respectively. He here writes: For in the previous war, they thought, the injustice had been more their own, because the Thebans attacked Plataea during a state of peace, and although a clause of the earlier treaty had forbidden recourse to arms of the other side proposed arbitration, they themselves did not respond when the Athenians invited them to submit the disputes to arbitration. On this account they thought it was only reasonable that they had undergone setbacks, and they called to mind the disaster at Pylos and any other that had occurred. (translation by Sealey, 1957b, p. 93) Besides the circumstance that reflections on justice and injustice in wartime can, beyond hostile accusation of others, also initiate critical self-reflection, Thucydides shows us that the war(s), as well as the course of its events, were not inevitable. The war(s) depended for the most part less on determined reasons than on contigent outcome of negotiations, on assumptions of justice and injustice, and on ethical positions with which the parties were endowed. Withal Thucydides does not concede, and accept, the pure ‘factualism’ that treaties are weak, promises not kept, human nature bellicose, and so on, but instead argues in favour of universal ethical orientations which should guide men’s actions. Antithetically he ‘teaches’ with the History what happens when, and if, common ethical grounds and political virtue decay and become lost. ‘Thucydides’ admission of ... frustration and remorse in the face of the complexity of [war] softens considerably the common portrait of him as a steely-minded pragmatist’ (Flory, 1988, pp. 55–6). As we have seen so far, Thucydides refers, too, to legal standards when explaining the reasons of war, not just to the factor of power and the Athenian power growth. His reference to legal standards clearly signals the universal background of his thinking. Because legal standards are regarded as binding for all parties who formerly subscribed to them, they, once agreed, transcend the particularity of each signatory and establish a new common and superior entity. And since Thucydides uses the breach of the Athenian-Spartan Thirty Years Peace Treaty as an important reason for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, he also believes in, and adheres to, a legal ethics which derives from the circumstance that the parties once agreed upon treaties. This ethics normatively states that treaty obligations have to be fulfilled and the treaties themselves have to be kept. When already the existence of treaties establishes some common superior, which transcends the particularity of the treaty powers, then this ethics of an obligation to keep the treaty agreements symbolizes much more a reference to universal (legal) thought. This is because this ethics, which can be termed an early version of the principle of pacta sunt servanda,20 can only be derived normatively from some universal idea of what has, and ought to be, done to impart
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legal agreements with power. The principle of pacta sunt servanda cannot be achieved from a particularized point of view (from the particular will of one party, for instance), because a situation can arise when the particular perspective of one party (from its ‘national interest’, so to speak) would perceive it as appropriate and opportune to breach the treaty and to pursue different goals from those formerly agreed upon. In spite of such a potential turn of interests, the legal ethics of pacta sunt servanda nevertheless claims that the treaty obligations have to be redeemed and the treaty is sacred. Consequently, this legal principle has to transcend the particular wills and interests of the single treaty parties, interests which could potentially arise after the treaty has been agreed and that might be different from what is laid down in the treaties. This principle thus sets up a new guideline, which states that treaties only become powerful and meaningful under the condition of a superior principle which, however, is not part of the treaties themselves, but stems from a universal ethical idea. The claim that the breach of treaties can explain a war (in the case in question the Peloponnesian War) consequently requires such a universal reference to ethical legal standards which postulates that treaties have to be sacred and sacrosanct to the particular wills of the treaty powers once they have been contracted. Thucydides here reveals himself as quite a modern thinker since the principle of pacta sunt servanda was not clearly elaborated in legal theory before the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, Thucydides has a distinct concept and term when he refers to this legal idea (see also de St. Croix, 1972): what has later been termed pacta sunt servanda is in Thucydides called justice. A few examples illustrate this. Thucydides narrates from a prewar meeting in Athens where the Corinthians tried to convince the Athenians not to ally with the Corcyraeans. The Corcyraeans, however, got wind of the Corinthians’ plan and sent their own legation to Athens. An assembly was then convened in Athens, and the Corcyraeans accused the Corinthians of having behaved unjustly by violating the principles of negotiation and legal arbitration with regard to their mutual claim to the city of Epidamnus: ‘And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to prosecute their complaints by war rather than by a fair trial’ (The Peloponnesian War, II.34.2). Why should Thucydides report from this prewar assembly and the Corcyraeans’ speech and emphasize, just by reporting it, its meaning for the outbreak of the war and the emerging alliances, if he had not perceived the parties’ resort to legal principles and to the concept of justice for momentous? Obviously, Thucydides thought of legal principles and justice as important. Another example, from Book 5.27.1 of the Peloponnesian War, supports this view and tells us once more of the parties’ sense of justice and injustice as well as illustrates Thucydides’s idea about, and esteem of, law and justice as his or the parties’ ultimate reference. The narration is this: In the tenth
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year of the war, in Winter 422/421, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians agreed on a 50-years’ peace treaty, the so-called Peace of Nicias. By this treaty the first war, the Archidamian war or the first 10 years of the whole Peloponnesian War, were over. The reason for the outbreak of the second war, the Decelean or Ionian War, which lasted for another 10 years, can again be found in mutual suspicions and grievances between the Athenians and the Spartans that the other party violated treaty determinations (see The Peloponnesian War, 5.20–26). After the treaty negotiations have been finished, all legations returned home in expectation and hope of peace; the Corinthians, however, suspected the Lacedaemonians of having agreed upon peace with the Athenians, not in good faith, but in order to subjugate the Peloponnesian peoples. Their suspicion was based on their disbelief in a peace treaty, in the good intentions of both the Spartans and Athenians, and in the possibilities of reconciliation after 10 years of war. They now started negotiations with the Argives, perceiving themselves as being now responsible for the protection of smaller peoples on the Peloponnese. Their argument and, respectively the motive shown by Thucydides, aims at fair and equal ground of law and justice for, and between, all peoples and poleis, irrespectively of their size and power (The Peloponnesian War, 5.27.1). Thus they (and/or Thucydides, respectively) normatively claim that, independent of military and political power as well as regardless of the immediate outcome of the war, all people and poleis who are independent and have a constitution of their own should have the same rights to be recognized and to partake in negotiations. They should also have the same duties and obligations stemming from the treaties. The Corinthians and Argives, and ‘with them’ Thucydides, are critical towards both Athens and Sparta due to their violation of treaties as well as due to their unethical behaviour (see below). They thus refer to, and claim, justice in the sense of both keeping treaty agreements sacrosanct and guaranteeing equal participation of poleis in treaty negotiations instead of just acknowledging the will of strong and hegemonic powers. 21 Thucydides’s ethics Thucydides’s History is a narration of war. As most commentators agree, Thucydides’s style is mostly narrative, sober and neutral. To conclude, however, that his narration could be understood just as a depiction or report is misleading. On the contrary, his narration of war battles, revolutions, and insurgencies as well as their accompanying atrocities is ethically informed. We find paragraphs in which he seems to be pretty neutral, and we find passages in which he posits explicitly an ethical condemnation of single war acts, but also of war in general. The background from which and the reference relating to which he narrates and judges reflect an ‘archaic pattern of ethical thought and are informed by the “world of traditional Greek religion” ’ (Edmunds, 1975, p. 74; Lloyd-Jones, 1971, pp. 144 and 206; also Strauss, 1964).
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A famous part of Thucydides’s History, which clearly highlights his ethical position, is his narration of the Corcyraean revolution in Book 3.82–84. His main argument and ethical reference become obvious when he states that, in wartime in general and with the Corcyraean revolution as a notable empirical example, ‘human nature [is] triumphant over the laws’ (3.82– 4–8). Here, we not only face another example of Thucydides’s reference to law (as argued above), but can also study his criticism of a moral deterioration in war, which he treats as an inversion of the normal when noting, for instance, that noble simplicity was laughed at while sophistication was admired, intelligence lost out to force, prudence was considered cowardice, and impulsiveness was seen as manliness. As Bagby notes, ‘Thucydides places the blame for this inversion of values on “the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry” (3.82.8)’ (Bagby, 1994, p. 144). We should read a paragraph from Thucydides’s ‘Pathology of War’: So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur ... The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible ... Word had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak of unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries ... The leaders in the cities ... went to even greater lengths (in their acts of vengeance), not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard ... Thus religion was in honour with neither party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation ... Men abrogated in advance the common principles – those principles upon which depends every man’s own hope of salvation. (The Peloponnesian War, 3.82–84) Thucydides characterizes the behaviour and moral attitudes in and during the war and wartime as a censure to prewar ethics. He provides several examples of how attitudes changed and how once-typical meanings of words turned into their opposite. All examples indicate that a traditional idea of ethical thought, which existed in prewar times, namely, the virtue of striking the happy medium between two opposite extremes of human
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behaviour – a virtue, which is paradigmatically elaborated in Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI) – perished because of selfish and hubristic behaviour during the war. According to Thucydides, only the negative patterns of behaviour prevailed; however, they were celebrated by his contemporaries as positive. But not only previously typical patterns of behaviour provide the standard for Thucydides’s critique of the decline and devastation of ethics in, during, and by the war. It is also normative standards, provided by religion and by considerations about the common good for the polis, which guide Thucydides’s critique. According to Lowell Edmunds, we find in Thucydides a unity of universal ethics, rooted in human reason, religion, and politics. He notes that the ‘distinction between the two realms is sharper for us than for him’ and for Greek political mythology and philosophy in general (Edmunds, 1975, p. 79). The ethical attitude, which characterizes Thucydides’s critique of the revolutions in Hellas during the war, threads through his whole narration of the Peloponnesian War and is symbolized by the term and concept of sophrosyne. (He discusses sophrosyne, both as an ethical value and as a form of political constitution; see also The Peloponnesian War, 2.37, 4.28, 8.64, and 8.97). Sophrosyne derives from Greek ‘sophron’, which means ‘sound and prudent mind’. The term also appears in many of Plato’s dialogues and bears the same meaning as in Thucydides. Translating the term and its inherent political and ethical idea into English is problematic because English has no word which encompasses the complex idea of ‘excellence in character and soundness of mind, both combined in one well-balanced person’, as the concept is explained in Plato. Another similar definition states that sophrosyne is the ‘agreement of the passion that reason should rule one’s behavior’. The best English translations might be temperance, moderation, prudence, self-control, and self-restraint; in any case, it expresses the radical opposite of arrogance, ignorance, and hubris, which increasingly imparted people’s character and deeds as well as the degradation from order to disorder during war. Due to the war, ethics became inverted. Thucydides’s view is that the war, the particularization of party interests, and selfishness are responsible not only for the loss of ethical orientations (like sophrosyne), but also for the loss of common political ethics between Sparta and Athens, which they shared in prewar times, and which once, in the Periclean Age, worked as a common ground of, and for, legal and political order in Hellas. Against various efforts in IR to instrumentalize Thucydides as a ‘realist’, it is most informative to look more closely at one more aspect of his ethics, namely, the fact that he adheres to an anti-utilitarian concept of political behaviour. Hence, his ethics does not allow, as neo-realists do, one to ask for the politically opportune outcome of one’s behaviour. According to such a view, a polis could support a certain policy or engage in some alliance (as a ‘bandwagoner’, so to speak in neo-realist terms) as long as this alliance appears to serve its interest. We can discern Thucydides’s anti-utilitarian
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ethics from the so-called Plataean episode (The Peloponnesian War, 3.21–23) in which Thucydides narrates the Plataean’s attack against, and flight of, the city of Mytilene. What is interesting here is Thucydides’s favourable and meticulous treatment of, and sympathy with, the Plataeans. This episode hence suggests that he has a strong ethical view about the morally right and wrong of this attack, independently of the outcome since the Plataeans are, in the end, destroyed. Nevertheless, Thucydides shares sympathies with their plans and judges them as ethically right, foremost because of the militarily unnecessary atrocities of the Thracians (see in this regard also Book 7.29.4–5; also Bagby, 1994). A further example which demonstrates Thucydides’s ethical background is the Melian Dialogue. The Melian Dialogue is usually cited as an example of the ‘realist’ (‘Machiavellian’) side of Thucydides (Keohane, 1986, p. 7). We will see, however, that this is a shortsighted and one-sided interpretation. In the Melian Dialogue, which is part of Thucydides’s narration of the fifteenth year of war in winter 417/416, he reports a meeting between Athenian legates and the Melians who met in Melos to negotiate the future of the island of Argos and of the Melians themselves. The Melians were part of the Lacedaemonian peoples and thus part of the Hellenic alliance against Athens. The Athenian legates did not speak to the people of Melos but to their council. The Melian Dialogue narrates their speeches. The end of the negotiations was brought about by a retreat of the Athenians who then, in their final comment, threatened the Melians with being sentenced and destroyed. Their extinction actually followed, and thus, Thucydides’s narration symbolizes and condemns another militarily unnecessary atrocity of the war. We read in 5.112–113: The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered: ‘Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited since seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both’ ... Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference said: ‘Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived.’
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As we see, Thucydides seems to simply report the ‘fact’ of what happened, without any explicit ethical judgement. The very fact, however, that he reports the dialogue and constructs his narration in such a way that the dialogue ends up with the failure of the negotiations and Athens’s threat of destroying the Melians, does make, as Bagby (1994, p. 147) argues, something valuable to the Melians’ death and their bravery, and at the same time points to a black stain in Athenian warfare. Their threatening to destroy, and finally their executing of, the Melians symbolizes their hubris, which is the most disdained human misbehaviour in ancient Greek ethical thought. Hence, we see that the Melian Dialogue is just seemingly ‘Machiavellian’ as Thucydides clearly expresses his dismay and moral indignation about the atrocities of war (a further example of this can be found in The Peloponnesian War, 7.29.4–5). He uses the Melian Dialogue, and his ostensibly sober style of reporting, as another example to criticize the decline of ethics in wartime and to evoke a similar response in his audience. According to Otto Luschnat, Thucydides’s intention to cause dismay and to evoke criticism both of war and the devastation of ethics has to be understood as theological historiography in its antique meaning (Luschnat, 1978). Greek theological historiography aimed at representing the orderly and divine array of the world and men’s place within this order. Luschnat notes that construing this intention and inspiration merely as pessimism, fatalism, and resignation (as ‘realists’ and neo-realists tend to do) is too myopic. The stylistic device to express consternation in Athenian tragic poetry consisted not in overt moral outcry but in ‘plain’ reporting. The intention that stood behind and accompanied this sort of textual composition was, however, crystal clear. The ethical dimension was always present and obvious to the author and the audience. It was standing permanently in the background, without a special need to be explicitly stressed (see also Creed, 1973). The selection and presentation of ‘facts’, so the general perception, did suffice to express and stipulate ethical dismay. The mainstream of present-day interpretation in IR, however, probably due to its naïve identification of the analytical and the normative (see more on this in Chapter IV.2), lost this understanding of classical texts and construes a Thucydidean ‘factualism’, taking his narration at face value. Considering the backgrounds discussed so far – namely, that (1) Thucydides refers to universal legal standards for explaining the causes of the war; that he (2) describes the ‘pathology of war’ and here criticizes the inversion of ethics and virtues caused by the war, and, in the Plataean episode, which tells another story of militarily unnecessary atrocities against a defeated city, assesses the moral right and wrong regardless of the outcome, arguing for an anti-utilitarian ethics; and that he (3) denounces Athenians’ behaviour and expresses his moral indignation about their exclusion of all considerations of justice (as symbolized in the Melian Dialogue) – we can conclude that Thucydides’s narration of the Peloponnesian War is deeply embedded
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in Greek traditions of political thought. Throughout his History, as the discussed examples demonstrate, he critically juxtaposes factual moral disorder, which both caused war and increased during the war, with the normative idea of ‘good order’. ‘Moral degradation, incompetence, political convulsion, disorder of the individual soul – these are his leading themes’ (Fliess, 1959, p. 593). At the same time, he complements Plato insofar as Thucydides is concerned with the causes of disorder and describes them, primarily focusing on Athens, while Plato was engaged in the attempt to reconstruct the political order of postwar Athens. Eric Voegelin notes, ‘The science of Thucydides explored the idea of ... the disturbance of order; Plato explored the idea of order itself ... Thucydides studied a political society in crisis, and created the empirical science of the lethal disease of order; Plato created the other half of politics, the empirical science of order’ (Voegelin, 1957, p. 357). The complementation of both authors, Thucydides and Plato, is, however, not just due to the pattern of disorder and order. This pattern also has a historical nexus because Plato is studying the devastation of the Athenian polis after the war which was reported by Thucydides. In his juxtaposition of disorder and order, Thucydides applies two metaphors: the one is an antithetical construction of the major war opponents, Athens and Sparta, symbolized by respective speeches, rhetorical features, and deeds; the other is the use of the historical contrast of pre- and post-Periclean Athens. Obviously, Thucydides’s emphasis is on Athens and Athenian policies, while he traces Athenian offensiveness and war atrocities back to internal moral and social disorder of the city.22 Thucydides criticizes Athens because it has decayed into a political culture of hubris in the post-Periclean age. Besides several examples recounted by him (see above), it is again the Melian Dialogue which epitomizes the Athenians’ lack of humaneness and ethical honesty, namely, when they place the alternatives of submission or total annihilation of their city before the Melians. The relation between a morally decayed foreign politics, which resulted in militarily wasteful actions of war crimes, is highlighted by Thucydides throughout several passages when he declares the tyrannical fashion of the Athenian polis liable for aggressive external behaviour. Individual atrocities are seen, hence, as just symptoms of the steady decline of political ethics. The tyrannical fashion of the Athenian polis is – here again the complementary relation between Thucydides and Plato emerges – exactly what Plato has in mind when he (in Politeia (The State), 562c–563e) accuses the ‘council of the four hundred’, which seized power in May 411, and the ‘council of the five hundred’, which replaced the former in summer of the same year, of tyrannical subversion of the polis. Consequently, Thucydides criticized, from a normative ethical perspective embedded in the classical politico-theological teaching of his time, the imperial restlessness of Athenian imperial politics, which he perceived as interrelated with the domestic decline of virtues. On
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the other hand, he complains about Spartan complacency, which for a long time did not realize Athenian armament and growth of imperial and economic power. ‘If the ruin of Athens was the result of domestic disorder and Spartan complacency almost caused the Peloponnesians to come to grief, it is little wonder that the dynamics of internal politics should have commanded Thucydides’ full attention. Time and again he shows how the shell of party polemics interposed itself by forcing leaders to ignore the logic of diplomacy under the impact of domestic pressure ... He was fully conscious of the need for a steady and fair-minded citizenry, in the absence of which all constitutions ... remain essentially empty forms. It is therefore not surprising that he should have gone on to expatiate on the disintegration of the ethos at a length which forms a striking contrast to the compendiousness and subtlety that characterizes the rest of his work’ (Fliess, 1959, p. 604). The ground of Thucydides’s ethical framework is generally to be found in his admiration for legal and political justice through an equal distribution of rights and privileges among the Athenian citizens (isonomia). As Gregory Vlastos points out in his study on isonomia, equal distribution of rights buttressed the citizens’ obedience to law and furthers their good ethical behaviour (Vlastos, 1953, pp. 350–1). This political view corresponds, again, with Plato’s and Aristotle’s political ethics, which teaches that a sound moral constitution of the polis transcends selfish class and individual interests through the foundation and spiritual anchorage of courage, honour, a sense of duty, fairminded toleration, and cosmopolitan acceptance of foreigners. The political life of a polis then appears clearly dependant on its ethical constitution, and the latter again is immediately informed by the virtues of its very members. The social and moral decay, however, as it began to take shape in postPericlean Athens, extended to the entire Hellenic world under the destructive influences of the war. Thucydides dwells on this feature in several passages by introducing in his narration many speeches, which refer to some transcendental values (however, complain about their loss) and depictions of war crimes (as seen above; additionally see the dialectically opposed and lengthy presented speeches of Cleon and Diodotus in 3.37–48, The Peloponnesian War). We can hence summarize with Peter J. Fliess that Thucydides’s History is a critique of contemporary politics, targeted both against Athens and Sparta, and that he argues from a normative standpoint, which is embedded in the idea of universal political and ethical truth existing across human civilization (which was, however, perceived as more or less limited to the Hellenic world); however, the ‘orientation toward the transcendental Good having been abandoned by an extroverted [Hellenic] society’ (Fliess, 1959, p. 608).
2. Cicero The Roman statesman, lawyer, and political thinker Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC) does not belong to the discipline’s canon of international
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political theorists. There are at least three forceful reasons, however, to consider his writings from an international perspective, too: first, he represents the political thought of republican (and imperial) Rome as meaningful and pointed as no other author;23 second, he stands for the tradition and legacies of Greek political thought in the Roman Empire (for Platonist and Aristotelian influences on Cicero see Striker, 1995); and third, he developed political ideas and a vocabulary which are worth study and interpretation from an international politics perspective in their own right. Although all three aspects are acknowledged by our neighbour disciplines, IR/International Politics widely ignored Cicero. The reason for this neglect seems to be found in the neo-realist mainstream (and its aversion to political thought and normative theory; see more on that below) into which Cicero definitely does not fit, and into which he cannot easily be made to fit in the same way that Thucydides (wrongfully) was made to fit. Nevertheless, Cicero’s writings contain many interesting aspects for the study of international politics, namely, a threefold relationship between his thoughts on empire and (original) views on the justification of war and warfare, both developed within the framework of a universalistic conception of reason and natural law (and a subsequent law of nations, a term and concept which, according to some commentators [Pangle, 1998, p. 243], was introduced and can be found for the first time in Cicero). The following discussion will start with Cicero’s universalistic idea of human reason because it represents both the framework within and the basis from which his concepts of just war and empire are embedded and derived, respectively. Cicero’s notion of reason and, subsequently, of law derived from human reason undoubtedly belongs to the most explicit universal conceptualizations in international political thought. Withal one has to notice that he lacks a developed philosophical foundation but most of the time refers to, and relies on, the tradition of philosophical thought layered by Plato and Aristotle from where he then straightforwardly concludes his own political statements. He seems especially influenced and impressed by Plato whom he admires as the greatest philosopher. Consequently, it is less a philosophical groundwork which raises our interest in Cicero here, but his conceptual framework of some major notions, such as reason and law, and especially his political conclusions gained from that framework. The relevance of these conclusions for an international politics perspective may be anticipated here in order to target and provide the structure of the following discussions: Cicero realizes and admits that there is no natural relationship and legal status between nations (and, due to that, no natural justice in the international realm); however, from this assumption, he concludes neither a natural state of war or ‘anarchy’ (as a neo-realist perspective would do), nor the necessity to establish interstate (international) political and legal institutions (a more Thucydidean or, as we would say today, liberal solution), but the erection of an empire in order to create an ‘international
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commonwealth’. Empire – and for Cicero the only acceptable empire would be a republican-governed Roman Empire – is the solution to create and to provide political and legal relations, and finally justice, among nations. This solution has, however, an ambivalent source because it results, on the one hand, from a deep affection of patriotism to Rome according to which Rome naturally is, and should be, the master of the world, and, on the other hand, from a reciprocal conception of universal natural law, human reason, and right and justice. The universality of reason and law Cicero’s notion of human reason and its universality rests upon a political anthropology. This political anthropology can be described – in an Aristotelian sense – as teleological insofar as Cicero views the basic anthropological characteristics of human nature and its end purpose (telos) as an entity. The raison d’être of human life, including the ethical obligations of men, relate to, and stem from, the potentials of human condition imparted in human nature. The ought of our ethical conduct of life, of our social and political commitments, as well as the development of our potential skills emerges from the potentiality of how we are able to life and what we are able to achieve and to develop (on this see excellent discussions in Marx, 1961, 1972). Typically human potentials and potentialities to develop can be seen according to Cicero’s political anthropology – what is typical for most political anthropologies – by a distinction between archetypical human and animal characteristics. In On Moral Duties (De officiis), Cicero writes: But between man and beast there is essential difference, that the latter, moved by sense alone, adapts himself only to that which is present in place and time, having very little cognizance of the past or the future. Man, on the other hand – because he is possessed of reason, by which he discerns consequences, sees the causes of things, understands the rise and progress of events, compares similar objects, and connects and associates the future with the present – easily takes into view the whole course of life, and provides things necessary for it. (Book I.4)24 The use, application, and further development of reason – that is, the ability to logically identify causes and consequences, to compare outcomes and the progression of events due to different causes which gave rise to them, and to dispose over time-consciousness – is construed by Cicero not only as a human condition but also, in accordance with his teleological outlook, as an ethical obligation to aim at and to accomplish for the realization of our potential aptitudes, talents, and predispositions. This conceptualization of reason is also to be characterized mainly by two aspects: it is per se universal and applies to all human beings as humans and as such naturally distinguished from animals;25 and in addition to that, it is incrementally practical
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since a successful life – or what Aristotle calls a ‘good life’, that is, a life conducted in accordance with men’s natural disposition – can only be lived through the active realization of our anthropologically given constitution. Cicero notes in this regard that ‘(the) reputation of virtue consists wholly in active life’ (On Moral Duties, Book I.6). When we think both aspects together, the universalistic anthropological conception of reason and its realization through practical, active life, two consequences of Cicero’s anthropological foundation of politics become obvious, which need further discussion: first, there is a necessity of creating a social and political framework which is binding for all members of a political body since Cicero’s anthropological determination of human life applies to every human;26 such a framework is socially and politically binding due to his anthropological teleology according to which individual life and political life can only be rational when, and if, they are conducted and organized in a way which accomplishes and abides by the teleological determinants of men’s anthropological pre-determination, that is, if they develop men’s potential of rationality. Second, the necessity of creating such a socially and politically binding framework generates Cicero’s concept of law and justice, which are thought of as genuinely universal and strictly compulsory because they are construed as based upon human nature and its (teleologically determined) rational development. Deviating from this conception of natural law would mean to contradict and violate the human condition itself. In Treatise on the Commonwealth, Book III, Cicero notes that ‘he who obeys it not, flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man’ since – as we read in, and can combine with, On Moral Duties – ‘nature is the fountain of law’ (Book III.17). Supplementary to this, we read on the relation between nature, reason, and law in Treatise on Law (De Legibus) that ‘nature hath not only given us reason, but right reason, and consequently that law which is nothing else than right reason enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil’ (Book I.33). Thus, in order to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘rightful’ and ‘wrongful’, Cicero relies on our judgements by reason (or ‘common sense’, sensus communis) and conscience, which has to steadily take into account and to consider the moral aspects of the law of nature (see De Legibus, Book I). We hence recognize that Cicero’s idea of law and legal justice is not only anthropologically based upon human nature, universal as it applies to all humans regardless of their political and social culture, and endowed with the power of being binding and compulsory for every human, but furthermore is incrementally driven by and inherits ethical aspirations (‘conscience’). Thus, law as the consequent institution of human nature at the same time points to and requires ethics and human virtue. Finally, since law is the framework which not only corresponds to human nature, and vice versa, but also creates the political organization in which men can realize their natural disposition as rational beings, law both has a fundamental
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ethical element – indeed men are ethically obliged to realize their virtues in accordance with law – and is thought of as universal. Cicero writes in Treatise on Government, Book III.33: There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. From an international politics perspective, this construction is interesting for at least two reasons on which I will concentrate my following interpretations: one point of interest is that Cicero distinguishes between three sorts of law, namely, natural law, civil law, and law of nations, thus explicitly taking an international perspective. Another interesting and important aspect to further investigate – and which elevates astonishments that Cicero has been excluded from the canon of IR literature – consists in Cicero’s application of his legal thought to war and warfare, thus to another distinctively international politics topic. As Thomas Pangle notes, ‘Cicero laid down some of the most influential ... pronouncements ever made on the moral limits of war’ (Pangle, 1998, p. 239). Consequently, he becomes probably the first Western author to contribute to what was later called the ‘just war theory’. At the very least, he formulates international legal restrictions on war and warfare some 1,500 years prior to Hugo Grotius to whom the foundation of such theorems is usually assigned (albeit Grotius explicitly drew on Cicero). About the distinction between law of nature, law of the state, and law of nations, Cicero reasons as follows: (Our) ancestors recognized a distinction between the law of nations and the law of the state. What is the law of the state is not necessarily also the law of nations; but whatever is the law of nations ought also to be the law of the state ... (True) law and genuine justice ... are drawn from excellent models presented by nature and truth. (On Moral Duties, Book III.17) We learn from this paragraph that the law of nature is fundamental and prior to both the law of the state and the law of nations.27 Thus, how a state should be governed and how the relations among nations should be organized is both derived and derivable from the law of nature. At the same time, we learn that, for Cicero, the law of the state and the law of nations are not necessarily the same and that what is determined in the
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law of nations should be incorporated into the law of the state. This means that the law of the state appears more complex because this incorporation does not work otherwise; however, Cicero also requests that the law of the state should neither violate the law of the nations nor natural law (see also Nederman, 1993, p. 506). Most important, however, is that Cicero thinks of international politics in terms of legal relations among the political bodies. Moreover, those regulations stem from one source, and that is natural law, thus, international relations have, according to the above discussed ethical impact of the law of nature, a moral codification as well; Pangle speaks of a ‘Ciceronian Moral Code of International Relations’ (Pangle, 1998, p. 251). And the law of nations and its determinations are universal as is the law of the state. In the Treatise on Commonwealth we read: (Law) is not one thing at Rome and another at Athens; one thing today and another tomorrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author – its promulgator – its enforcer. (Book III.33) These are so far only formal definitions; in political terms, however, it seems important to develop concrete ideas and to develop precise determinations of a law of state and nations. We know from the previous discussion that the law of state and the law of nations are not identical, nevertheless we can conclude – since both are derived from the law of nature – that what is rightful according to the one cannot be wrongful in the realm of the other. Cicero is aware that his formal definitions have to be concretized, and he addresses this problem by asking, ‘But the great question is “Who are the ‘good men’, and what is to be ‘fairly done’ ”?’ (On Moral Duties, Book III.17). Especially in his writing On Moral Duties (De officiis), Cicero elaborates legal standards – backed by the system of thought as described, dependant on political ethics and virtue, and driven by the aspiration of justice – which apply either to the law of the state or the law of nations, or to both. For the following discussion, I refer to those standards that are most relevant for the conduct and the organization of international law, that is, his legal restrictions on war and warfare.28 We find within Cicero’s legal thought seven determinations affecting the rights of war and warfare. The excursions, in which he speaks about legal restrictions on war, are spread over several of his writings. Mainly, however, we find relevant paragraphs in his De republica and De officiis. If we read those paragraphs together and produce a collection of his thoughts, we find that his concepts aim to restrict warfare in terms of excluding certain actions as principally illegitimate and/or practically counterproductive and also because they intend to impose prohibitions on war in general, or certain kinds of war, respectively. Most of these ideas reappear in Grotius nearly identically.
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Before discussing Cicero’s legal determinations or restrictions on war and warfare, it should be demonstrated that, and how, those legal thoughts are embedded in a universal framework. Universal ethics and reason provide in Cicero the structure in which his just war theorems are formulated and from which they are at all derived. Here, we see the impact of the above discussed relations between anthropological universalism and universalism of the reason, ethics, and law on very concrete political considerations. Just war theorems as outlined in Cicero seem only possible due to his fundamental concepts of, and beliefs in, the universalism of ethics, reason, and law, which create a common bond and solidarity among mankind and its several, ethnically heterogeneous nations. This commonness is rationally tangible because humans are gifted with reason to investigate their anthropological constitution. In De officiis, Cicero speaks of a ‘fellowship of the human race which is in the closest accordance with nature’ (Book III.33). Furthermore, universal solidarity is an ethical obligation, according to the teleological principle that what constitutes our nature predetermines the way we ought to act in order to realize our nature, as well as being part of human destiny and prophecy according to which ‘mankind was intended to compose one fraternal association’ (De Legibus, Book I.32). It seems that only such a conception or a similar29 universalistic conception grants modes of thought which allow, by transcending the separateness and multitude of individual political bodies into visions of some commonality, the foundation of legal standards regulating war and unifying war-waging parties by common obligations. Thus, Cicero’s rights of war are preceded by general ethical demands from which they are specifications applying to distinct situations and contexts, namely war, while also in war and wartime, as it should generally be the case, the point politics bears on, ‘(is) the moral end of our actions (ad finem bonorum) to which all things are to be referred, and for the sake of which all things are to be undertaken’ (De Legibus, Book I.52). In addition to this, we read in De officiis, Book I.7: The first demand of justice is, that no one do harm to another, unless provoked by injury; the next, that one use common possessions as common, private, as belonging to their owners. Private possessions, indeed, are not so by nature, but by ancient occupancy, as in the case of settlers in a previously uninhabited region; or by conquest, as in the territory acquired in war ... If any one endeavours to obtain for himself, he will violate the law of human society. But since ... we are not born for ourselves alone; since our country claims a part in us, our parents a part, our friends a part; and since ... whatever the earth bears is created for the use of men, while men were brought into being for the sake of men, that they might do good to one another – is this matter we ought to ... strengthen the social union of men among men. But the foundation of justice is good faith, that is, steadfastness and truth in promises and agreements.
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The rights of war and warfare we find in Cicero and which are derived from these general ethical axioms, in terms of the general legitimization of a war are: Wars must be undertaken only with a proper motive. But what is a proper motive? Here Cicero introduces the first and most relevant motive of self-defence, which accomplished axiomatic status in international law until the present day. His second general motive to term a war a ‘just’ war is that it must be undertaken for reasons of restoring peace. Both selfdefence and peace are hence motives for a just war, while the most deniable motive for war is a personal ‘desire of fame’ which, however, appears to Cicero unfortunately to be very often the case (see De officiis, Book I). Consequently, all wars which are not fought either for reasons of selfdefence or reestablishing peace are to be termed unjust. Cicero writes: ‘All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust ... (and) no war can be undertaken by a just and wise state, unless for ... self-defence’ (De republica, Book III, Fragments); ‘(war) should be undertaken in such a way that it may seem nothing else than quest for peace’ (De officiis, Book I.23); and ‘wars ... are to be waged in order to render it possible to live in peace’ (De officiis, Book I.11). In addition to these two general determinations on just war, that is, general in the sense that self-defence and peace specify war regardless of how the war itself is fought, we find individual restrictions related to warfare. Here the most important – which again traces throughout the history of international law until the present day – is that a war to be perceived as legitimate needs a war declaration; ‘(every) war which was not duly announced and declared, might be adjudged illegitimate’ (De republica, Book II.34). Further to that, Cicero appeals to the general legal-ethical dictum that promises have to be kept with mutual respect and rectitude and consequently views stratagems a violation of rights. In De officiis, Book I, he exemplifies this dictum using the example of a 30-days’ truce between two armies during which one party would attack at night arguing that the truce only referred to days, not nights. Such an interpretation would obviously contradict common sense and maliciously betray the other party. Cicero’s fifth restriction on warfare consists in the appeal to compassion and moderation of the winning party treating war prisoners, refugees, and the people of the conquered and besieged territories kindly. In De officiis Cicero states that all behaviour during and after a war should be ‘free from personal insult, and should have reference, not to the pleasure of him who administers punishment or reproof, but to the public good’ (Book I.25). His sixth appeal concerns good faith on both sides that laying down arms and flight to the other’s party command will be perceived as surrender and soldiers doing so will be spared (see De officiis, Book I.11, 12, 22). Finally, he underlines the importance of diplomacy and negotiation between politicians that require certain skills of a statesmen since the ‘skill in the settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage in disputing them by arms’ (De officiis, Book I.23).
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All of these determinations on warfare – war declaration, no stratagems, compassion, moderation, and good faith – serve the higher purpose of the aforementioned general criterion of just war, namely, that war has to serve peace, aim at the creation of peace, and focus on the ‘public good’. They serve this higher purpose insofar as they contribute to avoid feelings of injustice, unnecessary atrocities and violence, and longing for revenge after the war has been fought. Thus, Cicero is aware of the need of reconciliation after war, which seems to be, however, less an end in itself rather than a pragmatic political imperative to pacify societies under the banner of Roman republican imperialism. This qualification is revealed when taking into account Cicero’s discussions on the relationship between expedience and the unconditioned procession of the moral common good; and his discussion is by all means ambivalent because Cicero, notwithstanding his legal restrictions on war and warfare which apply unconditionally, represents a very distinct attitude towards peace-bringing wars, which are the second type of just wars after wars of self-defence. But what kind of peace and war has Cicero in mind? It is with regard to this question that Cicero’s thoughts become ambivalent. He qualifies utilitarian, consequentialist behaviour against unconditioned and honest ethical behaviour in case of altered circumstances, and he begins to justify expediency. ‘Justice for Cicero’, Marcia Colish writes, ‘is the paramount virtue for the duties flowing from it above all “pertinent ad hominum utilitatem” ... In applying these principles Cicero stresses ... that circumstances alter cases ... In particular, political life frequently requires us to apply the latter rule. We should conduct war and peace without guile or violence, if possible. But while such strategies are bestial rather than human, we may have to use them as the last resort’ (Colish, 1978, p. 87). Ambivalently to his ethical postulates, Cicero views such altered circumstances, which allow a justification of expedience and war, when the wealth, glory, and honour of the Roman Empire are at stake. Here, the image of wars in order to create peace becomes relevant, a peace, however, which is a Pax Romana, thus an imperial peace which is pacifying only insofar as it dictates, if necessary by war, the conditions of peace unilaterally to other nations and can be peaceful only insofar as besieged nations can be made allies after the war. Under the condition of Roman imperialism, which is for Cicero the best and the only thinkable and wishful order of international politics, such wars are, however, unavoidable. In order to turn besieged nations into allies, however, unnecessary violence and subsequent feelings of revenge have to be prevented and reconciliation after the war has to have a chance. The legal restrictions of warfare finally aim at, and should serve the purpose of, this post-war policy what constitutes their very practical character beyond all ethical considerations. Along this line, we can understand the following verdict of Cicero as a conclusion of his consideration on war and peace: ‘Let all wars be just, and justly prosecuted. Let allies be spared, and our
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armies restrained from all unnecessary violence, that glory of our country may be augmented. Then shall our soldiers return home with honour’ (De Legibus, Book III.28). This takes us to the next paragraph on patriotism and empire in Cicero’s international political thought. The Ciceronian concepts of ‘patriotism’ and ‘empire’ The relation between patriotism and empire in Cicero implies an ambivalence between imperial universalism, on the one hand, and an univocal attachment to the particular polity of Rome, on the other hand. This ambivalent relationship remains unresolved in his thoughts and threads through all his writings. It furthermore provides the pattern to understand the paradox why he perceives wars for the increase of Roman glory, honour, and wealth as legitimate while, at the same time, condemning acts of war as atrocities against humanity and restricting warfare on legal grounds. The idea behind that paradox points to Cicero’s outlook that war on behalf of the Roman empire will at some point, namely, when the previous enemies have been turned into allies and pacified satellite states of the imperial centre of Rome, benefit all and will be the best for everyone. Thus, the outcome of Roman imperial warfare aspires to include the world (or what has been perceived as the world) into Roman political order and is hence based on universal ideas of international political order – the Pax Romana – by means and an ideological agency, however, which are indeed particularistic in nature. Nevertheless, even if it is probably not at all tangible for Rome’s enemies, Cicero is driven by the unreserved conviction that the imperial peacekeeping order enacted and invigilated – if required by further wars to pacify and keep the peace – by Rome is to the advantage not only of Rome, but also of the imperialized nations themselves. Thus, Roman war against its neighbouring nations is initially perceived not as punishment or as retaliation, but to do them good: politically, culturally, and in the name of humanity. In On Moral Duties we read: Yet so long as the sway of the Roman people was maintained by the bestowal of benefits, not by injustice, wars were waged either in defence of our allies or of our own government; the issues of our successful wars were either merciful or no more severe than necessity demanded; our Senate was the harbour and refuge of kings, tribes, nations; while our magistrates and military commanders sought to obtain the highest praise from this one thing, – the guarding of interests of our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith. Our sovereignty might then be termed patronage, rather than the government, of the world. (Book II.8) Such a paternalistic system, called ‘patronage’ by Cicero, in which Rome not only conquers and besieges foreign nations and subsequently includes them in their empire with rights and duties, but also will be obliged to accept responsibilities to defend their (new) allies, is termed by S. E. Smethurst a
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‘protectorate system of government’: ‘The Roman Empire, he claims, evolved as a result of Rome’s defence of her allies, and is justified on these grounds. It is a protectorate – patrocinium orbis terrarrum’ (Smethurst, 1953, p. 217); in addition to that he argues: In case of any conflict of interests Rome naturally must have first consideration ... More significant is the fact that he [Cicero] takes for granted the impossibility of any system except one in which Rome will continue to rule the nations. His attitude is paternalistic. Originally, Rome’s right to rule depended on the moral character of her leaders and the justice of her constitution ... She has retained her predominance because ... natural justice demands the rule of the ‘best’ over the weak for the benefit of the latter ... It is not surprising, therefore, that in his speeches there are often suggestions, if not of racial basis, at least of certain consciousness of superiority. (Smethurst, 1953, p. 219) We can conclude from here that Cicero’s paternalistic imperialism is based on three foundations – moral, legal, and policy-oriented (i.e., republican, as we will see later) – all driven by the very notion of (universal) Roman superiority over the world. The ultimate point of reference for his universalistic political thought, from which he derives his moral, legal, and policy- oriented outlooks, is, however, anthropological and consists in his belief in one human nature which finds, and undoubtedly should find, its political manifestation in one universal commonwealth. In addition to the evidence of this view, as discussed in ‘The universality of reason and law’, two examples of Cicero’s very pregnant representation of this view on a ‘common body of humanity’ (On Moral Duties, Book III.6) reads as quoted below. It becomes again clear that his universalism incrementally includes the aforementioned paradoxical relation to a patriotic particularism, such as: (All) mankind bear a fraternal resemblance and relationship to each other [while] the main object of this whole discussion is to strengthen the foundations of our Commonwealth, to establish its forces, and to benefit its population in all their relations. (Treatise on the Laws, Book I.35; emphasis H.B.) Or (The) whole human race of mankind, as being united together by one common nature as a citizen of the universe, [is] considered as a single Commonwealth. (Treatise on the Laws, Book I.61) The groundings of Cicero’s paternalism will be discussed now; first, however, it has to be emphasized that Rome’s universal rule is not unconditionally
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granted, but has to be earned. In other words, Rome’s superiority, and Cicero’s claim of Roman superiority, only has a legitimate basis insofar as – however cynical this might sound – its imperial politics is conducted with honesty and courtesy, supported by the ideas of overall security, peace, and benefit for the whole Commonwealth, and preservation of life, as well as guided by good faith and philanthropy for other nations and races. Concretely, the father (pater) has to proof himself worth of his reign. Consequently, if Rome fails to prove the righteousness of this role, she does not deserve to be acknowledged as ruler over the world. Cicero sees Rome’s deserved failure and disregard as the imperial motherland approaching with the decline of the Roman republic and the monarchical and dictatorial transformations under Caesar (100 to 44 BC) and Sulla (138/134 to 78 BC). Accordingly, Cicero became an opponent of both during the Roman Civil War (88 to 82 BC) and proves himself as a firm adherent of Roman republicanism. As Marcus Wheeler notes, ‘Endless quotations may be taken from the political speeches, from the Catilinarians to the Philipps, to witness to Cicero’s distrust in any kind of monarchy’ (Wheeler, 1952, p. 52). Only a republican Roman Empire would deserve recognition, following, obedience, and solidarity by other nations. Cicero himself notes in On Moral Duties: (After) Sulla’s victory we entirely departed from it [justice and patronage; HB]; for nothing any longer appeared inequitable toward our allies, after so much cruelty had been exercised upon our own citizens ... And so, foreign nations being thus oppressed and ruined, in token of our forfeited empire, we saw Massilia borne in a triumphal procession, and triumph celebrated over that city without whose aid our commanders never gained a Transalpine triumph. I might mention many other abominable things done to our allies, if the sun had ever beheld anything more shameful than this very transaction. We therefore are justly punished ... We have fallen in to these calamities because we preferred to be feared rather than to be loved and esteemed. (Book II.8)30 This throws an interesting light on Cicero’s patriotism. Even if the paradox between universalism and particularism cannot be dissolved completely, at least we learn from the contingency of his loyal feelings to Roman politics that even his particularism (patriotism) has a universal basis, that is, there is something higher than his patriotic loyalty to Rome and that is his belief in the value of republicanism (concretely in his case: the sovereignty of the Roman senate) and philanthropy. Finally, it is because of the observation and realization of these two highest common goods that Rome (meaning the Roman Republic only) would deserve universal reign over other nations and the world; or rightfully deserve punishment by resisting nations in case Roman politics and warfare violate the norms of both goods – as, according
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to the above quotation – Sulla and Cicero. In case Roman politics abides by and realizes the norms of republican politics and philanthropy, it warrants being pater mundi and having foreign nations be obedient to its patronage. We hence find in Cicero, according the abovementioned paradox, the notion of universal values manifesting themselves in the particular unit of Roman republicanism and its paternalistic imperialism. Universalism in Cicero thus reveals both the advantage of universal thought in international politics in that it allows the development and application of indiscriminate values and policies to all nations, cultures, and individuals, connecting and incorporating all political bodies into a theoretically conflict-free order of peaceful relations and sharply points out the downfalls of this concept in that this order is only thinkable as a hierarchic hegemony under the supreme authority and, if necessary, violent reign of Rome. However – and that will play decisively into the distinction between pre-nineteenth century universalism and nineteenth and twentieth century universalization, the latter being informed by positivistic, instead of normative, rationality (for this discussion, see Chapter IV.1) – Cicero adheres to a political philosophy of order and hence views a reference point beyond the political which determines the righteousness of concrete political conduct (in his case, the righteousness, or not, of Roman politics) and finally is solid enough to even qualify his patriotic love to Rome. As he notes in his treatise on the Commonwealth, Book I.1, ‘so great is the necessity of this patriotism which nature has implanted in man, so great is the ambition to defend the safety of our country, that its energy has continually overcome all the blandishments of pleasure and repose ... but all virtue consists in its proper use and action’ (emphasis mine). We can conclude that Cicero’s patriotism to Rome is founded by, and consists of, the realization of certain highest values by Roman (republican) politics. When Roman politics deviate from this ideal (which happened in Cicero’s view with Sulla’s and Caesar’s violation of the Senate’s authority), Cicero’s love for Rome qualifies accordingly and is as such contingent.31 Smethurst writes, ‘Cicero was considering the good old times. The protectorate system, however, was modified before Sulla’s time and has been abandoned altogether since. Sulla, Cinna, Pompey, and Caesar, all aspired to a regnum, a term which ... denoted not monarchy, but the possession of excessive power within the framework of the republic ... Caesar’s ambition dealt the deathblow to constitutional government. Such is Cicero’s bitter indictment in the second book of De Officiis ... which we may assume presents his final and considered judgement on the most aggressive of Roman imperialists’ (Smethurst, 1953, p. 221). As long as Roman politics corresponds with republican politics and protectorate virtue, Cicero believes in the superiority of Rome in legal, political (i.e., republican politics as the best form of government), and moral terms. It appears that there is a clear hierarchy among these three in Cicero: derived from the supremacy of natural law itself, the legal order of a commonwealth
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provided the embedment for the realization of both the political and moral order. Thus, a commonwealth can only be, and rightfully claim to be, superior to other nations if it realizes just laws and equality among its citizens, inspired by God and imitating ‘nothing else than a nature perfect in itself and developed in all its excellence’ (Treatise on the Laws, Book I.25). This realization has been accomplished in republican Rome, ‘the most equitable of all nations’ (On the Commonwealth, Book III.16), whereby it is this legal universal order realizing justice and equality which enabled the political life to be republican. Mutually, the Roman constitution protected the legal order and guaranteed its orderly functioning ‘to regulate the affairs of that universal city [Rome]’ (Treatise on the Laws, Book I.23). In Book II.2, Treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero writes: (The) government of Rome was superior to that of other states ... Our Roman constitution ... did not spring from the genius of an individual, but of many; and it was established, not in the lifetime of a man, but in the course of ages and centuries. The mutual enforcement between legal and political-constitutional order and their duration in Rome over centuries, as Cicero argues, lifts Roman superiority on a structural, eternal, and illustrious level beyond the influence of individual action32 and unique in comparison with other nations. It made Rome a sacred institution, immortal and, as Andrew Bell emphasizes, ‘the stage of the world’ (Bell, 1997, p. 1), being an universal manifestation of the trinity of human nature, ‘God’s’ will and (the only rightful) political-legal principles and hence possessing the natural right to impose an universal empire. This manifestation in Rome and respective realizations of these principles in the republican past of the Roman Empire, constitute finally the moral superiority of the Roman people. Rome’s ‘very greatness of soul’ thus consists not only in the disposition over ultimate reason and divine spirituality – both legally and politically – but, based on that, also in the possession of the virtue to create, guide and ‘preserve the common harmony and fellowship of the whole human race’ as well as common safety (Cicero, On Moral Duties, Book I.41). Thus, the Roman Empire is in Cicero’s view also a cosmopolitan ethical ideal, endowed with, and responsible for, the care and cultivation of humanity at large – a care and responsibility which paradoxically, that is, albeit Cicero’s moral and legal restrictions on war and warfare (see the discussions in ‘The universality of reason and law’) are to be put into practice, if necessary, by imperialist wars of expansion cynically for the sake and welfare of others. Cicero’s imperialism is symbolically informed by a geopolitical pattern typical for imperial thought, not only in antiquity but apparently throughout the centuries until the present day (see Eisenstadt, 1963; Voegelin, 1974; Bauer, 1980; Sinopoli, 1994; critically Ashley, 1987; Behr, 2007). Cicero’s
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geopolitical vision merges into a political cosmology which centres Rome in the middle of the universe and constructs the rest of the world as the periphery of Rome. According to Cicero, these peripheral zones nevertheless belong to the universal commonwealth. By using a political cosmology, Cicero emphasizes another time, now symbolically, the universalism of his thought and of the Roman Republic, respectively. It is thus suggested that Rome is not only the centre of the commonwealth and all its integrated nations (i.e., of the political world), but of the cosmos as such because the cosmos appeared to be ordered geocentrically and Rome is thought of as the universal centre of the globe. Thus, this political vision of imperial privilege becomes endorsed by objective, eternal, and unchangeable, that is, cosmic, principles and is construed not only as metaphysically based on ‘natural law’ and anthropology, but further as a human order, a monument, corresponding to, and at the same time coined in the stone of, the physis of the imaginable.33
I.2 Christian Political Pragmatism and Ethical Universalism – Aurelius Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
1. Prolegomena This chapter will be on the international political thought of probably the two most important and influential Christian philosophers: Aurelius Augustine (354–430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225[?]–1274). Discussing both as theorists of international politics is obviously not part of the historic canon constructed by the discipline of IR; nevertheless, both contribute importantly to the history of international political theory. The knowledge and interpretation of their writings enhance our understanding of traditions and legacies in international political thought and how they fed into perceptions of twentieth- and twenty-first-century inter-national politics. Both authors are part of a stream which is nowadays called ‘idealistic’ and their normative ethical tenets have, whether positively shared or not, solidified as commonsense knowledge (at least in Christian cultures, Protestant or Catholic), such as the dogmas of the Sermon on the Mount to international politics, ‘pacifist’ attitude towards international politics, and thoughts on ‘just war’. The latter perceptions, however, have to be put into question: a Christian pacifism cannot be coherently and convincingly derived either from Augustine or Aquinas and has been criticized, for example, by Reinhold Niebuhr as a-political (more on this later); and a Christian just war theory remains quite vague, at least as an original contribution to international political thought while, in a retrospective view, Cicero elaborated a much more coherent concept of ‘just wars’ long before the Christian Fathers (see Chapter I.1). Against the popular views that Christian international political thought provides coherent teachings for pacifist international politics or delivers an original just war theory, I will argue that Augustine as well as Aquinas subscribe to rather pessimistic and sceptical outlooks on international politics (as on politics in general), which view a permanent threat of war due to a lack of human rectitude and social reliability as well as due to human feelings of 50
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retaliation and aspirations of glory and pride. Saying this, it has to be emphasized that they also speak of ‘just war’, ‘justice’, ‘peace’, and a Christian duty to love one’s enemies and neighbours. And this is important here because both Augustine and Aquinas elaborate a normative framework consisting of ethical and legal instructions which operate, or should operate, as guidelines for more peaceful and just human relations, on an interpersonal and ‘international’ level. This is finally why they contribute to the central question of this study as a further example of universally oriented international political thought, even when rooted in perceptions which some would call traditional ‘realist’. It is argued here, however, that such categorization as ‘realist’ would be misleading for mainly one reason: it is a blurred categorization because, as will be seen throughout this study, it seems impossible to define what ‘realist’ actually means, and that is why I prefer, with Niebuhr, to term Augustine’s and Aquinas’s thoughts as (partly) ‘pragmatic’. Finally, the strong normative counter-picture against their pragmatic view of reality, drafted and claimed on the basis of Christian beliefs, either drops out of a secular and scientistic reading or is decried as idealistic and utopian. In both regards, they are not suitable for the construction of ‘realist’ legacies, and this might be the reason why Augustine and Aquinas are being widely neglected by IR theory. Augustine and Aquinas, as different as their historic circumstances and the initials for their oeuvre were, argue on common ground which is typical for all Christian thinkers, orthodox or liberal, historic or modern, about the principal situation of men and its important consequences for their political world. R. W. Southern summarizes this common ground as follows: ‘Man is a fallen creature, who has lost that immediate knowledge of God which was the central feature of human nature before the Fall; that human instincts are now deeply disturbed and are often in conflict with reason; that human beings are now radically disorganized and disoriented – all this is common ground to all Christian thinkers at all times’ (Southern, 1995, p. 22). Nevertheless, there is an unshaken normative belief which is set against this pessimism of the ‘human condition’: ‘The first fundamental characteristic is ... a strong sense of the dignity of human nature’ (Southern, 1995, p. 22). This fundamental assumption is to be revealed for further discussing and understanding Augustine’s and Aquinas’s political conceptualizations relevant for international politics. For this discussion, it is less important whether, or not, one shares these assumptions or beliefs, but much more relevant to be aware of them in order to understand their pragmatic approach to the ‘real world’ and to recognize at the same time, first, the existence and, second, the strength, of their normative (counter-) world. With regard to this study’s question of universalistic and particularistic ontologies of international/inter-national order, Augustine and Aquinas have many thoughts in common. They evidently share the Christian tenets from the Holy Scriptures, acknowledge the authorities of Aristotle and, to lesser extent, of Cicero in relation to ethics and natural law; and Aquinas
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recognizes unrestrictedly the authority of Augustine.34 Interpreting Aquinas and Augustine regarding the problematic at hand, their writings are complementary. This correlation provides the structure for this chapter; and recognizing that there appears to be no aspect in regard to our question in which Aquinas would oppose Augustine, the following sections of this chapter apply to both Augustine and Aquinas. Whereas Augustine develops fundamental outlooks then adopted by Aquinas, continuing the tradition of orthodox Christian thinking on politics, such as the differentiation between a ‘godly’ and ‘earthly’ city (called Civitas Dei and Civitas Terrena), Aquinas is more explicit on law and legal aspects and their nature and function to order human action and politics (Questions 90–108, Summa Theologica; further referred to as Aquinas, 2007). However, we can legitimately assume that his conclusions are, or would be, in line with Augustine’s since most of his arguments end up with an authoritative quotation taken from Augustine. Another difference, though again complementary, relates to their explicitness on just war and laws of warfare, which are worth discussing (see ‘Transcendental universalism and the intelligibility of order: Peace and justice’) even when they remain quite vague. Here, it is also Aquinas who is more specific. Their vagueness, however, seems all in all to be due to the idea that men have a natural knowledge of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ (and their exceptions) through their rational participation in divine law (or eternal law and subsequently natural law), a knowledge imparted in men as rational beings and finally guaranteed by their belief in God and the Holy Scriptures. At the same time, both Augustine and Aquinas, although they find their ultimate reference in God and the Scriptures as well as the human belief herein, share, perhaps astonishingly, a rational conception of God. It is only because of this rationality, which guarantees a universal intelligibility of divine and natural law for all human beings, that the lessons of the Holy Scriptures and the vision of the Civitas Dei (or the Kingdom of God) can operate as the normative framework of politics (or the Earthly City). It is also this intelligibility and the knowledge imparted in men by belief and devotion to God by which both Augustine’s and Aquinas’s vagueness can be explained when it comes to politics (compared to Cicero and Thucydides, for example) since this knowledge is supposed to be, or supposed to be able to be, known nat urally and hence, as they trust, does not need to be explained at great length. In addition to this, and this is a most relevant consequence for our discussion, this rationality manifests in a profound humanism in both: their illumination of Christianity derives from their interest in its lessons in relation to and for men in this world, based on a profound conviction of human dignity, even after the Fall. R. W. Southern notes: Just as human nature has an inherent dignity which, though ruined by the Fall, has not been altogether lost, so too the whole natural order is in a similar situation. The continuing human power to recognize the
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grandeur and splendour of the universe, to understand the principles of the organization of nature, and to order human life in accordance with nature, is symptomatic of the survival of human dignity, in however depleted a form, after the Fall. But it is also symptomatic of the continuing dignity of the natural world itself that it is intelligible. Consequently, when human beings understand the laws of nature, they not only achieve their true dignity as nature’s keystone, holding the whole created order together in an intelligible union, but they also recognize the rationality of nature itself. Further, this position gives human minds access to the divine purpose in the Creation, and therefore, in some degree access through reason, as well as through Revelation, to the divine nature itself. (Southern, 1995, p. 23) Consequently, Augustine and Aquinas utter strong and determined views on politics which will, especially in Section 3 of this chapter, be interpreted with relation to international politics, that is, to the problem of diversity of humankind into nations, languages, and customs and the principles of interaction of diverse entities; to the human inclination towards glory and pride (sought primarily in waging wars); and to efforts of, and teachings about, establishing peace.
2. Political pragmatism35 in Augustine and Aquinas To further investigate the basic belief of Christian theology in the dilemma of human beings and human society in its political relevance, the narrative36 of the Fall has to be further discussed. This narration lies at the ground of both Augustine’s and Aquinas’s pragmatic outlook on politics. According to this narrative, humankind, initially created by God in his image and in unity descending from the first man created by God37 lost its innocence and paradisaical conditions when starting to reflect upon its contingence and when seeking for knowledge, symbolized in the metaphor of Eve seducing Adam. With this incidence, and from this point onwards, humankind, or as Augustine puts it, the ‘earthly City’ fell from God, its creator and governor, lost its original virtue, and sank in sin. This narrative is, of course, deeply ambivalent since mankind’s human condition and anthropological constituents, namely, its quest for knowledge and capacity of reflexivity, in other words humans’ self-consciousness, self-confidence, and free will, depended on the denial of unconditioned belief in, and devotion to, its creator. This ambivalence is also emphasized by Niebuhr who argues that ‘Augustine sought God in the mystery of self-consciousness’ (Niebuhr, 1941, p. 168); he further explains: ‘His description of the capacity to transcend temporal process, and of the ultimate power of self-determination and self-transcendence, stirs a sense of amazement in Augustine and the conviction that the limits of the self lie finally outside the self ... The conclusions at which Augustine arrives in the contemplation of this mystery of human self-transcendence are of tremendous importance for
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the understanding of man’s religious nature. He concludes that the power of transcendence places him so much outside of everything else that he can find a home only in God’ (Niebuhr, 1941, p. 167). This narrative’s symbolism also describes the human condition as genuinely conflicted since the capacity of reflexivity naturally leads to the tendency that men start to draft and create their life in general and their political order in particular due to their own visions, imaginations, and passions. This again leads to the division of mankind into different opinions, political communities, tribes, races, empires, languages, customs, and social practices.38 However, God as the creator remains the governor over human destiny: ‘(The) times of all kings and kingdoms have been ordained by the judgment and power of God’ (Augustine, 1998, p. 184). Thus, this narrative is embedded in another narrative, which conveys that humankind was punished by God for its fall from divine order and its separation and individualization from God. Put differently, the invention of politics as humans’ vision to create their order on their own free will, principally independent of God and symbolized in the Fall, results in the punishment and destiny of being eternally and irretrievably divided, diversified, and morally sinful. Henceforth, humankind has to deal with diversity and conflict, having lost its initial togetherness and unity in peace before the Fall (see Augustine, 1995, Book XIV, and especially Book XVI, chapter 4, 6 and 8). This human condition of conflict, diversity, strife, and war among nations, accompanied and initiated by men’s passions, pride, desire for glory, and lust for mastery, compared to the innocent life of obedience, contemplation, and firm belief before the Fall, is symbolized in Augustine by the metaphor of the earthly city where no political order is everlasting (1995; Book XV, chapter 4), where triumph in war brings nothing but death (ibid.) and where peace is only temporary. These conditions, represented as God’s punishment for men’s longing for knowledge and autonomy, are referred to by Augustine in Book XVI of the City of God by the story of the city of Babylon and the erection of its towers which stand for men’s ‘ungodly pride’ or hubris (see chapter 4) as they reach into heaven and thereby would provoke God. God’s answer is the division of mankind into nations and different tongues. Babylon, Augustine argues, therefore means nothing else but ‘confusion’; and more than that, men’s activity which stands behind his longing for knowledge and capability of reflectivity, namely, philosophy, is equated with Babylon, confusing people by its multitude of opinions, sects, and speculative questions. Consequently, he describes the earthly city as reign by ‘the lust for mastery’ (1995, p. 644), where peace can never be eternal (1995; Book XIX, chapter 5) and social bonds were genuinely nonreliable (1995; Book XIX, chapter 8);39 and he further illustrates: Do we not know that human affairs are everywhere full of such undoubted evils: of injuries, suspicions, hostilities, and war? And even peace is an
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uncertain good, since we do not know the hearts of those with whom we wish to maintain peace. Moreover, even if we could know them today, we should not know what they might be like in the future ... And these ills are bitter in proportion to the sweetness of the peace which, though believed to be true peace, was only a most clever pretence ... If ... there is no security even in the home from the common evils which befall the human race, what of the city? The larger the city, the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and criminal trials. Even when the city is at peace and free from actual sedition and civil war, it is never free from the danger of such disturbance, or, more often, bloodshed’. (1995, pp. 925–6) He concludes that historically Rome was such a earthly city, or a ‘second Babylon’ (p. 824).40 Facing such ‘realities’ – which are, indeed, just one side of men’s reality, namely, the part bare of the normative world which is later symbolized by the ‘City of God’ – Augustine’s pragmatism aggrandizes to its utmost form. He even tends to relativize the value and relevance of political order and politics. In Book XVIII, chapter 41, The City of God, he considers: ‘But, in any case, what does it matter in what direction or way unhappy humankind sets out on its pursuit of happiness, if it is not guided by divine authority?’ (p. 880; also Book V, chapter 17, ‘About the consent of the conquered’); and in Soliloquia, Book II (1986), he declares the righteousness of deception in political and social life if expedient for the realization of a higher cause (which remains quite vague and foremost lies in the perspective of the very agent). However, this is just one part of Augustine’s outlook, which nevertheless conveys how bald and penurious human life would be without the ethical guidance of God. We find the same pragmatism in Aquinas, based upon common beliefs in the human condition and upon the use of the same metaphors and symbolic narratives. Aquinas’s political pragmatism communicates most decisively from his Summa Theologica when he argues, based on the assumption that each nation, or people, naturally knows external or foreign enemies, that human relations are usually divided into hostile and befriended interactions (2007, pp. 1472–3), and that some forms of war (i.e., those for defending the common weal against those external enemies or those fought in God’s command41) are righteously fought, and that slaying is here a conventional and habitual part of peoples’ affairs. Aquinas notes: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities ... When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God’s people; whereas the women and children were speared. But in the neighbouring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor of Divine justice. (p. 1473)
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So far, I have summarized some basic beliefs as they are typical for Christian orthodoxy, recapitulated by Augustine, shared by Aquinas, and providing both pragmatic and prosaic outlooks on men’s fundamental condition. Nevertheless, humankind is not completely lost, and Augustine turns this negative into a positive by some astonishing arguments which describe men’s intellectual capacity to reflect and transcend their conditions and their factual reality not as a complete downfall and decline. Finally, he even binds – and this might be most surprising, however, founds his reputation as philosopher and last but not least as a political thinker important for this study – the notion of God to men’s intellect, and thus reverses the initial dilemma of men’s Fall into a positive political philosophy of order. This is achieved by Augustine – and shared by Aquinas – through a juxtaposition of the earthly city, characterized by human misbehaviour and all the subsequent shortcomings, and the City of God, or Kingdom of Heaven as Aquinas terms it. Before Augustine’s and (Aquinas’s) political philosophy evolves and can convincingly be demonstrated in its relevance for international politics (see Section 3), the City of God and its relation to the crude reality of human and political life have to be explained. Humankind is not totally forlorn, albeit all the failings, weaknesses of men’s behaviour, their opposition to God, and humankind’s diversities and disunity. Responsible for men’s deliverance from evil is a humanism, which prevails in Augustine’s and Aquinas’s thinking since they assume some remnants of dignity in men through its creation by God in his image while at the same time men were punished by God for resembling, or imitating, his power and entitlement of creating order. Augustine writes: ‘For there is nothing so social by nature as this race, no matter how discordant [and disobedient to God, one can add here] it has become through its fault; and human nature can call upon nothing more appropriate ... than the remembrance of that first parent of us all’ (1998, p. 540). The dignity of men is hence manifest in its nature; men are not only at the top of God’s order of creation, but are closest to him out of all creatures;42 and no man is God’s enemy by nature but only by a misguided will and soul.43 This understanding of humanism can be pushed further to an interpretation which finally argues that God is for men, or at least not without and apart from men, what last but not least is symbolized in God’s sacrifice of his son for the salvation of humankind. What does the City of God stand for? To put it simply, the City of God represents all virtues, values, and potentials of men that are imparted in men and which men are potentially capable of possessing and realizing, but which have been lost and become repeatedly lost through passion, pride, lust for glory and mastery, disbelief, and paganism. However, even if not men’s manifest reality, men do have some knowledge of this transcendental world (see more on that below in Section 3); and what is more important, they have the potential and possibility to realize, and live accordingly to, the
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norms of the City of God, that is, the Holy Scriptures and the Sermon on the Mount. This is why there is a normative template for men’s life in the earthly city and for political order. Although there is only temporal peace, transience, and mortality,44 because ‘all things are woven into a temporal order’ (1995, p. 87), as well as strife, war, disconcert, and conflictive diversity in the earthly city, that is, in politics, there is eternal peace, concord, unity, immortality, and love in the City of God, that is, in the possibilities of human life, which should guide their action. The temporal structure, in which the earthly city and political life are woven, leads furthermore to a mutability of ‘human affairs [so] that no people is ever granted a security so great that it need never fear incursions to this life’ (Augustine, 1998, p. 801). This being-in-time and its political consequences are overcome, or surmountable, in the City of God where eternal peace by complete security through peoples’ unity and unification under divine principles of ethical conduct of life is possible. Thus, these thoughts on security not only represent (another time) Augustine’s pragmatism (insofar as security is never fully achievable and war is an always looming threat),45 but also point to the chance and eventuality of a better reality and of having a more peaceful political life when men would (only) rationally bethink the normative substructure of their reality (symbolized in obedience to God’s prescriptions). However, the juxtaposition of the earthly city and the City of God (the Kingdom of Heaven) is not dualistic but rather dialectic; and only therefore it can be aspired and operate as a normative template for political life at all. Thus, the interrelation between both cities (Augustine and Aquinas also sometimes term them ‘societies’) has to be elaborated. However, first of all, it is interesting to acknowledge that there is such a dialectical connection and to realize that the City of God is not something otherworldly, but of this world. Even if it does not describe the major factual characteristics of human and political reality, it nevertheless is something from this world. As a (the) normative realm of human rationality, it relates to humans’ capacity to reflect upon the contingency of their existence and to transcend their factual being into future visions of social and political life; it hence points the way to possible developments of real people and their society. The City of God can be regarded as the telos and ethical purpose of personal and societal advancement. Augustine writes: ‘(The) two cities – that is of the earthly and the heavenly – ... are in this present world mixed together and ... entangled with one another’ (1998, p. 450); and further he notes that the human race belongs, albeit its division into a multitude of nations, to two societies, which are depicted as follows: (It) is that, though there are a great many nations throughout the world, living according to different rites and customs, and distinguished by many different forms of language, arms and dress, there nonetheless
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exist only two orders ... of human society ... two cities ... The one is made of men who live according to the flesh, and the other of those who live according to the spirit. Each desires its own kind of peace, and, when, they have found what they sought, each lives in its own kind of peace. (Augustine, 1998, p. 581; see also ibid., p. 632) From this description we see clearly that living according to the City of God, that is, the normative counter-vision to the ‘real’ world, is possible when men overcome their inclination to mere passion (including their lust for mastery, glory, and pride) and live according to their reason and spirit. Both sides – the turn to live ‘according to the flesh’ and the capability to live ‘according to the spirit’ (the ability to use one’s reason) – are part of the anthropological condition of men. This is symbolized in the narrative of Adam, being, on the one hand, established in a perfectly organized material and intellectual order, while, on the other hand and at the same time, being inclined to transgress this order and becoming finally too weak to resist his passions.46 Men have an ambivalent anthropological constitution and are torn between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’, passion and reason. To live without normative guidance and visions means to remain in the realm of passion and not to develop the reasonable side of one’s being. Living without transcending the desperate crawling in factuality and momentariness corresponds, as Augustine says, an eternal punishment. But men do possess, by their nature, the chance to free themselves through their love of God, that is, the use of their reason and intellect.47 However, while ‘human life points beyond itself ... it must not make itself into that beyond ... [Human] freedom is the basic of both creativity and sin’ (Niebuhr, 1941, pp. 169, 298). Equating human life and power of creation with God’s power and putting men in place of God would be what was called ‘hubris’ in ancient Greek ethics (see section on Thucydides) and what Augustine circumscribes as men’s basic sin. Put differently, Augustine’s anthropological ambivalence, his humanism, and his tendencies to deify human self-consciousness suggest a metaphorical understanding of God as a transcendental and ethical counterbalance in political and social life against human arrogant pride and self-righteous feelings of security, both of which are either humiliating to one’s fellow men or inappropriate in the face of the weaknesses and shortfalls of human life.48 Aquinas agrees with this conception of Augustine about the normative nature of human life and political order. In Aquinas, this conception is embedded in his idea of natural law whose development takes up a huge part of his Summa Theologica (2007; QQ 90–108). According to Aquinas, natural law is ‘nothing else but the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law’ (quoted in O’Connor, 1967, p. 62); as such, it is identical with Augustine’s notion of the earthly city and the City of God being intertwined. And the divine law in Aquinas is to be equated with the City of God
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in Augustine. The natural law in Aquinas is, as Augustine’s conception of men’s anthropological ambivalence, also an anthropological characteristic; and furthermore, the participation of men in eternal (or divine) law refers to the same kind of tension which has been observed in Augustine. What distinguishes Aquinas from Augustine is a legal terminology differentiating between natural, divine, eternal, and human law, as well as an explicit legacy of Aristotle, which we find in Aquinas’s oeuvre. In political terms and with regard to the normative guidelines of politics, which men can gain and derive from divine law/the City of God for their actual life and social order, it is possible to precise both, Augustine’s and Aquinas’s, notions according to the commonness of their views when we look deeper into Aquinas’s terminologically more secular discussions about the relation between natural and divine law. The divine, or eternal, law imparts in men the possibility of transcending and developing their actual being. This does not mean that men actually or necessarily make use of this possibility and capability, however, it means that they do have the faculty to do so by their natural condition. In Aquinas, this faculty and condition is terminologically referred to as inclinatio naturalis, which is identical to the Aristotle’s concept of telos imparted in men and prescribing their anthropological disposition to develop their potential as rational beings.49 The inclinatio naturalis, or the telos, of politics in Augustine and Aquinas is to retrieve political life from the up and downs of mutability and temporality and to create a society which aspires to the City of God, that is, the universal order of eternal law (the order of the cosmos in Aristotle). D. J. O’Connor explains: The eternal law is the ideal type or order of the universe pre-existing in God ‘just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things made by his art.’ The divine plan pre-exists and controls the construction of the building that he has designed ... The word ‘law’ in the sense of a moral rule or in the rather different sense of a socially established ordinance has a prescriptive sense, being a direction designed to bring about a certain type of conduct ... Anything obeys the eternal law by following its ‘natural inclination’ ... And as it is part of my natural inclination as a human being that I ‘act in accordance with reason’ I am following my natural inclinations as much when I make a moral judgment as when I digest my food or act ... in accordance with any other law of nature ... The inclinatio naturalis of a thing is simply that set of dispositions or tendencies to act and react with other things that it has in virtue of its nature or essence. In the case of a chemical element, say, a piece of iron, its natural inclination is to combine. (1967, pp. 59–61) The natural inclination, or in modern terms, the very concept of the political, which is, even if not fully, at least, however, approximately achievable, realizable, and possible in this world, is, according to Augustine and
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Aquinas, peace and justice, both gained and derived from the normative ethical framework of eternal and divine law symbolized in the Christian symbolic cosmos of the New Testament in general and the Sermon on the Mount in particular. In Aquinas’s terminology, according to theoretical reasoning, men know that peace and justice are necessary consequences and universal truths of divine law in which politics can, and should, participate; practical reason, however, ‘since [it] concerns the complex contingencies of every day affairs [i.e., of political affairs]’ (O’Connor, 1967, p. 63) varies between peoples and nations, and throughout history. Nevertheless, they represent the universal guideline for politics and the amalgam for the political relations among nations. Without this universal guideline, the best kind of peace possible – which is an unjust and deficient peace – is hegemonic peace as Augustine describes the imperial order of the Roman Empire. We read that Rome intended to unite (the world) in the society of a single commonwealth and its laws, and so to impose peace throughout its length and breadth. For there were at this time strong and mighty nations, accomplished in arms, nations who would not easily submit; and their conquest involved vast peril and no little destruction on both sides, and horrible toil. For at the time when the Assyrian kingdom subjugated almost the whole of Asia, although this conquest was achieved by war, it was possible to accomplish it without a great deal of cruel and difficult strife, because the nations were as yet unskilled in resistance, and were not as numerous or as great as they were later to become ... Rome ... did not so rapidly and easily subdue all those nations of East and West which, as we see, are now part of the Roman Empire; for she increased little by little, and, wherever she spread, she encountered robust and warlike peoples. (1998, p. 848) What a better peace can and should look like, how justice relates to peace, and vice versa, and how the normative template of universal values impacts international political order will be discussed in the next section.
3. Transcendental universalism and the intelligibility of order: Peace and justice The relationship among politics, justice, and peace IR literature which discusses Augustine (or Aquinas) is very rare. As stated earlier in this chapter, neither belongs to the canon of international political thought, which the discipline constructed. Apart from an interpretation of Niebuhr (see below) and the inclusion of Aquinas in a text compilation on international relations in political thought that was, unfortunately, only marginally annotated (Brown, Nardin andRengger, 2002), it is to my knowledge only Michael Loriaux who brought attention to Christian international
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political theory in an article on Augustine that was well placed in the journal of the International Studies Association, the International Studies Quarterly (Loriaux, 1992). It is quite unusual to feature an article so prominently, but for several reasons, this appears to be justified here. What we learn from this article is not primarily something about Augustine’s moral scepticism and his (partly) pragmatic approach to politics (see section 2 above; also Loriaux, p. 401), rather this article serves as (another) inglorious example of the (mis) construction of a realist legacy in international political thought. As such, however, it does not stand alone as demonstrated previously and as will be discussed in later chapters in this book. What distinguishes this article, and what becomes obvious here, is the inability of a (the) neo-realist perspective – or of those authors who set out to promote such a perspective – to be conscious of the normative dimension of political thought; and to even manipulate single authors (in this case Augustine), if not complete traditions of political thought, in order to neglect such a dimension since it does not fit their understanding and reading of politics. These are serious accusations, but I will show in the next paragraph how Loriaux conducts this obscure job. As will especially be argued at the end of this study (in the Part V), and as has been mentioned in the Introduction, this loss of capability (and unwillingness) to recognize a normative dimension in political thought by a neorealist, scientistic reading of single authors and of political order contributes to a ‘loss of ethics’ in international politics. Loriaux is prominently placed at this point manifesting this inability to understand, read, and recognize normative political theory and projecting either base materialism onto some authors (as has happened to Thucydides or Hobbes, for example; see above and below, respectively) or naïve Christian beliefs (as Loriaux projected onto Augustine, deducing some political moralism, while missing the important point of a huge normative cosmos in Augustine and a distinct notion of the political). The discussion on Augustine’s pragmatism showed, among other things, the despair and hopelessness of the material world as well as his tendency to relativize politics, as long as there is no hope and comfort for a better life. To envision improvement, Augustine introduces a triangle relation between love, hope, and faith as the basic (Christian) virtues.50 In politics, hope for a better order stems from the incorporation of justice as the norm of politics. There is a constituent, universal, and mutual relation between politics and justice in Augustine which is finally responsible for his (nevertheless vague) thoughts on just war and warfare, and his thoughts on peace. Finally, and most importantly, justice distinguishes politics, political order, and society from any other assembly of men. Thus, justice is the very essence and, at the same time, the purpose (telos) of politics, and without justice, there is no peace. That is also why, alternatively, peace can be termed the very essence
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and telos of politics. This complex relationship will be elaborated in detail below; first, however, I will discuss the trajectory of Loriaux’s misinterpretation of Augustine. First of all, Loriaux assumes an ambivalence in Augustine, which concerns not Augustine’s definition of men’s nature (thus, where Augustine is indeed ambivalent), but his attitude towards politics. Loriaux notes: ‘Augustine’s ambivalence regarding the supposed merits of a given ... order is also quite pronounced. It is rooted ... in his conviction that humankind is incapable of establishing a truly just political order in the saeculum’ (Loriaux, 1992, p. 407). As I agree with the statement that men cannot, according to Augustine, establish true peace and true justice in political reality, I, however, suspect that Loriaux separates the saeculum – in which such establishment is not possible – dualistically from a divine, next world (Augustine’s City of God). Loriaux seems not to realize that both worlds are, according to Augustine and as shown above, intertwined and interconnected. And even if he rightly states that in the saeculum true peace is not possible, he misleadingly deems the City of God as representing only some ought-regulations derived from the Christian virtues of love, caritas, and moralism (see Loriaux, 1992, p. 403) and not, however, standing for a distinct and practicable political norm. Missing the intertwining and interconnectedness of the ‘real’ world and its normative template, and consequently Augustine’s understanding of the political as something distinct from other human assemblies, namely, as distinguished by justice, Loriaux equates political orders with robber bands and asks, in (falsely) following Augustine: ‘(How) can one distinguish between the order imposed by the state and that found in robber bands?’ (1992, p. 407). Continuing with this line of reasoning, he quotes Augustine from the City of God (Book IV, chapter 4), ‘For what are robber bands except little kingdoms? The band also is a group of men governed by the orders of a leader, bound by a social compact (pacto societatis astringiture), and its booty is divided according to a law agreed upon?’ (ibid.). The inglorious example which Loriaux represents ignores, or deliberately omits, the very beginning of this sentence in Augustine, and these words make all the difference. What Augustine actually writes is: ‘Justice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers?’ (1998, p. 147; emphasis mine). 51 Here it becomes clear that justice is the normative essence of politics which separates politics from all other forms of human assembly and agency; this is what Loriaux ignores and why he finally misappropriates the political dimension in Augustine and its normative vigour. Augustine specifies some pages later what, in opposition to politics, is to be called robbery, namely, ‘to wage war against neighbours, and to go from there against others, crushing and subjugating peoples who have done no harm, out of the mere desire to rule: what else is this to be called than great
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robbery?’ (1998, p. 150). In this example, we find an immediate relation between war and politics as well as what happens to politics, illustrated by this example of ‘unjust war’; when justice is missing, it diminishes into robbery. Thus, the very distinction of politics from nonpolitical forms of agency is clearly to be found in the principle of justice. And Augustine relates this principle first of all to war and warfare, which reveals both an instant international political dimension in Augustine52 as well as his approach to ‘just war’. Before I discuss this topic, the subject of justice (and politics) has to be further clarified in Augustine and subsequently in Aquinas. With regard to this study’s problematique of particularism and universalism and its exploration in Augustine and Aquinas, a discussion of the relation between justice and diversity in both further informs us about their political ontology. With the problem of diversity in mind, Augustine criticizes the common view that justice would diversify in relation to the multitude of cultural, social, and political practices as well as he condemns a political relativism which would determine men’s perceptions and thoughts on this topic. Since he does not agree with such a position, he notes: Some people have been stuck by the enormous diversity of social practices and in a state of drowsiness ... have concluded that justice has no absolute existence but that each race views its own practices as just. So since the practices of all races are diverse, whereas justice ought to remain unchangeable, there clearly is no such thing as justice anywhere. To say no more, they have not realized that the injunction ‘do not do to another what you would not wish to be done to yourself’ can in no way be modified by racial differences. (1998, p. 155) Very clearly here, Augustine argues against relativistic positions and for a universal concept of justice which is valid in all nations and represents a conjuncture between them across diversity and differences. It is not surprising that Augustine relates this universal principle to the Holy Scriptures and finds in it the ethical rule called the ‘Golden Rule’ (in Kantian terminology this corresponds with the ‘categorical imperative’ as an equally universal principle; see below II.2.3). Beyond all those differences, which Augustine lists as separating peoples and nations (language, customs, rites, and so on; see above), there is a universal ethical principle which unifies them and which, in the realm of international politics, connects, or at least has the potential and the normative quality to connect, nations. What does this mean for the relation between ‘justice’ and politics? Augustine discusses and exemplifies this relation looking at Rome and its historical development and drawing mainly on the writings of Cicero, he discusses the Roman Civil Wars as well as the decline of the Roman Republic into a dictatorship. Augustine terms the Roman Republic also a ‘commonwealth’ and praising the republican element (res publica) of this
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commonwealth, he applies justice and its different grades of realization, respectively, as the main criterion to discriminate both kinds of order. The distinct difference between political orders is hence to be found in their realization of the principle of justice.53 Consequently, only political and social criteria – such as grades of justice and professional and social relations – become relevant when Augustine lists and specifies the characteristics which differentiate, and sometimes, as he very pragmatically admits, separate men from each other. However, there are no ‘structural’ (to put in modern terms) and as such insurmountable criteria beyond men’s dispositions which would divide humankind and detach nations and peoples from each other.54 This outlook is shared by Aquinas when he refers to Augustine, The City of God, Book II, chapter 21, stating that ‘a nation is a body of men united together by consent of law and by community of welfare. Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws’ (Aquinas, 2007, p. 1465). Aquinas has the points in common with Augustine that, first, justice is (to be) the essence of politics; second, a nation is (to be) ordered and bound together by justice; third, a nation is a foremost political body; and fourth, consequently, the relations between nations are to be thought of as political relations, that is, as relations which are subject to men’s agency and will and which are brought to order by justice. This conclusion sounds quite paradoxical, especially since Augustine often states that God would govern all kingdoms and preside over the destiny of men. As determined as this view is in Augustine, it is, however, due to men’s will and decision whether, or not, to follow God’s rule and precepts, individually or as a nation. And as such, it is a distinct political decision, that is, a decision due to men’s will and deliberate agency (apart from psychological factors concerning men as a ‘fallen being’, which are, however, not further discussed here) when it comes to community life and whether, or not, the community conducts a virtuous life. In this regard, it is worth to remember Augustine’s definition of the evil as a consequence of human will: in fact misguided, however, deliberate since the conduct of a rightful life is in men’s power and capacity. This, at first glance a paradox, points to a dialectic relation between religion and politics (i.e., common human agency due to men’s choice) which we find in Augustine (and Aquinas) and which will be explicitly discussed below. See Augustine further on this writing: ‘If ... we are asked what response the City of God makes ... and ... what it believes concerning the Final Good and Evil, we shall reply as follows: that eternal life is the Supreme Good, and eternal death the Supreme Evil, and that to achieve the one and avoid the other, we must live rightly. For this it is written, “The just man lives by faith” ’ (1998, p. 918). The phrasing of ‘to achieve’, ‘to avoid’, and ‘we must live’ clearly insinuates furthermore that good, or evil, lives are subject to and consequences of men’s choices.
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When Augustine sets out to specify ‘justice’, it is not surprising that he enters the realm of men’s faith in God and of Christian values. Men’s belief in God and the conduct of their lives according to God’s commandments are thus the common and universal bond of the political unification of all nations, peoples, and races. Here, Augustine and with him Aquinas develop a forceful dialectic between politics and religion (i.e., Christian precepts of justice and ethics, based on belief), typical for Christian orthodoxy. Augustine writes, emphasizing again the normative role of the City of God for ‘this present life’: If the kings of the earth and all nations, princes and all the judges of the earth, young men and maidens, old men and children; people of every age and each sex; if those to whom John the Baptist spoke, even the tax gatherers and soldiers: if all these together were to hear and embrace the Christian precepts of justice and moral virtue, then would the commonwealth adorn its lands with happiness in this present life and ascend to the summit of life eternal, there to reign in utmost blessedness. (1998, p. 74) The dialectic relation between politics and religion has been intensively elaborated by Reinhold Niebuhr and represents the core of his political interpretation of Christianity (see Niebuhr, especially 1935 [1963]). Niebuhr states that ‘the very essence of politics is the achievement of justice’ (1935, p. 116). When justice in Augustine’s and Aquinas’s thought is identical with the essence of politics and this in a normative sense, then the realm from which this norm stems has to be intelligible for human beings. On the one hand, this intelligibility is given due to the narrative of God’s revelation; on the other hand, it is possible to know due to the interconnection between the earthly city and the City of God (see the section on ‘Political pragmatism in Augustine and Aquinas’), or, to put it differently, due to men’s anthropological constitution to transcend their being, that is, their capability of reason. Niebuhr writes: ‘(It) is the function of reason to explore (the possibilities of a higher justice) ... as it is the function of a profound religion to discover the limits of these rational processes and reveal the canker of moral complacency in all moral idealism [i.e., to prevent hubris; H.B.]’ (1935, p. 101). This mutual relation between reason (and agency guided by reason) and religion describes the dialectic between politics and religion. The thereby intelligible world discloses, as Niebuhr terms it, a ‘higher justice’; this means principles of justice which are universal in the same way as men’s capability of reason is universal. Reason enables men to experience the intelligibility of a universal order for this world whose principle is justice. One (further) aspect of this dialectic includes that only within a political order and thus via politics, can the universal norm of Christianity, namely, justice, be realized. This dialectic, part of Augustine’s political thought, evolves fully in Aquinas.
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In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas extensively deals with law and legal prescriptions for men. Basic to his discussion is the perception that ‘law ... is the art of ordering the life of man’ (2007, p. 1460). Within the division of law in terms of its realms for which it prescribes certain kinds of behaviour, one most important part concerns the relation of citizens to foreigners such as ‘about wars ... and about the way to receive travelers and strangers’ (ibid.); thus ‘international’ law or, with Aquinas, the art of ordering the relations between nations and their respective citizens.55 We clearly see here the political nature of law and (again) justice since justice is the norm for (‘international’) law. With regard to international politics, the art of ordering the relations among nations by law finds its normative prescription and disposition in the creation of international justice. And since justice as the ordering principle of relations among nations would remove ‘the obstacles to peace’ (Aquinas, 2007, p. 1753), Aquinas concludes that ‘peace is the work of justice’ (ibid.) or, put differently, ‘peace is the effect of justice’ (ibid.; emphasis mine). We thus can summarize that both Augustine and Aquinas develop a normative framework for international politics whose essence lies in the principle of creating peace through the establishment of justice. This normative framework is universal in that it both applies to and is intelligible to all human beings due to their nature as rational beings (defined by natural law) which are thought of as being capable of understanding the ethical implications of divine law and of transcending the temporality of their immediate being, that is, of creating human law to order politics and society. What follows in Augustine and Aquinas are thoughts on peace in international politics, which are derived as universal rules from the normative template of the City of God (see also Cochrane, 1961, p. 511), and thoughts on just war and warfare and how they relate to the norm and practical establishment of peace. These thoughts will be investigated now while we will see, first, how the dialectic between politics and religion discussed above impacts the Christian ethics of just war and, second, that there are, despite the existence of the norm of just war, no reasons to assume some coherent pacifism in Christian orthodoxy since war very pragmatically belongs to the means of international politics (see the Section on ‘Political pragmatism in Augustine and Aquinas’). Peace, just war, and warfare I will discuss the topics of peace, just war, and warfare starting with Augustine and then proceeding to Aquinas. In Book XIX, The City of God, Augustine is most explicit with regard to definitions of peace and its dimensions. His basic idea is that peace is a great benefit, a benefit, however, which comes from true God and means living in full harmony with God. He writes: We may say of peace, then, what we have already said of eternal life: that is our Final Good ... For peace is so great a good that, even in the sphere of
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earthly and mortal affairs, we hear no word more thankfully, and nothing is desired with greater longing: in short, it is not possible to find anything better. (1998, p. 932) Since it is, however, impossible for men to aspire fully to their normative ideal and men differ in terms of their attachment to, and realization of, this idea, there are peoples who live close to and other who live remote from God. The respective approximation of their political life from God impacts on the peace they might enjoy. And since peace is the final good, the measurement of how close to or remote from God they live is to be found in their peace-loving and peace-bringing political order and actions (see Augustine, 1998, pp. 961–2). In two consecutive chapters of Book XIX, The City of God, chapter 13 and 14, Augustine specifies what this measurement concretely means. His arguments can be summarized that the best guarantee possible for ‘earthly’ peace is provided by good concord of political order. This applies both to the domestic and international political realm whose ‘peace lies in the tranquility of order’, as Augustine also states (1998, p. 938). Aquinas directly refers to this expression of Augustine in Summa Theologica (2007, p. 672) and he himself concludes: ‘Therefore the end of government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of government of the world is not an extrinsic good’ (p. 763), but rather it is in men’s political disposition to aspire and work for peace. This work and aspiration describe the telos, or final good, of politics and men’s behaviour. Aquinas deduces: ‘therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is ... peace’ (2007, p. 674). Acknowledging that peace is more perfect in the Kingdom of Heaven than on earth or in actual international politics, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of peace, a perfect and an imperfect peace. However, he calls both types of peace a ‘true peace’ since both the perfect and the imperfect peace represent the quality of peace which is possible in either the Kingdom of Heaven or in real politics. In both types of peace, the maximum possible tranquillity of order manifests; here, ‘the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good [which] unites all one’s desires by giving them rest in one object’, and there ‘imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace’ (Aquinas, 2007, p. 1752). From here communicates the Christian idea of order. Criteria of order are harmony, unity, and rest; order is ‘anti-movement’, it is the complete fulfilment of every wish, desire, aspiration, and plan. This notion of order is, as are justice and perfect peace, normative, and can indeed only be found in God. In politics and the ‘real world’, Aquinas admits, everything is ‘disturbed by external things’ and never do ‘our desires rest altogether in one object’ (2007, p. 1197), thus, there is never complete tranquillity. We remember Aquinas’s and Augustine’s pragmatism, acknowledging divergent
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political interests, hostile groups, social conflicts, and strife; when all these come to an end and all divergent interests ‘rest altogether in one object’, then full peace is accomplished. This, although it is never achievable in politics, nevertheless remains the norm, the telos and charge for men and politics since ‘we are commanded to keep peace because it is an art of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue ... It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness’ (Aquinas, 2007, p. 1754). If men are commanded, as Aquinas says, to keep peace and peace is perceived to be achievable, even true peace in this world following the normative template of perfect (or ‘eternal’) peace, and if the final, universal good of politics, is peace, then there must be a Christian ethics of peace, and war and warfare. I will now refer to Augustine’s and Aquinas’s thoughts on just war and warfare, before I will finally come back to the question of universal ethics in both. When changing the focus from peace to war, we find that war is related to peace in a normative way. Namely, insofar as peace is the overall telos of political action, this telos includes war and warfare. Augustine devotes a complete chapter to this normative determination of war (chapter 12, Book XIX, The City of God) and concludes that peace has to be the desired outcome of war, at least insofar as this war is deemed to be a just war (1998, pp. 933–7). Saying this does not mean, however, that war in general is not perceived as a misery, even just wars. We read in Augustine: By these [civil wars and wars among nations alike; H.B.], the human race is made even more miserable, either by warfare itself, waged for the sake of eventual peace, or by the constant fear that conflict will begin again. I could not possibly give a suitable eloquent description of these many evils, these manifold disasters, these harsh and dire necessities ... Let everyone, therefore, who reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery. And of anyone either endures them or thinks of them without anguish of soul, his condition is still more miserable; for he thinks himself happy only because he has lost all human feeling. (1998, p. 929) Consequently, all war has to be avoided, and Augustine and Aquinas develop an ethics of peaceful political action (see below). Unfortunately, however, there are some conditions that make war necessary, and wars fought out of necessity are the only type which Augustine and Aquinas perceive as just. These just wars are exclusively those which, first, have the normative good in mind to create peace and, second, those which are ‘imposed upon’ (Augustine, 1998, p. 929), that is, wars of defence. The second cause of just war is straightforward to determine; in case of being attacked, it is legitimate to defend one’s nation and people. As a consequence of this,
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Augustine condemns most of the wars which the Roman Empire fought as unjust because they were caused by greed to subdue foreign cities and nations and by ‘lust for mastery,’ which ‘disturbs and consumes the human race with great ills’ (Augustine, 1998, p. 111). The first cause of a just war, ‘wars in order to create peace’, is, on the contrary, more complex and difficult to determine. It might be in international politics that occasions arise in which an offensive war – thus a war in which the war-waging party has not been attacked directly – stands on overwhelmingly legitimate and sound grounds and is the only means to avoid further chaos and death and to create peace in the long run; it might, however, also be that the legitimization of war by the motive of peace is less obvious and clear, and is yet declared by the war-waging party to serve peace and order.56 This case finally depends on the legitimization of order and of peace itself. And here, both Augustine and Aquinas are ambivalent and their thoughts on just war become quite vague. Both, although Augustine more that Aquinas, recognize legitimate causes for wars waged by the Roman Empire for the sake of their vision of (imperial) order and finally for the sake of unifying its neighbours. In fact, Augustine argues that Rome had to defend itself and resist ‘the savage incursions of their enemies’ (Augustine, 1998, p. 104). He neglects to mention, however, that this need to defend itself arose because previously conquered territories, which had recently been incorporated into the empire, subsequently had to be ‘defended’. From the perspective of the conquered, their wars would have been just wars of defence. A further ambivalence arises when Augustine refers to the holy city of Jerusalem. For the sake of Jerusalem, which would actually translates as ‘vision of peace’, and the unification of different people under the bond of Christianity, it would be, and it was, legitimate to go to war against foreign (‘pagan’ and savage) nations. Thus, we find in Augustine the legitimization of holy war and crusades for the higher cause of spreading Christianity among other people to subject them to Christian belief, the latter perceived as a (though utmost unilateral and hegemonic) bond of peace and security. This motive for the unrestricted legitimization of wars in the name of Christianity is the main reason why it is impossible to deduce and accomplish a coherent pacifism from Christian orthodoxy. In addition to this, we find in Augustine and Aquinas normative determinations of just warfare, which have to be unrestrictedly observed in order to keep a just war just and to prevent the very worst miseries in the case of war in general, whether it might be just or not. None of the criteria for just warfare, either singly or all of them together, can render a war just if it is waged for unjust reasons because whether a war is just, or not, depends on the reason why it is fought and not how it is fought. On the other hand, the violation of the regulations for just warfare can turn a just war into an unjust war, for example, if strategically unnecessary slaughter or bloodshed occurs or
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a rightful intention (such as to restore peace) turns into motives of aggrandizement or retaliation. Further regulations to observe, according to Augustine, are to regard churches and temples as places for asylum (even the Gauls conquering Rome observed this regulation when Romans were seeking shelter in their temples, as Augustine emphasizes in The City of God, Book I, chapter 4) and to respect the gods and religious feelings of the vanquished (ibid., chapter 2).57 Aquinas, who shares Augustine’s views on just war, is more explicit than Augustine on regulations of warfare – or ‘certain rights of war and covenants which ought to be observed even among enemies’ (Aquinas, 2007, p. 1817). Perhaps the most important condition he adds to Augustine’s regulations is that the command during the war has to be and to remain in the hands of the authority of the sovereign, ‘(for) it is not the business of a private individual to declare war’ (ibid., p. 1813).58 More detailed determinations of rights of war by Aquinas are that the first obligation besiegers of a city had is to make an offer of peace to the besieged (ibid., p. 1473); that men who are physically or mentally not fit for fighting and thus ‘an obstacle to the fight ... should be sent home (ibid.); that women and children should be spared (ibid.); that the besiegers should ‘not (cut) down fruit-trees of that country’ (ibid.), that is, they should not devastate the natural resources; and that ‘the breaking of promise’ would be false (ibid., p. 1817). Augustine’s determination of warfare or the ‘rights and covenants of war’, as Aquinas says, constitute a universal ethics of war and peace. In both, we read less about the legal institutionalization of warfare than about a distinct Christian version of ethical self-constraint, which prevails in their thoughts despite their partly pragmatic views. This ethics can be summarized by two canons: first, as Aquinas normatively states, well aware that wars occur, ‘no nation shall lift up sword against nation’ (2007, p. 2940); and, second, the well-renowned ethical precept from the New Testament to love one’s neighbours and enemies: For the word ‘neighbour’ implies a relationship: one can only be a neighbour to a neighbour ... The commandment extends even to our enemies; do good to those who hate you ... This is also the teaching of the apostle Paul when he says: “... You shall love your neighbour as yourself.” The love of one’s neighbour does no wrong. (Augustine, 1995, pp. 68–70; also 1998, p. 224) Well aware that both claims are highly normative, Augustine and Aquinas know that these ethical virtues do not exist in all men. That is, however, exactly why they are most relevant. And therefore, both have a distinct view how virtues can be imparted in men. The appropriate strategy would be education, and they argue here in a distinct neo-Platonist (Augustine) and Aristotelian (Aquinas) tradition. According to this legacy, virtue does not naturally exist in men and guide men’s behaviour, however, due to their
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rational capabilities and due to the intelligibility of some form of higher, universal order, men do have the disposition and potential to act ethically and to become virtuous. The very means to impart virtue into men is by teaching and adoption. Augustine writes: ‘Virtue, which, as the art of living, is the most excellent of all the goods of the soul, and which is implanted by teaching’ (1998, p. 916). But how does this ethical attitude manifest concretely? What kind of actual political behaviour does it require and recommend? The answer to this question refers back to the discussion of the dialectic between politics and religion (see above). Religion accomplishes the mythical role and task of representing values of a higher moral order. In Augustine’s and Aquinas’s political ethics, the primary purpose of ethical virtue is to enable men to engage in peaceful behaviour, guided, due to their rational and intellectual capabilities, by respect of values preventing hubris and inspiring modesty. In a metaphorical narrative, preceded by a critique of Roman imperial politics, Augustine communicates the rightful ethical attitude, which can be summarized as modesty as a means against war. We read: Is it wise or prudent to wish to glory in the breadth and magnitude of an empire when you cannot show that the men whose empire it is are happy? For the Romans always lived in dark fear and cruel lust, surrounded by the disasters of war and the shedding of blood which, whether for their fellow citizens or enemies, was human nonetheless. The joy of such men may be compared to the fragile splendour of glass: they are horribly afraid lest it be suddenly shattered ... Instead let us imagine two men ... Let us suppose one of these men to be poor ... and the other to be very wealthy. The wealthy men, however, is troubled by fears ... he is never secure; he is always unquiet and panting from endless confrontations with his enemies. To be sure, he adds to his patrimony in immense measure by these miseries; but alongside these additions he also heaps up the most bitter cares. By contrast, the man of moderate means is self-sufficient on his small and circumscribed estate. He is beloved of his family, and rejoices the most sweet peace with kindred, neighbours and friends ... As, therefore in the case of these two men, son in two families, two peoples, two kingdoms, the same principle of tranquillity applies. It is beneficial then that good men should rule far and wide and long, worshipping the true God and serving Him with true rites and good morals. (1998, p. 146)
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Part II Universalistic Thinking from Early Modern Times to Enlightenment
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II.1 Universalistic Thinking in Christian Legal Philosophy – Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria
1. Prolegomena This chapter will discuss a new epoch of universalisms in international political thought, namely, sixteenth-century legal philosophy as it developed in Spain during the reign of King Charles V and his successors, Kings Phillip II of Spain and Ferdinand I. This epoch is especially fascinating in the context of our discussions because it was not only highly influential for the development of a legal framework for the conduct of ‘international’ relations for the centuries to come, but it also faced a yet unknown confrontation between different, that is, European and non-European, cultures in the context of the Spanish overseas expansions into Central and South America. In the wake of respective experiences, questions arose regarding not only the legitimacy of those expansions and about just war and warfare, but also whether, or not, Indian natives are to be regarded as human beings. These questions were perceived as all but self-evident, and the legacies of Aristotelian, Augustinian, and Thomist philosophy were not regarded as providing sufficient and satisfactory answers. Fierce debates evolved between defenders of the Spanish conquests and their critics. Interestingly, the main criticism was pronounced by representatives of the Catholic Church while Catholicism was, on the other hand, used to legitimize the expansion by those who were in favour of the conquests. The main critical voices from within the Catholic Church came from Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Domingo de Soto, and Luis de Molina (for more on this body of political thought, see Hamilton, 1963). This body of critical literature as it developed in sixteenth century Spain is sharply distinguished from Northern European political thought, which emerged under the influences of the Reformation, in that Spain did not break with the natural law tradition. ‘The Thomist version of natural law theory, which was strongly attacked in all northern universities during 75
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the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and largely jettisoned in Protestant countries, continued unbroken in Spain, and had, indeed, a new flowering during the sixteenth “golden” century ... In all cases ... the Thomist hierarchy of laws, and in particular natural law, forms the framework for their discussion of politics and the political community’ (Hamilton, 1963, p. 11). This tradition and its critical discussion indeed provided the intellectual framework for what became the main achievements of international political thought as it developed in sixteenth-century Spain, namely, first, the framing of universal human rights, their extension beyond Christian Europe, and their application to Indian indigenous cultures in the Americas; and second, the development of universal legal standards and jurisdiction as a guarantor for peaceable relations among political communities. Here, also he idea of the sovereignty of political communities under the condition of their mutual recognition as sovereign was born under the intellectual auspices of natural law. This idea – which prepared the soil for legal thinking in international political thought as it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – is very different from the modern idea of sovereignty and recognition as it emerged in the nineteenth century with regard to the transcendental structure which is perceived (and believed) to provide and guarantee recognition. Whereas it was universal natural or divine law (and ‘God’, respectively) and/or anthropological universalism which imposed legal and ethical principles of recognition up into Enlightenment philosophy, it became individual and particularized rationality (as it politically manifested in the coming nation state and the inside/outside logic of modern sovereignty) which underpinned the modern concept of recognition. This rationality is tangible and shared only – and indeed has over and over again been not shared – on the basis of individualized appreciation, toleration, and morality, however, not as a demand on the basis of something ‘natural’ and ‘normal’. As Bernice Hamilton explains, ‘Natural law has the twofold sense of something which is reasonable and at the same time is generally accepted ... The natural was ... the normal’ (Hamilton, 1963, p. 11). Against this background of the innovation of universal legal standards in sixteenth-century Spanish philosophy, including European overseas expansion and conquest, the Spanish authors of the sixteenth century belong to the main body of international political thought in their own right and are not only to be seen as predecessors of Hugo Grotius or successors of Thomist thought. Richard Hartigan emphasizes with regard to de Vitoria that his work was ‘no simple reiteration of St Thomas’ thought; rather, it is a thoroughly contemporary, sixteenth-century exposition, lucidly phrased, of the morality of war’ (Hartigan, 1973, p. 82); the same can be said of las Casas. And looking ahead in the centuries to come, a thorough study of las Casas and de Vitoria suggests that Grotius strictly follows the legacies of the former, rather than being the ‘founder’ of international law. Thomas A. Walker notes that ‘(again) and again the reader of the pages of Grotius, who shall have made the acquaintance of the lights of moral and legal learning
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of the sixteenth century, will catch the echo of their opinions and their very phrases’ (1899, p. 333).59 The following discussions will therefore emphasize las Casas and de Vitoria and link to other Spanish authors of the sixteenth century where it seems appropriate to highlight general patterns of sixteenth-century thought on universal human rights and international jurisdiction. With Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566) and Francisco de Vitoria (1485 [?]–1546) we thus encounter the foundation of one of the most important tools for organizing international politics. Although the relevance of international legal arrangements, treaty systems, and a distinct legal ethics has been emphasized in the history of international political thought prior to las Casas and de Vitoria (as in Thucydides, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas), the legal theorists of the sixteenth century developed these thoughts into a more coherent and formalized corpus of theories. While they drew, though critically, upon legacies stemming from Greek and Roman as well as Christian political thought, arguing on the basis of universal views on divine and natural law, they faced historically different and novel political situations and were situated in advanced secularized social and political contexts which influenced their theorizing. There are not only the rationalized versions of Christian humanism (founded by Augustine and Aquinas, as seen in the previous chapter) and the tremendously influential impacts of humanistic political culture of the Italian renaissance on political and social thought (see more on that in the next chapter on Machiavelli), but also the philosophical movements of scholasticism in general and nominalism in particular. Political thought, already rationalized in Augustine and Aquinas, developed more and more autonomy from, even if still liaised with, religious thinking. The sphere of natural and especially human law increasingly gained autonomy from divine law. Authors such as Anselm of Canterbury, Maimonides, Roger Bacon, Johannes Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and, of course, Thomas Hobbes (see the next chapter) represent these philosophical moves. Nevertheless, divine law, or universal reason (in which men as rational beings participate), was still perceived as the guarantee of the existence and operationability of human law. And their belief in the order of creation ‘backed up’ the order of the political, domestically and internationally. Thus, the old universalism of international political thought and corresponding ethical teachings lost their substantial identity with principles being perceived as divine and sacral; however, a strong notion of common ethical and natural bonds among peoples and humankind survived. Las Casas and de Vitoria are both linked with Latin American history and the effort to defend the indigenous peoples of Latin and South America against Spanish conquest and exploitation. Both did so by extending human rights to Indians and by introducing a body of legal restrictions and guidelines in international politics. The writings of both men established a strong legacy of modern legal thought, which then had a tremendous impact on
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Hugo Grotius, for example, who massively drew upon traditions of Roman and Christian political and legal thought. Some commentators describe de Vitoria as the ‘eminent precursor of Grotius ... Not that he alone is the author of modern [international law], but it is hard to envision the category in its present form without his contribution’ (Hartigan, 1973, p. 80). Also Joachim von Elbe writes with regard to the problem of just war that Grotius would adopt ‘more or less unchanged from his predecessors’, the Spanish theologians of the sixteenth century (von Elbe, 1939, p. 678). Anthony Padgen goes even further and notes that ‘Vitoria’s claim that all humans have a right grounded in nature of free (and peaceful) access to all parts of the world draws upon a long ancient and humanist tradition, which is, like the natural law, itself Stoic in origin ... All of them, together with Vitoria’s own formulation of the argument, were employed by Grotius in what was perhaps his most widely read work, De mare liberum of 1607, a tract whose initial purpose was to deny that the Portuguese had any right over trade in the Indian Ocean’ (Padgen, 2003, pp. 186–7). Padgen’s view is supported when we read in de Vitoria the following passage, which strongly foreshadows Grotius’s argument on the freedom of the sea or natural resources in general, respectively: Therefore it appears that friendship among men exists by natural law and it is against nature to shun the society of harmless folk ... By natural law running water and the sea are common to all, so are rivers and harbors, and by the law of nations ships from all parts may be moored here; and on the same principle they are public things ... it is an apparent rule of the jus gentium that foreigners may carry on trade, provided they do no harm to citizens. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 152) Las Casas witnessed Spanish conquest in the Caribbean, foremost in Cuba, when he was a priest, the first Bishop of Chiapas, and later in his life when he became a Dominican monk. Apart from scholarly work, he became an advocate acting on behalf of the native population, protesting against Spanish genocidal attacks in the West Indies and travelling back and forth across the Atlantic, the most famous of his journeys leading him to the royal court for the important debate with Juan Gines de Sepulveda (more on that below). Consequently, most of his scholarly work is a defence of Indians’ human rights and against the emerging slave trade between the Caribbean and Europe. His conceptualization of human rights, explicitly including the Indians and applying to mankind as an universal reference, as well as of the equality of relations among humans and ‘nations’ is derived from an Augustinian and Thomist version of human reason and united mankind created in the image of God. On this basis, las Casas founded and represented a new type of critical political and legal thought at the time when European powers were going overseas in an unprecedented way and starting
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to colonize the new world. Paradoxically, however, he did this according to the legacies of (rationalized) Christian thought, hence, following the same pattern in whose name the devastation of indigenous cultures took place, a devastation that some politically defended (or at least tried to defend). Contrary to las Casas, we know very little of the life of de Vitoria; even his date of birth is uncertain. Like las Casas, he was later in his life a Dominican monk and then priest. It is recorded that he became a university teacher in Paris in 1512 where he stayed until 1523 when he received the title of a doctor of theology. Between 1523 and 1526, he taught theology in Valladolid at the Colego de San Gregorio before he was appointed catedra de prima (the most important chair of theology) at the renowned university of Salamanca where he worked until his death in 1546. De Vitoria’s most important writings are De potestate civili and De jure belli in which he elaborated a theory of state power and juridical foundation of international law. His most famous theological writing is a commentary on Aquinas’s Summa theologica in which he primarily discusses Aquinas’s views on justice. In his De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones, which will be discussed here as his most practical treatise, de Vitoria describes the motivation and background for his discussions as follows: The whole of this controversy and discussion was started on account of the aborigines of the New World, commonly called Indians, who came forty years ago into the power of the Spaniards, not having been previously known to our world. This present disputation about them will fall into three parts. In the first part we shall inquire by what right these Indian natives came under Spanish rule. In the second part, what rights the Spanish sovereigns obtained over them in temporal and spiritual matters. In the third part, what rights these sovereigns or the Church obtained over them in matters spiritual and touching religion. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 116) Both las Casas and de Vitoria do not belong to the canon of political theorists in IR although they are, as we will see, much more original and foundational for modern international law than Grotius. Indeed, de Vitoria established the major part of the theoretical body of modern international law, arguing for equal state relations protected by legal arrangements on the ethical basis of just war and the legal basis of mutual recognition and territorial integrity. Las Casas was more concerned with human rights and their extension to the native peoples of the Americas (discovered and yet undiscovered). It is interesting to note that both las Casas and de Vitoria formulated their thoughts in a critical discussion of Christian thinking while, at the same time disassociating from Christian orthodoxy. It has to be asked, therefore, how far critical Christian thought, that is, critical towards the Augustinian
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and Thomist orthodoxy, provided the intellectual framework for the development of modern international political theory, mainly of the axioms of legal equality among states and the mutual recognition of sovereign rights. I argue that indeed major theorems of modern international political and IR theory are critically considered and partly secularized, nevertheless, Christian concepts while a strong theological background is alive until at least the eighteenth century, however, abandoned thereafter (see also Becker, 2003). In this regard Padgen argues that the modern ‘concept of human rights [for example] is a development of the older [Christian] notion of natural rights and that the modern understanding of natural rights evolved in the context of the European struggle to legitimate its overseas empires’ (Padgen, 2003, p. 171), or, what should be added, to delegitimize respective conquests, as in the case of las Casas and de Vitoria. This legacy might be the reason why Christian thinkers never found serious reception in IR, which started to perceive itself, especially during the second half of the twentieth century, as a rationalist, not to mention thoroughly secularized and antinormative, ‘science’; this perception took hold, however, at the cost of ignoring its origins and neglecting the wide range of international political thought and corresponding notions of ethical deliberation.
2. Universalistic human rights and their extension beyond Europe When the Spanish Empire started to conquer the Americas at the end of the fifteenth century and to subjugate its peoples, one might argue that neither Spain nor any other European nation was prepared for both the material and philosophical challenges of overseas expansion (see Donavan, 1965). Nevertheless, this is a retrospective assessment only, while the majority of contemporaries believed in the hierarchy of cultures with Europeans at the top and all other nations following on a declining ladder of (what was defined as) ‘barbarism’ (very instructive on this are Bitterli, 1991; Greenblatt, 1991; Ryan, 1981; Seed, 1992). The philosophical legacies, which were cited to support those prevailing forms of Eurocentrism and racism, followed by systematic politics of annihilation of indigenous people and cultures as well as by individual atrocities,60 were taken from Aristotle’s idea of a natural distinction of mankind in masters and slaves and from a Christian tradition of a civilizing mission stemming from Augustine and Aquinas (see above; and more on that in relation to las Casas below; for thoughts on ‘otherness’ in antiquity see the excellent monograph by Dihle, 1994). I will not discuss whether, or not, and how far these understandings seem to do justice to Aristotle; I will, however, come back to the chapter on Augustine and Aquinas since we find some references to possible misunderstanding in the previous interpretation which are also flagged and discussed by las Casas. The key questions, which arose with Spain’s overseas expeditions and related
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experience and which las Casas addresses61 while being personally involved in the Spanish conquests and becoming more and more critical towards the Spanish tyranny and economic exploitation in the Americas,62 were whether the Indians should have the same rights as Europeans; whether they possessed intrinsic rights to their land and culture; and whether they were to be perceived as human beings at all.63 The enduring relevance of las Casas’s main writing, In Defense of the Indians (1992a), lies, first, in its presentation of universal human rights, extending their validity beyond Europe, and his philosophical criticism of European traditions of thought which have been used to justify the Spanish conquests and the disregard of Indians as human beings; second, las Casas develops a system of jurisdiction which he perceived as the guaranteeing framework for the existence and observance of human rights and for relations among peoples based on equal rights and mutual recognition. The first aspect will be discussed now, the second in the following section. Two epochal events occurred during the lifetime of las Casas – the bull Sublimus Dei promulgated by Pope Paul III on May 29, 1537, and the so-called Valladolid debate in 1550 – which signalled a new course for the Catholic Church and for the King of Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V, towards the European overseas expeditions. In both events, las Casas is either directly involved (the Valladolid debate) or at least his arguments have been echoed and recognized by the pope. In Sublimus Dei, Pope Paul III, some years before the Valladolid debate, recognized Indians as ‘truly men’ and condemned any deprivation of their life, possessions, and liberty. This meant a revolutionary new ‘policy’ for the Vatican, emphasizing at the same time a new humanism and the Catholic Church’s claim for universal reign of mankind. The bull states that the Catholic Church considers Indians are truly men and that they are not only capable of understanding the Catholic Faith, but, according to our information, they desire exceedingly to receive it ... that, notwithstanding whatever may have been or may have said to the contrary, the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; not should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be null and have no effect.64 We clearly see that, on the one hand, the relations of European powers towards the Indians and towards ‘all other people who may be discovered by Christians’ shall be conducted in an equal and respectful way regarding and preserving their life, liberty, and possessions; that, on the other hand, however, the fundament for this recognition is the Christian faith itself.
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The criteria, even, to define Indians as human beings is their capability to understand and finally receive Catholic faith. Taking this paradox – which David Campbell rightfully criticizes as a ‘persistent [Eurocentric, phonological, ontological, and epistemological] logocentrism’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 118) – into consideration as the weak part of traditional universalistic thinking, which can think about ‘otherness’ only in terms of self-definition,65 one nevertheless has to concede the revolutionary accomplishment by Sublimus Dei defining intercultural and international relations on the basis of the principal equality and recognizing beliefs other than the Christian as legitimate. The same paradox of ‘logocentrism’ on the one hand and the demand of human and religious equality on the other also applies to de Vitoria. In the ‘First Relectio’ of his De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones, he argues that the Indians would be true possessors of their land and dominion and the Spaniards had no right to deprive them of what naturally belongs to them. This is certainly a considerable accomplishment in terms of the recognition of their way of living and of different forms of rationality, emphasized by his notion that ‘they also have a kind of religion’. The rationale for this recognition is twofold: it stems from natural law as well as from the circumstance that the organization of their societies and politics is reasonable according to European standards. In this second rationale, the paradox reveals. De Vitoria writes: The Indian aborigines are not barred on this ground from the exercise of true dominion. This is proved from the fact that the true state of the case is that they are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their own kind, the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also have a kind of religion. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 127) The universal extension of human rights and subsequently the recognition of different peoples and their cultures as politically equal was effectively translated into the official position of King Charles V and the Spanish court when the emperor ordered las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda, one of Spain’s leading intellectuals of the sixteenth century who had massive influence at court and who tried to defend the Spanish conquerors and the system of ‘encomienda’, together with other jurists and theologians to the ‘Council of the Indies’ at Valladolid for a debate on the merits of just wars and Aristotelian logic in order to determine ‘how conquests may be conducted justly and with security of conscience’ (quoted in Hanke, 1959, p. 36). Las Casas was given three days for his speech before the court in which he lectured from the manuscript of his In Defense of the Indians. Before discussing las Casas’s arguments in detail, which refute Sepulveda step by step, it
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is worth mentioning that we find the same logocentric paradox in las Casas that was communicated in Pope Paul’s bull. This logocentrism has been summarized by Bill Donovan as follows: Las Casas indicted individuals for the New World’s problems. Although he saw the encomienda system as inherently wicked, it was till colonists – not the king, Spain, or Christian Europe – whom he found responsible for the evil committed under its guise. The suggestion never arises, for example, that Indians just left be alone. Christian responsibility, for las Casas, meant exposing native people to Grace. Indeed, Indians could not be left alone: they were, to use, his phrase, good enough to be Christians and to be integrated into Christian society. Yet, what did it mean to be a Christian? Las Casas implies that that was unclear to Spaniards living in the Americas, but it was clear to him: he was a Christian opposed to Christianity as it existed in the New World. (Donovan, 1965, p. 21) Las Casas begins his defence of the Indian populations by a juxtaposition of the Indians and the Spaniards as the most peaceful and peace-loving, obedient, and friendly people on the one side and, on the other side, the Spanish conquerors ‘who immediately behaved like ravening wild beasts, wolves, tigers, or lions that had been starved for many days’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 29). This juxtaposition, which traces through all his writings, results in the historical narrative that ‘only after the Spaniards had used violence against them, killing, robbing, torturing, did the Indians ever rise up against them’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 32). Besides the fact that this assessment leads to a clear judgement about the unrestricted guilt of the Spaniards, las Casas argues that, from a Christian point of view, this treatment most heavily violates every appropriate way to ‘have the Indians been brought to embrace the [Christian] Faith and to swear obedience to the kings of Castile’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 48). As he explains in detail in his work On the only Way of Attracting All Peoples to the True Faith (1992b) it is love, teaching, and preaching, not the sword, which have the power and which are described by the holy sacraments as the only rightful way to spread Christianity and to convert ‘unbelievers’. In the Indies, however, peoples were told that ‘they must embrace Christian Faith immediately, without hearing any sermon preached and without indoctrination.’ They were told ‘to subject themselves to a King they have never heard or nor seen ... by the King’s messengers who are such despicable and cruel tyrants that deprive them of their liberty, their possessions, their wives and children’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 48). The Spaniards’ behaviour would thus contradict the commandments of Christ Jesus, and the Indians eventually had no other choice than to resist. Las Casas asks, ‘What will these people think of Christ ... when they see Christians venting their rage against them with so many massacres?’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 27). However, las Casas’s condemnation of the Spanish
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conquerors relates not only to the violation of the holy sacraments and of Jesus’s teachings, but also to an utmost disregard of the Indians as human beings. This argument seems from an international politics perspective more relevant because it finally results in the recognition of other nations on the basis of equal mutuality; it deflects, as Hayward R. Alker emphasizes, ‘a process of mutual recognition, respect, and toleration’ (Alker, 1992, p. 362). Evolving the argument that Indians are to be regarded as ‘true men’ and belong to one (and the same) mankind as Europeans leads las Casas to discuss critically the arguments Sepulveda brought forward in the Valladolid debate. Sepulveda referred to an Aristotelian legacy of differentiating peoples into ‘barbarian’ and ‘civilized’ and applied this differentiation to the Spanish as civilized and the Indians as barbarian. He concluded from this differentiation some natural hierarchy between master and slave in order to justify the Spanish conquerors and their use of violence to dominate indigenous peoples. Las Casas criticizes Sepulveda’s argument and emphasis on Aristotle’s definition of barbarism as those forms of life which would not know any form of government, political institutions, and order. Las Casas writes that these ‘are barbarians in the absolute and strict sense of the word ... they lack reasoning and way of life suited to human beings and those things which all men habitually accept’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 30). Aristotle would indeed write about those peoples as barbarians calling them slaves by nature; however, contrary to Sepulveda’s interpretation and application of this distinction, Aristotle would note that this form of life is ‘rarely found in any part of the world and [is] few in number compared with the rest of mankind’ (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 33–4).66 Consequently, las Casas argues that this definition cannot be applied to the Indians who, in addition to the fact of the rareness of such a kind of barbarism in general, did develop highly sophisticated systems of government, would know legal bodies to regulate their social and political life, and had accomplished many cultural achievements (of which las Casas most admired their architecture). Therefore, they would not be barbarians, and Sepulveda’s understanding and application of Aristotle’s distinction would be wrong. Las Casas notes: They [the Indians] are not ignorant, inhuman or bestial. Rather, long before they had heard the word Spaniard they had properly organized states, wisely ordered by excellent laws, religion and custom. They cultivated friendship and, bound together in common fellowship, lived in populous cities in which they wisely administered the affairs of both peace and war justly and equitably, truly governed by laws. (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 42–3) It is less important here whether, or not, las Casas’s assessments of Indian life, culture, and politics communicates an historically true image
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and conveys a proper description, rather than that he critically discusses philosophical traditions which seemed to be set in stone and appeared all too easy to apply (by Sepulveda and the Spaniards) to the justification of Spanish conquests and mass murder. By his critical discussion, las Casas opens the intellectual and (as seen by the Valladolid debate) political horizon of sixteenth-century international politics, facing overseas expansions and experiencing different forms of human life which provoked philosophical reflection. Just as Machiavelli notes in the Preface of his Discourses that political philosophy has to break with traditions and metaphorically requests that it set out for new shores (see more on that below), las Casas is actually realizing such a program in the philosophical and most practical sense, being motivated by the factual historical realities of overseas expansion and novel intercultural encounters. Leaning towards John G. A. Pocock’s (1975) metaphor of a ‘Machiavellian moment’ in Renaissance political theory and its influences, Alker speaks of a ‘las Casas moment in Renaissance humanist thought’ (Alker, 1992, p. 363). What, according to las Casas, enabled the Indians to accomplish the cultural and political achievements that allowed them to be seen as ‘true’ human beings and as civilized? Las Casas’s answer to this question lies in his belief in God’s order of creation and subsequently in the endowment of universal mankind with reason. It is the rational nature of their being with which God gifted all men, by which all men are made perfect ‘in no other way than by his intellect’, and by which all men are finally distinguished from animals: ‘For since God’s love of mankind is so great and it is his will to save all men, it is in accord with his wisdom that in the whole universe, which is perfect in all its parts, his supreme wisdom should shine more and more in the most perfect thing: rational nature’ (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 35–6). According to this universal belief, las Casas concludes that a ‘natural light’ has been imparted in all human beings which requires mutual respect and humanist recognition for all forms of human life, even if they might be (very) different in their conduct of every life and in terms of religion, customs, and politics. Las Casas’s ethical backbone derived from this universal humanism can be found in the Christian (and later on philosophical; see below with regard to Kant) doctrine ‘See that you do not do to another what you would not have done to you by another’ or ‘(Always) treat others as you would like them to treat you’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 27). This ethical principle, las Casas argues, would be known, and has to be respected, by all men according to their natural reason. With regard to philosophical and Christian traditions, las Casas enters not only into critical debates with Aristotle, but also with Augustine and Aquinas. This becomes obvious when he radicalizes the elements of Augustine’s and Aquinas’s rationalist construction of God even more, arguing for some form of religious relativism. This does not mean that he leaves the common ground of perceiving Christianity as the only true faith,
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however, he admits freedom of religion and equal status to religious beliefs at least before Christianity was taught in the rightful way and made known to the yet ‘unbelievers’. Men, gifted with natural reason, would also be enlightened with some form of spirituality. However, las Casas denies that this would necessarily lead to one form of religious beliefs and practices, and states, rather, that a multitude of worshipping habitudes would legitimately exist among mankind. This multitude is to be respected by every true and honourable Christian, and that is why, ‘(if) they [the unbelievers] refuse to listen, we must go to other places, until we find friendly listeners’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 178). Las Casas argues for an anthropological constitution shared by all men which imparts spirituality or some form of ‘a common knowledge of God’, which is, however, ‘very vague and universal and shows only that there is someone who puts order in things that we see functioning according to some order’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 131); this does not, however, refer necessarily and only to the Christian God. Las Casas here radicalizes Augustine’s and Aquinas’s rationalist principle of God that perceives God as a cognitive construction, admitting that men, by their constitution, depend on some form of spirituality due to the intellectual ‘limitations in themselves’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 132). Due to this limitation, men were simply not capable of having logical explanations for the natural order of things. They therefore try to ‘reconcile’ their experience and such incomprehensibilities through religion and forms of worshipping; and ‘if someone objects that worshipping stones as god is contrary to natural reason and thus forbidden ... we answer that the ordinary and ultimate intention of those who worship idols is not to worship stones but to worship, through certain manifestations of divine power, the planner of the world, whoever it may be’ (ibid., pp. 132–3; emphasis mine). This recognition of a multitude of forms of worship as equally religious practices and beliefs is really revolutionary and places different religions at the same level with Christianity; not with regard to their final truthfulness, but in terms of their acknowledgement and deserved respect. Although they do not worship the true God, the Indians can, however, not be made responsible until Christianity has been preached and taught to them in a proper way. Before this might have been successfully, but peacefully, achieved, one religion is as true as any other and deserves full respect. For the humanist ethics of the respectful treatment of other cultures and religions, it is important to recall las Casas’s argument that the Gospel should not be spread among nations by the power of weapons and conquest, but must be taught in a peaceful and brotherly way. Only love for your neighbour and for all mankind would correspond with the ethics of the Sermon of the Mount (see particularly In Defense of the Indians, chapter XI). We can summarize that las Casas’s universalism consists of the extension of the definition of humanity to all mankind because all men, by the power of natural reason, bear the natural and unalienable right of their
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liberty, regardless of differences in cultural, habitual, and political matters; or, as Alker puts it, las Casas’s universalism consists of ‘the cognition of and respect for universally/naturally grounded, species-wide, creative capacities, together with the recognition of the intrinsic worth of different, voluntarily accepted, cultural expressions of these capacities’ (Alker, 1992, p. 363). In addition to this, the exercise of different religions is perceived as a human right itself, which has to be equally respected, and whose violation is a sin against the teachings of the holy sacraments. The previous discussions of human rights and the question whether, or not, they apply beyond Europe to the indigenous peoples of the Americas also included the question of the Indians’ right to possession. The conquest of the Spanish and the seizure and devastation of the Indian’s land brought up this question, and it is de Vitoria who devotes large parts of his De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones to discussing it. De Vitoria develops his very clear outlook on this issue – stating uncompromisingly that the Indians have full rights to possession and dominion and that neither the Spanish King (the ‘Emperor’) nor the Pope has any legitimization to deprive the Indians of this right – on the basis of natural law. Hamilton argues that de Vitoria formed a theory of human dignity based on natural law, which would bridge the differences between peoples and cultures and demand mutual responsibility ‘extending far beyond the bounds of one country’ (Hamilton, 1963, p. 105). De Vitoria writes: ‘I ask first whether the aborigines in question were true owners in both private and public law before the arrival of the Spaniards’, and he concludes ‘that the people in question were in peaceable possession of their goods, both publicly and privately. Therefore, unless the contrary is shown, they must be treated as owners and not be disturbed in their possession unless cause be shown’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 120). This right of true possession, according to natural law, applies to all mankind, regardless of their differences in race, culture, and religion. Indeed, de Vitoria explicitly states that The foundation of the law is in fact that no matter how many diverse peoples and kingdoms the human race may be divided into, it always has a certain unity, not merely as a species but even a sort of political and moral unit, which is indicated by the natural precept of mutual love and mercy which extends to everyone, even to foreigners of any nation. (de Vitoria quoted in Hamilton, 1963, pp. 108–9) The unity of mankind of which de Vitoria speaks is created by natural law and does not suffer any harm from differences in religion. The abovementioned recognition of different rationalities, as it communicates from de Vitoria (and also from las Casas), reveals also here with regard to the right of possession. And even if de Vitoria is bound to term the Indians’ religion ‘unbelief’, he nevertheless contests the idea that ‘unbelief’ would prevent ‘anyone from
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being a true owner’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 123) since natural law establishes ‘a bond of relationship between all men’, which is why ‘it is contrary to natural law for one man to disassociate himself from another without good reason’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 153). Thus, according to Vitoria, the right to possession is guaranteed by natural law, and as an unalienable right cannot be taken away from anyone on the basis of human law whatsoever this law might suggest. He thus declares the Spanish conquests and their seizure of Indian land and goods as illegitimate. As did las Casas, Vitoria assumes that natural law, tangible by all men, exists among all peoples, whether Christians or not, as a system which provides human dignity and an ethical bond among all men and which stands on its own regardless of individual attributes. How this universalism of reason and human rights translates into teachings for legal relations among nations will be discussed in the next section.
3. Jurisdiction as landmark and guarantor for universal human rights and just war In the Preface of his In Defense of the Indians, las Casas outlines the course of his arguments against Sepulveda. First, he says, he shall refute his argument that war against the Indians would be justified assuming that they are barbarous and uncivilized. This argument and las Casas’s anthropological universalism of human rights was discussed in the previous section. I will now discuss his second, third, and fourth argument of the Valladolid debate, which focus on the question of just war in general (his second and third argument) and on the question whether, or not, the Indians were subject of both the King of Spain and the Catholic Church and would thus fall under their authority and jurisdiction (his fourth argument; for this argument also de Vitoria is very relevant; see below). It is with regard to this argument and the question of jurisdiction and boundaries of jurisdiction, respectively, that las Casas and de Vitoria developed a new standard for the conduct of state relations. This standard puts the same legal restrictions on each state, requires mutual recognition among states, and protects each of them on an equal basis against hostile aspirations of other states and unjust war. The reference for this international jurisdiction stems, on the one hand, from their universalism of human rights, and, on the other hand, from a universal notion of natural and divine law. Although we have reviewed discussions of universal legal standards to regulate state relations from Thucydides and Cicero, and of divine law from Augustine and Aquinas, thus prior to las Casas and de Vitoria, there is nevertheless a new momentum in both. This originality is to be seen in the equality of nations being protected from each others’ claims of any nature and subsequently in the recognition of diverse cultural, political, and social patterns of life, whereas prior legal principles were either quite vague (Thucydides), even if their notion existed, or drafted in favour of imperial
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power (Cicero) and superior truth (Augustine and Aquinas), not, however, on the basis of nations’ equality and guaranteed protection by mutual recognition. Equality and recognition in las Casas and de Vitoria are based upon the notion of spheres of jurisdiction and are as such supposed to not only protect each nation from other nations’ political aspirations, but, in case war should break out and seems inevitable, also to provide standards for just war and warfare.67 When las Casas prepares his defence and approaches the development of his second, third, and fourth arguments, he again critically refers to Augustine, Aquinas, and the official position of the Catholic Church prior to Sublimus Dei (1537) and breaks with previously well-established traditions – traditions which have been emphasized by Sepulveda and which las Casas set out to refute successfully. His critique goes to the heart of Christian selfperception and politics, tackling the question of the righteousness of mission and appropriate respective political means. He argues that Sepulveda concludes from Christian authorities, namely, Augustine, Aquinas, and previous papal bulls,68 that it would be ‘totally just, as well as most beneficial to these barbarians [the Indians], that they be conquered and brought under the rule of the Spaniards’ since this might be the easiest way for them to embrace the Christian religion (las Casas, 1992a, p. 15). He then explicitly criticizes Augustine and Aquinas for having stated that ‘if someone is unwilling to do what is good for himself and he is obliged to act for his own welfare, it is just to force him to do even he is unwilling and resists’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 12). Las Casas puts Christian superiority in spiritual and political matters into question and refutes the perception that the Indians themselves were responsible for being forced to be subjugated to the Spaniards and Christian rule because they did not recognize and even denied what might be good for them. This perception sounds absurd to us, and so it does to las Casas (see also Donavan, 1965, p. 15).69 Before evolving his arguments regarding just war, las Casas summarizes Sepulveda’s view that the armed expeditions against the Indians were justified as long as they corresponded with the rule(s) under the authority of the King of Spain as the legitimate sovereign. It might thus be sufficient to expect the Indians to immediately subjugate themselves to this rule and to embrace Christian belief without any negotiation. If this does not happen, then waging war against them would be just according to civil law (set up by the sovereignty of the Spanish king) and natural law: according to natural law, the Indians’ status is to be perceived as uncivilized and barbarous, and consequently it would be justified that the civilized (Spain) should govern them. Las Casas’s critique of that outlook applies to the just war problematic in that he radically alters this definition and declares all wars that the Spaniards fought against the Indians were ‘unjust wars’ and all wars that the Indians fought against the Spanish conquerors were ‘justifiable’ (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 41–8).
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The main criterion for this turn is a redefinition of natural law from an ostensible natural master-slave hierarchy to the natural right of peoples to defend their liberty. Rhetorically, he introduces an historical analogy asking Sepulveda (as well as the jurists, theologians, and representatives of the Spanish court at the Valladolid debate) what he thinks of the Spanish wars against the Roman Empire and whether they were just or unjust, then applying this analogy to the rebellions of the Indians against the Spanish conquerors. ‘Did the Spanish wage an unjust war when they vigorously defended themselves against them [the Romans]?’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 43). Las Casas’s answer is they did not, and he denounces such an argument as ‘absurd’. This does not mean, on the other side, that he renounces all claims of spreading Christianity and preaching the gospel to other, non-Christian peoples because las Casas – despite all of his arguments on behalf of equality and recognition – remains convinced that it belongs to the church to teach the ‘truth’. But, as was argued above and as he lays down in The Only Way (1992b), this has to occur by means of brotherly love and peaceful means, not by war, violence, and coercion. If, however, someone actively opposes the Catholic Church preaching the gospel, then it becomes just to wage war against those ‘unbelievers’, when and under the condition that this happens within the jurisdiction of the church. He writes: Therefore the Church, to which belongs the care of peoples throughput the world as regards to preaching the truth, can justly wage war upon those who prevent the gospel from being preached within their jurisdiction ... It should be noted that ... war against unbelievers can be just only when the rulers or kings maliciously prevent the spread or preaching of the gospel ... But if both the rulers and all their peoples ... out of love for and devotion to their religion, refuse to hear or admit Christian preaching, then, under no circumstances, can they be forced by war to let them come in. (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 170, 172; also ibid., p. 107) We find here a clear insinuation towards the relevance of jurisdiction; before I discuss this matter explicitly below, I shall further reconstruct las Casas’s argument for the justification and legitimization of self-defence. His first argument can be summarized by the dictum that when the Catholic faith is or has been lectured in a proper Christian way, everyone is obliged to accept and to follow. This, he argues, would be a consequence of natural law since no one can, or should, resist the truth; in this regard, las Casas subscribes to orthodox Christian beliefs. If, however, someone is forced to accept Christianity and coercively baptized (or tried to be baptized), resistance would be legitimate since violent conversion would not only contradict Christian values, but also natural law. Las Casas develops here an individualistic voluntarism which goes hand in hand with his universal anthropology
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of reason and virtue, writing that ‘men are obliged by the natural law to do many things they cannot be forced to do against their will’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 46). Individual voluntarism and reason, which make men equal, count higher than the ambitions of missionary work and (the pretence of) superior wisdom; they thus represent eternal law.70 This individualistic notion, both with regard to the individual human being and an individual nation, is las Casas’s strongest argument against, and at the same time represents his philosophical dissociation from, Aristotelian legacies and Christian orthodox doctrine handed down from Augustine and Aquinas.71 He concludes that ‘every nation, no matter how barbaric, has the right to defend itself against a more civilized one that wants to conquer it and take away its freedom’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 47).72 De Vitoria shares these views, and in his practical way of thinking, being sometimes more like a lawyer than a philosopher, he lists three reasons which could never justify war and hence always initiate unjust war. In his ‘Second Relectio’ of his De Indis et Jure Belli Relectiones, he posits that ‘difference of religion is not a cause for just war’,73 that ‘extension of empire is not a just cause of war’, and that neither would ‘the personal glory of the prince nor any other advantage to him [be] a just cause of war’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 170).74 The last aspect would not only characterize just or unjust war, but in addition to this also mark the difference between a lawful king and a tyrant in that the latter would seek his own advantage in war, a lawful king, however, would wage war only for the common good or avoid war when it would not be necessary for realizing the common good. The perspective that war declared for the glory of the king is always an unjust war, and the related idea questioning whether the belief of the king that a certain war would be just can actually make a war just, are important for de Vitoria. Here, the experience with the reign of Charles V and the absolutist declaration of the empire’s expansion might have been the impetus for de Vitoria to further argue that a ‘king is not by himself capable of examining into the causes of a war and the possibility of a mistake on his part is not unlikely and such a mistake would bring great evil and ruin multitudes ... war ought not to be made on the sole judgment of the king, nor, indeed, on the judgment of a few, but on that of many, and they be wise and upright men’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 174). A circumstance in which war can be just exists, de Vitoria argues, only when and under the circumstance that a ‘wrong has been received’ and that this circumstance is scrutinized carefully (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 170). The definition ‘when a wrong has been received’ results in the argument, similar to las Casas (as well as to what we know from Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas), that only wars of defence could be declared just wars because ‘(not) every kind and degree of wrong can suffice for commencing a war’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 172). He concludes, therefore, that the Spanish conquests would be profoundly unjust – indeed they would be waged for reasons of ‘expansion
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of empire’ and attempted to be justified by ‘difference of religion’ and the necessity to spread Christianity. We read: The Indians in question are not bound ... to believe it [the Christian faith], in such way that they commit mortal sin by not believing it, merely because it has been declared and announced to them that Christianity is the true religion and that Christ is the Saviour and Redeemer of the world, without miracle or any other proof of persuasion ... Therefore, where there are no such signs nor anything else of persuasive force, the aborigines are not bound to believe ... which of the two is the truer religion, unless a greater weight of probability be apparent on one side ... From this proposition it follows that, if the faith be presented to the Indians in the way named only and they do not receive it, the Spaniards can not make this a reason for waging war on them or for proceeding against them under the law of war. This is manifest, because they are innocent in this respect and have done no wrong to the Spaniards ... Where, then, no wrong has previously been committed by the Indians, there is no cause of just war. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 143) From this treatment, the following arguments on just war and warfare can be concluded which then lead to de Vitoria’s outlook on the final purpose of war itself. He introduces a basic notion which is thoroughly innovative for the discussion of just war against the views of the Spanish colonialists and those who support them. De Vitoria puts stress not on an enemy’s subjective or subjectively perceived guilt, but on objective acts and their assessment as just or unjust according to their status as combatants or non-combatants. ‘No longer must there be a rather vague identification of the enemy as a mass of wrong-willed individuals whose subjective guilt must be certified or supposed, according to which criterion a determination of the innocent is almost impossible’ (Hartigan, 1973, p. 89). From this is derived a norm of noncombatant immunity, which is a universal norm that must be observed by everyone, including the emperor and the Spanish conquerors. Hartigan argues that de Vitoria thereby established ‘real life’ for an abstract moral principle: the ‘innocence’ was not a tangible reality. The spirit of innocence could now have concrete form as the ‘uninvolved’ (Hartigan, 1973, p. 89). When this norm is combined with de Vitoria’s determination of unjust causes of war, the final purpose of war, if it is necessary at all, is revealed. This final purpose is found in the realization of peace, security, and the common good not only for one political community, but also for mankind and the world as a whole. De Vitoria writes, ‘there would be no condition of happiness for the world, nay, its condition would be one of utter misery, if oppressors and robbers and plunderers could with impunity commit their crimes and oppress the good and innocent, and these latter could not in turn retaliate on them’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 167). The question which
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arises now is this: who are the oppressors, robbers, and plunderers, and why? Here, de Vitoria relates to a thoroughly Aristotelian (and Augustinian and Thomist) definition in that he shares the idea that a perfect political community ‘is one which is complete in itself, that is, which is not part of another community, but has its own laws and its own council and its own magistrates (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 169). What does this mean for the question of the legitimacy of Spanish colonialism in the Americas? Here, the question of jurisdiction and sovereignty develops its full meaning. For if a community is only a perfect one under the condition of sovereignty (‘not being part of another community’), if war is unjust for reasons of a prince’s glory as well as because of mere expansion, and if different religion(s) is (are) not a just cause of war, however, self-defence is a just reason of war, it then follows that the Spanish have no right whatsoever to subjugate the Indians. In addition to this, the primary obligation of each king and prince, who acts lawfully, is to recognize the above conditions; de Vitoria argues: Now, in point of human law, it is manifest that the Emperor is not lord of the world, because either this would be by the sole authority of some law, and there is none such; or, if there were, it would be void of effect, inasmuch as law presupposes jurisdiction. If, then, the Emperor had no jurisdiction over the world before the law, the law could not bind one who was not previously subject to it. Nor, on the other hand, had the Emperor this position by lawful succession or by gift or by exchange or by purchase or by just war or by election or by any other legal title, as is admitted. Therefore, the Emperor never was the lord of the whole world. Second conclusion: Granted that the Emperor were the lord of the world, still that would not entitle him to seize the provinces of the Indian aborigines and erect new lords there and put down the former ones or take taxes. The proof is herein, namely, that even those who attribute lordship over the world to the Emperor do not claim that he is the lord of ownership, but only in jurisdiction, and this latter right does not go so far as to warrant him in converting provinces to his own use or in giving towns or even estates away at his pleasure. This, then, shows that the Spaniards can not justify on this ground their seizure of the provinces in question. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 134) And some pages later in the same paragraph of this treatise he repeats ‘that at the time of the Spaniards’ first voyages to America they took with them no right to occupy the lands of the indigenous population’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 138). The next question, which arises for de Vitoria is this: Can the pope be said to have jurisdiction over the Indians due to his religious and spiritual authority? In order to investigate this question, de Vitoria distinguishes between
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temporal power, civil power, and spiritual jurisdiction. In this regard, de Vitoria is certain that the pope has no temporal or civil power, because not even Christ wielded this kind of power, and the pope is nothing but ‘Christ’s vicar’; so how could he have this type of power? (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 135). What about his spiritual power and his religious authority over the Indians? In his answer, de Vitoria refers to the New Testament (St. John) and the narrative about inner-world temporality as it is expressed by the metaphor of ‘one flock and one shepherd’. This metaphor clearly suggests that there will be only ‘one flock and one shepherd’ at the end of ages, that is, when Christ descends from heaven. As long as this has not happened, the world is divided into different peoples and religions. From this reality of the peoples of the world being differentiated into a multitude of religions and organized in diverse political communities, de Vitoria regards it as evident that the pope also has no spiritual power over the Indians or any nonChristian people. He concludes: The Pope has no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over other unbelievers ... For he has no temporal power save such as subserves spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual power over them ... Therefore he has no temporal power either. The corollary follows that even if the barbarians refuse to recognize any lordship of the Pope, that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing their property ... even if the barbarians refuse to accept Christ as their lord, this does not justify making war on them or doing them any hurt ... Therefore they cannot be compelled to recognize this lordship. (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 138) It also would be false to assume ‘that the Pope has jurisdiction over the Indian aborigines’ (de Vitoria, 1917, p. 146). From las Casas’s and de Vitoria’s conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereign spheres of jurisdiction follows a triangular relation between natural law, the right to defend one’s freedom, and the right to repel force by force (see, for example, in las Casas, Defense of the Indians, chapter XXVII). Consequently, war against the Indians in order to convert them to Christianity is unlawful and their ‘rebellion’ and eventual war against the Spanish conquerors is just. In addition to this, there is still another argument that waging war against non-Christian peoples is unlawful and unjust. This argument embodies another important pillar of their juridical framework, pointing to the circumstance of innocence and the conclusion that killing innocent people can under no circumstances be lawful. This fully applies to the Indians (and other native peoples to be ‘discovered’ in the future) because they had no chance to hear of the Christian God, thus, they are not responsible for their ‘unbelief’. Punishing them for this ‘unbelief’ or, put differently, for worshipping their own gods consequently would be unjust and evil. It will be important to come back to this aspect of innocence. First, however, I shall
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discuss how this emphasis on innocence provides important criteria not only for just or unjust war, but also for laws of war and warfare. Las Casas explores the problem of laws of warfare in two chapters of his Defense (chapters XXVIII and XXX). In doing so, he develops an anti-utilitarian, universal ethics. His arguments again are directed against Sepulveda and his argument that, in order to successfully subjugate the Indians to Spanish (and Christian) rule, not only war itself would be justified, but also each means of warfare which would make them obedient, such as means of killing, massacres, public punishing to terrify others, retaliation, and so on. Las Casas condemns such behaviour as sinful not only according to Christian morality, but also on grounds of an ethical position that means can never cure or justify the (possible) ends. He writes: From this arises the rule that when evil and good [the prospect of conversion to Christianity as such] are so conjoined that, from the good I wish to do, evil would necessarily or almost always result, if the evil is greater than the good I seek to accomplish, the good (action) must always be omitted lest the evil should result. (las Casas, 1992a, p. 202) From this ethical position, he claims that not only innocent people, but also obviously harmless persons such as children, women, and the elderly must be spared. Las Casas illustrates this claim and his respective ethics by the question whether, or not, and under which circumstances to attack a city or fortress. With this example,75 he makes the same important argument which we know from Cicero and Augustine, namely, that a just war – that is, a war which was begun and waged with just reasons – can turn into an unjust war simply by using methods of unjust warfare. Therefore, he first condemns the argument that when once a city has been taken in a just war, all its inhabitants are presumed to be enemies as well and consequently have to be killed; and second, he states that when some military action is not necessary ‘for the favorable outcome of the whole war’ (1992a, p. 200), such as the attack of a fortress and its complete annihilation, it would be unjust to undertake this attack. The reason behind these repudiations is that in every city or fortress, in each community, there are innocent people (such as children, women, and the elderly, but also ‘farmers, workmen, merchants, and pilgrims’; ibid.), and to attack or kill such people would be a mortal sin. His notion of just war is therefore bound to certain methods of warfare to both ensure that a just war remains just and, given an unjust war, to avoid at least the worst outcome of a war which in itself, is an evil deed. Those methods require restriction of warfare to those who are supposed to fight the war and who are professional soldiers and to spare the innocent and civilians. The following question has to be asked: how are las Casas’s and de Vitoria’s normative determinations of the recognition of universal human rights,
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religious freedom, and just war and warfare to be guaranteed in practical political life? The following elaboration of this question reveals their original principles of international jurisdiction. These principles revolutionized the medieval notion of one (Christian) empire and introduced the early modern concept of a world divided into different ‘nations’ with individual systems of law and authority. According to las Casas, and as seen above in de Vitoria, in such a world different ‘nations’ can exist concurrently and are granted mutually recognized sovereignty, however, only on the basis of an universal conceptualization of equality and equal rights to freedom, property, and religion. Kenneth Pennington acknowledges that las Casas’s principles ‘were preliminary to a nascent international law’ (1970, p. 160). Las Casas’s international legal principles are established on, and depend upon, his anthropological and ethical universalism. Further than that, only this universalism allows him to recognize and acknowledge differences as equally legitimate articulations and manifestations of one and the same substance of which the human and political world is made, namely, universal human and divine reason, ethics, and finally universal humanity. Similar to Pennington, Hamilton argues that ‘for sixteenth century Spaniards the jus gentium was in one sense normative, a reflection of the natural law, in another sense customary and improving slowly’, and he concludes that, when considering these foundations of international law, ‘we are forced back on the hypothesis that morality, and not our selfish interests or those of our state, may prove the best policy in our relations with all mankind’ (Hamilton, 1963, p. 167). The framework which politically warrants, or is supposed to warrant, the mutual recognition and acknowledgement of difference is delivered by rights and obligations of ‘international’ jurisdiction. In developing this framework, las Casas and de Vitoria refer to their argument against the claim, which the Spaniards upheld, namely, of superior wisdom which would legitimize conquest (see above). Contrary to such a claim, las Casas argued that the Indians’ war of defence against the Spaniards is by all means to be perceived as the legitimate form of violence in all confrontations which take place in the ‘New World’. ‘(No) free person, and much less a free people, is bound to submit to anyone, whether king or nation, no matter how much better the latter may be and no matter how advantageous he may think it will be to himself’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 47). Following this argument, he consequently declines to term the Indians’ resistance a ‘rebellion’ and the Indians themselves ‘rebels’ because, as he notes, ‘no one can be called a rebel if ... he is not a subject of the King’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 65). This definition goes immediately to the heart of the body of the universalistic thinking in Christian legal philosophy in the sixteenth century which is based upon the conviction that the legitimate use of authority and power stems from legalized relations between those who exert authority and those who are subject to this authority, domestically and internationally.
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All these arguments were developed against those who supported the Spanish conquests, most prominently Sepulveda, and the conviction that the Spaniards would rightfully conquer the Americas and could punish the Indians for ‘idolatry’ and ‘disbelief’. ‘The ancient concept of jus gentium received new life in Spain through the discovery and conquest of the Americas ... But their consciousness of living in an expanding world made them [the respective critical theologians] more aware of the unity of mankind and more anxious to assert it’ (Hamilton, 1963, p. 98). In chapter VI of In Defense of the Indians, in which las Casas attacks Sepulveda on the ground of his legal theory, he is more explicit on his definition of jurisdiction. ‘In this chapter ... we shall prove that unbelievers who have never embraced the faith of Christ and who are not Christian subjects cannot be punished by Christians, or even by the Church, for any crime at all, no matter how atrocious it may be’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 55).76 Jurisdiction, and then the definition of being subject to one’s authority, or not, and of legitimately, or illegitimately, exerting political power, is determined by territorial spheres. Only within the territory of his own nation is a sovereign entitled to wield his authority. He has no legitimate power outside the borders of his body politic. Those living outside, as the Indians with regard to the Spanish Empire, are therefore neither subject of the Spanish Empire nor of the authority and power of the King of Spain who ‘has no jurisdiction in this area’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 55, here similar to de Vitoria; see above), regardless of the possible seriousness of ‘crimes’: ‘Therefore, in this case, the emperor, the prince, or the king has no jurisdiction but is the same as a private citizen, and whatever he does has no force’ (ibid.). Beyond the territorial definition of political power, authority, and jurisdiction, we see that certain terms and concepts become political and accomplish political character only by the possibility of their legal definition, such as ‘rebellion’, ‘rebel’, and ‘crime’, which become definable only under the condition that they apply and can be applied in a juridical context. The limitation of political authority through a territorially defined body politic and the recognition of the political sovereignty and independence of other ‘nations’ relates, however, not only to matters of resistance and punishment, but also to religious or spiritual matters. Also here, the power to convert people ends at one’s own kingdom’s borders, hand in hand with the request to recognize other peoples’ right of religious freedom. Las Casas notes in the same tone as de Vitoria: (As) regards to religion or spiritual matters, no matter whether they be Jews, Mohammedans, or idolaters they are in no way subject to the Church nor to her members, that is, Christian rulers. And therefore when they celebrate and observe rites they cannot be punished by Christian rulers, for [they] lack jurisdiction in this area. (las Casas, 1992a, pp. 54–5)
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This form of ‘relativism’, or as termed above with regard to de Vitoria, ‘recognition of different rationalities’ is more strongly developed in las Casas than in de Vitoria, and therefore he shall be discussed in further detail. Pursuing this ‘relativism’, las Casas extends the determination of the territorial limits of jurisdiction and subsequently the assignment of who is, or is not, subject to a distinct authority beyond the relation between Spain and the Indians to, first, the Catholic Church and the pope and, second, to each kind of relations among states. Regarding the Catholic Church and the authority of the pope, las Casas differentiates between ‘actual’ (or ‘factual’) and ‘potential’ power. Actual power relates to those who are indeed subject to the Catholic Church by embracing the Catholic faith and by being baptized, that is, believers and heretics or sinners who break from the church, but are under the jurisdiction of the church. They belong, as las Casas states in reference to Augustine, to the City of God, and hence the church and the pope may exert power over them. In contrast, persons who never embraced the Christian faith and did not subject themselves to Christ’s jurisdiction are therefore outside the church and Christian law. Although the ‘Eternal Father’, as las Casas says, ‘gave Christ power over all nations, believing and unbelieving in heaven and on earth’ (1992a, pp. 55–6), those who are not baptized and did not willingly submit themselves are only potentially, or ‘habitually’ (ibid., p. 57) subject. In Book IX of In Defence of the Indians, las Casas describes the holy sacraments as the borders of the City of God and baptism as the gate to this city. Here again we see the importance, as it has been in his discussion of just war and warfare, of innocence and, as has been seen in his debate on human rights, the powerful aspect of voluntarism, which overrides philosophical and orthodox Christian traditions claiming some form of natural communitarism. Innocence applies here to the ‘pagan’ who has never heard of Christ nor received faith and hence cannot be an actual subject to the church and the pope; the pagan cannot be made guilty of not embracing Christian faith because he or she never learned about Christ and the sacraments. In addition, las Casas stresses the voluntary character of receiving faith and why, in religious matters, no one can be made a subject against his or her free will. Regarding the aspect of innocence in relation to jurisdiction and the power of the church and the Vatican, see especially chapter XVIII (las Casas, 1992, pp. 127–9). To summarize this point, the pope has no authority to judge those who are outside, ‘he has no actual jurisdiction over these ... unbelievers who are completely outside the Church [and] are not subject to the Church, nor do they belong to its territory or competence’ (ibid., p. 62). He is ‘actual king within the Church and potential king outside the Church’ (ibid., p. 144), and as such has theoretically no greater political power than any secular ruler. Indeed, their power is both limited and granted by the spheres of their actual jurisdiction; in case of a secular ruler, this limitation is territorial
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because ‘jurisdiction is said to be implanted in a locality or territory’ (ibid., p. 83); in the case of the pope, this limitation is symbolized by individuals who are, in terms of their belief and spirituality, outside the Christian faith and who must not forcefully be converted against their will. This principle of recognition applies generally to the relations among all ‘nations’ and peoples. Every ruler and sovereign is thus restricted in the exercise of his power to the territory of his polity and has to respect the sovereign jurisdiction of other polities. Power and authority for all sovereigns end with the borders of their own body politic. This principle has to be acknowledged by everyone as a divine law which ‘forbids anyone to violate or transgress another’s territory or jurisdiction’ (las Casas, 1992a, p. 84). Las Casas employs this principle to the international relationship between France and Spain and states that neither have authority outside the borders of their empire, nor would the ‘king of France pronounce sentence in Spain [or] the king of Spain dictate laws for France’ (ibid., p. 83); and borders were called so because they ‘limit, determine, or restrict the property, power, or jurisdiction of someone’ (ibid., p. 80). It is important to see that this new principle of international jurisdiction and territorial integrity breaks with Roman law according to which possession was perceived as legitimate by physical presence and the factual hold of territories. Las Casas replaces this traditional notion with the principles of territorial jurisdiction (see also Seed, 1992). It is also worth pointing to the explicitness with which the principle of political territoriality in relation to jurisdiction and political power has been introduced, while there is a clear hierarchy between politics and jurisdiction. As seen above, politics and political terms, respectively, attain meaning only in a legal framework which defines relations of legitimate authority. The triangular interlink between politics, territoriality, and jurisdiction and the claim of mutual recognition of territorial integrity characterizes the Spanish theologians as major thinkers of the early modern state system, which was established about one hundred years later in Europe as the so-called Westphalian state system. Lewis Hanke even goes so far as to declare that las Casas prefigures the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights (Hanke, 1970, p. 116). Even if this might appear to be an overstatement because there is a clear difference between modern international law and the jus gentium of, and leading up to, the sixteenth century not only with regard to the notion that the jus gentium is solely customary and unwritten law, but also in relation to their philosophical and epistemological frameworks regarding their universalism, it can nevertheless be stated that a practically significant (in its own times) and relevant (for the centuries to come) universalistic ethical and legal normative philosophy emerged based ‘not on the habits and conduct of one people or another, but of the whole world ... in harmony with the unity of mankind’ (Suárez, quoted in Hamilton, 1963, p. 108).
II.2 Universalistic Frameworks in Early Modern Political Theory
1. Niccolo Machiavelli Any interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), which intends to portray him as a nontotalitarian, or even republican thinker in the tradition of ancient Greek and Roman thought has to fight against deeply rooted mainstream perceptions of so-called Machiavellism. These perceptions construe Machiavelli as a reckless and brutal defender of power politics as long as such politics serve the power-increase of a political leader and the stability of the political system. The ethics underlying Machiavelli are said to be functional because the ends would legitimate the means, thus, all means would be acceptable to accomplish the growth and stability of a political leader’s power. Machiavellism is widely applied to domestic and international politics, and this perception was introduced by Elizabethan writers in England and strongly promoted and popularized by the Prussian king Frederick II and his work L’ anti Machiavel, ou, Essai de critique sur le Prince de Machiavel (1958).77 It is interesting, however, that those who promote this perception of Machiavellism appear to base their interpretation exclusively on one work of Machiavelli, namely, The Prince (written in 1513), thereby ignoring Machiavelli’s main work, The Discourses, which was finalized some years later (around 1518). (Both works were published posthumously; copies of The Prince, however, were circulated during Machiavelli’s lifetime.) This neglect is especially the case in International Politics/IR, leading to an interesting question: why was The Prince, and not The Discourses, received by posterity as the main piece on which interpretations of Machiavelli were based? Or, to put it differently: why did posterity choose Machiavelli’s small piece and not his more comprehensive volume? Perhaps The Prince was chosen because it is shorter; perhaps because it is more bellicose and less reflective and thus makes a better fit with the prevailing perception of Machiavellism. Perhaps interpreters chose this work because it better suits their own ideological interests in two ways, that is, they can use Machiavelli as a political ‘realist’, 100
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who very vividly described politics, both domestic and international, with a clear view for reality, or they can blame him for a political tradition and attitude of rigid and amoral power ambitions. Whatever the answer, the ignorance of his Discourses is striking, and Bernard Crick ironically paraphrases ‘What do you know of Machiavelli who only The Prince have read?’, suggesting that it is probably the brevity of The Prince which made this piece ‘famous’ (Crick, 2003, p. 19). There is, however, another tradition in the interpretation of Machiavelli, which promoted a kind of rehabilitated reading of Machiavelli as a republican in the tradition of Aristotle and Cicero78 and understanding his Prince as one of the first works in what we would call today ‘political sociology’ and ‘totalitarianism studies’. This tradition starts with Alberico Gentili in the second half of the sixteenth century and comprises, for instance, James Harrington, Francis Bacon, David Hume, Baruch Spinoza, Charles de Montesquieu, and Jean Jacques Rousseau who wrote, ‘While appearing to instruct kings he has done much to educate the people. Machiavelli’s Prince is the book of Republicans’ (quoted in Viroli, 2005, p. xix).79 With regard to the discipline of International Politics/IR, only a few works explicitly discuss The Discourses while many (pretend to) know The Prince, raising their voices in accordance with the orthodox interpretation of Machiavellism and contributing to the solidification of this one-sided perception. At the same time, Machiavellism became a keyword in International Politics/IR while Machiavelli is (mis)used by ‘realists’ and neo-realists as a kind of founding figure (together with Thucydides and Hobbes) of their own patterns of international thought. Machiavelli also is (mis)used by internationalists, who cast him as the villain who established selfishness and brutality in international politics and created the basis for others, mostly dictators, to legitimize their politics (see Russett, 1974, 1993), and members of the school of democratic peace, who usually juxtapose Machiavelli as the villain and Kant as the upright politician.80 I do not intend discussing Machiavelli to provide the right interpretation. Nor do I want to try to understand Machiavelli solely on the basis of his Discourses, an approach that would commit the same error as the many interpreters from our discipline who focus only on The Prince, only the other way around. Nor do I want to turn Machiavelli into a peace-loving ‘good guy’ and mitigate his statements from The Prince while arguing that the real Machiavelli can be found in The Discourses. I rather want to point to three circumstances which highlight the relevance of interpreting Machiavelli for our present-day understanding of international/inter-national politics. First, The Discourses also comprises important thoughts on international politics, and this work should not be ignored in interpretations of Machiavelli’s outlook on international politics. Second, to get the ‘whole story’, it does not suffice, therefore, to quote again and again only from The Prince; those who do generate suspicions that they are less interested in
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Machiavelli and more interested in promoting their own politically motivated interests. And finally, we get a different picture of Machiavelli when we broaden the basis for our understanding and interpretation; thus, including both The Prince and The Discourses suggests some revisions of orthodox beliefs in International Politics/IR. That we should consider both of his writings is last but not least suggested by Machiavelli himself when he explicitly advises his audience in the first book of The Prince to read the Discourses, too, because he notes that The Prince deals with principalities only and not with republics (which, as he says, he had treated ‘elsewhere’ at great length). This is a clear statement very early in the text saying that The Prince does not provide Machiavelli’s complete outlook on the political world but a partial one focusing solely on one form of government (‘De principatibus’). Those who ignore The Discourses hence appear not to have read The Prince from the beginning, or they have not taken Machiavelli’s advice seriously. The different picture we get when we consider both The Prince and The Discourses and inquire his conceptualizations of international politics consists of the following: Machiavelli’s main interest tends to be in domestic politics, and above all in the well-being of the city-republic of Florence. Nevertheless, he is fully aware that a republic’s welfare also depends on its foreign politics. He therefore perceives the international realm divided up into competing republics, city-states, and empires which are all interested in their own political and economic well-being. Machiavelli has no principal complaint about this situation and does not construct a metaphysically or ethically inspired counter-picture of the international world against this reality. He rather conceptualizes political order and political action within this given context and accepts conflict and competition as patterns of political reality. However – and the mainstream interpretation in our discipline repeatedly ignores this – Machiavelli has a notion of universalistic principles which are common to all political bodies and affect all politics, and he envisions the creation of principles to construct international order in this reality. These are the vital forces of republican politics and virtue. These principles have an impact on political fortune and qualify the fate of single political bodies. State leaders must be aware of these principles and must not only develop instruments of political, sometimes despotic power, but also virtue, confidence, and morality. Finally, these principles constitute common guidelines of politics in general and foreign politics in particular and affect the conduct of each state’s foreign politics with the same ordering principles. Consequently, they integrate ‘international’ politics in frameworks common to all political communities. From this perspective, it is not only and not always a thirst for power and power maximization which prevails over international politics, but also aspirations of harmonic conduct of ‘state-to-state’ relations, diplomacy, and international negotiation. At the same time, diplomacy and negotiation not only generate common norms and values among republics and city-states, but they also are backed by, and
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based upon, common norms and values – under the condition that state leaders have developed certain capacities of virtue and morality. If we read Machiavelli this way – and this picture will be elaborated throughout the following paragraphs – against the mainstream interpretation of Machiavelli as an all-out ‘realist’, we learn to conceive of him as an intermediate figure. He is not universal like Augustine and Aquinas (see above) or universalistic like las Casas and de Vitoria (see above) or Kant (see below), and he differs from Thucydides (see above) in the decisiveness of excoriating war atrocities and requesting legal norms. We learn, however, that he also refers to universalistically valid principles, which impinge on international politics and apply to all political units, bridge potential disintegration of the ‘international’, and provide eventual ethical standards for the conduct of foreign politics. ‘Two Machiavellis’: Political sociology and republican ethics, or the ‘analytical’ and the ‘normative’ We know statements from Machiavelli such as ‘A wise ruler ... cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him to make a promise are removed’ (The Prince, chapter VXIII), or ‘A Prince ... must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions, and its discipline’ (The Prince, chapter XIV). These and similar statements have been used by scholars and politicians alike to form the interpretations of Machiavellism. However, we also find other statements such as ‘But let us come to the second instance, when a private citizen becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness or any other intolerable violence, but with the favour of his fellow citizens’ (from The Prince, chapter IX, ‘Of the civil principality’; my emphasis). We also read about his admiration of ‘Ecclesiastical Principalities’ because of their realization of what can be called good and humane government (The Prince, chapter XI); we encounter the statement ‘For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation’ (The Prince, chapter XV); and we find Machiavelli writing ‘How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live with integrity ... everybody knows’ (The Prince, chapter XVIII). The purpose of these quotations81 is to illustrate an ambivalence in Machiavelli, which opened his writings to one-sided interpretations that either exploit him as a supporter of brutal power politics and reckless selfishness, if opportune, or construe him as a republican thinker. Both ways of understanding are, to my point of view, insufficient because both have a strong tendency to neglect one or the other side of his writings and to pick out single sentences and paragraphs without trying to read them in combination with, and with regard to, the architecture of both The Prince and
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The Discourses. We have to ask the following questions: Why this ambivalence? How can it be explained? What consequently is this architecture of his political thoughts? By trying to find an answer to these questions, I intend to demonstrate that Machiavelli is much more complex than assigning him for now and ever to be a republican or a totalitarian. Or to put it differently, I believe that we have ‘two Machiavellis’ and that we have to understand his two sides in combination in order to solve the seeming ambivalences. However, I would like to suggest that the two sides of Machiavelli are not represented in either The Prince (a despotic Machiavelli) or The Discourses (a republican Machiavelli), but rather alongside the distinction of a Machiavellian historic-analytical political sociology (of principalities and republics) and a Machiavellian ethically oriented political thought. Machiavelli knows very well the importance of distinguishing between the analytical (i.e., his political-sociology approach) and the normative in the study of politics (i.e., his judging and evaluating comments). In most parts of both writings, Machiavelli is a political sociologist. He analyzes politics in principalities and in republics, more or less descriptively, focusing on the mechanisms and ‘logic’ of power. Thus, he asks questions – evidently using a different political terminology, but one that is similar to modern political sociology – concerning political leadership, political friendship, the role of political elites, the function of religion and the role of the church, polit ical power, the significance of political mores, ‘social capital,’ and so on.82 The discussion of such questions, in combination with Machiavelli’s quite unsparing treatments of political power, appears to be responsible for his reputation as a supporter of reckless power politics and political deceit and for interpretations of Machiavellism as if he subscribed normatively to these mechanisms, instead of having them (just) analyzed. However, to assume that a scholar of totalitarianism would be a totalitarian thinker is absurd, and indeed most of them during the twentieth century – for example, Hannah Arendt, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Eric Voegelin, and many others – have been themselves victims of European totalitarian politics and staunch republican thinkers. But Machiavelli was not a great methodologist and he provides just some hints about what he is doing and heading for, namely in the ‘Preface’ of The Discourses when he writes: Although owing to the envy inherent in man’s nature it has always been no less dangerous to discover new ways and methods than to set off in search of new seas and unknown lands because most men are much more ready to belittle than to praise another’s actions, none the less, impelled by the natural desire I have always had to labour, regardless of anything,
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on that which I believe to be for the common benefit of all, I have decided to enter upon a new way, as yet untrodden by anyone else. (1983, p. 97) This introductory paragraph can be understood in two ways: as the invention of a historical method comparing the current situation in sixteenth century Italy and primarily Florence with examples from Greek and Roman antiquity and especially with the Roman Republic (what would not be really a new method); or as the invention of an analytical method to describe the mechanisms and structures of government and practices of power, both in principalities and republics (what would indeed be a new method). He notes in the Dedicatory Letter and the second chapter of The Prince: I have neither decorated nor filled this work with elaborate sentences, with rich and magnificent words, or with any other form of rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation that many writers normally use in describing and enriching their subject-matter, for I wished that nothing should set my work apart or make it pleasing except the variety of its material and the gravity of its contents ... I shall aside any discussions of republics, because I have treated them elsewhere. I shall consider solely the principality ... and I shall discuss how these principalities can be [not ought to be] governed and maintained. (2005, pp. 3, 7; emphasis mine) We here learn that Machiavelli intends to restrict himself in order to be analytical and that he refrains from presenting his analysis normatively. As with the navigator and explorers of his time who sailed across the oceans to discover new land, Machiavelli wants to invent a new ‘way’ (methodos) of political study. This new way should be without ‘ornamentation’ and ‘rhetoric’, but straightforwardly heading for an ‘objective’ (‘objective’ in his sense of drawing lessons from historical comparison by refraining from personal comments) and analytical description of state leaders’ successful conduct of politics. I hence ask if we tend to suppose George Orwell had an interest in defending and legitimizing the totalitarian government of pigs in his Animal Farm or, much worse, to advise dictators in their government? My guess is that we well understand that Orwell’s intention was to describe and illustrate (and, of course, to criticize) the mechanisms of totalitarian government in order to teach people how such governments come into being and how they operate. So why do we assume then that Machiavelli supports rude and selfish government, without taking seriously enough into account his statements from the Preface of the Discourses and the Dedicatory Letter and the second chapter of The Prince (as quoted above) about his real interest? And why are we instead seduced in our understanding by misled assumptions either about ‘his’ normative support of egoistic and opportune government, or about a Machiavellian tendency to seperate politics from morality?83
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Instead of being trapped in such misleading assumptions, a different view is suggested here, namely, to understand Machiavelli’s analytical focus as, in modern terms, a ‘political sociology’ perspective. On this aspect, Alker’s notion is instructive when he writes about ‘Machiavelli, Renaissance Humanism, and Modernity’ and reveals an analytical dimension in Machiavelli which he deems being ‘reflectively modern’. ‘With a keen eye and ear for provocative formulations, he built an imperfect but prescient, proto-scientific ... grammar of emerging ... modern power relations’ (Alker, 1992, p. 358; emphasis mine).84 In order to further investigate Machiavelli’s analytical and normative dimension, I suggest that we carefully read Machiavelli’s comments on ‘good’ and ‘evil’ behaviour, ‘just’ and ‘fair’ government, and a cooperative and peaceful conduct of international politics in the short paragraphs he interspersed throughout the main text despite his stated intention to omit ‘rhetoric’ and ‘unnecessary ornamentation’. In these paragraphs, Machiavelli discloses his normative ideas, apart from his analytical outlook. We hence have to understand Machiavelli as an author who sharply distinguishes the analytical from the normative level and who consequently focuses on two separate units of his study.85 The empirical-analytical outlook in Machiavelli is thereby based on his historical studies of Roman and Greek antiquity, especially the Roman Republic, whereas his normative views are derived from political principles and ethics of republicanism and self-government. This applies, as I will try to demonstrate, both to domestic and international politics. No argument, however, can be made that Machiavelli would derive his normative outlook from his analysis of the ‘real’ world. He does not derive normative ‘ought’ obligations from his analyses, but only ‘must’ maxims about what a prince or republican leader had to do in order to stabilize his power (the reification problem, which we observe in neo-realism, thus does not apply to Machiavelli and appears to be a distinct problem of scientific epistemology; see below, IV.2.2). Thereby, Machiavelli tries to uncover the mechanisms of despotic and republican government; however, he never states that principalities or bellicose empires would represent ideal political orders and one should, normatively speaking, realize them. There might be times and certain circumstances when a principal government is necessary to guarantee stability and to overcome crisis. This does not imply Machiavelli’s normative outlook, however, but merely his concession towards the might of ‘necessity’ (necessita), that is, to do the right thing in the right moment. (The gauge to judge what is ‘right’ is political stability and the question of what can bring about stability.)86 When a situation arises in which necessity requires certain actions, and they might imply war and dictatorial leadership, it then is, according to Machiavelli, crucially important to know what to do and how to act.87 But again, this is not a normative ‘ought’ obligation but a ‘must’ maxim due to political analysis and born out of necessity, that is, the requirement
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to act successfully in order to stabilize the community. Only from the viewpoint of a contemporary political-science orthodoxy – which lost its normative orientation – and of an International Politics/IR – which is dominated by the epistemological naivety of neo-realism and identifies the normative with the analytical – can Machiavelli be understood as someone who takes political reality (or what he thinks it is) at face value to derive general ‘ought’ obligations from it.88 Coming back to the question of international politics in Machiavelli: much is here about war and warfare and the leader’s capability and knowledge of how to wage war successfully. Machiavelli also writes about colonies and how empires expanded and why they declined. He also covers the question of how military discipline can be created and how important it is that troops are well trained and reliable to their leader and home country, and how a country and its society that have been defeated can successfully be ruled. The criteria and the standard for success are provided by the realization of stability. As Crick notes, Machiavelli attaches an ‘extraordinarily high value to political stability’ (Crick, 2003, p. 24). This concern stems from his belief in the periodic and inevitable rise and fall of political orders which would cause each political unit to decline eventually, regardless how huge and powerful it once was. Thus, stability can at least enable a political unit to last, although it cannot prevent its final decline. In this regard, Machiavelli stands in the tradition of the Greek-Roman historian Polybius, and, as he writes in The Discourses, there is a ‘cycle through which all governments pass’ (1983, p. 109). It therefore is the greatest challenge for a political community, whether it is a principality, an empire, or a republic, to resist its decline as long as possible. One guarantor for stability, according to Machiavelli, is expansion, if necessitated by war. Thus, war and statesmen’s necessary capabilities and expertise as war leaders are permanent motives in The Discourses and The Prince. His thoughts on that topic can, in a summarized form, also be found in The Art of War, which ‘repeats and assumes every essential proposition of both The Prince and The Discourses – for the art of war is an extension of the whole condition of society’ (Crick, 2003, p. 37; also Machiavelli, 2003). I do not want to discuss this further because this discussion would distract from my main concern, which aims to address the question whether, or not, there is something in Machiavelli pointing to an international order in the sense of some common principles shared by single states. Regional republican order Asking whether, or not, there is some principle in Machiavelli constituting an in-between among states, and whether Machiavelli’s thought does, or does not, reach beyond the interests of single political units, it might be surprising that we find in his writings the idea of a regional republican order. This idea relates to the normative, not to the analytical, side of his
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writings and therefore may be not part of the main attention his studies have received. This is, however, astonishing because it is as early as in Book I.1 of The Discourses when Machiavelli talks about the very reason for the foundation of cities, and he refers to international politics to explain this reason. We thus can conclude that, for Machiavelli, international politics lies at the very heart of each city (and politics), and the foundation of a city is the first occasion when dispersed small communities join, and that is for the better enjoyment of their security. ‘Hence ... either of their own accord or at the suggestion of someone of greater authority among them, such communities undertake living together in some place they have chosen in order to live more conveniently and the more easily to defend themselves’ (Machiavelli, 1983, pp. 100–1). What Machiavelli describes here is nothing else but the creation of a security community in which cities, because of their individual smallness, unite together for the better realization of their commonly shared interest in security. Machiavelli construes such a unification of small communities into a greater (and stronger) association as the most fundamental motor in, and the first motive for, the creation of politics, and both relate to international politics. This motor and motif are understood by Machiavelli as historical conditions and, as such, as an analytical description of ‘The Origins of Cities in General and of Rome in Particular’ (Book I.1, The Discourses). It seems crucially important to relate any understanding and interpretation of Machiavelli with regard to international politics to the paragraphs mentioned above. He herein not only esteems international politics as the fundamental grounding of politics, he also describes how, and why, individual communities form an association of a greater community. In Machiavelli, we do not find the image of only particularized and singularized interests ‘out there’ in international politics, but of unifying common principles and shared values guiding states’ (foreign) politics. According to our present-day terminology, Machiavelli here notes the beginnings and foundation of an ‘international society’. And even if such a society breaks apart from time to time because of the natural rise and decline of states and empires and due to their eventually selfish, bellicose, and power-seeking behaviour, common interests and the shared value of security operate as the founding principles of international politics. Shared norms and values hence do exist in international politics and operate in the international realm as ordering standards. As I argued above, this picture is to be comprehended as historical and analytical, not (yet) normative. Much about security depends on the military organization of a community and the state-leader’s capacity as general of his army. In The Discourses, I.4, we read that ‘where the military organization is good there must be good order’ (p. 113). We now have to turn to Machiavelli’s normative thinking, because the term good order is elusive at first. When further inquiring into the meaning of good order, we have to consider two aspects: both relate to the domestic
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order of cities, and both reach out into the international sphere. Thus, there is a link between domestic order and international politics in Machiavelli, not only in terms of negative impacts because of bellicose and imperialistic politics of states, but also in a positive, normative sense. One of these aspects concerns Machiavelli’s preference for small republics. His argument does not, however, foreshadow Rousseau’s (domestically oriented) argument stating that small cities are better suited for (‘democratic’) republics, but is, on the contrary, borrowed fully from an international perspective. He writes: I am firmly convinced ... that to set up a republic which is to last a long time, the way to set about it is to constitute it as Sparta and Venice were constituted: ... not to make it so large as to appear formidable to its neighbours ... if it be content with its own territory, and it becomes clear by experience that it has no ambitions, it will never occur that someone may make war through fear for himself, especially if by its constitution or by its laws expansion is prohibited. Nor have I the least doubt that, if this balance could be maintained, there would be a genuine political life and real tranquility in such a city. (Machiavelli, 1983, pp. 122–3)89 It is the domestic organization of a city as a small city which has a pacifying effect on the international sphere. No other state, Machiavelli argues, has to fear a small city. If the peaceful conduct of its foreign politics were additionally determined by its constitution and laws, this would produce an even better and more preferable situation. Machiavelli well realizes analytically that states may be driven by ambitions to increase their influence, power, and glory; however, normatively he envisions a different, and more peaceful, international order, one which is made up of small states unified by their common interest in increasing, and their value for, their quality of life.90 Towards the end of this quotation, we notice that Machiavelli talks about ‘genuine political life’ and ‘real tranquility’ that stipulates a deeper inquiry into the second aspect of (and link between) domestic order and international politics. The second aspect touches upon good ‘order’. There should be no doubt that Machiavelli prefers republics to all other forms of government, such as principalities, empires, and, of course, dictatorships – ‘if you can get them’, as Crick formulates (Crick, 2003, p. 24). A paragraph from The Discourses should leave no doubt about this position: It is not the well-being of individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that promotes it is carried out ... The opposite happens where there is a prince. (II.1)
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We can add now that he prefers small republics to large ones due to their pacifying effect on international politics. Machiavelli explicitly discusses the question of a confederation of republics in Book I.59 of The Discourses under the topic ‘What Confederations or Leagues can be trusted most; those made with a Republic or those made with a Prince’ (p. 257). His answer to this question is very clear. He comments that confederations made by republics are much more reliable. And ‘(instances) might be cited of treaties broken by princes for a very small advantage, and of treaties which have not been broken by a republic for a very great advantage’ (p. 259). We hence learn that republics would be more reliable because they ‘abide by their agreements far better than do princes’ (p. 259). Again, the ‘normative Machiavelli’ not only highly esteems associations of republics (what he calls ‘confederations’ or ‘leagues’) based on their common norm and value of security, but he also measures the preference of republics over principalities by their far better fulfilment of treaty obligations (see also Gaubatz, 1996, pp. 109–23). We here touch upon an aspect which seems constantly neglected in International Politics/IR when it comes to Machiavelli, namely his normative esteem (and factual analysis) of international treaties. It should be clear by now that we have to revise the common picture of Machiavelli as an uncompromising realist, who is nowhere speaking of ‘anarchy’ in ‘international’ politics, and who qualifies power politics by normative principles. His normative notion of ‘international’ politics is based on a twofold notion of common norms and shared values between states: stability and international law. In this regard it is interesting to look closer at his argument why republics are more reliable. Although his argument is hidden in one sentence only and Machiavelli lacks a modern political science terminology, we can nevertheless learn that his preference for republics is very much due to (what we would call today) a system of checks and balances which operates in republics, but not in principalities. His argument is about time, and he notes that republics ‘are slower to act and take more time than princes in arriving at a decision’ (1983, p. 259). In more current terminology, this argument is well known from the Federalist Papers when James Madison argues for the advantages of republican orders in opposite to kingdoms and refers to the idea of time in the decision-making process of republics. The momentum of a slower pace in the decision-making process of republics would guarantee a more reflective, moderate, and thus less emotional and sounder political outcome. The mechanism, according to Madison, for preventing decisions being made too promptly is the system of checks and balances between the executive, the legislative, and eventually the juridical branch. That is, in terms of time, a system of negotiation, vetoes, co-operation, and votes operates in republics. When it comes to defence issues and military questions, however, Madison finds his counter-argument in the Federalist-articles of
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Alexander Hamilton who argued that in wartime decisions have to be made immediately and without delay. Therefore, a strong executive, equipped with military command, would be required.91 As to Machiavelli, he views the slow pace of decisions made in republics as beneficial for international politics because it increases the reliability of such governments with regard to their treaty obligations. Thus, we have to realize two links which universally operate between the domestic order of cities and the international sphere. On the one hand, (small) republics are less frightening and are of a more peaceful character towards their neighbours; on the other hand, the quality of domestic decision-making endows republics with a greater reliability in the international environment. Both characteristics are conducive for less conflictive and more cooperative international relations; this again provides not only international, but also domestic stability. In The Discourses, II.4, Machiavelli consequently projects a regional order of free republics, a projection, which is based on his normative outlook as well as on historical examples of peaceful and flourishing state relations. We read: The student of ancient histories will find that there are three ways in which republics have expanded. The first was that which the Tuscans of old adopted, namely, that of forming a league consisting of several republics in which no one of them had preference, authority or rank above the others; and in which, when other cities were acquired, they made them constituent members in the same way as the Swiss act in our times, and as in Greece the Achaeans and the Aetolians acted in olden times ... The method of leagues ... does not readily involve you in wars ... Twelve or fourteen communities join together, and beyond that they do not seek to go ... Hence, when they have reached the number which appears to promise them security, they devote themselves to ... the protection of those who apply for it, and by this means get from all around money which can easily be distributed among them. (1983, pp. 285–7)92 I do not want to overstretch my interpretation of Machiavelli, either in terms of a modern political science terminology nor by turning him into a peace-loving universalist. However, I would argue that his normative picture for an international order made up by republics strongly resembles models which are in our days discussed as regional security orders, or ‘regional security complexes’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003). No convincing argument exists, however, for seizing Machiavelli as a ‘realist’, who would argue in favour of power politics and a leadership of foreign policy elites (a ‘prince’ and his cronies), independent from their society, and who would furthermore base his analysis and international outlook on assumptions of ‘anarchy’ and a intransigent promotion of ‘national interest’. On the contrary, we could see that reliability, treaty obligations, cooperation, and the internationalization
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of republicanism rank high in his thoughts. Further to this, he perceives no dualism between domestic (‘inside’) and international (‘outside’) order, with two aspects of the domestic order (of republicanism) reaching into the international. The belief to expose Machiavelli as a realist must hence be understood as one (further) misreading of present-day International Politics/IR. This misreading seems due to the lack of a differentiation between, and the equation of, a normative and an analytical level of studying the international as well as due to the solidification of an ‘inside’-‘outside’-dualism in post-nineteenth century inter-national theory, which appears to operate as an a-historical, ontological lens, even when looking at pre-nineteenth century international politics. The purpose of this chapter, to say it again, is not to show the right and the one and only possible Machiavelli. Rather, I intend to show him in a different light, contrary to how he is usually portrayed in our discipline, and thereby to broaden the perspective of understanding him as an international theorist. Finally, we must realize that he does not fit into the modern dualism of thinking the domestic here and the international there, that he thinks beyond the welfare and interest of a single (his) state only, and that his thoughts are well informed by international principles which are valid, if not always empirically, then normatively, for all states. There remains one aspect to discuss which is important for domestic and international politics likewise: conflict. Machiavelli is aware of the (potentially and factually) conflictive behaviour of states, and it is in order of their stability, not for some power maximization (or expansion, or glory) per se that states have to deal and to cope successfully with political conflicts.93 However, Machiavelli accepts the reality of political conflict and does not try to project an order in which conflicts are eliminated. On the contrary, he perceives conflict as a stimulating and ‘creative momentum’ of politics (Crick, 2003, p. 36). He thus does not believe in any eternal or divine harmonic order of the world and its political and social affairs (as, for instance, in Augustine and Aquinas). He discharges medieval political metaphysics in the most sustainable way. He formulates a concept which displays conflict not as some decline and disassociation from order, but as a genuine pattern of the world and within the sociopolitical order. Conflict is nothing bad which has to be overcome. It is a pattern with which politics has to deal and which has to be civilized, cannot be abolished, and, after all, should not be abolished. This is true for domestic and international politics, and in international politics, it is the projection of a regional republican order which would best suit the challenge to civilize conflict. A further aspect, fundamental to Machiavelli’s conception of politics, comes into play when we consider why conflict should not be abolished. Recapitulating Machiavelli’s idea of a republican international order in combination with his perception of political conflict, we see that such an international order best suits the challenge to civilize international conflict
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and therefore is the order which provides the most stability. Consequently, a successful conduct of international politics requires distinct capabilities from statesmen as much as the conduct of domestic politics does. We can hence apply Machiavelli’s concept of virtù to international politics. From a theory of action-perspective, virtù represents for Machiavelli a guideline and normative requirement for a league (or confederation) made up of republics as the best international order possible. But what is the meaning of virtù? To put it simply, a basic meaning of virtù is the capacity ‘to do the job well’. It can be compared with Aristotle’s techne (art; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1139b, 5–17), which has a practical goal beyond mere knowledge. There is a medical art, which aims at healing the patient; there is the art of an architect to build a house; there is the art of a musician to play the flute; there is the art of a carpenter to construct chairs and tables and so on. In this meaning, ‘art’ combines knowledge with practical wisdom aiming at a certain goal (telos). Pursuing the art of one’s profession with great excellence and realizing the goal of the related action (e.g., the doctor heals the patient, the musician plays the flute well, the carpenter constructs a nice chair) entitles the person who acts with virtue. There is a virtue of a doctor, a carpenter, a musician, and so on. The highest form of art in Aristotle is the techne politica, the art of politics (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a, 21–24), which aims at the realization of the ‘good life’ for individuals and tranquillity for the political community (eudamonia as the virtue of politics; 1097b, 12–34). Construing Machiavelli’s virtù from this perspective, we can concretize his talk about the virtù of a general, for instance, who successfully controls his troops and achieves glory for his country through successful battles (see, e.g., The Discourses, III.12, 18); or about the virtù of a doctor (one of Machiavelli’s favourite examples) who heals his patients and contributes to their well-being. What does this imply for a republic and for international politics pursued in a republican international confederation? In political terms, virtue means a ‘civic spirit’ (Crick, 2003, p. 46), which is necessary because a republic’s good order and tranquillity depend on citizens’ readiness to subordinate their own interests to that of the common good. Machiavelli says, both in The Discourses and the Prince, a city which rests upon the virtù of its citizens is the most difficult to seize by a foreign army, and its stability enables it to resist domestic disorder and decline. But how to create virtù in a city and in a republican international confederation? At this point, Machiavelli’s esteem of political conflict has to be reconsidered. In his architecture of the political, conflict is the momentum which keeps politics alive, it is the immediate matter of politics, and it prevents stagnation. Finally, conflict is the rationale behind the ‘come and go’ of cities, empires, and leagues. Because conflict is, however, the very nature of politics, the art of politics and political virtue develop through dealing with conflicts and trying to civilize them. This is a radical discharge of
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the ancient and medieval imagination that political virtue becomes manifest in acting in accordance with harmony and a divine order of concord. Machiavelli topples that picture upside-down, saying that it is exactly the opposite, namely, the management and civilization of conflict which create and generate political virtue, and the capability of doing so characterizes a great politician and a tranquil political community. And because conflict is permanent, this kind of political virtue is always required. If, so we can conclude, conflict would be eliminated (which is, moreover, impossible), then the development of virtù would stagnate, a community would become complacent, and the attitude of political leaders would degenerate into hubris. We hence can conclude that virtù always implies political ethics. This is an ethics which is not gained from imaginations of acting according to some eternal ‘good order’ or harmonic cosmic or divine law, but rather an ethics which stems from the idea that political conflicts have to be dealt with and civilized. It is thus an inner-worldly ethics,94 arising from the practical and purely political knowledge of what to do strategically in the right moment in order to cope with conflictive circumstances. However, the goal of acting ethically in this sense is not glory or power or something similar per se, but – and here again we encounter ‘the normative’ in Machiavelli – the realization of republican order. And a republican order is one in which the civic spirit is most developed and which, due to the existence of civic spirit, is most difficult to destroy; it best resists instabilities as well as the cycle of rise and decline. We can conclude that there exists a genuine fourfold relation in Machiavelli between the art of politics, virtù (or civic spirit), republican order, and stability. When we apply this picture to the international sphere, we learn that virtue in international politics never exists in a policy which tries to eliminate conflict by oppressing others directly because this would represent a ‘useless method’ (The Discourses, II.4; pp. 283–5). It is also difficult to form hegemonic and imperial alliances ‘in which you reserve to yourself the headship, the seat in which the central authority resides, and the right of initiative’ (p. 284), a method which the Romans applied but which appears historically unique. From this point of view, a league of republics consequently appears to be the best and most appropriate method because it is governed by ‘a council’, which has to arrive ‘at any common decision’ (p. 286) and which symbolizes the institutional body for dealing with and managing conflicts among its members. Again, conflict is being seen as a positive motivator which requires a certain virtue. According to Machiavelli, probably the most important ‘art of civilizing conflict’ in international politics is diplomacy. The conduct of diplomatic relations contributes to the creation of trust and confidence among states, and it is the most effective means of moderating conflict through direct and personal political communication. Machiavelli is regarded the ‘founder of modern diplomacy’ because he invented the idea and practice of continuing diplomatic relations with neighbour states by permanent ambassadors and
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embassies, a practice which replaced the then-usual practice of individual and temporary delegations when required for immediate conflict settlement. It may overinterpret this picture arguing that Machiavelli perceives such a league of republics as a means for peace in international politics. However, we see that Machiavelli has a (normative) outlook on inter national politics which is based on the idea of cooperation and an inner-worldly ethics oriented towards the stabilization of a republican regional order. The rationale behind such a mode of cooperation is a notion of conflict, which is a constant in politics and cannot be abolished but has to be dealt with and to be civilized. Conflict, however, as history teaches, is also played out from time to time through war. In wartime, yet another virtù is required, namely, the virtue of a general and perhaps a prince, so that the state might last through the politics of hardship and not perish too quickly before the historical cycle of decline and fortune (fortuna) will eventually extinguish even a successful and powerful state. However, a state based upon ‘wellordered’ virtue will last longer because fortune, like a river, ‘turns her impetus towards where she knows no dikes and dams have been constructed to hold her in’ (for this metaphor see The Prince, chapter XXV; here p. 84). Furthermore, the perception of a cycle of the rise and fall of powers teaches not only prudence, but also ‘moderation’ as a matter of political virtue and as a ‘moral lesson’ in foreign politics. According to this teaching, even a powerful and successful state should act with ‘responsible moderation’ and not challenge the mighty powers of fortuna (see Mansfield, 1981). We have seen that construing Machiavelli as a ‘realist’ whose thinking would lack normative perspectives on cooperative international politics and who would not know about common ethical principles bridging states and enabling them to consider jointly their common matters appears to be not only incorrect, but also an instrumentalization of his notion of conflict as if he would promote and approve of bellicose, malicious politics. We thus can learn about a very different Machiavelli compared to the image we are used to understand as Machiavellism.
2. Thomas Hobbes The references in International Politics/IR to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) as a ‘realist’ are endless.95 And indeed, it is very difficult and challenging to argue against this image and to demonstrate arguments which allude to a political, if not ethical, self-constraint in Hobbes. The ‘realist’ picture consolidated in our discipline performs predominantly as ‘the liberal’ script of modern political thinking. And of course, we all know paragraphs which seem to leave no room for interpretation, such as the following: I show that ... the condition of men outside civil society (the condition one may call the state of nature) is no other than a war of all men against
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all men; and in that war all men have right to all things ... All men, by necessity of their nature, want to get out of that miserable and hateful state, as soon as they recognize its misery. But they can only do so by entering into agreements to give up their right to all things. (Hobbes, 1968, pp. 11–12) Applied to the sphere of international politics,96 this paragraph seems to serve the projection of anarchy perfectly, although Hobbes’s statement does not refer to the international realm, rather to the state of human life before individual men enter into a social contract. In the Leviathan (Part II, chapter 30) we read: Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the savety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the savety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Commonwealths, that is to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there is no Court of Natural Justice, but in the Conscience only; where not Man, but God raigneth. (Hobbes, 1968, p. 394) Following these statements, two options appear to exist for international order only. One option seems to be the natural state where all states fight each other, and anarchy would prevail due to the lack of international law (or Law of Nations, as Hobbes says). The other option would be the erection of a world-state Leviathan which would, on the basis of his sovereignty superior to single nations, govern the single states like the ‘domestic’ Leviathan is supposed to govern its people: namely, with strict laws, according to his definition of ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’, with the power of the sword, and the submission of the individual units.97 The benefit for single nations – comparable to individuals in the state – would be the provision of ‘safety’ by which ‘is not meant a bare Preservation [of life], but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himselfe (Leviathan, Part II, chapter 30; p. 376). However, as Hobbes posits very concisely in A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, ‘there is no Common Power in this World to punish injustice: mutual fear may keep them [states] apart for a time, but upon every visible advantage they will invade one another’ (1971, p. 57). It is probably due to these paragraphs that Hobbes is univocally called a ‘realist’ and his approach is called an ‘empirical realism’ (e.g., Boucher, 1998).
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However, we have to ask whether these views do justice to Hobbes’s philosophical outlook and what conclusion we can draw from Hobbes for international politics. Can we find indications for a third and, compared to the well-established views in International Politics/IR, more appropriate option for interpreting Hobbes based on a deeper philosophical understanding of his writings? The following interpretations assume that the central points for understanding Hobbesian international politics can be seen neither in the ‘problem’ whether, or not, the notion of individual behaviour applies to state behaviour nor, if we suppose it does apply, in the understanding whether, or not, international politics would be characterized by permanent war, due the lack of an international sovereign.98 I rather argue that, for understanding Hobbes, the question whether states act like individuals and the question of a world-state Leviathan are completely irrelevant. They are irrelevant because, although an international sovereign obviously does not exist, a mechanism operates in international politics which functions totally independent both from (the erection of) international sovereignty and from a possible analogy between individuals and states. This mechanism relates to Hobbes’s construction of a relation between sovereignty, legitimacy, and security which powerfully reaches from domestic politics into the international realm and which establishes a common (and, apart from defensive wars, pacifying) regulative reference for all sovereigns in their conduct of foreign policy. The difficulty with Hobbes’s outlook on international politics is to be found in the circumstance that he seems to be primarily interested not in international but in domestic politics. We thus find just a few paragraphs in his oeuvre where he is explicitly considering interstate relations. There is nothing, however, that prevents us from investigating Hobbes’s contribution to international politics further or, as David Gauthier puts it: ‘The elements of my presentation are all to be found in Hobbes, but what I shall present is the theory he never gave’ (Gauthier, 1979, p. 548). Such investigation into the consequences and deeper meaning of his thoughts has to analyze the notions of conscience, rationality, fear, legitimacy, and law of nature, and will reveal that the legitimacy of the sovereign is not unconditioned. It rather rests on his fulfilment of the mutual obligations derived from the social contract which is conceptualized as an equally binding agreement between the people and the sovereign himself. Hence, he can loose his legitimacy – a contingency which has far-reaching impact on international politics and foreign policy. The triangular relationship between conscience, political rationality, and fear Prior to the analysis of the relation between sovereignty, legitimacy, and security, we have to consider Hobbes’s outlook on international politics in a
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much wider context than relying on his direct statements on international politics only. We therefore have to take into consideration his references to conscience, political rationality, and fear. This triangular relationship enables us to see Hobbes’s thought on international politics in a different way. Against the common understanding, Hobbes’s theory is informed by a counterbalance to unrestricted sovereignty of the Leviathan, which, at least normatively, is mighty enough to discipline and regulate states’ behaviour so that the prevailing picture of international politics in Hobbes is not anarchy and permanent war, but a political and ethical norm of self- constraint. This counterbalance is not just an accidental aspect of his politico-philosophical worldview, but lies very much at the heart of his system. We have to ask three basic questions in relation to the function of conscience, political rationality, and fear in his philosophical system in order to understand this counterbalance, which qualifies the familiar statement and image of anarchy. First, how do people or states, which are said to fight each other constantly because they are being driven by their passions, achieve reasonable judgment when they begin to understand that only the rendering of their individual natural rights to a common sovereign power could overcome their bellicose natural state? Second, where ‘in man’ is his ability for reasonable judgment located? Is it a mere functional consequence of ‘fear’, is it political rationality, or is it a capacity endowed by ‘God’? And third, is there a relation between domestic and international politics in Hobbes: If yes, how does it affect the foreign policy of sovereigns? In discussing these questions, I try to demonstrate that we find a political and ethical counterbalance against the state of ‘anarchy’ and permanent war in Hobbesian international politics. Consequently, we have to rethink the understanding of Hobbes as a ‘realist’ and should renounce the perception of a ‘realist’ tradition in international political thought which would last from Thucydides over Machiavelli to Hobbes. Conscience In order to answer the first question, we have to examine the reason for conflict. It seems to be a popular assumption in International Politics/IR that fear, implanted naturally in human beings, is the reason for conflict and war. However, not fear seems to be the real reason for the ‘war of all men against all men’,99 but fear is only the psychological dimension accompanying, and itself being caused by, the fight over conflicts. The reasons of conflicts in politics are to be found foremost in religious and metaphysical worldviews solidified into ideologies. Hobbes himself experienced such conflicts in his lifetime, encountering the religious and civil wars in England (a period which can be dated from 1580 to 1680), which prompted him to flee England for France and back again. In relation to traditional metaphysics, Hobbes has mainly the political philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero in mind, which would be based on speculations instead of reason and logic
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and thus seduce the people. Traditions of ‘naturall Philosophy’ and religious ideologists would be responsible for revolution, war, and conflict: To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old Philosophers (as Cicero saith, who is one of them) have not some of them maintained. And I believe that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotle’s Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques ... If such Metaphysiques, and Physique as this, be not Vain Philosophy, there was never any. (Leviathan, chapter 46; here, 1968, pp. 686–7, 696) In the first dialogue of the Behemoth (written between 1665 and 1668), Hobbes identifies the seduction of metaphysics and religion, combined with human passion, as the evil of contemporary politics. He especially refers to the unrest in the period between the ‘Long Parliament’ and the reestablishment of the Stuart monarchy under Charles II (1660 to 1680). The most important reasons of conflict are listed below: The seducers were of divers sorts. One sort were ministers; ministers, as they called themselves, of Christ; and sometimes, in their sermons to the people, God’s ambassadors; pretending to have a right from God to govern every one his parish and their assembly the whole nation. Secondly, there were a great number ... which notwithstanding that the Pope’s power in England ... had been by Act of Parliament abolished, still retain a belief that we ought to be governed by the Pope ... Fourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by the glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny ... Sixthly, there were a very great number that had either wasted their fortunes, or thought them too mean for the good parts which they thought were in themselves; and more there were, that had able bodies, but saw no means how honestly to get their bread ... These longed for war. (Hobbes, 1969, pp. 2, 3) I quoted this paragraph because it makes very clear that, in Hobbes’s analysis of unrest and (civil) war, fear plays a minor role and is not – neither is human nature – said to be the reason of conflict. Instead, Hobbes offers a range of politically and socially grounded reasons for civil conflicts. As we know from the Leviathan and much more from De Cive, men are also perceived as passion-driven and are instilled with an existential fear of violent death (‘metus mortis violentiae’). But as we learn from the above quoted
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paragraph, fear itself is caused by the possibility of being killed, by civil unrest, and permanent insecurity. It is though far from being the genuine cause of conflict. One element, which operates as an additional driving force behind conflictive human behaviour is, however, passion. But passions not only have a conflictive nature, they also perform as pacifying forces, namely, they are ‘that incline men to Peace’ because of his ‘Feare of Death’ and ‘Desire ... to commodious living’ (Leviathan, chapter 13; p. 188). However, there is no automatism, which translates fear (and passion) into (reasonable) judgment of individuals when they eventually transfer their rights to a sovereign power in order to achieve an ending of conflict, peace, and political order. Passions and fear form initiating and energetic, but not causal, forces. Such a force, to bring about a decisive turning point, is yet required when men proceed from the state of natural conflict and war to the institutionalization of a common sovereign as conceptualized in Hobbes by the social contract. In regard to the reason of conflict in Hobbes, the discussions of Richard Ashcraft are very informative: ‘Hobbes’ ... explanation of the civil war establishes a relationship between class interests and ideology, or, in his terms, the economic, political and religious meanings of faction’ (1978, p. 44). Ashcraft further argues that Hobbes’s explanation of the English Revolution offers the basic parameters within which his political philosophy – foremost his analysis of conflict, its reasons, and means to overcome conflict – has to be understood. Consequently, Ashcraft argues that Hobbes’s Behemoth (where Hobbes analyzes political conflict historically) and Leviathan (where he develops his theory to discipline and overcome conflict) form a unit, and the one could not be understood properly without the other. He quotes from a letter which Hobbes wrote in August 1641 in which he maintains that ‘the cause of civil war in all places of Christendom’ is traceable to religious controversies which undermine the exercise of civil power (quoted in Ashcraft, 1978, p. 33). The same point results from the debate between C. B. Macpherson and D. J. C. Carmichael – initiated by Macpherson’s book The Political Theory about Possessive Individualism (1962) – about the influence of class interests and bourgeois capitalism on social conflict. Although the mutual criticism is quite harsh, there is nevertheless on common point in Macpherson’s and Carmichael’s arguments, namely, that neither fear nor human nature are the reasons of conflict, but conflicts are social and political in nature (see Carmichael, 1983; Macpherson, 1983). Thus, there must be something that finally enables men to cease engaging in conflict and to progress to rational action and reasonable judgment. This ‘something’ must furthermore instil social trust and confidence into the individuals and make them believe that the sovereign power to be erected is of different character than anything else and all the other institutions men are familiar with and that previously ‘seduced’ them. The sovereign power to be established must be thought of – different from what people
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know from their ‘state of nature’ – as an institution which does not act for its own profit and well-being but for the good of the people. (In De Homine, chapter 11, Hobbes calls this good a ‘common good’ that all human beings want and can share; here Hobbes, 1972.) The yet missing link is what Hobbes calls ‘reason’ perceived as a kind of rational calculation and ‘counting’ (see the quotes below as well Leviathan, chapter 5; pp. 110–18). But where does this ability come from? Political rationality This ‘missing link’ is provided by the human ability to use reason and to conclude reasonable judgment. Since reason is, according to Hobbes, counting, subtraction, and addition, we have to ask what do men subtract and add and consequently conclude to accomplish reasonable judgment? Hobbes writes in the Leviathan (chapter 3), ‘Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of the Past: So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also’ (p. 98). We therefore can determine that reasonable judgment is experienced-based, and each conclusion by men is founded on the evidence of his past and of what he knows from the past. But to what experience and logical operation of the mind does Hobbes refer – especially under the paradox that this experience is, on the one hand, the ground of people’s judgment and, on the other hand, the constituents of the same experience which must be left behind in order to establish something completely new (namely, political order and the Leviathan)? Hobbes is referring to the addition of one distinct logical operation grounded in experience-based evidences, evidences, which yet taught nothing but fear, ruin, chaos, and men making war. Evidence-based judgment is hence grounded in politically and socially taught (bad) experience. But abstract reasoning, by ‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’, attaches the decisive added value by one intellectual operation, which asks the following question: if there is (and was) a predominant cause for substantial fear in the past (namely, conflict and war), what has to be logically ‘added’ to this experience in order to abolish the reason of fear? That is, what has to be added to the experience of the past and ‘links the past with the present’ (Ashcraft, 1978, p. 38) is – so reason teaches – another logical step (a kind of ‘subtotal’100), namely, the ‘entering into agreements’ by which people ‘give up their right to all things’ (from the Preface of On the citizen). They thus become disciplined for the future, renouncing their passion-driven aspirations (of the past) to possess the belongings of, and to govern the lives of, others while at the same time trusting the newly erected sovereign power – and finally trusting the operations and results of mathematical reason.101 In so far, reasoning means, even if ‘taken from past’, a leap in being of human life by becoming political, although reasoning has no insinuation about the quality of the future besides the promises of logical reasoning itself.
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This understanding of reason points to Hobbes’s methodology of, and his political confidence in, more geometricus. Walker thematizes this leap under the rubrics of change and ‘the historicity of the contract’ (Walker, 1987, p. 74). Perhaps Walker’s argument that Hobbes intends to abandon time entirely is overdone – because we could see the paramount relevance of ‘experience’ in Hobbes; nevertheless, he realizes very clearly that the ‘geometrical method, the appeal to reason, the artifice based on reason’, and finally ‘his concern with order’ (ibid.) constitute a completely new political situation after the social contract has been agreed. This new situation causes us to revise the Hobbesian outlook on international politics and to finally realize that the analogy between the individuals’ ‘state of nature’ – which relates to the time before the social contract – and the principles operating in international politics does not lead us any further. On the ‘Use and End of Reason’ Hobbes writes: The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without any certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded. (Leviathan, chapter V; 1968, p. 112) Passion seems to be excluded from this logic of ‘Addition of parcels’ and ‘Substraction of one summe from another’ (ibid., p. 110) and appears to be irrelevant in this kind of mathematically guided intellectual operation. Applied to politics, the experience on which political judgment is based is summed up and aggregated by what man ‘hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruine of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also’ (ibid., p. 98). The experience of such ruin, chaos, and battle, and the addition of such experience might trigger in men the fear to encounter the same destiny, to suffer physical violence, and to be in permanent danger of a violent death. Experience, accompanied by fear, might convince men eventually to use their capability of prudence and reasonable judgment by adding these experiences and ‘conceiving of the consequences’ (ibid., p. 110). However, fear is far from being the causal reason of prudence and judgment (as well as of conflict), rather it is a trigger, and judgment is grounded in experience and made by an experience-based, logical conclusion. Experience of social conflict and war, evaluated by logical reasoning (or prudence), and only accompanied by fear and passion, leads individuals to political judgment in order to relinquish insecurity, ruin, and chaos. This complex relationship is at the foundation of the Hobbesian social
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contract and its erection of the sovereign body. Consequently, sovereignty is fundamentally based on the sovereign’s guarantee to prevent citizens from further exposure to political conflict, fear of violent death, and insecurity. As Hobbes very clearly states, the sovereign’s legitimacy to exert power over its citizens depends totally on its success guaranteeing safety for its citizens. This guarantee constitutes the whole purpose of the social contract. We read: The Office of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people. (Leviathan, chapter 30; p. 376) Or: The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived ... from the End of the Institution of Soveraingty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common enemy. (Leviathan, chapter 21; p. 268) We can therefore conclude a vital interdependency among sovereignty, the legitimacy of the sovereign’s power, and the provision of safety. Fear Security is the rationale of sovereignty and of the legitimacy of the sovereign’s power, institutionalized due to individuals’ political (rational) judgment. We have to understand security as a protection from domestic and external threats and violence. Before entering into the agreement to erect a common sovereign body, the social contract, men were living in per manent fear and insecurity, but free. Now, under the conditions of the social contract, men renounce their ‘rights to everything’ and are subordinate to the sovereign. However, security, which is the initial rationale for the social contract, also remains its lasting rationale. This means that The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection. (Leviathan, chapter 21; 1968, p. 272) Accordingly, the individuals regain their full right of nature under the condition that the sovereign does not, or is not able to, guarantee their
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security any more. They then fall back into their original state of nature, and every person is fully responsible and entitled to care for his or her own life. The sovereign’s legitimacy to exercise power then consequently comes to an end, too. The social contract and even the political itself dissolve because the mutual obligation of the contract between the sovereign and the individuals depends on obedience as the people’s contribution, on the one side, and on the sovereign’s obligation to ensure their security, on the other side. As Peter Steinberger notes, ‘For Hobbes, the bonds of the commonwealth dissolve when it fails to achieve the ends for which is was created ... When the state fails to do what it was designed to do – when it threatens, rather than protects, the interests of the citizens – then the social contract, i.e., the original agreement ... is annulled’ (Steinberger, 2002, pp. 858–59). This mechanism is based on the unalienable ‘Right of Nature’ (ius naturale) which Is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (Leviathan, chapter 12; p. 189) This ‘Right of Nature’ – that is, liberty – results in a ‘Law of Nature’ (lex naturalis) – two categories which, according to D. J. C. Carmichael, are the ‘twin pillars of Hobbes’ jurisprudence’ (1990, p. 4) – which remains valid even under the condition of the social contract.102 And if the sovereign breaks his obligation to ensure security for his subjects, and the lives of the individuals are threatened (again), the law of nature – derived from natural, unalienable liberty to do everything to preserve one’s own security – prevails over the political, sovereign law established by the social contract; or, as Morton Kaplan notes, the ‘laws of nature and the rights of nature apply to the actions of men, even after formation of the commonwealth ... A higher law does limit the sovereign’ (Kaplan, 1956, pp. 390–1).103 Men then do not have to abide by the political law any more and can refer in their decisions and acts to the permanent validity of the law and right of nature. And, even more, they are not only allowed to return to the presocietal and prepolitical state of nature, according to Hobbes, they are even prohibited (by the law of nature) to do anything which could harm one’s life or contradicts its conservation. This prohibition includes the observation of orders of the sovereign in the case that he risks his subjects’ lives. It then appears to be an obligation by the law of nature to resist those orders; at least, the subjects have a right to resist. A Law of Nature ... is a Precept, or generell Rule, found out by Reason, by which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or
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taketh away means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, which he thinketh it may be best preserved. (Leviathan, chapter 12; p. 189) The subjects must abide, however, by the sovereign’s orders when these orders aim at, and do serve, their security. Hobbes qualifies the conditions of the right for self-protection, on the one hand, and the duty to obedience, on the other hand, quite clearly in chapter 21 of the Leviathan. He here discusses, from an individual’s point of view, both righteous conditions of desertion and the duty to perform the obligations of a military draft (in the case that they aim to, and are appropriate to, defend the people’s security). Hobbes trusts the individual to competently decide and judge whether, or not, a policy enacted by the sovereign is appropriate to produce and to preserve security.104 If an individual feels that a sovereign’s policy or order does not lead to security and endangers his personal life, Hobbes concedes this individual a right to desert or to lay down his arms. Another case in which surrender is legitimate is simply fear. The background, however, is the same: to secure one’s security and prevent violent death. No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Sovereign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the word of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is ... Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without Injustice ... And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse ... When armies fight, there is one side, or both, a running away; yet when they did it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But ... when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or the courage to preserve, was in vain. (pp. 269–70) A revised interpretation of Hobbesian international politics What can we conclude from these arguments? My argument is that the mechanism of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security also applies to, and operates in, international politics. I am not alone with this proposition. In the wide field of interpreting Hobbes’s outlook on international politics, it is to my knowledge, however, only Michael C. Williams who relates Hobbesian international politics to the question of, and interconnectedness between,
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sovereignty and legitimacy and endorses the argument of a ‘relationship between (the sovereign’s) external relations and relations with its own citizens’ (Williams, 1996, p. 232). Although Williams develops his argument differently – reading, to my view, Hobbes too much as a ‘constructivist’ and neglecting, or at least relativizing, thereby the fundamental and universal roles of reason and of the law(s) and right(s) of nature – this circumstance does not detract from the coincidence of our finding. To put it in Williams’s words: ‘While the sovereign ... has in principle the right to act in any way it chooses, Hobbes argues that a correct understanding of politics will lead not only to obedient citizens but also to prudential self-limitation of activity by a rational sovereign. The sovereign will avoid actions that too obviously threaten the interests of the citizens for fear that will lose their acceptance of its authority ... This places considerable limits ... on state action both domestically and internationally. Since the sovereign’s authority ... depends upon its ability to retain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, the sovereign should always weigh the implications of its actions on the lives and opinions of its citizens ... In its external relations, the same logic applies’ (Williams, 1996, pp. 221–2). My argument consists of three parts. Its first part stems from Hobbes’s universalistic outlooks, which are rooted in the nature of the social contract itself. This construction claims validity not only for the contemporary politics which Hobbes witnessed, but also for all political bodies and all men. Second, the ‘mechanism’ of the social contract consequently applies to all sovereigns internationally and thus represents a regulative function of foreign policy conduct, qualifying conditions and constraints of political legitimacy. And third, from this qualification we learn a Hobbesian universalistic norm for the conduct of (each sovereign’s) foreign policies which contradicts ‘realist’ interpretations on three levels: There is a fundamental relation between domestic and international politics which contradicts the (neo-)realist notion of the state as an unitary actor (on this point, see also Williams, 1996, p. 223). There is also a self-constraining element in foreign and international politics which sees the ‘national interest’ of a state in relative terms. Finally, there is a notion which forbids offensive, preventive, and/ or hegemonic war, which is fought in order to create alliances or to amount the nation’s security targeting potential threats, however, actually risks people’s life. The only war, which can be judged as a legitimate (just) war is a war to defend the political ‘commonwealth’ from an immediate external threat when otherwise the people’s security could not be guaranteed. And even here, if an enemy’s army is overwhelmingly stronger, surrender and submission to another sovereign for the purpose of saving one’s life are deemed by Hobbes not as illegitimate behaviour, but just as cowardice (see the quotation above). In general terms, we can determine that the mechanism of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security constrains a sovereign from leading a war in which
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he endangers his people’s lives and security (besides a defensive war; see more below). If the sovereign risks his people’s lives unnecessarily, he is losing his (domestically obtained) legitimacy. And because this risk and endangerment are present in each war, and because this mechanism operates in each state, we have a powerful norm in international politics which universally regulates foreign politics. This Hobbesian norm should not be mistaken for the conceptualization of an international sovereign who rules international politics and governs over single states, but as a norm for interstate conduct. This norm does not stem from international politics itself, but is derived from the realm of domestic politics. Nevertheless, we clearly see that there is no anarchy ‘out there’, no haphazardous state, and no unbridgeable dualism between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Rather, the domestic norm of legitimacy reaches into the international sphere and teaches each sovereign to avoid war on behalf of safeguarding his citizen’s security. The only exception to this general rule is a war of defence, which must necessarily be commanded and fought so that the citizens will not be victims of a foreign army and be violently killed due to another sovereign’s orders. The arguments developed by Hobbes resemble the definition of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ war from Hugo Grotius (see Tooke, 1965): the only just war is a war of defence, and the aim of war always must be peace. However, the threat must be immediate, and a war which is waged preventively, anticipating a future possible threat, or due to hegemonic aspirations, even if such a war aims at finally pacifying state relations, is unconditionally unjust and evil.105 Hobbes considers – in a passage in chapter 14 of the Leviathan which is mostly ignored in interpreting his outlook – peace to be the general aim of politics, which would correspond with the fundamental law of nature and the general rule of reason. This rule of reason can legitimately be suspended only in a case of defence when all means of warfare were allowed. We read: And consequently it is a precept, or generell rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, defend our selves. (1968, p. 190; emphasis in the original) We thus find two universalistic elements in Hobbes’s thoughts on international politics. First, the mechanism of sovereignty, security, and legitimacy applies to all commonwealths and is an unconditioned, general element of each political order (and social contract). Second, this mechanism, which fundamentally qualifies war and warfare, is based on universal reason with which all men are endowed and from which we can assume – as we know from no restriction in Hobbes due to culture, development, or
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‘civilization’ – that it operates in every state. On the ground of both universalities, we can further conclude a regulative momentum in international politics. Although there is no sovereign beyond states, there exists a mechanism in international politics which applies to all states. This mechanism operates in interstate relations and ties together sovereigns’ foreign policy decisions by dictating, with the power of universal reason and the law of nature, the same principle of an interdependent mechanism between sovereignty and legitimacy upon them. There is, however, one condition to make this mechanism work effectively, namely, that all states have to be commonwealths based on the identical principle of legitimacy. Additionally, all states must recognize the permanent validity of the basic fundamental right of nature (which remains valid even under the social contract) as well as of the general rule of reason. The fundamental right of nature and universal reason guarantees two things: first, that men have an unalienable right to protect and preserve their life and second, that men and sovereigns should seek peace. In short, all commonwealths have to be political bodies organized and operating according to Hobbes’s construction of the social contract so that the norm of not waging wars, which unnecessarily puts citizens’ lives at risk, can perform internationally. As mentioned above, the only wars, which do not expose men to inconsequential risks and endanger their lives unnecessarily are wars to defend one’s commonwealth facing an immediate threat. These are likewise the only wars which can be perceived as ‘just’ wars, because destruction and occupation of the commonwealth by another sovereign would render worthless the entire reason and rationale for why it has been erected, namely, to provide security. It is not my intention to over-interpret Hobbes. But because this interpretation causes us to revise our familiar picture of Hobbes, one further consideration seems worthwhile: namely, answering the questions whether the Hobbesian mechanism of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security and the deriving norms of avoiding war (apart from wars of defence) and seeking peace constitute two basic principles of what we today call ‘international society’? Although I do not want to elaborate on this question, I think it is worth conceding that this mechanism creates a political principle which can be common to all (or at least a group of) states. This principle unifies states on the basis of their common acknowledgement of each state’s ‘right of nature’ (i.e., to procure for its security) and the ‘law of nature’ (or ‘general rule of reason’, i.e., to seek peace). It creates a shared norm of conducting peaceful relations in the primary sense of avoiding war and in a subsequent meaning of producing cooperation, concordance, and international institution building. ‘Hobbes suggests’, so confirms Donald W. Hanson, ‘that the true sovereign would recognize the imprudence of an adventurous foreign policy’ (Hanson, 1984, p. 349).
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From this perspective, which supports the ‘emphasis on rules and norms in the constitution of “international society” ’ (Williams, 1996, p. 215), Hobbes’s principles can be understood as a precaution against international despotism, hegemony, and the arbitrariness of sovereigns’ foreign policy; they create a ‘pacifying dynamic’ (Williams, 1996, p. 232) must, however, be understood and seems to be endorsed, if not enabled, politically by the verdicts of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), the latter being agreed three years before the first publication of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Hobbes himself lifts these principles to ethical standards and adds a second ‘Law of Nature’ to the first – which stated that men must (and should) seek peace. His second law of nature claims a mutual policy of concession, which reminds us of Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ and the Gospel’s ‘golden rule’, respectively. From the viewpoint of international politics/IR orthodoxy, the assertion of an ethical dimension in Hobbes might be the most controversial conclusion of my interpretation. However, the consequences of the ‘First and Second Law of Nature’ make clear statements which should not be ignored. ‘The laws of nature’, Gauthier endorses, ‘are the grounds at [which] point morality enters Hobbes’s account ... Peace is a common instrumental good, since it is a necessary means to each man’s chief good, his own preservation. Reason is instrumental, but the laws of nature, which prescribe the means of peace, are addressed equally to each man’s reason, and so are rational for all’ (1979, pp. 551, 553). An ethical interpretation on these ‘laws of nature’ is also presented by Jean Hampton who concludes the assertion of a norm of ‘cooperative forms of behaviour [which] effect peace and peace in turn helps to effect longer life’ (Hampton, 1992, p. 337). It thus seems consequent that Hobbes, in the Leviathan, chapter 15, writes that ‘all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature’ (Hobbes, 1968, p. 216; emphasis in the original).106 Finally Hobbes notes: From (the) Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence ... himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe ... For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre ... This is that Law of the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. (Leviathan, chapter 14; p. 190; emphasis in the original)
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3. Immanuel Kant In this chapter, I will focus on Immanuel Kant’s On Perpetual Peace, which will be identified as the last work in the history of political thought which adheres to, and at the same time enables, universal/universalistic thinking of an international order. Its appearance in 1795107 sharply marks the shift from universalism to particularism, which evolved around the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Just two decades later, particularism found a seminally important originator of nationalized and particularized inter-national thought in Hegel (see Chapter III.1). Kant is writing explicitly about peace, and thus there is a twofold coincidence of his On Perpetual Peace according to the interpretations undertaken here. On the one side, we learn about his ideas on peace and how he thinks international peace can be possible: it is not just ‘some’ peace, but an eternal peace. On the other hand, it is exactly this work which best reveals his ideas on political universalism in a practical sense. Kant’s definition of peace already points to his universalistic concept of an international order insofar as this determination is so fundamental that it necessarily requires some general grounding. The first paragraph of the First Section of On Perpetual Peace contains Kant’s preliminary articles of a perpetual peace as well as his statement that ‘no conclusion of Peace shall be held to be valid as such, when it has been made with the secret reservation of the material for a future War’.108 Kant thus specifies peace as a true peace which, in the first instance, is different and has to be distinguished from a mere truce or ‘suspension of hostilities’. As he further explains in this paragraph, he deems this qualification necessary because of his ambitious aim to talk about an eternal, or perpetual, peace, and hence he would be remiss not to distinguish the objective of such an undertaking from minor forms of ‘peace’ like a cease-fire, for example. In practical concerns, such a peace would have to be characterized by an entire abolishment of all standing armies, both because war will always threaten as long as states maintain armies and because the expenses for the maintenance of standing armies become ‘in the long run even more oppressive than a short war’ (On Perpetual Peace, First Section, Third Article). Such a peace furthermore includes real chances for the reconciliation of two previously warring parties, what could best be accomplished by avoiding, or having avoided, any ‘dishonourable stratagems’ during past wars. These three major characteristics of an eternal peace – the definition of peace as more than just a truce, but as something more fundamental; the idea that armies must be abolished; and finally that war atrocities, or dishonourable behaviour, must be avoided – are, according to Kant, ‘valid without distinction of circumstance’ (On Perpetual Peace, First Section, Third Article). In this absoluteness, they represent a ‘right of humanity’ (ibid.). These short introductory notes on some of Kant’s main practical imperatives on peace reveal much about his conceptual approach to international
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political order and indicate the trajectories of his further argument. His further argument will be about universalistic determinations of rights, which should govern the international relations between states, as well as about the normative and ontological unit – which is mankind and cosmopolitan society – at which international politics aims or should aim. Kant’s principles of right encompass humanity as a whole, and his vision of peace hypothetically and normatively aims at an universal community of mankind, governed, as we will see at the end of this chapter, by cosmopolitan laws. This reference to an universally construed ontological unit not only communicates from Kant’s On Perpetual Peace, but can further be seen by his addition of a fourth philosophical main question – ‘What is man?’ – in his Anthropology (1974), supplementary to the three questions from his first Critique (1982; see also Kant, 2004; ‘What can I know?’ ‘What ought I do?’ ‘What may I hope?’).109 The creation of peace: universal republican, legal, and ethical order Both law as well as a universal foundation of international society are necessary conditions for Kant’s normative conception of peace to built upon because peace ‘is not the natural state’ of the international order, as Kant notes (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Introduction). This normative conception should not be confused with what we usually tend to understand as idealistic. Peace, Kant says, ‘has to be established’ (ibid.). It is thus a creation of men, and Kant’s intention is to demonstrate that an eternal peace is possible. He also wants to elaborate on the conditions of its possibility (Bedingung der Möglichkeit) as practical guidelines for international politics. In other words, Kant’s doctrine ‘sets forth ... those obligations which are the conditions of the achievement of peace among nations’ (Sacksteder, 1954, p. 853). Because the establishment of a peaceful international order (in the ‘true’ sense) is for Kant a moral obligation of politics and mankind, the question is for the guiding principle on which such an establishment must, and can, be based. The answer to that question points to Kant’s essential reference to law and to the elemental significance of internationally shared legal standards among states. For that reason of mandatory provision, Kant titles the section in which he states this credo ‘The definite articles of a perpetual peace between states’, and he notes that only under conditions ‘which are regulated by Law’ could peaceful state relations flourish (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Introduction). Such law, which is to guide and regulate the creation of peaceful international order, has two sides: one domestic, and one international. Strictly speaking, Kant discusses the domestic relation of international law only in the First Definitive Article of the Second Section. To my mind, however, the Second Definitive Article, in which Kant elaborates his famous idea about an international federation, belongs to the domestic side of his treatment
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of law. Because such a ‘federation of states’ develops from, and only under the condition of, a certain domestic order which is present in all states participating in this federation, the federation itself incrementally depends on the domestic side of law in each participating state. The international side of law is then the issue of the Third Definitive Article, in which Kant posits a cosmopolitan law of international hospitality. Both sides and aspects of law are understood by Kant as universal (universalistic) concepts which promote the creation of an eternal peace. According to Kant’s philosophical differentiation between the concrete possibility (the occurrence) of something and the condition of the possibility of something (and of its occurrence, respectively; Bedingung der Möglichkeit), law, both its domestic and its international side, does not create peace automatically. The application of laws does not automatically lead to peace; laws are, however, the necessary and indispensable conditions for peace insofar as they make an eternal peace principally possible at all. They provide, to take up Kant’s distinction again, not the concrete possibility of eternal peace but the condition of the possibility of eternal peace. As such, laws symbolize Kant’s reference to transcendental metaphysics, which is, theoretically speaking, to be found as the Bedingung der Möglichkeit, and, practically speaking, manifests in a certain pattern of domestic and international rule of law for conceptualizing and potentially accomplishing international peace. (The ontological unit of international politics for Kant is mankind; see below). The domestic side of law posits that ‘the civil constitution in every State shall be a republic’ (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Definitive Article). Kant writes that a republican order in all states ‘includes the prospect of realizing the desired object: perpetual peace among the nations’ (ibid.). In addition to this, he conceives republicanism – which would be the only rightful fashion of domestic rule of law according to the imperatives of (pure) reason (see more on this below) – not only as the realization of the universal principle in the realm of domestic politics, but also as universally possible in all nations worldwide. The internationalization of republicanism is, to anticipate his next argument, the necessary condition on which an International Federation of Peoples can be based. A federation of this kind would eventually make eternal peace possible. However, we have to delve into Kant’s idea of republicanism in more detail, mainly because the equation of Kant’s republicanism with democracy, as has became common in present-day IR, buries another misconception in our discipline (amongst others, see Bruce Russet’s writings on the idea of ‘democratic peace’; Russett, 1974, 1993; see critically Williams, 1992). In the First Definitive Article of the Second Section, Kant notes that ‘the Republican Constitution is not to be confounded with the Democratic Constitution’ (italics in the original version). As this were ‘commonly done, the following remarks must be made in order to guard against this confusion’ (ibid.). Kant’s distinction between republicanism and democracy
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relates democracy, as it was usually decried in his time, to an immediate, nonrepresentative form of people’s government. He also distinguishes a republican form of government from a despotic form of government. The decisive difference is then that in a republican form of government the executive power is separate from the legislative power, whereas in a despotic form of government both powers are represented in one institutional body. Only a separation of powers that is both personal and institutional would, according to Kant, guarantee the realization of the ‘public will’ (as distinct from the ‘private will’). So Kant avoids the term democracy completely as an indication of preferred form of government because he associates this form of government with despotism. Democracy would not be a representative form of government, but the ‘lawgiver in one and the same person may, at the same time, be the executive administrator of his own Will’ (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Definitive Article). By this definition it becomes clear that Kant’s understanding of democracy inherits the traditional way of thinking about republicanism and democracy, which associated democracy with an unleashed public will and which favoured, in order to conceptualize a free form of government ‘based on the consent of the governed’ (the famous definition of James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 10), the idea of republicanism. On the other hand, republicanism understood this way was perceived as a form of government which was realizable universally, without obstacles stemming from cultural and religious contexts or differences.110 International Pacific Federation This universal conceptualization becomes clear in the Second Definitive Article, where Kant argues in favour of an ‘international federation of the people’, based on republican national governments and assembling, at its best, all republican nations worldwide (‘would at last embrace all the Nations on Earth’). Such a federation would enthrone ‘reason’ as the ‘highest moral law-giving power’ and would condemn ‘War as a mode of Right, and, on the contrary, makes the state of Peace an immediate duty’. The international federation of the people may also be called a ‘Pacific Federation’, which is to be distinguished from a ‘mere treaty or Compact of Peace in the latter merely puts an end to one war whereas the former would seek to put an end to all wars forever’ (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, First Definitive Article). In short, the universalism of the republican principle would bring and guarantee peace not just in the form of a ‘suspension of hostilities’, but as an ‘end of all hostilities’ (we remember Kant’s basic definition of peace from his First Section, First Article). It is important to note that this federation is not a world government or world state. Kant explicitly stresses that each nation in this federation remains sovereign and free from external regulation of its domestic affairs. A. C. Armstrong notes on this point that ‘the federation
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does not seek any of the powers of a state’ (1931, p. 203). Towards the end of the Second Definitive Article, Kant clearly juxtaposes the idea of a ‘Universal Republic’ and his idea of a ‘Federation of the States’. A ‘Federation’, opposite to an ‘Universal Republic’, will found in men a higher moral capacity based on reason and free will and will operate as a universal legal power, which is supposed to be based upon international treaties and international law between states that retain their sovereignty and individual political and legal personality. Kant writes: This Federation will not aim at the acquisition of any of the political powers of a State, but merely at the preservation and guarantee for itself, and likewise for the other confederated States, of the liberty that is proper to a State; and this would not require these States to subject themselves for this purpose ... to public laws and to coercion under them. The practicability and objective realization of this idea of Federalism, inasmuch as it has to spread itself over all States and thereby lead to Perpetual Peace, may be easily shewn. (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Second Definitive Article) Both the universalism of a worldwide federation of republics and the idea of the universal practicability of republicanism are interrelated with three more universal principles which are normative prerequisites and necessary conditions for a working peace system à la Kant: first, with universal reason, which provides and imparts to men the capability of overcoming the distinction of peoples into autonomous and divided nations (On Perpetual Peace, First Supplement); second, with a universal commercial spirit, which drives men to peaceful cooperation across their states in order to trade (ibid.); and third, with men’s natural right claiming universal and cosmopolitan hospitality (On Perpetual Peace, Second Section, Third Definitive Article). Possibly the most important underlying condition of Kant’s ‘Federation of States’ is the assumption of what Kant calls a ‘pure practical reason’111 which would be common to all human beings as an ‘objective reality’. Therefore, Kant posits that it can be ‘realized in fact’ (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix). This reason operates not only as a moral lawgiver, but also provides a system of ‘unconditionally authoritative laws [in a legal sense] ... in accordance with which we ought to act’ (ibid.). This system of authoritative law prominently manifests in the formal moral principle, which is known as Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’: ‘Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim shall become a universal Law whatever may be its end’ (ibid.). Applied to the idea of a perpetual peace, this principle reads as follows: ‘Seek ye first the Kingdom of pure Practical Reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of Perpetual Peace, be added unto you’ (ibid.). Williams concludes from this that ‘(in) Kant’s view, we must always ask the question “What would the world be like if everyone acted this way?” ’ (Williams,
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1992, p. 108). The categorical imperative, as the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy, thus is essential for his understanding of international politics. What a difference this is to the maxim of international politics, which follows Kant, immediately in Hegel, and which is guided and determined by what can be termed the ‘national interest’! This maxim in opposition to Kant could be formulated alike: Act always and without restriction so that it benefits the well-being of your own state and its people and measure your means and strategies by that end (for further discussion, see Part III and onwards). A further quotation from Kant might be useful to emphasize this difference even more strongly: Perpetual peace and the rightful conduct of international politics, he says, Requires above all, an internal political constitution, arranged according to pure principles of right [that is republicanism], and further, the union of it with neighbouring or distant States, so as to attain a legal settlement of their disputes by a constitution that would be analogous to a universal State. This proposition just means that political maxims must not start from the prosperity and happiness that are to be expected in each State from following them, nor from the end which each of them makes the object of its will as the highest empirical principle of politics; but they must proceed from pure conception of the duty of Right or Justice, as an obligatory principle given a priori [this means as the condition of the possibility of peace (‘Bedingung der Möglichkeit’)] by pure reason. And this has to be held, whatever may be the physical consequences which follow from adopting these political principles. (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix) The second transcendental formula grounds Kant’s conception of a perpetual peace, based on an international federation of sovereign republics, is the idea of an universal commercial spirit that is deeply embedded in human nature and that is indispensable for a successful conduct of politics. This spirit is, according to Kant, a power strong enough to prevent war insofar as commercial interests and trade would be harmed by war and hence would impact international politics in a pacifying way. War would destroy the realization of commercial interests, and ‘the power of money is the most reliable’, Kant writes, ‘and thus the States find themselves driven to further the noble interest of peace’ (On Perpetual Peace, First Supplement). And last, but not least, there is the concept of universal hospitality, which is an unconditioned political necessity to make the concept of perpetual peace work. Kant discusses the concept of universal hospitality in the Second Section, Third Definitive Article. So at a very early stage in On Perpetual Peace he is indicating the importance of this concept within his whole treatise. Kant’s concept of universal hospitality is being used in the debates about global citizenship, which has become a frequent and popular topic in contemporary global studies.112 However, it is not only the idea of universal
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hospitality itself, which should be seen as topical, but also the founding idea which stands behind it. Kant notes that a peaceful conduct of international politics strongly depends on ‘means for social intercourse’ among the states (On Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article). In current terms, this idea of a social intercourse among states corresponds to what Raymond Aron called ‘transnational society’ (Aron, 1966). The similarity of both concepts can be seen when Kant notes, that the Social relations between the various Peoples of the world ... have now advanced everywhere so far that a violation of Right on one place of the earth, is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a Cosmo-political Right of the whole Human Race, is no phantastic or overstrained mode of representing Right, but is a necessary completion of the unwritten Code which carries national and international Right to a consummation in the Public Right of Mankind. (On Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article)113 According to this conception, the surface of the earth would not belong to a particular state or people, but to populate the earth is a right of nature to all men. Therefore, Kant concludes, a universal hospitality should indiscriminately grant a right of entering and visiting another state’s territory. This is not meant to be a guarantee for some form of permanent residence. However, by itself, the right to visit would promote peaceful relations among states and its peoples who would enter into mutual social bonds and communication by mutual contacts. Together with the driving force of commercial spirit and free trade among states, the cosmopolitical right of free entry into another state would propel societal international relations which in the long run would contribute to the abolishment of the danger that states, being interlinked by trade and transnational social ties, would wage war against each other. Kant’s conceptualization of universal hospitality, of the federation of states, and of the moral duty to act in accordance with universal law (the ‘categorical imperative’) emphasizes the paramount relevance of his thinking in constitutional and judicial terms. Consequently, just and peaceful international politics depends upon a legal regulation (Verrechtlichung) of states’ and men’s behaviour. Even if Kant endows men with the capability of reason through which they are enabled to overcome the distinction of the earth in different nations and peoples by conceiving and politically realizing the imperatives of pure and practical reason, he does not completely trust the good morality of men, but finally deems it necessary to refer back to law as guarantors for peace and well-being in the international realm. The ‘Federation of States’ will finally operate as an international treaty system. Consequently, he notes towards the end of his treatise: ‘Now, in fact, both philanthropy and respect for the rights of men, are obligatory as duties. But the former is only a conditional duty, the latter is unconditioned
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and absolutely imperative’ (On Perpetual Peace, Appendix; emphasis in the original). Kant’s vision of international politics, which is still framed within the traditions of natural law and unalienable natural rights of the individual, clearly marks the end of universal/universalistic thinking in international political thought. ‘The Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan world ... sank beneath the rising tide of nationalism, much of which, of course, was driven onward by precisely the kind of imperial ambitions Kant himself hoped would finally come to an end’ (Padgen, 2003, p. 188). In order to better understand this ‘hope’, we should briefly contrast Kant’s On Perpetual Peace with his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784 [1963]). Although On Perpetual Peace is the more famous piece, we nevertheless should take a look at his Idea for a Universal History because we will note some interesting ambivalence with regard to his idea of cosmopolitanism and humanity. This ambivalence relates to the question of how best to prevent war and belligerent relations among states and whether a ‘Federation of States’ best promotes the conditions for the possibilities of accomplishing (eternal) peace (as outlined in On Perpetual Peace) or if peace were best guaranteed by a new authoritarian kind of world government (as argued in the Idea for a Universal History). This ambivalence demonstrates Kant’s struggle to recognize the diversity and plurality of sovereign states while, at the same time, he attempts to envision and to outline the conditions of the possibilities for international pacification through the integration of states in some common legal, political, and societal framework based on universality. A closer look at this ambivalence may even reveal some uncertainty and scepticism in Kant about the most appropriate and promising political, that is, practical, means for the realization of cosmopolitanism (for further discussion on this, see Franke, 2001; Höffe, 2006). He thus remains a true philosopher, one might say, in that he tries to imagine and to elaborate the conditions of the possibilities – which per definitionem are and have to be universal in character – which men can have to create peace. His focus on, and elaboration of, the conditions of the possibilities of (eternal) peace seems to be the reason why he titled his writing on peace not just Perpetual Peace (Ewiger Friede), but ON Perpetual Peace (Zum Ewigen Frieden) – and why the translation of the title as just ‘Perpetual Peace’ is deficient in this sense.114 Consequently, he ‘does not’, as Barry Hindness observes, ‘present his universal history as an exercise in empirical composition’; Kant would consequently not make an ‘attempt to synthesise what is known about the past and present conditions of the diverse sections of humanity and to extrapolate the results into the future’ (Hindness, The Very Idea of a Universal History, p. 3). His universalism and cosmopolitanism are therefore not to be seen and simplified as a straightforward template for some kind of liberal inter-national institutionalism (à la democratic peace theory), but rather as a last example of a philosophical draft on the
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conditions of the possibility of peaceful relations among mankind before the advent of the nineteenth century and its oncoming force of nationalism. Kant still tried to think of the international as integrated into some common telos of universal mankind and humanity, and understanding his attempt as a study of the conditions of the possibilities of such teleology strictly forbids stigmatizing Kant as an ‘idealist’ or his On Perpetual Peace as a work of ‘idealism’ in international political theory, opening up a dualism between (such kind of) ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’. The narratives in IR, which construct this kind of opposition and dualism, appear to ignore or to not understand the philosophically ambivalent character Kant’s writings on international politics, which acknowledge and even affirm the international system of sovereign states. At the same time, they seek to establish universal/universalistic ontological and epistemological principles and linkages across states – a worldview and interest that Kant has in common with all the authors discussed so far. However, this worldview comes to an end and becomes lost with the advent of the authors and schools of thought in International Political Theory/IR which we will discuss in the remainder of this book.
Part III The Emergence of Particularism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
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III.1 Philosophies of ‘National Interest’
1. Hegel on ‘international law’ In Chapter II.3, we could see the universally based conception of international order in Immanuel Kant. Kant’s philosophy proposes that peace and state cooperation are, despite all kinds of possible conflict, war, and disputes, implanted in universal principles of reason, commercial spirit, and ethics which apply to mankind and promote principles of ontological and epistemological togetherness and sociability among all states. As I note above, universalism in the history of international political thought comes to an end with Kant’s On Perpetual Peace. What we find after Kant are thoughts and concepts, which are based not on considerations and perceptions of universal ethics and natural law, but on notions guided by viewing the world as consisting of substantially particularized entities, each with its own solipsistic mores, political ideology, and interests. Thereby, the ultimate reference for formulating the ontological view of international political thought shifted from universalisms to particularism. From then on, something ‘in-between’, or above, states can only be accomplished by bringing particularities together to form a generalized mosaic. In terms of ethics, a loss of ethics appears to result consequently, which manifests in a loss of the traditional maxim and virtue of ethical self-restraint as it was conceptualized throughout previous centuries (see above Parts I and II). What is defined as good for the particular entity, that is, the nation, is good for its own sake, if not for the world. From an ancient perspective, for instance, such a position, which represents the actual birth of ‘realism’ in inter-national political thought, is nothing but hubris. Conceptually, such a position can be accomplished only under the condition that the particular, the nation, is constructed as something which symbolizes, in all its particularity, transcendental values and personifies some divine spirit. However, such transcendental values or divine spirit do not, as some might think, constitute an equally universal reference with pre-modern conceptualizations, but only express and manifest themselves in some particularistic and occasional entity. 141
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Withal the meaning of universalism seems to have changed. Whereas theories of international politics until, and including, Kant have been embedded in notions which were, ‘falsely’ or ‘rightly’ and with which consequences ever, universal in so far as their authors did discern some tangible transcendence of order, theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries do not share this view any more. If they state something ‘universal’, this is necessarily something universalized which they, because of their lack of universal/universalistic ontologies and epistemologies, transfer and generalize as particular standards to other nations. However, the notion of the world as a unit, bound together by commonly tangible and joint principles, which indiscriminately belong to humankind as a whole, seems lost. This means that ethics, as consideration and conception of general standards and guidelines of human behaviour, which are valid for all human beings, regardless of their heritage, place of birth, ‘nationality’, and religion, is replaced by particular morals (see more on this in Part IV and the concluding sections). Even if such a conception did not result, as in the case of Kant (and others), in a world-state and all nation-states retained their full right of existence, Kant identifies principles which are supposed to work universally as unifying rules for and of international politics. The new thinking rejected not only the idea of a world-state – which no one really promoted, but which nevertheless spooked around – but also the existence of universal/universalistic principles of international politics. National morals are (now) said to differ so substantially from nation to nation that no principles superior to them would exist (for further discussion of that aspect, see below in Chapter IV.3). (This position seems to have been formulated initially by Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menscheit.) This paradigm shift in international political thought occurs in a very short time span, namely, between 1795, when Kant’s On Perpetual Peace was published, to 1821, when Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Rights appeared. Whatever the historical circumstances might have been for that shift, I will not inquire into those circumstances,115 but concentrate my study on the analysis of that shift in international thought. Hegel’s conception of the ‘external law of states’: The state in its absoluteness Hegel starts his section on ‘International Law’ writing that ‘International Law arises from the relations between independent states’ (Philosophy of Rights, §330).116 It is most significant that we find one of his key ideas, namely, about the independence of states, in the first sentence of his treatment of inter-national politics. The use of the term independent is very important in Hegel’s thoughts and is highly complex at the same time. And it is crucial for understanding and interpreting Hegel that we refer to the original German version and learn that here he does not use the term “international law” (internationales Recht), but writes about the external law of states. To
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emphasize this difference makes good sense because the term international law suggests that a new sphere of law might emerge, which, even if initiated by states, has some structurelike character, independent of the states after it has once been founded (by them). Exactly the contrary, however, is indicated when Hegel uses the term external law of states (äusseres Staatsrecht): what is called ‘international law’ in English translation is then, when we consult the German text, substantially and eternally primarily a law of the state (states). The state remains the uncontested subject and master of that law, comparable to its status in the realm of domestic (‘interior’) law. ‘International law’, according to Hegel, hence does not constitute something international, which might eventually establish a sphere of its own above and between individual states. Far from that, international law is nothing else but determinations of, and about, the state’s external legal relations by particular states themselves. Literally, when we take Hegel seriously, there could be as many external laws of the state as there are states, an idea which immediately turns into an absurdity when we think about international law as we are used to understanding it. This difference is crucial (and lost when we just talk about ‘international’ law as if it were to be understood to have the same meaning as, for instance, in de Vitoria or Kant) because it points to the substantially independent status of states. Thus, both meanings, merged in the very first sentence of §330, Philosophy of Rights, have to be interrelated, and only by doing so can we understand the substantially supreme and autonomous position which Hegel ascribes to states as particular units. The relation of states consequently goes back to, and depends upon, mutually exclusive and essentially distinct sovereign particular wills. There are no ‘international laws’ and no relations between states independent of the states, and if states decline to act internationally, there is no, nor has there ever been something, international. Although Hegel notes in §333, Philosophy of Rights, that treaties ought to be kept inviolate, he later admits that they have their reality not in a general will (as in Kant where such a ‘general will’ was peace, for instance), but in the particular will of the states. Accordingly, the fundamental proposition of the international would be a good intention, nothing more. We will see later that if it suits a state’s will to breach a treaty in order to promote its particular will and welfare, this breach is regarded by Hegel as legitimate. There are no ethical or legal principles above the states (such as the pacta sunt servanda) according to which states are obliged to keep their treaty obligations. When states cannot come to an agreement, they go to war, and Hegel regards this as the right solution. Hence, there is no substance or reason which can be in charge for setting up and creating something between and among states greater than states themselves. The international realm is incrementally due, and remains bounded, to the actor status and will of states. In the addition to the same paragraph, Hegel describes the state also as a ‘completely independent totality’ and, thereby, juxtaposes the status of
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states to that of the individual or private person. Whereas the status of private persons is not one of independence, because they are bound together by social conventions and legal rights and duties as well as subordinated to a superior moral body, Hegel perceives the state as ‘the absolute power on earth’ (Philosophy of Rights, §331), which had no higher power above or against it. For individuals, the binding moral, political, and legal framework arises from the state’s domestic order. The state itself, however, is bound by no restrictions or obligations other than those enacted by itself. As Pierre Hassner notes, ‘Hegel admits, international law is based solely on the will of states whose nature and duty command them to respect their commitments only in so far as they correspond to their interests’ (Hassner, 1994, p. 745). There is just one factor on which the state in its absoluteness relies, according to Hegel, and that is recognition. Because recognition is in Hegel a tricky matter, I will come back to it later. Before, however, we must discuss (again) some discrepancy between the English translation and the German original, specifically the first sentence of §331, Philosophy of Rights, because it contains Hegel’s idea about the identity of ‘the Be’ and ‘the Ought’. This part discloses another picture of Hegel’s idea of the state’s absoluteness, and finally helps us to concretize the image of particularity in Hegel. Emphasizing on translation, this time does not imply that the English version would be wrong; however, we understand that Hegel is indeed much more radical when refer to the German original; that the translation is an attenuation; and that it therefore forecloses the understanding of Hegel as a philosopher of particularism and (German) nationalism. According to the Cambridge edition, Hegel writes in §331, Philosophy of Rights: ‘The nation state [das Volk als Staat] is the spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate actuality ... each state is consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others.’ There are two important differences with the original text. Hegel’s formulation ‘das Volk als Staat’ means something different than the English ‘nation state’. The correct corresponding term would be ‘the nation (or “folk” in the meaning of an ethnic people, an “ethnos”) as a state’. This difference is crucially important because it emphasizes Hegel’s thinking in terms of particular entities, that is, states, which are not only constituted as political, but also as ethnic entities. ‘The nation as a state’ also suggests that a nation – and this is the case with each nation (as an ethnically constituted unit) – is prior to the state, but manifests and materializes as a political unit in the form of a state. As such it enjoys absolute superiority and highest power. The manifestation and materialization of a nation as a state is an obligation in the sense of an ‘Ought’, and each factual establishment of a nation as a state has full legitimacy (because it symbolizes the realization of an ought obligation). That the nation predates the state and is supposed to be the ideal substance of which a state is constituted furthermore points to Hegel’s idea of particularism. Insofar as Hegel perceives states as essentially distinct not just in political terms but
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also, and prior to that, in terms of their national populations, that is in terms of their ethnic characteristics such as language, mores, religion and spirit (Volksgeist), the world and the inter-national are made up by such ethnic and political distinctiveness. We can push this interpretation of particularism in Hegel further by pointing to §337, Philosophy of Rights. As noted above, the Cambridge edition renders this section as ‘each state is ... a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others’ (my emphasis). According to the original version, however, it should be ‘each state ... is a sovereign and independent entity against [“gegen”] others’ (my emphasis and insertion). ‘Against’ means something very different than ‘in relation to’, namely, it communicates a much more aggressive and solipsistic notion. If one state is against another state, and each state in its absoluteness is, has, and ought to be, against each other state, there is no relation as something in common, but just opposition, which is another insinuation of the substantial particularity of states and nations (as their distinct forerunners).117 The particularity of states (and nations) is, however, not just a given fact, according to Hegel, but it is due to a metaphysical correspondence between ‘Being’ and ‘Ought’. The state, which is, is morally good and politically legitimate because it ought to be and because it is factual through the metaphysical providence of rationality. When Hegel qualifies this idea and restricts the identity between the ‘Ought’ and the ‘Being’ of a state to powerful states and those states only, which actually would be based on a nation (in the ethnic sense), we conceive once more the nationalistic inclination in his thinking. The rational identity between the ‘Ought’ and the ‘Being’ of a state actually would be provided by the circumstance that the nation as a state is ‘the spirit in its substantial rationality’ (in §337, Philosophy of Rights, Hegel describes the state also as the ‘ethical substance’; see also §331). With this idea, Hegel elevates the notion of particularity and distinctiveness of states into the spiritual realm of metaphysics. Particularized e