A Companion to Applied Ethics

A Companion to Applied Ethics

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole Written by today's leading philosophers each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures terms topics and problems of the field Taken together the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike

1

Already published in the series:

14

The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy Second Edition Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric TsuiJames

A Companion to Cognitive Science Edited by William Bechtel and George Graham

15

A Companion to Bioethics Edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer

2

A Companion to Ethics Edited by Peter Singer

16

A Companion to the Philosophers Edited by Robert L Arlington

3

A Companion to Aesthetics Edited by David Cooper

17

A Companion to Business Ethics Edited by Robert E Frederick

4

A Companion to Epistemology Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa

18

5

A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy Edited by Robert E Goodin and Philip Pettit

A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Edited by W H Newton-Smith

19

A Companion to Environmental Philosophy Edited by Dale Jamieson

6

A Companion to Philosophy of Mind Edited by Samuel Guttenplan

20

A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Edited by A P Martinich and David Sosa

7

A Companion to Metaphysics Edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa

21

A Companion to Genethics Edited by Justine Burley and John Harris

8

A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory Edited by Dennis Patterson

22

A Companion to Philosophical Logic Edited by Dale Jacquette

A Companion to Philosophy of Religion Edited by Philip L Quinn and Charles Taliaferro

23

A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Edited by Steven Nadler

10

A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

24

11

A Companion to World Philosophies Edited by Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe

A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages Edited by Jorge J E Gracia and Timothy B Noone

25

12

A Companion to Continental Philosophy Edited by Simon Critchley and William Schroeder

A Companion to African-American Philosophy Edited by Tommy L Lott and John P Pittman

26

13

A Companion to Feminist Philosophy Edited by Alison M Jaggar and Iris Marion Young

A Companion to Applied Ethics Edited by R G Prey and Christopher Heath Wellman

27

A Companion to the Philosophy of Education Edited by Randall Curren

9

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

A Companion to Applied Ethics Edited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman

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Idi

Contents

Notes on Contributors Preface 1 The Nature of Applied Ethics Tom L Beauchamp

ix xvii 1

2 Theories of Ethics Stephen L Darwall

17

3 Property Rights and Welfare Redistribution Jeremy Waldron

38

4 Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey the Law A John Simmons

50

5 Capitalism and Marxism Richard W Miller

62

6 State Punishment and the Death Penalty David Dolinko

75

7 Racism Michele Moody-Adams

89

8 Sexism Ann E Cudd and Leslie E Jones

102

9 Affirmative Action Bernard Boxill and Jan BoxiR

118

10 The Legal Enforcement of Morality Larry Alexander

128

11 Hate Crimes, Literature, and Speech L W Sumner

142

CONTENTS

12 Pornography and Censorship Lori Gruen

154

13 Dirty Hands Gerald F. Gaus

167

14 Sexual Ethics Alan H. Goldman

180

15 Gun Control Lance Stell

192

16 Citizenship Wayne Norman and Will Kymlicka

210

17 Immigration Michael Blake

224

18 World Hunger Hugh LaFollette

238

19 War and Terrorism C. A. J. Coady

254

20 Nationalism and Secession Christopher Heath Wellman

267

21 Intergenerational Justice Clark Wolf

279

22 Bioethics Margaret P. Battin

295

23 Abortion Margaret Olivia Little

313

24 Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Michael Tooley

326

25 Reproductive Technology John D. Arras

342

26 Genetic Engineering Dan W. Brock

356

27 Surrogate Motherhood Rosemarie Tong

369

28 Cloning John Harris

382

29 Allocation of Medical Resources H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr and Ana Smith litis

396

vi

CONTENTS

30 Experimentation on Human Subjects Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald

410

31 Disability Leslie Pickering Francis

424

32 Moral Status Mary Anne Warren

439

33 Killing and Letting Die Alastair Norcross

451

34 The Doctrine of Double Effect R G Prey

464

35 Bad Samaritans Acts and Omissions Patricia Smith

475

36 Moral Dilemmas N Ann Davis

487

37 Education Amy Gutmann

498

38 Personal Relationships Lawrence A Blum

512

39 Animals Jeff McMahan

525

40 Business Ethics Patricia H Werhane and R Edward Freeman

537

41 Corporate Responsibility R Edward Freeman and Patricia H Werhane

552

42 Whistle-blowing Terrance McConneU

570

43 Professional Ethics David Luban

583

44 Media Ethics Judith Lichtenberg

597

45 Computer Ethics Deborah G Johnson

608

46 Engineering Ethics Michael S Pritchard

620

47 Environmental Ethics Andrew Light

633

vii

CONTENTS

48 Values in Nature Dale Jamieson

650

49 The Tragedy of the Commons David Schmidtz and Elizabeth WUlott

662

50 Global Warming Robert Hood

674

Index

685

viii

Nt

Ctibt

Larry Alexander i W D i t i i h d P f fL t th U i i t fS Diego He specializes in the areas of constitutional law (especially First Amend ment) criminal law and jurisprudence The author of numerous scholarly articles that have appeared in leading law reviews and philosophy journals Professor Alex i l th ( i t h P l H t ) f Whom Does the Constitution d Command? d dit f Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations An Anthology H th d i t i l b d f th j l Ethics d Law and Philosophy d i dit f th i t t i l t l Legal Theory John D. Arras is Porterfield Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Professor of Philoso phy at the University of Virginia where he directs the Undergraduate Bioethics Program and participates in the MA degree program in bioethics He is a fellow of C t d f b fG C ' N Y kStt th H t i T k F Lif dL P f A i th dit f Bringing the Hospital Home: Ethical and Social Implications of High Technology Home Care d th th f til bithi Hi i f h i t t i l d th thi f h i i i t d i i d AIDS t t t d h l b l ti d t t i l h d t i thi d th t h d l i f t i l thi Margaret P. Battln is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor Diii f M d i l Ethi t th U i i t f U t h Sh h f I t l Mdii t h d ditd ditd t l b k ildi Puzzles about Art; Ethics in the Sanctuary; The Least Worst Death; Ethical Issues in Suicide; Drug Use in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide; d Physician-assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate I 2000 P f Btti i i t f th R b l t t P i th U i i t f Uth' t tii d Tom L. Beauchamp is Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar at the Kennedy Institute Georgetown University He is series editor of The Foundations of Philosophy Series and general editor with David Fate Norton and M A Stewart of The Critical Edition of the Works of David Hume A i t t P f Michael Blake i t tH d U i i t Hi k

t

t th J h F K d th i l i t i

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Lawrence A Blum Fidhi

Alti

d Mlit

Ml

P t i

d P t i l i t

Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald

Bernard Boxill

Jan Boxill

Dan W Brock

Didi Philhil

f E

Oth Th Ethi f S i B i d i l Ethi

t

Dii

Mki

Lif

d

Dth

C A J Coady

Testimony: A Philosophical Study Ann E Cudd

Stephen L Darwall

16401740;

Impartial Reason; The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought": Philosophical Ethics; Welfare and Rational Care

N Ann Davis

Ethics

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

David Dolinko

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr Th F d t i Th J

l

f Mdii

d Philh

f Chiti

Bithi Bithi

Leslie Pickering Francis A i cans with Disabilities: Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions Sexual Harassment as an Ethical Issue in Academic Life Legitimate Expectations in a World of I f t Jti R. Edward Freeman

Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach; Business Ethics: The State of the Art; Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics Environmentalism and the New Logic of Business R. G. Frey

E t h i

dP h i i i t d

Siid

Gerald F. Gaus The Modern Liberal Theory of Man; Value and Justification; Justificatory Liberalism; Social Philosophy; Plitil C t d Plitil Thi Ct Libli Thi f Pbli R Pbli d P i t i S i l Lif Pbli R Th Philhil Th f th Stt d Rltd E A t l i J l f Philh Pliti Philh dE i Th Hdbk f Plitil Th Alan H. Goldman Jti D i i i t i P t i l Rl

Th Ml F d t i Wh W Nd Th

f P f i l Ethi d Wh W D't

Ml

d R K l d

Lori Gruen Overcoming Moral Alienation

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Amy Gutmann i L S Rkfll U i i t P f f Pliti d Director of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University She s a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Education Among her books are Democratic Education; Liberal Equality; Democracy and Disagreement ( i t h D i T h ) d Color Conscious ( i t h A t h Aih) hih i d th R l h J B h A d H til l d litil h i l h i Ethics Philosophy and Public Affairs Political Theory Social Philosophy and Policy d th j l John Harris i b f th U i t d K i d H G t i C i i d th Ethi C i t t f th B i t i h M d i l A i t i H i th th dit of fourteen books and over one hundred and fifty papers including Clones Genes and Immortality; The Future of Human Reproduction; and Bioethics He is the series editor of "Social Ethics and Policy" published by Routledge and the founder and a l dit f th "I i B i d i l Ethi" i blihd b Ofd U i i t P H l t d Fll f th U i t d K i d A d f Md i l Si i 2001 th fit h i l h t h b l t d t thi l t f dil itit Robert Hood i A i t t P f fP h i l h t Middl T Stt U i versity He works on environmental ethics and is currently writing a book on clinical approaches to environmental ethics Ana Smith litis i PhD didt bithi d litil h i l h

t Ri

U i i t

H

ff

thi

Dale Jamieson i H R L Pf i th H D i i f Glbl Ch t C l t Cll H h itt idl i i t l h i l h moral and political philosophy the philosophy of biology behavior and mind Professor Jamieson has edited A Companion to Environmental Philosophy Deborah G. Johnson is Anne Shirley Carter Olsson Professor of Applied Ethics at th U i i t f V i i i Sh i th th f Computer Ethics d th b k d til thi i d t h l Leslie E. Jones i U i i t fK

d t l

t d t

i

th

D

t

t

f P h i l h

t th

Will Kymlicka is Professor of Philosophy at Queen's University in Ontario Canada He has written many articles and several books in moral and political philosophy ildi Liberalism Community and Culture; Contemporary Political Philosophy; Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights; Finding our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada; d Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism Multiculturalism and Citizenship Hugh LaFolIette i P f fP h i l h tE t T Stt U i i t H is a coauthor of Brute Science: The Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation the author of Personal Relationships: Love Identity and Morality and editor or coeditor of seven volumes He is currently writing The Practice of Ethics which seeks to integrate d i i f til thil i ith t h i l th ii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Judith Lichtenberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy Research Scholar in the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy and Director of the Committee on Politics Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland She writes in the areas of ethics and political philosophy and has edited Democracy and the Mass Mdia Andrew Light is Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy and Director of the Graduate Program in Environmental Conservation Education at New York University as well as Research Fellow at the Institute for Environment Philosophy and Public Policy at Lancaster University (UK) In addition to founding and co-editing the journal Philh d G h y Andrew Light is the author of over fifty articles on environmental ethics the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of film and has edited or co-edited twelve books including Environmental Pragma tism; Social Ecology after Bookchin; Philosophies of Place; Beneath the Surface: Critical E th Philh f D Ely; Thl d th Gd Lif?; and Th Athti f E d Life He is currently completing a book on pragmatism and the relationship between environmental ethics and environmental policy-making Margaret Olivia Little is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University She is co-editor (with Brad Hooker) of Moral Particularism and is currently finishing a book on abortion entitled Abortion Intimacy and Responsibilities to Gestate David Luban is Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University Law Center He has written or edited five books on legal ethics: Th Gd L L ' Rl d L ' Ethis; L d Jti A Ethil Stdy; Th Ethi f L s ; L l Ethi (co-authored with Deborah L Rhode); and most recently a Japanese-language anthology of his writings His other writings nclude Legal Modernism and many papers on legal and political philosophy Terrance McConnell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro He is the author of Gtitde; Ml I i Hlth Ce; and I l i b l Rihts Jeff McMahan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbanat th Mi f Lif Champaign He is the author of Th Ethi f Killi Pbl and is currently working on a sequel that discusses killing in self-defense in war and as a mode of punishment Richard W Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University His writings in social and political philosophy ethics epistemology the philosophy of science and aesthetics include A l i M Mlit P d Hity; Ft d Mthd E l t i C f t i d Rlit i th N t l d th Sil S i s ; and Ml Diff Tth Jti dC i i Wld f Cflit Michele Moody-Adams is Hutchinson Professor of Ethics and Public Life as well as Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University She teaches and does research n contemporary moral theory moral psychology and applied ethics as well as n the history of moral and political philosophy and the philosophy of law xiii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Alastair Norcross is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rice University He works both in ethical theory and in several areas of applied ethics such as euthanasia abortion and animal rights He has edited (with Bonnie Steinbock) Kitting and Letting Die He is currently writing a book arguing that consequentialist ethical theories should not be interpreted as theories of either the lightness or goodness of actions but instead as scalar theories that evaluate actions as better or worse than possible alternatives Wayne Norman is Chair of Business Ethics with a cross appointment in the Centre for Applied Ethics and the Faculty of Commerce at the University of British Columbia He has written on a wide range of topics in moral philosophy specializing recently in political philosophy as well as business ethics and corporate citizenship He is the author of Taking Freedom Too Seriously? and has edited Canadian Political Philosophy (with R Beiner) as well as Citizenship in Diverse Societies (with Will Kymlicka) Michael S. Pritchard is Willard A Brown Professor of Philosophy Director for the Center of Ethics in Society and Associate Dean of the Graduate College of Western Michigan University His publications include Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases (with C E Harris and Michael Rabins); Reasonable Children; and On Becoming Responsible David Schmidtz is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona He works principally in moral and social philosophy and has authored The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument; Rational Choice and Moral Agency; and (with Robert E Goodin) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility He has edited Robert Nozick and (with Elizabeth Willott) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works A. John Simmons is Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia specializing in political legal and moral philosophy He is an editor of the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs and the author of Moral Principles and Political Obligations; The Lockean Theory of Rights; On the Edge of Anarchy; and Justification and Legitimacy Patricia Smith is Professor of Philosophy at Baruch College and Graduate Center City University of New York where she specializes in legal political and social philosophy feminist jurisprudence and action theory She is the author of Liberalism and Affirmative Obligation and Omission Law and Responsibility as well as editor or co-editor of five volumes including Feminist Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law: Theoretical Issues and Practical Applications (with P Commanducci) She is currently working on a book on the evolution of values during cultural revolution Lance Stell is Charles A Dana Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College where he directs the Medical Humanities Program He also holds an appointment as a medical ethicist in the Department of Internal Medicine at Carolinas Medical Center (Charlotte NC) He publishes in the areas of ethics medical ethics political philosophy and the philosophy of law

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

L. W. Sumner is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Toronto He is the author of Abortion and Moral Theory; The Moral Foundation of Rights; and Welfare Happiness and Ethics as well as numerous articles on ethics applied ethics and the philosophy of law He is currently working on a book on The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression Rosemarie Tong is Distinguished Professor of Health Care Ethics in the Department of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte An awardwinning teacher and prolific writer and lecturer she is the author of Women Sex and the Law; Feminine and Feminist Ethics; Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Applications; Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction; and Globalizing Feminist Bioethics: Crosscultural Perspectives Professor Tong currently serves as Co-coordinator of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics Michael Tooley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado He is coeditor (with Ernest Sosa) of Causation the editor of the first five volumes of Analytical Metaphysics and the author of Abortion and Infanticide; Causation: A Realist Approach; and Time Tense and Causation Jeremy Waldron is Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for Law and Philosophy at Columbia University He has written widely in political and legal philosophy including The Right to Private Property; Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man; Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-91; The Dignity of Legislation; and Law and Disagreement Professor Waldron was elected a fellow of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences in 1998 Mary Anne Warren teaches in the Department of Philosophy at San Francisco State University Her publications include Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things; The Nature of Woman: An Encyclopedia and Guide to the Literature; and Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection Christopher Heath Wellman directs the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics and teaches in the Department of Philosophy at Georgia State University He works broadly in ethics specializing in political and legal philosophy Patricia H. Werhane is the Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics and Co-director of the Olsson Center for Applied Ethics at the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia Her works include Ethical Issues in Business (edited with Tom Donaldson and Margaret Cording); Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modern Capitalism; and Moral Imagination and Management Decisionmaking She is the founding editor-in-chief of Business Ethics Quarterly and on the editorial board of the Journal of Business Ethics Elizabeth Willott is Assistant Professor in Entomology at the University of Arizona She has co-edited (with David Schmidtz) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works and has presented papers on environmental ethics in Italy Australia the US and to the Convocation of World Leaders She has published on xv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

human population trends and on the management of insect resistance to transgenic cotton With David Schmidtz she has done fieldwork in sub-Saharan Africa on wildlife management In addition she works on the immune response and biochemistry of insects Clark Wolf is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Georgia He specializes in ethical theory political philosophy and the philosophy of law

xvi

PREFACE

ethics, as a reader on topics in a particular area or on interrelated topics bridging several areas, and as a collection of individual essays on topics of great moral, social, and political interest. We would like to thank Stephan Chambers, Steve Smith, Jeff Dean, and Nirit Simon of Blackwell for their enduring support for and help with this project. We would also like to thank Sue Ashton, Brad Champion, Elisa Marchetta, Karen Mazner, Eric Rovie, and Sara Zenlea for their very extensive help in preparing the manuscript for publication. RGF and CHW

xviii

1 Th N t

f A l i d Ethi

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Th t " l i d thi" d it " t i l thi" it i h 1970 h h i l h d th d i b t dd i l bl i it di f i l thi ( i l l d i l thi d b i thi) P i t l th d bti t h i th t ti fh d i l bjt i h i i f f t i ti acceptable risk in the workplace the legal enforcement of morality civil disobedi ence unjust war and the privacy of information

H i t i l

B

k

d

D i t th t ii f th t " l i d thi" i t i tht f t bjt tt b t d t i t ti F l libti t blih controversial opinions engage in civil disobedience commit suicide and choose one's religious viewpoint are matters of perennial interest as are questions of unjust wars and the moral status of animals Although moral philosophers have long d i d th bl it i bl th tht j h i l h t h h t th h i t f l h i l h h d l d thd f lid thi M l h i l h h tditill f l t d t h i f th i h t h d d th i t tht t t i th t lt A til i i id f thi t h t i l lit it i ll h hth d if h th i t b lid t t bli li ttl l bl d d t i t i l It is not obvious that applied ethics is the offspring of or even dependent upon general moral philosophy Its early successes in the 1970s owed more to arguments directed at pressing and emerging moral problems in society than to traditional theor i f thi M idiidl i l h i l h i l d t h l i l thi litil th d th f i ildi dii b i i i d itifi h d d d th i Th idiidl f d l fftd b i th id it di i d i i d l l i b t i il lit d i f f b dijti d i t d t l b l Th i i d b iil iht ' iht i l i h t th t th i t l 1

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t d th i h t f i d th t l l ill ft i l d d thil issues that stimulated the imagination of philosophers and nonphilosophers alike (A volume that nicely illustrates the state of one area of interdisciplinary ethical inquiry around 1970 is the massive compendium on research involving human bjt titld Experimentation with Human Beings [ K t 1972]) I th l t 1960 d l 1970 h i l h i i l it t t ith l f th d i i l i h i t t d i l bl ldi th f th h l t h f i l b i i i d th il d b h i l i P h th t i f l t i l f l d i th d l t f hl l litt i l i d thi l d l h i l h M bl f applied ethics have since been framed in the vocabularies of these two disciplines This is not surprising since moral philosophy and law have common concerns over matters of basic social importance and share various principles requirements and iti f id L i i t th bli' f t l t i lit i t liit il idli d ti df tilti i h t f ff C l i til h idd d t db i t i l tht i f l t i l i ll f l i d thi D i th 1970 d l 1980 b f h i l h b t fhi their careers around interests in applied ethics an almost unprecedented develop ment in a profession generally skeptical that "applied ethics" was either a scholarly enterprise or had a future in the university The late 1970s and early 1980s saw th bliti f l b k d t d t h i l h i l t t t f bjt l i d thi Vitll b k blihd i l i d thi i t th l t 1970 h d b id t i l l th th i t f l i i l h i l h i l t h i Thi itti h d idl i th l t 1970 d 1980

Problems of Definition M

h i l h h i d l i d thi th t t t t i l t ith l l lt h i ith th l f li til bl Th th t d l i t l tht b d t i th l bl H it i t d ll td tht t i h t f d tt til j d t i ibl b l ith t l t h i t l l i i l ( h "O ht t t t t l t th d f t h " "O ht t k i " "O ought not to inflict harm or risk of harm;" "One ought to treat people fairly and with equal respect;" and "One ought to respect the autonomy of others") This s the socalled gap between theory and practice Theory and principles must it b l t d i b di f iht ti i i l dt i t i l i d th lik B t i il hih ()? Thi ti h l h " l i d thi" i difflt ti t d t d d df A d i l it d b t f l tht l i d thi i b t d f d th li ti f l thil t h i t til l bl ( h l th d f i t i l

2

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ffd b G t 1982 5 1 2 ) Thi d f i i t i i tht ill t recognize it as reflecting either the appropriate method or content of applied ethics A weaker and more defensible view is that "applied ethics" refers to any use of philosophical methods to treat moral problems practices and policies in the f i t h l t d th lik Thi b d k i t t t th l f l t h i i i l d d t i i t b l l i th l It b th t d t d i f th t ithi th f i f h i l h b t it ld b i d tid h i l h flti i i f i t diili bi A d i f f t bi i f d i th id t h t " l i d t h i " i ith "professional ethics" Problems such as the allocation of scarce medical resources unjust wars abortion conflicts of interest in surrogate decisionmaking hate crimes pornography war and terrorism whistleblowing the entrapment of public ffiil i t t i l jti h i l d th fidtilit f t i f t i t d b d f i l d t t ll t i i th d i f l i d thi Th t l ti b t th t f" l i d thi" l d t idti f b t h th t t d th thd f l i d thi

Problems of Moral Content Th

i f l t i l t f h d i th l i t t th it f t t i l i d thi i t l t t l t d i d i t l t l t Th t i fit f h i d f th l i f f i l thi b t th b l i d t th h i t i t t i l d thi f ll t Th fit d f d thi d i d f f i l i t i t t i l ti t d d Th d iti tht t i tti f l i d thi l d i jtifiti b external standards such as those of public opinion law the common morality religious ethics and philosophical ethics The third claims that distinct forms of t i l thi internal t f i d ititti t h l d l i f l d b b d ( t l ) l t l f k Internalism S

h i l h h i t i d tht tblihd ti id th i f t i l thi I f l t i l i thi l i t t i Aldi M l t ' f "practice" to designate a cooperative arrangement in pursuit of goods that are internal to a structured communal life He holds that "goods internal to a practice" such as those found in the professions are achievable only by engaging n the ti d f i t it t d d f ll S t d d i t l t th f i t h f d t i h t it t b d titi E h f i h hit d ifi h t tht ti tditi ii f i l t l t i t it i t (Mlt 1984 17 175 187 1 9 0 2 0 3 ) H d B d d F k Mill ff f f i t l i t l i th f d t i f d i l thi

3

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Physicians by virtue of becoming socialized into the medical profession accept alle i t t f l l h i h dfi th t f dil ti Th l i ri t t l t f th l dti i b t hii i thi f i l l d i d i t th i t t hii Th professional integrity of physicians is constituted by allegiance to this internal morality (Brody and Mill 1998 386) These writers and others like them maintain that moral frameworks in the profes sions derive from rolespecific duties and professional virtues N bl d i t t h t f i l l i t l bliti didl H i t l lit t i l tb d t l h i h t ll t b l Trditi d f i l t d d t f l d d f t t l f i l d i dii b i j l i i i d th fild ft ilif l i t k th idfibl iid li lt d th ity than they are entitled to claim Brody and Miller address this problem by distinguishing between the core moral norms appropriate to a profession and the dogmatic and unsystematic provisions f d i d f f i l thi A th it i t l lit d hld l i th f f il h "Even the core f dil lit t b thhtfll l t d d t t d t i t l d th t t i ill b id t b th h li i d it h i i t b l i f l d b itl l th i t t th h i t " ( B d d Mill 1998 3 9 3 4 397 h i ddd) T h h t thi i i ftl t i t l i It h tht i t l t d d may be shallow and expendable whereas some external standards are deep and essential Even current practice standards might be weak and insupportable We also know from recent history that a meaningful reconstruction of traditional pro f i l di t i t t i l liti t dt l t l h i likl t b l t th i t l t d d f f i l lit C i d thi h i t i l l I th l t 1960 th b k A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research b il h l i t H b t Kl b lihd j t b f t i l f d f b fh bjt b i l i t i t (Kl 1968) K l ' b k d th f t i d k ll l t i i l i t i t t th f t t h t th h d i d f i i i in standards of research ethics Careful attention was subsequently paid to the moral judgments that psychologists should make in carrying out their research and to the many defects of standards in the then prevailing practices Problems were f d i ti h th i t l d t i f b j t th llti f dt i i d i i d l l idtifibl f d th f fiil i ti t bti bjt It b l t h t th ili ti t d d d t t dd th ti Externalism A th t i l

4

t l b t t lit? A t l

t i t l lit i

t d d tht i

f

f i l t

d itit d l

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

tht ti l t t th f i t l lit P b l i ii law religious institutions and philosophical ethics have all served (whether justifi ably or not) as sources of external morality One influential answer in philosophy to the question of which external source is t i t i t h t t h i l th id th it b i f lid thi A l i f d i th k fB d G t dD Cl Th i t i tht t k dj d t i l i d thi th t b " i l i f d t h i l t h " Th l f t h i th i t id " f k h i h ll f th d i t i ti " d t i "id i t tht tititil ll l " Th b l i t h t t h i th will alert attentive persons to issues of applied ethics identify the morally relevant features of circumstances determine the difference between morally acceptable and unacceptable solutions to problems and show which conditions are necessary and f f i t t j t i f th ilti f l l (Cl d G t 1990 2 3 1 2 f G t t l 1997 3 6 1519) Gt d Cl d t h l d t h t th i l li it t l t d d f f i l thi O l t h i th d ll th t h i ftll f l d di b l f d di P t f th t h i ll assume a similar partisan stance Independent of this confusion over whether one particular theory is morally authoritative it is often unclear whether and if so how a philosophical theory is to be used to criticize internal standards or address a diffilt l bl If ld b fidt tht t h i l th lid h b t b i ld k t t i l til d li ti b i l ki th i t h t th ifi H t t h h th d l it tht th f thi d i ti i likl t B t h ithi d i t h t h i l h th t h i tht i f t t d th th i t t f th il lit f h i h th i E if idiidl i i d tht til theory is correct (authoritative) he or she needs to deal responsibly with the fact that other morally serious and informed individuals reject this conviction Skepticism about the practical relevance of theory is not surprising in light of the li d jtif lit t f t tht h i l h h tditill tid t lif l t t i h lj d t d t d d t b i i i l f l t t ti t h i t l til l bl d l i t d f f i l thi G l t h i ill i t d ll itd f til kb th dd h i l h i l bl tht i t h l d i d f ti Althh b t l ity philosophical theories are primarily attempts to understand or unify morality not attempts to specify its practical commitments Mixed interncdism and externalism

A thid t f bth i t l i d t i l t d f th f i d

h t th t t f lid thi i t l i It t t ith th iti i difft i di lt th t t d i t i t t i b d b

t tht d

l t f l it M b l t d d ht 5

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

fid t l b thi b h i ( i t l l i t ) b t l b th moral standards of the broader culture or community (an external morality) The authority to practice is itself granted by society on the condition that its professions and institutions will in a responsible manner be educated in and adhere to the high l t d d td b tht i t If f i d ititti td t f thi ti t h t th ili l l f th l it ill b h d i ti Th il t d d di t th t ti ill f it t it I t l liti i th f i ill dil b th i i i f i t d d t th t l liti A theory of this description has been advanced by H Tristram Engelhardt He holds that profound disagreement exists about the nature and requirements of professional practice across larger communities such as Orthodox Judaism Roman Cthlii Hidi d l h i There is no way to discover either a canonical contentfull secular morality or the t ll ttfll lti t t h th t b d b th lit f h d l ii t h t bid lf i d M l t d t see the world in the same way Moral strangers [cannot] resolve contentfull moral t i b d t i l t M l fid th th h d di idl h d h h i i (Elhdt d Wild 1994 136 l 13547) A d i t E l h d t ttfll lit difft iti Th t l k f Othd Jdi f l d t i ht i t bl tbl l f tht ti f th J i h ti hih t it dititi F thi ti l t d d f ht i blit d permissible for professionals in medicine politics law and business derive from the more general moral commitments of a larger community beyond the narrower community of professionals Th d lthi t k i thi t i k t i l th btti f d t i f l l i d thi d lki h f d t i th f d t i f t f l i d thi th th h i t i l t i iti N i t l lit it t i th t l lit f til lt (Elhdt d Wild 1994 1 3 7 8 E l h d t 1 9 9 6 1 0 5 2 4 ) Thi t h i i h t i t th lti bt t l d i t l liti b t it h k B h i i d i i t it i t overlook basic similarities; that is to neglect the core of near identical moral goals interests and commitments that exist among welltrained professionals from differ t l t l b k d F l h i i ll th ld h l d t h i fhli lliti hbilitti i d i f t di ti t t i d th lik Th i h d l i i t (h iitd) d h d f f i l ti th iti P d i l l thi th l tt th d f h d t ithi "th iti f l f i d " tht f th i f th t Th th ii h i i l h d ifit i h it

6

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ff i d hih bl tbl d libl t di th l f th professions and professional ethics However in communities of almost any size there exists a pluralism of viewpoint These communities are not lacking in sub groups with different moral points of view and hopes to revise prevailing conditions ti d d C h i i t f b i t i d t i i d t i liti th lti f iil i h t d th lik k f flid i t th iti ith t dt l iti Ath k i t h t thi i d i t l i t t l i t t fftil ld l t l tht i it j d t Th lidit f l dj d t d d i thi t thi d t b nity; no transcendent principle warrants crosscultural appraisal It follows that there are no universal human rights that protect individuals Human rights are by definition valid claims that are justified by reference to morally relevant features of h bi tb f t l t d d It i l d i f f l t t h i thi th ll td bli li i t b f h i d i lliti i t It i t h thi th tf i t lii i i t ititti b t it i b i l i t t li tif d iti i bli li k it t ft h ith th d ld d bl t apply ethics to our deepest social problems

Problems of Method and Justification S l dl f thd ti lld thd dl f tifti h b d i d i l i d thi Th f th t i f l t i l dl t t d i thi ti Th fit dl h jtifiti d thd f t d ti t h t h i l d t h i l th Th d approaches justification and method from a bottomup perspective that emphasizes moral tradition experience and particular circumstances The third refuses to assign priority to either a topdown or a bottomup strategy Top-down models I

th

fit dl iti Thi dl f t th ll it thd i l li t h t fll d th l Th "applying" a rule: ti

l

lid t hih i t l l ll l l ( i i l idl flli i th d d t i f i

ti l iht i

l

it t thik t) t l d i

1 Every act of description A is obligatory 2 At bi fd i t i A T h f 3 At bi blit Thi d

dl libl b i l d d i i hih t h i

i

th l d

i l

f j d t b h t ditl i i l b t it l t l libl l i i l j i i t i thi

7

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t d i t i l ti i t i t t i l l d j d t Whil h i th moral life conforms roughly to this conception of moral priority much does not There are several problems with this moralpriority thesis First moral judgments in hard cases almost always require that we make the norms themselves more ifi ( th ti "Pbl f S i f t i " b l ) bf bi til i t d i l i i l I th f ifi di ki til j d t ft t tk it t f t l blif b t th ld l t l tti j d t f likl t d i d t t h l fill t d i iht t l i i l d t h i Th i l l i i t i th S d th f t f itti also be such that no general norm (principle or rule) clearly applies and the differ ent moral norms that can be brought to bear on a set of facts may yield inconclu sive results For example destroying a nonviable human embryo or fetus does not l l ilt l i t killi d d th l tht h iht t t t bdil i t i t d t l l l t thi li E if h ft t i h t th h i fft d th h i f l tht d l t ill t j d t tht i i t i b l ith th ' hi fft d l Slti th i h t t f f t db i i th right set of rules to bear on these facts are not reducible either to a deductive form of judgment or to the resources of a general ethical theory The topdown model also creates a potentially infinite regress of ustification a di d d f fil j t i f i t i b h l l f l t i t i hih l l t j t i f it If t d d jtifid til b h t d jtifid i t it ld th ti f thi h t h t th jtifid i i l j d t I th ld h d l thi bl b ti tht i lfjtifi t h t it i i t i l t t hld b t f tht thi t t d t h t th j t i f ll th i i l d l i t d d tht t thil theory is well equipped to meet Bottom-up models S it i l i d thi t thi ttti l h til d i i d th th l i i l d t h i Th bli tht l i d jtifiti d btt t t d Th it t f iti il t d ti i i h t d i l d ti l i th t t i i t f hih commonly make moral decisions They also depict an evolving structure of moral beliefs based on exemplary lives and narratives experience with hard cases and analogy from prior practice Btt dl ttill i l d lditit t h d l i C i t h b th t idl d i d i l i d thi b t i f f ti t i l i d th thd l lif P t f th h l i i l d i t i i th d fk l d t i T h t i th i f t i d iht f i i l di f i l t l i til i t (J dT l i 1988) F l h i i 8

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

dd i t h d i i l i f i t h l i f tit t fi missible killing But progressively after dealing with many agonizing cases they and society came to frame many of these acts as forms of permissible allowing to die or even as morally required acts of acknowledging refusals of treatment All practical l l b t killi d ltti di i d f d ti th b th i i l l it i l t l ti f idli A it' l i fid thi tt h h bddd l tditi d t f d tht it d ft iiht d j d t A l t th thit ti i l i ti id t b t th h t f thi thd h th d i i f jit fj d b thitti i case the judgments in their decision are positioned to become authoritative for other courts hearing cases with similar facts Defenders of bottomup reasoning see moral authority as analogous: social ethics develops from a social consensus formed d hih th b t d d t itht l f th ltd l id A hit f iil d iil d t t it b i i l f d t i it l l i d k l d liti ( l i i l ) i it li tditi f thil flti Case analysis which is central to casuistry has long been used in law schools and business schools Training in the case method is widely believed to sharpen skills of legal and business reasoning as well as moral reasoning One can tear a t d th t t btt ft t i iil itti I th t h t d l tti t h d t d t lik h l i b t iht d b t t i Th b j t i i t d l it t bl d t fd l lti tht k i th t t k i h t d ti i d th k i tht thi i th th b i f f d t i l l fl i t Th thd i l h t b d t d ble facts and judge the weight of evidence enabling the transfer of that weight to new cases This task is accomplished by generalizing and mastering the principles that control the transfer usually principles at work in the reasoning of judges Use of the thd i b i h l i f idl f d t i tht t th t d t i th d i i k i l ft iitil i i i t th f t f l itti H th f th thd i t t itti lt ith th f t ii d jdi tht iht t dt fd f ki it d i i i h i t A ith t d t h i i bl li i it f d f d f btt up theories First defenders sometimes write as if paradigm cases or particular circumstances speak for themselves or inform moral judgment by their facts alone Clearly they do not To move constructively from case to case or to attend to the l t f t f til itti id l f l l t t th itti Th l i t t f th itti bt th f i t t i d liki itti All l i l i i ti t i d i t tht bjt t i ik lik th i l t t Th ti di f th i t l i k i t b h i d b l itlf Btt t

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t h f t i i l l i til l l ents in the case or set of facts at hand "Paradigm cases" and "morally relevant features of circumstances" seem to com bine facts that can be generalized to other situations (for example "The employee bl th hitl th l " ) d ttld l (f l " K l d b l l h iht t d i l th di f th l " ) Th ttld l ltill ditit f th f t f til Th l th t l l ti th l th t th t t f l i i l l Btt t l t bl h th it fliti l gies judgments and case interpretations Defenders stress that cases and particular circumstances point beyond themselves and evolve into generalizations but they also may evolve in the wrong way if they were improperly grounded from the t t Btt t h l t h d l i l t t b i d d l t f l t f l t ft f Th bl l d t ti b t th j t i f i t f th t H d jtifti ? I it l b il ti d l ? Miht t difft l i d l t ti "iht" ? With out some stable framework of norms there seems to be a lack of control over judgment and no way to prevent prejudiced or poorly formulated social conven tions This criticism is a variant of the muchdiscussed problem that bottomup t l k i t i l dit f l t l blid h l d l ii Idtifti f th ll l t f t f d d th h k j d t b t d th idiidl ld t f tilit d i i bi jdiil f l tht i h k d b tbl t fi t i l i i l dh iht Th h t f th bl b t h t th t t thd itht t t tht i t l ft h h t tht dil th f d t l i t f comparison and analogy in moral thinking but that lacks initial moral premises It is certain that we reason morally by analogy almost daily and we are often confi dent in our conclusions However such analogies also often fail and analogies t li ftth tit Thi t h d th l ith th bl tht tt h ti t i t iitill h if f th f t i t t t th t i th d i t i l d d fl t t t Coherentism "The top" (principles theories) and "the bottom" (cases particular udgments) are both now widely regarded as insufficient resources for applied ethics Neither gen l i i l til i t h ffiit t t l i ith th dd libilit P i i l d t b d if f d l i d i l l i t i f l i i l I t d f t d btt dl t i f th dl i l f d t "flti ilibi" d" h t h "

10

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

Jh R l ' l b t d t f "flti ilibi" h b th t influential model of this sort In developing and maintaining a system of ethics he argues it is appropriate to start with the broadest possible set of considered moral judgments about a subject and to erect a provisional set of principles that reflects th Rflti ilibi i i t i t i i thi ( d th t t i ) flti tti f l i i l t h t i l tlt d th l t l blif t k th h t ibl " C i d d j d t " i t h i l t f i t j d t i hih l blif d iti t likl t b td itht ditti bi E l j d t b t th f il d i i i t i li gious intolerance terrorism torture and political conflicts of interest These con sidered judgments occur at all levels of generality "from those about particular situations and institutions through broad standards and first principles to formal d b t t diti l t i " E th i d d j d t tht t" i i l l fid it" R l "libl t i i " Th l f flti ilibi i t th d djt i d d j d t i d t d th h t ith th i f t l l i t t W t t ith d d t of moral lightness and wrongness and then construct a more general and more specific account that is consistent with these paradigm judgments rendering them as coherent as possible We then test the resultant actionguides to see if they yield i h t lt If d j t th id i th d th W ltl tbl ilibi th i d djti b td t t i l l ( R l 1971 20ff 4 6 5 0 5 7 9 8 0 [1999 d 17ff 4 0 5 5 0 8 9 ] 1996 8 381 384 399) T tk l i th thi f t l t t i i i tht t t t d t h ft lii (1) d i t i b t b td b f f i l (i d t i i th b f i i l t f th d ) d (2) distribute organs by time on the waiting list (in order to give every candidate an equal opportunity) As they stand these two distributive principles are not coherent because using either will undercut or even eliminate the other We can retain both (1) d (2) i th f fi ditibti bt t d ill h t i t d liit bth i i l t t h ith t fh t if i t t d bl th i t t i t th i t t Th liit d t ill i t h t b d h t ith th i i l d l h di d i i i t i i t th l d l d th l f bilit t i j t h f th l l t i f i dil d We have no reason in applied ethics to anticipate that the process of achieving moral coherence will either come to an end or be perfected A moral framework adequate for applied ethics is more a process than a finished product; and moral bl h d l i th t itbl t f t d ditibti hld b i d d j t i d f t i l d j t t b flti ilibi W hld i l i d thi t h t f di h f i h df l itti tht hll t lf k ( R l 1971 1 9 5 2 0 1 [1999 d 1716])

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One problem with this general model is that a bare coherence of norms never provides a sufficient basis for justification because the body of substantive udgments and principles that cohere could themselves be morally unsatisfactory This points to the great importance but also the great difficulty of starting with considered judgments that are themselves morally justified These considered judgments presumably will have a history rich in moral experience that undergirds our confidence that they are credible and trustworthy; but how is one to justify such a claim in the case of any proposed set of considered judgments? After all the persons codes institutions or cultures from which the premises descend may not themselves be highly reliable For example the Hippocratic tradition the starting-point in medical ethics for centuries has turned out to be a limited and generally unreliable basis for medical ethics In addition vagueness surrounds the precise nature and scope of the method of appeals to coherence A philosopher seeking coherence might be pursuing one or more of several different interests: evaluating public policy constructing a moral philosophy improving his or her personal set of moral beliefs and so on The focus might be on judgments on policies on cases or on finding moral truth It is also not clear how we should and should not achieve coherence or how to be sure that we have done so In light of the differences in the models explored in this section and the diverse literature in applied philosophy it is questionable whether applied ethics has a distinct method or type of justification Applied philosophers appear to do what philosophers have always done: they analyze concepts examine the hidden presuppositions of moral opinions and theories offer criticism and constructive accounts of the moral phenomena in question and criticize strategies that are used to justify beliefs policies and actions They seek a reasoned defense of a moral viewpoint and they use considered judgments and moral frameworks to distinguish justified moral claims from unjustified ones They try to stimulate the moral imagination promote analytical skills and weed out prejudice undue emotion false authority and the like From this perspective differences between traditional ethical theory and applied ethics can be easily exaggerated In philosophy journals that publish both applied and theoretical work no sharp line of demarcation is apparent between the concepts and norms of ethical theory and applied ethics There is not even a discernible continuum from theoretical to applied The applied-theoretical distinction therefore needs to be used with caution (Beauchamp 1984: 514-31; Gert 1984: 532-48)

Problems of Specification It is now generally agreed in literature on the problems addressed in the previous two sections that specific policy guidelines and truly practical udgments cannot be squeezed from abstract principles and general ethical theories alone Additional content must be introduced from some quarter General theories and principles f used at all must be made specific for contexts; otherwise moral guidelines will be empty and ineffectual The implementation of these general norms must take account of feasibility efficiency cultural pluralism political procedures uncertainty 12

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

b t rik li b difftd ti l dil d th lik I short theories and principles must be specified for a context Specification should not be understood as a process of producing general norms; it assumes they are already available It is the process of making these norms t t h t th ifll id d t Sifiti i d i th i d t i t f th l t i th i d ti idi it hil tii th l i t t i th i i l Filli t th i t t f th ith h i h t t i lihd b i th f th t l b lii h t th l Th i d H Rihd t it b " l l i t where when why how by what means to whom or by whom the action is to be done or avoided" (Richardson 2000: 289; see also Richardson 1990: 2 7 9 3 1 0 ) For example without further specification the principle "respect the autonomy of t t " i t t hdl litd bl f ht t k f i liil dii d h i l i h bjt A dfi iti f" t f t " ( " l l i t t t i thi libt riht") iht lif ' i bt ld t th l d it if S i f t i i d i f f t kid f lli t th analysis of meaning It adds content For example one possible specification of "respect the autonomy of competent persons" is "respect the autonomy of compe tent persons after they become incompetent by following their advance directives" Wh i th f thi til ifti b t l t diffilti i l i d diti ld if f t h fll " R t th t f t t ( f t th b i t t ) b flli thi d diti if d l if th d i t i l d tii t th i t t h d " A th bl th f ifi ti ill ti Tht i l d ifd l idli d lii ill b fth ifd t h d l l i t Thi i specification is one way to practice applied ethics and it may be the best way In progressive specification there must remain a transparent connection to he initial norm that gives moral authority to the string of norms that develop over ti Th i l th ibilit f th ifiti bi bl d it i ibl t h t d i f f t ti ill ff d i f f t ifti Th ti ifti ll b t t t i d jtifibl Of t ll ifti j t i f i b l Th t f f i l iti (i d lii d j d t ) h ft b t d i thi th h b b i d d l f t t i P f i l thrit i thi way protect shoddy moral reflection In the process of specification overconfidence in one's specifications is a moral vice that can have profound consequences Moral disagreement in the course of formulating specifications is inevitable n t t I i b l t i d i l t i l ti ifti itll ti t b ffd bt l t t i ifiti d t b tt f t th th i th t t i hih flti ff l t t i lti t til bl Thi b t i tk t th bjt fh hld i itti i hih llitdd d i i dk l d b l fid t h l i d i t 13

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Problems of Conflict and Disagreement Moral disagreements emerge in the moral life from several different sources These include disagreements over which specification is appropriate factual disagreements (for example about the level of suffering that an action will cause) conceptual disagreements scope disagreements about who should be protected by a moral norm (for example whether fetuses or animals are protected) disagreements resulting from a genuine moral dilemma disagreements about which norms are relevant in the circumstances and disagreements about the weight of the relevant norms in the circumstances It should not be presumed in a context of disagreement that at least one party is morally biased mistaken or otherwise deficient Conscientious and reasonable moral agents who work with due diligence at specification and reasoning about moral problems sometimes understandably disagree The parties may disagree about whether religious values have any place in political affairs whether any form of affirmative action is viable whether physician-assisted suicide is ever acceptable and dozens of other issues in applied ethics When evidence is incomplete or different sets of evidence are available to different parties one party may be justified in reaching a conclusion that another party s justified in rejecting We cannot hold persons to a higher standard than to make judgments conscientiously and coherently in light of the relevant basic and specified norms together with the available evidence Of course tolerance for some norms rightly has its limits The method of specification offered in the previous section needs enrichment by an account of moral justification that will help distinguish justified and unjustified specifications The models of method and ustification discussed in earlier sections may be our best resources in this endeavor but if so these resources stand in need of further development to be of real practical assistance in applied ethics

Conclusion A robust confidence in and enthusiasm for the promise and harvest of applied ethics is far from universal Many are unconvinced that traditional philosophical ethics or contemporary ethical theory can play any significant role in case analysis or in policy or professional contexts There is for reasons discussed throughout this chapter skepticism that philosophical theories even have practical implications (or applications) However these suspicions may rest on misconceptions of the nature of applied ethics No morally serious individual doubts the importance of the issues treated in applied ethics and virtually everyone familiar with work in the field can cite some examples of outstanding applied work The better view is that adequate conceptions of the method and moral content of applied ethics remain a project n the making

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References Beauchamp T L (1984) On eliminating the distinction between applied ethics and ethical theory The Monist, 67: 514-31 Brody H and Miller F G (1998) The internal morality of medicine: explication and application to managed care Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23: 384-410 Clouser K D and Gert B (1990) A critique of principlism The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 15: 219-36 Engelhardt H T (1996) The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd edn New York: Oxford University Press and Wildes K (1994) The four principles of health care ethics and post-modernity In R Gillon (ed) Principles of Health Care Ethics, pp 135—47 London: John Wiley Gert B (1982) Licensing professions Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1: 51-60 (1984) Moral theory and applied ethics The Monist, 67: 532^48 Culver C M and Clouser K D (1997) Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. New York: Oxford University Press Jonsen A and Toulmin S (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. Berkeley CA: University of California Press Katz J with Capron A and Glass E S (1972) Experimentation with Human Beings. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Kelman H (1968) A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Maclntyre A (1984) After Virtue, 2nd edn Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (rev edn 1999) (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press Richardson H S (1990) Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279-310 (2000) Specifying balancing and interpreting bioethical principles Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 25: 285-307

Further reading Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (1996) Final Report. New York: Oxford University Press Altaian A (1983) Pragmatism and applied ethics American Philosophical Quarterly, 20: 227-35 Beauchamp T L and Childress J F (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edn New York: Oxford University Press Brock D W (1987) Truth or consequences: the role of philosophers in policy-making Ethics, 97: 786-91 Daniels N (1996) Wide reflective equilibrium in practice In L W Sumner and J Boyle (eds) Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, pp 96-114 Toronto: University of Toronto Press DeGrazia D (1992) Moving forward in bioethical theory: theories cases and specified principlism Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 17: 511-39

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Dworkin R (1993) Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion Euthanasia and Individual Fd Feinberg J (1984-7) Th Ml Liit f th C i i l L 4 vols New York: Oxford University Press Freeman E and Werhane P (eds) (1997) Dictionary of Business Ethics Cambridge MA: Mthil hy 20: 222-34 Maclntyre A (1984) Does applied ethics rest on a mistake? The Monist 67: 498-513 Alid Ethi i Tbld Wld Dordrecht: Kluwer Rachels J (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism New York: Oxford University Press Mtt f Lif d Dth N I t d t E i Ml Philh 3rd edn New York: McGraw-Hill Reich W (ed) (1995) Encyclopedia ofBioethics 2nd edn New York: Macmillan

AC

Alid i

Ethi t Ethi

(1993) P t i l Ethis 2nd edn New York: Cambridge University Press Sugarman J and Sulmasy D P (eds) (2001) Methods in Medical Ethics Washington DC: Sunstein C (1993) On analogical reasoning H d Winkler E R and Coombs J R (eds) (1993) Alid well

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L Riw 106: 741-91 Ethi A Rdr Cambridge MA: Black-

2 T h i

f Ethi

STEPHEN L DARWALL

Ethi i t i l diidd i t t t tthi d ti thi ith th l t t b i diidd f t h it ti th d " l i d t h i " th ith h i h d i thi l Thi l t t tb ill t h i it t lti t ti th lik t h t f lid t t h t i h t h i d i d i d d t l d l th lid to cases When it comes to normative ethics theories are often formulated and evaluated by reflecting on the ethically relevant features of cases Thus some phil h i t i tht i t th l l l f diti ti bt killi d ltti di ( ll t bt i il d ltti th h ) b flti ifi lik J d i t h T h ' f "tll b l " i hih di h bt ltti hi t i kill ti b f l dditi it t t k h it ld kill ll b (Th 1976) I t h i k i b t thi it to be relevant that by diverting the train the driver would be killing people or causing their deaths himself whereas if he let the train continue undiverted he would only be allowing deaths to occur By seeing this in a specific case it is d it dititi f lt h t i l l Ath t f " t i l thi" id th iti bt i ildi i difft i it t t h t th l f i t t til ti f ht t d F t l ht t t k i t ht hld d ( hld h d ) bt h t t thik fl b t ' h t b t hi h i d thi t f ti ti A d th th thil ti tht t i i l t i l ith even if they have practical implications: do all living species have intrinsic worth? Is aesthetic appreciation a more valuable form of human experience than the relief of a scratched itch? And so on

C A btt t th fidi

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

ratio

morality

obligations

make

THEORIES OF ETHICS

td ttitd ht t h A l i l tt h thi b true only if something has other properties: the reasons for valuing it And such reasons cannot simply consist in the property that it is good since that is itself the property of there being such reasons Unlike say the property of yellowness which iht t t h t thi ll b i t l f it thil ti i b thi t lti b fth ti t h t thi d If I jd ti i t b lbl I t t h i k it h t tht k t d ft tht th d f it l O if I t h i k t h t ti ti i ll i d I t t h i k th ti h t i t i f th ti d th itti tht k it ll b l i t f t tht th d f it bli toriness And these thoughts commit me to the existence of background normative theories I am committed to thinking there are truths that relate an experience's having certain properties to its value such that any experience that had exactly th ( d th thill l t ) ti ld b lbl l th thi bi l O i i l l I ittd t thiki th it lid l i i l tht lt t i ' h i ti f t t it b i ll i d I thi b d th th i t i t i f ti thil t h i i avoidable if we are to think about ethical issues with any care Any udgment we make about an individual case will be no better than the background theories we commit ourselves to in making it Moreover there are special considerations tht it t ti t h i f dititil b t t h th d t k ti f l iht d Thi i b I t d bifl b th t f thi ll lit i dld l if th t t Wht i i ht i t l hld tbl f di ht t bl l h d t P t i f tbilit i thi t diti df t l i A ith j d ' l l fidi t h f l fl t tilt i ciples (or theories) that are capable both of justifying our judgments and of being publicly addressed to and accepted by other members of the moral community Someone we hold accountable for wrongdoing we think should be capable n f ti j d t f bi b h t t t h t it i bl j d t t h d Thi i difft f th thil t h f l f l didi f d hld h it t b l th th th Didi f di d ' t t t t t d i t th d t h l d hi tbl d b th i iti libtliiti l t th i t h h t tht didi i i ate only if its object should be able to accept it and see things the same way To the contrary disdain may only increase if its object can't "get i t " If however we judge someone to be incapable of assessing his own conduct morally this can l d t thik t h t h i t ft b j t f l lti i h i i b l f t i it tll tbl l it It i t h f bl t t b d f bi bl t f l t bli tifiti f j d t f l iht d tht i iil t i d ' l l fidi N t i l th i i thi t d l f bli l di

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Mtthi O

i i t t i thi h t ill b ith th j ti thil t h i t t l i tili d t l d it th Bf d i i these however we need first to introduce briefly the other main area of ethical theory: metaethics Unlike normative theories which concern themselves with substantive normative questions such as "What is valuable?" and "What is mor ll b l i t ? " t t h i l t h i d ith b t t hil hil i tht d l i th W d i t i i h f d i f f t kid () ti i th h i l h fl i th i d t t f thil j d t (b) l t d i i th h i l h f id i ht tl tt thil j d t h t it i t h l d thil i () t h i l i i th ibilit d t f thil t t h d (d) epistemological questions concerning the possibility and nature of ethical know ledge and how we can justify our ethical views Why however should we care about metaethics? Some people think that case thi b d i d til f tthi Th t tht l i thil ltitl ll normative th b t h l d t h t thi i til i d d t f tthi I t h i k thi i i itk d t h t th h ti ti d bt t t h i l d ti t h h t i ditti bth f h th t t t i t h i l thik (lik A i t t l Kt) dd ll fh d d hld di t l dbt Consider for example issues that arise in environmental ethics concerning the moral claims that other living species make on us How much should we weigh harm to other species either to individuals or to the species themselves in our l d l i b t i ? It i i i b l t t h i k fll b t h ti itht i t t h i l i O th t fh T b bl t b h d thi t h d lf B t h t i it f thi t b d b d for b i ? O i b t th d fh bi ' d it th d i h ld h if f l l i th tifti f di ( l t t i l informed or would if fully informed have for herself as she actually is) (Railton 1986) This view is sometimes put forward not just as a normative claim but as a metaethical position concerning what personal welfare or benefit is But such a tthi f lf l t th ibilit t h t i lki di b bfitd h d R h l thi ill b d b d for bi l it t b d b d to it ( it i h t t h h d i ) I bli thi t t h i l th t b th itk lt f li f t h h t t h t t k it f td tht ' di ht h i ti f h i t i l O tht th t f lf bfit h h i i l d tt f th ti of an agent deliberating about what to do but is one we require rather when we care for some being or thing for its sake (ourselves included) we can appreciate why h dbfit t t i t d t bi ith d i ( D l l 1997 2002) T h f b f th i j t i t di f their

20

THEORIES OF ETHICS

sake that they do well or flourish We can sensibly regard a species as capable of being benefited or harmed therefore if we can care for them for their sake But again what sort of claim does harm make when we understand it n this way? Do we have a moral obligation not to harm members of any species? Or is the fact that an action would harm another person relevant to its being wrong in a way that harm to other species is not? Here again we cannot answer this question without taking a stand on meta-ethical issues concerning what morality and moral obligation are if only implicitly If we understand moral questions broadly enough then it may seem that harm is harm and is no less morally relevant whether the being harmed is a person or a snail darter If however we think of morality as a system of reciprocity or mutual accountability where norms of right and wrong mediate a moral community of free and equal moral persons then harm to other persons will seem to have an intrinsic moral relevance that harm to other species does not For then what is morally wrong will be what one can be held accountable by others for doing in accordance with norms that must in some sense be acceptable to all from a perspective of equality So viewed harm to persons is not simply harm to members of a certain species but harm to a member of the moral community to whom norms of right and wrong must be justifiable This is only one example of how questions of meta-ethics are implicitly involved in issues of normative ethical theory and therefore in case ethics Ultimately we have no alternative but to pursue philosophical ethics, that is to attempt to work out a comprehensive outlook that integrates normative ethics and meta-ethics (Darwall 1998)

Contractarianism/Contractualism We can turn now to a review of different normative theories and begin with one that can be grounded in the meta-ethical theory of morality as reciprocity or mutual accountability just mentioned This is the idea that whether an action is right or wrong depends on whether it accords with or violates principles that would be the object of an agreement contract or choice made under certain conditions by members of the moral community The general idea can be developed in a variety of ways depending on how the choice or agreement the parties who make it and the conditions under which it is made are characterized One broad distinction is between contractarianism, under which the choice of moral principles is self-interested and contractualism, which grounds it in a moral ideal of reciprocity reasonableness or fairness It may seem strange to think that moral principles can in any respect be agreed upon or chosen How can a moral proposition be made true by any choice or agreement? Only rarely however do contractarians or contractualists claim hat right and wrong are determined by actual choices or agreements (Harman 1975) More frequently what they hold is that moral principles are those that would be rationally or reasonably chosen or agreed to under certain (frequently counterfactual) conditions

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C t t i i Contractarianism was initially formulated by Thomas Hobbes (see Hobbes 1994) Hobbes begins by considering the situation of an agent deliberating independently f th f th ti f hi di i t t E h h thik ht h d i d ii hi t k it B t ht lt if ll f t t h ti d i d i t t ? Althh h ' di tll lt i hi i t t bi b t td i th d t f th it d ' t f l l tht ' i hi ti i t t th th ' i th i ti principle other than selfinterest will actually result in everyone's (or even any one's) interests or desires being best promoted In situations where this is not the case where the collective pursuit of selfinterest leads to an outcome that is worse f h h ht i k llti ti bl Thi i i l l t t d b th t h t i l k th P i ' Di l i hih t idiidl jild ii f bb Th d i t i t tt tll h tht h l k h id t i t ith hi hi t f bb bt il it h fb k i d t i ii each a sentence of one year He offers each a deal: if one confesses and his partner doesn't the confessor will go free and the partner will get twenty years If both confess both get five years S tht h l b t di th l t ti Th t t f th itti th i fll If A f bt B d t th A t hi fit kd t d B hi f t h k d ( t ) A d i if B f bt A d t f t h k d f A fitkd f B If b t h f bth t thi t h i d k d t A d if b t h d ' t f bth t thi d k d Wht h l d h d? R fit f A' ti B ill t i d d t l f A d ith f t It t h f tht A h l d f i whatever B does A will do better if he confesses If B confesses then A will get his third as opposed to his fourthbest outcome by confessing And if B doesn't confess then A will get his first as opposed to his secondbest outcome by confessing So A hld f A ill d b t t b f i ht Bd B t B' i t t i i tl l t A' f A t f l ll t B S if A ld d b t t f th ld B It b idt h thi i lld llti ti bl A' d B' ti l t h h liklit t hi th b t t f h h tk idiidll tk t t h ild t tht i f h If b t h i d ht would be best for him given the actions of the other both will confess But that yields each one's thirdranked outcome whereas they could have both achieved their secondranked outcomes by not confessing Although the ailhouse context k thi d t t f i i t l l th ti t t f A d B If A d B ld t t thi t l d t th ld b t h t f d d ith t h i d k d t th th th t h i d k d t tht i d d t l ti t h i i t t ill hi P l t h th f th it f t h i i d d t i t t d fll l l th llti flli f hih t '

22

THEORIES OF ETHICS

i t t b t t th ld h b d b i thi it ests independently. Obviously cooperation is required for many many things that are valuable in life perhaps especially in complex modern societies n which we cannot assume that genuinely common interests shaped by common cultural or lii tditi ill t t h ll f i i f t i t t i Morality b t h h t f ill b d d i f f ti Pi il f l iht d ld th b ht l ifi i t ii d ft i th b d t ibl f f ti l ti i l i t j t thi tht it litil it b t ll t t h t (Atll Hbb' i tht ation among large groups was impossible without political authority since other wise uncertainty of others' participation would undermine the assurance necessary for it to make sense for one to do one's part) A d i t t t i i th hth ti i iht i d t i d b l f ti f th b d t t tht i bt ll h l t Tk f l th l t h t it i tt t th id f th i d l th ifi i l d i tt t( l it i t b l l a d/ th ti f if t di t b l l (3) Arguably there exist some a and p such that it would promote everyone's interests more for everyone to follow the resulting rule than it would for everyone to pursue their own interests independently If that is so then for starters contrac t i i ill h l d t h t it ld b t t fll thi l T fit i t i t t i i hld tht h t it i i h t t d d d ht l it ld b i ' i t t f t t d b idd b i thi d l i b t i d l ti H ht f i different ibl l f i kid f i t t i h th t tht ' i t t ld b t d btt b ' flli tht l th th ld b if t t t d t t thi i t t i d d t l ? H is where the idea of an agreement or contract enters the contractarian picture Taking as a benchmark the "no agreement" point in which all regard themselves as bound by nothing but their own interests and values contractarians treat the ti f hih i i l tll ll b d b th lti t t i l b i i bl f thi b h k i hih ll h t i t t i i t tll d t i i l t h b idi th " t" it bt h diffi i t t i tl hih i i l tll d (Gthi 1986) H f b l th ltt i i l t t th difft titi t ill d d h h th t t l if th i agreement Consider for example what principle of mutual aid would be agreed to If those with fewer resources and greater vulnerabilities have more to lose from the lack of agreement than those with greater resources and fewer vulnerabilities then t i l b i i l d t l i i l f t l id th ld lt if l b l th ith l Thi th i t t i i ' b i f k f i li T k t l bliti i ifi th b l i t i f ih d ti i d i lbl i h t thik b t ht t i i l f dli ith th i ld lt f titi f

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

th " t" it i hih h t t t t t d it it ests and values In acting on the principles that would be agreed however the parties are not simply promoting their interests; they are cooperating Cooperation promotes everyone's advantage but as in the Prisoner's Dilemma it does so by ii idiidl t f ti thi i t t E h ld f h i h i h th if b i t b th bt h t i d t d it t i d b i i l f ti tht ld t i l l t Contractualism Contractualism has a similar structure It too understands principles of right con duct as the object of a rational agreement But whereas contractarianism takes l i i l t lt f t i l b i i t t l i th t i i l db lidl f l t tht ld b i i t t ith b i i f d t l t f iti F t t l i ' it f i th bl ith t t i i i t h t it t tht i d i i d l h i fft l l i t th th ld h f th d l f ti O t h i th l tht lt b b gaining from that position will have no moral force But why assume that people have such a moral claim? From a moral point of view this seems entirely arbitrary unless some background theory of natural rights is assumed And contractarianism 't j t i f that ti i it l f ld h l d t d d it Thi bl f th d i t i if id h idiidl iht tf l f i t t d til i t t t i l i If h t i t f h i d d t i t t th f itti i h i h th tblihd l f ti h ill t h i k it rational to bargain to an agreement with others to be bound by certain rules But how can this give her a reason actually to follow the rules? The reasons of nterest she has for agreeing to follow the rules can't give her a reason actually to follow th i th hl it df t i f l f ti i t h t th constrain h it f h i t t F h t b bl t th l i h t l d t l f ti It b tht it i i h i t t t b h d t t t i l f ti bt hil thi ld i h t want t t th l l for these reasons. h l d ' t accept th The animating idea of contractualism is implicit in Kant's "kingdom of ends" formulation of his Categorical Imperative Kant maintains that anyone subject to the moral law must be able to be regarded also as "making the law" (Kant 1998) O l th th l l b t h h t f l f it f f l t bjt l t l th l i l t t h l Thi i i f R ' id f l i t i t litil it iti i hih 1987) h "hil iti ith ll thl b l h i l f " (R A d i t R thi i l ibl if l ht h ll th " l ill" th ill f h as f d l b Siill K t i f

24

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ll " d " b h l t h h ld " l i l t " it as f and equal member of the "kingdom of ends" Here we have the central difference with contractarianism Moral principles of right are not rules that individuals would prescribe and attempt to gain acceptance for from their different individual perspec ti b i i t f l f i t t Th th l idiidl ld ib ( d t) f ti f d l th Bt h i f i l l i thi ti t b d t d ? K t i hit i tht i " t t i i f t i l bi d bjti l " l if " b t t f th l diff bt rational beings and also from all the content of their private ends" (Kant 1998) This suggests the contemporary contractualist John Rawls's idea that principles of justice are those it would be rational to choose in an "original position" behind a " i l fi " di f t tht i d i i d t d i f f t thi i t i ( R l 1971 1 3 6 4 2 ) I til th h i ti i t f thi i d i i d l biliti t l t d i i iti and t h i i t t idiidl l R l t h t th ti h i t t i t l h i d i thi i t t ( h t th turn out to be) and therefore that they value the "primary goods" that are neces sary for these: freedom opportunities wealth and the "social bases" of selfrespect Rawls's idea then is that justice is determined by whichever principles the parties ld h f b h i d th il f i t h t i as f d l th R l d t h t thi h i i l f i t t d ithi th t i t l d b th il b t thi d t d l i t l f i t t i T thi th ti titd tb lf i t t bt b f i l th i d i i d l Si th il f i d i th f i f t i tht ld l t th til i i l t any til ' i t t th i f t i l diff bt i th parties to be selfinterested and assuming them to be trustees for another individual The original position is in effect the perspective of a that is an arbitrary free and equal individual R l t h t th t i l hi i th i i l iti ld b t fj t i kd i d f iit fit tht i th it f i i l ti b i iil d litil iht d f d d d th "diff i i l " hih fi lit f tit d tht ii i d h lth d i t i b t d b th b i i t i t t i f it tht k t th t t d t f th h l t d t d I fft this says that inequalities are justifiable only to the extent that they work as a social resource (for example by providing incentives) from which everyone benefits n cluding the least advantaged If we take seriously the possibility that we could be dh f titi bbiliti f di i til iti th t i l thi ld b t t t i t th t ibiliti b h i th t i i l ildi th diff i i l R l t th id f d th fjti "jti f i " h l l d it M tl h h t d t h t it i t b d t d litil th th l l th (Rl 1993) I hi li k

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h h t d t h t it i h t l b i d l th "iht as fairness" (Rawls 1971: 111) To do this we would have to ask: what principles of individual conduct (or of the conduct of groups nation states and so on) would it be rational to choose to govern everyone's conduct (as well as moral criticism and ti f tbilit i it) f th i i l iti Thi ld th i f k ithi hih t id hih i i l ht t l t if iht h d d i i A d t t l i t h b t i t d b thiki b t h t it t k li l Wh li thi i thi h t t t t i th b d h d equal It is as if she says "This is a reasonable claim for you to grant to me as you can see were you to put yourself in my shoes and consider that it would be reason able for you to make it of m e " Such a claim implicitly invokes the idea of principles f d t tht i l l ii l t t l t t bl j t I d l i h t t l i t h T M S l it h b i h t b bl t j t i f t h i d t t h th b i i l t h t th ld t bl j t i f th l h thi i ( S l 1998 1 4 7 2 5 7 ) P i i l f l iht d th b thought of as norms that structure a mutually accountable community of equals To apply this criterion we must make judgments about what is reasonable How can we make these? There seems no alternative to putting ourselves into others' h d i hth ld d ti li bjti i t d i i l ld bl k if i t h i i t t i Thi i l j d t It i t i l th diti tht ld k th li bjti W iht thik ld b t t h t it ld b bl T k th iit j d t it t t t t t t i t th th' ti i t i l l t hth ld d th li bjti bl t k t th i l l ii l Suppose for example we are trying to determine what principles should govern reduction in nations' use of fossil fuels to combat global warming Contractualism will hold that developed and developing countries alike should govern their conduct b i i l tht f th ld bl j t If d t d d i ft j t d b d l i ti f i t it i th t d h t h thi ld b bl b j t i t k i thi h Ad tll b j t d b d l d ti i f t d d tht iht

Consequentialism Wh

t t lit t til E if th th b d Wh k t b bd j d t h i l 26

i i ll d t tili jd f i t i

d

t t l i

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ithi ti f i i t bt l b i ith it h l d t b prior t lit l iht d thi ld till b d d th i d ffi db t l i th l t ki l lti if f lit N i t h th i th t h k d ti l

f

THEORIES OF ETHICS

h i l d h t i Rth di t h t it is a bad thing that the suffering happened that such suffering is a bad state of affairs a bad thing to happen The idea is not just that suffering is bad for the sufferer but that it is a bad thing to occur period As these values and disvalues are independent f lit th l l d non-moral C t i l i t lt h i t t ith non-moral value theory: ti th f hih t t f th ld (thi tht h ) h i t i i l hih h d i l d t fh th l ith ith dil ki ith dil ti Wht k th l l i i t h t th t lti f l h t bt f outcomes or states ways the world might be Of course such states might nclude agency and character But even here the evaluation of the state (as something that happens) can be distinguished from the evaluation of the act or character trait that i t i t t f t h t t t Th iht i t t l t h i k it ld h b d if Hitl h d b i t d tht tht ld h b d thi t h h d b f th li it ld h d if h iti ld h h b ll A ill tilit iht d tht h killi ld b b t th i t i t h t th would be no incoherence in holding it to be wrong and at the same time thinking that the state of the world of Hitler's being assassinated would on balance have been a good thing to have occurred C t i l i t lt h i ll t h t th l iht d f t d t i d b th l d f relevant consequences Th h t kid fi hih tilit t h i diid Fit d t b i l th di b bi b d difft t h i f l l A t i l i t ith h d i t l th di t hih l i th l i t i i d ill di f l ith h hld tht i i h h i t i l l t l t b d thi in themselves Second consequentialist theories can also disagree by holding hat consequences of different sorts are relevant to determining moral right and wrong Act-consequentialism holds that whether a given act is right depends on the value of th f that act d ith th l f th f th t th t ld d i th i t A d i t ruleconsequentialism th th h d th i h t f t d d th t f th t b t f th il t f l ii fbiddi itti th t d ith th f ti th ibl l f tht kid f If ti l ii t f tht kid ld have the best consequences then the act is morally required And consequentialism can take other forms too All forms of consequentialism however understand moral evaluation to be an t f instrumental extrinsic l t th t f d t l l l All b d t h i f th i t i i l l f t d ll th l tt f t d h t b d t i i hih t il l tit f h t th b t i t t f ti th t lbl tt F t t i l i ll i h t t i th t' b t ilbl i t t f d i l l Ad l t i l i d th i h t f t

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b th dit f ill libl l tht i thi tiiti i il practices of moral reasoning and criticism the best instruments of that kind for producing nonmoral value In principle virtually any theory of outcome value can be harnessed to a conse tilit l th Hitill h tili h b d d tf t l b h i l h h h t h h t tht lbl t t h i l th li f i bi W iht ll benefit consequentialism th i tht lbl tt ll th d lf f bi th d tht l t t ltitl b b d thi It i ibl t b l i h tht thi b f t h bi b affecting something other than the quality of its experience or conscious mental states For example perfectionists sometimes assert that a being's approximating an ideal for its kind is intrinsically beneficial to it This is what leads to the conclusion fAittl' f " f t i " t tht h d flihi it i llt dititil h t i i t ( A i t t l 1998) B dl h b f t tilit h t d d t hld tht l b f t d h d til b ht itil til fft thi t l li tht i t f tili h l d ith hedonistic desire-based f The most popular form historically has been utilitarianism which is distinguished by three features First utilitarians are benefit consequentialists who because they hold either hedonistic or desirebased conceptions of benefit maintain either hedon iti d i b d tili S d tiliti h l d t h t th l l f t i d t i d b i th b f t d t t ll f f t d ti A d thid tiliti bli t h t th l iht f ti th

I II

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th

tt

l d t i d b h Th l i l hedonistic t i l i t i f lti i Bth f l hld tht h i i i d tt d tht l b b f t d l b th i t i i liti f thi i i that is by the degree of pleasure that they experience compared to their pain or suffering (Bentham 1970) A different kind of utilitarianism based as much per haps on a freestanding value of autonomy as on a conception of happiness holds tht idiidl' lf i d t i d b hi di d f Si l h f f thi th th th i t i i liti f thi i tt thi desire-satisfaction f f tilitii h th difft i l i t i f h d i t i F l iht t l di th i l f ti ild Adi tifti f f tilitii ld i h thi f t i f f i th if i it d tib tion to the quality of any being's experience (say because the individual in question did not know anything about the area's survival) Although consequentialists have usually been utilitarians or benefit consequen tilit f t th i thi i th l i f tili tht t i t it t th i P h i l h h f t l d tht h thi k ld d t d i fidhi l b t d titi d th l t l ti it d ti h i t i i l tht t b d d t th b f t th bi t h ( th t i t ) lif Aft ll f d t tifti t h l t i l th appreciation f th l th l t

28

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

Th id t h t th l bliti tht t l t i i thi hallmark of moral theories According to deontologists agency and action are not simply instruments for producing valuable states Rather actions are based on reasons and principles and some important moral principles crucially i l th t' lti t i ( th b i ) i th t h f f t It i l t h h t t b ki f t f ti f l t h t it ill i l (tht i )h i th b t i f i d b k i i dili fd d S tilit t h i l t h h t ll ith th t f l R l t i l i ill if d l if it d the greatest overall value (assessed agentneutrally) for there to exist social prac tices of moral criticism and psychological patterns of moral reasoning that are themselves guided by agentrelative rules according to which it is a wrongmaking ft f ti t h t it i l ' (th t') h i th b t i f i d d M it i i d l d t i l i t t h t thi i C t i l i t ll t h t th t ffti t d th t t ll l i W t b idd b t t i l i i thi d l i b t i d l itii th lt ld b h f many different reasons Shared rules are necessary to coordinate complex cooper ation establish reliable expectations diminish selfserving rationalizing and special pleading when the longrun effects of particular actions are unclear and so on In th d h l t i l i t ill t h t th f d t l f ti h t l t i l d i i l i t h t thi i i t tll fl i ti tt h l i t t l

Dtl Deontological theories depart from consequentialism on this fundamental point They hold that what is morally right and wrong is not determined at any level of l i b ht ld t th b t t tt d t t l l Th b k t i l f th ibilit f l lti f tt tht bth t t l d ll l t D t l di ith t t i l i i hldi tht d i d bd t i t th l thi t h t t d t k t iht D t l l di ith l t i l i i hldi t h t th h thi i t tht b l i i it t b itlf d th b t t D t l i t hld that at least some fundamental moral principles or ideas are agentrelative "all the way d o w n " Contractualism is one example of a deontological theory since it holds that moral i i l d d i th f d t l t l t i id f lii ith th t f t l t A thi h t i l i i i Th i t t i i hl fll D t l d tili dfi th tll l i d h t i f ti t h i f l iht d G l l t t l i d t t i i d t l i l t h i f l i d i thi h Vit t h i i d

30

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b S d d t moral t h i t ll b t l t i cases as replacements when put forward as part of a critique of morality (see "Virtue Theory" below) Some are deontological theories And some are consequen tialist in at least some important respects Thus Francis Hutcheson (see below) d d it th di t hih i l b l th h i h t it d d f ttilitii th d t h t thi th t ith th d l i b t i i i l d i thi h i h t i t Bt d t l i l t h i d i i l ft d f d d ditl itht t t t i t d th i th id t h t i h l d t b h b i Hitill th i fd t l h b l l d intuitionist i f intuitionism. What characterizes intuitionism in general is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of different right or wrongmaking features whose moral relevance cannot be derived from some more fundamental principle or reasoning but can only be fid b l flti " i t i t i " Thi iht b d ditl h f l it bi flti t h t th f t t h t ti ld t t b t l b k i t t i t it ll O it i thiki b t l i ifi f i t h flt th " t l l b l " it i d t tht i h d allowing it to happen are morally different Another example defended by some deontologists is the "doctrine of double effect" according to which there is a moral difference between causing harm or evil i t d d idfft f i t d d ti li di t d i th h il d i t l ith d t d Th l t h h it i t i b l thi h i t iili di d i ti f l h b b i ilit t t ll b f lti it ld t b t t t kill th b f iili ditl if d i ld d th lbl d f it i i i O i f thi i h i h thi i i l h l d i t t l i th controversial issue of abortion Since abortion aims directly at the death of the fetus it is sometimes argued that it is morally worse than another action would be which caused the fetus's death only as an unintended sideeffect While it might be permis ibl t f dil d tht i t t ' lif t th i k f killi th f t it i d tht b t i ft t th ' lif i ll th l b it i i i i b l t t i l killi D t l i l ititiit h d f d d id it fi d d t i i l d t i f iht ki ft f d t I dditi t the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between "doing and allowing" there have been claimed to be: duties of beneficence or mutual aid duties of non maleficence ("do no harm" along with the idea that these are weightier other thi bi l th dti fb f i ) dti f titd f b l h dti f titti f di j i d dti f fidlit l t i t i d t t dti f l l t i h i (ildi th f f i d t hild fil b d tk ll) f i l dti dti i t d t ( h t l d ) dti f i i t d fi l fth dti fj t i d t i t th i l (t th t t t h t th h

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tb i l d d l d ) dti t l d i th Of it itionists do not agree about every doctrine or principle not even about all we have mentioned But they are none the less agreed that some such list of independent principles or doctrines is correct and that the principles on the list cannot be derived f f d t l i i l th h t t l i tili Bth i t i t i i t d t t l i t d t l i t h l d t h t th i h t i R l ' h " i t th d" ( R l 1971 3 0 3 ) Th b l i tht t t t t di th i h t f t t l t l i b d t fil i th ti f h t it i i h t t d i tht f t f l ithi the world defined by a complex set of relations to others who make widely varying claims on us owing to these different relations What states of affairs would be good to exist considered as from some agentneutral observer's standpoint may f there h l b th idti tht l t t ht l t h l d d Bt dti d d l ithi th t t b iht t l t ifll th i d lti t d i d tht ti bi t t d i t th t d tit t t t t th h i t i f th ith h i t t d Many of these relations were listed in passing above but we should have them before us more explicitly We cannot begin to exhaust them but it will be helpful to give some idea of their range (1) Dti f bf d lf Lik tilit d t l i t bli tht h ti f f t th d f th (th t l t d h th b i h h lf d) l h l t ht hld d ll B t th l i i t j t t h t th lbl d i l b l t t t It l tt ht t d t lti h t th f f t d ti ( d ht l ti ti bi t h ) H i th i ( ij d t the other) other things being equal than forbearing to benefit It is not ust the causing of a disvaluable state; it is doing harm to some being Doing harm is worse also than failing to prevent it And directly intending harm is worse than causing it i t d d idfft (2) Dti f il Vi i l lti f tki i i t il bliti fb f i Th t h bliti t t th lf f thi hild tht h t th th d t i fb f h t th i l Ad i i l l f t t d th lti f ilid h d t t h d h ibl f t h i tients' or students' medical or educational welfare (3) Duties of honesty and fidelity Obligations not to lie or intentionally mislead to keep promises not to violate contracts and more generally not to encourage tti i t d t t t ll fit d th l t f k i fith d t ilti t t V i l l t i h i lik th f f i d l d b l d d thi bi ll (4) Dti dii f t' d t i t ' hiti f dt Wh d ij th i d t i t th t k l d flt d ff titti ( t f l t ) Wh th bfit i dti f titd t d th

32

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{patient-benevolence) A ' t d t ll f it sponse especially from those who have special responsibilities to respond appropri ately to merit and desert such as judges of various kinds (patient desert) (5) Duties of reciprocity and fair play There is a duty to do one's part in mutually d t ti ill h l t i l t ti bfit C t t i / t t l i t thi d t f d t l F titi i t it i i l i d d t l i t t dt th fth dti fjti d i f litil (6) Further duties of justice V i lti f l f tht f l itihi H h dti t t j t litil d tht tblih d t t b i iht d hi distributive justice Where actual political relations are lacking as in the nter national context justice may require that we do our part to help establish ustice more widely through more extensive political forms i dti d d l lti I (7) Duties to other species H dditi t d t i fb f d lfi i i l bli ti t b f ti i i t hit fi t t i ith th E if th i l t b fll t i ti h i d t i t th i t th i hih h i l d th i lives and ourselves in theirs Pets are an obvious example but no less significant may be cases where species are themselves shaped and cultivated for human pur poses in ways that give them special needs and vulnerabilities Thi l i t i i hdl h t i It h l d b b i t thi it h t h t th d i i f i t l ill i i t b l i l t j t i l i i l iht ki idti bt l bi ti f i i l idti Si ititiiti d t l j t th id tht hi i i l id f i it i t f h i h th i i l idti iht b i t t d iitid h d i t i t i i t bli t h t th b i f l flti i t d thinking about concrete cases? W D Ross distinguished between the claim that a given duty or right or wrong making consideration holds prima facie that is other things being equal and he iti tht i t l i t thi th i l dt ll thi i d d h t it sans phrase (R 1963) (Si " i f i " t thi i t l i l h i l h d ikl t th t "pro tanto" [" f it "] Th t l id i t h t iht ki idti i tht k t iht other things being equal h tht t h t th l ll l t ft th th ti would be right or wrong all things considered or "sans phrase") It was claims of the former sort that Ross held to be selfevident to intuition To render a moral judgment in any actual case however it is necessary to reflect on all of the morally l t f t d h th i t t T tk fili kid f h id t d thi f ltil d i t l t fid lf l d i iti t i th id i t h t hih h h di H bth i d d ti t h iht b t i ihti d id It ld b t t d l i f i it b t th lf f th i ti ii i t i d l bliti t

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t th i i B t thi i t th l i hih l considerations can interact Sometimes one consideration can wholly defeat an other When for example a benefit one is in a position to provide is tainted by injustice this may cancel the positive reason to provide the benefit and not ust t i h it Ultitl i t i t i i t it th i i l btitt t fll idi thil i ll f t h i lit A l i " f t i " it i riht ki f t i f i dti i i t t t f th Bt h b th i t t i tht i t i t i i t bli df l f l t i d b t t th t t grips with these complex interactions in a way that leads to a reflective sense of what moral verdict they will ultimately support

Vit

Th

C t t r i i / t t l i tili dd t l ll l t h i M i thi i d i t l d ith til questions we have been considering these theories as accounts of morally right conduct An approach called virtue ethics frequently associated with Aristotle is orthogonal to these theories in both respects First virtue is concerned primarily ht ith h t th th d t ith h h l d be th th h l d d Ad d it thi i f t l d d t l th bt t f th thill d t fh lif t h t it i ti d ttil i l t d h l t f lit d it dititi f Th ti f lit t f i l d fill thritti l b h i h ll l t t r i l l obligated i far from the only form that ethical reflection can take (Anscombe 1958; Maclntyre 1981; Williams 1985; Slote 1992) The modern idea of morality derives from a distinctive historical tradition the JudeoChristianIslamic idea of divinely ordained l t h i h it i l S h i l h h d t h t thi ti f lit i i l dfti i ri d tht thil flti ld fitbl tk th f S l h h d thi ii thil th l k d t A r i t t l ' Nicomachean Ethics f ti F A i t t l th f d t l ti i t f Mill H b b K t " W h t i th f d t l i i l f l riht d t dh iht thi b d f d d h i l h i l l ? " A r i t t l k th " W h t i th l f human life?" "What kind of life is best for human beings?" Aristotle's is a distinctive kind (a paradigm perhaps) of non-moral virtue ethics "nonmoral" again because although Aristotle's translators frequently use "moral i t " t i l t h t h i tlki b t ll f h t tht d ith h i Aittl d t l t th it t ti f l l d h i h ll tbl l Vit f Aittl di k dt id h t iti t h ht i fi bl (kalori) f it i b Th ti ti i ht N i t h lld " k d i " ideal ith t t hih b btt t l tht 34

THEORIES OF ETHICS

li ith ilt F A i t t l th ti thil ti h esteem pride and disdain or contempt not guilt respect selfrespect and moral indignation Virtues are excellences {arete) traits that is that make something an excellent i t f it k i d It i it i kif f l t h t it h h d t h t it t ll I l k hih t i t ll ( l l t ki) i lti t thi' f t i (ergon) h t i t i tiit A A i t t l bli t h t th h t i t i tiit d i t i t i fh bi i ti ( i ) tht dititil h f f hi (f ti l d i t h l bl fi (kl)) h ld t h t th it tit f character that is settled dispositions to choose certain actions and avoid others as intrinsically noble or base We might put his point by saying that human excel lences are states of character concerned with choices that are themselves guided by idl fh ll I l l it thi i h ( l ) h idl A l t h h it b tid i Aittl' t t l l i l f t i i t i f h t di t h i h th i thi tht h bi i h t l f to b it d t b b d A l it thi b put forward simply as a normative view about which traits in human beings are worthy of esteem (or disdain) Analogously a moral virtue ethics is a theory of what is worthy of distinctively moral esteem that is traits that are worthy of esteem in a moral agent E l f h i b f d i Libi d th i h t t h t Sttih h i l h F i Hth Th H t h d t h t th b i l h i t f b l th d i t b f i t th d k th h M l t h hld i t iril f t bt f ti tit f h t l th d i t d d t f h bi d th t i t bi Th i i h i h th f it thi iht b ti of case or practical ethics First nonmoral virtue ethics reminds us that questions of right and wrong are far from the only or perhaps even the most important ethical questions we can ask in specific cases Thus it might be that failing to provide i i f i t l id t li ld h d ffri l t h h t i l ll th l ift i f l d lftifti O if th i t i t thi t h t b d jtl t t d l t t i till ift i i t t t i t d t d th i t l l t i t tht t dd ith l i i fll tifi h if S d ti f th i t i i d d t h ht action it is appropriate to take in specific cases In considering what to do it may be helpful to ask what a virtuous person or someone with a specific virtue (say generos ity) would do in that case This may simply be a useful heuristic but it may also flt th A i t t l i i t h t th i ff l t i thil iht t tht b d d ll lid b h l k th id " " f th i t A L i A t i td t h "If h t k 'll k " id b t j Thid i t thiit tf d ti f it t i l id t it ( ll i h t ) ti bt t f ht k ti

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it ll i h t Th it b hld tht ti i th iht or appropriate thing to do in some case or circumstance just in case it is what the virtuous person would (characteristically) do in that circumstance (Hursthouse 1999) Such a view might depart from the letter of Aristotle's position since he idtifd it ttld d i i t i t h ifi ti f thi k ( b l ) Thi ld t k hih t i t it d d hih ti bl t i N t h l i it ld h l d t h t t th it f ti i ibl t h h th id d t f it h i ld i it l t Aittl' i f d t l iit W h t i t it thi i th id t h t id t sial questions of case ethics can be gained only by looking to the virtues or the virtuous person as a model Writers on case ethics therefore look to virtue ethics less frequently than they do t th thil t h i ill h th d ith i f l iht d If j d t f l bliti iliitl diti hldi th tbl f li it ill b bl t d d tht tifi ti f th j d t b f l t d i t t h t th b j t t th d t i i i l t It i thi d d tht h l d t th k i d f normative moral theories that have been advanced by contractarian/contractual ists consequentialists and deontologists In each case the goal has been to articu late actionguiding principles of right conduct that can be grasped and applied itht il it th th th j d t f ll t t l t

Rf A b G E M (1958) M d l h i l h Philosophy 33 1 1 9 Aristotle (1998) Nicomachean Ethics trans W D Ross New York: Oxford University Press Bth J (1970) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation d J H B dH L A H t L d Athl Dancy Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons Oxford: Blackwell Social Philosophy and Policy 14 D l l Sth (1997) S l f i t t d lf Cbid U i i t P 15878 Al i Ell F P l ( d ) Self-interest C b i d CO W t i P (1998) Philosophical Ethics B l d (2002) Welfare and Rational Care Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press G t h i D i d (1986) Morals by Agreement O f d C l d P H Gilbrt (1975) M l ltii d f d d The Philosophical Review 84 3 2 2 I d i l i EST H k t t H b b Th (1994) Leviathan d E M C l Hursthouse Rosalind (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford: Oxford University Press K t I l (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals d d t M G N Y k Cbrid U i i t P McDowell John (1979) Virtue and reason The Monist 62: 3 3 1 5 0 IN U i i t fNt D M l t A l d i (1981) After Virtue N t D BbbMrill Mill J h S t t (1957) Utilitarianism d Ok P i t I d i l i The Philosophical Review 95 163207 Rilt P t (1986) M l li Rawls John (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University

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(1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press Ross W D (1963) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press Rousseau Jean-Jacques (1987) The Social Contract. In The Basic Political Writings, trans Donald A Cress Indianapolis IN: Hackett Scanlon T M (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Slote Michael (1992) From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press Thomson Judith (1976) Killing letting die and the trolley problem The Monist, 59: 204-17 Williams Bernard (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

Further reading Darwall Stephen (ed) (forthcoming) Contractarianism/Contractualism. Oxford: Blackwell (forthcoming) Deontology. Oxford: Blackwell (ed) (forthcoming) Virtue (Ethics). Oxford: Blackwell

37

3 P t

Riht

d Wlf

Rditibti

JEREMY WALDRON

I ll d iti t it it ith b j t t I th U i t d Stt th 1999 fi l t h t th i t l 21 illi fili ith h h l d i i f $100000 d th 16 illi f i l i ith h h l d i l th $ 1 7 0 0 0 M t f th l t t lii i t j d d b ffiil " t li" (tiltd tl b the US authorities as around $ 1 7 5 2 4 per annum for a family of four) Defining poverty is of course difficult and controversial But we may understand it in a h d d l t d i t tht i b f i h h l d t tdl k h d hi bt tifi i d f f thi b (hlt i i l l titi f d bt t bth b i dil hlt bt t bth dil hlt d i i l l triti f d bt t d t lthi d ) P fili th th h d h i d th hih bl th il t t i f ll the needs of all their members and devote an amount to items going well beyond need that would be sufficient if spent differently to satisfy all the basic needs of many many more N dbt h ld b id b t th dfiti M h i l h d il i t i t h d i d f idi b l t dfiti f " t " lid f ll iti d i t (S 1992) Thi i tl b t i dfid i t f d d t t t f d t d t b lti t th i t f i it Wht t b i di ltil b tti lik A r i it iht b d i f f t f ht t b i di l it ( B b k 1987) O i l l it i td tht we should pin down the concept to survival so that we count something as a need only if a person will die without it But even this remains ambiguous How ikely must death be and how imminent? What does the formulation assume about l lif t d tlit t t ? A A t S it t P l h b k t i ith i d i b l littl titi d th t b lti i t f lif tti dit liit id I ft physical opulence seems to go on increasing with nutrition over a very wide range Th i diffilt i d i li h d th lld " i i tri

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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

tional requirements" have an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations bt d i (S 1981) N t

f thi d

i

tht dfiti bl f th

hld i i d t f d di

t h t tht iti t

i l flti t W d diiti fi d lth d t h t it i th f i th iti t i t i t th t fft

i thil iifi f th diiti A society with great disparities of wealth will face pressure for some sort of redistribution of income so that a proportion of the assets that the prosperous enjoy is diverted to satisfy the basic needs of the very poor Such pressure might be i t d b th llff d b i l th f h i th ditibti ht i i d th t d i d d th it i likl t b B t if th li d t d th l l f it it l th id f ditibti i i t t i i It h l l t t h i k b t th l tt ll th i iifi f th h b lth d i ll d t i d S th l ditibti tht t b l i d t i d b th di ti f kt (ildi th kt f l b ) Is the demand for redistribution a reproach to these processes? Or do these processes have a significance of their own that may be used as a basis for criticizing particular redistributive schemes? Maybe the economist who defends market processes as d i t i ffii l t h i i t i ill t t tht df t itii d i t i b t i h tht h ditt kt t O b ditibti b itiid l d f di th l i i b i l i t f i i t f d i t i th lb i f th t i t l t f th h llff M t f thi h t ill f th l th th th i t It is important however to understand that the two are related Market processes are not just valued instrumentally; economists do not normally advocate setting up any old allocative arrangements that happen to conduce to efficiency Markets are l d b thi titti t t bd i t t i i l f it l t Th f d t l l f kt "N t f itht t" d "K t t " l l i i l d t d t f ll ll ill h th iltd S it' tht lf ditibti d i t t lb kt th t t f kt i t i i ld j t i l i t it ft h t f l reproach as well for it is seeking implicitly to defend institutions that have inherent moral significance even apart from their outcomes Modern societies adopt two main redistributive strategies for mitigating the rigors f t F i t th id b f i d titi (f l bli d t i d i ti i l hlth ) t ll iti ti f t h i bilit t S d th id l i t ith i h i kid t l b f i i h d t h h f th t d th t t f h t d th diti h i h it i granted vary widely between societies and within societies over time Both types of provision raise interesting moral issues but I shall focus mainly on the second type

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ft d i b d " l f " b it ditibti i l i t i evident In fact the extent of the redistribution involved in actuallyexisting welfare schemes is easy to exaggerate At the time of writing in the United States federal b d t t t d lf t i t l t t f d 6 t f t di S lt tk i l l fil ith h h l d i f ( ) $100000 b t 35 t f thi i f d l t Of t h t $35000 t f d f th f i l t th US T d 6 t i d t d t lf t f T t it th th fil i l i i d t tibt l lihtl th 2 t f it t t l household income to the poor (slightly more when state taxes and transfers are taken into account) Given the extent of poverty in the United States a 2 percent contribution from each of the most prosperous households must be regarded as a fil d t t Still th ti ti i i f i t t f ld d th l f $2000 ( ) i bb i l M d f d f lf ditibti ft i t i i th t t f d d th US t i l d th ll f h hih l l f ii f th l l f ii hih might well require a contribution two or three times greater than that currently paid by welloff American households We have to evaluate these proposals as well So how should we think about welfare from a moral point of view? How should we t h i k b t th 2 6 t fi ( th $ 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 ) t h t lf d t thik f i l (lt' if th h d f h h h l d " P " ) should f i d i t t t d id t th i d i t ( tti f h hll if "Idi")? P h i l h i l dbt b t th thi f lf ii t d t f th compulsory t f th t f T t i d d i t i b t i i l f d t f t l t f P i d (It i t Idi hth h claims the welfare assistance to which his household is entitled) One could imagine Prospero being quite happy to make a voluntary donation to Indigo's family But he may be affronted by the fact that this money has to be paid to the US Treasury for d it lti fl ffiil d i t i b t i I f t R b t N i k (1974 169) td tht hld dt t i f i " ith f d l b " If P i f d t i 2 t f hi i f k t Idi th h i i f f t f d t k f Idi f b t k N N i k k l d tht P i t litll f d t k f tht k h ld i k ltth db welfare recipient himself Prospero chooses to work and having made that choice he has to devote a week of his year to Indigo's sustenance But as Nozick observes coercion often involves such hard choices When a robber threatens me with a beat i l I t l l hi th biti t f I t k th b t i ( d k th b i t i ) if I t t Still t f ld if I d i th biti d t h t th I f d t d Th bb h fll t k t ti I titld t t h t i keep-the-combination-and-not-get-beaten R l t i tht b l i h h d itti i d t t ht h t (Nik 1972) Th ti i t i i Bt ti t h t t t i th l

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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

N i k t tblih tht k f l f d t t r i b t i t t h an appropriate baseline for thinking about whether taxandtransfer should count as coercing Prospero He must present this as an option that Prospero is antecedently entitled to so that it is wrong and coercive for the government to take it away n d t t hi t k ( littl) f th ll f h i l f Bt f tht' tl f th it ti Oth t b t i t th l lit f th t f S h i l h h d tht t t li d i P ' tibti f l t f it b l f d ditibti th l h f th l lit t h t i h t b hibitd i l t t f hit (Rothbard 1970) But this objection is hardly conclusive For one thing the elem ent of charity or generosity though important is not the only morally important feature of the transaction A benevolent act has two features: the admirable motiv ti f th i d th h d d b f i t t th i i t Th d f th d t l it i i f i h th f i t i d i d W ti ll t tht tibt t th' d d hih t i l l t f dill beneficent t dt b l t ( K t i l i 1976) A it i t l tht tt li does f f t ti i th manner complained of Consider an analogy: most of us refrain from murder be cause of our recognition that murder is wrong; and that does not cease to be our motive when we realize that the state will punish us if we commit such an act The l t f li t b k t th i t ti it d t il l t it Adittdl th f t d t f i litd W l th tt t l t f th t i th f th f h b l i i f f i i t ti bt l t t th t tht lik P ill it i th t t t P h h h ill b f i t f th h Th fit f th ft d i d d h t h t th l lit f th giving is not the straightforward benevolence that is involved in giving alms to a beggar There are other elements as well elements of fairness and mutual assur ance among donors The idea is that each person who can should make a fair t b f i t h li t t (1) d t i ht tibti ld be f i tibti (2) d i t th llti f tibti d (3) id h tibt ith tht h th i tht hi h tiiti i t i i B t th liti d t d i th l t f d i l l I ll t f th h i l t h i t t l l iti t if b t th d t b d d d d ht ld b reasonable amount to give Modern tithing is like that; so is the voluntary support I give to my local orchestra; and a great deal of charitable aid involves money being given to agencies without the donor having any idea of who in particular (in some t th th id f th ld) ill b f i t f hi h d t i O d t d tht b l b l th th i l idd t t d l bl it i l t t th itii tht tt i l t il d i th t h i l l t A hititd i f th bjti li tht t f t d t f t t th bliti tht P d b t d l h t h l th 41

JEREMY WALDRON

t h h it perfect b l i t i lik hi b l i t i t k i Bt maybe the moral obligation to help the poor is more like an imperfect duty one that commands concern for the welfare of others but which is understood to leave a certain amount of latitude for free choice in determining what to do about it (see Stk 1967) F l I t b I lk dN Y k d t h h I it ld b t t i t f th I t b d t i t b h th I id t ifi iti t f t h t i t d h t f C t i l it ld i i l lti t th b t tht f th h I right t f it i i h t f t i d tt i (t least to some) but the choice is mine and it is not the subject of any rightful demand on their part A perfect obligation by contrast that is an obligation determining a particular action that must be performed (or as the case may be ittd) i h it f ( i i ) i i ti II b l t d ith iht I h f t bliti t h f dit h h iht t b id b d I d t h ll t t d hi t bt t ll h th ti f t i Thi b j t i t t d t f i th tj t lit b t li Nor is it a matter of Prospero having the right to neglect the demands of morality for the sake of his own wellbeing According to Kant (1996: 153) an imperfect duty "is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions but only ii t liit i fdt b th ( l f ' ihb lb l f ' t) b h i h i f t th f l d f th ti f it i i d d " It i til t d t flt ht lit h lld " i thi" th h l ti tht ht t th t i l d t th d d b f f d lif if h lif i t ilbl t ll ( N l 1991) I t d th i tht thi i h t l d i t i i th l l i bi td it it i dt minate requirement from which all elements of individual udgment have been removed I think the language of imperfect obligation needs to be examined quite carefully i thi t t A h th id i d t b tht P t dt bt d t d t ll f th l i f d tht t hi ttti Nt li t t li f iht i t hi N h thi? S l it i t b l th d f some l tt ( i til l ti f t h ) Th ll tt Th it f tlk t id t ibilit f fi f t dt t b t h t Prospero i them all In other words a given claim's mattering Indigo's claim for example does not mean it amounts to a right against Prospero But Indigo may still have a right against the class of eligible dutybearers: it ought to be the case that someone f tht l d t hi d d l tht i t ld t b th id f i f t dt Bt h l k t it i thi t h t th id f t d t f t does t th ti f i f t dt A t f lf ii i tb d th i tht Idi h iht i t P It i b d th th i t h t th l f liibl d t b h bt th fll ibilit f th d f ll f th h i i h d

42

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

N tht d d f lit iht b l i d t h h th h h d l tion of random voluntary performances of individual imperfect duties; or it might be satisfied by an orchestrated taxandtransfer system which elicits a fair share from each of the eligible dutybearers for the collective fulfillment of all of the claims that iht b d b h f th it i i t Th diff i f ffi i t l i i l A l t i l l th i thi i th ti f iht i d f ifi h th b f th lti d t ( M C i k 1977 201) A d i t J h R ' (1984) i f l t i l t hld tht X h iht h t tht idiidl i t t fXi ffiitl important to justify holding others not necessarily any specified other to be under a duty There certainly seem to be good arguments for regarding Indigo's interests in this light that is as the basis of a moral right to welfare and I will go nto th i t Bf I d th i lii bjti S iti (Th t 1984 1394) t b d th id f lf iht d l it ith f needs I t h i k thi ti i b d i d t d i It f th t t f li ith th ti f i hih tht li i h d (It i lik i hld t t l dti d tth telling!) The language of rights as nowadays understood is perfectly accommodating to a concern about human need There used to be controversy in the analysis of rights about whether rights should be regarded as essentially negative in character; tht i iht t i t f d t th f f i t i il it tht lf iht ld i ( Wld 1996) B t thi t h l l b b d d th i f t i l d d i i iht h b btti tt t lti Adittdl tti th f lf ii i t f iht d t il th lit b t li f l t h h iht ft dd li t h t it i it t f tht t f th d t fll i t l i l b it f use of the Razian template (I shall return to this in a moment) Also whether we should advocate the incorporation of welfare rights into a constitution and their enforcement by courts is a still further matter and well beyond the scope of this h t Nthi I h t t df f constitutional lf iht I dfdi th id f lf i h t th t fili t t i l t f t l t i f iht tht l d d i t t Th f l H Sh (1980) tht fll j any i h t t h t h h i d t h if h h l k th til f bl hlth d ti lif Th i h t t h t t fili t iht t iil d political liberty evoke images of autonomy rational agency and independence But we know that things like malnutrition epidemic disease and exposure can debili tate and finally destroy all the human faculties that such rights presuppose There is t f Idi lii th t f t lif t h t h i id h tlk b t iil d l i t i l i h t if h i i tt f bjt d d t d Th th h t tht i t tk h t l f ttki t h t i th i l t tk h idiidl d d b f f dtitti t d t ldi f bit If t l t h diitlf t fll tht l h it d

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JEREMY WALDRON

d i th i t fh lif it ll i t t t d t th needs of persons whose ability to function as agents is threatened by poverty or disease or by the fear of those predicaments Or we can try a more direct approach Instead of saying that welfare provision s f thi l (f t f i f l iil d litil libt) iht i l i i t tht ii f di f d t l t f t f N if thi i t t d thi b t iti t d t f h it i littl h d t dit W l f ii tl tid t i t th i t littl l t t b dd f d t l i h t f it h t i t i l l t itlf dd t tblihd h f property and market economy rather than as a basic determinant of social arrange ments If we want to pursue the idea of a basic right to welfare we will do better to regard it in the first instance as a rather abstract right involved in the very founda ti f litil d i th d th k f th t f i b t t d t f W ld t thi f d t i l h h t t th l tt f i lit b t th ditibti t f lf Th lik P h t d t id f d f lf ditibti t d t of wealth and income that is legally theirs (Even when Prospero's salary is taxed at source still the taxes are paid out of funds to which he is legally entitled by contract with his employer for example) But the fact that the money legally belongs t P d t ttl th ti f hth P i titld t it tt fj t i Whth iti h f t di ditibti j t i l ti If th t t h t i if th iti h i j t th t tth h l iht t P ' lit b t bi f d t tibt t lliti fI d i ' liht M b k l tt t P ' iti i l b it f th f t t h t it i id b iti iti l b t th i t h t thi ld i t th level of a justiceclaim is to say the least a very controversial theorem n the theory of justice and false on most accounts We can try a similar analysis from Indigo's end Apart from the taxandtransfer idi I d i ' t f it t l l i t hi t h iht h l l tt ht N t h l it i h t b itk t d I d i ' t l " l " li A b d tht I d i ' t t i li fj t i li tht h b it f th i fjti fit ll l l ititti Idi b lii tht h d l lik hi ( h h d hi t ) t t d fairly in the initial distribution of resources and opportunities Maybe their wealth and livelihood was stolen or maybe they were never given the chance that ustice would demand to secure wealth and livelihood for themselves If this is the basis of I d i ' li d i l l if it i th b i hih ll i ti th iti llti f lth d i t P th P ' lit b t ditibti i ltil f i i l It i lik th lit f b l lltblihd d t fb l h thi i l l t t i fill t d t (th h i f) t h i i t i Phill ditibti i tki l bt t tht i ll i t t T d thi it i l hdi t

44

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

th f f t it t t h thi littl t d lf ii involving this sort of rectification for the welfare schemes that we are focusing on do not involve any serious physical redistribution of land or other assets But that's just because they are so modest (or miserly) The fundamental case for welfare is t h t th lliti f t i th least t h t j t i i l b i ijti i th d i t i b t i f lth d t i t i d d d Th i t f thi f d t i l h t th d f f lf ii i iditd l b f i N i k (1974) A l t h h it i h t i id t b h iht t i l d N i k it t t h t th hih ld h t b d t t i f th d l d b owned by individuals He argues that if private property entitlements in fact cover all the relevant resources there is nothing to be done so far as welfare provision is concerned: the property rights that particular individuals have over particular thi "fill th f iht l i f l iht t b i ti t i l d i t i " ( N i k 1974 238) N i thi b j t i ht li b d d ltil fiil l i l th f i t i t l t It i t h h first d t i d h ht d only then t i d h t d lft tifd S fNik' li t tht this order of priorities is unavoidable: "Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them" (1974: 160) He thinks that this is clearest in the case of body parts: Indigo may need Prospero's kidneys but Pros ' t i t l t t th i il i t I d i ' f t P ' tt itht ii i tht tt ihtfl li t th l i b ll d tht k hi h h i B t N i k t h i k t h t thi i i t t l f th t l b j t tht l k " I ' t it i l i b l tht h hldi d d d t it h f f t t ll h hld h l d h t ? " (1974 155) Th t b l ith lf iht thi t i tht th " t t b j t if th df h t f t h i " lik from heaven "[I]s this the appropriate model" he asks "for thinking about how the things people produce are to be distributed?" (1974: 160 198) I am not saying that Nozick is right about this But the challenge of his objection i t h t it f t f t th i f l iit N i k i it i h t l t h t th id f lf iht th id t h t I d i ' i h t t iht b b d i l d th th hi h i d it f d it d it i hll t d t d i f i t t Th ti f t ill b if it i l bjt t b t hll thi b i S h thik h t h ith til l have acquired property entitlements in particular things or people in general have a right to material and economic security even when they cannot provide it for themselves One or other of these things can be true but not both We do not have t tNik' lti f thi dil i d t ith hi b t th i t f f t i it h t l d liitl If tt f t thi i ithi th fi f Niki th th hld b i b ii tht ll tbl t f P ' t i t l t t hi t tb ditd i th f th initial i iti f f t i l l d d th f t f dti W

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t tlk f t iht i t lf ii til h th tht deals with "the issues of how unheld things may come to be held the things that may come to be held by these processes the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process and so on" (Nozick 1974: 150) What's more we must develop i i l f iiti tht t h ' f d t l iht t d i t f thi ld t h t i hit A l t ll i t h i f t i tht t i t i th J h L k i it i t b l l i iht f t ll t i th l t t f th d (Lk 1988 170) d i t b hi llk t i k th jtifiti f i t t ith th iti tht l i t i t iti leaves "enough and as g o o d i n common for others" (1988: 288) And Nozick despite his exclusionist bluster recognizes it too with his "Lockean proviso" (Nozick 1974: 178) I l th h t th d f f lf iht tht I i d iht b d t i l d fundamental i th fh t d f I t d f ki th i h t th b i f dt f hit i b t iti thld t t k th b i f lli iti t t t h l it ti t h t th it f unsatisfied material need becomes an objection not just to the way property rights are being exercised (selfishly thoughtlessly etc) but to the very shape and distribu tion of property entitlements themselves In proclaiming welfare rights we are not b i thld t b littl W ki th th d ti b h t i h t d th li t hld thi l i l thi i f f t h ' bjt d? W i i t t h t t t t th t i b l f d t th th d A l t t i l iht h th N i k i f k l t t h d tk difft h t jti h t h t f R l (1971) R l t i i t tht lf iht t b id t dd bt i t f foundational theory of the basic structure of society a structure that includes the whole system of property markets and subsistence We justify the basic structure as a package by showing that it satisfies principles that would be chosen (for that )b i R l ' " i i l iti" h i t f h th t d i th t l ltt ft l t biliti d t I lti t thi t k f il j t i f t i i idiidl i kd t id ht h ld t f il t if h d i d ' t k hth h i t t t t b l k lik P f t t lik I d i R l k tht idiid l f t d ith thi h i ld i i t i i l tht d tht il and economic inequalities were regulated to the advantage in the first instance of the leastwelloff group (This is Rawls's "Difference Principle"; Rawls 1971: 7 5 8 ) Such principles would then govern the whole structure of property markets and bit i tht fi t Th i i l ld t t h l d t i ht titld t b t it ld t b ii if th d d th i t i t t i f thi lik d t f lf ii ( R l 1971 276) A d if th did th ld b bjti t h i i th b i f t i h t f th lf ititti d th t ititti ld b t h b j t i f i d t f th b i t t di 46

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

t th b i i i l (Iidtll I d't t t t tht R l ' theory is the only alternative to Nozick's; but it is the best known of a cluster of theories including Ackerman 1980; Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000 that insist on approaching issues of property poverty and inequality in this holistic ) All thi i b f h i t h t th l i b l d f f lf iht h l d t i t l f i th f d t i f th f t d ti It i t l i ti t libl h i l h Riht t d t bit f d tl t ti f th t d t di d d d ith d ll ith t i ld t h t ti th resources that might (if others let them) enable them to live and flourish The welfare system might seem like an optional addon to a market economy But the advantage of the account I have outlined is that we can view welfare provision as th l i t i l ti f l t h t i l i b It i th flti i d i i tti ti f li tht d d it ll b b t f t thik f it littl th h i t t f t t t d lt h l f th t f hi t h fil t tf d t l h iht i i d i t d b th f t t h t l ti t b itht t th resources that they need in order to live When we take this approach then familiar objections to welfare rights seem much less formidable The objection based on the element of compulsion is no l it b tlki b t iht hih t th b i f th jtifti f th t f t If thik t h t t iht l i t i t l b f d h h t t h i k th b t lf iht h t h b thi iti i t d l f th tifiti f t N hld t h b t th b j t i tht t d t f h i h th h d k i d d th i d l t S h d i t i t i bt it d i dbt i t t B t th t distribution of resources and opportunities; they may not be invoked as a reason for neglecting or postponing economic justice or for failing to do what as we saw earlier may be presented as the very least that justice demands We are not titld t ithhld f idiidl thi tht h h i titld t l b f t h t thi ld i f hi h idl d if thi it li t t it li t lf iht t if th i th b f t f th t ff d t i l tIh td S iti tht lf iht i l t th l i l i i l "Ought i l i can" M ti th d th th t id i i l economic security for masses of their citizens (Cranston 1967) But even if true this is hardly a basis for attacking existing welfare provision in countries where patently the resources are available (even if people would prefer to devote them to thi l) A th l l d i i b i l i t i ft t f ti t h t th iti ditibti f t i t i l l di t b d Wh ti t i t l f lf ii "Th i l i't t h " ht i ll t i t h t it ld b iliti t t t i it f iti thld d i b t t i Th d i l hll t h t th iht t th d l i

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ditibti f lth d i i i l i d O tt t i thi way it becomes pretty clear that the "ought" of human rights is being frustrated not by the "can't" of impracticability but more usually by the "shan't" of blinkered selfishness No doubt where resources are scarce relative to human wants any t f iht t i t l t ill d d i t th h t i d b it If i t i l d ii f lf it it l d d i t t B t if it d ti l d h ii th th t f t iht i h ill l d d i t th ii it d t h t th f i f ki f t h t th d t i A l th ti i t hth t h d i system of demanding rights but how the costs of the demands are to be distributed

References B (1980) Sil Jti i th Libl Stt N H CT Y l U i i t Ak P Braybrooke David (1987) Meeting Needs Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press M i (1967) H iht l d d I D D R h l (d) Plitil C t 4153 Ld Mill Th d th Riht f M Dworkin Ronald (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality Cambridge MA: H d U i i t P K t I l (1996) Th Mthi f Ml dM G Cbrid Cbrid U i i t P K t i l i A (1976) O b l Mid 85 4 2 8 3 1 Locke John (1988) Two Treatises of Government ed Peter Laslett Cambridge: Cambridge U i i t P M C i k D N (1977) Riht i l i l t i I P MS H k dJ R (d) L Morality and Society pp 189209 Oxford: Clarendon Press N Y kOfd U i i t P N l Th (1991) Elit d Ptilit N i k R b t (1972) C i I Pt Lltt WGR i d Q t i Ski (eds) Philosophy Politics and Society: Fourth Series pp 10135 Oxford: Blackwell (1974) A h Stt d Uti O f d B l k l l R l J h (1971) A Th f Jti Ofd Ofd U i i t P R J h (1984) R i h t b d liti I J W l d ( d ) Thi f Riht 182200 O f d O f d U i i t P Rothbard Murray (1970) Power and Market: Government and the Economy Menlo Park: Insti tt f H Stdi dFi A E Etitlt dD i t i O f d S A t (1981) P t Clarendon Press (1992) I l i t R i d C b i d MA H d U i i t P Sh H (1980) Bi Riht Sbit Affl d US F i Pli P r i t NJ Prit U i i t P Stacker Michael (1967) Acts perfect duties and imperfect duties Review of Metaphysics 20: 50733 T h t M k (1984) A riht T L Ri 62 1363403 (1995) Rl Fd f All Wht (if Athi) C Jtif Citli? V P i j Phili Oxford: Clarendon Press

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Waldron Jeremy (1996) Rights and needs: the myth of disjunction In Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns (eds) s pp 87-109 Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Further reading Arneson Richard J (1990) Liberalism distributive subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare s 19: 158-94 Goodin Robert (1985) Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of our Social Responsibilities Chicago: University of Chicago Press Gutmann Amy (ed) (1988) Democracy and the Welfare State Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Moon J Donald (ed) (1988) Responsibility Rights and Welfare Boulder CO: Westview Press Waldron Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 esp chs 1 and 9-13 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

49

4 Ciil D i b d i d th to Obe the La

Dt

A JOHN SIMMONS

"Ciil d i b d i " i th t i d b H D i d Th i hi f 1848 f th (i B d 1991) t d i b d t h hi f l t hi l l l i d ll t f l b d hi l bj ti t hi t' t f l b f Nti A i d it f i ith M i Th ti f iil d i b d i i l famously associated with the writings of Tolstoy with Gandhi's program of wide spread passive resistance in India (see Gandhi in Murphy 1971) with the Ameri iil iht t ( d i til ith th t h h t d ti f M t i L t h Ki J [ Ki i B d 1991]) d ith th ti t i t th A i d t f th V i t W P h i l h h b ill i t t d i h i i l d dibdi f it t t t b ll j t i f b l i tht i tt f th k i d f i l l l d t Dlib t iti i i l d l b k i b it f it tl l d b l motive appears to be itself laudable or at least excusable (unlike lawbreaking that is merely selfinterested or malicious) particularly when its objective is to maintain the agent's moral integrity or to morally improve rather than to overthrow the iti il litil l l d P h i l h i l d i i f iil d i b d i h t d d t diid t h i t t t it t f th definition f i i l d i b d i d t f th justification f i i l d i b d i Th h b d th h d t d i t i i h iil d i b d i f th k i d f l f l d l f l d t d th th t h h iil d i b d i i t i l l ( i l ) jtifibl kid f d i b d i Th li b t th t d f bound to be blurry (as is clear when we see that the usual object is really to define a class of actions that has a special justification) making for debates about whether various features of particular accounts of civil disobedience are really definitional ft l ft tht k i t f iil d i b d i ill jtifibl N th l if h t i t i f iil d i b d i tht til t d i t i i h i it f i t t l d i f f t kid f d t A t t t t l i th j t i f i t i f iil d i b d i til d b i t h t iti f(t l t ) bl j t t t h l l dt t b th l (i th h ht l l l d " l i t i l b l i t i " ) A d it

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i t h thi ti i l ( b k d ) t f th j t Were there no such general duty there would seem to be no moral presumption in favor of obedience to law hence no special moral justification required for civil (or perhaps for any other kind of) disobedience Obedience and disobedience to law ld b ll i d fjtifiti d iil d i b d i ld b b i l dfibl b it t th ld iil ( l lf i t t d ) dibdi Th iht f b ti h t i t i f iil d i b d i ( it i l t t it l i bli l d t i ) tht k it til bt t il j t i f b l th iil d i b d i i th b f ldt t b Ad i t iti f th law's principal functions is to enforce the society's most important moral require ments (such as the prohibitions on violence or theft) so that disobedience to law will often be independently wrong whether or not there is a general moral duty to b Bt f thi t h t bdi t til l b i l dt b ll i t dibdi ( d l f th ti f ith) l th i l l dt t b ll f th l f th l d I d d i th it f l il titi d i i i t d i f f i t l f d i t iti ( i t h t idi that are more seriously evil) it is hard to believe that absolute obedience to law would even be statistically more likely to be justifiable than would random disobedi ence in the absence of a general moral duty to obey the law Th lti bt th i kid f h i l h i l t f th d t t b th l d th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i ill b d i d bl l ith ld f i t i l dj t i f t b t iil d i b d i Th h fth ltd ti b t h l l th iti ht t t t iill d i b d i t l b k t h t ill t b d d d dtil h If i i l d i b d i j il ljtifti (lti t th k i d fl l d i b d i ) d thi f t ll f il l l t t t f the civilly disobedient beyond the consideration that is already normally given to familiar mitigating factors? Many philosophers have argued that it does (eg Dwor kin in Murphy 1971) But I raise the question here only because it is important to d i d bl i moral b t h t th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i jtifti t (i t iti) legal j t i f t i L l jtifti f tl i l l l ti ( h th j t i f t i f " i t " ) lik l l ( h i i t l i t idt) ll d f d t l t t h f l l libilit M ljtifti ll d t At b t h tht d t d i f th t f ti tht ll j t i f d will come to be reflected in the excusing conditions of the legal system that governs our conduct

Definitions A

h tl b jtifd (

i dfdi dfiiti f iil d i b d i h i l h dt h t i kid f d t t h t th i j t i f b l th th f f d i b d i ) Th

h ill j t f

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dfi iil d i b d i i b d h t ht bit tifi cial in light of the fact that deliberate principled lawbreaking can be divided up into an extraordinarily large number of kinds none of which obviously uniquely deserves the title "civil disobedience" This is especially apparent when it turns out it d i t h i l h ' dfiti f iil d i b d i tht d t lik T h ' f h i h th t i t d i t l d t d i t f iil d i b d i t ll Th h bi t t hih tl libl dfiti f iil d i b d i ill dt W h th f d i b d i i l dibdi l d l i b t (tht i t i t t i l ) i i l d illl d t Thus characterized we emphasize the obvious contrasts with both various kinds of lawful conduct and various kinds of unprincipled illegal conduct Conduct which s uncontroversially lawful can plainly possess many of the other prominent character iti f t i l iil d i b d i f i t it b i i l d bli f f t t ll d t i d i d t k th it j t d Thi i t f i t f f ditd dd i t i b t till ftl l l d t h i d t t liti d i d t t f l f l t d i d t i i t t t Bt h i i l d lawful conduct could never be plausibly described as a form of civil disobedience f only because it is not disobedience (to the law's "letter") at all Similarly unprincipled (eg purely selfinterested or malicious) illegal conduct clearly cannot count as civil dibdi if ( i diil t th ith i l i i l d t ) it i ditd i l t d h th l i k l lt f ti ijti Wht iht b lli i l l l d t " i i l d " i f ht b d thi i tl t b ith th btitti f th I t " i t i " I b " i i l d " illl d t d t f hih f th i titi i th b l i f t h t th d t ( iil illl dt) i ll id ll i i b l Th iill d i b d i t lawbreakers may believe that the legally required act is itself morally forbidden (or the legally forbidden act morally required) or that they are morally required or permitted to break some such law in order to protest injustice (injustice which may b l t d t th t fl b k ) i l t h t it i ll f th l t hibit ( i ) th t i ti tht dibdi t tht l i II iibl ( i h t t li t b "tdi thi iht") ( Fib 1979) It i i i l l l t h h l b i l h t it t t h t th iill d i b d i t d l i b t l i i i l d "illegal" d t M t t ers for example have claimed that the "laws" they have broken are not real laws at all despite the enforcement of those "laws" by the state appealing to consti tutional (or other "higher law") provisions that render the supposed laws nvalid S t i th li h d d/ b h t b ( tittil d) t S h t t (l ith l l t h i t h d f d ti i f ht l ll i ) i h t th bjt t h t i i thi d t i i l d "illl" d t I "illl" h l t t th hititd d t d i f th t i thi lik " t t t d d blil k l d d t b lid l d likl t b f d b th

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li dl t " O thi t f th tt if I f ( i i l d grounds) an act of a kind that I reasonably believe police and courts take to be contrary to valid law and of a kind that I believe they will make a sincere effort to detect and enforce I may count as civilly disobedient (even if the "law" in question i th b t l l th l d t d t b ilid t b " l t ll") B t t d t ill t t iil d i b d i if h i i l d it i t l t "dd ltt" l hih li d t k fft t f ( d l f hth t h l h l d b tk t b lid di t th b t l l t h ) It i til t dd t l t fth lifti t t f iil disobedience This qualification also concerns the motive for the unlawful conduct though in this case it deals with what we can call the immediate aim of the conduct It seems important to try to distinguish the civilly disobedient person from th i i l d lti t h h bth i dlibt i i l d illl d t Th b i diff bt th i t h t th i d i t i f th f diff f t h t f th l t t t h h it i i difflt t t thi diff il M h i l h h t d t h t th i i l l di bdit dil ith hi h d t l fidlit t l t of the nearjustice or legitimacy of the legal or political system as a whole where the revolutionary plainly does not (see for example Rawls 1971) Further of course since civil disobedience on such accounts aims at only limited changes d i d t d btt th iti t it likl t b j t i f b l th th h i h l d i t i ill d th f th lti Th bl ith h t i tht thi t f th h tk t b di iil d i b d i t i l d t lif h Gdhi f i t t i l did t t th jti liti f th t h f t d did Vit W t t bl did Th A i iil i h t tiit ( L 1998) W h t h t f all of them was that their illegal conduct had as its immediate aim only limited non revolutionary ends such as protesting a law or policy frustrating a law's or policy's purpose or bringing about a change in some law or policy While civil disobedience ibl b t fl t lti l ( i Gdhi' ) ht d i t i i h t f iil d i b d i f i i l d lti t i thi difft i d i t i A ki d f i t i f iil d i b d i th t h t it i d l i b t i i l d illl d t ith l i i t d i d i t i Ciil d i b d i b ith d i t h th l b k i i t l f th l ( kid fl ) t h i h th civilly disobedient person objects or indirect when the law broken is itself largely unobjectionable or unrelated to the legal wrong being protested the lawbreaking being used only as a means to call attention to the wrong at issue (for example h t t blk tff t ll t t t i t j t f i li) P h i l h h d f d d h t ffth ( difft) ti b t th dfiiti f iil d i b d i t f hih d i f t l h t i (bt t ll) t l h i t i l i t f ht ld t h t i l l idtif iil dibdi I ti h l f f th t i t ti l ith f bi k t i l b t th d f i t i l ft

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(1) Civil disobedience as disobedience within the system. A h it i common to claim that civil disobedience is disobedience to law that displays fidelity to law that shows one's general acceptance of the system as legitimate and/or nearly just and that is addressed to the sense of justice of the majority in the it B t h l th ft i l d t h t i kid f d t tht t it th "iil d i b d i " M i t t h dibdi tht i j i d ith h ti blif d iti i t b i l j t i f i b l th dibdi b th ti f th t hth t it i jtifibl ill l i l d d th l h t f th t d th l itiit f th j i t i th particular case at issue (see for example Singer 1973; Greenawalt 1986) (2) Civil disobedience as public and political. Closely related to this idea of civil disobedience as disobedience within the system is the idea of it as essentially public d l i t i l Ciil d i b d i it i d t b illl d t f d bli (i t tl) d f l l d b t f th l l l ibd i h t (i itht t t t t d th l l f ' t i ) Fth th f i iil d i b d i t b litil t l i th t h t it tb i d t h i l lii b d t ing and appealing to the public's moral sense and thus must clearly be a part of (not a suspension of) the continuing political processes of the community This allows us to distinguish civil disobedience with its public political character from " i t i f l " (dibdi titd i i l l b th d i t id ti i tht i l t ' l i t i ) " i t i i " ( i t i f l j i d ith f f t t d i h t ) d th " i t" dibdi i d i i l t k i ' h d ll l ( f l Ch 1971 R l 1971) Whil th d i t i t i ti l l fl d th f t idtifid l l h t i t i f t f iil d i b d i it i f l l t h t th should be embraced as relevant to the proper definition of civil disobedience People like Thoreau for instance now turn out not to have been engaged in true civil disobedience at all (since Thoreau's original actions prior to his later lectures were dititl " i t " d " i t i " i t ) If th i f iil d i b d i i bli l d t i d d i t l t th i f th bli d th bli thiti f th t dibdi i likl t lih thi i B t th i f di iil d i b d i t ( h h i d th i t i i i t i i t f th bli) h j t ft b i l t fft ditl il ti t f t t il t id liit i di d these aims require neither public performance of illegal acts nor acceptance of egal penalties for disobedience Similarly principled disobedience that is not made public for very good reasons ( h th it f th l l lti th d t th tht ld b d b t di i t ) fil thi t f th tt t lif iil d i b d i h thi d i b d i i t ll " i t " ( "l h d " ) t t ll b t h th il i f d i i f t t i th f j t l lii I d d h t bt litil d t l t fil t lif " i t i f l " Th thi d dfiitil ft

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l it l h hld lif f l th t i i t i th Boston Tea Party nineteenthcentury American abolitionists who secretly aided fugitive slaves or encouraged escapes or Europeans in Nazicontrolled territories who secretly aided fugitive Jews All seem appropriately classified as civil disobedi t i t b t f th bli (3) Civil disobedience as non-violent If i i l d i b d i litil f th it it ld t h t it t b i l t I d d if it i t b " i i l " d t t ll il iht til A d f th b t k titi f iil d i b d i ( h Gdhi d Ki) l ittd t il Nt i i l th hil phers define civil disobedience (in part) as nonviolent disobedience (see for example Rawls 1971) Since it seems easier other things being equal to morally justify nonviolent conduct than to justify violent conduct characterizing civil dis bdi till i l t l t hl h h iil d i b d i iht b ill j t i f b l f f l f l d t Th t h f t bi difflti F i t it i t i l difflt t j t ht titt " i l " f th l t t Whil i kid f lt d btti ht t l l fit t id hll include "psychological violence" or violence against property in our definition? If so illegal conduct that traumatized slaveholders or destroyed property on which unjust practices relied (say sinking a slave ship or throwing tea into Boston harbor) ld f i l t lif iil d i b d i S d if i l tifibilit i ll th k i i kid f i il i ft h i t j t i f th th i hih i l l l d t til fft th P h i J i th b i t jtif ll th blki J ' t hi l fb i blki th t t hih h d t di Fth f th i l itti i hih i j t i th di i ffiitl i i t d tht i l t dibdi is much easier to justify morally than would be less effective nonviolent conduct In light of these facts it is unclear why nonviolence should be thought to merit a privileged place in the definition of civil disobedience (see Zinn in Murphy 1971; M l l i Bd 1991)

Jtifiti

d th D t t Ob

Jtifi d t i t i l l " d f i " i th tht jtifiti ffd against a background presumption of possible objection to the conduct; to ustify s to show that the objection(s) at issue do not apply in the specific case at hand Jtifiti f iil d i b d i ffd i t th b k d ti tht i l l l d t i ll ll tl t h th l ti t t h l f d l i l j t A d i thi th t ti ( f th filllit) i ll t k t b t b l i h d b th it (ithi t i l d t t t ) f l l dt bliti t b th l P h i l h h d f d d difft t f th t t d d f th d t t b d th diff bt th f f t th k i d

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fj t i f t i f iil d i b d i tht b t d B t it i th b i i by first considering a few more general claims that have been made about the justification of civil disobedience claims that seem not to depend so directly on any very specific allegations about the nature and extent of the duty to obey the l Fit f i t it i ft i t i d t h t iil d i b d i b tifd l if th l i k l i h d f d i b f i l h i ' it b ' di bdi i l t i l h i h (f l R l 1971) f l th jtif i ' i t t th i k f h tht dibdi i b it i d i t d b th b d (i lit) l it t Second it is sometimes argued that civil disobedience is more justifiable the more direct it is; for the more direct it is the more the disobedience seems to target the specific legal wrong by which it is motivated (see for example Greenawalt 1986) Thid h i l h h f t l l i d t h t iil d i b d i b tifd l l t t ft l l f d d i ' l bjti ( h l liti dl f l tt) h ll b h t d Ad f l l h h th t ti f ll h b t h t iil d i b d i b jtifd l if it i i l t We have already seen the proper response to the last of these claims But what of the others? To the first claim's insistence on a high likelihood of producing benefi cial change with one's disobedience we can concede that disobedience that satisfies thi diti ill h h ll ki t b id f it B t l it t b t t h t iil d i b d i t h t fil t t i f th diti t b j t i f i d Ciil d i b d i t ft k tht thi i ltil h l (t l t i th h t t ) t th t k t h l t b ll b l i t d ( it td) t b thi d i b d i thi t t t t d dit f thi tt' lii t ff (b " t d i ") t h i iht ith t h i d i b d i Fth f th b thi d i b d i iti f i j t ice from unmerited harm even where there is no real prospect of changing the unjust policies causing the harm None of these purposes or objectives seem obvi ously to be of a sort that would delegitimate civil disobedience T th d l i ' i i t th j t i f i f " d i t " i di bdi th l i i l Oft d i t d i b d i t j t l ld b f h f l t it ll t th i t i fijti th ld i d i t f fdibdi P t t i idii ("th tik") t t t ditl b itti th i l t f l i tb j t i f i b l th t t i th b blki t th th Th i l t b obvious correlation between the directness of one's civil disobedience and its justifi ability Neither it seems is civil disobedience justifiable only when used as a last resort as asserted in the third claim above For the most pressing moral causes are ft th t i t i t l d b th i ldi i i t b l t i t l b l l dl i th it f l l f d O l i th (b t d d ) i t h tilii l l i hih liklihd f i ' ( h ' i t t i l l t) d it l i b l t i i t t h t iil d i b d i hld l b l d l t t ( G l t 1986) 56

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H t t th l t i t j t i f b i l i t f iil d i b d i h ill have to depend in part on the strength of the moral presumption in favor of obedience that we embrace which in turn depends on the specific theory of moral justification to which we subscribe (and which we use in deriving our version of this presump ti) O lt h i h t t i l i t t h i (lik i l t tilitii) th ttil f d i i t l ti i f f l l bdi liitd d th ttil f d i l jtifiti f ( i t f) i i l d i b d i Wh t h ' l i ti i t d ith ' ti th b t i th i t thi ill d d th t f th i t d th (i th f obedience or disobedience) on the nature of the society and its government The phenomena of inconsequential illegality and highly influential principled disobedi ence are too familiar to make it likely that actconsequentialism will yield a general l i tht i l f bdi t l it i i l d i b d i O th lt h i h ti t l l dii l t h i it ill b till t id j t i f i t i f tl t t i kid f iil d i b d i If f d t l l dti t b dii l b ll b d t b th l f l d l h di i i t t ith b i dii l But this means that any legal obedience is necessarily morally wrong f it mplicates us in wrongs or injustice forbidden by divine law making corresponding disobedience obligatory (hence justifiable) On most moral theories however the ustification of iil d i b d i t tt b l tt F h i l h (i th Middl A tl t ) h t i d t d f d th id f l dt bliti t b th l t h t i b l t (i bidi i ll i t ) th t d d t i i tht h dt bliti i t t i fi l i t i t h t th i t t h l d i th fi t l b l j t l b t i h d b ti l idti i f fdibdi A d i t th b t k t porary defense of civil disobedience that advanced by John Rawls (1971) our duty to obey the law can extend to obeying unjust laws provided these laws do not exceed certain limits on the severity of (or on the inequitable distribution within it f th b d f) i j t i A d i t R l ithi bl t d t i tt iti h dt t t thi ( b l jt) titti d t b th l tht td di t it d l i t Thi d t i b d l t l l dt t t ti tb ti d li ith j t i t i t t i tht it d l t Whil R l iti t h t thi d t b i d t b j t l h ll as well that there is a special justification available for acts of civil disobedience (which he characterizes as public political nonviolent conscientious illegal acts) and acts of conscientious refusal Where injustice is clear and substantial and where l l f d h fild R l iil d i b d i b tifid (t l t h it i t t f t ) tbilii d i i tittil t f di dt t t jti b idtifi ijti lli th jit t t it dt h b t t h i th t t R l ' df f iil d i b d i i l liitd f b it f it li l t dibdi ithi bl j t d i (hih d t

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d i b t f th di h i t i l i t f iil d i b d i ) d have already seen reasons to be skeptical about insisting (as Rawls seems to) that certain features of (some) civil disobedience (for example publicity and nonviolence) are essential to its justification It should be emphasized as well h t h t th t fR l ' jtifti f iil d i b d i t i t tl th i hih h h t d f d th d t t b th l Rli l dt t t jti th f dt t b th l t t l " " i th d t f bdi it hih jtifid d i b d i i f l d i ijti "fit" Thi f t i f t h t i hl f i l f h t th d t t b th l hih ll following Rawls "natural duty" approaches These approaches all derive the duty to obey the law from a more inclusive moral duty to promote some impartial value like justice or happiness So in those "gaps" where the impartial value would be fftil td b dibdi dibdi i tifd ( i d d i d ) Th ( d i t it d i t t d l dd d) t i l i t i t h i f th d t t b ill l t thi l i f t i " t l d t " h A d tili t i df f dt t b ill t i th k i d f " " i th d t idi f j t i f d iil d i b d i t h h i thi th ill i t in those instances where happiness can be more effectively promoted by legal dis obedience As we will see however natural duty approaches to deriving a duty to obey the law will also share certain common problems " N t l d t " h t th d t t b j t kid th tht t h b l d d i th h i t f h i l h i l t h h t th bjt W d i t i i h f thi f i t k i d b t h ( h t ll) "t t i l " h d " i t i " h T t i l h b f th tfili k i d f th th ildi bth t / t t t h i d i t i t h i f th d t t b th l O t t i l h t th dt di th d t t b f ht h b d b f th who are said to be bound by the duty So according to the consent/contract tradition of thought most famously associated with Locke the duty to obey is derived from the express or tacit consent (promise contract) that citizens of decent states are alleged to h i t thi t' t h i t (B 1987) A d di t i ti t h i th d t t b th l i d b iti fd t tt fi t f th i i f t b f i t th h td i d f th ki fthi t t t iti ( K l k 1992) O b t h k i d ft h i th d t t b i d i d f th ll i i f t i t t i t t i bt iti d lit t( th t l dt h) f what best promotes some independent value The difference between these two approaches to the duty to obey is obscured somewhat by the development (in Kantian contractarian thought) of hypothetical t t t h i di t h i h th d t t b i d h t i l idiidl ld h d t b b d b it ( h d th b bl t h d th i i l tht ld thi litil l i ) B t h t h t i l t t t h i d i t th t t i l l d t d tti f th t l dt h t th t t i l h f th f t t ll th t l hit f th l t i h i bt iti d

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lit b t th l ht ill t fftil d th i t i l l that the hypothetical contractors are characterized as seeking Similarly it may seem difficult to distinguish cleanly the third "associative" approach to the duty to obey from the transactional approach Associative theorists mostly following Hegel W i t t t i d tl d i b d t d iti di th d t t b th l f th l l litil idtit l f th b d Si litil l t b f t i f ht Ih d t it tht h h i d i b l t th t t i l Bt iti t h i t t i ll t t h t it i th ft f b h i i il it d b l fl l bdi i d d t f h t I iht h dt or otherwise chosen to do that imposes on me a moral duty to obey Each of the three approaches to the duty to obey the law has a certain source of appeal at least one striking weakness and some clear implications for the justifica ti f iil d i b d i N t l dt h li i i l l b it f thi (i d i i dt t b ) f l i b l l l i i l th idtif i i t i l l lik j t i h i tht t b i l th k i d f thi l t ht t b dt t Ad t l dt h t th d t t b h t i l l amenable to yielding clear justifications of civil disobedience; general duties to do what best promotes some value leave natural "gaps" in any duty to obey the aw that is derived from them But natural duty approaches to the duty to obey all seem t f d th bl f " t i l i t " Whil th h li h ht ti t b th l f t i (i h di i th b t f ti th l i t i ) th t ll li ( th d t ) th b i f l dt f bdi dt particular t t (" ") th If l l " l l i " i t th ti f i t i l l th b i h h l d b tk t it til d t t b til t fl (Si 1979) Associative approaches to deriving a duty to obey the law appeal to us because it seems that many of our important special duties such as those of parents siblings friends or neighbors derive from simple facts about nonvoluntary social roles we (Ht 1992) B t it tht iti t t l k h f jtifti f iil d i b d i hihl lti ibl d i f f i tl bt iti ( d bt iti f th l kid th it tdifft t i ) F hth iil d i b d i ill l l ( )b ll iibl ill t di t h t th ifi t i t t f th il l th f k f il tti th tt f social interaction in force in the society in question We will reject associative justifications of civil disobedience and of the duty to obey the law if we are (appro priately) skeptical about the claims of normative authority for local social practices hih ht h i l (Si 2001) Fill t t i l h t h tht i t l i di t h h t b t th d t t b th l C t t h i t th id t h t litil dl l lli ht t b d d t f hi t bjt l d i t i t h i i i t th iti tht dbt t it (ildi th d b t b t id b b d i t it l) di f 59

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ht iti h d f Bt i th k i d f j t i f t i f iil disobedience that a transactional theory will yield seems to depend very much on the specific circumstances in the political society in question The extent of the duty to obey (and hence the moral space for justified disobedience) must turn on exactly ht h b d t b th iti i ti ( d i t t / t t t h ) ht t fi h f th b d ithi th ifi ti litil h ti ( " f i " i f i t i t h ) ht titt bl i t i f th ifi d i d d b th t t ( " t i t d " i f i t i t h ) All f th ft ftl bl f i f it t it ithi th l kid f society leaving us with no general conclusions about the justification of civil dis obedience In any event these transactional approaches to the duty to obey the law plainly face serious problems before arguments about their implications for civil dis bdi b i F th f i d d i l bidi (i l t ddlibt) litil t i l fiti i th t t i t t d i l l t t f th b f i t h tt id Th b f i t f t i l fll h t h th td t A d it l tht ll d t l dbt f td benefits that are simply conferred on us nor in any event if we did would such benefactors be entitled to specify the precise nature (eg obedience to this set of laws) of the obligatory reciprocation (Simmons 1979) I l i h t f th diffilti f t i h f th th h t d i i dt t b d fill t t h i k b t th f th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i h l d it i i b l t fll d f d h dt A h i t f t h t th i l d t t b th l iti ( ibl) t t If hit t th i l ti i f fl l bdi d iil d i b d i ll f jtifti th i id f ti ll Th i i l d t d liitd dit aim of civil disobedience of course will tend to make it easier to ustify than purely selfish or malicious conduct or riskier revolutionary action But other familiar fea tures of civil disobedience may cut both ways For instance the publicity of much iil d i b d i k it jtifibl ( h bliit likl t iitit i d i l ) l jtifibl ( h bli d i b d i i l t i f l t i l bli l fdibdi ldi t h f l d i i l d i i t t i ) O th hit i th t tht i t h t iil d i b d i ill b j t i f i d il h th b l f l f it d t h t th i t t h t thi ill t b l

Rf Bedau Hugo (ed) (1991) Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge C Hl B H (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. L d Ch C l (1971) Civil Disobedience. N Y k C l b i U i i t P Feinberg Joel (1979) Civil disobedience in the modern world Humanities in Society, 2 (1): 3760

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Greenawalt Kent (1986) Conflicts of Law and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press Horton John (1992) Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press Klosko George (1992) The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Lyons David (1998) Moral judgment historical reality and civil disobedience Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (1): 31^19 Murphy Jeffrie (ed) (1971) Civil Disobedience and Violence. Belmont CA: Wadsworth Rawls John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Simmons A John (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (2001) Justification and Legitimacy. New York: Cambridge University Press Singer Peter (1973) Democracy and Disobedience. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Further reading Bedau Hugo (ed) (1969) Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice. New York: Pegasus Edmundson William (ed) (1999) The Duty to Obey the Law. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Green Leslie (1990) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press Harris Paul (ed) (1989) Civil Disobedience. Lanham MD: University Press of America Raz Joseph (1979) The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press

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5 Citli

d M i

RICHARD W MILLER

I l i h t f th t t M ' li tht d itli "th f i i l d d t i d litti bt ith thi th l th lt f th ki l " (1867 929) l k lik hi lti h Hi h t h t th lti t f t i f itli ld titt t i h ff d h f d htl di i th t l t Yt characterizations of capitalism derived from Marx's failed system which describe capitalism as resting on exploitation guaranteeing alienation and making repre tti d i t t f l l till id itii f t ititti Th t f thi l f M i ill i t t j t f l i d thi h i t i i t t th i h t h f itli i t t b dlld b lbti f itli' it i ffii d th t ti f i t iititi

Marx's Capitalism I M ' i iti t f d t l l d i t i i h d b d i t il lti f t l i th dti f t i l d Th d i t f f dti i itlit iti i lb i h i h th th l t i t h t l i i f t f dti ll th f thi l b t th th b i i h t l th f dti t h t th k d th d f th l f h t th d F tl d i d f Ad S i t h ' th f d t i t i Marx believes that proletarians in every capitalist society bargain at a severe disad vantage when they "sell their lives piecemeal" in the labor market Typically when a proletarian seeks employment from a capitalist firm the firm has substantial f d i hil th l i t h b t t i l i d th fi h l f i t t i hii til l i t th th j b k h i ldi jb S th fi i d l t k d l B fi i t i l l l lb kt bth d l d tl l th thi ttil l th i btt iti t l l b t ( l l titl) i iti i d th l t i i iti d

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B f th d i f f t l t i h i f l t h di t t h to personal life "If you don't like it here try to get a job elsewhere" threatens in a way that "If you don't like our terms for working invest elsewhere" does not The bourgeoisie can respond to low unemployment with laborsaving devices while l t i t t h l t d thi d f l t M t h i k t h t f th d th if l d d t h l ll t h h itlit i t t i th l t t ld b hih th h t capitalists i tht k k li t ft i i d k it ibl f k t i hild t ft i t f th i t l i t ill At least in his post1848 writings Marx does not claim that workers will sink to this physical minimum He thinks they can resist this "tendency of things" (1865: 228) through nonrevolutionary collective action transcending market activity; for l b ti t t d i ilit d i i litil tiit ldi t i f I d d M t l th l t k ith t h l i l N th l ill t d k ' d b d l i th i h t thi it id M ' fth diti f ilit lti d i f hi dd itional expectation that an increasingly unified proletariat will be victimized by increasingly violent instability As a result of mounting obstacles to the further expansion of capitalist firms industrial depressions will deepen and wars will b i i l hil l i t d i f t l l d b t i d db t l i t t i th i t t h f th k ' t

Elitti If one subtracts the failed apocalyptic prophecy do the more plausible aspects of Marx's account of the proletarian situation provide useful means of social criticism? M hilf ti i i t tht itlit lb i b d f tht i d d t f th ffi d i b d i hi i t i d i t t "[T]h t f lb i t f l h t h th k i btt t" (1875 329) B till i f dti b lb t h h t i f ti l t i i h h itd h i t t " E l i t t i " d tht M li t itlit lb h h b th t d d t f i th t l ti i thi project of retrieval: "What is it about capitalist wage labor that makes it a form of exploitation?" After examining responses that do not appeal to Marx's other cele brated indictment of capitalist wage labor as alienated I will consider the virtues of i t t i th t t fM ' l At ti b t t t fiil l l it i l h h M t k itlit lb t b liti H t h h t tht itlit t k d t f th i f i b i i f l t i i tht i b j t i b l Bt useful l fM ' d i i ill it f ifi d libl d i t i f th t f th bjti 63

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Force and freedom of contract Although it is selfconscious exaggeration Marx's talk of the wage labor system as a form of slavery does point to one ingredient in the charge of exploitation: proletar i forced t i lb Of l t i i t f d t k f til i t l i t Still M i i t tht l t i i f d t k f th itlit l th b i i tht i f itlit l th Sh i f d t d b h i t i th itlit l b kt t h h f h t i lb Th i t d t t t i th l l t t i F l in Marx's youth in the Prussian Rhineland the alternative for many proletarians was a dreary but physically tenable existence on a marginal family farm Still someone who rationally chooses one option can be forced to do so can have no real choice b ll th l t t i tj t l d bt f f i t l b d Lik th t f l i t h h d d tht f hik t t k th th f k i th t i l thi b d fll f h t f h i l titi If th i t t i i l t i d i d f l k d l i ith t th i h t till t bjti t th il d Bt the crucial constraint the absence of control over the means of production on the part of the vast majority was created and is sustained by coercive acts In blazing narratives Marx describes the role of violent dispossession imperial conquest and i i th h i t i l hih l t i t l d h i t th t i l k ' ft M i t t h l i i t tht i l t itlit titi tti ith itti f l i ld i i t b l d l i t ti t h h th l d i f f t i t i f i d l d thi d d t Wht i t i l t th f d h t f itlit lb i hi i i th t litill f d l f l f d t d th l i i t d l t t i t l b t h t th ild But are the current alternatives to wage labor really so circumscribed? For example proud owners of thriving small businesses sometimes started out as prole tarians getting where they are by working long hours for little initial reward in the f fl ik f fil A k f d it lb if thi i ilbl? C h (1983) tht if h idiidl l t i i f f thi l t i l fr l ti ld tll b thi t i th t d i i f itlit dti ld d i ll it h d d it f l i h i Oth h i i t d t h t th i k db d f th t ilbl t an individual proletarian in the vast majority of cases make these routes fit for a menu of alternatives constituting forced choice Also some (for example Reiman 1987) take the time required for exit to be compatible with an ascription of forced h i i th ti Benefit and weakness A

64

f th ifiti t f lbti f

f th f d t lb i l l i t i

f it

lb it

b

ld i t t

i i l ith th

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alternatives So other ingredients of the "exploitation" charge must be characteriza tions of what proletarians actually choose Of course it is important that capitalists benefit from the circumstances forcing proletarians to sell the use of their labor power Exploitation involves deriving a benefit from someone on account of a weakness (as Wood 1995 emphasizes) But a further ingredient seems to be required After all dentists benefit from others' being forced by toothaches to seek their aid Yet we do not take them on this ground to exploit their patients or their patients' suffering (compare Wood 1995: 136) The nature of this missing ingredient he objectionable feature of the way in which bargaining weakness forces proletarians to work on terms that benefit capitalists is the central controversy over Marxian exploitation (a controversy much invigorated by Roemers thesis that exploitation does not in fact merit normative interest from Marxists; see for example Roemer 1985) According to one standard account the needed ingredient in addition to capitalist benefit from workers' bargaining weakness is provided by Marx's characterization of the benefit itself A capitalist firm will not last long unless the wage paid for a working day is less than the amount that a typical worker adds to output in a working day Marx often characterizes the working day remaining after the worker produces the equivalent of her wage as unpaid (though he also often concedes that this usage is not literally correct) Perhaps Marx thought that capitalism was exploitive because its social structure is organized so that unpaid labor is systematically forced out of one class and put into the disposal of another" (Reiman 1987: 3; see also Holmstrom 1977) But is this surplus extraction sufficient to make a social process exploitive? At he start of the Manifesto, without a trace of irony Marx celebrates a heroic era in which capitalism overcomes technological stagnation geographic isolation stultify ing conformity to tradition and abject feudal deference These benefits depend on the extraction of "unpaid" labor which provides incentives and resources for capitalist improvement of productive powers In principle if not in Marxs view of actual history such benefits could make capitalism the best feasible system on balance for workers in a certain phase of a certain society Marxs quip about wellpaid slaves implies that capitalist wage labor would still count as exploitation But unless more is said about the process of surplus extraction the charge of exploitation seems farfetched (If on account of incentives for land improvement everyone benefits from a rule conferring ownership on the first to farm a plot of land the consequent advantages of firstfarmers over latecomers need not con stitute exploitation) Granted if a capitalist and a proletarian employee are typical occupants of their social roles their incomes will be quite out of proportion to the time that they invest in economic activity But as Arneson (1981: 206-7) and others have noted such disproportion need not be a basis for condemning a relationship as exploitive If healthy workers are taxed to help those who are physically unable to work the frail will benefit out of proportion to their labor but this does not seem to constitute exploitation Indeed such transfers are characteristic of the post capitalist societies that Marx regards as overcoming exploitation (see 1875: 3 2 2 3 325) 65

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Alienation One way of coping with these difficulties is by a more thorough appropriation of Marx's legacy incorporating the discussions of alienation which occur throughout hi lif t h h th t i t l M t k th d i t i i lif b itli t l i t l f th df th f l P l l i t d f th b ll b th t h ' di hih ld b bjt f iti i l d l t i h i i i t d d ft t i l d t ("th means h b I i " 1844b 275) f t d f it t ' aspirations The prime example of this estrangement is the capitalist labor market in which capitalists if they are to stay in business must do what they can to take advantage of needs driving people to seek employment (the word "exploit" comes t l l h ) d t fid th t k ' d d tht t h thi fit B th t h ' d t t h l f t h iti t h diit M h t i l tihi tht h l l d t i d b th i t i f th kt i Kti l t i h i i hih " k f th th hi " ( 1 8 5 7 8 : 243) and the capitalist treats "the real producer as a means of produc tion material wealth as an end in itself" (1866: 1037) It is natural to characterize someone as exploiting another's needs when she bfit f th and i l iti t th fl i f t i i h ti fh i d d t i t t Adtit h h h h f th di b i t k hi i d h id ti d i t h t ill k tit l l t i d l i t hi tit' ffi Bt thi i i i i th i t l i t l t i l t i h i hih titt litti f th l t i tj t litti f hi di Th t i th l i t i f th k f hilf E if th t f th proletarian's bargaining weakness is not a life scarcely better than death by starva tion Marx thinks it is (always or almost always) work that is endured as a sacrifice "not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself" (1844 326) S h it i ti t h t th k if l f t i ld t b i f h h i " titi f his own t " (1866 1044) R t h h tb d i d t i t it t " t h d it f [hi] h t " (1894 959) I t M d thi d t t idtif ith ' k lif th k ' liti f h l f b k lif d itli tk f a proletarian's waking hours But the thesis of selfalienation also reflects an assess ment of the value of production (If Marx thought that only leisure was worthy of enjoyment he would have regarded all work as alienated) Like Aristotle (see Miller t h i k t h t th ldi f ' i t di t ' 1981) M i i t i l f l t d l idd b ' iti i f d t l t thhil h lif C i t tht k ' dti tiit fh j t k it i i b l f h lif hl t b th d t i fh h i t

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Thi dit d t d d th l t i ' d i th i d b i drudgery described in the most heartrending reportage in Capital. But it does depend on the features of work life under capitalism that Marx sometimes calls the "real subsumption of labor under capital" (1866: 1 0 3 4 5 ) which inevitably results f it " f l b t i " th t l f th l b b th b i i I it f d i i l i diti d ffit ft h l i t l i t fi ill t t l t i k tht l t i d d di tiiti tht d t it h i t t it h iititi bili b d fh iti S tht i itlit dti th ith i i f t t l th of production benefit from bargaining disadvantages based on pressing needs that others are forced to endure to which they are responsive as tactical advantages to be used or as sources of discontent whose cost is to be minimized That a relationship is h t i d b thi d t l i t d t t h ' i d k d (hih i tt l i ) t b j t t it dd b i f di th l t i h i liti S i dditi t h t th t f th k t i f d t f ti t f ii ith hih h ld t f l l i d t i f hil f l l ti h l f d t h t th t party benefits from the imposition of these terms Then one might naturally say that the stronger party exploits the weaker party So perhaps Marx's theory of exploit ation and his theory of alienation are continuous Capitalist wage labor is a form of litti b itlit b f i t i l i t d f ill d k i th bfiti f th it t i k li th tht l i t th th f t h l M bbl t i d itlit ld t h l th lit i thi t i t B t th t jit f th thik tht f t h il i f thi f f dti ildi i d i d f d d d ffii k f f itli btt f ki l th noncapitalist alternative Suppose that they are right Does the view that capitalist wage labor exploits workers still have a bearing on modern political choice?

Th R l

f Elitti

If itli i d i b l t h h it i i t litti th lii b t litti iht i t lii b t lif b t d i d t h B t thi ik d i i l ld l t th f t t h t litti comes in degrees so that the intensity of exploitation of people in a certain situation may be too great to be justified even if they are better off being exploited than not bi l i t d t ll Aft ll i th litil l th j t i f i t i f b t t i l diff i d t jtif ll diff I litil t l i iti f litil thit h ifl d i t ti tti i f di iti N th l it ld b j t l j k if ditt t iti b iti t th t t h t h t hi b t t th th h f t t ll

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Elitti b l l d i i Th thjb alienation produced by the "real subsumption of labor" can be more or less ntense (for example because work is more or less monotonous or exhausting) Opportun ities for selfexpressive activity outside work can be facilitated or blocked by different t f l t (H i i t t t h h t ll i t t ) E t t l l i t d k lif b l difflt B i i did t l f l th f th dti i bditi tht i itlf k lif l b d (f l f d il t d th tibti f l ith il t i i di k tht i t ffitl bjtd t dtild i i ) Without calling for the end of exploitation one can recognize that complaints deriving from exploitation are serious and more serious the more intense the ex ploitation The mere fact that a change will deprive some of benefits from the litti f th l i t ll d t f th b f i i t th h S il t it f b th t jtifbl d f litti Thi ti f il itii t dititi liht th l t f itlit iti Capitalism and freedom In one familiar view government interference with individuals' efforts to retain the full benefits of capitalist selfadvancement is a troubling interference with freedom h i h i j t i f i b l if t ll b th d t tk t f th l h i lit B t if lit f litti i l i t fbi f d t h k lif ith h i h t l f t f l l idtif b it d t j b l i bl id f lbl h iti th th h i itlf lit f f d T d t l f R ' (1986 374) h t d iht h d d t i h i t evading a tiger is significantly unfree because of her alienation from her own ife If the Island Council can help her by requiring someone to cage his pet they need not be troubled by the thought that freedom has been reduced to promote another d liberal

neutrality

Th M i t th f litti l t dbt f fl i b l litii in which the ultimate perspective of equality avoids reliance on a ranking of ways of life Mitigation of the distinctive burdens of those whose exploitation is relatively intense may produce a reduction in their net income the "allpurpose " f d b libl tlit ki t id lti bi i t h i j d t f i jti F l thi t d f f i d b th t f titi ti t fi l d b bli f d i f t l t l t h t f i l i t t th j b l i fi t t iti bt d t dd t i At h j t it i h d t h tlit f lif b b d if lit f litti i it iht 68

CAPITALISM AND MARXISM

Beyond equal opportunity Both in current egalitarian politics and liberalegalitarian philosophy the funda mental project of economic justice is often envisaged as the elimination of unjusti fid i l i t i i lif t flti diff i "tti l " t hih l b (Rl 1971 7) Th h thti t M ill til h thi ith th l t f i f th h t iti h t f d ll i itlit titi Bt itiit t h f litti t t itii f th t t f i d fil hih i i d d t f i l i t i lif h Suppose (probably per impossibile) that a reasonably efficient capitalist society could so arrange education and initial economic resources that everyone has an equal initial chance of winding up on top If none the less some inevitably spend i i f i t t f t h i li bi l l i t d th thti t M ill di b j t i b l f f i l i t A l th t d ti d t i ttitd t d liti i t th i l d i t ft i t h i d if l t t t i l iitil h t b t t

Political Legitimacy and the Capitalist State Th h h l t h i M ' ii f t i t l i t it hil thii ith hi t fh td b itli ill l k t t ti t d th h S th d t fth t f M ' th f itli hi i f th b i i th litil li l d itli Talk of a capitalist ruling class suggests bizarre conspiracies But in fact Marx's political tropes are flamboyant emblems for the following threepart thesis (1) Government actions serve the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole even if those interests conflict with those of the rest of society Thi i not t d tht hift i t li tif f t l l l t i d d h it i t i th i t t f th b i i Si th b i i h i t t ( t h h t l l i t t ) i t t i i d tbilit h dti b t i l t it l t i t t h l Still t t i t itlit it M t h i k t h t ll hift i li t h t t k i ilti i i i f i t t th b i i f t i d t t t i l retreats from disruption or the threat of disruption prudent that is from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie (2) This bias in interests served is sustained by mechanisms that are part of the socicd context of political choice sufficient mechanisms which will exist in one form or other so long as capitalism endures I til i d i b i ti b t tl ti d b i i t t i tbl l i t d i M ib th tt f hi th t f fl l t d ffiil t d li lti f i th th bib i Th l f b i t l l d di i l t l d th df b i fii 69

RICHARD W. MILLER

f th t i l dbt l f th i t i l h i h cites (3) If a social movement threatens to end the bias toward bourgeois interests the old connection between class and government wiR be defended through violence which mobilizes residual bourgeois political resources violence which can only be defeated by organized counter-violence rooted in part in non-electoral activity E ithi th b d f t t h th t t ld t b " f th l t f lb b i t l " (M 1871 290) if b i d i f it ld b dd b l l l t t d l t l tiit M t h h t tht b i i f t d ith thi t ld ith fll t i fd i t d i l t pression or at a minimum support a "proslavery rebellion" against an elected workingclass government (see Engels' Preface to the English edition of volume 1 of Capital; Marx 1867: 13) If the latter regime could be defended this would be b f it ld b l t i tki d t f t i i f l t l flit i hih k hd f t d itlit fi d i itlit i I liht f hit i M ' ti th t h i d l i i l till i t t It i t l diffilt t th fit l i iill ith th rival hypothesis that the bourgeoisie (alias big business) is an exceptionally import ant interest group in a democratic process that can produce departures from its longterm interests Still part of Marx's political theory seems both practically rele t d iill t d th it f h i i tht t t ti ill b i t t l b i d t d th i t t f th b i i i i i t bl f t f itli S tht i t i tibti l l l d h th t f litil ii t h h i t l l i t ffi itl l i d di f th t i f t i ilid di Still d f i l t th t f th itlit i diii f lb h t d f bi t i d t i f th i t t f th b i i ith th interests of society as a whole will have knowledge skills and networks of ac quaintance that make them specially likely to be recruited to positions of political power or to offer influential advice Resource allocation will still be dominated by th l t f t f l f i t t d i t tht litil l d t tk t id ti it i t b t thi t Bth M d hi iti t h t th d l i f bi t d th b i i ld tb l i i t d itht d t i i t f bl ffii it lit dti M itlit hi f di i i t d i t i t ifl bli ii hih ( t f d f tltifi domination) pervasive state ownership would not remove given bourgeois nflu ence on the state A common and plausible view of capitalism which I will call "the postMarxist t h i " bi thi f M ' th f th itlit t t ith t th l t Fit if th flit b t th i t t f th b i i d th i t t f t ki l i t M d th ft i flit b t th i t t f th b i i d d i th b d f lif d itli i d i b l t h h fibl dti th d f litti l t i f i i t i i t i t d

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i l i t i tht h iiti t th i f i i lif B h add to the costs of production make work discipline harder to achieve or make t harder for those in or allied with the bourgeoisie to maintain their personal wealth and status and pass them on to their children the structural political power of th b i i ill i l liit t i t d i d t Th th l t i th t M i t t h i i th it M i t i tht f f itli i btt f itll i d d it th f f itli Thi it h i t t b i i f l t i l i f litil liti Lik th iti tht M itiid f hi dil ti th i (if the postMarxist synthesis is right) exaggerate the importance of purely political processes through neglect of inequalities of economic power Ironically these criti cisms are more compelling because of the concession that some form of capitalism is b t T b i ith th t M i t thi i hll t litil l i b l i th t i t t liit f f t i i t litil h i l h f th i f th l litil ( R l 1993) A d i t litil l i b l i iti f d h l d ti t l ll ti fb i jti ildi b i economic justice through principled mutually attentive deliberations establishing a broad consensus concerning the proper interpretation of purely political iberal values such as civil liberty and equal citizenship This restriction to consensus b d libl litil l d i th f f bli i t bi t litil l i b l b it i id t il th i i t b l i f litil h i ith th t l t t h t iti t th H if th t M i t t h i i iht litil h i t i d b litil l i b l i ill i i t t b i t i b l ith t f fll iti S t h t th h litd h i lit i t h l d lii t h t k litti h thi i i t b l th i the higher the degree of exploitation One can combine respect for the exploited with insistence that a political response to their complaints take place through certain channels only if this political process is not biased against them But di t th id f M ' l i l t h i th f f t i t h h i i l d d i i i b i d i t th litd i it lit i t If i th litil l i b l t t tht h i t d d f f bli ld h t t i ditti th th t h i f th iit f f f itli it l C t t h d l i it t iti hld t ti t t th i t tii h unbiased political process since this change would seriously worsen all by depriv ing them of the benefits of capitalism Those who reject political liberalism on these grounds can still regard departure f libl litil ti i t bt fll j t i f b l t i t t i l l i t t B f thi i f th d i f il h th ill b ill d t ll tht ffiil i tit til d ti d thi litil b i bl di ti Th i t d tik f th 1930 i th U i t d S t t C d S d d l h did t it f

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th i f l itihi d iil d litil libti t d l dt sustain their aspirations by appropriate legislation If they had waited this consen sus might never have emerged The postMarxist synthesis also challenges a widely shared assumption of which litil l i b l i i j t il d l t ll ibl iti h l d hl t hi lit h lilti ht t b hld b h iti if h d it i j t b f th t f th litil tht d d it d t j t t fh i t i f f f i t Thi t f h t f th hl f i l d fft t h th l bt h iti hld h grounds for regarding it as everyone's duty to help implement the law until it is changed Whether or not they are political liberals many political philosophers regard this as a feasible goal so that it is at least an open question whether current iti h t t i d it E if th t k th t b " " i l i d t tht t d i h l h t h t th dibdit hld t th l t h th litil hl b d i b i blill d blil d illil bitti t i h t Bt h i d l f liti i t i f th t d i t f th t M i t synthesis Because of the obvious difficulties of claiming actual consent by all (and the less obvious difficulties of claiming that consent has not been manipulated in inappro it ) t h i t f liti t i l l l t diti th th t tht ld k it tt h l d th t f llti i hih t th tk t Plibl i i l i t i t f fi t t t i th l i t h t it i t dib l i llti if h b f t d f l f i t d th b f i t db d f th fil h d B t t l t if llti d i t ' h l lif th f t d it i t i l t h t th f i h i involve adequate equality in responsiveness to one's interests and desires as com pared to others' Given the threat of chaos Ivan the Terrible's autocracy may have been by far the best feasible regime from the standpoint of the serfs but they had no dt t b ll th dt lti f i h i h th td f hl th th Siill f iti f d tt di t t M i t thi fibl d d i b l litil t i th t t t i l l b i d i f f t h ' i t t f th t h h i idi d t t h l d it t

PostMarxist Cosmopolitanism I

dditi lit lti "Th h t iti d f th i t

72

t th

dbt b t t f titi ki h t" (M dE l d i f th t i l l t i

litil liti M ' llti M hilf t W t tk 1848 51) I it f l l t t d t t i f l b th i t t i ld lti

l ild fll j t h l f th h t th thi dil l l l b i i d tht t

CAPITALISM AND MARXISM

d d Th t M i t thi d l f dti f il cern for compatriots that bind proletarians For example a postMarxist could accept that when a worker benefits from a general preference for principled persua sion and support for democratic rights and civil liberties a proper valuing of this h d ii i t t i i l l l t t it h fll iti l t th il l l t i ffidhi Still M ' l dd idbl iht t lit idti tdi th f b d di h i t i t f t i t t i l i lti Th iti f litti t t t th b d b l i tries with high percapita income benefit from the specially intense international exploitation of people in poor countries they have a special obligation to help them A proper valuing of nonalienated relationships in which others' needs are a source f iti til i t t t h ld i h i h th d f th i ti litd ( d ti td) f t t i l d t i tht i filittd b i t t i l ititti F i l l if ( t M i t thik) i l i t i fb i i b d th bilit f itl d th it f i t l i t fi t hift dti t k elsewhere still dominate workers' lives the growth of international ties among workers and their allies is a central means of reducing exploitation "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains They have a world to ll f ldid il i WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES U N I T E ! " it lti th l i f th Mift d lik bd di Yt it i f th ld t ld l i th i h t t d f itli t ft hi k tht ht t b l d if th hld t b b k hi tht h b d d t lit dti f f Th h d f t th ld t till h t lit t it

Rf A R (1981) W h t ' ith l i t t i ? Ethi 91 2 0 2 2 7 Cohen G A (1983) The structure of proletarian unfreedom Philosophy and Public Affairs 12: 334 H l t N (1977) E l i t t i Cdi J l f Philh 7 35369 M K (1844) E i d Philhil M i t I El Witi t R Livingstone and G Benton New York: Penguin 1975 (1844b) E t f J Mill' "Elt f Plitil E " I El Witi N Yk P i 1975 t RLiit dG B t (18578) Gdi t M Nil N Y k Vit B k 1973 (1865) Wages Price and Profit In K Marx and F Engels Selected Works in One Volume N Y k I t t i l Pblih 1968 (1866) Rlt f th I d i t P f Pdti I K M Citl l 1 t B Fowkes New York: Penguin 1976 (1867) Citl l 1 t BF k N Yk P i 1976

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(1871) e In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1968 (1875) e In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1966 (1894) l vol 3 ed F Engels trans D Fernbach New York: Penguin 1981 and Engels F (1848) y In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1968 Miller R W (1981) Marx and Aristotle In K Nielsen and S Patten (eds) y suppl vol 7: y Rawls J (1971) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press (1993) m New York: Columbia University Press Raz J (1986) m Oxford: Oxford University Press Reiman J (1987) Exploitation force and the moral assessment of capitalism: thoughts on Roemer and Cohen s 16: 3-41 Roemer J (1985) Should Marxists be interested in exploitation? s 14: 30-65 Wood A (1995) Exploitation y 12: 136-58

Further reading Brenkert G (1983) m London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Brudney D (1998) y Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Buchanan A (1982) m Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Chapman J and Pennock J (eds) (1983) XXVI m New York: New York University Press Cohen G A (1978) e Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1988) Oxford: Oxford University Press (includes Cohen 1983) Cohen M Nagel T and Scanlon T (eds) (1980) y Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (includes Cohen 1983) Elster J (1985) x Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Gilbert A (1981) s New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press Miller R W (1984) y Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Nielsen K and Patten S (eds) (1981) y suppl vol 7: (includes Miller 1981) and Ware R (eds) (1997) n Highland Park NJ: Humanities Press (includes Holmstrom 1977; Cohen 1983; Reiman 1987; Wood 1995) Wood A (1981) x London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Wright E 0 (1997) s Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

74

6 Stt

P i h t

d th D t h

P l t

DAVID DOLINKO

Thi

h t l th l tt f th ti f ihi i i l l di til f th h i h l t i l f ti d f i h t Pihi i i l i l d l i b t l ifliti th f f ffi itd f i t d i t i l f lib t h d t h It i l bjti th t t t t ordinarily believe wrongs people or violates their moral rights Justifying punish ment requires explaining why it is morally permissible legitimate or unobjection bl t d h thi t l t f th d ithi it liit t i i l h it d not th i l t thi l iht S h l t i t l i t f ft i l h l f t h h t consequentialism d retributivism. C t i l i t bli tht h t j tif th i t i t t i f i h t i tht l i it i l d t t d th tht ilbl l t t i li ld d P i l h to measure the "goodness" of consequences (and states of affairs generally) will depend on the specific version of consequentialism employed The classic utilitar ians for example identified the goodness of a state of affairs with either the total or th h i f th i tht t t f ffi M t tilit i t d d th tifti fidiidl' f th it f d Th f f t f i h t i k d t li h it ill i l d i l l d i l d d t i th l f b h i th i i l did ( " l d t " ) d t i th i i l hilf f fth ff ( " i l d t " ) h i th i i l ' h t d l tht h l ih t it i ("hbilitti" "reform") disabling even an undeterred unreformed criminal from committing further offenses ("incapacitation") and expressing condemnation of crime n a way that reinforces this societal value judgment ("normative validation") Whatever the fft h i d d ht th f d l d til it t h i " f d l k i " b i th j t i f t i f i h t t td ft lt Rtibtiit t h i b t t " b k d l k i " Abji ti tht i h t i j t i f d b it th t h i i i t tht ht ll l i t i t i h t i th lti it b t th i i l ' i d d

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fl b k i P i h t t i b k t h l breaking is seen as intrinsically valuable or good or appropriate regardless of its results (Consequentialists typically view punishment with its attendant suffering as in itself evil and good only instrumentally by virtue of its consequences) As i t t tibtiit t it " T h t f t i iht l b td b i h t i h l f tibtiit bt t f th jtifti f i h i " (M 1987 180) Bth tilit d tibti jtifti f i h t f h t ith diffilti C i d tili fit It k th ti bt i d i h t hll t i t W d t i i l t b punishing the agent only because we believe doing so will most efficiently achieve our goals; that is that any system of alternative responses would have worse conse quences overall But then critics charge the consequentialist depending on the ft tb d t jtif ith t littl t h If th f tiki th bli t l d ffd t h l it blii tht i i l i d i h t h i f t thi d t th b ftiti h t i t h i i f i t i l i k l t i l b i ti lti i d li b ffiil ht h tilit ht t embrace such a sham punishment regime It would achieve whatever deterrent reformative and normreinforcing consequences genuine punishment would pro duce without imposing the cost of the suffering of those punished Consequential i i thi i t t i ld j t i f t littl b it ld t tif i f l i t i actual i h t i i l M libl tht hl ildd thd f t t i i i l tht l tl d ffti i ti th f ffdi th t d i t i l i h t (Sh thd iht i l d hth d l t h k b i biti f t h ) If th d t f th t t t h t h tili ld th d i h t morally unjustified (Indeed optimism about the potential of rehabilitative therapy motivated calls to abandon punishment during the 1950s and 1960s See for example Menninger 1968: ch 1 0 ) Yet many people find unacceptable any t h h t f dlibtl f i i h t t l t f b t l d hi f f if tilit i ld fl f h i h t (M 1987 1 8 3 5 ) O th th h d id hititil b h t ti l b t l i i h t ihi th f i l i f ffd d th d l i b t " f i " fi t t il t h th l t t of a shocking crime cannot be caught Great suffering would clearly be imposed on the victims of such treatment Widespread anxiety among the general populace might be triggered by overly harsh penalties and by the vicarious punishment of f f d ' lti d ld l i if k l d l k d t tht i t hd b f d Y t if th i i i t ti ildd ffiitl t ff d iti 76

tilit ld k i h f th ti ld k th

ld t k d f bli f

th

t b ll j t i f i d P h t t i t h t th i i dt ld d f th d d thi l d P h th th l i tht f t i l i hd

STATE PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY

b " l d " b fri i t Whil l i k l th thi could h and if they did consequential reasoning would endorse torture and false convic tions Thus consequentialism potentially justifies far too much Consequentialists commonly protest that the objectionable implications alleged to fl fr t h i th ll d d ildl i l i b l ti Sh ih t d th " f r i " fi t f l ld h h t b k t tll t f th l ( t b i l k t th d i i t i th t ) Citi li h tht tili' l i d f t t t h t it ld i f t d th t lii kthd b b t tht t t t th lii " l ibiliti" h i i t i contingent their likely effects Rather the critics insist vicarious punishments the framing of innocents and the rest are intrinsiccdly wrong (Duff 1986: 160) Sophisticated consequentialists may reply that their critics' beliefs about what is " i t i i l l " l ltitl t l ititi A d th hll h l b i t h t th ititi d t f l t i i d b i i d t d f i ith i liti llif itti Th t libl id i th k i d f f f t h d liti i t t i t i k if t l i i lik ti h punishment are even arguably to have the best consequences This sophisticated consequentialist argument raises general metaethical ssues that go well beyond the limited scope of this chapter Equally broad issues surround th l i t h t tili ff f dft f d t l th d i t lii i ti i i b l bt likl f t l tti Thi li i tht tili ilt h t it iti t i b i l i th it f i t f respect for persons. T h h f l t d i th i t i tht ( dlt) t b t t d t d ibl t t bjt t b d i l t d f thi l l d d f th l f th Th t i t i l i t flt l dt for reducing offenders to examples used to scare others into obedience; they fault special deterrence as naked coercion that treats criminals like wild animals to be beaten into submission rather than persons worthy of respect and dignity; and they flt hblitti ttill l i i ht t i l i d l t i t h i ( d i h th lik) ld t ffitl " l d " th f f d ' h t t our d i C t i l i t h i ildi th t t t h t th i l ti btiit h t itlf d " i " ffd t hi th ' l (Dlik 1992 1 6 3 2 4 2 ) Th h h i dt argue that announcing in advance the penalties for lawbreaking acknowledges and respects the potential criminal's status as a rational actor capable of freely choosing whether to obey or to risk the price of disobedience Moreover the very ti f" t f " i hihl ttbl M tilit t tht thi h t i l " t " ll b it ll th l di d i t t f idiidl l iht i didi ht lii ld ii th " d " A d j d i t i th ti ti f" t f " ld i tk f th ifi f th ih t dbt it d h i l h i l t ildi th t l th 77

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i d f th h i l h f th t i t t f " specting persons" Immanuel Kant The belief that consequentialism fails properly to respect persons is one prominent argument supporting the great rival of all consequentialist justifications of punish t retributivism. Whil th t h b lid t it f d i f f t th th f tibtii i th i tht h t k i h t ll i ibl i t i t t i i t it b f i i l bt i l th f t t h t i i l deserve t b ihd C l th t i b t i i t dd t h t th amount f ih t tht i j t i f d tt h f b th t th i i l i ti d dif tht i h t tb t i l t th i f th i Retributivism is occasionally characterized as claiming that punishment is usti fied because it is "fitting" or "just" or "good in itself" (Hart 1968: 231) And critics thereupon denounce it as viciously circular amounting to the unsupported ti t h t i h t i ll j t i f i d h i h i th it t i Bt thi b j t i i i i d if d t d th tibtiit f i d t Sh j t i f ihi i i l t i l b i it i ll bj tibl t i h th bt b i t h t th d i h t Ad ' d i thi i t ith it b i ll b j t i b l ( permissible or justified) that one have or receive it but is a much narrower notion Though it may well be morally unobjectionable for the holder of the winning lottery ticket to receive the prize and for the duly appointed Secretary of State to take up hi d t i th f ld t d i i l b t h h t t deserve hi i th l t t hi iti A i bl f tibtii i thi It t tht ii l h t th d i ll iibl jtifid Yt t t t tht ld t h i ilt h iht i t il iibl i l b h d tht t t t T bli tht l i t f i tht t t diidt d t t f th t t t h d i not to believe it would be morally permissible to torture him (Dolinko 1 9 9 2 : 1 6 2 8 9 ) Many retributivists in fact go beyond merely asserting that criminals deserve pun ishment and try to explain why they deserve it Such theorists can then argue that th ifi b i t h t k i h t d d l h t h t ifliti it i d d ll iibl O ti ith t i K t d i th th fj t i fJh R l i t h t th i i l i consents to wills chooses h ih t At l t h " t i l l i l l " it i tht h i h t i lld f b l f il ti tht t i l t ld ( ld?) t i "original position" of selecting institutions to govern their relations (Murphy 1973) Notoriously however it is difficult to understand the justificatory force of a fictitious or hypothetical "consent" In our case how could such a fiction legitimate th h h t t t f l d ti f f d ? Ad d i d i thi f f d ' it i f f hi i i " t " b d ith th respect for persons t l t th l f t i b t i i ? (S Dff i i t 1986 2 1 7 2 8 ) A i f l t i l l t t i d th ti t h t i i it t t unfair advantage th l b i d i C i i l l h th b f i t

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f f d f f d d i t t th i f t i i hi i impulses The criminal retains the benefit of the compliance of his fellows while renouncing the burden of selfrestraint This "freeriding" gives him an unfair ad vantage over noncriminals which punishment removes thereby restoring the bl f b f t d b d (Mi 1968) U f t t l it it d i f f l t t if tl ht " d t " i i l b t i Th t l ibl didt i f d f l f t i t B t th th i i l ' d t hld b d b th b d f l f t i t h th ff b t th b Thi i t d d h h t t t i l ll f l t it th i i ti Th i i f l t t d t it (lik murder and treason) would yield less "advantage" and hence deserve less punish ment than crimes (like speeding or incometax evasion) that tempt most people more severely Efforts to avoid this unpalatable conclusion by giving a different t f i i l ' " f i d t " h tf d ll M th " f i d t " ti i t ht i b t i W d it d f l f di t h t hi i t i t f fti t th f th f h i h we ld kill b t d t T h t th fl f i i it t t k th i t i ' th i th stone of a third attempt to explain why criminals deserve punishment in a way that shows we are permitted to inflict it Put forward by the late Jean Hampton this s a modern version of Hegel's view that punishment somehow "annuls" the crime I h t i i i l ' t H t d i th f l l li t h t th i i l i i i l t h iti d hi f h Ad h t jtifi ihi th i i l i tht di t llifi t h t l f l h d d t k i f t th il l t t h tht ffd d iti li l l d titld t l t( H t 1991) Thi t i h t fi t i i ti H f l d it l t i itht bi iti lik h i i ? If i i l ' iitil aggression conveys a message of superiority to the victim how exactly is that message "corrected" or "nullified" when the criminal meets "defeat" at the hands not of the victim but of society as a whole? And just who is the supposed audience f th iti H t fid i i h t th tht i i l d iti f l th? Thi i ill li b H t i i t tht i h t b i d if ith i i l it ill h d it d th iti d t d it ( H t 1991 4 0 2 3 ) Th t b i bl ith H t ' th h i thi th f t t h t til ti ld " l l i f " " t " fl l li i l fil t t b l i h t h t th action would be morally permissible I claim that a certain repressive regime is morally praiseworthy; you could "correct" my claim by having me abducted and thrown into one of that regime's vile prisons Does it follow that your doing so is t t i l l ll iibl? A l t h h th i f tibtii it bif illtt th k i d f d i f f i l t it t h i d i lii th l liti jtifiti f th ti f i h t Rtibtiit h l t d diffilt i ii t t t thi f t ti tht i h t i jtifid l if " t i l " t th i ( f l Dlik 1992 79

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163642) Y t li th tilit l t t i h it severe flaws Not surprisingly a number of efforts have been made to craft "mixed" or "hybrid" theories combining retributive and consequentialist elements Such efforts often appeal to the sense that while retributivism is needed to rule out such i h i h t ti d i l b t l lti l lt l i th point f ihi i th fit l Th l i ti l th li i tht fH L A H t H t d tht t k th i t i t t i f i h t t b tifid b it b f i i l d i th i i d f th h f l d t it h d d i i l d t t i l l l t th k i d f b h t ti that consequentialists are accused of regarding as merely contingently inexpedient Questions about the "distribution" of punishment who may be punished and how much are he insists logically separate from the institution's "general justify i i " S tilit t th l t t th l t i d d t tilit i i l f fi jti tht t liit i h t ' "ditibti" fbiddi f i t " f i " th i t ihi i i l ' fili ( H t 1968) Ht' h h d li d i f l t i l B t i it ll tifi resolution of the problems that bedevil pure consequentialism and retributivism? It may instead merely combine elements of those theories in an unstable and ncoher ent fashion For one thing treating "justifying aim" and "distribution" as wholly t i t it i l i b l tht li h " i h t " i jtifid i t h t h i ifid who i t b ihd d f what M th b i j t i f i t ti il h Ht' t i it ll iibl t t t itd f i i tht ld t h i b i l fl? P b l Ht' li i i h t ' " l jtifi i " it b f i i l B t thi i t d tht t t t tht ld t h i i l b ll l i t imate if it is part of a practice with sufficiently beneficial consequences overall And how can one endorse that position yet nevertheless insist that certain ways of treating people are categorically forbidden no matter how beneficial the conse f i h t t tht i t d th ti ld b ? Th h t i ft d i t i l tilit d tibti h h i i d it f th l i t hih idti f ld d i i P h th t i t i i f th k (lik til i ) t hibit i h t i b d i l ii ffd thi d t hil i i t i (lik t i l i ) t h t th lti bt this purpose and punishment is not purely contingent A leading example is the view that punishment is justified as a means of "moral education" aimed at getting the criminal to appreciate and repent the wrong she has done On this view the d t i f t i ll i l l til titi th iibl d f i h t hih t t d i t ith th i i l t i l t Yt t f thi i tt d t h t it f i l t tif th t l i h t ti f t l iti ( M i 1981 2 6 9 7 0 Dff 1986 2 9 1 9 ) A d f t h i t h b d d fft t tif i h t ltth t it b l i t i t l t d t i dti ft i f f 80

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d i t l t i di i h i h th ti t ditl di ticular offense would employ informal procedures aimed at healing its effects and reintegrating the offender into the community (Christie 1982; Bianchi 1994) The preceding sketch of the problems raised by punishment in general can serve b k d i ii th d b t th t t i l f f ih t td th d t h lt P t f itl i h t ( " t t i i t " ) h lid bth tilit d tibti t Thi tilit li i tht d t h i superior deterrent t th ilbl i h t (I ti th t itl lt ld b lif i i t ith i t h t th ibilit f l ) Th tibti t i t h t d t h i th l penalty severe enough to be appropriate for the very worst most heinous offenses Opponents of capital punishment ("abolitionists") challenge both of these argu ments They assert that there is insufficient evidence that death is a more effective d t t th lif i i t Th l t d tht ti dil ll d f t i ttitd t d h lif t h t k it i i t lt f th t i t t tilti ld b F t h bliti it t t k th t l d i i t t i f itl i h t idbl bi t ill d i i l l d i i i t d I th remainder of this chapter I examine these competing arguments In doing so I will at times focus on the capital punishment system of the United States in what may seem a parochial fashion This is to some extent unavoidable Cli b t h itl i h t i d i i t d i ttdi t l ld d t h l t t d th d d i d t i l d ( t J ) tl l th d t h lt Of th 1 8 1 3 ti dd b A t I t t i l d i 1999 (th t t dt i l b l t th ti f i t i ) 85 t t k l i Chi I S d i A b i th C d th U i t d Stt Of th ti th US h d th t t il it d t h lt t ith liti dh l d th t th h t test for those who insist that such reconciliation is impossible Furthermore I will simplify the discussion by considering death as the penalty for "murder" Actually American states punish only the most aggravated murders by death while some th ti l itl i h t t d tffiki i ff d th i bid d Th tilit f itl i h t t l l t h h t l i l tt f i i l ft R t t i i t t tht ti ttil d ill b d t d f killi if th lt i d t h b t ill t b d t d b l i h t lif i i t itht l U f t t l testing this hypothesis is rather difficult Researchers have compared murder rates in jurisdictions with and without capital punishment and murder rates in single jurisdictions before and after they abolished (or adopted) it But so many uncontrol lbl f t ifl th h i i d t t h t it i h d t b fidt t h t th lt f h i flt th b f th d t h lt th th (f l) i l t t lti ditibti d th lik B i i i th 1970 b f hititd tdi l d th t h t i l t h i f ltil i l i fft t t l f th i f l th d t f h t f t 81

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A d jrit f th ri tdi b t h th i l ti t and the more sophisticated recent variety have found no evidence that capital punishment has the superior deterrent effect retentionists claim for it (Bedau 1997: ch 9) S t t i i t d ith l t " " "O i t d t d b ht f t" i l t ll h f dth th t l f libt d t h t dt f l l th lif rit (V D H dC d 1983 69) A b l i t i i t t f i t t h t th t h t f lif i i t l d ffi t d t t t i l kill h ld b d t d t ll A d d th li i hth i d ll risk f d t h deters better than a risk of prison A motorist in a hurry might be willing to accept an (actual) speeding ticket but not an (actual) lifethreatening accident so that the deterrent difference between these outcomes is great But knowing that speeding t ll risk f i idt b t d t t th k i risks t i k t (C 1974 434) E if th i i l d i t dth' d t t ffi l d normative i ld i M t f bli tht ft t i l i h t l i l th t b b d if th ld lt i t saving of innocent lives Torture and extremely painful modes of execution are commonly so regarded along with executing the families of convicted murderers We would not be likely to endorse crucifixion burning at the stake or the use of th k if k th i h t ld d t t t i l kill h th t h t fl lti ( i l d i " h " ti) l d At th f h f th iti t itl i h t i th b l i f t h t d l i b t l killi ti h bi h i l bl t t h t ' if i th bbiti hih i i dt j t i f I ill t t thi b l i f b i f l t th d f thi h t H I i l t tht blitiit h h l d it ld t b d if itl i h t were h t dt more effectively than imprisonment Retentionists have their own normative argument Deterrence aside they claim that some crimes are so heinous some killings so aggravated that a penalty short f dth l b l d i l i i t f f t t th d i i t d h it f th i t i i h t i ijti Hitl S t l i N i t t f id d i f i t l (B 1979 8 V D H 1985 971) S h l b t h l l i h littl l ill f l t h t l l d d ifl t t ld d t l i h Hitl Eih hil th fid h t l d hll irrelevant in thinking about the runofthemill killers who populate actual death rows Retentionists need an argument showing that at least some "ordinary" mur derers deserve death so that on retributive grounds giving them a lesser punish t ld b j t A t d i t i l h b t l t lex talionis th " f " i i l tht d d tht riil b ihd b ffi th f t th i f l i t d t h i iti K t tbl t f thi i iiti t h t " O l th L f tibti {jus talionis) d t i tl th kid d d f i h t " f i d dfdi itl i h t f d thi b i "Th i f kid b t dth d 82

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ii li d th t i b l diti d tl th is also no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judicially condemned and put to death" (Kant 1965: 101 102) Lex talionis, however is a completely unworkable principle It dictates unaccept bl t i h t f i bti btt i it t t i t t hil t ti lt f h t f th f f lik t i i f d k dii C t tib tiit ft t i t d l tht i h t t b proportional t th i Th t i hld i th t i h t th t t i t th t t i h t d Whth h ih ment system can possibly be set up is quite unclear But even if it could doing so presupposes that at the outset we already know what is "the most severe punish ment" which can only mean the most severe punishment of those we are willing to inflict S if td d i th t i f i d t h ill b th " t i l " i h t l if h l d d i d d t h t it i ll iibl lt D i t ll thi t t i i t tht d t h t b th l it lt f th t d b l ti i th i h th killer has inflicted on his victim "Does it not cheapen human life to punish the murderer by incarcerating him as one does a pickpocket? Murder differs in quality from other crimes and deserves therefore a punishment that differs in quality from th i h t " (V D H 1982 331 l B 1980 511) B t h i l l lti "diff i lit" f iltl tli hi t

t

ih bth btt d thi ith i i t M killing "diff i lit" f iki hi kt d t d t t ll kill t f i t th h kill t h h l i t dii d ti R t t i i t th l bth tilit d tibti t d abolitionists attack both These arguments are substantive, focusing on whether killing a person is by its very nature intrinsically appropriate or alternatively m proper as a punishment Abolitionists also rely however on a number of procedural t li tht th i fl i f t th thd d t l t th kill h ill t l l b t d (Th f l l i d i i f d l t i d d i ftht i Dlik 1986) P d l t b d i i d b iiti tht itl i h t t d t hibit th til f t f th A i t Bt lti b t h t h t i l t i t d littl t b l t th iti f ht i after all almost the only functioning death penalty in a modern industrialized democracy (Japan where capital punishment is shrouded in remarkable secrecy is believed to have executed about 35 people during the 1990s) O d l t i tht itl i h t i iflitd " b i t i l " itht t i l i i l d dititi bt th d h td d th f l b h i i t (I th U i t d S t t i t l 625125 t f itd f ttill itl d h tll i d dth t f i Bd 1997 3 1 2 ) Th t liit d t i l d i f thi t t d tht t f

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th il t i h i i d ti tht lt i ti tk "under no standards at all or under pseudostandards without discoverable mean ing" (Black 1981: 29) No articulated standard for example controls a prosecu tor's discretionary decision to bring capital charges in the first place or to reject a l t l ff A d th t f" d i t t i " f t l i it f itl d iti i l f " d t d d " th ( ) tt h j i tld tht " d i t t i " i i l i t t d d th t bf th killi Ath d l t hih l fid tbli i tht itl i h t i iflitd i ill d i i i t Thi li supported by many empirical studies which show that killers of whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks A 1990 review of thenexisting research by the US government's General Accounting Office reported that "In 82 t f th t d i f iti f d t ifl th l i k l i h d f b i h d ith itl d ii th d t h l t " fidi " k b l i t t dt t tt dt llti thd d lti t h i " (Bd 1997 271) C t l l i f it f l i t i t l t il ibl d d b t did t l i i t th id f fiti bi The most prominent retentionist academic Ernest Van Den Haag has dismissed both of these arguments by insisting that the justice of executing any individual killer depends wholly on whether execution is what that individual deserves and is fftd b hth th h d dth l i t l t t d ith " b i t i l " f ill b i d (V D H 1982) T h t t i b i ith d t th biti t h il li th l k f t i l thd f d t i i h i h kill " d " dth M it i d i t i i fj t i h i comparative d i i Yt j t i h b td ith " t t i lik lik" ittl ith " i i h hi d " i d d bth h t i t i t from the same passage in Aristotle Besides if we do take a wholly noncomparative view of justice we are given no convincing reason to believe ustice so conceived must always be preferred to equality Van Den Haag's premise for inferring that d d l i t d t i th it f ti th h i thi " j t d t " Wht th k fV D H ' iti h th biti d d i i i t i t d iit i bjti Th i i l b i f th biti t i tibl P t t d t f hll hth itl d i i k b d b explicit l t h t f f t i l t i their discretion Yet decisions not subject to explicit rules may none the less be made in a consistent rationally explicable manner and standards vague and indeterminate in theory may in practice receive a narrow and principled interpret ti I d d i i l tdi f itl t i t tht ll b fft ill d i t th t i itl th tl t h t th t hl " b i t " th blitiit Th i i l id f fiti d i i i t i hil t hll l i i fl d til f t th th id f " b i t i " Yt thi id i t fliti i t t t i F l ll l 84

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htilit t itl i h t b l k th hit hih iht t l t into less community support for pressing capital charges in cases with black victims Then too the great majority of murders are intraracial meaning black victims tend to die at the hands of black killers so prosecutors trying to avoid an f bi i t blk d f d t iht d i t d i t th li f b l k iti R d l f th l i b i l i t f lii th fiti f f t i th iil th d i i i t i t h bi d f t ith th bi t i t Nith d d il f t fdth ih t h if lid i d i t th i i l jti t dl f ht lt is reserved for the very worst crimes Suppose for example that the criminal justice system is as riddled with standardless discretion as proponents of the arbitrariness argument allege Then whatever penalty is employed against those convicted of "the t i " ld b i d i t h k i l ii d i t i l t b ll l i t i t O kill iht i lif itht l th lif with l thid fi t hil f t h f l t t h ll th ht fd i i d " d t d d t ll d d t d d itht d i b l i " N t h t kill f whites are more likely to receive death sentences than killers of blacks because prejudiced prosecutors judges and juries value white lives more highly than black lives Abolishing capital punishment would not affect those prejudices so killers of hit ld th i th t non-itl i h t d i t i tl ft d t kill fb l k Wht bth t t th i t tht itl i h t h l d b b l i h d b t t h t th h i f iki t "th t i i l " d ifliti th ht i t lt d t h h i f if it i t b ll tbl Of dth i t l th t i h t i th t ti it i littil difft f th l t h i t i t taking everything from the criminal and in doing so irrevocably But the arbitrariness and discrimination arguments do not trade on those features of capital punishment In particular their force does not stem from a fear that we might discover we have td ith " b i t i l " f d i i i t db bl t k th i h t d k d Th systemic t tht i i l d i t i d i t i i h the class f d h t td tht kill f hit as a class h h l t t d t li tht i til idtifibl di biti d i i i t i A thid d l t h l l t th i i ability of capital punishment This is the claim that the unavoidable imperfections of all human factfinding and decision procedures make mistakes in capital sentencing inevitable Every now and then perhaps extremely rarely but sometimes inno t l ill b itd f itl i t d t dth di t l t i t ill t l l d bi t d (Tlk f " i t l" h i ilifiti b th th itl t i " i t k " ik fidi killi d i t t d h it tll i l i iti f d d f d t h t l l klld i l i t i t lfdf l jti lid i i t d f ) Thi td di it f f th hilli t

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fl i tht h b l td d bi bl t ll ff the punishment or compensate the hideously mistreated innocent It has been an increasingly influential argument with Americans in recent years in the wake of several widely reported instances of death row prisoners winning release after new id t b l i h d thi i M t t b l th f Illii d d t i ti i tht t t i J 2000 ft th ti f th t h i t t h d t h i f d t h b l i t d th i 1977 R t t i i t h t t th itk t Th fit i t h t b l i tiit l t th l i k l i h d f ti i t Atll retentionists assert the multiple layers of review and due process protections built into the American capitalpunishment system make it extraordinarily unlikely that a genuinely innocent person will ever be executed When abolitionists note that th i t i h b l d f A i dth i 1973 h id f thi fl iti d t t i i t t t h t thi l if t h i l i t h t th t k t f t t itl iti bf itk ti S d t t i i t t h t th rik f i t k i l l idti relevant to whether execution is morally permissible and can be outweighed or over ridden by competing moral considerations (just as we regard the use of automobiles as morally legitimate despite knowing their use will cause the deaths of faultless individ l) I til it ld b iibl t th rik f d ti i t l itl i h t id ffiitl l t i l i bfit ith b fi d dt ildi t saving f i t li b "di j t i " ii th t kill t h i tibtiit j t d t Ablitiit hll b t h f th t th itk t Th i i t tht ti f th i t i t t ibilit l i i tht t l t t t f h i i d i th 1900 ( R d l t t l 1992) The protections and reviews supposedly built into the system they argue are fre quently more apparent than real given the often abysmally poor legal representa tion of indigent capital defendants at trial and the formidable legal barriers to i f l t i t i i ill i f th btti t f th t dt hth d l ittd T l l i l t l i t f t d itl iti ft ri f th l t f tit i t t i f di fi ll t d t d th t hll t i d th f l riil jti t A f th b f i t f itl i h t t i h i th rik f i t k ll first that there is little evidence of death's superior deterrent efficacy And "doing justice" can provide a retributive "benefit" sufficient to justify risking execution of the innocent only if we agree both that some murderers deserve death as their i h t d t h t it ld t h f b unjust t i th l lt B t td li t h t ith lex talionis th " t i l i t " l t t i h bld t t i i t t li h i i l i l d dth thi i h t Ad h l b d ( d i i tribtii i l) t h t if d d ti t t t ii it t h d t b ll iibl lt l thi j t i ll requires f 86

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I th l t l i th th f f th procedural i t k t t one's assessment of the substantive case for retributivism Indeed one's ultimate view of capital punishment may well be determined by one's reaction to the ultim ate normative claim of the abolitionists presented earlier in this chapter that exe ti ihilti hi ltl d i b l i hll d i h t l i l ft t i fll h i t t tilti Thi b l i t i i t i I bli li t th h t f th i tht f l iti t th d t h lt Y t th h d b thi i h t b bl t t t till lli t t t it It b tht h t f t h i d tht h h hd lti ate ethical judgment on which competing intuitions and emotional responses will necessarily have the final word

References d Bd H A ( d ) (1997) The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies N Y k Oxford: Oxford University Press Berns W (1979) For Capital Punishment New York: Basic Books (1980) D f d i th d t h lt Crime and Detinquency 26 503 B i h i H (1994) Abliti d t I R Dff d D G l d (d) A Reader on Punishment Oxford: Oxford University Press B l k C (1981) Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake 2 d d N Yk W W Nt Chiti N (1982) Limits to Pain O f d M t i R b t Conway D (1974) Capital punishment and deterrence: some considerations n dialogue Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 4 3 1 4 3 f D l i k D (1986) H t itii th d t h lt Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 77: 546601 (1992) Three mistakes of retributivism UCLA Law Review 39: 162357 Dff R A (1986) Trials and Punishments C b r i d Cbrid U i i t P H t J (1991) A th f tibti I R GF d Chrith Mri (d) Liability and Responsibitity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press H t H L A (1968) P l t th i i l f i h t I Punishment and Responsibility O f d C l d P J Ldd I d i l i BbbMrill K t I (1965) The Metaphysical Elements of Justice t Menninger K (1968) The Crime of Punishment New York: Viking Press M M (1987) Th l th f tribti I F Sh ( d ) Responsibility CharCbrid U i i t P acter and the Emotions C b r i d Morris H (1968) Persons and punishment The Monist 52 Reprinted in H Morris On Guilt and Innocence Berkeley CA: University of California Press 1976 (1981) A t l i t i th f i h t American Philosophical Quarterly 18 26371 Mh J L (1973) M i d tribti Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 284 Radelet M L Bedau H A and Putnam C E (1992) In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases B t Nrtht U i i t P V D H E (1982) I df f th d t h lt til d l li I H A Bedau (ed) The Death Penalty in America 3rd edn Oxford: Oxford University Press

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(1985) The death penalty once more UC Davis Law Review, 18: 957-72 and Conrad J (1983) The Death Penalty: A Debate. New York: Plenum Press

Further reading Ezorsky G (ed) (1972) Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Lacey N (1988) State Punishment. London: Routledge Ten C L (1991) Crime and punishment In P Singer (ed) A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Walker N (1991) Why Punish? Oxford: Oxford University Press

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7

Racism MICHELE MOODY-ADAMS

In several topics of importance to applied ethics it is frequently difficult to find uncontroversial propositions from which to begin a substantive discussion of the relevant ethical problems This phenomenon is perhaps most familiar n discussions of abortion where simply describing the competing positions to be analyzed and evaluated is an activity fraught with controversy Less familiar or at least less frequently acknowledged is the extent to which substantive discussion of the ethical dimensions of racism must begin with assumptions that to some will seem as controversial as any assumptions shaping discussions of abortion But consider three propositions that many including the author believe to be fundamental to any discussion of the ethical implications of racism 1 Racism is morally wrong and should not be embodied in the beliefs and actions of individuals or in the practices and institutions of social groups cultures or nations 2 Racism exists (even in many circumstances where it is the subject of official condemnation) and in its most virulent manifestations continues to have socially and economically important consequences for those unjustly affected by it 3 The effects of even virulent forms of racism can be powerfully mitigated and sometimes even eliminated by collective and sometimes individual efforts of determined moral agents All three of these propositions have long been the source of intense discussion and debate Yet given what seems to be their centrality to discussions of the ethical implications of racism it is important to enquire about the nature and source of the disagreement that concerns these propositions and then to consider whether there are any means for responding to the underlying disagreement in a constructive way Articulating the nature and source of the relevant disagreement is a relatively straightforward task To begin with those who appreciate the depth and breadth of moral disagreement will not be surprised at the contention that the normative claim contained in proposition (1) remains a subject of controversy But it should be emphasized that this claim remains controversial despite the spread of legal political and social orthodoxies officially condemning racism It may be less widely

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i d tht l l i t th i f ffil d t i f i proposition (2) alleging the continued existence and effects of racism is in many contexts as controversial as proposition (1) For instance citing the legal prohibition of discrimination in the United States an increasingly vocal group of social critics h fidtl l i d th " d f i " i A i (D'S 1995) A d i t h iti h l l litil d il t h d i ffiill d i b t t i l l i i diiti bt th il i d litil iti f " f l " d i i i t d i t d th f th il b ttibtd i i l ll t fil th t f th lii t h l E d f i t h i t ll t h t th l welloff groups frequently exhibit failures to take advantage of legally protected opportunities as well as intrinsic "racially based" weaknesses and blameworthy cultural impoverishment or some combination of these three causes S t f thi i t it l i b t th " d " f i iftti f til f f i I ltd i th t h t it b i i b l t t ll b t t i t t i itht li " l i " il lii B t th l t h li t t i d d f " l blid" lii t h t i i l l rely on concepts and methods created by the antidiscrimination movement to give a renewed legitimacy to racial discrimination (Freeman 1978; Crenwhaw 1988) Taken together these fears have given rise to a pessimistic assertion of the "per f i " (Bll 1992) It i th t h t it t iti (3) ith it l i t h t th f f t f i b l i i t d bttill ititd h d l d l l i t l t i tht h d i t th l i f iti (2) B t it i ltil t i l l i t th d f i t i hih d i i f th t h i l d i i f i f t l f d M td flti i i d if t id f l i i h t i t th by which we might move beyond the resultant ethical impasse created primarily by disagreement about propositions (2) and (3) Ethical thinkers have frequently failed to appreciate that the most promising path starts with a clear and detailed under tdi f ht i tll i N h th i t d t h t it i i i b l k f i it t h i l d i i if th fi thi l t t th liitl " l t i " t f i (tht i t l i b t diff i th i t i i l f difft ilid ) (F tii l th " l " lti t f it li t th f th k i d f b tti ti f i ' tdl " i i l " " i t i f i " li ith out which it is impossible to achieve any kind of analytical clarity about the nature of racism) That is only after a careful analysis of the central features of racist conceptions of reality will it be possible to articulate important elements of a robust t t i b t th t h i l d i i f i A b t t i t th id t t t t f th f hih i t b j t d ll Th t t th di th i t i h i h it i ibl t i th it d it f i Fill b t hll t i t l t t l t f blii tht d th f f t f i itht 90

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i t t i l l ffii account that I now turn

i '

t

l

It i t th d t i l

f thi

What is Racism? At th i l i d

f i t f i i th t d ti t h t ( ) th h b diidd i t d i t " " h t i d b fil ittl bdl f til ttibt d (b) th b d l f til ttibt db k thi " b " bl i t i i l l l able (especially socially economically and morally more valuable) than members of other races Racism may be manifested in the behavior of individual persons; it may also shape social practices and institutions either by the deliberate action or the l d i t i f id t f il t B t bf it i d i th ti fidiidl bdid i il ti d ititti i i till dititi ti f th t f lit P l i b l f f t t ti lt ht iht b id t itit l i i t i ' fft t d f i ti f th l i hih i l ith th h agents who (to varying degrees) accept it attempts to construct reality Efforts to scrutinize racist conceptions are surely made more difficult by the fact that racism takes many complex and varied forms It is important first of all to b tht d i f f t il t t h d d it id t f il l i f t i d ll id d t d i fh (lldl) t i i diff i th it f til ill b d i i F i t hil N t h A i i i th d h l f f th t t i t h t d th it ft ibl th " j " t hih l dl i b l b d t t t i t h t Bili i i idl b l i d t h lid ft il t i i hih d t played a very small role (Marshall 1993) Second historical developments within a given society can have profound conse f ill d i t t t f il l i f t i ll f ltt i l i k d ith t h t t t W h t thi i tht i d it f f t d i i f t h i i l it ti ti ltil h t i d f ti I t i l l iid l f thi hl h d t d litill d ill i f l t i l h i h t t fA i i O f th ti t t i h A i d d t f lti h h d i i t d t th U i t d S t t i th l t nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from countries such as Ireland and Italy In the middle of the twentieth century members of these groups gradually went from being members of several distinct "white races" (with varying amounts of t t i b t ) t bi b f i l hit " C i " lldl d i b l l b t d " i " t " C i " ( J b 1998) Oth diffilti t d t l i t th t k f tiii it ti i l l f th t h i l t h i k ki ill t l hitill flti t th ti "Wht' ith i ? " A thid d ill ti fh i liti i tht l i f t i t l t it ti 91

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d

il lit ttt t diid i t ill d i t i t lti fh b l i d b till d i i t t d b t b h t i l l d tl t i l l tt h th O h l i f t i t b l i d t h it it i i h t h t J i t hih dll td t " i l l d i " t t k th Et h b l i d b t b itll iditiihbl f th il l h ld th ( M h l l 1993) A t h h t b h t it it i i l d i th B l i l i t i f t l Afi td " i l l ditit" T t i d Ht i R d t f l h i i l diff bf l i t i d hi f i kid f t Th l i f t i t i th t t d i i t tht d t ll i t b t th h hd f d t tht ( i ft th ) dill i h t i lti d i i t tht d i t Th h i i t tht il l i f i t i t till f t i t dif thi d l " b i " b t h d i i t hld flt th f ith h i h t t th d i i t th li l t fid ith t t i l l it d t i Wht th t t i l l hifti d t i l f til l i f t i t i i ll it id iftti i l t d i i l b t ldi tht it j t h h i l h i l ti b lid t h i i t d th ti d ti hih t f d l i d t b jtifd b it ldi Y t th t k f ki f it ti i fth l i t d b th f t tht f t l th til t f it ti th id t h t th b diidd i t d i t " " d tht h i Homo sapiens i t i i l l h t i d b dl lbl tit t fll tiltd b th h t d t it h t i t i f th i W ll thi th bl f t i l t d i M th h i f ti ltd i i ill di t t (lik t t t i " d l d " t i ) h th i t l t liit il d i l f i t ti d ti I h t t it i t t f d tht i d i f l f d t i d ltd f f fftd i t i d i l t h t ti d ti t bl i t t d t ift i ht bl i t t i h t l t k th t b Of hd i l ihtl t i d l i t th th t ltil i il b N b t th t llibl b i likl t bli ll f t i t b h li tht h t t d d t blk f t th d l i h t f hi ll i t d i t " l i t " th b l k t d t h t k I t t th d t f h i l h f h til di blk t d t f j i i th bjt l i i i l t i t th " i l t t h d k " fh t d t i l likl t b id t l t b th i b id f i It ill b d i f f l t if th f it tdl t t i t i l f fh b l k t d t ' k t ltil t k d i i t tht d i i th f j i i hil h thi b i i l ll i t t i d Th bl i h f i t h t it i ti th i t f i tht b db t l b " l l i t t i d " t h t d th t h t i b l idiidl d F i t th f t t i t t f flti th bi

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d t t i f i th th l lti bt t h d their fundamentally impressionable students (MoodyAdams 1 9 9 2 3 ) However perhaps the most important obstacle to careful philosophical scrutiny of racist conceptions is the fact that some who explicitly affirm racist views claim hat thi i h dll b l d bjti fti I t t t th li d t t i l l t h h t l b th h i i t tht h t i thd ll th t th lti iit d i f i i t f difft l ith id lldl h i tht t l t f th t t i b t t h t k h lti " l b l " ( i l l tlli ) i l t h i t b l Thi th d i t li tht f from being a morally problematic stance a racist worldview must surely be morally unimpeachable The claim will be that it provides morally unimpeachable explan ations of (and ultimately justifications for) differences in the economic and social iti f til d t h i t b l diff i t t t ( h il fili f i t ) S h ti h b ill fl i ill d i i i dbt i th U i t d S t t b t l diff i il i d lit i l tht h f t l b th bjt f l itii Th h wield the psychometrician's axe in these debates claim to have an ironclad method of supporting their case They claim to be able to provide measurements of largely heritable traits that are crucial to economic and social success (in particular a trait th d i b " l i t l l i " ) Th li fth t h t th lt f t h i t h t h t th i thi j t b t iti ditibti f il b f t db d ( H t i dM 1994) B t th li h b th bjt f t bd flitt tht idl itd b h i l h ld l ll thi fd it ti i d i i f l i d thi E t h i i t h f t l d tht d i i f thi l i t t d it i l i t i iht b t it i t critical race theory and possibly in some pockets of work in the philosophy of science But this assumption is to the detriment of work being done on the ethical implications of racism S l d d f kb i f l t i l lti bilit lti ti it h i l t h l i t d il itit t l t t h t th h t i i ' li t b t libl d t t til tbl Thi k h d d i t t hll t h t i thd d ti f i t t ti t h t th i i l tit lld " l i t l l i " tht b d i iltbl " i t " ll t th ti that the psychometrician can claim to have measured it and to have done so reliably (Fischer et al 1996) It has been noted further that even the allegedly most "scientific" versions of the relevant views rely on science to affirm the "real it" f il t l i tht t l d th itif t i bt t h l d d ill dbt ti t l i i l i t i litil di ( M h l l 1993) O t k h t h th th d i fh i hih i l i t i l di h dt b ill libl f itif k l d M l it t th li f il i h td d diffilti ith th id t h t th fft 93

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t d i i d th h i it till d i t il i itlf f d mentally flawed Thus for instance studies of gene differences between the major population groups in America reveal as much genetic variation between individuals from the same "racial group" as between individuals allowed to come from different il (Liit 1964 N i d R h d h 1972 C l l i S f t l 1996) D i th l d l t f h i l h i l k i d it fft h i l h i l i d h d i i d i t thi t l t th t k f tiii th thil d i i f i P t f th l t i f thi i t t t i i l b i d t f the notion that it is possible to challenge racism's evaluative claims while leaving its (purportedly) empirical assertions about races intact But it is difficult to see how to understand racism's evaluative claims unless one understands them as responses t th d l i i i l ti ith h i h th t i l l j i d It i t tht i ' lti li ill i "flk" i f it i t l b d th k i d f f l i f i b l b l i f b t th t t f th t l ld l i k l t d itif ti f th blif ffti hll t i Th f ith h i h t i l d times profoundly irrational attitudes about what it is to "belong" to a particular racial group tend to provide the basis for racism's evaluative claims has ustly strengthened the pessimism of those who fear the permanence of racism Yet a b t t i l b f ill i f l t i l it li t bli tht i ' lti li b d itifll tbl liti b t h lti Th t tht i tht thi it iti till f l i f b l d bjt t ii if d f t d Th it i t i t t f h i l h i t t d i th t h i l d i i f i t tk i l t till l i b l hll t th liti tht d i t it iti F t t l th i i i id tht h i l h illi t debate the strengths and weaknesses of these challenges and that they have inally recognized the crucial relevance of these challenges to applied ethics Several useful and important philosophical discussions of the very idea of race have appeared in the t fft M hd i i h b t t k l th ttill t tli ibilit t h t i t h i l h ( f f t i l "tki id" i iliti l t i ) h l d ill l i hli t f l t id f lt tk ( t i h l l ) b th b i i f th l t i h t t h d l i t t h t i (Gldb 1990 H d i 1993 W t 1994 A i h dGt 1996 Mill 1997 B i 2001)

Why is Racism Morally Wrong? Of M il h 94

t f th ffitd

liti b t h lti th b ll i i f t diff b f til lti F i t d ihtfll itd fdi ti f thi libt P t d t

t i t h l h l h libl id ll

ll bi t l th dt i i f i t

RACISM

b i hih t t t i t d thi difftl f th l I a different but potentially related kind of example it is surely defensible to claim that for some purposes though obviously not for just any purpose it can be morally acceptable to spend social resources differentially in response to certain kinds of diff i th biliti f th h t d t ft f il Citi th b i f hih d i i b t h llti hld b d t l t i l It i th t h t t bli h l t t t l dbti d i i t hift f " t l iftd" t d t t " d i f f t l bld" t d t db k i Wht i l h i tht (t l t l l ) th ill b iti tht li difftil di t i d t diff i bilit On a first reflection what seems morally most problematic in such contexts about relying on racist worldviews to provide any criteria for disparities in treatment among groups is that racist worldviews are profoundly unreliable accounts of real it Th t d i i d th i i tll b l t i d t k li b t th h t i t i f th it l i f tht d t t d t ti If th h l l t t f il l i f i t i t th bl i tht h t l hifti ilitill td d itifill tbl i t t til il d t h t th ik t h acteristics of human beings that have no genuine moral significance But let us in fact suppose that the challenges to many racist assertions about the nature of reality and hence to racism's evaluative claims are correct Does ti thi iti tll l d t l d t i f i idbl Ih td? S tht f d it i d t d tht il l i f t i t f t l kh lit ildi th l i t tht b t h ithi d il ll th l i t tht iti d h i t i l i th i il l i f t i t tht h hld W l i i h d t i i t t h t th " i l " fil f itifi tilit b t tht holding on to racist beliefs possibly on the strength of vaguely particularist notions about the moral value of group membership is not so obviously morally wrong whatever its potential intellectual shortcomings This racist might even t l t i i t il l i f t i t i t l d tht if t i t lti bt il i t d th i f til tit h idiidl b f ti t t t t h th t i t t h t ld b i d t th b th t t b d ftit d t b " t i l " t ii it d i f f t il i t Bt l i i " t i l i t " it h ld insist that there are always a few "anomalies" insisting all the while that the anomalies are simply exceptions that "prove the r u l e " What is the best way to reply to someone whose racism remains resilient in the f f hll t f th d l i ti f it l d i ? I t i l d i i f l i d thi l t thi t iht kt l i f l t i l t lt h i t th bl li t tbl t h i f th f i l i tl fKti d t l i l i tilit ( i l l tiliti) i h l th " " ti d t i kid f iti i Y t hil th i h f i t t

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fili fft t h h tl i f l t i l i iht i l l i t t ary moral problems this method of moral reflection proves remarkably unhelpful on the matter of the ethical dimensions of racism This is because the most compelling account of the moral wrong embodied in racist misperceptions of human reality is not t l th t ll b t t i l l ih i t t t i fh S t i ( d ltitl P l t i ) i f l i b t h ht ith i Th t i f l t i l tilti f thi t i t i d M t i Lth K i ' d l t f th S t i ti t h t i i j t b it " d i t t th l d d d th l i t " (Ki 1964) K i ' ti i l l i t t f th btl b t i h i h i h it id f the psychologically and morally deleterious effects of racism on the personality of the racist as much as on the personality of the objects of racism without diminishing the moral weight of the wrong done to those on the receiving end Th S t i t d l d b Ki i hi l i l f iil d i b d i i th i t t f th i h i h it f t i th l fl f d i iht ll " l t h h " (MdAd 1997) Ulik th l ti th S t i ti ( i h t l i i ) i tht lti b td i d t d i f t l t dtil f historically significant interactions between an agent and those likely to be affected by action Moreover this is the standard for reflecting on evaluations of all sorts whether to be embodied in action or in reflection on the actions of others In the th d f lt l t h h ld dt flt d hl i l l i t ifi d t i l f i t t i t t i bt th it d th bjt fh i Ki did t h i l f l t thi k i d f l t h h f i i ll it lit i h dt t t i t i l tt ti tilti th ti f th i t i f i Yt i th d t h f dtild l flti th i t l ti f f i ' iti t l t t th ti fKi' iti it h ll f f i i t f Ki t concentrate on illuminating the perspective of the objects of racism Equally import ant however is that the Socratic view he defends quite explicitly points to the moral importance of the task of eventually supplying the ethnographic details on id Th dtil ill i l i f t if h t d t d th th th d l t i fft f i th h f th it ll th h bjtd t i M

Kti thik iht t h t th K t i id f " t f " liitl b d i d i th df l t i f th C t i l I t i id ll ( ) lli t th ti b t ht constitutes the fundamental moral wrong of racism After all it might be urged Kant's notion that morality demands fundamental respect for the dignity of human ity whether in the agent's own person or in the person of the other certainly ti i t t t f th t t h b t lit W h t i it i tth tht t h il l i thi t t Bt K t t tht h th ti t t t d t d th l f fili t t h diit i b d i d i th id t h t it i t th th l t d h d t h Thi t fil i i t h h t d t d th f l l f th l d d t th i t Th i

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dbt l f d i i t B t th i i i h t (ft k l d d ) f the conditions that make for a flourishing human life The problem is that this undermining of the conditions for human flourishing is something we cannot see without some effort at a moral ethnography of racism Kant's view cannot show h h t h h i i l I thi i t t h f it f i l t t lt t f th thd f l flti b t bl t th d t i l d i l i t i f i ti t ti Th S t i i bth d l d b P l t i th S t i d i l d t l l b Ki i th L t t f B i i h J i l (1964) h d f liht th ti fh iht t ftbl flt th li l i t i f th ti f i

What Constitutes Racism and When is it Morally Wrong? Ih t d th t lit d fl f S t i i f l l ti ll f t t i flti th l tt f i W h t th S t i i t t i d i t l i P l t ' Socratic Dialogues b t l i Ki' t t i t h t b i i t h t it i f t l i i b l t d t d the moral nature of character and actions without reflecting on the way in which they are situated in various practices (one might even say embedding them in various "moral narratives") extended over time It is thus for instance that we come to d t d th h t fS t l th f l dil d l f d ti ll l t d h i l h i l h ith d i f f t kid f i id i l tti Thi ti t k il i t i th f f t t d t d ht t t h t i ti ti i t f i t i l l h th t t i ti h ith liitl d i d it ti ations or may simply fail to articulate any motivations at all It is equally important when in such contexts we confront social institutions and practices which may well continue to bear the stamp of quite powerful racist intentions and policies ht th f f i l t h d i f th t It t tb f t t tht i ffil t t i hih i i d d bth i d i i d l d ti l b t th it d i i fthi d t th il ti td b tht d t Th d f i t h i t i f t t i thi f t Yt ti l d ' t tll t h t th i f t t t t i t t i it ti d ti ititti bd it ti b t th t fh lti i th b f kid f t jtifi tion or explanation in terms of racist convictions It is in these instances that we must turn to the Somatically inspired notion that moral understanding requires us to put actions along with social practices and institutions into their appropriate il dh i t i l t t Wht iht flti il dh i t i l t t l? T b i ith t it tht i h idiidl ti il ititti t liitl j t i f d ( " l i d " ) b f t it ti hit d il t t id lli t bli t h t th d t ititti i ft d l td i i Th l i t f lli i f 97

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hit d t t b idfiitl l bt t f th ti t t () general consistency with other similar actions or institutions known to be racist (whether or not they are performed by other agents or rooted in the practices of this or other societies); and (b) good evidence that expressions of racial superiority would t ith th l l f i t t f th t t th llti lf i t t f til il tht l l bfit f th il ti ti Th ti f th ( " h i t " ) ll f t i t b h d blkf f i t h lli it ith t ti ti k i th l t it t bd hiliti i t ttitd Bt id litd W iht d h t hit d il context should tell us about cases in which even though we have a strong ntuition that the action practice or institution in question is an instance of racism they are not explicitly justified by reference to racist conceptions and there are strong prima fi t t i t t th ti ti i ti i f i F il t t i hih d i i i t i i l t ll d i i dh i h b ffiill t l d ill t id j t th iht kid f i fi i t fidi i t b th it l t i f i t t il d i i t i i l t ll d i i d housing Indeed "endofracism" theorists tend to assume that many of the actions practices or institutions that contemporary critics tend to describe as racism are best construed as cases where what they see as prima facie reasons against finding " i " t tt b h l i ( " l l thi idd") i t di Y t th l i t i hih t h h th i d d i fi ti b f i tilit th l d d flti b f th idti tht iht t lit flti Of h th t i fi i t lli thi i th t d d f d f t i li f l i t b relatively high But it seems obvious that there can actually be compelling consider ations capable of defeating claims of moral innocence even in these cases For instance if it is impossible to attribute moral innocence to some action or practice itht i l flifi i t t h i t i l dtil itht ii t f i l i b l ti b t th t d fh ti ti th it bl t t h t th ti ti i ti i i l ll i t A tdl ilit il ti tht t f l l i t thi t i th l l d l l "ttitil" h i bki h b blk l k ith d i d l t t h i h th blk applicants with relevantly similar profiles or given the loans at higher nterest rates than applicants with relevantly similar profiles The endofracism theorist wants to view this kind of practice as morally innocent Yet at many points in recent United Stt hit t i d i i i t i ffiil h j t d hi t d ht l l ti t h l l li fi ( l ll l l ) M h d d th ifi t t f th ti ti i ti d th l ti i h i h th ti ti i b d d d It i itll i i b l f i t t k libl d t i t i b t th it ll b i h t f th ti f th d h i l h f h l t

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i l di blk t d t f i h i l h itht fll it of the complex moral context of the conduct Yet it must be reiterated that the social and historical rootedness of moral evaluation should never be overlooked Perhaps the most problematic characteristic of writings proclaiming the end of i i th t d t t h t th d fl l l t i d i h bi ith it f d li f th h b i i d il i t t i ti t b th t i f it ti Th df i t h i t i l i bi di t t ft f il d ill h i t i l l i t tht k i t t i l l fi d t i l l t i i f t il t t To be fair opponents of the endofracism views (especially the permanenceof racism theorists) can be as inattentive to causal complexity as the endofracism theorists are to historical complexity Moreover their inattention can issue n un i i t f ill l h Thi bl i ill di d i i f i h f hih i t b t b t l til l t i ( il t b l t f thi i t ) S h hlfl t i t ill th f t l fi il t i l d hlfl d i i f th A i i i l justice system The problem as many knowledgeable commentators observe s that there is very good evidence in some American jurisdictions of racial profiling of black motorists that discriminates unfairly against them solely on the basis of race Y t th f t t h t th i id f th fi f il fili t i th b l k t ti tht il d i i t i th i i l ti t t id fd i t t t t th b i f ( K d 1997) Th f i l It i dbt t tht b likl t it ti kid f i t it th i i ti tti f h b b j t t th il d i d i t i t b l t th l i i fft f il d i i i t i th if h t b b j t Th fact remains however that there is no evidence that racism is necessarily more than a proximate cause of the crime rate in certain social contexts or that racism (in the criminal justice system or outside of it) is the primary cause of some of the tbli il liti i iti di i t t f Afi ffd Nt h h ffd ti t ff f A i i ' fft i i i l tiit ( M d A d 1 9 9 2 3 ) It i th iliti d d t t t t t t th f il d i i t th A i l l t t th d i t f f t f i

Must We Believe in the "Permanence of Racism?" B t if it i d i i dd t t i t d tht it f l h i t i f th f f t fl i i i it i ll d i i d d t ti f th h kt l i th d f i t d th tii i t f hit I thi t t it h l t ll th bl fH L A Ht' tti tht thiti l l t d t d d bdi t l l b th dll i i t l " i t l ti" 99

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thi l Th i t l ti l di t H t i t h t ti from which agents come to treat demands for conformity to legal rules (and criti cisms for nonconformity) as fundamentally justified (Hart 1961) If Hart is right about the gradual emergence of the internal perspective on the law and I think he i it i l i l i b l t t tht l h i th l f d i i i t i ld ill di d i t l d ll ill i f l t i l t t t t ^ i i t th b i f Thi t l liht f h d i ill bl flti th A i t i l t t i th f t t h t l l l t i d ti i A i l t d f l d th f i d d i d j t t i i t h d it i h t b b t t d Yet while affirming the plausibility of Hart's view suggests pessimism about the possibility that legal change might bring an immediate end to racism it is surely compatible with holding the optimistic conviction that influential social actors can h t d i ifl ( t l ll bli) ll b t th t thiti l l t It i l i t t ith th ti tht t i t t it i A i hit hi f l t i l t hth idiidll lltil h fll dt i t h t ifl ibl il t t Th f i l t iil d i b d i i th A i iil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s in particular is powerful evidence of the moral possibilities available to those who take concerted "direct action" against persistent discrimination This fact surely gives special weight to King's Socratic l i f th l f i Yt t t i th f t th f th iil i h t t dll t b f it d i f f t t t i f hih t h f i d Th d i t i till t f l th " l i " il l i i t h t iti h t " i " thi t i th th l t d b d i t i d i t h t th t t j t il d i i i t i E l l i t t it i f f clear whether those countries (including quite recently Brazil) which have emu lated America's experiment with colorconscious practices as an effort to remedy social injustice will manage to avoid the socially divisive debates that they tend to t Y t th d b t l i lii thi fi thi ffti th l i k l i h d t h t th ill t td b k l h h fi ffti th iht b tdl h f l i F th h t h t th iti f l d t i t t t d d d illi t i difflt b t ill i t t d i i b t th t d i l i t i f i i t d f i l tki it it f td Wht the "permanenceofracism" theorists say this is surely a reason for genuine f cautious optimism about the moral progress of the human species

Rf A i h Ath d Gt A (1996) Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

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Bell Derrick (1992) Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: B i B k B i R b t (2001) Wh i t d th t f ?Kt' l i th E l i h t t t t i f I R B i ( d ) Race O f d B l k l l CavalliSforza L L Menozzi P and Piazza A (1996) The History and Geography of Human Genes, b i d d d P i t NJ P i t U i i t P C h K i b l W (1988) R f d t h t Harvard Law Review, 101 1331 D'Souza Dinesh (1995) The End of Racism: Principles for a Multi-racial Society. New York: Free P Fih Cld S H t M Sidl A t l (1996) Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press F Al (1978) L i t i i i il d i i i t i t h h t i d i i i t i itil i fS C t d t i Minnesota Law Review 62 1049 Gldb D i d T ( d ) (1990) The Anatomy of Racism M i l i U i i t f M i t Press Hdi S d ( d ) (1993) The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future. B l i t IN I d i U i i t P H t H L A (1961) The Concept of Law O f d O f d U i i t P Herrnstein Richard J and Murray Charles (1994) The BeU Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. N Y k F P J b Mtth F (1998) Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race C b i d MA H d U i i t P Kennedy Randall (1997) Race, Crime, and the Law. New York: Pantheon Ki M t i L t h (1964) L t t f B i i h J i l I Why We Can't Wait. N Yk N A i Lib Livingstone Frank B (1964) On the nonexistence of human races In A Montagu (ed) The Concept of Race. N Y k F P f Gl M h l l G l i A (1993) R i l l i f t i l d itif I S d Hdi ( d ) The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future 11627 B l i ton IN: Indiana University Press Mill C h l S (1997) The Racial Contract. Ith NY C l l U i i t P M d A d M i h l (19923) R l d th il t t i f l f t The Philosophical Forum 24 2 5 1 6 (1997) Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy. Cambridge MA: H d U i i t P Ni M t h i d R h d h A K (1972) G diff bt diidl from different ethnic groups Science 177: 4 3 4 6 W t C l l (1994) Race Matters. N Y k V i t B k

Further reading H i C h l (1993) Whit t Harvard Law Review 106 1 7 0 7 7 9 1 Yk Lf C h l A (1987) The Plessy Case: A Legal-historical Interpretation N University Press Plessy Ferguson (1896) 1163 US 537

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It i

i

l t d i d d l ditbi f t tht b f llbi d th l b li l li th I h f th ld th l ll ihd l hlth d l ll d t d (UNIFEM 2000) E h th l b l t il d b b It h b t i t d tht lt f th f t db i l il babies are disproportionately aborted or killed there are one billion missing women (Dreze and Sen 1989) Many more women in the world lack access to education and many more are illiterate Jobs that are high paying are much less likely to be hld b Tdi d il k i h likl t b d b W i th kf id l th thi l t t ft h d ditiidtd i k d f ft ibl f hild d h k "ft k" I d d t l f thi tiiti i th i kf ff f d t i il t h t t b primary responsibility for childrearing and housework and are much more ikely to be sick and poor in their old age In much of the world women do not have access to safe abortion or sometimes even to contraception further putting women's health and wellbeing at risk Women everywhere bear almost the full burden of unplanned pregnancies Women in many nations of the world lack full formal lit d th l Wh th h it th l likl t b bl t th j d i i l t d till l k btti lit A d l t h th ld d hld hih t ffi t h th t f I h t h th lif t f d fid tht i f likl t b hlth b d d litill d i f chised even while she works longer hours and is largely responsible for the primary care of future generations Two general explanations could account for this remarkable disparity in ife pro spects: (1) women are by nature inferior to men and so less worthy of concern or l bl t b f i t f l (2) t t i l l did t d b it Ud th fit i l d l t i b d hl bil ibil d tht i t i tht t l diff bt d f f i i t t j t i f th til dd lif t f A ill di bl i "Objti" t tht h i

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li d d t t id ( F t S t l i 1985) d tht i d i t normative implications follow from whatever differences might exist between men and women In what follows we proceed on the assumption that the more plausible course is t tk i f th d t T fll thi li i i t i t i th i hih t t i l l d i d t d i t i t i t i W b i ith h t i t i f i W th ff b i f hit f it il iti W t th t th l l t hih i diti h i l lif d di di l f i W th t t th t i i l t ff i i t t h i f i d ld ith b i f d i i f three objections to struggles against sexism

What is Sexism? It i i th

t

t

t i

t

t th

t t tht i i hihl l ti It i h t df tll t h h thi i ll t k th t tl d i l l i d t i f T h h th til t t f sexism on many definitions sexism is often only identifiable by its symptoms or consequences We can quite readily explain that if some distribution of opportun ities systematically deprives women of what is offered to men and there is no t idi hih j t i f h ditibti th h l i fi f i A l l i thi t bth dibl d i l b l Th id t h t i i l t t i i l i t i i h t l i d ki d f i t i Y t th h d t h t th i ( h ) i i th ld i til ft d d l tibl id Objti t i l iti ld b h l f l h d h l f l f di h ki li ll Th t k f fidi h i t i i ft it d i f f i l t d comes from a wide array of theories covering the gamut of the social and psycho logical world For sexism happens not only in explicitly institutionally structured settings such as for example the denial of equal opportunity for obs but also n th d i l d bl h t i t t i bt A th ltt i t t i i l id it f ti d th t b i d i t i d idiidlid th th ill t t d I h th h f i i h t th l t b l th bi Th th t l k f lifi th t f i i f i t k th th til k f h i tht til t i t involving the mistreatment of women is the result of sexism or an instance of sexism It is for this reason that much feminist work focuses on conceptual clarifica tion and the organization of women's experience I it i d t th t " i " b dt f t thi t h t t titt t ti lit jtifibl dititi bt th (F 1983 18) I thi id th t " i " ( d it iti "it") b dt f t td t h h itk diff bt th Thi t l d i t i f th t h i d l tift Fit b th h i t f th t (bif it i ) h it t h b i t t i l l 103

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dld " i " A " i " d t l d i b t t t t difftit between races but instead refers to pernicious distinctions between races the term "sexism" is better understood as referring to pernicious distinctions between the sexes Second a neutral use of the term implicitly denies its conceptual role in binding t t h d i l l i t i th i f f ' i l diff d th i h i h th diff h f l A i j t i i t tl dt f t i f f i i t C i (t l t i W t i t i ) i th t d if ith h i h ill b d h " i " f t hitill d lbll i f f i i t It i thi ifi d liitl ti f sexism that is the subject of feminist inquiry One catalyst for the identification of sexism was women's participation in struggles against racism In fact the first wave of the women's movement began ith th tiiti f b ft h h t f l i th b l i t i t f th i t t h t (Stt d Ath 1981) d th " d " liki t it t th f th i i l i h t t th t t i t h t (E 1979) Wh t l t i f "th bl tht h " Btt F i d (1983 h l ) t it th i littl d b t t h t for many feminists the parallels with racism made the term "sexism" appealing In some ways it might seem that this was an unfortunate start for the differences between racism and sexism are sometimes obscured by the easy way in which they f lit f il P h th ti t t diff i tht i b d dbi t h i b t th diff bt th hil l diff hdl b d i d R i ft t b titd b h t d f f th th f h i h th l i t h t th " " th ' i f i kid f i tht K Ath A i h h lld " i t i i i " S i b t t i t i l l ki t ht h ll " t i i i " h th j d t t h t th th i i f i d i f th d t that aspects or abilities of the other are inferior (Appiah 1990) Thus many sexist men when socharged can truly object that "I am not sexist; I love women" but this only means at best that they are not intrinsic sexists However there are lll b t i d i F thi bth i d h hih h t Bt i t t l th h l i l h i tht k i d i ibl d d i b l iil l h t f t i i b il d ki iidi dititi bt i d t b ( C d d 1998) F t h th il h i tht iti i d i iil Bth i d i maintained through systematic violence and economic disadvantage Both are diffi cult to pinpoint but can be statistically documented and are much more readily perceived by the victims than by the respective dominant social groups Both sexism d i h d t t i h l i l fft idiidl A d bth i i l fl b k l h h th blil h l l d C i d bl k i t b d h th l t i h i bt th t f i d i ( A l f f 1998) If hld d tht i i i bth h i t i l l d lbll th it ill b i t h t it d ill b b t h id dd Ititti 104

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tht it ill b b t h d fft f i Wh dd result of past sexism such institutions will then carry on a tradition of say exclud ing women from available highpaying work Managers and others who carry on this tradition may of course overtly maintain extrinsic sexism They may i l bt fll bli t b i b l f i thi k Thi intentional extrinsic sexism h l d b d i t i i h d f ht iht b lld individuated extrinsic sexism, h i h iti t h t hil ( ) bl f i thi k idiidl i I ith it ill b t l diffilt t i l tblih ht h t ttitd i t I th ltt t h h i l hld t b bl t d thi k the technique of holding that each one now applying cannot do the ob will effect ively if unintentionally maintain the sexist tradition Within that tradition such judgments are considered to be matters of keeping high standards not sexism As thi ti i i i l hih d f dbi j d t th l it ti ti it b dil l bl t ttibt t d th th i blif tht ( ) ll bl I th fi t t i l t i i i th f t t h t th tl f i th fild t i b t t th i tht t d t want to do the work The tradition of excluding women is in this case intentional but is labeled by those who practice it "realism" not "sexism" One important effect of the practice of excluding women in these ways is of course tht d d d t th ll B d i th titi h i l b l t th l bl t l l tblih bth t t h l d t th thi l bilit t lih h i h i ( h i h t t ) t k Wh th tt lft h l l d th i th littl t t th l i tht b t d d t M th fft f i t hii ti i f d i b f Th i f d b tt fl hih k d dliit it tiiti d attitudes on the basis of sex and relegate the activities and attitudes of women to a lower status (ie sexist language) And they are reinforced by systems of education and enculturation which support if not create and coerce discrete proclivities for il db d l t th liiti f il t l tt Th il t f i fth i d i h l i l diiti di d lf t A t i th tiiti ttitd d liiti hih t i l l i t d ith " l " " t d d " f h bi (i th t d d ) ld d th tiiti ttitd d liiti hih t i l l itd ith h difft b l b t d d F i t ill appear "highly emotional" or "hysterical" when they display more emotion and concern than men or "brooding" and "moody" when less More pertinently recog nition of the man standard enables us to make as much sense as one can of the t dibilit h t i t i f f f ill W ttd li t h t i i l t t i i l i t O d i i t thi it h t t t d t l i d t thi ti O i i i t ti i b t ft btl f tht iti th i f d tht i t kt h h i t i t t i l t t i i t l i t t i d th ttitd t h t d i th d i th iti liiti d t i l

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fidiidl id I h t i t t i world and makes that world on the whole worse for women than for men

f th

Background: Language Experience and Recognition T h h i i i f f i th t " i " i f i i l t i fit i i i t i 1968 ( S h i 1985) L d iti l lli h idtifi il bl d titi th ibilit f il t f t i I i thi il h d thus drawing attention to it the secondwave feminists of the 1970s provided the conceptual space within which to recognize and reorganize longstanding moral social and political structures based on and affecting gender and biological sex The lti l t i it i h ildd idbl iiht d b f diffilti Pri t th t ii f " i " th i l t t f t th t f ' i I t d th idtifd ri hih d t b i t t d Ath riti thi bjt ll described fairly "local" forms of mistreatment The primary focus of feminist argu ments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for example concerned the m portance of education for women and an opposition to the absolute sovereignty of ithi i ( A t l l 1694 1700) Th t h l hld t h t h i th iti f d d d l l if t l l h i Th l ft d ith th l i tht hd t l l liitd t i l it ( h d ith ) d tht d t i lif ' t l l h At th d f th i h t t h t M W l l t f t f d til t it f il f t tribti t ' b d i t iti Taking the radical stance that women are not inferior by nature she held that women are naturally deserving of equal rights and could if properly educated t i i t i "th t h t f l i t i " Lik h d h hld tht i l hd d d l d t i l it Th i tht i i t ti l ttribtd t i h i it ll d d "it i d t 0 flih ! h i h th di !" ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 302) U l i k th h h d t h t it t t bt l k f d t i tht h d tibtd t ' f ltil tiil tt I t t l h W l l t f t did t thik tht education would be sufficient to rectify women's subordinate position She recog nized that what she called the "stream of popular opinion" had an even stronger effect on women's social standing than did any characteristics actually possessed by idiidl ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 102) F b l t d b th t f l ii d ill d d hibl f l h t h d tht ' b h i ft did " j t i f th thrit t h t h i h k bi t h d t " ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 319) H j t bl f iri "h i t " h d t h t th il tht bi d d 106

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Lik W l l t f t J S Mill d i th i d i t t h t t h t th i ous forms of mistreatment women suffered were contrary to general utility (Mill 1869) According to Mill the opportunities offered to women and men should be based on a perfect equality of opportunity That is there should be nothing that is ffd t tht i d i d t b th W lik ill diff i titd d i t t b t lik th hld b l l d t i thi il iti t h h fi d it titi O thi iti th i i t d t l t d d f ll A h tb i d d ith th (f l d t i l t titi litil d il t d i ) t t th t d d ht i dd i il t f ation which will give them the levels of access usually accorded men In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir reiterated the argument that women were not inferior to men by nature However de Beauvoir was interested in explaining not l th b d i t iti f i it b t l f ff l bjt iit t h t t i b t t th d b i l i t f ' b d i t i Sh th t iht t ii "th l i d i " f th did fh d I h i bth ' d ' t h b ill t t d H th il t t i f h td " d " in which women do not even regard themselves as a locus of dignity as a self (de Beauvoir 1952) Instead they regard themselves as "other" and like men reserve the notion of selfhood for men The creation of a second sex is moreover the result f i i l i "di f l f j t i f i t i " Tht i th hi bli h k thtill i f h l f th lt f h t t d t th t t i f hih i f th i A l t t i l th ti f "bi " i l iit ifll iit h tk i i t i i ' i f i i t W ' bdi ti i th l i d d i f d b ' d ' f i i th ld T h h i t t i i dliti t ff l bjtiit h k faces serious interpretive difficulties that mirror the main lines of feminist inquiry These difficulties turn on the question of whether her position can be reconciled with some concept of genderneutral standards On the one hand unless we can k f lf h i h i d th t t d lf ti f d t l t d d ill b t I th d itht A h i d it f i d tlit ill " l i t ith " (i th t d d ) d ' diff ill b d t i t l t t h i llbi O th th h d f th i d lf d th t t d diff bt d lft ith th d i f f l t t th l b tk " b t d i f f " th and somewhat uncomfortable goal of establishing "separate but equal" standards To a large measure feminist work on sexism has engaged in exploring developing and critically evaluating these complex lines of thought It ld b d i f f l t t d tht i iti f i ill t f ' l f t i d ' ti f th ld P l t ' ll f th i t f h itil t f t i f i t i thi ld h t d f i t li t h t h t li t l F th iti f i i j t h t f t i F ik h d l l ' f t li f th th iti f i i bth lt 107

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d d i i t i W ti d i b thi f t iti f i moment of realization a "click" in which many previously disparate experiences problems reports and issues become unified What seemed previously to be simply one's own experiences become a woman's experiences What seemed previously to b l bl b ' bl Wht t b t th i i th b t i d i b t lik lf Th iti f i th i l bth f tlii i d idtifti ith th It i l i i l bild i iti ( B t k 1990) F d it i d i f f l t t d t i hih f ' ti d hih t th lt f ' i d i i A the world of personal experience fades and the pervasiveness of sexism becomes more clear few aspects of one's life remain in place Fear anger and resentment at being insulted or threatened (however subtly) can no longer be regarded as simply l ti t l fft Th d ft btt h d d t f t f i i hih i d i i d l t t h k i l ff th b d i lti f i Th iti f i f i dh b bth l d i l it d i f f t ( S l 1990) F t th iti f i "click" It is more likely to take the form of a ploddingly arduous reconstruction of their own experience which will require that they take responsibility for participa tion in sexist practices and reevaluate many of their beliefs and desires Forms of l il i t t i ( jk hidi) t b id t l d l i f A t di f liit t b id lli t i i t t ith iti f bth i l i il ti d d i t l ti Th iti f i th l b t f t i A it i id b tht b f i f f d iil th i f hih d t i ' lti il t d i th t f t i i idbl l i k A it i id b realization of complicity the intentional nature of which is not always clear it carries considerable moral risk Different accounts of sexism will affect the degree of moral risk men face and the degree of personal risk which they ought to undertake T h h th d i b difft ht i l f bth d t h t th iti f i d it di l t f t i iit f il t f t i S i td b k t b f difft l l h i t t i i i i d ffth lifti

Levels of Sexism S i f

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di t d ldi h i t t hl t t t th l l i t i t t i l h th l l f il ititti i t l t h h i t t i idiidl h i l t t d i i hih iti d ffti f i d i i d l It

i i

A hih i t liitl k t th i hlfl t

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t t th l l i d t li h h f i uncontroversial while others are difficult to see or evidence conclusively Institutional

ltil

sexism

I t i t t i l i f t iidi li l i t i i th liit l d iliit i d t t i il ititti Rlii titti id fl l fh liit l d iliit t t ti tti I th C t h l i C h h f i t it i l i i t l t h t ll i t d ll Ol i t th h h h i h d priests outrank nuns in most decisionmaking situations While it is clear how explicit rules can govern and structure institutions this example can also help us to see that implicit norms also structure Catholic experience and create sexual inequal it Whil it i l idl td liit l tht i h t l i th i th h d f th h h l d d th i th h l t it i i l i d b th lti k f i t d i th h h d b it d iti Thi i l i i t iti b i i ( i ll th il ititti i hih bth t) l l idi l i l i t I dditi t th liitl l d ititti f government religion family health care and education there are crucially import ant informally or implicitly structured institutions prime among them being lan guage and the sites of cultural and artistic production To say that sexism is a t t i il i j t i b d ' (Rdliff R i h d 1980) di i i t l difftiti (Btk 1990) i t k f i t i t t i l i S i th t b d t d t f th il d iil t th i d f itli th litil d f libli Interpersonal sexism Whereas institutional sexism involves the explicit rules and their implicit norms tht ti i il ititti i t l i i l t t i bt tht t db liit l I t l i i ti d th i bt tht t titt t ti d/ lit i i d i l i l i t i Th h i ti i it ki it i d t i t d i th i t t i l d i t t i l f f i t l sexism Here are some examples from our experiences: •

As a child the girl is not allowed the free play of her brothers; she is prevented b h t d t h f i i h d t b l l t i ldd i tiiti i l i bildi t t t i t t d t t td t d t t t h t i l d h i tiiti d i d lik h b t h t d d t i h

•

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i h dh

t kl ith b t t

d d

ti f h

h

b h i iit b t b

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•

•

•

ld h f thi d b i t t k th i ttitd f thi fathers In sports she sees males and manhood extolled females and womanhood ridi culed Coaches and teammates insult male athletes by calling them "woman" "il" d i th ith th t " " Wh d tit l h l b i hi th l k l t th S k t d i d hil t h i I ti bt ll til d f d t hil ' k i d Wh l ll t ht f l has said he is complimented for his good idea

Sexism is a key motif that unifies this otherwise seemingly disparate set of per l i Thi l i t ld f b tl dd d h f i i t kh b d t d t i i t k f l i Thi ki i t t b i i h i t l bt k t f th d ld t h t b t h d h d i f f i l t ti ii it F it' d f liti t i tht i j t i b id d ill opposed Yet the injustice of sexism is built into the very fabric of everyone's every day experiences from infancy on Unconscious sexism " U i ti iidi

i " f t th h l i l h i d t i t blif ttitd tht t titt t ti d/ lit l i l i t i Thi t ill b d i d b bl t il i k d B t th bth t l d i i l t i f f it it Th t l t i t h t th ttitil evidence concerning the lesser lives that women live would be completely puzzling given the legal guarantees of equality for men and women in many countries were it not for the possibility of such unconscious sexism Institutional and interpersonal i t l t f ll th d t T h t i l i t h t th i ttitd d b l i f t h t ll i iti f i l t f t h il d ditibtd d t t t t h l b li it t d d Th i i l t i idl d i f f d b t ibl It i t f i t f ll id f th it f i titi hih i t i th h logical literature Second there is evidence that when the same work is attributed to a woman it is judged of less value than when attributed to a man (Valian 1998) Third there is evidence that women find it more painful to think of them l d d fid it i f l t thik f t h l th i i l d d Th th i titi f ith t thik f d d d i t ( B b 1998) F t h th t d l f id f il iti hl t t tht k iidi dititi lit il t i tht t d t lif th ll b d th l diff bt i d i i d l i th t i d 110

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tht i f th t i ( T j f l 1981) N i it l t b argued that men get the worse end of this deal this fact constitutes evidence for the claim that such cognitive processes tend to create unconscious sexist attitudes and beliefs There is no doubt a great deal more evidence that could be cited but this h hld b ffit t k th i t tht i i i l d t d h l i l h H i d t t d it lit h d i i d l ill b hlfl t h i i i iftd dh iht b t d i i it Th k t ii i titi ill tht l t t t k l d i t h l i t l k f d i sions or actions that could not be justified by a reasonable assessment of the avail able evidence What counts as "reasonable" and "available" are crucial issues here of course By "reasonable" we mean consistent with one's other explicitly held blif d idl h d it k l d i th it W it liit b l i f h b f if h tit i t b l i f th ti ld b bl b t it d t t td i B " i l b l i d " f i t t tht ld b d b b f th it h d t h it blif ttitd h it blif l d role in the reports or to widely shared nonsexist knowledge in the community Of course there may be no nonsexist members of any community The practices of sexism affect one's selfconception Internal critique may not be enough to free lf f idtifti ith th ti Bt t b i t idtif it ti h G t i t h t it i ibl t h t ill t i ll i ( i d d ll i ) i till b i b fidi th bi C i d th f l l i l •

•

•

A h i l h d t t i lki t hi f l t b Othid f the applicants are women Onethird of the interview list is made up of women In the interviews the women are judged as doing worse than the men The comments afterwards are that they don't seem "as polished" or "professional" th Th f t i t h t th d t t th i t i ' t ti f ht h i l h f l t b i d t l k lik tht i l d bi t t A d t t i idi h t di f l ll d l ll i thi h f t Th h l bt d t blihi d d hl lbt d t t h i d H th f l ll h f i Bth ll h b ti participants in the departmental politics and have voiced strong opinions in departmental meetings The male is judged to be an excellent colleague while the female is judged to be uncollegial They give the male colleague a very iti t f hi t t d th f l i d tht h t blih d i h t h i t t t I f t th d t t h j d d h t b b th fl ftbl ith t ti hil th i j d d t h l d h i liti A d i bi t t d f it f f t i i ti h t di All th h bjt Wh kd t t f thi th h t

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l d d tht ' h ld i t f ith th t d Whil it is surely true that the drug could affect women differently from men as a result of female hormones it is equally true that it could affect men differently from women as a result of male hormones This symmetry is lost on the research t h lik t f t d t thik f th ith th " i t f i " b l h U i i ft t b i t i th t h t th b l i f fli tht k it i d d ft b d idl h d t t Whth t it i i t l d d th d t h i h th individual has access to information that counters the unconscious sexist beliefs and attitudes a condition that depends on larger social factors Although we do believe that "sexism" names not only a mistake but a prima facie wrong there are h it thi d t tb lbl Th l l f i f i t l t d U d t d i t i t t i l d i i i t i i th i t t i bt d l t f i bl S i l ititti id d t i t l ttitd O l f t i d tion of others are at least partially a product of the social structures through which we interact with one another How they are interrelated is a central question within feminism feminist philosophy and feminist social science Different ways of under tdi th i t l t i bt th l l lt i d i f f t d ti it d i t t T t f t i t i th f i i t litt I th t ti di th t t

T

F i i t Vi

f S i

Though feminists agree that sexism structures our very experience of the world feminist theories of sexism vary considerably None the less they can be very hl d i i d d i t t t i Fit ht b lbld " l i t f i i " iti tht il ititti th i di f i M d d t diff kdl i thi ttil iti i t t d biliti Gi iil t i i d ld d l fil iil t l t t l t iil th bt bt Th if t t f i t it ill i tht it d d i th ititti tht f diff d d i t i t l d i f titi t d l highly valued social skills Equality feminists need not accept what we have above called "the man standard" Rather most contemporary equality feminists employ measures of social value such as utility respect for human rights or hypothetical t i d t d l d t l t d d b hih t d th titi tiiti d liiti f d A l t t i l "diff f i i t " iti tht i di th i di f i A d i l il ititti th lt th th th f i R t l it f f i i t hldi thi i h t t t d t bth t i l t th diff bt d

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d l t lit f i i S lik C l Gilli (1982) N l N d d i (1984) and Sara Ruddick (1989) have argued that women's "different voice" involves a greater emphasis on responsiveness caring and the maintenance of particular concrete relationships This voice is undervalued in society they argue b f th d i f " i b i l i t " ti hih i l tit dh t i i l d h i h th tif th l it f i Oth k t i l f d tlit l k t i l f th id t h t i d l t i h i it b t h t i ' diff Th th k t idtif d i f f t diff Cthi MKi (1987 39) it " l b h l d di t th i th d we could probably use some" In her view since women's subordinate position n society informs their experience of the world and so requires concrete critical evaluation it can also give them a unique and privileged position from which to itii il tditi S h t i i l l L Ii t h t th itil lti f hld ith t ht h tditill b tk t b ' t ti f lit ith Sh iti tht th l h d t t "ff j t i t two genders that differ i t h i d thi di thi t i " (Ii 1993 4) Both views aim to transform institutional sexism interpersonal sexism and un conscious sexism They differ however over just what form such a transformation would take For equality feminists the notion that there is a significant difference bt d diff tht k diff likl t t i th l b l d i i t iti bt d i thi d i i t h b bilt th b i f difftiti F diff f i i t th th h d th ti t h t th i i i f t diff bt d likl t d i ' iti Si h b dfid dh d f d t h l i lti t b d i t t d i t ' i d d d d d i i h i i t i l inventing a different identity Importantly both equality feminists and difference feminists have the same worry For both the idea that an attempted transformation of society will result in a mere modification of sexism rather than its elimination is i it idt t h h d k l d d dth d i d i t bl d l l til

Objti Three kinds of objections have been raised to feminist struggles against sexism which we shall call the objections from essentialism, skepticism, and defeatism. The bjti f essentialism iti t h t th til b i l i l h l i l diff bt d h tht t lit l lti f d ill l t i t l b i i b l ill t tl t i libt S h bjti t f i i t fft t d th f i h l hit f Aittl' i f til t h h b i l i l t h i fi f i i t t d i th i t t h d t t i t h t i t F d i h l t i t h i ff i i i t A t d tl 113

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i f l t i l i f thi b j t i l t lti hl t li the differences between the status of men and women According to evolutionary psychology there are distinct male and female psychologies because of the different reproductive strategies that each sex pursues and the resulting psychologies k l titi i d d t d i hil f l t i d d b t i t l lti I dditi t l t t f lti hl h l i d tht l hl k t i i t b l tht ill " t t i th d tht d i t i t l t d i th t d btt f t" ( G t 2001 B15) Th th b t l tit litii b i d on must be men So Guyot argues it would be inefficient and morally wrong to bring about parity in gender representation of these fields To this objection we have three responses First specifically regarding evolution hl it i hihl t h i d b t l l t t d h t h i t thi it Gi it l th i ti f lldl itifi f f ' i f i i t it i i t t t b k t i l til d l it i i l S d d thi li t i t i f i th b t l diff ti i l i t i f diff ditl i l i d b descriptive differences That is it is fallacious to infer from the fact of sexual differ ence that women should therefore not have equal chances for social success Finally the ideals of liberal individualism and equality require each individual to be t t d i d i f i il d b d hi h t l idiidl it d t b d th it f h l t d S if it t tht l ll i t d t b l ht it d t fll t h t th hld b f d i l t tht t d i i i t d i t b f thi I f t if l ll i t d t i ti it i th l i k l i h d t h t l ill fil jd idiidl b thi rather than their individual merits The objection from skepticism maintains that sexism is admittedly a serious prob lem in some other countries but though it has been a problem in our society in the t i h l l b W t td f ii d t i t i th kf ti thi l iht t t t t t di I t t d f t i l l d ti t f T h f th i t di t i it i l d Thi t f bjti h b l l d b Chiti Hff S (2000) H thi b j t i l k lth f t t i t i l f tion that proves that women's wellbeing is still compromised in contemporary American society The gender wage gap hovers around 75 percent (Institute for Women's Policy Research 1997b) up considerably from the 59 percent of the l t 1970 b t till h d l thi t b t i f i d ith A d i t th J i t C t f P t R h l t h h th ll t f t i th U i t d Stt i 1997 133 t th t f 24 t W ff f d t i il t hl f ti th t f (US D t t fJti 2000) I 2001 73 d i th US C (136 t) thit i th S t d 60 i th H b t h llti h i h Of 114

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h b US P i d t d l t d h been Justices of the Supreme Court Women in state legislatures compose only 2 2 4 percent even of those bodies (Center for American Women in Politics 2001) Women own businesses at approximately half the rate of men and of the top one l t h d d lthit l i Forbes Magazine' l i t f 2001 A d thi i l t i l l i t f th ti l i t i ffd b i t US i t F i l l it i l i t t t it t t th k t i t h t th f t tht ffi f i i h f th ld i i t l f h f l t ll W f il l t il Th t h b h h t h ' ft t t t If h d th t t of Kabul then American women who travel there will be harassed If women are subjected to humiliating or violent treatment in East Asia then American women who travel there will be as well If women are not taken seriously in a country th h d i l t f A i h t d h b t h ? Th k t i th d t i t b t h th d t hih i till i t i W t it d th f f t t h t i ldid h ll Th defeatist t h t th i thi t h t h ll d t fiht i Dftit ft ti b i tht i th t t h l mistreating women do not dislike women or hold them to be inferior they should not therefore be required to do anything to combat sexism; nor do they think that any thing constructive can be done to eliminate it Defeatists overlook the existence of i t i t t i l d i i Th f i l t i t h t th tiit i i itht t i i t ttitd If th t k i l th bl f i th th hld i thi b h i hi d f f h t th t th ld P h th ill fid d t h dilik f ti k jdi i t ti t h t th d t h b i t ti Thi ld b l f i i ( d i ) Th hld l i h th d t th ple's overt interpersonal sexism Do they laugh at wife jokes? Look the other way from sexual harassment in the office? Such behaviors support sexism and thus injustice Finally the defeatist who acknowledges institutional sexism has the obliga ti t t t it t t t f it t t b f it t t it Th d f t i t h l df i th d l h d i t t h t th b i i i t l i th tittil i I l i i i li d ll i t W t it d t t d i h f th t f th ld S i i i f f oppression and as such it is incumbent on decent people to oppose it though the form that opposition should take remains a serious matter for theorists and activists alike

Rf A l f f Lid M t i Blackwell

(1998) R i

I A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Mid

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A i h A (1990) R i I D T Gldb ( d ) Anatomy of Racism M i l i Ui it f M i t P A t l l M (1694) A Si P l t th Ldi f th A d t f thi T d G t t I t t N Y k N Y k U i i t P 1997 (1700) Some Reflections on Marriage N Y k S B k P 1970 B t k S L (1990) F i i i t dD i t i N Y k Rtld d B i S (1952) Th S d S t H M P h l N Y k R d H ( i b 1949) B b N (1998) T h i k i b t ' d ' iil d i d t f llbi i d Bitih J l f Sil P h l 37 16784 C t f A i W i Pliti (2001) i t d / ~ c / f t / fhtl C d d A E (1998) P h l i l l t i f i I C Willtt ( d ) Thii Mltiltli Mid MA B l k l l D J dS A (1989) Hunger and Pubtic Action O f d C l d P E S (1979) P l Pliti Th R t f W ' Libti i th Ciil Riht M t d th N Lft N Y k V i t B k F t S t l i A (1985) Mth f Gd B i l i l Thi b t W dM N Y k B i B k Fid B (1983) Th F i i Mti 20th i d N Y k Dll F M (1983) Th Pliti f Rlit T b NY Th C i P Gilli C (1982) I Difft Vi P h l i l Th d W ' D l t C bid MA H d U i i t P G t J F (2001) Th d f i i tf d it Th Chil f Hih Edti

A i l 20 Ititt f W ' Pli R h ( 1 9 9 7 ) The Status of Women in the States: Highlights R h i B i f W h i t DC (1997b) Th W G M' dW ' E i Bif P W h i t DC Ii L (1993) S dG l i t Gilli Gill N Y k C l b i U i i t P MKi C (1987) F i i Udifid Di Lif d L Cbid MA H d U i i t P Mill J S (1869) Th Sbjti f W N Yk S B k 1970 Nddi N (1984) Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education B k l CA U i i t fC l i f i P R d l i f f R i h d J (1980) Th S t i l F i i t L d Rtld dK P l R d d i k S (1989) Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace N Yk B i B k S l L (1990) Sl Mti Chi Mtiiti Chi M N B i k NJ Rt U i i t P Shi F R (1985) H i t i l t th bl f th W ' M t A i can Speech 1 3 1 6 S C H (2000) Th W A i t B H Miidd F i i i H i Y M N Y k Si d S h t Stt E C d Ath S B (1981) C d Witi S h d E C DBi N Yk S h k B k T j f l H (1981) H G dS i l C t i Cbid Cbid U i i t P UNIFEM (2000) P f th Wld' W 2000 N Y k U i t d N t i

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US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (2000) Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence against Women Survey. Washington DC Valian V (1998) Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women. Cambridge MA: MIT Press Wollstonecraft M (1792) Vindication of the Rights of Woman. New York: Penguin 1988

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P i d t L d Jh d th t "ffiti t i " t f t il fft t tht l i t l d t t t t i i itht dt d l t i l ii Td h th t i d t f t lii t h t i f t i ll Afi A i dH i i i th titi f j b d ti d for places at universities and colleges Such policies have been under attack ever since they were introduced thirty years ago Affirmativeaction policies the critics li j t fi ill d i i i dd t t i f th l f t d lft f th b f i i i Bt b b l th b j t i t l h d tht dititi b d iidi Citi t d t b d i h J t i H l ' dit "O C t i t t i i lblid" Rjid t th itii f ffiti ti h b ith f d l k i b k d l k i F d l k i t d f d ffiti ti th ground that it has good consequences Backwardlooking arguments defend af firmative action on the ground that it is compensation for the harmful effects of past injustices Initially many defenders of affirmative action relied on backward lki t bbl b it i t d d b f i i i ik Afi A i d h d t h t li f ti i t A i i t f th f f t f t ijti R t l h t d f d f ffiti ti h lid f d l k i t I d d R l d D k i th tf d f d f f f t i ti h if ill j t d b k d l k i t i f ff d l k i Th ki f ll d i i h it Blk l i t h riht t f b th b l k f f d fr ijti i th t Bt f f t i ti h riht It h f d looking justification The policy promises a better educational environment and a ess ill t t i f d it f It i tht jdi h i d it f ll f d tht f t i titi f difft t td d k together is part of an eifective even if slowworking antidote (Dworkin 2001) E i d t l D k i bli t h t th f ffiti it i b f i i i Bt h d i t h t thi i b

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injustice in the past On his account it is because the presence of blacks in universities and colleges will make for better educational environments there and will lead ultimately to a less racially stratified and prejudiced society We agree that forward-looking arguments for affirmative action are attractive They make no ugly accusations and dredge up no past crimes that the public is really tired of hearing about As their name suggests they look to the future listing optimistically all the good things that affirmative action will bring Further their appeal to diversity is fashionable and lends them an air of sanctioning the pluralism of modern liberal societies On the other hand dredging up past crimes is the very linchpin of the backward-looking arguments Instead of a rousing call to help realize grand and benevolent historical tendencies they seem to reopen old wounds and to encourage divisiveness We are wary of the current tendency to abandon backward-looking arguments and use only forward-looking ones to defend affirmative action If backward-looking arguments for affirmative action are sound then affirmative action is a demand for justice and a matter of highest priority It will not enjoy such a priority if it is based on forward-looking arguments even if these arguments are sound Improving educational environments for students and reducing racial stratification and prejudice may be desirable goals but there are many ways to achieve them and affirmative action may not be the best Finally we should not overlook the good consequences of presenting affirmative action as compensation Justice is not only the irst virtue of a society Most of the members of a society see it as such Their conviction that their society is acting justly may have consequences that contribute more to the welfare of society than diversity and equality (Hill 1991) Consequently we propose to present here again the backward-looking case for affirmative action This does not mean that we must reject forward-looking arguments Some of these arguments are persuasive In the end however we believe that none of them is as persuasive as some forms of the backward-looking arguments Let us begin with the forward-looking arguments

Forward-looking Arguments The main good consequences claimed for affirmative action include those cited by Dworkin namely improved educational environments and the reduction of racial stratification and prejudice These consequences are important mainly because they help to make opportunities more equal Let us begin with that argument The main idea behind the equal-opportunity principle is that places and positions in a society should be awarded to those best qualified for them That is places and positions should go to individuals with the qualities and abilities which make t likely that they will best perform the functions expected of those filling these places and positions Thus it requires that individuals be evaluated for positions strictly on the basis of their qualifications for these positions and forbids all discrimination on the basis of characteristics irrelevant to adequatelyfillingthe positions At least two considerations favor the equal-opportunity principle The first is straightforwardly utilitarian: if we abide by the equal-opportunity principle positions 119

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ill t d t b d i t i b t d t th h b t d h t th i d tilit ill tend to be maximized The second appeals to the principle of equal consideration of interests The principle of equal consideration of interests forbids giving A's interests greater or lesser weight than the like interests of B Suppose however that both A's d B' i t t tb tifd bt tifi A' i t t ill b t t bl t th t tif t h i i t t hil tifi B' i t t ill bl l fi th t tif t h i i t t I tht th i i l f l idti ld t l l t tif A' i t t Thi t h th l t i t i i l t d t th i i l f l idti fi t t Th l t i t i i l t d t ditibt d i b l iti t th th th t th l t l t d th more and less talented have similar interests in filling desirable positions but the more talented are likely to perform the functions expected of those filling these positions more efficiently than the less talented; consequently assuming that the interests of ll b t t db t th b l ffii it tht f th l t i t i i l th i i l f l idti f i t t Bth t i l i t i i d th i i l f l idti fi t t t tht t t t f th l t i t i i l i i l t W ld award positions to the most qualified although talented people who could be even more qualified are not properly educated But if very talented people are not prop erly educated society is not making the best use of the talents available to it and b t h th tilit i i l d th i i l f l idti fi t t ill b iltd W tt h f d t t t f th l t i t i i l ith th i t t h t ll i d i i d l hld h th h t i th lifiti f d i b l iti At ii thi i tht l t d d h l id ith th d t hth th ih blk hit l f l ( B i l l 1980) M iti til i l t bth t f th l t i t i i l I many societies people are frequently ruled out of consideration for positions simply because they are female or members of a racial minority and as if to compound this injustice schools for the rich are usually better than schools for the poor; h l f hit ll b t t th h l f blk dt l t d il f i i i hitt d th h i l i t d It i t h iti f ffiti ti lik t it J t i H l ' l i t h t th A i Ctitti i l b l i d If t h t iti h th i h t t b l t d f d i b l iti ll th b i fthi lifi ti d tht l i t ll lifiti f iti th colorblind principle and the similar sexblind principle seem to follow from the equalopportunity principle But if so then if affirmative action violates the color blind or sexblind principle it also violates the equalopportunity principle H thi l i i d t ikl S i it likl tht th i l t i i ti f th l t i t i i l t th t t tht blk t fill t i iti If f f i t i t i lii i th f t i l t i i fb l k d f iti tht t t i l d th f thi b k th t t i d th h l t k titi l f blk d F l if t t 120

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tht tb i d ffiti ti bl to become engineers it will serve to undermine the stereotype that women cannot be engineers Since that idea is one of the main reasons why many girls are pre vented from becoming engineers affirmative action will help make the opportunities f i i i l t th tht j Thi i t b k d l k i t Th d blk ii f t i l t t t h h i d d th h d i tht fft blk d d thi f t i l t t t tb i d ti f h th f f d Thi f t i l t t t i jtifd til f d lki idti l t h t it ill k titi l f blacks and women These consequences of affirmative action may be desirable but the practice may still be unacceptable Practices which violate people's rights are normally not ac tbl if th h d i b l Th t i t t bjti i t th f d l k i t i t h f tht f t i l t t t i lt l ' i h t Th h thi b j t i li tht f t i l t t t ilt th i h t f hit l t b l t d f iti ll th b i f thi lifti A li thi f l l f th lblid d sexblind principles that neither color nor sex can be qualifications for positions This objection is not as decisive as it may seem It rests on the assumption that qualifications for positions must be things like scores on aptitude tests grades and i i t dil Rflti t h t h t thi ti b f l if i d i h t t th i i l f l idti fi t t Th b i i t i tht dil h l dl h l f l t tblihd i d t d l ith h i h d d hih titd t t b t t id dil dl l i f th it T thi tht tt tblih dil h l i d t t i d t t it l bt t f th hl' d t ti i iti ith th lt t h t l i l are without adequate medical care In such a case if the state had good reason to believe that doctors from rural areas are more likely to practice in rural areas than other doctors from urban areas and if it gave equal weight to the interests of rural d b l i ii dil t t t it ld ftl jtifd i ii th dil h l t b i idi l ii lifti f d i i If thi b dd l it t i i l d bjti t i lifti f d i i t dil h l ill b d i f f i l t t ti Th flli i tl lll F l if l i blk iti d not get adequate medical care because not enough doctors elect to practice there; in that case exactly as in the previous case if the state has good reason to believe that black doctors are far more likely than white doctors to practice in black commu iti d if it i l i h t t th i t t fblk d hit l i ii dil t t t it ld ftl jtifd i ii dil h l t b i idi bi blk lifti f d i i Th l h h ffiti ti hl it i l idti t th lik i t t f ll th h h blk b f t i l l dittd it dil h l i d t h t th i t t f blk i ii

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medical treatment can be better satisfied And they also show how affirmative action can have these good consequences without violating the rights of white males to be evaluated for positions solely on the basis of their qualifications They show this by demonstrating that race or sex can in some circumstances be a qualification for admission to medical school Critics sometimes object that some white doctors are more likely to practice in black communities than some black doctors What they say may be true but it fails to invalidate the case for considering race a qualification for admission to medical school That case would be invalidated only if black doctors were not more ikely than white doctors to practice in black communities Practically all policies awarding places and positions must rely on generalizations which everyone knows are not true in every case Consider for example the policy of awarding university places partly on the basis of high scores on aptitude tests and high-school grades No reasonable person suggests that the policy should be abandoned although it s well known that some people with high scores and grades will not do as well in the university as some people with low scores and grades It thus seems that the color-blind and sex-blind principles are based on an excessively narrow conception of what can count as a qualification for a position The qualifications for a position are the qualities and abilities which make it likely that a person who has them will adequately perform the functions expected of anyone filling the position and enable society to give more equal weight to the like interests of all Other things being equal persons with high test scores and grades are more likely than those with low test scores and grades to adequately perform the functions expected of those filling desirable positions Consequently high test scores and grades are usually among the qualifications for desirable positions It does not follow however that they are the only possible qualifications for desirable positions As we have seen race or sex may sometimes be among the qualities which make it likely that a person will perform the functions expected of those filling desirable positions and which enable society to give more weight to the like interests of all In such cases there is every reason to consider race or sex a qualification for that position This argument does not challenge the equal-opportunity principle It allows that people have rights to be evaluated for positions strictly on the basis of their qualifications for these positions What it denies is that affirmative action necessarily violates the rights of white males for it affirms that race or sex may be a qualification Of course when institutions are going to fill positions this does not absolve them from the obligation to publish the qualifications they are going to use to evaluate candidates Further the rights of candidates to be evaluated strictly on the basis of their qualifications can be violated if the published policies are not followed Note however that these rights are not violated simply because the policies rely on distinctions based on race or sex The second forward-looking argument for affirmative action is that it produces better educational environments for everyone including white students At first glance this argument may seem implausible Indeed it may seem more likely that affirmative action will worsen educational environments at least for white students; presumably the best students make the best educational environments but affirma122

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tive action gives preference to black students with lower test scores and grades than some white students Advocates of the forward-looking argument rebut this difficulty with the famous diversity argument According to this argument a class or university filled with students with the highest possible test scores does not necessarily make the best learning environment If students share the same background assumptions they are likely to have the same blind spots and to overlook the same things This may lead them to miss the truth even if they are highly intelligent They are more likely to learn the truth if there are students among them with different backgrounds even if these students have lower test scores and grades than others who might have been admitted It is easy to see how this argument can be used to justify affirmative action The crucial premise of this justification is that black students have different background assumptions from white students Once this is granted a case for preferentially admitting black students into universities and colleges can be mounted on the forward-looking consideration that this will improve the learning environments of universities and colleges This is a satisfying reversal of the earlier argument that justified integrating primary and secondary schools on the ground that white students improved the learning environment for black students Further there is something to it Discovery of the truth does not depend on logical agility alone It also depends on the premises of our arguments on what we notice and that depends on our background assumptions and attitudes There is no need to collapse into relativism here The facts may be the same for everyone and everyone may be capable of noticing these facts Still different background assumptions and attitudes may dispose different people to notice different facts The third forward-looking argument for affirmative action is that it reduces racial stratification and therefore racial prejudice; this argument is less compelling Dworkin is obviously right that preferential admission of blacks into universities and colleges will reduce racial stratification At least he is right if such admissions will get their beneficiaries better jobs But reducing racial stratification may not reduce racial prejudice Germany and Austria were not racially stratified before the Second World War because the assimilated Jews of those countries had high positions and good jobs But their success did not save them from the anti-semitism of the majority Indeed on many accounts it exacerbated anti-semitism; many Germans hated the Jews in part because the Jews were more successful than they were Plausibly blacks who are successful because of affirmative action will fare even worse because resentment of their success will be fed by the belief that they got it by unfair means If the forward-looking case for affirmative action is sound such a belief could be false but it may nevertheless be irresistible We are not going back on our earlier argument that affirmative action may help to undermine stereotypes of black or female incompetence This argument may or may not be sound but undermining stereotypes is not the same as reducing racial prejudice The fact that blacks hold responsible positions successfully may help undermine the belief that blacks cannot hold such positions but it may increase the prejudice against them Blacks may be hated precisely because they hold responsible positions successfully We can know that better jobs for blacks and their presence in universities and colleges will reduce racial prejudice only if we have a correct 123

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th f th f il jdi Af d l k i t f f f t i action that relies on the premise that it will reduce racial prejudice cannot be accepted unless it produces such a theory and uses it to justify that premise However is reducing racial stratification not a worthy goal of affirmative action if it d t d il jdi? W lli t thi ti i th f f t i t l t if th b k d l k i t f ffiti ti i j t d N t i t h t td i tht d i i l iti i it i th l It i ill i it ith id i i l i t i lik th t i A i Bt f f t i ti d t d i i l i t i i i i f i t d it i i t t ith widening economic inequalities It is quite possible for the gap between the haves and the havenots to widen even as some blacks join the ranks of the haves The critics of affirmative action have made this point repeatedly and it is a serious blow t th f d l k i t Of d i il ttifiti ld b th l f f f t i ti if it d d il jdi R i l jdi lifdl il d thi t h t d it i d t l t if it d t thi bt h d d t f th f d l k i t h tb t h d t tilt th tht h tht d i i inequalities reduces racial prejudice Let us now see how the backwardlooking arguments may help to resolve this difficulty

Backwardlooking Arguments B k d l k i t jtif f f t i ti ti f t j t i j i Wh l i d t b l k th t i t i f Th f i t i t h t f f i t i ti t b l k f th i j i th ff a result of unjust racial prejudice and discrimination directed at them There are two versions of this argument: one is that affirmative action is compensation for specific acts of discrimination such as being denied admission to a university simply b f ' Th th i t h t f f i t i ti i ti f i j i ffd lt f th i i i it W ill b t th fit i f th t b t h i l h tht f fiti ti ll b it ti f ifi t f d i i i ti t l t h th d i i i t th t f ti Th d i f th t i t i l O tht t ll b l k h ffd i j i tht d ti if th h ffd ifi acts of racial discrimination As Thurgood Marshall says "It is unnecessary in twentieth century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination [It] has been so pervasive that none regard l f lth iti h dt it i t " ( T h t 2001 353) Thi t li ll t d t ti kt f l l hit A d th t it if t f ld i i i t i t h t b bl t t l tht h h b i j d b th i i f it Siill i l i iti h E l d th l l ff f i l jdi tht ij th ll Thi tb 124

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marked in the United States as in other countries but it does exist to a certain extent The second main backward-looking argument is that affirmative action is justified as compensation to present-day blacks for the injuries they have sustained as a result of the enslavement and unjust racial treatment of their African and AfricanAmerican ancestors This argument differs from the first because it appeals to njuries suffered by the ancestors of the present generations of blacks Perhaps the most priceless of the many criticisms aimed at this argument is that compensating present-day blacks for the enslavement of their ancestors is impossible because such compensation would mean that present-day blacks would not exist (Boxill 1992) This objection relies on a certain conception of compensation; namely that to compensate someone for an injury is to bring him or her to the position that he or she would have been had the injury never occurred But if the African ancestors of the present generation of African Americans had never been enslaved they would have met and had children with different people and consequently the present generation of African Americans would not exist Accordingly it is impossible to compensate the present generation of blacks for the enslavement of their ancestors Despite its popularity this objection thoroughly misunderstands the argument t aims to rebut The problem does not lie in the conception of compensation that is used It lies in a misunderstanding of the injury that is supposed to be compensated The argument does not say that present-day blacks should be compensated for the enslavement of their ancestors That would indeed be impossible because logically speaking no one can be compensated for injuries that another suffers; one can only be compensated for injuries that one suffers oneself The argument in question satisfies this key condition It says that present-day blacks should be compensated for injuries they have sustained It only adds that some of these injuries result from the enslavement of their ancestors No reputable historian has dared deny that the legacy of slavery has deeply affected and harmed present-day blacks There are at least two ways in which the legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population First the black population starts off with less wealth and education than other people because their ancestors were slaves This should be easy to see People bequeath their money property and position to their descendants Slaves generally have less money and property than free people Consequently the descendants of slaves start off with less money and property than the descendants of free people Finally this hamstrings them for desirable places and positions in the society And consequently harms them The second way in which the legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population is less obvious than the one just described but is perhaps more mportant The legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population by intensifying the racism against it Black people are despised and hated because they are the descendants of slaves But the intensity of the racism against black people has played a major role in holding them back If black people have not matched the success of other groups in America it is because the white population has hated and despised them so much; and it has hated and despised them so much because they see them as the descendants of slaves

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Other minorities and immigrant groups have boasted of success despite the racism directed against them The implication is that racism cannot prevent people from succeeding if they have talent and are determined to succeed We submit however that the racism directed at these minorities and immigrant groups is different from the racism directed at blacks It was not animated and intensified by the contempt of the racism directed at descendants of slaves If this is correct the racism directed at blacks is not only pervasive but also more virulent and harmful than that directed at other groups It is also more virulent and harmful than sexism and class prejudice What made it so harmful is that it must have seemed so effective When few blacks succeed blacks must conclude that the racism against them is not only intense but also effective in holding them down In such circumstances hopelessness is rational When racial prejudice is pervasive intensive and seems effective in blocking black success it is rational for a black person to conclude that he or she will not succeed In these circumstances black success was always accompanied by a sort of craziness a refusal to draw the conclusion that logic seemed to demand; namely that being black one would fail Earlier we argued that the bare fact that affirmative action reduces racial stratification is not enough to justify it; some other premise is necessary before we can draw the conclusion that it is justified We now have that premise One of the few consequences of affirmative action that is not controversial is that it will reduce racial stratification (Bowen and Bok 1998) With the elimination of racial stratification it will no longer be rational for blacks to infer that they cannot succeed The evidence of black success of blacks in the middle and upper classes will support the inference that blacks can succeed Affirmative action then is ustified because it provides for compensation in the form of restored hope This argument does not depend on the idea that racial stratification will abolish or even reduce racism We have seen that this optimistic argument is unwarranted That would of course be a happy circumstance if it did but there is no guarantee of this nor does the argument depend on it What really robbed blacks of hope was not only racism but the apparent effectiveness of racism in keeping them down The elimination of racial stratification will demonstrate that racism if it still persists is no longer effective in keeping black people down One might claim here that we are appealing to the same questionable empirical assumptions that we used to reject earlier versions of the forward-looking argument That is is the claim that abolishing racial stratification will restore hope to the black population really less controversial than the claim that black doctors will work in black communities? Or that abolishing racial stratification will abolish racial prejudice? We believe that it is Our position rests on the assumption that with experience human beings are usually able to know when to stop wasting their time on impossible projects Racial stratification makes the goals of reaching the middle and upper classes an impossible project As we have said it makes hopelessness rational If no blacks are succeeding it is not rational for any particular black person to believe she can succeed On the contrary it may be crazy for her to think she can The elimination of racial stratification will at least demonstrate that the American dream is as available to blacks as it is to any other group; there will no longer be a rational basis for not having the hope to succeed 126

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W h j t t d tht t i difft fr d libl than the argument that affirmative action will reduce racial stratification and con sequently will reduce racial prejudice Our argument is also different from the argu ment noted earlier that affirmative action will undermine stereotypes of racial i f i i t W t t tht t Th t t fblk i t did t il ttifiti W d b t t h t b l k bli th t t Th f il ttifiti th f hit i d th t ffti f tht i i k i blk d A h t d i h i t i h tilit it ditbl tht tblk ld t t t d T i t d i th i t ld b t i l With the ending of racial stratification caused by affirmative action then again (given human rationality) blacks will conclude that they can succeed Only then will it be true as the conservatives like to say that racism cannot keep blacks d O fil it ffiti ti i t it i t li d i d t ll it' ijti il i It i li d i d t tif t ijti d t ll th i l t t d jtl t th titi f it Lik li it i ith ft til f f ti effects However we believe that affirmative action is justified when we look at the fuller picture using both the forwardlooking and backwardlooking arguments

References NJ P i t U i i t W G d B k D (1998) Shape of the River P i t P Boxill B (1980) Sexual blindness and sexual equality Social Theory and Practice 3: 2 8 1 9 8 d Littlfild (1992) Blacks and Social Justice 2 d d N Y k R D k i R (2001) R d fl The New York Times O E d A i l 13 Hill Jr T E (1991) The message of affirmative action Socio/ Philosophy and Policy 8: 10829 Th L (1993) W h t d I? I St M C h ( d ) Affirmative Action and the University Chi IL T l U i i t P Tushnet Mark (ed) (2001) Regents of the University of California v Bakke (1978) in Thurgood Marshall Chicago: Library of Black America Lawrence Hill Books Chicago Review P

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th l l f t f lit i ll t k t t th hth ' tt lid l i ffiit t tif it f t t h h th i i l l Tht ti i t i ft h d th ti f th l i t i f"i i " "itil i " Ad d d th i i l f f thi h t ill b i l thi ti It i however to begin by setting aside some other issues that "the legal enforcement of morality" might suggest F i t th fli id f th ti f hth i l i t i sufficient f i l l l i t i th l ti f hth i l i t i necessary f i l l l i t Althh f th t i h d b th i i l l f l d btt thft d kl d t t i h t f d l i l th ihbl t t I th b f th f d l I t l R C d th i l tht i t i l 36 t f i t the federal government In the absence of the California Motor Vehicle Code there is no moral norm that requires me to drive no faster than 35 miles per hour on Sandburg Avenue And similarly although many of the acts that are legal wrongs iill th th i i l l l i l f l i t t i l b h f t t ti t t ti i th t t l t i th b fl l iti If h fi l t l l l ibi d dti d t d t th id l l l t h t dfi t iti tblih i t i t t i d fth d l ibi d dti d t ht td b " l l f t " th til b d that despite first appearances immorality is necessary for illegality Even if there s no moral norm (in the absence of a legal norm) requiring me to give precisely 36 percent of my income to the federal government there may be a moral norm ii t d fi h t t tl i dt l ith th ifiti f tht fi h l th ifiti fll ithi bl l i i t di i d tt h h bl f i d Th t ith d i i 35 il h Sdb A O ill i thi t ti f th d i t i t i ithi i i l l bt th i i l t tht mala in se ( i t h l ) h ti

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d d d th tht mala prohibita, b hibitd But the distinction is misleading in this sense: although many specific acts are wrong only because they are prohibited they are tokens of types of acts that are wrong in themselves such as failing to do one's fair share to support the govern t dii t bl d Th d b d f th iti tht i f l ditl lt d t t h h iti d d t th i l i t f th d t ibd d th l it f th d t dtd diti f th l i t i fl l f t Lt t t t l ti l hth th i l i t f conduct is a sufficient condition for legal proscription As a preliminary matter t should be noted that although this issue has usually been debated with only crim inal proscription in mind it is at least conceivable that immorality is not sufficient f i i l iti b t is ffiit f iil ti h d d At l t thi i h t b th ith t t th i l t tht h th bt tt t t ffiit t jtif i i l i h t F l b h f i b i l d l i t i t l id th b i f iil d B t th tb i l t th d sary to justify criminal punishment especially in light of the social costs of their criminalization and the adequacy of civil remedies The same might be true of some immoral tortious conduct offensive conduct and minor nuisances For example as hll J l Fib bli tht titi f tht h t th t h h iitti d t hld t b i i l l ihd i t b ff d f h bt h d t t h t iil d iht b dd i t th f (Fib 1984 2 4 4 5 ) Th t f i l i t b l i t i t l bjt t l l f t bt t i i l f t T i t hth i l i t i ffiit f l l f t t h h th criminal law opposition to sufficiency is frequently based on the socalled "harm principle" The "harm principle" which limits the legitimate scope of the criminal law to those acts that harm others is associated historically with John Stuart Mill d i t ti ith H L A H t i th H t D l i d b t It t t h h i l b t i h i i J l F i b ' t f l f l k The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law ( 1 9 8 4 8 ) Fib bli t h t th i i l l l l i t i t l b lid t d t tht h tht i ff ( i ff b l ) " H " f thi "f t th tt f t b k i t t tht the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others" (Feinberg 1984: 215) Thus "transitory disappointments minor physical and mental h u r t s ' and a miscel lany of disliked states of mind" although evils are not harms for Feinberg because th d t i l t b k f i t t (1984 2 1 5 1 6 ) t b k f i t t db d t tht i ll iibl ( h b i ti ti l i t i t l f d f ) tht i t d t b th h i t t t b k (1984 215) O th th h d t tht jtifibl ik h d f l l ithi th h i i l d b l i t i t l ihd t h i h l t tht h h t d (1984 216) 129

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N t ll h d b fl d t jtif riil i h t F example harms caused by imitative conduct should not be imputed to the conduct imitated for purposes of criminal punishment in the absence of extreme culpability (1984: 2 4 4 5 ) Moreover even the harmfulness of conduct is not sufficient for ts riiliti i i l i t i itlf h d tb jtifd l th h it i l th th h d b th d t riilid (1984 217) Fib t t th it f i l i t f ( r i i l ) illlit H ll j t riil riti f d t tht i h f l l t th h l t i l i it ( l l t l i ) b th t d (Fib 1986) But he rejects the sufficiency of immorality for criminal punishment If the immoral conduct causes no harm to others or causes harm to others too minuscule to justify the harms caused by criminal punishment then it may not legitimately be i h d t h h th riil l (Fib 1988) F i b ' iti th l l f t f lit i f it t i l M fid b l t i hi d i l t h t d t tht h t h h iitti b th hld b i d d h f l i th tht ld tif riil riti t l t i th b f hih d f lbilit (Feinberg does however allow criminal punishment of those who "incite" others to engage in harmful conduct [1984: 240]; and as noted above he appears to ap prove of civil liability even for those whose conduct is harmfully imitated by others) J t t i l l Fib d i t h t th d l t r i fft f i l d t th t ' h t hld t h jtifi riil ih t if ii ii h t i b d f th t h l f if th t ih t t h l f ii h h t ( l f t l i ) d if ith ii h t i likl fll t h th (Fi b 1988 285) ( F i b tt j t tt f riil i i l i i d t tht h t th l b i ii h t tit bt he is quite skeptical of the efficacy of the criminal law in that endeavor; 1988: 132) And similarly Feinberg denies that the coarsening effects of harmless immor alities on the public culture should count as harms to others justifying criminal i t t i (1988 128) F i l l h j t th i i t d ith P t i k D li (1968) i hi d b t ith H L A H t t h t it l i t i t l riili t h i h l i l d t th d tht ihd i l t d i th l d t h t dfi th it d th t h t th it' it qua it (1988 1 3 3 4 0 ) ( J h K k h d t h t thi i i i t t t i fD l i ' iti d tht Dli only arguing for the enforcement of that portion of the moral code essential to protect minimally good lives perhaps the very portion of the moral code Feinberg would enforce: Kekes 2000: 2 7 8 ) Fib t fth fil i ti f i l i t tht i l d d t tht d t h t th i F i b ' f i h d t h th d d d d d d Th h i i l h d b t d t dfi i l d t bt th l i i t it l i t i t lti t h h th riil l Tht l l ilbl f ttki Fi b ' iti 130

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Fit iht t bth F i b ' b d ti fi l d t d the harm principle but reject his restrictive view of the latter Thus one might have a more capacious view of harm and thus for the scope of the criminal law Or one might take a more generous view than Feinberg's of how immoral conduct causes h t th Th iht ji D l i i l i i tht d t t i f itdfi l d hld t h jtifi i i l ih t O ld l i t h t th i fft bli lt i h h t h t th l lik b t i l i t ii h t f t i d h t th ffiitl t t t i i l iti f lit Alternatively one can accept the philosophical position that Feinberg rejects legal moralism the position that immorality is sufficient for criminalization but come to conclusions similar to his by rejecting his broad view of what counts as i l F l R l d D k i i hi tibti t th d b t i t Dli' iti i i l i t i d t i t Dli' l l li bt th i t Dli' th itil i f ht td i l (D ki 1977 2 4 8 5 3 ) D k i ' iti tht thi h lik F i b ' Mill' h i i l f t i t t l t i t ht kinds of immoral conduct can be legitimately criminalized but rather as an internal constraint on defining conduct as "immoral" Similarly Michael Moore endorses legal moralism and its principle that those who do wrong deserve to be punished (M 1997 6 8 7 8 ) N th l M ' ti f ht t " " i f l i th Dli' d till h l t th d t F i b ' h i i l ld it t b i h d (1997 h 18) Ath iti i t tht F i b ' h i i l it t much i i l i h t Thi iti i t k b J t h S h h k h tht F i b l tk h t th ti i f f i i l i h t hih i t b " b l d " i t tht t against criminal punishment reasons such as the restriction on liberty that crim inal statutes represent and the various costs in terms of social resources loss of privacy possible corruption crowded courts and so forth that criminalization of d t t i l ( S h h k 1994 h 1) S h h k th th h d i t b l i d i f f i f "flt" F i b ' h i i l tblih l t h t th t t h l i t i t thit th d t i ti At t h t it i i l i t i t t h h t flt bf it b d d j t i f d Th tb l t t i t i i l i t i h i i l i i tht d th h f l d t t ceptable levels (Schonsheck's "presumptions filter"; 1994: 6 8 9 ) Moreover the costs of criminalization which include moral costs such as loss of privacy corrup tion and diversion of resources from other social goods must not exceed the bfit f i i l i t i i t f dti fh i d t (Sh hk' " t i f i l t " 1994 7 0 9 ) N it i t l S h h k dit tht F i b j t S h h k ' "filt" i tht F i b d h t th t b l i f f i i l i t i t l i F Fib d t t t h t th l h th l f libt tht ih i t i i l i t i N th 131

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l S h h k tht i f th l f i i l i t i i tht Feinberg discusses Feinberg fails to take these countervailing reasons seriously enough and is led in Schonsheck's opinion to the wrong conclusions Finally one could like Feinberg hold that the class of immoral conduct includes h tht i t h i i F i b ' bt j t hi h i i l ltth F h th l l lit t tht i l d d d i b i i l l ihd if th h f l i th F i b ' ih d i i f th t fh t th tht tif i i l i h t t i tht l t h h it i t t i thi iht i h l t i thi h t A th t i hth l can be wrongfully harmed posthumously; whether exploitation counts as a wrong ful harm; whether failures to prevent harm can be wrongful harms; whether other regarding interests can be the basis of wrongful harm (not if they are malicious or diti di t F i b ) h t h ft di f t th l t d d d il d i l b fll h d d hth b fll h d b t f ' it ( t h t i th t t f D k Pfit' " f f t i " i i l ) F h h ht ti t t F i b ' jti f l t l i th iti t h t th criminal law can legitimately be employed to protect people from harming their own moral character and his rejection of legal moralism which deems immorality to be sufficient for criminal enforcement even if it is "harmless" Moral paternalism i b t i d d t f th b d t i f t l i ll F th h i l h i l i i l t l i i t hth th immorality f lf ti b h i jtif it i i l i t i bt hth th h t lf tht iht jtif i i l i h t f h t h i t t l i t i jtifti f i i l l i l d h t ' l h t i dditi t h h dth h i l ij d Tht i h F i b ' j ti f l t l i d t hi jti fl l li i t within the scope of this chapter Before turning to legal moralism however it is important to examine a category of conduct that Feinberg excludes from the purview of the harm principle but not f th l i t i t thit f th i i l l Th t i tht f d t tht f d ff t th Fib d t ti l t th t f ff (Fib 1985) H ld t h t ff tt h i d t t h h dfi it i hi fit l Harm to Others N th l h ld tht d t tht i f d l ffi l i t i t l b i i l i d (th ff i i l ) (1985 1) E l f foundly offensive conduct in our culture are public fornication and masturbation public bestiality public handling of excrement and public desecration of corpses (1985: 1 0 1 3 ) Fib ld t i t th f d ff ti t th h i i l t d t tht i bli B k l d tht h d t i i i i t tt h ditbi t jtif i i l i i it i t (1985 6 0 7 1 ) O t h i h i i i l i i ffi d t ld likl ll it l l li ( W h t h hi titi f i i l i t i t bli ffi d t i dfibl d th hth h id l l 132

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li hil b i i h t f ffi d t i tt hll take up below) Turning now to legal moralism it is important to get some sense of the type of conduct that the legal moralist would punish but that "liberals" like Feinberg ld t f i h t tt f i i l Th d t ld f h t b i l At th ti h it ld t fll t b k th i t t f th ( l it ld f l l ithi F i b ' h i i l ) ld it b blil d i ( l it i h t f d l f f d th db l i t i t l i i l i d tht d) H l f d t tht iht b d d i l bt t harmful: bestiality (sex with animals); exploitation (taking advantage of another's dire straits to extract most of the contractual surplus from transacting with him); producing and consuming hardcore pornography that appeals to lurid and sadistic i l d tti d ttdi lditil t t i hih t t t l t i l f h t t th d t h tt t l tibtd b I i K i t l (1971) B t i l i t t f l l ithi th h i i l if i l ithi th tti f th i i l b th h i t t tht b t b k if b t i l i t d ti f t t b k th i t t Elitti t fall within the harm principle because the "victim" is not harmed but is inad equately benefited Pornography may not fall within the harm principle unless t "causes" its consumers to harm others (Feinberg 1988: 2 132) And gladiatorial t t t f l l ithi th h i i l f t h Y t bl h f th t f d t i i l Fib t th i l i t f th d t i th l bt h d i t h t th d t b l i t i t l i i l l i h d i th b fh ff H i ht i l b t th l d i t i l l i t b h h dbt b t hth lditil t t ld id h t th f l h t h th ld id t t t i ldit h " t " t truly voluntary (1988: 3 3 0 1 ) or whether they could avoid so coarsening their audience that they cause an increase in violent crimes (1988: 132 3 2 9 3 1 ) In the final analysis however he appears to concede that preventing evils other than h t th b l i t i t f i i l i t i t tht i l t l t i h d b th h f i i l i t i bt h t t i h d i th f lditil t t Wht ld F i b ' jti fl l li til f " i t i l i " h titti bli dd ? Th i t t ll l O liitti f titti i h t f l l ithi th i i l itti i i l i t i of acts that are profoundly offensive Acts within any of these categories might involve harm to others (for example adultery use of joint funds without consent) And particular instances of gambling and drug use might involve the wrongful iki fh t th h i likl t l th f i l ' ilk di hil i i d b t d d i t d t flfill ' l l bliti Th f Fib d i t hi jti fl l li iht d i i l i t i f tl t i t f th tiiti ( I d d thi i h iti lik S h h k bli F i b ' h i t ii f i i l i t i th th t t i t i ) 133

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Aid f j i fl l lik K i t l ' l d i t i l t t tht weaken the conviction of antilegal moralists like Feinberg what can be said more systematically on behalf of legal moralism? One approach for the legal moralist s that taken by Michael Moore Moore argues that the point of criminal law is to see tht di ( d lbl t t t d ik f d i ) i ihd (M 1997 70) A d di i l d t l th fl t t h t fll ithi Mill' F i b ' h d ff i i l F M if t i ll th i l t t d i h it t h h th i i l l D i t hi l l li h M ld bbl h l i punishment very similar to Feinberg's For Moore holds that while the immorality of conduct is always a reason for its proscription the reach of the criminal law s tempered by three countervailing moral concerns First like Dworkin Moore refuses t t h t is i l ith h t lilti jit jit f th believes t b i l A i i l ttt i l i t i t f M l if l th d t it f b i d i t l i l d hth d t i t l i l tt f l lit t l b l i f (1997 6 6 2 3 ) F l M hilf bli tht t l l tiit i l d i h l i t i t moral and therefore should not be criminalized regardless of the views of demo cratic majorities (1997: 756) Second Moore like Schonsheck believes that the costs of criminalizing conduct t i t f iti l f i ti d d i t f th l tht ih i t i i l i t i di ditt tht i l i t i h d (1997 6 6 3 5 ) A d d i t i l l th ht M d th " t i f l i b t " tht t t th i i l l ' dti f t d ti f it l bd tht ih i t i i l i t i (1997 7 6 8 7 4 7 8 ) S l i i l i t i f l b k i i hld ihd b th l t f criminalization outweigh the retributive principle that immorality should be pun ished? Third Moore endorses a right to liberty a right that immunizes from punishment t f i l d t (1997 7 6 3 7 7 ) M j t Mill' d Fi b ' h i i l th b i f th i h t di t d h t i th i h t tti h f "lfdfii h i " (1997 775) Th lfdfii hi tht t t d b th i h t t l i b t i l d hi tht i l d t h i l i t i t l bjt t i i l iti d i h t Th M d "iht t d " Moore applies his right to liberty to the question of criminalizing drug use (1997: 7 7 9 9 5 ) He canvasses various arguments to the effect that drug use is immoral: t contravenes the ideal of asceticism; it creates the risk of wrongdoing; it reduces dtiit it i d flihi d it l d t th d t t i f th lf M j t l bliti t b dti ibl t tti h idl t f l i h (1997 7 8 0 1 7 8 3 7 ) H d bli h tht i d t i i l b it i k i j i th itht t i lbl t Bt d ik i j t h h i i th l i k l i h d f th d ' ft lbl di dh j t d i th d 134

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f th i l d t it i h t k l i k l (1997 7 8 2 4 ) H d accept however a moral obligation to refrain from destroying our capacity to act as moral agents (1997: 7 8 7 8 ) At this point Moore's right to liberty kicks in because the selfdestruction is a selfdefining choice So although it is morally t tk d t th it f l f d t t i it ld l b ll f th t t t ih h di (1997 7 9 2 5 ) J h R lik F i b bli t h t th ll t ti tht d t h th i F i b ' fh (R 1986 397) H l d i t t l i b l tht tf t i t l t i f ll h f l hi (1986 3 8 0 1 ) A t hi h l R l when they are directed at ends that are truly morally valuable (1986: 380 412) Therefore eliminating morally base choices as options does not impair the value of autonomy (1986: 3 8 0 8 1 4 1 0 1 2 ) D i t hi f d i l i t hi d i t d t d ll b ( t h h h l ) d R th l d thi lik F i b ' h i i l t ld i i l i h t fh l i l i t i (1986 4 1 8 2 2 ) R h l d i t i i h bt i i l iti fh l l d t d fl i lik t d bidi t th morally good and discourage the morally bad Coercion through the criminal law he says is "an indiscriminate invasion of autonomy" (1986: 418) That is because "imprisoning a person prevents him from almost all autonomous pursuits" (1986: 418) S R j t f t f lit t h h th i i l l if t t h h l i l l Bt f hi iti h itd t th ll t h t f hi t b t th l f t t f l l l i Aft ll th t h t t t i ihi th h i h l i l i t li t i th f f i h t h i i t bt th til l i f th i l ti F i i t i l h i t i l form of criminal punishment Fines are another yet they leave those subject to them with every bit as much autonomy as those who are taxed Similarly if the punishment for harmless immorality were electric shocks or whippings people ld b d t d f i l hi b th t h t f h i h t b t th i h t t h l ld t i d t Ad R t d tht ki th h i ttti ilbl i i i th l f t i t h t th l f t i lid l t h h th hi Th R h idd fl t f l l li d i t Feinberg's harm principle despite his endorsement of that principle If there are harmless immoralities the choice of which is valueless no matter how autonomous then Raz should endorse their criminalization in the absence of excessive costs n di Lt t t th ti f hth t f i i l i t i f f d l ffi d t i i t t ith jti fl l li Fi b iti Th t t d b t t h t it i Si Fib d l l lit ld d i i l i i th h l i l i t i tht ffd th f b f th ff th l t t b f th i l i t d i 135

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( t ? ) h l i l i t i ill ffd th f th ht left for the operation of Feinberg's injunction against legal moralism? One area s where harmless immoralities fail to offend seriously enough to warrant their crim inalization A legal moralist might reach exactly the same anticriminalization con l i Fib f th Thi i b th ill b i t t f th t t h t ill b tb k b i i l i t i tht ll t i h th i t t i ihi i l i t i h th i l i t i i t h t it ill t i ff A l t h h it i t l tl h th l l l i t ill i h th b t t l f ihi i l i t i t th i t i t t t h t ill b tb k b i i l i t i th i t thik h ill ignore or heavily discount the latter The area where Feinberg and the legal moralist clearly part company is that of offensive and immoral conduct that occurs in private This is what Feinberg calls th "b k l d b l " (Fib 1985 6 1 7 1 ) S Alfd i f d l ffdd lt f l k i f Btt dC l ' lbi lti hi th i t i t ti f hih bhid l d d i thi t t S Alfd i t b l i hi ff d tht ff tlbi ti i i d d d i Ad f th k f t tht lbi ti are immoral though harmless Will Feinberg's offense principle then legitimate for liberals the criminal prohibition of lesbian practices? Feinberg wants to deny that it will He draws a bright line between offensive i i l ti t h t Alfd i ditl i bli l d th tht Alfd k f th th t h h d i t ti It i h t h t th ti f di l l d th ff i i l it d d th h i i l T b ihbl d t t t l ffd it t l it iti Thi i Fib t h t th i t i ' i b l Alfd t l i t h t he i d b Btt dC l ' i l d t d i t hi bi ffdd b th t h h t f it At an earlier point in his argument Feinberg claims that one can suffer lower order non"profound" offenses such as revolting or disgusting or boring sights and smells only if one directly perceives them rather than merely learns of them (1985 5 7 8 ) Wh does i th d t h b ff th ff th i f l i flt t b l t th i Th ff ff b f ilti f l i F i b ' t " f d " ff d td d ' ii dt k i b t th i l t i Alfd ff f d ff hth t h it Btt d Cl i thi l b i i t i i l k f th But where he does not witness the conduct, but merely knows of it, his grievance is not a personal one because he cannot claim the conduct is a wrong to him. And if the conduct because unwitnessed wrongs no one it cannot be prohibited under the offense principle I til ith F i b ' l i f f d ff t f th l i h d f it ( A l d 1994) Th t h Fib iht id h d ith ill t hi h h t t O i th d i t i t i bt i d d t d k d t Th th i th d i t i t i b t d t tht ffd b it i l t d d t tht ilt b it ffd L t tk h f th dititi i t 136

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Fib t hi iti th d i t i t i bt i d dk duct He wants to say that if Alfred were to be unwillingly forced to view Betty and Clara's lovemaking then even with respect to his profound offense (the offense he suffers as a result of the violation of the moral norm) he has a personal grievance liibl f tti d th ff i i l If A l f d l k f Btt dC l ' d t h th h l k l i Wht th d f F i b ' dititi bt ti d k l d ? Th t ibiliti O ibilit i t h t th i difft lit t ff tht i d d t ff tht l k b t Th th ibilit i t h t ti bt t k l d idiidt th h f offense in a way that makes the resulting grievances capable of characterization as wrongs to particular people The first possibility overlooks the fact that we are dealing here with profound ff ff i t th f t t h t l h b iltd Whth Alfd d i t l i Btt d Cl l k b t th tht t f hi ff tht i f d ff ld b t t At l t F i b i t t h t it ld t b A l f d ' d i t ti i t f hi t k b t Btt dC l ' f d l ffi d t I ll it is his knowledge that moral norms are being violated that causes his offense Consider Agnes who believes that extramarital sex including heavy petting is immoral (but harmless) She has learned that Barbara and Charles unmarried are h i ffi d h i f d l f f d d At d h b th l Bill d C d i i th h tti At f i t h b l i th id d h i t f f d d b thi b h i t h h it i i d i t Wh h i i f d t h t th t id h ff f d ff Cll h ff i bth i d t fh k l d tht l bi iltd P t i i th d l id h ith id f th ilti The other possible basis for Feinberg's distinction between perceived and known immoral conduct is that perception but not knowledge somehow personalizes the offense in a way that allows us to identify specific persons who have been wronged Thi t i b l t i C i d t fi l d t tht i i d b t h d f l d tht i i t b t tht i l d f b f l Th i t l b t l i i t h t th f h b d ("If ti l l d th fid t h d th thi i ik tk h t i l l " ) N i th t l b t l i i tht t h d h h b ll d i th fit M numbers are irrelevant though if they were relevant they would cut in favor of not against mere knowledge I conclude that Feinberg has not offered a convincing rationale for distinguishing bt f f d ff tht i l d i t ti f ffdi d t d f f d ff tht i l b k l d f ffdi d t M Fib i tiili hi l i b l f d f liti i i l hibiti b f i th h ld i h l liti t d bhid l d d B h h l d d i t d thi i t t i i i h d t did d i k d if th t t t t i

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t i t id th ill l t i th b l i d th ff principle unless they retreat from the public realm But why if we are to bar legal moralism through the front door should we allow it in through the back door in the form of protecting against profound offense a protection that makes the i l i t dl iti h t i hi f i t ti t f d ? If i th f f d ff j t F i b ' dititi bt i d d l k i l d t lft ith th ibl di titi tht iht t th ff i i l f l l i it l l li th d i t i t i bt d t tht i l t l b it offends and conduct that offends because it violates moral norms Although Fein berg does not ultimately rely on this distinction in making his case against crimin alizing immoral conduct that occurs in private it is useful to consider the i l i t i f l i h dititi Aft ll th d i t i t i h l l l t d t th jti f l l li th d th d i t i t i bt i d d l k d t Fib k l d th d i t i t i bt d t tht i i l b it f f d d d t t h t ffd b it i i l d t it h appears to be drawing the boundary between the offense principle and legal moral ism on the basis of it Ultimately however he countenances prohibition of conduct that offends because it is immoral so long as the conduct occurs in public Bt h t j t thi d d d tht d t b ffi d dtl f i l i t bf it b hibitd d th ff i i l W l d thi t hi h h t t b? S l t If l i i t f th liti f th ff i i l ll d t tht ffd b ilti f ( dt d t hih i l t b it ffd) th ff i i l ill b i t d It ill l h t d t th i h t ll d f hih ld b ffi i ll lt h th ll f l h i acid or the sound of chalk screeching on a blackboard But most of the offensive conduct that Feinberg wishes to criminalize as profoundly offensive would not be eligible for prohibition under the offense principle M t f th d t tht ffd d b it f it f l t i f Thi i b i l t f h thi blhi i bli It i bbl l t f bli b l i i h i d t i th ll b lt tht t fid h d t lti A d it i t f h d t bli dit d bli f i t i Fib t i t t bli t h i H it t tht offended by public nudity or fornication but not by private nudity or fornication (Feinberg 1988: 1 5 1 6 ) Therefore it is our perception of the conduct not its violation of norms that causes our offense The norms against public nudity and f i t i th l th ilt d th d t li bt l i d b th ff d Thi l i f h i i t Pbli dit d f i t i d t h d t ll ti f f d Th ffd h th ilt b t bli b h i tht i i l It i t f tht dit df i t i i i t d t ilt dd t ffd Ad

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it i t h f l t t h t it i thi b t thi bi bli t h t l d t our condemning public nudity and fornication But it is incorrect to conclude that bare perception (no pun intended) rather than norm transgression is the source of our offense in such cases There are norms about proper conduct in public that are f ff h i l t d b t tht d t t t i t ff tht it th t h l E l i i t th d l i i t th ff Cid i thi ti th f l l i l Bill d C d i bli f i t i bf thiti d ft t l k N t i ffdd b d th i t bli f i t i Alfd h h t t bt h ld h b ffdd hd h b present he subscribes to the norm against public fornication hears about Bill and Candy Will he be offended by what they did and if so why? I believe that Alfred may very well be offended (in the profound sense) even though t A d th f h ff ill t il b hi i i i f h t Bill d C d l k d lik t th ti Alfd b f f d d j t b th f t t h t Bill d C d iltd t hih Alfd b i b t l t if t h t th d t dit f ti h th l k ill t b f f d d (Th i t bli f i t i iht i d d t dit f h exception: we may think that public fornication is improper even if no one present minds it) Feinberg must admit that many offensegiving public acts are so because they ilt tht i t ff Tht d i i l d ith th i t t h t th t i / k l d dititi i i l t i th f ff db ilti ( f d f f ) t h t ith t ll th ff i i l it l l li l t ltl l t t i l t th ff i i l b d i it l i t i t th ll b f f i l l lti iht ll d d T b t ff i i l d t id l l li Fib might resort to the following argument It is true he might say that most of the cases of offense that I would allow to be punished involve norm violation as the source of the offense But the norms in question as opposed to the norms with hih jti fl l li i d d t d ltll lti ti b t b h i i bli d th b t h t h t ( d d i t ) t th t E lt d ti f thi kid b i lt l dt k h t h th bi h d i t ( d hld thf f l f f d d ) Th t t f th b it ibl i thi t t i ltil i t t Tht i thi t t i relatively unimportant in the same way as the content of the norm about which side of the road to drive on is relatively unimportant There surely are norms that fit this description Their public violation causes ff t th t ( t l t if th b i b t th ) Thi i t il ti d t ff b th t b i t l i l t d (Th l l t d t i th' d th t t d th it hil f d t t i t) Thi tti t t i blti f l F i t it ddl iil l t i l blid t b i l Th

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former can be enforced through the criminal law under the offense principle; the latter are legally unenforceable (at least through criminal sanctions) Second many of the acts that a Feinberg liberal would presumably find punishably offensive consist of publicly flouting norms that are believed to be universal moral norms not conventional norms of the respect/offense-giving kind Consider homosexual embracing and kissing in public The strategy in question would apparently rule out punishment for this even if the offense it caused (by its direct perception) were serious widespread and so forth and not outweighed by free speech or other interests of the actors For unless there were a conventional norm deeming homosexual kissing in public to be disrespectful of those present - as opposed to a moral norm condemning homosexual behavior generally - the offense felt by the witnesses would be of the profound variety and no different or so I have argued from the offense they would feel if they merely learned of this conduct but did not see it Of course there might be a conventional meta-norm that deems publicly flouting moral norms to be disrespectful of those present and violation of this conventional meta-norm might then legitimate punishment even if violation of the underlying moral norm would not But this tack for legitimating punishment exposes a third and I believe quite devastating weakness in the strategy I am describing The weakness is this There is nothing in principle that keeps us from having norms governing how to demonstrate respect (and give offense) that deem as disrespectful all public flouting of non-conventional moral norms Whenever therefore we wish to criminalize public immoral conduct it will be unclear even to ourselves whether we are criminalizing it because it is immoral (legal moralism) or because it violates our norms regarding offense Moreover there is nothing in principle that prevents us from regarding private immoral conduct as disrespectful to anyone who learns about it at least if we jettison the distinction between perceiving and merely knowing about conduct (If no one ever learns about private immoral conduct it will not be punished anyway even under legal moralism) And given that private immoral conduct wUl cause profound offense among those who learn of it we may in fact deem it disrespectful of those whom it offends In that case the line between the offense principle and legal moralism is all but obliterated In any event under the argumentative strategy we are considering private immoral conduct is always hostage to the content of conventional norms regarding how respect and offense are shown In the end once the perception/knowledge distinction is dropped the fact that those offenses which Feinberg would punish are more often than not products of norm violations leads to the result that the offense principle covers most of the territory that legal moralism might otherwise occupy Feinberg cannot want this result but neither can he avoid it unless he eliminates norm violations as legitimate sources of punishable offense His choice then is between a denatured liberalism one that through the offense principle embraces most if not all of what the legal moralist wants and an anemic offense principle one that covers only universally noxious sights sounds and smells

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References Alexander Larry (1994) Harm offense and morality Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7: 199-216 Devlin Patrick (1968) The Enforcement of Morals London: Oxford University Press Dworkin Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Feinberg Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol I: Harm to Others Oxford: Oxford University Press (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol II: Offense to Others Oxford: Oxford University Press (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol Ill: Harm to Self Oxford: Oxford University Press (1988) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol IV: Harmless Wrongdoing Oxford: Oxford University Press Kekes John (2000) The enforcement of morality American Philosophical Quarterly 37: 23-35 Kristol Irving (1971) Pornography obscenity and the case for censorship The New York Times March 28 Moore Michael S (1997) Placing Blame Oxford: Clarendon Press Raz Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom Oxford: Clarendon Press Schonsheck Jonathan (1994) On Criminalization Dordrecht: Kluwer

Further reading Arneson Richard J (1990) Liberalism freedom and community Ethics 100: 368-85 Greenawalt Kent (1995) Legal enforcement of morality The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 85: 710-25 Hart H L A (1963) Law Liberty and Morality Stanford CA: Stanford University Press Mill John Stuart (1956) On Liberty Indianapolis IN: Bobbs-Merrill

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11 Hate Crimes Literature and Speech L W SUMNER

How should a liberal society respond to those who preach or practice hatred toward some of their fellow citizens? The issue is an agonizing one for liberals because it seems to expose a conflict between their two most cherished values A liberal society prides itself on its acceptance of a wide diversity of communities and on its fostering of a climate of equal consideration and respect for members of those communities It therefore rejects all forms of discrimination or intolerance based on such factors as race ethnicity national origin religious affiliation gender age disability and sexual orientation At the same time liberals are commited to a vigorous form of freedom of expression which requires them to tolerate the advocacy of opinions which they regard as false offensive and even malicious The activities of hate groups threaten to reveal a contradiction between liberal equality and liberal freedom The ideology of these groups decisively rejects the iberal deal of equality of respect and the public advocacy of this ideology arguably serves to undermine the equal social status of its targets whether they be members of visible minorities Jews or gays However as a form of political expression that advocacy seems to call for particularly robust protection in a liberal society Liberals must therefore decide how far they are prepared to tolerate the activities of those who are themselves intolerant However this issue is resolved it looks as though it must be at the cost of limiting one of the values that liberals hold most dear Are they to side with liberty at the cost of threatening equality or equality at the cost of restraining liberty? The issue is more acute for hate speech than for hate crimes For our purposes hate speech is any form of expression or communication not itself violent which insults or defames a social group identified by such factors as race ethnicity and so on or which insults or defames individuals by virtue of their membership of such a group The notion of speech must here be construed very broadly so as to cover besides oral or written messages such further means of communication as visual materials (photographs cartoons videos) body language (gestures intended to express contempt or to intimidate) and symbolic acts (wearing a swastika burning a cross) A hate crime on the other hand requires an overt act of violence motivated by hatred of a target group Paradigm instances are assaults on the person (for example gay-bashing) or the desecration of property (for example vandalism of 142

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J i h t i ) B th ti f ht i i act whose criminal status is uncontroversial there is not even a putative case for tolerating it in a liberal society There is such a case however for tolerating (non violent) expression even when its content is odious and hateful Hate speech thus t it i i l d tt ithi libl it hih i t h d b ht i it i h t h t th d t th h t flibli i t t d t t

Ht S h

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Hate speech is undoubtedly as old as hate and speech But we are concerned here with its contemporary manifestations in the liberal democracies of the West For i db th th j i d i t i ith h i h I t fili I ill fi lf t h t d th l l lti f thi tiiti th U i t d S t t d C d A ill th A i d C d i t h tk th d i f f t h d hd th d i f f t l i i th t t f th t' i h t t i liit ht h These two jurisdictions therefore represent two possible resolutions of the liberty/ equality dilemma But first the hate groups themselves Glorying in such names as Aryan Nations th C h h f th C t Whit A Rit th H i t F t d f th il ( d tl t) K Kl Kl th ltil ll h d fi iti titd b h t d f ll " hit" i i t i d d d i t d t th t b l i h t b f if f h hit it Thi f d t t iiti blk th Ai dJ F ht i ti t t i b t th i the role played for them by hate literature All of them either produce or distribute materials both vilifying racial or ethnic minorities and preaching intolerance of them (and often also violence against them) These materials still circulate n print f bt i i l i l b l ith id th I t t All f th j ht h b t b l i h d W l d Wid W b it hih b iitd b ith I t t (Th Si W i t h l C t t i t t h t th th 600 i t it th b ) Th i f th d h i h th i l t i i t t f b d i f t f l th t f iti b I th d ht litt l d i t t i i t i i i i th b h i f ht groups; it is designed not so much to win acceptance of the gospel of white suprem acy in a broad public forum but rather to attract and retain those who are already receptive for whatever reason to its message H i th t t t d t th h t d i i t d b h ?I th U i t d S t t t t t t liit l t th i l t i f th ikl i t th i j t i t h t "C hll k l b i d i th f d f h" t i d i th F i t A d t t th Bill f R i h t Thi i j t i h b i t t d b th A i S C t itti titi f "ti d i t " if th h ( h 143

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tti th bli i t i ) th th i th i l t i of the ideas being expressed Content restrictions on the other hand are forbidden At the same time the Court has distinguished between degrees of First Amendment protection for different forms of speech some (such as political speech) receiving the t t i t tti th l l d d ( h df ti) t ll Thi i t d i t t i l d h t th C t h lld "fhti d" d f d "th hih b thi tt iflit i j t d t iit i d i t b h f th " {Chaplinsky New Hampshire [1942]) Thi iht l d t t t h t th t t h ht l t i t t titi fhti d f i t t b ti i l t or epithets standardly directed at members of racial minorities However the most recent leading case RAV v City of St Paul (1992) suggests otherwise The case involved the burning of a cross by white teenagers inside the f d d f blk fil A h ft i t R b t Vikt ( j il t th ti f hi t) t i l bt h l h d d it di hih hibitd th d i l f b l hih " l t t i th th b i f l d lii d " D i t ti t h t th di lid l t fhti d th S Court none the less struck it down primarily because it violated "viewpoint neu trality" by prohibiting abusive speech directed against certain target groups (the ones enumerated in the ordinance) while permitting it if directed against other B fili t b i i t t l i t th C t l d d th di f f t t titi I th k f thi d i i it difflt f t t lti fht h if l d t t t l fhti d t i ti l it i d i th t h d d A t t t t ff il tti t iiti i d t b ill l b l b f t i d i i i t i ill b f d t ilt i i t tlit A lt i th U i t d S t t th f effective legislative controls on the circulation of hate messages The situation in Canada is quite otherwise The Criminal Code which falls under federal jurisdiction contains a provision which makes it an offence to "wilfully t h t d i t idtifbl " b " i t i t t t th th i i t t i " Th t t t d f "idtifibl " " ti f th bli d i t i i h d b l lii thi i i " B it t l i t t titi bt l ilt i i t t l i t thi l ld i tittil ti i th U i t d S t t H th C d i S C t h l d it i th l d i fR Keegstra (1990) James Keegstra was a secondary school teacher who used his class room to inculcate a number of antisemitic doctrines which depicted Jews as personally odious politically dangerous and enemies of Christianity When his t h i ti t liht h d i i d f hi t h i b bt l h d ith ilfll ti h t d Th tittil i bf th ti tht th i i i t f th h t d l ith th i h t t "fd f t h h t blif ii d i " t d i Sti 2(b) f th C d i Cht f Riht dF d Th C t f d t h t hil th l did i d d i i thi i h t th i i t jtifd d th S t i 144

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1 ii t h t th i h t t d i th C h t bjt t " h able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo cratic society" The justification for the law which was endorsed by the Court was in part that its objective protection of the equality of the enumerated groups i d b t t i l H th C t idd b S t i 15 f th Cht hih hibit d i i i t i " b d t i l thi ii l lii tl h i l dibilit" B th C h t iil th lit i h t f th d i t d d b th h t d l ifill i d t tti f th lf th l ' ilti f i i t tlit t i f th C t As a result of the different constitutional climates in the two countries Canada has a law targeting hate speech which has no American counterpart It therefore seems appropriate to conclude that Canada and the United States have come to difft lti f th flit b t libl f d d libl lit hil A i h t d d t l fth i th d i t i f th f C di h b l i th tti f th l t t

Two Theories of Rights The American and Canadian courts have not only reached opposed conclusions i h t h lti th h l tk ht d i t t t th l i I d t i t thi l t t diff dt tk dt f th j d i i l t it b t t d h i l h i l t i t Bth h ) f d f i d lit f t t iht i libl i t If ( th flit h i thi flit t b ld? H t d t i hih d d th th l t t i l h th t iht t be brought into congruence with one another? There seem to be two different ap proaches to these questions which correspond to and flow from two different views about the nature and justification of rights O f th i iht t b jtifid i t t l l d i f d i tti ti i t t i t t (Mill 1969 h 5 S 1987 h 6) Th i t t l i t iht i d i b l t fth d lbl t i t h l b t f th l th t If f ttti f h i h t th thi h ill l d t i d t i f th i t t db h iht hih b l l t d i t th i (Mill 1977 h 2 S l 1979 C h 1993) Th fit it f speaker interests which collects together the many ways in which being able to express ideas or indeed to engage in any form of communication can be a benefit for the person who exercises this freedom Speaker interests include but are not restricted t th lfflfillt lft tht fl f bi t i i t bli f bi id iti ith i i th ffi f ' it audience interests, h i h i t f th C l t i ith k i t t bfit lid b bi th i i t f t h ' h Lik k i t t th i i b l t t h t i l b t th t i l l it f bi 145

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btt i f d bi d t l i d d i id bi filittd in the pursuit of one's tastes or values and so on Communication is a relationship between one or more speakers and one or more listeners (or viewers or readers) and the first two groups of interests served by free speech underscore the ways n which thi l t i h i b tll ftbl Th t h i d bystander interests, i t t fth d i i f th iti l t i h i l it ill f f t f th h t ditl ti t it Th fft f b ti b t h f i f th t tl t th iti ff f f i Th t t t f th i t f th bfit d i iti f lii i it i which our fellow citizens are open minded inquisitive and well informed In add ition to benefiting those directly involved in particular communicative exchanges the free flow of information can be a public good by contributing to an atmosphere i h i h th l l l f i i d dbt i i d Thi t h i t i l l i t t i f t i i d h t tl t l lti bt th lit f t d th d f tiiti th litil t b i f d iti F h t h f b i d t b f lbl d Bt it can also be thought to have a different kind of value one which belongs to it as a part of a valuable whole Let us call this kind of value constitutive rather than instrumental The larger whole in which free expression stands as an indispensable t i ll t k t b d itlf ( D k i 1996 h 8) O thi i l l d d d i t fth dt hih i iht i l d i f h tibt Rth it i litil t hih it t i l l i th iht t lki th i l d t t d ti Whil f d f i i ll i d d t li t th f th t f d it i t th l iht i l i t d i tht t Oth iht tt t ibl j t h th i l d f t h f d (li gion association peaceful assembly) as well as rights to vote run for office and so on The justification of these rights is provided by their constituting a particularly valuable kind of political order If we ask in turn what is so good about democracy th thi f t h ti b d b l t h l ti ( d t i d i l fi f bitti ti i i t t ) th d i i t t f iti Bt i th i titti th th i t t l d bdi b i i i l f jti t diit d t Th i fth d t h i h it The right to freedom of expression can therefore be given either an instrumental ist or a constitutive justification But so can the right to equality: it too can be seen either as a necessary means of protecting the (individual and/or collective) nterests f b f l b l iiti th til t f t d t i d Th diff bt th t f fj t i f t i t d t b hihlihtd h t t th i h i h th bitt flit i h t Th i ff h iht b h t t h t th lit iht f thi t t tti th l t t th i liiti th f S i f th ti h h flit t b djditd?

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Si bth iht j tittil tti ( t l t i th U i t d S t t d Canada) this question takes us back to the courts When courts are confronted with this conflict what method do they use to resolve it? When one constitutionally protected right putatively conflicts with another the t d h t b b h t it O f hii thi i t liit ( b t h ) f th i h t t h t th f flit i l i i t d Th t h t th liitd f d t ht t t b t th b f il thi iiti t h t th l il tt f th iiti If th th f d iht b liitd titd t ld t i kid f iti h ht h "fihti d" The now delimited freespeech right it is then thought does not conflict in the same way with the equality right Let us look more closely at what is involved n limiting a right The process is what Judith Thomson (1986: 3 7 4 2 ) has called " i f t i " Th k i d f i h t t likl t b i l d i flit th d i b d i i t T h ' l th i h t t lif d th iht t lfdf S d i b d flit b t th iht ill h t kill ttk i d t d f d h lif B t h th flit di if if t l t f th i h t i ti fll The needed specification Thomson says may be either moral or factual It is moral if we redefine the right to life as say the right to not be wrongly or unjustly killed Since killing in selfdefense is arguably not wrong or unjust then the right of self df l flit ith th i h t t lif Th ifiti i f t l f th i h t t lif i d f d th i h t t t b killd l i t i t kill l h d f d h l f i lthl S ifd i th flit ih B t h th C d i d th A i t h l i i t d th i h t f f i b ifi it th f th i h t d ti l d hf f i ti d f t i i i l i f d "fhti d" d (i C d at least) hate speech However they have carried out the specification exercise n somewhat different ways In interpreting the Charter guarantee of freedom of ex pression the Supreme Court of Canada has construed "expression" very expan i l t i l d tiit hih " t t t t i " dl f it t t d it h i l d d ll h i ithi th f th C h t tti l it t k h i l l i l t f Si th t t lt f f i b fl th ttil th f h lilti t ifi thi ti f th C h t It ld b itk h t tht h lilti i t h b d d Ud Sti 1 f th Charter all of the protected rights and freedoms including freedom of expression are guaranteed "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" It is therefore possible f lilti hih liit f f i d t h f ifi Sti 2(b) t b d d Sti 1 if th l i i t it i i f d b th t t b bl Th S C t h d t d b f t t f bl hih till i l b l i th b f t t b td f th l i ti i t th t h i h fl f it i i t ff i 147

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I Keegstra th b f t t k th f f h d it d/ lit f racial ethnic or religious minorities while the costs took the form of damage to the various interests safeguarded by freedom of expression After balancing its benefits and costs the majority and the minority on the Court reached contrary conclusions b t th h t d ttt H th d t h t b t h f th flit i i t t t t k i th th i t t d b f d d lit til i t t i libl it Th d f d f th ttt d l d t h l illi i thi i t t liit i i t t i d t f d lit i t t hil it t d l d t h l illi t t th l t t t ik i d t t t th f A l t h h th t id f th d b t defended opposing resolutions of the conflict they both got there by engaging in the same exercise of balancing the two values in question against one another The balancing metaphor presupposes that we can determine the relative weights f fliti iht H th t b t t thi i hih d t l k b h i d th i h t t th i t t h i h th t t Riht "i th b t t " h i h t th ihtl Bt ti (idiidl d llti) i t t h iht d it i l b ihi th i t t tht it bl b t k bt th i h t t h t t t th The balancing procedure that the Canadian Court uses to specify and limit the right of free expression therefore seems to presuppose the instrumentalist ustification of rights Th C d i Cht liitl d i t i i h bt i f i t f th i h t t f i d jtifibl i f i t f thi i h t (Th 1986 40 51) B th A i Bill f R i h t l k l t th l i i t i i i fSti 1 it id l f jtifbl i f i t ff i df b l i A i t h t h f t d d t djdit Fit A d t i b ditiihi difft t i f h ith i d fFit A d t tti d( t h f ) difft b d f jtifi tion on legislative restrictions In the US system the important question is usually whether the form of expression in question falls under full First Amendment protec tion; if so then it is subjected to "strict scrutiny" a burden of ustification which s itll i i b l f th l i l t t t L d f tti d l d t d d f ti libl t th f f i Plitil h (hih i l d ht h) b l t th fit t hih h itll t t lti i i i b l f it A h i i i l t l t lti f fhti d hld b i f l i l t t j t i f b t i th k f th RAV d i i t t tlit i f d i this case Why more stringent protection and stricter scrutiny for some forms of speech rather than others? The reasoning of the US Supreme Court seems to be that the more vital the form of speech to the operation of a functioning democracy the i l it ill b f d d litil h t h f i t tti th il h Thi iit i d t b i d t i iht l t l i th d th C t h i fft d d th Fit A d t t ff h th F t t h A d t t f" l tti f th l " I th C t ' i f d f i li l t th f d th d lit f tt t I 148

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harm test:

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d bl t i th il fbi ldi th t ithd it quietism or apathy Socially marginalized and relatively powerless groups are at genuine risk of harm from the racist attitudes of employers landlords police bureaucrats and the thugs which hate groups use their propaganda to recruit Th h t t l t h f ill t l t titi ht h H it ill t th f t h diti hih titi li t tif 1

2

3

Efficacy Th d titi t h bl tti f Whil it b t h h t d i b l t ihibit ht h b l l it i fth ti hth di i ibl T th t t that the restriction can be readily circumvented by an underground market or by technological innovations such as the Internet the case for it is weakened Minimal impairment. There must be no lessintrusive policy available for securing th lt E h it i t b ffti i ti i i f i t il h hi b i d l libt d d i f ht b f t th d i f th hibitd f f i It t t h f b th l t t th fit t f tf ti th h i ti Wh l i ( d t i counterargument and so on) promise similar results they must be preferred Where a narrower infringement of freedom of expression will be equally effect ive it too must be preferred Proportionality. Th td b f i t f th titi t bl tif it t C h i i th i t t il l h i ti bli d b t It h "hilli fft" liti t f f i (lit titi t ) Th d d i t i l tti f l bl idd b hi t b t h t tif th l l t l t

These three conditions raise a high justificatory threshold for restrictions on free dom of expression Could content restrictions on hate speech surmount this thresh old? The instrumentalist approach to rights teaches us the valuable lesson that the iht t thi ti f it b th f th Whil f h iht b i l th i t l i i t t th iht ill t t Wki t th i h t f til it b d d t ill b l tt ii id d t d ill tl b tll t iti d ii E if til bl t t t b l l iditd f jiditi b it f it til history or political culture it cannot simply be extrapolated to others This degree of social relativity notwithstanding the Canadian experience with its hatepropaganda legislation may be instructive While the law has been on the b k f th thit it h ld b i k d (J K t th ti t th l ) Th l i h d d d b b f f d d i d t d it hilli fft " l i t i t " litil h ildi th i t t h t th t t th k ' ifi i t t t t h t d d id it f df i l b l t th d (ildi tth d bli b f i t ) Th t fft f th f d i t i hih t h h l d i t 150

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fl ti h i h t h t th f f t t iti ld worth the bother (especially because the very process will afford hatemongers much more publicity than they could ever expect to gain by other means) The Canadian law therefore faces a kind of dilemma When the Supreme Court majority upheld th l i Keegstra it l i d h i l th f d i ldi t h t th i i t ff d f i i i l i t h t th f d th ld til h b t k d Y t th ii d th l itll f b l It i t t i t ld tht t l t h i i l t i t i ti ff d i i l i i t tll tibl I f f t thi h b th l i f th A i t T h h th are virtually alone in the larger global context perhaps they have got it right after all

H t Ci

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I J 1998 hit it d J h Ki dt f hi f i d h i d blk J Bd t ik t k dd d hi l t d until his body was torn to pieces In October 1998 two men viciously beat Matthew Shepard a gay student at the University of Wyoming and left him to die tied to a fence in nearfreezing temperatures In July 1999 a student named Benjamin Smith t i Idi d Illii i hih h h t b l k J d Ai killi t l d di t l I A t f th hit it d B f d F h t fi l i J i h it t i L A l All f th l i ht i lt d titd b i h h b i At f i t l th i i d b th i it d i f f t from those we have so far been discussing After all no sensible person will doubt that these deserve to be crimes or that the protection of the law against such attacks should extend equally to all citizens including members of minorities How i th fh t h th i i f th it l l t th i Hihfil ht i h th f i ti l l t f li i d t l Ati thi li h ld b fj i d i t i ildi C d d tA i tt t i l t ht i ( "bi i " th ft l b l d ) f l l t t t th h t t i t d lt d Th il tt dd t ht i tk ith ft f dfii i l ff f ht motivated violence with a more severe penalty or enhancing the penalty attached to the "generic" offense when hatred is perceived to have been a factor in its commission For simplicity we will confine our attention to the second option of lt h t f ht i H th l i k ith h t h i b t E h i th lt f h t t i t d il t t ihi t t f hi t ( l t d ) b t l f hi t t f id Fth th t t f id i ti ( h t d f dfid b h ft l i t t i ) i i l th d i ht h If th i tifiti f 151

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i i l i i ht h th d f it t i l l di t t th perhaps there is also a justification for enhanced penalties for hate crimes In both cases the argument would take the form of pointing to the ways in which the harms done by the speech or by the crime ramify beyond the immediate victims to i l i t th f h i h th b ( d th b i f h i h th i l d t) O th th h d if h t h hld b dd l l tti th ht ld b th d f t t i ht i l? Th i (th lt th d ) ill b ihd i t fth lt d i t d t h t th f f d thik th th ht h d ? A i th fht h t b d ith id f th question of penalty enhancement Proponents claim that hate crimes do more harm than "parallel" nonhatemotivated crimes to the immediate victims to the broader target community and to society at large (Lawrence 1999) Opponents respond t h t it i i h t l diffilt t d f ht i ( h i h kid f jdi t t?) d t t b l i h th l t titi i til d tht di il l l tt t il i t b f ti d i t d l d t th b l k i t i f th i i l jti t ( J b d Ptt 1998) M t f th i hld b l k fili Th l d diffilt and I will make no attempt to settle them decisively here Instead I want to point to the ways in which this particular controversy like the one concerning hate speech reflects some larger issues in legal and political philosophy M f th t b t h id f th t ildi th bifl kthd b i t t l i t H th i i hth lt h t ill b f f t i i di t t hih d f tti i t th f f il t h i h th lil tibl itht l ildi idfft (t id i l i t i d ) hih t i h hibl b f t Sttli thi i i b t h th k i d f i i l if ti d th ihi f t db f t hih t i l f th i t t l i t approach to free speech On the other hand two kinds of noninstrumentalist argu ment are also available to the proponent of penalty enhancement One takes the line that is familiar in a retributivist theory of punishment: the enhanced penalty s jtifid t f it d t t f f t ( t h h it h h fft) b t b th t t f i d f th t t f ht i i ll th th tt f i d f th h t t i t d ffd P i thi li f t ld i h i h bi titd b il jdi h h b i i ll ki th bi titd b d th l t f It b t t lft t th h fid it ii th I d The other noninstrumentalist argument is that singling out hate crimes for special treatment has an important symbolic function since it expresses a society's peculiar abhorrence of the threat these crimes pose to the ideal of equal respect The df i ti f f d f th i i l i t i f ht h Stti id h t thi ll b l fb f t t iht b ( hth th h ) h t h h t i l it i id t tilt d dli f th b i l f libl i t Th i t t l i t ill h f thi t It b t t h t th it f h l k b f iiti fl hihl l d if th th 152

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must be counted as benefits But they are but one factor and far from the most important in the cost-benefit calculation that needs to be done before concluding that these laws are justified An expressive theory of law may be tempting precisely because it promises to bypass all of the empirical messiness of an instrumentalist justification but taking this route just means avoiding all of the hard but indispensable questions

References Cohen J (1993) Freedom of expression s 22: 207-63 Dworkin R (1996) n Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Jacobs J B and Potter K (1998) s New York: Oxford University Press Lawrence F M (1999) w Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Matsuda M J Lawrence m C L Delgado R and Crenshaw K W (1993) t Boulder CO: Westview Press Mill J S (1969) Utilitarianism In J M Robson (ed) y pp 203-59 Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1977) On liberty In J M Robson (ed) y pp 213-310 Toronto: University of Toronto Press Scanlon Jr T M (1979) Freedom of expression and categories of expression w 40: 519-50 Sumner L W (1987) Oxford: Clarendon Press Thomson J J (1986) y Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

Further reading Cohen-Almagor R (ed) (2000) University of Michigan Press Fiss O M (1996) Greenawalt K (1995) ton NJ: Princeton University Press Schauer F (1982) Press Schneiderman D (ed) (1991) Thomson Walker S (1994) Nebraska Press Waluchow W J (ed) (1994) Press

e Ann Arbor: h Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press h Princey Cambridge: Cambridge University r Scarborough Ontario: Lincoln: University of y Oxford: Clarendon

153

12 P

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d C h i LORI GRUEN

P h

th th t i dli ith h ittl d t th l i t d thil litil l l d it i Th t l i i l d ti f dfiti ( h t i h dh i it d i f f t if it i f ti?) dt h i f tti (d h d i t lit d it h lit i it f t or is it some combination of all of these?) Legally in the US debates about pornog raphy have focused on competing interpretations of the First Amendment right to f d f i i i h t i th h d th I t t d th l i t i f th t t t l l l f lit P l i t i l l i th US th h b t j t i t i tht h i d b t th d ti ditibti d ti f hi t i l lii ti d f i i t Th ti t d t tht h d b i t d i important social values and diminish the dignity of human relations Feminists are politically divided on the topic Some feminists see pornography as one of the pri mary sources of violence against women and thus argue that the abolition of h hld b t l t k ff i i t l i t i l ti Oth f i i t d b t f f hi tti f d hil d bt d t bli t h t iddi it f h ( d t iddi it f d t i t tht t lid i t il f l ) ill l i i t d i t ttitd d ti Still th f i i t bli t h t th hi f h ill b d t fth tifl ' l i d id i b l k i t f h t l monogamous sexual desires From an ethical point of view the existence of pornog raphy adds important dimensions to discussions of the nature of harm and the success of various normative strategies for weighing conflicting values such as libt t d lit I thi h t I ill t h h f th diffilt i F i t I ill b i f l t th h i t f b i t l i th U i t d S t t i t t i hit li t h t th t btt i t i d th th t f t d t i ht h i d ht hld b d b t it Th id f th d i i ill b d t d t ii t f th t i t t li f k i t l i

154

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t i t h tht h h d tht h violates women's equality I will argue that while some versions of these arguments are sophisticated and important they ultimately fail in making the case for censoring pornographic material

Hit

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Th fit l l t d d i th U i t d S t t f l i i t i th dti ditibti ( " b i t " ) d ti f k tht ti ll liit t i l was borrowed from British common law In 1868 in Regina v Hicklin (LR 3 QB 360) Lord Chief Justice Cockburn wrote: "The test of obscenity is this whether he tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose id t h i l ifl dit h h d bliti f thi t f l l " Th ti t h t b i t i tht hih d d t ti t ifl b i t l t thi d H th b t t i l t t tblihd d Hicklin t h t b i t i t b j d d b d th f f t i l t d t f kh t i l l tibl i d i i d l h b b d d A number of cases served as forerunners of contemporary standards for restricting pornographic material The first of these was decided in 1933 in a Southern New York District Court where US District Judge John M Woolsey presided In US v One t d t i hth tJ J ' b k Book Called Ulysses, W l b d th hld b d i d i t t i i t th U i t d S t t d b j t d t i ffit f t i d d t t i I hi d i i W l t i it tit dIh d th f h i h th d Ulysses till li l ti Ulysses i t b k t d ld h t d t d Th tti f Ulysses i th lit ranted my taking such time as was necessary to enable me to satisfy myself as to the i t t ith h i h th b k itt f f i h b k l i d t b b it t fit b d t i d h t h th i t t ith h i h it was written was what is called according to the usual phrase pornographic that is itt f th f liti b i t i Ulysses i it f it l f k Id tdtt h th l f th lit I h l d t h f tht t i t hi Ih G

t

B f i th i t t f th k d i f j d t b d solely on isolated parts of the work taken out of context Woolsey laid the groundwork for future shifts in obscenity law Perhaps most importantly however Woolsey's ruling significantly altered the standard set by Hicklin whereby obscenity is deter i d b d it f f t t i l l tibl I t d W l ld t " b l " t d d "Whth til b k ld t d t it h i l dt h h t t b t t d b th C t ' ii t it fft ith i t i t h l i thi b h f l l i i th l fh t h t i l t d th ' b l ' i th l f t t "

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Th t i t t hift i b i t l d i th 1957 S C t case Roth v US (354 US 476) This case raised questions about the constitution ality of obscenity law Prior to Roth it was simply assumed that obscenity like libel and fighting words was not protected under the First Amendment But in Roth the t liitl h l d t h t th HicMin t t " t b j t d tittill titi f th f d f h d " I l f th HicMin t t th t tblihd t d d f i b i t t h t th b l i d d tittil t A d i t Jti B iti f th jit b it "i t t l itht d i il i t " d th t t t d b th F i t A d t Th t tblihd b i t t t b d "whether to the average person applying contemporary community standards the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest" The Roth case adopts the standard of the reasonable person judging the work as a whole tht t i l t d i W l ' li d dd t l t th k ffd it t d d d l k d i il i t ( l t hih dbtd d l b t d i tht f l l d d fill b di fid i llti f 1973 t t b l Miller California [413 US 15]) I Miller J t i B iti f th jit tblihd t t f b i t that is still in place today In order to determine that a work is obscene courts must look for the coalescence of three elements: • • •

hth "th li t ld fid t h t th k tk hl l t th h t h th k d i t d i b i ttl ffi d t i f i l l d f i d b th libl tt l h t h th k tk hl l k i lit itifi l

it i t

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titi

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The Supreme Court was not unanimous in this ruling however The dissent led by Justice Brennan expressed significant concerns about the inadequacy of the defin iti t h t ill ti t ll th t d d t b lid b d th bjti t t d i f th j d A h t " h t h k b t f ihb Wht t bil i h lt i flt l hi i t h d b t h " B th dfiiti f b i t h h tb ifid ith f f i i t lit th d i t i d t h t it ld b i i b l t id f i ti t h ih t t ditibt ll liit t i l W ll "k it when we see it" but that does not serve as enough of a warning for those who may face legal challenges after the fact In 1984 in what can arguably be thought of as a response to the concerns set t b B bt t l tht f i i t l l hl Cthi MKi d tiit Ad D k i dftd d l di f th it f I d i l i hih liitl d f i d h P h i th hi ll liit b d i t i f tures or in words that also includes one or more of the following: 156

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American Booksellers Assn

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LORI GRUEN

The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than i t bl l f l d id di O h

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t th t h b l b t h t b i t d h hld b titd bt h b h d I t h i k it i f t tht h ti t d l t h l i i hih ll liit b d d d ditibtd ( i i i t l l lit hi!) will continue to be debates over control and censorship

thi l t i l th

Arguments against Pornography Based on Harm Why th

hld h b d d h h l d th t t b i l d i t t ? I thi d th f l l i ti I ill l b f t tht iht jtif tt liitti th dti ditibti d ti f h I ill f fit t i f t b d the claim that pornography causes harm The first is an argument based on the view that the existence of pornography causes harm to society; the second is an argument based on the view that pornography causes violence (an obvious harm) i t I th f l l i ti I ill f i f t tht li tht h t i b j t i b l b t h i t j t t h t it h b t t h t it d i lit b h b d i t d i th tt lit db h il d i h tiit lit Aft fll ii h f th t I ld tht d i tblihi t h t tif hi Harm to society The community morality version of the harm argument against pornography takes the familiar form of arguments grounded on some version of legal moralism The t ll d b ti t tht iti h iht t t t t h l f f tht l d t h t th d t t i f h d l P h i f it t "iftil t b t " lit i t f ith i t i bt id l d fth t iti t h h it d i l f i d t ffi l b h i d t it l S i t th h i h t t b th dti d ditibti of pornography and to prohibit its consumption Some proponents of this type of argument for censorship liken pornography to threats to public health Just as society is thought to be justified in placing certain people under quarantine ii dt tti f b d i l flid h idiidl td f h i t t d d t i b th it i t i t t h f l di f di th it tifibl h tht t h t t t i t iil it A it tht tl t h t l di d th d b t f it iti Thi ti d t t f hih lit f bli lif A d i t th it 158

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lit i f th h t h tb dt id th threat that it poses to traditional values and decent living Surely harm should serve as a justification for societal action even state interven tion but the idea that there can be "harm to traditional values" raises serious ti Wht t d i t i l l ? It h b t d t h t th U i t d S t t f d d t t d i t i l l libt d lit t h t ft i flit I dditi t d i t i l l ft ht t h T d i t i l i b t th l tt f Afi A i Ai A i d f l idl hld b t l l itk C i itk bt t d itil l l d t t il d th d i t i t h f community norms would Further many liberals have argued that only when a harm can be identified as affecting a particular victim or victims is the state justified in interfering Harm to it h d h l bli lif i th f f d tht ffd b th i d t d b l t i t t h t i t f ith i d i i d l l i b t M l i t id h l f l i b t th ti f hih i b t f i t i th l Af it i hih l t t d t k thi itk d t th will allow for the fullest expression of human potential and flourishing There will be occasions when the citizenry at least according to the judgment of some does not act in ways that are honorable or desirable but it is not the business of the tt it t t i t f l til idiidl bi h d If th d i th dti ditibti d ti f h ti d l t th it b jtifd i blil h i th d d i i i th tiit itl b t t h t i ll th tifd i di C h i i th b fh t ifibl i d i i d l i t jtifd Harm to women Some feminists have argued that there are indeed identifiable victims of pornog raphy namely women (and children) Proponents of censoring pornography tht h d b h i it f W h d i th dti f h Th t td l f thi t f h h b d i b d b Lid ( L l ) M h i ( L l 1981) h h itt d ttifid b t h l b i th ki f th fil Deep Throat fil l ll Sh l i tht h bdtd d ltd d i th dti f th fil C l l if i d d forced to engage in sexual activity without her consent she is being sexually assaulted and sexual assault is a harm to that woman and it is illegal When women are physically and/or sexually harmed in the production of pornography or i th t t tt ti i j t i f d i ti th h d ihi th t t Th i h t t f d f i b t h h t t b ffitd f tht i t d th dti f h tht ditd illl tiiti B t thi t fh i bl f th h tht f i i t d b t h d b th d i t i b t i d ti f h d hih t l d idtifibl illl 159

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F i i t iti f h iti tht i d i i d l d battered harassed and subject to other forms of violence by men who consume pornography and women as a group are harmed because of the climate of violence against women that pornography engenders Feminists who are opposed to pornog h d i hih h b d d th it li tht h d hi d it ( S i l kill T d B d h d d d ll b d t l t thitfi lldl l i d bf h td tht h i f l d b h) S i l itif tdi l l tti td t d d l f t d liklihd t ft i i h h l b itd i t f th l i t h t t h causes violence against women During the height of the protests for women's rights in the 1970s feminism itself was equated with an antipornography position All feminists are opposed to violence against women pornography causes violence i t ll f i i t dt h Whil it i til t t h t ll f i i t d t il i t d it i l t tht i l t i ittd i t t t d b h h th l i t h t h causes il i t i bjt t dbt f i i t d th It i difficult to establish the causal role that the consumption of pornography plays n violence against women Perhaps pornography leads men to act out their violent fantasies on real women perhaps pornography creates those fantasies perhaps h d i t i t il i t h h t l f il tht ld t h i b t t d h h i ll i t A t i d b il itifi tdi t t h t th i l lik b t t h d il i t th tdi t th it d till th i l i A Ndi St b if th t l ti b t th ilbilit f h d il i t th might expect a higher incidence of violence against women in places where pornog raphy is widely available and conversely we might expect a lower incidence of violence against women where pornography is banned These correlations do not it h F l Uth k th l t i ilbilit f h i th U i t d S t t d k t t f i f t h i th b f tht td N H h i k ith i ilbilit f h d f t f t h i th b f (St 1995 2 5 3 6 ) E if l lti ld b tblihd i ti hldi th d d ditibt f h ibl f th ti f th sumers of their products will be difficult to justify legally politically and economic ally Perhaps more importantly though holding pornographers responsible for violence against women diverts attention away from those who are ultimately lbl th h h btt d ll b R t t b l th h h d btt ft t t bl th i l l th i t i (th " k d f i t " th d d til "th ld't h t ") H l d i ibl f t h i i l t ti d i t bi h h i i l l l il i t th il f i i t j t 160

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A t

it P h

Bd

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MKi d Ad D k i l t d th t f th d b t b t h d hi i th l 1980 ith t h i l i tht h is not just harmful but in addition its production distribution and consumption silences and subordinates women How we are to understand the claim that porn ography silences and subordinates women has been debated among feminists legal t h i t d h i l h Wht i l i t h t th l i k t t th i f i h difft l l fti If it b tblihd tht ' iht t lit b f th l i bi iltd b h th th l l i i t E t b k i Hdt dibl t l h f iil iht tht f f h (f h ) f h (f ) bt th l h f ti i h t (t h) d iti i h t (t l i t ) Th new arguments against pornography do not rest on it having objectionable content that is destructive to social values and do not rely on establishing that it causes harmful outcomes particularly violence against women Instead the new argu t li tht h tll d thi it d i lit b it il d b d i t th S h t d t h t th id i i l tht h d t j t tibt t th i l i d b d i t i f bt tll il d b d i t th P h i tti it i it i i f d i fi idt fl d h thi cannot d anything However feminist philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jenni fer Hornsby (see Hornsby 1993; Langton 1993; Hornsby and Langton 1998) drawing on the speechact theory elaborated in J L Austin's H t D Thi ith Wd h t t t d t k f th id t h t hi d d i d thi l il d b d i t Th i i t b d A t i ' dititi bt l t i h t tt b t th ld t h t ith t fl ( "Th id Cf Flh i tfi i t l " "Mik T itd f " "Ni H t l i d $20000 f h f i Dbbi D Dih") l t i h t tt that persuade someone to do something (eg "Let's watch Bhid th G Dr" fO do you?"); and illocutionary speech acts "You don't really want to read St utterances the saying of which accomplishes a particular goal (eg saying "I do" in f t f jti f th i th t t f ddi i i

"Y' hid" l t li f jb h il t ttil l ki th i f "T" ith b t h h d i bktbll ll th th t t h t f t h ) P h th tht i f i t h t h th " " th " " (thi i th l t i t) d it d t t t women as if they are inferior or believe that women don't mean "no" when they say it (this is the perlocutionary act) but the claim that pornography silences and subor dit t h tht h f illti t I h t fll I ill i h f i i t h t th t t t t tblih tht h d f illti t di di d i bl f

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lit I ill di th t tht h b d i t fit d i women equal status with men and then turn to the argument that it silences denying women equal participation in civic life Subordinating women: a violation of status equality I b

d

t k f th l i t h t h b d i t it ill fl t b liit b t ht b d i t i i d th t tblih h d i i l b d i t Th it b d t i d hth hi d i illti i th t b l i h d F th purposes of this discussion let us understand subordination to occur when an individual (or group) is placed in a position of inferior worth or lesser status by another individual (or group) who has the authority to place him or her (them) n h iti dfth t h t thi l t i j t d i i i t th i ll b j t i b l N id th f l l i t d thi ith d If I l i i "Elld S t d t Ol" th d f l I ii thit t d i i i t bt lld t d t d ll th t lld b t I t l i th ldd idiidl' tt th i tht ld b b j t i b l i th t t f i i t where the conditions of participation in classes are established The sign is meant to be performing an illocutionary act that of excluding nonenrolled individuals but it is not a subordinating act If however the owner of a grocery store places a sign tht "Whit O l " th h i f i illti t tht f ldi l f l hih ld b i d d b d i t i t i f it b j t i b l d i hit t th t l t h i h hit l h Thi i l if th t t th i i f t f ti tti I thi ith thit i d i litil t t t th tht i h i thi litil t t d i i i h d Nti tht h i authority is crucial If I a university professor go to a voting station and put up the sign I have not acted with authority Government officials act with legitimate authority in taking the sign down and nonwhites have the authority to ignore th i I d i f i i ffi illti t b l i h i h I d bt I h t dd i f i b d i t i D h f b d i t i illti t? M K i li tht Sil i l i t i bttill d i Sil h i h i d di

td d f d t dd t iti (MKi

t h t i done t h h d it i t h t bi bdid 1993 13)

Pornography institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy which fuses the erotiza ti fd i d b i i ith th il t t i f l d f l Gd i l P h t i t t th i f tht lit M t t women as who they see women as being Pornography constructs who that is Men's t h t th dfi h b P h i tht (MKi 1987 148)

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P h li d i l i t di f i i t A d i l it i d i things (it is illocutionary): constructing women as of less worth discriminating against women and denying women the equal status they deserve But does pornography do these things? And more importantly does it do them ith th iit thit h tht h ld b i d d t f bditi ? I ld t h t it d t M ll liit id i d t t tht d d d d i t i b t d b th h i d t i d t d lbi Th d t d t fll th h t l tt f b d i t i tht f i i t iti d Ath i t f th h i d t i id f t i l d d b df women some claiming to be feminists and most of these cannot be described as sexualizing gender inequality Another fairly large section of the pornography industry consists of comical videos and cartoons media that are not particularly likl t b t k i l h t t d ti il h i h i Th b l k f idl ilbl hi id f l it f l ditd l lit l itd f d l b d t t ith b d i dbbd i Bt if d i d th b l k f th i d t d l id th d and images that portray women as subordinated does it have the authority to be considered as subordination generally? Consider what it would mean for pornog raphy to have this sort of authority Remember the canonical examples of illocu ti t th f ki th i f "T" ith h h d t i l t h i l f l i bktbll tti th d "I d " th t t f ddi i d t b id l i " ' hid" t f ffi ti l jb I h f th th diti tht t b t A h f i l i "T" d t d thi tti th d "I d " t hi l t th t t f ddi i G i d t d thi d mother offering you a job as CEO of a lucrative business that she has no part in does not do anything either In order to have the authority to do things with words one must participate in a specific set of practices in the appropriate way Different t t ill t difft ti ti di d t f illti t th ti t b f l l d i th i h t t t (E ffil f i l i "T" t ddi d t d thi it i t f t t ) S b d i t i t i il t f ti Nt t i lt l C i i t f h ill b i d h i th thit t f h t ( d thi acting as if they have authority does not make it so) It might be claimed that young people learn about sex and gender subordination through pornography and they thus enact what pornography teaches them Rather th i h t i t t t h i t it i l b tht h thit i td h i t k l bt th l tll b l d th h d't k btt P h b id t h th thit i f b b d i t d t i d b d i t i ti B t thi t k b k t th li t i d bl f ti d th i l i l ti f th i l l t i

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t f bditi Ultitl h t h th it f hi d images that portray women as sexually subordinate causes women to be sexually subordinated is an empirical question that is very difficult to answer n a culture n which sexist messages and institutions are ubiquitous This question may be easier t h h th l t i l it ti d t f dii iti liitd Silencing women: violation of participatory equality If h b h t il h th it b diffilt if not impossible to establish that these other forms of sex discrimination and subor dination even exist How might pornography silence women? Pornography might condition women to believe that they deserve their inferior status and discrimin t t t t It l t i t iht t illi tht k l t t t k l t i lii t h t th bi t t d i ll bjtibl hibl It i t tht d t i d i i i t i h b t i th t t f i t t ith d lit th id d li f t l thi t f li b t i l i ill k Perhaps women are unable to perform perlocutionary acts as a result of pornog raphy Women may be unsuccessful in persuading others that discrimination s occurring Again there are certainly individual cases in which women's perlocu ti t fl b t tht i likl lt f ki bd t th th lt f h' i l i fft S tdi h td tht d iliti tibt t ' ibilit t k t t t i l l i l d i t d t t b t hth h th f thi iliti dh h f i tt f iil i t i t i Fth ii i t t l t i (th f t that MacKinnon's arguments against sexual harassment in the workplace have ed to the creation of federal laws which have allowed for successful lawsuits against harassers or the fact that "date rape" has become a topic of muchneeded educa t i l d i i i hih h l d ll f l) d i th f th l i t h t bl t fll f l t i t A th ith b d i t i th h t f t i th f i l i illti H h th i i t h t h th h h th thit t f bditi h t bt whether pornography denies women the authority to perform certain illocutionary acts If pornography can disable women so that they cannot do certain things with their words if an act of saying "no" to sex cannot be perceived as an act of refusal th h b id t il dd th l tii ti i b t h i t ( l ) d bli ( l l ) tt H iht h dibl h t h t th bl t d ti thi ith d? P h bl t t ti f th tht iht H i libl ti A l b k k li t t i th d th f th h h j t t t f th h tht tb

164

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t d ff d t th d d d i l t l th t th h the woman (accidently?) drops her towel the plumber makes sexual advances he woman protests he is insistent they have sex in the shower the woman appears to enjoy it the plumber turns off the shower the woman thanks him and smiles The ' t t i t i d t t I thi ll ti id l i t i t d th t W ' t t f l t id l i t i t Thi h t i f f t l th i l d Thi i til ibilit b t it i h t b t h t th ll d t i i t ith h bt i il ti d tht h ii t l l t l ti Th i id t t the latter hypothesis A social psychological study conducted in 1988 of female undergraduates at a Texas college reported that 39 percent of the women said "no" when they wanted to have sex; 6 0 8 percent of the women said "no" when they i t d d t h Wh k d h th ld " " h th td t h 90 t id t h t f f i i t t ft th th f t h f f ll t i t t d di M f t d d t lii ititti d th di h th d d il ti tht t difftil l f ll games There is clearly a problem when saying "no" is not perceived as an act of refusal But it seems unlikely that this particular kind of illocutionary disablement which happens all too often can be attributed to pornography Th i d b t tht hild d h t l iiti t ik i lt tht i d i t d b i h t l l lit Th U i t d Stt i bl h lt Th h tht t l t h thi t f th dbll f US lt d th h ittd t ti th d i i t d llbi f t t ith d l B t it i h d t tblih tht h h d d i lit A d th d l i t d t l information in the hands of a maledominated state is not likely to bring about he cultural changes necessary for gender equality More speech more arguments and more education have led to changes in social conventions in the past and there is t b t i l t i i t i t h t th thd ill tibt t f th i t i th t t f

Rf Hornsby J (1993) Speech acts and pornography Women's Philosophical Review 10: 3 8 4 5 dL t R (1998) F h dillti L l Th 4 2137 L t R (1993) S h t d kbl t Philh d Pbli Affi 22 293330 Lovelace L (1981) Ordeal London: W H Allen MKi C A (1987) F i i Udifid Cbrid MA H d U i i t P (1993) Ol Wd C b r i d MA H d U i i t P St N (1995) Dfdi P h F S h S d th Fiht f W ' Riht New York: Scribner

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Fth

di

Cornell D (ed) (2000) y New York: Oxford University Press D k i A d MKi C A ( d ) (1997) Cbid MA H d U i i t P Dworkin R (1981) Do we have a right to pornography? s 1 177212 (1993) L i b t d h O t b 21 D S ( d ) (1995) B l t CA W d t h Gruen L and Panichas G E (eds) (1997) w New York: Routledge H k D N d Th EL G C (1992) D t il ti d bl itk 11 9 5 1 2 6 M h l h d C d H l l b h L (1988) D ti h th yes? The prevalence and correlates of women's token resistance to sex J 54 8 7 2 9 0

166

13 Dit

H d

GERALD F GAUS

APbl

i A l i d Ethi

Ethil

T h ?

M t thi

h i l h id th " b l f dit h d " t b i i lid d ifill litil lit D fl litil ti h ll i tl t it litil l d t d ht ld t h i b wrong or perhaps is still wrong and yet is nevertheless in some sense required? As Machiavelli saw it a prince must "learn how not to be good and to use this know ledge and not use it according to the necessity of the case" (1950 [1515]: 56) It is idl t h h t t h t litii f ill h d l hi itti hih ht th d il i l i t ill lt Th it i id litii t t h h d dit t d h j b ll h ill b ll t i d b h fi i l i d thi i ibl f il Y t i t t t th t jit i d i thi l th l i t t th bl f dit h d i h t id b t i d d i t b t h t h th i h bl t ll ( Donagan 1977: 1 8 4 9 ; Nielsen 1996); and even among those who believe that there is some special moral issue we find deep disagreement about what it might be Some insist while others deny that dirty hands involve a moral dilemma or a type f i d t i t h t it i bl between lit d liti hil th i i t t h t it i bl within lit bt t difft t f lit ( C d 1993) A d fid d i t b t h t h it i il bl f liti l bl f l lif I thi h t I hll t h t th bl f dit h d i l i b h th th i i l i d thi it i th d d t T b sure almost all issues in applied ethics are theory dependent in so far as recommenda tions about what should be done say about multiculturalism immigration pornog raphy abortion and so on all depend on ethical theories such as utilitarianism virtue th d t t l i Th bl f dit h d I hll i th d d t i b i h t h th b h bl t ll dh it ill b d t d t i l l t fil b t t i i t h i l th ft t t h i l th A l t h h th lti f th b t t i ill t f tll litii ht t d i diffilt l itti th t i l l ill d t i h t h it k t t l k b t "dit h d " d h t thi iht 167

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I id f difft ti f dit h d (1) flit f i i l (or values) entailing opportunity costs; (2) as a conflict between moral principles and valuable consequences; (3) as a moral dilemma with no right answer; (4) as a manifestation of vice; and (5) as a coerced choice resulting from an evil project that i l ll di I hll t tht f th f lti t l i f lit d t i l i t tht i bth lli d tblih i t t i l bl f dit h d Ulik t i l i d thi i thi tti th tthi iht l th bl

O t i t

C t

C

i

d P l i t i l Ati

A t litil tt h tl i i t d t h t liti i f l l d with "dirty issues" in which it is impossible to take a stand and yet remain "clean" or retain one's "purity" (Postrel 2000) In the real world of messy politics we are told to take a side by endorsing one party to a dispute usually requires that one d ti l d ti tht ffd f ' i i l F l Lt' tht thik t d d ditibti i b d d t h t th h l d ' t tll l h t li t h i li d thi I you wouldn't want any taxes at all or would want them only to support tiiti t h t b f t h th t d t i l df thik t hld b l l l Y l tt t b tl hld tt lt i t i l b k if a new home for the first time or pay college tuition? (Postrel 2000: 48)

t rft ld government Eith H th th b

You favor lower taxes and tax neutrality; this proposal will lower taxes but decrease neutrality If you take any active stand for or against you will be true to one principle at the cost of forgoing the other You must rank the principles: "To dd dit i 't j t h i i l Y h t h iiti" ( P t l 2000 48) S th tht h t l i i l low taxation d neutral taxation N ti i t f t tk t d i i hih ' i i l flit t h t i h th it t ti d i f f t id Thi ht tt Viii P t l ll i i t i " t i i t " If i t i t l litil d i t h ihtl tll t k ' principles: one must decide either that in this case low taxation is more important than neutral taxation or vice versa What is hard to see is how there is anything morally unusual problematic or "dirty" about such a choice Perhaps the most tht it h t h t i tht h i bt l lbl l d i t h ti h t k t l d t t th t f t hii th l Th id f t i l ti bilit t k l d t d t th b i f h k i If t h t i h t i i l d i d i t h d it l h t i t i f t i l ti t il l bl Whil P t l i til iht tht

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DIRTY HANDS

liti t t i l l dit ' h d b i l ( i i l ) at the cost of others such grime is the stuff of rational action in a world of oppor tunity costs Admittedly one may sometimes feel regret that one had to give up something important to achieve something else; one can feel the loss of a valued d Bt t b t i t hih t i l l tt bl hdl t i t t dit h d T t il l d/ t i l bl i th hi bt fliti i i l ( bt l ) O iht f l th di k t d i t i i h i l faiRng to promote a value or principle f acting against it betraying it (Stak 1990 27) Th id h i t h t to t one principle rather than another is simply a rational choice but to act on one principle and so against the other to somehow reject one through endorsing the other is morally problematic It is though hard to see how to explicate this idea S i th b tht libti th t t b th i h b t i low taxation? Sh i ki it i l t neutral taxation; i h t l i th i t b t to i iit t i t il t b t th th " B t l " i t h i d i i fl l t i hih tht hih h li ( i th " t h l " ) It i h d to see how ranking one principle as less important is to betray it A lower ranking of one principle only constitutes a betrayal if it not only has a call on your devotion but insists on being loved more than other values If one has an di f l di to h i h t l ( i i l ) h hld t b b l t i th tht t till f tht l f th k f th th hi titt b t l f S f l h b i f i d to i di f i i l h t h t (1) low taxation neutral taxation, d (2) neutral taxation b f f th k f low taxation O i d d ill h l dil if f d ith th it f h i B t i thi th " d i t h d d i l " d t i i l f hi b tween values (or principles) but from a particular sort of value structure containing incommensurable values and the possibility of their conflict (cf Donagan 1977: 1809) It is akin to giving supreme devotion to two gods: any choice of one consti t t b t l f th th I ill t t thi i bl Th id fb t l k h h i l it t ti t h t k it i i b l t h l d th th l S f l t h t th l f t i l it d i ld t blkil fid t blkil fid i t i l to k t i l it b f i d h i it i t l th f i d h i l b fid to blkil I this case the cost of securing the favored value is higher: one is not simply forgoing this opportunity to promote it one gives it up altogether

The Conflict of Consequences and Principles A t ilti

t th th

i th l i t t i ill i i l f d

dit h d i t h t th it f l b l i t i liti d thi ft l d t lit ( N l 1978) H th flit 169

GERALD F GAUS

t bt t i i l bt bt l riil d l d d Stanley Benn has argued that "states and their agents are licensed to set aside moral principles for the sake of good outcomes (or more usually to avoid bad ones)" because states and their officials are "the champions and trustees of the bli i j l ld" (B 1983 167) O thi i th litil d i t i i h d f i t lif b t ft (1) ill b t t ll i t t i l ffi it i l ditbl d l d it i i f th tt f t d (2) l i t i l t t t i f th h i bilit t ti tht t t th b i iil i t t f t h i iti A d i t (1) litii t t ti l b h i f th ith whom they interact and as Machiavelli famously observed "A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good" (1950 [1515]: 56) But by (2) a politician has no right t h i t if f h i t f th di ittd t t t i thi i t t C t l it t h t i th ditbl d ll i t i hih litii ft t th t i th l t f d lit dl k t t th d fthi i i l All thi k ft th ti i h t h it l d t libl ti of dirty hands Consider two interpretations First suppose that the pursuit of good consequences is required by morality: if one finds oneself in the position of a trustee operating in an environment of danger and uncertainty then the moral thing to do i t k d t b fidlit t l i i l If thi i th it b k t th t i t t t t k d hi bt ti l idti d ht d thi i t t ill b l t B t Ih h i d thi i d i t t i l hi ( G 2001) Gi t h t tiliti l th i i t t h t th it f d i thi ( i ll )i ll i d it i t t ll li t h t tilitri i i t t tht h t bl f dit h d One is not guilty of immorality or wrongdoing even though sensitive people may feel guilty (Hare 1989: 58ff) The conflict between the political pursuit of good consequences and moral prin il bl ditit f th l d i th i ti f lit ii h l bliti t th d b ilti i i l Thi ld b flit between l i t i l i d l i litil i i t t th litii t b il t i l Thi i ldi id f th lit t d i t i i liti hih i i t "th i l t b l t i bt th l d d th i t f successful political action" (Morganthau 1973: 10; see also Niebuhr 1963) Here we seem to have a basis for describing the hands of the successful politician as "morally dirty" for he seeks political success by doing what is all things considered, i l Thi i h t b S t ' i t i hi l Dirty Hands h i h th t thi d b t H d th i d lti li th t th liti H h i i t t i !H fid t il h d l All H li t it right stay pure! What good will it do you? Why did you join us? Purity is an ideal for a 170

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moral

Weber on the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility

GERALD F GAUS

Th thi f l t i t d Wb t i i th ld f liti Politics he argues constantly confronts its participants with the choice between using evil means or failure to achieve good ends Those idealists proponents of the ethic of ultimate ends who insist that no good can come from violating moral i i l l i t i l i f t (1958 [1919] 123) Th f h Wb i l t h td tht t i l t l t i l d liti ill i th t f ilti i i l i d t t l A h i liti b t f t if i i l f l d d ill l d ll t d i t Whil ll thi it t libl tht l i b tilit i liti th i di lif (G 2001) need more to establish a problem of dirty hands Weber points to two features of political action that seem to give rise to a special moral stain: (1) the possibility that politicians are confronted with a moral "paradox" or dilemma and (2) that a cost f thi fl it f l i t i l d i l f li t i t th lti ti f i I id (1) i thi ti d (2) i th t Irreconcilable duties "Politics as a Vocation" is not clear about the precise relation between the ethics of ltit d d ibilit At it Wb tll t h t th " t b l t t t bt th l t hih l i i titt i h h 'lli f l i t i ' " (1958 [1919] 127) A h h h l d i b th " f d t l l difft d i ilbl d " If f thi l t t id ft i i l b l thil t d t d th l litii t b fi ht Wb ll "paradox" or what others deem a dilemma If the two types of ethics cannot be reconciled and if they require inconsistent acts of a politician no matter what he d h fil t t i f th i t f Th id t h t f dit h d th i hih litii f t dil i f ht h d i f it f i i t th h t fMihl W l ' l i S ti Wl iti "it i i h t t t t d d th it t l b iht t t ' h d dit B t ' h d t dit f di h t it i t d " (1973 164) W l bli tht litii f dil b h d stands moral rules as absolute in the sense that (1) "moral rule R requires act A" entails (2) "it is wrong not to A " Thus he says: Wh l idd d t tlk t if th h d b t id cancelled or annulled They still stand and have this much effect at least: that we k h d thi if h t h d l th b t thi t d th h l i th i t (Wl 1973 171) Ad it i tt A if th l idti d thi idti id R It i th b l t l ( l ) b f i i f A-i Of if th idti tht id R f b i d t A it i l t A Th it i b t h t t A Wht d d

172

i t

ilt ll t A

t-A R d

DIRTY HANDS

It i i t t t t tht Wl d t i t i t h t th litii f moral dilemma in the sense that he cannot decide what to do; apparently he knows what is the best thing to do Consider Walzer's famous example of a politician who has seized upon a national crisis a prolonged colonial war to reach f H d hi f i d i ffi ldd t d l i t i d th h t l ittd t b t h t h h t itht f th d t f th i t t I th h ibilit f th th h t d fastly opposed it Immediately the politician goes off to the colonial capital to open titi ith th b l B t th i t l i i th i f t r i t i d th f t d i i th ld f i thi h i k d t t h i th t t f t d bl h k bbl k th l t i f b f b b hidden in apartment buildings around the city set to go off in the next twentyfour h H d th t t d i d tht h td f th k f th l h iht t h i di i th li t h h h bli tht torture is wrong indeed abominable not just sometimes but always He had expressed thi b l i f ft d il i th i th t f t k it i f hi d H hld d hi ? (H hld h d h i l f ? ) (Wl 1973 1667) Th litii d t ht i dil i th tht h d t k ht t d Wl t l l th t it tht t t i i th l thing to do His moral dilemma is that no matter what he does it will be wrong Thus it is wrong to do that which is all things considered the moral thing to do It is certainly true that when one duty overrides another the agent may owe thi t th h th b f i f th l t t f f ti b id h t id l i t i t li i f f i Bt i t thi t f idl l li bt hth th t ll i tt ht h d N it i t t i d th b d f t d ti f l l h t h t th ild i ibl ( l l thi i d d ) dti " h t " ( Willi 1973 1981b) T d so however commits one to an unorthodox metaethics and one which under mines the actionguidance function of moral duties For if both A (torture the prisoner) and not-A (do not torture the prisoner) are all things considered one's d l dt th l i tht h l dt t A l t A f lit l i i t h dt t t-A M t t d d Wl tht i d i t h d it i it t d th litii ll ilt f d i ht l d t i i i t ti f ilt b l t h i d ibilit It l fll tht i b l t h for A-ing only if (1) it was wrong to A and (2) one should have known better than to A; for in some dirtyhands cases what is wrong is what one has most moral reason to do and so even an ideal moral agent could not have known better than t d it f it th ll b t thi t d If f t b th t i l d I thik f i l i l i b l t h i b t d t i l i d th t l iti f ilt d b l t h i W l ' l i f th d i t h d dil i d i d

173

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Dilemmas incommensurability

and dirty hands

A

A A

anti-torture

saving innocent lives anti-torture

A

-A -A

saving innocent lives

A

-A

A

-A

A not

A

-A

not

-A

tragic chokes

A

A

-A

facing a dilemma A -A

A

-A

DIRTY HANDS

h t resolve the dilemma i t di h hld "f" ll ranking She resolves the dilemma by filling the gap in her preference structure such that she now is a different sort of person And should she face the same choice in the future she will not face a dilemma; for she would then have an overall reason to h If h d B ' l l i f t i l l th h resolves th dil l f i b l j d t d l i bjt t i i t t l dti B t thi b i b k t th t f i d d b Wl d i hi f lli f dit h d

Dirty Hands and Vice Ih b f i t f dit h d t h t l i th ii f i i t t ti diti lj d t I "Pliti V t i " Wb t th d t d i f bl i t h t "H h k h lti f th l hi l d th hld t k it l th f liti f th it d i f f t t k f liti l b l d b i l " (1958 [1919]: 126) And Machiavelli tells us that the nature of politics requires the cultivation of "vices" such as hypocrisy (Grant 1997) Rather than seeing dirty hands arising from the guilt of performing wrong actions we might view it as d ith th t f tb t b fl i liti iht it f d t lti th th t lti ( C i h 1992) I d t b fl i liti t b th t f h kill li d i h i t ii bli l l i t it tht tl i O th b bd ii t l t h l itiit i tl i i d A d t h t i h i t i d b liti it i t h tht ' h d dit ' li A Mhilli t lit ician may lose his soul for the good of the community Now this conception of dirty hands makes sense if we adopt a view of vices and it di t h i h ti A i i ( i t ) if it i t ft V if A i ll iibl ( i i i b l ) A l t h h thi i f i i t b d ith d it lli I d t l t it id lihtl t i i th iit ti A i i ( i t ) if it i f t V if Ai ll i d ( hibitd) Thi l k tt dd S f i t tht litii fi f li i i h i h li ll id Sidik d i t h t i thi it i t it " t h h th t l tion of such acts excites in us a quasimoral admiration we certainly should not call them v i r t u o u s " Sidgwick thus concludes that "it will therefore involve no material deviation from usage if we limit the term 'Virtue' to qualities exhibited n iht d t " (1907 219) A l i th i t i liti hibitd i ll i h t d t ld t b t i thi til th h " l l iht" " l l i d " b t it l i libl h i l " l l i i b l " If Sidik' l i l d t j t th ti f it d i tht i i t th ti f dit h d A i fd l i d i i f b t t t h i l th 175

GERALD F GAUS

B d Willi t tht h d t i f th litii' "vicious" lie does not arise from its vicious nature in the case in which it is justified but from our fear that the politician's disposition to lie will manifest itself in cases where it is unjustified "The point is that only those who are reluctant or disin l i d t d th ll d i b l thi h it i h h h f t di it h it i t " (Willi 1981 62) A b f h i l h th tht litii' di t li kill thi l ibilit d k t l i l ti i t f ( H h i 1978) B t l it i b j t i b l t bl t h i ll ll f A-i h A-i i ll j t i f d i th h fd t i h d th from A-ing in future cases in which it is not justified: this is to abandon the tie between wrongness and blameworthiness guilt or moral stain It is rightly objected to utilitarian theories that they could sanction "punishment" of the innocent to dt ft i i l t T hld tht litii " d i t " h th tifibl A i th h f d t i t h h h l i l h i d i i ft j t i f i d A-i i i l l j t

Dit H d

C d

B t l Rlti

f

Eil P j t

M i h l Stak h d l d l d hititd t f dit hih i i t tht t h h h t jtifid " b l i t " th l ll f h d ilt (1990 lift) S t h d Wij (1994 30) h marized (and developed) Stacker's main point thus:

h d th

p]n all cases of dirty hands what is common is that actions involve the ustified b t l f l riil d t th i l i t td b th ( iti f ) ithi hih t fid h i l f I h i t d fid it i i b l tt b db l id erations to commit moral violations In order to minimize further evil arising from the hkd il f th i l i t th ti f d t t ith il f t h i it i l jt Stk i i th

h l th t i ditiihi di il f i l tit t f ti i d i t h d th t f ' ti t hih i l i b t l H id f l th (f Willi S t ' l Shi' Chk) i hih N i f Shi Plih mother in a concentration camp to choose which of her children will live and which will die Stocker concludes "She picks one And she does so with dirty hands" (1990: 19) She has been forced by the Nazi to participate in his evil j t d th b t h d h t h h h b t b di h h i i i d il d d th i h t thi N t h l Stk i i t it it tht h f l ilt d h f h hi Thi l i f S h i ' dil i li l d Fit Stk i h i i t tht h i bl t h Shi li i d i

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tht h 't h A d thi th fh liht f til f d t t she cannot compare the importance of the lives of her children they are iterally incommensurable and so she is literally unable to choose. The incommensurability analysis (see above) seems much nearer the mark here (Gaus 2000: 1 3 5 6 ) To be l t i t l th N i d Shi it ki h i b th t h t t kill b t h hild if h d t h Ad h d h (h l d d i ) Gi h i i t tht h t h bt h hild it tti fh ti i t h t h hi i i l tht hild i i t d f b t h f th di th th i f f hild th th I t ht i ditbi b t Stak' l i i t h t th t coercion under which Sophie acts does not in his view undermine the appropriate ness of guilt Under a standard analysis of free action and responsibility that one is coerced and under extreme duress into A-ing obviates responsibility for A-ing and so ilt f A-i i A-i i t th t' h i (G 1999 2 0 3 5 ) Th b k tll h h d th b k ' t it i t hld ibl f th t h f t h h t i ilt t h h h h " h " t i th b k ' Ad f tht i b h h t ll h t ll Y t S t a k ttibt hi t Shi d i t h i i t tht h t choose and despite the incredible duress she is under; he insists that guilt and shame are appropriate for this victim of the Nazis For Stacker the person "has chosen even if coerced to bring about what is terrible" (1990: 26): coercion and voluntariness are hld tibl A d b Stak' l i f dit h d f bi coerced i t il j t thi i t i d i t i ft f th f hi l i i th l i t h t t i d t d i th t t i b t i f hi d ilt t th t I f h il j t i liti d i t h d i l f t f l i t i l lif b t S t a k l l thik tht h il j t l it tiiti dit h d i Stacker responds to this line of criticism by insisting that "there need be no conceptual or moral error in thinking that even though agents of dirty hands are morally unable to avoid the dirty act they can and should feel guilty and ashamed f di it" (Stak 1990 31) S t a k th d l ilt f lbilit N i b d f di S h i l h i f l d b Aittl tht b d d ilt f i t t i l di f ti i i t t i l it i l t d ilt i it Ad i Shi' d i i t h i t t i l ilt i i t B t thi i dbi i d d f h th it i t t i l t it i t voluntary act One suspects that underlying Stacker's analysis is an archaic under standing of guilt: one is stained by an intentional act of betrayal regardless of whether one is culpable or responsible A person who is coerced into such an act is ll t i d d i ilt "th h l d f l th d f t t d l i b i h t " (1990 31) T d thi h i i t i t i k "t t h i f l " (1990 26ff) H hi t f hi l t i ibilit d ilt t h l th ittl t d til t lli

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C

l

i

Thi h t h d li t t l f dit h d T h h t Ih ht t k t l it Fit l th t of dirty hands we quickly become immersed in questions of deontic logic rational choice theory the nature of virtues issues concerning freedom of action culpability and guilt and so on Whether there is a distinct problem of dirty hands i t i l b difft f l t i ll d d t l d t i l li i h i l h Of thi i tt t h t it i t i l tht litii ft f t tht i l t d lit tht i t i l l th d d t W h t h thi i l il bl f dit h d h i i d d d d t th lti f th li W d t i th h f dit h d i iti h d hi t d t l d th iti f th t d f our choices but whether all this involves incompossible oughts or duties necessary moral guilt and so on is a matter of rather subtle ethical theory Secondly I suggested and because of space limitations it could be no more than ti tht h i th li f d tht t f dit h d dbi i f t i l hi d t i l i it th lti f l t i t ilt d Plitii d thi tht ll i l h t h th jtif h ti i l di t t li H it f d t tht thi h d i dit f such actions are justified

Rf B

S I (1983) P i t d bli lit l lii d dit h d I S I B d G F Gaus (eds) Public and Private in Social Life pp 1 5 5 8 1 New York: St Martin's Press Cbid U i i t P (1988) A Theory of Freedom C b i d 1679 N B l i I i h (1969) T t f l i b t I Four Essays on Liberty Yk Ofd U i i t P Coady C A J (1993) Dirty hands In Robert E Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy pp 4 2 2 3 0 Oxford: Blackwell C i h Ath B (1992) Th l i r t f dit h d Journal of Value Inquiry 26 2 3 9 5 0 Donagan Alan (1977) The Theory of Morality Chicago: University of Chicago Press F h P t (1983) Ethics in Government E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l G G l d F (1999) Social Philosophy N Y k M E Sh (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories Boulder CO: Westview Press flit f l d riil I Gld (2001) Th l i i t f homo economicus: th G Jli L t d Chriti D F ( d ) Values Justice and Economics B f f l NY H i t Bk Geise J P (1989) The problem of dirty hands: political necessities and liberal values International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 4: 9 5 1 1 3 U i i t f Chi P G t R t h (1997) Hypocrisy and Integrity Chi

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Hampshire Stuart (1978) Morality and pessimism In Stuart Hampshire (ed) Public and Private Morality pp 1-22 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hare R M (1989) Essays on Political Morality Oxford: Clarendon Press Levi Isaac (1986) Hard Choices: Decision-making under Unresolved Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Machiavelli Niccolo (1950 [1515]) The Prince In The Prince and the Discourses New York: Modern Library Morganthau Hans (1973) Politics among Nations 5th edn New York: Alfred A Knopf Nagel Thomas (1978) Ruthlessness in public life In Stuart Hampshire (ed) Public and Private Morality pp 75-91 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Niebuhr Reinhold (1963) Moral Man and Immoral Society London: Student Christian Move ment Press Nielsen Kai (1996) There is no dilemma of dirty hands South African Journal of Philosophy 15: 1-7 Postrel Virginia (2000) Impure thoughts Reason 32 (4): 4 8 5 0 Sidgwick Henry (1907) The Methods of Ethics 7th edn Chicago: University of Chicago Press Stocker Michael (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values Oxford: Clarendon Press Walzer Michael (1973) Political action: the problem of dirty hands Philosophy and Public Affairs 2: 16080 Weber Max (1958 [1919]) Politics as a vocation In H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology pp 77-128 New York: Oxford University Press de Wijze Stephen (1994) Dirty hands: doing wrong to do right South African Journal of Philosophy 13: 2 7 3 3 Williams Bernard (1973) Ethical consistency In Problems of the Self pp 166-86 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981a) Politics and moral character In Moral Luck pp 5 4 7 0 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981b) Ought and moral obligation In Moral Luck pp 114-23 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Winston Kenneth I (1994) Necessity and choice in political ethics: varieties of dirty hands In Daniel E Wueste (ed) Professional Ethics and Social Responsibility Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield

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S It i thik

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bbl till f t tht h th jit fA i f l f th t f lit th t h i k fit f T h t i th t h i k t h t l di d tiiti i t h l t l hibiti b f their sexual nature Certain sexual activities are taken to be among the paradigms of moral wrongness This belief is one legacy of the JudeoChristian moral tradition although its roots go back further to Plato's ethics Its clearest contemporary articu lti i h th V t i ' " D l t i S l E t h i " f 1975 I thi d t th C t h l i C h h l t l ti f l iditd t l l b th " l t t i f " S t i d th t t f ti d th l i i t t f i i itlf hld t b ll b it i i flit ith G d ' t l l H diit i bdi t tht l hih titt h t ll S l lit i t h f based on the natural function of sexuality: reproduction in the context of longterm commitment for raising children "Every genital act must be within the framework of marriage" (The Vatican 1975: 306) Sex is here reduced to genital acts and t i t d t th f dti i l i l t i h i Th dti id h i t d h t ti k i i hldi h d b t th titi hibit t l t i t l d h l i t bt ith d d tbti ll Th l t t i liitl h l d t b l (Th Vti 1975 308) d i t th f t t h t it h dd t fft th thi i t t Let us examine critically the links between reproduction and sex and love and sex and their alleged moral implications First it must be granted that though the reproductive function may be the biological origin of the sex drive psychologically th t it d i t i t M t l i i i th t f dti t h t t l d t l di b d h i l b t t dti fit Pi t th d t f libl t t i th i t t f hild h b d t lik t dti bt ht i f tht i l th d d t b itbl ti h i i 180

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S d d d tht th h i l b d l f thi principal biological functions Mouths may be principally for eating but no one condemns their use for speaking breathing expressing or even kissing The main biological function of hands may be for grasping food or tree branches but we b l l l th f iti t i thi i d l i t i S t i li l th f th b d f l d ll t f l ll i h t If idiidl h l bliti t b hild th h hld b blitd t l l f tht ? Wh h l d d th b d ' i f l liit th l t f t i ? The explanation for the Christian sexual ethic probably lies not only in its origin prior to artificial contraception but in its more distant origin in Plato and in the particular way Christianity adapted the ambivalent Platonic attitude toward sex Thi t d i t i h i d th id t h t i i i t "l l " i l t i dditi t h t t d lltil t iiliti i t l f Th id h t k d t i W t lt h tht th h kd h i d th d fV i t i i i th l t idttith t ld t f t h l til f it F d l t l d repression the redirection of sexual energy as central to the development of civil ization even if dangerous to the individual psyche while Marcuse held that capita lism's desexualization of the body was necessary to make it available for labor Even th j iti f l i th d t tht bidld l di d i t lif t th d t i t f th tiiti Bt h h ith id t tht jti f th t l titi l thi t h t l i k it iibilit t dti lt i dditi t W t f l itht b i ltt d j ki itht b i i l h d Th l i t h t i difft libl t l d ii f th i d t i f t i ith bdi tht ldi d tiit entails The claim that moral sex must be linked to love is somewhat more complex as well as more popular Here adequate criticism requires first a distinction between ht i idl ht i iibl d ht i t b td S d t k t t t t l bth ldi dl i d t hth i itlf t il l titi d h t h it i t l l b t likd t l i l t i h i Lt b i ith l L i i fit f ll t h d i it i l idtifiti ith th l d ' i t t d i t d d l t it ment to further those interests It is secondarily selfregarding: a desire for constant companionship with the person and therefore a pleasant emotion in their presence and a longing in their absence It tends to be relatively exclusive; while we may l l l t ildi ll hild th d d li t l i liti i l i b l It i l t h h t t h t th i i l kid f l ti l hih till i l d ti d i It i il kid l b th l i l t i h i f l l f hild d t i l h di Bt t h i k f thi ti i l l dfid b l th bl l di S l tiit ik th

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tiiti til l ll th ti bt h sexual desires for and relations with those we do not love and love those for whom we have no sexual desire Sexual desire itself even when expressive of or linked to love seems clearly ditit Fit l t h h it i d i f th ' bd lik l it i i i l l f d i di f th l tht h i l t t ith th t h ' bd d S d hil ldi i t i l l li i i t til th it i t l i i th l h i if f l t i ldi f th T h i d it i t l t i i t t Th l f i i t l f li i it i t h i l l l tht i at best repetitive not cumulative as is the value of a longterm loving relationship It might be objected that the claim that love and sexual desire are distinct and separable reflects a male bias Popular literature suggests that for many women tift ti l d t i l i t t hil th i tt f O th li tht t i l t t h t i t i l f l di i hil th i t f (Rbi 1983 101) S i b i l t l t i f h d diff M i thi h f th lb h i l t hil d b k i man for support through pregnancy and childrearing This explanation is highly speculative however And even if this generalization about different attitudes toward sex is true as a generalization it leaves much room for differences in desires d f bth ithi d d Th it i tht l di i ltill ditit f l At it t b i it i di f h i l t t ith th' bd d f th l tht h t t ffd If i ditit f l till k fit h t h it i t tht i best likd ith l d d hth th l i l i t i t th t thi fit ti A t b t h id f th f i t ti b idd A l t h h l desire is distinct from loving commitment certain of its features might suggest a natural link First sex is naturally a private matter It involves exposure vulnerabil ity and intimacy so that others third parties are naturally excluded No third t ll h iht t b ' lb h i d h b t i ld t i l l d i t b l tiit W h t i i t ld th d l i l t i h i I bth i f d l i l th b j t f ' di ti d thi f t t t l ti S d iht b id t b i fh t d id d i f bdi i h t th b t h h t t l t th i d l l t i h i L l ld i i thi i an affirmation of the whole person something we might all seek We derive pleas ure not only from the physical aspects of sex but also from expressions of affection from our partners O th th id it b d t h t th i i t tht b i t d ith l i i i t t i it i t i l l t i t d b th id t h t i itlf h t f i l t b iliti titil h i l litti B t if i itlf i b i th h it b itbl f i l ? I d d h i lit b th b t t t d d ffti (V 1980 12 26)? V i i l 182

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t thi l th i fl iht d t t f th i t physical pleasure that is its chief value for many people If in sexual acts one must be constantly monitoring that one's communication of affection is succeeding this will certainly lessen physical spontaneity and pleasure Finally restricting sex to the t t h i till i t t d f th l t d i f it d lt hih dd t th l f I hll t t t t t ttl thi d i t h i I d t bli th i i l t Whth i j b l di i th t t f l i l t i h i i tt f i idiidl hl d i til lti bt difft idiidl M i t h t fil l d so because of a confusion between sexual desire and love when the intensity of the former fades somewhat and when the idealization of romantic passion succumbs to reality For many other luckier couples sex remains an integral part of a deeper l t i h i It i i t t h t h i tht ki f h t i btt idl t f ht i ll iibl E if lik th tiiti tk h i h t d i d i t h i fl thi d t i l tht dbt itht l i ll i i i b l Sti t k i b t t th h b f t l b t ti t k i t l il able or preferred and eating hamburger is not prohibited Meals that are also celebrations are more meaningful and better for being so but we are not morally required to make all meals celebrations W t if f l th b t t i i i b l f t iht t i t f Th f th f h i btt i l i t t th t b dditil t if tht i itht l W t d t th i t bt td ii tht i l h i l t i itlf ll t Bt j t f l l d t b dditi it d t b i i d t ilti W k bfit i i l i i t t i itht i t t i h t h enter into these transactions voluntarily Similarly we can seek our own pleasure primarily in sex without mistreating partners whose participation is voluntary Physical pleasure is something generally good not bad in itself although once t th k i d f l t h t bild itlf l t titt j lf t i l lif l Th t b t hth ht t b td ith l i dtil t l d th d f h dtil t l t i t th idiidl ith t h i i di t h th d i t d

Privacy Consent and Homosexuality If

l di i itlf l k l i t th th t iht t l t l th l d i h i d b t tht t t b i t f d ith A i h t t l i t f l iht t d l l d ti t d t l f f i l i t thi l

idti tht k ll Th i f l t ithi t i t l b d t h th d tibt fi h

t

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t th l lf Th t i t t t h F i t th riht i indicated a right against outside interference It does not imply that consensual sex is always right or morally permissible One may have a right to do what may sometimes be wrong and persons may be wrongly harmed by actions to which th t P t t t t h i d i d i h f th thi th t d hil l t i t l i t i d thid ti t h th riht t i t f th diri b t liit d t h t S d d i t t t t b i f d dt l l t i d t b i d lk li i th d i f i l th ti f h t ti t l l tary that is not based on coercion or exploitation Once more however a general aversion to paternalistic interference would require a strong burden of proof of coercion or unjust harm before consent could be concluded to be involuntary W l f th l l i i d t b t ifi l ti d l i i d t th Wh d fid t h t ti ti d d l b f th triti l thi j t d b t h t th i th i f i t d t h t till th dit f l I ill t k l i illtti th types: homosexuality harassment and rape prostitution and adultery Most Americans continue to believe that homosexual behavior is immoral When pressed for a reason a variety of answers might be given: (1) homosexuality is t l (2) it i t d (3) it i t h t t th h t l fil (4) h l i d bi thi tiit i t f t i i bridld i i t (5) h l b h i d AIDS (6) f i lid h l i t ld ll th d f th h Th d i l d ritil ti (1) H l i t i t t l i di It i i d d i th i l kid di l l t tht i d d h t l as well It may be more natural in not repressing these acts as some hetero sexuals do The only sense in which it is unnatural is in its not fulfilling the "natural" function of reproduction The claim that morally permissible sex must flfill thi f t i itiid d j t d b W dd h tht l t ll f h lf d d ltri th f t bildi hlt ki f d ll f d t h l dii d C t i l t ll t h t i t l i thi fd t i f t b i l Th f h l i t t l i thi di thi ld l k l li ti (2) Although most people equate sexual perversion with moral depravity our intuitions regarding specific perversions and degrees of moral wrongness do not align Most think that drinking urine for example is perverted but they would be h d dt i ( t h th ti th h f i ) h it i ll (R 1984 385) W h t h t l f th t f i i tht td t t b bth l l d d i t i Wht i d i t i i lti t l' t t H l i t l bt t l bi f d b hl 5 t f th l ti S fid it d i t i Bt thi l k li l i t i Off 184

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ffiit t til i t b h i d bli h l dil if of the type that are allowed to heterosexuals should not be prohibited on grounds of offense To do so is to discriminate against people for an inborn trait that is part of their identity (3) H l i t tb t h t t th i t i t t i fh t l i if h l titt h ll t f th lti Th t h t th libt l h t l b h l If th l i i t h t h l ld titt h l t f th lti f t d i d th thi l i til tb b i d ith th id t h t h lit i t l td l Attti t homosexuals into marriage with the opposite sex is itself more likely to result n many more failed marriages hence itself more a threat to the institution On the other hand homosexuals themselves can make up families if allowed to marry and d t hild (4) H l ttitill b i th h t l bt thi l i f t l b libl ttibtd t l k fi t i t t i l tf ll il i t l t l t i h i Witht h th i littl t thik t h t h l ld b l fl t i taining longterm loving relationships (heterosexuals are not all that successful as a group either) Thus if sexual activity must be socially restrained and once more this requirement may be only a corollary of the Platonic antipathy toward our i l t th i t f thi t i t th h l it (5) P i b h i iht ll t i b t t th d f th AIDS i bt h l i t d t AIDS h i h i db h t l tiit ll I t th di i t di idl ldid h l th h t l Th t h t f AIDS i ti f ll ll ti idiidl h t ' hiti t known as well as warnings to potential partners by those infected by the virus In this respect homosexuals are no different from others (6) If universalized homosexuality would spell the end of the human race Kant's t t f ilibilit t i t d d t l t ti th d tht th f ll ti i th ld b b d Th i l i t i f i l i i i l f ti hd t lt i tditi flit i th ill B t K t h i l f ld h f d flit i ti i l i t i ld d t h i t t i l t dh f t h d i d f h l i t ( K t 1963 164) N t h l h d i l does not result from the proper application of his general criterion On the same grounds celibacy would have to be impermissible if homosexuality were The key to the proper application of the criterion of universalizability is the proper specification f th i bjti i i l tht d l i th ti bi i d d All d l th l t t th ti t b i l d d i th i If ll th l i th ld t t t t t t l l kt h I l t thi ft th lt ld bbl l k th d f th h B t th l t i t b i l i d i l d ti f th d i t th th Siill th K t i t t i i l i t i f h l

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b h i th ith h l di f d th t f that test would be neither contradictory nor dire Critics of homosexuality nclud ing Kant also see homosexuals as violating the second formulation of his criterion of using each other as means only but without restricting permissible sex to pro ti th i t thik tht h l t td ft th h t l W h t th f d d t d h l b h i i itlf i l I t d th lthi i f i d t h t th til l t f b h i i ll t l i itlf l t tht b ff t tht d ti l t ll

Rape and Harassment O

iht thik t h t ith i i t l t th l t li tiit t h t i i l b f it l t B t thi i t Th t f th t t h l i t ht k th f th th t tht f d ith d l t W h t k ith i i th l k or impossibility of genuine informed consent the fact that such acts are therefore coercive manipulative and harmful to the psychological wellbeing and future mental health of the victims Siil k l t hih i h ith i i l i d d f f It i t th f f th l t tht k h i b t th f t t h t i h i l lt i i f i hili ti d th f itht h t R i th h i l lt i th tht dh i i d bb i th l f t It i i i f th i t d th i i f the body is the worst form of such violation of privacy Beside these serious wrongs and harms longerterm damage might result from the selfidentification of women in primarily sexual terms and although rape is almost exclusively a male crime f i i t h t h i k f ll l t i i l d t d h ll h t l it f littl h l h Th i thi ll t i l b t l f bt t d i ith dt h ti i t l t d h t fll l t d i tht i ith dt b d l i f "dt " d lh t S t i i t idli f t d t i tht liit bl t b liitd d i f h t fi i l activity from holding hands to kissing to petting and so on This seems excessive if sex is to be at all spontaneous and pleasurable instead of an academic exercise but it remains a difficult question how to specify consent and refusal Clearly "no" t " " t t f l t i i t b t it i t l t h t il l k f it l titt tit t tht t i t t l btitt f liit t E liit t h flti i i d b l h l d ll t b i bt d thi tht ft d i k i i iibl? M h d d i hit d fll t t

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Similar problems arise regarding the newer category of sexual harassment Harassment is defined not as sex without consent but primarily as certain unwelcome sexual advances or overtures Of course not all unwelcome or rejected offers can count as harassment as morally wrong or there would be very little sexual or romantic activity in the world among morally minded people One possible place to draw the line is to say that advances that constitute harassment must be continuous or continue after their rejection has been made clear But in certain contexts this is not necessary for harassment to occur The relevant contexts are those involving unequal power relations such as those between teacher and student or doctor and patient Here any sexual overture can be considered coercive and so it is proper to prohibit all such conduct In contexts of equal power by contrast it seems that individuals can be left on their own to make their desires and intentions or lack of them clear Harassment is also said to occur in working environments when there is sexually explicit or implicit discussions jokes or displays Here once more we must attempt to draw a line that will prevent unduly hostile environments without stifling free and spontaneous expression In the entire general area of free expression versus offense such lines are hard to come by and defend I have claimed that in contexts of equal power or when power relations are absent explicit consent and rejection or refusal should be taken at face value Some feminists argue that in the present social context such relations are rarely if ever equal or absent Consent by women to sex is therefore on this view rarely f ever uncoerced or non-exploitative Heterosexual sex in Western society is seen as a typical expression of male domination and to be avoided The conclusion of this argument is again a restrictive sexual ethic not now from the supposed links between sex love and reproduction but from the supposed link with economics and politics Just as there need be no such links of the former type however sex need not be linked with economics or politics even in capitalist societies that have been white male dominated Sex no more than other non-political and noneconomic activities need be viewed as an expression of economics and politics whatever the nature of the latter in particular societies This is not to say that some individuals do not use sex for political or economic purposes while others are forced to do so in socially and economically oppressive conditions Whether the former is always morally impermissible is our next topic

Prostitution and Adultery Before leaving the topic of genuine consent we can consider one last issue n which the questions of truly voluntary consent and what it permits figure prominently the issue of prostitution Grounds for morally condemning prostitution independent of the issue of consent were dismissed above Sex with prostitutes is certainly sex without love or reproduction and for mere pleasure but that is irrelevant to its morality Prostitution can also be harmful to prostitutes themselves: they endure not just indignity and social ostracism but danger of physical harm risk of disease exploitation not only by customers but by pimps and landlords and damage to their non-commercial sexual relations This is a more serious charge against prostitution 187

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bt t li h b td i i d i i Fit i th of homosexuality much of the danger risk of disease and exploitation results from social stigmatizing and criminalization Thus these harms argue more for legisla tion regulation and change of attitudes than for the conclusion that prostitution is i i t l f (Ei 1980 3 6 1 2 ) A f d t tid l lti f l i t t t i kid f tilti t tl bt d thi f i tht d S d I h d ll t i t l i t i t tht hld t i t f if t d t i f t l t if h f l tiit t h t d t h th H t d t th ti hth titti b t l l t sensual and whether if so it might nevertheless constitute one of the few excep tions to the permissibility of mutually consensual behavior There are certain things that one is not permitted to sell in Western society: for l l i li hih b i dft l t t i t C t t i t t i i th d t d th t t i iibl Bt i th thi i b th t t i ld b f i t th ld d f t th f llti t O l t ll d li t i b t i th thi i b th l ld b h f l t th buyers who are incapable of informed and voluntary consent Prostitution does not appear to be unfair to third parties or harmful to buyers in these ways There is yet a third type of case however that may seem more analogous: the impermissibility f t t t ll lf i t l Th i l i d i t f h t t di f th i t i l i t f ti t l fth f t f l d titti i t l i thi t Bt i lli h bd titt b id t ll h l f d lli h l f b id t b l t lli lf i t l Th ti h h i hth titt d ll h b d d h h l f Thi b f ki b t it l i t l t t h d th it moral import can be questioned Its plausibility derives from the fact that in sex one identifies with one's body The body in turn may be constitutive of the self at its most basic level the primary criterion of personal identity If the prostitute sells her b d th h b dit h l f d hld tb d iti B t d i t thi th b t t t it i libl t th titt lli i t h l f (Ei 1980 341) If h l i t l l ld h l f h ld b th t f th t t d ith di f h l d Bt hi t th S i f l i t ld Thi t t i l l l t t t f l It can still be claimed on the other side that prostitution is a paradigm hence a symbol of the oppression and dehumanization of women that the prostitute is used as an object a mere means to the pleasure of the John and that sex is a private i t i t tt t fit f t t i il b i Bt t t t th l bjt i d h i i l if i itlf i b d bjti bl T t t th with t h i ti ftl iibl d i i t t i d i ll l lti ll W hi d i t tk f i t di t i t h i tt f th ldl d i i t t d d bjt t h i il b i 188

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tht Fill if titti itd f b i th it would be a paradigm of male oppression and domination But if as claimed above this model is not fitting and many if not most customers of prostitutes are shy inexperienced and weak not dominating types then prostitution in itself is dom iti d bjti l if ll i d l lti I ih t ld l tht titti need t b ll b j t i b l if b d i t t t bt l ti d t h t it i ibl f il t b b d h t t N d it b tt f l t df l titt h b i Bt f thi i t d th ll b j t i b l t f titti i W t it M t prostitutes are from socially and economically oppressed classes and are further exploited degraded and harmed in their careers So it is not unrealistic to view prostitution in this context as a symptom if not a symbol of oppression The issue h i d l f tht d d th ibilit f f l l l t d i t Tht ibilit i ith t t Y t th l ti b t til l tiiti dit f i bilit i t h i Th l tt f dlt f l t b d i d d l l b th t f th ti d i t l i l d i th i t t f h other spouses and indirectly those of any children in the marriages can be affected as well The first source of variability here is that there are different sorts of under standings between married couples with regard to sexual exclusivity Those who hld tht dlt i l d thi Th i i l i b dfiiti i t t t l l i i t (W 1986 45) A d l t h b tditi i th ill i t t t bth i d ilti f th i h di t th K t i iti E ith t l t thi iti if th i liit iliitl td d t d i f l liit th dlt ill i l th b k i f i dd t i flit i dilti f th i But even granting this understanding of marriage and these consequences of adultery there is room for different overall judgments of its morality depending on the specific circumstances Whether secrecy and deception are wrong f they will t flit i f l t b d i f l Th i fi if h i fi iht t i f t i di t h i t ' tiiti B t h t h th h iht t h if ti h t h th l i t h iht i b d l th b j t i b l ti f i dj l i t dbt O bl h iht t k ti i f t i i l i ' l lif f ' tht regarding fantasies during sex for example but sexual activities with other partners may not fall into this class if there is a mutual understanding of sexual exclusivity that has not lapsed for both parties And whether deception is wrong once adultery h di t ti f h t h it h l d i th fit l if d t i ill b f t d Bt i th t th l t t ti d d ibl i t H tift th l l ti ithi th i f l ? Th b d f i i d i t f l th idl ithi it d th iht iht t jtif ffi t i d th i

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I th i h d f th k f t d t d ing of sexual exclusivity as a necessary part of marriage But this assumption is false Certainly there are reasons for being married aside from sex let alone exclu sive sex for example the creation or maintenance of a lasting family whose lives are h d E if l liit t f th l l d f i t i f i thi ld t bid l ll A d i f t dlt d t l l l l i i tht l liit i t t f th l l dfiti Whth it i b t t t it t l liit d d th i d i i d l i l d It d d th d t hih l t d t d l i it f th d th d t hih i t d ith l W h td that these connections are variable On the one hand the desire for exclusivity in love or sex might be seen as an unwelcome corollary of possessiveness and jealousy Nonexclusivity can be held to t di l i l l t i h i If ll thi t th fi t l l t l d t i l i h t th l f i d h t th l ? O th th h d it i h t b h l d t h t d t h f l t i hi i l i ti l i i l t i l t bdth d tht tid l ffi l t d t t h t i b l th d i for exclusivity is a natural concomitant of deep love Outside affairs themselves however can range from loving commitments to casual recreational sex and the latter may be less threatening to most marriages Th th difft idl f i ith d i f f t i l i t i f lb h i ithi it i f l i i t t ith d t bth ti l d t th t f liit ith d t b t h th i fj l d i It t b h i d t l tht th dl b itbl f d i f f t i d i i d l d l ith d i f f t t t b t t h t th t f d i t th i i l d til A f d t b th ith th l tiiti ll d l t i morally wrong not in itself but when it violates norms that govern nonsexual acts also for example when it unjustifiably deceives or harms a spouse or destroys a family to the detriment of its children by careless impulsive or shortsighted behav i I t l tiiti d b iti l t th d t d fft l f ' t E t i t l ffi diff i t h i ttil th ti d th l idti b l d t ibl

Rf Ericsson L 0 (1980) The charges against prostitution Ethics 90: 33566 L Ifild N Y k H K t I ([1924] 1963) Lectures on Ethics, t

dR

R b i L B (1983) Intimate Strangers. N Y k H dR Ruse M (1984) The morality of homosexuality In R Baker and F Elliston (eds) Philosophy and Sex 3 7 0 9 0 B f f l NY P t h V R (1980) Sex without Love: A Philosophical Exploration. B f f l NY P t h

190

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The Vatican (1975) Declaration on sexual ethics Reprinted in J E White (ed) Contemporary 3 0 3 9 B l t CA W d t h 2000 Moral Problems, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 4 5 9 W M J (1986) W h t ' ll ith d l t

Fth

di

Baker R and Elliston F (eds) (1984) Philosophy and Sex. Buffalo NY: Prometheus B l l i t t i R (1993) Good Sex: Perspectives on Sexual Ethics. L KS U i i t P f K Bertocci P (1949) The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage. New York: Association P N J (1999) Moral Matters, h 11 P t b h O t i B d i P P i t I (1999) Ethics and Sex. L d Rtld Scruton R (1986) Sexual Desire. New York: Free Press MD R d Littlfild S b l A ( d ) (1991) The Philosophy of Sex. S Sddl T R Z k A d B h t D ( d ) (1997) Philosophy of Sex and Love. U Ri NJ P t i H l l

191

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Ctl

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Wh G

C t l Mtt

It i i t i t h t th t t t l l il ithi it iditi Y t th " b l i i d t i " h l d t h t th t t dt t t t idiidl f il i t i f th f t t h t it l l li ance on its protective services "Reliance" especially when encouraged tends to be dutycreating but the "noduty rule" eliminates negligent failure to protect as a cause action against the state Since no one has a right against the state to minim ll d t tti f il th t t h libilit f d i i i t fil t t t F t t h A d t l tti ilti t h i Th bl f t l f t i l thi i f idi itill th f l l i iti (1) th t t hibit i l t i t i i t i d t it li t it (2) th t t t t th f d t l idiidl i h t t bdil i t i t (3) th t t ' li t il includes the authority to threaten nonfelons with criminal penalties for having arms for selfpreservation and defense; (4) the state has no duty to provide minim ally adequate protection to any individual Affi (l)(4) i i h t (2) d (4) l t (3) ( W h l 1997) G l ill f f t th b l bt (1) d (2) f h ditl i d i t l If th t t b iili i f" l i " b i k i l d (1) d (3) it d t t dt ( f t h ) t th f k id ti libilit t fft lti ik l it (4) Prohibiting civilian possession of "equalizers" also has distributional wealth effects even among the lawabiding It marginally increases the risks of violent victimization for poorer citizens who cannot afford the services of bodyguards l t d th h d it i t d ith l i i i td iti S i i l l b i " h " S t d Niht S i l fftil d i t th ( b l ) l bdil i t i t i t t f ll iti t l th i t t f dt i i l h t d ll t b th B i " h " t h t t t f bt t h i l b i d i iti i t fl ll f h i d t th b i f ffdbilit I 192

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dditi liiti l f" h " il d t " i l l cheap" guns to "cheap" gun status Since gun laws implicate the fundamental interest in bodily integrity affect the balance of advantage between felons and he lawabiding and have distributional wealth effects among the lawabiding every t i l h t b t t l P t i l thi f t blili i b dfi d l i l t l d i i l i itil ttti t th idti b i f i i l li di il ti d tki i l i t i fft d i i tti t d imperfect compliance. Th ti f i f t li id li l i d i f ik h thil l l d ti tutional rules prohibiting violent victimization are never fully effective not against private violence nor against official violence The assumption is well founded Pro hibiting criminal violence does not eliminate it Similarly official violence whether i f l i t d b li t i b ' t d th l fl h tibl d i hit P i t il iilit l i (Whl 1999) I thi h t I k t h b i f l th " i i t i l t i t l t b l " i iht d d i t i i h it f th bl f lti th i f i h t Th I distinguish two major types of gun control outline the ethical assumptions that support them and critically evaluate the causal argument that gun proliferation among American civilians irrespective of whether they possess them lawfully or t i sine qua non f d i th t i ' t i l hih h i i d t

Th I i t i l E t i t l t

Pbl

S h l l th t t ' li i t l ? O h l d th power over arms be vested in "the people" incorporated among their inalienable rights? A society's constitution whether a written document or a set of historically based political understandings distributes the initial entitlement Incorporating an l th t t ' i h t li i h l l k f h it i t t i titti Th t t ' l d ll i i l i i d i t i iltll bl iil If th t t li i i l i i d i b t ilt iti' iht G iht t th " i i l di i t i " f iti A b l i i i d titti b t t t th i i t i l t i t l t "th l" l th b f th litil it h nized as its full and equal citizens According to Aristotle the right to possess arms along with the rights to own property in land to participate in community govern d t h l d ffi f bli t t titt fll i t i h i d bli titti A b l i ' iti th " d i thi h d t i d t iti thit bth i t dibdit bjt d i t t l i l t " C l i l libli td Aittl' ti f itihi It i t d th i h t t "th iil d i i t i " f iti (Hh d H t 2000) Si bli titti d i tht h t t hll j l it t l t ld 193

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b i t i ' i f H th t t i d d t i specification to the right and reasonably regulate the operation of it Despite the fact that Article IV Section 4 guarantees a "Republican Form of Government" to every state in the Union guncontrol partisans disagree how the US C t i t t i d i t i b t th i i t i l t i t l t di D th C t i tti t th i i t i l t i t l t i th f d l t i th l tt i "th l ? " Th ti f ht t t hld b i t th A t i l IV Sti 2 "riil di i t i f i t i " i l l l t t thi d b t h d t ttti h f d i t t i "A ll ltd Militi b i t th rit f f S t t th i h t f th l t k and bear Arms shall not be infringed" Three theories of Second Amendment interpretation may be distinguished The "states' right" view claims that the Constitution secures monopoly power over arms t th f d l t h h it ith th l tt b lldl th A d t subordinates riht f th l t k d b t th t t ' i t t i i t i i l l l t d iliti Th " i d i i d l iht i " ti l l d th S t d d M d l I t t t i li t h t th l ii tt i t t i i t i i l l l t d iliti id a non-exclusive reason for recognizing the right of the people to keep and bear arms The "modified individual rights" view claims that the Amendment vests the nitial entitlement in the people yet only individuals actually enrolled in the federal militia h th i f r i b l iht t k db Th t t ' i h t i i i d i b l Nt l i it i i t t ith th bli ti f itihi it i d i th t t ' liit l ("th riht f th l t k db ") d th C t i t t i ' it f Th C t i t t i ditribt " " t th f d l t d t th l tt bt " r i h t " Th l i b i l i t f th t t ' riht i t f i th t t ' t l t iht ith th hi f riht The modified individual rights view is not incredible The Amendment's language clearly recognizes a state interest in maintaining a wellregulated militia However the Amendment's prefatory clause is not followed by "therefore the right of militia t k d b hll t b i f r i d " O th t th h " r i h t f th l" i d i t d Th i bit t i thi h difft i i th S d A d t th it h i A d t 1 d 4 I dditi f d l l d l t h t th iliti f th U i t d S t t i t f ll b l b d i d l iti t l t 17 f d d 45 d th f l iti h b f th N t i l G d I i l l f "the right of the people" were interpreted to forbid infringement of the right to keep and bear arms for members of the militia only a huge body of citizens would be rendered immune from indefinitely many federal and state guncontrol laws The difd i d i i d l i h t i til b t t i l d i i t t i t l h tht i dd f d iliti b ' riht th i d t f libilit t i t

Th S t d d M d l ' " i h t f th kbl C t i t t i l j i d i d l riht i t t t i d t l

194

l" i t t t i i i l It l d Th l t i t riit f th t t l O th t th

itlf di tt

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ti th ibilit t if due process of law (Stell 2001)

d

lt

th

iht t k

db

b

The Regulatory Power All i h t i l d i th i d t i t l t ab initio i l i b l td i th l i ifti d lti b d fl Th process t ht b liibl t i th i h t h of specification dd liibl tblih lifiti f ii it h t iil t included in the right who has standing to complain about alleged government infringements in court and which government official must respond to such com plaints what relief is available and so on The process of regulating rights addresses h th titti iil li d i i t i t h th b i d dl t h dh th b i d (if ) d h iht titti iil t i t lli bli i t t Sifiti d lti l b t i h t b t l l i i t th Riht h littl til l i t h t bth I A i "th f d f h" i l d the right to display publicly a jacket embroidered with "Fuck the Draft" {Cohen v California 403 US 91 [1971]) It does not include the right to lie under oath about a material fact to make fraudulent promises or to shout "fire!" in a crowded tht N t d t h t th f d f h i b l t d i t t b l N hld if f th f t t h t th t t lt f h iht b d fl t h t "th f d " i ll " l l t i " t h t "th i h t f h l bl t bl" i ll f th t t ' i h t li Th i liti S t i b i t t f f t th f ifi d lti f d t l iht t t i f i t f l h " i f i t i " f iht b hibit i t i l l Bt the state's regulation of gun rights may also infringe when the regulation manifests inherent hostility to the right or imposes burdens on its exercise that lack any reasonable foundation t h t i i t arbitrary and capricious i f ffiil d i t i if h f lti i invidiously discriminatory

D

G

C t l

D t l (DPGC) f t i fl l l f b l restrictions disabling from gun purchase possession and use persons who by virtue of past wrongdoing disloyalty or legal incompetence are widely perceived t t t h DPGC h l b th d i t f f t l A i D i th l i l id dd iliibl fit f itihi l th i d i lti di t d l l l l dibld f i d t h t th t l l il t t t h il d/ i t t A idl h d bli litil h i l h ikd i dibiliti ith l i t i l i l i t I l i t l i k d dibiliti 195

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i it l b t i i th l d f th R b l i A i ' l tion of black freemen grew ever larger (Franklin 1971) Enlightenment political philosophy denied that there should be a racebased legal distinction between "free men" and "citizens" A culture based on raceslavery prompted the opposite Whit' lli t i f blk litil l di t l l Th l i d dititi dibiliti "f f l " F l N t h C l i ' 1840 l i d d " T h t if f N ltt f f l hll b t hi h k i hi h h ht k t ifl itl d d b i kif l h h hll h btid li t h f f th C t f Pleas and Quarter Sessions of his or her county within one year preceding the wearing keeping or carrying thereof he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be indicted therefore" Georgia's Supreme Court distinguished between i t i h i t i t t i iht f h i h it b l k f ttll b f t d l l i b t "F f l h b i d h iti th t titld t b t f b f th l i l t t hld i i l ff Th h l i t i l i h t b t th h l iht f hih i l libt" Raceconscious interpretation of raceneutral laws often elicited candid commen tary from the courts Thus in 1824 the Supreme Court of Virginia opined: Th titi i d thi l f l [fr f l] of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution both of this Stt d f th U i t d S t t t th fr hit d t t tht h th i t t h tb idd t t d ll t b t h l f population We will only instance the restriction upon the migration of free blacks into thi S t t d thi iht t b This "freebutnotequal" regime reached its apogee in Dred Scott, when the US Su preme Court ruled 7 2 that blacks were not citizens of the United States hence they l k d " t d i " t bi li it f d l t {Scott Sanford [1856] 60 US 393) Chif J t i T d t h t th t fiitil t i t l t (th " i i l d i i t i " ) d t "th l " b th C t i t t i ldd hit T h f blk t d i tit f l i i thi ti th iil di i t i f t i l i t i h i T thik t h i ld t i l (i T ' id) bdit l tht ittd b l k ld b titld t t l f l f t t t t t t hld bli ti l i t i l ffi and "to keep and carry arms wherever they w e n t " The history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that Congress explicitly intended to overturn Taney's Dred Scott jurisprudence Today guncontrol laws no longer wear a racist face de jure C t l i t d fl liftidibld b f d l l f h i i f iti A d d i t i l l it i f d l ff t ll di f f iti t (1) h d i t d f fl f i i th t ( t f tt id ) (2) f i t i f jti (3) f dditd t l l l d (4) djditd tll i t t (5) dittd t tl 196

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ititti (6) d i h b l d i h d f th ilit (7) h has renounced US citizenship; (8) illegal aliens; (9) anyone under a court restrain ing order for stalking or presenting a credible threat to an intimate partner or partner's child (Halbrook 1998) Violators face up to ten years in federal prison A DPGC i i tht t ifill dd t t th b l t i th l i b t i h t t h d d iti f t h ifd b lt l F l h th G C t l A t f 1968 t d i t th f d l i i l d C d l d it i t th f thi titl t l d F d l titi or burdens on lawabiding citizens with respect to the acquisition possession or use of fi i t t th fh t i t h t i t t h t i l tti th l f l t i i t d t h t thi titl i t i t d d t di l i i t th i t hi f fi b l bidi iti f l f l ( K i 1995 137)

Strict Gun Control Stit h d i t

t l (SGC) f t l l i tht ill tit h d i d t li d th ffiil dt iili i i t b i Th d i b i l i t h l d i t i f d d t dfii djditd i t d t l f t h mental illness The resulting inequality between "the people" and the state could not be clearer Machiavelli put it plainly "There simply is no equality between a man who is armed and one who is not" (Machiavelli 1981: 88) f SGC t ti f iitil titlt l tht Jtifiti A l t t i l th t t ' i h t li i t l lt bli it t t jtif i f t f SGC f d t l t i t t i l iht i P t f SGC l dili i t ti b ll t F t t i l th it "t b t " Th A i A d fPditi (AAP) h ftd " d l " SGC sans strategic disclaimers The AAP's model law would ban the manufacture purchase and possession of handguns Among the bill's legislative "findings" s: "except in the hands of law enforcement officers or others specifically authorized by l h d l i t i t l f l d titt h d t h bli h l t h d lf f th l d i l l th hild f thi S t t " d l i litil ti i l d th f l l i (1) i Th A d ' th l i l t i d t i f i d i h t b t th t i b it l t th f th t t ' i h t li t h ti l d iht l ildi th t b production sale purchase or possession of handguns on publicinterest grounds; (2) by excluding selfdefense as a legitimate lawful purpose for possessing a hand gun and by recognizing "sporting purpose" as the only legitimate lawful purpose f i f k i d th l j t f th if fidi i l d d t l l l t h t lfdf i l i t i t l f l i f d l 197

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sine qua non

Ipso facto,

(n/

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N t i l Sft C i l ' d t d t d dli an especially steep decline over the past decade

i ftl f

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Guns as Environmental Toxins G per se f i l t d l t d J i l Jti d Dli

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very strong relationship between owning illegal guns, delinquency and drug use Sev it t t i 24 t it tf t f th i l l l i d 41 t d Boys who own legalfirearms,however, have much lower rates of delinquency and drug use and are even slightly less delinquent than nonowners of guns.

The socialization into gun ownership is also vastly different for legal and illegal gun Th h l l h fth h f t d hti O th th h d th h illl h fid h illl d are far more likely to be gang members For legal gunowners socialization appears to tk l i th f i l f i l l l it t tk l th t t (Offi f J i l J t i d Dli P t i 199418 hi ddd) A l i td ld h fild t d i t i i h b h d l l l f th h d th i l l l l It ld h " f d " tht " i b " h h d dli t h h i h th i b Th t t study would have ignored that socialization and parenting are the key independent variables and urged more stringent gun control instead Since at least 1986 criminologists have had good evidence that felons despite t h i lifti l l dibilit f i d iti t hih t th th l lti O b i l it i i t h th lti bt i d il th t i t i t hth i i l il i i f i t l lt ith l f l i bt t ith l l i H th lti h fil t id i f t i dd f t i l li d k littl b t d l t litil t i t d

G

P l

Sil C

f th US H i i d

Rt

Th A i i t i hl bl t t h t f th G7 ti A ica's assault rate is also roughly comparable to those countries However the American homicide rate is much higher The number of guns owned by American civilians is much greater Does America's higher homicide rate result from the t b f i i l i d ? Fi dt it i t l 70 t fh i i d i th U i t d Stt H d d t it th d t jit f fi h i id I d d th t fh i i d i t t d ith f h hld kbl t d i th 1920 ( K l k 1991) C i i l i t Zii d H k i l d t h t "Th i t t i l i d i t i tht i l i t

199

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Shooting Industry

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Figure 15.1 Homicide rate in the US 1900-1998 Source: National Center for Health Statistics Vital Statistics

1980

1985

1990

1995

Figure 15.2 Homicide victimization by gender in the US 1976-1999 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics How can we explain the recent sharp drop in the homicide rate? Handguns have not become scarce among American civilians On the contrary gun industry production data reported to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms says that Americans own more high-capacity pistols and assault-style rifles than ever But even more remarkable we have no evidence that handguns suddenly have become scarce among felons or other illegal possessors. Nevertheless the decline in the homicide rate of the past decade is almost entirely owing to a decline in handgun homicides Obviously the addition of millions of handguns and assault-style weapons to the civilian gun supply during the past decade is compatible with a substantial decline in both the homicide total and the rate An economic theory might hypothesize that 202

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1980

Figure 15.3 H i i d Source B fJ t i

itiiti Sttiti

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Figure 15.4 P t Source B fJ t i

1985

b

1990

1995

i th US 19761999

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Age of victim

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i l i

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f iti

i th US 197699

t t d t d th h i i d t hil h d i ti tend to increase it During the 1990s the economy was very strong Ergo The National Center for Health Statistics graph (figure 151) enables cursory exam ination of this hypothesis (and many others) The Great Depression was obviously a id f b t t i l i t t th h i i d t d l i d d i th D i N th f i i l il t th h f th t i ' d dii lt i h i i d t f th ti t Slti ad hoc l i i tilfit h S l l dt t f i d d P h th t h dli i th h i i d t lt f ddi t th lti 3 5 illi iili l i d t h d ld l l novation that began in 1987 and now includes thirtythree states (Lott 2000) The reasoning might go like this Uniformed police officers because of their high visibil ity almost certainly have higher "reassurance value" to the lawabiding public th d d ffi Bt i f d ffi h l d t t fft

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1980

Figure 15.5 H i i d Source: B fJ t i

b Sttiti

t

1985

1990

1995

i th US 19761999

on violent criminals because their visibility makes them avoidable However the deterrent effect of undercover officers on predatory criminals is likely to be much h i h th tht f i f d ff b thi " f l " t i tl tit Th it i t bl t tht l i i iili t ld h d dt i i l il btt th d t h t it t iti tliti f th d t b t Th i l t t i i l t i h th td i ( d i d ) lti f dti i t d d t t that his victim or someone nearby may be armed Perhaps the decline in the homicide rate results in part from the legalization of abortion in 1973 Legal abortions total between 1 1 and 1 6 million per year Suppose hlf f b t d i l H d th i d d h d th idiidl b ilid d i t hihl dti f il l th ti t h i t i t th lti ld t d t h b t t i l d d ft th ld h b b i t th h i i d t 182 5

Guns and Social Causation of the Homicide Rate Social causation is a troublesome concept Poverty youngadult age and male sex l t hihl ith th tti f il H f th i th j i t l jitl ffiit diti f h i i d ffdi Y blk l i ti likl t t t d t b iti f il th thi hit t t H t l hth blk hit kill lt M t dt i i l t t l lt kill Siill h i i d ittd with myriad sharp and blunt instruments as well as by kicking and punching So guns are neither necessary nor sufficient for homicide Are poor young males who own guns legally more likely to commit homicide than poor young males who do fJ t i Stti t h illll? W d't k b t th B

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ti' td fj i l dli t t h t th dititi tt O b i l characteristics significantly associated with an increased probability of homicide offending are not thereby social causes of homicide offending A theory of social causation does not ask whether gun possession might have h l d t d th l f t l f l f hi d i d t i t th tibti t hi i iltl N F d i h lid th th f l d i ( l "hlli i i " ) t hi Th tht hi blit b i dit lti f b i f f l i d G i i d d h i t t d ith hi b l hl i thi Bt i l l i l t strengthen others' sense of personal responsibility and selfrestraint we can con clude nothing whatsoever about the net social tendency of gun possession of illegal gun possession or of legal gun possession For example Thomas Jefferson wrote to hi h Pt C "A t bd k th id t A t th i f i I d i th Whil thi i d t i t th b d it i bld t i di d d t th id lt t h f b th t t i f lk N thik f tki b k ith " A dt h iti d h thi ht b t th ti net social effects of illegal versus legal gun possession among the population Establishing causation for rare events is a trickier business still For example the incidence of suicide in the US is approximately 1 1 / 1 0 0 0 0 0 It follows that 9 9 9 8 9 t f th lti d t it i i d i i S i i d l i t h t t t d t t t dl bli libl diti f iid t il I i dl itiit i l d t fl iti I i dl ifit ild t fl ti ( J b 1999) H t h f tht diti d t lf i h i h l bjti d "liil" M h i t tk i i I l t i l itti "d tlf" d t l t h l i b t it t i t i h idfiitl

Mechanism in Causal Accounts A d t t f" i l t i " i (1) t b l i h i th it f d itt iti bt d d t ibl ( th h i i d t) d i d d t ibl ( l ) d (2) th f h i lii h th dti fh i i d t d t lt f possession How closely matched should the concomitant variation be in order to nominate it for candidacy as a causal relation: 90 percent? 50 percent? 20 percent? Even when the covariance is "close enough" it remains to be determined what ht? D il l t i f tti d ii k t h i i l t l ill ikl t it i l t t? G il (ldd) i S th d t jit f it i l t t If ht (ldd) i i l ? A th f h i f il f t i it i diti t l lti b li tb k d ti db ldi i ttibti f

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ti F l td " f d " b iti " i i f i t relationship" between "increased risk of mortality" and "hospital admission" Fur ther suppose that "hospitalization" was "independently associated" with a forty eight times greater risk of mortality (compared to nonhospitalized patients) Should li tiht tht h i t l i t i " i " f t i h t f l d tit' ik f tlit? " I " i i t ti If hld't i f l hll th ti t h t tit i diil ll d i d t t d i l dti f h i t l i t i ? I th U i t d S t t i t l 2 3 illi dth h th jit i h i t l T i l l l h i t l i d b th ffitl ill to meet admission criteria or have symptoms that warrant careful study Both factors are associated by common sense with an increased risk of mortality quite apart from hospitalization Thus hospitalization is a "marker" associated with the b l t i ti d ik f tlit t fi d ik

M t l

C t i

A plausible theory of mental causation makes lethal violence the upshot of desire strength Possession of a loaded handgun may play a causal role in the etiology of violence by (1) seeding the agent's motivational structure with a new rresistible di t iflit l t h l i j (2) t t h l d t di t iflit ij ffitl t th t' f l ffti ihibit di (3) k i hi t h i ffti ihibit di fth biti ( M l 1987) It i tht f lif' ti t i l t i l i bt t i t di t i f l i t bdil h B th di h t l i d lbit i t t ft th b t bf i t t iflit ij H if ti d l d d iid th i t t i effects with desire strength will tend to result in death or crippling injury Causation might proceed as follows Joe SixPack acquires a handgun (and am i t i ) Hldi th l d d ( i t t i l l ) d k d J Si P k bl t k hi l d i t i ( t) l t h l d i ffitl t t hi ti it Th lti t i t i l tt b h tht J bl t d i t hi t t t i f il b i t t i l l thiki f thi l f l b iidl ti t h i l f th lti h i l i l fft f ht flh th i i b l l f hi t f lif t h t bl ld lt f hi lli th t i d I t d h f exclusively on the favorable aspects of destroying what angers him His will is overwhelmed Without deliberation he fires the gun On this account Joe Six Pack's agency is destroyed His abilities to access and to effectively employ his t h i ffti l f t l t h i d i d h l d b iitibl di J b i l i t t h iti f i th h h t t H th di l ti't t libl i it t k it Th i i t i b l d i t iflit i l i ij dth lti i J ' l f l f t l i l t ff fth f t J ' i t t i i li

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i ht h d b t t th l t h l d i ' d t ttl d i It remains unexplained why Joe holds the gun by its grip rather than by its barrel or in some other way why he places his finger inside its trigger guard rather than somewhere else and finally how it comes to pass that of all the possible directions th iht h b i t d it i t d t th i t i il i i d t ith th ' dih I h t th " i i n b l d i l n i l f t l " t k l h ffd t t i ( l f i ? ) h l i l k t h It k l h ffd libl t f tl ti i l i fi t t i l t l If th f f d l t t l t it d i d f making reference to the guiding force of his intentions after that in which case it is hard to explain how things actually worked out as they did A refined version of mental causation might propose that the formation of the iitibl di t iflit i l i ij dth b f ht d t d i J ' i t t i f t l l i d i ht h O th dd t J ' l f l f t l i " f l " l l f bilit t d t t t h ihibit di ffiitl t t th d f t t h t h t hi l t h l d i h i d Th lti l t h l d i th id all the things he does subsequently But he does them all intentionally even f he acts contrary to his prior allthingsconsidered better judgment Such an account makes perfect sense It is consistent with what the law calls a "ht b l d d t" " kti t " Wh d t i i t h t h killd i th h t f i f k f ill dittd d i ld t l h t i th t tht b d i t hi ( i i liti ff l d ) H ith l t h i k th i thi il b t i th t i l fiitibl d i killd d i i t kill i f l i t i l i ij

The Paradox of Gun Control and Reasonable Policies D i f3

th d d f th 1990 d t i dti ttl id f illi (1992) t h i h f 4 9 5 1 d 4 3 illi i 1993 1994 d 1995 t i l I 1996 dti fll b 5 0 0 0 0 0 Th B d L d 1992 d td N b 30 1993 Th lld A l t W L d i 1993 d td S t b 13 1994 I 1999 th D t t fJti blihd td f th l t t ' i i l i l f f t It ld t detect any because "the weapons banned by this legislation were used only rarely in gun crimes" However the law had other effects that were clearly detectable " F l d b th b lti i b dti f lt d i th th l d i t th b [ P d t i ] b th 120 t f t i t d f 91000 ll b t 1989 d 1993 t b t 2 0 4 0 0 0 i 1 9 9 4 " Th d f t l tht t l l h d l i t t i t iili t ifi t f d i ( " l t t l " ifl d h i i t i ) ill t i l t dti d i

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d i i t i f th t t d it iili A ll t gun market where almost everyone who wants a gun probably owns several exogenous factors (eg "reasonable" gun control) will stimulate demand more strongly than endogenous factors (eg product improvement or novelty) Thus the lilti l f tll tt h "ild" itd d t i t b d l

C

l

i

When thinking about further guncontrol measures in America the following con siderations should be kept in mind:

1 Th

iili

l i A i

A l d i th il t 3 E "ild" t l 4 H d b l They will likely fail to be targeted by prohibition 5 There is some evidence i i l il d 6 It i t bl t h d i 7 P l h hld t l l l dibld f

i

2

l

l i

tibl

ith

t i d

dli

l ill t i l t l ill t l tit t f tit t l enacted They will strongly stimulate demand for items that concealed carry laws have a deterrent effect on t b f i l tliti f i tht ti dditil l l titi ill d th h i i d t b t t d ith f b t f d l l i d iti f lifti

A

k

l

d

t

I am indebted to and here rely on the analytical work done by Tyler O'Connell Davidson Class 2000 Tyler worked as my research assistant during the summer of 1999

Rf Franklin J H (1971) The Free Negro in North Carolina 1790-1860 New York: W W Nt H l b k S (1998) Freedmen the Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms 18661876 W t t CT P Hughes Todd C and Hunt Lester H (2000) The liberal basis of the right to bear arms Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (1) 1 2 5 J b D l G ( d ) (1999) The Harvard Medical School Guide to Suicide Assessment and Intervention S F i J B Kleck Gary (1991) Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America New York: Aldine de Gruyter

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Korwin Alan (1995) Gun Laws of America Phoenix AZ: Bloomfield Press Lott Jr John R (2000) M G L Ci Udtdi Ci d G Ctl Ls Chicago: University of Chicago Press Machiavelli Niccolo (1981) Th Pi New York: Penguin Mele Alfred R (1987) Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia Selfdeception and Selfcontrol New York: Oxford University Press National Safety Council (1999) Ij Ft (wwwnscorg/irs/statinfo/99reporthtml) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1994) Ub Dli d Sbt Abuse: Initial Findings (wwwncjrsorg/pdfflles/urdelpdf) Stell Lance K (2001) Gun control and the regulation of fundamental rights C i i l Jti Ethis 20: 28 Wheeler Samuel (1997) Self-defense and coerced risk-acceptance Public Affairs Quarterly 11: 431 (1999) Arms as insurance Pbli Affi Qtly 13: 111 Zimring Franklin E and Hawkins Gordon (1992) Th Citi' Gid t G C t l New York: Macmillan

Further reading Calabresi Guido and Melamed A Douglas (1972) Property rules liability rules and inalien85 (6): 1089-128 ability: one view of the cathedral H d L Riw DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) 489 US 189 Donohue m John J and Levitt Steven D (2001) The impact of legalized abortion on crime Q t l J l f E i s 106 (2): 379-420 Feldman T B and Johnson P W (1992) The self-object function of weapons: a self-psychAd f P h l i s 20 (4): 561-76 ology examination J l f th A i Higginbotham Jr Leon (1978) I th Mtt f Cl R d th Ai Ll Ps New York: Oxford University Press Jh Aldid v Th C l t h (1824) 4 Va 447 LaFollette Hugh (2000) Gun control Ethics 110: 266 Roth Jeffrey A and Koper Christopher S (1999) I t f th 1994 A l t W B 199496 Washington DC: US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice Shk v Uitd Stt (1919) 249 US 47 Stell Lance K (1986a) Close encounters of the lethal kind: the use of deadly force n self defense Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (1): 113-24 (1986b) Gun politics and reason J l fA i Clte 9 (2): 126-53 (1991) The legitimization of female violence In Newton Garver (eds) Jti L d Vile pp 241-59 Philadelpia: Temple University Press W v Ditit f Clbi (1981) 444 A2d 1 Wright J D and Rossi P H (1986) Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and thi F i s New York: Aldine de Gruyter Zimring Franklin E (1997) Ci i t th Pbl Lthl Vil i A i a New York: Oxford University Press

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16 Citihi WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

Citihi i b h i f l f i litil it N d th i l f i t i h i t d t b th t t b t l l b iti f btt litil iti h f d l i f tt iti lik th E Ui Citihi t t ith b h i f th kid f d iti d f d b f l lii d l preference and ethnicity Like "justice" in the 1970s and "community" in the 1980s "citizenship" has b f th t l ii t f ti litil t h i i t R t t i f ll th j h l f litil t h h t libl ti iti ilit f i i t d bli h f l t th d t dd th " i t i h i d b t " (Shfi 1998) I d d th i t t i i t i h i h b it t h t it t h t t tk th fild Aft ll l t bl i l i t i l th d l i t i l thi can be redefined as an issue concerning the complex relationships between the individual society and the state that are the stuff of citizenship Moreover because the term "citizenship" has such positive connotations in political argument it s ft d t d t tht ll b t th i l A D i l W i t k t th h t i l lt itihi ft " t h th th t dd ti iht t li ititti ti t h t ld j t tl b d i b d itht f t i t i h i " ( W i t k 2002 244) It i till ti ht t fi b t d i d i t f th f itihi th th th f jti d W ill t t thi ti ft l k i t f th i t t t debates What is undeniably helpful about the recent "return of the citizen" to Anglo American political thought is the renewed understanding of how "the health of the libl bli d d d bilit t titt t l litil i t i t ti bt it tt f i l lif d iti h t " ( M d 1996 240) Thi f th b h i d l f i d i i d l iti k itihi t l t i f l dditd t i i l i d thi

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Th N t

f Citihi

T i l l t t th fi flli d th bi ditiihi f i t l t d t fi d i i d l ' munities and the sorts of debates they raise

f " i t i h i " it i b h i f litil

th

Citizenship as a legal status Citizenship is in part a legal status and contrasts with the status of noncitizen immigrants and refugees or in earlier times with the status of noncitizen subjects hild f d l C t dbt di th l l tt f itihi h t d d t f t ti f t ht th t d hih i i t h l d b bl t i itihi tt i thi h ? S d h t h l d b th ifi l l i h t d bliti h i h t t h t th tt f iti? W ill t di th f ti h l t h h it h b j t i i t ill i E ti hih h t hitill t h l " i i t t i " bt hih h l numbers of foreigners living permanently in their countries Our main focus is on the second question and on recent debates to expand or restrict the rights and duties of citizenship Citizenship as identity It i l t h h t t b i t t t h t th t t f i t i h i mean thi t i d i i d l i th d t h t th identify ith t h i litil it h ih thi b h i i it d fl ti id b t it A i t i h i idtit t ith i t i d i i d l i t i i t t bt l ith b h i f th litil iti ( h f d l i th t ) d b h i f th t f "idtit " dfid b lii d thi it l f Th i tht l' i t i h i idtit h been losing out in this competition with other individual or communal identities and that action must be taken to strengthen it Citizenship as solidarity Cll hld The idea complex to divide

l t d t th b t i t i h i i d t i t i th b l i f t h t i t i h i l h th primary l f it d lidit here is that it can provide the most appropriate form of "social cement" in diverse modern societies in which anonymous citizens are otherwise ikely along other identity and class lines Citizenship as civic virtue

C t l t th d f i i t i f i t i h i i t h t it i litil it U l i k bjt iti h tiit til d ibl i th th d t t

b h i f self-governing th i h t d h l litil il d l t l 211

WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

b t t t f thi it H th i i f t h t th ii virtues are in decline in Western societies replaced by civic apathy or passivity f not individual egoism or group fundamentalism Much intellectual effort has been devoted to identifying the primary virtues of citizenship and the best ways for state t t ititti t t th it d

Rt

f th Citi

Attti t th d t i kill it d l l t f iti i ld W t political thought itself Socrates chose execution over fleeing the city in violation of his duties of citizenship Aristotle and Roman thinkers reserved a central place for theories of citizenship even if they held rather exclusionary conceptions of citizen hi b t d d S t h i l t d ti f itihi R i d i E l i h t t thik i th b b f d i th I t l i li tditi f Mhilli M t i dR t th th f th Federalist Papers d T i l l F h f th t t i t h t h b t itihi t k back seat to concerns about justice and what John Rawls (1971) would call the "basic structure" or major institutions of society and the state As democracy spread throughout the century so too did state bureaucracies and a belief among bth litil thik dt h t t h t th f d t l hll t di t t ititti tht ld d l i llbi d t t th d d i t i b t it f i l Citi l t h h t f h th th I h llbi d t h t k O i l l th lld t d f d thi h l d d h t f t l th kd t t dt t b l l t f th litil t th f l t proposing the best set of institutions and public policies A confluence of largely unrelated factors began to conspire against this dominance of "institutionbased" political thinking in both political and intellectual circles in the 1990 Aft l t t i i i tW t t t t h h t th t i d b t h th l f t d th i h t b t d i t th i b i l i t f th d lf tt t f d i t i t t i l f f h i bl fl t l t lf d d d di bli d t i At th ti h i i f th t iti ( dlii ti t ) d li ti f t d i t i l t liti Al f fidtit liti f i l t thi tili i E t E t f ff i i ltiltli aboriginal and black militancy in Western Europe and North America seemed every where on the rise challenging traditional assumptions about common membership of society Western Europe faced difficult debates over the maturation of the European kid f t t ith f l i t i h i ll d t d Ui ( d ft l ) fl f i t f th t df f l i Ad II Et E d i t l i t f th i f ith littl " i l itl" i iil it i till All f th bl ld d h l l d th b i ti f tt ft b t th id i b t th tiiti it idtiti d 212

CITIZENSHIP

llti f iti N f th bl ld b l d ll b ti and better institutions They also required the creation of good citizens: citizens with capacities for cooperation and tolerance and the virtues of publicspiritedness and responsibility In short many political observers came to see changes to our prac ti f itihi ith diti f bjti f fibl ti t t i l lti t th bl Th i iti f th i t f ti d ibl i t i h i f th h l t h f l i b l d t th ti th i b t th d l i i iilit d bliiitd I d d th h tlk t litil t t b t " i i " f itihi By the early 1990s several academics had also announced more or less inde pendently that "citizenship" was the new "buzzword" of political philosophy Part of the explanation for this is that academics had begun looking at the political hll i th ld d i b d b d f d t h t th b t t ti t h i fi t i t t i l j t i th h d b dfdi f l t ti hd littl di t ff At t th d b t f d i t R l i libl t h i fj t i hd b i f t d d d b i i i l b t t d f t l Th f itihi ffd t b t h if into these debates In particular citizenship seemed like an ideal concept to inte grate the traditional liberal concern about justice with the concern of communi tarians conservatives multiculturalists and disaffected socialists about community Citihi i l l dfid i t fidiidl t i t l t lik l i b l ti fjti b t it i l b t b h i f d idtifiti ith iti Citihi t h f idd l t h t ll id ld i k d f Ad th d i l t d t tt f itihi i j i d i i l l th f ii bli ddlibti d t h hd i l f d t h l t th i fd b t tht h d l t d th democratic id f l i b l d t i th

Liberal Citizenship on Trial I th 1970 d 1980 th i i l dbt i A l A i l i t i l hil h i l d th d f iti flibl t h i fjti ith t i i t lii h t th d d i d ith i R l ' A Theory of Justice Wh th l f th d b t hiftd t i t i h i i th 1990 l i b l i i provided the focal point although theorists no longer looked to Rawls for the touchstone interpretation of a liberal theory of citizenship Instead most partici pants in the new citizenship debates turned to a 1949 essay by the British sociolo it T H M h l l " C i t i h i d S i l C l " ( M h l l 1965) F M h l l l i b l d t i i t i h i i fll d l b h i f th t t d th t ffti b h i i f th t t t t id f iti hi i h t M h l l d i i d d i t i h i i h t i t th t civil i h t h f d f lii df d f bit t political i h t i l d i th iht t t d f bli ffi l ith f d f th d social iht h th i h t t bli d t i hlth lf d ld 213

WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

i I E l d M h l l th th kid f i t i h i iht i successive waves with civil rights arriving in the eighteenth century political rights in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century And along with the gradual expansion of the rights of citizenship came an expansion of th l f iti hih iill i l d d l t i t t t A l t h h thi did t l i th t i (f l R i hd i l iht bf th hd i i f t l i t i l i h t ) it ff iid i l l t t i fh th t t d i f itihi tt i i b th btti i h t t h t b k it Thi l i b l ti f itihi i t h f i h t b d (A th A i Supreme Court once put it citizenship "is the right to have rights") There is no corresponding emphasis on the need for citizens to be active patriotic or virtuous Of course Marshall hoped that securing these rights would promote active citizen hi titi lidit d ii it I d d h d t h t ll f th ld fl t l l f l l f t i i lf tt M h l l t l d ith th status f d itihi bt l ith it l i filitti th solidarity d identity t f itihi F M h l l d ti t f libl flli hi th f l l t i f itihi i a liberaldemocratic welfare state By guaranteeing civil political and social rights to all the welfare state ensures that every citizen feels like a full and equal member able to participate in identify with and enjoy the common life of the it Thi l t d i d f l f t t libl d ttk f ll id b th d f th t t i t h t Of th hd l b itii f b t h th i h t d th lft t h t th lf tt j t b it ith t t h Th " i t i h i " bjti h d i t d th tti t h t th lf tt d th f l l tii ti f ll iti R t h th i tht lf i i t t d i or that it was unfair to force the better off to pay for those unwilling to work conservative theorists now argued that many social rights actually served as barriers to full participation of the lesswelloff in society Welfare they argued creates lt f i d d tht t th it bjt th th ti ibl iti M th lft h l d iil i b t th iit d d b th lf tt l t h h th t h h t t h t thi id t i t t t i f il iht Ol ith i l d f l ld h t hi fll lit t h d i th kl Lfti i t l l t l l b d th iit f th l d d th ki who failed to mobilize and to actively demand justice (or revolution) Much of the leftwing discourse after the retreat of democratic socialist parties in the West and state socialist regimes in the East shifted from an explicit critique of capitalism to a d d f t titi f d th d b t b l ti tht t l d tiit d t i di ld l d t f ill i lii I h t libl itihi fltd i Mhll' dl f d t i lf tt i i l b d i lfih i d i i b l iti th th ti l l d it iti

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Schools of citizenship The new discourse of citizenship also gave rise to competing accounts of where to find the best "schools" of citizenship and civic virtue If the liberal status quo breeds l i iti h iht b t t hi h t b ti d i t ? O t t it th th l i b l t t t th rights f itihi bt h iti t l b t db t i t d t flfill t h i duties d responsibilities i t i ? T h i t fdifft h l h l k d t th t i it f thi t th ti th k t iil i t d t If welfare breeds passivity then the obvious solution according to conservatives is to expose the longterm unemployed s t a y a t h o m e single mothers and the like to the rigors of the market Part of the idea here is that a primary responsibility of b l b d i d iti i t d h t th t tt h l d thi f i l i Fil t t t t t t thi b l i t i i t diiih ' tdi fll d l b f th i t i th f ' fll iti Thi i d dt " b d t i t l t " i i d " k f " hih id lf i i t t k f thi b f t ll it f h to disqualify large numbers of people from welfare altogether While this "citizen ship" rationale for trimming back welfare entitlements first arose among conserva tive thinkers and politicians in the 1980s by the 1990s it had spread far enough th litil t tht tit D t i i d t f th U i t d Stt ld t k id i hi ti "di lf k it" i iil t Of it i ildi t t il i t i h i d th lf tt ith th f lf it t th h i l l l d It ld b diffilt t t h t th t l f th lf tt h hih lit bli d t i i l hlth d ld i b d i ity among their recipients On the contrary ensuring that the less welloff are healthy and well educated is an obvious way to support their full participation n society Few people argue that the quality of a child's education or health care hld d d h h hi h t k S b i th i f th kt t b th l th i fiihi h l f d itihi I d d tl t i T i l l ti iti h id b t th i hih kt tiiti i tithtil t l itihi d l i d i t it d d if lfih d t i i l b h i d th ifl f i liti t th f l lit f l i t i l tii tion Another school of citizenship is participation in civil society Civil society is that sector of society that lies between government and the market on one side and the l i t l ff i l df i d th th It i d f l t iti lik h h ti hiti thi iti t t l i t t i lb dditi t i t l iti t d i d th lik F T i l l (2000) i d d tii ti i i i l it f th k t th fA i d i it fit t H th iti i iil it " h l f d " 215

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t h i th it f bliiitd ti d iilit B th tk V l H l th f i t ( d l t ) t i t idt f C h l k i th lt b f iil it t i d th C i t P t f th t t b t l t th t i t i t d i E t E Th d iti f th i t f iil i t f th i d i tii f hlth il fbi i f th t fhi tibti f th itihi t i t litil t h h t C h i f iil it h l f itihi l t t h t iil it id th f h iti t likl t t k ti l dbti lii d ti t li llti l It i l t tht iti f t d i t thi iti d i t l i t l l i th l d t i di b hli t l th i d litil fl b fidiidl t h th f t i di l t t i f bli li Bt iti h itd t iil it t th i b d f d t i iti f fll tiiti i di d t i i t Th l t t f b h i f th iti f iil it tht l likl t fid t h l dbti d ti ith i d i i d l h h lik t h l (fll i t h i t J h h ' Wit S bi A i t ) O th h d thi k i d f i d littl t b f th dil l l i fi t t d l tht h t i t d i Ad th th "th i ik tht ' idtit d i t t b i i l d ith til iil it ill t li i hih b th i t t f ll ' fll iti t h h th i tittd b ' idtit" ( W i t k 2002 255) I i h b h d l t b d ihb d d l i h t i th l iit b t i h b h d iti l t h

l

t

t

th

"NIMBY" ( " t

i

b k

d")

i i l

h

it

t th l t i f h hlf h d bli k Siil thi ld b id f f i l i hih d t i h l h i h i f ti t ti h h h i h i h t t h blid df d tl f th f i t h thi hih iht t h jdi i t th d Th t k i it f b d i kt d thii iil it Bt t t f t t h t ith f ti th f f i t d t f f i t iti d t it t d th f d t i itihi ( i t iti d ti lik th B S t h thi ii t h i t i h i b t th t i ) it h l d h d l b ii t h t th f l l h t If ith th kt iil it d th f i l b lid ll d d h l f th i t f itihi tht ld t l t itlf t l t th t k Th t b thi dd b t hifti th f f i t i h i th t th i f h tt ititti hl t i it itihi Aft ll th i i l i f thi k i d f t h i i t h it iti ld k th i t i t t i f tt k btt th th i t i t t i f tt ld k iti k btt O b i l 216

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t h h th i d i l t i h i bt th ffti fititti d the quality and activity of citizenship and there may be much that state institutions can do to improve this relationship Unfortunately most of the critiques of the orthodox liberal model of citizenship h f t ti i thi d If th bl i i b l b t iht d ibiliti th bl lti ld b ith t tk itihi iht t f dditil i t i h i dti H it i h d t f d iti h f dti i th b i litil iil i h t f l i b l i t i h i ( l lf iht i l d ttk) h f tt ti t f i t i h i dti O til imagine some potential policies in this regard If civility is important we could pass Good Samaritan laws If political participation and voter turnout are mportant we could make voting mandatory If publicspiritedness and patriotism are important ld i id f dt t i l it i If i i l i t i t h h t t b th b t h l f itihi ld tt f i i f lii d th iti l ith t lti i iil it t t th f f itl d i i i t i i tid b fit iti If bli h l b t bl t teach responsible citizenship because they require children of different races reli gions and social classes to sit together we could prohibit religious and private schools B t th t fh h d d d t t i l l illibl lii h t b f d i th iti f l i b l i t i h i ( l t h h th d i f t it i d d i ) I t d ll t ft i th i t i h i l i t t th i littl th l t tht i t i h i d iilit th d tht it ld k b t t if th l i it i d i d t I th tt h h i d t t i iti f th t l f t t ti f itihi h f ithi th l i b l t d i t i itself; in part because it has most fully taken up the challenge of how to rethink he state's role as a "school of citizenship" with special emphasis quite literally on how state schools and education policy could be harnessed to cultivate and promote it lik iilit t l bliiitd d f jti

Citihi Th f i d i i did not live up to their seriously the cultivation 1990 h t h i t b th i Th id h i tht iti tht t i l l ti d i h b "

d D i i t

h d d d th b l i f t h t l i b l d t i iti promises in the postwar era because they failed to take of a virtuous active and patriotic citizenry By the late likl t d i i t th th th hll t t ti f itihi t d i t i l dl t k f td ltll h diidd i i l l l li M h l l f l d t i t t th ki l h l k f d l d d th f th " l t " tht h l d i d h i t " Of i f i d t i d

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t ti t l d th tff f tki fll d t f t h i iti ship rights But many groups including racial minorities women indigenous peoples religious minorities gays and lesbians feel excluded from a common culture not primarily because they are economically disadvantaged (although ex l i ft l d t thi) b t b th different. I d d t h i t ti h t h th it lt i thi t d h t h thi i thi t h t it d th t t h l d b t i t t At t i f thd ti f itihi d lt tht i t t d th ti d thiki Ath fd i b i th t hll f i t i h i i di iti is to think of this as a fourth wave of citizenship rights Having gained civil polit ical and social rights we are now seeing demands for cultural rights: rights to the accommodation of cultural difference On this "multiculturalist" view members of ti ld b i t d i t th litil it t l i d i i d l b t l t h h th d thi i t i h i iht ld d d i t thi b h i Ii M i Y (1990) ll thi " d i f f t i t d i t i h i " W hll i l f d i f f t i t d iht bl F t h i t th id fdifftitd i t i h i i O the standard view citizenship is by definition a matter of treating individuals as equal persons with equal rights under the law This is what distinguishes modern democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that determined l' litil t t b thi lii thi l b h i M ll iti tht l t i l t l iht d i th t b i l f l i b l d t i itihi ildi f d jti dd Th ltiltlit d f d fdifftitd itihi d tht l iti hi tll i d i f f t i l ditibti f itihi iht i d t d t th il d d idtiti f th b f l t l Lt ikl f th l t i l t l iht bi d d d d then examine how they may or may not challenge the values of democratic citizen ship

M l t i l t l Riht A lit f d d i l t i l t l i h t i t h t th i b l tt i ti i t t l ith tt lt I ll t f it f th d i t l t l M t f th il dti d d d b minority groups are meant to address what they see as the inherent unfairness of an "undifferentiated" citizenship that does not recognize the special predicament of ti iiti J b L (2000) h d i t i i h d i h t t f l t l iht tht ht b i Difft t f t d t kf difft t f l t l iht d f if d d ll f th Th i t t ll f th t fd d h ( K l i k dN 2000 2 4 3 0 ) b t it i th ti t h i i t if l b iti f ltiltli ft i t ll h d d ith th b h 218

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F i t it h

l

b

f F

t i l h th l

tW t ti hd S d l i l f h td il ti t J i h h k h ihd f lii t l S t d bt S d If th t l l d t S d th it ld b i i b l f th h t t b bl t b t h ti t h i lii d i titi i b i G t i th ti fi b th d i t i f S d th "d f t" l l t ltll t l d i i i W t tt it t d f th f t t h t th h d Chiti jiti I ti t f th " t i iht" d d d i l th b l i f f lii iiti Th i l d ti f ti d d h th flit ith l i i i t f ilit i f lii ifit df h i hild ttd t i kid f l ( d t i ) i bli h l Rltdl kf d S h " i t iht" l fili ft f t libl d i f bth l t l d " l t l " ( h th d i b l d ) Th i l d f fititi t hl b f hitill d i d t d d i i t l iht hth t i th titi f b f t i l iiti t bl i i t t i it i f bli i t i t t i M t i l l ill idi l d t i l iiti d d A l i th l lilti d t d b th t fQ b tht t i t d th i h t t Elih il i d t t t th lt f th F h k i j i t i th i E t i l S t i th l f d th ll i i i l it b t h t f t i d iti i hih t t d t t t i l d Bt ti l d d th I l i i l diidd iti lik I d i dI l lii h i i f i t d f t l fil l d thi thit t l b k th l tt f (f l t d th l i h t t i i t i t di ihit t ) It i l i i l t i t f th l l t d i t i f idi l i t th l tt' l if thi ti t i t th iht f f idi iti idi idi l d I dditi th t difft t f iht d d d b ti i i t F i t th Th i l d d d t d th b d i f l t l d i t i t f th f i i th tti f d t d ll i t i l i t ffi i tt ititti f b f d i td thi lii d S d i t d f ( i dditi t) d d i i i t l ititti th tht d d th iht t i t l thi ffi S h t i l l df t i t i l l t t d t i l iiti (lik th Q b i C t l ) idi iti t h h it i t i th 219

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d l i ld f h t t b td t t h l t l ethnically mixed territories through "consociational" rather than federal arrange ments Finally there is a grabbag of cultural rights that answer to demands for symbolic recognition of the worth, status, or existence of various groups within the larger state. At tk h tt "th f th lit it fl it t f it t i l th it bli h l i d th b h i h th l t l ill b k th th ' hit i t d " (L 2000 154) A i th b i tbhid hd d i t h t th t t i t ltll t l d it bl d l f d t d i ft flt th f th d i t l t l group

Multicultural Fears Whil i i l l t d i l i t i l th til tl th t f lti l t l iht i ft it i l t ll W t d i d i t t t f th " l ld" f l i b l d t i i t i h i Wht i t do such rights have on the principles and practice of democratic citizenship? Given the vast array of rights just discussed as well as the variety of groups demanding them there is no simple general answer to this question And for that reason l hld b ii f iti f l t i l t l iht tht th i i t b l i i i l t itihi Thi i t t d tht ti ti l t l iht i ti i t ill d itihi Bt hll th l t l iht l l h itihi l d idtiti f b f i i t I d t d i t i i h i t i h i d i d i t i h i t i l t l i h t it i th t i t th d i t i t i bt th f t f itihi introduced earlier Let us briefly consider in turn the basis for fears that cultural rights are eroding the equal status identity solidarity or civic virtue of citizens Equal status W h l d td tht iti t h i k t h t ti il iht t i iti necessarily i l t th f l itihi tt B t thi it il ith th f t t h t j d t i tt d d i f f t i l iht f hih it t i l d b j t i f d i th f lit ( i the otherwise unequal situation of members of some identifiable groups) What we need to know is when differential status creates a disadvantaged or stigmatized status for some groups or individuals (whether members of the minority or of the jit) Th t thi ti ill ith th i t t i O th h d it i h d t h it i l t ' l tt if t i l i i t ik th Sttih l l d t h f thi t i l b l (th f St A d ) th l t t ' fl ( B i t i ' U i f l ) O th th h d h i i t iht d i l titi th l i b t f ith th b f

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th i i t (f l if th t t ll lii i i t t f it illiberal family law on its own members) or of nonmembers (as for example when Anglophones could not post commercial signs in their own language in Quebec n the 1980s) In cases like these minority claims may threaten equal citizenship tt h th t d b f t f i i t tti fil ditibtd h b ithi th i i t ( ) h l t d b (Qb A l h ) kd t b t ll f th t f l t l dti hil th j th b f t Fragmentation of identity and solidarity One of the most common fears about differentiated citizenship in a multicultural society is that it would lead to a proliferation of "hyphenated" citizens individuals h idtif ith t h i t h i b th ith t h i fll iti With itihi t i l idtit liti ld b d d t modus vivendi t ith littl t l d t d i t t l i d i t Th i i f d i th l 1990 b t i th f S i t Ui E t E Y l i d R d h i t t h i il t h t d b t h li d th i t i t f tt N i l t tit t i W t Europe and Canada also seemed to the critics of multiculturalism to show the dangers of allowing or encouraging ethnic groups to maintain and reinforce their own identities Thi f i tl i l d Th bhid thi il i tt itht d t i tditi t l t di h t h h l h f t t f th l t d i refusal b jiti t i t i l iiti l ith t h i l d lii Bt if id l th d ti i i t t i th W t it i i l t l h ti lf t iht l iht t t i l iiti ltitl f f t th citizenship identity of the members of the minority nationalities Granting auton omy to such groups often gives their leaders the means (for example control over education) to promote the group's identity at the expense of the citizenship identity B t thi f f t h t b b l d i t th liti tht h t i l i i t i d i d t d iti Th i f tit ti t i Q b i th l 1990 b d i t l l i k d t th f i l f Elih ki C d i i t tif d ii Q b ditit ithi C d it M t th i t it i itk t t h t ll t l t i l t l rights are designed to help groups to separate from the larger society Most minority groups do not act like historic territorially concentrated national minorities The special accommodations demanded by immigrant minorities religious groups gays d lbi d th h idtit t i l l d i d t f i l i t t th integration f t h i b i t th l it t thi ti C i d th d d b b f lii ildi J d Sikh t b tf ilit d d t h t f b i d th i fthi lii h d S h d d i t bli f t t t t t ltll f th l it t t d it t i l bl d idtit th it h tht 221

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b f th lki t ltll b i d being able to participate fully in important national institutions

b t l

t

thi

Civic virtue Thi b i it

fill t th ti f hth l t l iht t h t ii d litil tiiti A i th h i ith th k i d f d th k i d f i h t b i d d d Th l f lii h d ti i l i f l t l iht i t b i t ii tiiti Th ti f i i t l iht ffiill tt for minority languages is another such case: this makes it easier for native speakers of the minority language to have professional careers in public life or the civil service Other minority rights might indeed erect barriers to civic participation For l lii kf tt fdi ( t t i ) t t thi h l Bt b l i th t t h l t i thi t h i hil d b d i d f th tit t l h t t l t t d t d d b f i d ith l h d t h thi lii d thi i i thi it f it i t i h i lt

Conclusion I th l f liti b t i t i h i i di iti i t h t th f liti F thi i th t f h i l h i l li b t th i h f iht d i litil jti f ltiltli h i t d t i l d tdi f th i l i t i f itihi fdifft l t l iht d litil t Th b id f th i f th b t " h l f i t i h i " d i d b Plitil philosophers and other scholars are now looking much more closely at specific case studies in order to finetune claims about how civil society or the education system can be used to promote civic virtues or how political institutions can be arranged t ft hih lit fd t i dlibti Thi d t t t th f itihi t dil li t h i fjti B t it d h h ttti t th t t idtiti d it f iti i l i t i t t f h i th f litil lit f d d t i tt

References Klik W dN W ( d ) (2000) Citizenship in Diverse Societies. O f d O f d U i i t P L J (2000) The Multiculturalism of Fear. O f d O f d U i i t P Macedo S (1996) Community diversity and civic education: toward a liberal political sci f lif Socio/ Philosophy and Policy, 13 (1) 2 4 0 6 8 d il l I Class, Citizenship and Social Development. M h l l T H (1965) C i t i h i New York: Anchor

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Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Shaflr G (1998) The Citizenship Debates. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press de Tocqueville A (2000) Democracy in America, ed and trans Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (orig pub 1835-40) Chicago: Chicago University Press Weinstock D (2002) Citizenship and pluralism In Robert Simon (ed) Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, pp 239-70 Oxford: Blackwell Young I M (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

Further reading Beiner R (ed) (1995) Theorizing Citizenship. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Bohman J and Rehg W (eds) (1999) Detiberative Democracy. Cambridge MA: MET Press Callan E (1997) Creating Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press Carens J (2000) Culture, Citizenship and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press Gutmann A and Thompson D (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Kymlicka W (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press Miller D (2000) Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press

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17 I i t i MICHAEL BLAKE

I i t i h t i d t d l f h i l h i l ttti Whil th i di i i t i h b bjt f i bli d i i lik d i i h tb f t h i i th h i l h i l it I d d th b f l i t i l lif i hih h t d i h t ith littl t i d ti t h i i In what follows I do not propose to remedy this lack but to offer one possible explanation for its existence An adequate analysis of immigration I suggest i f d t l ii i th thdl flibl litil h i l h I i t i i t i l i t h i h th hi fl i b l litil h i l h iht b l i d b it t it f th ii f f th ti tditill d b libl t h i t A h it i i i l diffi lt i l t f t h t di th thi f i i t i lt l t d l d t th b h i h th thi iht b d t d It should be noted at the outset that the issue of immigration involves not one question but many I cannot hope to address all of the questions raised by the phenomenon of immigration in the present chapter My attention will t h f b liitd t ht I th t b i ti i thi t t hth t libl it ittl ith it l i b l i tit i ti t ll Thi ti I thik t b d bf ifi t fi i t i li b d t l d l t ith Th tf h ll b t i dbt i thi t i h i l h h l i d t h t ll titi i i t i i h t l j t dh th f d t d li f" b d " th l li i t t ith i b l equality Other philosophers have replied that such an implication is not and indeed could never be a correct interpretation of the sort of liberalism we have reason to endorse I h t fll Ih t i d i t i l l di th t bth id f thi d b t W h t I h t d t t i tht ith id h ffd t fi i t i t h t i fll d f i b l It i tti tht b t h id h d i th th h t tk d t t f ht i ditit b t i i t i litil i I ill k thi tti i f t F i t I ill tli ht k i i t i h

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difficult issue for liberals to address I will then discuss arguments made in favor of open borders and examine whether these arguments are ones liberals are bound to accept I will then do the same for arguments in favor of the legitimacy of restrictions on immigration I will conclude by offering a few hints about how an adPolitical Equality and Moral Equality There is a wide academic literature on immigration; very little of it has been produced by philosophers Much of the writing deals with the issue from the standpoint of sociology history policy or law Some of this literature includes normative tion is found within several anthologies (Gibney 1988; Barry and Goodin 1992; Schwartz 1995; Bader 1997) and a handful of philosophical articles and books as discussed below As already mentioned I think this shortfall can be explained in part by the difficulties involved in writing coherently about immigration from a liberal point of view What I want to do now is explain what I take this difficulty to be To begin we may note two things about liberalism The first is that liberalism begins with the idea of the moral equality of all persons The precise contours of this idea need not equal moral concern and respect for all who share common humanity No person or group of persons is to be arbitrarily excluded from the reach of liberal justice The second thing to notice about liberalism is that it has been developed as a theory primarily within the context of the nation-state This is not a logical fact about the nature of liberalism; it is simply the context within which most liberal theorists have developed and articulated their political views Within this context liberalism condemns arbitrary inequalities of treatment by the political institutions of society What liberals have traditionally defended therefore has been some condemned The task of the liberal on this understanding is to figure out what principles could justify political power to all those who live within the society such political power creates This approach - the search for principles reciprocally acceptable to all - derives principles guaranteeing equality under political nstitutions from the more basic conception of moral equality We can call this methodological approach the framework of political egalitarianism. It is I think implicit in much of how liberals think about political justification In the context of the state the equation it makes between moral equality and political equality is entirely appropriate The history of differentiated citizenship is a history of oppression and injustice; distinctions in political status tend to bespeak deviations from the ideal of moral equality The difficulty arises when we move from this case to one in which individuals are not subject to the same political institutions Immigration is distinct from the standard cases discussed in liberal theory precisely in that the 225

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ldb i i t i not b j t t th l f th it b t k t become subject The liberal equation of moral equality and political equality may not work under such circumstances The wouldbe immigrant and the citizen have distinct relationships to the political society in question The usual methods of liberal political h i l h t h f tt l W th k ht ld we t dh i i l f litil j t i hih t l lit? A d t k thi b th t ti i h h l l b d i t t d t thi l i t i l we i th fit l ? A l i b l th fi i t i t h f i t i th thdl b hih d l th i l i t i f libl i t t M f th problems implicit in our current analyses of immigration stem from the persistent hold this methodology has upon our thinking Much of what has been written about immigration insists that moral equality and political equality are nherently l i k d thi ti h d t hld t i th t t i hih i ti I h t fll I ill i th iti i dtil d h h thi ti d i th l i b i l i t f ht h b id Aft di t h t I ill b i f l i ht th fi i t i tb d th litil liti f k i h t l k lik

Cosmopolitanism and Open Borders Th

ti t h t titi i i t i i h t l j t i t t l fid i t i t i Th i h t t t l t i l t i d i d d liit df f tht iht til f t hih i l i d i t b th i l bi t f th i h t i ti S l t h i t h h ffd t t th f f t t h t thi t d i h t i i f t ill Restrictions on immigration are on this analysis at odds with the moral egalitar ianism animating liberal thought Closed borders are therefore morally llegitimate (Ackerman 1982: 8 9 9 5 ; Carens 1987 1999 2000 forthcoming; Bader 1995) J h C h f f d th t l l d l d i f thi t d it i thi i t h t I ill i i h t fll Th t h h t idi C ' h t i i t i i i l d ttti Libli C t d th f t i t f t t jtif i l i t i i t t t A bi t t f th h h thiit t l i t i t l t d diff i litil t t t A litil it hih d i d iht t l i it f thi ld ll b i l of an illiberal and unjust community Citizenship however seems to be as morally arbitrary as any other factor we could name None of us chooses our place of birth or our parentage; we deserve ith bl dit f th i t it hih b R t i ti i i t i i th d i f f t i t iht b d h bit ft t h f t b ll f f i th th bi f ijti Th f t t h t b id f bit li dI th th t t d diff i ht h t d db If t t f i i t i d tki d t f th

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titi f i t it d ijti If thi i j t i h less intuitive than injustices such as racially discriminatory political rights that simply shows the degree to which our ordinary moral beliefs have yet to grasp the egalitarian potential of our liberal commitments Liberalism can have radical and f th ti ft ll i h i h th i j t i f il d i i i t i t it bi ith (C 1987 268) Th l i b t t d b C b f lit di fR l i h i h th i i l iti dt d i i i l f ti t b l d lbll th th i th t t f th t i t t (f j t i f t i f thi di B i t 1983 1999 P 1989) R l ' thdl k t develop principles acceptable to all by eliminating knowledge of social contingen cies which could result in illegitimate bias Given the contingent nature of the border it is inconsistent on this reading not to apply the original position at the lbl l l Ad f ithi thi i i l iti ld l d i i il t i th f d t b d itht i t f J t R l ' d t i i i l iti ld d f d f d f t ithi th t t C ' i t t i l i i l iti d f d f d f t i t t i l l [0] h l t k h t h th i h t t i t f l ithi i it i important liberty The same sorts of considerations make migration across state bound i i t t N libl tt tit i t l bilit Th t t tht d tit i t l bilit itiid f d i bi h frd If frd f t ithi th t t i b i t h t it id th l i fl l litil iti ht d tit frd f t tt? (Carens 1987: 258 267) If this analysis is correct then the denial of entry to a wouldbe immigrant is an injustice More generally the conventional account of immigration in which liberal states are justified within very weak limits in looking out for their own llbi i th d i fi i t i li i f d t l l i t i ith libli itlf Th lit i i t tht l i b l i ' t f l lit t t t th b d i l t i t t l i b l th t th l tt f tid C d dit f i t h t thi f t ill h i l i t i t j t f th fl f d bt f ll Whil it possible for us to challenge Carens's reading of Rawls as Rawls himself has done (see Rawls 1999) it is more difficult to reject the intuition undergirding Carens's project None the less I believe it is possible for us to challenge the equation of itihi d bit ft h thiit W t I thik tht i h th t i bit f th l it f i M d itihi bth d d b i t f hih I tk ith dit bl Bt f th f t t h t th i t ii i t il l i t i l diff bit t l d t h t t h t diff i ll irrelevant T thi t t h t th b d h bitil t t d k t thi f t l iif It k t

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th thi th b d i f h d libilit t l i t i l t t Thi diff I think may well create some legitimate differences in what sorts of ustification we can expect from that state The state can do powerful things to all and only those who live within its sphere of authority; citizens may be taxed punished coerced d i th l i i t t d b thi t Ul f i iti f il tt tt h l ithi th t' h f ifl th i f h i ti It i h t th tht th il l t i h i bt th iti d th t t i i t ditit d d f jtifti If I b j t t th i litil ti f tt d l seek t b b j t it d t tht d I ill sarily be entitled to the same sort of justification from the state in question The contingency in the world creates a difference with some moral relevance; in this way the analogy between race and citizenship might be somewhat undermined Thi b l i d b t ith f t th f l t t f C ' t f b d Th i t i t i idi thi t b h t d t th i l t t b i i th f l l i l Y li i B f f l d libli i i t tht h th l iht t t B t I li i T t d tht f t t t h ith th f t t h t th it t i l b d bt is the result of a contingency which cannot ground a legitimate difference in the administration of justice Therefore I must also have the moral right to move to Boston If this right to mobility is important domestically it must be important i t t i l l ll d h iht t d thi i h t t tid h t it t i i d Bf thi t d h t ti t h t iht b t d t d lt f th d t jtif tt thit i f l l t th h li ithi t h t t' h f thit I thi it l l Lt tk litil iht l With th iht d idti t l l l t th b t iht b d follows You live in Buffalo and liberalism insists that you have the moral right to vote in United States federal elections I live in Toronto and that fact together with the fact that there exists a national border between us at all is the result of a ti hih t d l i t i t diff i th d i i t t i f jti T h f I t l h th l iht t t i U i t d Stt f d l lti If thi i h t i i t t d t i l l it t b i t t i t t i ll ll d h iht t d thi i h t t tid h t it t iid Thi t ld t i d d I t h i k th ld b right to resist it While one's status as citizen might ultimately be causally deter mined by arbitrary facts in the world the status of citizen does create some distinct demands for justification In this case the political institutions of this society have a dt t b i t th ddi f th h b j t t it t h i t th t h f ldd f i itht ti btti t f litil tiiti If litil t i i t t k itlf t h i d t i th i h t i litil it t i f l l t th bi d Th t h d t l t th h not b j t t th thit f th t t Th diff i 228

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i t t diff i ht if litil iht th t which we are entitled This difference moreover does not offend moral equality n the slightest Moral equality here lives in perfect harmony with differentiated polit ical rights When the political circumstances are relevantly different moral egalitar i i d d th th d l i t i l diff i t t t Thi b t h h t fi t C h k l d th ttil it f l i t i t il bliti bt tit t i f thi h d l i t i l lif (C 1992 44) I t h i k h tht d i t th ti bilit f l lit d l litil iht C ' ititi t b diffilt t t I til t tht C h argument as to why the right to mobility should be treated as something which s always an implication of moral equality rather than a specific implication of moral equality which applies only within the context of shared liability to the state My i hih I td f d h i t h t it i th l t t i d t b jtifid t it iti t t ff ti t ildi if t f l i b t Th l i b t i hih t it bf t thit ld b j t i f d i l d bth litil libt d litil libti h th i h t t bilit O thi l i th U i t d S t t ld t both d th B f f l i the right to move to Boston and expect that Buffalonian to accept the government's legitimate authority Neither could it allow any subordinate political institution such as the Massachusetts legislature or the Boston City Council to act so as to d h thi i h t Gi th l t i h i i ti k i th B f f l i tt N Y k i t h ill d ti i t l h if ld b f d t l l illibl Th i i t ' l t i h i d t i i t thi i l i t i I d i th T t i th i h t t i t d li i B t th U i t d S t t l l lf i t t h d Thi h tb b fft hi i t libli i it i l l t h t th ti f the Torontonian ought to be considered as affronts to his status as morally equal Given that he does not live under the authority of the United States but asks admittance to that status it seems a mistake to consider him as equivalent to those h already t d i h l t i h i f litil thit Id t l i t h t thi i th b t l t i f th i h t t bilit l t h h it d ht ititi t Th i i t f th b i tht C ' ititi t tht h t i ll bit i i t l i t i t diff i iht d thi ti I thik i t t S ti l litil t t t i ilti f l lit b t t l Given the differences between the citizen and the wouldbe immigrant moral equal ity may not issue in a perfect equality of entitlement A theory of immigration must not assume the borders as moral watershed and Carens has done a great service in iti t tht f t b t ith t th fi i t i th b d' l i l I ld t thi j t it t l t t fC ' t h h t hih d ti Th b l i f b d d th it f il li th t f th ldb i i t d kd hth l i i itlf ilti flibl lit O i i th i t th 229

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possibility f l i t i t l i It i ibl t d f d thi ibilit d the less insist that contingent facts of global economic inequality condemn much current exclusion as illegitimate The reality of extreme global economic inequality I think may serve to place considerable restrictions on how a liberal state may i it t ld C t l h l f th ld' lti h i d t itti d t h f f di d tlit t t h t th t h t f d i th lti f W t i d t i l d i ( C t t 1999) U d th i t itihi i W t i d t i l d t b C t t f f d l b i t h i h t iil l k idt f bith d i t diff i lif tti (C 1987 252) W take for granted I think that any plausible account of moral equality will condemn this sort of inequality as morally indefensible Even if we deny the cosmopolitan reading of Rawls employed by Carens we must none the less apply our iberal i i l f l lit t th i t t i l l l th i i l ill l t d f fd i t i ll i i i b l Thi t b i t i ith h t h bf b t I bli thi t b illi Iiti tht tt d t h th same litil dti t f i th d t iti i t th iiti tht tt nothing to foreign nationals The current economic circumstances of the world I think cannot be justified on any plausible theory of liberal justice Exactly how unjust they are depends upon which theory of justice we employ and so is beyond th f thi h t B t it d l i b l tht W t i d t i l d i t j t i f th d t hih thi lth d t h t f th d l i ld If thi i th jti i th iti t d thi itti di ill i l d i ditibti di t i t t i l f b t th ill l i l d t i t th bilit f lth t t t l d th h d T f t t i i h d f i iti i i t h t ifi h lif f th k f lth d l Thi i if I think a liberal can never legitimately make

Partiality and Restrictions on Immigration Th

idti I thik it ith h i h t b i ft h i t h h ffd jtifti f l i T ft I h jtif l d b d d i b i i ht iht i th lit t f i i t i th l lit f iti d foreigner Even if those who defend the possibility of legitimate border restrictions are correct in their conclusions I think they are too often incorrect in the theoret ical assumptions they employ in defense of these conclusions W b i b ti t h t th h i t b d l k h t thi i f Th t i i ll i t d d li ti f id h i l h i l j t d ft d i d l i i Th f t tht i h t litil h i l h h th f f t f l i t i t i l d b d i ll t k b h t h i t t b l i l i t i i th i t i t i ll f l d b d t t th l i t i f

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th ll j t A h th id t h t l i b l i i ittd t b d and freedom of immigration is often taken as a reductio of liberal thinking If liberal ism implies that we cannot legitimately close the borders then we have reason to reform our liberalism rather than as was the case for the theorists discussed b litil i t i t t i (Wl 1983 3 1 6 3 T i 1993 1 2 4 3 0 K l i k 1995 1 2 4 6 ) S h t ll b i b ti th i fft f f t ht i ifill l l Th t f th l l it hih f t ld d i ll d i b d i t f lt d l l f d l t Th i l t l l f d t d i l d i l this community and the inability to exclude would undermine the possibility for this cultural group to maintain its distinctiveness and collectively guide its internal development (see generally Walzer 1983) Arguments for closed borders therefore ll b i ith l i f th l i t f ifill l l d tditi Th i t d l f iti i h th f thi i t i d d t h f h i t t th l l f t d d t b F i th diff di i ll b t h th l i k b t th i t f lt d th l i t i f l d b d i t be made out Culture on these analyses is a sort of good which is necessarily local; it is a good in virtue of what it does for those who live their lives within the norms and values t i d ithi t h t lt Th i t f ht i i f l l l l i th f tk t l i t i t diti f libl i t i l i t Th h bl t tht lt h il bliti t hld d it i t i t t i Th t h f h il bliti t th bliti f i t t f th d d i t t f h th b th f t b f th l t l it G t t h f h il lti t iti hih b d i d f th il bliti d b th iti t another A legitimate project of governance indeed for some thinkers the domin ant project of governance is the preservation and protection of the local cultural community The implications of such a view of politics for immigration are not difflt t d l Th d i i b t i i t i t b d ith f t th i t f h i i t i th li d j t f th l d ithi th l t l If i i t i ld d i l t l i t i t d hi i t i l i t i t l b ldd t i i t th Th i t l t fjtifiti i t d ith thi i f i i ti Th t t i f i l idtifid ith th i t t d d f th l l community Justification of that state's actions is something to which the citizens of that state are entitled; they are entitled to justifications moreover which acknow ledge that their interests and projects are to be preferred to those of individuals t i d th t t If kt d l i i l f litil j t i t b l t ll t i t t th h t i t b i d th iti f th l l it I i d h iht i it f thi l lit t i il ll ld t l i t i t i i thi t l i t t i Ot id h d t h i l t tdi t hll th ti d d i i f th t t i ti Si th t t i dd t b t i l t th 231

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i t t f it iti it i bjti t t t h t th i t t f tid are not being given equal attention Such a view of the relation between the state and the citizen is implicit in much of our ordinary political discourse It is therefore not surprising that this view would t d t d l i b t i i t i hih k d l i i l t th f d i t i l l l ti W t t t f thi i t O i tht i i t i ill b l l tt f d i t i ti th t f th t t If i tt d t l l i i t i i it lf i t t it h th l iht t f h i i t i Th l i f th h k d i i t i l t t th l i f th l d h T tht given denial of immigration is unjust would on this account be an exceptionally difficult proposition to establish In some very limited set of cases however such a case might be made out This leads us to the second way in which this picture of i i t i t k t l l ti Libl ti b d b thi l db i t t i l t l t ll f i iti t t h i f ifd f f ti i th th i li t t hih t b bttd b h i f ditilit th t f th l l iti Siill t t h i t f l d b d d i t t h t th i stances under which the general right to exclude outsiders would become unrea sonable to exercise Michael Walzer for example argues that a state may have special duties to take in needy foreigners under some highly constrained sorts of i t t tbl h t il i th ld ld b idd t liibl tt l (Wl 1983 4 8 5 1 ) Th i thi li i thi i t it i th it f il l t i h i bt th t t d it iti d k l d tht i thi l t i h i th ldb i i t b ditit i litil t t f th t iti Th i h thi d l tbli h ll Th tbli t f th l i I thik b t b d t d b ii t aspects of the picture under consideration We may inquire about the precise struc ture of the argument by which these cultural facts are supposed to legitimate a deviation from impartiality; and we may ask about what circumstances in the ld tb d bf th tf lt l i t i t l d b d I ill id th i i t W b i b ti th d t h i h th thri d d th iti t h t th it ifd d h t t f l t l ithi litil it I i l thi i t th M t tt th ld ti rit f t i l iti ithi t h l ( ll Kymlicka 1995) Under these circumstances it is difficult to apply a theory such as Walzer's; legitimating partiality with reference to the local culture is difficult when the very existence of such an animal is in doubt This in itself might pose a consid bl d i f f l t ith th l i t i t liti ft h i h W l ' t lit i l ti Wht I t t li h h i th thi I b l i tht th f h thdl t tit i i t i i i t i l t h t i l l jtifid b t ii T i d t i f th f th t t ith th ti f l t l i i i t b l t d iidi dititi i t th iti h d th t bl t tht it I ll

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i h i h th t i l thi iiti hih i t th t jit of actual cases to restrict immigration for national or ethnic reasons is to make some citizens politically inferior to others To see this we might briefly examine Walzer's analysis of the infamous "White Australia" policy by which the Austra li t t t t d t dfi A t l i hit it d t hit i i t i Wl d thi li bt i ht I fid bj tibl k Th Whit A t l i li W l ' di l t i t l b d ti f t ft i t i l i th A t l i t b k Th i t h thi ll ith th l itlf tht f ti thill it A i th t h t th tll i fl l d th l i f it ld force a political community like that of White Australia to confront a radical choice Its b ld ild l d f th k fh i t th ld i h it ( t th ti f ltiil i t ) f th k f th l d A d th ld b t h i l hi Whit A t l i ld i l Littl A t l i (Walzer 1983: 4 6 8 ) There is I think something important here that Walzer overlooks It is the fact that Australia was not and indeed never was a purely ethnic society trying to maintain itself as such It like most of the world was a state containing within its borders ltil l t l tditi d thi t tbl f l lti fA b i i l A t l i It i l t ht t t Wl i t d hi l t i th h i t i l f th li b t hi f th l t tht h thi ith it t t t i t dfi itlf t h t diff f th i h i h it i tl t t d W l ' l i th t t d A t l i t idi titi ltithi A t l i f t t t i t create Whit A t l i t h h immigration This I think cannot be correct Even if a hypothetical pure society could close the borders to preserve itself a modern multiethnic democracy could t d itht iliitl t t i idiidl l d t ithi th it dl iti Ski t l i i t th f i f it b lti i i t i i ilti t th b f tht l d t thi i bl I thik if tW l ' i tht l iid h i ith h i h t h l l li Thi d i f f i l t I t h i k i idt i l litil l f i i ti h tht f f d b Pt B i l (1996) B i l f il quotas on immigration to the United States in terms quite similar to those employed by Walzer The United States on this analysis is a cultural and ethnic nation whose identity is defined by its cultural and ethnic ties with Europe Widespread i i t i f E ld t h f d i th it d tiit f th l t l tditi B i l idtifi ifill A i It d t tk t h litil t h i i t h h thi th d d th tt f E iti b dfii E f i d i b l di dt f i i t i Thi i d i tht E ll d t i t l t th A i j t S h t t t ld f b

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tbl t E iti d B i l ' h t i t i would thus be unacceptable even if those outside the borders were assumed to have no moral status at all The statement is moreover somewhat repellent on its face; if the American project means anything it means that arbitrary classifications such dd t t b t d f d t i l i th t i ' lf d i t i Thi l d t th l t t f th t bjti I thik b d i t t h i t f l d b d Thi l i d f d l d b d l i t i t li ti fl l t i l i t If ih t d l libl t tb i f il h thi tilit t i i d i t b j t i f i d Th I think two ways of doing this from within the liberal project The first is to take the closing of borders as beneficial to all citizens throughout the world It might be the case on this analysis that a world without walls would be an unpleasant d i t i l t li df thi t k f d li E h tt lki ft it i h t b i th d jtifibl i ti l lit Thi i th t jtif tilit ith f t th l l tt f ll it i t ff i t i l df f tilit ( W l 1983 39 th i td i l i R l 1999 39 48 l Gdi 1988) The alternative is simply to argue that we have no need to inquire about the effects of closed borders on the world as a whole; we are better off with closed borders and the partiality legitimated by cultural facts means that this is all we have to do to j t i f th O thi l i libli itlf ht t b i d it i t h t i l t t ith i h t liitti (f th id f hih Wld 1993) L i b l i ' t fi t i l l h l b t f h t h d Th f l l i i i t tht l i b l t t b til between iti d t i l towards th Th fit i i i t tht ld i t h t b d i l i k l t b th b t t f ld t h t l i i t d t h l ld i h b i t I b t the strength of this argument as an abstract statement Local difference as Carens has noted flourishes quite nicely within states in the absence of legal restrictions on movement; Alabama is not California even though citizens of the one could freely i t t th th (C 1987 2 6 6 7 ) I h t h t thi t i it i d t jtifiti f th l f b d i th t idl ld W h t h t b d ld b f i t ll i th i d l ld th d t d i t ld f i i l i t T it th b f i i l fft f th b d t dtitt ldb i i t f th d l i ld i l b Will K l i k t k l d th f of this objection asserting that a nation which has more than its fair share of resources thereby loses the right to exclude which he has otherwise defended (Kymlicka 1995: 224 n l 8 ; see also Rawls 1999: 8 9 ) This admission I think s d b l it d h d t t th d t hih titi t lik K l i k ' tb i l d t jtif t tt ti Th l t t i i t d i b libli t h t it t f l lit li l ithi th t i l it th th i l l O thi t l i b l i ' t i h t l liitd i tt t t t ll citizens li l tt b t th d h t i t d

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f i M l l fi i t i I thik i l i i t l l thi analysis; it allows us to make judgments about immigration based solely upon the economic and social interests of the local community (see for example Beck 1996; Brimelow 1996) This picture of liberalism I think has certain advantages: t l th d i f f i l t fd l i l i b l th fi i t i libli thi t has d i t i l i t i f i i t i Th bl h i t h t it libli t th t f ki it th li M t i b l t h i t i t t d t th lit f persons t j t f iti th i thi ll i i f t b t h bi hih k th it bjt f liti t h h t d thi thi ht it i d t depend upon legal standing To place an arbitrary limit on the applicability of liberalism would be to rob liberalism of its intuitive pull As Carens points out moreover liberals have often been surprised by the implications of their commit t libli h hd i l i t i f il d d lit it i i t i l f l t ld h f d bffli T h libli tht h i i lt ld t ab initio i h t f h i t d l ith bl ti b t it ld d thi b ki l i b l i ith fl ttti Th t i f f l d b d th b l t i t b t I thik one basic conclusion given by the theorists described above is correct: exclusion s not inherently illiberal The methodology used to establish this claim however s deeply flawed The flaw in this methodology I believe is equivalent to that identi fid i th li d i i f b d Th i i h t idi th h tif l i i tht l i b l liti t b d i th C t i l ld t b i dlibti ith ll f h i t dt h b d l lbl litil i i l hih ld id t l i t t i Th lti hi b t th i d i i d l d th l l it i ll i i f i t d ld t thi thdl itht d i i tht l t i h i S i t d th t h i t d th f l t th l l it b seeking to justify a partiality which is in most practical cases equivalent to an absolute trump We deal with the difficulties involved in globalizing politics by localizing moral concern Thi i h t th l t d It i ibl f t k l d l lit d t i i t t h t thi l lit ill h ditit i l i t i i ditit litil t t L l iht b d i t i t i t h t th iht bi i d th d d l tt f tid I h l d i t fh bth bilit i h t d litil iht iht b d t d lti f th d t jtif litil thit t i f i l l th idiidl who face such authority Such an analysis does not depend upon outsiders being subjected to a moral discount rate in our evaluation of their claims It acknowledges that we can be moral egalitarians and none the less justify distinct political rights d ditit litil i t It ld h th d i t i t d t I thik f t d i t i th l lit f f i iti W d l i i t tht h t li b d i t i tt tk t f th l i t ' l t i h i t tht t t Citi titld t thi tht f i t bt h dt d l litii i th f tb lihi thi l i

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Conclusion As I noted at the outset I believe a single error informs much of what has been written about immigration The conventional methodology of liberalism is quite innapropriate for use when the question is not one affecting the rights of members but the composition of membership itself To use the political egalitarian framework to develop principles of immigration is either to assume the border as moral watershed or to assume away potentially relevant political differences Neither is attractive as a liberal vision of immigration What we therefore need I think is a fresh beginning in our task What we ought to do is to see what moral equality actually implies when it is interpreted n the international context This task I think is exceptionally difficult I will therefore end simply by asserting two conclusions that I think would follow from a theory developed in this way Thefirstconclusion I think would be that much of the exclusion we currently employ is illegitimate Moral equality may not have the same distributive constraints internationally as it does domestically but it must condemn certain sorts of poverty and immiseration as illegitimate Restrictions on immigration which help perpetuate such poverty - as I think those of all Western liberal democracies now do - are illegitimate If this is correct then the category of those whose claim to immigration may not be refused is wider than we usually think; in particular those fleeing famine and extreme poverty have legitimate claims to entry despite the absence of such persons from our current categories of refugee law (see Shue 1996) The second conclusion however would be that not all forms of exclusion are unjust To take my own example: I am a Canadian citizen who is currently seeking mmigrant status in the United States If I were to be excluded there are a variety of things I could say I could point out that the United States had by its actions adversely affected my well-being I could note that it was precluding me from exercising valuable options I could say that the decision was disheartening unwelcome and incredibly disruptive to my plans What I do not think I could say is that the decision was inherently unjust A United States citizen has claims against the United States government that I do not; preventing such a citizen from taking a job in Boston is quite a different matter morally speaking from so excluding me These conclusions of course do not constitute a theory They are regrettably sketchy and insufficiently justified I would take these facts however to serve as an invitation We do not have enough good philosophical minds presently examining the issue of immigration Given the political importance of this issue the world could only benefit from careful and precise analysis of the moral issues nvolved We have not developed an adequate theory of immigration but we may hope that the best philosophical work in this area has yet to be written

References Ackerman Bruce (1982) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven CT: Yale University Press 236

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Bader Veit (1995) Citizenship and exclusion: radical democracy community and justice Or ht i ith i t i i ? Political Theory, 23 2 1 1 4 6 ( d ) (1997) Citizenship and Exclusion. N Y k St M t i ' P B Bi d G d i R b t E ( d ) (1992) Free Movement. U i i t P k PA U i sity of Pennsylvania Press B k R (1996) The Case against Immigration. N Yk N t Bit C h l (1983) C l i t idl d t i l t i t Journal of Philosophy, 80 65919 (1999) Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University P B i l P t (1996) Alien Nation. N Y k H P i l Carens Joseph H (1987) Aliens and citizens: the case for open orders Review of Politics, 49: 25173 (1992) M i t i d lit libl liti ti I B B d R G d i ( d ) Free Movement, 2 5 4 7 U i i t P k PA U i i t f P l i Press (1992b) R f d th l i i t f b l i t i Public Affairs Quarterly, 6 3 1 4 4 (1996) R l i t i d idliti h t th thi f i i t i International Migration Review, 30 1 5 6 7 0 (1999) Reconsidering open borders International Migration Review, 33: 1 0 8 2 9 7 (2000) O b d d l i b l liit t Ibit International Migration Review 34 6 3 6 4 3 ( f t h i ) Migration, Membership, and Morality. Crossette Barbara (1999) Half the world lacks sanitation says Unicef New York Times, July 23 A9 Gib M k ( d ) (1988) Open Borders? Closed Societies? N Y k G d P Goodin Robert (1988) What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98: 6 6 3 8 6 K l i k Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. O f d O f d U i i t P Ntt R (1971) Th i i l i h t t d f th i h t f f t Ethics, 81 2 1 2 2 7 Pogge Thomas (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press R l J h (1999) The Law of the Peoples. C b i d MA H d U i i t P S S k i (2000) Guests and Aliens. N Y k N P S h t W ( d ) (1995) Justice in Immigration. C b i d Cbid U i i t P Shue Henry (1996) Basic Rights. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press T i Y l (1993) Liberal Nationalism. P i t NJ P i t U i i t P Wld J (1993) S i l ti d t l dti Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 3 3 0 Walzer Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books W F k H (1996) Th l i i t fb d d t l f i i t i f Stanford Law and Policy Review, 7 3 5 5 5

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W thi t l i i d d t i t f UNICEF O f th C h i ti C h i l d ' F d i t t f i t h W b t d ikl fli t th h l P h t th k i t h f k M b j t it t i t t t h Th hiti b i h th h t i i fdtitt t i hild f TV d t h h t b t th d not alter the brutal facts: millions of people in the world are undernourished; thou sands die each day; most of those who suffer and die are children; and with llti fft ld d th ffi f illi itht t h t i At th ti f tlk if l i d i t Rlti t th ih i it b fiill t d B t lti t t iti f th ld h ith Gi tht h t if thi hld d idiidll lltil t l l i t thi ffi d thi l i ? M t f i t t thi ki hld b hitbl d if h h i t b l ? Tht seems to be the guiding premise of organizations who implore us to send money: they tell us to open our hearts to be generous to give of ourselves to help those in need The character of their appeal reveals just how pervasive the "charity view" is W t h i k t h t l t h h it ld b i f t i t th t i f i ll i d t i t th tht h d thi ( ) if i th t i d I d d t l t h t if h l th l h Th th i d i h i t i l i i tht fil t it i t j t tihtfitd b t itil S f th ill l i tht bliti i b d i h t f th t i t it (Li 1996 Sh 1996) while others who claim we have strong obligations to assist will eschew rights talk because their preferred ethical theories do not countenance them (Singer 1996/1972) But all these thinkers emphatically reject the charity view They aver tht iti th d t i t t i t l ti b t l i t Th f till h d l tht h iti bliti not t h l i it di t thi diti ld t l l th h ' i bt i th b f d t h ( H d i 1996/1974) D i t th diff t d t f h i f th l ti iill Th k I did i th b i i h t if thi h l d th ltil fflt d 238

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t

id th t i ? F l l i th k fD d S i i b hl j t thi f l t i (S 1981 D d S 1989 1 9 9 1 ) hl tt i l tht ki thi ti i thi i itk d likl l fili (Ck 1996 211) Th k f th d l t l t h i t is i t i l It li d i l l i t ft f ld h t ti i th t d d ff i th d b t (f l i t f t d i Aik d L F l l t t 1977) It l l i t th i t di d th f bth d i d idi h It ff i id b t ffti fft t llit h Th D d S ' k h i i f t l d til i l i t i H th i l i t i ith d i t i d i t d t thik Thi k d t l i i t th d t dd th t d d l ti W t till ti hth d h th f i lti ffl hld ll d t th b t f t f t t i d t th diti tht t d t i it Th l i fd l t l thi d t i th ti th l i tht f th B t bf tl h t i th i hld f t d t d th t d d ti f Th

Th B i

Oti

Charity M t l i th U i t d S t t d b b l i th d l d ld b th hit i i ft i t i O i being h i t b l i hll l t hil th th to whom hitbl i hll l t A d i t th f i t iti h dt f k i d t th d ( H i 1999) A d i t th d t b l t K t h imperfect d t t hl l i d H l t h h ht t b h i t b l t d th i til blitd t it d til til t lt l d d it D i t t h i diff bth i hld () tht til d d t hit d (b) t h t t t l i t i t l ( i t t i ) t b h i t b l (N 2000 317) M l t h h th d iti hld tht ll ht t b h i t b l flfill t h t i f t dt itht hli h i t i W ld i t d h l th l d i i h b h d t lit i t P l d P t h d Pt difftl dt b d t t t d bf t i l b t t i l Si th i d l t h it i i k l ld tif i f t dt f hit itht hli f th ld' t i Th bth h i t i l h fil t tibt t f i lif i h t b ti ll h t i h t d b t th ld t il b i l I thi h t I ill t d i t l di thi l t t i I i l t k it th dflt iti I t k it t b t if l t t i b d f d d I ill f th l t t i l t h h i d i i th I ill i d i t l dd th h it i 239

HUGH LAFOLLETTE

We should not aid the starving Most of us think that feeding the starving is good even if it is not something that we do We think it is good because (a) we think it relieves human suffering and most t f lit h l d t h t (b) l i i h ffi i tl t iibl d h ll i d H d i di H thik t h t ( ) i fl d thf l d tht h l d not f d th t i B t h th d t d th hit i Hdi li tht bilit t f d l i b d l It i t "A t i ' l d h liitd it t t lti d th t ii h h i h l d d d th carrying capacity of our land" (Hardin 1996/1974: 12) Given these imitations some countries are like overcrowded lifeboats Their land cannot support the cur rent population and certainly not future generations given current population th t A l t h h f d i th t i l t i l k f th li i th l it ill i th l t i t th it h l f d th if t d T h t ill i ffi d d ft ti Tht i h it i ll H ' l t illtt Hdi' i t At th ti Hdi f t t about the subject in the early 1970s India had a population of 650 million people Despite the large number of people dying from starvation its population was grow ing at a rate of 2 6 percent per year At that rate India's population would double t t Th bl t i Clbi E d d Pkit hih h d l lti th t f th 3 t At t h t thi lti ld d b l t t If th ti bl t f d t h i t lti h ld th ibl f d lti t i f ti tht i ith i it f fflt t i ? H lthh iitil i l i t f d th t i hld t W hld i j t "h it b " (Flth 1977: 105) A strong obligation to feed the starving Th f

tht h t bliti t i t th t i tk t b d flti ' lt h t i l f k Th f t l i tht h iti bliti t ffi d t h i h hld it the starving (Singer 1977/1972: 28) The second claims that people have a right to food and that right undergirds our obligation to assist them Of course rights absent compelling obligations or duties are effectively empty (Pogge 2000) That s why th h li tht l h i h t t f d ill l i t h t th ltil fflt h t lti iti bliti t i t th i d H l t h h th d i t i t i b t th t iti i t h t i l l i t i i d ld ll h some t i l iifi f t I ill ll th d i l t l k b t th t bliti t i t th t i Th h l i th ltil fflt h thi t bliti t other things show why Hardin's projections are either morally irrelevant or mis taken A hearty few take the former tack: they claim that we have a strong obliga 240

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ti i

t

id th t i if ld tll b t i lifbt th k i t h t th f t t i ld i i f idiit d ll (Wt 1977) It ld b ll f b l t di lif f ll th t ti t li t th f th thik ht t f d th t i ill l i i l h d th t i b l Hdi d i t th 1977/1972 34) T h f t h j t Hdi' t h t th j t d tl t i l i b l T t th t f h i tht H d i ' i d l t l l t t i

Th

D

l

t

l

l i h d b d th t l i t t t i H t h t if f d i th hld t f d th M l t h i i if t d t b l I t fit d i t d

O thi i t th titi d t t h t i (Si t h b

th

A l t t i

The basic idea M t d i i f ld h tt i l tht () t t i i db h t ff d i i (b) h i h i i t l f ll db t l d i t ( d h t fld t ) Gi th ti th k ( ) h t if thi hld ll d t h l l th f f t f th f i ? If hld i t th (d) t d i d "who i ibl f idi thi h l " ( M K i l 1981) J D dA t S t h t thi ff i th i i t k l t t h t l l i d d h t d t th il lit i l d i ititti ithi h i h it i (1989 1 9 9 1 ) Th li thi i itk h thiki b t f h h l d Th f ' bilit t b t i h f d d d t l th i d lit fh l d l ifll dh h d k bt l th ti f th Will l lii t d l l t th t fli t h h h ld? Will th it t h i i l t th l d th i f h ? Will th ll h th li h d d i l fd d f i t ? Will th b h d t h h t b th li h d ? Will th h fi i ? Will th i t h if d i t i t f ith h t h f h t i it? U l th d th ft t i f d th ll th l d dh d k i th ld ill t ff t f d h fil T h f h fili l k d t f d th h ittl t d ith th l ilbilit f f d i th Hit t thi hi i D i th 1974 f i i B l d h th t ff d it th t h i d h i h t d i t id (D d S 1989 27) Thi fidi d l i t d ithi th i f th t t hit b th f i "O f th f i ditit ( D i j ) hd th highest ilbilit f f d i th ti t d i d d ll f f th f i ditit th t fi i t f f d ilbilit hd" (D dS 1989 28) Th bl D dS l i i t h t th f i l i h d i f f i i t " t i t l t " t f d Th " t i t l t " d t i d t 241

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l b h t th d bt l h t th b d ht i d i l b l t th (S 1981 4) Thi h h t d t i th f ith idi d i h b i l ki h t h th t ' ll l l ff d h d l i d W t d t i hth th l h ffiit t i t l t t f d Of th ll ilbilit f f d i ft d t i i l' titl t (D dS 1989 2 5 9 ) A l t h h d t t l i it i th i l t i t t f t ( B b i k 1987) t h ith D d S t h t it i i f i ft h i d ( P i k h 1991 S b h 1991) I t l thi d b t h l t h h lt t ill h b i th i i l i H if f d ilbilit th t t t ft it i t th l Whth dli i ll f d ilbilit l d t t t i d d it f il litil d i ft The moral implications Thi th thi hl l W

d l t l ti i tht l b d ti b t litil il d i l t i h i ithi d bt ti Bt d t b i t th d t th l ti h t if thi d th f i fflt ti d t hl i i h d ti d idiid i l l th fi idi d i h ? It j t l i h t l h t hld k "A blid t i t h t th h d t f d titl t?" Tht i t k ld i t i ti d h bliti t ( ) thi t t h thi t i t l t ? A blitd t tblih t d lti ith th ti t h thi i t i ' t i t l t ? D h bliti t d f d t hl ditibt f d h th t td it ? A l t h h th d l t l ti d t l th l ti it h iti i l i t i Miill it blitt i l i fH d i ' t C l i h H d i' t fil l i d t i i f i t f t f th d l t l ti Hdi li tht t ' bilit t f d it l d d ll it l d ' bilit t d ffiit f d D l t l t h i t t t h t th l d ' ftilit i f l i t t th ( ) it i t l i d litil t t h d (b) it t t i l i d litil t Th l h h i l d d t th b t h ithi d bt ti Th h tht d t i hll l f l i t F l hil f f th ld' llt dl t ti i t d l d t l 10 t f thi t i l d t (GNP) th t ti i t i t d i l t t t f it GNP M t E d l d t t th thid f t h i ti GNP ( U i t d N t i D l t P 2000 213) A l t h h th ti d t ditl fd thi l thi l th l ll f d Aft ll th h t i l d dh kill t t d f f d d th til d M Hdi' jti lik th f Mlth bf hi h t d t t b ildl itk I th l 1970 h j t d t h t th ld' lti t th t f th t ld b 6 6 billi It i f t lihtl th

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5 8 billi (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 226) A d I d i hih according to Hardin had a population growth rate of 2 6 percent in 1973 had a rate of 2 percent by the turn of the century; that is projected to decline to 1 2 percent by the year 2015 (United Nations Development Program 2000: 225) Th l liit t h l th l d t bt t hi th l i i t t th b k k dHdi li It i t h t k t h t hi jti f i l It i il t d t d h th f i l Th l t i f t h i fil l i i f i t ft b t th t fh d t t t t t i f it t l if t diti P l ti t d b t l i d b th " d h i t i t i t h " (DTT) sociological theory around long before Hardin first advanced his views on hunger According to one prominent formulation of DTT population trends move through four distinct stages In the first the combination of a high birth rate and a high dth t d t d lti I th d t dth t dli hil b i t h t i hih l d i t hih lti th t I th t h i d bith t dli idl th dth t tl lti t i bt t h l I th fil t lti b tbl l bith t lll l dth t W h l i d th fit t and the declining population rates worldwide suggest that most of the world has passed the peak of the second stage Even those developing countries still in the second stage are ambling toward the third while countries in the highly developed W t l d ftbl t t l d i t th f t h I th lt t lti th t tbili hil d t h t dli Tht h tht d t "lt ' t " t t l lti th G l i d l t l t i i t th ltt t i hih l h t h l fili dh i h t d t h ll (H 1975 1 3 1 4 ) Th d h i t i t i th i bth t h t i l l libl d it ith th i i l dt It t h t i l libilit i l i i h d l have strong incentives to have large families especially in countries with poor medical care In an environment with high infant mortality rates people can rea sonably expect to have surviving children only by having many of them Having hild h i h d t f d th f i l ith b ki th fild ki i ihbi iti t l t th f i l i Th l th d ' l f i i ti itht il it C l ltil fflt ti d th hih i f t tlit d t h i iti d hild t l t th f i l i t f th old age Such countries also have high educational attainment Although education may enlighten students about the scope of the population problem its most powerful influences on population growth are indirect First postsecondary education delays i d tl d th b f hild b S d it t i l titi f f hildbi Thid l ith h i h d t i t d t h hih i d th l likl t d hild t id ld it F t h i t t ith l d t i th hild t bttill t i b t t th f i l fi i t d th d i i Fifth t t ith l d t i

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likl t h il it f th l d l All th ft i t ant in tightly knit traditional societies in which individuals are sustained not primarily by the nuclear family but by extended family and social groups (Caldwell 1976: 3 3 9 ^ 4 ) Th ft lltil li lti th t Th dit t h t l l i d t d l k i it d li i t ith h i h i f t tlit d il it th th ill h l fili C l hlth i i f t tlit d d t f d il it d tblih l d t i th b i t h t ill d l i dth t dli Th t h t i l diti h b borne out time and again by epidemiological facts (World Health Organization 1999: 3 2 3 ) The difference in population growth rates between countries is dra matic In 1998 rates in the lowest developed countries averaged 1 9 percent; in di d l d ti 16 t d i th h i h t d l d ti 06 t (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 226) F i l l th H D l t Id ( ilti ff t flti hlth d i llbi) h i d ldid th t t t (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 1 7 8 8 5 ) Thi t d l t ftl l l l th decline in the number of people starving (Bread for the World 2000: 4) The DTT is a theory well established in fact Hence we have compelling theoretical and empirical evidence that Hardin's pro l ld b likl t h th it lt t t h t d i t d Tht' t it i h t Aid t h t i l k t th t i li d did thi t h thi ll llbi iht ll h hi ditd lt It ld bl l th d t ft i t i di ffi H i d i t f d id d dil it ld ith d l t l it t h i it l i f t tlit t d i th d t i l tti t f it iti ld i t i f l fili d l th with incentives for smaller ones Since Hardin's position is both theoretically and empirically flawed we are left with two basic options As I stated at the beginning however I take the charity iti t b th d f l t T h t i if th l i t h t h t bliti t it t b d f d d th hld ld tht iti i ll i ibl b t t ll b l i t Whth t bliti b d f d d i ht ill d t i

St

Obliti

t

A i t

A responsibility to help the vulnerable Th tfili df l i i tht h t dt t it i i l that if we can alleviate people's suffering or prevent their dying at little personal cost then we morally ought to do it (Singer 1996/1972: 28) This seems especially plausible when those in need are in no way responsible for their own plight Since th h l i jit f th h i l d i h d hild

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h d i t i l l i t d l b l ( B d f th W l d 2000 1 0 0 2 ) then their need would arguably demand our assistance (LaFollette and May 1995) In this world we are mutually dependent We live in the conditions which constitute the "circumstances of justice" (Hume 1978/1740) OUR DEPENDENCES ON OTHERS

Althh l d i l l hild l b l th th ll f d d d t th N f i ld b hll lf ffiit M t f i tht t hd t f l t di B t that is only the beginning of the debt to our predecessors Our abilities to speak a language to read literature to appreciate art to live in cities to travel the world and to purchase the goods we want and need arose only because of the efforts of th h bf "It i f d t f l tht li iilid l i " (D 1988/1922 19) W liki d d t t i bth df Of i f l d b Ad Sith iht thik t h t l' b h i bfiti th i ll j t d i i d d i t d l f i t t I tht li hb h i I t t h i k t h t it li it ll Th b t evidence suggests a biological basis for altruistic tendencies (Ridley 1996; Sober and Wilson 1998) Had others acted solely out of their own interest wholly indif ferent to us and our vulnerabilities most of us would not be alive Had they largely i d lbiliti i h t b li bt i bttill diiihd diti Nti lik i d i i d l l l b l I th d i t t t ti h b ltil lfffiit N l N t i l b l t t h ' ti A th li d t lbl i t iditd h i l d d th ti t d i ith I d d th d l d t ' omy the more dependent it is on others although in many respects it may have immense power which masks that vulnerability For example the powerful econ omies of the United States Japan and Western Europe cannot survive without he i t d il d i l tht di thi ti i d t i (B 1974) O lbl k t l d d l I h t di t th i d f d i t t th i lit' f k l d i i l lbilit h i t It flt th f t t h t l b l l li i th i t fj t i (H 1978/1740 b k III ti II t II) O t difft dl i l i i f f li (Sh 1996 1 1 9 2 2 ) PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE

R b t Gdi tht bilit b t i O th til f Gdi

(1985) ff i t i i d fl i t f thi t H bliti t i t th l b l i t i iti i th l ld t tht i d ll il l ibiliti i f lit il bliti ill t t d i l t i l d bliti ( H t 1955 1 8 3 4 ) H thi l t i t dl t l i th t t t t

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f

t t h f bliti t fil d f i d dti f titd bliti ii f i t t d l f i l dti Th ti l f i l iht i f btt l i d ii f t h ' l bilit i lti t "It i lbilit h d d tht l th il l i ti il i b i l i t i " ( G d i 1985 107) Th l t i t dl t d t l l i th lt l t t h f dti t k i F i h thi i t tk l i i l l bidi d th l f l tilit At th ti b l i t d t flfill t h ' tti h th ill l b l t itht liit i t h l th Thi bliti d i f d i th l l d t i f t l (Gdi 1985 4 2 8 ) If G d i i iht tht h thi l d t th h l d h l th h ill l b l t t i l l h i t th t l t i l littl t t l Wh th ill l b l t th ti f ti th th d d i t i l thi b b il ibilit t h l ( G d i 1985 1 3 5 4 1 ) Thi t if l i b l ld b l t th i tht h bliti t th l b l ill i lltil d idiid ll i t th t l t i l littl tt l A d th f t i th li f A d i t B d f th W l d th U i t d S t t ld h l th b f it d th ld' h ith i t t f $6 billi j t lihtl th $20 ( B d f th W l d 2000 3) E if thi t i t ifltd b ft ft t h h td ti l l d ld h b i t i $100 US iti ith th t diiihi ti A d ith th ti f th t f th d l d ld ld ith th tibti likl d h d dit t d ll i i th l t f th th billi l h tl l i i i t l th $1 d ( W l d B k 2000 46) It difflt t i i ht t ld b t d t t t h t ( ) thi i t t i t th t h t t t h t (b) t l b l d t h bi ld t b illi t tht t It ld b i G d i ' d t th flfllt f llti didiidl ibiliti H th t d t t h l t h h ft it d O t l i t d d d th t lbilit f th th f d ttill t t t t t h t if d h h libti ld l i t h t h bliti t i t th t i A duty to rectify injustice M t d i i f ld h id th t i (Cllit 1996 f t h t th t i l hll i d d t f E D th " b l " ff i d h f "bli t i " (D dS ti t th l i h d t l

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h t h th ltil k thi liit) til ditt d i dS ft k thi i h d th " d " ( 1989 17) H thi d ithi t bt l

fflt hld Th i l i t t th k f t i t ) t t l t h h t th

WORLD HUNGER

ld It tht i ibl f t h i l i h t Y t if th assumptions are false then we arguably have a potent "negative" obligation to assist them to rectify the wrongs we helped create the suffering we sustain and the inequalities from which we benefit H ' h A d i t t lt h i h ill t ti bliti t t h If b t l h th h t t bliti t d tht h d i t k f i d d W h t t h i k t h t th f i fflt ti h tl d th l i h t f th d i h d tht til t i thi i h t d tht b f t f thi d i i i h d diti If any f th claims is true then we have not only the "ordinary" positive obligation to assist the vulnerable but also a negative obligation arising from the harm that we caused and/or sustain If all are true then the negative obligation would be very strong Lt l k t hi t WE CAUSED THEIR PLIGHT

The same economic social and political interdependencies that explain our mutual lbiliti t tht likl till d th t i l' liht Dii i t f th ld h i i l l h S i l b tidl W h d b t b t thi h th h t i h Wh OPEC hik li i it i t f lii d i f i t d Wh J b t t i f f it hit l l t Wh th h t d f th i tik ikl i tht t h ' decisions to sell or withhold goods or to increase tariffs negatively impacts on our economies Yet we conveniently forget the impact of our economies on others That is a factual and moral mistake For as potent as the actions of others are on us our ti i i f t f th Th W t i ill fl tht i l i i i f t ti h d t i fft ill Thid W l d ti Th fft lt difft i hih bl th ffi f th ld' i i h d l C i d t iti i l l I th fit l illi ldit it ith li Wh killd I cannot wash my hands of their deaths Although the lions and not I were the immediate cause of their deaths I am responsible since I placed them in this vulner able position Two I do not place gladiators into this arena Rather I "offer" men i th i th " t i " f b i ldit Id k i fll ll t h t i th l fi i th I ilt b l i i tht i th h l t d t fiht th li th I t ibl f thi d t h N th l b i thi t lbilit t t th t d ht ld d if th h d ti th I till ibl f h tht lt A i h bl k l d i thi if th vulnerable parties; why should we deny it when we are the exploiters? Arguably we (partially) caused the plight of the starving in one of these senses We are highly advantaged people whose economic social and political nstitutions " l l d l t l d i th i f th " (P 1997 505

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2000) M lti il t t i iti "h d fr i l h i t i l tht dd b i " (P 1997 509) T h t i h "W h l d tt l t h dil i l i t i i il t t i iti if th l l t i f th iti d d h i t i l i h i h ll i t t l ( d l l ) l d i i l i l i l t d " (P 1997 509) A d i t t d l th l t k f hih P k t d i l l Tht i h ldit l i ht d i l I tht I l d ( t i d ) th i t th ith th li H t i l h d d l t d th diti hih ld t t t i Tht i h i wholly ibl f th l i h t f th i i h d d t i O ld d lbl lt fr fl fft ildi th hi f billi f l t d d ti C t i l h ll b f l t d t i l l i i f t i thi l hi H l k il h d ht M f thi i lt ff th l h k I d t h W d t b th l f t t b (till) ibl f it Aft ll t i t l th l f t ti h l ithi ti t t d b k d diti (Ht d H 1973) ( h i h i h th OPEC ti t ll ibl f k k t i il i i t h ! ) If ll ibl l f th thi f hih th l th bl ld t b ibl f thi A d if ll ibl l f th thi f hih th d i t ld b ibl f littl N d b t l t h b k d diti ditbl tbl iht f l jtifid i ibi l ibilit f ti Bt tht i F t f ht i i t t i li th ti i t I solely predomint k did I antly ibl f h b t hth I responsible enough? W l sufficiently important l t h t it i t ttibt ibilit t t bl f itk ( d t t t t f t h ) t i f ? Lt i t l M t l i t l f ki h I N th l it ld b i t k t t h i k th hll ibl Th i d th f t f hih I k th f hih I i t D i t th f th th f t ld b f l i h t d t' l l i ki h I T f t hll ibl f th d fil f thi t d t T t h i k t h t th f h f th th d Thi i i t k tht bth d i i t t d t d t ft k Yt hld t th th t b i f i tht f t ibl t ll f t d t l i Th f t i t d t l i i f t i f it f f t f hih i l th f Th i hildlik t f tht t t l ll th l ibilit ( d i l l th l b l ) f hld lik tl diidi th ld i t th d d th b d Bt tht d t f l t th th ld k A th i l idit th f tht k h 248

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d th f tht t i i f i t litil il d i changes are not singular but arise from a convergence of factors That is true not only of work habits or student learning but also of special relevance to the current issue of endemic and episodic hunger I h t d t il d t i ' tibt l bf ti i i ibilit O k tht l d tibt l i ti th h th hld k l d til ibilit d h i h t d bliti t it t hl d th f f t f ht h d Si th i f th W t ld b t t i l l i f l l th Thid W l d tht llbi h t d t thi then we should accept some responsibility for their plight WE ACTIVELY SUSTAIN THEIR IMPOVERISHMENT

S

i h t t h i k it i t t t tht d th diti tht k i d d h likl E if t h t t ft ti tht ti th diti f th l i h d T th li l if I h d thi t d ith l i l i th ith th li bt b t l d hi f htl t i t f h t t h th ti til t th exploitative practice I am partly responsible for the death of the gladiators The relevance to world hunger is clear We are voracious consumers Because we want fresh fruits coffee and spices and we want them at a minimal cost we bi it b t ( ) t ( t i ) fft t t ' t bl l d f i t l f th l l t i iti f S t i thi i d t t i t th l l ( if d i d b th l l ih) i l l f th d d f th l i bt it ft d Fth i t f h d fiill d th b i i i litti hii ti i th T h i d W l d t h b till i th ffi f th l b l (Wolff 2001) We also politically support the international borrowing and resource privileges that burden democratic regimes with debts generated by former dictators and that allow those dictators to legally abscond with the country's natural re (P 2001) A l t h h i l l li b t th ( d th ltd) ti th f t t h t t th t h h ti d litil d i i h tht t i th i i h t f th t ff dt h b till thi t i t i WE BENEFIT FROM THEIR SUFFERING

Even if we do not actively support the systems that harm the impoverished most people in the Western world benefit from the poor's predicament and do nothing to t it I t h t l tibt t thi d i t i S iht li tht l l d l ibilit diiihd i i l fild t t th h I th t t h i tht i t i h If t t fil t l d t id ffdbl hlth t it hild th th t h d t h i illit ill h l t h if t fil t h t f i ith t l d i t th it i ibl f th d t h it ld h td Ad 249

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if I f i l t t lt thid t i l l if th t ik f i t i is minimal then most of us will say that my inaction contributes to any harm befalling the victim This is especially true if I benefit from that harm (the victim has me in her will) For then my refusal signals that my action is in some sense i t t i l Responsibility in the real world Th th t i t thik tht h ti i bilit t t h t th f th ld fd H th t though powerful are not beyond dispute Does this give us a reason to do nothing? Of course not We should act on the best evidence we have The degree of epistemo logical certainty we require before acting depends on the relative costs of action i t i Bf i i i l lti h th t t d i i l bl d d very t id f thi ilt H d t i t d t ld t h ti t d d W hld l th t d d f id h () ti i (b) h l d i th ibl f h th till ti ld remedy and (c) accepting responsibility for similar harms we partially cause sus tain or could remedy We use a more relaxed standard of evidence when accepting (and expecting) praise for our successes and when attributing blame to those who h W hld th t d d h d t i i ibilit f ti i t i If d th ill i l ibilit f th l i h t f th i i h d i ld A d if G d i (1985 1 2 6 7 ) i t tht d tb ll ibl f h t h t k ibilit t d h th h l d hl ill i d thi diti t l t i l littl tt l

Conclusion W h l t i l d t tht t h t bliti t b l t th llbi f th i l i i h d Fit h iti bli ti t i t th h l b l t ti S d l h t thik till ibl f th ffi f th ld' d h h t ti bliti t t fth h Thid ld f d them and ease their suffering and pain with relatively little effort If we do nothing in the face of these arguments we have reason to think that we are complicitous in the deaths of many people We might be wrong but when with only a relatively ll ifi id th d i d d ibilit t h t li l ' d t h th ll ht t t K i il h t t i l Dbtl i l t d idiidl h liitd t d th bl T d f d th ihd d llti ti d h i lbl ititti (Sh 1996 1289) S i f i l l if th t i th l t ti t th i t

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fft

hld b t ti i tht ti t h ' i t Th h l d () k t bi i t t i l fft t b t t (b) lbl (P 1997) t t d l t t h t ill k d i h ifl t f llti d () tblih t hih f f t i l dt idi h Likl t h h b litil fft ill t t i l d i h dti i i h d i k tht t likl t h t i th t th hld H hld l tibt t iti ith t k d i liiti h ti d l t d i th Th tibti ill i t th d th ill h th tht i b t th tl di t i t t i l h Th t t t hih hld i f t i l it i th i i b t th d hih lit b d d i (Willi 1985 K 1989 S h f f l H hi b d th f thi h t

A Thk

t t

Th

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Rf Aik W d L F l l t t H ( d ) (1977) World Hunger and Moral Obligation E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l Food Policy B b i k P (1987) R j i d t b l h t h i th ff i 12 (1) 5 9 MD B d f th W l d B d f th W l d (2000) A Program to End Hunger Sil S i Yk B L R (1974) In the Human Interest: A Strategy to Stabilize World Population N Nt Population and C l d l l J C (1976) T d t t t fd h i t i t i th Development Review 2 (3/4) 3 2 1 6 6 Population and (1997) Th l b l ftilit t i t i th df ifi th Development Review 23 (4) 80312 C k D (1996) H it dd l t I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) World Hunger and Morality 2 d d 21130 U Sddl Ri NJ P t i H l l Cllit G (1996) Th lif i l I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) World Hunger 5169 U Sddl Ri NJ P t i H l l and Morality 2 d d Illii Ui D J (1988/1922) Human Nature and Conduct C b d l IL S t h it P D J d S A (1989) Hunger and Political Action O f d O f d U i i t P ( h t t / / l i f t / d / h / h O h t l ) ( d ) (1991) The Political Economy of Hunger: Entitlement and Well-being l I O f d Ofd U i i t P ( d ) (1991b) The Political Economy of Hunger: Famine Prevention l II O f d O f d U i i t P

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( d ) ( 1 9 9 1 ) Th Plitil E f H E d i H l IE O f d Ofd U i i t P Flth J (1977) Gi if it h l bt t if it h t I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Ml Obliti 1 0 3 1 4 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l G d i R E (1985) P t t i th V l b l A R l i f S i l Ribiliti Chi U i i t f Chi P Hdi G (1996/1974) L i f b t thi th i t hli th I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 515 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l H t H L A (1955) A th t l i h t ? Philhil Ri 64 1 7 5 9 1 dH T (1973) C t i i th L Ofd C l d P H D M (1975) S i t dP l t i 2 d d E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l H i J (1999) Gd i Gd Th Citlit Pi Gid t I t i N Yk H C l l i H D (1978/1740) A Tti fH Nt 2d d Ofd Ofd U i i t P I t i f f M (1985) Th Nd f St N Y k Viki K S (1989) Th Liit f Mlit Ofd Ofd U i i t P LFlltt H dM L (1995) Sff th littl hild ibilit dh I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 7084 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l Li X (1996) M k i f th riht t f d I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 15370 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l MKil M (1981) O b l i t i t th t i N 15 3 0 9 2 4 N J (2000) L i b t r i i I H L F l l t t ( d ) Th Blkll Gid t Ethil Th 30624 O f d B l k l l P i k h K S (1991) C h i h i th ld i t fi t t i l lii I J D d A S ( d ) Th Plitil E f H E t i t l t d Wllbi l I Ofd Ofd U i i t P P T W (1992) A i t i t t i l h t h i t t i Pbli Affi Q tl 6 (1) 8 9 1 0 3 (1997) A l b l diidd I D C k d T Lid ( d ) Ethi f C ti 50138 T t NJ R d Littlfild (2000) I t t i l iif fh iht J l f Ethi A 4 5 6 9 (2001) O l b l i jti MthUh 32 6 2 4 (2001b) P t i h i t r i i t t i I I Crt d M R i d i (d) F d P d Plitil Mlit E f Fli O h i L d Pl Ridl M (1996) Th Oii f Vit L d Viki Shffl S (1992) H Mlit Ofd Ofd U i i t P S A (1981) P t dF i A E E t i t l t dD i t i Ofd Ofd U i i t P Sh H (1980) Bi Riht Sbit Affl d US F i Pli P i t NJ P i t U i i t P (1996) S l i d r i t t d th riht t f d I W Aik d H LFlltt ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 11322 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i Hll Si P (1977/1972) F i ffl d lit I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Ml Obliti 2 2 3 7 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l (1996/1972) F i ffl d lit I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 2638 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l

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Sober E and Wilson D S (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Sobham R (1991) The politics of hunger and entitlement In J Dreze and A Sen (eds) The Potitical Economy of Hunger: Entitlement and Well-being vol I Oxford: Oxford University Press United Nations Development Program (2000) Human Development Report 2000 Oxford: Oxford University Press (http://wwwundporg/hdro/) Watson R A (1977) Reason and morality in a world of limited food In W Aiken and H LaFollette (eds) World Hunger and Moral Obligation pp 115-23 Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Williams B A 0 (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Cambridge MA: Harvard Uni versity Press Wolff J (2001) Economic competition: should we care about the losers? In H LaFollette (ed) Ethics in Practice 2nd edn Oxford: Blackwell World Bank (2000) World Development Report 2000/2001 Oxford: Oxford University Press (http://wwwworldbankorg/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/indexhtm) World Health Organization (1999) World Health Report Geneva: World Health Organization (2000) World Health Report Geneva: World Health Organization (http://wwwwhoint/ whr/2000)

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O

d i i b t b i ith Th Hbb i f i i l it t l th bl d b th d i h lif H b b t h h t t h t i l td h i i iil diti (hi " t t f t " ) tht id t i l thi t l iht t l f t t i i d t t sole right of the sword His solution to the problem posed by lence of the state of nature is to monopolize the potentiality Th lti

Hbb iil it l f il i iil t l i t l t i ith th the widespread vio for violence in one

h f d t i i thi d i f f t hll thi Hbb' litil h i l h f ti t i bl bt it t id l l lti t th bl f il it ld d t th t f tblihi lifti f ( l t ) b l t i Th ld bbl f t h th ( H b b lid) i t f manent hostility akin to the war of all against all with which his problematic begins This "anarchy" of the international order thus poses almost intractable difficulties for the peace that Hobbes took to be a primary objective of the laws of t df hih i t id th t Hbb t b hld t b l f th i t t d d i l h t d t t t bld f N th l hi d i t i t i t f bth i t d jti bt th i t l l t l d i f f l t i f i ith th t d A d th d i f f l t i th t h t i l Hbb' h i l h fl d th d l t f"lit" t h i fi t t i l lti tht h t hd i t dil d litil ti I thi difft ways the names of those avowed "realists" Henry Kissinger and George Kennan stand testament to this impact Not that modern realist thinkers have always pro moted war over peace but their theoretical posture tends to make them misunder t d d i t t th l til d d i t i ibiliti f th i t t i l F Hbb t l i th i itll b l t b t it l d f th t fj t i i h thi th i d b j t H t it i j t i i t hi bjt th i d thi bjt H it i t ii t h t th id fj t i dijti i th i t t i l

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d th i t d id fj t d j t i i ttti from him His attitude is neatly captured in his famous remark: "Where there s no common power there is no law: where no law no injustice Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues" (Hobbes 1968: 188) Elsewhere this bleak verdict is d t d b th t Th i t b d fijti bt i l t th l f t d b bl t G d f h t Hbb ll i i i t Th th i h ti bliti l t th d i b d bf Gd t f t th t t f t l l C t l t t ld b ld t dtil d l d N Hbb' lifti t i t d t th lit f b i i f hi brief discussions of honor cruelty and necessity in war allow some minimal room for moral restrictions on how a war is conducted (Hobbes 1969: 78) Hobbes's qualifications mirror the twofold division of discussion within the justwar tradition th fit d ith th lit it t t t t ll d th d ith th lit t h t h l d th i f h t Th f i ft l l d jus ad beUum d th l t t jus in bello. Th H b b i i i i dti th f l h f th jus ad bellum i th thi f f " i d " (i d t f i h t ) d th d d i diti f th jus in bello reflected as the (largely unspecified) requirements of honor This suggests that the totally amoral attitude to war much discussed by philoso phers is in reality exceptional both theoretically and even practically If we regard j t thiki d ith th ljtifti ( l k f it) f fhti th l t ift d ihilit i thi i not j t t h i t Y t it b t dititi d t t t d th t id W d b t t t t th it d b bt t i t th t "jt t h " t tht b t fjtifti tht i l th t d i t i f thiki b t d th i t t i l i t fjti Thi t d i t i i b t i t d t Cthli thik t h h f th h i f l d t development It might be more accurate to see it as an outgrowth of natural law theory since many of the significant thinkers in its development in the West were natural lawyers such as Vitoria Suarez and Grotius who were also founding f i th d i i l i fi t t i l l N th l St A t i i hdl t l l t h i t i M i h l Wl Y t it i b d l t tht t t h i t t t thi hibiti d l h i th tiliti t i l i t bit Utilit d i d d i t t i d i i th lit f (h ld th f i l t b ? ) t it i hd h th i t i fjti i d d f it i t i t tk b d th Bt more of this below

The Just War: Jus ad Bellum A l t h h it i t tlk f " j t t h " th d f thiki iditd i b d tditi th i l ifd i t l l t l ti It i l lik th th f th t i l i t i d lik lit N th l ti l d i i k d

t h b t d I

ill

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bi ith d i t f th tht right to go to war: the jus ad helium. 1 2 3 4 5

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War must be declared and waged by legitimate authority Th tb j t f i t W tb l t t Th tb bl t f Th i l d tb t i l t th bi

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E h f th diti i bl W hll bifl i f th diffi culties with conditions (3)(5) and then comment more fully on condition (2) Conditions (3) and (5) are specifications of a commonsense understanding of the rational limits to selfdefense Given the ambiguous benefits and definite risks of t f il d th i h t t d it h t b d t l th id f "lt t" it th d i b i l i t f ti h t f N th l th diti t i tht ti t tt l ti S f th ill b t b d t ft it h t i d every th dti th dl th i i t b l t th d i d t f t cause Last resort requires the use of imagination and some degree of risktaking n the search for reasonable alternatives to war but it does not counsel peace at any price Hence it will be a matter of practical judgment whether the relevant alterna ti t h b h t d M it h l d tb f t t tht f th l t t i t h thi i l t i illttd b i d i h t t ith th h t f ti t f ti Th i t f tilit th jus ad bellum d th jus in bello d i i t tht lthl il hld t b l d itht idti f th bl bt th il it b i d th dt b hid i iti il Th i h l t f llti b t th lt ti ality is not fullbloodedly consequentialist This is because its focus is narrower We are not asked to consider whether going to war is the best thing for the universe all things considered but whether the foreseeable costs of this resort to violence are t f kilt ith th i i l b h i it k t d Cid th i t t ddfit F h i t i it ht id Elih fihi t i 1992 id b l l l fF h il (tti Elih t d may j t i f h i l t t fibl d i Elih b t littl) Thi ff Bitih b d i fi t i F h fihi b t b t it ld t i l t li th tt f l l l Condition 4 is also a reflection of common sense but at an even more basic level since it is merely an application to warfare of an apparently fundamental condition of rational action Normally one is irrational to engage in a plan with ittle or no id t f Y t th d t i t i hih dt t i t th dd Th ti lib h f dit f l h b t i l t t t t th l i h h thik it likl h k it I th f fiht i t th dd b jtifibl h th t k hih h fl i d t i d t l t bt l Thi l i b l b t it d t ft di 256

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ti 4 h i btl i t t t i f " b l " F th desperate mountain climber it may be reasonable to attempt the unlikely jump and so too for those resisting slavery against "hopeless" odds But what if the odds really are hopeless? The climber confronts not just a crevice but a sheer cliff with no other id t h d th it f h l i iht d b L i th l i b t hi dil id th ilit S ld t h t th i t i h i h fiht t th d t h i fbl t itlti Thi h t libilit h th i b t l t t i t i Bt ld t d th i t fth t th bli ti f t i l h M i h l Wl t d i hi d i i f Fild' "futile" war of defense against the Soviet Union in 1 9 3 9 4 0 What these argu ments show is that the concept of "success" is open to complex interpretations At first blush one naturally takes it to mean winning the war but the counter l t th N th l h i h b i t t d i th f t i l h t t t f ti b t lf i l t i f it k Cditi 2 i j t l h it ii i ititi bt i it i t t t i i bl Th diff bt th ld tradition and much contemporary theory The medieval tradition of the ust war stems primarily from St Augustine and was generally more permissive though sometimes the differences are only terminological The classical texts as both John (1975) d B (1992) k l t d d t ll id f th d th lik M i h l W l ' th tht ld b t t d f th UN C h t Th d i l iti i titi th i t h l b t it i l i t i t f ilit i t t i th df i t i A th t d i l H Gti t t "th f hih i th f hih l i t i " (Gti 1925 171) Y t it i l tbl tht G t i ' b t discussion stresses the centrality of selfdefense and response to aggression (Grotius 1925: 7 0 4 ) Barnes asks whether medieval theory sanctioned what he calls "humanitarian w a r s " such as one waged against a government that is injuring ts iti H li t h t th l t t f th th t t thi b t t h t th iit i i t it dh t S i l i " h t t tht i ki h t ih i j i th hl ld i l t t h fl d f d ll d d dititi f i d i t i " (B 1992 779) Thi i bth i t t i h i t i l d btti thil ti O th h i t i l ti it i th ti t h t B t f the very late medieval theorists the sixteenthcentury Jesuit Suarez to make his point It is possible to argue however that by the time of the Spanish theologians Suarez and Vitoria the spirit of the theory had begun to change partly under their ifl A l t h h th d f lfdf hd l l d l i liti ti t t A i d th hd l l l d i " i j i " f lii t H i i t t t h t i l l t thd t hth didt f t Bth Viti dS dlt Gti i t liit f t h h it i libl t th tdi t th b i i f t d

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titi ttitd t j t (Gti 1925 5 1 6 1 7 5 5 3 4 S 1944 Vitoria 1991) The current ban on "aggressive war" can be seen for all its obscur ity as the outcome of such a development The strength of this ban is also of course connected with the rise of the modern tt d th d t i f i t tht h i d it I d d t d i i f ht i lld " h i t i i t t i " tk t i t i t h t th l i t ilit i t t i i th i t l ffi f th tt t i i l th d t i f i t it d l d i d ft th T t fW t h l i tht t d t th W fRlii i 1648 Th tti f S k it l h tht l ti against armed intervention in the affairs of other peoples predates Westphalia and is based on considerations other than the apparent sanctity of sovereign rights n the modern sense Hence any presumed breakdown in the modern conceptual f k f i t h th d l t f " d i t i l i t " ff l i th f l li f i t t i th i i i l b l i d Adittdl th t bh f " i " h th iti th t i f " i " i l i d t litti None the less the moral power of the idea of defense against aggression comes from the moral significance of selfpreservation and particularly selfdefense It is not a uniquely modern concept as Anscombe (1970) for instance seems to believe (see b l ) i it b f d itll t ti l h ti b t th l i t i f id S f l k l dititi bt i d i ( d f i ) d f l it t k il f th l i t i f i (S 1944 8025) M i t Chi d i i f th lit f if ll dt j t th l i t i f i d l t h h th t f i t ki ht difft f tht h i d i th UN C h t it is a recognizable relation (Tzu et al 1964) The basic moral intuition draws much of its appeal from the legitimacy of personal resort to selfdefense Hobbes for instance treats the legitimacy of self ti th f d t l iht f t Th til bl t l t i f th f i d i i d l t tht f t i t t di l i dti t f t i l iht b t h th t t i l l d f d i it l th th it h th f lit th th t i h lbl f M it i t th it f th t i tht h hd i t d i t i l d i i If ti i ti titld t th f l violence in its own defense then surely other nations may come to its aid as long as their objective is to help repel the attack and no more This parallels what seems allowed with regard to aid in the case of individuals Of course in both the domestic d th i t t i l ht i b t t l ll iibl i t th hl t Th b fl dtil f t hli th d f d t h l Wh th S i t U i i d d H dlt C h l k i th ld t d b i i l l b f f f l d th f liti h t l t t k bl f h ii i t i 258

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defense against aggression

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ld t t jtti th t f i d t i l l h poses since her argument seems to presume the existence of a struggle in which actual blows have not yet been struck though they or something like them have been extensively prepared for So some form of aggression (different from the UN dl) h d l d b i th f l i t i t ti d i d li Bt i t t i t l f "th fit bl i th t l " ld f t th i bl tht iitit d flit Thi i td b l ith h i h A b i t d th d i i l th i l t B i t i h i f th l t d d P l t ( A b 1970 43) H h clearly has in mind justifying resort to war by the idea of suppressing some grave evil in the international order even where it constitutes no aggression of any sort against your state Taken with her remark about "the only question" being that of " h i i th i h t " thi k t t th li d t d i f j t It ld th id f ilit i t t i i th tt' ffi d t fl t d ti t l il h ti f i i t F l l i t fhi lt ll th di itti " h i t i " Th t h i l h ' f t i wars in Uganda Cambodia Somalia and Kosovo have recently shown Support for humanitarian warfare strengthened amongst philosophers and other theorists at the end of the twentieth century though politicians were generally less thiti S h i t i h d th th f th i dl t h d l b t th t d t t t ii t t i t d t th j t d t b t t d ith i Th i ti i t th l lidit f t t i ht k f th h i t f f f th t d t t i it l d th d b i ti tht h ft f l d it F th th d l t fj t th h b i l f ltiti l i t i t i f O i f f lii f trade and imperialist wars and of what tends to happen when one nation conquers another "for its own good" speak against allowing expansive accounts of "just cause" (compare Walzer 1977: 1 0 2 5 ) Thi id fl bjti t h i t i b t th f t i t h t th b t tht hll th bjti Wl t t th Idi i i f B l d h i 1971 h h th i t t i t t th f lti b ht i l l it t Th V i t i i fC b d i b iil th T i fU d t h h th h i t i f th ti i th h b l th happy Anscombe's example of the use of violence against "the manstealing busi ness" is another case that has good claims to exception from the ban though the example is complex because it sometimes involved armed action against criminal d i d b thi t At th ti h tbl th f B i l th B i t i h d i t l iltd f i i t ( C l d 1964 h 6) A t t t t d l ith i th h i h i d ti th hijki f i f t i iil liti A thid ltd bl ith th i d l i t h t it tifi iti t i l t t t Citi k h h l d these b d i d these 260

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tt b i h t? Th ti i i ddd f b th i which colonization and decolonization have created states with whimsical boundar ies This is not the place to engage in a fullscale discussion of sovereignty national determination nationalism and the justification for state authority but we can t t thi O i tht id f i t tht i b l t i it f tid i l t h d h d k l th t ld th d i tht i t h l i f d i till ll i d h i f d l iti iif b th bjt t t H tid i t i tt h ll i t t i d ill ft f d l d litil bl Th f h i t i d t b conscious of these drawbacks (For objections to Michael Walzer's restrictive view of the right to humanitarian intervention see Doppelt 1978: 3 2 6 ; Wasserstrom 1978: 5 3 6 4 5 ; Luban 1980: 1 6 0 8 1 ; also Beitz 1979: 4 0 5 2 4 Walzer has since b thti t i t t i d tl t f hi iti h hiftd h t i th th d i t i Wl 1992 i i 1995 L b d)

Th Jus in Bello Moral restrictions on how one conducts oneself in war are apt to be met with incredulity "You do what needs to be done to win" is a common response There is ti l i thi ti t l k b t it fli i th f t l f t thiki bt f h t Th t f t i t f i t h d l i thiki E tht t h i th US G l Chk Y ffd i l li t d t it " t i t i " t h t h i d l i d ith i W l d W n H ill " t d" f hi t i th i d i i i t t f f 50squaremile area of Germany (Yeager and Janos 1986: 8 9 9 0 ) The idea that there are nonlegitimate targets amongst "the enemy" is the basis of one of the two primary rules of the jus in bello: the principle of discrimination Th th i th i i l f tilit th ti f hih l l l it k i th jus ad bellum f th ti t b i d bth b t hth th tt i t i l t ij d hth tti i t i t t it j t d fft A j t f th d i i i t i i i l th i i t f b t t f d i t t t k Thi i k i t t hih tiliti h t th j t i f t i f t d t t ith th l i l j t tditi Either they deny that the principle obtains at all or more commonly they argue that it applies in virtue of its utility The former move is associated with the idea that war is such "hell" and victory so important that everything must be subordin td t tht d bt i tiliti t it i l t h t thi f f thl h th b t t ill h it i h d b th i id H th i t t h t th i i t f b t t i fl l f titi th d ht b N t i l i t i (I h l l ll th " i t i i l i t " b th bli t h t th i t i i th th fili t i i d) t h t th h t i i 261

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f th i i t l b t th ill thi f t i i f i t dditil reason to conform to the principle Intrinsicalists will argue that the principle's validity springs directly from the reasoning that licenses resort to war in the irst place This resort is allowed by the need to resist perpetrators of aggression (or on th b d i t dl ith d ) d h it li il l i t th t Thi i th it bhid d i t i i h i b t t f b t t i th t i l d di t I thi t t h lif l b t t i t d t t h t th h il i t h i h t lk thi f thi t ' lii d t h t th b t t h h il thi Th lifiti concerned with the role the individual plays in the chain of agency directing the aggression or wrongdoing And it is agency not mere cause that is important since the soldier's aged parents may be part of the causal chain that results n his being ilbl t fiht i t h t t h i h i t ibilit f h t h i di Th b t t b d t fiht b t h h i till ti th if th t bl li ith th h O th th h d th hlhild b thiti b t h t' bt i t ti t Nith i th f h d t f d th t f h ld f d th (if they'd buy) whatever their role But even when these distinctions are made there seems room not only for doubt about the application of the distinction to various difficult categories of person such l lb dt ki iti f t i b t l it libilit t ll t th h i h l i t t d iti f d tt It i l h i t i t thik f t d bt i it i ll ti i t ti i t l i t l Bt l t h h d h lft it " t t l " t i i d t t i th flti f h d lit E i W l d W II t iti b t t I th i illi f l h are not plausibly seen as involved in the enemy's lethal chain of agency There are for instance infants young children the elderly and infirm lots of tradespeople and workers not to mention dissidents and conscientious objectors Moreover the dl f t t l tht d i thi b j t i i i t l f t d t d Th i f th 1990 t tht f th f t likl t i l h l dl M ill b lik th lli i t I d th i t t i i t Sbi K ht Mihl Itiff h lld " i t l " (I tiff 2000 200) Oth lik th d t i Si L k ill b i t t b l iil N b t t ill f b t t d b t th i t believe that we can never tell who they are In fact there has been a remarkable change on this issue in the strategic doctrine and military outlook of many major powers since the end of the Cold War It is now t t l t li i t th i i l i d d b ti t i t h di th Glf W d th b b i f Sbi d b th i d d d t i fR i btlit i Chh Th l ti i t h h t h it i i l t t t b t t (it i ) b t h " l l t l " d ddth t b t t b d f d d Thi l bl i j t f th i i l f d b l f f t Thi th ft ld b tt f 262

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l l d f th h i f b t t i i t f but unintended sideeffect of an otherwise legitimate act of war The "circum stances" included the proportionality of the sideeffect to the intended outcome Not everyone agrees with the principle (and this is not the place to discuss it in detail) b t th d t f i t i t i ll i i b l l th tiiti f i l l d t t b t t t ik i ti i t S difiti t th i i t i i l t ll d i t h i t b i li ith lit i th f lif d t b i t t d b th i t f If it i t i l b l th ifi Hl (1989 193203) h d th l l ti

Terrorism F

h tht h i d d it d di t i i i l d i f f i l t t dfi It h b t i t d t h t th ll h d d d i f f t dfiiti ft i i th h l l litt (L 1999 5) Thi di f l t th f t t h t h di l i th t highly polemical so that the act of defining becomes a move in a campaign rather than an aid to thought Consequently many definitions are too broad to be of analytical value conflating terrorism with any form of violence the authors disap f R t h th t i l i i th iti f dfiiti I t t t k l t i t df b t t i l th id t h t it i l " i t " iti Thi id it f ti ith th l t fj t th i f i l l th i i l f d i i i t i d it i t f b t t i i t Of t i d t l tk l i th t t f l l t i t t i l bt t usually has a warlike dimension I will define it as follows: "the use of violence to target noncombatants ('innocents' in the jus in bello sense) for political purposes" This definition has several contentious consequences One is that states can them l t i th i t h t h litil il b tt t ill t b t i t A t th f th i t d ill t th tti f tt t t i t th ibilit f t i t t t tt t B t if thik f t i i th l i h t f th d f i i t i b tti th th idl thi t d hld b itd i tt d d th t t i f ttki th i t S t h i t h thik t i t b t t d b t t h f d ti ith different definition They define terrorism somewhat in the spirit of Hobbes as he use of political violence by nonstate agents against the state Some would restrict it to violence against a democratic state This is the way many political scientists view t i d t l t i th f d t i t t th it ll C l l thi th litil dfiiti t t t ith th t t i l d f i i t i A fth f th t t i l d f i i t i i t h t it i l i d f i tht t i i t h h t t l k S t h i t h l i d tht t i i till " d " th t h t it i till " i " I bth th l i i t h t f t litil i i i t I l t i

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b d tht tlk f t i d i t d b th i tion that it does not restrict its targets to the obvious military ones but this does not mean that it is wild and purposeless Indeed most terrorists think that the best way to get certain political effects is to aim at "soft" noncombatant targets Simi l l th b d b t tht t i t ttk i d bli i l i th ffiti f th t t i t d "W till h tk ti f " Y t th i d t l d th i th ti "Tht' t t l k " h b d i d t di d tt ft S t i t t b d bth i d litill i It i fth ti h t h th t i l l l i t i Th id tht terrorist acts are merely expressive is partly sustained by the belief that when viewed as purposive the acts are basically futile The futility is often real enough but purposive acts abound that are in fact futile Th t t i l d f i t i f th bl l d d i d i th i f th t " b t t " bt tl I ill i t tb il i d t i f i b l b t t d ill kt lit l th ill d l l i h b i t t i th i t h b b l i thi tt b t t O th th h d tt ffiil h t ditl ecuting the campaign against the insurgents may be plausibly viewed as implicated in the grievances the revolutionaries are seeking to redress There are certainly problems here but they do not seem insurmountable In the heat and confusion of b t t l it b diffilt dd t t t hild b t t ill h hild d d d it b t t l ( i i t flit) N th l dittd i fb b i i l h i t l t id iili l k f ti ith b l i th d fi f t d th t t i lbl ilti f th jus in bello. S f tt ffiil h t thiti tffi li h l ll t t i l l l t d t th f th flit It i t tht i d l i purport to have enemies so comprehensive as to make even small children and helpless adults into "combatants" Western advocates of "totalwar" strategic bombing of cities share with the Islamic fanatics who incorporate American air t l l d d iti fM h t t i t thi h l t t iliti d M i h ii f th ld t h t i t dd ith th j t tditi' t t t t bi l it t b th f litil il I t i ? Gi j t th d th t t i l d f i t i th i l l A d if t k th i i l f b t t i i t t k b l t l hibiti j t thik h l d th it i always wrong Yet many contemporary moral philosophers sympathetic to ust war thinking are wary of moral absolutes They would treat the prohibition as expressing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism and the targeting of b t t b t ll f ti i t i t S Mihl Wl thik t h t i diti f " " th ilti f th l i i t i iibl i f t h h l ith h b d f ( t d i t t i ) H t h i k th Allid t b b i f G iti i W l d W II (i th l t ) l i t i t d b th it f th N i t h t J h R l h tl d d thi i hil d i 264

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th

b b i i t t i

f Hihi i l l d t th t "

tt

d N k i it Th l "

(Wl

1992 it

l t k

t d t t b l

t

R l ll litil

1999) If thi it t tt t tht h j d t

Rf A

b G E M (1970) W d d I R W t ( d ) War and Morality B l t CA W d t h B J (1992) Th j t I N Kt t l ( d ) The Cambridge History of Later Cbid U i i t P Medieval Philosophy C b i d B i t C (1979) B d d lit j t i d th t t i ld liti International Organization 33 4 0 4 2 4 C l d R (1964) The British Anti-slavery Movement ith it b J F N Yk B d Nbl D l t G (1978) W l ' th f lit i i t t i l l t i h i Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 3 2 6 Gti H (1925) The Rights of War and Peace (De jure beUi ac pads libri tres) l 2 d F i W Kl ( i b 1682) O f d C l d P Hbb T (1968) Leviathan d C M h H d r t h P i (1969) The Elements of Law: Natural and Political 2 d d d F d i d T i ith it b M M Gldith L d C Hl R (1989) On War and Morality P i t NJ P i t U i i t P I t i i f M (2000) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond N Y k M t l i t B k Jh J (1975) Ideology Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 P r i t NJ P i t U i i t P L W l t (1999) The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction N Y k Ofd U i i t P Lb D (1980) J t dh riht Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 1 6 0 8 1 ( d ) Intervention and Civilisation: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War ( b l i h d it i t d t th) R l J (1999) Fift ft H i h i I S F ( d ) Collected Papers 56572 Cbid MA H d U i i t P S i d i k H (1898) Th lit f trif I Practical Ethics L d S S h i dC S F (1944) Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez l 2 d J Stt Ofd C l d P T H T H F dT M (1964) Basic Writings of Mo Tzu Hsun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu t B Wt N Y k C l b i U i i t P U i t d Nti (1974) General Assembly Ruting 3314 N Y k U i t d N t i d V i t r i F (1991) Political Writings: Francesco de Vitoria d A P d dJ L Cbid Cbid U i i t P Wl M (1977) Just and Unjust Wars N Y k Bi B k (1992) Just and Unjust Wars 2 d d N Yk B i B k (1995) Th liti f Dissent 42 1 W t R (1978) R i f Just and Unjust Wars Harvard Law Review 92 5 3 6 4 5 Y C dJ L (1986) Yeager L d A B k

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Further reading Chang, Iris (1998) The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. London: Penguin. Coates, A. J. (1997) The Ethics of War. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gray, J. Glenn (1998) The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press. Paskins, Barrie and Dockrill, Michael (1979) The Ethics of War. London: Duckworth. Ritchie, R. (1986) Pirates: Myths and Realities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Shue, Henry (ed.) (1989) Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teichman, Jenny (1986) Pacifism and the Just War. Oxford: Blackwell. Villar, R. (1985) Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980. London: Conway Maritime Press.

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d

S i

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T h h i tilit t i l l h it bjt f l idtifti t d th d (3) h ti Aft lii f th t " t i til ttti t th t h i d

i th li (1) ti (2) t i l h il bliti h iht t litil l f d t i t i i " I ill i h f th ti li d it i l i t i f i

What is a Nation? 0

i ti i l t l f l h idtif ith th d ith h k d f litil l f d t i t i U d t d thi ti h th t ff t l t l h l i l d litil C i d hi t Nations are cultural groups in that their members must share some combination of the following attributes: language religion dress territory ethnicity holidays values etiquette history traditions crafts arts and social mores This is not an h t i lit i f th f t ith ffit A 1 d t d it ti i l t t tht d i f f t lif ti i it f h i i f t i f th h t i t i d th f t b l i t t t difft ti Wh ki F h i t t th Q b i l i t th S i f i t It i t h h l bjtil t h th ttibt th common characteristics must make a subjective difference To qualify as a nation a group's members must view themselves and others as belonging to the group n virtue of these common characteristics Thus the Basques might constitute a nation h th llti fl f t h d d h l d l ld t b l th f f f i t l idtif ith th T i l l thi i d t i f t i i h tht ill t l tk id i th ( d b h d f th f i l ) f h fll t i l h ill l i k l d h l f h i il tdi h t i l tdi hih i l il iht d ibiliti A i C t i f l i likl t f l ll 267

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titd d ll b l i t d t it th C t i bf h ld b inclined toward a similarly imperiled nonnational Finally a group must either have or seek political selfdetermination At its ex treme a nation might have or covet its own state but this is not necessary Less d t i l l l t l h k l il tt ithi l l t i t i l tt T i l l ti lbb f il l lii t iht Nti A i i th U i t d S t t d C d i l f ith d i t i t i litil t t Bf i lt t t h t thi ti f ti i l t l th th t t i t I th d hil it i t f t litil it ti I do not Thus on my view Kurds qualify as a nation even though they have no sovereign state of their own; most states are multinational in so far as they house more than one nation; and a "nationstate" is a country with only one nation J b l

Nti

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Nationalists point to the great diversity of circumstances in which national senti ment flourishes as evidence that it is natural to identify with one's conationals They typically not only suggest that there is nothing irrational about fastening ' t i l b h i t f ' l i th ld th ll fth t h t th ld b thi i i t b t not t k i id i d fli h d f th ti f t i l W f d t l l il bi d t i ltth d t d b l tht h l d dfi l t l t till i t f l t t h t N t i l i t t d t h t it i fitti t h t hld k th f l th l f ti t d th f dh il f t i l W t ll lik th i t diversity of ways to approach life and it is natural and appropriate to feel most comfortable with and interested in those who share one's values customs and l i f lif I h t th i thi i b t idtifi ith fll t i l Citi t d tht t i l i ' t l d t h tht ti li i i d i d b h t T th t th ik E t Gll (1983) i t i t h t it i t i t h ibl l ithi th l i i t i litil d i diti f d i t O thi t tili k it ld t h d l th i i environment had fostered occupational mobility common educational systems as well as the widespread literacy and mass media which this type of educational system allows What is more critics argue that nationalism is a regrettable phe hih h l d ti t Albt E i t i k f h h td tht tili i "iftil d i " bl t th " l f k i d " (Bk 1990 144) A d i t th d t t t i l t i t i i t i l titi i hih i l l t t i th d fil f th if th ' Th i thi ith t k i id i ' di t i i ' ft bt h hld 268

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tk id i th i t i th f t f th l ? If th accomplishments are someone else's it just seems wrongheaded to take pride n them as if they were one's own And since the future of other people affects them rather than oneself it seems the very picture of irrationality to ignore one's own it i f f th i f l d ti N t i l i t ld d b thi b j t i b it tl li i l t i t i t f h tilit A h idtifid ith l h idiidliti j t i ibl bt h ld t i k t f b t h dd d li I i h flt ti t h ibli d l t f i d f i t Wht h l d thik f h was no more moved by her best friend's winning a Nobel Prize than if a stranger had won it? Indeed just asking the question reveals that one could not really be said to have close friends unless one is somehow personally invested in them These idti i d i t tht hld j t t f tilit hih i t b i d i f f t t ll b t idiidliti it Th f t tht l l d i t l idtif ith i t h h l t t h t d th hld k t l i f th ti fl t d th This alone however is not enough to exonerate nationalism To defend national sentiments fully one must explain why conationals are like friends and family appropriate objects of personal identification The problem is that whereas we have t i l l t i h i ith i t i t d t k th t jit f th i ti Th it i f kti f tili t d th it fidtifi ith fil b d till ti th tilit ffli td t t i l I th d b k ldi th i t f l l t i h i i li th iti f tili id th h f t i itht b d i h ttk N t i l i t h d d t thi h i t i t d bjti i i but one prominent approach is to admit that nations are "imagined" communities and then suggest that they are none the less real communities and appropriate objects of personal identification (Anderson 1983) The first thing to note is that t f h " i i d " ti i th d th l ith h idtif d i t h i l l t i h i ith th R l l h l i t l d b Pi D i ' dth f i t All th ld l h hd t Di i d h h did A l t t i l ti h itd l t b t ti t b i t d i th t t h h h l l t i h i ith f the participants That is to say we often root for a team and experience varying degrees of joy or disappointment when "our" team wins or loses As these examples illustrate there is nothing extraordinary about the "imagined" l t f t i l iti Still iti iht i i t tht d i t bi ll i i d ti i t i l it i i b t tilit t l i th it f idtifi ith t i l h t H I t h i k th tilit' t ii i t li h t i l h l t i h i ki t t h t t t Thi l i hlfl b f t h t th i thi t b t f l l f l i

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t t I d d b f th l l t i h i hih when people work together for a common goal teammates typically form close friendships which transcend normally unbridgeable differences in social economic or cultural background Nationalists can invoke the relationship among teammates b th i i hih t i l i i d " t t i lif" C t i l t t i lif i f th h i fh h l d li ' lif T h t i ti l l i t t i it f btl d t b t l h t li d lif Thi ti f th d lif k t i l lik t t b (i th i bl d i f f t t li ' lif f hih tb kd di t objective criteria) ways of life are appealing to the extent that they enable their adherents to flourish As a result the extent to which my way of life strikes me as sensible and worthwhile depends upon the degree to which I and those who live like me f l i h Th if I d ll f th h b fbi i th ld t l i t fd i i t h i li th I l likl t thi f lif th f it If t f th h h l f l i h i th th h d th I b thi th ith fd t h t it i i t (if t the it) f bi i th ld M t f ll it i important to recognize that our selfesteem depends crucially on our confidence n our way of life One does not choose among ways of life in the same manner as one shops for a candy bar: we typically mature into adulthood with a relatively well d f d d i l t i ti f th d lif M t f d th t f li tiki ith th i ilt f l b t t i l l th d i hl i i hih h l i l l bl t ti l t l h Ad b b h l li d thi tt it i il t lf t tht h fid i it If th di i t t th it i t h t i l lik t t i lif V i l (1) b lft i i t i b l d ill tid to our confidence in our way of being in the world; (2) because our confidence in this conception of the good life depends on the extent to which those who embrace it flourish; and (3) because our conationals are those who in fact share in our concep ti f d lif it f l l t h t (4) lft i f d t l l tid t hth t i l f l i h f d A t i l ' it i it f b th f i id tht h d ti fh t b i th ld i th hil d h id hl btt lft di d Th t i l t t i lif i f l db i l df ll d l d i t i l d i t ll Th j t no one would question the joy I would feel when a close friend wins a Nobel Prize no one should be suspicious when I take pride in a conational winning such an honor Given this it is perfectly understandable that conationals should root for nvest in k th f l th l f dtk id d h i th I h t it it tht t i l h l d idtif ith th Whil I t h i k thi l bt t i l dt t i li t t h t il ll iti At l t t ttil bl i Fit t d tht ti i t t l d i l t t b t i l ti t i ft b d fl h i t i d td ti f th

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liti t i l d thi d i t i t i fr th Th d t t allege that conationals are at least twice removed from teammates in that the former not only do not have personal relationships with one another they also are prone to base their allegiance on fabrications Second critics object that these false t i i i i t i l il bt th i i d " t " Th bl t h t th tb " " itht " t h " d ti h tibl hit ft i t l t t h l b d d i th E h f th bjti i i t t bt f d f d f tili t k th t b d i i I t th f t tilit t tht hil l dbtdl li t tiid i f thi t i ' hit thi does not show that there is no distinct nation any more than an individual's self deception entails that she is not a distinct person (Indeed team "histories" may also be distorted but this does not make their members any less teammates) More th lik D i d Mill (1995) h d t h t th t t h f t i ' t b t itlf i l i t t th h it i i it b t bh If td t b t t i ' h i t i l t l i i it b t b i i i d d d t k t if h t h ' bhlf f i t th it ftihiti b t tth t d d tht h l d id th nationals of their misconceptions And while no one would claim that nations have never warred with one an other many nationalists assert that there is no necessary connection between sup ti ' ti d ttki th I ft f th t ti t i t l i t i l th i t tht tili i ftl tibl ith i d d it i hlth l t t th i l iht f libli Libl tilit ll tht t i l t i t b fl ddd t i t t t th t d i t i l l i b l i h t tht b f ti t d i l b d b d th ii d d f i l lit t i il idti d it t f l l t i l ( T i 1993; Miller 1995) Not everyone is convinced that nationalism is fully compatible with the liberal ideals of equality and liberty but the most promising theories of nationalism today strive to combine these two historically antithetical approaches

Nti

dA i t i

Obliti

A iditd b idtifi ith ' ti i l th thi having a sense that one enjoys a special standing among one's conationals a standing which carries with it additional moral responsibilities According to na tionalists these perceived special duties are real; the obligations among fellow na t i l t i dd d i th th S i t dti t h h t t it t Lik th t i l i t li b t l idtifti h thi ti i h t l d b t d Th bl i t h t th i l bli ti t flit ith lit i f th t dd ith d f th i d l f lit d libt A d i t ht S l Shffl (1994) h d b b d th " d i t i b t i bj t i " il bliti t i l i t i b l ith it 271

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d f th lit f ll b th t d ll bit d t t national members Why should one enjoy a privileged status merely because she belongs to my nation? An even more popular concern is the "voluntarist objec tion" which contends that these special obligations are inconsistent with each idiidl' l h f t (Shffl 1994) Th id h i tht h f i iti f ld i i l f d i ffi hih t t f ll b t t l h i t t B ti l t iti dti hih t l f t i l b h i ld i itht t Th t th t t tht l t i i ft f lit th il bliti conationals appear incompatible with our ordinary moral thinking Nationalists attempt to defang the distributive objection by emphasizing that the extra rights correlative to the special obligations of nationalism are a supplement to th th btitt f th b i h iht d b ll M th t i l iht " i t t i " hih i t tht h ti h it t f il li d ibiliti (Mill 1995) Th bii th t it hil A l b i iil h th til C h f i t th A l b i t t ll f th C h ' b i iht d th C h may in turn privilege one another over Albanians Understood thus the special obligations posited among conationals do not seem so antithetical to equality In response to the voluntarist objection nationalists contend that our common lit i t l t thi b j t i b hil t f d i d d l libt l l i l i d l ik f t i t J t di l thiki ffi th il bliti ibli d ll f i t it l l l f ll iifi t ti t i l M ffiitl it th ti f f th b d iti fll t i l t h t th il bliti d t t f ll bit I h t tilit maintain that there is room both to conceive of individuals as largely free and equal and to view them as morally encumbered by their communal ties If so then the special obligations which accompany national membership need not conflict lit ith Whil h i till b i d t d l thi li f t I i k t i l M hif i tht t k l d h td d t l t i t h h t i l b d t dti M ifll h bilt bid f th l i b l d i t i i tht t i l do idtif ith th t th biti d t i l ti clusion that nationals ought to do more for one another (Wellman 1997) To repeat: there is a huge difference between claiming that Xs are typically inclined to assist one another and asserting that Xs are specially obligated to do so Until ff lli l t i t h th f i i t th ltt I thik hld ti th it f th t dti A i t thi t f lit tilit t tht l t i b lidtifti i ll b i t Th id h li J ' h i i tht j t d th "J i d X" t il dt t X d it l J i f ' lidtifiti ith Y t li

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h il bliti t Y O thi i d t i i l i t d jtifi cations for why a Jewish American philosopher has special obligations to other Jews Americans and philosophers because it follows simply and directly from the fact that she identifies with Jews Americans and philosophers (Tamir 1993) Whil thi t k f ii f lidtifti b i f l ii lti t th t bl it l d t th l i hih l l t b l (Wll 2000) C i d tt l M t f f t l idtif ith i t bt f ld t h t it fll t h t th h il bliti t t th t (W i h t ll h t h b k "h" t th l " f i t h f" bt I will suggest below this is an indictment of her character rather than an allegation that she has disrespected a duty to continue to root for the team) A second less benign example is the racist or sexist who identifies with other whites or men Given that we ld b l t h t tht hit it h t d t i t th hit tht i i t h il bliti t th ht t t b th i t h t ll li d t i f t i t dti Of t i l i t iht b j t tht it' i d t i f i t i ith th hit i i t i l i i t b t thi i bl f it Fit b t h i t ti th ti ality of national sentiments and second the most promising argument for the special duties among conationals relies on the contention that identification creates obliga tions not the view that we are obligated just in case we ought to feel connected B f th bl I i k t i l f th l i t h t h ti t il bliti it t i l Th t h t i t th dti d t i h h b thiit t b f i t t l dti ith d t d i M i i t h t thi h i h t d ttti ill l t i t l h t h t if th i thi i l i i b l l b t th t d b i t th th th l b d ti t i l it i b t t f dti A th l f th " f i t h f" i l l t t l l ith someone who claims an allegiance during the good times but disassociates during the bad is that she reveals herself to be objectionably selfcentered We think she would be a better more loyal person a person with a more laudable character if her alle i i d t t t h h d ti dbd S i i l l h tk l i h t fh t i l d t dit h l f h id i ll f th h ti d t l h l f t b b j t i b l lfih Th hil I t h t th i thi ll t b t h li "we " h h t i d "they l t " h h t l I l t t t l i thi ld f t i t fd i t d d t i In sum much interesting work is currently being done on this topic but no argument has yet been furnished which convinces me that conationals have special obligations to one another

Nti Th t

t f

t

t if

f t t b k i h h iht t

d S t t b k i td litil t h i t t d (Bh 1991) Th

l t

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l th illi t ti th t i t r i l i t r i t f iti tt i the principle of national selfdetermination the view that each nation has a right to its own state (Margalit and Raz 1990) In this section I will first explain the appeal of this nationalist principle and then argue that while it contains an important k l f t t h it l t i t l i th k Bf i th l i b i l i t f th tilit i i l I h l d dd t lii tt F i t l t h h I ill lf l t l i l ith i i t flit b l it i i t t t i t t h t th rit f t j l f d t i t i itht tlli ' tt A th lik Y l T i (1993) d All B h (1991) h i it i t for groups to exercise a degree of cultural selfdetermination with highly specified collective rights within their larger multinational state Some Native American groups in the United States for instance exercise collective control over the sale of t ithi ifid t i t With th l l t b l k th l f t t l t i d th t i b th i t h b bl t l i i t th l t l ifl f tid Siill th Q b i i C d h il l iht h i h h l th i t i thi d i t i t i idtit B d i t i F h th f f i i l l i th h l d t f l db hibiti th public posting of commercial signs which are not predominantly in French the Quebecois are able to exercise considerable control over their cultural environment The lesson to be gleaned from these examples is that even when cultural l f d t i t i i d f i l political l f d t i t i (hih d t l b th ) hld t t h t th l i t i l lf d t i t i t i th f f lt i t A d lii it th t i i th d i t i t i bt i d d i l riht t d A iht h remedial i h t t d if it h th ffti t t t itlf i t d tii j t i t t d b th h t t t (Th K d i I iht lif h ) One has a primary right to political divorce on the other hand if one has the discretion unilaterally to withdraw from the remainder state even when the latter has committed no injustice Although individual cases will often be controversial d i l riht t d idl i d b litil t h r i t Tht i t itll k l d tht tt l it l li t trit if it t t it t i t t ffiitl jtl It i h t i l h h t h th ri l riht t d A I d t d it th tilit i i l i th i tht h ti h primary riht t d Th b diti i l i t i l di (just as there are often conditions placed on marital divorces) but thorough going nationalists typically assert that each nation stands in a privileged position of moral dominion regarding its own selfdetermination a position which gives t th i h t iltll t did hth t t t it i ti tt Th h i f t i f f th tilit i i l i t i h t f d d i l l t riil i (1) t i ' hlth ditl f f t it b ' lf d (2) l i t i l l f d t i t i ll ti t blt thi h l t h B t h f th li libl id hi t

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B i i id d i i b di th i hih l t i ally identify with their nations it is easy to see how a nation's health can affect ts members' welfare In so far as nations offer the values that guide our choices of which type of life to pursue nations supply the foundations for us to live rewarding d i f l li Ol hlth flihi ti bl t t ih d di f i f l li b th t t h f lt d t i it bilit t t t t f hi ithi hih b t l df l t i h i A f d i lt ill b l bl t i t it b thi t t t t bild i f l di li i th b ill h t d i f f l t bildi l t i h i d i l hih tll t h other Because of this the prospects for selfesteem and selfrespect depend largely on the health of one's culture As a consequence the first premise that a nation's health effects the welfare of its members seems unobjectionable Th i t f hlth ti t idiidl i l th ttil l f t i l l f d t i t i A l t h h th b l i l ti bt t i ' j i lf d it f l i h i it i l tht l f t i ll d i t t i ' it d d i i t Th t bi d t t litil i t i hild i t ti b t it l help minority groups who suffer from a majority's neglect ignorance or indiffer ence The central idea does not require an elaborate explanation: a nation stands to prosper when its members can freely debate among themselves what rules should il h it b dft l t d d j d i t th l d h it b t l l t k t th t t d f th l I h t j t idiidl t i l l fl t f t b l i thi h ti h btt h ff l i h i h it li it t Gi th libilit f b t h f th li I h t th f th t i t f t i l l f d t i t i It i il t ti h t h t hil th i f f th tilit i i l i t it i l i facie Before we can conclude that the nationalist's claim for selfgovernance is decisive we must weigh it against competing claims And because secession as opposed to emigration invariably involves taking territory away from an existing tt t bl th tilit' l i t th t t ' l l i t it t i t E l i i tt' d i i it t i t i j t i litil th tht h td t it f t hih I t i h M i hl i t h t litil t t jtifid i i thi t i t t b d it ibl l h ll f l l i l t f l d th l f t f l t i i ll giance is if they are nonconsensually imposed upon all those who are territorially contiguous (Wellman 1995) Assuming that something like this account of political legitimacy is correct we btt th tilit i i l Tht i ih t i ' li t t i t ( b d th i t f t i l l f d t i t i ) i t th t t ' li t it t i t ( b d th i t f i d it) A tilit i t t it t thi t f litil liti l l f tilit t t b k i b h th tit ti i bl f f i th litil f t i f i

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d rit th iti tt h jtifiti f it l i In other words when a nation is sufficiently large wealthy politically organized and territorially contiguous it can secede and thereby enhance its national self determination without jeopardizing the benefits of political stability I t h t i t thi d f f t i ' riht t d b t it i i t t t ti t h t thi i tll l h th tilit i i l i th k Thi i b hil litill ibl ti iht h riht t d th ti h i h l k th iit litil biliti ill t h l i t i t li t b f f th t tt' i t M i t t l i th i hih ti h iht t d m; rather it will be its political capacities If so then there is a sense in which a group's cultural status s beside the point; the crucial variable will be the separatists' ability to govern the t t d trit i f dj t T h i it i t t t h t ll d l ti h riht t d b t i l ith th iit l i t i l biliti ill h iht t d d litill ibl ti ill t It ll b t h t t tit i ft titd b ti lit iti b t th ti h li l i t i t ill b tifid b their political capabilities not their cultural attributes Even though there is no perfect correlation between a group's being a nation and its deserving political autonomy there is some truth underlying the principle of t i l l f d t i t i Thi t t h i t h t (1) ti t d t b h i th th f t h i i (2) th lf f ti i ft ill i t t t th b f th d (3) t i ' lf b i d b i d litil t Th i i f i f th ft b t d i th f l l i t F i t l t h h th f t t h t titt ti i t ditl i t t t it l i t d (i ht i til i ' bilit t i t l f ) it i i d i t l i i f i t b t i ' i d h i h t capacity to perform the requisite political functions and consequently makes t a better candidate for the right to secede The idea here is that its national allegiance enables a nation to motivate its members to make sacrifices on behalf of the political i Ad d i t i l t i l l l litil l f d t i t i h i h l th t i l thi i th f ' li t l i t i l lf d t i t i h i h th l i f th l k Thi i t t i it b tht l i t i l tbilit ld b j d i d if ll i t t d f ti i l l d t d b t t h t th litil l i t ld il ith t d liitd b f th f i thi tt U d th i stances we could utilize additional criteria to distinguish among the eligible secessionist movements and the nation/nonnation distinction might well be the deciding factor In the case of Canada for instance Quebec's FrenchCanadian lt ld i it i i t l irit iil li d d b E l i h C d i i Th I t tht hil th tilit i i l t ftl t t it d t i t t k l f t t h b t th ( d ) iifi f t i l lli i tt f t t b k i Bf l i it i i t t t t tht if h th i iht t d it d t fll t t i l l tht hld i i t t i l

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l t i d f th iht I f t th lik B h (1997) suggest that it would be shortsighted and reckless to amend international law n this way because of the perverse incentives it would create Buchanan worries hat supporting viable secessionist movements will undermine federalism by giving states th i t i t tht i i t d tb ibl tit t I B h ' i f d l i th li f ti l i i t d i t i th f f i llti iht t dititi l t l i th h l t h i t f l t i l t l tt t d t th ttill l i d i i t ithi t h i b d If t t k t h t th i t t i l it ill t th i i t l f ll i b l tit t h th th ill be disinclined to extend special collective rights to cultural minorities for fear that any additional bit of sovereignty will make each of these groups more interested in and more viable as an independent state And because most countries are loath to l f thi t i t th ill kt th th t i i t l t l Th i th d i i t t i l l t f i i t iht iht d i f d l i dt h b d h d th d It h l d b td tht t i i d ith th t f i Did C (1998) f i t tht i t t i l l f i i rights to political divorce will likely produce substantial benefits Copp acknowledges that there is the possibility for perverse incentives (though he contends that these worries have been exaggerated) He argues both that (1) most of these ncentives l d t d t h t (2) th ibilit f i l i i i t i ld b th t d f b th b f i t fh i l l dfid d itittill i t d iht t d id i i t t i l l I til C t tht tit t d tt lik t d t i f l hih i t i l l d dfiitil l i i t flit I t h i h id i thi d b t i i h t b t it d t t h t th presence of moral rights to secede does not automaticaEy entail that we should use international law to globally enforce these rights Those who draft laws need to be vigilant to their likely actual effects and it would be reckless to enact international l f i i i i t iht l hd l t bli t h t th l ld d d th h

C

l

i

In the end I have mixed reactions to the three standard nationalist assertions I am genuinely unsure about the appropriateness and rationality of identifying with one's ti I k t i l f th it f il bliti t i l d I t h i k t h t th tilit i i l itk i t t d ibl i i i t l f th il lft i t t b k i I h f t i l t i t i i d ith th psychological i t bt I t t i d t h t th ft t b l i h th t t h f th moral l i tilit d I th d hil th i d i t h t (1) l f t l idtif ith t h i ti (2) l fl fl l l i t

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t i l d (3) t i l thi i i l t amounts in an effort to establish sovereign nationstates it does (1A) it is natural and fitting that we understand ourselves in terms ity (2A) we have special obligations toward our fellownationals ti h i h t t it tt

if not follow that of our national and (3A) each

Rf V Ad B d i t (1983) Imagined Communities L d Baker David (ed) (1990) Political Quotations Detroit: Gale Research Bh All (1991) Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec B l d CO W t i P (1997) Theories of secession Philosophy and Public Affairs 26: 3 1 6 1 C D i d (1998) I t t i l l d lit i th th f i The Journal of Ethics 2 2 1 9 2 4 NY C l l U i i t P Gll E t (1983) Nations and Nationalism Ith Margalit Avishai and Raz Joseph (1990) National selfdetermination Journal of Philosophy 87: 4 3 9 6 1 P Mill D i d (1995) On Nationality O f d C l d ShfQ S l (1994) F i l i ti d t The Lindley Lecture L University of Kansas NJ P i t U i i t P T i Y l (1993) Liberal Nationalism P i t Wll C h i t h H t h (1995) A d f f i d litil l f d t i t i Philosophy and Public Affairs 24: 1 4 2 7 1 (1997) A i t i lli d litil bliti Social Theory and Practice 23 181204 (2000) R l t i l f t i l i b l l i t i l th i th i i th ""? Ethics 110: 53762

Further reading K l i k Will (1989) Liberalism Community and Culture O f d C l d P C l d (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights O f d Press Lhi P B ( d ) (1998) Theories of Secession L d Rtld L J b T (2000) The Multiculturalism of Fear O f d O f d U i i t P McMahan Jeff and McKim Robert (eds) (1997) The Morality of Nationalism New York: Oxford University Press C t M i i N d ( d ) (2000) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict L S l l IL O M M t ( d ) (1998) Nationalism Self-determination and Secession O f d O f d U i i t P (2001) The Ethics of Nationalism Oxford: Oxford University Press M i C h i t h (1999) An Essay on the Modern State C b i d Cbid U i i t P

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Skepticism about intergenerational justice A d i t fili i th i t fjti th t i i l l i t tht l t B j t ti h f l t th duties of justice are the most pressing and urgent of obligations If we fail to be courageous or charitable we may have only our conscience to chide us But when we fail to be just then those to whom we have been unjust have a wellfounded lit li i t O thi f i l i i j t ti d titti th tht t iti " l i t " h h l fil ffd t b k t thi i t t h iht h b iltd d h b d ti Th h t thi f i l i t fjti f d it d i f f l t t li how we could possibly have obligations of justice toward members of distant future generations Suppose we understand "future generations" to include all and only those persons who will exist but whose lives will not overlap the life of any pres tl iti Th l h ill b b f th "ft t i " d t it Thi it ill d d th hi f tl iti f l if i diki t tht b t i l th th ill t i t It b d tht thi identities d d hi i difft l t it d d i ht d If l did t h hild thi th th t then the child they have will (it is sometimes argued) be a different child from the one they would have had if they had chosen differently If the child they have is worse off than the child they would have had even much worse off can she li t h b h d b h t' h i ? H ld b h d b hi bt f hih ld t h i t d t ll? C l l h i tht d t i who ill i t "identity-determining choices" It b d tht f i t t hi i d t i t d t i i hi d t h t th i d t i t d t i i fft f th hi ill d di ti E t l l f h l ill i t h ld h i t d if hd h difftl B t if 279

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t b h d b i i d t i t d t i i hi ( hi bt f which one would not have existed at all) then distant future persons cannot be the victims or complainants of present choices Considerations like these have led some to conclude that present actions cannot h th b f ft ti d t h t th i f " i t t i l j t i " d t i ( S h t 1979) It ld f l l tht thi d i th t ld ibl b j t t th l h ill i t i th d i t t ft A d th th diffilti tht f th f ti bt ti Ft i iti t li fijti i t i th ill t i t til h ll d i d A d h t ld it k t say that nonexistent persons could have rights or that we might owe compensation to them? How could nonexistent persons have anything at all? If they cannot "have" anything then they surely cannot "have rights" These are difficult ques ti bt f l l th fi t t i l jti ld d t th P i i b t th t f h th h ld t ld tht bliti f" j t i " i l t t d t d i t t ft ti It ld fll t h t if tb h i h i i th d i t t f t thi b f t t f b fft ti b t it ld t b j t In favor of intergenerational justice It is easy to see why one might conclude that there can be no question of "justice" bt ditt ti B t th idti hld tit t id th bl fll b f ti h t l i I i t t t t ti ( d i i ) fft ft h th t h t th fft t F l hi k ft ti btt ff i it f difft It i tl i t d t th th' t t d d th rich diversity of species Our choice to consume (or our failure to conserve) non renewable resources will make these resources forever inaccessible to future gener ations who might have used them Some of the issues of resource depletion are idtil t d i t i bl fjti d fi llti f d fj t i b fll lid t l th It i th t t h i ti t h t t ti t l d i ft ti f b f i t th iht h j d th l fflit f t ti ith bl d d i d t F l if l l t t t ltiit th d i t t f t ti ill til ihit ld t h t ti h d ous nuclear waste It is clear that present actions can sometimes determine or at least importantly influence future advantage or disadvantage suffering or well being To most people this consideration alone suffices to support a strong prima fi bliti tt d h t ill b i l d i d t t ft Sktii b t i t t i l jti i diffilt t t h id t d bl O t ti d t i th i t f lif f f t ti d hi d l ifl thi li f btt B t if ti k th ff d it k t tht h harmed th tht ti unjust? C ft

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b th victims f t h i ? I i t it t l t say that present actions can harm people who do not yet exist and it does not seem at all odd to think of them as the victims of present choices Joel Feinberg (1986: 154) gives a colorful and persuasive example: A Wikd M i t h di t bl hlh i d t kill tilt th il H l b b i l t i th k i d t d t tii It ff h d l killi tilti d ff di t ff i i year old children It was the evil action of the wicked criminal six years earlier before th i d t h t h d th It t i t i l tht ld d i t l t th h Of ld d i b F i b ' l h t h t th lif f thi W i k d Mith ld t l th li f th h h d b hi lii d j t ti h lti th ti b b i hi l t t bf dth d h ith il l t th t h h t f th d h h d t th t i d iti f hi i It ld b f f t h d t h h t i i b l t k " l t i th b b " i d t i t d t i i hi that those who are killed in the blast would not have existed but for the prior actions of Feinberg's Misanthrope But setting a time bomb of this sort would be a h i b l thi t d b i l l h bliti t t d thi ik thi A d it it i l i b l t t h t th h ff i th b l t t " i t i " f th M i t h ' i ti A th tht l i l l l i d th i ld b t i d d Ft tb i iti t press thi li i t tl iti b t thi d ti d i t l l t h t th h i h t If h i h t th it f l l t h t th h lti bliti b t it d t fll t h t th i h t h l d h th t force others to respect those obligations So from the fact that future persons cannot press claims it does not immediately follow that they have no rights or that "obligations of justice" do not apply between members of distant generations S l bli tht t ti d lii t i t t th l i l t f i t t i l ti b b It h ti b d tht li l i tbl ik ft ti i t t tht t l t ill b fl t d til it ditiit h d l i d t f l l S i i l l it h b d tht tibl litti f t l tit d t th th' environmental ecosystems and humancaused decrease in global biodiversity are likely to be much worse for people who will live in the distant (or even the not so distant) future and that these actions are therefore unjust We have good reason to l d t h t th W i k d M i t h i F i b ' l h h d th hil d h i j d b hi b b d tht h iltd l l bliti h h t it P h th hld l d t ld tht iil ti ill b h f l t th b fft ti d t h t th tiiti titt ilti f bliti t th ft whose misery will result If there are such obligations to the members of distant future generations we should be able to situate those obligations in a theory of

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i t t i l jti t h t ill h l t d t d thi t t d iht A theory of intergenerational justice would be a somewhat general background theory that would explain the justification nature and content of our obligations (if any) to future generations Ideally one might hope that such a theory would be hlfl f l i k h h t tilt il l i i t h t ill d i t l t th i h t di t t f t d ft Thi b i f h t t h t ff f l l th fi t t i l ti b t ill i ldifft t h i fjti i t f th th ff f h th Aft idi libti d libl t h i d di i th bl fi t t i l i it ill i l ti of "sustainability" and will offer a conception that may be a plausible minimal requirement or first principle of intergenerational justice

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C t litt i litil h i l h i d i t d b t d i f f t kid ft h i fj t i liberal t h i d libertarian t h i It ld t b priate to identify these as two general theories of justice: each is a family of different conceptions of justice loosely united by some common features So for example while John Rawls is often taken to offer a paradigmatic liberal conception of justice d libl h b t t i l d i t ith th R l i i Th b id f l i b t i ti f jti I h t fll I ill d i b lf t tht d i t i i h l i b l dlibti ti f j t i d th f t t iht tk i tdi th ti it till Libti hld tht litil i t i t t i hld t t t iht d enforce people's purely negative rights "Negative rights" include only claims against unprovoked interference while "positive rights" would include substantive claims to goods or perhaps to others' assistance in times of need Libertarians hold tht bli i t i t t i hld f ti iht d tif th i j t i tht lt h ti iht i l t d b t tht h ititti d thi ihtfl thit h th d t k j t d i d t t lf d th bli d A d i t libti it b d thi t i lf i tht l' d tifid dt t t th h d l b l b t th j t t id b libti ti d libti ll h l d t h t it ld b j t t t th h btt off in order to benefit those who are worse off Most libertarian theorists hold that future generations are not directly protected by norms of justice (Nozick 1974; Gauthier 1986) That is most libertarians are skeptics b t i t t i l jti Ft t h t t iht d th t h i t t h t it ld b jtifid t t i l th libt f t t l t t th lf f ft ti H libti k l d dti f hit hih l i h t imperfect b l i t i t d t th d f th S h libti iht d tht h i f t (thf f b l ) bliti t

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id l i ft ti dtitt d i d Fth i b t i have argued that free libertarian markets will in fact promote the interests of future people And some like David Gauthier (1986) have even argued that free markets will provide optimally well for the interests of future generations Gauthier argues t h t th bl fi t t i l jti i l ill t i i k i i tht l l f t i i kt ill d t l d t th i t t fft ti H iht kt id b f i t f f t t i ? Th l difft t h i b t h thi iht tk l F i t f ll h b kt t i t i f h di t i i th who discover economic substitutes for scarce resources can expect a brisk market for such products For example as copper resources dwindle we might expect increased investment in alternative conductors and in fiberoptic technologies that f t i l l l i f Ad kt l id ti t d t t i thi l i ith thi it D f d f th k t ft it lik th i df f th li tht kt ill d t l t ft d Th l d t h t th d f b f th t ti t k ifi f th benefit of future generations Future generations are not specifically protected by norms of libertarian justice but libertarians comfort us by urging that members of future generations will be well taken care of in any case (Gauthier 1986; Simon 1996) It i i d d ibl t d i b i t i hih hi d f kt likl t t t f th f t ( S h i d t 1994) B t th d f ktii b t th b d i i l li tht l i b t i kt ill d t l d t th d di t t fft ti i th l ld d btt t d b t tht ld k i i tht kt ill d thi F it i l ibl t d i b i t i hih rational economic agents will deplete and destroy resources and in which t is economically rational for earlier generations to do what would leave later gener ations much worse off (Wolf 1996) We need to look closely at our own economic itti t d t i hth t l l d kt likl t t t th i t t f ft ti Th ilbl i i l dt t ii thi d hil f kt h b h t i it t th b f l h li b l th t l l h tdil i d ti d th i d t d b t t h t thi f t t t d ill ti th f b l ft If thik tht h iti bliti t id leaving the members of future generations without resources to meet their basic needs (at least when we could do so without excessive cost to ourselves) then one may remain unsatisfied with libertarian accounts of intergenerational justice

A L i b l Th Th ti

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iti f libti libl t h i fjti d t h t th t "libl" i t b d t

d it h t b

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i f l A I ill th t h "libl" t h i f jti hld b understood to include all theories that have the following properties: (1) like liber tarians liberals take the right to individual liberty seriously and place a high priority on preventing public institutions from interfering in people's lives; (2) lik l i b t i libl l h l d t h t it i ti l i t i t f bli i t i tti t d t k iti j t (bli d d h l f l) dt t t t l t i i l t f iti i h t (lik th i h t t d t i t b i ii f lf t) D i f f t l i b l t h i t ff d i f f t k i d f t h t i l t f th l i tht bli i t i t t i hld f iti iht d bli d S t th li hl tili tarian grounds while others argue that just institutions are those we would choose as the object of an ideal contract According to contractarian theories the concept of justice is essentially associated with a companion concept of free and rational agree t i l t t i ti fjti h l d t h t ll d l th il t j t t h t ith ld b th b j t f f d t i l t th t f ll h tiit i f f t d b th B t l iit i ll hibl t t i tht j t ititti th t h t could be th b j t f f d t i l t To use such a theory to examine whether actual institutions are "just" we would not ask whether those who participate have actually consented to them but would instead ask whether they could hypothetically consent For this reason such theor i ft l l d hypothetical contractarian conceptions of justice. Rawlsian hypothetical

contractarianism

t t t t th f t J h R l ' Theory of Justice (1971) i t i i hil idi d i f f l t i tht l l t t i t t i t h i H t h t th i i l fj t i th i i l tht bl would accept as fair terms of cooperation among citizens regarded as free and equal persons and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life from one generation to the next To help understand what such principles ld l k lik R l t tht th t f i t t i l il ti t th t f i d l l fi t t tht ld t b j t d b bl t i i t T d t d th ti f "idll fi t t " R l t tht id ht t t l t ld b illi t if t it itti i hih f d t id th t t f th ti f th i t t f h b f i ety Accordingly he suggests that we consider the principles we would choose from an "original position" from behind a "veil of ignorance" that blinds us from any knowledge of ourselves that would make it possible for us to tailor the agreement bitil t f l R l tht ti t h i i l iti ld h t i i l t th b i i t i t t i f it th f i t i i l hih R l ll th E l L i b t P i i l t tht h i t h l i h t t th t t i ttl t f b i libti tibl ith iil t f ll Th d i i l i i t t It t i l t tht il d i i l i t i t b d t h t th

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b t h (1) tthd t ffi d iti t ll d diti f fi l ity of opportunity and (2) such inequalities are tolerable only when they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society Intergenerational choice behind the veil Bt

ht d jti i i th i t t i l ?R l i h l if i ht h b t i t t i l jti d ht h d i fi R l ' il f i d t d t t i l b h i idi th i i l iti hi hld i i ht ld h if we did not know in which generation or at what stage of social and economic development we might live This insures that the choice will not be partial in favor of earlier generations over later ones or vice versa In the first edition of A Theory of Justice (1971) R l t Th ti d tk t hih ti th b l ht t th thing the stage of civilization of their society They have no way of telling whether it is ltil lth l l i l t l l d idtilid d Th il f i i l t i th t Th th i th i i l iti t kt h l h h th ld b illi t t h t th assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rates That is they are to id t h i illi t t i h f iiliti ith th d tdi t h t th t th t l t th h l f lti I ffet th th t h j t i i i l tht i it rate of accumulation to each level of advance (Rawls 1971: 287) A d i

t R l t th i t t

i i l ill b i t t i l l fi l if th t k t f l h ill li t d i f f t ti ddifft t f h i d l t Bt h ld t i l h k h h i ? I hi l k R l t h l f l i ii t f th ti t h i i l f i t t i l ditibti H t i l t d tht ti t th i i l iti hld d t d t h l t b h i "heads of households" or as "fathers looking out for the interests of their sons" Concern for later generations was thus a function of the altruistic concern that members of earlier generations were supposed to have for members of later gener ti Th ihtl itiid f i d biti (B til ti t h t th 1978 Oki 1989) d b th l b h i d th i i l fj t i th tht t i l d tll d i i t t d t ld h f b h i d th il f i I t k R l h i d hi t f th h i f i i l f i t t i l jti d i Whil h till d th it i i l of saving as the one that would be chosen from the original position he has recently argued that parties to the choice should understand themselves to be ti t h d t d h i t h t i i l th ld t earlier [ P j t i [t th O i i l P i t i b j t t th f t h diti

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followed it Thus the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and ll t i ) ld d t th thi ti i t fll d th i i l th ld t di ti t h f l l d ( d lt ti ( R l 19932 74) t fll) tt h f b k ( f d ) i ti Thi h i i t i i t l i t t d it id f the problems that plagued the original account Most importantly it recovers con cern for future generations as a function of rational choice from behind a veil of ignorance in the original position But what intergenerational principles would ra t i l t h f b h i d th il f i ? R l li t h t th ti fi t t i l jti fll d th bl fj t i M i b l t h i t h f l l d R l i idtifi th t l ti f i t t i l dh h hld t ti jti th ti f just saving: h t f th b f t f ft t i ? A th fj t i ld id i i l d t thi ti d it i t thi bl tht t

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The general problem of intergenerational saving Exactly what and how much are we obliged to "save" for the benefit of future t i ? Wh th t ti i th th ill h ti t thi d i l hil th ill h b i b l d If t t h d littl th ft ti ihit ld bl t t thi d B t if t h dll i i h l f th b f t f lth d d t Th ti f just i b t fll t ht i t (if ) ld th t of saving by earlier generations be so low that it would constitute a violation of obligations to future generations? It is worth settling a terminological issue right from the start: by "save" we need t i l tti id d f d f lt b ft d " i " i th l t iht ti l thi lik i l il l (f l) tht lt ti ill h it I th l t h " i " li t ht t b t th d i l f ft hth i l t th id t W i h t " " i thi i l b bl t ikl ht th ll d not because we have any concern for the welfare of future persons And it is sometimes pointed out that conserving oil or coal for the benefit of future generations might be a way of saving less not more for future generations since the opportunity costs of ti fll th f t ll th t It i d i t b l hth t d t " i " ill i lii f ti d ti It i l th hil t ti t h t " i " i th t h t th t i i h b l d i d d t l f th i t i t t i d t l i h it It iht t t h d tht f kt ill d t l " " this sense for future generations and that the best way to save for the future would be to protect property rights and economic liberties Or it might turn out

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tht kt ill d thi b d l l i b l If th fid it it to put in place alternative institutions aimed at increasing the rate at which re sources are conserved for the benefit of future generations Is there an obligation to save for future generations? Consider what it would mean t t h t th i h bliti It ld f l l tht ld t " " th th' dl ft ti ith thi t ll E if i tl t if fil t th lt f dl d t t i f dd b ft ti ld thi i ilt bliti if t d t th f th th d l ft ti l t ll S l h t l h l d thi i bt hope that they are few Those who are inclined to reject this view face the problem of identifying some nonzero rate of saving and arguing that this rate meets minimal obligations to future generations We can set up the problem of saving without any th b t bliti t ft b t th h i f btti t f i ill d d th t d t t h f bliti t th f t Choosing a saving rate I idi th h i f i t it i h l f l t b i b diidi i rates into three classes (1) In the first class there are saving rates that are "unsus tainable" in that they tend toward zero saving in the long run The "zero" saving rate falls in this class but there are many other ways to save unsustainably If we ittl t t ft th th d l d ith btitt th k it ti tht ft ti ill t l l b lft ith thi t ll (2) Th d l f i t th tht i l iti lti i t h t th l lt ti btt ff th li If ti if th b l d b btt i btitt th it b ibl t i th i th l f th t t l resource set left for future generations (3) The third category is unlike the other two in that it is unique: while there are many unsustainable rates of saving and there may be a variety of different rates that will allow positive accumulation ( d d i th t t hih l d ) th i l h t f i tht i i l " t i b l " W hi tibilit t tl th t t hih ith l th d l i b t i t t f th It i t diffilt t h l h dd " t i b i l i t " ii didt f i i l f t t t i l i ( D t 1974 B 1989) O thi i i l li ations have an obligation to avoid using resources faster than the rate at which they are replaced or substituted J t

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t i b l i d ti ld b f b f lt ations If as Rawls suggests we should select that saving rate that we would like the previous generations to have adopted then it might seem natural to conclude that "sustainability" would be a lower bound on the range of saving rates that could till b h f th i i l iti R l hilf if t t i hih i ill t k l h it i l t i l b t ill d l i i b li ti i th i t t i fl t ti A d i t R l i " t j t ( d t ) b i ititti h b tb l i h d [ A d ] t thi it l i (tht i t dditi t l itl) fll t d iti t k l d t b i t i d l d d bl resources carefully husbanded for future use as appropriate" (Rawls 1999: 107) Thus parties to the original position will choose a principle of intergenerational justice that requires savings at stages when there is too little wealth to secure just basic insti tti bt i l iti iti jti i Problems with Rawls O

iht dR l ii tht li ti hld til th h th l t ii l l f il lth th l l f th maintenance of just institutions and that saving after that point must simply be sustainable But this view faces objections that Rawls fails to consider: importantly this account of intergenerational saving does not take into account changes n lti i Wh lti i i ti li ti ti t t t f t th th t i b l t bt h th ii l l t hih j t i t i t t i b i t i d Ad t ititti i l i i lti i tht ti bilit ld l lt ti bl t t d b i jti I d d i th ti it ill b lbl t id l t t i ti f "sustainability" to see whether there is a conception that could fill the relevant role in a theory of intergenerational justice

Stibilit

A l t t i

C t i

M t fi t t i l jti t i l t tht j t ititti t b i t t i l l tibl Wht d it t tht ititti " t i b l " tht it i i t tibl t? S i i l there are many different interpretations of this seemingly simple idea This section will review a series of alternative conceptions of sustainability and will evaluate them for their suitability as candidates for a principle of just intergenerational i Sustainable Ph th ment O thi 288

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endowments f

t i b i l i t i t h t f sustainable endowt i b l if d l if

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

t th t ti d t tht i i l t t th inherited from the previous generation But stated in this way sustainable endow ment is ambiguous and may be impossible to satisfy By equivalent endowment, one might mean to require that the same resources must be available to subsequent ti d i th titi tl U d thi i t t ti t i b l d t ill t b t i f i d if l f ft ti t f d l t d il bt t b l i t h l i l b k t h h tht id bl d llti l t t i t il d It h ti b d t h t th t i t i l f bl ill b f l t i t l tti d f th l t satisfaction of human needs If so it would seem strange to adopt a conception of sustainability that would prohibit us from taking the necessary steps to move toward reliance on energy sources that would serve human needs without inflicting h i t l d Sustainable productive opportunities C i d t i lik th h ld t tilt difft tibilit t d d hih iht b l l d sustainable productive opportunities. O thi ti advocated by Brian Barry among others we should strive to leave for future gener ations productive opportunities that are comparable to those we ourselves nherited from previous generations (Barry 1989) "Productive opportunities" are stable h it i ibl f f t ti t d th titi f d d th t f d f th b f i t f t h i b S thi ti f tibilit d l t i f bl ill b ti bl l " f f t " th t t ft ti ith t h l i l d tht ft ti ill t h f titi th h j d But like sustainable endowment, this conception of intergenerational sustainability has some obvious problems First some goods may be "nontradeable": there may be nothing we can provide for future generations to compensate them for the d t t i f th M i i i i d l t th b f t f bthbl t h b thi d tht ld d t l t f S i i l l th th l f bidiit d t t h tiiti M i t t l th ti t h t hld l ft ti diiihd titi fil t d t th f t t h t l t ti b h th li A h lti i t dti t b inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population Where population is grow ing stable productive opportunities may leave all members of later generations worse off than their predecessors Surely it will seem strange to regard such steady dli " t i b l " i ti Sustainable welfare: two conceptions O ti

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f i titi A d i l iht id stable welfare conception of sustainability attractive Such a criterion would recognize institutions as "sustainable" when they provide future generations with undimin ished welfare as compared with present generations Something like this conception d t d b R b t Sl (1974 1991) h tht hld i h b t i t i ffit lth t h t f t ti ill h th t i tt hi th lf l l t ti Th t l t t i t t t i f th t b l lf ti d tht i t i th t l l f total lf th d tht i t i t b l average lf SUSTAINABLE TOTAL WELFARE

Th total i i i d l db it d ti d f d d (N 1989 t thi i i t t i l i i tibl B 1992) A d i it id th t t l lf t l t ti t li T h f i d th lf t t l ld t th lf f h it t i ti ( i i t i ) d t h t t th t t l lf j d b h it t th ti ti A d t f th total view recognize of course that we cannot do this directly But they would urge that we often have justified beliefs about which actions will tend to increase or decrease total utility If so then the total standard can be used even without b t ' lf dtild i f t i Th t t l i h b idl d i d d i tibl t bjti F i t th t t l i ill ti di i th t f lti th t f f t th lti i f If l i b l d d i d d t t h i l i h t ith id t d titi Bt iht db i i th b fh l t h h d t i policies that promote fertility The total view is indifferent between these two alter natives and some people regard this as a decisive objection to that view But second total welfare may remain stable or increase even when all members of later th i li ti thi ld b f ti ff th l if lti i i I t i l t i b l t t l lf i t t ith t d i l d l i i lf it i ibl t i t i t b l t t l lf l l ti if h b f h b t ti i h ff th h b f di ti ( P f t 1982) A i ill d thi d i i bjti t th t t l lf ti fi t t i l tibilit SUSTAINABLE AVERAGE WELFARE

Th h j t th t t l i iht b t t d t f i t i i tbl average welfare i t d T fid th lf ld fit t th (dditi) lf l l f ll b f l t i th d i i d b th b f i d i i d l i th l t i Th i ill t d i i lti d ( l i k th t t l i ) ld f ti ll bttff ft lti th th l ff M l f i d th i l i 290

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ti f th i li Bt flti hld k it l t h t thi conception is also extremely difficult to accept In particular average welfare can remain stable even if more and more people in each succeeding generation are destitute and starving This could be the case for example where the wealth and ti f i i t i ti hil th ii jit l ih i t d t S h i i t d i l i t d i f t f l t th t l tt f th ld b t f l d thi d thi F th hld t tbl lf i fft t k ititti tibl

Intergenerational Justice and Sustainability The need for an alternative conception Th

i ti i d d l t t i ti f " t i b i l i t " d t i t h f th Th t bif b t h th ffiit t h tht d l t t i ti f tibilit bf tht t i th fi t t i l jti d i A tive conception of "sustainability" cannot simply focus on welfare or resources or opportunities it must also appropriately accommodate likely changes n popula tion size and the effects of resource depletion on people's ability to meet their needs It b it d i f f i l t t k h ft " l f " h l d fi i d l i b t i b t i t t i l i S i l itit ll it lf ith ti f tifti bt t il k h t ft ti ill tt k h t th ill f B t it ld b ildi t h i t i b t h t ft ill t W l i b l if fllibl dit t h t thi b i d ill b similar to our own It is surely implausible to suggest that we should frame social policy around the possibility that future generations will be so different from our selves that they will not have similar basic needs Several alternative conceptions of t i b i l i t fll t i di h i lti i A h b it i ibl t iti tbl d t dti titi d lf h lt ti i l d ff ith t t th l idtifid Th idti ilitt i f f l t t i ti f tibil it h i h (1) t k d ii (th th lf titi ) as a plausible value to be sustained and which (2) is formulated as a negative principle rather than a positive one Focusing on what future generations are likely t d ll t b tit b t h t th ill want A d f l t i tibilit diti i ti t k it ibl t dt lti h G H l B d t l d ' f dfiiti f " t i bl d l t " i t bth f th ft h t i l t tht tibl d l t i " d l t tht t th d f th t ith t ii th bilit f f t ti t t thi d" ( B d t l d et al 1987: 43) In the spirit of the Brundtland proposal we might define "sustain ability" as follows: 291

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Ititti humanly sustainable if d l if t h i ti d t l future generations worse equipped to meet their needs than members of the present generation are to meet their own needs A principle requiring that present institutions must be humanly sustainable would require that present institutions should not reduce the ability of future generations to meet their needs There are two different ways to reduce the extent of future t d O i t t it t h t th b f ft ti ill h th bilit t tif t h i d A t h i t d ftilit tht ft ti ill b ll d tht f d l ill it it Th i i i l id t h t th t i ll t d ftilit dli h l' d

Human sustainability and intergenerational justice Is there any reason to regard human sustainability as a requirement perhaps a minimal requirement of intergenerational justice? There are several ways in which such a claim might be supported First we may note that future generations l b l t hi d t h t it i t i l l dd " j t " h l dll d i th f th bilit t tb i d Th i t fh tibilit i i l t d l if l ft ti ff th l ith t t th tifti f d ilti f th i t f h tibilit ld k lt ti ff i d t bfit i bttff ti But there is an odd feature of such an argument: it treats "generations" as if they were individual persons While earlier generations may be better (or worse) off than later ones there may be members of these same earlier generations who are much ff th b f th l t ti If th l fh tibilit d i f th h i h i i t thi i i l i t th tifti f d th it i l i b l t t h i k t h t t t d t l t i t t f th l it f i ft t d F th iht d it iibl t dd t d first h f t i hi bt th d f t d ft ti Thi i i l priority for the present is plausible for other reasons as well: we know more about the needs of members of the present generation than about the needs of distant future generations A d t i t f th l i t h t "h tibilit" i i i l i t fi t t i l jti d th i d l t t i tditi i litil h i l h it i bl t h t ti t R l i i i l iti hi tht i l d d ti blid ld h h ti bilit i i l i t fi t t i l jti F l t t i i il ld i th i k t h t ti t th h i ld b bl t t basic needs Rawls argues that parties to the original position choice will be unwill ing to consider principles that raise this downside risk

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Thi d i i t li t h ffd lti t th bl itd ith th d l t f th fi t t i l jti Whil I ld t the principle of human sustainability as a plausible first principle of intergenera tional justice one may have several reservations about it First even if we wish to save in such a way that future generations will not be left unable to meet their d h l id h t l i h thi W t k hih lii ill b t t t ft d S d ti d i i d d i i l i t h b dfiti it i th t i i l i t ld i It b tht hld d h f ft ti th l t d ht t t h t th ill t b bl t t thi d A f l l th f i t t i l jti ld ff lt account of our obligations to future generations

Rf B

Bi (1978) C i t fjti d ft ti I R i h d Sik and B M Barry (eds) Obligations to Future Generations Philadelphia: Temple University P (1989) Th thi f dlti I Democracy Power and Justice O f d C l d P Broome John (1992) Counting the Cost of Global Warming Cambridge: White Horse Press B d t l d G Hl t l (1987) Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development N Y k O f d U i i t P D t P t h (1974) O l t t i iti f j t i bt ti Journal of Public Economics 3: 4 0 5 2 3 Fib J l (1986) W f l lif d th t f t l l t i h i Philosophy and Social Policy 4 (1) 14578 Gauthier David (1986) Morals by Agreement Oxford: Clarendon Press N Y K (1989) W h t h l d d b t ft t i ? Th i i b i l i t f P f l t ' Th X Economics and Philosophy 5 2 3 5 5 3 N i k R b t (1974) Anarchy State and Utopia N Y k B i B k Okin Susan Moller (1989) Justice Gender and the Family New York: Basic Books P f l t D k (1982) Reasons and Persons O f d O f d U i i t P MA H d U i i t P R l J h (1971) A Theory of Justice B t (1993) Political Liberalism N Y k C l b i U i i t P (1999) The Law of Peoples Boston MA: Harvard University Press d S h i d t D i d (1994) Th i t i t t i f t I El F k l P l F d D Mill Jf& P l ( d ) Property Rights N Y k C b i d U i i t P Schwartz Thomas (1979) Welfare judgments and future generations Theory and Decision 11: 18194 NJ P i t U i i t P Si J l i L (1996) The Ultimate Resource E P i t Review of Economic Sl R M (1974) I t t i l it d htibl Studies Symposium Issue pp 2 9 4 5

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(1991) Sustainability: an economist's perspective In R Dorfman and N Dorfman (eds) Economics of the Environment, 3 d d 17987 N Y k W W N t Wlf C l k (1996) M k t j t i d th i t t f ft ti Ethics and the Environment, 1 (2) 15375

Further reading A

K t h (1973) R l ' i i l fj t i Swedish Journal of Economics, 75 2325 Dasgupta Partha (1994) Savings and fertility: ethical issues Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (2) 9 9 1 2 7 S A t (1994) P l t i dli d lit New York Review of Books, 41 (15) 6271 deShalit Avner (1995) Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. L h MD R d Littlfild Wlf C l k (1997) P ffti tilitii d lti li Si J ' th f il hi I Nik F t i d J Hll ( d ) Contingent Future Persons. Dordrecht: Kluwer

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M f l l h b i d th f i G M d l ' d bithi i t j t th f f i ft t fild b t l i f t l t th difft diili Th th d i t t i ithi b i t h i h i l h di i d l it i ibl t i l t d b t h l i l i h i t i d lit tdi thl litil i d many others It is this richly mixed ancestry that gives bioethics much of its remark able vitality Bioethics is in part an academic field (a trait it inherits from philosophy d t t t t h l ) it i tl t f l i i l ttitd d ( tit dd i dii ll t h l d i l ) d it i tl l i i t d f f il l i ( t i t it d i f l d l t d fild i d litil i ) Yt h l it t d it lik hbid t bithi i i t l l t l d il h tht h t l idl d f I hll t t h l l fll th past several decades and now represents a significant cultural force as well as an important practical one When bioethics first emerged as a new field several decades ago it looked ike a fd f th d i flh i th tht b t i t fhi t t t ttti f l f d th i l i h ll id i th d i litt d f d t h i ti bt ll It i l tht l t h h bithi t d ith kbl d h lik f d it t f t dditi t t t h h t It i h t b fi t l l t l t i h t ll ( t h h ill b idt ith i t t t i ) t l i t l l t l d bli success

Bioethics as "Dilemmamotivated" S t i t bli f t h i ftl d t k t h t th hi? O th

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d ill di i t h t it b t l i t i ilbl hih tit hld get it? Suppose researchers want to test a treatment or a vaccine for a highly lethal disease but the disease is particularly prevalent in areas of the world where local culture means that obtaining informed consent in the standard Western ways ill f t d ill t b ibl h l d th d th td? Bithi f t l bl lik th i liil dii dil h dil li tt lti di i i l b d f i t d ith h l t h dhlth bth i t i l di t t i l t t I d d it i l bl lik th tht h tditill titd h f bithi Nt l i it fild t h t b ith f l t i b t i llif bedside dilemmas about what to do (or not do) for this patient here and now but such reallife dilemmas continue to motivate the field They are its intuitive motivational core the deepest source of energy in the field In bioethics unlike th h i l h i l fild til d dil h di th d l t t th th d Th th b i f t i f thi t i t i t fild h i l h i l flti liil ltti d li d l t ll d i b d i l t i it i th ifi t f tht i t h t i l i tht i liil lti d tht ti f th h the higher courts become the landmark legal cases that shape public policy and practice The dilemmamotivated character of bioethics also in part explains its extremely f t i t S dil d i h l d th d t t l l th t i t th t t h hth b t i d i i b t t ' HIV tt b t th l i k l i h d t h t ii ill t d? S h l d il idti t i didi h t l l t th l ilbl i t ti tit? Shld t h l i b d t t h dti t t f iftilit t tif tl di f ti t f hild t t il d? M fili i arise in new more urgent contexts spurred particularly by new biomedical re search or new events Does in vitro fertilization or gestational surrogacy or cloning change the nature of parenthood? Does it affect the importance of reproduction? Wht ik b tk ith t h l t i l l h it fft ft t t i t i h t t t th ik? I ti t t i l il ti i ? Ad F l l f t i t K A Q i l ' illftd f l h l dd t t i 1975 dN C ' t b i l i d t i 1983 h l h d h f d i i fi b t dth d di tht t th cases both similar and dissimilar ones What is a person? Does a human being who has become permanently comatose vegetative or braindead cease to be a person? Should a person's antecedent wishes control their treatment after they have become l t t ? Wht th i t t f h i tl t ?Wht d it t tht t t t i "ftil" d if t t t i ftil it b i l t i l d i d t th tit h t it t h l ? Nt l d fili i i t t bt dil l i ll th ti i t t h l i l d l t di t b k litil d il i t d lblid Wht b t 296

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th t t i fd i d t l Thid W l d lti h tit or governments may be unable to pay for drugs even if they do prove effective? What about cloning and genetic engineering? What about using transplant organs from other countries where the conditions of donation do not appear fully volun t ? Wht b t d t h d t t f tit ith t b d i l i b t th t t i Pegram Heydrich i hdld f iht d lt fift il t f t h i lii ith h i h th d t i i l d ? It i th ti d f d l l t dil d t f h i t l h filiti t d d tti d bdid h tht k bithi i t h b k neck pace and that adds such excitement to its public as well as professional appeal These dilemmas drive its theoretical agendas not the other way around

Th E d i

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Th t l f bithi l I thik tf h f it t l l t l d bli Nt lik i tht d t d i ll d i t i from an original central big bang bioethics began with comparatively narrowly focused attention on the doctor/patient relationship but has continued to explode outward in innumerable new directions Originally called "medical ethics" (a clue t it th liitd f ) bithi h d l d i i l b d d hititd t f it h t d dti d d d dti t h l i ildi bti t t h h d l i ti i i d t l l h i t t i h d i l bjt dth d di ildi ithdi d ithhldi t t t h i i i t d iid d t h i llti f d h much more Prodded by specific individual dilemmas bioethics as a discipline came into being as it began to generalize these questions raising systematic theoretical issues ike th d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di th iti f h d d th t f lit f lif Th h b id b ttti t till l b k d l i tht i i fild f l i d thi ( l t h h d i i f th b i bithi) tthtlli fidtilit i f d t d t l i ft i t b k d fi i il jti A bithi h l d th l ti f th i iitill i d d i th t t f th i d i t d t / t i t l t i h i h t have much larger scope The concept of "informed consent" for example was initially important in the context of a therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient but has begun to take on additional complexity as it has been extended to dditil f l t h t i i t l h i t i t t i l l t i h i lik th bt b i b d thi h l t h i l d l il i lik th l t i h i bt iti d thi hlth t ' fdi iiti Siill ithhldi ithdi f t i l l ill t i t i h i l h i i h i t ith th tit' f i l fi i

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fr idi i t t f i CPR i tibiti t t t pneumonia for a single patient but withholding and withdrawing treatment also raise a much broader range of issues when such practices become a matter of policy for whole classes of patients for example the very elderly those with poor progno th ith ltil dil bl hth d t d b h i t l h l t h i t iti tl hlth t Th bl tb i d j t dil ithi th d t / t i t l t i h i bt t l b itl i fditibti j t i i t b k d f ith t t l I d d f th i f bithi t l i f d t bt fdtilit tthtlli t l i jti i llti d on have this outwardexpanding character: they were originally explored in the intimate context of one doctor and one patient back when bioethics was still usu ally called medical ethics but are now coming to be seen as of much broader scope Th t h f t d d i i i t t ll i i t f th d i l t i t d h t f bithi th i i t i l ifi ill ft t tt h b d i i l i t i Fth l t h h f th i bithi dd h th iti f thd i i b t dti t h liitd libilit i other areas of bioethics other concerns like the risks of the "slippery slope" or dilemmas about distributive justice play a role in many or perhaps most of the issues bioethics addresses Bioethics also shares many concerns with other areas of applied thi d lid f i l thi b i thi d i t l thi ll i b t l t i d th l t i h i bt f i l d lit b t i d bi i t l ith d i b i l i t i b t i t t fit d t lit d b t lbl it d jti

Institutional Settings of Bioethics In tandem with the expansion of the intellectual concerns of bioethics the range of i t i t t i l tti i h i h it f l i h h l b idi A l t h h bi thi b t th b d i d i th l i i l tti fl tti h i t l h th fi t i t d tbli hi it h tht f l t it t i t i t i t l l t l t I th fit l t h t i l bithi f t i fllbl d i fild lt ith j l f d ffi t d d t d d t d t i l ititti ldi dil dl h l th t i l l i l h i l h i l l i h di sions oriented toward the exploration of issues qua issues Second in partial contrast clinical bioethics has become a familiar consultative practice in many f fhlth ititti ildi h i t l i h h i t t i t lii d h it t i l l i l th d i i f d i t d tht i h th i d i t titi tit fil b ill id th I thi l i i l f th ti f bithi ft i l f l t th i t i t t i l thi itt bdid ltti b th i t i t t i ' dilthi t f f it itti t t d th l b t i b t i t d t d th lti fi Cliil bl

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li

b bithiit ft l i l f ( thi l t ) ki t ltt f i th ilti I th t h i d f it i i l i l i i t d bithi l i l th t t i d l i f f i l i t i t t i l d bli li M h f h ki l i i t d bithi i d t d i th i bithi t tditi ihitd f th i i l Hti C t f d d b D i l Cllh d Willd G l i d l th K d Ititt f Ethi tG t Ui it Th bithi t i th U i t d S t t t i t d ith i i t i d i dil t d hil f thi k i d i i h t t f f d d j t tht i lt d l i i t d Siill th bithi ii b i i ith th N t i l C i i f th P t t i f H Sbjt f B i d i l d B h i l R h (19748) i t l t t t d h th P i d t ' C i i f th S t d f Ethil P b l i Mdii d B i d i l d B h i l R h (19803) hih d d i f Deciding to Forgo Life-sustaining Treatment and Securing i f l t i l t ildi Access to Health Care th N t i l B i t h i A d i C i t t (NBAC tblihd 1999) d it f ilf ii h th A d i C i t t H Rditi E i t ll f li i hth i i t li f l t i li N t h l d i t th id t i t i t h t f th i t i t t i f bithi th diff it th b i f t h Th t th t fild d i liil d li b i t h i b t th t f i l fild M f th l d i ht fi t i t t i l tti d ithi it t i l iti i l l th A i S i t f Bithi d H i t i d it i t t i l ildi i l iti lik th E S i t f P h i l h fMdii dHlth C (ESPMH) th A i Bithi N t k (ABN) d th lbl I t t i l A i t i f Bithi (IAB) P t f th t t h f t bithi i t i th flidit f it i t i t t i l t d th ith h i h i d i i d l b i t h i i t th

Bithi Bithi

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ith t dil f dil ti d hlth ll b t it tiit hth i d i l i liil lt ti li f t i it i b i i t b bd f l i th I it l d bithi d ith th f f t t l th i dt fid lti t t dil d l d d i i t t d i t t h i l b t t i t h t it i d til i b t it f f l i it flit h t dt tiliti f l d t i t d thiki i i l b d d t l i l thiki d it thi h d d i i d f f ti thiki fil i d i i i t l d ll t A bithi hititd d b t t t tii it thil f d t i h T B h dJ Child d l d ht 299

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h b th b t k d t idl l d t t i t i f it mative method a set of four midlevel principles intended to cover the full range of applied ethical considerations relevant in bioethics Often affectionately chided as "the Georgetown Mantra" in recognition of the fact that both Beauchamp and Child t h i tG t thi h ff i i l t lfi b f i djti i l l f b t h tiliti idti ( l f i b f i ) d d t l i l ( t j t i ) Whil it h b bjtd t t h t i l hll thi i ilit h it i ti lld h d i l k b l i th l i t i fbithi C t f th t fb k d t h i l th especially Thomist and other sorts of divinecommand normative theories as well as various forms of virtue ethics also play a role in the thinking of some bioethi cists In its international forms bioethics also involves efforts to introduce norma ti idti f Ai Afi d th j l t l d lii tditi T b bithiit t h l ki d ifi ti ti Pt Si f l d i b hilf Utiliti O O'Nill l f Kti flki t i d Chl C Jh N d K i Wild id Cthli bithi cists but in its remarkable multiplicity bioethics appears able to accommodate all these ways of approaching normative issues at once In mainstream bioethics no single normative theory has ever become dominant

Bithi Nt

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l i bithi t d i t d b i l ti th b t it h l i d til i t th d l t f i t l l t i l methods of analysis often reflected in other academic fields in the use of jargon Terms like "the Georgetown Mantra" recourse to principles like "double effect" concerns about the "slippery slope" and appeals to "the yuk factor" are about as close as bithi t t j t th i ti tht j t t Thi ll bithi t i ibl t titi f id it f b k d fild i l d i it t diili f h i l h dii d l h d b thl t h l i d th il i It l ll bithi t i ibl t th d th bli t l It i t d t d ht bithiit d it i t i bithi d i i d d i t Otid d t h t t t d d h i th f i t l convention Of course bioethics has developed a few characteristic responses For example the "yuk factor" refers to a reaction of repugnance for a practice like terminal sedation and "yuk" has come to have a fairly specific almost technical meaning: "t thti b t l i i t d t h i l d i l " i th tht " ld til t t it f lf b t ld t b l k it f t h " Th "k" iht t j bt b d l th fild i blil i t l l i i b l d til j f T th t t tht ti ithi th d i d f i l diili l fhl d d h t i t i l l t t d i j bithi i til li t i l fild

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Itdiili

Fth t l d bithi i til t i l j fr df f th d i f i l l th bt l i l background field among those in its multihybrid parentage has become dominant and no background field has been either excluded or lionized as a participant n bioethics discussions Doctors do not have the final say in bioethics discussions; nor d l d f tht tt d h i l h th f f th th fild tibti t bithi Bithi i d l d t h h l itdiili T b bithiit f th b k d fild f h i l h dii l d th d t l i i it th d i d d k difft ti b t h t it i t " d " b i t h i hld t h t it i t l th f t h t i l i th t h t it i t i d t i f and resolve a clinical dilemma and still others that it is to formulate a successful social policy They may make very different assumptions about whether bioethics dilemmas including the specific concrete cases with which bioethics often begins b l d t ll Th l h difft iti f ht t d bithi dh t d i t i i h it f t d bithi Y t th i iti ith h th thi i h t i t l t th ltihbid h t fbithi Bithi i fild t tht i i t d i i l i i th t j t t h t it bjt tt li tl i th i t t i bt d i t t i d i f f t fild b t i t t l t h t it i d t d b and under the working assumptions of the full range of quite different background fields This too is part of what accounts for the intellectual and public success of bioethics This is not to say that problems in bioethics are always solved "cor tl" bt th t h t it i fild t h t f t i l d fitfll d ith l iifi f f i l tit d th bli i hi th bl t h t it d

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W th h h d ti it ld b it t t exhaustive account of the core issues of bioethics the theoretical problems which occur and recur throughout its academic discussions in its clinical problemsolving and in its efforts at policy development Instead here is a quick overview: autonomy W h t i it f t b t l f d t i i ? A t hi l t b t d ? A th hi l hld t k ? I th l i i t t i f ' t hi f t l i t i l ?A t ll h i ltll h d tht l t i t ibl? competency What is competency a legal notion a medical one a philosophical one or all of the above? Is competency general or is it specific to certain kinds of decisions and tasks?

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consent Wh i t i t t ? Wht i id f tt b i f d information understanding freedom from internal and external pressure and what else? Is the consent of a patient or of a research subject a sufficient protection against abuse? personhood W h t i d ht i h d ? Wh i it id t ht it bt ti d bith l t ? I it l t h b i i b l t b i d d ? A th iti f hd? lif l ? D lif per se h l i it th i value of life W h t i tht l h i lif t h t f l ? D ll lif h l t h lif? quality of life Quality of life? How do you measure it? Is there some minimum below which it ought not fall? Is this a subjective matter or an objective one? needs and wants What is a need? Is it different from a want? Do other parties h bliti t (t t ) tif ' d ? W h t i th diff bt d d basic d? bt ill d d i ? (Th i illness and disease W h t i th diff l tditi f flti h ) W h t i th l f il f t i lbli ll d d i ? W h t i th b f ill di l ? N l f t i ing? Or is it to be identified in terms of the patient's perceptions? Is "mental illness" another sort of illness like physical illness or something different in kind? And what about situations like "terminal illness": what exactly does this label mean and h t h l b l b ? W h t i th f f t f l b l i " t i ll ill?" futility Wh i t t t f t i l ? Wh it ill t k i b l diff i th tit' itti t d diff diff t ll? H hld d t itti f ftilit b ii d ithdi ?I it iibl t ithhld ithd h th h i i bli t t t i f t i l b t th tit th tit' f i l d t? pain Okay so we know what pain is we have all felt it But how do you measure it given the theoretical problems of intersubjectivity? Does the patient have a moral right to have his or her pain controlled to the best of current medical k l d ? W h t if it tb tlld? suffering S f f i i t th i it i b d hd t dfi d h hd t "tt" D ffi h th li i dil ttti? disability H i h litill d t h t i l l iti i ht i dibilit? W h t dti d/ ti i it? D l have the right to refuse treatment for disability in their dependents e g deaf chil dren? Are conditions like pregnancy obesity and depression disabilities? How ex tensive an effort should society make to accommodate people with disabilities and d th b i t f t i ? A l ith d i b i l i t i l b l i th f bi bjt t il tht iht d i t t thi hi b t hlth ? death D d i d d B t th i b i dth ildi b i dth d l b i d t h th diti lik PVS i h i h th tit' it f il i t t i i tl t th i hl i hih ift'

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iti i h t b d t d Wh i d d d d d when should patients in these conditions be treated as dead? racism sexism agism There are plenty of problems with these and other "isms" in all sorts of areas of human activity; the question is what forms they take and h t h th t i l l ii i hlth justice fairness equality W k th f il d l i t i l th d th thi d i f f t i th t t f hlth ? Wht b t i t t i l jti d th l l t i fhlth t th th th th ld? W h t b t lit b t t t i l l ill t i t h bth h t di b t i i t h ld h d i t d hil th th i t dependent on life support and so must wait until the disease kills him? What is fair in distributing donor organs or limited quantity vaccines or coverage for expensive pharmaceuticals etc? Issues of justice fairness and equality permeate virtually all f bithi Thi i j t th b i i f thi l i t

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Attacks on Bioethics Experts - Consultations - Fees - Testimony before expert panels - Testimony in legal cases - Testimony before government commissions - Bioethicists in the hire of private industry T h i k b t it iti h i th h t fbithi h i ? Th i i l f t tiiti th t fbithiit t h l dl i ith th ld flti f h i l h fi l dil ith th f h i i f t d ith h d h i t th b d i d th th tiiti f th tti th t th l f d i i tl t th new critics of bioethics claim They see bioethics as making claims to moral author ity that are unwarranted and they charge that bioethics as a discipline as a field l bd ft h h t d ti h b t l b l t i l i bli lif M l i j t tht t f thi itii hld l issues Th b h thi " t " h " k " th " i h t " th dil d th t fbithiit didi h ti (f f) i l l t Th t know h t i ll iibl d ht i t th i il b i t h i l k l d t h i h th l h th k N d bithi cists have "special" moral sensitivities Nor should public policy be determined by bioethicists who claim to be unusually sensitive to moral issues or to know what s right or who are supported by or in the hire of commercial corporations: the whole t i f bithi thi li f t t k hld i i f itlf jtifid bli l A dill ti li ft h h t idt i i f t t i G l i t b i t h i i t P t Si bt l till ht i d t i th U i t d S t t d l h h l d t h t th d i i fi as issues t d t li th ti i ti T tlk b t t h i

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i i t i d t th i tht t h i i i sible; to talk about genetic engineering does the same thing After all these critics hold we do not talk about "moral issues" in murder; we simply agree without question that murder is wrong Thus this line of attack holds bioethics ought not tlk b t l i i t h i ti i i th tt h th i t thi t b id b t h id d t h t it d h th ii ifl f thi l l illitit diili F i t bithiit t thi i l l b th d t t h t th li b t tt lik t h i d ti i i Bt til f bithiit h tid t tk i l th f the radical right and except for continuing discussion of the issue of universal health care (both nationally and globally) few bioethicists have found themselves very far to the political left For the most part bioethicists have been content to l th dil hih ithi iti t f hlth

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A

?

So what about truth? Can bioethics actually provide answers? Can it capture the truth? Is it even capable of providing real solutions to the dilemmas it addresses? Its critics claim that it pretends to do so; the question is whether it is at all possible tht bithi ld id tht th till fl tht d t b l true O b i i i lik b t i t h i t ll h d t it t h i I i thi ti it i i t t t d i t i i h th i l tht bithi l it d i h l l l it l i i l l d it l i th d l t f bli li I it d i l bithi k li t tth th h t it l i i il ti i th it f l i f patterns of reasoning and logical implication in the literature of bioethics and the history of the issues at hand and in identifying the background moral theory to hih ifi l i liitl iliitl l I thi d i l bithi th lidit f t f ifi l l i itht i th t t h f th l i itlf I d d " t t h " i t i h t h h i i th t it t t i idl td f t tht th h l lif i b t t th d t h t h t th h l h l t h i btt th ill d tht th hl l i b t t th i B bithi d t t if i l l th t it hih ld b bl of adjudicating these questions in a consistent way it is not uniformly Kantian or uniformly utilitarian or uniformly committed to theologically based premises of any sort it does not reach agreement at the deepest level Despite the widespread t f b i i bithi h i l h i l l flti t i t i l d ith t tth I it l i liil ltti i t t bithi l l lik t h t f thi f l it h l ti t dd ith h th d t d th t d i t it d i t i i h bt i i l d i t d d i t f l d it thd h l l i f i t i d l t t i d i t

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lti t t t bi th ti i t i th d t th t i t th f i l the hospital the insurer or whatever to understand and resolve the nature of their disagreement Bioethics does not decide cases like a court; rather it assists the parties involved in deciding how to resolve them Here it does seek answers but makes no t f hi th " t t h " F i l l i it blili l bithi bi b t h it h l l ti d it l i i l i t b i i il li bt h t it d h i l bjt t litil It d t t t t f l t l l d iti li it th t f th P i d t ' C i i th k f ii lik NBAC b t th ii t h l bjt t political pressures and are established and discontinued as the winds of politics blow They have no way to pronounce definitively on what is "right" and what is "wrong" though they nevertheless make an important contribution to public ife b ii th l t i Th i l bithi d t d t l i i t thitti l i bli lif iti h t d d d it t t d t ff th t t h t h h it l i t t bli l

The Scope of Bioethics: From Western to Global A bithi h dd t d f it i i t i l ith th i d i t d t / t i t l t i h i d dil fditibti j t i i th di iti t t i l itti f dii i th d l d i d t i l ti it h b t l k t h b d fbithi i d th ld Th d t th f t t h t th d t / t i t l t i h i d th f t l t t hlth b difft i difft iti Bth d t d tit h difft tti b t hlth d hlth i th th "Western" countries from those in the southern "nonWestern" countries Patterns of illness and disability and causes of death as well as background social institu ti idl b t ih d ti Th b difft tti b t tthtlli fidtilit t l i d th t l f l i lt ( th US) it i th t tll tit th t t h b t ftl d i i i th ( R i G ) it i th t t t l l i till th ( J ) it i th t tll f i l b bt t th tit d i till th ( th N j ) d i l b l i i itd l t t h Furthermore types of disease conditions vary dramatically in different parts of the world: bioethics in the industrialized nations has been concerned primarily with conditions occurring in laterlife degenerative disease and reproductive issues asso i t d ith h i h t h l i t d ftilit l b i t h i h t t d th l ifti di tht h t t t d h ttti i bithi t ll h b fflV/AIDS dd i t t t b l i Cditi i th i d t i l i d ti tht bl fifti di i d t dti hlth i t l hlth bl d l k f hlth t l

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Wh i f ditibti j t i l d i th F i t W l d t i l l l lack of access to extremely expensive hightechnology therapies such as organ transplantation or sustained artificial nutrition and hydration in the Third World in contrast issues of distributive justice the same in theory but vastly different n bjt tt i l t i i l l b i lik i i t i l h dti tibiti t t i d th h tt ti di f d d tbl t Mdii l k b l th i th i h d ti Bithi ith i i f lbli d f ltil t l diff i b i i t d t th diff F l Pt A Si it t bithi d l t f ti tlki b t dth d di bt almost all its discussion is focused on the withholding and withdrawing of the high technology "tubes and machines" form of endoflife care common in tertiary medical centers in the advanced medical systems of the West though just 8 percent of deaths i th i h ti d 87 t i th d l i d difft i t df difft Th h h i f d i bithi i h dflif d h i h t h l dti d ifi i h h t h th f t i h t h killi i l th l t t i di lt i tf it origins in the hightechnology hospitals of the industrialized nations Yet not every resident of the industrialized nations gets inside the hospital door and residents of the poorer nations threequarters or more of the world's population have virtually no t ll t t h l i l l hititd hlth Th ii f bithi W t i d t i l i d ti l t h t it h d l d ithi l t l i t tht t libl idiidli il d litil f d kt d th l f th W t l i b l tditi It h b l iti t i t l t l di t t i l i til f i l tl d it h b l d til l t l ith f fhlth t i d th h i h t h l h i t l h blihlth i ti d t l f i b l di or "homecare" issues where housing is rudimentary or the care of dying persons who have no resources or family members at all Many of the same issues arise n comparing urban and rural bioethics in First World contexts To some degree as bithi ti t d l d d th i i d ti b t th hdl t f th i i l fbithi d til tl h t b dd t l Bithi i i th t d f l bl i th dii f d d i d t i l i d ti ith h i h l hititd t it i j t b i i t d till f t h t d t hlth i th it d i f f t h l t h d i f th l i i l d t f th ld

The Future of Bioethics A bithi ti t b t h i th d d it b i t f h t i t i i it l t i h i t it t diili b d l i ltihbid i t d i i l i h i l h thl dii l litil

306

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i d th it i ti hth bithi ill ti t function in this crossdisciplinary way or whether it will become an autonomous fully fledged field in its own right On the one hand it might seem that bioethics is so fully dependent on its original background fields that it could not function with t th d t h t it ill ti t f t i t i d i t t i h i l h d t l d f i l i th fild H it l tht h fild id i d d t d t f l hl t h l d i iill d l d ithi t diili ( l l h i l h ) bt b h d ff f tht t th i d lit t h t i l hititi d bli t t t i bithi t may already be in the process of branching off from its parent disciplines into an independent and autonomous field If this process is actually already occurring philosophy medicine law and the dditil fild b td t ti t l tibt l bithi d l i th f t b t bithi itlf ld l it fll l f t i d t fild S h lti ld b kd b h i t i i bi thiit ld l b iitill t i d h i l h d t l t h l i i l i t i t t h t i th ld l b t i d hl and professionals in the various parent fields who are then typically drawn to bioethics later in their careers as they respond to the range of dilemmas they have encountered Rather new bioethicists would be trained primarily as bioethicists d t d i i l l i th d i t i t i i d litt f thi fild bi thiit f th t t I thi d ? Th i f d t i bithi iht t t h t it i M t d t t th fild f b i t h i d i t l th th fit b i h i l h d t l I t i t t i l ti h dtilli ( l d d d i i ) f fl i i f tii bithiit l t i th fild' f fii f it t diili though of course it depends on many other factors as well My own view of this branchingoff process is guarded and only partly optimistic: yes I think fission is well underway but I am not sure whether it is a desirable thing

Th S i l R l

f Bithi

T h t thi fb h i ff f it t diili i l d d and is likely to continue is as I see it in part a function of the social role of bioethics Like several other commentators I see the social role of bioethics at east in some of its forms as supplanting a role earlier played by religion In the 1950s d 1960 i f lii ii d ld t h i di i fb i l b i t h lif ffi i dth i th i f th h h hih i tht f ii ld f i l i t t b d it d i t d i t i l d i i f h i E i l lii i d d th t k f l t l k b t lif d d t h Bt ith th idtit liti t h t f l l d th i i l i h t t th " t " t d th t h i i d t i t t f th l t d d f th t t i t h t li

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i h b i i l t i l d ith i l conversation among themselves and with a broader public than with doctrinal commitment internal to themselves What might have been a broad albeit amorphous discussion of "the nature of suffering" tended to become an account of "the Jewish i f f f i " "th C t h l i iti th f it t li f f i " At th ti t i l t d b d i dii d t h l hih d ti b t l i lif i i dti d ilti d t h bithi b t l b i i lik lif d t h h d d j t i i t h t did t i d t i l i t t d tht i d d ld b fll l Th b i t h i d i t fill th id lft b th i t i ism of religion replacing it with a deep but secular discussion of values Further more the multihybrid character of bioethics rooted in the vastly different fields of philosophy medicine law social theory literature and others kept it from becom i hll d i f b i j i d d f d l i i t t i i b l t tid Th fbithi ld b d b th di fil dt l i i f d bithi' "hd " ftil i t i th f lt di d d hl h lik ER Th bli th d l k ld ll d t d th b i t h i h d b h t t th f Bith ics was a remarkable public success: it was accessible; it was morally important; it was compellingly interesting; and in order to achieve its wide scope it was forced to remain wholly secular That did not mean of course that the principal people i l d i th i bl d d d b bithi ld t h li i i t t f thi bt th t h t th lti f th d l i dil ld t b dittd b th t i lii Th l ititi t th f th dil h d t b bl t b i d b ll Tht bithi h d i t fill th id lft b th i i t i i f lii l tl li h l t h h bithi ith th k f t h l i lik J h F l t h P l R dRihd M C i k t h l i now have comparatively little input into current bioethics Religious bioethics was increasingly marginalized in the early 1970s and some among those bioethicists who have remained have found themselves constrained by institutional and dog ti idti i thi k Of th l tbl b i t h i i t h b k d t i i i i thl lik A l b t J d th iti tti tht t h l i i l ith i i bithi th b i lii lik th P k Rid C t Bt b dl l t h h bithi b iitl t f l f th i i f i f lii blif d ti i t i t ' li f l i l i th dil itd with the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses bioethics itself does not for the most part countenance religious claims in its argumentation It is a primarily secular discipline enjoying the expansive social role that a less sectarian f f lii did B i t h i i l th l h fild bfild f l i d thi l iil il l ll i l d i i t l thi b i thi thi fl i i thi d b t bithi l l th i i thi l S h l i t i t h t ik Bithi i l th l t i fi f l d i th i i th b th iti d th 308

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i t l t l b t i th t itti it i h d t bithi' philosophic legacy of reflection Crises in the newborn nursery demand quick clear decisions Policies about the care of geriatric patients and those near death require general formulations that cannot always take account of the nuances of ndividual dil Wht t b b l flti iid iiti th d l t f t f l thd th i k f bithi l tht h t b i issue d i l t i t d i ill l i f i t position b t th i h i h th dil hld b l d Thi t b til i k if b i t h i t ff i t d d t t h t i fild f it d l i it i t l ti and assumptions Some observers already see bioethics as authoritative as actually capable of resolving dilemmas in medical practice by reaching the (sole) morally sound answer a field with real claim to moral authority (this is the view that iit th t f ttk bithi d i d li) d hil th j t thi i t t d t i th fild lik th t f th P i d t ' C i i d th ii f th AMA' C i l Ethil d J d i i l Affi tib t t thi ti Th i k i t f " l i t h d " H Tit E l h d t J t it d i d f lii j t bt thl invested with the mantle of knowing what is right

"Uncontested Core" of Bioethics Y t th iti fbithi d iti f it l " l i t h d " d t it t h it Bithi thi l i l l f h i l h i l l i i l ttitd d li i l h liitti d t it b d i b t it l h t d i t t h It i t t t h t it accessible and interesting and that everyone patients physicians academics journalists the public can more or less follow its principal concerns Rather what is important is that it takes as its focus a field an area of practice namely dii d hlth tht h ht b lld " t t d " I t t th f t i l thi lid f i l thi ik thi f l b i thi i i thi d t i thi thi f i d lii (t bt f f th l i d thi bfild t h t h d l d i th k f d i l thi i t ) f diili h " jt" t l li l b l t i Th j t fl f l tht l bjti t t l t th institution of law as a whole is to defend and protect opposing parties' rights; this is evident not only in the courtroom but in most of law's other occupations as well including the conduct of business and the development of new law This is not to d t h t th l il l bl ft t i t tht it l tiit i lititi bt i th l f bl it t l f t i d bjti i t t t th i h t f ti h i t t b t dd S i i l l th " jt" l fb i i ki fit t h h it t l tiiti i th h d l i f i id I fild lik th th t l til fiil i t b id b t 309

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it fl l b i ti h fidtilit it b t th challenges to the core project itself: in law the defense of rights in an adversarial situation; in business the pursuit of profit from other parties' wants and needs In such fields the core project whether adversarial representation or profitmaking b d l t t d Bt i bithi th ti d ti dii d hlth ll h it j t l b d l t d th / t t i f hlth ti lld " " t t h ith ltd l ildi th lif f f f i th ititi f dibilit d th ti f di tllti f d th ti f " " I h t th j t f dii th f ti f bithi i t itself problematic In this specific sense bioethics does yield answers and indeed does harbor " t r u t h " To cure a patient's illness is in general a good thing The moral questions in bioethics all arise where cure is not possible (for instance n a b ith i t dfit dlt ith i i b l t i l i l l ) h ditibti it tht t b idd f ll (f i t i t l t t i i i ditibti i d l i t i ) h diti i i t l idtifd ill (f i t h l i t ) V i t l l th ti d i t f i i bithi i l itti where health care cannot accomplish its core project of cure whether because the patient's condition is beyond retrieval or because of background scarcity; but bio ethics does not normally challenge the central assumption that it is a good thing to k ill ll Of d i t ti fl b t ht titt ill (th i l t i l l l i hit d i d dii) d ht t d f f hld b ittd i t t t i t ill b t th j t itlf i t i l h l l d E th t t h h i iti f dii lik Th S f h t th td li b t ill bt ld t b j t t ffi th ibilit f h th ill i h th d t h th t d h th ld work; it is just that such critics think there are virtually no such cases Serious questions also arise concerning physicianassisted suicide with deep divisions about the propriety of physician aidindying and causing the deaths of patients but here t th j t f dii i t tll h l l d If it ibl t k th t i l l ill t i t ll i t " " th ill t h t ill t h i dth ll ti ld l b t thi t M l bl i dii i j t h fil t h t i h it t t d j t t b h i d W h t thi f b i t h i i t h t it bl ti i i l i l b l To be sure they are recurrent in that there are always more patients who are irretrievably ill and always more situations of scarcity but the central commitment of bioethics to explore how the core project of health care can most ethically be t i t i itlf b l t i Of ifi t t t t l th i b i d l i l l l t d td i i ti thil t h i bt thi d t t h t th il d i t i t h i l D bithi ild ? Y d Bithi i ll it ltihbid lit t t i l l t i d iti f dii d hlth ti bt dii dhlth ti thl i h i h th tiit

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d ti i t till t t d d i t thi l bl Hence one might say bioethics is a fortunate field a spectacular success both intellectually and I think it is fair to say (despite the continuing critiques) publicly as well This does not mean that bioethics will not continue to "make trouble" n h l l i ll l t tt f ti d j t f f il li bt l t h t it ti t hld t fid it tht f t i t t h t th i hih dii b t lihi it t l j t thill tbl d i d d tht f t i t t h t i th f f ti it dh t thi j t t ll F ll it lit it till k t it t l h t h t thi btt f tit df those who provide patients with care

Acknowledgments I

ld lik t t h k J J b d Will M t i f d i i

MD L l i F i f thi h t

F t h

M i

Millt C h i

B t t

di

Btti N

M t P b t (1994) Yk Ofd U i i t P (1996) 2 d d E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l B h T d Child J (1989) 3d d N York: Oxford University Press B k D W (1993) N Yk Cbid U i i t P Buchanan Allen E and Brock Dan W (1989) N Yk Cbid U i i t P Cllh D i l (1995) W h i t DC Georgetown University Press (1995b) E t " B i t h i " l 1 C C h l E (1978) Nt D IN U i i t f Nt D P Dil N (1985) Cbid Cbrid U i i t P Engelhardt Jr H Tristram (1986) s New York: Oxford University P (2000) Li S t d Zitli Fletcher J (1954) ( i i l l th 1949 L l l Lt tH d U i i t ) P i t NJ P i t U i i t P F l t h J h C (1997) B i t h i i t i l l f f i f " t " it T y 27: 297324 Gi G G d B l J M J (1979) fNt D P Nt D IN U i i t Jkbit I l (1959) s New York: Bloch

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Jonsen Albert R (1988) The Birth of Bioethics New York and Oxford: Oxford University and Toulmin Stephen (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning Berkeley CA: University of California Press McCormick Richard A (1981) How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics Garden City Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition: Tradition in Transition Crossroad Macklin Ruth A (1999) Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine McGuire Daniel C (1974) Death by Choice Garden City NY: Doubleday Noonan Jr John Thomas (1986) Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice Oxford University Press Ramsey Paul and Farley Margaret A (2002) The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics A Theory of Justice Press Singer Peter (1993) Practical Ethics 2nd edn New York: Cambridge University Press The New York Times August 2 Szasz Thomas (1984) The Myth of Mental Illness New York: Harper Collins Veatch R M (1981) A Theory of Medical Ethics New York: Basic Books The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27: 365-71

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23 Abti MARGARET OLIVIA LITTLE

It i ft td tht bli d i i f th l tt f bti i d i i t i l d Th iti tkd t d th i ffd t flt littl f th btlt d t t ti bil tht k i t flti th bjt D i t t t t b i ti t fid iddl d th d b t i l l l i d t it t d t i ith t conservatives claiming abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder even as extreme liberals think it devoid of moral import T t t thi l i t i i d t th l l b t t l t h t ti t hd l d i i Adii f thil it i f d ill l i th d l t t d ti f hth bti hld b l l l t t d ti f Bt t t t bl f th t i d d b l i d t th d t f l th itlf F thi th t h i l l i t t bti h f d l t l i l on the thinnest moral assessment on whether and when abortion is "morally permissible" This question is of course a crucial one its answer often desperately sought But many of our deepest struggles with the morality of abortion h t t d ti b t it l t th l f decency respectfulness, d responsibility. It i thi t d i d tht bti iibl it th t d i d t h t it honorable thi t d i d tht bti i i i b l it th t d i d t h t it monstrous It i th ltt t i tht d t i ht iht ll th t h i k l i t t ti f th t d ith it th i th t li ith d th ti ttitd h d i t fb d i t i tht h d th think the act deserves A moral theory that moves too quickly or focuses too exclu sively on moral permissibility will not address these crucial issues Moreover the tools that mainstream moral theory has used for analyzing abor ti fit l k d l t thi bjt tt M t t t l bti i th t df i h i jtifid th t t f bli ti t d t th tti d t th iti fL d d V i i Whil th i l fi h t t t d l i id f th t i t t th l t t th thi f tti ht t t l l i creating h t ibiliti t h t i l

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t j t iki ' bd d lif h t fll f th f t t h t th entity in question is or would be d Nor are such lacunae incidental glitches As theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon (1991) and Robin West (1993) have pointed out our moral and political theories have been forged by and large t d l ith i t t i bt i d d t l ittd d ltil l t H ll thi iht kf ldil h i db b l ( ti th i i it iht) h th iht tb td t d ll ith l ti dli ith th t fi t t i t t i If thi i i h t it it i ill i t t tt f ll i many treatments are wont to do arbitrating the question of fetal personhood The question certainly matters: the moral contours of abortion as we shall see are importantly different depending on the answer we give it The question is moreover i l l i i th t t t hih l tt i f t i f th t fbi thi l d i j d d b it t ti d th t f t it ld b if it d l d (M i hih I ill t d f d h i t h t fll l tt i i t tiit d i t thi h i d th f t ' tt b i l iht nancy continues For the debate on moral status see Brody 1975; Marquis 1989; Feinberg 1992; Steinbock 1992; Quinn 1993) Complex as the issue of personhood is though the temptation to think our work done if only we could settle it as t h h th l tt f bti fll l k t f th l tt f th ft h ld t h i t t i th i h t h i l i tht i d b th hll th d i t i t i itti i h i h th f t i l t d T k th l tt f bti it t t i t j t t bitt l d fili t i i t h i d thi bt t t t d t th d i t i t i t f t h t ft t d t thi i I th f l l i I t t t h t if k l d tti motherhood as a p and creation as a s we will be in a far better position to appreciate the moral textures of abortion I explore these textures in the first half on stipulation that the fetus is a person in the second half under suppos iti t h t l h lif h i t t l th f t

Ftl P

h

d

F

W f l Itf Ribiliti

t Piti

If fetuses are persons then abortion is surely an enormously serious matter: what is at stake is nothing less than the life of a creature with full moral standing To say that the stakes are high though is not to say that moral analysis is obvious (which s h l h i l th ti ll t t t t li l ' li t i ) I t h i k th t idl hld b j t i t bti i bdl i i d d i t t l it b th d thil ti ti O th l i it i ftl bi ht t b t bti iti fftl h d if f t th bti i d P ft ll h f d t l i h t t lif d bti it ld t it 314

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ilti O thi i th t t f bti it l l I particular we need not delve too deeply into the burdens that continued gestation might present for women not because their lives do not matter or because we do not sympathize with their plight but because we do not take hardship as ustifica ti f d I ft t h h b t i ' iilti t d ill l t l if h l d i d k f t f tti Whil ti t h d i t tti i i t h h th f t i l i til it i b th t t h i f f difft O h i tti i id i th f t ith t d t i i h t ti bld d l i i oxygen providing hormonal triggers for development without which it could not live For a fetus to live is inextricably tied to receiving aid (see Bolton 1979) And whether the assistance is delivered by way of intentional activity (as when the t tk h tl i t i ) b fb i l i l h i it it l i l i B t thi h il i l i t i f b t i ' l l d tt d T t it i l th i h t t lif J d i t h Th (1971) f l t it d t i l d th i h t t h ll it dd t i t i t h t lif Edi tti ill t l t t l t t i l l d t th f t ' d i but that does not mean that doing so would constitute murder Now Thomson herself illustrated the point with an (in)famous thought experi ment in which one person is kidnapped and used as life support for another: staying t d t th F Viliit h it t b th k i d thi t d b t d i t i lf d t i l t th V i l i i t ' i h t Th d t i l f thi th t i l h ld t i d d h tht T h ' it i h dititi bt killi d ltti di d ld l t t l t i h i h th t ibl f ti i I f t t h h I t h i k th t l iiht h i b d th th l T h ' l i idit As Frances Kamm's work points out (Kamm 1992) in the usual case of a killing if you stab a person on the street for instance you interfere with the trajectory the person had independently of you She faced a happy enough future we will ti h d tht tki f h thi h ld h hd bt f ti I di tti t h h ht tki thi i thi h ld t h hd t b i ith i t h t f id Sh t ith " d d t j t " it bt f h ld l d b d d I i tht it t ilti th ' i h t t lif j d d i th t d i t i l t f iht i t i t f While all killings are tragedies then not all are alike: some killings as Kamm puts it share the crucial "formal" feature of letting die which is that they leave the person no worse off than before she encountered you Th t i t d tiliti di t hih t t kill th b d h lif ( t h h h i i i l f bithd I t h f lt t l it ith i i t ) Th it th i tht h I till i th f i tii bli lif d t h t lif t b th d t i d b l di t h t it b ti d t ilt i h t t lif 315

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N f ill tht tt h h th i ally responsible for procreation In such cases it will be said she is responsible for introducing the person's need She is not like someone happening by an accident on the highway who knows CPR; she is like the person who caused the accident Her ti i t d d t f lbiliti d d h il dt t l lbiliti d i h h iflitd th B t th i d d i l bt i th idt d ti Th f t f i h itlf i t d h t di d i th i iti f h i t d tht di B t th i l t f ti d t th f t ' iti itht ti th f t ld t it at all and the mere fact of being brought into existence is not a bad thing To be sure creating a human is creating someone who comes with needs But this cru cially is not the same as inflicting a need onto someone (see Silverstein 1987) It is t t h h th f t l d itd ith l l f d d th ddd ( d h f i t if tk d ft ti tht i th f t ' lbilit t ti ) Th i (till) ibl f ti lif d it i lif t h t il i l d d b t tht i t th bi ibl f th bi needy rather than not The pregnant woman has not made the fetus more vulner able than it would otherwise have been: without her procreative actions it would not have existed at all E if th f t i th bti ld t b d M b d l t bti ht it i h t d i t i f wrongful interference N f thi t h h i t tht b t i d h iti i t h f b l t i It i t i t d t h t th il li d t b l t d W f l i t f i t l i lit b t it i t th d disregard l W l d ith ti f neglect abandonment These are issues that involve abrogations of positive responsibilities to help others not injunctions against interfering with them If fetuses are persons the question we really need to decide is: what positive responsibilities if any do pregnant h t ti t t i l i t ? Thi i ti tht tk it f ih df i t t i t i t th tht id b d i i f d O k ti i h t hld t t th f t th f f i l i l diid tt f general beneficence P h i l h th biti fb f ill t d bt bti i ditit difficulties of its own On the one hand the beneficence called for here is of a particularly urgent kind: the stakes are life and death and the pregnant woman s the only one who can render the assistance needed It is a rare (and many of us ill t h i k d d f l ) l th tht ill t h i k h f ibiliti t it h i d i f i h l ithi h t i dit i d l f lid O th th h d tti i t j t t i i t It i l h i ' bd It bi ith it t i l i t t i t tht h ' ti if It dd th t ' fil Bi kd t tt th tht

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i t lik b i kd t it h k t t i i h d hild it i like being asked to adopt the child Doing so is a caring compassionate act; it is also an enormous undertaking that has reverberations for an entire lifetime Deciding whether and if so when such action is obligatory rather than admirable is no light tt Id t thik l th h b t dd th i h ti ti h Wh i t i t ti dt i t h ? H d i h th if lit i f h it i d ti t f ik b t f i t t i t? W h t h l d thik f h bliti if th i d t ld b f d d diti f f d l f l i t i ? Th type f i di matically represented by gestation an assistance that combines life and death stakes with deep intimacy is virtually nowhere discussed in ethical theory (We are not called upon in the usual course of events to save people's lives by say h i lit ith t h ) B i i th i i t l th h dd d l d l l i th l lit f bti Diffilt th ti t h h it i tll di I t tht i tht d bti iti f ftl i ibl f h f th h d O flti ill th i f t i th t woman are not about generic beneficence at all The considerations she faces are not just those that would face someone uniquely well placed to serve as Good Samaritan to some stranger as when one passes the drowning person: for the pregnant woman d ft ill t t If th f t i ill it i her child d f thi h h il ibiliti t t it d I th d I bli h f th i t i ith b t i i t b t ht t i th it i b t ht t t h i hild B t if it i t h d tht i i ti i h t th d thi f thd th f ht k t i thi t h i k l ti d h t th t f it ibiliti ll Thi h l d i something of a warning flag Philosophers it must be said have by and large done a rather poor job when it comes to parenthood variously avoiding it romanticizing it or assimilating it to categories like contractual relations to which it stands n d i t i t t Thi l h t i i idt i d i i f b ti h t kbl hlfl dl d i t O iti d t d b J d i t h Th d f th t t t t t f bti i l i l l libl It tht il ibiliti tth t thd bt tht thd i t h b tt tht i t d it l b t Tht t i ll t i t t b tki th b b home from the hospital qualifies None the less special responsibilities to a child accrue only when one voluntarily assumes them Such a model is surely an odd one The model yields the plausible view that the iti d t f th t f dti th t b t it d b i l i tht h fth hild d i iht t d h il ibiliti t d t h t hild l h did h d P h t tikil h i h f k l d i tht th b l h should t t th t t Th h ti b i l i l ti h t d t t th l f t 317

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bt thi h it i h l i l l i i t t h t id t thi normative Another position is classically conservative According to this view the special responsibilities of parenthood are grounded in biological progenitorship It is blood ti t th l d f h i d l " i ' " i t t l t i tht k t d d h i h t d ibiliti Thi i h it blid t It h th f i tht h fth hild f iht t d f il ibiliti f th hild h t h h lik it t bt f ditiihi bt th ibiliti f h h d th il t d f hild h h df years in the activity of parenting and the responsibilities of someone who bears literally no connection beyond a genetic or causal contribution to existence On this view a sperm donor faces all the responsibilities of a social father Wht bth iti h i i th iti tht thd i l l t h i ffi A l i d t th tti ith thi i i t th hild l d h thi b d lb f l h did h d Bt thd lik ll filil lti i l litd l ti th thi P t hood and its attendant responsibilities admits of layers It has a crucial existence as a social role: something with institutionally defined entrances exits and expect ations that can attach to us quite independently of what our selfconceptions might It l h il it relationship t i l ti h d hit i t t i t f li It i b ftht i t t i t tht t' titi t if i ft i d i t B t it i l b f tht l t i h i tht ill biti if l i t i t l td d h fil t d t k th ld b b l t i b t l i t it b b t l f th l t i h i itlf I h t thd i t lithi f th ibiliti d i t i l l it tl attach not to the role but to the relationship that so often accompanies it These layers matter especially when we get to gestation for the pregnant woman stands precisely at their intersection If a fetus is a person then there is surely an i t t i h i h h i it th t dh j t i t i l bl t h l it ld l d i t t th i t t i Bt h i t t th t thikl d i b d th i t d i l t i h i ith hild ith th ibiliti b f h d hit d th t i f tki Th d t i i t l I thik t d t d i th d i t i t i t f flit t h t t ildi t t b l th flit t bring within the mantle of motherhood Women sometimes decide to abort even though they regard the fetus they carry as their child because they realize grimly that bringing this child into the world will leave too little room to care adequately f th hild th l d ii Thi i flit t h l bitt t d d i if th f t i h hild h ld h ibl h t if it lif l th t k litll i l t f th t h ? B t thi i t i th l f t h d Sh i th l f th t th f t b t ith th th hild h i b d i t f ti i t t i d i t t i t i l t i h i f t h h d Th f t i h bb th

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types

for the painting for the fetus

some

respect-worthy

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t d k ll P h t b i l l it i h th thought of someone aborting with casual indifference fills us with misgiving Abor tion involves loss Not just loss of the hope that various parties might have invested but loss of something valuable in its own right To respect something is to appreci t f l l th l it h d th l i it t t h b t bt i it dt h h t h t hibitd i iti f th l d l tt ftht hih i B t if h th i t i t i tht l h lif h l d i f t th i idbl d i t b t h t tht t l k lik Th i idbl flit t h t i ht dti t b i human life In part of course this is due to disagreement over the degree of value such life should be accorded: those for whom it is thoroughly modest will have very different views on issues from abortion to stemcell research from those for whom it i t d t B t thi i l t f th t O b d b l i t D Vii iti f th t i t t f flit i l l f th t iddl k f d t id t h t " d " f ftl l If lit t ' t l b t h it i ll d t t d ht h th b t motherhood d respect for creation. These themes are enormously complex I want to argue for they enter stories on both sides of the ledger: for some women as reasons to continue pregnancy and for others as reasons to end it Let me start with motherhood F h t l t bti th d i t d i t t tll d i t id th i th f it i t id h t li th f id f th th l t h h d If tti i l tt f di h t ik it t hl b i h lif th h if th ld h d tht it itht t h b ddi b t thi f i l th d i i f d ld b f diff t Bt tti d t j t ll ll t b it t it a mother One of the most common reasons women give for wanting to abort is that they do not want to become a mother now ever again with this partner or no reliable t ith th f th tht ft f thi ltd fll t th (Hth 1987 h 8 4 ) N d dti t i l lti T i hild ld b f lif l t th f t t i t tht ld b t h i liht k it jtifid t i hild f th t O i d t f t l h d t tt i hild j t bt k t h t if h does carry the pregnancy to term she will not want to give up the child for adoption Gestation she knows is likely to reshape her heart and soul transforming her into a mother emotionally not just officially; and it is precisely that transformation she does t t t d It i b tii bi ith it thi idtit d likl l t i h i th tht f l it l i t i t t d l i Bt ' ti t t h h d l t th h l f bti i j t th it d i t i F t h t it ld b h hild i il h h fl h t ti th if t h h d t ht h d i d T b t i t h ' t t i l hild k k i t

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' d t b t i t t ' b k it d i i tht would haunt them forever On this view the desire to avoid motherhood so com pelling as a reason to use contraception is uneasy grounds to abort: for once an embryo is on the scene it is not about rejecting motherhood it is about rejecting ' child N t l i t l l f i th i hild t t t t t d th bjt f jti B t th t h l d tk t ht t i f acceptance h ttil fil b i k k i t th d hld k d l h i Th t ititi t tj t f d l difft f gestalting th i t t i f di O th f t i bti i l t t tion: hardly equivalent because it means the demise of something of value But he desire to avoid the enterprise and identity of motherhood is an understandable and honorable basis for deciding to end a pregnancy Given that there is no child yet on th d t il t th l t i h i tht t d t h d f ' t j t O th d i bti i l t iti tl l t i h i hdl i l t f f th k lt i t t fll t Bt ' d i i b t hth t ti th l d fl ill t i d tht ld b l t d t th lti t some moral force It would take especially grave reasons to refuse assistance here for the norms of parenthood already have toehold Assessing the moral status of abortion it turns out then is not just about assessing the contours of generic t d t b i h lif it i b t i th li f impending relationship. A d thi i i tht f t i i difft f difft d ti i d th I i til th f t i hld i l ti t d l i thd d d th Nt b t h h d il b d ( t h h it b) b t b it t h h l h ht iht ll ' f d t l practical identity. Th t i f thi restructures the self changing the shape of one's heart the primary commitments by which one lives one's life the terms by which one judges one's life a success or a failure If the enterprise is eschewed and one decides to give the child over to th th i d t i t f th till h th ti f t t h t t f th i b h d ll l ( R 1982) A d ith hth th hild l t it t ti tht i f ' h t th i ill f lk tid ' bd A f d th t hld h f b i h lif hld k l d l ti i d t i t t i t t i commitments and enterprises as profound as motherhood Whether one agrees with this view or not there is at any rate another layer of the moral story here If women find themselves with different ways of gestalting the ti l t i h i i l d i it i i t b th h d i f f t idtiti i t t d i d l tht h t i t t ith i t t hih hil iibl i d i t i ll thitti f them If fl l d d t b d b th f thd t t thi t f l it b f th d tht i i t t l h l d is it th Sh f d h l f ( h t 321

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h i) ith t l i t t t thi t B t tki th identity of mother toward something just is to take on certain imperatives about its wellbeing as categorical Her job is thus clear: it is to help this creature reach its fullest potential For another woman on the other hand the identity of mother s t t b tk it i t i d h td bt h d l i d i hih t i d bt l i d f d f th th lti hi th j t th i Ad i if fl h t f l t b i h lif t h t h it b t b h thik h t thitti f ll b t b f th i t d hih h t i l idtit is now oriented: receptivity to life's agenda for instance or responsiveness to that which is most vulnerable For another woman the virtues to be exercised may tug in just the other direction: loyalty to treasured life plans a commitment that it be h t th h f bil tht h l d d t i h lif' b l t i lfditi ft lif t l ld b diit d ft Didi h it i ll d t t d it t t i di t f ttli i l l i l l thitti l i t d f d i i d bitti ti ft ii dlibti ti i decision no less deep for its immediacy one's own commitments identity and defining virtues A similarly complex story appears when we turn to the second theme Another t h d tht i ' t i i th f f ht t f th iht ibilit i l d i ti h lif O i it i th tht ll dt i difft diti I it t fili diti it h i t i f h ht i t i d M l bli tht ' ibilit t t lif i i t t l l i f d if i ibl f b i i b t it it i th fit l J t h t it t k t t ibl h i it hih individuals diverge (whether voluntary intercourse with contraception is different from intercourse without use of birth control and again from intentionally deciding to become pregnant at the IVF clinic) But triggering the relevant standard of ibilit f ti it i f l t b i ith it h i h t d ibilit t t it i d i t f l t t h lif l t ll it t ith Pt i l h i ibl f b i i b t t tht h i t i i l i it f it ttil t b h il ibilit t h tht d tt bl it t B t th id f tf ti i l if l f t l k l d d times the reason why women are moved to end pregnancies As Barbara Katz Roth man (1989) puts it decisions to abort often represent not a decision to destroy but a refusal to create Many people have deeply felt convictions about the circum t d h i h th f l it i h t f th t bi hild i t th ld C it b b h t i t d t ld i t t fil it tht i i l l t it ? Th idti it ft ti h tk l f hil th embryo h l d b td h t S did t b t tht i tb th d t want th lti hild i d d th f thi dd t l ih tht thi i

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t t h i bt b th d t thik b i i hild t th world the right thing for them to do These are abortions marked by moral language A woman wants to abort be cause she knows she could not give up a child for adoption but feels she could not i th hild th t f lif b th t f t h thik hild deserves h ld h t i th hild t h i k it ld b unfair t b i hild i t it l d b d d b jti h ll d d it lii i t kd b t d d thid t t b t b h did it ld b wrong f h t b d h t h lif lik h ld b f l l d ith hijti d hdhi Some have thought that such decisions betray a simple fallacy: unless the child's life were literally going to be worse than nonexistence how can one abort out of concern for the future child? But the worry here is not that one would be imposing harm th hild b b i i it i t it ( t h h hild h i th itti t i d h li tht t th l i i ) Th l i i t h t b i i b t ' lif i th i t ld d i l t h idl f ti d t h d Sh d t t t bi it it d h t h t l d f h d t t t bi it it h life will be marked by disrespect or rejection Nor does the claim imply judgment on women who do continue pregnancies in similar circumstances as though there were here an obligation to abort For the i ti i d t b i l l thitti l li Lik i d l f d ti th k t idti ll h l d b iti t h bt ll bl l dh t difft i ti d ihti Still th ti f th h d h th f f i tt ft t th i d l d t i t t kid f t i i t i i i t i h thit i t dibl t d th i t f i t i i di Th t t i b t integrity, integrity over one's participation in this enterprise precisely because it is so norma tively weighty What is usually emphasized in the morality of abortion is the ethics of destruc ti b t th i b l i thi f ti Ad f l flit b t bti i flit within t h t thi O th h d h h d tit t h t h f tit t h t it h b i t h l it ti h i l l if h hd l i it ti hih i h l bti i t til i l t t t t i O th th h d t t d is t d thi l l t ti ti and for some women pregnancy strikes in circumstances in which they cannot countenance that enterprise For some the sanctity of developing human ife will be strong enough to tip the balance toward continuing the pregnancy; for others thi f tfl ti ill h l d F th h bli t h t th i ti f ild l t i t th ti t l f b i lif b i ibl t tii t tt d di th b t t bi b t th diti d hih tht ti ill b tfl F th t h h th tiit fftl tl i ild d t h i t d d f tfl ti h i h d th l i j t th th diti

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it i i f t tt ti ti h ti b k d diti such as a loving family or adequate resources are not in place However one thinks these issues settle out they will not be resolved by austere contemplation of the value of human life They require wrestling with the rich i f ti ibilit d kihi A d th i I h td j t h i b t ' i t i t th b t ht i i l l blit O t t t f bti idti b t hth t t ti h t d b f th h d d i l l thitti ld d th th bt f th ti t t t i li i b t

References Blt M B (1979) R i b l d bti dii I 0 O'Nill d W R d dik ( d ) Having Children N Y k O f d U i i t P Brody B (1975) Abortion and the Sanctity of Life Cambridge MA: MTT Press D k i R (1993) Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion Euthanasia and Individual Freedom N Y k Alfrd A K f NJ Fib J (1992) A b t i I Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays P i t Princeton University Press Hth R (1987) Beginning Lives O f d O U i i t P K F M (1992) Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy N Yk Ofd U i i t P MacKinnon C A (1991) Reflections on sex equality under law The Yale Law Journal 100 (5) 1281328 The Journal of Philosophy 76 183202 M i D (1989) Wh b r t i i i l Quinn W (1993) Abortion: identity and loss In Morality and Action New York: Cambridge U i i t P Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 R S L (1982) A b t i d th d t h f th f t 232^5 Rothman B K (1989) Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society N Y k Nrt S i l t i H S (1987) O ' " i b i l i t " f th f t Socio/ Theory and Prac tice 13 10319 Steinbock B (1992) Life before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses New Yk Ofd U i i t P Th J J (1971) A d f f brti Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 4 7 6 6 West R (1993) Jurisprudence and gender In D Kelly Weisberg (ed) Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations 7 5 9 8 P h i l d l h i T l U i i t P

Fth D

di

S dFib J ( d ) (1997) The Problem of Abortion 3 d d B l t CA W d th Finnis J (1973) The rights and wrongs of abortion: a reply to Judith Thomson Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 11745

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Harman E (2000) Creation ethics: the moral status of early fetuses and the ethics of abortion Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28: 310-24 McDonaugh E (1996) Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent New York: Oxford University Press Noonan Jr J T (1970) An almost absolute value in history In J T Noonan Jr (ed) The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, pp 1-59 Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Wertheimer R (1974) Understanding the abortion argument In M Cohen T Nagel and T Scanlon (eds) The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, pp 23-51 Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

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24 Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide MICHAEL TOOLEY

The questions of the moral and appropriate legal status of assisted suicide and of different forms of euthanasia have been and continue to be the focus of serious philosophical discussion and intense albeit not always well-informed public and political debate I shall focus upon what seem to be the most important arguments on both sides to see what the prospects are for resolving these crucial ethical issues The discussion is organized as follows In the first section I set out some preliminary concepts and distinctions along with the main alternative views that people have embraced Then in the next section I offer an argument for the claim that assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia are morally permissible Finally in the third and fourth sections I examine some important arguments either for the view that voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide are morally wrong or for the view that regardless of their moral status they should not be legally permitted

Important Concepts and Distinctions and Alternative Views Euthanasia may be defined as an action in which a person is intentionally killed or allowed to die because it is believed that the individual would be better off dead than alive - or else as in the case of irreversible coma at least no worse off So understood is euthanasia ever morally acceptable and should it ever be legally permitted? Two familiar distinctions are important for the discussion of these issues First there is the threefold distinction between voluntary euthanasia non-voluntary euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia Thus euthanasia is voluntary when t s requested by the person who undergoes it It is non-voluntary when the person n question is not able to indicate whether or not he or she wants to undergo euthanasia (This will include cases involving infants and adults who have permanently lost consciousness) Finally it is involuntary when the person who undergoes euthanasia wants to go on living The second important distinction is between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia How this distinction is best drawn is controversial and there are two slightly different ways of doing so depending upon how cases involving the withdrawal of 326

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l i f t t l i f d Th fd i th d i t i t i terms of the contrast between acting and doing nothing at all: it is a case of active euthanasia whenever anything at all is done including the withdrawal of a life support system that facilitates the person's death and a case of passive euthanasia l if thi i d tht bi b t th ' dth A difft f d i th d i t i t i bt ti d i t h i i i t f hth ht iht b l l d th i fdth i h ti i t d ij di h f ti t h i h th i fd t h i h ti d f i t h i h th i fd t h i ij di Precisely where the line should be drawn between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia is important if one holds as a significant number of people do that passive euthanasia is morally permissible but that active euthanasia is not Here h i thi i i th tf d t l ti ll b d d d b f i f t h i h i d i i d l i killd d h dth i tb h t b t b ithdi l i f t t Ath i t t lii tt th f t t h t h t h i fb i i b t th d f ll f th lif f i i i of euthanasia depends upon how death is defined Suppose for example that one accepts the definition proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School (1968) according to which the criterion of death is irreversible coma based th t t l d t f t i i f th hl b i Th f h i h tt df l i f t t tht ld t b f t h i d bl ld t b ll b l t i P il h t th i h t i t i f dth i th th il I d t h f th h l b i th i h t i t i ? O i it i t d d t h f th b i ? O i it i l th i i b l l f i ? A libl i if id bjti t th ti t h t it i the irreversible loss of consciousness that is the right criterion The objection is that strictly speaking one never has an irreversible loss of consciousness since though it is not possible at present it is in principle possible to restore consciousness to any h i b f l idi th b d i ti ith b i Di ld t f t th h itd ith t h t b d th ihbiti th b d ld b th h b i hd b t l t d i t th b d B t thi i t th t th t t i it b i t tht h t i t i t t h i iti f h a person h d i d d thi i it b l t h t th iti f dth needs to be formulated in terms of those states such as certain memories beliefs attitudes and personality traits that are the basis of personal identity Both whole brain death and upper brain death ensure presumably that all such states have b d t d Bt hil th f f i t f t h t th t th tt ld b d t d i t h t th d t t i f ll f th b i " I i b l " l f i th th h d i ith f f i t th t t t h t th b i f l idtit i th d t ti f th h i l i l b i f i d l it f i i th d t t i f th t t t h t k f l idtit

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A f l i th f t t h t th d f i i t i f t h i ffd b involves no reference to a terminal illness Why has this been left out? The reason is that if euthanasia is potentially justifiable in the case of a person who is termin ally ill it would seem that it must be at least in part because that person's ife t h tht h h t i l l jd t h t ll thi i d d t i d it i likl t b th d t h Bt h i ffi b b l i f i b l di tht i t l i f t h t i l b i itti h it i t i l t hld tht ll thi i d d t i d it i likl t b th d t h Wht t l i th f dil ill l l i th l t t It i itk t h f t tit euthanasia to cases where an individual is terminally ill Given the distinctions on the one hand between voluntary nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia and between active and passive euthanasia on the other h i t f ti l t ti t h i l t i t h i l t ti t h i l t i t h i i l t ti t h i d i l t i t h i d h th i th ti f th i fi l tt f th ti d f it it l l tt As regards voluntary euthanasia the view that voluntary passive euthanasia s in general morally permissible is very widely accepted indeed although it is cer tainly possible to hold that voluntary passive euthanasia is prima facie wrong ill i tht t hih h b ffd i t l t ti t h i dil t b t i t l t i th i ll ( T l 1995) I i f th id t f l t i t h i h it ill b b t t f th k f d i i tht l t i t h i i ll iibl d th t k i t hth l t ti t h i i b l t i d dl hth if it i th diff i h t d it i fi ll How does nonvoluntary euthanasia compare with voluntary euthanasia? This is a place where one's definition of euthanasia may make a difference Earlier I de fined euthanasia as involving the death of a person and when it is thus defined it l i b l t h t killi h i bl t k t b killd i th thi bi l ll b l t i th killi h h kd d i i l l f ltti di If th th h d t h i t b killd d f d b d l t h t it i l d d f killi d ltti di h th i ti h l d d t i t th h ld b l b l t i th f l t t h i h i il ent Because consent is absent more is needed by way of argument if one is to show that nonvoluntary euthanasia is justified even in the passive case So n addition to the questions of whether there is a significant moral difference between l t ti t h i d l t i t h i d hth if th i it i h t d l t ti t h i i fi ll th i l i t t ti f hth l t t h i i jtifibl i th i Fill d t b l t i f ll i i l t t h i d it t t k it f td tht i l t t h i t l b i fi 328

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

i l ( R h l 1993 33) Thi h i f f l C i d particular a case of involuntary passive euthanasia in which the continued exist ence of the person is very much contrary to his or her best interests Does the right to life involve a right to be given assistance to continue living even in cases where th idi ftht it ill k h ff? If t th it ld tht i l t i t h i i ti ll iibl Th ll i t i h t i tht idd t h t t h i i d f d t h t it i l th d t h f th i l t t h i ill th thi bi l b b l t i th l t t h i hih i t ill b b l t i th l t t h i I th d i i t h t fll I hll focus exclusively upon the case of voluntary euthanasia

A Brief Defense of Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Euthanasia A d 1

2

3

libl itd iid

8

ll

li i I

tht t

l t fll

ti

t h i

'

itti

iid i

h i

t

ld

tb

It could be morally wrong to assist a person to commit suicide only if either it was morally wrong for that person to commit suicide or if committing suicide t t th ' i t t

6 Thf i t 7

t f th

If a person is suffering considerable pain due to an incurable illness then that person's continued existence may very well not be in his or her own interest There are circumstances accordingly when suicide is a rational action A ' killi h i l f h l f i h i t ll t i f th f l l i t diti ( ) It ith ilt l' iht (b) It d t k th ld l A ti t h t t i f diti () d (b) d tht i t t t ' i t t tb ll

4 Thf morally wrong 5

ti t

it

ld t b d i b d b

Wh iti t h i i l jtifid T h f l t ti cumstances in question

t i t h i

it

t

itti

it

iid i j t i f d ld

t b

ll

iid i th l t

ti i th

i

This argument progressing from suicide through assisted suicide and on to volun t ti t h i i t l d th ti i l d it d t M d f d f l t ti t h i ld tt tb lih h t l i t th f f t t h t it i i fi ll t d l t itd iid t l t ti t h i Th l t f f d f tht l i i ht i ti f d t th A t f M O ff l t i thi ti fll 329

MICHAEL TOOLEY

1 I 2 3

4

t

idiidl h

iht

tt

d

t

ffi

If one has a right to something then others are under a prima facie obligation to provide one with assistance in acquiring that thing The only way in which one may be able to avoid great suffering in some cases is t h h t it i itti iid t l t ti th i T h f it i i fi t t ll l i h i t t it i itti iid t l t ti t h i

Thi t i l I thik libl B t it d i l ti that is controversial: the assumption namely that a right involves a right to assist ance rather than merely a right to be left alone Assume for the moment that the first of the above conclusions that assisted iid d l t ti t h i ll iibl b t i d Wht h l d thi l l t t b? C t i l th f t t h t ti i t ll titt t i fi d f ldi t h t it h l d t b i l l l It i ibl h f ti tht t ll thl t b h hld b hibitd th d tht l l i th ti i question would give rise to other actions that would harm individuals or violate their rights Thus for example if voluntary active euthanasia is legally permitted then people may choose active euthanasia in circumstances in which it is not really i thi i t t t d A l t t i l hil i d i i d l t f t h i t ilt ' i h t if h t b th l ti f t h i d h t h t d i l t th i h t fidiidl Fth idti i t h f d i th fil ti f thi h t t i t t bjti t th l l i t i f itd iid d l t ti t h i ill b i d

Arguments for the View that Voluntary Active Euthanasia is Morally Wrong Fit h dt id h iht hll th i tht itd iid d l t ti t h i ll i i b l Th t th th id fll b d i i d d i t lii d t h l i l t th h d d l h i l h i l t th th A d th f h i l h ft f l I t h i k t h t l iti i t ll sary on the grounds that even if some religiously based argument turned out to be sound it would be wrong at least in a pluralistic society to base any legislation or any policy decisions upon such an argument Whether such a response is satisfac t i t til l It t fbl t i h t idiidll d t id hth th lii i tbl S h iti I bli ld h tht lii t i t l t ti t h i i itil ti H tblihi tht li ld i l dtild iti f i i th h i l h f lii tht tb d t k h A d lii t th t t

330

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

ft d d li ith t h t l t ti t h i i b ti contrary to human nature or that it is wrong because it involves the direct killing of an innocent person The former line of argument however seems deeply prob lematic in an evident way For even if it is granted for the sake of argument that a di t i i h d i d it h bi h h l d it b t t t t tht d i h it i t i ' i t t l' it t tht l i i ? I hll f dil th d t th t h t f h i h i t h t ti t h i bth l t d l t i i fi i l b th d i t killi f i t i i fi i l (O l t t i l th l i b tht active euthanasia is absolutely wrong because the direct killing of innocent persons is absolutely wrong: Sullivan 1975; Sacred Congregation 1980) There are three main philosophical responses to this type of argument The irst b t fll 1 2

V l t i I t t i l l killi l ll

3

The only morally relevant difference between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia is that the former is a case of killing and the latter a case of letting die T h f l t ti t h i i t ll

4

t h i

i

t

ll di t t i l l

ltti

di

Gi t

i

t h t (3) i l iht d t h t f t h i k t h t (1) i i t k thi (2) I it t th t h t killi d ltti di ll t thi ti i f f l O th h d b f h h d t h t i t t i l l killi d i t t i l l ltti di h i l th l tt (Rhl 1975 T l 1980 Oddi 1997 and one very interesting way of attempting to establish this conclusion is by of a Bare Difference Argument Thus James Rachels for example in a discussed article focused upon the following two cases:

th

t ? Th hil 1998) means much

I th f t S i t h t d t i l ihrit if thi hld h t hi sixyearold cousin One evening while the child is taking his bath Smith sneaks nto th b t h dd th hild d th thi t h t it ill l k ik idt In the second Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his sixyearold i Lik S i t h J k i l i t d th hild i hi b t h H j t h t th b t h J th hild li d hit hi h d d fll f d i th t J i dlihtd h t d b d t h th hild' h d b k under if it is necessary but it is not necessary With only a little thrashing about the hild d ll b h i l f " i d t l l " J th d d thi ( R h l 1975 79) If t th bt

t f i t t i l l killi hd iht t f i t t i l l ltti di th i Sith' ti dJ ' ti i t h t th f i

th

ki l diff f killi

d 331

MICHAEL TOOLEY

th l t t f ltti di S i t h ' ti t b i l th Jones's But Rachels suggests and most other writers seem to agree that our moral intuitions do not support the view that there is any significant moral differ ence between Smith's action and Jones's action Hence an act of intentionally killi i t t h i ki t th t fi t t i l l l l i i t t di Th t t fB Diff A t h b d i t d ith hil h hldi t h t thi f f t i d (Rhl 1979 M l 1992 Oddi 1997) d th hldi t h t it i t d ( B h 1977 F t 1977 1 0 1 2 K 1988) O th f f it h th t til appears sound For if one tries to hold that while the distinction between killing and letting die makes no difference in Rachels's case but does make a difference in other cases it would seem that the morally relevant properties cannot be simply those of bi f i t t i l l klli di t t i l l lli t di th t th b l ti t h t t t i R h l ' bt t i th B t th it i i b t th iti t if h t th l ti d t h dd i di thi Nevertheless there is a problem with this first response in that there are cases where the intuitions of most nonconsequentialists are that killing and letting die are not morally equivalent One of the most famous cases discussed at length by J h H i (1975) i l th ibilit f killi hlth i d t tht ' t t l h d t l t if th t i If killi d ltti di ll th killi th t t hld b t l iibl b t hihl dbl M l h f l t h t thi i t Whil thi d h fth d i i it ill b b t h t t t t th h l t i l Lt id th th sponse that also focuses upon the relation between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia This second response grants at least for the sake of argument that the following asymmetry principle may very well be true: B t h th di t th

t th

f killi ki ltt

ti

d th b t th f

t i

f l l i ihti

t ki

Gi thi i i l th h hld tht l t ti t h i i morally wrong in itself can argue as follows First in cases of voluntary passive euthanasia the benefit to the person of greatly reducing that person's suffering may outweigh the wrongness of letting the person die Secondly an identical bene fit i f l t ti t h i ll t b ffiit t t i h th t f killi H f l t i t h i ll b ll iibl ll thi i d d h di f l t ti t h i t Wht i t b t thi t? O ld b t h t f thi tt k it h t b th t l t h t killi i ll th

332

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

l l i t di b t t h t it i h F if th f l lihtl than the latter then surely there would be cases where the benefit from reducing the person's suffering would be sufficiently great that the slight moral difference between killing and letting die would not be enough to change what would otherwise be a ll iibl ti i t tht t ll iibl Tht h i i i t Th il i th t h t th t i i l ttd b i t tift ff l t i th i i ti i th lti bt killi d ltti di Th i tht Did B i (2000 1 6 0 1 ) h b d d f hldi t h t th i l diff bt killi d ltti di t l b d f hldi tht h general principle is correct the principle namely that intentionally causing a given harm is intrinsically more wrong than intentionally allowing that harm to occur Or to put it in terms of wrongmaking properties: B t h th ll l l i ihti

t h

fi t t i l l t ki t th

i

h th

ki ltt

d th ti

t f i t t i b t th f i

Thus for example someone who holds that murdering someone is morally more wrong than intentionally allowing say a homeless person to die of starvation will also hold that inflicting pain upon someone is morally more wrong than intention ll l l i tht t ff bl i d i i l l tht d t i ' t i ll th i t t i l l lli tht ' t t b d t d Th h t i t h t t th t t t h t th killi ltti di d i t i t i i i t f th l ll i i f i t it i precisely because it i j t dititi bt i t t i l l i h di t t i l l lli h t h B t th th i i l t i i l ttd b i t t formulation of what is true in the killing versus letting die case since it fails to distin guish between cases where killing or letting die are harms and cases where they are benefits What is needed then is the following modified asymmetry principle: B t h th t ki

t f l l i t th

f killi

h h

t di ki th l t t

ti

th killi h l l i th b t th f i

th t di h ihti

d th th

But now it is clear that one cannot support the claim that there is a moral differ ence between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia by appealing to the thesis that there is an intrinsic moral difference between killing d ltti di i i f t h i h th i d i i d l bi bfitd th d b bi killd b bi l l d t di T h f if l t i t h i i ll i i b l th t b t f l t ti t h i Th l i fB i ' t th i tht t t th i tht l t ti t h i i b l t i th l t i th

333

MICHAEL TOOLEY

i lt l th i tht l t ti t h i i i itlf ll by appealing to the thesis that intentionally killing an innocent person is more seriously wrong than intentionally letting an innocent person die But I want to argue that Boonin's line of thought can also be extended to support a more striking l i Th id b h i d th t i i tht t h t th killi ltti di i i l tb il f th f l l i i i l B t h th ll l l i ihti

t h

fi t t i l l t ki t th

i

h th

ki ltt

d th ti

t f i t t i b t th f i

The question naturally arises as to whether there is a principle dealing with benefits that corresponds to a principle in the case of harms In particular if it seems plausible th it ld t h t th f l l i i i l hld l libl B t h th t fi t t i l l till lli bfit t i ihti i h t k i

i

b f t i h t k i th l t t

t th

d th

t

ti

f it b t th f

But if this principle is right then one will also have the following principle as a particular case: B t h th th th ki

t

t f killi f lli i h t k i t th th l t t

h t di ti

th killi h l l i b t th f

bfit th i

th t di ihti

d bfit iht

B t th th t t t t t th l i t h t l t h h l t i th nasia is morally acceptable voluntary active euthanasia is not by appealing to the killing versus letting die distinction will not merely fail to support any such distinc tion: it will provide a positive argument for the claim that voluntary active eutha i i i t i i l l ll fbl t l t i t h i Th t i d d f bth i d i t t th l i tht ti t h i i i itlf b it i l th d i t killi f i t i th th ilti ht i ith th l t t i i l th t t t b d th l i tht l t i t h i i ll i i b l Th t h i d b t t l showing exactly what is wrong with the claim that the direct killing of innocent persons is always morally wrong in itself This final response begins by asking what account can be offered of why the d i t killi fi t i l ll i itlf O ibilit ld b i l i l d i i di t h i h th it f i t f ki th ld b t t l B t thi f i valuable, i th t t t i t l i th i i l i ti i t t i bjti Th fit i t h t if thi l t i f th f killi i t t th i t t i l l f i i f b i i i t it it

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EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

ld l b ll d t th d i th f i l t create an object that would have a certain value makes precisely the same differ ence with regard to the overall value of the world as the destruction of an already existing object of the same sort other things being equal But the failure to bring an i t it it i t ll ith d t i i t h l d i t S th i i l t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf tb l i d i l i l l Th d bjti i thi C i d i t h i ffi tibl f i b l ill d h ld f t b killd th th t lii If h l d t h t killi h ld b b would thereby be destroying something of value then one should also hold that one would make the world a better place by creating an additional innocent person who one knew would suffer to the same degree due to the same incurable disease B t th l t t l i i l i b l A d f t t t i t d f d th l i t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf i b li t th id f iht d b hldi tht h ti i b i t h iht t lif B t thi ti l t tl t t bjti Th fit i t h t l can in general waive their rights Thus for example the fact that one has a right to some property does not mean that one does something wrong if one destroys t or gives it to someone So why should the situation be any different with regard to th i h t t lif? Wh h l d it t b iibl f l t it iid t i l ii t kill ? Wh h l d th i h t t lif tb i h t t h t lik th iht i ? A d dd bjti i l ki h iht f t i A libl i I t i tht iht f t i i t f i t th f t i t t t idiidl' i t t d dl th f t i t id i d i i d l ith h f d t k d i i i h t th ill d ith t h i li B t if thi i right then in a situation where a person wants to die helping them to do so will further that person's autonomy while if the situation is one in which it is in the person's interest to be dead killing that person will further his or her interests So if iht f t i t t t i t t d t th h bth diti tifid t h t it i i th ' i t t t b killd d th k t b killd ti t h t t ill t b t t ith f th thi tht iht f t i t t t A d i l th l i t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf tb d f d d b li t th id f i h t Th l i td b l t th id f i h t t lif ill b t t th h t h t ill b more limited one that the killing of an innocent person is wrong in itself if that action is either contrary to what the person really wants or contrary to the person's interest

Shld A i t d Siid A iid

dV l t be Legal?

Ih d t h t th d d l t ti t h i i t h l i h t b f f d f hldi t h t th hld

Ati

E t h i f

hldi tht ll iibl thl b illl?

itd Wht

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MICHAEL TOOLEY

Th i t h b d d Th fit i t t f d by Yale Kamisar (1958) which focuses upon possible harm to those who choose to undergo euthanasia The thrust of Kamisar's argument is that if voluntary active euthanasia is available some people will choose to be killed in circumstances where bi killd i t t thi i t t K i ' t i b l t i i t I th fit l if t t d t h t h i i itti h tht t t hi h i t t d h th t t l l d i t b d it i h d t h if th td ith th h it ld b b t t t lii h h ld b bl t i t th f f th In the second place it can be shown (Tooley 1995) that the possibilities for irrational choice that Kamisar suggests whatever weight they have generally have precisely as much weight in the case of voluntary passive euthanasia So one t K i d hld tht h ibiliti titt d f t l l i i ti t h i itht ll h l d i t h t th l d f t l l i i t h i Th th t t i t l l i t i d fl idti F i t th ht ft f d t " d " "li l " t against voluntary active euthanasia These come in two forms Both maintain that legalizing active euthanasia would be a mistake because doing so would be ikely to lead to undesirable consequences involving the legalizing of other things According t i f th t h th ld f l l b it f l i l lti if l l i l t ti t h i th l i l it i tht l l l i f l i l t t h i ll (Slli 1975 24) Th d i f th d t b t t iti t h t th d i b l ld f l l i l d t ti f t b t h hl Th bl ith th " l i l i t " i f th t ill b l from the discussion in the previous section For the present argument ike the earlier one can be seen to rest upon the assumption that the relevant basic moral principle involved here is something along the lines of: (1) Th d i t killi h b i ) i l Bt l d

i

fft

i t d

b

f

i

t itlf

i li i i l

(

h

i i l

i

l t t i l

i

t

t It

d t

t

b

h

(2) Innocent persons have a right to life B t th

th

i t i tht

(3) It i i fi i t h hi h It d

336

t

t

li

hil (2) d lif

t kill i t i t d h

t t

li

h h h

t i

i

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

(4) It i i fi t kill i t h h fid d rational desire for death and who has given permission to have his or her life terminated Th l

th

d li t h t th d i t killi f i t i i itlf i l d b th d i i l tht i t h i h t t lif th t t ll i i t t l hld bth tht l t ti t h i i ll iibl d tht i l t t h i i t Th d f f th d t b t t d t i l unsound assumption about the relevant moral principles For here it is granted at least for the sake of argument that voluntary active euthanasia is not wrong n itself It is then argued however that acceptance of voluntary active euthanasia l d t th t f ti tht i t h l h l t ti t h i Bt ht th f thiki t h t thi ill t k l ? K i (1958) i d i thi i f th d t ff th Fit h li tht d t f th l l i t i f l t ti t h i often seem to hold that the case for legalizing certain types of nonvoluntary eutha nasia is at least as compelling (Kamisar 1958: 1 0 2 7 8 ) Secondly he cites a poll which measured the amount of public support for on the one hand euthanasia for dfti i f t d th th h d t h i f i b l d i f l l ll dlt d h th lt tht l d f th f th f th l t t (45 t 373 t) (1958 1029) F i l l h l (1958 1 0 3 1 2 ) t ht h d d th N i iti th d i t i ffd b L A l d (1949 40) Th b i i tft l btl hift i h i i th b i ttitd f th h i i It started with the acceptance of the attitude basic in the euthanasia movement that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived This attitude in its early t d itlf l ith th l d h i l l i k G d l l th h f th t b i l d d i thi t l d t th ill dti th i d l i l l t d th ill td dfll ll Germans But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedgedin lever from h i h thi ti t d f i d i d it i t th ttitd t d th hbilitbl i k How strong are the considerations offered by Kamisar? The problem with the irst two types of support that Kamisar offers is that they concern attitudes toward nonvoluntary t h i d th t l t t th li tht i i d f lii d l tht l d f l t ti t h i t thi tht ll l hld tht l t t h i t t d ith i l t t h i i ll B t i th f i t l thi i d l t i l li i h b f th ft tht K i it l tht A i i th ll t h t K i f d t d f t h i i th f"dfti i f t " th i th f "i

337

MICHAEL TOOLEY

bl d i f l l ill d l t " S d l th t t tht b offered in support of euthanasia in the case of severely defective infants arguments that Kamisar does not even address This leaves Kamisar's appeal to the case of Nazi Germany Here there are at least t ti tht dt b i d Th f i t i h t h th l i t h t i d d i th b i i ft t F it h J h Flth (1973) dM i K h l (1975) h d t h t th N i d th th i t f ttitd t d th hbilitbl i k b d th id f th tti d ifiti f th A t k d it t b tiiti M if i H i t l ' Mem Kampf, th very strong evidence for that view and against Leo Alexander's claim Consider for example the following passages: Wht

t fiht f i t f d th it d dti f d l th t f hild d th it f b l d th f d d independence of the fatherland so that our people may mature for the fulfillment of the ii l l t t d it b th t f th i (Hitl 1971 214) The Jewish doctrine of Marxism withdraws from humanity the premise of its exist d lt A f d t i f th i thi d t i ld b i b t th d f d itlltll ibl t Ad i thi t t f ll ibl i [ h ] th lt f liti f h l ld l b h th it ld l b d t t i f th i h b i t t f thi l t If with the help of his Marxist creed the Jew is victorious over the other peoples of d thi l t ill it th ld hi ill b th f l th f h i t did t h d f t h h th th d i d f (Hitl 1971 65) In the light of passages such as these Leo Alexander's claim that the startingpoint of the Holocaust was "with the acceptance of the attitude basic in the euthanasia movement that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived" seems clearly t b l S d l if L A l d iht ld till dt t k t ht t t th N i i hih d i ditthi i d idit f h t i likl t h i d t i it h th U i t d Stt Th l i t h t it i t if i th U i t d S t t t advocate such things the opposition would be massive Finally it is also possible to offer empirical evidence against the wedge argument as is done for example by James Rachels (1993: 62) He argues that there is "historical and anthropological id tht l f killi i t t d t il l d t killi i difft i t " d it illtti th killi fdfti i f t i i iti d th killi f l i lfdf i it S th i d f thiki tht l bl f d i l l li d th f t lidi d ht l i d t b li l I dditi h ff i i l id f d i t t i th i it h l t ti t h i h f th t f years been permitted: namely the Netherlands Thus while some who oppose legalization of voluntary active euthanasia have claimed that the Dutch experiment

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id t f th li l t th d t h t th h been cases of involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands in fact the opposite is the case as emerges if one compares the situation in the Netherlands with what obtains in societies where voluntary active euthanasia is not permitted In particular if one th lt f id t i th N t h l d i 1990 d 1995 d i A t l i i 1 9 9 5 6 th f l l i f t F i t i th N t h l d th t f ti t i t i i t h t th tit' liit t fll f 08 t 07 t th id f 1990 t 1995 h i A t l i th t f h i 19956 35 t t h t i fi ti h i h th i th N t h l d S d l i th N t h l d i 1995 1 3 5 t f ll d t h involved a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment whereas in Australia n 1 9 9 5 6 this occurred in 3 0 5 percent of cases; moreover in Australia in 2 2 5 percent of the cases the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment was done i t h t th tit' liit t (Kh t l 1997 Oddi 1998) Th l i dil i t h t th i h t fidiidl likl t b iltd h l t ti t h i i i l l l th h it i ittd Thi b i t th f i l b j t i tht I hll id t th l l i t i f l t ti t h i Th t h t f thi b j t i i t h t th i problems about how to implement the legalization of euthanasia Should there be no laws at all concerning voluntary active euthanasia? That surely would lead to significant abuse But if there need to be laws what form should they take? If the l i t d d l d t i t d th ltil f l h ld b f i t f l t ti t h i iht i d bi bl t d O th th h d if th d l d ld th l i k l i h d f b t ? I t thi bl J R h l (1993 6 3 5 ) h td tht ld b th bl f iti diffilt d dtild lilti dli ith h l t ti t h i i iibl b i t d i t d i l t the effect that just as the fact that a killing has been done in selfdefense may serve as a defense against a charge of homicide so the fact that a killing was one of voluntary euthanasia could function in the same way; that is as a satisfactory df i t h f h i i d R h l ' l i i t t i d it ld til t b d i b l h It i l h h h l ld h t l t ti t h i lt B t h ld bi R h l ' ti ith th i t d t i f th ti l i l t i tht ld ib d d hih l t ti t h i i ti l t types of cases would be legally permissible The combination of these two ap proaches might then both provide access to voluntary active euthanasia for those in need while minimizing the likelihood of abuse since anyone committing eutha i i b d l i ld dt b dt t h t it i d d f l t t h i O fil i t t i i thi It i ll d t h t if l t ti t h i itd iid t b l l i d th h ti ld b id tb d t Thi ti h l d t t iti t l l i t i th t f th A i Mdil A i t i hih h hld t h t i i f 339

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th b i itti f th ti f dii t d th i f li d t should not perform active euthanasia Advocates of legalization have tended to respond by challenging the latter view arguing for example that assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia are not really contrary to the Hippocratic Oath Bt if thi i iht ll k h t h it i h t t i f t b btt if d t t i l d d if i t d b t h th l t li d th f f th ti i ti i th h d f th t i d f i l F i th f i t l it ll b h l i l l diffilt f l t hift f t t t i t d thi t h t b d t ' lif t d i thi t d tht ' lif I th d l ld it t be better for euthanasia and assisted suicide to be carried out by people who have been especially trained to do this people who are willing to step in when doctors have done all that they can who are knowledgeable about the needs and the hl f th h di d h t h f btt bl t id th t d f t tht i dd t h t i ?

References Ad H

C i t t f th H d M d i l S h l (1968) A dfiiti f i i b l rt f th Ad H C i t t f th H d M d i l S h l t i th dfiiti f b i d t h Journal of the American Medical Association 205 (6) 3 3 7 4 0 Alexander Leo (1949) Medical science under dictatorship New England Journal of Medicine 241 3 9 ^ 7 B h T L (1977) A l t R h l ti d i t h i I Th Mappes and Jane Zembaty (eds) Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy pp 6 7 7 6 New Yk MGHill Journal of Apptied Philosophy B i D i d (2000) H t i t ti t h i 17 (2): 15768 Fletcher Joseph (1973) Ethics and euthanasia In Robert H Williams (ed) To Live and to Die 11322 N Y k S i Vl R i t d i J h Flth Humankind: Essays in Biomedical Ethics 14958 B f f l NY P t h 1979 Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2) 85112 F t Phili (1977) E t h i Harris John (1975) The survival lottery Philosophy 50: 8 1 7 Hitl Adlf (19257) Mein Kampf M i h F Eh N h f Editi t Rlh M h i Bt H h t Miffli 1971 Kagan Shelly (1988) The additive fallacy Ethics 99: 5 3 1 K i Y l (1958) S lii i i t d" k i l l i " ilti Minnesota Law Review 42 (6) 9691042 Kohl Marvin (1975) Voluntary beneficent euthanasia In Marvin Kohl (ed) Beneficent Euthanasia pp 13041 Buffalo NY: Prometheus 1975 Kh H Si P B P Clk M d R i k d M (1997) E d f l i f d i i Atli dil ti Medical Journal of Australia 166 1 9 1 6 M l H (1992) I d f f th t t t t I Jh Mti Fih dM k R i (eds) Ethics: Problems and Principles pp 2 7 2 7 New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Oddi G h (1997) Killi dlttidi f b diff t l diff Philosophical Studies 88 2 6 7 8 7

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(1998) The moral case for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 28 2 0 2 2 4 R h l J (1975) A t i d i t h i The New England Journal of Medicine 292 (2) 7 8 8 0 (1979) Euthanasia killing and letting die In John Ladd (ed) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death 14663 O f d O f d U i i t P (1993) E t h i I T R ( d ) Matters of Life and Death 3 d d 3068 N Y k MGHill Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (1980) Declaration on Euthanasia Rome: The Vti Slli J h V (1975) Th i l i t f t h i I M i K h l ( d ) Beneficent Euthanasia pp 1 2 3 3 Buffalo NY: Prometheus T l M i h l (1980) A i l t idti killi ltti di I B i S t i b k ( d ) Killing and Letting Di 5 6 6 2 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l (1995) V l t t h i ti i d th ti f it Revue Internationale de Philosophic 49 (3): 3 0 5 2 2

Further reading D

H t h G t (1998) Th li l t I Hl Kh d P t Si ( d ) A Companion to Bioethics O f d B l k l l GayWilliams J (1979) The wrongfulness of euthanasia In Ronald Munson (ed) Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics 1 4 1 4 3 B l t CA W d t h H D i d (1777) Of i i d R i t d i E F Mill ( d ) Essays Moral Political and Literary pp 5 7 7 8 9 Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1985 Kh H d Si P ( d ) (1998) A Companion to Bioethics O f d B l k l l L d d J h ( d ) (1979) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death O f d O f d U i i t P L b D i d (1988) Down the Slippery Slope L d C Hl Maguire Daniel C (1975) A Catholic view of mercy killing In Marvin Kohl (ed) Beneficent Euthanasia 3 4 4 3 B f f l NY P t h T l M i h l (1979) D i i t t i t lif d th t f I J h Ldd (ed) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death pp 6 2 9 2 Oxford: Oxford University Press Wlt D l (1992) Slippery Slope Arguments O f d O f d U i i t P Willi G l i l l (1958) " M k i l l i " l i l t i jid Minnesota Law Review 43 (1): 1 1 2

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T h l

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Pi

t th t lti i dti t h l i d h t i bi hild t t h d littl h i bt t il th l t thi b i l i l d t i I i l h id t f bth l dh i h t h l i ki hi ilbl t ti t O th l t h l id tifiil i i t i d t ti (also known as contract pregnancy) have allowed many previously infertile couples to reproduce merely with the help of a turkey baster or a change in the law On the h i h t h l id h l il t h l f d i i d lifti f i t t i ildi in vitro f t i l i t i (IVF) d b d t i th f i f t d b th i j t i f i l it i i t t l i ijti (ICSI) d h i th t t d i t t ft l i (Gd 1999) I dditi t i h t h l i t h " hild f t h i " i th sense of genetic relationship to at least one of the parents prospective parents are now making use of other techniques such as prenatal and even preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening in order to control the characteristics of their ffi Althh h t h i tl d l t " t" i d i b l tit h ib ti tbli d i d b f d i t i tti d bti th bi i th f t ith i ti d dti t h i t ffd t hi f iti h t i h t i t i I i l th liitti l' bilit t h hild t h th k i d f hild th f i d l tt f b i l i l dti d more as matters for technological intervention and personal choice Boundaries that previously had seemed fixed for eternity such as the inability of postmenopau sal women to have children have been exploded by the seemingly inexorable h f b i d i l Pditbl h f thi itd t h i f h f d l d il iifi hildbi d f i l lif i d b l d d d Whil l bfit f tl dd f l dti hi th i b t th idiidl d il t Will hild i d b f l t h l i h IVF b f i d l i b bjtd t h l i l h i l ld

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h ? Wht th i l i t i f l ti t h tract pregnancy for our conceptions of lineage and the traditional family? Will this technology be used to liberate women or further subordinate them to men's reproductive designs? And what are the implications of such "quality control" h tl ti i f th t t f dibld l it? Thi h t t t t t l th d b t h ti ithi th t t f h i l h i l f k B t i t ld t d d di i f h t t d f itd dti I hll i t d t t t ff d t l thil ti t h t th ll t d t i ht l d interests are at stake for individuals as they confront decisions to have children with the assistance of reproductive technologies? What special moral concerns and complexities are generated by the current generation of assisted reproductive tech l i (ART)? A d h hld flit b t idiidl' dti libt d t i l i bhlf f t d i t i l l ft hild d th d i b l d b f f t i l ld?

Reproductive Liberty Since debates about social policy bearing on reproduction usually pivot on the il f f th i h t di t t i l d t b i t ith lii k th t f " d t i l i b t " Thi t b diidd i t t j t i th f d t id ti d h f d t i ti E h f th t i b fth diidd it " t i " iht i t t t b lt l b t d " i t i " iht i t t i th t i l t hi ' i I hll focus here exclusively on the "right to reproduce" understood as a negative right to be free of social or governmental restraints bearing on whether and how one might reproduce Th ihi t i tt i hild h ft b f t d ith t t f d l d lii d i d t i d th ih Th l tditi i th US d th ti f l fi l t i l tilii ti l f l h th tll t d d il i i t i d h (Cl 2001) L i k i th ldb t h i th ilid it f th h lbi l ii IVF t i hild id l ki t ti t ith illi thid party often find their desires thwarted by laws or professional norms prohibiting such efforts at "collaborative reproduction" Some social critics moved by reports of the high incidence of child abuse and neglect have even called for the licensing of ll ti t li t h t ld l t h t th i t t f idiidl i b i d ii hild All h l d lii ld th flit ith i d i i d l ' ti f d d t d f d f tt ill i d liitti h i hild Th t i l bhid tti "iht t d " i l if t th th fili f idi ti hih t i l l h i

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ti f bdil t l f d t i t i i th b d i of one's children and social equality between women and men The impact of infertility on women and couples desirous of having a child is often devastating Their selfconfidence can be destroyed they are often haunted by feelings of inad d ilt d thi b i h t l f blifl ft d h d Bt h d th l d i t h hild i th fit l ? Althh t l h i hild i " t h t i l " tt f i l "di ht t l l " idtif l t f t d d t thi ti F th ih t t i t i t d b th d i f l t b d thi l f h th i th lif f F th h i children establishes a satisfying link to the future wherein their DNA and hope fully some of their values will inform the lives of future generations For those who do not believe in an afterlife this aspect of procreation can provide at least a i l fi t l i t M i t t i ti hil f i i th i t i t d f d f tti d bith Oth di t h th h i l i f ii bith th ibilit f ii hild d h i d d lti l t i h i ith th F th f h i hild f " ' " t f th l t t simply having a child to love and rear is enough Having children can also signal a decisive step into adulthood for many individuals and couples No longer primarily their parents' children they are now responsible parents with children of thi i iti f h d t ithi th it (Al 1992 1 4 7 7 0 ) O i f l t i l tt h t t t d t th iti ith th b t i tht ti itll i l i t t t f i idtiti i lfflfillt i hii d i t i i f diit di d t d i ti th i f li (Rbt 1994 2 2 4 2 ) Thi i fl t fi t t tht l l d b t t i l tti i both social custom and law Whether the desire to have children especially chil dren of "one's o w n " should be universally and absolutely honored is however another question Many people who advocate nearly absolute negative reproductive iht i i h t not t h hild i t t i d bti hitt t b ll t iht t h hild O f h l t t f th f t t h t th ti f hild t iti ibiliti t ffi ibiliti t h t iht b fll hikd h t t i d bti til t th d i f h bliti Liki l h iht d t iht t d naturally h qualms about the capacity of artificially assisted reproduction via gamete donation and embryo freezing to confuse children's sense of location on their family tree The question then is whether the weighty interests invoked on behalf of assisted dti dd t b t "iht t d " d if h h iht iht i h i th b l i t ti idti b d th l f f ffi th h l t h d l f i it df l t d t th difiti f hild d hildbi (St 1997 1 1 2 6 B h t l 2000 2 0 6 2 0 )

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Strong Libertarianism O i f l t i l t th ti tk d i i t d th id f i d i i d l libt A d i t l f d bithiit Jh R b t (1994) th i t f ti f th d l t fidiidl i diit d idtit i i t l b l t iht t d Althh R b t i f i t i l i idti (f l t h t t traditional morality the status of women the wellbeing of children) he contends that procreative liberty should enjoy a presumptive priority i i all such factors Robertson develops a twostep procedure for testing the adequacy of claims on bhlf f dti libt i t d ll i l idti Fit t d t i hth til li t d i l fll d th tti bll f dti libt R b t di th d i i f h libt t b i l i l d il d i i tht idll ifd t d itil ti f t h d I th f l l t t d i t i l t i h tibt t t th ti f h bi ( t i thd) id bi h i h th f t hild i h t b t d ( t t i l t hood) and provides the child with a loving home (rearing parenthood) The advent of ARTs has fractured these various components of parenthood so that now it s pos sible for a child to have five distinct "parents": i e two unrelated gamete providers a " t th" h tt th lti b d i l idiidl l l t d t th th th ti h i th lti hild R b t li tht h f th l t i biti i ilti ( h d t ll t ith i t t i t tt i hild h tt itht d t i t i t d i t ) fit ftbl d th bi f dti f d H l b tht tti li to reproductive liberty might turn out to lack such protection; for example claims made on behalf of seriously retarded persons who may lack the requisite comprehension to intend to be a parent or on behalf of emerging technologies such l i tht bl f df t d i t i l ti f ti t h t th f l l t i d th t l b d f dti f d 0 li thi i i t i l h d l ithi R b t ' f k it i th bjtd t d " b l i tt" i d t th i f i t l i tht iht t i h ' i t t i dti S h li i l d i b t th i fft f ART th t d i t i l f i l h i l h t hild d h t idiidl h l i l and as a class Robertson contends that the presumptive value of liberty in the sphere of reproduction is so great that we must demand a clear showing of substan tial harm to the tangible interests of others before we limit reproductive iberty Wht l iht f it thi i t d i i l t i t t t f t bl l i i t t i dti f d I ti R b t i h d d t k l d liit th f ART 1 t h l l th R b t ld tht iht t d itht it f f th t t i j t t th i h t t t d t h h

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t t i d bti t h t th i h t f i l l t d hild just as strong as the right of married couples; and that the right to oin with others in noncoital procreative projects (such as IVF or contract pregnancy) is ust as strong as the right to procreate naturally We shall now take a closer look a several t l i t f t t d dti libt i d t th d f R b t ' i f l t i l iti

Reproductive Liberty in the Balance " U t l "

dti?

O bjti t f t t d dti libt i h t i d t i f i d ith th R Cthli C h h d it f f i i l th f" t l l " ( C t i f th D t i f th F i t h 1987) A i ll k ffiil C t h l i iti t contraception stems from the view that all acts of sexual intercourse must "remain open" to the possibility of reproduction In other words the socalled "unitive" function of sex (ie the psychological and spiritual benefits associated with nter ) t b d i i t d f th ti f t i ( t l t th ibilit t h f ) B tifiil t t i t thi t l b d b t th iti d ti f t i f ki ibl itht ti ffiil C t h l i d t i d l it t b t l d l C l Cthli d t i ll ART i l d i th i l t f IVF i l i l th t fh b d d if th d t h t th k possible procreation without sex Focusing on the simplest case of IVF using gametes from a husband and a wife with blocked fallopian tubes a robustly libertarian view of reproductive liberty li i i t i t th f f i i l C t h l i hibiti f d ll ART ithi th t t f i A i tht h b d d if ld h iht t dti libt b d th i t f hild b i t i b l i f thi t l i t t dl f th it i diffilt t h th id l i idtil i t hld t h i d t i l iht l b th if' f l l i tb h t b blocked In such a case IVF would seem to be morally analogous to a heart bypass operation in which a natural function is rerouted in order to achieve a desired and morally licit goal In the case of IVF the goal is the establishment of a family til ithi th fi f h t itl l t i h i hih l h t b th h i f d i d t f th f f i i l C t h l i i (Lit 1993 2 6 4 3 ) Ath bl ith thi l t t i t i t d d i t h t it i b d t i i f "th t l " tht tt b h d b t th l i l l l d htill lliti it A t h b d hibiti f ll f f ART i l d i IVF ithi i th d tht they all fail to conform to a particular metaphysical and theological vision of "the natural" would clearly amount to a tyrannical imposition of a sectarian religious view on the rest of society Equally tellingly it would clearly fail to meet Robertson's i t f b t t i l h t th t i b l i t t f th At t

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h h tti " i i t l " ff i t til ti fh nature (as opposed to particular human beings) It remains to be seen however whether libertarian arguments of this sort will prevail against other more problem atic variations on assisted reproductive technology Some feminist objections S f i i t tht lt i i f l " t l i t " t h t ft th d i f hild b t t i b t d t th i fft fb t il ditii th th t ditbl h f i d idtit A d i t th critics calls for unlimited procreative liberty especially in the area of ARTs must be viewed with skepticism against the backdrop of the socalled "parental prescription" Other feminists object to reproductive technologies on the ground that they tend to t f d f t th i f t h h d (f l it t ti t t i l d i t) hil l i it d th t h l i l tl f A l t h h th iti ll h t i l t th C t h l i f t i Chh' t h i th h th C h h ' d ii ith th t l b i l i l d f thi Whil k l d i th l f idiidl f th i h t t th t h l i thi f i i t iti t tempts to reveal the negative impact of ARTs on women as a class (Corea 1985) A third feminist objection to ARTs highlights the physical and psychological risks imposed upon individual women by these technologies IVF for example typically i th d i i t t i f fl d t t i l t " l t i " hih ll liii t h t d th ftili l b f f bth i d i t i l t t i i th t df i f lt A l t h h th d tl t h h t t b ffiitl f k h t thi l t fft i h t b Gi th h i t fd i t l t f d i t f b i f l DES antinausea drug that was found decades later to be responsible for many serious health consequences including cancers we cannot rule out the possibility that many women are routinely being harmed by current IVF techniques An example f h l i l h i idd b th ti f t t h i " t " i f th t t i l d t l i i h h bb t bith A l t h h h f d thi " i " f th i t h t hith t h i d d t d t h l i l ffi th l f th hild t h th h i bith (O ll 1987 T 1997) Feminist objections to ARTs based upon our culture's allegedly "coercive" pro natalist ideology harbor a grain of truth but must ultimately be rejected as guides to policy The element of truth consists in the astute observation that many infertile d th fll t f ART ith ll f t h i l f l compelled t i t dd i f t bf ditti "dft" d ttli f dti Dii t h ff th dti tdill t i t bf th bitt d ft h t d b iii tht ld d h l d h d Th bl ith thi itii h i t h t it t h t ll t dii t t t hih i iftl fl 347

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F i i t b t th d i t i d f t t i f ' t l role in motherhood in the service of a maledominated technology may have some validity but they are significantly undercut by the fact that hundreds of thousands of women have actively sought out these technologies evidently viewing them as a th t h l i th d tht iti d all things considered. T th h dldd ff f fl i ld id ith d l ft b d t i ii f "th t l " Objti b d ttil h i l d h l i l h t idiidl t b tk h i l Cll thi t b d t make the practice of assisted reproduction as safe as it possibly can be Promising research in the area of in vitro maturation (IVM) of eggs for example could eventually displace superovulation with all of its known discomforts and unknown risks And t h l d dfitl b tk t d th l i k l i h d t h t ti t th ill tll t thi iitil d i i t f f i t thi tl li It i l bi h hth dt ht t t h ttil f h hld l d t b d t i l ART l t l t th fll Harms to future children In contrast to those religious and feminist objections based upon speculative offenses against nature or illdefined threats to women as a class reservations b t ART b d ditd h t th hild th d i tt i d d If l h i f i h l i l h i l h t th hild b f h t ld b d th t libti lik J h R b t ld h t d i t t h t th i h t t d hld b idd A i t f l l d h i l h iht l d th i h t i k f bith d f t ibl d b IVF b f i i t t l mic sperm injection (ICSI) or cloning Potential psychological risks could include feelings of abandonment on the part of children born to surrogate mothers ("My biological mother gave me away so she could afford a college degree or a new dk") l d hild' f l i tht h i " l " f hi it P t i t h d i th f f h ik iht ll b i h t l d f ti i i b l A l t h h th b j t i b d h t hild i l l th right sort f t l i t f t t d dti libt R b t bli t h t it f t i b l h i l h i l i d d t h i l b t l D i th k of Derek Parfit (1984) Robertson points out that whatever alleged harm might befall the children of ARTs would be due to the very fact of their being born In other words the only way to avoid harming such children would be to avoid giving b i t h t th i th fit l Bt t d tht ld b i l t b f t th i th ld th t i t t ll S th h i i t th f i l i bt h i l h l i l ffi d l bt th bt ffi d it (Rbt 1994) I Pfit' t i l thi k i d f i t t i i l i t th lld " idtit b l " M t f fili l hi di t P f i t t d t b 348

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" " bl tht i bl h hi ill fft l d existing persons making the same people better or worse off He points out how ever that some choices are "different person" choices that is situations wherein our very choices will cause different people (and sometimes different numbers of l) t it E l f h difft bl ld i l d hi b i lti lii d th t f t didi t bi it it hild h dibilit ld b i b l f it b i t h If hild tb b i t h t bi bjtd t ti ik f h l i l h i l h it i R b t t l l t ij t t h t hild t b b d th i t Th l ti t thi l i ld b th f children whose lives would be so miserable that it would be better (for them) had they never existed Such cases constitute the legal and moral category of "wrongful life" Thi li f i l d R b t t th t t l i l i tht l hild' lif ill t b " f l " i th b tit b i i hild t th ld i d i d h d i d d i d t d tt t b "i i b l " if th i l t t i bid it f th (Thi l i b i l d t i l d " " h t' ti h i drinking during pregnancy or exposure to toxic chemicals make the child worse off than she otherwise would have been) Although Robertson concedes that parents who bring children into the world in a damaged state can perhaps be faulted for "ffdi h t b l d b tit ffi" h d i tht h hild h t h l b h d A d i th b f "tibl h " R b t l d t h t th i i l f dti libt h l d il M iti h b ditbd b h t th d R b t ' " l i i l i " di th ti f i i d hild S l th t d h i t tk h th l ffdi th ibiliti f th h f t t it t ffi S l h t t i b harming or wronging the very children whose lives are blighted by profound m pairments One way of shoring up this intuition is to posit something ike a "right to a minimally satisfying life" where the bar of moral acceptability would presum bl b t h h i h th b l i f f l lif ( S t i b k d MCl k 1994 P d 1996) U d h i i l t h k i l b h t hild i t th ld ith d d f l di d f t ld b d f ilti t h i hild' " b i t h i h t " Th iti d tht hi t h t fi th t h h l d f i i l tifti iht d t i t k W l d th b b t t blid d f ? D ' d ? Hti ton's chorea? HIV/AIDS? But they are united in rejecting Robertson's drawing the line at wrongful life One way of approaching this question they suggest would simply be to ask what a loving parent would want for his or her child Parents who f i l d t li t thi t d d ld th b b l d f dti i bilit Ath h t thi bl ld i l h b d ti f ht t h Th h Pfit dR b t l t t t tht t h t h i hild i h bith i i b l f dibilit i tht h hild' i t t t d l fftd t b k b bi b

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( R b th l t t i f th i it t l ) S if tik with our standard definition of "harm" as a setting back of one's interests from some prior baseline then it indeed seems conceptually impossible to harm such children by giving birth to them One possible remedy would be to broaden our t d d ti fh t i l d thi lik "tt f ill f f i " (G 2 0 0 1 1 1 8 2 2 ) If hild h d t li lif h t i d b i i t d ffi ( h t f f l lif) ld th t h t thi hild i i " h d t t " t h h h t diti d t t tbk f i btt b l i A l t h h b t h th " b i t h i h t " d " h d tt" t t i t strongly held intuition that such parents do wrong and that the wrong they do s to their children neither approach seems to have fully absorbed the lesson of Par fit's nonidentity problem So long as there was no other way for these children to h b b d l th hild t h l t h i li bi b f t t th if t h i li t " i i l l tifi" ( h t tht ) lid i " h d tt" th it i h d t h th ld h b victimized. Th i l th liti i d h i h th ld h b d btt ff W til tibt t d i intuition here by lamenting that it is too bad that such children have to suffer and live with such impairments but we cannot meaningfully say that they have been victimized We cannot say that the child has a legitimate complaint against her t f hd h t d t h i h ld t h b b A h i l h i l l tifi b t till i t i t i l ttli lti t thi bl i t h l d th t tbl f h i b h t b t " f l d i b i l i t " i th b f til h h b h d d I Pfit' t i l t k t " ffti" i i l H i libl l f h i i l Individuals are morally required not to let any child or other dependent person for h lf th ibl i i ffi liitd tit i l fh i d if th t tht itht ffti th b f h ill i t d i t h t i i bttil bd t loss of benefits on themselves or others no child or other dependent person for whose lf th ibl ill ri ri ffri liitd tit ri l fh i d (Bh t l 2000 249) This approach to the problem is admittedly "impersonal" (or nonpersonaffecting) in the sense that it objects to bringing about states of affairs characterized by serious suffering without attaching those states to any particular victims It does neverthe l ll t t t pace R b t t h t th t t l t i l b th h offended l h d t th di f i ffi bt th il b th h b h t tht ffi i t th ld Th i k i ffti i i l l i iit th d i h t f th l i b t i ' l b l t iht t d If h ffti i i l i t th it h l d b f to reproduce when serious suffering is highly likely to result Contemplating

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th t f h ik ibl t ld bl it til th threat could be removed or failing that possibility he or she could decide not to reproduce at all or any further Of course everything depends here on a number of important variables bearing on the magnitude of threatened suffering the probabil it f th i k d th d fb d i d b d i i tt d F l i th t tt f l i t h l it ld l l b i i b l f t l hilf d t h b b j t hi l t t ik f i bith d f t (Dll th h i td t b l b d i t l ! ) It ld b l l hth bl it ld b i ibl f l d t th t t hild h iht ff some speculative psychological harm The specter of commodification and

instrumentalization

W t d i th t t f i th f f i i l C t h l i iti th f IVF b h b d d if t h t th t i h f th l i b t i i i l h did t il i l iil lt i litd f itd dti W t id f th Th f t tht t d t k th b t litd d d i f f l t i l d th f l l i (1) t from sources outside of the married couple; (2) the freezing of embryos for later uses which could include subsequent implantation donation to other parties (in cluding postmenopausal women) and research; (3) the use of "surrogate mothers" t tt hild f il f (4) th f i l t t i ti i t t th b i t h f hild ith i d i b l h t i t i d (5) th f t biti f t ll d l i t h l i t t b ith d i d h t i t i R b t ' t libti i i l tht i liit dti libt itht l h i f b t t i l h t th t i b l i t t f th may well prove to be problematic in the context of ARTs that commercialize repro duction and instrumentalize the human embryo in the service of the "perfect baby" Consider first the practice of traditional commercial surrogacy in which women i hild t h h tifiil i i t i t t t h t hild f 9 th d th ll t h i t l iht t t t i l f b t t i l f Whil libl f i i t i th f d t d th thi t d l f l d it lt iht t l d bdil t th (ildi f i i t ) l d t th h t f kt l i t th h ffil l t i h i Th iti t d t h t th mercialization of reproduction and the selling of parental rights threaten to under mine the genuine autonomy of women the personhood of children and the social conditions for the flourishing of family life (Anderson 1993; Radin 1996) A d i t thi i t d d t t t d thi t t l fli f thi f f i t h t t d th h d f hild t th t l f thi i h t i t i d l th " t l i t " f fil l t i h i ith th h d d d it f th kt I dditi f i i t hihl i t i l f th kt' lt b d i t i f th i d l f tti t th b t t 351

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d d f t t d l l i t t i Th t d t h t th f d i ences of gestation and birthing make women into genuine mothers and that the law and the market should not attempt to annul this important fact (Rothman 1989) From this angle genuine liberty means more than the mere ability to sell ' dti t th h i h t bidd Ath t i l h i th kti d difiti f d F h b lli t h i t d t i ( $50) f t l i tifil i i t i I it f i t' i t lli b b i d th b d t ( t l t b l ) thi l t d i ti h t t t t d h ti thil t Si controversy has arisen however over the more recent practice of egg retrieval and sale for rather large amounts of money Payment for human ova has risen sharply in the past decade in response to competitive market pressures among fertility clinics f hih h $5000 l F f i il iti i thi h tl b b t d b th tht t i i ftilit t h l d d t i t i i t d t i thi illi t bt $35000 d $50000 t ith th iit I L b k d d thlti ( S t i b k 2002) (Th day may not be far off when US News and World Report begins to include the asking price for coeds' eggs in the formula for ranking colleges and universities) Many of these egg brokerages now offer their wares to interested parties via webbased cata l f t i th h t i t i f th d d th ki i f thi A l t th bit lt ith d i t d biliti f t h t th iliti fh dti t i l i i fll i A ditbi t id i th ttil f i ART t i t t l i th h b i th i f iti i d I i i th t t d i t t ft t h t ftilit i l i t fid t tk l' b t t t ll f it t tblih l f t t i ll i and then subject the entire cell colony to a highly efficient vector containing "en hanced" DNA for various human characteristics The specialists then take a treated stem cell from this colony and insert its DNA back into an enucleated human egg ll th f i t h h l i h d h b f l t t i Th lt f thi fl f t ll d l i t h l i ld b hild " d t d" i i i f t t O d t i t th ti f h ftiti i I d d i th ttil f d l t i t k h h li ld i i l b f i l ti i f h t h l (i designed to screen out horrible defects) One can also imagine some salutary posi tive eugenic uses designed to engender various positive traits such as enhanced immunity to disease better memory more acute vision; i e traits that would tend t b b f i l t j t b t tt h t thi ii f th d lif Bt l il i i h t h l i ldi t th t t l i t t liti d d h i t i f h lif i th i f " b t i " i di Nt tt i t (K 2001) Th t i t f difti di t t l i t i i b l f th t l i b t i ' l b l t i i l f dti libt

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Tht i i l ' i i t clear h i f substantial h t identifiable individuals makes it the moral equivalent of the legal "clear and present danger" test for the constitutionality of free speech As such this test will automatically disqualify any and all objections to assisted reproductive techniques that invoke ft h t idiidl ititti ( th f i l ) t l f l ( ) Bt i f t l t tht t l d dti libt ill l d t iftl d i b l il h th difiti d iliti f hildbi th t libti i i l ill il f i l t k l d idti tht iftl l t f th f l t i f d bli li If it i th tht f th values we embrace regarding the family (broadly defined to include many "non traditional" arrangements) and much of the autonomy that we cherish in the reproductive domain are themselves supported by an underlying cultural context b ht iht b lld " l f iht" t h t t tht d l i t t t b tk i l S h l d it t t tht f th ditb i f ART d i d d t h t f l t ' t d t i i th i i f f thi dti lb ( i t t ) t th d i i t d h d f hild th it i b l regimes would be entitled to consider such threats and weigh them in the balance against the freedom of individual agents to engage in market transactions with like minded others (Murray 1996) Thi i t t tht d ll lti t h t t il l f dti hld t t i l l t l t dti ibt f f it B t ith h l d it f l l f th l i b t i ' h i dti f d tht d ll i ft t h t t tht l hld b ldd ldlibti il li H t thi ill on principle f d d it ff t b i th itd f th t h t d h it bbilit d th t f titi i d i i d l libt F l li that nullified commercial surrogacy contracts would also necessarily constrict he ability of many poor or lower middleclass women to advance their own socioeco nomic standing by entering into such contracts Such restrictive policies would th difflt flit b t di t f d th diti f h flihi i difd d ilid dti i t d di t d th i f d i d t d M t J R d i (1996) h d b b d thi k i d f l flit "th d b l bid" d h h d f f l l tht h d i i tb d " t i l l " ith i t th tilit f all th l t l idti Th strong libertarian's nearly absolutist principle seems ill suited to this kind of nuanced and contextdependent inquiry

Conclusion Th th ti

lld " t h l t i " h b h t ld b iti t h d fi d i i d l d f thi iftilit A th t libti

h j l t h h

d

tifti t th i i t i t t i

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ti i l l tid t i t t i t t i idiidl lfdfiiti d wellbeing and so should not be limited by sectarian appeals to "the natural" or to rigidly defined conceptions of "family values" On the other hand the potential of some uses of ARTs to introduce serious suffering and impairment into the world id tht dti hi d ibiliti t th h ill b b Ad h ibiliti h l d i t id t h t th d i i t t i t l tt f individual i l f d t i t i d lf dfiiti It i th d i i t bi th h bi it it d i i fihtd ith i ibilit f th k i d f lif t h t th f t hild ill li W h l tht f ART i t h t t th dignity and personhood of children and women and that our methods of moral deliberation over social policy should not automatically exclude such threats simply because they do not happen to pose here and now a clear and present danger to idtifid i d i i d l d h i h d il ti F th l d d b ht h t i likl t fld l i d f ti il l f dti dll d l t i t i b l b t th d i d d l " tl i t " f th kt

Rf Alpern K D (ed) (1992) The Ethics of Reproductive Technology. New York: Oxford University P MA H d Ad E S (1993) Value in Ethics and Economics, 1 6 8 9 C b r i d University Press Bh A B k D Dil N d Wikl D (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics Cbid U i i t P and Justice. C b i d NY Cld S i Cl E (2001) The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea. Cld S r i H b Harbor Press C t i f th D t i f th Fith (1987) Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day. R Itl Th V t i M h 10 Corea G (1985) The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs. N Y k H Gd R (1999) Designing Babies: The Brave New World of Reproductive Technology. N York: W H Freeman G R (2001) M h d b t tt thil i f th l i t I P Yk Lit ( d ) Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research, 11431 N Ofd U i i t P Kass L (2001) Preventing a brave new world The New Republic, May 21: 3 0 9 Lit P (1993) Pursuing Parenthood: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction. B l i t IN I d i U i i t P CA U i i t fClifi P M T (1996) The Worth of a Child. B k l Overall C (1987) Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis. Boston: Allen and U i P P f l t D (1984) Reasons and Persons. O f d C l d Purdy L (1996) Reproducing Persons: Issues in Feminist Bioethics. Ithaca NY: Cornell Univer it P

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Radin M J (1996) Contested Commodities Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press R b t J (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies P i t NJ P i t U i i t P Rth B K (1989) Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society New York: W W Norton Stibk B ( f t h i ) P t t d Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine d M C l k R (1994) Wh i b i t h f i t th hild? Hastings Center Report 24 (6) 1 5 2 1 Strong C (1997) Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine New Haven CT: Yale Univer it P T R (1997) Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Applications Boulder CO: Westview Press

Further reading Cllh

J C ( d ) (1995) Reproduction Ethics and the Law B l i t IN I d i Ui it P Cohen C B (1996) New Ways of Making Babies: The Case of Egg Donation Bloomington IN: Idi U i i t P Fild M (1988) Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues C b i d MA H d U i i t P Glover J (1989) Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European Commission D K l b IL N t h Illii U i i t P G t i L 0 ( d ) (1990) Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy B l i t IN I d i University Press H i J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology O f d Ofd U i i t P Hlld S dD i D ( d ) (2001) S i l i h' fid f d i f i t i ? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11: 3 Mahoney J D (2000) The market for human tissue Virginia Law Review 86 (2): 1 6 3 2 2 3 N Y k Stt T k F Lif d th L (1998) Assisted Reproductive Technologies N Y k N Y k Stt T k F Lif d th L (1988) Surrogate Parenting New York: New York State Task Force on Life and the Law

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26 G t i

E

i

i

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I J 2000 t di d t jitl d t h t th l f th ldid H G P j t (HGP) t d th ti h hd till b l t d Of k till l h d t d t d th if tht tibt t h di d di bilit h l t th ltitd f l h i l iti t i l d behavioral traits of normal humans No one can confidently predict the rate at which that understanding will be achieved in the future nor the ultimate limits on it Th i hih i t t ith th d ith d i f f t i t l ltili ht till f th t t d t t d t d Bt d i t h h i t b l d h l d d t tid i b i i t d t d th ti b fh t M h f th itil k i th HGP h f d h f th if ti tibti t h di d d i b i l i t Th h b idtifd d t t f it d veloped that allow prediction with a very high degree of certainty of whether an individual will develop Huntington's chorea an adultonset single gene disease that leads to devastating neurological deterioration and death over a period of years In th h b idtifd d t t f th d l d tht l i i d i i d l ' ik f d l i di lik b t At t thi i f t i till ll l liitd d ltil d t l th ti i h i t f A l h k f f i l hit th tht bth t ik f i til ti di t t h i hild t t f thi ik f d i bf ti If ik i f d t b t i h d t i in vitro fertilization (IVF) preimplantation embryo testing or forgoing conception are now available to avoid transmission of the genetic disease to future children After conception testing of the fetus is sometimes possible to determine whether t carries th f th di d th t th d i d hth t b t f f t d ft Whil h tti i ibl f l it l i i t d b f di dibiliti f h i h th i i i f i t ti t t th iti t ti t d idl i th f t M th it t d t t d l t i i likl t b b i d ith biliti f in utero t h t i i t t i ti ilti t t f th d l t i

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( ) Th t tht d i ti k l d d t h l will increase our ability to prevent or to reduce the prevalence of disease caused n significant part by deleterious genes It is not just much disease however but virtually all normal human traits that h i i f t ti b i Th d i ti k l d d t h l t h t ill bl t t di ill l t i t l bl t d tk i t t i t i l t th d l i ltit d f t i dt h th tit df t i i th b f di dibilit it b ibl t i l t t h l itlli i t h di h i l t t h d t ity and life expectancy to take only a few examples Thus we face the prospect of being able to take control over and to design human nature and the nature of our progeny What was once in the hands of God or the natural lottery will come i i l ithi d l i b t h hi d t l Thi h t i b t f th t h i l i tt f h i tht t l I th l i i t d ilbl h I ill t th t h i l b h i h th ti i t t i ill likl Whil b f th l d i l h th ill d l i lti d ti t thi ti d while some of the ethical concerns will be specific to particular technical means as they develop over time most of the deepest ethical concerns do not turn on the specific technical details of genetic interventions I will understand "genetic engin i " h t th d l i b t ltti dditi f i h b thi i l d ti ll ti i t t i tht fft l th bjt f th i t t i ll ll i t t i h th h ill b d t th f th b j t f th i t t i Thi tht t td b f ti th i f ti di t i t f ti i i I ill d t d it h bt tl t f th thil i i d b th t ill l i ith ti i i to prevent such disease Let us begin to explore these issues

The Various Uses of Genetic Engineering C i d f t th f ti i i t t di It i i t t t d t d tht t f th t difflt t h i l i tht i ith t f ti ti t i i f di ill t i ith th f ti i i t d Th f " f l lif" d " f l disability" (Buchanan at al 2000) Cases of wrongful life arise in the relatively rare cases of diseases like Tay Sachs and Lesch Nyhan that are so awful as to make a person's life not worth living to make it better for the person never to have been b Bt t d h i l h h d d h bi b ith h diti ld b h t th i d i i d l i h i i f th i d i i d l ' diti lt f th h f l t ith h t it ld h b h d th h f l t th b f d B t h th l t t th h f l diti i t t th i d i i d l f i it it th th i t b i h t it i t

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diti t h t b d ith th i d i i d l ' it ith T S h Lesch Nyhan disease because nonexistence is not any condition at all So many have wondered how it could be a harm and in turn a wrong to bring someone nto existence even with such a devastating disease I f f l d i b i l i t th d i b i l i t i l b td b t b i i th i d i i d l i t it ith b t ii tht d i i d l b bti ft ti b t th i d i i d l ' d i b i l i t ld t b i t k it lif t th l i i t ll th h th f f l lif I h i tht hth til fil t t ti t i i f dibilit i ll d d id ations and in nearly all cases that choice should be left with the parents The systematic philosophical difficulty here is that the individual is born with a disability like blindness or moderate mental retardation which still leaves him with a life well th l i i d hih ld l h b td b t b i i hi t it t ll H ld d i h di t hi? H ld it b b t t f hi t t i t th t i t ith lif ll th l i i ? Thi lld idtit bl ( P f i t 1984) h i d h h i l h i l tt ti d I bli h i lti t it till b d H in the case of genetic engineering which prevents the transmission of genetic dis ease by altering or adding genes in an embryo it is arguably the same individual who will exist with the disease if it is not prevented and without the disease f it is td if th h b i t t it i th ii bi idiidl tit t h t ill i t ith i t h t th ti di N i ith it db d d it t i l t h t it i b t t f tht i d i i d l tt ff b l i d d t tl t d t i I d d if t fild t bti dil f thi b hild t t blid d t tl tdti t h i fil ld ll titt hild l t d th t t ld t i l l i t i l if t i that the child received the needed treatment Nevertheless while these ethical issues do not arise with genetic engineering to prevent the transmission of genetic disease other issues do arise

Th Dibilit Riht Chll

t th P t i

f Dibiliti

O t l t f bjti h b d t l d f f l l b disability rights groups (Asch 1999 2000) The disabling conditions from genetic disease that genetic engineering would be used to prevent are the same conditions that persons with disabilities now live with To use genetic engineering to prevent th b i t h f ith th dibiliti i b dibld i th t h t it ld b b t t f lik th d f th tt it Thi i d t d b l tbli dt h t i A d it l d t ti bi d ith h i t i l i t i til th N i h t k ti t t l i i t dibld t tb t ti f th bt b t i l killi t i t i th ( P l 1995) If i ti i i t t ti di d dibilit ill i b l 358

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l i k l l d t th h f th N i i t th l h th strongest of ethical reasons to avoid it Disabled persons point out moreover that they have satisfying and worthwhile lives in spite of their disabilities and that the disadvantages they suffer are often a lt f j t il diti di d i t Th t h t t h i li ft lt f t h i d i b i l i t i th li f dibld l d t h t it i i t k t bli tht dibld h l lit f lif A b f tdi h h tht dibld t thi lit f lif h i h th th dibld t it i l d i thi f i l b d d t (Sktt dT 1978) M d t d h thi i First societal prejudices and stereotypes about disabled persons and their ives remain powerful and strongly influence common beliefs many of which are false beliefs about disabled persons and their lives Second disabled persons often suc d i d i th ti i t f t h i dibilit t h i li Chith M (1996) h d i t i i h d th tht t i l l ft ff i dibilit A d t t i i th b hih h f t i l f t h h f l i d kill d l t C i i th b hih djt d l thi tti for functioning to reflect their lowered performance and which thereby increases their satisfaction with their level of performance Accommodation is the process by which individuals adjust their life plans and activities to deemphasize or eliminate tiiti d diffilt i i b l b t h i dibilit d btitt ti iti t i i l l liitd T t h th f dtti i d dti lt i ith dibilit tl lti h lit f lif l d d b t t th it i t h t th dibilit M k tht b i dibld d i t h h th f dtti i d dti i d iiht d h t t t h tht ih dibld ' lif i d t extent that would not have been possible by other means And so when persons with even severe disabilities claim that their overall quality of life is no worse than that of nondisabled persons there is often good reason to accept their evaluation as t d if it i t h hld t t t h i h l i ? H thi b d ith th blif tht b i l dibld i ift tht h l d b idd td h ibl? S l it l t Fit ith d i b i l i t i h li j t d t i l dibld t h h th f d t t i i d dti F th ith d i b i l i t i th h l limited or partial success and both they and others would rate their quality of ife as significantly diminished by their disability Since we can usually not predict the effect of a disability on a particular individual's quality of life so long as the ll f f t th ti l f ith i d i b i l i t lik b l i d d t tl t d t i i ti li f ti f th d i b i l i t b jtifd A d i t i t h t th f dtt i i d dti if f l l fl i t i dibld ' lit f lif t it l l bf th d i b i l i t ft d d b d f l 359

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iri l t h tl d diffilt hbilitti O bl k t avoid the necessity for these processes for oneself or others in order to avoid their burdens even if one could know ahead of time which of course one cannot that they would in the end be fully successful This point is illustrated by the fact tht dibld ld till f tt h b dibld if lt f d t t i i d dti th t thi lit f if diiihd f h t it h d b bf b i dibld I t b t th b d f dibilit tht ' lif ti i i f t b d d hdhi d t h t it i itk t t h i k it i ibl h d i b l t t ll b d Seeking to do so involves a misplaced perfectionism and a fundamental misunder standing of the human condition But seeking to prevent serious disabilities need not involve these attitudes Recognizing that every life will have some share of b d ift d hdhi i fll tibl ith ki t t th h t h h h lif ill h f th it i b t t if h lif h f th th A thid i t i t h t th f f t f th f i th lit f ' lif l d b l t i O th h d di l psychologically healthy who realistically adjust their expectations in the face of significant disabilities and "get on with their lives" as it is sometimes put Since one aspect of quality of life is one's subjective level of satisfaction or happiness with ' lif thi f i ll t t ti tifti d h i ith ' lif i th f f i f t i l liitti l Bt th bjti l l f tifti h i ith ' lif i l t f th lit f lif t th hl f it (Griffi 1986 B k 1992) I dditi th th tiiti l i h t d l lti tht tll k t h t lif t h t k i th b j t i t t f th lif If th bjt i t t i i f i t l i r i h d th ' lit f lif ill b diminished even if he remains satisfied and happy with his life In many parts of the world today deepseated gender bias remains so powerful that many women simply do not form expectations for their lives expectations about career opportunities i d d dil triti tht i thi iti tf t h l ( N b 2000) Thi l d t diiihd lit f lif f i d d t f h t h it l d t t h i h i diiihd l l f tifti h i ith t h i li

The Goal of a World without Disabilities Th th d t b i d i b l d hih tifti h i f tl fi d itk t dibiliti b ti i r i ith h dibiliti t fll it ith ll th riht d tt 360

ti i r i t i t t ith ii dibld M bli tht d f d i th i l l fll i dd ll th

t t t t t th h i h lit f lif d it i i l f d t t t t t ri i i tht b f th l l d t f

GENETIC ENGINEERING

ll th B t i th l f ld i t h t d i b i l i t i if it ill b realized morally problematic? Some worry that reducing the number of disabled persons may in the real world lead to reduced social and political support for meeting their needs in a just manner The extent to which this is so is an empirical question b t h i h it i d i f f i l t t b fidt Bt if i d i th l f dibilit ld h ti fft th ith th d i b i l i t h i tht ld b d l t b l i f t t t t i t t dibil iti t h t titt i d i d t It ld b l t i tht hld tt t d ki i d t t di lik d h t di if t h t ld d h th di d t t t f th who have them This would be deliberately to use the preventable suffering of some persons without their consent for the benefit of other persons A second concern about the goal of eliminating disabilities is that even though dibiliti ll b b d f th i d i i d l h h th thl th ld ld b l itht l ith d i b i l i t i i it It i dibl t tht l ith d i b i l i t i h h i d h f l f t h l th d it ll b t t h i d i b i l i t i ll t til t thi h i t d tibti I h ' dibliti have played an essential role in their achievements for example by directing their efforts along particular lines by building character strengths in the overcoming of their disabilities and so forth But once again if the disability is on balance a b d f th ti l f l h ff it th tt t it f th k f th bfit ld b t i l ifi b d f th k f ll b f i t t dibld t i t N i th i h i h th h ill b b d d ld t t th ifi i d th f th k f th t bli t h t th ld i f t t tht ibl t th if b i i d th f th k f th Nt ti th d i b i l i t i f thi l t persons without their consent as mere means for the benefits of others

Use of Genetic Engineering to Enhance Normal Function T

ti i i th t kt t ti di d th ffi d d i b i l i t i t h t th d t ll d ti b ll i d Thi i i k i ith f f t i dii ll t t t t di d th ffi d d i b i l i t it H people worry that the use of genetic engineering to enhance normal function n persons who are without disease raises fundamentally different and deeper moral concerns than the medical use of genetic engineering Yet what could be wrong ith t i th t h l f ti i i if it b ilbl t i t h i h i l d ' li d titi? P t ll dd h i ii d i bliti t d th b t hild th Th td f l t k thi hild hlth ibl If ti t h i t t h thi hild' i t d th i t t i d l ik bl t iti

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hld t t b f id i t th? P t invest time efforts and resources in developing athletic talents intellectual abilities and prudential or moral virtues in their children If parents have great leeway n attempting to produce the best children they can according to their own view of ht i b t h t t d thi l i b t t ti ? E

i

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S t f ti i i i t k l it h i th f d mental identity of a person in a way that parents' environmental efforts do not They see parental efforts as environmental in helping to develop the capacities their children already have as bringing out the potential that is already there In con t t ti i t t i h i hild i f d tl ki th difft f h th t h i ld h b B t thi t t i b l t i Wh t thi tl i t l ft t "bi t th b t " i t h i hild th dif h t Gi t h i hil d ' t th ftit d biliti bth h i l d b h i l that constitute the phenotype of the child we see and interact with is very much a result of the environment that parents and others create There is no preexisting and fixed best in the child that is brought out by parental manipulation of environ tl h ilti h fft i h i d d t i i h t Wh t th dd t t' l f thd ht ti i t t i k it i t lih t h i l f thi h i l d ? P t f ht ditb l i th itk blif tht ti i t ti dif th i d t i t f th i d i i d l h i t l t ti l dif idtl ft dl idtit h d Th id seems to be that genetic interventions result in a new individual whereas environ mental interventions merely modify the same individual But our genes do not constitute our identity in any deep sense Suppose the operation of our mmune t ld b h d l h d b ti i t t i W ld t b i l i d t "I d h I ld h b if t hd t ltd i t l i thi ?" W iht h difft if th ltd tht d d j h i t f th lf t h t id tl t f lf l idtit F h f it i til l t f h t h bi itllit i t itt t t f t tht tk t b tl t conceptions of self and to our essence as a particular individual These traits are produced by interactions between our genotype and our environment and neither means of altering them is more fundamental

Wh

T t t t i l l 362

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GENETIC ENGINEERING

b t ti i i i hth h i idiidl' lh tit would in fact be beneficial for them In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley (1946) imagined engineering some persons to have limited abilities and aspirations and to be happy doing menial jobs in society While this might be beneficial for the society it ll b j t i b l i liti th i d i i d l f th b f i t f th t f it M l l tbl ti i i fidiidl h l d til i th t jit f l i b l b f b f i t t th idiidl f thi ti A t t t f di bjtil d f i t i hih h t t? F l t t t tht t l i uncontroversially and objectively beneficial to anyone whereas enhancement of a capacity to excel in athletics or play a musical instrument may only be beneficial for a person with interests in these activities However this is not a contrast bt ti i i df t t t h t bt th t t bt biliti t h t ll fl i i t l l l f lif d biliti fl i l f lif b t ti th S h t f iti lik th bilit t f ttti t k f t d d i d f ti ld l i k i b fl i l l f lif h treatment for example of a disease that impairs fine motor skills might be very important to a pianist but of little importance to a person who did not make significant use of those skills There is no systematic contrast between treatment of di d h t f l f t i tht k th f bjtil b f i i l i th l t t i t

Th M i t d

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If disease is understood roughly as a condition causing an adverse deviation in normal species function however treatment that prevents or treats disease and so maintains or restores normal function will be at least prima facie beneficial for a M th t t i i f lf t i id h t i it f fl t t t O th th h d i th f ti i i f h t th l i i t f ibl h i l' ti i h i t d d b t h i th iti t h t i h t b h d d i th d t h i h th iti iht b i d th i bi d i t t ttil h t bl t th l lf t i l ith t t t H h t t hld i t? It might seem that the more a desirable trait is enhanced by genetic engineering the better but that would be a mistake for at least two reasons First some enhance ments would only be beneficial within a limited range because of how the enhanced it tit ld i t t ith th i d i i d l ' th iti tit F l h i f f b d liitd iht i t f ith th f f th iti t b ll d i b l i t d f b f i t Th d h h t ld l b b f i i l ithi liitd i tht b d tht idiidl ld b itd f h i l lif F l th llk il

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b f i t t bi tll Tht i h th h h l i l i t t i that raised a normal individual's height to several inches above the norm might be a beneficial enhancement But there are limits to how much of an increase in height would be beneficial To grow to be 9 ft tall certainly not now possible with growth h ld b bl h f l i l h it b 7 ft t il ld i t t d f h hiht l h b d t O ld l i t l l b i h i l t fit f h A d if th h till d t i i th f Glli i L i l l i t it ld b h d t th i d i i d l till b f th i M h i h ft d iti b ti i i ld l b beneficial within some range and public policy could quite appropriately regulate its use to ensure that it stays within the beneficial range

Th M

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t

I it ll i t t tht ti i i i th d t h h i t i ? Of i i ll i t t such as the risks they carry but is there something about genetic manipulation itself that raises moral worries? Many people admire others who have developed skills and abilities through long hard effort that they would not admire when the d ti i i M ti l d tiit i dfid i t b th it l t j t b th d t h i h it i It t h i t l h IBM' t "Bi B l " b t th th ld h h i G K B t it l difft h i t f th i hih h hll tl b t K Ad IBM i h d i d Bi B l ' d i l t d the moves it chose claimed that he was the new world chess champion Here means make all the difference in the chess skills and successes with which the engineer should be credited In many valued human activities the means of acquir i th iti h l d d d i d th f itlf O t f ti i i th d ill dt h tht h i til h iti b ti i i d t th t f dd l i t t tiiti t h t l th iti

Wh

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It will often be morally important who is using genetic engineering technologies to h til it I b l i th ti t t diff bt th fit h t l t l thi d h idiidl th th t i t t l t thi hild thid h i d i i d l th t h thi iti ( t i t l thi l t ld t b ti i i dfid b bt ti i t ti b ibl l t th th b t fd l t ) Th t bi diff i bt th fit t d th t h i d i th fit t

364

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i th i f th j t i f t i f ti t f f t l f example it is widely held that individuals are justified in taking risks for themselves that they would not be justified in imposing on others Less obvious but at least as important are the different degrees and forms of neutrality about what is a good life tht l td f th t t f t t d t h i hild d f i d i i d l i thi li I libl d i it i i d l h l d t h t th t t hld k t b t l bt difft h i ti f d lif t h t it iti h l d Thi l i b l tlit l b t t i l liit tl ti t l i th f ti i i tht ld l b beneficial in some specific conceptions of a good life The genetic engineering com patible with this liberal state neutrality is roughly that which enhances what John Rawls (1971) called primary goods that is general purpose means useful in a wide it f if t i t l l ll l f lif P l i f l i d i th t l i jtifd th d h i it t tth d i b f i l tt ht ' til l f lif E h i b ti i i iht b ll C i d t' f ti i i f t h i hild Wh h primary responsibility for raising children in most societies parents must have substantial discretion in the values they impart and the particular capacities they seek to develop and enhance in their children There are moral limits however on t' thit t h thi h i l d ' iti hth b ti i i th th f l l i illtt S t t thi 7 l d d h t it i t i t i t i i t d l h t til t b f i l t i l hth i t t ll td t h th i h t t d thi B t th t l dt ithd h f h l b th b l i d h d t i i t f i ith h t i t i i Pbli li it l ld t it th t d because although it might enhance her tennis skills it would be at the cost of severely limiting or neglecting many other capacities and opportunities she would otherwise have later to choose and pursue other different life plans Parents do not h liitd l iht t h t h i hild d thi h i l d ' iti t th t fd i th bl f titi t l t d thi ti f d lif th t d d l th iti t k th hi Child h ht J l Fib (1980) h lld iht t " f t " hih i d i t i f th f d t l iht f dlt t l f d t i t i i ki i i f t hi b t t h i li f t h l and according to their own values or conception of a good life Disagreements will arise of course about the extent or scope of a child's right to an open future and what would violate that right but the right places significant limits on the use of ti i i b t f t h i hild If i d i i d l ld ti i i f t h l ith f th f f tlit ld b i d b thi d i ld b i t i f i t f l f d t i t i t Pbli li iht l i t i t l k t tht h hi ll i f d t i l l h th i i f t d i i b l i k b t it h l d t b t i t t it d t 365

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b t h ti i i ld b d i b l f th l t i f d judgments of competent adults As a general matter we have seen that who would be using genetic engineering could be important for the moral ustification of that use

I

t

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E i i

Fi

d I l i t

I tfll t id h t I bli i th ti t t l f th l i bli li ill f i di t i d d iti f ti engineering that enhances normal capacities The problem arises when an en hancement by genetic engineering would confer a substantial competitive or pos itional advantage on its recipient thereby strengthening an individual's position l t i t th i titi f l b f t If th ti i i i i dditibtd th b i f bilit t f it th l th ill ll ff ill t it Thi ill i b t fi d lit f t i t ifll hth th h t ffd ti i i h fi tit t t f th b f t i t th h iti t compete have been enhanced by genetic engineering Imagine that the children of the higher socioeconomic classes not only have the social advantages they now typically have but that they also have certification that their intelligence memory i t d it t t t ttti t k f t d d id f ti h ll b h d b ti i i Thi ld b i i f i t d t i k d th t t it ld l i k l i i f t l i l i t d ld i i i f fi d lit f tit f bli li Pbli li ld bl l t th f ti i i tht ld f i l i i l i t b t th ld b i t t l liti i di it t f ti th political will to do so Many real enhancements that may become possible through genetic engineering will in part confer positional or competitive advantages but will in part confer non titi i t i i b f t ll T k th l f h i idiidl' iti t f thi t t t i i t l f i i f t i d f ti til t k tiit M dlt ith di dfit th d Ritli f thi Thi ld f i i f t d t i k t t B t it ld l i idiidl' i t i i tifti f t i i t i lik liti t i thi fl t d fth f hih competitive benefits that make anyone else worse off The quandary for public policy is that concerns about fairness and equality of opportunity would support limits on this use of genetic engineering but these limits would at the same time d i d i i d l th tit f ii i i f t titi b f t t h i li Pbli li ill f th d i f f l t i i di t iti f ti i i ildi lti f titi h t tht ld b lfdfti if i d l d d lti f th i k t h t ill b i h t thi Whth df t t t f di f h t ti i

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i i h h l d tk l l ft fl lti t tht t risks are justified by its potential benefits this will be especially important for any germline interventions But the potential longterm adverse impact on nequality and fairness may well prove to be the greatest challenge Th l d li i t h t ill l i k l b i d i th f t b i ti t l ti i i t t di d dibilit dt h l h iti ill l t i t l h t h t h S l ill d h i t t i " l i Gd" b t I bli th ttil f h b f t k l l b t thi jtifid Wht I h t i d t d i thi h t i t tilt f th moral and policy issues that we must confront if we are to use genetic engineering wisely safely and ethically

Acknowledgments Thi

h t

d

h i l

B k

(1998)

dB h

t l (2000)

Rf A h A (1999) P t l d i i d lti bti hll t ti d li A i J l f Pbli Hlth 89 164957 (2000) Wh I h ' t h d id b t tl d i i flti d fi d Dibilit Riht W h i t DC t I EP d A A h ( d ) P t l Tti Georgetown University Press B k D W (1992) Q l i t f lif i hlth d d i l thi I A S d MN b ( d ) Th Qlit f Lif O f d O f d U i i t P (1998) Enhancement of human function: some distinctions for policy makers In E P (d) T h l i f th E h t f H Citi W h i t DC G t U i i t P Buchanan A E Brock D W Daniels N and Wikler D (2000) From Chance to Choice: Gti d Jti Cbid Cbrid U i i t P Fib J (1980) Th hild' riht t ft I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) d Stt P Tt NJ R Wh Child? Child' Riht P t l Athit d Littlfild Griffin J (1986) Wellbeing: Its Meaning Measurement and Moral Importance Oxford: Oxford U i i t P H l A (1946) B N Wld N Y k M d Lib Murray C (1996) Rethinking DALYs In C Murray and A Lopez (eds) The Global Burden of Di A C h i A t f Mtlit d Dibilit f Di Iji d Rik Ft i 1990 d jtd t 2020 198 Cbrid MA H d U i i t P Nussbaum M (2000) Sex and Social Justice Oxford: Oxford University Press P f i t D (1984) R dP Ofd Ofd U i i t P P l D (1995) Ctlli H Hdit 1865 t th P t A t l t i H i h l d NJ H i t i P Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

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Sackett D L and Torrance G W (1978) The utility of different health states as perceived by the general public Journal of Chronic Diseases, 31: 697-704

Further reading Duster T (1990) Backdoor to Eugenics. New York: Routledge Harris J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford: Oxford University Press Kitcher P (1996) The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities New York: Simon and Schuster Roberts M (1998) Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Silver L M (1997) Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World. New York: Avon Books Walters L and Palmer J (1997) The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy. New York: Oxford University Press

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S t ll i l

t h h d i f f llbti itd dti tht t i th id iftil l (th i t d d t) d t th Th t b i t f t d i t i l d t t i l I t d i t i l th t th i tifill i i t d ith th f th l B th t th i th child's genetic as well as gestational mother at some point after birth she must legally terminate her parental rights and the intended mother must adopt the hild I thi th i t d d f t h bt t th i t d d th h ti ti t th hild Th i t t i i th i t t i l H bth th i t d d f t h d th i t d d th h ti ti t th hild Th t th i l tt th l' b d d t h h th f in vitro f t i l i t i I lti iti t t i l th i t d d t ld k t th t tt b t h t th have adopted In such a case neither the intended parents nor the surrogate mother would have a genetic connection to the child (Robertson 1983) An intended mother who herself gestates an embryo that she and her husband h d t d h h l f tt b t h t i th d t fh h bd' d d ' i t lifid t th Th f t t h t i t d d ( f l ) t b t ith th i t t i fk i th bb d i t i i h h f t th h b t ith th i t t i f l i i h i th b b t th h i i d h dti i U i d l (f l h t l l l) id fertile couples who do not want to interrupt their lives with a pregnancy and single men or even single women may also seek the services of a surrogate mother However since many centers for surrogate parenting limit their services to infertile id h t l l l f th idiidl ill b fl thi h Phii t i l l l t t t it l h h medical f ki th i f t th d t d lii d i i t t diilid t it idiidl th th h t l l f f f di th l l ik d thil tht l d d t

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Fth liti t i th f t t h t t mother arrangements are commercial while others are noncommercial Commer cial surrogacy arrangements involve monetary payments to the surrogate mother and to the third parties who facilitate the pregnancy In 2000 the average cost of h t $60000 Th t th' f ildi i i t l $ 2 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 ith th t f th i bi id t t hii l d th bk (Ct f S t P t i I 2000) I t t il "ift" t i t l titd ll b t iftil id l d f thi l f l lti fid N h d f th t th' t tional services although the couple typically cover the surrogate mother's medical expenses

Ml A t S

it

df S t

Mthhd

t

t h h d h t ll d t f h tditil h i l h i l ti d th f dititil feminist perspectives Although more heated views have been exchanged about commercial than noncommercial surrogacy arrangements "gift" surrogacy ar rangements have not gone unchallenged f

Moral arguments against surrogate motherhood Mt

t i t t t h h d b d th h t h t th ti i t h h t t d F i t it i l i d t h t t t h h d ik h t th lti hild Citi lt tht b th t th i t tti th hild f h l f b t f th h b l titd t take care of herself and the fetus throughout the pregnancy and less emotionally committed to the fetus should the pregnancy become in her estimation too taxing for her to continue For example in one of the few peerreviewed retrospective tdi f t t h h d i th dil litt t dt t t h i d f th 41 t th i th l hd t l t f th f l l i t l ik f t ki l i id it f 0 >4 ( = 5) (Ethi C i t t f th A i Ftilit S i t 1994 715) H t th lti hild l if th i t d d t d/ th t th t dill d h l i l l df tl " f t " th ld be in the course of traditional adoption proceedings Finally the resulting child may be harmed if he or she becomes the object of an acrimonious childcustody suit; s rejected by both the intended couple and the surrogate mother because he or she s i b l di t ltihi ith th t th th ith th i t d d t illi t it th t th illi t t S d it i l i d t h t th ti f t t h h d ik h t th i t d d t d/ th t th d h fil Sifll t i d tht i t d i thid ti i t th fh dti 370

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k ti itl d filil l t i h i If l f th i t d d parents is genetically connected to the child that parent may view himself/herself as having a greater claim to the child a claim that may be recognized by the courts in the event of a divorce for example In rare instances it is conceivable that i t d d fth f i i t h l i l b d ith th t th i i h th th hi if th " l " th f hi hild Oth ibl h t th i t d d t if f l th t th d l i b t l th f t t h t h t t t i t th l h i id f t l i i h th hild t b i t h Pibl h t th t th i l d t t t b th i t d d t to impose autonomyrestricting contracts on her that require her not only to agree to prenatal care but also to have amniocentesis and depending on the results to abort or not abort the fetus Although such contracts are generally viewed as non bidi l i f d t th t li th t t h f h iht t f t t t t h bti I dditi th i t d d t f t th t th f t t th hild t b i t h ith b th hild i t t t h i liki i l b th h l t i t t bi t I f ltiti th i t d d t dl pressure a friend or relative to prove her love for them by giving them the gift of a child Harm may also befall the family of the surrogate mother If the surrogate mother i id h h b d t f hi if " k i " t th t i l l if h i hi if i th ' hild if h d th ik dtki f hi if If th t th h hild th t t i b t h i t i t k th b b d ht ' d i i t d f thi it O d b d th ibl h t i d i i d l th di t th iti th l il h tht t t h h d iit A th t surrogacy arrangements harm women in several ways First these arrangements exploit vulnerable women who need money or who are trying to make up for the fact that in the past they voluntarily aborted or gave up a child through adoption I d d i td t bjtif ll b d i t ftl ti b f t dti hi T h i d th t t d t t i diii Rltil ih hi ltil t t thi dti d ddi hildbi i t th h i l d i i hih ill d i d t d tditill idd t ill i i l d I d d f h the few US Office of Technology Assessments of surrogacy programs it was reported that seven of the thirteen programs surveyed were willing to accept as surrogate mothers women on welfare and that the average income of all th t th t d b th t h i t $ 1 8 0 0 0 i 1987 (US C 1988) W t t d i l i th dti ti i t th ti th t t i l th d i th I th f t th iti ill b t b d hild R t h till i ill b t b in vitro t b d i d ill th "tttb bbi" t t 371

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d t t d ill th b f if t dlthd (Corea 1985: 276) Over and above raising concerns about the exploitation of women critics of surrogate motherhood raise concerns about the commodification of children Rather th dti hild i t t ith t h i hildl iftil l i i t tht l ti hild ill d ffi t ht th h t t t th k i d f hild th t O i l f f i it ftil th t d th i k d d i f t f f h Ud h diti b th iti tl l b ditil i d d d th i t hll th i t d d t' ability to make necessary sacrifices for their child Babies say the critics ought not to be viewed as "products" to be manufactured in women's wombs for a price They are not "Ken" and "Barbie" dolls to be ordered from a catalogue Moral arguments for surrogate motherhood A d t f t t h h d l i t h t th " id b t t t h h d hl lti db lti t th t th tl it" (Ad 1995 8) S i f i l l th h f arrangements claim that it is highly unlikely that the children resulting from them will in any way be harmed For example reproductive rights lawyer Lori Andrews claims that the surrogate mothers she has interviewed have uniformly described t h l t t i thi " " ith t th th ld bbl t t f thi i precisely b th i l' hild ( A d 1995 13) M Ad lik th d t f llbti dti iti t h t it i t fi t i llbti d t b dill d h l i l l df tl fit i l h bl t d t l l ittd t d with no screening whatsoever To be sure proponents of surrogacy arrangements concede that there have been some cases of children being rejected by both the intended parents and the surrogate mothers as in the notorious Malahoff case in hih hild b ith i h l iitill j t d b ll it d d W l l 1984) bi f h t i td d i t f S l i (Si ti i th t i l i d Bb M {In re B b M [1988] 537 A 2 d 1227 NJ) B t i ti t ll ll d t d hild i b h t h t th th i t d d t h l i l f i h d A d t f t l t h t th i littl i ical evidence for claims that the intended parents the surrogate mother or the surrogate mother's family are harmed by surrogate motherhood On the contrary in their estimation there is every reason to think that such parental arrangements f i d b l b f i t t ll th ti i l d Th i b f i i i f th i t d d t h ld t h i t h th ibilit f h i hild till l t d t th B t th t th i l j b f i i f t A d t f t t h h d li tht t t l l lti t most t th fiill i l d d

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t h h l i f d h ih t ll i thi lbl ductive services Moreover most surrogate mothers have little if any difficulty relinquishing the child to the intended parents Rarely does a surrogate mother report experiencing anything like the psychological trauma that many birth th t i i h th d i d t i t h i hild f dti Wh 75 t f bith th i th d t i tti did t k thi hild ilbl d t i d i t t h t f th 1 t f t th h thi id b t ii th hild t th i t d d t (Ad 1995 10) F i l l it i i l tt t h t th t th' hild tht h h i t t i f ii th t th fit bidd O th t th speculation is that they are proud of their mother for giving a lonely couple the opportunity to have a family of their own Defenders of surrogacy arrangements also claim that far from creating divisions bt th i id tht h t tll bi l t t h h iti " t f t i fft" F l i td f t t h d l dt t h d t th h l i t Hil H f i b d t h t "th i t d d th h h ll b ki l b t h i l d i f th gate and deemphasize career once they have a family The surrogate mothers on the other hand are motivated by the intended mothers to expand their horizons Many pursue further education or make career advances after being surrogates" (Ad 1988 7 1 2 ) Fill th h t t t h h d i i t tht t b i t d d t i t t th t th d th t h i d ti d t t h t th i t h l b i "thi" "t" f t d f thi l I d d L i Ad t "th i id tht th l h $10000 t t i l i k l t t t th hild dit th th l h $10000 t in vitro f t i l i t i d t " (Andrews 1995: 20) Nor is there any evidence to think that just because the government publishes reports about how many thousands of dollars it costs to raise a child from birth to adulthood the government assigns no more value to children's li th f l f i l ' li

L l R d i

f

S

t

M t h h d

At l t f j l l di ( i t h i t i ) h b df surrogate motherhood They include: (1) the nonenforcement of all surrogacy ar rangements commercial or noncommercial; (2) the criminalization of commercial bt bbl t il t (3) th f t f il d bbl l il t t h h t t l d (4) th iilti f il d h l il t it ith t d i t i l difid d t i l E h f th di h it t dd t t H i th U i t d S t t th t lilti t t h b tht f f t ( f l R b t 1996 924)

373

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Non-enforcement of all surrogacy arrangements whether commercial or non-commercial I

t i Jd H R S k ' li i th 1988 t t d Bb M i h i h th t th M Bth W h i t h d f d t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t th N J S C t b d tht t t f t th d i i d f fb b l l i tht l l d t th litti f fiill d d th difiti f hild P l i i h t t l l i t bli li th t ruled that they are legally unenforceable No state should recognize contractual agreements that egregiously violate the rights of human persons especially vulner able ones Since 1988 nearly half of all US states have enacted surrogacy statutes Th jit f th h f l l d N J ' l d b fi t h t t (D 1999 475) D i t t f t th f b l t h t if ith th t th th i t d d t b h th t t th t t ill l th ti it fid th S f l if th i t d d t fil t th t th h f th t t ill t h l h l l t it O if th i t d d t refuse to take the child from the surrogate mother the state will not force them to do so Instead the state will require the surrogate mother either to maintain her paren tal relationship with the child or to put the child up for adoption In the former case h b titld t hild t f th i t d d f t h d i th l t t h b titld t hi f i i l it i th ff h d t h Th i t t i i l t d f t di f th i t d d t If th t th f t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t d ith th ill t b bl t td f th hild b d th contract th th t th H b th t t h td l f f th child of the surrogate mother and the intended parents the court will rely on trad itional family law and the "best interest of the child" standard to resolve custody disputes In cases of traditional surrogacy in which the surrogate mother is the child's ti th ll t t i l th itll ll US j i d i t i ill i th td d i t bt t ti t th t th d th i t d d fth I f t t i l i h i h th t th l th t t i l th US t ill i th td d i t flit bt t t i l th (i th t th) d ti th (i lt b i l i l iti f li f th i t d d th) t b didd b parenthood Thus in Johnson v Calvert (851 P 2 d 776 [Cal 1993] cert denied 1145 Ct206 [1993] and cert dismissed 1145 Ct 374 [1993]) a gestational surrogacy case th C l i f i S t t S C t l d t h t th ti th h d li t th hild th th t t i l th did Th t h d thi l i b th U i f P t At d t d b C l i f i it t h h d t b dt i d ith t t i l or ti d F d ith t l i i t b th l th f hild th t f d t h t th ti i t t i f bth th t th d th i t d d t d i d d th i i f f th ti th i t d f th t t i l th ( R b t 1996 923)

374

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The criminalization of commercial but probably not non-commercial surrogacy arrangements Some legal theorists equating commercial surrogacy with a disguised form of baby selling argue that criminalization rather than nonenforcement is the legally cor rect remedy for surrogate motherhood Thus in 1985 the United Kingdom passed th S A t At hih b il bt t il Thi t ih l h th " i d d l " i il titi Elih l h i i d t b k f fi d/ i i t if th () iitit

tk ti titi ith i t th ki f t (b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement or () il i f t i ith i t it i ki titi th ki f t (S A t A t 1985 h 49 2 (1) a c ) I t

dditi blih d i t d f idil d i t i t bjt t fi d/ i i t if th t d t i t h " b f hi" " l illi t ll f h t w o m b " Significantly the intended parents as well as the surrogate mother escape punishment on the grounds that it is not in the best interests of the child to be born of parents "subject to the taint of criminality" R l t i l f U i t d Stt j i d i t i h d di t fll th Uitd K i d ' l d Mihi th l t i it b il t h h t il I 1993 th M i h i Stt l i l t l d t h t it i id t t t t d fl t " t b k " ith i lt f $ 5 0 0 0 0 fi d fi i (Mihi C i l d L A t t d 7 2 2 8 5 5 [ W t 1993]) W h t h such outright bans on commercial surrogacy arrangements are constitutionally per missible however remains to be seen It may be argued for example that if the only way a married infertile couple can have a child genetically related to them is by i t th f h t t i l i th t hibit th f di i jtifid i t f ith t h i f d t l iht t t l

Enforcement of commercial and probably also non-commercial surrogacy arrangements through contract law Unconvinced that contracts for surrogate mothers go against public policy some legal commentators urge that these contracts be recognized as legally binding collab t i d t i t I thi titi ll d i t bt t th di t d d t hld b dd b h f t t t b d i d ith b ifi f d h S f Ak Flid d N d th l US j i d i t i t b t t l d l Th

375

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jiditi i th i t d d t th l l t b t th F l i d d Nevada laws apply only to gestational surrogacy arrangements (Andrews 1995: 6) Supporters of a contract approach to surrogacy arrangements argue that this approach is best for all the involved parties but particularly the child who will not b d th b j t f t d d i t i th t fd i t bt th i t d d t d th t th N ill th hild h t b "lit" bt it i t d d t d it t th I dditi th i t d d t ill t h t li t h h i th f l i b iti t hth th t th ill i f t l i i h th hild t th F i l l th h t t t ht t l i t h t thi hi best for women in general Not only does it recognize women's right to control their own reproductive destiny it also illustrates that just because a woman bears a child does not mean that it is she who must assume or wants to assume primary or total ibilit f i th hild Assimilation of non-commercial and perhaps also commercial surrogacy arrangements into either traditional or modified adoption law Because there is arguably little difference between making arrangements to adopt a baby before it is born and making arrangements to adopt a baby before it has been conceived some legal theorists argue that the kind of rules that govern adoption titi hld l t Althh t f h thik i t i tht t th hld b id l f t h i bl dil f th i t i tht i t d d t hld l b ittd t t th d d i t i l "fi f " f t h i t d i i I ft l h i l h P t Si d hii D Wll d th t b l i h t f S t t S B d A ti t th ti t t th ld b id t t t nonprofit State Surrogacy Board; that is a very specialized type of public adoption agency that would screen all the parties to a surrogacy arrangement supervise their dli d t "fi f " f th t' i (Si d Wll 1984) Yt if t f th d t i ht t di b t th it f i th t th f thi th h th ll t h t th t th hld b idd ith "h fh t " id d i hih h did hth t h ll t t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t T th b j t i tht ii tdil d t t th t th i f i t th i t d d t supporters of the adoption approach reply that it is no more unfair to the intended parents than the kind of disappointment adopting parents sometimes sustain From the very beginning of the adoption negotiations adopting parents know that f the bith th d i d t t i h hild f dti ft ll th ill h t t Th idd t h t th i t d d t k f th t t t h t th t th i ittd t h h id b t l i i h i th hild h d th i j t i if h d i d t k th b b T th f t h bjti tht d t i d t t h h d d i l b i th ft d i t i l th i t d d f t h i l th hild' 376

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

ti f t h d i th f t t i l th i t d d th ll the intended father are both the child's genetic parents supporters of the adoption approach claim that genetic linkage is not necessarily the determining criterion for parenthood For example philosopher Sara Ann Ketchum notes that as soon itit d l lii d h l i i t h i it ill b ibl t t hild ith l l ti b k d Wh th ill t th ti t f h hild? O l th d h t i b t d th t h t th hild? O l th d h tibtd j t l h th th h i h t d ? O ll th d tt h h f h th tibtd to the child? After all had even one gene or chromosome been different the child in question would not be the same child Under these circumstances the genetic rela tionship does not seem nearly as important as the gestational and rearing relation hi Wht i t t ti ti th til iti f t h d i t i l tht d t i t t l t (Kth 1987) F i l l t th b j t i t h t th d t i h t t " d i d f th t dititi t i t tht k h " b i i "th i i f fdlibti d tti th it t i sion and shape the future through intentional choice" (Schlultz 1990: 3 7 7 8 ) defenders of this approach point out that mind is not everything and that it should not automatically be presumed to rule over matter On the contrary there are at l t t l h th t th th th th i t d d t hld b l l l dt h i t l iht t th hild I h fit l b it i th t th d t th i t d d t h th j ibilit f b i i lif i t th ld h d iti h l t i h i ith th hild l th i id f hild b h t S d b th t th " i l l f it b t t bith di d i t l t h f t t f th hild" d i t i h th l l "natural" mother of the child is more likely to protect the child's interests than any alternative arrangement (Annas 1988: 2 3 4 ) In sum what makes a person a parent is the degree to which that person has shown that her or his commitment to hild i th tt f ti ti i t t i Th f t t h t th t th tt th hild f i th ti th i i d ik f tht h i i t t d t th hild' H ti k l d l th d d til i t t i llbi f i t t t th hild S t h i lik th d t i hi f d i th t h i t tt tht tk familylaw approach to surrogacy arrangements tipping the balance in a custody dispute in favor of the surrogate mother and/or giving the surrogate mother a certain time period during which to change her mind about relinquishing the child F l Flid thi ti f t d i t i l t ithi d f bith N H h i it t th (tditil t t i l ) t h h id ithi 72 h f bith d Viii ll t th ( t d i t i l t t i l ) t h h id ithi 180 d f th l t f f itd ti (Ad 1995 6 7 ) t

377

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P t i

fHlth Ptiti Mthhd

S

t

Given fragmented confusing and in many instances nonexistent statutory guidance for surrogacy arrangements collaborative reproducers need to proceed ith idbl ti bf th d i d t tit h t S t d l b k d t i l l hlth titi ith t h t l t t t i l i i i b l t hi M th f i l it i h l t h titi h th tk f th ti f t t h h d T b it i ibl f idiidl l t ith h i h t tifiill i i t t th although it is quite medically and legally risky to do so But it is not possible for an individual or a couple to fertilize an embryo in vitro and transfer it into the womb of a surrogate mother as is the procedure in gestational surrogacy Thus it is not ii tht h dil iti th A i S i t f R d t i Mdii (ASRM) d th A i Cll fObttii d G l i t (ACOG) h i d idli ii t d d f in vitro f t i l i t i t it flli t f d ltd d I dditi th dil iti h bliid dti b t th t hdl t ethically ll l l l ACOG proposes that surrogacy arrangements be considered only when medically necessary that the surrogate mother should be "the sole source of consent for medical decisions regarding pregnancy and delivery" and that compensation to the t th hld b b d h i d t hth h i bl t id th i t d d t ith i l th k i d f hild th t (ACOG 1990 133) Of il i i f i th f t t h t ACOG d tht t "b b i t fit i ith dtil iil t th f dti i " (ACOG 1990 133) d t h t th t mother be given a certain period of time after the child is born to decide whether she really wants to relinquish the child to the intended parents ACOG's recommen dations are nearly identical to Singer and Wells's (1984 see above) except for the f t tht lik ACOG Si d Wll f public d t private t l t Th ASRM ff ht difft dti f t t i l t th f t d i t i l t A l t h h it h ti b t bth f f t d t tht i i l h d t b d th h b f i t ti f ll h t the ASRM appears somewhat more comfortable with gestational than traditional surrogacy arrangements Like an increasing segment of the legal establishment and the general public the ASRM believes that the more connections parents have to a hild th t t h i l i t b it t i Th i t d i t i l th t th ld t h th t t t l l i t th hild b h i th l ith two ti t it ti d t t i l I t t i t t i l th i t d d th ld t h th t t t l l i t th hild b h i th l ith two 378

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

ti t it ti d i t t i l Still th ASRM i ll thi tic about any widespread clinical application of surrogate motherhood at this time and emphasizes that healthcare practitioners may ethically decline to participate in surrogacy arrangements

P t i

fS i t

S

t

M t h h d

E b t t illi hild b i th U i t d S t t A i t l 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 f th b ith th it fd 716 with the assistance of donor eggs and 7456 with the assistance of in vitro fertiliza tion (IVF) (Robertson 1983) As techniques for egg freezing and IVF improve the total number of assisted births is expected to increase; nevertheless the general i i tht itd dti i likl t b l th itd dti i th f ft F it f th f th l t i f th " " d i t i f " t l " ti blk t t h l i l dti Th i i dditi th h t ikl t remain few and far between for quite some time: namely the financial cost Relatively few people have the $61975 necessary to participate in stateoftheart traditional surrogacy arrangements or the $66975 necessary to participate in stateoftheart t t i l t (Ct f S t P t i I 2000) l Cll t l f d t i d and l l t d Bt if t t h h d b i d d th ti ff i t th tit t k itlf d i ti b t thd P d i l l lthh t it it t ll hild t b till l t d t ith (i th f in vitro f t i l i t i ) b t h t h t h lld i t ti th l tht hld l in assigning parental rights and responsibilities Adoption caused society to think that the rearing parents of a child not genetically related to them may have the same claim or even a greater claim to that child than its genetic nonrearing parents Why then hld t t t t i l l t t i l t t i t t thik t h t h t k ti t h genetic t i b t i t hild it i gestational ti t hild? O dill h hld t t i i t t h t i th f t it ill ftbl ith th id f llbti d d d t th d th l h ih t l ti role in rearing a child banding together in a new sort of family in which they all fully share all parental blessings and burdens?

Conclusion Cll i l hll tt

t

t h h d t Th lit f thi h i t fll i f d

l thil l l dil d ti h l d bbl dt b t it i k ll it b f i t d 379

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h i t i t t d t th llbi f th hild h ill lt f it C tainly until society comes to terms with the full implications of procreative freedom it must use its powers of moral persuasion and legal coercion to eliminate any exploitative aspects of surrogate motherhood Too much is at stake to do anything l th thi

Rf A i Cll f Obttii dG l i t (1990) Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood (ACOG Committee Opinion 88) Washington DC: ACOG L i B (1988) A l t t i d f d t i I Shill Ch d Ndi Ad T b ( d ) Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 361403 Clift NJ H P (1990) The aftermath of Baby M: proposed state laws on surrogate motherhood In R i h d T H l l ( d ) Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies 186201 B l t CA W d t h (1995) B d d t i l b d i l l f k f t thhd I Virginia Law Review 81: 2343 Annas George J (1988) Death without dignity for commercial surrogacy: the case of Baby M The Hastings Center Report 18 (2) 2 3 4 Ct f S t P t i I B l Hill C l i f i (2000) ( t i f i l i com) C G (1985) The Mother Machine N Y k H dR dti t h l i d th d D Jdith F (1999) A i t d veloping an equality model to protect reproductive liberties American Journal of Law and Medicine 25 (4) 4 5 3 7 8 f th A i Ftilit S i t (1994) E t h i l idti f itd Ethi C i t t dti t h l i Fertility and Sterility 62 (5) ( S l 1) 15125S Ketchum Sara Ann (1987) New reproductive technologies and the definition of parenthood: a feminist perspective Paper presented at the Conference on Feminism and Legal Theory: d Iti d b th I t i t t f L l Stdi t th U i i t f W W i i M d i Robertson John A (1983) Surrogate mothers: not so novel after all The Hastings Center Report 13 (5) 2 8 3 4 (1996) A i t d dti t h l d th f i l Hastings Law Journal 4J (4) 91133 t h l di t t i b d thd S h l t M j i M i (1990) R d t i rtit f d t l i t Wisconsin Law Review 2 3 7 7 8 Pt d Wll D (1984) Making Babies: The New Science and Ethics of ConcepSi tion New York: Charles Scribner's Sons United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1988) Infertility: Medical and Social Choices W h i t DC US G t P i t i Offi OTABA358

Fth

di

Bayles Michael D (1990) Genetic choice In Richard T Hull (ed) Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies 2 4 1 5 3 B l t CA W d t h

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Th S d

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Reproductive Laws for the 1990s Ethil I

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Issues in Modern Medicine Th Hti

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28 Cli JOHN HARRIS

D l l th ldf l d h b i Fb 1997 D l l ' " t i " t i l t i d d it t ti It til t h l d d b li iti B t thi tithtdi it i t h b t d d th ld D l l h l i bith t b f th t l t h i h i th th t h t h t d t h i t th human gene pool genetic diversity the ecosystem the world as we know it and to the survival of the human species Thi h t ill h f t F i t it ill d i b th d i t f d t f l i It ill th t th il litil d lilti t th b i t h f h T h i d it ill l k t th t tht h b d d i th thi fh dti l i d fll t ill bifl id l t hih b l i l i dti t h l ff l df f th ti

Process Cli t t i l

did t t t ith th b i t h ith th b i t h f D l l Th fit l dti f lld h l b ith t h k i d h t th S th fit t fd l i b t which results in monozygotic twins

f Dll t did t i f i l l d d l t f l i f th ti idtil ( t i ) ti Th t f d fii l t h f th d th hl fl i ith l i t id i " b litti"

Embryo splitting Idtil ti lt f th litti f th l b l b ith d th lti t i h idtil b i i k d i th l b t d in vitro b thi ibli

382

in utero. Th Thi b lit

h ti

CLONING

Thi itlf h b f thill li if t b l t i ft If you have a preimplantation embryo in the early stages of development where all cells are what is called "totipotential" (that is where all cells could become any part of the resulting individual) and if you take this early cell mass and split it let it f l f ll h f th f l titt b hih i ibl d ld b i l t d ith h f fl d l t it dlthd E h l i th l idtil " t i " f f th th d it bi tt h h ti b t b f th d i i i f th l ll M th f l b bid it b i Thi t itti h i t h t th d t t i f i l human cell one human life if that is what it is can be split into four and can be recombined again into one Did "life" in such a case begin as an individual become four individuals and then turn into a singleton again? We should note that ht t thi ti ll thi d i t h t th ti f t tt d i t h t th d t t i f i l ll Th h thik tht ensoidment t k l t ti h i t t i bl t t f th litti f lit f d f th d t t i f th l h th f b bid it dt tf ( d l th thi f) th destruction of three individuals without a single human cell being removed or killed These possibilities should perhaps give us pause in attributing a beginning of morally important life to a point like conception M t i ti hth td th t l lt f l dti b litti i l t t i b i th l b t th t l l thd l ibl If h ti h th t i i t th t l d th h i ll t h i DNA b t th ill l h th th t l d b b l th th i t t i t l ifl tht h ll Nuclear replacement This technique involves (crudely described) deleting the nucleus of an egg cell and substituting the nucleus of a cell taken from one of the body's organs or tissues Thi t h i h b fll id t i th l b t d l d h t i d i h ll b d d thi i th hih d d Dll U l th d i l t h t f th ll l d h l ill t h i t h d i l DNA ith th ll l d d ill tb till l l thd l hih lt f b litti t t h t it i f l t t h i k t h t th l i th ti hild f th W hld nucleus donor It is not The clone is the twin brother or sister of the nucleus donor and the genetic offspring of the nucleus donor's own parents Thus this type of cloned individual is and always must be the genetic child of two separate geno t f t till d i f f t i d i i d l h ft it i l d l d Th i i t b l f th i t h d i l f thid diidl t h t th ti i h i t f l i i f t ih th t h t f th idiidl ih i th f bi i l d i d Ul f th l d i l th d Thi b i t t if th l d

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JOHN HARRIS

i bjt t i t h d i l di ihitd f hi h child genetically related to her that will be free of these diseases

th

d

t

The Reaction to Cloning Wh D l l ' b i t h t d i Nature Fb 27 1997 th ti i d i t d h i l h t i l Th th P i d t f th U i t d S t t Bill Clit lld i d i t l f i t i t i i t th thi f h d d d t i bli di h l i Clit' investigation has long since reported and commenting on its conclusions Presi dent Clinton said "there is virtually unanimous consensus in the scientific and medical communities that attempting to use these cloning techniques to actually l h bi i t t d d f d ll tbl" I t t i l th N t i l B i t h i A d i C i i (1997) t t d t h t it th i l because f Eith C l i t i d hi d i ' t didd t dd " l l tbl" t f th f t t h t it t t d d f th th i l b it t t d d f George W Bush (2001) has repeated this ritual genuflexion in the direction of hostility to cloning "I strongly oppose human cloning as do most Americans We recoil at the idea of growing human beings for spare parts or creating life for our i " Th B i t i h P i Miit T Bli h d tht Biti i t th h h t I th " G t R t th R d ti d i th Chif M d i l O f f i ' E t G R t St Cll R h Mdil P ith R i b i l i t ' " th t t d th td li tht h dti l i "thill tbl" d hld ti t b t l d (Hi 1999) M b f th E P l i t (MEP) d d d tht h EU b " t bidi lilti hibiti all research on human cloning and providing criminal sanctions for any breach" (Biocentury 1998) E tt f h i d d h iht h b td ikd it i t t ti D H i h i Nkji D i t G l f th W l d H l t h O i t i id "WHO id th f l i f th liti fh i d i i d l t b thill tbl it ld i l t f th b i i i l hih dill itd ti Th i l d t f th d i i t f th h bi d tti f th it f h ti t i l " (Wld Hlth O i t i 1 9 9 7 ) WHO f l l d the line taken by Nakajima with a resolution of the Fiftieth World Health Assembly which saw fit to affirm "that the use of cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and contrary to human integrity and morality" (Wld Hlth O i t i 1997b) D i t th f d i f ti f th S i tifi d Ethil R i G ( N t i l Bithi Adi C i i 1997) hih d d t h t "th t t hld b t h h l t i d fll d i i f th [ i ] " F d i M f UNESCO ll i k ff th k t d "H bi t t b l d d i t " (UNESCO 1 9 9 7 ) O D b 3 1997 UNESCO b l i h d l l d Universal

384

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Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, t i l 11 f h i h d "Practices which are contrary to human dignity such as reproductive cloning of human beings shall not be permitted" (UNESCO 1997b) In a staggeringly compla cent preface Federico Mayor states: "The uncontested merit of this text resides n th b l it t i k b t f d i t f h iht d f d tl f d d th dt f d f h" Th E P l i t l hd t h h lti l i i 1997 th bl f h i h td ( h B) [T]he cloning of human beings cannot under any circumstances be justified or toler td b it b it i i ilti ff d t l h iht d i t t th riil f lit f h bi it it i d it l t i f th h it ffd i t h diit d it i experimentation on humans And which went on to claim (clause 1) that "each individual has a right to his or h ti i d t i t d tht h l i i d t ti t b hibitd" Th t t t l t til d i d f t d t i l Th f t "h iht" "bi i i l " ith littl t t t t li h t th i i l t idit h th iht l t l i

Arguments against Human Reproductive Cloning The security of genetic material Th WHO t t t f l f t th b i i i l hih h dti d i l t " t f th d i i t f th h b i " d " t t i f th it f ti t i l " O ti tht i i h i th it f ti t i l i d ? I it l h i t d with precision by scientists or when spread around with the characteristic negli gence of the average human male? If security of genetic material is really an issue and since we know that skin cells hairs and other detritus from the human body hd i t d t i th f l l f th i d i i d l it i diffilt t b i b t it f ti t i l Human dignity The idea and ideal of human dignity has been much invoked in these debates T i l f l t h diit tht t i d i th W l d H l t h O iti t t t l i i d M h 11 1997 "WHO id th f l i f th liti fh i d i i d l t b thill tbl t ld i l t f th b i i i l hih dill itd ti Th i l d t f th d i i t f th h b i " A l t h diit f i l l ttti th th political equivalents of motherhood and apple pie Like motherhood if not apple pie

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th l h i l A fit ti t k h th id f human dignity is invoked is: whose dignity is attacked and how? If it is the duplica tion of a large part of the human genome that is supposed to constitute the attack on human dignity or where the issue of "genetic identity" is invoked we might l i t i t l k hth dh th d i i t f t l t i i t h t d b th it fh it d h t fll t th iibilit f t l ti t i i ? H th ti fh d i i t i ft l i k d t K t i thi d it i thi l i k I i h t i l l h At i l l d tht t t t t id b i f bjti t l i b d h diit A l K h ' (1997) i t i f thi principle in his commentary on cloning in Nature Kahn a distinguished molecular biologist helped draft the French National Ethics Committee's report on cloning In Nature Kahn states: Th ti fh l ll f ll li ld f h i l h i l it f i b i bi t d i t i t th riil db I l K t tht fh d i i t Thi riil d d tht idiidl dI ld t d this to read human life should never be thought of as a means but always also as an d (Kh 1997 119) The Kantian principle invoked without any qualification or gloss is seldom helpful i dil b i i t t (Hi 1997) A f l t d b K h f l it ld l tl bld t f i Th b f i i fbld d ti ith k i f ll i b t th d th b l d ( d it d ) l i l t h d Th i i t f bld d t i d t ll k f b t th i d t i t f th b l d d Th d fi i th lif f th i i t fb l d l i l An abortion performed exclusively to save the life of the mother would also pre sumably be outlawed by this principle Instrumentalization

and the right to an open future

Thi id f i idiidl t th f th i ti t d " i t t l i t i " t i l l i th E t t I th t t th t t t t d t i i th lif fidiidl ft iliit i t t l i t i i ft t h h t t ilt l l d iht t ft (Fib 1992) Th " O i i f th f di th t h i l i l i t i of biotechnology to the European Commission" for example in its statement on "Ethical aspects of cloning techniques" uses this idea repeatedly For example refer ring to reproductive human cloning (paragraph 2 6 ) it states: "Considerations of i t t l i t i d i d h t thill tbl" Mki f th id f" i t t l i t i " i t If t t h hild th th ti f h i h th i d i i d l td ith ll i l t b d i t t th l idti S tht h f l hild i d d l i l t id " d hi" ( ft i l t ) it i l h hth Kt' i i l

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li Eith th ti l t t i b t d t th t t tl purposes with Kant or the child's eventual autonomy and his or her clear and substantial interest in or benefit from existence take precedence over the compara tively trivial issue of parental motives I t tht l d i d th jit f hild i d ith thi l i i d b t th l l f bth t th t h h t ( i d d f ) f ti bi f f thi id T h f t b f f l l bti ft t h t th i ti i fftil th l ti Oth i l i l d "hi " " t i i th ti l i " idi " h i t th f i l f t " A fairytale F i t l b i t t i tk S lt id llk t Th i h fll i l B t hi h i l ith h f t t l t i d id t l Sh t h f i d d itbl ti if Th Q ld l t hi d i d " " B t it hi d t t d h children to be heirs to the throne that he was heir to So he found a very young and beautiful princess who did not know any better and married her in order to fulfill his duty to provide heirs and become a suitable candidate to be king when his th d i d Th h d t fi h f hi if d h bth l d d l Bt l ll th ld k th did t li h i l ft F h t d t h t th f i t l i ' ti b d t h t hi i hld h b td lld t h t fili t i l tt i t t i hi hild h b tbl d d b thi k l d f thi i f t i hi t f th H t b th b t t moral prince in the world of the imagination but he is not accounted irredeemably wicked In some future fairytale he may even become king Although many argu ments have been adduced against the institution of the monarchy denial of an ft t l hild h ld b i t th H i idl b t th it fr f id f d f ti i l f id t h t th ith th id i l tht l i l t i hld t thi ti hi W hld t f idl d f f l i i l hld i i tht titld il t f f h t l h l d th Autonomy again F d i M (1998) h ld th i th ' idtit" A tiht l i t h i t i t t h i t h d i t " Th t t h ith th

d d i f thi t l i i "Cli tht h h d i t t l i d R b t Wit (1997 9 1 3 1 4 ) h td " f d th th ld tibt i t t l i t t i ifl d b t th i f l ld t t d t i t i 387

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f bdil f d ti i d t i t F l diff i and anno Domini between clone and cloned would all come into play

i

t

Another story: fewer fairies L i ' b l d b d li i it l i M P b l ll f thi bd ld b d l t d dL i ' l d Cld h k L i i t l d ll t t h bdil f d ti k t t ti hi h t d idiidlit ld b " t l didd b th h b i " ? I h th i bi Vldii Ilih Ul b A i l 10 1870 i th t fSibik th V l It i thi h b d h i k t t f V I L i E ith thi ' di t t ill L i i S f th thi tht d Vldii Ilih ht h t b d d if hi W t t lti R i W t i l t hi i t d d t i t t hi t t bi hi d ifl hi d l t f d l th d b t d l did W t k th t h h t f K l M h f l it t th h d W t i h t d thi bt d hi d tht ld b l h It b tht " kth "bt t til d t At k f ti t i i fftd b l iil it f b d i l f d thi Genetic variability It i ft l i d tht h l i ill d ti ibilit ith t t h i lt Th UNESCO ht l i f l f t "th vation of the human genome as common heritage of humanity" Well normal genetic reproduction does not preserve the human genome rather it constantly th i l i i l l ld b th i it If preservation b t t hi thi ( l l d b i ) b j t i O l if ll i t i l l d ld th h b " d " i t t A t ti d i i t l i tb id t i t th ibilit f th h it l t ifiitl ll t f it t tht i td t t l t f b t 35 t h d b i t h It i likl t h t " t i f i i l " l i ld h h t lbl l d ld f lti mechanisms to prevent this without banning the process entirely I take this figure f th t f t l t i i Th t t i d i 1 270 i (M d P d 1993) Th h i t h t t th h f i ti ith h l i l t i fh th h ti ibilit iht b d l fftd It i t i hih h b lih t h t t i t h t tht ifl bt d t d t i ht tit l ill h Pt h t l t d fil i d d ilbilit f l i Bt i th t d th f i h t id ( i d f l d t i ) it i likl t b t d d thd f dti th i IVF At 3 5 t h d i 388

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t l ti t i i i l d it frt it i l likl t h t the cloning rate would match this Would more than one in every 270 couples or individuals for that matter want or be able to use cloning technology? Suppose this rate were doubled or even tripled by cloning would anyone even notice? If the rate ft i i i th i ld f lt t l i t h l th th b it l t t h Eugenics Th lti f th E P l i t tk difft t k H i td the now mandatory waft in the direction of fundamental human rights and human dignity it suggests that cloning violates the principle of equality "as t permits a eugenic and racist selection of the human r a c e " Well so does prenatal d i l t t i i t t ti d t i d t i bti d h f i hi f l t Th f t tht t h i ld b b d d t titt t i t th t h i l th i t f ti th b fl T b l i th d t h t it i h t b df it i t t t t i tht l it hld b hibitd b it it th i bility of rape Genetic identity Th d i i l l d t b th E P l i t tt tht " h idiidl h i h t t hi h ti i d t i t " L i id th i i t bl tibti f i t h d i l DNA h tht i th f t l idtil ti ti i d t i t i t til t f l identity nor is it necessary for "individuality" Mitochondrial DNA individualizes the genotype even of clones to some extent The mitochondria are particles of DNA present in each egg cell and are derived from the mother of that egg They are d d i t i l t th f t i h tht k th hih i l d i l btitti M l ti i d t i t i i d ith f l idtit f i d i i d l i t it i t l h th hld b iht t h thi B t if th i ht t d b t th i h t f i d t i l t i ? S th i t bi l i f t h t i ( dibli) diti tht fftd t d t h t th ffti t t t th l idfft f hih t h t it d th b t diid lti i ti Would the existence of the supposed right conjured up by the European Parliament mean that the therapy should be outlawed? Suppose that an effective vaccine for HIV d l d h i h h d th f f t f d b l i th t l t i i t ilti ff d t l h iht? A t f l th ld thi b ibl b f t t b d i d f h l i fli b i ? W hld 2 70 ll t h t th t l f ti ( i d t i l ) t i i i Thi t h t i th U i t d K i d ith lti f b t 58 lli tht 200 t h d h i h d H t dh iht ilti h d l? 389

JOHN HARRIS

Cll th b i t h f D l l d th ibilit f h i l t h lft many people feeling not a little uneasy if not positively queasy at the prospect It s perhaps salutary to remember that there is no necessary connection between phe nomena attitudes and actions that make us uneasy or even those that disgust us d th h ttitd d ti t h t th d f jdi thil N d it f l l t h t th thi tht f d t are thil t b hibitd b l i l t i tlld b lti Th t t hih i t t Moral nose Th id t h t l t i t i d d t ti t l il l th d t i t i f ht i ll iibl i t i Thi id iiti ith D i d H (h bl k d i hi A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) t h t lit i " l f l t th j d ' d f") h b i f l t i l th k f b f t l h i l h I til M W nock has made it a central part of her own approach to these issues Briefly the idea is: If

lit hih be passed Wht fli tht ti ( W

i t dl

it f

t ll

ith

k t th b i i t it ti k 1987 8)

i t l blil hld tb d ft

f ld b i d t

th b i t

if t f th

t b thi hih h l d thi ll

t

i d f iili

A i t t i l i th t t f l i f L R K pointed by George W Bush to head up his new "President's Council" on bioethics In a long discussion entitled "The Wisdom of Repugnance" Kass (1997) tries hard and thoughtfully to make plausible the thesis that thoughtlessness is a virtue: t f l i h bi tb f th t lld b th lt f th dtki bt b itit dfl i d i t l d argument the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear

W

itht

Th d i f f l t i f t k h ' f t i id f thi ll d i t b i d h it i i l i fb jdi thi h f l Th E l i h lit G O l l f d to this reliance on some innate sense of right and wrong as "moral nose" as if one could simply sniff a situation and detect wickedness The problem as I have ndi cated is that nasal reasoning is notoriously unreliable and olfactory moral philoso h it t h t i l "bi b t h " h d littl t f it i it tbl f d t i W hld b t h t i th t t th d i d itbl f lld " l f l i " l h b d i t d b th i h t f J blk l di d d bi t t d l d ii t f lit ith th I th b f i i t hld b ii f ti th l i f th h l i th b i fthi l iti

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I K ' ti (h d i i l dit li "i t t") th giveaway is in his use of the term "rightfully" How can we know that revulsion however sincerely or vividly felt is occasioned by the violation of things we right fully hold dear unless we have a theory or at least an argument about which of th thi h t hld d rightfully h l d d ? Th t "ihtfll" i l i j d t hih f th tbilit f th f l i If it i i l fli f i th th ll i th i t t i W i t t t i l d b i d f th t fi th t t h f ht d i th fit Th t h i d bth f i t i dditbi ditbi because the individuals concerned occupy positions of power and influence world wide and their instant reactions and "offtheshelf" arguments have been translated into resolutions and regulations which are likely to prove seriously prejudicial to h lf d ibl l t h iht Wh l i d lft l h i l h t bd t d th d l d i th f liitti h iht d f d thi itlf titt ttk th f d F bli d t dit tht h iht df d b titd hi or simply to assuage feelings of unease or even of revulsion or to protect beliefs that are themselves expressions of prejudice or bigotry One of the hallmarks of a moral position is the preparedness to deploy evidence and argument in its support Wh th d l d th t l d t t th f ti th l iti d th adequacy f th b t th l t b l i h th iti ll t b l (if t t) d it d h t l bi d i f t Wh th t d l d i t f l iti i d t fld th th iti i lft i t h t tifiti d t Af d t l i i l f th lit f ll d t i ti i tht h liberty should not be abridged without good cause being shown Now where the liberty in question is trivial or vexatious or is itself morally dubious or even morally neutral it is plausible to claim that no harm is thereby done particularly h l t f th l i i t t i f thi d f d b d t t d H h b d t th f f t t h t th f d hih ti ll d b i bt th i h b bidd i t l ttiil i t l f th i f d i i f thi ll i i f i t th it b i d t b i tt Th h id f th likl didt f h l i Everyone has in mind the "Boys from Brazil" scenario of maniacs choosing to clone Hitler's genome (but not of course Hitler despite their hopes to the contrary) umpteen times in the jungles of South America However the fantasies of film k l i hld t ditt t l d i d Lt l k t b f likl hih iht b d f h l i d t t ititi b t th bf i t i th t f dti t W ill i ll tht h l i b l btitti i f in vitro f t i l i t i h it fit f d

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Nine cases

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per se

JOHN HARRIS

A b l D k i ' dR b t ' t bth t h t I bli t b the key idea namely respect for autonomy and for the values which underlie the importance attached to procreation These values see procreation and the founding of a family as involving the freedom to choose one's own lifestyle and express t h h ti ll t h h d th d l hld blif d th lit hih f i l i h d t ft ti Gi t h t th f d t ' i idl i d t b i t t l it i t l t thi f d libl d i i f ti t tl t b l d i h b t t t d b th id f th il t f dh l i k d th ti i t i to the genetic imperative Whether or not this suggestion is ultimately persuasive it is surely not possible to dismiss reproductive cloning in such short order as does the report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997) Reproductive choices hth t th t b t t d b iht t ti libt t h itht dbt li t b t k i l l li A h th t i l b d i i d h d h ti jit b bld i t th Th h kt d th l li f th t h d d ffit It i j t h d t h t th N t i l Bioethics Advisory Commission report and all the other recent pronouncements on cloning have failed to demonstrate

Acknowledgments Thi h t d id fit f l t d i "Gdb D l l th thi f h l i " i Th J l f Mdil Ethi 23 (6) ( D b 1997) 3 5 3 6 0 "Cli db l d t h i " i Ii T ( d ) Bithi i th N Mill i (St A d P 2000) " C l i dh d i i t " i Cbid Q tl f Hlth Ethi 7 (2) ( S i 1998) 1 6 3 8 d "G l d Riht h iht" i Jti C B l ( d ) Th Gti R l t i dH The Amnesty Lectures 1998 pp 6 1 9 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) Some of the material was presented to the UNDP/WHO/World Bank Special Pro gramme of Research Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction R i G Mti G A i l 25 1997 dt h i l i hld b th E P l i t i B l M 7 1997 I tfl t t i i t t th t f tilti iiht

References BiCt (1998) Th B t i R t BiBi J 19 ( b i t ) Bh G W (2001) R k b th P i d t t ll h Th Whit H ( h i t h / / l / 2 0 0 1 / 0 8 / 2 0 0 1 0 8 0 9 2 h t l ) Dworkin Ronald (1993) Life's Dominion London: Harper Collins Fib J l (1992) Th hild' riht t ft I Fd d Flfilt 7697 P i t NJ P r i t U i i t P

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Harris J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997) Is cloning an attack on human dignity? Nature 387: 754 (1999) Genes clones and human rights In Justine C Burley (ed) The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights: The Amnesty Lectures pp 61-95 Oxford: Oxford University Press Kahn Axel (1997) Clone mammals clone man Nature 386: 119 Kass Leon R (1997) The wisdom of repugnance: why we should ban the cloning of human beings The New Republic 17: 26 Mayor F (1998) Devaluing the human factor The Times Higher Education Supplement 8: 47 Moore Keith L and Persaud T V N (1993) The Developing Human 5th edn Philadelphia: W B Saunders National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997) Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations Rockville MD: National Bioethics Advisory Committee Robertson John A (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1998) Liberty identity and human cloning Texas Law Review 76: 6 Slack J M W Isaacs H V Song J Durbin L and Pownall M E (1996) The role of fibroblast growth factors in early Xenopus development Biochemical Society Symposium 62: 1-12 UNESCO (1997a) Press release no 97-29 New York: UNESCO (1997b) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights New York: UNESCO Warnock Mary (1987) Do human cells have rights? Bioethics 1: 1-14 Wilmut I Schnieke A E McWhir J Kind A J and Campbell K H S (1997) Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells Nature 385: 810-13 Winston Robert (1997) The promise of cloning for human medicine British Medical Journal 314: 913-14 World Health Organization (1997a) Press Release (WHO/20 11) Geneva: WHO (1997b) WHO 5037 14 May

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29 Allocation of Medical Resources H TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT JR AND ANA SMITH ILTIS

The Conceptual Geography To morally justify in a principled fashion the allocation of medical resources one must first determine who is in authority to make such allocations and what pattern of allocation should guide them The resolution of the latter depends on moral accounts of the limits of the authority of governments to (1) acquire resources by taxation (2) distribute those resources in particular ways and (3) constrain the free choices of their citizens in the market as well as an appreciation of the empirical views regarding the marginal return on more than very basic health care The more it is plausible that there are significant moral restraints on the power to tax and to constrain peaceable market behaviors the less morally plausible it will become to impose by governmental force a single all-encompassing pattern for the allocation of medical resources even if that particular allocation is recognized as n some sense morally ideal As doubts increase concerning the legitimate political moral authority of governments to impose one all-encompassing understanding of the appropriate allocation of medical resources the concurrent existence of numerous allocational approaches will be morally inescapable For example one may be morally constrained to allow private approaches to health care in addition to and parallel with any governmental approaches Further if there are diminishing returns in relief from morbidity and mortality risks the importance of guaranteeing all equal access to health care will be brought into question Beyond the question of the limits of governmental authority to impose a particular all-encompassing approach to the allocation of medical resources there s the core issue of determining what allocation if any is uniquely morally obligatory To establish an allocatory approach as morally obligatory or to restrict all to one encompassing package of health-care services (eg as in Canada) requires resolving a number of key value-theoretical quandaries First one would need to determine how to compare morbidity and mortality risks so as to establish health-care priorities because health care addresses not just risks of death but of suffering For instance one must compare the moral importance of treating cancers with treating forms of osteoarthritis which are not life-threatening but painful One must n addition compare various forms of suffering such as the suffering of migraine with

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ALLOCATION OF MEDICAL RESOURCES

th ffi fh i bld th b d i l i l t fd t b t able and in need of remedy Second allocations of medical resources will depend on the amount of resources available for allocation to health care versus those to other needs or goods This will require comparing the goods of being relieved of particular bidit d tlit ik ith d h d t i d btt d ll th i f ilbl t d ih Fill ill dt d t i hth li f t t t t ti it h lif h i h t th th d t th it F l d hild h h t lid f l l lif h t li t f th t t t f diti l k i d th l i f t h t i ldi th th ld t iti treatment? The application of a theory of justice to medicine requires establishing how par ticular medical needs or desires generate particular rights This is a core challenge f t h t i l t f li i jti P t i l tt f ffi t b t l t b ith f t t f t t bt i fi j t ii tifiti ildi th t f f f th i h t th I til th fjti t li h l t th t l d il l t t i hih l ill d i i h d t li i t others for their resources or provide grounds even to restrict the purchase of health care in a private market in order to satisfy a particular norm for equality of oppor tunity or outcome S i l bl i h t h i fjti lid t i f dii I t f lif l t th t l d il l t t i b td b d hl If th f f t d t ' h t fild b i t b d h l If il t t l d t th t t i i i h t f til l f i d i i d l th il t t b tifid H if ' l t th t l ltt l d t iifi t dibilit li d t h ft d t ti b d If class of patients is blind paralyzed or likely to die early and if there is only a possibility of slightly ameliorating these defects but not of curing them and slightly but not appreciably postponing death one will not be able to make whole such l t th t l ltt Th l l t i f dil ill ft ith ti t hlth bt l dtl l i t di d f t dibilit th t f l dth M i dil k l d i bbiliti l l t i l li i t t t t i d d d t d i f h t bl ith i d t l bidit d t l i t i k Th ll h t th l l t i fhlth ill th d d it what risks should be accepted in order to husband resources and expend them on goods other than for health care or in order to avoid interfering with the choices of individuals regarding the use of their own resources In short a theory of justice n hlth ill h t h h tblih tht til llti f dil i itl i d b tl f Th i ll h b hd b li t h i f ti t hlth llti Thi h t i h til t h i f ti h b tt h i Fit i d t tht t th l l i i l iii th d S d l i ill b i f th

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accounts that rely on an understanding of right or fair action held to be independent of considerations of the good Finally libertarian approaches to resource allocation will be considered as a limiting instance Special attention is given to the implications of each of these approaches for issues of macro-allocation (ie decisions concerning how many resources go to health care as opposed to other areas); meso-allocation (ie how the health-care budget gets divided among various endeavors of health care); and micro-allocation (ie what health care individual patients receive) The last concerns regarding resource allocation are expressed n conflicts between institutional interests in resource utilization and the particular commitments of health-care professionals to particular patients (eg may physicians play the role of therapist gatekeeper and allocator?)

Some Teleological Approaches to Distributing Health Care Teleological accounts of what is right and just reduce the issue to what is good If particular patterns of health-care allocation will maximize the good and there are no non-teleological moral constraints on the pursuit of that good then the realization of these patterns will be morally obligatory In such a case right and ust choices will be those that maximize the net good Utilitarian accounts regard decisions concerning the allocation of resources as opportunities to maximize total net or average utility There are of course important distinctions among different utilitarian theories First utilitarians differ with regard to the nature of the good to be maximized Different background understandings of morality result in different conceptions of what counts as the good They thus provide different assessments of the merits of competing systems for health-care allocation (Engelhardt 1996: 45-6) In particular different understandings of the good will yield radically different recommendations regarding how appropriately to allocate resources For example if longevity is deemed inherently valuable then a utilitarian would urge that resources be allocated in such a way as to maximize the total number of years a population lives or perhaps to maximize the average life span If on the other hand quality of life is most valued then a calculation to determine how to maximize the quality and not merely the quantity of life-years will be pursued Even if one agrees that the focus must be on quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) one will need to compare different understandings of quality To determine which system of health-care distribution s best on teleological grounds one must know what counts as best This requires a background moral theory Second utilitarians have different assumptions concerning the background empirical states of affairs; for example what will actually maximize the good and in which state of affairs there is more net utility A socialist utilitarian might argue that state ownership of property will maximize the total good while libertarian utilitarians will argue that private ownership a free market and a very imited government will yield the most good Both have as the basis of their views the idea that the right is reducible to the net good The disagreement lies in how to maximize that good and/or in the nature of the good Thus utilitarian accounts can be

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dill d i f f t d d i th b k d th f d ll ht assumptions are made concerning empirical states of affairs The contrast between Peter Singer and Richard Epstein exposes these variations For Singer the mpartial ity of the moral point of view requires treating persons equally Equal interests hld t ll dl f h h l d th d lit i tht i i th i t t A lt Si f t f ll ti t h t t k th li t t f ll ll i l d tht li "th b t ibl l f h dll t" ( K h d Si 1988 102) I t t i tti th f d ft t d t i th ll td t hlth i t idi li Si i t h t th primafacie reasons to avoid such restrictions but he argues that it is defensible to do so and that a national health service funded by tax dollars is morally appropri ate Resource allocation should not be determined by a free market because of he i t i i t i di l i t i f th f kt H k thi tf titi t ' f d b l i i t h t "it b [th ] t h t th it ti t t h hi d t h t th idiidl ld t hi tt h h h didd t d hlth " (Si 1976 188) F t h Si li t h t "th il t f medical care may make it unsuited to market control" (1976: 189) Market struc tures may ultimately result in individuals spending more on health care by discour aging preventive office visits and ultimately resulting in expensive hospitalizations (1976 189) Si l " t i l hlth i [] ffti f ditibti i " (1976 190) Thi tht h dt diti bti i itlf i t F Si h th i l ti t t li t f th l l t i f i th t t f t i l hlth i i t h t it i d i b l t li i it i hih " t i f d t l f lif" i t t d (1976 191) A Si d t d it h t t d t d i t t i id i f it t h t k idiidl "tht when it comes to vital things like medical care we are all in it together and your money cannot buy you anything that I am not equally entitled to" (1976: 1 9 1 2 ) The sense of being bound together with regard to important aspects of ife and he t h t ll i d i i d l i ll titld t d d t iti f Si itil I h t th f i h t b t i th t t l / b f t / df h dll t At th llti l l th i hth dll b hlth dll f d dll hlt dll d At th llti l l th ti i h t k i d f h l t h i l d th b t l The critical issue is how to answer this question Singer and Helga Kuhse face this issue by addressing newborn care They are critical of the use of the concept of qualityadjusted lifeyears QALYs involve determining "[h]ow many years of ife ith til diti [ ld b ] dt i i d t h f l lif i t h t tht d i t i " (Kh d Si 1988 1 0 3 4 ) Th j t th f QALY f t Fit " [ ] l l t i fh h it t t dd litdjtd t t i t ' lif t k t f th i t th f f t d b th t t t " ( K h d Si 1988 104) Th f iii th t t l t d i l h S d "[] l i 399

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b d th b f b h i h lif i l d ill ll f th provision of treatment to younger people rather than older people so long as the treatment is successful in restoring the patient to a normal lifeexpectancy" (1988: 105) Th bl f Kh d Si i t h t it ill l t l t t tht h QALY l l t i it ill b b t t i f t dlt d thi th i Thi li i dd i thi i i th l f tdi li th l f ti lif filitti ti "th i t l i tdi lif t h t i l d ll d th i ti lif" (1988 106) K h d Si h l d thi b th d stand life as a journey marked by goals When conception has not yet occurred there is no individual bearing goals whose ends are thwarted Therefore they main tain it is better to extend a life than to create a new one They extend this argu t t th f th f t b "th j [ f f t ' lif] i t d i fl f th f t i t f itlf bi ith t d ft Th f t h l h di t t i " (1988 107) F i l l K h d Si h l d t h t th i t fi f t b "th i h ll i i f i t b d bt th f t d th newborn infant" (1988: 107): infants have no goals hopes desires and expect ations Thus it is better Kuhse and Singer maintain to extend the life of an adult than to extend that of an infant At the microallocation level the issue is much the hld k llti fhlth dll t th tit h ill i th b t l A tiliti t tht t t h l ith S i ' i tht f R i h d E t i I Mortal Peril (1997) E t i ti ht t b l i l ti l tht i d i i d l h iht t h l t h f d d b th tt Fit h tht h l liitd ibilit f th lf f th tki hi b k d lit t h t f th l tditi Second he argues that not to have state regulation of health care will ultimately lead to increased rather than decreased access to health care: "The simple and compact set of common law rules does a far better job of providing health care than th dl t fl i l t i djdiil i t i f d " (1997 23) T h i d h tht i d i i d l h iht t t t thi bdi dt k if hi f t h l T t h th li i d i t t h t th kt ht t l i i f i t l i th llti f hlth tilit d E t i ' t bi tilit idti ith iti f ti iht f d i d t i t ht i f others These sideconstraints as well as the empirical assumption regarding which conditions will maximize access to health care together suggest for Epstein that resource allocation ought to be unregulated and addressed by the free market Th t t bt Kh d Si th h d d E t i th th k l t f th i i l diffilti ith tilit d ti l l tiliti t h i f th i f llti Fit h t d d ll db k d l ti b t th ki f l d t Th ll ti di il i i i l tt f ffi t h t ill k th liti f th d l

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hih i t li i d ffi It i i t t i thi dt i that not all hypothetical contractor theories would necessarily agree with Daniels's conclusion that there may be an appropriate place for some agedependent rationing though they would follow the same general methodology For example iht thik tht h t h t i l t t ld tt f lit f lif th th l tit f lid It h l d l b td tht D i l t t t t id j t f f t hlth i d t i th lif t f th h ld t h i di A t l l t i l i D i l t d tht h thtil t t ld h t id b h i d th il f i ti of how much of society's resources should be spent on health care rather than on the satisfaction of other needs and desires Though Daniels holds that healthcare needs have a powerful claim because of the role health care plays in maintaining ' titi it it i t b l i i t d thi i t i t t d h d t i D i l hld tht h t h t i l t t ld t thi l i b th j t d dtil t h d t k ht ti th b l t H li ilifid i fR l ' il f i d tht " d t d l i b t itl t i d ld k healthcare and longtermcare system that protected their normal opportunity range at each stage of their lives" (Daniels 1985: 103) He expands on the concept of an agerelative opportunity range in order to avoid problems of age bias or age d i i i t i " d t dlibti b t th d i f [hlth ] ititti rid t ith th d f b t t i f idiidl ti rit t th t k ld t t t t idiidl fi h t j t f th l t i t f h lift With thi fit th f i lit f tit tI i f hlth ill id th itfll f b i " (1985 104) T ti th f d t i fD i l ' li hlth i i t t and not all kinds of health care are equally important (Daniels 1985) Health care is important because of the role it can play in preserving normal functioning which in itself plays a role in determining what opportunities are open to an individual F th hlth i il d di f llti hlth i t t d titt i f il j t i (Dil 1985) M hlth ititti th i t i t t i ibl/blitd f tti fi lit f t i t (1985 45) t h t thi riil ht t ititti (1985 86) If h l t h d t th th i i l f fi lit f t i t i t tifid D i l li (1985 86) D i l ' emphasis on fair equality of opportunity stands in contrast to Singer's focus on fair equality of results This difference rests ultimately on the fact that Singer's view s a consequentialist and in particular a utilitarian one while Daniels's account s a d l h i i fi d D i l idtifi f l l f hlth ititti h f hih til l i hlth F i t l l ititti " t t i i i th l i k l i h d fd t f th lit t i " (1985 47) S d l l ititti t " d t f th i d l i t [ d ] dli l dil d hbili tti i " (1985 48) t h i d l l i t i t t i id " t d d dil

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d il t i f th ( d t l ) h i l l ill d d i b l d d th frail elderly" (1985: 48); and fourthlevel institutions provide "health care and related social services for those who can in no way be brought closer to the idealiza tion" (1985: 48) "Each corrects in a particular fashion for a type of departure from th R l i idliti t h t ll l f t i l l l ll th ti tti d i d d if f i lit f t i t i t b td" (1985 48) D i l i hi i f fi t hlth i th flli [H]lth ititti hld h th l i i t d b t i t t tk f tti l i t ri i d i t t tit t h i fili t j l species functioning On this view shares of the normal range will be fair when positive t h b tk t k tht i d i i d l iti l f t i i h ibl d t h t th th d i r i i t i d i t t thi h i f lif l Still f i h t l i idiidl t l t d kill ill till differ and these form a natural baseline against which individual shares of the normal d f d ( D i l 1985 57) One of the most farreaching or ambitious attempts to apply Rawls's theory of justice to health care is that of Ronald Green Green argues that Rawls's account hld tll i l d thid i i l fj t i tht t t h l t h f th b i il d b hlth i f l t h i t th b i iil libti R l i t f ll (1976 1 1 7 1 8 ) Th h t h t i l t t ld d t " i i l f l t hlth " tht ld t t h " l i h t t th t t i hlth i th it l l " (1976 117) Thi i i l G hld l th d i i l d th d i f f t i i l h l d b th t h i d f th l i l l ordered principles of justice (1976: 118) According to Green then the hypothet ical contractors would require an egalitarian system of resource allocation Green's account rests ultimately on first the assumption that Rawls's use of hypo thtil t t d th i i l iti i i itlf it d d lti t ht i i l f jti th h t h t i l t t ld d t Jh M k l id i f t hlth i liht f R l i t t i i d tht "hlth i il i d l hih i th ti f if l l iht" (Mk 1983 329) B i i ith th assumption that "one of the proper functions of government is to enhance the welfare of its citizens" Moskop argues that "providing health care becomes a social ideal when it contributes importantly to human welfare through its significant f ill d d i t hlth d d i " (1983 336) Th l l t i d i i d ithi h it tht llti llti d i l l t i d i i ill i t i (1983 336) A id f hi ill t j t b t th t h t ill t b tbl F l h hld tht " i i t fi d tti d i i k i " d h idtif t llti i i l tht h li hld id resource allocation decisions:

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(1) More effective inclusive or secure means should all other things being equal be f d t th hih l ffti i l i [ d ] (2) S i i l ii hld b d f iil d F l it hih d t i i f t t th h dfd dh i hld t l t th with needs for basic health care (Moskop 1983: 337) For Moskop basic assumptions concerning the appropriate functions of govern t d th d i f t i l t t di t hlth i th d t i f llti h tht i liti ibl R b t V t h d l t t i th f d i l thi t h t i t td i th R l i t fjti D i l ' G ' d t t t M k ' t t h h h li iilit V t h (1981 125) i k it i f t t ki t hil idi t h l t b impartial contractors In A Theory of Medical Ethics (1981) Veatch begins his dis cussion of justice in health care with the recognition that medical ethical decisions are made in the social context and thus require a "commonly acceptable basis for thi l t i " (1981 100) V t h ' t f" l f k " (1981 111) h i h h h l d b i d f t i l it i liti dd th dil i (1) Human beings are of equal moral worth in the sense that no human deserves a li t th l th l h f ilbl (2) Th t l f th ld h l d b l h i hd l ti t t h d t thi Th h b " d " d ilbl f appropriation and use without conditions attached prima facie ibilit l t t th (3) H bi h f th ld t it t d ditibti f tht i l ( V t h 1991 85) Veatch then argues that equality requires that each person have "an opportunity for equality of objective net outcome (probably most easily measured by equality of resources)" (1991: 92) Veatch also addresses the problem of the natural lottery n hlth if ll h t th hlth d t ll t t ff ith l h f t l ( ) d th d th l d I lliti it i h i h th i i l t id t fj t i i lft t i t lf k ( V t h 1981 118) I hi t f d i l thi thi i th t t i i t f t t i medical ethics: "The creation of a contractual framework could provide a basis for making medical ethics decisions that would be commonly recognized as legitim ate" (1981: 120) Veatch envisions three contracts First there is "a basic social t t [tht] t i l t [th] f d t l i i l " (1981 138) F thi (1) t t b f it t th t t d i d (2) t t bt it d f i (1981 1 2 7 3 4 ) d (3) t t bt f i l d t i t (1981 1 3 4 7 ) Th t ltt t t t tdit th lit f th b i il t t (1981 138) h i h V t h h l d i t t f i i i l b f t t k i t h t th

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id f killi djti It i thi fil i i l fjti tht i f il importance for the issue of resource allocation Veatch (1981: 276) argues that "people have a right to enough health care to provide an opportunity to be healthy" This raises the question of the extent to which th i h t t h l t h i V t h ii it l i i t d b i d i i d l h i d ti tht d idiidl' t i t f hlth V t h ld tht The principle of justice is focused on the fair distribution of burdens from paying for health care not on the goal of decreasing healthrisky behavior That might be the bjt f t d i th i i l fb f i bt h tliti l ld l flit ith th i i l f t A t d i th i i l of justice on the other hand simply concentrates on the fair distribution of the cost of th b h i Hlth f ld b ddd t l t i l hlth i t h l t h i fdi l Thi ld th t th i t f th i l costs to the extent that those costs could be calculated Of course if a behavior is td t h hlth t b t tht th b d it ld f i d t h h l t h f f th b h i (1981 279) V t h ff t f llti tht i tht h h t i t "f l t lf (bt db l ti) justice would require giving persons an equal opportunity to be as healthy as others" (1991: 96) Although Veatch acknowledges that no "definitive rational defense" (1991: 83) can be offered to support "any [particular] interpretation of th i i l f j t i " (1991 83) i l d i litii h fil t dd h it i thl i i i b l t idiidl t ti f i t ith l l i hlth t Althh L C h h i l l (1987) liitl j t t t i h t llti hi tb i t t bl t i tht l ht h t h t i l h ith til ldi ld d Chhill holds that contractarian accounts rest on an inappropriate understanding of he relationship between the individual and society Such views according to Churchill give priority to the individual over the society because they are grounded on the L k ti tht i d i i d l h t t d li i i t Th iti tht Chhill d i th b d ti f l tilit hih h iiliti t h t h t i l t t t F C h h i l l th i d i i d l t b d t d i th t t f th il d j t it t i th idiidl " i t d d i [th] il ld t h t d d i h " idiidli (1987 61) With th iti f th i d i i d l il social Churchill argues that individuals will perceive the interconnection between their needs and the needs of others including strangers Individual selfsufficiency will be recognized as inadequate and incomplete Churchill's conception of the self il i t t idiidl i ti t h t i iht t h l t h dd i h d F thi ti idiidl hld t i t h t ll tibl t ill ddth d th ll dhlth S h idiidl h d t d i f t h l il bi d h d t d i lt i th d i f it i t b i Fth Chhill iti h d t d i ft iti f th d t

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ll tilit t services

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Libti fll i t t th h l b t f d l d th f d i d t i t diti f ll l i t i t h ment For those who recognize freedom as a sideconstraint allocation at all levels will be patterns that develop as spontaneous orders out of decisions of all individ uals who decide freely to collaborate with each other This latter genre of libertar i t h t th b d t i l t f t i l i i t t t i f th i i l fj t i I th b f dfiiti t d ii tht i t t t i f th i i l fj t i i it th i i i t i f i ditibti h Th B l III (1991) f l i th d i t i t i bt iti d ti iht th lt t i f llti B l (1991 2) t t h t iht t h ' d t ' d lid iti riht ll l li th l b d f th Piti iht i r i b ti riht th riht f th t b lft l I t i l th j t i f i t i f iti rights involves seeking the authority to impose a particular moral vision coercively on h t t h l i iti b l i t i f t i l kid t th th b f i th t k f th Thi f B l i th i t i l t t h t l d t th j t i f t i f th l i b t i approach Unless and until one has the moral authority to justify the coercion of others one cannot violate the right of individuals to be left alone Thus negative rights constrain the distribution of resources (1991: 11) E l h d t J f libti h t th l l t i f H Tit hlth i h t i i l f h i (1991 1996) E l h d t h th it dflt iti i th k i d t i f i th l i b t i f di th f l d l i i l i l l l iti i t Whil th h t llti kb d t i l argument to establish a binding contentrich normative account Engelhardt appeals to permission as the source of moral authority This libertarian account recognizes freedom not as a value but as a sideconstraint: "One is moved to a libti iti t hb f fl t bhlf f li libt i t t b tb h l idiid f t h thi " ( E l h d t 1991 104) l Athit f ti i l i th i l llit i t i d r i d f thi permission As a consequence 1 Witht h i i t th i thit i t h thrit b l t h i th f l i ilt 2 Ati tid th l it i l d ki liit ( b t t b l i t ) t l i atory defensive or punitive force (Engelhardt 1996: 122)

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I th d i th d thi t i t h t thi ii ilt what is by default the cardinal rightmaking condition As a result the golden rule is recast: "Do not do to others that which they would not have done unto them and do for them that which one has contracted to do" (1996: 123) 0 f th i i l bjti id i t th l i b t i h i tht t lik ll th h l d d t h t th t t i b t i f idi 1 t f d i j t i f i d th th t t i b t i f l t th d Y t E l h d t lik N i k (1974 3 0 4 ) d i t i i h bt f d l df d i d t i t S h libti t i t h t th f d f idiidl ( ti iht i B l ' t i l ) tit ht we may do to persons without their permission not because this is harmful but because this violates the default basis for a general secular morality Without a clear and convincing argument to the contrary we may not infringe upon ndivid l' h f l f h i d t l

C

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To address issues of the allocation of medical resources requires first an under standing of the authority of government to tax redistribute income acquired by taxation and to restrict the choices of individuals in the market Second resource llti d i i i iti f th i i l id di th i l t btid f th b i hlth Th iti f llti i thid d t d i f hth t f llti i ll b l i t d if hih Thi i iti f bidit tlit i k ll i f i f f bidit d bidit t difft i t i lif F i l l if t idtif til t f llti j t th t d t d which theory of justice is right and how it applies to health care in particular The attempt to apply utilitarian conceptions of justice to the issue of resource llti ff f th d i f f l t i i t d ith ll t i l i t i t Utili t i l i f d i l d b k d ti di ht d d th i i l tt f ffi t h t ill d tht d S h t fil t t th d i l d liti h i h th d d A t t t t dd i f llti t h t li h t h t i l t t h D i l ' t tht i dd i i ht h t h t i l idiidl ld d i h Chhill' t ff f th f i l t dil th background conceptions of the good attributed to the hypothetical choosers Such accounts lack an appreciation of the fact of moral pluralism and they rely on speculation concerning states of affairs and individual preferences Moreover it s t h h th i i t i f til ldi tht h t hi th i i t t h t th f it h t h t i l i d i i d l Fill ibt i d t d t h t b d f l t th i bliti t t th t f idiidl B f th i b i l i t t tblih til t t i h ti t t t t t d ill b th ti d l d t i l Witht hjtifti idiidl tb l l d t iti h

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of self-ownership and control Thus libertarian accounts of resource allocation recognize that it is impermissible to impose a particular understanding of health and health care on others The allocation of resources then must be left to individuals through peaceable market activity

References Bole m Thomas J (1991) The rhetoric of rights and justice in health care In Thomas J Bole III and William A Bondeson (eds) Rights to Health Care pp 1-19 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Callahan Daniel (1987) Stti Liit Mdil Gl i Ai Sity New York: Simon and Schuster Churchill Larry R (1987) Rationing Health Care in America: Perceptions and Principles of Jtie Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Daniels Norman (1985) Jt Hlth Ce New York: Cambridge University Press (1988) A I P t ' K ? New York: Oxford University Press Engelhardt Jr H Tristram (1991) Rights to health care: created not discovered In Thomas J Bole m and William A Bondeson (eds) Riht t Hlth C pp 103-11 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic (1996) The Foundations ofBioethics 2nd edn New York: Oxford University Press Epstein Richard (1997) Mtl Pil New York: Perseus Press Green Ronald (1976) Health care and justice in contract theory perspective In Robert M Veatch and Roy Branson (eds) Ethics and Health Policy pp 111-26 Cambridge: Ballinger Kuhse Helga and Singer Peter (1988) Age and the allocation of medical resources The J l f Mdii d Philh 13 (2): 101-16 Moskop John C (1983) Rawlsian justice and a human right to health care Th J l f Mdii d Philhy 8 (4): 329-38 Nozick Robert (1974) Anarchy State and Utopia New York: Basic Books Rawls John (1971) A Th f Jti Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Singer Peter (1976) Freedoms and utilities in the distribution of health care In Robert M Veatch and Roy Branson (eds) Ethics and Health Policy pp 175-93 Cambridge: Ballinger (1993) P t i l Ethis New York: Cambridge University Press f Mdil Ethi New York: Basic Books Veatch Robert M (1981) A Th (1991) Justice and the right to health care: an egalitarian account In Thomas J Bole III and William A Bondeson (eds) Rights to Health Care pp 83-102 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Further reading Aaron Henry (1991) Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America's Health Care Washington DC: Brookings Institution American Medical Association (1990) Hlth A A i Th AMA P l t I Access to Affordable Quality Health Care Chicago: AMA Basson Marc (1979) Choosing among candidates for scarce medical resources Th J l f Mdii d Philhy 4 (3): 313-33 Battin Margaret and Huefner Robert (eds) (1992) Chi t Ntil Hlth C Ethil d Pli I s Salt Lake City: University of Utah

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Contemporary Issues in Bioethics Philosophy and Public Affairs

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy

Ethics Justice and Health Care The Hastings Center

Report The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Rights to Health Care The Dependent Elderly: Autonomy Justice and Quality of Care The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Rights to Health Encyclopedia of Bioethics Encyclopedia of Bioethics Strong Medicine: The Ethical Rationing of Health Care The New England Journal of Medicine Justice and Health Care The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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i dii d d h i t t i b t t t ld t b d l d i t h t it B t i t t i l t h bjt t ik b t t d t t t t k i t i t h C tl t th h t f h i t t i li flit bt th d f dil d th h l t h i t t f h bjt H d balance these interests? When should experimentation proceed? After a series of research scandals in the twentieth century a broad consensus developed around th b i i i l f h thi tf b f i d jti Iitil liti f th i i l f d i d t tti f h bjt I h titi h i t t i d t l t t h bjt d i th h b h fild t tti

Scandalous Research in the Twentieth Century I

1947 th ld l d f ht i th t if dl i dil h dil i t d t d b N i d t N i d t f d it fditbi i t i i tti S i t d i d t f t h th fft B f ti lti N i d t i t t d i l i h t t t ht d h t t t di h t h dh t fftil ilt h ht d i th i t f th N t h S T td ht d N i d t ht inmates and examined their wounds To study diseases such as typhus Nazi doctors intentionally infected inmates with the disease To study human capacity to with stand exposure to cold Nazi doctors stripped inmates and exposed them to icy water b l i d i t hd l t d ith i i th d t d ith Oth ti bttiti N i idl D t i t t d i tilii " i " h l i t d tblihi t h l i l diff d i b l T fid ffti f tiliti N i d t i j t d bt f ith ti bt i th h f b t t i thi f l l i 410

EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN SUBJECTS

tb d iflitd b difti bth l df l i by exposing them to high doses of radiation To "cure" homosexuality Nazi doctors injected hormones into inmates suspected of being homosexual To catalog physical differences in race Nazi doctors killed a number of prisoners stripped the flesh ff t h i b d d thi k l t f t h l i l (Lift 1986) Aft th N i d t tid t N b G f i d i i t h i t Fift N i d t itd tN b d t d t d t h Y t th h b th t if N i d t J h M l fld t S t h A i d d ti Mengele known to some concentration camp victims as the "Angel of Death" participated in the killing of 4 0 0 0 0 0 victims When shipments of new prisoners came to Birkenau and Auschwitz Mengele would often sort through the crowd ll lti ti th ii h bjt d d th tt th h b Hi i t M l d t f bjt t i i l l f l t i h k i t t t t t b l i h th l i i t f h d H f d l df l ti t h t h t h th ld h ti children He injected blue dye into the eyes of children to see if he could change their eye color He surgically grafted the back and wrists of one child to his fraternal twin in an attempt to create conjoined twins P h b th N i i t h i f th j d t t N b h d littl i d i t i t h ti i A i Th f i d th bli h d f i tht A i h ld t t t h l thil h B 1966 h h i A i t k t t I tht H B h dil f t H d blihd d b k i t i l i th New England Journal of Medicine i hih h d ibd t t t "thill d b i " dil i t td i dil journals (Beecher 1966) Two of these experiments are of special note The first was conducted by Chester Southam at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in New York Dr Southam was i t t d i th l l d b th b d ' i t i th d f i t T hi h ti Sth i j t d li ll t t t t h i t l t i t Th tit t t l d f th i t I t d " l t l d th ld b ii ' ll'" ( B h 1966) th Th d td d t d b S l K t th W i l l b k S t t S h l Stt I l d N Y k W i l l b k ititti f " t l l defective" children and the institution had a problem with a relatively mild strain of hepatitis In hopes of developing an effective prophylactic agent against the strain Krugman and his associates set up a special hepatitis unit and deliberately i f t d hild h lid th it P h th b t k dl i A i h d i 1972 I tht l d f f t l td d t d b th U i t d S t t Pbli H l t h S i i T k Alb I th T k i t 399 A f i A i ith hili d 201 f f th di lld th t d Th i f t d bjt t t d f thi hili th 411

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t l d t h t th h d th di Th t d t t d t i h hili progressed when it was left untreated (Jones 1993) Two years after the Tuskegee study was exposed The New York Times broke a story about research conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The CIA's k

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t h i tht ld b dt t l h b h i Blii t h t th h t i d LSD h l d i th CIA d i i t d it t F k Ol itit i t h t hi k l d O k l t Ol did f t suicide Another subject Harold Blauer died from a similar experiment (sponsored by the Department of Defense) designed to test the drug mescaline For the next two decades headlines about research ethics more commonly re f d t tl lti th d l b t i 1993 if ti b t ld i t d I tht th Albuquerque Tribune b l i h d i f t i l tlli th t f i t d t d b th M h t t P j t d i th fil d f W l d W II d t i d b th A t i E C i i (AEC) d i th l f th C l d W I th experiments eighteen individuals were injected with plutonium without their con sent Similar experiments were conducted with other radioisotopes including uran ium and polonium The experiments were conducted in the hope of establishing t idli f th ft f t i k A th t f th l t i ijti bi tld t i f th t b l i i t i l i diti t f Th td i t h i h d thi t t i l b th f f t f d i t i th l dti t i d i t d t hl d t i d i t h tll t d d hild fd d i t i t l t f t i t i l t d (Adi C i t t H Rditi E i t 1996)

Basic Principles of Research Ethics E h f th d l h i h l i h t d th d f th t d th dil f i t i h ti Wh th N b t i t d th N i d t f i d i i t h i t it t i l t d i f t i i l k th N b Cd A th i i l i ments that research subjects give their voluntary consent before they take part n an experiment that investigators minimize any risks research subjects might face that the degree of risk taken should never exceed the humanitarian importance of th bl t b l d b th i t d tht h bjt h l d l b f t ithd f i t Oth f i l d f l l d N b I 1964 th W l d M d i l A iti d t d f i l d f thi l l d th D l t i t H l i k i Th D l t i hih i d i 1975 1983 d 1996 d t d f th i i l f d d b th N b C d b t it l d t d t t t i i l t d i d b N b F i t th D l t i td tht h 412

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i t i t t b i t hi h h lt " i d d t it tee for consideration comment and guidance" This principle was an important step toward the establishment of institutional review boards (IRBs) ERBs are local com mittees called upon to review research proposals for potential ethical problems S d H l i k i l l d f th ibilit f h hild d th i d i idl h iht t b bl t i t l fil b " t" ( N t i l C i i 1978) If h hd b i d t fll th N b Cd t i t l th ld t h d t d h hild i th d t t t h t "th i l d hld h l l it t i t" Both the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration at Helsinki had profound impacts on governmental regulations and theories of research ethics but a third document has perhaps been more influential on theories of research ethics The Belmont R t b l i h d i 1978 th f d i f th N t i l C i i f th P t t i fH Sbjt fB i d i l dB h i l R h It i d t i f i d th b i i i l f thil h t f b f i d jti Th i i l dd lt i f t b th N t i l C i i lti d t d b th F d dD Adiitti (FDA) d N t i l Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1981 and current "Common Rule" which governs fifteen federal agencies They are also the most commonly used framework for understanding the ethical issues of human experimentation

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Th fit i i l i d t i f d b th B l t R t i t f " R t f " it t t " i t tl t t b i thil iti fit tht individuals should be treated as autonomous agents and second that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection" What does it mean to treat indi viduals as autonomous agents? Autonomous actions are usually understood as ones tht d i t t i l l ith d t d i d itht tlli ifl T t idiidl t t i t id th i d i i d l h "hld b f t h d t itht tlli t i t i d b t h " (Fd dB h 1986 8) Th i i l i t i f thi i i l f h i t t i i th i t f i f d t T t h bjt i t i t t bti thi i f d t S bithiit i f d t "autonomous authorization" (Faden and Beauchamp 1986) suggesting that an individual must authorize rather than merely acquiesce to being a research subject must intentionally choose to be a research subject must have a substantial d t d i f h t thi h i d t k thi h i itht b t t i l t l tlli ifl Ptti thi l i it ti i t d t b i l i i t i t t dil i t t i f t i b t h j t d i h bjt t t bi t f th j t R h h hld d th thi I f d t i ll h i t l t fi t t dil d t d i

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l t i d t Th diti f t i th i t i t to determine that subjects are able to understand and appreciate the mplications of their consent before informed consent is possible Disclosure requires the investiga tor to reveal all information that may be relevant to the potential subject's decision U d t d i i th i t i t t dil i f t i i tht d th ttil bjt t it ht i t tk V l t i i t h t th bjt b f f i ilti ifl If ll f th diti d if th i d i i d l i hi h t t bi t f h bti t l th th i d i i d l h i hi h i f d t All f th dl i l d i d hd bl ith i f d t I most of those cases there was no consent at all The Nazi experiments were done against the will of their subjects In MKULTRA Frank Olsen was given LSD without his knowledge In the case of the plutonium injections some of the subjects seem to h b t h t th t f h j t lt l t h t th i ijti f l t i Liki t th J i h C h i Di H itl t i t hd t bli th h bjt d t l d th t i ijti f li ll Th T k i t l hd i bl ith t Sbjt told they had "bad blood" rather than syphilis In order to follow the progression of the disease subjects were given spinal taps a fairly painful procedure where a needle is inserted between two vertebrae and a small amount of cerebrospinal fluid is with d Whil i l t f l d i t i th bjt tld t h t th " t t t " f t h i b d b l d E h f th 600 b j t d i d b t th f th t d d th d t i t i d f th f t d t i f th h M thiit h l i t i i d th W i l l b k i t f lki i f d t b t th i h btl th th N i i t MKULTRA th l t i ijti T k O df D S l K gave for his research was that "only children with parents who gave informed consent would be included" (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) Critics however question whether this parental consent was adequate First some maintain that t itti i hihi f d t ibl If W i l l b k fll th N b C d "[T]h i l d h l d h th l l it t i t" d " h l d b ittd t b bl t i f f h i " B t th W i l l b k b j t h d ith th l l it t t th bilit t i f f hi Th bjt i t i t t i l i d th hild d th l t d d Th D l t i t Hliki k room for proxy consent but some critics of Willowbrook suggest that research should never be conducted on retarded children unless there is therapeutic intent Second critics questioned whether parents were adequately informed about the ik f th h B h f l li t h t "it t l hth ll t tld tht h t i t i ti t f t l li d t t i t h t th i ibilit t h t i h i d l i l t i if h h d it ii i li h t i t i " ( B h 1970 125) T h i d th h d tht t t t l l t S f th t f th hild l l d i th t d h d i i t i l l b t d f 414

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W i l l b k b f di th t l d t h t th i i th special hepatitis unit Thus some parents faced the choice of whether to include their children in the study or lose the option of placing them in Willowbrook Given the shortage of institutionalized care at the time some critics maintain that the ti i Th th l d t ld tht h t dt ll t h i hild i th W i l l b k i t th did t i thi i f d t

Bfi The second principle of research ethics identified by the Belmont Report is the principle of beneficence The Belmont Report interprets the principle as creating two bliti "(1) d t h d (2) i i ibl b f t d i i i ibl h " ( N t i l C i i 1978 6) Oth h i l h k btl d i t i t i bt t fb f Th h i l h Willi F k (1973) f l d i i d th i i l fb f it f l bli ti (1) ht t t iflit il h (2) ht t t il harm (3) one ought to remove evil or harm and (4) one ought to promote good Both Frankena and the Belmont Report begin with the obligation not to inflict harm (sometimes called the principle of nonmaleficence) but Frankena gives us a more dtild t ht b f i i dditi t lf Th i liti f th i i l fb f i t h i t t i i th i t tht b f t f i t b itl b l d ith i k Thi f t i tht ik i t t h bjt t b t hi th h bjti If h ld b d i d i tht ld l i i t ik d till hi th h bjti then it should be so designed Some risks however cannot be avoided so we must determine which of these risks are justified While there is no formulaic method for making this determination the goal is to weigh risks against anticipated bfit Wh th i i l fb f t i th h dl f th t t i t h t tht f th fll h t S f th l l h

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i t d H l d Bl did f iil i t d t d b th D t t f Df Y t i th th i th N i i t th i fh i l th i h t iitill bli J h M l claimed that his experiments did not harm his subjects Since prisoners who were not used as experimental subjects were typically sent straight to the gas chamber Mengele claimed that his research did not make prisoners worse off For th f i h i d M l ' i t d f d t th d f th M l i h t b i h t t h t hi i t lft th i ff th th l t t i D tht M l did t h hi b j t ? Th i hih M l l l did h th th ll f f d d did t hi h d M t i t l bjt ff f t l d t h t it ilt th i i l f b f i ? 415

PATRICK BOLEYN-FITZGERALD

A iil i i h i th T k td I th T k study researchers left 399 cases of syphilis untreated Apologists claim however that the Tuskegee study did not harm the health of its subjects The treatment for syphilis in the 1930s was neosalvarsan which required 2 0 4 0 injections over the f i d did t l lt i B 1948 iilli idl k t b ffti t t t f hili b t it i ffti f t i t i th i i t i l t f th di t f tit h h hd hili f d d I th d b th ti iilli k t b ffti t t t it h b t lt t hl T k ' bjt C t l t h t th i th T k td ld h b better off if the study had not taken place While there may be many cases where it is difficult to claim that research subjects would have been better off had they not taken part in experiments this does not i l t h t th i i l fb f i h liitd libilit R h fb f i if hd tl bjt ff i l t th i i l F k ' iti f th i i l i hlfl h Th i i l fb f i t l d i t i t i t t id ki bjt ff B f i l d i t i t i t t th h d t d M l l l fil on this account He had numerous opportunities to prevent suffering and save lives Instead of taking those opportunities he contributed to the suffering and carnage of the concentration camps The Tuskegee researchers also fail They could have tried to i th h l t h f t h i b j t Th ld h t t d th ith l h th t d b th ld h t t d th ith iilli i th 1940 d th ld h d th t h b i i i i th h f t i i W tb tht f th ti ld h td h f l b t th h bl ti Th ti ld t f i t t d i ti hiliti tit' llbi Th t t f th i i l fb f i i t hth k h bjt ld h been better off had they not participated but rather whether investigators seek to protect and promote the health of their subjects

Jti Th fil i i l f h thi i d t i f i d b th B l t R t i th i i l fj t i I it tb i f th i i l fj t i i t i i d i i d l thi d d t t th f i l Wh l thi i i l t h experimentation we are typically referring to the more specific idea of distributive justice the idea that social benefits and social burdens ought to be distributed fairly H i t t i t bth il b f i t d il b d E i tti tibt t bilit t t t di d h t t t bfit f i d i i d l hlth Bt b th f i t i t dt i hth t t t k i t i t h h bjt l b th i k f i ij dth h t t t f i l t li t tti Th bfit d ik t l t l t ' h th fit l i d d l b t jti i h i t t i

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Th i liti f th i i l fj t i t h i t t i h been in the area of subject selection When the Belmont Report addressed justice it expressed concern about the possible exploitation of vulnerable populations It stated that "the selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to d t i hth l ( lf tit til il d thi iiti fid t i t i t t i ) bi t t i l l l t d i l b f thi ilbilit t h i i d iti thi ilbilit th th f ditl l t d t th bl bi tdid" ( N t i l C i i 1978 9 1 0 ) F t h it td " h hld t dl i l f likl t b th b f i i i f b quent applications of the research" Some of the cases we have reviewed seem to violate the principle of ustice by selecting subjects in an exploitative manner Tuskegee is one obvious example All f th 600 b j t i thi t d Afi A i I th d d ldi t T k i l t i A i dii Mdil litt th lt i t t h d l t t i t h t i ft d i t ttitd Thi i ill t th t i f lit h h i i ft t d Afi A i h i idibl l tit ith littl l f t l O physician at the time wrote "Virtue in the negro race is like 'angels' visits' few and far between" (quoted in Jones 1993: 25) Another doctor referred to African Americans as a "notoriously syphilissoaked race" (quoted in Jones 1993: 27) The l f th i t ttitd d th d i f th t d h d iti t ld tht T k h h d littl t f thi bjt O hiti l d d "Th b littl d b t t h t th T k h dd thi bjt l th h " ( B d t 1978 2 1 9 ) Th i t f i t ttitd bjt lti i th T k td i l l i fjti b t it i t th l R d l f th h ' it ti h th d i d th t d th f f t t d i t i t l b d social group Only African Americans bore the burdens of the research Since the selection of AfricanAmerican subjects served no scientific purpose it would have been problematic even if there were no racist intent Problems of overprotection i i l t l i d i th B l t R t id f k f l Th th i thil i Th h b t l h l f l i thi t k d h b i t d it tl lti f i l d d t h t i l models Initial attempts to apply these principles focused on the protection of sub jects Respect for persons focused on informed consent so that individuals would be protected from coercion fraud and deceit Beneficence focused on protecting indi idl f t d ik A d j t i f d tti f litti Thi f hld i i th th t t i t h t dl l k f tti f h bjt Whil thi i i t i l lt f h b it t th bl hihlihtd b h d l th i t thik t h t h thi tf th th tti f bjt E l lti t 417

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h b tti i t l t t t i t l d f terminally ill patients and access to participation in research protocols for women and minorities Consider first the case of terminally ill patients and their access to experimental drugs In recent years patients with endstage cancer AIDS and other ttill lthl diti h d d d t i t l d hih h tt l t th l t h l Th tf d t If t i t ih t t i t l d i l l if i t l t t t h littl h f i th t i t th h hld t t d i th f tht tit' i h ? I t thi t th F d l D Adiitti dt lti h i h ll tit quicker access to new treatments First the Treatment Investigational New Drug Program allows patients who are likely to die within a matter of months access to unapproved drugs as long as there is no "satisfactory alternative drug or treatment i l b l " ( B d 1998 39) S d th A l t d A l P t fil l t ill ii t t t (Bd 1998) B t h f th t t h t th l f liiti ik f tit hld b b l d ith th l f bli t h i f th t i l l ill A d bl ith tti i i th d t t i f women and minorities as research subjects Consider the case of women For most of the twentieth century research subjects were predominantly male From the perspective of the protective ethic this would seem to harm men more than Ui tl h bjt t th t di t i t i k Citi f th d t t i f h l i t h t th l b d h b b b Th it f h bjt d i th ti b f i t W t t dil t t t difftl f If t t t l t t d th i t l fidi b i i t l lid t Thi d th P b l i H l t h S i ' T k F W ' Hlth I t l d "Th h i t i l l k f h focus on women's health concerns has compromised the quality of health informa tion available to women as well as the health care they receive" (US Public Health Service 1985) This call to include women as research subjects (and a similar call t i l d i i t i ) t t h t th l f liiti ik t f l d i i t bjt hld b b l d ith th l f ditibti th b f i t f h fil Problems of insufficient protection Despite the focus of research ethics on the protection of human subjects and despite occasional problems of overprotection insufficient protection remains a serious concern Part of the problem is a practical one A recent study found that research bjt ft f d b t th d i t i t i bt th d h i f d b t th t t i l ik f h d litill h f l b t th tti h f hbfti th ll I ti th l f th thi ft t t Bt t h t i l i l i R t hi d l i ti i l l t t l i i d i t b t h t kid f bliti h h t t t h bjt

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I 1997 P t L i d Sid Wlf t d t f th P b l i C i t i ' Health Research Group criticized the ethics of several experiments conducted on HIVinfected pregnant women in developing countries (Lurie and Wolfe 1997) More than a thousand children become infected with HIV every day This problem it d i t ilbl t t t tht liit ifti Wh id di (ZDV i l AZT) i d i i t d t H I V i t i t bf d d i lb d th d i i t d t i f t htl ft th b th iid f HTV t i i i d d b t t h i d Aft tdi h d d t t d th iti f f t f ZDV it b th t d d f i th U i t d S t t d th d l d ti B th i t b t $1000 h millions of HIVinfected women in developing countries do not have access to t This economic barrier has motivated researchers to find a cheaper regime of drugs No one doubts the importance of studies that might find cheaper alternatives N li t tk L i d Wlf h i t i i d th b hih l tdi tid t t t i thi l th i t i i d th f l b tlld til P l b t l l d til i t l t t t t t t t t h h t t h h i l i l f f t Si th k t t t f d i HIV t i i th l b t l l d t i l k i l ith held effective treatment from patientsubjects Instead of a placebocontrolled trial Lurie and Wolfe (1997) argued that research ers should have conducted an equivalency study The new regime should have been t t d i t th i f ZDV k t b ffti If h hd td t d t t d i th U i t d S t t th ld h hd hi bt t d t i l td R l t i f th tti fh bjt ld h i d it L i d Wlf d tht hld t d l tti t h bjt h d t t d i i th d l i ld Th d tht h j t hld b id ti d l i t f it ld b i d d thil i d l d t Other scientists have defended the studies arguing that the use of placebos did not harm the subjects If women who received a placebo had not been enrolled in a study then they still would not have had access to effective treatment The same i ti tiltd i t f th h flli th " l l t d d f " Th t d d f i A i i t i HIViti t ZDV b t th t d d f i d l i ti i t t t t ll Th i l b t i th t d d f tblihd f A i dil ti b t th t t d di t th " l l t d d f " Shld h t t d i t th l l t d d f should they afford the same protections to research subjects in developing countries as they do to research subjects in developed countries? Marcia Angell executive editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, agreed with L i d Wlf' itii d fth td tht t t t t tif th h l l l d th f T k "Th j t i f i t i " h t " ii t f th f th T k td i th T h i d W l d ld t i [ZDV] th i t i t i l b i ht ld h t th b j t ' i f t if th t d " ( A l l 1997 847) A l l ld tht "it if h t f f T k ft ll" ( A l l 1997 848) 419

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A l l itd t l i ith T k bt I td li th t of justification was used by Mengele He claimed to have left his research subjects no worse off than they would have been if he had done nothing There does appear to be a parallelism in the justifications used by HTV researchers and the ustifica ti d b M l B t thi llli hld i N ld l i t h t HIV hi d l i ti i ll i l t t th h i f i i t d t d b M l S h t i th d i f f ? O t d dititi i t f th i i l fjti W h l d t t fi j t i i th T k i t i d i i i t ti t l t bjt d lti th i tht d i t i t l burdens one social group There is however another type of injustice relevant here It is unjust to exploit an existing injustice When individuals suffer an injustice t is exploitative for others to use it to their own advantage while doing nothing to correct it Thi t f litti i t i bth M l ' i t d T k M l l i t d th i j t i f th " f i l l t i " I t d fdi thi tht ld i h i b i t N i t t t t id h t i b t d t th d th d th iti t hi d t Th T k h l i t d th il j t i f 1930' Alb I t d f idi d iiti th h d their subjects' disadvantaged position as an opportunity to collect data Focusing on the exploitation of existing injustices gives us one explanation for how Mengele's experiments and Tuskegee were unjust Focusing on exploitation l i t th i j t i f th i t M l l i t d th i d i ti f i Th T k h th th h d litd il d i i i t i d th d i d t d iti tht lti f tht d i i i t i Whil b t h j t M l ' litti i Th T k h d th l t d hlth f thi bjt t thi d t d did thi t t tht l t Th b t iht li f M l h i t h t h lft f hi bjt ff th th alternative of summary execution We can apply the same reasoning to the placebocontrolled HIV trials No one would suggest that these trials are morally equivalent to Mengele's experiments b ld t t h t th t i l litd ijti id B t th ll i l t t T k ? Did th i t lit ijti th i f Afi A i i 1930' A l b ? S iht id th litti ll i l t Th l b l d i t i b t i i P l i d l i ti di b th l k f hlth t l i f i t t t S t h t th ditibti f h an important human good is morally arbitrary and unjust If we accept this argu ment then the neglect of HIV patients in developing countries is unjust for the same reasons that the neglect of the Tuskegee subjects was unjust The placebo t l l d HIV t i l ld b l t T k W iht h d dititi W iht th l t f Afi A i hlth i 1930' Alb j t itht i th l t f HIV t i t i d l i ti j t W iht th l t i T k j t b it th lt f il d i i i t i Th l t f tit i d l i ti th th h d iht b ttibtd t it

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f tht tijti Thi ld t t h t th l t f HIV tit in developing countries is merely unfortunate Some commentators who defend the trials take this kind of position The Center for Disease Control (CDC) for example describes the lack of access to medicines in developing countries as "an unfortunate f t " If d t id th l b l ditibti fhlth t b ijti th th l b t l l d HIV t i l ld t h litd jti Th HIV t i l ld t b l t T k F i jti illtt h t i h th l b t l l d HIV t i l b l t i hil th h th dl U f t t l th i i l fj t i i t hlfl i li th d i t t is in explaining it The question of just access to health care is hotly contested and nothing indicates that this debate will be resolved any time soon If we want to move toward consensus on this issue we will have to approach it from a different ti F i th i i l fb f iht id ith hlfl h B dti l b t l l d tdi th th i l tdi h i d tit t t h Th i t i t ld h d t d thi tdi i tht ld h d d k l d hil also preventing an estimated thousand babies from becoming infected with HIV The investigators may defend themselves by arguing that they did not cause any harm and that the research subjects were not made worse off by the study b t thi ld l t tht i t i t did t i l t th i i l f lf B f i i th t i h It i t i h i h d ti d I th l b t l l d t i l th i t i t fild t tf b l h Thi itii i difft f b d th litti f iti i j t i If f litti th th bl i t l tht h b j t did t i ZDV b t t h t tl HIV t i t i d l i ti d not receive ZDV The real problem would be the inequitable distribution of health care If we focus on the principle of beneficence however we can discuss research ethics without having to answer the larger and more difficult questions of global jti I t i t h il l t i h i ith t h i h bjt d th fb f i t tht ti bliti l ith thi l i i l tihi I t i t h bliti t t t d t th llbi f idiidl h th ll h bjt A l t th i l t i l i i l tht dil f i l ht t th t idiidl d thi h th th t i l ll b l t i

Conclusion Th t t i t h t it t ditbi b i l h Ethiit dil f i l d d d t th b b t i t d t bjt A lt h b d idi td ik dj t lti f bjt

fh

bjt d t ffiil i i t i l l tti f h i f d t T t h th i i l

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constitute a protective ethic While this ethic can prevent egregious abuses of science there are strong reasons to move beyond it Sometimes the protective ethic can lead us to ignore other important values If we try to ensure protection before we pursue any other social value then terminal patients may be denied autonomous choices and both women and minorities may be under-represented in research In other cases application of the protective ethic has resulted in too little protection Investigators who conduct research in developing countries have at times interpreted their obligations to protect human subjects in a very narrow fashion These investigators see their research as unproblematic as long as they obtain informed consent and as long as the research does not leave subjects worse off But investigators have an obligation to prevent harm to research subjects under their care When investigators can design a study in a way that prevents harm to their subjects or improves their health they should

References Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (1996) Fil R t New York: Oxford University Press Angell Marcia (1997) The ethics of clinical research in the Third World Th N Eld f Mdiie 337: 847-9 J l Beauchamp Tom and Childress James (1994) Principles of Biomedical Ethics 4th edn New York: Oxford University Press Beecher Henry (1966) Ethics and clinical research N Eld J l f Mdiie 274: 1354-60 (1970) R h d th Idiidl London: Little Brown Brandt A M (1978) Racism and research: the case of the Tuskegee syphilis study The Hti Ct R t 8 (6): 21-9 Brody Baruch (1998) Research on the vulnerable sick In Jeffrey Kahn Anna Mastroianni and Jeremy Sugarman (eds) Beyond Consent: Seeking Justice in Research New York: Oxford University Press Faden Ruth and Beauchamp Tom (1986) A Hit d Th f Ifd C t New York: Oxford University Press Frankena William (1973) Ethis 2nd edn Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Jones J (1993) Bd Bld Th Tk Shili E i t New York: The Free Press d th Phl f Gide New Lifton Robert Jay (1986) Th Ni Dt Mdil Killi York: Basic Books Lurie P and Wolfe S M (1997) Unethical trials of interventions to reduce perinatal transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus in developing countries Th N Eld J l f Mdiie 337: 853-6 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978) Ethil Piil d Gidli f th Ptti f H Sbjt (the Belmont Report) Washington DC: Government Printing Office United States Public Health Service Tk F W ' Hlth I (1985) W ' Health: Report of the Public Health Service pp 73-106

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Further reading Kogan E (1950) Marks J (1978) York: Times Books and Pappworth M H (1968) Beacon Press

l New York: Farrar Straus and Cudahy l New Boston:

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Th fil ti hihliht l f h t i b t dibilit misunderstood if they are viewed in terms of ideal moral theory rather than as problems of what it is just to do under circumstances of significant injustice

U d t d i

Dibilit i R l t i

t S i l Jti

O l l i f i t 15 t fA i tl idtifid dibld ti i i l i th d d i d t i l i d ti A lti ti t th ti ill Yt th description of the classification is contentious In the United States the term is "people with disabilities" emphasizing that the disability is a separable feature of the individual In the United Kingdom the preferred term is "disabled people" liki th d i b i l i t t th ' idtit I F th t les handicapes t th f f t f il t i t ( A l b h t t l 2001 3) Th diff i b i t i l flt th ltil i h i h th t "dibilit" d ltd t h " i i t " " h d i " h b d t d Thi h t l ltil t d d bt t t i l t i l i l (one associated with WHO 1980 until its recent also controversial revisions) An "impairment" is a departure from ordinary biological functioning It rises to the level of "disability" when it limits a major life activity such as moving working or d i A " h d i " lt f il i il i t h th t k d j t t i lf ( h i h " l l th l i fild" b d lf' t h i t ) th hibiti f lf t i t t l ( d l t t d b d d ith ill t t d b i t lf ith l di t f th f lf ill d f i d PGA Tour, Inc. Martin 532 US 661 [2001]) th t t i f t t b ( h i h f f t th l t i diffilti ft t i h l h i l ) (Sil t l 1998 8 9 ) All too frequently terminology in the literature of disability conflates descriptive and normative judgments Terms such as "impairment" while used descriptively in the WHO's classificatory scheme too often also carry normative force such as he j d t tht diti i d i b l (Sil 2002) Th t i l i thi h t i i t d d f ibl t b til t l Th d t tht h i i d h i i i i l j d t tht dit f t i b l f l b f d Th ti d t t h t thi i tt f ffi t h t ht t b t d if ibl i difft d d l t t d li Sil t l (1998 87) i thi l f th flti drawn from genetic counseling: the chance of having a child with an anomalous condition is described as a "risk" carrying the judgment that it is the chance of a bad thing The more neutral description would refer to the "probability" not risk D i t fft t d i t i i h i i l d ti li h it t b k l d d t h t th li b t th t i ti d t b l i th litt B h i d th t i l i l d i t li th f tdbt b t dibil it d jti h l d th f f ttti f dibilit li b i i t dibilit il h d i ? O id th i ht jti i th

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t t t f l h h ri f t i l li Th th l t b lems of justice and disability to a greater or lesser extent in the construction of the world Major policy innovations such as the Americans with Disabilities Act may be assessed differently depending on the model employed On the social model the At lll th iil i h t l i i d i i i t b i t th i f i h t If d i b i l i t i d f t i th h t t t h th ADA th DDA b ti l f thi l di th i l iil ( F i d Sil 2000) Th id t h t li hld f idiidl i i t h b h t i d th " d i l " d l f dibilit S i l ff t i i fl dft in the person whose condition it is A blind person lacks vision a quadriplegic cannot ambulate and a person with Alzheimer's disease has developing cognitive deficits Some philosophers of a naturalizing persuasion (eg Foot 2001) have d tht h j d t b t t l f t i t ti ( l t h h t l) j d t f d bd I i d ii i th b d f th h ri it M dibilit hl h d i l tht thi h f ttitil d t i i t (Sil 1998 A h 2001) Th hl bjt ll t th f t h li tht ti f th problematic vision would be "good" for the person at issue Perhaps the most common approach stemming from the medical model regards disability as a grievous loss to the person who suffers it a loss presumably not his or h flt h i h ll f ti " S i l " d t i tht t t t t k f f t i l dfiit l f thi t h C t i h k d l b l t i i f dibilit li Di bilit i i d t i f i d ith j d t fd f i th th ith diff (Sil 1998) Thi i d t i f t i th l i tht l ith d i b i l i t i t f d f t h l d d tb dt d F til ti h i fd d l d tht f t isolation and dependency rather than independence and selfsufficiency The develop ment of institutions such as "training schools" for the disabled has been attributed to this version of the medical model of disability (Braddock and Parish 2001) t t i d d t lii d i t i h b d f d d I lli l ith d i b i l i t i t d l thi biliti (S 1980) t th fllt d th it ll t b f t f th riti f h ibiliti (Kitt 1999 B d d k d P i h 2001) Th l f i d d t lii i tk i th ADA h i h t i ti f l ith dibiliti lilti Th ADA h b i t t d t i tht public services be provided in the least restrictive setting appropriate {Olmstead v LC 527 US 581 [1999]) However this Olmstead requirement is also subject to the defense that responsibilities are "not boundless" and states are not required to " f d t l l l t " thi i d Thi bttl i t b th tii b j t f lititi i th U i t d S t t it i itiid ti th i d t d i t h t h t th ADA i i f d t l l tt f ti l ith d i b i l i t i f t h i d f i i A fth til itii i tht l i k i th dil dl h ltd i tht d t i ft bfit l ith d i b i l i t i Th i

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id tht " l f " f l ith d i b i l i t i t i t i d tib ute to isolation in lowpaying and lowstatus jobs (Drake 2001) The welfarist approach to disability policy also risks putting people with disabilities in conflict with each other Silvers et al (1998: 24) give the example of a limited transportation b d t d hih l ith d i b i l i t i t f t t A d h i k i ith th dil dl i dibilit li t f th bl f ditibti jti i hlth ith t t th d Efft t t t i i t d lik t t t f th t f ill h l t h Si th bliti f R l ' A Theory of Justice i 1971 ih it f h t ditibti j t i h b d l d ith diffi li cations for disability policy Daniels's (1985) argument that a Rawlsian chooser ignorant of his or her health status would allocate health care to attempt to achieve normal speciestypical functioning across the lifespan is perhaps the best k k i thi i Th P (1989) h d f th liitd l i tht R l i h t ditibti jti hld t t l k f i d h th b i ii k f hlth f ildi th ith d i b i l i t i R l d D k i (1981 b) h td i i dl tht lit i idi l with disabilities with the protections they would find it rational to purchase in a hypothetical insurance market The goal of these approaches is to distribute ustly in the face of disadvantages due to impairments differences in natural endowments bth itht i k i fll btti th f th d i i i t t t llbi ll Oth t h i t h d t h t ditib ti j t i i i b d lit f tit h i d t lit f lf llbi E h f th h t ditibti j t i h f b th bjt f it ti Of l h th til b t thi li ti f dibilit li Th i l i t i h b itiid bth d underinclusive Several themes stand out in the critical literature One is the dis tinction between impairments and significant variations in talent Daniels for example contends that the former fall within the scope of distributive ustice n hlth h th l t t d t A hild h h t i lt f h t h ld th h li th h tht hild h i l h t ld t Sil t l (1998) tht i i l d t i l f th d i t i t i i lki Ath b l t i li i th d i t i t i bt t l i d iti tht lt f il diti h fil t t d t i P (1989) f l bli t h t it i j t for society to compound the effects of natural inequalities This view too is criti cized for lacking a justification of why natural disadvantages are arbitrary from a moral point of view but social disadvantages are not It is also criticized for failing to i h th b t difft titi i th liti f d i f f t i d i i d l ' li O th th id th h h i ll bi d f d l i l l f tifti i th li f l ith d i b i l i t i ( A h 2001) Th l itiid f l i i lif ith d i b i l i t t i f (Ad 1999) Th h l b i d t h t th ll diiihd tti lti f il i j t i t litii

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diiihd d f llbi ( A d 1992) A t h i i th d b t i whether equality requires putting the natural endowments of some to the service of others Defenders of the social model of disability claim that many of these issues can be bypassed if we regard disability not as a defect of the individual but as a diti f it Hlth tii id fl i l l t t i fh th th l t th li l l O l f th b f i t f th t b d i t f l i t d j t d lif (QUALY) Th d b t t d jtifti f QUALY i t i Jh H i (1996 1999) f l h d tht b h idiidl i titld t l tit to benefit from a public healthcare system the use of QUALYs in rationing cannot be justified Julian Savulescu (1998) has contended that if wellbeing is the good achieved by health care there is reason to consider equally the claims to care of t l h ill h diffi liti f lif b t t t i diff til If h l d i t b f t i th f dibiliti th d th i t f l ith d i b i l i t i i th tii t i If li i l d QUALY th iil l h d i t i ill tii dibilit h i i d bilit adjusts the quality measurement downwards (Silvers 1998) To the extent that measurements are nonscalar as Savulescu (1998) contends discounting will not occur Finally there are also data that physicians downgrade life satisfactions in dli ith t i t ith d i b i l i t i d k b l t i d i i t ith hld ithd lt ( A h 2001) Th iidtifiti f dibil it d ill ll i j d t b t lit f lif b f l d b th f t tht h l t h id t likl t b b l d t h l d t l ith d i b i l i t i i ti f ik ( B t t 2001) At th it l f th dil d l i dibilit li t h t f th l il ti f " h d i " ft f il i d world design Our world foregrounds sight to touch legs to wheels and shortterm to longerterm memories Lennard Davis (2000: 56) writes: "An impairment s a physical fact but a disability is a social construction" Had it been designed differ tl th ld i h t h i i l d t h h l d th ditt t P h th ld f d it d b l l fll i h t th t h h i b t thi i f t i f b d diff th th lit l It i l lt f i t t d f f k iti i i t l h d i i f l h f i th d i t f f i t i i t A N l l (1999 173) writes: "Those of us with disabilities tend to have to rely upon Social Security because of the way society is ordered rather than there being an economic situ ation which enables and facilitates our contribution to society" Defenders of focus i dibilit li th il t f hdi d t d th f t f h i l i l diff th th t d t h t th il i f dibilit i ht tt f th it f i f jti B d th iti f th dil dl iti t h b d df d t d i dibilit il h F i t f ll diff i h i l i l f t i d t il t k f t i l i t i th ld W h t 428

DISABILITY

i f t i l i ld i h t b h i h l d f t i l i th S d th social model better accords with the selfunderstanding of people with disabilities who experience their handicaps not as a function of their own deficits but as a matter of barriers erected by the way in which the world is designed (Silvers 1998) P h th t t l it db d f d f th il d l i t h t it d t d ttt h th A i ith Dibiliti A t t d i t i l iil iht l Th A i Ciil R i h t A t f 1964 i d t l i i t b i b d d i bli dti l t d d t i Th ADA f l l thi d i It i l f l t k bl accommodations for otherwise qualified employees Viewed through the lens of he medical model this provision of the ADA "compensates" people for their deficits by accommodations On the civil rights model by contrast the ADA removes barriers hih k it h d f l ith b d i l diff t k th l ith th O thi d l th l i i t t i t " b l d t i " i t liit l d t d il iil I t d it f l t th i tht i di ijti tb i ith tl iti ld d i ( F i d Sil 2000) In defense of the social model Anita Silvers urges the thought experiment of imagining how social practices would be transformed if unimpaired functioning were atypical (Silvers et al 1998: 129) To the extent that our social practices b b d t t h l th itd d d f thi tilit th f t t h t bilit i l i i t t ttitill d i t i h i i d ld ti ld l l diff I th t ld idi i til l t t h i f d i b l d hik hil idi i h l h i iif l k h th l lki (Sil t l 1998 62) O itii fS i l ' t h h t i t i t h t i th t l ld i t l d t h i i d f t i i it i ffit t design for the majority Silvers observes in reply that current world design may not be efficient; "universal" design modalities might have been ust as efficient and more inclusive Moreover from the point of view of justice Silvers argues inclusive i t b f d t ffi Sil i h th t d f f b t i l i d ffi M i l i d t tk difft f i f i i f t iti dibiliti S h i t Sil t d hld b dd bl f ditibti ti f i th th f l ith d i b i l i t i t h l Wh li t b d dh th t bl fjti fit t t h h i i issues for defenders of the social model (Goering 2002) The above discussion suggests that the medical and social models of disability ie in tension with one another Several recent theorists however have contended that d t h t i l l l th h t jti t i flit t l t t h t th t t t h i h th flit i thiki I i f til Did W (Sil t l 1998 W 2000 2001) h l d th iblit t h t th t d t i d i i i t i dl b dd i l t th fj t i C t i hth b d lit f tit lit f lf k t k f idiidl' 429

LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS

d f i i d dl l biliti t t it llbi Compensatory approaches falter from an apparent reliance on limits that cannot be drawn in a principled way They falter as well from regarding people with disabilities as suffering from medical problems diagnosed lacks or deficiencies n llbi h t h i difflti t l t h tt fh it i d B t th f di d i b i l i t d i i i t i flt i it W S i l t f f t b t h th li f l ith dibiliti d th li f l ith i t biliti D i b i l i t d t tht hit f t i t i t i k th f bt t th l t t W t tht idil j t ll f f t th li f l ith b l t training the airplanepropeller mechanic in today's world of et engines for example or limited talents such as mathematical abilities (Silvers et al 1998) Wasserman also points out that changes in society alone are unlikely to ameliorate th i t t i f l ith f d iti d i b i l i t i T h i i b t l it i t f biliti bi bth f i d i i d l diff d th i t f il t bt W (2001) d b t t h t thi h b i fll i i l d tilti H t i t d t h t th f d tl bl i ht jti i i th f f th iti fh diff Viewed in this way the problem foregrounds basic conflicts between efficiency and equality in the design of social institutions Wasserman is pessimistic that more can be said by way of a solution Elibth Ad (1999) h d liitd lti f th di l f lit A d bli t h t th flit tlid b d i t t l t t t f i d t d i th t t f lit Th i f lit i t lit f i d i i d l llbi i it ti di tibti t k f d d b d l k i th t It i t h i d i i d l d i thi i t li I t d th t t f lit h l d b h l lt t th il litil t Thi d t d i tures the traditional target of egalitarianism: undeserved hierarchies that under mine the equal moral worth of persons People should be guaranteed as a matter of equality "the capabilities necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen and idi i " (Ad 1999 327) Th bli i b i d h i t ili d b t f hld b t i l filiti fftil t ll N hld b td t i d b f thi diff b f th l ' ii b t ht ld b d f th Ahii th l f lit ill i diff i ditibti ill h l h i t i b i l l Th diti f l itihi must be afforded as well to those in dependency and their caregivers although spelling out these conditions requires much further work Throughout Anderson's account the lodestar is equal citizenship not equality of tit tifti llbi Yt thi i t i l id t ffi f t fj t i d dibilit W (2001) h t i d t th tht d t i lit i i t t diff h l f Pi hdhi tht d t f f t th bilit t f t i iti i l fft lit f lif th l Withi d t i iti hi W t d l k th h i bl fh t bl ffi

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d lit F i th f ith f d iti d i b i l i t i t be difficult or impossible to guarantee equal citizenship If equality of citizenship includes capabilities to live independently to the extent possible conflicts between efficiency and distribution reappear To be sure Anderson does not claim to have i fll t f th diti f l i t i h i f th ith f d dibiliti h l th i f fth d l t I t d h it t th t f itihi th th th tifti f i t lif db iti i thi d i t i t h t d h t i t th f th f dibilit d t Bt h i t b id b t h t it t t ith f d iti d i b i l i t i l iti

Cognitive Disabilities and Equality If

d t b id b t lit f itihi f ith f d iti d i b i l i t i ht diti h l d it t k ? O d i t i ld b dil thiki f ht lit f i t i h i Ath diti td b Ad (1999) d Sil (2002) ld b t t t t t d l fll count of how to achieve the capabilities of equal citizenship for those with profound cognitive disabilities One motivation for taking cognitive disabilities as a basis for rethinking equality of i t i h i i th i k f iliti Dibilit d t iht t b d b t kid f t tht tk t d d i f l tt d ith f d dibiliti liiti F l i th i l iht dbt f d l dibld h ti d t t f hth li b d bt h d h i l N h i l it i id l t h t i t i tht f d l dibld h d t thus it is inconsistent to argue that all and only humans have rights What disturbs disability advocates about this argument is that it treats profoundly disabled humans as marginal and marginalized cases (Fairbairn 1991; Byrne 2000) Whether the t thi ti t t i hift i d t d i fb i t t th h t f thi h l f d t i t i h i difft tt S l t t h i t h d t h t th i l i t i f iti dibilit h t thi i it f d t l Aldi M l t (1999) t d tht ll " d d t t i l i l " d th h d f th i t th ft fd d h hi h t b i l th E Kitt (1999) t h t th h i iti f hih i i l fj t i t b d f d d must be reconceptualized to incorporate dependency Kittay's view is not merely that we must rethink the substantive demands of justice to recognize the nevitabil ity of dependency It is that the very moral point of view is itself a position of d d Bth Kitt' d M l t ' k h i th i f dibilit i li di l t i h i ith th Kitt f l i l l iht i h d i i fh t it ili bth th ith d i b i l i t i d th h d th k f ll Kitt' k t i l l h l bl th li bt th i i f i f dibilit f j t i i it d th i i f f dibilit f d t d i 431

LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS

f th j t fjtifi i i l fjti C t h i S t k (1997) h diti guished between a decision procedure for selecting principles of ustice and the substantive principles of justice themselves To incorporate dependency into the Rawlsian choice procedure as an additional feature of the perspective from which i i l fj t i t b jtifd i li t difft l l f th li tht tt fj t i l i d t th h d d t d th h f th Kitt bli t h t th f i i d t hi th l t t b t it i t l h thi h l d b A d i i d iht i i i l fj t i t b j t i f i d t th h d d t ll t th h tl t t ti i t h i li thik f t h l i d d t rational agents It might achieve the project of justification on behalf of those with profound disabilities by constructing representatives for them In this way t would assign independent moral status as subjects of justification to all The substantive i i l f jti tht ld lt f thi h t h t i l d i i d iht b thi lik th t f lit f d t i itihi tht Ad f Th iht l i l d t f th ith iti diff tl t t bi ht l thi iht t tt i t f th d l t fthi iti What kind of a justification might be forthcoming on the other hand when the decision procedure itself features dependency? Kittay suggests that dependency ought to be added to Rawlsstyle decision procedures but provides no account of h t th lti j t i f i t i h t b lik (H btti t ll d i t d t th t l d i ijti i t t t t f l ith d i b i l i t i d k ) Th i k f l i d d t th h t f d f jtifi i i l fj t i i t h t th i i f f th i d d f li ill b l t t th l l f j t i f t i 0 th btti l l ll k b hl i t t d i dibilit i h tk ttill b l t i diti b t d t d i f tonomy and the nature of the individual In her work on people with Alzheimer's disease Jaworska (1999) argues that the capacity to value and with it the capacity to exercise autonomy in at least rudimentary form can persist in the face of major iti l F J k th it t l i th tti f ' i i t t i f It d t i b t biliti f til h th bilit t thik l ih l f 1 A ith A l h i ' di h ti f hilf itit t h h h d th i f th tiit ftht it id t l Wht tt i hi f i t t Wh t ld b others then help him to apply those values to make decisions they are helping him to achieve autonomy The "prosthesis" of assistance in decisionmaking in the form of a surrogate functions much on the analogy of the prosthesis of assistance i blti J k d t t k thi it fth t d i i f it i l i t i f d t d i f th lf B t h i th " l f " h tiit i d i i k i iht b d t d t d d lf d f th l f th A l h i ' tit d th i kill f th t Oth it dibilit h i f t tk thi t E d d (1997) f

432

DISABILITY

l t d tht idiidliti d t d i f th lf ill constituted is more fertile ground for understanding disability as integral to identity But the wisdom of abandoning the idea of the ontological independence of the self or the value of autonomy might well be questioned The risk of Jaworska's ap h i l f th d i t i t i bt th l f th ith d i b i l i t i d th l th h f d ith hi T th t t t h t th thti b i t f t i til f th ith d i b i l i t i ihi th i t th th th ft f li f l th li ill b b l d C t i l th li bt ' l d th l th h ith f hi b difflt t d cases Values of parents and their children with disabilities may be the same or utterly intertwined (Ferguson 1998) But the line may nevertheless matter if the possibility of conflicts between the values of the person with disabilities and the l f th i t b k l d d Th i d d f th lf tt f lll Witht h i d d th d f i h th i d i idl hld t i hi h iht b ddl tbl I d d it i bl t h t th t fd l i t f d t i itihi f l ith f d dibiliti f t h d b th ibilit f independence and the understanding of what autonomy requires At the outset t should be noticed that there are many different kinds of cognitive disabilities and what is required to pursue equal citizenship in the face of these differences may i d l (B 2000) B ti b d i b i d l ditbi hit f ti liti d i l ith iti d i b i l i t i P t (2001) d i b h b d t d i t i t t i l i t i h b l d b fft t li th i t t i f l ith iti i t A t di t t i h l l k f thi h Wh (1998) h d l d t f l f d t i t i f l ith j iti i t hih d t d l f d t i t i th f t l ' life and destiny For peopl