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I N THE
Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962
Sheldon Anderson
sqiqy - - A Me...
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I N THE
Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962
Sheldon Anderson
sqiqy - - A Member of the Pcrseus Rooks Croup
All rights reserved, Printed in tlne United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmined in any form or by any means, electronic or mecl-ranical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from tl-republishec Co)pyxlight O 2001 by Weslrview Press, A Member of tlne Perseus Bcwks Gro~up Publislned in 2001 in the United States of Amex-icaby Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hidrs Coy" Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford (11X2 9JJ Find us o n the Irilclrfd Wide Web at www.,weeslrviewpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Anderson, Sheldon R., 1951A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc : Polisln-East German relatio3ns : 1945-1962 / Siheldon Anderson, p. m. Inct~icZesbibliographical referencs and index, ISBN Q-813SF-3783-6(pb) 1, Potand-Foreign relation emany (East), 2. Germany (East)-Foreign relatic~nePotand. 3, Poland-Foreign relat.i0ne194~"i-1989, l. Title.
F88
ON DEMAND
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Contents Lisf of I~~ust~ations A c ~ ~ o w l e ~ ~ ~ ~ s List o ~ A ~ b r # ~ t i o n ~ A b ~ Usedefbr Archival ~ ~References ~ ~
xi xiii XV
~
~
Introduction
xvii
1
Notes, 8 1
“There Are No Good Germans”: The Myth of Proletarian Internationalism, 1945-1949
10
The Prospects for German Communism, 12 The German and Polish Communists Before 1945,13 The PPRs Anti-German Propaganda, 15 The SED Promotes Socialist Solidarity with Poland, 17 Gomu€ka’sFall and the Stalinization of Party Relations, 19 Notes, 23
2
The Controversy over the Oder-Neisse Border, 1946-1949
31
Poland’s Claims to the Oder-Neisse Border, 33 The SED Rejects the Oder-Neisse Line, 35 The SED Officially Recognizes the Oder-Neisse Border, 40 Notes, 46 3
The Myth of the Stalinist Brotherhood, 1949-1954
52
Poland and the German Problem, 59 Polish-German ”Friendship,” 61 The New Course and the June Uprising in the GDR, 65 Notes, 68 4
The Problems of German Repatriation, Reparations, and Trade, 19451953 The Problem of the Germans in Poland, 7 7
76
viii
Cunfenfs
Repatriation of the Germans from Poland, 1949-1953,79 Disputes over Reparations and Trade, 1945-1953,82 The Synchronization of the Socialist Economies, 194&1953,84 Notes, 89 5
German Remilitarization and the Polish Thaw, 1954-1955
94
Poland and the East German Peoples’ Army 102 The SED Restricts Cultural Contacts, 103 Notes, 108 6
Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization Speech and Gomdka’s Return to Power, Januaxy-Octaber,1956
114
The Poznah Revolt, 117 The Border Controversy Resurfaces, 120 Gomuh’s Election as First Secretary, 122 The Suppression of the Hungarian Revolt, 127 Notes, 129 7
The Cold Winter of Folish-East German Relations, 1956-1957
134
The SED Limits Cultural Exchanges, 138 UIbricht Rejects Gomutka’s National Road to Communism, 141 The Debate over Collectivization, 144 Poland’s Western Territories, 146 Heymann’s Recall, 148 The Harich Affair, 149 Lasota and the Closing of PO Prostu, 151 Notes, 153 8
Gomugka’s Trade Policies and the Recurring Problem of German Repatriation, 1953-1957
159
Poland’s Trade with the West in 1956,161 Gomulka’s Foreign Economic Policy, 164 The Recurring Problem of the Germans in Poland, 169 The Registration of the Germans in Poland, 172 Notes, 176 9
Gomuika’s Foreign Policy and the First UlbrichtGomuika Summit, 1956-1957 The SED Tightens Controls on Tourism, 189
184
Contents
Gomulka Meets Ulbricht, 190 The Aftermath of the Summit, 195 Relations at the End of 1957,198 Notes, 199 10
The Rapacki Plan and the German Question, 1957-1959
204
Poland’s Relations with West Germany, 207 The Berlin Crisis, 211 The Problem of Trade with West Germany and West Berlin, 213 Notes, 217 11
The Right Road to Socialism and Ulbricht’s Visit to Poland, 1958-1959
222
Cultural Relations Remain Frozen, 224 The SED Criticizes PZPR Church Policy, 226 The December Summit, 228 No Consensus on Germany or the Border, 232 Notes, 235 12
The GDR as a Model €orPolish Socialism, 1959-1961
241
Ongoing Problems in Cultural Affairs, 244 Defending the Oder-Neisse Border, 248 The SED and Gomuka’s Policy Toward the West, 249 Toward Detente in 1961,253 Notes, 254 13
The Berlin Wall and the Dittente in Polish-East German Relations, 1961-1962
259
The Border and Germany, 262 Unresolved Policy Differences, 264 Chronic Economic Disputes, 246 The Third Gomulka-Ulbricht Summit, 272 Notes, 276 Conclusion
283
Notes, 288 B~&~iu~ffpky Unpublished D o c u m t s , 289 Published Documents, 289
289
Cuntmts
X
Memoirs and Collecred Works, 290 Books, 291 Articles, 294 Nmspapms and Periodicals, 298 Index
299
Illustrations
Otto Grotewohl and J6sef Cyrmkiewicr signing the Zgorzelec agreement recognizing the Oder-Neisse border, Zgorzclec, Poland, July6, 1950
53
GDR President Wilhelm Pieck and PEP President Bolesiaw Bierut h Warsaw, December 1950
54
GDR President Wilhelm Pieck reviewhg Polish troops h WarsawI December 1950
55
J6sef Cyrankiewicz, Wiadyslaw Gomuika, and Walter Ulbricht at the East German Peaple's Parliame~~t in Berllk on October 19, 1962
272
Wiadyslaw Gomutka, J6sef Cyrankiewicz, and Walter Ulbricht reviewing East Gemall troops at the Brmdenburg Gate, October 19,1962
273
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Acknowledgments :I am deeply indebted. to many people who contributed to the completion of the book. I would like ta thank the archivists at the Archiwum Akt Nowych and the Archirrrt~mSpraw Zagrmicznych in Warsakv, and the Stiftung Archiv der Partei und Massenorganizationen and the Archiv des Aussmmhisteriurrt der DPZR in Berlin. Thanks to their efficiency and cooperation, 1 was able to complete my research in a timely manner. I would also like to thank the Deutsche Akadernische Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Kernan hstitute of Advmced Russim Studies, and Miami University for trhejr gelrerous grants to kilitate my search in Poland, Germmy, and Washislgton D.C. The book would not have been possible without the gracious hospitality of my good friends in Warsm Marek and Rasia Roszkowski, and 1%ter Meitz in Berlin, all of whom made my European research visits so comfortable and el7ljoyable. I would like to give a special thanks to Professor Tom Taylar, who task his precious time to read and critiyue the manuscript. Last but not least, I am b r e w grateful to my wife, Kristie, for enduring long periods of separation whiie I did rcsearclh in Europe, and for her patience and understandhg as :Iworked on the manuscript.
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Abbreviations 1 have used tfie Germall and Polish abbreviations with the exception of commonly translated cases, such as FRG. ADN CC CDZT C CzCP DBD
DWK ECSG FDGB
mJ
FDP FRG GDR
Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Srvice) Cerztral Committee Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratk Union) Communist Party of the Soviet Union Czechoslovak Carnmmzist Party Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands (German Democratic Peasmt Party) Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (Germm Economic Commission) European Coat and Steel Community Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union) Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free G e m m Youth) Freie Dernokatisehe Partei (Free Democratic Party) Federal Republic of Germany (BundesrepublikDeutschland) German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) Komitet Centrahy (Central Committee of the PPR/PZPR) Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germmy ) Komunistyczna Partia Potski (Communist Party of Poland) Krajowa Rada Narodowa (National People's Council) Kasernierte Vslks;polizei (Peaple's Pollice in Barracks) Liberale Demokratische Partei (Lfieral Democratic Pasty) Lmdwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft (Agricultural Production Co-operative) National-Demoksatische Pastei Deutschlmds (National Democratic Party of Cermmy) New Ecmornic Policy Nationale Votksamee (National Peoyle" A m y )
Polska Pastia Robotnicza (Polish WorkersTasty) Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Sociatist Party) People's Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) Polskie Stromictwo tudowe (Polish PeasantsTarty) Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robofnicza (Polish United Workers' Party) 5D Str0michn;o Demokratycme O)emocratic Party) SDKPiL Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Detltschlands (Socialist Unity Pasty of Gemany) Stromictwo Ludowe (PeasantsfParty) Soviet Military Administration in Germa"y Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Gemany) Urzad Rady Ministr6w (Bureau of the Council of Mhisters) Zentralkomitee (Central Committee of the SED) Zwigzek modzieiy So~alistyerny(S~cia1ist Ycruth U ~ ~ i a n ) Zjednoczone Stromictwo Ludowe (United Peasants' Party)
Abbreviations Used for Archival References
GenfzarzArchives BRD U Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Politisches Archiv des Aus1/~13rtigen Amtes (Federal Repuh)ic of Germany Political Archive of the Foreign Office), Emn, BRD BfGRF Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bundesministerium fiir gesamtdeutsch Fragen (Federal Republic of Germany, Federal. Mhistry for AL1-German @estions)], Koblenz. BRD B U Bundesrczpublik Deutschland, Buntfeskanderamt (Federal Republic of Gemany Federal Chancellor's Office), Koblenz. UUR MAA Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Ministerium fiir Auswgrtige Angelegenheiten, Palitisches Archiv des AuswBrtigen Amtes (German Democratic Republic. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Political Archive of the Foreig~nOffice), Berlin. t)l>R MfAurH Deutsche Demokratisrhe Republik, Ministerium fiir Aussenhandel und Innerdeutsehen Handel (German Democratic Republic, Mirzistry for Foreign Trade and Imer-German Trade), Potsdam, DDR MR Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Ministerrat (German Demcsatic Republie, Councjl of Ministers), Potsdm. SER ZK Sozialititische Einhei.tspartei DeutschZands, Zentsatkomitee (Socialist Unity Party, Central Committee), Berlh.
KWGK
Komitet Wspbgpracy Kuh;lraln? z Zagranica (Co tee for Culttrrd Cooperation with Foreign Countries), 1Narsaw.
xuiii
MSZ
MZC) PZPR KC
U r n BP
Abbrevia tiorjs Used fir A rcf.iiz?~f RC~~~T~PIC
Ministerstm Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Fore i w AfiFairs), Warsw. Ministerstwo Ziern Odzyskanych (Ministry of Reeovered Territories), Warsaw Palska Zjednoczona Partia Rsbatnicza, Komitet Centrainy (Polish United Workers' Party; Central CO tee), Warsaw tlrzgd I-Cady Ministrriw, Biura Prezidialne (Bureau of the C-au~zclilof Mhisters, Preside~zt'sOffice), Warsaw
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Introduction The ulliarzcr ofthc f u ~ ~zutbtzs o [Ger-mtur~ and PoEistzl is . . . not by atzy means u beatrfiful dreunr, u L-haunrifzgitllask~n;tzo, gentlenten, if is un itterrifahl~nc.@essifyrpsulfifzg front fhc confmoifinferc.sfsof fizc firm ~gfio~)1ts. -Fr&r-Irich Engela 184P
I crossed the Oder-Neisse border for the first time in 1987 on an overnight trajn from Hanover to Warsaw. As the traixr approached Frankfurt/Oder around miefnight, f was aroused from n-ty sleep by a phalanx of gmff East German border guards and customs agents..They took aver three hours to check documents and comb the train from top to bottom for stowways and contraband. I had experienced many close inspections m d lo11g delays on trips between West m d East Germany; but the East Gemans seemed to be even more vigilant along their border with Poland than they were on their western border, across which sat enemy NATO troops. The incident prornpted me to ask my East German and Polish Friends about their impressims of relations between the Germm Demcratic Republic (GDi) and the People's R~epublicof Poland (PRP). On the one hand, the East Germans rerjponded &at interstate relations were cordial and emphasized their govemmcmt%constmctive political, cultural, and economic chats to brjng the two peorfcs together. C h the other hand, they often harhored old, prejudices; that is, the Poles were lazy, disorganized, and untrustworthy Many complained &out Poles who crossed the border to buy up scarce East Germm collsumer goods. The Poles afso had ambjguous opinions about the East Gemans. Although some criticized the East Germans' arrogance, dogmatism, and davish adherczmce to Stalinism, they begrudgingly respected the GDR's economic and technical achievements. But the Polish attitude can be summarized i n the old saying fak Swiat Swinte~~, ~zieb d z i e Nkmirrc Pttkzkowi brategg (As long as the wodd is hvhole, no German will, be a brother to a Pole),"
This filial refermce is an apt metaphor for East German-Polish refations after World W a IT, The East Germans m d Poles were like siblings born into the Soviet fmily: N'R maner how much they quarreled, t h y could not leave it. They curried favor with the paternal cmter while pursuing conflict* naticmal interests..'f'he msult was a ""cold war" of misu~~derstmdh and g distrust. Like the Cold W;;rrbetween the Soviet Union m d the United States, there were times of d6tente and times of crisis, but in the end the East German and Polish commlanist parties had irreconcilable national diMeremces. Furthermore, the illegifimcy of the East Qrman and.Poiish communist governments precluded an honest =conciliation between their peoples. This study seeks to fill severd gaps in the history of East German-Palish relations in. the context of the Cold War. Much has been written about relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after World War H; but scholars have paid relatively little attention to East European c m munist party relations and t ~ a t e dthem as though they were alwa)is dictated by Moscow. Marxist historians of Soviet bloc relatiom told an incomplete and slanted story of closc? cooperation and friendship; Pofish and East German historians such as Eugeniusz Gajda and Werner Hgnisch sirnply imitated vacuous party pm"pagan& promoting hatem1 friel~dshipand mutual sodaljst goals." When the United States adopted a policy of cmtainjng Swiet expansionism after the war, Western policy makers and scholars pmpagated the idea that the Kremlin. was running a monolithic communist movement. The communist takeovers in Eastcrn Europe by 1.948, the victory of the communists in China in 1948, Mao Zedangfs alliance with fosef Stalk, m d the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 confirmed this perception. Throughout the Cold War, Western Europe and the tlnited States based their security policy and defense spending on a cmfrorrtatio~~ with the Soviet bloc countries, Western policy makers assumed, as perhaps they had to assume, that if war broke out the communist states would constitute a cohesive fighting force. The geopolitical world was sitnplified into a bipolar system that either ignored or downplayed differences within the two opposirrg blocs. fn the mid,-f;960s,Zhiglriew Krzezinski was one ol the first scholars to argue that relations within the communist world we= more complicated than that. He contended that national interests in Eastern Europe still had an important role to play in interparty relations: The Communist camp as a collective entity is guided by purposes which are said to reflect its colledive interest. At the same time, within these dorninant, universal objectives there are also the specific, particular interests of
the component units. Occasionally, and almost inescapably, a clash between the universal and particular takes place, and much of the history of relations beween Communist states has to be written in terms of such conRicts.4
In the 3970s, several scholars took up Brzezinski's call fnr serious studies of Soviet bloc relations. Roger Kmet noted that historians usually focussed m the deviatjon of satelli& foscign policy from Moscw%, while ignoring the foreign policy differences between the satellites thernsel~es.~ In the case of East Germany; Peter Merkl wrote that "East Germm foreign policy for many years has been ignored by Wstern scholars and even journaiists m the assumption that it was unlikely to be much mom than a mere instrwent of Soviet forcign poljcy.""hI"oitical scientist Peter Marsh agrcled: "An hterpretation of East German foreign policy . . . as one consistmt development towards the role of most trusted supporter of the Sobrief Union would be grossly simplistic."7 There is also a dearth of histories on Polish. foreign policy after World War II. In the mid-197tfs, James F. Morrison identified a general need for foreip poIisy sludies of the East European countries, and Poland specifically He also noted that analysts had main):y focused on the means that the Soviet Union used to control its satellites" foreign policic?s." Recent works on Soviet foreign policy toward Eastern Europe have suggested that the commnist parties enjoyed greater latitude thm many Western scholars and policymakers prmiously thought. madislaw Zubok and Constantine Pleshakav confirmed that Soviet control over their East European allies was haphazard; they argued that Stalin had no master plan for the communization of the area or desips fctr a separate socialist German state.Worman Naimark and Inessa fazhborovskaia corroborated this view of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Germany as unplanned and reactiwe, although the German Communist Party (KPDISED) was more tightly cmtrolled.10 Despite much new evidence to the contrary, the simplistic view of the Zlig~larworld persists. In his 3999 study cJf the postwar Europe, M m Trachtenberg wrote: People still think of the Cold War as a simple two-sided conflict, a kind sf gigantic arm wrestle on a global scale. But this view, 1 believe, is profoundly mistaken. A purely bipolar system would have been quite stable: Soviet power and American power vvoutct have balanced each other sa csmpletely that the risk of general war would have been minimal. But we know the Cold War was a serious conflict.11
Until 1989, the biggest obstacle to writkg an accz~ratehistory of relatjons between the communj.st parties in Eastern Europe was a lack of
archival evidence. Using previollsly classified Polish and East German communist party and foreip mhistry cltocuments, my research seeks to build an the w o r k of Chose who have argued th& the Polish and East German comunists pursued cmfljcting national htctrests first and foremost. As Rrzezinski pointed out, ""illhe Polish Communist preached and practiced a fanat-icalnational hatred somewhat out of step with the doctrinal concepts of relations between nationalities.W G e m m historim Frmz Sikora, in his study of Polish-East German relations, also concluded that their shared commmist commmity did not, in bis words, "kad to a disappearance of the average :Pole%prejudice and distmst of Germms or to their trust in a long lasting understanding with their neigh:bor to the west""13 Given the cdul-ies of conflict between Pdes and G e r m s (especiauy those Germans of the Rrandenberg-Prussia area that comprised a large past of the Soviet zone), continued enxnity between them was hardly surprising, regardless of their political affiliation. Nazi Germany" long occupation and thorough etevastation of Poland in World W r :IIwas the latest and most a w M chapter in this confmntation. S i b r a argued that the Poles did not really want "reconciliation" [ksiihnung] with the Germans after the war; the Poles' rapid and often harsh expulsion of Gern ? Poland only exacerbated theis mutual hatreds." m e expellees mans b horn Pofand represented over one-fifth of the popuhtion in the Soviet zone in the late 1940s. It was indeed a mighty task for the parties of the Polish and German Left to convince the masses, as well as their own party members, that Poles and Germans shared a common socialist destiny. Many commlanist leaders did not believe their own propaganda on this point. The ebb m d Bow of East German-Polish relations cibviously depended on their patronage from the Soviet Union and the contingencies of the Cold War. The Kremlin ultimately determhed the fate of the satellite partics, and the freedom that Moscow allowed the parties often fluctuated with the Wst. Althougl~the Polish and with the state oE Soviet ~1aticl.m East German communists could not stray too far ken? Moscow's forraignpolicy line, they promoted their lrespective natimd interests whenever possible. 'T"here are notably few rekrences in the Polish and East German communist party and foreign ministry archives to Moscow% directives regarding their relations, Athough much of what was said was undoubtedly kf t u11recorded.1~" Guidance m d patronage from the Soviet Unian did not bring the Polish and East German communi.sts any closer. Un the contrary, they were less trusting of each other because of their competiticm f i x MoscotrY's favor, a situation that the Sovi,ets used to their own advantage. Because Lenh" sotto, "Nationalist in form and socialist in content" " h adnot re-
ally =solved the htense national rivalries h the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership found the tried and true imperial policy of divide ef il~per*uexpedient inmaintaining their disparate and far-Bumg empisc.. It is nut the purpose of this study to chrmicle d l the ecmomic, cultural, and political ties between Poland and East Germmy from I945 to 1962.1 havc intentionally foclnssed on those issues t-hat hvere persiste~~tly contentious; First was the dispute over Pdand's administration of German territories east of the Oder m d Western (Lttsacian)Neisse border. 111 194fiPthe SED adopted a platform calling for a revision of the border, but finally had. to recognize the Oder-Neisse ljne in 1948. The Polish communists knew that the Soviets had forced the East Germans to adopt this position; repeated nnanifest&ions of revisionism in the SED and the GDR made this all too clear. Second, the two parties could not reach a consmsus on policy toward the West, particularly West Germany. The SED claimed that it was conductjng a socialist fareig policy in tine with the Soviet Union m d supportive of workers everywhere. Poland adapted a more ~alistic,less idealistic pdicy. Walter tllbricht insisted Ihat %saw f"c>l.low :his lead on the German question, and freyuent confrontations occurred over Poland's unilateral attempts to develop p0litic.d and economic ties to the FRG and West Berlin. In 1957, friction developed over a Polish plan to create a nuclear-frtze East Centsat Europe (includk~gthe FRG), in part because it was not m East Germm idea. Third, the East German and Polish communists WE in open conft,ict over Marxist-Leninist ideology and the comct road to socialism..The two parties guarreled over censorship, coliectivization, church policy, tourist traffic, cultural &fairs, and mny other dmestic policies. The East Qrman communists often compounded ideological diilerences by adopting an arrogmt and condescending demeanor toward their Polish comrades, British historian Mary Fwlbrook has characterized German communism as having "a f russian compkxion,"lb whiCh, according to Polish scholar Leslaw Kut-win, feabred "dopatism, intolcrmce, and chauvinism."~~ f have deliberately included nllmerous oMicid reports on cz~1turalexchanges to itlustsate the animosity that existed on party, government, and unofficial levels. The sheer number of such incidents is evidmce of the communists' utter faihre to dcvclop better personal relationships. Many exchanges seemed to do more harm than good in breaking down cJLd stereotypes and promoting gmuine friendships. Much to t-he embarrassment of both c o m u n i s t r&gim,es,many of their own officials, as well as the average citizen, preferred to make contacts with Mlest Germans, The most serious ideological rift came in 1956. After being etipelled from the party in 1,949, Wiadysiahv C;omulka returned to power on a platform that directly challenged the tenets of Stahism. Fearful that the
PZPKs reforms woulld destabilize the GDR, the SEI) cut off m a y cultural exchmges, shortrd up b0rdc.r controls along the Oder-Neisse, and instituted vjsa requirements for Poles. Altkough Gomnlka eventually proved to be a loyal Warsaw Pact partner and even supported the military intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968, Wlbricht never forgot that Gomulka was the product of a potentiaw dangerous reform movemetnt. Fourth, bitter disputes arose time and time again over trade. In the early postwar years, the SED vhemently opposed paying reparations to Polmd. Although trade grekv significantly in the first few years after the GDR was founded in 1949, it did not reach the levels that the East Germans wanted. I'he SED repeatedly accused the Poles of conducting a foreign economic policy that was hilaical to the interests of the GDR and the socialist camp, especially when Pdmd"s trade with capitalist countries increased irr the mid-1950s. The Polish commrmists wew not persuaded by East German arguments that the GDR had to achieve a standard of living comparable to that of capitalist West Germany. As trade negotiators on both sides =cognized, the muddled trade situation also had negative political ramificationss Finally, friction steadily grew over the status of the Germans in Poland. Many wanted to emfgrate, but the Polish authorities were re1uct;mt to allow the GDR to act as the Germans' sole representative. The Polish government often favored B m % htermts in regard to these Germans, but the East Germans viewd this as an unacceptable deviaticm from socialist solidarity. 1 have employed a loose chronological narrative whenever possible, but some recurring disagreements over the Oder-Neisse bordele, trade, and G e r m n repatriation from Poland are add-ressed in separate chapters. Chapter 1introduces the interwar links between the Polish and German communil;ts, and postwar ~ l a t i o n in s the context of the communfst takeover h Poland and the Germm cmmunist movement in the Soviet zone. Chapter 2 examixres the Oder-Neisse problem horn 1945 to the creation of tbe GDR in 3949. When the SED ~ e d campaiped y for a border change in 1946, it confirmed Polish suspicions that the German c m m u nists were nationalists in Marxist clothes. Although the SED eventually had to recopize the border, mmy party members remained steadfastly opposed to it. Chapter 3 cwers the period from 1949 to the turmoil in the Soviet bbc following Stalin's death in 1953. Disputes had to be hidden to maintain the illusion of mnity in Stalin" et~pire;relations between the SED and the PZPR wem correct, but plagued by persistent ideologicall debates and trade squabbles. Chapter 4 is devoted to a closer examhation of economic relations and the problem oi German refugees from Poland and of Germans who re-
mahed there, Ulsagl-eements over these subjects in the early postwar period contributed to the general feeling cm both sides thilt national interests trumped socialist soXidarity Chapter 5 examines the period after StaXin" death in 1953 to 1956, when the Mremlh" more liberal New Course allowed the Poles to raise many of these outstanding issues in pzlblic. Nttch to lheir cmsternation, however, the SED again broached the suhject of a bosder revisim, I have devoted four chapters to the volatile events surrouneiing Khrushchets secret speech i,n 1956,Gomuika's rclturn to power in October of that year, and the SED" ddenunciation of Gomulka" policies in 1957, when relations reached their lowest point. Chagter 6 deals with the impact of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization on relations between the two parties; the SEDfsrejection and the PZPR" acceptance of de-Stalinization set the tone for East German-Polish relations for several years. Chapter 7 takes a closer took at the SEWS reaction to Gomuitka%return; how Ulbricht tried to build a firewall against the reforms of the Polish October; and Gomulka" ideas about a national road to socialism. Witer Wlfgitng Harich's arrest and i m p r i s o ~ ~ mon e ~ charges ~t of conspiring with Polish intellectuals revealed UZbrichtk determination to avoid an. ""East German O~tober.~' Chapter 8 returns to the problems of trade and the Germans in Poland in the context of th Wlbricht-Gmulka rivalry, Chapter 9 covers the serious lack of foreign policy ccrordination between the two Warsw Pact partnas as well as the fisst face-to-face meting between tl'lbricht and Gomuika in the summer of 1957, Aside from the Oder-Meisse border, the most sensitive issue for Polish-East German relations was GDKs role in the question of G e r m unjfication. Chapter 10 focuses on the disagreements over the Polish foreign minister%plan for denuclearizing East Central Europe, the socralled Rapacki Plan. Chapter f7, examines the many dumestic-policy differences that continued to undermine the relationship in the late 1950s as well as the impact of the Berlin crises and the East German leader Wafter Ubricht's coal reception in Warsaw in 19558.This second meeting hemeen UIbricht and Gomuika did not clear the atmosphere, ?"he pride of the East German communists in their stable politic& situation and relathely successful economy was readjly appme"t in the early 1960s. Chapter 12 describes the ongoing ideological M a t e s between the SED and the PZPR over agricultura'i policy, trade, religious and artistic freedom, and the East Germcranskonstant sermonizing about the virtues of their road to socialism. Chapter 13 recounts Gomult'ka'?ireluctant acceptance of the B e r h Wall in 1961 and the uneasy dti;tente that developed after his third meeting with Ulbricht in the fall of 1962,
4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6: 1845-4848 (Mosccjw: Progress Publishers, 3976), p. 389. Quoted from Engels's speech in Londctn on Ncjvernber 29,1847, to mark the seventeenth anniversary cjf the Polish uprising af 1830, 2, Qucjted from Ines Mietkowsh-bisel; "Zur br6derlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen polnischen und deutschen Kornrnunistm und Antifaschisten nach dern Sieg Gber den deutschen Faschismus (1945-1949)'' (On the fraternal cooperation between the Polish and German Co unists and anti-fascists after the victory ower German fasdsm, 1945-1949), Jnlt&uelifgr Gesciric!tte &r sozialisfisclzen LWtzder Eurapns (Yearbook for the history af the scjcialist countries af Europe) 23, no, 1 (1979), p. 51. 3. Eugeniusz Cajda, Potskn Potifyka Zagm~zif-zna,19462971: Pudstnworoe Problerrzy (Polish foreign policy, 1944-1971: Basic prcsblems) (Wrsaw: Ministerstwa Obrony Narcjdowy, 1972); and Werner P-ignisch, A~rssezzpotitz'kzknd itzterr-zationnk Bezielfungen der DUE, 2949-1955 (The foreign policy and international relatians of the GDR, 1949-1 955) (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 15272). 4. D i p i e w Brzezinski, The Soukt Bloc: Uztz'Cy and Co1:zPict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196l), p. ix; see Gabrief Fisckter, ""Nationalism and Internationalism in Hungary and Rumania," Canadian Slamztic Papers, no. 1(191;8),The Rc3manian det~iationfrom the Warsaw Fact has been documented. Fischer concluded that national intel-ests played, in his words, "a substantial role in shaping and reshaping relations among socialist countriesf'; see also Yamis Valinakis, "Diversity in the Warsaw Pact: Bulgarian and Rumanian Scurity Pel-ceptions," Batkarl Stlidies, na. 1 (1984). Valinakis also revealed the widdy divergent security interests of Bulgaria and Romania and the lack of strategic policy coordination on the Warsaw Pact's southern Rank. 5. Roger Kanet, "Research on East European Foreign Policy: Other Needs, Other Areas, New Directions," in Konald H, Linden, ed., The Foreig~Potieie~of East Ezrropc: New Apprmches (Mew York: Praegex; 1980), p. 313. 6. Peter H, Merkl, Cermalz Foreigi~tPolicirn, West and East: 0 1 2 f k TIzreslzotd of n New Ezz(rol1en~Em (Santa Bahara, Calif,: ABC-CLio, 1974), p. 90. 7.Peter Marsh, "Foreign Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic," in Hannes Adomeit, ed., Forizig~Poliq M ~ k i ~ zifig Conzmunis t Countries (London: Saxon House, 1979), p. 106; see also Wilhelm Bruns, Die Aussenpc?litik der DDR (The foreip policy of the GDR) (Berlin: Colloquium VerXag! 1985), p. 24, Bruns also found that researchers had limited knowledge of relations belrv\reen the 30cialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and tlze other communist:padies in Eastern Europe. 8. James E Mc~rrison,"The Foreign Prjlicy of Pr>land,"in James KuNmann, ed., Tke firei8.12 Policies c?f East Euroije: Domes tic a~zdIn ternat z'onckl Determinnn ts ( b yden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1978), p, 129, 9. VXadisXaw Zubak and Constantine Pleshakov, X~zsidethe KrillrzlilzS Cold War: Fmm Stalin to KJarushc!tez~(Cambridge: Haward University Press, 39526). 10. Norman Naimark, The Russ-in~si ~ zGerma~y:A Histo~yof tlze Sozliet Zone of Ocezrpation, 1945-1 949 (Cambridge: Harvard Universiq Press, 1995); and Inessa
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"There Are No Good Germansff: The Myth of Proletarian Internationalism, 1945-1949 There are 110good Eerrnanli . . . a Ger?~tnt? con~al-rnislis alwaps a d al~oz?e all a EFYtnnt? zulito places Gerntarz ilzferesfsal~oz?c the inlcrrtafiarznl solihrifj! of fhe prcllefnrial. - T ~ w h N s h West Iflrzslii-Mteiin Poztzafis
:It wodd be a formidable task for any Polish gove ent, let alone a commmist one, to recoacilc Che Polish people with their neighbors to the west and east. World War It was the latest and most tragic chapter in a long history of conflict between Russians and Poles and between Germans and Poles. For centuries, Poles had resisted the German D u a ~ ~Nach g Ostmz and Russian expansionism, Polish national, identity was linked to the early modem commonwealth that stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Blaek Sea and i t s heroic struggles against Che Germans, hssians, and Swedes, Poland stood as a Catholic outpost between Prussian Protestantism a d hssian Orthodoxy, but the weak Polish state finally succllmbed to the late eighteenth-century partition between Prussia, Austria, and Russia, Polmd" resurrection after World War I lasted less than a generation: Germany and the Swiet Union overrm the Polish state in September 19339. Poland endured the longest and harshest occupation of the countries that fought Nazi Germany The Germans d e s t r w d the Polish state, pillaged the economy, and evi,sccrated the htelligentsia and political parties. Poland lost 300,0fX3 men in battle and 6 million civilians, m m g them almost 3 d i m Polish Jews. Tens of thousands of Poles perished in the Soviet W o n ; Poles who s~lrvivedthose brutal six years were left with a country in, ruins, Much of the great city of VVarsaw was oblitcrrated.,
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
21
With the Soviet Red Army's entry into East Centsal Europe at the end of World War 11, German and Polish communists were &lit;ated tcr put ~lali.onsbetween their two peoples on a nekv footing. As t-his verse from the old communist anthem "The IZed Regiment of Warsaw" pprfessed, the enemy of the working classes wlruld not be any one natim, but the capitalist class as a whole: Our enemy is not a foreign people, whether defeated or victor; our enemy are those, who hold the whip the foreipel; or your own oppressar.2
Accosding to Masxist-Leninist theory of socialist internationalism, the Polish communists would jettison aZ1 vestiges of Polish bourgeois-romantic nationalism, Polish Catholicism, and any sentimntal attacihmenl to Polish territories mnexed by the Soviet Union, The Germm communists, for their part, were bound to reject nationalist calls for fie retunl of German territories occupied by Poland after the war. Communism had shallow roots h Poland. There was much truth to Stalin" analogy likening crrmmunism in Poland to a saddle on a cow. The pantheon of communist founders did not i,nspi,re the patriotic, Catholic, m d often anti-Smitic Poles; Marx was a German m d a few, and Lenin was a Russian. With the exception of Rosa Luxemburg, Poland 11ad not produced promine~~t comanunist leaders. I:,uxemtnurg was a Jew and committed internationalist, even to the point of opposing a Polish state. The forenmner of the Polish Communist Party (:KZfI"), the Social Uemcxlracy of thc Khgdom of Poland and Lithuania (SUKPil:,), was fnu,nded in 1899 and reflected Luxernburg's orthodox Marxist views, The party had few followers.3 The Polish Socialist Party's (PPS) nationalist appeal outflanked the KPP for suppwt arnung the Polish. working and peasant classes, The PPS promoted a patriotic, evolutionary social democracy. Fearhg a rightwing government takeover in 1926, the KBP supporkd the PPS and Jizef Pifsudski's May coup dt4tat, This so-called '"May error" was a m g the reasms Stalin cited for erctermi~~ating virtuaily the entire. KPP leadership m d dissolvkg the party in 1938. Some 5,000 Polish cornmm~istswere executedVostwar Foreip Mlnistry offjcial Marian Naszkowski fater remembered his shock at hearing the news of the KPP's demise: A party that had done so much to awaken the revolutionary spirit of the masxs, a party that had Led mighty working-class brigades to war with capitalism, with fascism, could not be a fraud. . . . Shaken to the depths of our souls, accepting, with pain, with bitterness, the "truth' about our leaders"
12
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '" treachery, not for a moment did we doubt our idea or the rightness of our movement, our party. That gave thousands of Crtmmrmists the skwngth to live through the diEicutt times that had arrived-.That was the basis for the resurrection of the party later on."'"
Under the watchful eye of the Soviet secret police, Polish communism returned in 1942 as the Polish WorkersT~arty(PPR). Mrjthout Stalin's howledge or approval, Miladyslaw Gomujka was elected secretary general in German-occupied Warsaw in November 1,943. Stalin formed the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow to ensure his control over the PPR. These "Muscovite" Poles, among them Bolesjaw Bientt, Jakub Berman, Hilary Minc, and Stanislaw Radkjccvicz, formed l.he core of l.he party leadership after the war, From its inceptim in 1944, the I"1-f:l.I dominated the Poiish Provisional Government of Nationat Unity Gomugka muted Marxist revolutionary goals in an attempt to form a national front with the PPS, the intelligent"ia, and the peasantry. When this strategy failed to gain broader popular szlpport, the PPR gradtlally coopted the other political parties or drove them undergmund. U-rtder pressure from the Western Af.lies to fulfill the Ualta agreements, the Soviets allowed some members of Stanisiaw Mikdajczyk"s opposition 1301ishPeasant Party (PSI.;)into Ihe gover in the spring of 1.945, but they had nu real power. Aiter the phony elections in January 1947, the PPR was the master of the political scene. Mikd;ljczyk fled the country in N'Rventbecme P1)R had some latitude to decide domestic policy in the early postwar period., but there was newer any doubt that Moscow ultimately determined PoIand's political f uture.7
The Prospects for Geman. Communism The German communists had a stronger base in the German workng
ctass. Germany's defeat in W r l d War I, the failure of capitalism to solve the ills of the interwar economy, the demise of the Weianar Republic in the 1 9 3 0 ~ and ~ the disaster of the Niiltional Socialist period gave the party some ideological ammunition to promote communism in postwar Germany. Monarrhism, democracy, and fascism had failed Germmyf and trhe German communists could. claim to have fought them all. Now the party stood ready to constmct a truly ""$mocraticm "socialist state, one founded on Marxist-Lenhist-Stalhist principles,"" UnIikcl the KP:P, the German Communist Party (KPD) survived its exile in the Soviet tlnilrn before the war, although almost three-quarters of the membership had bee11 jailed. Those who spent the war in the Soviet Union were Stalin" lackeys; the KPD's association with the Soviet occu-
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
23
patim authorities furthr tarnished its image, Many Red Army soldiers inflicted their revenge on the Germm people, and the Soviets wantonly extracted repnrations from their zone. Atbough the KPD registered numerous protests wish the SovicJt military administration, mast Germans viewed the KPD as a collaboratcrr with the SoV;et ~ccupiers,not as champion of Gcrman interests. The SPD's more moderate socialism. had much broader appeal in postwar Germany. Because the KPD and the SPU were bitter enemies during the Weimar period, the KPD initially spzlrned cooperdion with the WD. The Soviet occupation authorities forced the KPD and SPD to form the Socialist Unity Party (SEU) fn April 1946. The other parties fn the anti-fascist Natiolzal Front, the CDU m d the ZJRP, were also coopted. After the elections of October 1946, in which the SED fared poorly in competi"cion with the SPD in Berlin, the Soviets no longer dlowed h e elections in its zone* The Soviets did not immediately hand. over p w e r to their proteg&s, however. Stalh~did not think that his plans to exploit Germany's ecanomy (including the Ruhr) and to bring about the eventual communization of the entire country would be served by a hasty communist takeover in the Soviet zone.Wven if Stalin did not want a division of Germany initially, his undemocratic tactics to consolidate communist control in the Soviet znne and Poland contributed to the emerging Cold. War-70
The G e m a n and Palish Communists Before 1945 'There was historical precede~ztfor cooperation between the Palish and German Left before 1945, but by the end of the war ties to the past were th~adbarc~.11 Luxemburg and fellow Poles Julian Marchlewski and Leo Jogiches helped found the (PR in 1918, and Jogiches Icd the party for a short tjm.e. When the KPP was outlawed in 1919, the KPD provided indispensable support; the Polish communists reciprocated when hdolf Hitler seized power in Germmy h1933.1Wany German communists escaped the Nazis through their und.erground connections to the KPP, which operated clandestinely in several Polish cities with large German populations, Gda-liskand Zabrze among t k m , A few Polish and German Leftists also developed friendships during their incarceration in :Nazi concentration camps.7" Wilhelm Pieck, the first secretary of the KPR after World War 11, W= one of the few German communists left to conthue this tradition,"" veteran of the communil;t movement fn Germany for nearly half a cmkry, I'ieck had been a close confidant of many ol h e Poiish comul-rists in the SPD before Mdorld War I. Pieck studied under Luxexnburg at the party
l4
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
school in Berlin, and stamchXy defended her against revisionists in the party who rejected her ortl.wifox Marxist positions." "wing the war, Pieck helped Marchlewski publish his works in Berlin; in the early 1 x 0 s the two worked together at the communist party school in :Mosco-rv. Pieck narrowly escaped with his own life the day raeticai right-wing in Berlin in January 1919. Jogiches was asnationalists shot Luxemb~~rg sassinated five months later,lWhen Marchlewski died in 11925, the old Polish guard in the KPD was gme. Pieck gave the eulogy at Marchlewslti's funerd; the placemmt of his f u n e ~ aurn i n c x l to the gmvemf Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht at the cemetery in Bcrlin-Friedrichsfelde was one of the few symbols left of Polish-German commlanist solidarity in the early twentieth century.17 The PPR bad reason to be suspicious of collusion between the KPD and the Soviet Union at Pcr1md"s expense. 5hce the partition of Polmd in the late eighteenth century, the Germans and Russians had often set aside their differences to mpress Polish national aspirations. Even the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917had not changed that; in 1922 and 1926, the Weimar Republic and the Solriet Union signed cooperative agreements that were inpart directed agalnst the new Polish state. 'e'he most egregious anti-Polish agreement was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. The X(PU &dared that "the German people welcome the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany because they want peace," The KI-fD went so f a r as to profess that the pact strengthe~~ed ties betwee11 the German and Soviet people.?" Pieck characterized Poland" defeat in 11939 as a victory of German workers over the Polish gentry.lWe said that the vanquished Polish government was a "reactionary strudure" anyway." Ig~~oring the Nazi-Soviet partitio~~ of Poland, the KPD condemned the war as an imperialist cmflict, The party criticized Gmat Britain for allegedly decking war on behalf of the Polish landowning class, and praised the work of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) among the workers in the Soviet-occupied Polish areas of Ukraine and Belarus.21 Wafter Ul.bricht, who led the SED from 1949 to 1971,22 deielzded the Nazi-Soviet Pact in a way that seemed to accept Hitler" aagt~ression agairist Poland. He blamed the war on British hnperialists instead: The German people and all thase nationti that have been incorporated into the German state are faced with a decision: to choc~senot English capitalism, prc)longatlion of the war, and another Versailles, but the Soviet Union, peacq national independence, and friendship among all nations. The workers, farmers, and intelligentsia of Germany, Austria, Czechoslavakia, and Poland wili be the staunchest supporters of the Sc~viet-GermanFact and the sworn enemies of the English plan.23
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
25
This was heavy historical baggage for the PPR to carry. Until mrushchev" de-Stalhization in the mid-1950~~ the Polish communists could not openly question Stalh's licyuidatior?of the KPP. 'They also bad to deny that Stalin had secretly partitioned Poland with Hitler in 1939, The Nazi-Soviet Pact was, as the Polish communists were forced to declare at the time, ostensibty "an element of peace, the result of the Soviet Uniods consistent peace poXicy.""" The PPR was also saddled with the task of convincing Poles to accept the loss of Palan& eastern territorks to the Soviet W o n . 'The party had to follow the line that the Nazis, not the Soviets, had massacred. thausands of Polish army officers at the Katyn Forest in 1940, and had to ignore Stalin's failure to aid the n"arsaw Uprising against the Grmans in 1944. Among those left to fight the Qrmans hWarsaw had been the PPR's own "People" guards."^^ The PPRrsAnti-German Propaganda ?"he PPR consciously used nationalist propaganda in its struggle for power in Poland in 1445, and stubbornly dekmded Poland's national. interests against Germmy%Havlng lived through the bmtd fjve-year German occupation, GomuZka had tittle sympathy for Grtrman political parties. He did not see an old ally in the KPD; he saw instead a party that had embraced Luxemburg's internationalism, obsequiously sanctioned Stalin's liquidation af the KPP, and approved of the partition of Poland in 1939. After the war, Gomuika declared that "the German horse must have its legs broken regardless of whether that horse is ridden by a Nazi ar a Social Democrat."n As Mir~isterof the Recovered Territories, Gornulka had a hand im the rutbless expulsion of the Germans from Polland.28 The PPR promoted a new pan-Slavism inskad of the unity of working classes across national lines"Gtn March 16,1945, a big headlhe in the PPR organ G405 Lzldu (Voice of the People) proclajnned "' Slav SoXidarity" in Eastern Europe, and strssed Po1md"s pditical and economic cooperation with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.29 Gornulka told. a Warsaw audience in April 1346 that Poland now had friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the other Slavic nations, adding that "without this alliance we would never have been able to defeat Germmy or include Gdafisk withh the borders of the Polish state."30 On July 15, G b s Lzrdzr celebrated the anniversary of the Polish v i c t q over the Te~~tonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410 with the headline, "Thmgh the Univ of the Slav Nations-To Victory."""l The I"oZish gove ent mnounced that it would base its foreip relations with any country, c o m u n i s t or not, first on that country's p&y toward Germany. In April 1946, Ed:warb &h&, me of the :Wluscovitt.s,
I6
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
called for solidari-tywith France and the Anglo-Saxon powers for the defense of Poland against its biggest threat-"Geman imperialism.'"2 The PPR count.ed on Czechoslovakia as a parhner in &is struggle, even though until Fubruary 1M8 it bad a democratically dected coalition g w ernment and a noncommunist president, Edvard BeneS. Afthough Prague and Warsaw had numerous disagreements after the war,"%i~?s Lzsdtl called for a united front with Czechoslovakia agaisrst German revanchism, warning that "the mortal enemy to the We a l ~ dliberty of both [Poldnd and Czechoslovakia] is still lurking-Germany."~Vf)olmd signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with CzechosIovakia in 1947, and with all the other East European states by 1949, Poland did not: have a similar treaty with the GDR until 1967.35 The Polish government also promoted the principle of collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi rkgime. During the Nuremberg trials in the fall of 1946, Polish officials criticized former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for arguing that Germany as a whole should not be punit;hed for the war." The PPR barely mcognized the existence of any "progressive" German political elentcws-such as the KPD and Ihe SPD. Polish authorities refected offers of cooperation from, the German Leftists in the former German territoritls." Foreign Minister Z y g m t Modzelewski declared that the Poles did not have confidence in any of the German political parges, hclluding the KPD. The Poli.r;fnWest Institute in Poznari issued this blartket statement: There are no goad Germans . . . a German communist is always and above all a German who piaces German hterests above the international soXibarit)l of the proletariat.38 For the first year after the war, the Polish communist press paid little attention to the German political scene." Reports that did appear were usually critical of the Germans, hcluding the German Left," Gios Ludu barely m n t i m e d the f-tlsion of the KPD and the SFU into the SED in Agril1946," hknowing that the new party was a machination of Soviet occupation policy. 'The Polish M I l i t ~ Mission in Berlin underscorltd this fact: "NO activity [for the creation oC the SED] was to be see13 from Ihe masses, but instead [their] passive and loyal: submission to the orders of the party organs."42 The Polish communists were outraged that the KPD (and later the SED) welcomed former Nazis into its ranks, and alleged that some were assuming important party posts. ULbricht later acknowledged to Gomulka that the ex-Nazis had been recruited because the party W= failing to attract new members. Ufbrirht pointed out that many of the German communists had lost connections to the movement during their years in Nazi prisons; by the end of the war, m y had become m e d e r s of the SPD or the CDU.4"
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
27
The Pdish communists adroitly used anti-German propaganda to strengthen their popular support. They accused Nfikcrtajczyk" PPSL of befrielldillg the German occupiers during the war and of supporting neoNazi wderground groups in Poland. In the summer of 1946, the PPR tried to undercut the PSI, by holdiz~ga referendurn on three constitutional reforms, Mikolajczyk encouraged his hllowers to vote "no" on the first proposition to abolish the Senate. Gomu&a declared that any Pole who vcrted against any of the three propositions ""helps Germany against Poland." He called, the PSL the party of "drei rrttll ~~eitr" (t%lreet i m s no), purposely using the German phrase to imply that the party was infiltrated by German agents.44 Wi~~centy Rzymowski of the Polish Democratic Party (SD)Jhrged Pdes to vote for thc propositions to show domestic unjty for the new "lnistorical Piast borhr" with Germany. He declartld Germans living in Poland wollld not be allowed to wote.46 One af the SED's primary objectives was ta establish itself as an equal a m g the communist parties in Eastern Europe, but the party was slow to gain acceptance. The SEU was not invited to Szklarska Porqba for the fisst meeting of Cominform, in Septentber 1347, and was not informd until October that the meeting had taken place, .GAccording to West German sources, the Poles and Czechoslovaks e x p ~ s s e dreservations about including the SED in any future Cominform meetkgse4B Gmul-ka had, serious misgivings about the Soviets"%two camp" 'policy announced at this first Cominform meetirrg; the policy would eventually prccltrde cooperation with the West and increase Soviet control over the bloc parties. He did agree that '"when two antagoni.3ti.cblocs-i.mperialist and democratic-have crystallized on the world scale, the problem of tactics to be adopted by communist Parties in particular countries carnot be tl-eated as merely a domestic problem for each Party separately but must be the object of concern and discussion by all The Parties." Comulka had no quahs about using the principle of: socialist so:[idarity to circumscribe the freedam of the SED, however." He again slighkd the Gcrman communists by declaring that ""Stav solidarity'bas one of the foundations af Polish foreign policy.50 When the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) was formed in December 1948, the new party organ Tqburru Lzldzi (People's Tribune) published congratulatory letters from the French, Czechoslovak, Greek, Soviet, Hungarian, and Italim Communist parties, but nuthing from the SED.51 The SED Promotes Socialist Solidarity with Poland Confronted with so many other serious probtems after the war, the SEU had little time to conduct a cmcerted carrtpaigl~ta improve relatio~~s with the Poles. The SEWS primary incentive for developing ties to Poland af-
l8
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
ter the war was economic rather than political or cultural. n e loss of the vital industrial center of Silesia to Poland had direct ecmomic implications for the Soviet zone, and the SED repeatedly asked the Poles to increase exports, primarily much-needed coal. I'he SEU leadership k n w how difficult it would be to & w e anti-Polish sentiments in the Soviet zone, especially amollg the Germm refugees from Poland, Many Germans viewed, th subjugation of Poles as natural and p m p q to them, the typical Pole was ignorant, lazy, a d backward. In March 1,947, a representative of the East German Kzlllzirbulzd conceded to the officers at the Polish Mllit.av Mission that "most Geman people are not aware of the responsibility and guilt that falls on the G e r m people as a result of Che war. Among other things this itgnorancc is the main cause of the continued reluctance of the German people for ~Iatioslswith the Polish people.'We said that Germans lacked m y howiedge of Polish culture, and had no interest in l e a r ~ ~ h about g it, mey adhered to the old adage that ""what is to the east of Germany is low and mcultu~ed.'~ Most Gemans still thou&t that Cllopin was Fmnch a d Copernicus was Gerxnm.32 Two yeamfiter the war, a Polish officer at the Polish Military Mission in Berlin observed that SET>functionariesh e w next to nothing about the political sitlaation in Polmd."WUI:bri.chttold the German press that "Germans still had a lot to learn about democratic Polmd,""' He achowledged that Soviet-zone joumatists needed to pay more attention to Polish political and econontir achievements, but suggested that the Poles reciprocate by publicizing the accomplishments of t k Germans in the Soviet zfme." A year later, SED functicmaries were still telling Polish officers at the mission that it would be a huge undertakhg to eradicate mti-Polish attitudes, even among party members.56 The SED also acknowledged that there were "deep-seeded nationalist prcl?judices [of the German working classes] against the Polish people."s7 The SE;D did m t have enough instructional materials to conduct a serious campaign to overcome East GemansYporance of Poland. In April 1,947, the editor of the leipziger Zeitrrng wrote a letter to the PPR Central ittee mquestsing honest information on the reconstruction of Polmd and life in the corntry in gc3neral.B K a t fall, the SET>leadershjp ordered its press services to devote m m coverage to Poland,sg but: it was not until the end of December 1947that the SED issued its first b u l l e ~ about Polmd."" K e Pofish Mifitav Mission rtrpeatedly u ~ e the d Polish Foreign Mssh-y to provide the SED with more propaganda, but. the Polish govenlment had other priorities.61 Until 1948/ the mail1 SSEZ)newspaper, Neues Dezrfschland (New Germany), virtu* ignomd German-Polish relations and devoted more caverage to developments in Czechoslova&a. The newspaper gellerally portrayed the Czechoslovaks in a more favorabk light.62
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
29
When Moscow tightened the reixzs on the satellite parties in 1948, the Polish and East G e r m press began to p r a t e the idea that t-he SED m d Polish communists were usherhg in a new era h Polish-Germm relations..Tn the suspicious atmosphere of the times, buwever, there was little clbjectiwe repclrting m either side. Few East Germans or Poles, including party members, beljcved in this propaganda. In March, the Poljsh journal N o w Drogi vigomustp criticized two Polish authors for writing a book emphasizjng t-he cmtinuity of German territorial expansior.lism in the twentieth ccn.t.ufy 'The journal attacked the authors for ignoring the new political developments in the Soviet zone and the d i k e n c e s between Soviet and U.S. policy in Germany. They were accused oE harborh g "hyper-anti-Germmf' attitudes.63 Tn June, the SEZ) resolved to ixrcreae press coverage of all important political, economic, and cultural events in Polmd and to develop mom cdtlaraf exchanges"64Later that sumnet; the party opetned Che F-felmutvm-Gerlach Socieb-in Berlin to provide Germans with readmg materials and exhibits &out Polmd.6 5fos Lzldu =parted in t-he fall that the SED was htensifyling its cmpaign against nationaiism and mti-Polish attitudes in the Soviet zone. Ulbricht achowledged the presence of a strong nationalist element in t-he SET) and the trade unions, a d declared that mtj-Polish anirudes were dangerous and unacceptable.66 Although the Polish press still devoted more coverage to the western zones in B48, Polish officials were quick to point out oversights in East Germanvs repctrting on Poland. For example, \zrhem Nezles Det~tschla~d failed to publish an important parlia.mentary speech by Premier Jtizef Cyrankiwicz in June, Polish diplomats in the Polish Military Mission told h d i Wetzel, the head of the SED's press depart~aent,that the omission was an expression of the SEDs general anti-Polish stance. Accordhg to the Poles, tbr SEC) prtrss spent too much time emphasizing the threat from the West ralher than rcnni,nding ~ a d e r of s the strength of the new people" democracies. Wetzel told Grotewohl and Pieck that the SED prtrss should pay closer attention to such importmt speeches in order to cdtivate what Wetzel termed "the weak seedlistg of Gcrman-Polish relations.f'67 Eomutka"s Fa13 and the Staliinizatiw of Party Relations ?"he fatlout from Stalin's expulsion of Uugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito from Caminform in 1,948 soon rewhed the other commul-rist parties in Eastern Europe. Each party engaged in a witch hunt of alleged "Etoists": ?"hose who supported national roads to socialism, or simpfy opposed Stalhist meirhods, were ousted, imprisoned, or executed. The capriciousness of the purg@s,however$put eveq communist in the cross hairs. The
20
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
communist lezlders in Eastern Europe now w r k e d under the strain of
slavishly adhering to Moscow's directives. Tito's ouster and the heightened East-West tensions durhg the Berlin blockade in the summer of 1.948 was a boon to the political fortunes of the SEU, but signalled an end to the PPIC's limited indepedence from Mosco\v. When Stalin delnanded p d e r ideological and political conformity from the communist parties in 1948, the SED easily fell into line. The SED had already ernbarked on an economic transformation of the zone that closely foiilowed the Stalinist nnndel,b%and l.he prospect of a m r c permanent &vision of Germay served the party" short-term, polit.ical gods. l'ieck and Urbricht knew that there was no democratic way for the %D to take power in a united German state.69 The SED underwent purges and rccantations, but the top party leadership mmained largely intact.7" Blind devotion to anything Russian was anathema to the Polish people, and the Polish communjsts never fully adopted Stalinist policies, GonruF-katried steer a course that recopized the Soviet Idnion"s geopolitical interests in Poland while advmcing a Palish-style cornmm~ismthat would ensure the greatest possible independence frm the CPSU. For the first few years after the war, Stalin tolerated C;ornul:kafsattempts to c ~ a t e a suitable socialist path for Polmd;n Pdes maintained many n( their religious, cultural, and economic freedoms.72 C~mujkatold a plenary session sf the Pl'R Central Committee in June 1,948that "both for the ITS and the PPR the independence of Poland is a supreme consideration, to which all ofiers are suhordinated."73 He defended Bto% national road to commrmism, and reected the notion that the Yugosla~rleader was a threat to Soviet leadership of the international communist movement. He opposed TX"itotsexcommunication from Cominform, warning fiat communist unity wodd suffer.74 That was enough for Stalh; in the fall, the Muscovites denounced Gornu2ka and his faction. In contrast to the purges in the Bulgarian, Hungarian, :Romanian, and Czechosiovak parties, however, the Polish communists did not execute their okvn.. Connugka, was arrested but never brought to trial. A few years later, Bicmt told Khmshchev, 'To tell yoll the truth, 1 myself d d t h a w what the charges are and why he" in j jai3,"E Bierut replaced Gomulka as party secretary, and Cyranftiewicz took over leadership of the PPS from Edvard OsBbka-Morawski, in part because Osribka-Morwski was opposed to the unification of the two parties. In December 1948, the PPR and the PPS merged to form the PZPR, The Stalinist die hha been cast for the Polish Left.76 At first the SED took a wait-and-see attibde toward Comulkafs suster; but in an article in the Noventber issue of the party's ideological j o w l , Eilzheit, Karf Peters issued the obligatov c o d e m a t i o n by accusing the
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
23
deposed Polish leader of deviating from a consistent Marxist-L,eninj.st line and of coddting bourgeois-nationalists.77 Mter the BPR-PPS meqer, SED Politburo member Mermam Matem declared that "never again wiXI Polmd be a reactionary springboard and the base of counterrcvolutionary war provocations against the Soviet Llnion." But in a cmdescending tone he cmcltuded that ""the reactionaries in Polmd tried to develop anti:Rrassim and anti-Bolshevik attitudes and use [them] to come to power. This too created vacillations and deviations among the leading comrades in the PPR, like GornuEka." Matern pt?id the usual tribute to the "great Soviet Union" for ensuring Poland's securiv m d "happy future,'"78 tllbrichtfs visit to Poland in October 1948 was the first face-to-face meeting between a high-ranking SED functionary and the top Pdish leadership. The SED viewed the trip as a turning point in relations with the Polish commmists. tllbricht recalled later &at it was not easy to address a erokvd in Warsaw a city that had been destroyed by thc Germans. He tried. to reassure the Poles that the SED had abandoned any hopes of revis@ the Oder-Neisse border: "For us t-he question of the Polish-German border has been definjthely settled.? U'tbrieht exaggerated the level of trust that he had develsped, with Polish dficials, however, claiming that Cyrmkiewicz wap; fully satisfied that the SEC) had overcome its rclvisionist tendencies-K"UIhricht said, that his delegation had ""succeeded in winning the trust of the Polish comrades for our party and our party leadership." He concluded that it was now up to the SEC) to keep that trust.81 The Poles gave UXbricht a rather lukewarm receptim.82 Cyrmkiewicz declared, "W cannot hnagine the victory of socialism without the victory of t-he SED in Germany,"'N%ut he eautiosled Urbricht that orlly '"the first step has been taken."@ Fearing popuhr demonstrations against Wlbricht" visit, G h s Lzkdu did not cover it until after Ulbricht had returned to ESerlh.85 The Polish Military Mission in Berlh viewed Ubricht's pronouncments as a positive s i w for the direction of the SED" foreign policy a d reported that the SED had made it a top priority to quash its mennklers' ideas about. revisixlg the (Ilder-Neisse bordec But the Polish officers at the mission, mhdful of Stalin" demand. for communist party fealty, warned that "even in the central organs [of the SEU] m t everyone speaks candidy about what they think [about the border].'"b Mo~over, the SEUk iil.legitirnacy gave the Poles pause about the party" aabjlity to elixninatc the German peopte" opposition to the Oder-Neisse border, let alone their negative attitudes toward Poles. The SED leadership h e w that much work had to be done to convince its constituents of the need for lriendly ~ l a t i o n with s Poland." UUlbricbt acknowledged that "unfortunately in the past the G e m a n workers' movemnt was mable to overcome reactionary elements."x" a letter to
22
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
the PPR thanking the Poles for inviting Ulbricht to Polmd, Pieck conceded that there was still considerable nationalist sentknent in the rmks of the SED." Tryhulztl Lzsdzr's ccorrespmdent in Berh, Stanisaaw Krodzki, also said that the SEWSmain task was to redress the historical corruption caused by Nazism and social ciemwracy of the Geman workirtg clas~.~O Both parties now pllblicly proclaimed the dawning of a n w era in Polish-German relations. At the PZPR" unification congress in DeceHlber, Cyrankiewicz extended a warm welcome to SED delegate Frmz Dahlem, whom he rclmernbered as ""my comrade from the concentration camp in Mauthausen." Cyrankiwicz praised the efforts of the SED leadership to combat social democratic, reformist, and other un-Marxist ideas h the pasty, and lauded the SEUs campaign to convince the masses of the need for good relations with Poiand. Dahlem =plied &at ""as socialist-internationalists, as German workers, we feel deeply bcmded to tl1e working class and the working msses of Poland, We are most vitally hterested in the strength of the3 People" Republic of Poland."% The Polish delegaticln atm to& home a favorable impression of the SED party cmgress in J a ~ u a r y1949. Edward Ochab observed that there was a new fresh air of trust between the SED and the PZPR: "We wmt to enlighten [the Polish working class] that under the leadership of tbe SED the true democratic, anti-i~nperiafi&forces are assernblix~gto create a united, peaceful, demcratic Germany that we have always wmted for a neighbor*"gz li.ybunn Lzrdrf reported that the audience's reaction was "especialfy warm" when Pieck stressed. the need for cooperation with the other nations of Eastern Europe, especially Poland." The newspaper even commended the SED for changjng the nationalistic, anti-Polish atlitudes in the German working classes94 and lavished praise on the party for eliminating the influence and power of Hitlerites, nationalists, and industrialist~.~-rigadier GeneraX Jakub Prawin, the head of the Polish Military Mlssion, told Nowe D q i in 1949 that the worklng classes in the Soviet zone had developed a new attitude toward the Soviet tlnicm; he said that the SEW had done m c h to improve relations with the peo,lefs repwblies, particularly with Polrnd.96 f'ieck led another SEC) delegation to Potand in September 4949. tlbricht reported that his talks with Cyrankiewicz and the Polish Minister of Industry Hilary Minc were conducted in a friendly tone, He maintained that Cyrartkiewicz was now satisfied that thr SEI) had ~ e l l e opd position to the border wi.lhin the partygT But the relative importmce of Pieck" visit to each side was revealed in the coverage it rcceived in the SED and the I'ZPR press. Netitrs Drzitschlurzd devoted severat extensive fsont-page articles to the visit, interpreting it as a significant breakthrough for the recognition of the SEE? as a legitimate communist party. Tryhzlrza Ltldu made only brief mention of the talks.98
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
23
Relations between the tcvo communist parties seemed to have done a volte-face by 1949, but it was a thin facade of commmist solidarity rather than a genuhe rapprocherne~~t; in the oppressive and s~~spicious atmosphere of Stalin" empire, the partiesyropaganda had a hollow ring, Before Stalirrfssplit with Tito and the b ~ a k d o w nof allied cooperation in Germany in 1948, neither party had rnade a concerted effort to reconcile their differences. For the first few years after the war, Pdish communists not: only ipored their German counterparts but exploited Poles' hatred of all Germms to attract adlaere11t.s to the party The SED was preoccupied with its relations with the Soviet authorities and with consolidathg its power in the Soviet zone, The Soviets did not actively fnster closer relations between the Polish and Germall communists either, for friction between them increased their dependency on Moscow In Stalh" eempire, a genuine frit.ndship between the communist parties, let alone the peoples, was impassfile. The Poles possessed more diplomatic leverage than the German communil;ts in the early postwar period, but ly'itofsexpulsion from Corninform, and the smb5equem.t.purges in the Sovkt Hoe parties changed the d ynamic of PZPR-SED relations. The comrrritted Stalinj.sts and Soviet satraps in the SED saw their formes on the upswing, culminating in the formation of the German Democratk Republic in October 1949. Until Stalin" death in 1953, UXbricht" cmfidence grew as did his resolve to promote East German interests in his dealings with the Poles. Neither the postwar communist gover ent in Polmd nor the SED in the Soviet zone had any legitimate claim to power. As a result, relations between the Polish and German communists were also artificial, conducted with the howledge that Moscow might purge them at m y time. The East G e r m s had misgivings about Polish and Russian Slavic solidarity and the possibility that MOSCOW woUld support a demilitarized, neutral, and democratic Germany. The SED knew that it bad no chance of winning a h e election, Meanwhile, the Polish communists worried that a closer ~lationshipbetween &e SEU a d the CPSU could result in a revision of the ader-Neisse bordcr, 'The Qrmm communists' unwillingness to recogslize the permanence of f i e border in the early postwar period cast a pall over relations with the Polish communists for years to come*
4. Quoted in Franz Sikora, Sc~zi~lis~i~ctzc Sulidlzrifdt zknd ~lnkiu:orze;tle lntercssetz (Sdalist solidariq and natimal interests) (Colc>gne:Verlag Wissenschaft und Poiitik, 1977), pp. 101-102. 2, Quoted from a letter from Polish communist veterans to the SED Central Committee on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, Qctclber 1959, SED ZK, Wlter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/ 1244.
24
'There A re No Goc7cl G e r mns '"
3, Luxemburg" closest confidant in the party was Lean Jogiches, who was bom in Wiitno to a wealtl-tyJewish family. Another founder was the infamous Botshevik inquisitor Feliks Dzier2yfiski. The SBKPiL and the left-wing Socialists formed the Polish Communist WorkersTarty in 1918. It was renamed the Polish Communist Party (KPI)) in 1925. 4. See M. K, Dziewanowski, The Corrztnz-lnisfPnrty cf 1Safnnd:An Ozkfline of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19761, pp. 118-419, 150-151. Stalin a h o alleged that virtually the entire W P was infiltrated with agents of the Polish intelligence seivice. 5. Quoted in Woy A. Medvedev, Let H k t o q fudge: Tke Origirzs and Cc~frseque~ces of Sfalinisnz (New York: Vintage Books, 19;71),p. 220. 6, See M. K, Bziewanowski, Palnrrd ifz the Tz~)enfz'eflz Centzt ry (New York: Columbia Universiv Press, 19"7;7 ppp,162-164. Gomuika's native communist group included Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spychalski, and Wladysjaw fliehkc3wsk.i; and Antta Prazmowska, ""Te Sc~vietLiberation of Poland and the Polish Left, 11i343-1945,"7n Francesca Gori and Silvio Prjns, eds., Tire SoztieC Uniorz alzd Ezzrape i12 the Cold Wal; 1943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 76; and John Cclutou~iidisand Jaime Keynolds, Potlarzd 1939-1947 (New York: Holmes and Meier, Z986), pp. 185-197. 'I". See Coutouvidis and Reynolids, bland 1939-1947 p. 315; see also Nikita Khrushchev, F;lhrrislzcl$evRemembers: The Glnsnasf Epes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), p. 116. In these memoirs, Khrushchev maintains that Stalin was not responsible for Gomu3ka%arrst: ""Iew for a fact, I heard it from Stalin, that he did not order Gomujka's arrest; on the contrary he even voiced doubts about the arrest, He trusted Gomutka." 8. Manfred Wilke, "Mommunismus in Beutschland und Rahmenbedingmgen polititischer Handelns nach 1945" (Communism in Germany and the cmtingencies of political exchange), in Manfred Wilke, eed., Anafomie der Partel'ze~frnle: Die KPD/SEL) nuj" &ern Weg zzkr Macill (Anatc~myof the Central Party Office: The KI"D/SED on the road to power) (Berlin: Akadernie VerXag, 119981, pp. 24-25, 9. See R. C. Raack, '"talin Plans His Post-War Germanyf"lournnl of Conlenzpor a y H i s f o ~28 (19931, pp. 55,bG. 10. See WiIfried Loth, Sfnlins ungelkbfes Kind: Warurn Moskazt die DDR niclzt wllfe (Stalin" unloved child: Why Moscotzr did not want the GDR) (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994); and Wilfried Lath, "Stalin" Plans h r Post-VVar Germany,'Yn Francexa Gori and Silvict Pans, eds., The Soviet U~zioclrzand Europe itz ttie Cold Wa1; 3943-53 (New tlork: St. Martin" Press, Z996), p. 24, Loth argues that Stalin did not intend to birth his "unloved child," the GDR: ""Salin really pursued the democratization of Germany under the auspices of the four powers and that he only ended up with a separate Socialist state as a result of the incompetence of the Communists to play the democratic gameW";see also Alexander Dallin, ""Stalin and the Prospects for Post-War Europe," in inrmcesca Gori and SiXviio Pons, eds., The Suvitpt Unbpt and Ellrope in ttie Gold War, 294>&53(New York: St, Martin's Press, 19536), p. 189. Dallin adds that Stalin" long.-termgoal was a communist Germany, even if he would accept a democratic Germany for the time being: "There is nothing in the record to sustain the argument that, in the long run, Stalin wanted a "bourgeois-democraticf gc>vernmenta n w h e r e anytime-surety not in the %>vr"et
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
25
Union, surely not in Eastern Europe, and surely not in Germany;" Michail M, Narinskij, "The Sc~vietUnion and the Berlin Crisis," in inrancesca Gori and S-iXvio Pons, eds., The Snviclf U r t i o ~and Europe in the Cold Wa1; 3943-53 (New k r k : St. Martin's Press, 19%6 p. 59. Narinskii concurs with Loth, arguing that Stalin gradually warmed to the idea of a wparate East German state in reaetiic~nto the Tmman Dc>ctrine,the Marshall Plan, and other seemingly threatening moves by the West; see also John Lewis Gaddis, We Klzuw Nozu: Rettzitzkirzg Cold War kll'sforp(Oxford: CXarendon Press, 1W?), p. 119, 41. "Left" refers to the communist and socialist parties, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Socialist Party of Germany fSX3D), the Polish VVarkersf Party (PPR), and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The KPD and SPD united in 1946 to form the Sacialist Unity Party (SEB), and the PI% and PPS merged into the Polish United WorkersTrilrty (PZPR) in 1948. Because the KPD and PPR dominated these new padim, the terms Potis!z commzrnr'sfsand Gennat~commzhrtr'sfswill be used to characterize the Left in each country, with the exception of where differentiation with the sc9cialists is necessay. 12. Internal memo, undated, unsigned, SE9 ZK, Hermann Axen Office, I V 2/2.035/459. In 1955, Hermam Axen wrt2te that "&ring the Weimar Republic the German Communist Party always saw its duty to support the struggle of the illegal Polish Communist P a ~ y . " 13, Heinrich Gemkow, "Ce~rwirzsasclmeTraditio11en der rez~nlutio~$ren deutsclzen tjnd polnisclzen Arbeiterbcweguq 1917128 bis 1945" (Common traditions of the revolutionary German and Palish WorkersWoclement 1947148 to 4945), in Beilrige Z Z GcschicF~feder Arbeirierbewcgz-~ng(Contributions t c ~the history of the workersf movement) 16, no, 1 (1"34), pp. 1%27, Far example, postwar PPS leader Jcizef Cyrankiewicz was imprisoned in Mauthausm with German communist Franz Dahlem. Adam Rapacki, Poland's fo3reign minister in the 1 9 5 0 ~ and ~ Jan Izydorczyk, the Polish chief of mission in the GDR in the early 1950s, also shared cells with German communists during the war. This cc>habitatio>ndid not necessarily mean that they befriended each other; German political prisoners were among the mc)st privileged inmates, and were oi'len used to guard other prisoners. 44, During KPD leader 1Erns.t Thalmann's internment in a Nazi prison from 1935 to 1944, Pieck acted as chairman of the Central Committee. Pieck spent most of the Nazi period in Moscow, and after the Nazis executed Thalmann in 1944, P i ~ became k head of the party. 45. Luxemburg's profession of a strict Marxist-Leninist internationalist f o r e i p policy was similar to the one espoused by the SE&)after World VVar 11, Luxemburg opposed a separate Polish state and any so>cialdemocratic notions of a nonviolent, democratic means to socialism. She alienated many Polish and German communists with these views. See Elzbieta Ettinger, Rosn Luksetnburg: Eirz lieben (Rosa Luxemburg: A life), (Bmn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 199Q),pp. 203-204. She writes that "the more Rosa Z,uxemburg stocd up for 'revolutionary Masxism' the more she was iscllateb. The Polish tradition of herclism and martyrdom and the German traditian of conforming and consematism were unreconcilable."" 46, Fleinz Vosske, WiEhetjn Pieck: Biogr~plrischerAbriss (Wifhelm Pieck: Biographical Abstract) (Berlin: Bietz VerXag! 1975), pp. 4 M 7 , Karl Liehknecht was also interrogated at the Eden Hotel and shot the same day*
~
26
'Thew A re No Guc~CI Germns '"
17, On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marchlewski's death on March 22,1950, Pie& presented a Polish delegation with Marchlew~ki%ashes, which they took back to Poland, 18. Declaration of the KPD Central Committee, September 23, 1939, SET> ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 361496. 19. George L. Flemming, "The Polish Eagle Looks West," "~aslt. Ezlrupe 16, no. 10 (19(77),p. 18. 20. Wilhelm Picsck notes, Oct&er 22, 2939, SED ZK, Wilhelm P i ~ 13agers, k NL 36/496. 21. KPD circular, October 21,1939, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck 13apers,NL 361496; see Horst Duhnke, Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945 (The KPD from 1933 to 1945) (Colope: Miepenheuer U, Witsch, 2 9721, pp- 333-351. 22. Caroia Stern, Ulbriclzf: A Pt~la'ticalBit?grnp!ty (New York: Frederjck Praeger, 1965), p, 34. Ulbricht became a member of the KPD Politburo in 1929, and tvas the party" representative to the Communist International in Moscc>w in the late 1920s, and again during World War 11, Ufbricht had the reputation of being a humorXess, efficienl; and dogmatic apparatchik, acquiring the derogatory moniker "Comrade Cell" ktr his work in party organization. h r i n g his years in the Soviet Union, Ulbricht developed closer ties to the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP) and its chief, Klement Gottwald, than to the PctXish communists. Pieck also served with Gottwald on the political secretariat of the Communist Xnternational in the 1930s and 1940s..A s a resuXt, the KPD enjoyed better relations with the CzCP after the war than it did with the PPR. 23. Stern, Ulhridzf, p. 207. Ulbricht" article appeared in Die Well., a Comintern paper published in Sweden. 24. MPP note on the German-Soviet Non-Aggressim 13act, November, 1939, SED ZK, Wilhefm Pieck Papers, NL 36/436. 25, See Norman Davies, God%Playground: A Histoty cl(XsolfindrV o l u l r ~11: 2795 fo flze Pracmlt.(New York: Columbia University Press, 19821, pp. 544-548. 26. See M. K. Dziewanowski, bEa7.zd ~ L Zflzc 20th Century (New tlork: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 164. Dziewanowski obsewes that the Krernlin accepted a Polish national rc~adtcr communism in 1945: "They apparently calculated that toleration of nationalistic slogans was one means of weakening the Polish popular opposition to Communism during the crucial takeover period." Although the Polish communists began to change this propaganda in 2948, this campaign had a Ic~ng-termnegative impact on the SEUs relatiom with Poland. 27. Quoted in Georg W Strcrbet, Beufscr?tl~nd-Polsn: Wtrnsefi irnd Wir-klz'ehkeif (Germany-Poland: Wish and reality) (Bctnn: Edition Atlantic Forum, 1969), g. 14. Born in the Awtro-Hungarian province of Galicia, Gomuika attended a German school where he acquired a working knowledge of German. When the Sctviets occupied Ltvdw in the fall of 4939, he fled tcr I-tis home town of Krosno, where he took his chances with the German occupiers. 28. This ministry administered the German territories occupied by Poland in 1945. 29, G b s Ludu (Vcjice of the People), March 16, 1945, p, 1, Although the nonSlavic countries in Eastern Europe, Romania and Hungary, would eventually become part of the Sc)viet bloc and the Warsaw Pact, they had supplied Hitler with several divisions far the attack on the Svvicst Union in 1941.
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
27
30, Wtadys2aw Gomutka, O pmblemie sli~mieckz'rn(On the German problem) (Mrarsaw: Ksigkka i Wiedza, 1"384), p. 39. 31.620s L u d ~July , 15,1946, p. 4. 32. GL?S Lud~,April 30,1946, p. 6. 33. For a thorc~raghdiscussion of Polish-Czechoslovak relations in the immediStoszlnki I;"ofl'fyate gs~stwarperiod, see Marek Karnifiski, 1"~~sko-~zec~lc?st~zvnckie m ~ c1945-1 , 948 (Polish-Czechoslovak political relations, 1945-1 948) (Warsaw: Pahsl-vvwe Wydawnicho Naukowe, 1989); see also Anclrzq Pgczkowski, "'The Polish Contribution to the Victory of the Trague Coup3n February 11i348," "13261lefin: Cold Wnr Internntionnl History Project, no. I1 (winter 2998)' p. 242. The disputed area of Teslin (Czieszen) Silesia was one of the main issues dividing the two countries until 1947, when Stalin brokmed a campromise, 34. CXos Lzadu, June 25,1946, g. 4; and GIos Ludu, August 26 1946, p. 4; see Hans Gectrg Lehmann, Der Oder-Meisse-Kotzflikt (The Oder-Neisse conflict) (Munich: C. H. Beck, 3979), p. 58. Relations between the Pc>Xish and Czechoslovak go?vernrnents were in reality rather ten= after the war, especially in April 1946 when the Czechoslovak govemmnt claim& small barder areas in Polish Silesia, The Pofish govei-nment responded by sending troops to the area, and the Czechclslovak govemmnt relented. 35, AliEons Klatfkowski, Tlw P(?lislz-Gmn.mnFrontier After. World War 11 (Poznah: t"dy8amictwo Poznafiskie, 1972), p. 91. 36. See C b s lizlldcl's reports on the Nuremberg trials in Spternber, 1946. 37. Norman Naimark, Tfze Rzsssia~sin Germatty: R Nisi-ofy of the Suztiet Zorzc of Occzrpation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Ffarvard biversity Press, 1995), p. 347. 38. Quoted in Sikora, Sclziall'stiscfzeSolihritGf zirtd r2afio~~aIe I-ttferessetz,pp. 101-102. 39. See G b s ttidu from May 2945 to April 1946, 40. See, for example, G2os Ludu, Bctt3ber 22, 4946, p, 2. The newspaper carried just ; t o small articles on the victory of SPD in Berlin and the SE132 in the rest of the %>vietzone, 41. See C2os tudu, April 23,1946, p. 2. In this issue was a small article from the TASS news agency titled jf"Pc>gressin the Work of German Dernocracyn";ee ~XISCJ Gtos Lzadu, April 25, 46946. 42. Polish Military Mission Repc~l"c,May 2,1946, MSZ, 6/671/42. 43. Erwin Weit, Clstbluck irztenz: 13 jnhre Dotmetsclrcrfiir die polnisctzc Pnrfei- iind StnnfsfiiFznltrg (East bloc intern: 13 Years as interpreter for the Polish Party and State leadership) (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Vertag, 19";78), pp. 225-226. According i-o Weit, who was Gomuzka" interpreter in 1950s and 19Ms, these farmer Nazis were even more loyal to Utbricht because he could use their past to incriminate them. 44. Jan Gross, ""Mar as Revolution,'' in Norman Naimark and lEJec)nid Gibianski, eds., The EsfabEz'shment of Commzr nisi- Rtgz'me?;in Easter~zEzrrope, 1944-1 949 (Boulider: Weshriew Press, 2997), p. 34; see also GIos Ludzr, May '7,1946, p. 5. 45. The SD, along with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the United Peasant Party (ZSL), collaborated with the PPK in the provisianal government. 46. Glos Ludzl, June 30, 1946, pp. 3-44 8; see atso Strobel, Deutscfrlar~d-Polerz: Wtinsclt ir nd Wirklichkeif,p. 13. 47. Loth, Stnlizzs Mnbeliebfes Kl'lzd, p. 104. Loth argues that the Swiets did not invite the SEU because it was not a communist party; see also Nairnark, The Rus-
28
'Thew A re No Guc~CIGermns'"
s i ~ n sin Gertrrmny, p. 305; and Giuliano 13rocacci,ed,, Tke Comirfor~rr:Minutes of the Thrce Conjerences, 1947/1948/1949 (Milan: Giangiacurno Feltrinelli, 1994), p. 3'7; and Erich W Gnifae, JaJzre MiC Lllbridzt (Years with Ulbricht) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und PoEitik, 1966), p. 264. 48. Press and Informatic~nService af the Federal Government, June 17,1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437; see also AiFred Schickel, Deltlscltc t-lnd Pc~len: Ein jnhrlnuse~zdgeltneinsame Geschiclzte (Germans and Poles: A thousand years af carnrnon history) (Bergisch GEadbach, Germany: Gustav LGbbe Verlag, 2 984), p. 245. 49, A m a Di Biagio, ""The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Caminfarm, June-September 1947," in inrancexa Gori and Siifviv I""ons,eds,, The Sazliet Union and Europe ~ I Zthe Cold War, 3943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 217; and Rajna, Csntziika, p. '70. 50. Procacci, ed., TIZPCumitzfonn,p. 61. 51. Tybzrnn Lzldzt, December 16,1948, g. 1. 52. Lewandowski notes of meeting with Weiner, March 1, 1947, PPR KC, 295/m-70, 53. Przeb6j-Jareckinotes, March 1,lli347, MSZ, 6/714 /46. 54. Repol-t on Ulbricfit's press conference in Berlin, October 23, 2948, PPR KC, 295/VTI-69. 55, Mellter notes of meethg with Ulbricht and Prawin, March 15,1947, PPR KC, 295/XX-170. 56. See the Letter from the SED Press Infc7rmation Department to Meller, April 26,1948, PPR KG, 295/XX-I7Q. 57, Letter from the SED Party School Karl Marx tcr the PPR Central %hc>alin Lddz, Spternher 27,1948,13PR MC, 295/XX-70. 58. Dr. Hermann Ley to the PPR Central Committee, April 18, 4947, PPR KC, 295/XX-71. 59. I""rotocoXNo. 13 of the meeting of the Central Secretariat-,November 10, 1947, SED ZK, TV 2 / 2 1 1144. 60. Ostap muski to ComuEb, December 15, 194'7, PZPR KC, 295/XX-72; see also GZos Liadzr, September 23,lli347, p, 1. 61. H. Metler to Grosz, F e b r u a ~16,1948, PPR KC, 295/XX-72. 62. See Nezhcs Dez-ktschk~fd (New Germany) from April 1946 to December 1947. ~ r q i (New Paths), March 1948, p. 209. The book was Janwz Pajewski 63. N O W U and Wlctdzimierz G%owaeki% A~znlogr'erew2"zjc11~izrnu ~ i s t n i e c k i ~(Analysis g~ of German revisionism) (Poznafi, 1947). 64. Appendix No. 4 to Prtstcxol No. 82 of the meeting of the Central Secretariat, June 7,1948, SED ZK, IV 2/21 1205. 65. In March 1958, its name was changed to the Deutsch-polnjscfie Geselfschaft fiir Frieden und gute Nachbarxhaft (German-Pc>lishSclciety for Peace and Gocd Neighborl iness). 61;. C1os Ludu, Sptember 23,1948, p. 1; and Gtos Lildzc, October IQ, 4948, p. 3. 67, Wtzel to Pieck, Grotewohl, et al., June 26, 1948, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143487. 68. Wilfried Loth, ""Salin's Plans for Post-War Germany," in Francesca Gori and Sdvio I""c>ns,eds., Tlze Soviet U ~ i o and n Ezll.ape in flze Cold War, 1943-53 (New
'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"
29
York: St. Martin" Press, 1996)' p. 33-By the spring of 1948,4Qpercent of all industrial prcjduction in the Soviet zone had been de-privatized. 69. See Nairnark, TIE-IZzassi~il?lls ifi Gerf~mny, p. 299. Even Otto Grotewahl, the former SPD leader who was now in a leadership pc~sitionin the SED, recc~gnizedthat there was na alternative but to kowttjw to Stalin, During his first visit to Mogaw in January 1946, Grotewohl fawn& ower the Swiet leader: ""Comrade Stalin is the g ~ ~ a t esocialist st in the world, Comade Stalin is the father af the t~rorld." 70. See Ann L. 13hiltlips,Smiet Policy fozuard East Gerlrznny Reconsidered: The Bostwar Decade (New York: Greenwwd Press, 19%)' p. 40. Ackermann first elucidated the WIYs idea of a "German Road to Socialism" h December 1945, and it was not untiX 1948 that the SED rejected Ackermann" tt-heoxy. He recanted in Septernber of that year, 13aut Merker was expelled from the SED in 1950, Ackermam and Franz Dahlern in 1953. Ackermann was rehabilitated in 1956. 71. Kkrushchev, f"=h~~ltshc/zcv Remembers: The Glnslzosf Tap=, p. 116. 72. Dziewanow-ski, 'The Commjranist h r f y c f h k n d , p. 207'. 73% Quoted in Dziewanawski, Polnnd itz the Tzuctztieth Cent~lry,p. 1%. 74. Raina, Go~rttiIk,pp. 74-75. 75.See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrustrcl~ttRemembers: The Last Tcsfame.tt (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p, 197. Gomulka was purged from the PZPR in 1949, and arrested in 1951. Five years later, he returned to lead the party. 76, Marjan Spychal"i, Zenon, Kliszko, and Wiadyslaw Biehkowski were other prominent leaders purged. See Bigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unify ancl Cotzflict (Cambridge: Haward Universiv Press 1967')p. 61. Brzzinski claims that one of the reasc~nsfor Gomulka" fdtl was that he was the only prominent communist Leader in Easte1-n Europe to oppclse the fc3rmation af Cominfc3rm in 1947; see also lazhborovskaia, ""Te Gornulka Alternative," p. 126, She writes that election tcr head the PPR in NovemStalin had not been consulted on Gomu%ka% ber 1943, and was opposed to Gomulka" ccommitment to colective decisionmaking in the party, and to his attempt to make an honest c=mned.ic>n between a national communist party and the masses; see also Leunid Gibianski, "The %>viet-YugoslavGonnict and the Soviet Bloc," p 2217. For several years the Foreign Policy Department af the CPSU had been filing critical repc~rtson Gamulka's attempts to put a Polish, rather than a Sc~viet,cast on the communist system. Now his unwillingness to slavishly fc~llawthe Sclviet model was used agaimt him; see also Gnif&e, falzre ~rzitUlbriclzt,p. 340, 77. Einfwit (Unity) 3, no. 11 (November 19481, p. 10&, 78. Nezges Deutscftland, January l, 1949, p. 6; see also Sikora, Sozialisfisclze Solidarz'lai und nnfionafe Trzteressen, pp. 116-1117.. Sikora calls Matern's lecture to the Poles typical of thct SED" '%'afrojiancef~(iiFe&cbliclzkt.it). 79. Report of Utbricht" press conference in Berlin, October 23,1948, FZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/VfI-69. 80. Nezk~sDezrfsclzla~zd, October 26,1948, p. 2. 81. Report on Ulbricht's trip to Potand, SED ZK, meetings af the party leadership, Octc>ber20-21,1948, IV 2/1/55, 82. Sikora, SuzkarEisfiscI~cSc7tidarit8i iiturd nntiotzate Interesscn, p. 116. Sikora writes that Dahlem" visit was much more thoroughfy reported in the Polish press than Ulbricht" "somewhat toneless visit."
30
'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"
83, Umigned memo, O c t d e r 20, 1948, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211245.. 84. Nezges Deufseizlalzd, November 21,1948, p-3. 85. GL?S Lzldu, October 24,1948, g. 1. 86. Meller to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 29, 1948, PZPR KC, group PPR KG, 295/XX-i"Q. 8'7".Neues Il)eufs&lland, November 24,4948, p, 3. 88. Repod of Ulbricht's press conference in Berlin, October 23,1948, 132;PRKC, group PPR KC, 2951VZZ-69. 89. Pieck, et al., to the 13PR Politburo, November 20, 1948, 13ZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-m. 90. Trybunn Lzddu, February 11,1949, p.3. 91.. Tqbunn Lzldzt, December 17,1948, g. 4; and December 18,1948, pp. 8-9. 92. Notes on Ochab" visit, unsigned, undated, ea. Qcto3ber 1948, SED ZK, WaLter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/2245. 93. Trybum Ludzr, January 27; 4949#p. 1. 94. Trybunn Lzddu, January 26,1949, p-4, 95. TyEizlw Ludir, Bctclber 4,4?24"3p. 3. 96. N O W Drogi, ~ March-April 1949, p. 127. 97. Utbricl-rt speech, October 22, 1949, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL, 361441. 98. See Tvbfina Ludzt and Rieues Deztksctzlnnd for the first week of September, 1949.
The Controversy over the Oder-Neisse Border, 1946-1949 I""o!~tnnrdno lorlger wants to be a soccer k EI tt~afis
kicked a r o u f ~ d f i aplace f ~ ~ fo place. ----madystau?Gomrslkn, 19&*
The primary obstacle to better relations between the Polish and German communists after World War 11 was the loss sf German territories to Poland. 'The equivocation of the KPT), the SPD, and the SED on recognizing the permanence oi the Oder-Neisse border undermined Polish confidence in the German Left. That they shared an internationalist ideology that theo~ticallytranscended their natimal differences did not seeln to matter; the border was still relevmt. The conflict between Poland and Germany over Uppefiilesia after World. War I was a prolsgw to the dispute over the ader-Neisse border, :Rosa Luxemburg had. rejected the notion of nation-states, national borders, m d even the resurrection sf a Polish state.2 111 1918, Pieck was also opposed to drawing the Polish-German border on strictly national lines, He promoted Polish and German working-class solidarity in the quest for a gmeral victory of communism in East Central Europe. :ll~the fall of 1,922, shortly beftore the plebjscite that w o d d determine the final border, Pierk wrote an open letter to the Poks calling for cooperation against nationdist agitators: "We wodd like the Polish and German wlrrkers from the border areas to e o m together, fraternize as m e d e r s of the proletariat, and investigate and prevent the criminal plans of reactionary nationalists and their agttlntsmr3 After the p1t.bi~cit.e~ Pieck critirsized the natianalists' appea[s to the workers in both countries, but he blamed German expioitation oi Polish
32
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
workers for the extreme cbaracter of Polish nationdist pmpagmda.4 H e urged German and Polish workers to unjte in a revolutionary cause against the industrial mag~~ates in Upper Silesiai.5 The KPP and the W D finally agreed to a border drawn along ethnic lines on January 29, 1933, the day before Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Gemany*" At the k'alta, conhence in kbruary 1945, British Priitne Minister Wins t m Churchill and U.S. President Frankli.n Roosevelt tentatively agreed to Stalirr" demand for a Polish-German border on the Oder and Wstern Neisse Rivers. At first, the Polish Provisional Government hesitated to make a legal claim to the German territories, The Poles did not want to set a precedent to change Poland's 1937 borders; such a change could mean the permanent loss of the eastern territmies now occupied by the Soviet Union.7 By the time the Aflied leaders met again at h t s d a m in July, however, the Polish governmat had established an administration in the G e r m n territories; the expulsion of G e r m s was undcrway. 'The AIlies confirmed at Potsdam that PoXand would occupy the territories until a final peace twaty with Germany." The Western Allies raised no o e c t i o ~ to~the Soviet Union's amexation of BeXarus and Western Ukraine; the Polish government ceded the territmies to the Sowiet Union on August 16, 1945. Now Warsw stood firmly behhd the Yalta and Potsdam agreeme~~ts as Poland's legal claim to the Wr-Neisse border.Yhe g o v e m m t turned its energies to the administration and develogmmt of the Western 'TtJrritories,Io in part to create a fait accompli before the Allies complekd a German peace treatyell The KPD, like all the German political parties, was adamantly opposed to the new border. At first, the party avoided making public statements in the hope that the establishment of LeEtist governments in Germany and Poland would aid a revision of the Odes-Neisse lhe. The KPD often referred to the Soviet zone as "Central Gemmy'YfMitteldezktscl.~lund), with the implication that an ""East Germany'\was yet to be reclaimed from Polmd. Such references elicited vehernent protests irom the Polish Military Mission in Berlin.7" The KPD was in a compromised positim, of course, because its political patron, the Sovict Union, had drawn the bodes in the first place. The party organ Ilt.l.ltsclze Vt,lkszeitzln,r (German People" N~ewspaper) avoided discussion of the border or co~~ditions in the German territories lost to Poland. Several articles djd appear &out the German refugees who were pouring in from Poland and Czechoslovakia, but: MIithout me~~tianing that most had been expelled.13 The KPD tried to absolve itself m d its workhg-class cmstihlents of respmsibility for the lost territories by a r g u i ~ ~&at g Hitler, with the support of non-communist Germnn elements, had garnblcd them away. Pieck, whose own hometown of Guben'%n the Neisse River was now a divided city, blamed Hitler for the plight of the German rehgees from
Polmd: ""We understand what it means when the German people in the east lose a piece of their lmd. "Illere is no one who does not deeply rttgret that it was possible for Hitler to gamble crimhally with the existence and the fuhurc of the German people,"'"" I'he KPD leaders hoped that a free exchange of goods between the fnrmer German territories and Germany was one way to make the new border irrelevant, but the Polish governmnt was in no mood. to cooperate. ?"he PPR ignored requests from the I(I'D to deliver more g o d s from these territories. Ulbricht rcjecled the idea that Germany codd not prosper withln the new borders: however: '*Thisis the old CLeberzsmt~m) argument with M;hich Hitler prc"pare"Jhe war. But from it came catastrophe for Germany; as a rest& of the war of conqllcst Hitler lost the territories east of the Oder and the Neisse forever."l~ The KPD rejected Polmd" historical claims to the territories; if the Allies decided to sign a final peace treaty with Germany, the party wanted to use this as an argument to call for a retum of the territories to Germany. For the time being, the KPD wanted to leave historical claims out of it. Bzrfsche \/cllhzeitu~zgwrote that "'any reference to [Germany's] historical rQhts is senseless, because historical events have repeatedIy shown that the main cause of the bloody wars of cmquest has been the ' D m ~ t g~ ~ a (fstm' ch policy of German imperial2t.s and militnrists.'"~ The KPU" qualified accqtance of the new border with Poiand did not reflect the opjnion of most of the G e r m n communists and socialists in Germmy; however. Social De~socraticParty leader Otto Grotewohl was unequivocally opposed to the Oder-Neisse line; in August 1945 he told an $231)gathering in Leipzig that the border was provisional. W e n he mgrily attacked the Polish government for its obdurate border m d repanationd.istic d e m n d s of our eastrations policies, he charged that "h em neighhor, Poiand, have increased irnmeasurably."lt*Grotewohl, in rejecting Ulhricht's argument that Germany could live wi.t.hout this Lebensritlzim in the east, mahtahed that the lost territories were vital to the industrial and agricultural well-bejng of the country. He warned Soviet officials that the ader-Neisse border would be the cause of a hture Polish-German conflict, and would jeopardize the Soviet tlniods longterm security.lWoscow saw things differently; as long as the Red Army occupied pmt of Germany, there hvas little possibiEty of mother German war of aggression, At this poin.t, the tension betwem the German and Polish communists made them that more dependmt on the Soviet U ~ ~ i o n .
Poland" Claims to the Oder-Pifeisse Border Mast Poles supported the ader-Neisse border, especially given the slim chance that Poland would recover its eastern territories.") Poles justified the acquisition of German land cm moral, strategic, eccmomic, and his-
34
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
toric grounds. As a victim of German aggression and a victorious ally, the Poles regarded the German territories as just cmpenm"ti"" for the human and m&erial darnage that Poland had suffered durjng the war. Polish officids argued that Germany" economic and military potential would be decisively weakened by ceding Silesia and Pomerania to Poland. These territories would also give Poland a stronger and more balanced agricultural and industrial economyB21 Poiish officials wercl. offended when the Germms, includhg German Leki,sts, suggested that Pulmd could not make efficient economic use of the German territories, The Germans often alleged that the sllow ecanomic devebpment in the territories was typical of thc. "Polish economy," a ppejorative term that Germans had long used to stereotype Polish backwardness, disorganizatiun, and inefficicncyzz Pohnd" historical claim was founded on the presence of medieval Piast ernpire on both sides of i.hc Oder River. Gontulka often referred to the Odcr-NQsse line as the '"new Piast borcier." A popular slogan in Polmd after the war wap; 'Wad Odra-Nysa kaiyc@-----RyliSmy,jrs te$r~y,Bgdzietrryf" (On the Oder-Z,usacian Neiss we were, we are, and we will be).2"1n February 1945, Ckos Lzltlrr proclaimed that ""5lesia was and will be Polish," "adding that it was ""the spirit of all Pdand, the power of Poland.""z" Schoulteacbers taught that towns such as Wroclakv and Szczecin were orQinally Polish,zs and the government alluded to Poland" historicaj rights by creating a new Millistry of Recovered Territrrrit.s.2" The PPR even claimed that areas to the west of the ader-Neisse border we= Mabited by Slavs, not Germans. Mrriting in Glos Ltldzl, Stefania 0sinska pointed out that when the Germans conquered the Oder-Neisse area h the tenth century, it was inhitbited by Sfavs k1o~i.nas Lusatim Sobs. She estimated that there were about 275,U80 Lusatim Sorbs living in the Soviet zone of Germmy, and said that they had cheered the Polish army on its way to Berlh at the elnd of the war, Some had carried plxards that read, "A Slav nation lives here, the Lusatian Sorbs." She exhorted Poles to remember their Slav kinsmen across the border: "Poland has regained its hdependence. Our brothers in the west beyond the Oder m d Neisse remah hcapti~iV."2~ Poles not only supported the new westem borcter, but mmt wanted the Germans out af Poland. At Yaita, Churchill h i t i d y objected to the forced removal of the Germans, but Staljsl argued that most of them were fleeing from the advancing Red Army anyway Churtlhill did not press the isszxe.2Wy removing the Qrmans as quickly as possjble, the majority of them in the first year after the war, the Polish authorit.ies made sure that Poland was not susceptible to G e r m ethnic claims to the Western Territories." The government immediately Polonized the area by resettling Polish refugees from the eastern territories."UAlthough estimates vary, by
1950 approximately 11,600,000 Gemans had left Poland, 4,300,000 gojng to the Soviet zone; 3,800,000 to the Rriitish zone; 3,300,000 to the American zone; and 150,000 to the French ~ o n e . 3 ~ Tn September 1945, 63Tls Ludzl wrote that ""all Poland is of the ophion that there is no glace for tbe Gem-tans in these territories, and that they shodd be expelfed from trhm as soon as possiblc." The newspaper even criticized the g w e ent for nut deporting them faster.32 Gomufka eschewed proletarian internationalismby declari~~g &at "we must expef all the Germcrans because countries are built on national lines and not on multixlational mes,"'"When he promised that no '"enemy or fornip" eXements would be allowed to live in Poland, he memt the Germans.34
The SED KejecZs the Odrtr-Neisse Line After the SED was formed in April 1946, the PPR hoped that Pieck and Ulbricht would psevail upon the party to recogize the Oder-Neisse border. Rut the SED adopted a positicm that more chsely reflected Grotewohlfsm d the SX")Wsblunt revisionism. Although the SED could not promote national interests as openly as the Poles, the party" stubborn opposition to the new Polish-Germm border clmfirmed what the Polish communists fcared the most-that the ghost of Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet Pact would return h the form of a deal behnieen the Stalin and the SER to revise the border in Germany" ffavor. The SED's first mnifest to the German people did not mention forc3ign policy or the Polish-German boder.3 h August, however, the SED declared that a communist German government that was mtaiz~tedby the Nazi's crimes against Poland and that contrib~~ted to the reconstruction of Europe w d d be able to undo the unfortunate results of Hitler's war, nan-tely, the loss of German territories to Poland." The new organ sf tbr SED, Nc~rcrsDeutschland, made a deliberate refcrtnce to Pieck's birtbpface to show that the SED sympathized with the rcfugees from Poland: "If the wcrrkers of Gubcm, in the spirit of strictest democracy, work with all their might for reconstruction, then they can hope that onc day the part of the city of Guben on the other side of the Neisse will agah be placed under German administraition."""a Former SPD melnber Max Fecher, now deputy chairmm of the SED, openly speculated that the Soviets would revise the Oder-Neisse border because Germany was mcrrc. hnportant to them than Poland..?-e PPl\i was worried about Grotewohl" and Fechner's revisionism, which reAectcd the view of the majority SPD-wing of the SED.3 When Fecher told a meeting sf SET>leaders that a Soviet officer had informed him the border would be revised in Germany's favor, Polish officials wcre increddous that no one present had raised an objection.^^^ The Polish Military
36
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
Mlssian in Berlin repeatedly attacked the SED for not mcognizing the permnence of the Oder-Neisse border; the mission kept Warsaw well informed af the situatio11.41 The CDU in the Soviet zone" also went on record as opposislg the OderNeisse line. fn May, CDU Vice President Emst L er told the top officer at the Polish Military Missio~~, Jakub Prawh, that he supported a border that ran from the west of Kdobzeg through the middle of Sjlesia., then to the east of Lepica to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. k m m e r &ought &at the disputed territory to the west oE this line could be resolved inbilateral negotiations, but the Poles rcljected the proposition outright.43 I h e SED i~~directly challmged the Oder-:Neisse tine by objecting to a loss of German territory in the West. Shortly before their merger inApril, the KPD and the Wt) flatly rejected French prclposals to sever tke RheinRuhr-Saar region frclm C;emanyYThey joined the CDU and tbr LUP in isszxing a statement calling for the integriq of Germany's western border as guaranteed in the Patsdam agreements." Uhricht contradicted, his prtrvious ~nunciationof Lehe~zsrutcnzin the east by defending Germanyfs 1937 border in the west: "Gemany cannot five without the Ruhr, the :Rhejnland, and the Saar."4.5 Picck also t d d a Collrzgne audience that Germany should not lose more territory." In August, the SED issued a stateme11t supporting Germmy" western border because Poland already occupied German tcltrritory. The party added that the Potsdam agreements did not sanction Polmd" sanxation of Germm lmds.'f7 Polish officials thought that if the Western Alljes moved Germany's western boundary eastward., justifying PoIand" occupation of German territory wourld be easier. Foreign Minister Idygmunt Modzelewski mgued that the reduction of German territory would cmtribute ta the securiv of Europe by weakening Germany forcver: "'fGcmany's] borders along the Oder and the 1Cheirr."lB M a y French and Soviet officids agreed. Pieck knew &at the SEE)" revisionist stance was contributing to antiSoviet smtirnent in the zone, but he did little to stop it. The millions of refugees from the former G e r m n territories were a constant s m c e of nationalist backXash*After visitiing the British znne in early August, Pieck told Rieuer; Detrtsckland that he saw gmat danger in appeals to nationalist sentiment, but he still left the door open for a revi,sjon of the C)der-Nejsse line.49 Bmno Koehler, the head of the SEE)" Central Press Service, told Prawin that the SET)would do everythiw posible to r e p ~ s mthe t interests clf the G e r m people at a future peace conference. He added that his party mcagnized that Poland was developing sacidism, in wfii.ch case the border question would be lcss significmt.50 Koef7ler was certknly not speaking for the German people or the majori-ty of the SED membership. Tn August, SEE) functionary WaZter Bartel
warned Pieck of tendencies among party mernbers to support ""reationary machinations" inregard to thr Oder-Neisse question, and =cornmelnded t-hat the SED leadership cSariQ the party's p0"tion.x But Pieck continued to hedge, Faced with a barrage of criticism from Kurt Schumacher's SPD that the SED was not doing enough to defend German interests, F"ieckcarefully formulated his call for a border revi,si.on in Marxist tems: Germany must '"gajn the trust of other naticms by diminating aggressive forces and through democratic [socialist] consolidation, Then the Allied powers will have understanding for the vital needs of"ou,r peoplc when it comes to the final determination of the border.''SZ The SED leadership even hoped that the Soviets mig:ht change the ader-Neisse line in comedian with a return of Poland's eastern territories. Pieck and Grotewohf speculated that the Soviets wodd return the oil basin around Lwbw to PoIand m d then revise the Geman-Polish border, bat Sta:lin had no such plans. D ~ ~ r i na gvisit to Moscow inJune, Stalin gave th Polish lcladcrshiy assurances that Poland" borders were permanent, in part because of the ethnic faits accompli~reatedby the expulsion of Germms from the Western Territories, and the resettlement there of Poles from Belarus and Ukraisle. Stalin. told the Poles that the OderNeisse border was ""enl;irely settled." Nonetheless, Polish officials wondered why the Soviet occupation authorities were not censoring the SED" revisionist statement~.~S The Soviets k ~ e wthat if the SED was forced to recognize the border, the pmty's chances at the polls would be hurt. D ~ ~ r i nthe g clecthn c m paign in the Soviet zone in the fall of 194(jlthe SED joined the other German parties in making open appeals for a vision of the Oder-Neisse border." At a gathering of SED functionaries on Septelnber W, Fecher repeated what he and GmtewoEil had said many times before: The eastern border was ''only provisional,'"" Accordkg to the Polish Military Mission, Fechner and other SPD elements in the SED had convinced Pieck to adopt a clearer revisionist stance, Previously, Pieck had been mom cirrumspect in his statements about the border, but now be rr-zjected the ader-Neisse line outright. Me told the SED youth orga,nization, Free German Vnuth (FDJ), 'Xftter the SEU' gains the complete trust [uf the Soviets], the Soviet administration will retract the Oder m d Neisse border m d return to Germmy those areas that are really Germm. . . . The SED has certain information that this wiX1:happen."Sb On September 6, the SEC) receivd indirect support for a border ~ v i sion when U.S. Secretary of State lames Byrnes declaxed in a speech in 5tuttga-t that Germany's borders wwld not be determined until the Allies ha$ signed a peace treaty- with GemanyYChurchill had a l r e a e dec l a d his opposition to Pojand's western border in his "lm Curtain"" speech in May which Gomalka had condemned as '"encouragement for
38
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German imperialism."'5T Now Bymes' statement found echo throughout the SED's ccampaign, In a stump speech in Scherin, Pierk contended that t-he "final settlemenl" meant a border revision i,n Germany's ffavore"" At rallies in Guben and Cottbus on September 13, be reiterated that once Germany had developed a ""dmocratic" character, in other words a socialist go~rernmentled by the SED, the Allies might revise the border.59 In Berlin two weeks later, GmtewoXll declared that ""recently the position of the SED on the eastern border has been clearly alld definitively laid out. . . . The SED is fighting for a sensible settlement of alX borders and the unity of Germany*"m Grotewohl even spemlated that the differencesbetween fie occupying powers might cause the Soviets to move the border in Germany's favor.6" Pechner continued to rail against the "provisional" border, promising that the SEU would oppose a recfuction in Germm territmy at the peace cmference.62 The PPR organ C b s Lulinl immediately ran a series of angry dmmciations of Bymes and the German parties who supported a =vision of the Oder-Neisse burder, hcluding the SEE), 011Septentbes 7, G b s Lzldac ran a huge front page headline that read, ""RymesClefends Germany: Attack on Poland" Right to the &covered Terrifories""h3 Successive issues cond e m e d the enthusiastic G e r m n rclactim to Byrocs' speech. 'The newspapemappealed to the other Slavic countries to protect Poland" interests, even making the dubious claim that the Oder-Neisse border was essmtial for "al Slavs." And as if to relnind readers of Germany's imperialist past, Clos Ludzl referred to Gemany as the ""Reich"' (Kzesm),No mention was ever made of solidarity with the German communists or the German working class.64 PoIish lcaders squelched the notion that Poland would give up one inch of the Wstcm Territories. President tioleslaw tiierut stated unequivocally trhat the "'recovered territories on the Oder, N'eisse, and Baltic are Polish now and will a h a y s be PoXish."G5 Gomulka mnoul-tced that the "Stavicf"border in the west was final, reitaating that Poland had a historer ical right to the area, He remarked bitterly that 'Tolmd no l o ~ ~ gwmts to be a soccer ball that is kicked around from place to place.'Wespite GomuF-kdsintention to develop socialism in Poland on his own terms, he called for close relations with the Sovict Union as the sole guarantor of the Oder-Neisse border." Wiadyslaw Bierikowski, one of Gomuika's close canfidmts in the PPR, branded Germany as Palmd" 'kortal enemy""; concerning Poland's foreign policy, he warned, "Our friends will be judged by their mlatims to Gemany" The PPS dcclared that if the great powers stood on the side of Germany in t.he border issue, all Pdand would ulnite against them.67 Poles across the political.spectmm joined in censuring Bymes, even the c~ppositionPolish Peasant Party (PSL), which had fie diplomatic support
of the Unikd States. A PSL, member of t h Polish National Council put it this way: 'Whoever is with the Germans is against us, be it Bymes, Churchill, or anyone else."@ Polish officials were haken by Bymesbrcmarks and disappointed by Pieck's frank visioni ism; they were bafRed by the failure of the Soviet occupation authorities90 stop the SED's propaganda. No c o ~ ~ s i s tpole~~t icy was coming from the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), although some Soviet officers acknowledged tbat the SEWSnationalist appeals were crsosskg the line. Colonel S. I. T'id'panov reported to Moscow that allowing the SED to lobby for a border change was a risky policy: "We run the danger of ailwing the party to revert to extreme nationalism."69 The Soviets tried to reassure the Poles that the border was final. Soviet Fortrign Minister yacheslaw Molotov said that the Polish administration of the German areas east of the ader-Neisse Rivers had been sanctioned at Potsdm, and that it was a fait accompli, that had little chance of being reversed at a future peace conference. H e repeated that it would be cruel Germans who had moved out of these territories to resettle the 2 miltio~~ m d the 1 million Poles who had moved in. Molotov concluded that "all that remains is to wish the Polish friends success in their huge reconstruction efforts in the Western liC3rritories."m Molotov" statement had no impact on blmting the SED's revisionism, however, hlthough Soviet officials in Germany told the Poles that they djd not: support the SED's positinn, they made no mow to stop it. Aware that the SEf>"schances at the polls would, suffer if the p a r 9 recognized the border, the Sowiets tolerated this propaganda, even t-hough it was cmtributhg to a growhg mimosity between the SET) and the PPR, As long as Soviet troops remained in Germany and the Soviet Union cmtrolled the political fate of both communist parties, this duplicitous policy served Soviet interests in consalidathg political co11tro1 of the zane.71 When the SED receked only 20 percent of the vote in the elections in Berljn, where the party had to compete with the SPI) and the other parties from the Weskrn z011es' Polish officials pojnted out &at the SED's nationalist appeals and revisionism had failed miserably" They wamed that the SED's pmpagada was exaceibating old German nationalist prejudices. GOS Lrrdra criIicized the SED for swcumbing to ""Gemanchauvinist pressure"n m d for its '"Ishameful solidarity with the revisionist cmpaign." ?%renewspaper admonished the SEC)for misleading the German working class, m d cautioned the party not to becme ""a taof of a resurrected German impe~alism."~ The Polish Mgitary Mission even concluded that the WU, bettcr than the SER, undt;rt;tocrd that blatant na.tictnal appeals would dtimatefy hurt Germanvs chances for a border revi,sion.7" The SED" nationalist propaganda also estranged the party from the other cornmunist parties in Eastern Europe. :ill early 3947, the Polish For-
40
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
eign Ministry noted that the SEC>rclmained isolated, and that especially the Czechoslovak and Uugoslw communist parties werr;, critical of the Easl. Germm communjsts.7h Glvs Lzkdu pldbljshed numerous articles about Yugoslavia and Czeckoslovakia and their support for the OderNeisse border, but virtudly ipored political cltevelopmmts in the Soviet zone. In 1,947, the newspaper still excluded the SED f r m the sociaiisl: camp, publishing such headIlnes as "All Slavdam Stands in Defense of Poland" Western Border.""" Caught betwee11 the dictates of the Soviet oecupkrs m d the demmds of the German people, the SED had no way out of its political bind, Schumacher" SPD attacked fie SED ~lentlesslyfor being "too little Germmff ill fighting for Germany's 1937 bord,ers.'qve~~ the KPDI wfi,jchwas slill operating in the Mrcstem zones, mcczuraged the SEU to prcssure the Soviets for a border revisim.m h d the SEWSpartner 13af"tit.sfn the Soviet:zone, positions.80 the LDP m d the CDU, maintained their openv revisio~~ist Polish diplomats understood the %D% dikmma, but nonetheless insisted that the party recopize the existing border. In April 3947, Prawin informed Modzelewski trhat if: the SEB took this posi.tion it would lose union support in Berlin to the SPD." Modzelewski cl-iticized the Polish press for exaggerating the possibitity of losing the Western Territcrries, and for poisonhg rcllations with the G e r m s *At a prrzss confe~ncein Navember 1946, a reporter asked Modzelewski about t:he final delineation of the border around Swinouj~cie.Modzelewski replied that an international committee was studylng small changes in the border, but refused further comment. Another reporter drew parallels between the current status of Swinouj~cieand Szczecin with the precarious geopolitical position of Gdarisk and Westerplatte in thc interwar period, m h d ing Modzelewski that Germm agitation for the return of G d d s k was the prtrtext for attacking Poland k-t 1939, Modzelcwski said that moving the border about five kilometers jn Poland's 'avor was likely, but he refused to elabarate.82
The SED Officially Recognizes the Qder-Meisse Border ?"he Soviet occupation authorities at last began to clamp down on the SED's overt revisionism in 1947, Pieck, Ullbricbt, and Grotewohl visited StaIin and Molotov in Moscow in Januar). to ask far small corrections in the Oder-Neisse line, but: Stalin gave them an unqualified "no.ff83 Vladjntir St.mjorno\j,thc political adviser to the SMAG, told Prawin that the "%D's unclear position on tke Polish-German border matter protracted a crisis in the SED as well as impeded the possibility of developing cSoser relations between the SED and the PPR." SmJono'v and Prawin agreed to wam the SED of the dangers of mother world war if they retained illusions of revising the border.M In Febmary, the Polish
Mllitav Mission reported that Pieck, Ulbncht, and even Grotewohl were now moving toward "the right attitude in the border matter.'"s Glos Lzldzi, which had been notably critical of Grotekvohl, quoted him as saying that the Potsdam agrements delineating Germany% border with Poland "form a good basis for the futurt. peace treatym% The first: face-to-ace meeting between Polish army officers in the Polish Military Mission and SEB leaders took place at the mission on Febmary 28,1947. P r w i n wrote Miarsaw that the Germans expected the Poles to have a "rigid hatrcd" of them, but were surprised by the Poles" invitat h n and the officesskpenness and hospitality. Prawh addcd that the Germans were esgecialfy gratefut for the meeting because up to that point: their only contact MIith forcig~~ ofCicials had been With the Soviet occupation authorities, The East Germans viewed the meeting as an opportunity to end the SED's isolation from the other communist parties.87 Paul Merker tautioncd, hocvevcr, that until the two sides had developed greater personal trust, they should r e f r b from discussing substantive issues. One Polish officer was unconvinced that the C;ermnsfpassive attitude was sincere, but believed it an u~~willingness to discuss the OderNeisse border.8" The Polish officers were most interested in glemfng the Germans' candid ophions about &at very issue. The Pdes knccv l-hat eval if the SED leaders publicly accepted the loss of G e m m territory to Poland as a war reparaticm, in private they still believed the loss was a temporary situatio~~.Kg Prawin. told Ulbricht in no uncertaiin terms that the SEWS revisionism, no matter what the rcasm, had to be abandoned: "The Germm people" cchauvinism finds its refiecticm in the political line of &e party [SED], makhg cooperation between ottr parties impossible. What is worse, trhe SED position dms not airn to cure the Geman people, but exacehates its chauvinist sickness.'Wlbricht conceded that the SER's prt-sent position was tactical, Me pointed out that ihe SPD and olher parties had defcated the SEU in the Berlin elections by rclentlessv criticizing U.le SED for not demanding a borcter change from the Soviet occupiers. He added that if the SED cognized the border now, and then t%le Ailies %reed to elections for an all-Germm government, the party w d d be saddled with an unpopular position. Prawin had no syxnpathy for this line of thklkhg.90 The SED h q e d for a defhitive decision on Germany's politicat, future and the Oder-Neisse border at the conference of Allied foreign ministers in Moscow in April 1947. Sbortly behw the m e e t a , Franz Dahlem declared that "the final delineation of the border, whether the border should run east or west of the Neisse, is still open. . . . The SER is as little respmsible as any othrr G e r m n party for thr eastern border tbat was decided in 1944."91 But by this t h e cooperation between t h Soviet Union and.the Western Alljes in the Atiied Control Commissilln was breaking down. The
42
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
United States and Great Britain responded to the Soviets' reparations p o k y and refusal to send prcrmised foodshffs to the Western zones by creating the Bizone in January 1947. Two months later, U.S. President Harry Tmman dccided to aid the anti-communist governments in Turkey and Greece, laying the groundwork for the e w r g h g W.S. policy of cmtaking Soviet expansio~~ism. The foreign ministersheet;ing in Moscow failed to reach an agreement on Germany; in July the Soviets rc3jected the Marshall Plm, which included the controversial reconstruction of the Western zones of Cermany As the nllied positinns hardened that spring, a h a 1 settlement on Germany seemed remote. Relations between the SEU and the PI'R appeared to be improving. For the first time, Polish officials promoted the idea that there were some '"progressive" Germans, namely, the German communists. In April, Gomuika told Clos Lzidu .that "all of the C e m m parties are continuing the spirit of fascism and intperidism m o n g the Germans, except the SED," Gomulka stopped short of praislng the party for recowizing the Oder-Neisse border, which it had not yet done, but said that the SET) was the only party that was not actively cmpaigning against it.92 On May Day 1947, Gcls Lzldu ran an editorial applauding several SEE?leaders for stating that they reected border changes. The newspaper calied this a sign that the SED now understood that recog~~izhg the Oder-Neisse border was an '"adispensable platform for strengthening the democratic [socialist] forces in Germany."g3 But Pieck was still performing a delicate balancing act between the Polish and Soviet demands on the one hand, and the national kterests of the SEU mehership and the Soviet zone populatim on the other, Most East Germms rejected the ader-Neisse border outright. In May, Prawin told Pieck that his government was disappointed in the SED" persistent and opportunistic use of the border issue, He asked the SEB leader whether there was truth to the rumor that the SED, in meetbgs with the Soviets in Moscon; had proposed a border change. Although Stalin and Molotov had told Piwk in January that there would be no changes im the border, Pieck n w told Prawj;n that thercz might be some very sntall border rectifications in Germany" ffavor, but no major ones, Once again, Prawin left t.he meeting disappointed.94 The debate over the Oder-Neisse h e continued to rage withjn the SEU, In July, the Pofish Mhistry of Public Security report& that both the Sl"D and KPU wings of the party thought it was time the SED took a ""concsrrte,clear, and precise psjtion in rekrencc to the eastern border," The old SPDers still maintahed, according to the ministry, that "the lmd [beyond the Oder-Neisse] was German and that the Germans [there]had been wronged," Pieck and the other formr KPU Leaders were mnre realistic; lacking support from the Soviet Union, Pie& now sollght to smooth relations with Poland by recopizing the border essentially as it was.95
At the SEU congress in September, Gmtewot-il declared that his position in favor of a border ~visicmhad not changed, m d that the prtrsmt border was unjust because it had been drawn, "without the participatio~~ m d consent of any prominent leaders of Geman sodev." To gain support h local and zonal ekctions, Grotewohl called for a '"lough positimf% ffavor of revising the border. For tacticd rclasons, Grotewohl supported the payment of reparations for the war, but then argued. that Germmy could better afford to pay them if the Allies returned the German territories.96 InJa~uary1948, the French l;inked their occupatior~zolle with the British and American zones to h r m the Trizone. The Soviets walked out of the A t lied Control Comxnission in March, and,in response to a currmcy refom in the Western zones in june,they blockaded the land routes from the Western zones to Berlin. The unification of Gemany appeared to be a remote possibility, and the SED became more cmfident that the Soviets would continllc to support the party's grip on power in the zone. Tt.le diate political future no ]longerdepended m popular support. Although it is unclear to what extent the Soviets pressmd Eke SED to accept the Oder-Neisse line, the SED kadership ul-rdoubtedy drew its own concIusions from the breakdown of Allied cooperation in Germany%The SEC)cast its b t with the other East European communfst pastie,, which, aftter the Czechoslovak communist coup in Fcbsuary, controlled alf the governments in the rcgim. The SEE?had to accept the present border as final." At t-he Second PeoplesTmgress in Berlin in Martlh 1948,Pieck declared that "the Polish-Germm border would not undergo any chmges." Now GrotewohI a g ~ e das well. The Polish. Military Mission reported that some of the leaders from the SED"s partner parties, such as Otto Nuschke (CDIP) and Wilhelm KGlz (LDP), made similar statements supporting the Oder-Neisse line, but without Pieck"s "dccisive tone."")") In May 1,948, Georgi Dertinger, who led the CDIP in the Soviet zone, told the Polish Military Mission that the leaders of his party understood that the borcier issue was settled. H e sutjge"t"d, however, that it would. be easier .for the German people to accept the loss of the territnries il the Poles delivered agricultural goods to the German people, and especially to the Sowiet zone. Mission officers informed Uertkger that if t-he CDU publicly declared its support of the ader-Neisse border, the Polish people would not be opposed to trade with Germany.l(Jo &rkg meetings of the Soviet bloc forc_.ipministers in Warsaw in June 1,948, the Pol,ish dclegati.on demanded that the SED xcept the OderNeisse border, and promised that trade with the Soviet zone would then follow.'OI Franz Dahlem assured them that t-he SED was not considering changes in the border agreed upon at Potsdam.loWuch to the Poles' satisfaction, the foreip mjnisters issued a declaration stating that the OderNeisse border was "immovable" and a "frontier of peaee."Jm
44
C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
In July, Glos t,udzl reported that the SED had. at last rccopized the border.lm C)n Sptember 30, the newspaper carrkd. a huge front: page headline that r e d , ""Waiter Ulbricht Confirms: There Cannot Be Any Discussion about a Revision of the Oder-Neisse."u" UTJllicht used the Polish formulation that the Odtzr-Neisse line was the '%orcler of peace";'"" he called the lost territories a center of twentieth-cerntury German qgressive wars against Poland: ""As Germans we cannot deny that twice in the last 25 years Cemany attracked Poland from the pincers of East Prussia and Silesia. The cause was the dominance of the reactionary forces in Germmy, whidn had particularly strong support h East Prussia and Silcsia,"l"7 @ert revisionism was still rampant in the SED, however. At a workshop for East German journajists at the Brandcnburg SED Party School, one reporter pointed out that "Comrade Pieck declared in 1945, and again in 1946, that the last word had not been spoken in rr.gard to the Oder-Neisse border. . . . Why do you [the SED leadershjpj suddenly say that the decision is final?" h o t h e r journalist asked why Germms had been stripped of their possessions and summarily expelled from P o l d after the was, C)ne reporter stated out loud wfiat the SEU codd. not say in public; namely, that the %D% recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was temporary and tactical: "Well, of course today we carnot do anything else, today W have to swallokv it., but sometime in the hture, when we become stronger, this border will not be maintained,"l(Js This kind of talk made Polish officids jittery; with East-Wst tensims on the rise, they did not rule out the possjhi(iq that the Soviets wodd. make a deal with the SED to change the border. In 1948, the Polish Foreign Ministry investigated a rumor circulathg in the Westcm zones that the Sovicts intended to force the Poles to give up Silesia behveen the Neisse m d the Oder and thus return Mlsoctaw (Breslau) to Germaslylo" A1:hough the rurnor was groundless, Utbricht fold a Polish diplomat that he disagreed with the Polish argulnent that the former German territories we= ecmomjcally indispensable to Polmd but unimportant for Germany. The diptornat reported that when he suggested that such an economic argwemt could be used to justif?j German claims to the Western Territories, ""Uibricht indignantly re~ectedsuch an interpretatim." 1'Zlricht cited his many statements that the bcrrcier was fh~al.He achowledged that although the SED had succeeded in eliminatkg the most dangerous elements from the party many '%eactionaries in masked forms" remained. As for Grotewohl's persistent: revisionism, Lllbricht assured the Poles trhat Gmtewohl cod$ no lmger count on the szxpport of his old. comrades from the SPD inthe central organs of the SEC>,Ufbricht pointed out, fr-tr instance, that Fechner had been demoted from deputy chairman of the SET>to the lesser position of president of the Central Ahinistration of Justice,ll("
Much to the dismay of Polish officials, however, the East German communists did not rule out a border revision. In November 1948, the SED p r o p o x h peace tstlaty that would unify 13erlin and establish one central, democratic German government.llUlthough the resoiution called for a trcllaty based cm the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which =c%nized Polish admhistration of the German territories east of the OderNeisse border, the border was not directly mentioned.l'V~n May 1949, Nusrhke, now chairman of the CDli, told a French newtipapm that "Germany and Poland . . . must work together in all areas. The proble~xof their borders must be settled in the same spirit of freedom loving cooperation."ll3 The Polish gove t did not cmsider the Polish-German border a '"problem"; it rrefus resolve other pditical or economic issues with the Soviet zone until the SEU f o m l l y recognized the border. The SED leadershjp no lolnger tc,lera.t.ed open revisionism in the party in 1949, although many meHlbers remained unreconciled to the bord.er.114 At the SED Party Congress in January, Pimk said that recopition of the border was a p~rclquisjtefnr German-Pdish understanding.""' Ch? muary 26, Trybunn Lzldzr, the new organ of the PZPR, covered I'ieck" sstatement and his promise to cooperate with the other countries in Eastern Europe, espeially Poland. The nekvspaper observed that the audience reaction to Pieckfsstatement was ""especially warm" and that "'the SED shows Germany the way to peaceful cooperation with Polanli.'"J"n February, the Polish political journal Nolrre Drugi quoted Pieck as saying that "recognition of the border on the Oder and.Neisse as the border of peace and the fight itgahst all revisionist hfluences am the first conditions for understanding with the Polish nation."ll7 The SED was gradually gajning a modicum of trust from the Polish communists. T r y b ~ ~ nLaz ~ ~ u B ' s e r h correspondent, S t a n i s h Rrodzki, d e d m d that the SEU's recognition of the border inthe face of opposition from the other German parties was ""a courageolls political act."Us In July 1949, the Polish Military Mission praised the SED for its hard work in promoting the Oder-Neisse border as a matter of world peace, incmtrast to the continued, revisionism of the political parties operating in the Western zones.119 The Pdes still had lingering doubts about the SECt's szldclen change of heart, however, because they suspected that the Soviets had ordered an end to the SED"s revisionism. They were fully aware that many SED members did not accept the partvs offic.ial position. To further cmsolidate control over the former German territories and precludc a change in the border, the Polish gove ent dissolved the Ministry of Recovered Territories at thc etnd of 1948 and formally integrated the krritories into the Polish state.
46
C ( ~ r t r c r over y the Oder-Ne-isseBordcr
When the Federal Republic of Germany was formed. in September 1949, and preparations for an East G e r m state were underway, cmce again the Palish gover ent feared the Western Allies would renounce the Potsdm agreements. Warsaw sent the Allies a diplomatic note emphasizing that the Potsdam agreewnts provided the basis for t-he security of Europe, and that Poland supported the politied and economic unity of Germany. The demrche brwght no rcsponse.120 The Polish-German border rmained a recufring source of friction between the Poles and East Germans long after the e ~ a t i n nof the GDR in October and its formal mcognj.tion of the Odes-Neisse line in 1950.
Motes 1. Wtadystarnr Gomuika, O probleurfie Nienzieckl'm (On the German prc>blem) (TNarsaw: Ksig;%kai Wiedza, 1971), p- 105, 2. Rosa tuxernburg, Gesantmclte Werke: Band 1: 1893 bis 2905 (Collected Wrks: Volume 4: 1893to 4905) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1199Q),pp. 50-51. 3. Pieck letter to the Poles, undated, ca. September; 1922, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieek Papers, NL 36/536; see Peter Wozniak, ""But, Erz, Kohle: A Thematic Examination of German Propaganda on the Silesian Question During the Interwar Uears,"Tast Ezrrapenrz QzinrferIy 28, na. 3 (Sptember 1994), p. 323. One of the I-solish nationalist slogans was, ""Whoever is stupid as a fool, votes yes far the Cl;=mans on Sunday'" 4. Pieck speech to the Prussian State Parliament, October 4,1922, SEU ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/3136. 5. Wilhelm Pieck, Gesammeile Redc~ziind Schrqfert. Brarld 11: lnnzlnr 1920 bis April 1925 (Collected speeches and writings. Vc>lurne111: January 1920 to April 1925) (Berlin: Dietz Werlag, 4959). 6. Franz Sikora, Sozl'Lzlisfisclze Solidarz'tiz't tfnd nntl'oualc Interessen (Socialist solidarity and national interests) (Colope: Verlag Wissensehaft und Politik, 1977'), p. 106. 'I". W d a w Baxlcikowski memo from the Legal Commission of the Settlers" Committee in OXsztyn, ca. spring, 1945, PZPR MC, Bolesfaw Bierut Archive, 254 / TV-1. 8. The peace treaty between Germany and the Allies was finally signed in 1990, 9. See Article I X of the Pc~tsdarnAgreement. The Oder-Neiisseborder remained in Legal limbo until a reunited Germany reeagnized the border in 1990. 10. The term Westera Territories will be wed to denote the German territories of lli337 east of the Qder and Neisse Rivers. 12. Legal opinion by Dr. Bolelaw Walewski, September, 1945, PZPR MC, BoEesiaw Bierut Archive, 254/ tV-1. 12. Deutscl2e Volkszez'tung (German 13eopXe%Newspaper), March 21, 2946, p. 2, The headline on this day read 'Central Germany Greets Wiihelm Pieck." 43, See Deutsclzc Volkszeidung, October 17, 4945, p. 2; and August 4, 1945, pp. 1-3.
14. The German half of the city was bter rmamed Wilhetm Pieck Stadt. 15. Henry Krisch, """borstellungen van kGnftiger aussenpoXitischer Orientierung in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spgtere Aussenpolitik der DDR (Concepts of the future foreign policy orientation in the Soviet c>ccupation zone to 1947),"7n Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich Schemer, and Eberhad SchuXz, eds., Drp.2'Jat~rzehnteAussenpalifik &r DDR (Three decades of the fc3reign palicy of the GDR) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg tieslag, 19";79),p. 48. 16. Walter Ulbricht, Die E?zfzoiclklzrng des deu fsclten volksdemokmt iseIze12 S tma fes, 1945-1958 (The development of the German Peoples' democratic state, 1945-1958) (Berlin: Dietz VerXag! 19142), p. 25, 17. Dezltselre V~Ikszeiftitzg~ August 7, 1945, p. 1. 18. Quoted in Sikora, SozhEistisclze Solidan"t#ftind natiolzale Xrtferesse~,p. 107. 19. Krisch, "VarstelXungen von k6nftiger aussenpolitischer Orientierung in der SEZ bis 1 9 4 h n d ihre Auswirkungen auS die spgtere Aussenpc~litikder DDR," pp. 43-45.. 20, See Sarah Terry, PulnizdS Place in Eurape: Getzeral Sikorski and ttic Origins offhc Oder-Ncisse Line, 1939-2 943 (Princetcsn: Princeton University Press, 1983). Evidence shows that Wjadysjaw Sikorski, head of the Prjlish government-in-exile in London until his death in 1943, understood that if the Germans lost the war the %>viet Union would grc3bably annex the eastern territories of interwar Poland, and therefore he supported the Oder-Nstern Neisse border for Poland. 21. See Hans Georg Z~hmann,Der Oder-Neisse-K~?ylPikt(The Ode~Neisseconflict) (Mrmich: C, H, Beck, 1979), p. 41, The Polish delegation at Prjtsdam pointed out that the area lost in the east was Xarger than the Western Tern"torjes. The area of prewar Poland was 388,000 square kilometers, and pc>s.hitrarPoland was approximately 309,000 square kilometers. 22. Prawin to the Polish Foreign Ministi"yISeptember 24,1946, MSZ, 61668142. 23. Letter from Stefan Krzywicki to Jan Izydorczyk, November 1, 1959, P D R KC, group Izq.cSorczyk 473129. 24. Gius Lirdlt, February 21,1945, p-3. 25. Memorandum from the President" Office of the Council of Ministers to W2adys1-awFerenc, June 5,1946, URLM Pf?r,file 773, 26. Wadyslaw Gomuika headed this ministry 27, G b s Lz-ldu, July 23, 1946, p. 7'. Jlakob Kaiser of the CDIJ asserted that only a few thousand tusatian Sorbs were living in Germany. The true number was about "i",000; see Gerald Stonet Tlze Smallest Stnvunk Nlzl-iu~t:The Sorbs of Lgsaki~ (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), p. 184. 28. See Diane Clernens, "I"~llcl (New Ycfrk: Oxfc~rdUniversiv Press, 1gm), g. 193. 29, BC Boleslatv Walewski to the PPR, Septembeu; 1945, PZPR KC, Bolesgaw Bierut Archive, 2541XV-1Z; Anthony Kruszewski, The Oder-Rieisse Boundary annd PulnizdS Modent izaliun: The Sucioecunumic and Political 1trrp~cC(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), g. 16. Krsrszewski points out that the mcjst of the '7.6 million Germans who had lived in the territories now occupied by Poland left before being expelled; see also Phillip Baler, The Oder-Rleisse Lirze: A Reappraisal tinder IntenzafiorzalLaw (bulder: East European Monagraphs, 14990), p. 104. According to Baleu; approximately 4 million Germans fmm Poland first settfed in the S v i e t zone of Germany.
48
C ( ~ ~ t rover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr
30, See Lehmann, Der Oder-Ncisse-Konfiikt, p. 57, According to tehmann, the PoEish gc>vernment%territorial aims went beyond the Ode~Neisseborder to a line 30 miles west of the Oder. 31. Br~Xes%aw Wiewidra, The I;"ofiskt-CcmzanFronlz'crfironz Clip Sfnnd;?ointofl~ztematio:orze;tlLaw (PoznaA: Wydawnicwo Zachodnie, 46359), pp. 13S134; and Norman Naimark, The Russiac;tns in Germany: A History cf the Soviet Z U cf ~Ocezrpafion, 1945-2949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 414"35), p. 449. 32. Glos Ludz-t,Sytember 16,1945, p. 3. 33. Quoted in Nairnark, TIze Rlissians in Germalzy, p, 146. 34. G b s L~ddl-l, January 2,1946, pp. 12-1 3. 35. SED manifest to the German people, April 22,1946, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-70. 36. " m e $Er> and the Eastern Question," unsigned, August 12,1946, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 37. Riezk~sDeuliscllfand, May 7,1946, p. 2. 38. Polish Military Mission report, May 2,46346, MSZ, 61671142. 39. 610s trrdu, September 24, 1947, p. 1. According to SEB figures, about 700,000 (47 percent) of the 1,295,000 party members we= from the KPD, the rest from the SPB. 40. Tnformation on the SEWs position on the eastern border of Germany July 30,1 946, PZBR KC, group 1313RKC, 295/Vf 1-69. 41. Prawin report of meeting with Arthur Pieck, April 23, 1946, MSZ, 6/668/42, 42. The GDU M-asone of the SEVs coalition partners in the Nationat Front, alc~ngwith the Liberal Demarratic Party (LDP), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPB), and the Democratic 14easantsTar-tyof Germany (DBD). 43. Prawin report of a meeting with representatives of the German cultural community May 19,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42. 44. Dr~clsekteV~fkssez'tltrzg~ April 9, 2946, p. 2. Pieck signed far the KPD, Grotewohl far the SPD, Jakub Kaiser for the CBU, and WiXhelm KGlz for the LDI? 45. Ulbricht quo>ted in Krisch, "Vc~rsteXlungen?Ton kGnfiiger aussenpolitischer Orientiermg in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spstere Auswnpolitik der DDR," p 448. 46. GZos LuAir, August 27,1946, p,2, 47. "The SED and the Eastern Question," uusiped, August 12,1946, SEB ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 48, Gbs Ludz-r,April 30, 1946, p. 4. 49. Riezk~sDeubchkand, August 6, 1946, g. 3; see also PPR memo, unsigned, undated, PZPIT MC, group PX3R KC, 295lVXL7Q. 50. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42.. 51. Bartel notes for WilheLrn Pieck, August 15, 1946, SET) ZK, Wilhelrn Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 52, PPR memo, rmdated, unsigned, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/WfiI-"i"0. 53. Chromecki notes of meeting between Fareign Minister Olszewski and Garreau (French Ambassador to Poland), Sptember 5,1946, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/VII-2@,
54. 130fishMilitary Mission report, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42, 55. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42. 56. 1301ishMilitary Mission report, September 2,1946, MSZ, 61671 142. 517. Gomulka, O probbtnie Nr'emieckint, p. 99.See Lehmann, Der Oder-Neisse-f(onpikl, pp. 70-109, for a thorc~raghdiscussion of the Western AllesVeliberations on the Polish-German border. 58. Meues l;teufsdzttrnd,September 14,1946, p. 1. 59. Speech b y Wilfhefm Pieck, September 13, 1946, Wifhefm Picsck 13apers,NL 36/ 7'43. 60. Nezges Deufseizlalzd,October 1,1946, p. 1 . 61.. Pctlish Military Mission report, Octc~ber1, 1946, MSZ, 6/6171/42; Krisch, "Varstetlungen von kijrnftiger aussenyofitischer Orientierung in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spgtere Aussenpolitik der DDR," p. 43; see atso Naimark, The Rlassiarls in Gcnnat~y,p. 288. Naimark states that "the Soviets dismissed Grotewohlk resistance to acceptance of the finality of the Qder-Neisse border with Poland as a sign of his petit bourgeois past." 62. Nezges Deufscizlalzd,Sqtember 14,1946, p. 3.. 63, GZos Ludzl, September 7,1946, pp. 1-2. The newspaper devoted its first two pages to attacks on Bymes' speech. 64. GL?~ Ludu, September 8,1946, p. 3; and Ctos Ludzr, September 10,1946, p. 2. 65. Stenographic Records of the National People's Council (mN), September 20,1946, p. 14. 66. Cctmufka, O problemie Niemieckim, pp. 99,112,144. 617. Stenographic Records of the National People's CounciX (KRN), September 22,1946, pp. 2W, 349. 68. Stenographic Records of the National People's Council (KEN), September 22,1946, p. 302. 69, S. Tiuf9p;aov report, September 16, 1946, Btdltetin: Cold War Irzferrznficln~E I-listofyProjrrct, no. 4 (1994), g. 32; see also Gaddis, We Nazv Knozv, g. 119. 70. Nezdes Deufsehland, Scrptember 18,1946, p. 2. 71. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42.. 7 2 . The Sucial Democrats received 49 percent of the vote in Berlin. In the rest af the zone, where the SPD was not active, the SED won 47 percent of the vote. 7'3%C;lm L I A ~ ZOctober I, 43,1946, p. 4. 74. Glos Ludtr, 0ctcr;ber29,1946, p. 3, 75.Polish Military Mission report, November 9,1946, MSZ, 6/6;71/42. 76. Notes on the SEE) in Berlin, January 3,1947, MSZ, 6/7'12 146, 717. Gas Ludzt, F e b r u a ~9,19417, g. 4. 78. H, Meller report (Polish Military Mission), March 18, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-72. 7 9 . Article in the W~sfdcz~Csches Voliks-Ectza (West German People's Echo), March 4,19417, in SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NIJ36J743. 80, See J. Marecki notes of meeting with ArZhur Leutenmt, February 28,1947", PZPR KC, group 13PRKC, 295/XX-70, 81, Prawin to Modzelewski, April 1Y81947, MS& 6/"i"11/46. 82. 13ressconference with Modzetewski, November 18,1946, MSZ, 15/230/22.
50
Copltruz~ersyover the Oder-Ne-isseBordcr
83. Naimark, Tht Rzass-in~sirz Germm~y,pp.301. 84. Prawin notes of a meeting with Sernjont>v, February 8, 1947, MSZ, 6/699/45. 85. Prawin to Olszewski, February 18,1947, MSZr 6/711/46. 86. Glos Ludil, February 16, 1947, p. 2. 87. Prawin to Modzelewski, March 4,1947, MSZ, 6/71 1/46. 88. Przebbj-Jareckinotes of a meeting with. German pc~liticians,March I, 1947", MSZ, 6/711/46. 89. tbid, 90. Meller notes of a meeting between Ulbricht and 13rawin, March 25, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 2951XX-';"Q;see also Wiesjaw Dc~brzyki,Grnnicrz Zacf~~d~zt'tz -30polityee polskt'ej 2944-2947 (The western border in 130Xish politics, 1944-2 947) (Warsaw: PaAst-wowe VVydawnictwo Naukowe, 1917$), p. 188. Dobrzycki writes that the SET) did not recopize the Qder-Neisse border for domestic political reasc~ns,fearing that the other German parties would label the SEE> the "party of capitulation." 91. Netrcs DeutsclzZtz~d,April 2, 1947, p. 1; see also Sikora, Sozialistische ScllidgritBt und nationale Interessen, p, 108; and Naimark, Tke Rz-fssi~~zs in Ger?rzmt.2yJpp.302. 92. Gk?sLladzt, April 21,1947, p. l . 93, Glos Ludl-l, May 1,1947, p. 6. 94. Melfer notes of meeting beween Pieck and Prawin, May 2,1947 PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/=-170. At this meeting Pieck mentioned the island of Uznam near Swinoujjcie for a possible border revision. 95. Ministry of Public Security to Berman, July 16, lli347, PZPR KC, grc~rapPPR KC, 291i/VII-72, 96. Report on GrotewohYs speech to the Sixth Plenum of the SED Central Committee, undated, 132;PRKC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-3. 97. See Ra! f BadstGbner, "Die sowjetische Deutxhlandpc>Iitik irn Lichte neuer Quellm" (The Suvitl: policy toward Germany in Ii&t of new sources), in Wilfried lEJoth,ed., Die Dcatsclzlnnd F rw izz der RincltkriegszAf (The German question in the e 19941, pp. 114-123. post-war period) (Berlin: A k a d e ~ Verlag, 98. '%gricultural Policy in the New Poland," from the SED Press Srrricq May 11,1948, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N L 901483. 99. Prawin to the Polish Foreign Ministry, undated, ca. March, 1948, MSZ, 6/"?"67/54. 100. Meller notes of a meeting with Be&inger, May 14,1948, MSZ, 6/767/54, 101. Neites D~t~kscllllal~d, June 27,1948, p. 3. 102, Motes on the German press, undated, ca. June 1948, PZPR KC, group 13PR KC, 2951XX-3; see also Gottfried Zeiger, Die FIgltung von SED und DDR zur EinItcif Deutschlurzds, 2949-1987 (The attitude of the SED and the GDR toward the unification of Germany, 1949-1989) (CoXctgne: VerXag Wissenschaft u. Politik, 1li388), p. 14. Z ~ Deutscfzl~nd-Frage1939-1949 (Poland and 103. Viktoria Vierhelleu; hEen E ~ P die the German qttestic~n,1939-1949) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 19701, p. 240, 104.6bs Ludr!, July 36,1948, g. 2.
105, G%ost u d u , September 30,1948, p. 1. 106. MeIler to the Polish Fc3reign Ministry, Bctc>ber29, 1948, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-70, Ulfbricht called it the ""Fiedengrenze." 107. Inialter Utbricht, "The Foundations of German-Polish Friendship," a. TanuarJiS 1949, MSZ, 10/470/43. 108. Georg Kraus notes, Oct-c~ber 26,1948, SED ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NIJ 18211245. 109, Wierna to Modzelewski, May 25, 1948, MSZ, 6/767/54; see also Patrick Kenney, ""Plish Workers and the Socialist Transforma tion," in Norman Naimark and teonid Gibiamki, The Estnblislzmenf of Communist Rk<~irnfs il'rz Easfem Eurolje, 1 9 4 H 9 (Boulder: Westview Press, 19971, p. 146-147. Kenney no>testhat the Soviet army encouraged this fear by shipping materials and factories from VVroc3atv back to the %viet Union. Furthermore, some older Germans returned to Wrc>c%aw temporarily after the war, and some Germans worked in industry there, 110. Meller notes of meeting with Ulbrjcht, December 8,1948, MSZ, 61767/%. 411. See Loth, ""Salin's Plans for Post-War Germany," p. 29, The Soviets were as yet unwilling to form a separate socialist state and p ~ c i p i t a t ethe permanent division of Germany. In December 1948, the Soviets rejected a SED prc~pasafto form a provisional government and accelerate the socialist revolution in the Soviet zone. 112, 13rotocol No. 130 of the SEB Central Secretariat, November 15, 1948, SEU ZK, TV 2/2.1/248. 413. Zrtekermann tcr Grotewohl, May 17, 4949, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483; see Norman Nairnark, "The Swiets and the Christian Democrats, 1945-1949," in Francesca Cori and Silvio Pc>rts,eds., The Svvlet Uniorz ap~d Eurnipe itz fhe Cold War, 2943-53 (New York: St. Martin's 13ress, 1996), pp. 37-56, Soviet military commander Colonel S. I, TiuYpanov forced Jakob Kaiser out of the CBU in December 1947, and Emst Lemrner out of the LDP in 1948. 114. See Krisch, "Vorsteilungen von kijrnftiger aussenpolit-iscfierBrientierung in d a SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auF die spgtere Awsenpolitik der DDR," p. 48; and Fischer, ""Aussenpolit-iscfieAktivitzt bei ungewisser sc>wjetlischer Deutschland-Potitifc (bis 1955)," p, 70. 115. Vierheller, 1Sulerz und die Deltfscl-zland-Frnge1939-1949, p. 141. The PoEish delegation to the cmgress was made up of Politburo member Edward Qchab, Central Committee member Dorota Kltuczyfiska, and the head of the PZPR Central Committee" Foreign Affairs Department, Ostap muski. 116. Trybunn L u ~ u January , 26,1949, p. 4; and Trybuna L u ~ zJanuary ~, 27,1949, p. kf isclle Solidaritdf t-lnd nationale It~fercs.sen,p. 117. 4; see also Sikora, Sl~zia'af 117, Nowe Drogz' (311,January-February Z949), p. 265. 118. Tqbzrnn Lzldu, F&ruary 12,1949, p. 3. 419. Polish Military Mission report to Mc~dzelewski,July 1, 1949, MSZ, 15/113/211. 420, Sikora, Sc~zialistisctzcSolidar-iflit.iind nnfiorzaleInferesscn, p. 119.
The Myth of the Stalinist Brotherhood, 1949-1954 J do nof brplitpzfe in fjzr dernocuatic Gerr~zaf~s fin the GDI
?"he Soviet blockade of B e r h was a diplomatic blunder and a propaganda set-back for the SovieWnion and Stalh's long-range plms ta expand communjst influence in Germany Stalin had calculated that the Western allies would leave Berlin, but the blockade mly forZified their resoiution to stay; fwthermore, it hastened l.he formation of the W s t German state, a development Stalin had been trying to pltevent," The Polish communists had mixed feeli~~gs about the division of Germany. They did, not necessarily want a unified Germny or a new peace tmaty that reversed the Potsdam dccisims on the Polish-German border, but an artificial East Geman state was not a genuine parantee oE the status quo either. Furthermare, a Socialist Germrran state legiti~sizedthe SED" status with;in the Soviet bloc, a situation the Poles had resisted. The SED kaders hoped that an official recopition of 'l-he Oder-Neistie border would enhance their standing with Poland and the other communist states. Pdand recognized the German Democratic Republic on October H, 19449, m d in November the two countries exchanged diplomatic representatives."ccording to the public posturislg of the Polish and East German communists, a new state of neighborlhess and good will now charI,lda declared that "'a necv Germany fias acterized their relahns. Wh~llza been born on our western border, m e that offers its hand to us in cooper-
Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod
53
Frc.rn left to right: Otto GrotewhoX and Jbzef Cyrankiewicz signing the Zgorzetec agreement recognizing the Bder-Neisse border, ZgorzeXec, Potand, July 6, 1950, (Photo courtesy Stiflung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorgantsationen der UDR im Bundesarchiv, reprinted with permission)
ation."'" Polish reporter Stanistaw Brodzki commented that the Soviets were giving the Germans an opportunity to carry on the tradition of Marx, Engels, m d I:,,iebb;xneeht;he added that '"on the founda.t.ion of this tradition-and. only this tradition-are built the bridges of friendship across the Oder m d Neisseem5 The fatuous propaganda extolhg etemal East German-Polish kiendship was typical, in Stalin" empire, Bureaucrats and party members wcrrked under a cloud of suspicim and mistrust. Otficials did not h e the courage to address directly the many unresolved issues that divided the PZFR and the SEE?;many of their reports were Hlisleading.6 Nothing symbolized this false smse of Polish-East German frkndship better than the GDR's recognitiol~of the Oder-Neisse hordes, Otto Grotewahl, the head of the new East German goverment, had bitterly ogposed the new border with Pctiand after the war. Now he proclaimed that ""theOder-Neisse border is for us a border of peace, which m k c s possible a friendly relationship with the Polish people."T In a preliminary agreement & p e d in VVarsaw on fune Q, 1950, an East German delegation led by Walter Ubricht committed t-he GDR to the present border. The two sides also initialed accords on economic and cultural cooperation. U-
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Frurn left to right: GDR President Wilhefm Pieck and PRI" 13residentEJftlleshtv Bierut in Warsaw, December 1950. (Photo c=oux?esyStiftung Archiv der P a ~ e i e nund Mas~norganisationen der DDR inn Bundesarchik7 reprinted with permission)
brieht cmcluded that "there are no more problems between the German and Polish people which c a m t be resolved in a peaceful mamer." Cyrmkiewicz had little in commm, personally or ideologirally, with a hard-limr like U'lbrieht, but nonethei,ess Cyrankiewicz agreed that a period of doser, friendly cooperation had begun.8 Brmo teuschner was gratified that President Bolesjaw Bierut, whom Leuscher called ""the most promine~~t representative of thc Polish people,'"rusted the SED's leadership of the so-called '"pmgressjveGcrmany'T~esch~rer addcd that the talk were cmducted in a "truly sincere and cordial amosphere.""" Neues Di?zrl"schland greeted thc border accord wi.t.h a huge front-page spread,l%d for several days the agreement was page-one llews in TTbzr~zaLuda.71
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GDR President Wilhelrn Pieck reviewing Polish troops in Warsaw December 1950. (Photo courtesy Stiftung Arehiv der Parteien und Massenorganisatic>nender DDR irn Bundesixrchiv, reprinted with germission)
On 'July 6,1950 Gmtewohl and Foreign Minister Georgi Dertinger met their Polish counterparts, Cyrankiewicz and Stefan WierMowski, in the border town of Zgorzelec, where they signed Chc h r m d treaty recognizing the Oder-Neisse as the final ""border of peace" between Poland and Germmy T~!bu~za Ludu claimed that t-he agreement ushered in a new era of ztnderstandi,ng: 'The emthkusjasm with whieh a crowd of people galhered in Zgorzelec, from both sides of the border, w d c m e d the sipjng of the agreement, is an expression of t-he will of both peoples to suppmt mutual relatio~~s on kiendiy prjnciples.'"z An East German poet dedicated these 1hes to the event: "The Neisse follows its old c~)~l.se, t-he Oder flows in its usual bed-but yet it is as if the lazy river had changed its countenance over nighl.". . . There, where for centuries d y anger flourished, through German fault we want to confr?ss,n w one will call we Germans neighbar, friend, and comracie. Clh, \zrhat a beautiful victory.'"s East Germm President Wilhelm It""ieck% official visit to lNarsaw in Decemher 1950 solidified this new relationship. It was his sec& visit in a little over two years, but this time he came as a head of state, Overlooking Pieckfs oupp0rbni.sti.crejection oi the Oder-Neisse bordm a few years earlier, Cyrankiwicz ~ " i s e dhim as "one of the most prominent revolu-
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tionaries and anti-fascist fighters," Tryhlmn Lzldzs lavished compliments m this ""devoted friend of Peoplesf Poland," writing that "we welcome him wiCh the depest sincerity seeing i,n him the symbol of a, new dernacratic, peace-1:ovhg Germany,"l"" Pieck ~ s p m d e d in an equdly mapmirnous f a s h h , nothg that this was the first time in almost a t-cousand, years that the head of a German state had made a friendly visit to Poland. Pieck evoked the memory of his former Polish cclmrades in the communist movement: "Heel especially c ~ m e c t e dto the Polish working class md its partypof course such g ~ a political t revolutionaries as Julian Marchlewski, :Row Luxemburg und Lea Jogiches were my friends and comrades in arms. 'Thembre my visit in Warsaw is m expression of proletarian internationalism, which binds the Polish Uni.ted Mlorker" Party with the S:ED."fi"Uponhis departure from the Warsw railway station, Pieck thanked the Poles for their "peat hospitality" and proclaimed, "Long live the great camp of world peace and its ingenious h e h s m m , our common friend, and leader, Generallissmo Stali~~l"" The Polish communists usually avoided &is kind of hyperbole, but alf in all the visit: was a public relations success. Rierut reciprocated Pieck"s visit bp goLng to Berlin in April 1951. Once again, nothing but kind w o d s wew exhanged in public. Bierut thmked the East Germans fnr their "musual hospitaZiQ and M,endshipef""7m Ulbricht went to Warsaw a m t h later, he sotenrnly declared that '"now there are no more difkrences between democratic Germans and the Peoples' Po1:and,."lB This public show of affection masked the f u n d a m t a f lack of trust between the Polish and East G e r m cclmmunists that had developed after the kvar. Relations were not what they appeared. The P7,f"R leadership knew that as long as Stalin stood behixld the SEVs new overtures toward West German Foreign Poland, no honest paranership was possible.1-e Mhistry specdated tkat U'brichl. and C m t e w d had rcceived instructions in Moscow in May to recognize the Oder-Neisse border, m d Polish officials suspected as much." 01e e ~ w i t n e s sto the Zgorzelcc meethg, Polish diplmat Ramuald Spasocvski, called later that the Soviets eventually bad,to mediate the serious differences between the two sides con. wrote that at the time he had cerning the w d i n g of the t ~ a t y He vkwed tke xcord as "a historic victory for peace, fnr both Poles and Cermans. With time, 1 saw with incrclasing clarity that it was Soviet foreign gdicy that was the actual beneficiary them, because the twaty helped their hegemony over Central Elzrope.Tl According to former LDX;" leader Ernst Lemmer, Grotewohl and Dertinger wercl. forced to sign the Zgorzelec agreement inskad of Pieck or Ulbricht so that "an d d c m u n i s t " wwolrld not be eharged with signing away German territory, Lemmer also contended that '"he Poles
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themselves did not take the theatrically staged siwing ceremony, behixld which stcrcrd the will of the Soviets, very seriously.""Lemmer aileged that m e drunken Polish journaiist told Derti,nger that no sel,&respectingPole trusted a leader who c d d sign away part of his country.22 Most East: Germns were of the same mind. The W s t Cermm press accurately reported that the SED was having serious problelns in justifying the treaty to the East German peopie.23 The SEB leadership still faced the formidable task of reconciling its own party members with the OderNeisse border; the East Gerntan Foreign Minjstry frequently had to admoni.sh its diplomats for using German names for the cities in Polmdfs Westcm Territories.24 The rmk and file of the SED's partner parties in the National Front, the CDU and the LDP, remained, in the words of the Polish Militaw-y Mission, stridently ""cauvhist and revisionist."z5 Polish officials privately thought the SED leadership was not doing enough to stamp out wisionism in the party. For example, during the visit of a Polish delegation to t h Goethe celcbratim in Weimar in November 1949, an SET) functionary was asked when Silesia would return to Germny. His reply echoed Pieck's mguntent ol a few years earlier: '"After the signing oi the peace treaty and when the Germans show proof of [their] democratic cor.lvictions."2Two years later, West German officials speculated that Che GDR was still banking on a return of Silesia, but Dcrtilrger assured the Polish Chief oi Mission, Jan hydorczyk, that '"the Bonn =ports relathg to Silesia do not have any basis in truth'"7 Izydorczyk gave Dertinger the benefit oC the doliht. Nonetkless, he reported that most GDR officials "lacked arguments confirming its [the border 'S] legitirnacy.'"Wther Polish diplomats observed that the East German communists tried to avoid the issue and that they "wcre not always up to [answerir\g]questions on the refugee or the Oder-Nelsse border issues.'"9 In October 1951, Dertinger again had to =assure the Polish governmem.t.that the SED was not maneuvering for sig~~ificant changes in the border,"" The so-called '"border of peace" was far from peaceful; the heavy gtlard that stood watch on the Oder-Ncisse was a powerful syrnbd of discord over the borkr, Frequent disputes over terntorid fishing rights that had begttn shortly after the end of the war continued after the Zgorzelec treat-y was signed. In the fall of 7,947, the Polish coast guard confiscated several East German boats fishing in the bay near Ueckermiinde, south of Swinouj~cie." Two years later, Polish authorities arrclsted four more East German fislnerman from Ahlbeck for fishing in Polish waters. By September 1950, eight East Germm fjshermm and two of their fishing boats were in Polish c u s t d y 'The East German gove demanded l-heir return, and called for a maritime qreernent to prevent future disputes.32 After repeated e n t ~ a t i e sfrom East Berl.in, the Polish
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authorities =leased the fishermen and their boats in 1951.3 Nonetheless, the East Germans continued to fish in Polish waters on the Baltic Sea, and the Polish coast g ~ ~ a stopped rd three more East German fishing boats in August 1951, The Polish Foreign Ministry in.formed the East German gowmment that the Polish coast guard would be increasing patrols a l q the maritim bordec" Polish diplmats complained that East Qrman boats werc still illegally crossing the border near Zgorzelec,3bnd later in the year the Polish gave ent rejected an East German pmposal to ease restric"rons on this traffic.36 If th communistsf assertions about the davvnhg of new epoch in Polish-East Germm relations were true, the tension along the border did not reflect it* In July 1953, the U.S. internathnal newspaper Herald Tribzuzc. went so iar as to call the Oder-Neisse "Europe's worst border problem." Reporter Gaston Cobientz predicted that after the June 17 uprising in the GDR, '"the festering ader-Neisse situation should breed more hatred for the Soviets. :It also stands in the way of complete solidariq between the Polish Reds and German Reds. The Poles still see Germms as enemiesand vice versa." He reported that the border town of Zgorzelec (the site of the Oder-Neisse agreement in 1950) was divided by armed guards and barbed wire, and that East G e r m 6migr4s from the Polish side of the town could see their old homes acsoss the rivec He elaimed that t h y expected to get them back37 Reacting to the Herald Trib article and to similar West German reent assured Warsaw that the border was ports, the East German gove permanent. h response, Bierut wrote Grotewohl that "the border of peace on the Oder and Neisse has estaE7lished a guarantee of friendly relations between our nations."% Frequent anti-Polish dernorrstratio~~s by the East Germans in the Oder-Neisse area, however, belied Bierat" aasscsrtion that the border was a ""garantce." The Polish communists halfhartedly accepted the SEDfs explanathn that such hostik actions against Poles were instigated by Western agents and fascist agitators in. the GDRe39 East Germm and Polish ofiicials h e w that such allegations were untrue, The SEDfsStalinist economic policies and intransigent position on German udication were becoming increasingty unpopular in the GDR. In N o v d e r , Ubrieht told Izydorczyk in confjcience that the SED was havhg difficulty in overcoming people's chauvhistic and. n a t i d i s t i c attitudes. WLhricht said that the party needed to instill mom political indockination, especially in the Guben and Frankfurt areas and eastern S a , , y and Lusatia, where popular opposition to the border was particularly strcmg.3"' At the SEU Party Congress in March 1954, Erich Honecker ack~awledgedthat the FDJ had chauvhistic tendencies, especially concerning the Oder-Nrisse border.41
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East German Ambassador to Paland St.edm Heym filed this report in the s u m e r of 3955: ''The Oder-Neisse border is not only misused in West Germany as a means of chauvinistic agitation, but wide circles of the population of the GDR-not unly the earXier settlers [from Poland]do not have a clear conception of this question, . . . An interpmtation is ofkm spread Ihat a united Germany kviX.1get: back the old territories on the other side of the Oder-Neisse." Heym offered the examgle of one young woman from m East German cdlcctive farm who was asked what she would do in a reunified Germ,any. She answered, "Then I would go home!" She meant, of course, to her home in Polish Silesia. Heymann concluded that whether or not East Germans were SED members, the Poles simply did not trust them.42 Potish officials repeatedly chided the SED for not dslng more to stamp out anti-Polish attitudes. T k Poles complained that the SEWS propaganda was contrib~~ti,ng to the beljef that the Oder-Neisse bordcr was a temporary result oi losing the war." "Polish diplomats criticizd the SED and its publishi~~g houses Eor rejecthg Polish bmks m the subject when they referred to Polmd's historical. presence in the Western Territories"4" The Polish Ennbassy reported that ""in nearly e v e y public speech, talk, discussitm . . . tbr problem of the border on tl-teOder and Neisse has not yet been laid, to rest. Even the statemats of responsible activists in government and society frtzqrrently treat the matter of the Oder-Neisse border as 'unjustly de~ided.~'~45 The Poles vigorously protested implications that the border was temporary. Some East Germans officials stilf referred to the GDR as '"Middle Germanyp"as though western P o h d was German territory.& %e official in the Polish MillisIry of Trade reported that the East Gcrman Embassy in Warsaw often called Lower and Upper Silesia "Poland I" a d "Polmd 11,"as ff they wert? not M y inkgrated into Poland. 'l'he official concludd that "this type of reference does not contribute to the stmgthening of good neigfiiborly relations.
Poland and the German Problem The PZPR did not view the creation of two German states in 1949 as a final resolution to the German problem." The CMer-Neisse border and sta" tus of West Berlin were ultimately dependent m Moscow's adherence to the Potsdam agreements. As long as there was no peace treaty with a u17jted German state, the Oder-Neisse border was sub~ectto change. Furthermore, the East German state was not recognized by other Western countries, but the Federal Republic cJf Germany (FRG) was graeiua1:ty gaining legitimacy in Wrsstern Europe as a vital economic and polit.ical parher.
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Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood
Tn the early 1 9 5 0 ~ the ~ Western Allies began to deliberate th rearmament of West Germav. The Polish communists were not as worried about this eventuality as they were &out Soviet diplomatic mancwers to prevent M s t Germany from joining NATa: a deal, for i_nstance,between the Allies and the Germm states to unify the country and revise the C)der-Neisse border: The Poles wanted a h a l peace treav between the Allies and a legit.imate, unified German governnnent that would guarantee the new border. But there were no assurances that the Potsdarn agreements would be the basis for negotidions. 'The SED had more reason to worry; an Allied deal for a united Germany and free elections meant their being rczlegated to a small and inslpificant opposition party In C)ctober 1950, the foreig~~ ministers of Ihe Soviet bloc countries met in Prague to devise a strategy to block the possible integration of West Germany into NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community [ECX]. The East Germans were not invited to the formal talks, but came as &servers, Dertinger held. several meetings with Molotov; tkese Dertinger ~ g a r d e das a c d r m a t i o n of the GDR's legitimacy. He said that the Soviet government was ""in cmplete understmding of our national n e e d ~ ~ " 4 ~ I'he foreip millisters proposed that t-he four Allies create the "conditions for the f o r m i o n of a united peace-lovi,ng dernncratic G e r m state," Gfotewohl was charged with forming a proposal for a German parliwntary council that would determine the procedures for all-Cerman elections and the future of a neutral,, largely demilitarized German state. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejected the idea, although t-he crverbre was probably sincere. Stalin was still not convinced of the lmg-term efficacy of the GDR; %viet fears about West Germany's entry into NATa were very real."" I'he United States and the other Westcm Allies were in no positim to appeaw s a l i n in the early 1950s. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic b o l b , uverestirn.ates oi the Soviet tmop strength in E~urclpe,the communist victory in China, a d thc. Korean War made a compromise with Moscow nearly impossible," The "lesson" of Munich infomed both sides; the West woufd not relinquish any part of Germany if it could fall under Soviet influence, and Stalin interpreted Munich as a capitalist deal to provid,e Hitler with a springboard for a wm against t-he Soviet Union.. There was little hope for serious negotiations on Germany; Grotewohl's proposal went n o h e r e . In March 1952, while discussions continued over the rearmament of West Germany, Stalin made one last proposal for a unified, neutral, and demilitarized German state. Once again, the Polish government f e a ~ d that the border cvitl Germany would go back on the negotiating table."" Ulbricht and Pieck paid iip service to supporting a unified Germany, but
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they knew that a cbange h the status quo threatened the GDR" very eexistmce and the SED's political future. The SEC) was g ~ a t reliewed y that the Soviet de~aarchefailed."" The SEX)took i m e d i a t e steps to confirm. the division of Germany into two states, and to break out of its diplomatic and economic isdaticm from the non-communist world. The GDR leadership enlisted Poland" ssupport in gain.ing djylomatic recognition from the non-communist states, ESiemt agreed-as long as Poland's interests were not compromised.54 111 early April 1952, Pieck went to Moscow to meet Sblin, who agrced to work on buiEding and supporting the socialist German state. Pieck evoked the Rapdo Treaty as a precedmt in Soviet-German cooperation, alt-hough fie h e w full well that a call for a new li'apalfo, which was in part an anti-Polish agreement, was an affront to all Poles, communj.sts included."" When the Western powers recognized the sovereignty sf the FRG h May 1952, serious discussion began m the FRG's role in the defense of by securing its boundary with the Western Europe..The GDR ~ s p o n d e d FRG; in August the Soviet Union liquidated its control commission in East Germany and declared its intention to grant sovercigsrty to the GDR, :In Octcrber, the GUKs djplomatic missims were upgraded from legations to e~abassies.Soviet troops remained in East Germmy; but the sccupation was officially over.% That summer, Ulbricht and the SSED resolved to build socialism in the GDR as quickly as possible, inpart to prevent a capitaljst takeover of East Germany if unification talks convened, The servile SED leaders also wanted to show the Soviets that they were c a p w e of developing a mature socialist state on the Stalhist model. The Soviets cautioned Ulbricht not to push the reforms too fast, however, for fear not only of alienating the East German population but of ending all hope for communism to gain a foot.hod in the FRG. Molotov rcmernbered that "it tufned out that the German comrades began talking at the top of their voices about buitding sociaiism without having laid the proper grolandwork for it." 'The pfan was a disaster, and by thc end of tbe year UI:bricht was pleading for more Soviet aid, The crisis cdminated in the uprisixlg against the SEE? rkgirne in June 1953and almost cost Ulbricht his jcrba57
Polish-German "Friendship" Before the creation of the GDR in 1949, the German and Polish c m m u nists made few honest efforts to further peoyle-to-people contacts. In 1950, Grotewohl conceded that /'the old prejudice and armgance of the Germans toward the Poles still exlistef"8The developnnent of genujne partnerships between t:he connmunists in Stalin's empire was virtudly
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Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood
impossible. No one could, be sure who was a Soviet agent or a VVestem spy. Even tbr Polish diplomatic corps, which had previously filed mom h o ~ ~ ereports st than the East Germans, now saw ideological deviations and spies everywhere. Shortly before Stalids death, for example, the Polish Diplomatic Mission in Berlin observed that there were "social-democratic tendcnciesf% the SE:), as welf as dmgerous inhences from foreign agents and bourgeois elements.59 It was not the SED's alleged deviations from Marxist-Leninist-Stalhist thought that made the Poles di,strust the East Germns. As long as Ihe GDR was the devoted satellite of the Soviet Union, Poles had no more trust in the East Germms than they did in the Russians. Shortly after the founding of the C;DR i,n 1949, a porter at the Warsaw train station probably spoke for most Poles when be told Bmdzki that ""fo not believe in the democratic Gemans [in the GDR].. . . G e m m s were, are, and will be our e~~e~=y." hodzki commented that most Poles could not disthgznish between the criminal Nazi concentration camp commandant [Amnun] Goefi from P3rask6w m d the fanous author Coethe from MJeimar.60 Numerous cultural exchmges were developed in the early 1950s to promote East German-Polish friendship, and although some undoubtedly fostered good will and understanding, many had the opposite effect.61 Poles wx generally more inkrested in cultural exchanges than the East Germans, Although many Poles stereotyped Germans as coldly efiicienf, dogmatic, anci condescending, they respected German culture, technology, and economic development. The Polish Committee of C d tural Cooperation With F o A p Countries enthusiastically promoted pmgrams to acyuaint the East Germans with Polish culture;hVrom October 1,950to May 1,951,over 200 Pdes m d e official visits to East Germany, the highest number of Polish visits to another comtry during this time. Because the East Geman authorities perrnftted exchanges only if they were organized and promoted by the SED, only six East Germans went to Poland on oficial gave ent business during this period, in comparison with 181 Soviets m d twelve Gze~hoslovak~.63 Many SEE) members, especially those in the lower ranks of the party, still held. strong prejudices against Poles. These prejudices were evident in various ertchanges; for instance, in May 1950, the head of t.he SEDfs Ecmomic Depart~aent,Willi Stoph, angrily de~~ou~zcled the rude behavior of an East German delegation to the trade fair in Pozna_l"l,and criticized an East Germm newspaper report for calling some of the fair's streets and czlltural park a "carnival,"kwhich Stoph found demeaning* Stopfi said that he was shocked and disappointed by the reporter" 'kstonjshing it;norance.'Vhen Bierut visited tl-te East German factory Lict~naWerkez in 1,9Fit, it was difficult for the East Germixns to organize a welcome because several thousand German immigrants from Pofand wlrrked in the plant." East: German officials worried that the wlrrkers
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would ask Beirut embarrassing questions about when the Germans could return to their homes in Poland.65 Friction between the East Germm m d Polish diplomats and their respective hosts in Warsaw and Berlin was yet mother barrier to better relations. The Polish Diplomatic Missim in Berlin was disappointed in the East German governmnt's lackluster efforts to promole friendship with Poland. East German officials thought that the first "Month of PolishGerman Friend?;hipf% ine GUM in March 1451had achieved positive results, but the SEE) cmplained about the Polish delegati.onfslack of political preparation for the celebration. The SED d s o reported that there were far too many manifestations of East Germans9ostility toward Poles*"" In August 1951, Polish d jplomats complained about the serious shortage of officials in the East German b r e i p Ministry who were responsible for Polish affairs.@That same month, Poljsh diplomats took untbrage when the East Gcrmans breached protocol by sending such middle-ranking SEC) functionaries as Karl Wloch, the secretary gmeral of the Committee for Cnlturd Cooperation with Foreign Count.ries, and Mans Joachirsl Hertwig, the secretary of the FDJ, to greet a Poiish delegation to the Polish Renaissance E;estival in Berlin. The Poles were also disappointed when o171Y two SEX;)rc~r)l"csenfativesat-tended a performance by '"Masowsza," the famolls Polish dance company.68 The discrepancy between the SED's official pmmotion of international working-class soljdarity and Ihe party's policies toward Poland was revealed in the SEE)" restrictions on casual encounters behnieen Poles and East Germns. The ~ s t r i c t i meven s applied to gave ent and party officials. At the height of Statinist repressio11 i,n late 1,952, the East German parliament passed a law requiring the approval of the East German Fore i p Mhistry for atl direct communications between foreipers a d East German officiats, agencies, and institutions.@Dertinger often made persmal decisions on the lists of accepthle contact persons for the various East German departments and agencies.7Us of January 1,1953, all visa qplications for prkate vi,sit.s & r o d had to be approved by the East Ccrmat1 police, the Interior Ministry, and the Foreign Mhistry, Articles that the Poljs2-r press sent to East German newspapers had to pass muster with Ihe East German Foreejgn Mbistry censors. Foreign Mjnistry official Fritz Grosse told Polish dlplornat Stianisiaw Dodin that these measures were necessary ""tocreate cmtrol and order . . . [and] to hinder the work of our common enemies." Grosse said that the Rudolf Slmsky trial was a good lesson for the pasties and a reminder to them to be wary of revisionists and western agt3ntsm71 The Polish diplomats in B a l h soon discove~dthat the SED was scrious about cmiorcing the new statute. East German officials we= careful not: to circumvent the law; when they did, they asked the Pdes to keep
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the meetings confidential, After one meeting at the Polish DipZsmatic Mission, for instmce, Wloch asked the Poles not to mention it to the GDR Fareign Ministry Word nonetheless got back to the ministry; which sent a note to the Polish mission warning against more unauthorized contacts." Because the tight rt~strictionsseriousIy impeded their work, Polish djpornats registered numerous officid prolests, particularly the activities of the mission's cultural attach&," The mission worried that cooperative propaganda effarts with the East Germm press would suffer hnmeasurable damage. Maria Werna, the diredor of the East German Department in the Polish Foreign Ministry, called the East German ban on spontaneous cmtacts '*"crude."T4 In March 1953, Polish envoy Jan Izydorczyk wrote Warsw that East Qrman press coverage of Poland had got.t.cn '"considerably" worse; of the sixty-three articles tlne Polcs had recently sent to tAc East German press agencies, cmly one had appeared in print.75 East G c r m n diplomats often displayed arrogant and aloof attitudes toward Polish officials. Even the SET) recognized the problem. The partyfs choice for chief cJf mission, dramatist fiiedrich Wlf, protested the assignment, but to no avail,.%In 1,950, an SED report on the work of the East German diplomats in Warsaw found that "the relationship between the diylt-tmatic n-tission and the responsible authorities in the Ministry of Foreign Mairs of t-he Repwblic ol Poland leaves mwh to be desired," A~ccordjngto the report, Wolf and his underlings took little interest in meetirrg with Polish offiicials or in fostering persona connections to thcm.77 The head of- the East German F o ~ i g nMinistry's Soviet section, Peter Florin, moved ongoing negotiations on cultural exchanges from Warsaw to East Berlin in order to exclude Wolf from the talks.7"n the spring nl1,95l, Wolf rclsigsled before hjs tour was up. Polish officials were often no more hospitable to the East German diplomats in Poland. Wolf complained that "it isn't easy for a German living in Poland. You are watched with complete suspicion." Another East German diplomat recalled that Poles reacted negatively to anyone speaking German, inchxdk~grepresentatives of the new '"socialist Germany."79 According to the West G c r m n prrzss, Polish offidals rebuffed meetings with the East Germans so m n y t h e s that the Polish government had to order its bureaucrats to treat the East Germans with ""kid gloves,""8 The East German culhral attach&" repeated complaints about the lack of access to Polish Foreign Ministry officials and the P2;PR"s prtrss seetim led to her recall to East Berlin in 1950. Other East German diplornats also grurnbled about the hardships of serving in Poland; the consulate was inadequate and the= was no suitable housing in Warsaw Like Wolf, many diplomats asked to Ieave the post.81 The East German Foreign Ministry begm to question the political reliability oi its own diplomats in Miarsaw and openly criticized their nega-
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tive attitudes toward Poks. Some of the lower-ranking diplomats were unhappy with Wolf's successor, h n e Kundermmn, in part because her husband, Erich, also worked at the embassy Ku~ndermmn,who had survived the purges in the Soviet Union, was a cmvlnced Stalinist. Horst Grmert, tbe p ~ s attachP, s ~ c a k later d that Kundermann was incapable of m k i n g an holnest assessment of Life in the Soviet Unjm under Stalin, even though many of her friends had been vicths of the purges; Grunert complained that her poccupation with embassy secwity subverted attempts by the diplon?a.t.s to mke contacts with the Poles. Stefan Mcymann replaced Kundermann in the faIl of 1953. Heymam had previously served as head of the SEWSDepartment of Cuiture, where, according to Grmmt, he had tolerated too much ""decadent-"and "abstract" art. Heymann helped raise morale at the embassy, but East German djplomats still tried to awoid the assipment.82 The malaise that pemeated the East German b b a s s y in Miarsaw throughout 1953 was just one example of the SEWS failurc to fol-ge a new relationship with Pcrlmd. Most party and government officials remained inctiffercnt to Poles, if not openly hostile. The Mew Course and the June Uprising in the GDR The power struggie that ensued. in the Kremlin after StaXids death in March 3953 d i ~ c 8 affected y Soviet bloc relations. 'fhe Kremtin graduaily loosened its control over the other communist parties in Eastern Europe, and promoted the Pdew Course in political and economic affairs, The CPSU declart~dits intention to treat the other c o m u n i s t parties as equals, and each country s:lowly received more freedom to conduct its own foreip economic policy.83 Stalh" ddeath also brought: hope fctr a laxa at ion in the Cold War. 'The first sign of change came wi& the end of the &rean War in Jdy- There even appeared to be a possibility for German reunifica6on; for a t h e the new Soviet leadership sericrusly debated the future of Germany and Stalin's propsal for a united, nonaligned, and neutral German state-84 The Polish leadership was also keenly interested in a final resolution to the division of Germany*At the Seclmd Party- Congress of the PZPR in March 1954, Bierut declared that ""the Germcran problem is the central question of European security" far France as well as for Poland. Bierut went so far as to pmpose that tt~ehistoric Polish-French alliance be mswrected." These ideas &raptly ended with West Gemany's erntry into NATO m d the formation of the Warsaw Pact ;in May 1955. I'he rrtixcd idecllogical messages that were cornillg out of Moscow in 1953put the commmnist parties in the Soviet bloc on. edge. The Stalinists worried that their past hdiscrctions w d d cost them their jabs, or worse,
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Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood
their freedom or their lives, The first serious test to communist rule in East: Germany begm on June 17, 3953, with a workersf strilce in East Berlin. W e n th,e uprising spread to cities thmughout the GDR, the Soviet army deployed troops and tanks to suppress it. 71t.e Polish government officially approved of the action, a d the East German Diplomatic Missim in Warsaw sent a letter to the PZ1)R thanki.ng the party ""for the proof of [your] trust and solidarity that you showed to workers in the GDR in regard to the crushing of t k fascist prov~cation+~~Bb Polish diplomats in Berlh echoed the SEDfspropaganda blamhg the demonstrations on foreign agents and provocateurs, but they were genuinely surprised by fie extent 05 the people's disaffection with fie SED r4girne.m The Polish mission reported that &ere was "a seriotls mood of hostility toward the USSR" h the GDR.WStanislaw Dodin construed the events as proof of the strong fascist elements in East Germany, Other djplonnats attributed the revolt to the fail~~xe of the SEU's economic plan for the first quarter of 1953; they wamed that the economic situation had not: improved much in the secortd.K" Ironically the June uprising saved the Ulbricht rkgirne, m d ended alS serious thoughts that Moscow might bave had about a new demarche on German unif ration.90 nrushchev later co ented fiat ""tmks to the Party [SED] m d its leadership, the uprising never got out of hand. As a result of the postwar circumstances which developed in the GDR, we h e w we would have to find other ways of esthiishing East Germany on a solid Marxist-Leninist footing, We knew Stalinism was contrary to Marxism-LenSrrism*"91 The Kremlin approved of Ulbrichtfs cmpaign to consolidate strict party control over East G e r ~ ~ politics an and so~iety.~Z Ulbricht purged the SED and the East German government of potentially hostile elcments, and rather than elevating the other National Front parZiei., to gmzline govcming part-~zers,the SED subordinated their role even furthes, The SED made a concentrated effort to undermhe the influence of the CUU.gWlbricht told IzydorczyZc that, at most, half the German clergy could be won over to socialjsm anyway and that they were a barrier to closer cooperation between the SEE? and the CDU,94 Before the June uprising, the Polish Exnbassy had specdated that Moscokv's call fnr cdective party leadership would force the SED to give the CDU and the LDP more important positions in the government.'" ?"hat fafl, Poland honored the CZ)U's top government official, Foreign Minister Ccorgi Dertinger, for his efforts to jlnprove relations with Polmd. Dertinger (CDLT) was sacked and arrested on spy charges a few weeks later, an embarrassment for fie Poles.96 7'he Polish Foreig~nrninistry and its diplomats in Berfin were opet.z:ly critical of the SED" unwilljngness to work with the other political, par-
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tks.97 Polish journalists accused Ulbricht of disloyalty to Moscow and disregard for the interests of tbe other people's ~publics.One newsman concluded that "Ulbricht is viewed in Poland as a man who hates Polmd."" The PZPR also deplorcd the SEUk purges of such loyal communists as Franz Dahlem, whom Ulbricht accused of adopting "political blindness" to the intrigues of imperialist agents.* Even some mennbers of the Soviet diplomatic corps in the GDR expressed disappointment in the %R's policies. One diplomat told k y d o ~ z y kthat the East Germans often m d e policy "without thinking beforc?ihand."l"""' But tke PZPR, too, was slow to reform., Polish Cardhal Wyszyriski was arrested in September 1953. &ly after J6zef Swial.0 of the Polish Ministry of Puhlic Security defected in Decentber, and his revelations of"the ministry" brutal persecution of h o c e n t people became widely known in Poland in the fall of 1954, did the party begin the long and arciuaus process of self-examination and reform. The PZPR returned Cyrankiewicz to the position of prime minister in March 1954; Bierut kept the title of first secretary of the PZPR.101 Gomulka was freed in December, m d the party rehed in its see~~rity police. The SED was so s h a h by the June events that the pasty immediately increased surveiliance over the population and took steps to =press liberalizing j,nfluences that rnigbt emanate from Poland. The SEVs central organs remained fimly in, charge of all. Polish visitors, and the party tightened enforcement of the January 1953 law to =strict direct contacts between foreigners and East German officials.lO2 In, a meting at the East German Foreign Ministry, Ezydorczyk complained about the time it took for a Pole to obtain a visa to East Germany- kydorczyk said that the delays were embarrasshg for his government because relations with l.he GUR, a ft.tll.owsocialist state, were supposed to be friendly.HI3 East German Foreip Ministry offitrial Max Keifson was genuinety surprised when the Polish cuih;lral attach4 inEast Berlin, Helena Jakubawska, told him that her gove m t had not issued the s m e kind of restrictions. Jakubowska s a d that she was having trouble doing her job because of te East German law, to which KelJson replied somewhat dishgenuously, "ln no case do we have the intention of impedbg your workem104 The East Gerent intclntionally kept Polish officials in the dark about its intern4 affajrs. I'"n(i& diplomat I, Burgh1 told East Grm,an Sccrcbry of %curity Ernst Wollweber that the Polish, government had not been well informed about the ewmts of June 12, or &out the SEWSrecmt p q e s of Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Hermstadt and thek followers" Wollweber promised to work m easing communications with Polish offjcids,but East German policy did not change.1"' Working condi.tirms for the Polish diplomats beclme so restrictive that Izydorczyk eve~~knally raised the issue with Gsotewohl birnself, who replied. only that the regulations appfied to diplo-
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Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood
mats from the othes peoplesbepublies as well. Izydsrczyk responded that in contrast to the GDR, the Polish t;owemmc.nt was doing everything it could to cooperate with tlte East Germm diploma& in Polmd. Grotebvohl suggested that the Poles review the policy with the new foreign ministes, Lothar Bolz, but he, too, iporc?d their appeals.l* Durhg talks that fall on a plm for cultural exchanges, Polish negotiators ag& asked the East Gemans to ease rcstrictions on their personal contacts with GUR officials. 'l'he Poles argued that they expected the m e treatmelnt b m the GUR that the F"olis:h govermnt. afforded the East German djp1omati.c representatives in Warsaw, but again the East Germans flatly fused d. They said that the l w was an intemal affair and expected Polish diplomats to respect itelO7 Polish-East German relations in Stalin" smpim were mircd han atmosphere of distmst and paranoia. Stdin" ccommunists were a camorra of sycophnnts, not an aUiancc by choice. Loyalty to t-he CPSU did not foster fPiend.1~relations between the satellite parties, nor did it cultivate red understmding hetween the natimalities of Eastern Europe. Many f"oli& commnists grrtmbed about the SED's bind obedience to Stalinist orthodoxy; the SED distrusted the PZPR for its alleged social democratic, capitalist, and bourgeois tendencies. The normalcy m d stability that Stalin had brought to cornmmnist party relations in, the early 1950s broke down after his death. In addition to their greater political inutonoq the sateilites soon began to reassert their economic htercsts. As the ptitical and economic fadt lines dividing Eu, rope weakened, the Polish government began to reassess the benefits of its trade with the Soviet bloc. German repatriation from Poland was also a source of lfiction between the East German and Polish communists after the war. In the mid-1950s, B o r n began to lobby Warsaw to allow mow Geman emigration. East Berlk demanded equal treatment in this matter, but never got it.
4. Trybzinn Lildrr, October 26, 494"3 p. 3. 2. See Wilfried Loth, "Stalin" Plans for Post-War Germany;" in inrancesca Gori and Silvio Pons, eds., T!le Sc7;zlieE U t ~ i o ~ l Eurc~pein ttw Ci11d Wal; 2943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2996), pp. 26-29; and Loth, StaEilzs ~fngeliebtesKii"ld: Wnrum Moshzi die DDR rzichl zuotlte (Stalin" unwanted child: Why Moscc~wdid not want the GDR) (Berlin: Rawohlt, *L994),p. 135; and Nikita Khrushchev, Kf~rustzcltezlRetnenfbers: Tfte Last Teslt.antenf (Boston: Littf e, Brown, 1g%), g. 192. 3, Polish Military Mission to Warsaw, November 15, 2949, PZPR MC, 237iV-146. In 1950, Karol Tkocz was named the Polish Chief of Mission. Friedrich Wolf represented the GDR in Warsaw, The diplomatic missions were upgraded to embassies in October 1953.
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4. Trybzinck tudu, October 20,1949, p- 1. 5. Tyhuna LIIGELI,October 12,1949, pp. 2-3. 6. Aside from same contmtiom negotiations on trade and repatriation of Germans in Poland (see Chapter 4), most party and go>vernrnentreports on both sides offer little in the tvay of an honest assmsment of relations. Both parties felt the p ~ s w r of e ever-present Ss~vietagents. The %>vietseven sat in on SED Politburo meetings, and the Polish Minister of Defense was a %viet citizen, Marshal Kmstantin Rokossovsky. It was not until the mid-1950~~ when Nikita mrushchev comolidated his power and the GDR was granted full sc~vereignty and an army in the Warsaw Pact, that East German officials felt no compunction about critridzing their Polish comrades. 7, Neues DezltsclzEa~d,October 13,1949, p. 2. 8. Cited in a speech by Friedrich Wotf, Oct-c~ber7, 1950, PZPR KC, 237/=11-521; see alsc~florst Grunert, Fiir kiorzecker azqgtaltem Parkctt: Eritz~tcrlangen e i ~ c sDDR-DiplomnCen (Fo3r Honecker on the smooth parquet: Memoirs of a GDR diplomat) (Berlin: Edition Qst, 4995), p. 104. 9. Leuschner notes on Ulbricht et al., meeting with Bierut, Minc, Tzydmezyk, Wierblowski, and Dguski, June 1950, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211247. 10. Riezk~sDeulisctzland, June 8,1950, p. 1. 11. See Eybunn Lud~a,June 6,2950, and subsequent issues. 12. Tybunn Lzldzt, July 7,2950, p. 1. 43, From a poem by Max Zimmering, ""Srom des Friedens" (Current of Freedom) quc~tedin Christa Hijrbner, "Das Abkomrnen .\ran Zgorzelec und die golitisch-ideofogischeArbeit der SED 1950/54" (The Treaty of Zgorzelec and the palitical-ideological work of the SED, 2950-19511, Beitrgge zar Geschicl?te der Arb-beite&ewc"gung (Contributitic~ns to the history of the Workers" movement) 23, no, 1 (19811, p. 39. 14. Bybzrnn Lzidzr, December 19,1958, g. 1. 15. 13ieck speech, December 28, 1950, SED ZK, Mlhelm Pieck Papers, N L 36/449. 46. Pieck speech, December 20, 1950, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, N L 361449. The SED leadership rare1y missed a public oppc~rtunityto praise Stalin, but the Polish communists were careful not to inflame the anti-Russian attitudes; of the 130tishpeople by stressing the PZ;PR"s relationship with Stalin and the Suviet Union. 17, Bierut speech, April 22, 1951, SEC?ZK, Wilhelm Pieck 13apers, NL 361451; and Bierut speech, undated, PZPR KC, Bierut file, 254lt-5. 18, Izydorczyk report on "The Origins of the GDR," May 15, 2 951, PZP1T KC., Izydorczyk file, 4[73/13. 19. See Alexander Fischer, "Aussenpoliitisehe Aktivitat bei ungewisser sowjetischer Deutschland-Pc>titik(bis 1955)'' Foreign policy activity in uncertain SSIviet German policy to 4955), in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Cerd teptin, Ulrich k h e uner, and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei Jalfrzelzszte Ausse~zyolr'tikder DDR, 51-84 (Mtmich: R. Qldenbourg krlag; 19791, p, "17. Fischer obsei-ves that relations between the GDR and Poland did not suddenly improve as a result of the Zgorzetw agreement,
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Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood
20. Foreip Ministry memo, unsiped, undated, Press and Inhrmation Office of the Federal Government, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437. 21. Romuald Spasowski, The Liberatz'ou LZ( One (New York: f-larcuu& Brace Ja?~anovich,1986), p. 293. 22. Ernst ternmer, Marzclzcs wnr doclz arzders: Erinncrzrngert eincs dezitsclzen Demokraten fSc)me things were really othe~wisc;:Memories of a German Democrat) (FranuurtlMain: Verlag Heinrich gheffiel; 1968), pp. 314-315. 23. See the West German nwspaper reports in the Press Service and Information Sel-vice of the West German Foreign Ministry, June 14, 1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437. 24. Marten to the GDR Diplomatic Mission in Wrsaw, April 26, 1951, DDR M f M , VVarsaw Mission, A3543. 25, b t i s h Military Mission tct the PoEish Foreign Minjst-r)l;November 15,1949, PzPn KC, 231;7/~-146. 26. %id, 27. Izydorezyk notes of meeting with Dertinger, October 10, 4954, MSZ, 10/318/36. 28. Izydorczyk to muski, Ncjvember 5,4951, PZPR KC, 237/V-146. 29. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, May 14,1951, MSZ;, 10/364 140. 30. Tzydorczyk notes of meeting with Dertingel; October 10, 1951, MSZ, 10/318/36. 32. Gebert (Polish Militar)~ Mission) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Septernber 9,1947; URM, MZO, Deparl-ment of Public Administration, file 434, 32. Freund to the GDR Foreign Ministry; January 7,15250, DDR MfAA, AZQ817. 33. Keilwn to the GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw; January 69,1951, DDR M f M , Warsaw Mission, A3542, 34, Ackermann to the State Secretary Eclr Frrt-9d and Consumer Industry, September 15,1951, UDR MfAA, State Scretary, A15627, 35. Tzydorczyk to Warsaw June 11,1951, MSZ, 1Q/364/40. 36. See the article in the Pnssazler Neue Presse, (Passau New Press), December 29,1951, in BRD BfGDE B137/1055. 37. lnterzzatiorzal Herald Tribune, July 12, 4953, in BKD AA, Department 2, vol. 438. 38. Bierut to Grotewohl, July 22,1953, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/IV-26. 39. $tanistaw Dodin notes of meeting with Emst WllwAer, October 14,1953, PzPn KC, 23;7/~-141;, 40. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, November 24,1953, MSZ, 10/320/36. 41. David Childs, Tfze GDR: Moscow's German Ally (London: ijnwin Hyman, 1988), p. 39. 42. Heymann to the GDR Fcyreign Ministry, July 2, 1955, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy, AAS670, 43, J6zef Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, March 31, 1955, MSZ, 10/369/41, 44. h a y i k to the Polish Fareign Ministry, May 5,1955, MSZ, 10/368/41, 45. Izydctrczyk to the Polish Fctreip Ministry, April 45,1954, MSZ, 10/367/41, 46. Wojeiecki r q o r t on Geneva conference of f a r e i p ministers, November 28, 1955, PZPR KC, 237/V-291.
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47. Headquarters of Foreign T r a d e c o a l and Coke in Stalinograd, to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade, June 7,1954, MSZ, grc~up10/315)/36. 48. b t h , S1ali;bzsungetiebfes Kind, p 135. Loth argues that Ulbricht played a major role in cmvincing a reluctant Stalin to create the GDR. 4% Dertinger report, Octclber 23, 1950, SET) ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 9Qi459;and Izq.cSosczyk notes of meeting with Gro>tewohX,August 23,1951, NSZ, 10/438/47. At this point, East Germany" national interests could not be voiced too loudly Uertinger" repeat& references to them, along with his CBU credentials, made the Soviets and hard-liners in the SET) suspicious af him, Grotewohl told the head of the Polish Diplomatic Mission, Jan Izydorczyk, that Polish officials should avoid discussing any impc~dantmatters with Dertingex: He was accused of spyiing and incarcerated in 2 953. 50. Gerhard Wettig, " m e Soviet Union and Germany in the IdateStalin Period, 11i35&3," in Francesca Guri and Silvio Pons, eds., The Sc7;zliel Uniorz and Ezhrvpe in i.Iw Cold W ~ I1943-53 ; (New York: St. Martin" Press, 1996), pp. 361-363; and Loth, "Stalin's Plans for Post-Wr germ an^" p. 30. Wettig argues that Adenauer rejected the ofkr because he did not want SEB or Swiet interference in West Germany, Wettig, in cmtrast to Loth, tzrrites that "the propclsal submitted by GrotewohX was clearly not serious offer for negotiations,'"t is unlikely that Stalin would have given up on the SED and the GDR without some significant concessions in return, such as Western withdrawal fmm West Berlin and West Germany, but his main goal in the early 1950s was to prevent West Getmany" remilitarination, not to hang an to the GDR, 51. See John tewis Gaddis, We Nozv Know: Rethinking Cold War Hislo~y(i(axfo~sd: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 123. 52. fiid,, p. 2 28. 53, Historians differ about the sincerity c ~ Stalin's f prc~pasal.See, for example Ann L. 13hillips,S~oiet1;3oEz'eyTotuard East Ger~r~rn~y Reclonsidered: The Postwar GlemCIE" (New York: Greenwood Press, 19861, pp. 125-127; and Vladislaw Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov; futside the Kremli~z'sCold War: From Stalin to Kkruslzclzev (Cambridge: Hamard Universiv Press, 1996), p. 159. Zubok and Pleshakov, like Gerhard Wettig, argue that Stalin was merely trying to prevent West German integratic~ninto a West Eurc~peandefense system, not contemplating a sacrifice of East Germany; see Wilfried Loth, "Die Historiker und die Deutsche Frage: Ein RGckblick nach dem Ende des kalten Mrieges," in Wilfrid Loth, ed., Die Deufsclzland Frnge in der Nnckkriegszeii. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag; 1994), p. 25; Loth, Stnlins unbelirbtes K i d , pp. 174-182. Loth views the proposal as a real offer to remite Germany and claims that the SED was very concerned that Adenauer would accept the Soviet proposals; see also Eberhard Schulz, "New Develvments in Intra-bloc Relations in Historical Perspective," k SmieC-Ensf Elarpenn Dz'lenfnzns:Coerciorz, Competifiorz,and Coplse;ent,eds., b r e n Dawisha and Philip Hanson (bndon: Heinernann Educational Books, 198l), pp. 51-52; see also BZankenhcrm, et al., report on the acceleration of Polish-German friendship, July 31,1950, BRD AA, mepartment 2, vol. 259, There is some question about what the East Germans and Poles knew about the Soviet initiative befc~rehand.In 1950, diplomats in Bonn hinted that perhaps the Sviets were thinking of reunification plans far Germany, and that they wanted to prepare the Poles and other East Europeans for that
72
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eventuality; Gerhard VVettig/ "The Soviet Union and Germany in the Late Stalin Period, 1950-3," p. 366. Wettig contends that the SED was confident that nothing would come of the dernarche, and that after Stalin died and Beria raised the possibility of abandoning the GDR, Molotctov said that Stalin would never have done that. Wettig says that the note was intended to put pressure on the Adenauer government and destabillize it from the Left; see also Andrei Gromyko, Memories (London: Hutchinson, 4989), p. 496, Crornyko later tzrrote that "no other European government in the post-war period made such a gross political miscalcubtion, Without doubt, Actenauer lcjst a historic oppctrtmityf>and Gaddis, We Mozo Krtozu, pp. 124-1 27. Gaddis asserts that Skalin finally realized in 1952 that his policies had prc>mpted the formation of West Germany, the ECSC, and the Pleven Plan to integrate German soldiers into European units, and therefore took a more comprc)mising approach. But Gaddis agrees with Wettig, Zubok, and I)Xeshako>v that Stalin expected the prc~pasalto be rejected. 54. See Izydorczyk notes of a meeting of the SED Central Gommjttee, March 4, 1952, KC PZPR, 237/XXI1-517. h March, 1952, Grotewohl publicly thanked the Poles for their support in the United Nations. 55, Ralf Radstcbner, "Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik irn tichte neuer Quel1en'"The Soviet policy toward Germany in light of new sources), in WiXfritzct lEJoth,ed ., Die Dcu tsclzland Frage izz der RincjskriegszAt (The German question in the post-war perid), 11-28 (Berlin: Akademie Vertag, 19941, p. 3.29; Gottfried Zeiger, Die HalIFzlng zlon SED und DDR zznr Eil~lzeitDeutscl~lands,1949-1987 (The attitude of the SED and the GDR toward the unification of Germany, 1949-1989) (Cologne: e r t a g Wiswnschaft und Pofitik, 1988), p. 49; and Phjllips, Soviet Pt>ll'cy Toward East C e r m a ~ yRewrzside~d:The Posk~xrnrDecade, pp. 125-127. 56. See Norman Nairnark, tc,?'i~e Xussia~sin Gertrmny, A History I?ffl~e Soviet Zone of- Qccupni"r'un,1945-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 286. Naimark remarks that during the occupation "the Suviets did not help the SED develop a sense of independence and confidence, The self-image of the SET>was also poorly served by the need far its leaders to petition repeatedly to the Swiets on a wide variety of material and personnel issues." 57. AIbert Resis, ed., Mc?tukuv Remembers: I-rzside Kwmlitz Pulilics. Curzvers.sal.io:orzs wiflz k l i x Chuev (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), g. 334; Loth, Stnlins unbdiebtes K i ~ d , p. 226; and Gaddis, We Now Kpzow, p. 129. 58, Notes on Stoph and Kling visit to the 130znahTrade Fair, May 7,1950, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/43487; see also Neues Derafschln~td,May 10,1950, p. 5; and Fischer, "Aussenpofitische AktivitZt bei ungewisser sowjetischer BeulschlandPolitik f bis 1955)," p. 72.. 59. Bodin to Wierna, 'January 28, 1953, 132;PR KC, 237/XXXX-517; see also the Educational institute of Scientific Faculty to Bierut, January 5, 1953, PZFR KC, 237/\1-146; and Dodin notes of meeting with VVollweber, October 14,1953, PZPR KC, 2371V-146.. in one case, the Polish Educational Institute of Scientific FacuXly in Warsaw criticized a visiting economics pmfesmr from the Humbold t University in krlin, Jiirgen Kuczynski, for un-Marxist ideas such as the ""pssibiliv of peacefully reforming capitalism." In October 1953, the head of East German security, Ernst ttlollwclber, told Polish diplomat Skanislaw Bodin that Kuczynski was iciec~logicaltyunreliable.
Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod
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60. Trybunn Lzddi-l,Oct&er 26,1949, p. 3. 61. See Fisches; "Aussenpolitische Aktivitgt bei ungew-iliser sc>wjetischer Deutschland-PolitiIri (bis 1955)," p, 72; and Sikora, Sozl'nlr'stischeSoLid~rit8tzrnd nnE.io:lannleItgleressesz, p. 130. The Poles were mc~stinterested in technical-scientific agreements as a tvay of obtaining German ""know how"; b r a thorou& discussion of Polish-East German cult-urat reiations, see HaneChristlian Trepte, ""FoXish Literature and Culture in East Germany: A Window to the West? The Polish R e view, no. 1 (1996), pp. 6S72, 62. Committee for Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries repart for October 1,1950 to March 31,1953, URM K W k Z , N-505/7, 63. Committee far Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries regc~rt;October 1950 to May 1951, URM, MWKzZ, N-505/7. 64. Notes on Stoph and Kling" visit to the P0znai.l Trade Fair, May '7,1950, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113487; see also Neues Deral.schIn~td,May 10,1450, p. 5; and Fischer, "Aussenpolitische Aktivitzt bei ungewisser sowjetischer DeutschlandPctlil-ik (bis 19551," p, 7'2, 65. Ines Mietkowska-Kaisrtr, ""Zur brGderlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen p o l n i ~ h e nund deutschm Kommunisten und Antifaschisten nach dem Sieg Gber den deutschen Faschismus (1945-1949)" @n the fraternal coogeratim between the Polish and German Communists and anti-Fascists after the victory over GerLander Euman fascism, 1945-2949), in jl2hrbucIz fiir Cesclziclzte der sctzinlr'sft's~-lzen mpas (Yearbook for the history of the socialist countries of Europe) 23, no. 1 (1979):49-67, p. 65. 66. Karl WEc>chto Ulbricht, April 2, 1951, $Er> ZK, Walter UEbricht Papers, NIJ 18214247; and Wiei-na to Skrzeszewski, May 44,1954, MSZ, 10/364/40. 67. f30tish Diplomatic Mission report, August 10, 1951, MSZ! 10/3M/40. 68. Polish Diplomatic Mission report, August 24,1951, MSZ, 40/364 140. 69. (East German) regulation of communications with foreign officials, January 22,1953, in MSZ, 1013319/36. Because officials from the East German Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade were not covered under these regulatians, they enjoyed greater freedom to meet with foreign officials about-economic matters, 70. Note of Polish Mission in Berlin, March 17,1953, MSZ, 10/349/36, 71. Simons notes of meeting beween Grosse and Polish diplomats Dodin and Jakubowska, February 19, 1953, DDR MfAA, State Secretary, A15582. SLansky was the Czechosfovak communist executed in 1952. 72. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, January 46,1953, MSZ, 40/319/36. 73. Simons notes of meeting beween Gsosse and Palish diplomats Bodin and Jakubc>wska,February 19,1953, DDR MfA A, State Secretary A15582. 74. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, January 16,1953, MSZ, 10/319/36, 75. Tzydorczyk tc:, the PoXish Foreign Ministry; March 22, 1953, MSZ, 10/366/40. 76. Grunert, Fiir Honecker nzlfglnftem hrkcltt: Erinn~rungeneines DDR-Diplomate~z,p. 96, 77. GDR Diplomatic Mission in VVarsaw report, July 28, 1951, SEB ZM, microfilm FBS 339113425, 78, hbodycz to Wierblowski an Matecki notes of contrersation with Florin in Berlin, August 26,1950, MSZ, 10/373/42.
74
Myth of the Sfrafirzist Brofherftood
79. W l f to Dertingeu; April 24,1951, BUR MfAA, State Scretary, A15155; and G r u n e ~Fiiu , Honeckt.rnufgtallenl Parhtt, pp, 94-136,109-11 Q. 80. Blankehorn, et ale,report, July 31,1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 259. 81. M. Lobodycz to WierMc>wskx',July 15,1950, MSZ, 10/313/36. 82. GDR Diplcrmatic Mission report, December 17, 4953, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13425; and Grunert, Fiir H o ~ ~ e knt&gf~ttenz er Parkff: Erinnerungen e i ~ e s DDR-Diplumah, pp. 99-400. 83. See Khrushchev, Khnlslzclzezt Retrzenzb~rs: The Gtasnast Tizpes, p. 2 16. mrushchev had a blind spot when it came to the way the Polish Left viewed the CPSU. In his memoirs, he says that the Polish communists were united with the Russians in the struggle againl;l:capitalism, even to the point of stating that Fetix Dzieriyxisky the founder of the Soviet secret police, had the respect of the Polish people: "This atl spea ks of the fraternal relationship of the Syviet Union to our atLies and bmthers, the Polish people." 84. See Zubok and Pleshakov, l~rsideflse Krenzlinls Cold War: From Stalin to KlzrzishcI~cv,pp. 159-160. After Stalin" death, the Soviet leadership had same serious discussions about the future of the GDR. Beria questioned Ulbricht" leadership and the Legitimacy of the East German state itself; see also Marc Trachtenberg, A Constrtlcfed Peace: The Illnkitzg of the Euroyea~Setflenzent 3945-2963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 138-139. Dutles posited the idea of a neutral Germany as well, but by 1954 that thinking was wer, 85. M. K. Dziewanc>wskl,fitand irz the 20tIt Century (New Ycfrk: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 238. 86. Letter from GDR Embassy to the PZPR Central Committee, undated, ca. June 1953, KC PZPR, 237/XX11-521. 87, S e the Polish Diplomatic Mission reports of June 1953, in MSZ, 2 0/354/39, 88. Izydorczyk to Wiema, June 30,1953, MSZ, 23/84/9. 89. Izydorczyk to Wierna, June 22,1953, MSZ, 2 0/366/40, 90..See Hermann-Josef Rupieger, "Verpasste Chancen? Ein RGckblick auf die deutschland-politischen VerhandXungen, 1952-1955" "issed chances? A Xook back at the German political negotiations, 1952-1955), in Wilfried Loth, ed., Die l;teufsdzfnnd Frrage in der NacItkriegszeif (The German question in the pc~st-warperiod) (Berlin: Akadernie e r t a g , 19941, pp. 207-210; Resis, ed., Mofatoz?Rentenzbers, p. 334. Kesis quotes Beria when raising the pmspect in 1953 of a reunited Germany without the GDR: "Why should socialism be built in the GDR? Let it just be a peaceful cormtry, That is sufficient for our purposes. . . . The sort of country it p. 131,150, Berials prowill become is unimportantm";nd Gaddis, We Mow KF~QZU, posal war; one of the pretexts for his arrest on June 26. Gaddis writes, "Having done so, it would have been difticult for any of them Ithe Kremlin leaders]-at least as long as the succession struggle was under way-tcxoppo~ UZ1"Ebn"cht,because that would have suggested assaciatic~nwith rebellion and treason. The culture of distrust S.E.alin had left behind now linked his heirs to an East German Leader Stalin I-timsetf had never tmsted." The Pr>lishcommunists shared this distrust. Remembers: The Last Testamrmt, p. 193. 91. Wrushchev, Kh~~ztshctzcv 92, See Phillips, Soviet Policy Toward East Cerrrrnny Reccrnsl'dered: The hstruar Decade, pp. 131-180. Philiips argues that the %>vietseventually decided on the
Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod
75
policy of two Germanies became of the Western allieshnnMrlllingnessto bargain on German unification. 93, Eobadycz to WddysZaw Ghralski on a meeting beween Uodin and Keilson, F e b r u a ~12,1954, PZPR KG, 237/XXTX-820. 94. Izydorczyk to Skrzszewski, November 24,4953, MSZ, 11Q/320/36. 95. Tzydorczyk to Wierna, June 30,1953, MSZ, 2318419. 96. Cmnert, Fiir Honecker alGgltrktem Parkctf, p. 94. 97, hbodycz to GbraXski, April 21,1954, PZPR KC, 2371XXIX-820. 98, Vrtn Mende notes on information from Polish journalists, November 12, 1954, BRD B U , Office for Expellees, B236/6483, 99. Sikora, SozinlisI.isclze S~IiL;kdl"ifafand nationale Interessen, p. 142; and Childs, Tke GDR, p-26. The SED exonerated Dahlem in July 2956. 108. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, March 29,1954, MSZ, 10/329 /37. in Ntwember 1952. 404, Bierut had assumed both pc~sitic~ns 102. Memo to Efans Lauter (signature unintelligible), March 12,1953, SED ZK, Department of Fine Literature and Arts, 1V 2/406/73. 183. Grosse notes of a meeting with Izydorczyk, June 17, 1953, UDR M f M , State Scretary AA15582. 184. f-lelena Jakubowska notes of a meeting with Keilson, November 5, 1953, MSZ, 10/319/36. 185. Bodin notes of a meeting with Wallweber, October 24, 1953, PZPR KC, 237116-146.. Wolilvveber himself was purged Ercm the party in 1958. 406. Izydorczyk report to Wierna, October 19,1953, MSZ, 10/349/36. In October 1953, the Polish go>vernmentraised its diplomatic mission to embassy status. 407. Wiei-na to Skrzszewski, November 40,1953, MSZ, 40/475 149.
The Problems of German Repatriation, Reparations, and Trade, 1945-1953 We will not give back otlr Pole to tlrr Grmlar~s, . . and zue do naf ztant onc2G~rlnan amntlg files, ---@omrslkn, Nove~~zber 1946.3
Poland" takeover of German territories after the war immediately spawned disputes over the treatment of C e m m refugees from Poland and the status of the Germans who stayed. 16 some of the a r m a n refugees from PolEmd did not harbor mti-Polish attitudes before 1945, the lass of their lmd and the harsh circ tancm of their deportaticm made it tikcly that they developed them," non-cornmm~istGermm press attacked t for the inhumane conditions of the deportations," but Polish officials vehemently denied ~\rrongdoing."f ter the terrible wartinte occupation of Poland, Gc,mu%a, like most Pales, paid nn attention to the German complahts,"i~fos LuBu responded to the charges by accusing the German p o k e of ard af villainy" m d af '%es-tialassaults" from Germany." ill their t r c a m e ~of ~ tf ol,ish prisoncss retur~~ing The expelled Gernans represented, over me-fifth of the population in the Soviet zone by 1946. 'f'he W D and SEC) faced a nearly impossible task of convincing the expelled Germans of the need lor .friendly rcllatiosls with the Polish people and its communist government, The KPD dld not directly addres the real reasons for tbr German exodus westward; it refersed to thern as "settlers'>&her than "~fugees'kor"expellees."7 The party did nut blnme the Poics or the Soviets for the Germans"light; it "
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
77
blamed the German "immpialist monopoly capitalists of industv and agriculture" who had so willingly served Hitler." Instead of complajning about Ehc refugees" rnisfarttlnc and alfeged mistreatment by the Poles, the :KPD urged other Germans to help resettle t h e m e m edirector of the Central Administratrim for Refugees in the Soviet zone, Josef Schlaffer, said, "We wmt to create a new home for these millions, in the political knowledge that we arc no less to blame than they are for the terrible pairr, the cruel misery, and loss of their homeland.""l" argued Chat Germans who complained about 'The Derdtsche 1/116kszeitu~zcy. their present economic situation should, remernber that Gemany had caused millions of French, Russians, Czechs, and Poles to go hungry during the wacll As true as this was, it did not ingratiate the communists with the German people. Durirrg his visit to Warsaw in September 1949, Pieck angrily depicted Western propaganda promising the eventual return of the refugees to their homes in Poland as "illusory."lz fieck added that those who disseminated these notions wanted to use the Oder-Neisse border as a catrslps belli agahst r3oiand.lVn 1952, tllhricht declared that ""the German people and the German settlers [from Poland ds not want war, however, and they view the Oder-Neisse as the border of peace.'"4 That was patently untrue. Few refugees wmted a new war, but they we= by no means reconciled to the loss of the eastern territories, Most wodd settle for nothing less than a retunl of Germany's borders of 1937, if not 1914.~"eir rclcalcitrant oppositim to the SED and its rtflcog~~ikion of the Odes-Neisse line complicated Potish-East German relations,
The Prablem of the Gemans in. Poland ?"ens of thousands of Germans wert? still living fn Poland in 1946. The I'olsh goverment had particular difficulty in expeuing the G e r m s from Silesia because so many had fled from East Prussia and Pomermia to escape the Red A r q at the end of the war. In the fall of 3945, the Allies agreed that the Silesian Germans could be departed into the British and Soviet zonesl but Polish authorities c d d not supply enough trmsports to tl-te British zone. In addition, the Pales wmted to exploit German labar. 'The Poles v a l ~ ~ eGermms d wi& techical stffills, but most were made to do back-breakmg work in the coal, textile, and. cmstruction industries.16 Polish officials tried to =place the Germans with Poles returning from Germany, but many of those Poles either chose not to retwm or did not possess the necessary sklls." The deportation of Germans was also slowed by Polish businesses that prtrferred to employ German workers at lower wages.19 In October 1946, C h s Lzrdu report& that 31)(3,0(30 Germans were still living in the fnJroclaw province alane,zo
78
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade
InAugust 1946, Polish officials discovered leaAets circulating in Silesia catiing on the G-mans to petition the AIlied Control Councir for a restoration of the German-Polish border of 19372l After anti-Idolish demonstrations broke out that fall, one Polish official declared that "not one German should be allowed to remair-t in Polandrf22Glos Lzldu predjcted in May 1947 that all Germans would soon be out of the country, but tens of thousmds retmained.23 The Polish p ~ s vehemently s lienied German ailegations that the Germans in Poland were being mistreated. The Poles said that the Qrmans fabricated stories Labout hungry ill-clad, and homeless Geman cbildren in the cities of Silesia. Three years after the end oE the war, one German newspaper in the British zone charged that there werc 20,000 hungry German children in Polanb. The Polish Military Mission pointed out that nowhere near that number of G e m m children lived in Polmd, let alone hungry children. The mission also denied that Polish authorities were try% to Polonize the Gemans."" Gfos Lzcd~aeven said that German children were better fed and clothed than 1-)olishchildren. The newspaper accused the Germans of laziness and clrunlcenness and of sending their children m t o the streets to panhand.le.E Soviet journalists told an offirer at the Polish Military Mission that they too, were d i s p t e d with the Germans' beha~Tioz26 Germans also disputed the P o l i s h e s of sone indigmous groups that lived in the former German territories.27 Several separatist movements sprang up in Poland adtcer the cvar, primarily in Silesia; Gomulka saw these movemnts as a German attempt to reclaim the territories on an e t h i c basis. He said that the Silesians, Kasbubims, and Masurims were Poles too, just like the Craeowims. He likened the differe~~ces to ethnic groups in Great Britain and warned, "We will not tolerate any weakening of the autoch-l-hon-Polesin the Recovered Territories.""" "I November 194fiPGomtka issued assurances to a group of autocht-hons:"We will not give back one Pole to the Germans . . . and we do not want one German among P~les.~'Zg The ot-her German political parties m d ~ l u g e organizations e chastised the SED for not doing enough to represent the interests of the Germans in Poland, but there was little the party could do. 7'he Polish gave rclgarded Ihe stixtus of these Gerrnans as a dornestie affair, and told the Germans, includhg the SED, not to meddle. The Geman communists were also powerless to imtervene on behalf of the approximately 45,000 Germm prisaners-of-war in Paland, many of whom were mad.@to work long hours in Polish coal m-ines,N or h d p reconstruct devastated Polish cities: TvVarsa~r;Cracow, Gdahsk, and Poznaii.3 After visiting a German POW camp in Szczecifi in 1%9, one SED functionary reported that the German prisoners "of' ten revealed an
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
79
undisguised hate for the Poiish people. . . . The [SEU"s] policy of friendship and peace with the Polish nation, [and] =cognition of thc. OderNeisse line as the border of peace is absdutely rejectedeff32 As of August 194g1there were still 10,000 Geman I>OWs in Polmd.33 1i1 early December, the head of the Polish Military Mission, fakub Prawin, proxnised UI:hricht that most of the prisoners would be released ,and sent home by Christmas." The last German POW left Poland in April 1950.3? Repatriation of the Gemitns from Poland, 1949-1953 Accordiz~gto officid Poiish estknates at the end of 1948, approximately 105,7C)I)Germans, or 5,1 p e ~ e n of t the prewar population, stilf lived in the Western Territories; these Germans comprised only 1.8 percent of the papdaticm in the territclries." h e Polish Ministry of the Recovered TerS l num:ber of the remainitlg Germans were ritories fomd that d y a m specialists, technicians, and otfiter workers with unique and ir~placcable sElls.37 In D e c e ~ ~ b 19449, e r Prawh hformed Ulbricht that the Germans who had families in Germany could leave Poland..According to the Polish Military Mission, of the appmxirnately 130,0W Germans still living in all of Poland in 1949,15,000 had relatives in the GDR, and 30,000 had family ties in the FRG.38 Polish Foreign Mhister Stefan Wierbiowski advised his government to repatriate in an orderly and humane manner those Germans who wanted to leave Polmd, "in order to at least ne~~tralize this element and in this way facilitate the political work of our German friends [inthe GDRJ.rf3g The SED received hundreds of letters from Germans h Poland cornplahing of discrimination,"%ut the party was not interested in their fate. Approximately 4 d i o n i igrants horn Potand alreaefy wsic3ed in the GDR, and the SED did not want more. The refugees were bitterly opposed to the SEB" ppoiicy of reconciliation with Poland., and were a s o m e of uncompromising nationalist opposition to communist rule.41 Many repakiates soon lcft the GDR for West Germany, where t h y agitated against &c? GDR and the Oder-Nelsse b0rder.a The German communists could not afford to ignore the Germans in Poland, however. The East Geman government. had to challenge the FRG's aassertion that it was the Germans9qitixnate representative abroad. East German officials alleged that Polish authorities were teiling the Germans not to go to the GDR because the East Qrman standard of living was much lower than Polandk.43 East German Chief of Mission hiedrich W015 also accused Polish authorities of serious abuses against the Germms in western Polmd. Wolf asserted that the Germms were not afforded cultural amenities or opportunities to join trade unions and the
80
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade
PZPR Premier Cyrankiewicz toid. Wolf that his government was dolng everything it could to give the Germans the same rights as I'otes. He said that Pojsh officials who had commit-cedwrongdoing would, be punishedl but suggested that the Germans we= also guilty of misdeeds. He rejected Wolf 's =quest fnr official talks on repatriation.44 In early Jmuary 1%5, tlne East German government offered to take all Germans who wanted to leave Polmd; the Polish government Ratly rejected emigration on such a large scale." 'The Poles again agreed to f m d y reunification,4~but the Polish Parliame~~t passed a law h1 1951 declarhg that there were no other Gemans hPolmd who could claim Germm citizenship. The repabia~ontrranspcrrts mded that March." In June, East Gcrman Foreig11Minister Georgi Dertinger infnmed Polish Chief of Mission Jan Xzydorczyk tfiat the tezsmha~onof the repatriation transports was creathg serious problcrms for his gave ent, anli demanded an explmatictn, Izydmczyk ~ s p o ~ ~ &at d e drnnst of the Germms wanted to go to West German)i not East Germmy, and that they agitated against PoIand and the Oder-Neisse border. He said this was causing problems not onty for Poland but for the CUR and t%re Soviet bloc as a cvhole." Izydorczyk characterjzed the tone of this discussion as '*mpieasant."~~ Durirrg a visit to Poland in July, Wbricht again raised the reptriation issue. The Polish government agrc3ed to examine individual cases, but rejected a general plan for mass repatriation.5Un SEE? report on repatriatim concluded that '"it is of particular significance tbat the Polish government is not prepared to negotiate with a GDR delegation over the pxlesskg mpatriation matters, althnugh there are a whole series of camglicated questions to clear up."""" Evidmtly under some pressure from the Soviet Unios~,on Fcbrwary 1, 1952, the PoZish gave ent signed a new agreemmt to remite Germms with their families in the CDR. The operation was sqposed to be completed by the end of the year.52 'The East German. Diplomatic Mission in VVarsaw was d.eligk.ttedwith the deal, and wrote the Polish Foreign Ministry that it not only wlruld =duce anti-Polish agitation by the Germans in Poland m d the rcf.p&ria.t.esin the GDR but would have ""a dtfjnite influence on the solidification of friendly relations between our peopIes."53 The controversy was far f m over. In 1952, the East German governmelnt subntitted lists of 8,592 persons to be rewnited with their fmilies, but by eariy 1953 d y 2,302 had been allowed to leave. When the Poks announced in March that they would not accept more lists, the East German. Diplomatic Mission reported that "in no way can it be seen that the pmblem of rt.unj.ting dividcd families is settled and the protocol of February 1,1952 fulfil led."^ In April 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry official Maria Wierna told the new East German Chief of Mission Anne Kunderm that the last trans-
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81
port of Germans would leave in June. The East Germans protested that Poland could not stop the transports unilaterally, and blmed the Poles for acting too slowly to aid the repatriation."Vhe West German Foreign Ministry observed that there was still. '"small hope" of emigration to East Germany of Polish Germans who were ""old, sick, or had the very next of kin in the Soviet zone. All others can no longer count on their emigration.fr56 ent sent a formal note to Warsaw on June 5 I'he East German gowe protes.t.ng Poland's failure to meet the provisjons of the rep&riation agreement." Polish Foreign Minister Stanisiaw Skrzeszewski angrily Rspcmded that his governmat was not obligated to repatriate those Vitlksdeutsche and autochthons on the East German lists who held Polish eitizenship before September 1, 1939. Skrzeszewski said that mast of the approximately 6 0 0 people m the lists who had been denied emigration fell into that category In addition, he blamed the East G e r m aut"rrorit.ies for not submitling the lists on time. Skrzeszewski wrote that ""the [East German] note of June 5, 1953, containfng the statement that the PolishGerman protocol d February 1, 1952 has not bee11 fulfilled, is without precedence in our relations with the GDR.""'" A month later, Kundermann confronted President Bierut about Poland's repatriation policy. She characterized Bierut" reception as '"rather cool." Kundermansr said that her government was not interested in mass transports, but wanted only to repatriate the people on the lists. She colnplained that no wason had been given for the exclusions. Bierut informed her that the matter was closed: "The submission of lists must also come to m end and cannot be erctended to an unspecified time." He said that only individual eases of fmiiy reunificdion would be eonsidered in the future. Biemt agreed to exmjne the grounds for denying exit visas, and the whereabouts of two other missing lists."" That fall, the b l i s h government rcluctantXy agreed to more talks, Hermann Matern and Peter Florin tolid Polish Foreign Ministry officials Ostap muski and Maria Wierna that East Germans with relatives still in Poland were causing serious pditical problems for the SED: Tarty Wtivists arc in a difficult situation because they often have no arguments at all against open questicms and attach on this issue. The impossibility of uniting famiiies is incontprehemsi.ibtcreesileto the people." Matern and Florin poislted out that oi the over 12,i"00 names su:bmitted, to the Polish government, only. about 4,000 had been permitted to emigrate to the GDR. They contended that it was in the interest of both governments to complete this process as soon as possible, musk and Werna countered that the mass ~patriationshad to enci so that the ~ m a i n i n gGrmans could cmcemtrate on bujlding their lives in Poland. They said that every new transport contributed. to a '"sujtcase atmosphere,"' and reiterated that
82
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade
their government was opposed to repatriating anyone on the East German lists who held Polish citizenship. They noted that c-tf the 12,723 people on these iists, 8,237 h d Polish citizenship, and of those, 1,521 had been allowed to emigrate anyway. The Poles added that many of the children cm the lists were adults, and that irr many cases the Germans' ~ l a thes in the GI3f.l: were distant relatives, not next. of kin. They also said that many of the Germans ultimately wanted to go to West Germany anyway. The Poles pointed out that 4,156) Germans had atready emigrated to the GDR, another 1,900 would leave shortly, m d an addit.ianal 2,500 would probably receive permission to leave, muski and M14erna contmtfed that this total emigration of around 8,500 people '9facifit;ltes a delbite coaclllsion to the major difficulties in the GDR res~titingfrom this issue,"M1The repatriatims continued well into 1954. Accordting to estimates of the Polish F o ~ i g n Ministry, 9,892 Germans were. repatriated to the GDR from February 1952 to September 1954.61 At the end of Octoiber 1953, the Polish government conducted a thorough study of the sibatim of the estimated ZO,O(flf Germans ~ m a i n i n g in Poland.62 Ttle report characterized their socioeconomic situation as '"generally sati.s(actory'hd comparable to the living standards of Poks. The report even found tbat mGermans enjoyed a higher standard of living than Poles; the report said that German children were happy in school, where they got along reasonably well with Polish children." 31n other attempt"^ appease the German population, the Polish gcrvornmelnt gave Germans l-he right to vote in parliarnelntary elections in 1952, and in local elections in 1954. According to Polish sources, a significant number of G e r m s were b e c o m a mow irrvolved in political matters and were generally optimistic about their future in Poland, although many still. held negative ophions of Poles and the Polish government. Polish officials blamed some of the mti-Polish, anti-soviet, and anti-GDR displays on propaganda from the FRG, on fmiiies with relatives in the West, and on letters and packages from VVest GcrmmyM In the mid-1950~~ W a r w tried to fmpmve relations with Bonn by allowing some of the Germans in Poland to go to the FRG (see Chpter 8). The Poles3isregad for the GDR" interesh in this matter contributed to the gmeral decline in mlations &er Gomuika's reto power in 1956. Disputes over Repamalions and Trade, 194S1953 Recurring disagreements over trade illustrated that national interests we= still paramount h the thjnking oi the Polish and East Geman communists..Even after the Soviets formed the Gomcil of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1949, and Western Europe began to direct its trade a w q from the Soviet bloc, economic cooperation across the OderNeisse fine nevw attained the level that the communist propagandists
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
83
had promised. Each side grumbled that the other was not interclsted in fully developing mutually beneficial ecmomic ties. The German communists, along with the other German parties, rejected. reparation payments to Poland, The KPD and SED regarded Poland's occupation of German territory as enough payment for the war, but the Poljsh governmmt expected to rcceive 15 percrent of the rclparations from the Soviet zone as stipulated in the Potsdam agreements. In August 1945, the Soviet W o n and Poland signed a reparation agreement promising Poland everything fmm maehines to works of art." A Soviet-Polish reparations commission was forrntd in the fall of 1945, but the Soviet occupatim authorities ultimately decided what the Poles Eceived. Shipments to b l a n d usually fell short of Soviet contmitnents."" The rclparatims also held strategic meaning fur Poland. The Poles, like the French and the Soviets, wanted to emaciate Germany's industrial capacity so that it could never fight another aggressive war*Comugka dcciarcd that Germany" hindustrial potential, should be completely eradicated, and that Germany" standard of living should be no higher &an the rest oE Europe's. Me said that Poland could not &ford to have Qrmmy overtake it economically.67 After the economic unity of Germany Zlroke down in 9947, and U.S. Secmtary of State George Marshall proposed a reconstruction plan for Germany and Europe, Polish Foreign Minister Stefan MiierblowslPci again told Allied. foreip ministers in London that Geman ecommic development should not be allcrwed to swpass that of its war victims*h" The German communists had the almost impossii3rXe task of garnering grass roots support MIhile the Sowiet occupation authorities we- stripping the zone of so many of its vital assets. Many SED members opelnly expressed their opposition to the reparation payments, but they were powerless to stop them.69 Few Germans agreed with Paul Merker's expimation that "the reparations which we are ob)igated to pay are certainly a great burdrm for the German people, but they do not hisldcr in any way the normalization of life of the wcrrki~~g population. We must merely prevent the trust-and-monopoly bosses from using the reparations output to profit, like after 1918.""71 In addition to the burden of reparations, many Germans blamed the d n w postwar econoJnic recovery on the loss of G e r m territory to Polmd, which included Silesia, one of Eurclpe" mmost important industrial centers. Under the harsh conditions of the Soviet occupatim, the SED was hard-pressed to raise the stmdard of living i,n the zone without irnports of raw materials and agricultural products h m Poiand. fni-t.ially, the East German co mists were codident that their ideological affinity to the Polish communists would work in their favor.71 Rruno Koehler told Prawh that if the Oder-Neisse region was integrated economically, " t b e ~the ~ question of the border will not have its past irnportme. W
84
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs,and Eade
will have a lively trade in goods from Poland for our factories,"'" At the end of February 1947, the Polish Military Mission predicted that if Poland sigszed an economic agreement with the Soviet zone, the ZJDP w o d d probably rethink its rejection of the Oder-Neisse border'yvhe PPR would not compromise, however, and demmded that all tbr Sovietzone parties comntit to the Oder-Neisse border, with no contingencies. The SED, however, was initially reluctant to make separate economic agreewnts with Poland because the party did m t want to set a precedent for the eventual divisio~~ of Germany. h Mar&, Ubricht hformed Prawh that ""from a strategic point of view it is not possi:ble to concentrate on an allimce with Poland and Czechoslovakia only . . . [or] to conduct a policy of distancing the Soviet zone from the rest of Germany, because that wou%d,put the stmggle for the unity of Germmy on the hack burner." Ulbricht added that the SED had vacillated on recopiz@ the Oder-Neisse border because the party had been slow to dewlap an economic recovery plan. Ulbricht told Prawin that to silence critics of the SEDk ssupport for the Oder-Neisse "order, Germany must expand production three to four times more than was planned at Potsdam, Ullbriclht said that the Soviet zone desperately needed. the coal and steel that it was no longer getting from the British z0ne.T.l-Prawin later infomed Pieck &at he saw no connedion betwee11 an increase in Polish exports and German unification, but agreed that raising the standard af Ilivhg in the Soviet zone would uXthately contribute to the economic mity of the four zanes.7" Prawh's superiors in Warsaw were in no hurry to see that happen. 'The destmction of Poland in the war and the loss of the eastern territories to the Soviet Union made Polish ofkials ~ l u c t a n to t grant tbr SED trade concessions; PoIish economic plans did not provide for trade with the Soviet zone. Instead, the Polish gove ent made it a priority to integrate the Western Territories into the Polish economy, and bstered Silesiafs trade Xbks with CzechoslbovakJa m d Hungary The PPR co~~ducted an intensive propaganda campaign to promote economic development in the regim. In early 1946, Gfos Lladzl wrok that '"he Polish Workersf Party is mobilizing all of its forces . . . on the Recovered Territories' front. . . . There is no Poland without the Ode~LusacianNeisse [border]." The newspaper publisked n m e r o u s articles on the reconstruction of the Western Territories, o k n accompanied by:fiuge headlines trumpeting such proclamations as "The &covered Territories: Guarantee of the Strength and Potential of Polmd!"%
The Synchronization of the Socialist Economies, 1948-1953 'The Polish government was keenly interested in Marshall" reconstructjon plan for Europe in 1947, but Polish officials were skeptical about Germany's partjcipation. After the Soviets forced Warsaw to reject the
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
85
plan, the Polish government declared that Poland did not want to be a party to German reconstruction. 0x1July 10, Glos Lzldzr wrote that "Poland, the victim of numerous German attacks, cannot take part in the conference [onthe Marshall PIan], whose result might contribute to the revival of C e m m aggres~ion.~'TT The collapse of allied coopaation in Gcrmny was unsettling to the Polish government, however. Poland had much to lose if the Potsdm agreementwere no longer regarded as the legal basis f o r the OderNeisse border*Me11 h t e r z o ~ ~trade a l in Germany collapsed in 1948 and the SED lcadcrshiy began to quash popular opposition to the border, the Polish government wnsidered increasi-rrg trade with the Soviet zcme.78 Given the geographical proximity m d existhg communications infrastructure, a renewal of prewar trade connections between the Sovict zone and Poland" Wetern Territories made simple ecclnornic sense. The Polish press began to differentiate betwee11 the Soviet zone and the rest of Germany; it promoted the SED%plans for economic ties to the Soviet ldnion ancl the other socialist countries.7" But =ports on Poland"?;econolnic relationslzips wjth the Soviet Union and Czechoshvakia still overshadowed coverage about trade with the Soviet zone."" When the Soviets blockaded Berlin in June 1948, the SED stepped up eMorts to expand trade with Pdand, placing top priority on innports of cod, coke, irm ore, and steel." Neues Ilteufso'zland reported that "the Polish coal deliveries for Berlin prove that the capitol does m t stand alone in its struggle against the thmttling of its economy."N% Julyf the head of the German Economic Commission (DWK), Heinrich Rau, told the Poles that "economic cc,clpem"tan between Poland and the Soviet zone in Germany is one of the basic prjnciples of DWK policy 'The commission projects Polmd as its main partner in the execution of its economic plans."g" Following a visit tcr Polmd in OctoZner, Bruno Leuschner acknow1edi;ed that the SED had to earn the trust of the Poles before it could expect:a significant expansion of econmic ties: Why haven't W-ereceived enough coal, any Eats, any meat, any steel making equipmen& and any coke up to this point? Of course one does not give a trading partner goods that one needs himself, if one is not sure that the friendship is realty meant sincerely. First the political step must be taken, then the economic questions will be wf\rect. For =ample, we should not forget that [Polish] coke production barely satisfies Poland" own needs, If we get coke a n p a y that is a gesture of friendship that cannot be .\raluedhighly enough."
In a publk show of unity, the SED credited their expmding trade connections with foland for the gradual recovery of the Soviet zone economy. Grcltewohl called for a new pditical and economic relationship
86
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade
with Poland so that East Gemany could share in the production from the former G e m m territories.gVhe SlEU press, which in the past had cmspicuously avoidcd covering Poland" economic development of the Wstern Rrritories, now began to reverse that policy. In late August, Ne~4t.sDlvntscl.rlut?d predicted that Poland would s m become the Soviet zone's second most important trading parher fhehjnd the Sovi,et Union), arguing that "in the close cooperation with the new people% Poland there is also a guarantee for achieving a better life in the eastern zone."""h In private col~versationswi& the Poles, however, the Germm communists often expressed their disappoinment in the vol cially the lack of coal and coke imports from Silesia. The Soviets were partly to blarne for the shortage of avai.able Polish cod because they werc forcing the Polish gove nt to ship so-called "reparation cad" to the Souiet UIlion at we13 below world market prices.H"~~additim, the Poiish gover~nmentpreferred to export caal and coke to Wester11 Europe (hcluding West Genxany and West Berh), whem they commanded a higher price," "'f"heSoviet Llnion and Polmd s i p e d a trade agreement in February 1946, but the Soviet zone received nolle oE the n.4 mi:llio11tons of coal and coke that Poiand exported that year, In 1947, PoIand sent ail its brown coal exports to the Soviet zone, but only 10 percmt of its coke exports-gg The Berlin blockade did more economic d m a g e to the Soviet zone than it did to West Berlh, h December 1948, Ulbricht told the Polish Military Mission that the economic sibation in the Soviet zone was grave, and pleaded for more imports to boost d0rnesl.i~production." h the spring of 1949, Ubricht led a delegation to t k annual trade fair in Pcxzna.li to explore the possibilities of increasing trade with Pcxland.91 I'olmd's trade with the Sovkt zolle rnse sjgnificantly in 1949, but only after a drop in demand for PoIish coal in Western By the time the GDR was formed in October 1949, the Soviet zone of Germmy accotmted for 18 percent of Poland's exports and 7.5 perce~~t of Poland" imports, In 1950, those figures rose to 15 percent and 11.5 percent respectively, but the East Gerr~ansstill wmted more Polish cod. The saturated West European coal market and the West's ecol~omicembargo forced Warsaw to seek a deal to sell coal and coke in return 'for East German machines, appliances, raw materials, half-finfshed goods, and cmsulner items.% When Ulbricht arrived in Warsaw inJune 19550 to sign the Oder-Neisse border agreement, Minister of hdustry Hilary Minc and Foreip Tmde Mhister Tadeusz Gede met the East German delegation at the Warsaw train station, Their presence underscored the importance of a new trade deal to the Poles. Mint told Ulbricht that "there is no doubt that the visit of this delegation to W;;rrsaw will result to a great degree in the resolution of a wide range of economic questions." BBef0t.e Wlbricht left, h initialed a trade pacte94
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
87
When the Western Allies amounced m end to the state of war with the FRG in 1950, the Soviets admitted East Germmy into Comecan. The SED sacv political as well as ecoslolnic benefits of the GDKs mrnbership; the party lobbied for more ecmomic cooperation by arguing that the economic health of the GDR was crucial to the security of the entire Soviet East Germany sent four trade delegatio~~s to Polmd in 1952, twice the nurrrber of any other Soviet bloc comt~.YhIn contrast to the problems that the Polish diplomats in B e r h had in making personal cmtacts with other East German officials, Poland's trade representatives reported that they had easy access to East German trade offices.YT Nowtheless, the volume of trade always fell shmt of expectations. Polmd and East Qrmany werc? both g d t y of ddislqllcnt deliveries or outright failures to ship promised goods, Forced by the Western embargo and the logic of their own p l a m d eccmomies to trade primarily witbin the eonhes oE Comecon, they were hard-pressed to find substitute suppliers. Most of the export shortages were caused by production problems; but in s a m cases, simple economics dictated that goods be exported elsewhere for high= prices or kept for dontestic use. NB.ther side trusted that the other was negotiating FR goad faith. The East Germans vestioned Poland% motiwes for trying to irrrrease trade with West Germmy and the other capitalist com~tries.f i e SED did nothing to ease Poland" trade with FRG because it was bound to come at the political and economic expense of the GDR." The? Poles, however, suspected that the East Germans wmted to develop a special economic relationship with the Soviet Ui~ionfor political reasms; trade with Poland made more economic sense. Polish officials h e w that some of the shortages in prornised East German exports to Poland jn 1,950 were the direct result of an hcrease in East German deliveries to the Soviet Union," These shortages resulted in an East Geman trade deficit of $2 million h l950 as well as serious bottlenecks in some Polish hdustries. Polish officials dropped hints about ranforeseen political repercussions shauld the GDR not meet its obligations. The Poles, however, ~ s p o n d e dposiZively to Gmtewohl's =quest for more coal in 195C).1mWolf hvarned his superiors that breakislg trade agreements would bave a dctrirnmta.1impact on relations with Poland in general: "":In my opinion the vestion is not: sirnply a kchnical questio~~ of trade relations, but of course at the s m e time also a question of mutual political trust and understandin.g."m1 Wolf was right. In the fall of 1950, a shortfall in chemicai hnports from the GDR forced the Poles to shut down two large factories in KaiowiCe.102 With their Six-Year Plm in jeopardy, Polish officials insisted that if the GDR could not meet its export r e q u i m m t s on time, the Poles preferred not to incl~~de precise delivery timetables h Iutnxre trade agreements.lo3 Che Polish trade odficiali told the East Germans that Polmd did not have such difkdties with Hungary. He admmished the East Germans to be
88
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade
sure of their ability to make punctual deliveries bebre entering into more contracts.104 Disagreements also arose over the quality of the goods traded. 'The East Germans complained about receiving coal and coke of poor qualitylm ""ndhe Poles were dissatisfied with the standards of East Cerman consumer items; in 1950, for instance, the Poles returned a shipment of 15,000 watches, m s t of which. were defective, and coffee pots whose cowers we^ so small that they fell into the pot. East Geman diplomats in Wilrsav a h i t t e d that East German cosmetics were ol such poor quality and so poorly packaged that they could not be put on the Polish market, They atso ~ p o r t e dthat East German butchering machfnes left: the meat black, and th& by the time one shjpment o( graphjc maehines reaehed Poland, they were thorough& rusted tlnrough.1" NegclCiations for a new trade agreement began in March 1951, but it took two months ol hard bargaining before an qreement was signed. Izydorczyk blamed the East Germans for refusing to rectify their trade deficit by increasing exports, especially chemicals."'"' Problems resurfaced that summer when the East Germans were unable to deliver promised petroleum prod.ucts.l" The Polish government again attributed the shortages to an increase in East German exports to the Soviet Won,'"" and therefore had no compunction about delaying coal and coke shipments to East Germany. East Gcrman officials, in turn, complained that some of their factories were idle because of the shortfail of Polish coke and the inferior quality nf the coke they did receive. M e n several appeals from lower-level officials brought no results#Grotewohl wrote a personal letter to CyranEciewicz in mvember 1951 requesting more coal. Gcotewohl also asked that f u t u ~ trade agreeme~ztsindude high standards for goods.llQCyrankiewicz reptied that his government was doing everything it could to meet its tbligatiom, but that there was a problem with a new cokery."l Both economies were strugglkg in the early 1950s. The Polish government ended rationing in 1949, but had to reinstate it in September 1951 as a result of increased defense spending and the ovcr-amklitious industrialization of the Six-year Plm, Collectivization took its toll on the amomt of foodskffs going to market, especially in the former German territories. 'The West's econorxtic embargo on the Soviet bloc also hurt the socia,tist economies. The United States ended Poland" most-favored-nation status in 1952.1'2 M e n the SED embarked on a rapid socializatian of the GDR economy in the s u m m r of 1952, energy shortages in East Gemany became so serious that Grotewohl sent yet amther letter to Cyrankiewicz requesting additional shipments of coal m d various heavy i.ndustrial goods."3 No significant incmase in Polish exports was forthcoming, however, and the GDR was unable to m e t its own export plans for 1953.114
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
89
There were signs, nonetheless, that trade rclations were i~mving.115 The East Germm gove ent praised the Soviet Union and Pohnd h r their economic cooperati.on, and credjted Sovkt iron ore and Polish coal for enabling the GDR to produce "'steel of peace."l" In the faI1 af 1953, the Soviet Unim and Pdand lifted a heavy h d e n from the East German econonty h l r h c n they agreed to end reparations;"? Gmtewhl and Pieck sent several persmal. letters thankirrg Bierut,lIg The wollrme of trade between the two countries jumped 72 pertlent from 1950 to 1955, but this was largely a rcsuit of the growth in their respective ecmomit.s.l" The proportion of Poland." trade with the GDR remained the same throughout this five-year pt?ric,d. Impmts from the GDR represented 11.5 percent of alX Polish imports in 7950, and 15.1, percent in 1954. Exports to the GDR amolmtd to 14 percent of all Polish exports in 1950, but had dropped tcr 13 percent by 1954.12" The relaxatio~~ af Soviet cmtrol over the satellites in the mid-1950s allowed Poland to rethink its trade relations with. the GDR (see Chapter 8). Poland began to s e l more coal and coke tcr the Wst, and exports to the GDR dropped. The SEQ which no longer considered Poland a reliable trading partner, embarked an a long-term strategy to develop economic ties to the Soviet Union. In ecommic affairs, the ideological ullity of the Polish m d East German Marxists was barely evident.
1. G%osLudu, November 10, 2946, p. 2; and Wta8ysrt.a~Gomdka, O proble~~~ie Niemieckim (On the German prc$iern) (Warsaw: KsigAka i Wiedza), 1972, p. 120. 2, See I'y'c~rmanNaimark, The Rzass-in~sirz Gerr~ta~y: A Histoy c?ffJteSovkf Zone of Occupatiou, 1945-2949 (Cambridge: Haward University Press, 19"35), p. 75. He tvrites, "Orders went out fmm the Polish communists to expel Germans by whatever means necessary to ensure incorpc~rationas well as occupation. As a result, the Polish administration of the new territories made little effort to pmtect local Germans from the depredations of Polish or Russian rapists and thieves. . . . Even the Scrviets expresxd shock at the Poles%ehaic~r,"" 3. G2os Ludl-l, April 25, 2 946, p. 4; see Hans Georg Lehmann, Der Oder-NekseKoujikf, (Munich:C . H. Beck, 1979), p. 36. Lehmann characterizes the expulsions in the summer of 1945 as '%rutalt' and "wild." 4. Clros liudu, January 1,1946, pp. 12-1 3. 5. See G b s Ludu, March 47,1946. 6. Ctos liudu, February 26,1946, g. 1. 7.Maimark, The Rtissirat~sin Germn~ly,p. 149, 8. Deutsclze V;?lkszeitung,July 24,1945, p. 1. 1945, p. 2, 9. Dezlltsclae Vi>lkszeilur$g, October 10. Detrtsclze Volkszeifung, November 20, 1945, p. 1; see also DeafscI~eIralks z i l u q , November 23, '11 945, p. 1. 11. Dcufselze Vokzeitung, November 17,1945, p. 3,
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Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Trade
12. 13ieck speech to the National Unification Congress of the 1301ishOrganization of Fighters for Independence and Democracy; &ptember 1, 1949, SED ZF;, Wilhelm 13ieckPayers, NL, 361441. 13. Article by Wilhelm Pieck in Neues De~ltsclllnnd,September 6, 1949, in SED ZK, Wilkrelm Pieck Papers, Nt 361441, 14. Tzydorczyk to muski, February 28,1952, PZPR KC, 237/V-14.6. 45. GZos tudu,January 1,1946, pp. 12-43, 16. Glos t u d t l , July 17, 1946, p. 2; and August 27, 1946, pp.7; and H. Kotficki to the Ministry of Recovered Territories, June 44, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, MZO, file 134; In January 1947, the Palish Military Mission in Berlin sent word to Warsaw of nurnerclus German offers to work on PoXish recmstruct.ic>nprc>jectsor to set up special businesses. At this point, the 1301ishgovernment would not entertain the resettlement of Germans in Poland. 47. Witalis Zielimki notes, rmdated, t"M file 81479. 18. GL?S Lzldu, March 30,1946, g. 5. 49, Unsigned letter to the president af the Cormeil of Ministers, December 20, 1945, URM BP, file 81526. 20, G105 Ludz-l, October 28, 1946, p. 2; an Qctclber 34, 4946, GZos Ludzr reparted that 4,237,040 Poles n w resided in the "IXecovered Territories." 21. Unsigned memorandum t c ~Jakub Berman, August 9, 1946, PZPR KC, group 13131XMC, 295/VII--;?M. 22.ZmicFrc>wskito the Council of Ministers, June 11,1946, UE7M BP, file 81184. 23. GZos L I A ~ ZMay I , 24,19474.1, 24. G o s Lzadzr, May 36,1948, g. 1. 25, Gios Lzidii, March 49,1946, p. 6, 215. Leapold Marschak notes of meetings with toebe, et al., March 1, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/U-'i"0. 27. U m i g n d mmorandum to Berman, August 9,1946, PZPR KC, group 13PR KC, 295/ VII-2M. 28, Gios t u d u , June 23,1946, pp.3, According to this source, there were between 800,800 and 1 million autochthc3ns in the Recovered Territc>ries,many of whom had been Germanized. 29. GL?S Ludu, November 10,1946, g. 1. 30. Alexander Nasielski notes of a press conference in Berlin for returning Cerman prisoners from Poland, November 15,1948, MSZ, 6/ 764/ 54. 31, Gbs Ludu, September 9, 1945, p. 6; see also Sikora, SoziaIisEiscl~SulidnriMt und natlitnnle Ilzieressen, p. 122. According to the Potsdarn Agreemnl; the Soviets handed over apprc?xirnateIy40,000 German POWs to Polish authorities. Fifty-one of the sixty POW camps were located in Upper Silesia, where the prisoners worked in the coal mines. 32. Artur Vt2gt repart an his trip to the POW camp in Szczecin, April 1, 1949, $Er> ZK, Wiithefm Pieck Papers, NL 36/[7J.5..This camp was under Sovie control. 33. Herbert Wamke report on a meeting with German officers in a Polish prison camp, June 7,1949, SED ZK, Wifhelm Pieck Paper, NL 361745. 34. Cesrgi Dertinger notes of a meeting with UIbricht: and Jakub P)rawin, December 8,1949, SED ZIC, Otto Grotewohl Papers? NNL 9014%.
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Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
91
35, Alexander Fischeu; "Aussenpolitische Aktivitgt bei ungewissm sawjetischer Deutschland-Politik @is 1955)" "mign policy activity in uncertain Soviet German policy to 1955), in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Cerd teptin, Ulrich Scheuneu; and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei J~t~rzettf'ztt? Au~~mpoll'tik der DDR, 51-84 (Munich: R. Oldenbaurg Verlag, 19791, p. 70. 36. Government report, January 21, 1939, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, MZO, 295/VIlI-159. The population af the Western Territories (including Gdalisk) was approximately 8,810,000 before the war: The populatbn decreased to 5,739,000 by Odober 1948, the majority of them Poles from the eastern territories Last to the Soviet Union. 37. Report on activiw in the Western Territories, January 21, 1949, PZPR KG, group 1313RKC, MZQ, 2951VlI-159, 38. Dertinger notes of a meeting with Ulbricht and Prawin, December 8,1949, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 901484; and Dertinger tcr Wierna, January 2, 1950, MSZ, 10/4172/49. Because estimates varied according to how autochthont; and Germans tzrho tzrer-e Polish citizens tzrere counted, it is difficult to verify the number of Germans who remained in 1301and. 39, WierMowski to Berman, December 30,1943, MSZ, 40, 1V/472/49. 40, See the many letters in SED ZK, Wihetm Pieck 13apers,N L 361743, 41. Ackermann to Warnke, November 20, 1951, DDIR MfAA, Poland Sectioyn, A1804; and Sirnoas notes on the GC1R"s suppod for the Germans in Poland, October 25, 1951, DDFt MfAA, Potand Section, A1811. The German Evangelical Church also Lc3bbied for the Germans in Poland, and many turwd to the Swedish and U.S. Embassies in VVarsaw for emigration gapers. 42. See, for example, the documents on West German efforts tcr support the Germans in Poland in BRD BfGBE B137/290. 43. K&n to the GDR Minister of Interior, October 6, 1950, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A10068. 44. Notes of meeting between WlF and Cyrankiewicz, June 5, 1951, MSZ, 10/398/44. 45. Dertinger to Wierna, J a n u a 2,1950, ~ MSZ, 10/472/49. 46. Kuhn to the GDR Ministry af Interior, October 6, 11950, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A1 0068. 47'. Florin tcr Grotewohl, April 24, 1954, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL r60/484. 48. Izydorczyk to Wierna, June 44,4951, MSZ, 10/398/44, 49. lzydorczyk to the Polish Foreip Ministry, j m e 11,1951, MSZ, 2 0/364/40, 50. Simons notes on the GDRs support for the Germans in b l a n d , October 25, 1951, DDR. MfAA, 1301and Sction, A1811. 51. Unsigned letter to Grc>tewo>hl,Oclit~ber11, 1951, DDR MfAA, State Secret a q A45627. 52- See the documents on the repatriation of Germans, in MSZ, 10/398/44; see also "The Situation af the Germam in the German Eastern Territories under Polish Administration,'kundated, BR%)BfGDF, BB137/290. 53. GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsatzr to the Polish Foreign Ministry, June 5, 1953, MSZ, 2 013981412,
92
Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs,and Eade
54. GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw to the Polish Foreign MinistryJJ m e 5, 1953, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A1CfO68. 55, GDR Diplomatic 13Rission in Warsaw to the Polish Foreign MinistryJJ m e 5, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/44. 56. Notes on the Germans leaving Poland, July 2, 4952, BRD AA, Department 2, ?70X. 439. 57, GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsatzr to the Prjlish Foreign Ministry, June 5, 1953, MSZ, 2 0/398/44. 58. Skrzeszewski notes on the GDR Diplomatic Mission's note of June 5,1953, undated, MSZ, 10/398/44, 59. Kundermann notes of meeting with Bierut, July 24,1953, DDR MMA, Main Office, A10068. Kmdermann told Bierut that 5,000 people on the list had been denied emigration. 60. Nc3tes of meeting between ZambmwsEri, muski, Wiema, and Matern and Florin in Warsaw-fNctvernber 2,1953, MSZ, 10/398/44. 61, Report cjn the February 1,1952 repatriation agreement with the GDR, %ptembeu; 1"34 MSZ, 10/398 /44. 62, See the documents in BRD BfGDF, B13137/1277. The West German government estimated that there were approximately 65,000 Germans left in the OderNeisse area, the rest in former East Prussia. 63. Broniatowski notes on the situation of the Germans in Poland, October 29, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/44; see also Sclzlesisclle Rundscltnu (Silesian Review), Octc3ber 15,4953, in BRD BfGDF, B823/2W, The newspaper recommended that West Germans sending packages to Poland leave off the return address; see also the "Report on Assistance for the Territories East of the Qder-Neisx," "February 16,1955, in BRB BfCiDE B137/290. The West German government estimated that West Germans sent about 290,000 packages to Poland every year. The Polish government did not obstruct this traffic because it collected considerable sums of money from custom duties on these packages. 64. Broniatowski notes on the situation of the Germans in Poland, October 29, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/M. 65. Ernil Sommerstein (head of the Bureau of War Reparatiom) to the President of the Polish Council of Ministers, September 14,1945, URM BP, 8/4V. 66. Bul-eau of War Reparations to the President of the Prjlish Council of Ministers, October 15, 2947, URLM ",G?; and ""Report on Reparatirons,'" Bureau of War Reparations, May 1, 1947, URlM BP, 8/47?; see also Vladistaw Zubrtk and Constantine Pleshakov, 11rzsidethe Krenzlt'tz's Cold War: Fm~ttStali~zto Klzndshchev (Cambridge: Haward Universjv Press, 1996), p. 147. According to this source, East Gamany lost 3,500 plants and factories, 2,115,000 pieces of equipment, and 2 million industrial jobs. 67, Franz Sikora,, Sozkarlz"s.lisclzcSotidnriMt iirjd ~zntiorzraleI n f e r ~ s c n(Scrcialist solidarity and nationat interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und dotitik, 19177), p. 113. 68. Georg W. Strobe], Deut-sclzland-Polen:Wtlnsclz tfnd Wz'rklicfikeif(GermanyPoland: Wish and reality) (Born: Editicm Atlantic Forum, 4969), p. 12. 69. See Nairnark, The Rttssiazs 111 Ger?r~mt.zy, p. 296. Nairnark quotes Information Officer Sergej 'Tiul"anc>v in August 1947: "Direct anti-soviet speeches at SET)
Be
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
93
party organization meetings have become almost constant occurrences. At 209 party meetings of production and district grc~upstaking glace in Dreden, there were constant pmvocatianal speeches." 7'0, Report on Paul Merker" speech at the Swond Congress of the FDGB, April 21,1947: PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 2951U-71, 71. Leopoid Marscha k notes of cmversations with lEJoebe,et al., March 1,1947 PzPn KC, group PPR KC, 2951m-70. 72. frrawin to Warsaw, Sptember 24,1946, MSZ, 61668142, 73. Marecki notes of a meeting with Leutenant, Fhruary 28, 4947, PZPR KC, group PPXZ MC, 295/XX-7074. MeIler notes of a meeting beween Ulbricht and Praw-in, March 15, 194'7, PZPR KC, group fZPRKC, 295/XX-70, 75. NeXIer notes of a meeting beween Prawin and Pieck, May 2, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 235/XX-"i"0. 76. G ~ QLudzr, S June 4, g. 3; see subsequent: issues in the summer and fall, 1946; SotidnrifSt ulzd nationale Infer~se~z, p. 126. see also Sikora, Sc?z&li~til;che 77. 6 b s Ludz-t, July 10,1947, p. 1. 7%. See Christopl~Royen, ""Osteurc~paischeStaaten" (East European States), in Hans Adolf Jacoben, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich kheunes, and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei jnllrzeltnte AussenptliCik der DDR (Munich: R. Bldenbourg Vertag, 1917C3), p. 604, Lladzt, July 1,1948, g. 2. 79. GL?S 80, See EyburPa Lildu from January to June 1948. 81. Appendix Nct. 4 t s Prs~tocolNo. 82 of the SEE> Central Scretariat, June 7, 11i348, SED ZK, 1V 2/2.1/205. 82. Nezges Dcu tscizlalzd, June 29,2948, p. 2 . 83. Broniewicz notes for the Polish Ministry of Industry and Eade, July 45, 1948, PZPZZ KC, group PI% KC, 295/XX-72. On March 15,2948, the DWM signed a trade agreement with Poland, and. then another on September 25. 84. Bruno Letrschner report on his trip to 130fand, undated, ca. October, 1948, SED ZK, Walter tilbricht: Papers, NIJ 18213247. 85. Neues l;teufsdztand, June 2'7,1948, pp.4. 86. Riezk~sDezttscl'zland,August 29,1948, p. 4. 87. See M, K. Dziewanowski, Poftz~zldin the 20tfr. Ccrltury (New York: Columbia University Press, 19771, p. 171. From 1%5-1947 the Soviets paid $1.25 per ton of coal, but Denmark and Sweden were willing to pay $12 a ton. In 1948, the So>viets paid $14 a ton; the market price in Europe was $18-19. See also Nikita Khrushchev; Khrarshctlev Rententbers: The Lnsl Testame1~1(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 208. During Mhrushchev" visit to Warsaw in October 1956, the Poles raised this issue. Khrushchev later asked Miko>yan,"How did this happen? How could we pay our Polish comrades such an unfair price f o x their coal?" Mikoyan answered, ""lW-asall Sta-ittin" dc3ing." 88. See Sheldon Anderson, ""Pland and the Marshall Plan,"Viptomatic kll'slory 15, no. 4 (fall 1992),pp. 473494. 89. Sikora, Suzi~lz'sfz't;cF~e Sufidnrifdi'f ztnd natit~~nle I-rztercussc~z,pp. 110, 125. After the Swiet zone no longer received coal front the Ruhr, 1301ishcoal became an essential energy source.
94
Problems of German Rlipaliriafiorz,Rc7paraliiorzs, and Trade
90, Mellter notes of meting with Ulbricht, December 12,1948, MSZ, 6/767/54. 91. internal SED memo, May 10, 1949, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 182/334, 92. Report on trade between Poland and the St~vietzone, January 1, 1939, PzPn KC, group PPR KC, 295/=-[;72. 93. Fischer, "'Aussenpolit-ischeAktivitgt bei ungewisser sc>wjet-t-ischer DeutxhLand-Pctlitik (bis 1955),"' p. "9; and Sikora, Soziall"sfi~cI~c Sulidnritgf iirjd nnliorzrale Jtzferessen, p. 125. 94. 3ybul.m Ludir, June 6,495(5, p. 4. 95, Michael Kaser, Comecrm: Irttegmfion Problems of fhe Phlzned Economies (tondon: Bxhrd University Press, 1967, g. 11. 96. 13ZPR report on delegations to Xloland in 1952, March 28, 1953, 132;PRKC, 237/V-76. 97. Izydorczyk to Wierna, October 49,1953, MSZ, 40/319/36. 98. Wierna notes of meeting between Wierbtowski and Wc)lf, May 6, 1950, MSZ, 10/373/44. In 1950, Polish Frrreip Minister Stefan Wierblcjwski said that Poland intended to increag its trade with West Germany one way or the other; and Wolf tc~Dertinger on a meeting with Wiel-lakowski,May 22,1950, DDR MfAA, Poland Sction, A1812, VVoXf reported that Wierbiowski told him that the question of trade with West Germany was still open because Poland would not sign agreements with the Adenauer r$@me. 99. See Sikora, Sazia:nlislisdteSolilzriCat und ntlfiotfaleJnleressen, p. 126. 400. Wolf notes of meeting with Gede, April ti", 1950, DDR M f M , Minister's Office, AZfiZfiS. 404. W l f to Ackermann, March 20,1950, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, Warsaw Mission, A3662. 402. Erben notes of a meeting with Celinska of the Polish Foreign Minisfry, Spternber 14,1950, DUE MfAA, Warsaw Mission, A3662. 103. Letter to Lore Steirner; signature unintelligible, April 20, 1950, DDR M f M , State Secretary, A1 5635. 104. Letter from East German trade delegate (signature unintef ligibEe) to Wlf, December 17,4950, DDR M f M , Warsaw Mission, A3662, 105. N6fier memorandum, December 19,1949, DBR MMulFI, DL-2, file 1948. 406. Erben tcr Ackermann, July 5,495Q DDR MfAA, State Secretary A45635. 107. Tzydorczyk to the Polish Foreip Ministy, J m e 11,1951, MSZ, 10/34/40. 408. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry, August 40, 1951, MSZ, 10/364/40. 1013. 1zydorczyk to the PoXish Foreign Minjst-r)l;May 3,1951, MSZr 10/363/4Q. 110. Gsotewohl to Cyrankiewicz, November 20,1951, BD13 Ministemat, DC-20, file 616. The agreement called far Polish expc~rtsof 79,000 toms of coke in October, but the Poles sent only 57,429 tons. 111. Cyrankiewicz to Grotewoht, December 8, 1951, DDR MMulH, DL-2, file 1948. 112. See R. F, tesfie, et al., The Hisloty of Poland since 2863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 319-320. 113, Grotewohl to Cyrankiewicz, November 6, 1952, BDR Ministerrat, BC-20, file 616.
Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade
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114. Izydorczyk to Wierna, August 12, 1953, MSZ, 3 0/366/40; see also Zubok and Ptes;shakovr Inside the Kwmlir-z's Gold War, pp. 159-160. The East German economy was in g r i a w difficulty in 1953 in part because the SEB was in the process of nationalizing the entire economy on the Stalinist mcjdel. Ulbricht repeatedly asked Moscaw for ecmomic aid. 115. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry September 23, 1953, MSZ, 10/366/40. 116. Izydorczyk to Wierna, May 12,3953, PZPR KC, 237/XXIl-517. 417, See Mcucs DeufsdzEand, May 47,1950, p. I . The newspaper carried a huge headline on Stalin" note to Gsatewohl announcing that the GDR no longer had to pay reparaticyns to USSR or Poland. Tn truth, Stalin reduced the reparations payments by 50 percent to $3,171 million. Although the Poles had also agreed to this deal, the article did not thank them. 438. CrotewahZ to Bierut, September 15,4953, MSZ, 10/35V/39; and Crotewohl to Bierut, December 31,1953, P21711 KC, Biierut Archive, 254/XV-26; see also Pie& to Bierut, 22 January 1954, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/IV-26. 119, Analysis of trade with Poland, July 22, 1955, UDR MfAuXH, BL-2, 2392; and notes a n trade between Poland and the GDR, July 6, 1961, PZPR KC, 237/V-379. According to the Polish source, the value of trade beween the two countries went up about 50 percent frc>m 1958 to 1955, from 660 million (exchange) zlotys to 9137.6 million zhtys. 120. Fixher, ""AussenpotitischeAktivitgt bei ungewisser sowjet-t-ischerDeutxhStaaten,""p. 60&605; land-Pctlitik (bis 4955)," p. 72; and Royen, ""Ostettrc~paische see also "The Polish Economy Since World War XI," ' i n BRD AA, Repa&ment 2, vol. 242.
German Remilitarization and the Polish Thaw, 1954-1955 I t is ule*Elknoitln flrinl fhrre are g r a t e Hqficutties in rdalions Itctu3ee.el.lGrvmat~sand I%ks (of cutrrse rant in rrlufior?s befwee.el.1ozrr fic~astalest Iftmn in relafiotts betrlvt>n Cemtgrtzs utzd dhr zt~orkersiilz file other people's del-tlocuucies, ---East German Ambassador to fita~zdSI;Efan Heymarzn, 19551
Communist party relatiosts in Stalids empire were frozen in an atmosphere of paranoia and dist;mst. After Stalirr" deafrh, the Kremlin's New Course promised to build stranger cmmunist bonds, but the uprishgs in Czechoslovakia and East Gemany in 1953, as well as the West" plans to rearm West Germany, pprevented significant change in satellite ~ l a tions. m e ""ehaw"in the Soviet Union did allow for domestic experiments, however. The Ulbricht r6gime cmtirrued down a Stallnist path, and the PZRZ began a slow reforming process. Relations between the two parties steadily deteriorated. When no agreement was reached on German mificatian at the fourpower fartrign ministers" conference in Berlh in fanuary-February 1954, the Sovkts m u n c e d in March that the C;DR w o d d be granted fulf snvercignty. With almost a half million Soviet trooys stationed there, this symbolic move had minimal irnpact on the real political indepedence cJf the East Germm state, but it did bolster the SEP>"sstatus with the other satellitrr parties," The Potish gwenlmmt ofificially welcomed the Soviet declaration. Ambmsador JmIzydorczyk told &c Polish Parliment &at in Ihe Likelihood of West G e m m remilitari.zatii,n, East Geman sovereigty was in "comp1ek In reality, F&& officials were ctpagreement. with our national irmterc?~ts.~~3 posed to putting the GDR on an equal basis with the other Soviet bloc comkies. They were concerned about h e future of heir militasy mission
Gerrrfa~~ Re-lnilif.ariukio:orz and the Polish Tl~nw
97
in Berl4n and the distixlct possibilily that East Germany wodd be amed;" in addition, East Germm officials a p p e a ~ dto be more assertiwe in pro-
mdi~ngEast German inte~sts.East German Ambassador Stefan Hey told. a Polish F m i g Ministry official h confidence that U.le SEU Pol now thflu&t: that it was a mistake to wait for MOSCOW% iniLiative befoe mabng foreign pdicy. East Berlin launched new efforts to gain diplomatic recognjlim h n n such non-aliped states as Lndia, Egypt, and Fisrlmd, and scrught out new trading parbers. I-leym clairned that Yugoslavia was now willing to champiorn East Germm interests in the United Natiorns m d in the Economic Commission for Eurclpe.5 For years, the East German diplomats in MIarsaw had complained about the jnadequacy of"thcir mbassy building. After Masco\vfsdeciaration of East German sovereipty, FXeymann told Polish Fornip Minister Stanisjaw Skrzeszewski that it was time for the GDR to build an embassy that reflected the country'S new political importmce. Heymam said that East Germany valued good relations with Poland, and that ""of course the size and the outside appearance of our embassy dso play a role. Therefore ouc new embassy buildi,ng is m urgernt politicai necessity." Shzeszewski replied that no space was availabk in VVarsaw.6 Polish dipl"mats encountert-d this new East German self--assurance at a banquet at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin in June 1954. Grotewohl promised the North Koreans assistance in rebuil.d.jng their war-ravaged corntry; he then surprised everpne p ~ s mby t suggesting that the rclpresent&ives of Ihe other peoples' rclpuhljcs, which Grotewohf clajrned were better off than the GDR, make the same commitment. Grotewohl embarrassed Potish Ambassador Jan Izydorczyk by asking him point blank, "We11, Jan, will you make such a pledge in the mme of the People's Republic of Poland?" Tzydorczyk mfused to answer, After dinner, :Izydtrrczyl?ci~~formed Crotwohl that Poland was aiready gjving aid to North Korea, m d that he was not authorized to make new cmmitments~ East German security chief Ernst Wollweber later told Izydorezyk that Grotewohl had spoken withoUt Politburo authorizatbn, and that ""the wh& 'scene' had a strong social democratic aftertasteef'7 The East Germans could not trumpet their sovereignty too loudly, however. Without recqnition from m s t of the nm-communist countries, the GDR still needed Poland to represent its interests abmad.8 'The East German Foreip Ministry &served that the rode that the I""a>plefs Republic of Poland plays in Eurc>pe%collective security is sipificant for relations beween our corntries in two ways. Next to the Soviet Union Poland is the strcmgest comti"y belonging to the peace camp [the Sc>vietblc>c]-.Morec~ver[Ifc>land%Jposition beween the GDR and the Sc~viet Union makes rebtions between our countries especially iqoxltant.9
Warsaw" efforts to k p r o v e relations with France pronpted Heymann to ask Skrzeszewski to promote East German interests in Paris." Ulbricht hoped that if France =cognized the W R , the other Western courlkies m i e t folIow.11 fn the Ml of 1954, the East German press gave thorough cowerage (JI Poland" offer to France for a nmggression and mutuai ct-roperation agreement. East German journalists stressed that the agreement was not directed agajnst German5 as Bonn argued. But Po1and"s willingness to r e p s e n t East Germany abroad had definite limits; the Poles wcre careful not to complicate their delicate negotiations with France, and officials at the Polish Embassy in Berlin thought the East German press misunclerstooci the sipificance of the Polish proposal.12 Ulbricht also worried that Polmd and the other Soviet bloc corntries would now develop clloser economic and political ties to West Germany. Heymann publicly praised the Poles for representing the GDR in the United NaEions, but. in private East G e r m officials were disappointed with Mlarsaw" lXukewarm efforts to promote the GDR as the principd German state. The East Germans flinched every time the Poles ignored the GDR's role in resolving the a r m a n problem, m d it was heconning apparent that Poland was more interested in improving relations with the FRG.13 I h e East German leaders publicly supported VV;arsw%ooverturcs to Bonnl but. they worried about being outflanked by the other Qrman state. FXeymann asked to be informed about new deals with West Germany and any phns to irivite West German defegations to Pohnd. He informed Skrzeszcvski, that the GDR, not the FRG, represefied German interests in other comtries,l" In Rsponse to NATO's decisfon in October 1954 to bring West Germany into the alfimce, the Soviet Xlnio~~ m d the satellite cowltries issued the Moscow Ucclaration on October 23, 1954. The Soviets proposed allGerman elections, an Austrian peace treaty, and nuclear liisarmament. 'Three weeks later, the Soviets declared that a palicy is being pursued towards Western Germany which is incompatible bcgh with the prcjmotion of peace in Europe and with the national reunification of Germany. The carrying out of the London and Paris Agreements [to bring West Germany into NATO] tzrill mean that the reunification of Germany through free all-German elections is sacrificed to the present plans of resurrecting German militarism, that mortal enemy of the natians of Europe, including the German nation it~elf.1~
That fall, representatives of the Czechostovak, Polisb, and. East German parliaments met in Prague to discuss West Germanfs entry into NATO and Central Europem security issues in general.16 The East Germans codd not convhce the Poles that the NATO alljance posed an imminmt danger. The head of the SEU" Deparment of F m i p Affairs, Pe-
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ter Florin, complahed that the Poles did, not show interest in strengthening cooperative diplomatic efforts against West Germm revmchism and militarism. Florin concluded that the Poles ought to be better informed abwt the serious threat that the Adenauer government posed to the GDR and to peace in Europe.17 Meymam reported that serious differences had surfaced among the three delegations over a cornmunip4 to the French Chamber of Deputies protesting the fomatilm of a W s t German army, Agah~,the Poles had ~serval.ions&out jeopardizjng their rccent efforts to improve relations with France," Heymann was now convinced that VVarsaw was ignoring East Germm interests in favor of better ties to the TvVest.29 Some Poles were not at all opposed to having the FRG contained withisl the Atlantic dliance, :Most Poles, including a significant number of PZPR members, thought &at a divided Germany was in Polmd's best interest-." A~iccordingto the East G e r m n Foreip Ministry, "the reservations among the Polish people to a strong, unified Germany are a lot strcmger than we usually guessed. . . . The German problem in Poland is not fully viewd corrtlctlyPand the meaning and the strengtt.1of the GDR is somewhat mderestimated. m e n the Soviet Union declared an end to the state of war with East Germany in January f 955, Poland dutifully folowed suit. In the original draft of Pdand"s declaration was a warning that if the Western powers and the West G e m a n gove ent ratified the Paris treaty to = a m Germany, "the People's Republic of Poiiand will further strengthen its rclations with the GDR and take any measures with the other peace-lovhg states which will guarantee the security of Poland and other nations.""No special mention of t-he GDR appeared in the final declaration, however, which left Heymann noticeably disappointed: "This deletion has a significant political meming. I see in tbis incident more proof that right now the Polish government is still. not very e11t-husiastic about concluding a tripartite pact between the GDR, Poland, and CzechosIovakia."~~ Heymann speculated that the PoXish gove ent did not wmt a formal pact with the GDR because the Polish people might think that a war with the West was imminent. Polish authorities were already havlng difficulty convincing people to settle in the Western Territories. In early 1,955, Heymann rclported that s o m Poiish farmrs &ere hvere not planting their fields for fear that war would soon break out.23 He cited several. other exmples of Poland's disinterest in closer cooperation with East Germany; for instance, the failed Prague conference and the recent disagreements that had surfaced at a meting of the Foreign Affairs Departments of the SED, PZPR, and CzGP.Z4 In January 3,955, Tybgnu lzldzr edjturialjzed that "today W have a situation in which no important German political pmblem can be resolved in a peaceful w v without the German Democratic Republk."E Later that
month, however, Heym noted that the newspaper had raised the possibility of a neutral Gemany without mentiming the GDR at all. Articles in the Poljsh provincial press had often ig~~ored the GDR, hut this was the first time that Trybuno L u ~ had z ~ adopted, in his words, such "false interprtrtaticms of the German questicm." He thought that wbzl?za L2rdzl"s editorials indicated that the PZPR was less s~tpportiveof the Moscow Declaration of October 1954 than the other Soviet bloc parties." Althuugh it should have came as no surprise, Heymann exclainled that ""not a few Poles have fears of [German] rcunii"jcation!"27 Exaggerating the W R ' s legitimacy a d hpmtance in resolving the Gtitrman question, the East German Embassy guessed that "the main =ason for this hesitation is that the strenglh of the GDR is underestintated, so a certain fear exists that o~tr state coulld be devoured by the Federal Republic."'"" The East Germans ~ p e a k d f ytold Polish officiafs that they supported better relations between Poland and the FRG, and promised to assist in that effmt, At a meeting between PZPR, SEU, and CzCP leaders in 'January 1955, for instance, the Poles introduced several plans to exchange professionat and student delegations with West Germany; the East Germans offered to help the Poles in dcvelophg specific cmtact5.29 Zlrt reality the East German offers were a pretext for East Bedin to stay abreast of Polish-West German relations, and to prevent agreements that compromised East Germm interests. The East Germans were concerned about rurnors that Poland and West Germny wodd exchange trade missims and later raise them to diplomatic xnjssions. Wlbricht called this West German ploy a 'Trojan horse."'"" Ulbricht" suspicitrns were clmfirmed in February when the W s t German government offered to discuss a trade agreement with Pdand. Cyrmkiewicz suggested that the two countries normafize all relatinns.31 :111 an attempt to prtrempt the trade missims, F o ~ i g n Minister Bolz again offczred to help economic and cdturilil exchmges between Polaxld and the FRG32 In March, he told Rierut that although the GDR supported a trade agreement between Warsw and Born, related questicms needed to be resolved beforehand. Balz achowtedged that he did not want the Poles to compromise East German interests in the negotiations with West Germany.33 The East Germm Fareig~~ Mhistry told its diplomats that "in the future it will be especially important to watch alI appearances of efforts by the Polish authorities to nomalize relations with Wst Cermany.'"Tecause most Pales still made no distinction between the GDR and the FRG, Heymann requested more propaganda to inform Polish officials about the 'progressive Germans'" the GDR. Ileymmn agreed with his superhrs that 'East Berlin should participa.t.e in talks between Warsaw and Bonn on trade and cdtural exchanges so that they would not have a "purely West G m a n charactereff35
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101
East Geman diplomats repeatedly pressed Polish officials for specific information ~ g a r d i n gthe mgojng trade negotiations with Bonn." "'le East Germans also dichted the terms of Polmd's trade with West Berlin, fearful that this trade would mdermiYre the GDR" efforts to claim that part of thr city. Bolz b ed direct contacts between East German officials and the Polish Military Mission, still, located in West Berlin. M e n the Polish gwernment protested, Bolz suggested that the Hlission coordinate its diplornatic efforts with the Polish Embassy in East Berlin. Skrzeszewski asked the East Germans to expedite the trmsit of Potish goods to West Berlin, but Bolz flatly refused on the grounds that his g w ent would not allow direct trade connections between West Berlin m d Poland.37 He pointed out that West Berlh was a special case: "Here our efforts are htended to make West Berlin as costly as possible for the American and German imperialfsts, Zn our opinion this principle must also be conside~din the decision to develng econolnic ~lali.ons between the PRP m d West Berlin." Bolz said he would weigh the wonomic benefits of each trade agreem e ~ against ~t the political costs. 011this point Skrzeszewski agreed, and Cyrmkiewicz assured Bolz that trade with West Berlin would only be inctueted in trade agreements with the FICC:;. He added that ""s;l1ing [coal] djrectly to West Berlin was out of the question." The issue was settlcd fos the time being, but resurhced after GomulZca" r & m to power in October 1956.38 U11;lble to stop West German rearmament, the So~rietbloc countries fomed the Warsaw Pact on May M. Tbe Soviets signed the Austrian treaty a day later. After the Geneva Conference in July 1955, :Khrushchev st..opped in East Berlin to assure the East Gerntans &at no agreennent. on German unification would be made at the expense of the GDR. mmshchev met Ulbricht again immediately after the Soviets established diplomatic relatio~~s with Born in 9ptember.39 The rapidy changing developments in Central Europe in 1955 unnerwed Ulbricht and Bierut. Bientt was alarmed Zly the Admauer gowernmcnt's increasingly nationalist f o ~ i g npoliCy, and r m o r s that West Germany might produce nuclear weapons.-Il OR m official visit to East Berlin that summer, he pledged Poland" suppmt of Soviet and East Cerman diplomacy regardhg German u~~ification."According to one East German diplomat, however, Ulbricht" constant lecturing eventually got on Bierut"s nerves." Bonn interpreted the visit as an attempt to pmp up the East German government and to ""strengthen the status quo in the German problm,"M The promise of diplomatic relations between proved to be an itlusion. In 1,955, the Adenauer gov the HaUstein Doctrine, which withheld full diplomatic ties from any country that had formal diplomatic relations with the CDR. From the
Polcs-point of view, Miest Germany" refusal to recqnize the OdesNeisse border and entry into NATO prt-cluded any serious ccmsideration of formal djplomtic ~ c o g n i t i manyway. Poland and the East German Peapfes' Army
When Wcst Germany joined NATO in 1955, Moscow went ahead with plans for an East German army as controversial a subject in the Soviet Union as it was in Poimd; as Molotov argued, "Why shottld W fight the West over the GDR?"43 The Polish government feared that an eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany would leave Poland as the Red Army's main western outpost, h which case Polmd would be forced to increase Hlilitary spendlng and garrism more Soviet troops.46 Poles had fresh memories of the Geman onslaught in World Miar II, and were vehemently opposed to an East German army47 Foreign Mirzister Bok assured MlBrsaw that Ihe East G e m m people would figlnt along side the Poles to defmd the Oder-Neisse border,48 but few Poles msted m East Germm army whose existence depe~~ded on the Soviet Union. The Polish government was so concerned about people's reaction to East German rearmament that during one special simultaneous radio broadcast from factmies ~ IWarsa\vf I Prague, and East krlk:l in 1955, Polish officials asked the East Gemans not to play any marchhg or martial-sounding rn~sic.4~ speculated that Polis cials had cmceled a tour af East Germ m musicims to Polmd that s r for fear that their concerts would be disrupted by demonstrations agajn.st the crcation of an East G e m m army ?"he Poles d s o denied an East German r t t p e ? j t for a performance of a m r t e r e d Peoplc's Police (KVP) band at- the fig* anniversary cetebration of the Oder-Neisse agreement on July 6,1955.'Weymann told his superiors that if more Polish dekgatkne; could rclviecsi East G e m m police m d militia units, they could see that: &ese forcles had a ""classcharacteref'51 The West German newspaper Die Welt cited SED sources who conceded that the Poles and the Czechoslovaks had serious misgivings about an East German army The newspaper wrote, The Czechs objeded that there were too many former Wehrmacht officers employed in the Quartered People's Police who have thoughts of revenge. The Poles agreed with the CzechasXwakskbjectian. A news conference that is planned for the beginning of February in Warsaw is supposed to arrange the military cooperation between the three countries in such a way that Pragcle and Warsaw maintain the right of veto and cantrof over Pankow [the GDR government quarter in Berlin].s2
Accordislg to the West German Foreign Ministry Bolz" discussions with Polish officials in the spring of 1955 did not produce cclncrete agree-
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ments on the role of an East German army in the defense of Eastern Europe. The Poles rr.jected a unified high commmd with East German army officers; they surprised the East Gernnans with a plan for a joint PolishCzech command of an army gmuy ""north."'" The Polish and Czechoslovak governments had no way to p ~ v e n an t East German army,3%ut they insisted that it be limited to 170,000 men."" Ch January 19, 1956, Tqbnrru Ltddu welcomed the r e m i 1 . i t i t i o of the GDR with this headline: "The National Peoples' Army-the Uefense Arm of the GDR-This Army-Ally of the Polish Nati.on."" m e ne\iv"paper wrote that this was ""not just a German a m y but an army of peace and socialism.""" The East German Embassy in Warsaw encouraged its Foreit;gn Ministry to sand articles 811 German sddjers cvho had sided with the Republ.icans in the Spanish Civil War, German resistance fighters who had foutght with Poles in the World War 11, Germans who had been incarcerated with Pdes in Nazi concentration c q s , and bi,ographies on Dcfense Minister Wlli Stoph and East German army officers.58 To further cooperation and information sharing, the Pofish and East German gouents agreed to exchange mi)itary attach4ss39 The Polish government h e w that if war broke out with 1"6ATa, however, asking Polish soldiers to sacrifice their tives in defense of the GDR would be virtually impossible. m e PZPR functionary told Heymann that m n y p a r 9 mmbers recowized that this was a different East German army but they had red fears that it was no match for NATO forc?es.a
The SED Restricts Cultural Contacts 'The PZPR began a process of sell-criticism in late 1954. Bierut ack~owledged. at the Third Plenum that the security apparatus constituted a "state within a state," and he fired the hated seclrfity chief, Stmisiaw Radki,ewicz. Other Stalinists were also purged from the party, and Gorntlika was set free in December.61 Ulbricht had effctetively e l k h a t e d most of his opposition after thc. uprisillg inJune 11953; he was not about to risk destabilizing his government by sanctioning the PZPfi"s liberalization program, The SEDs tight restrictions on East Germmskontacts with foreipers conthued. The SED leaders we= especialfy wary of exchmgs outside the scier~tificor techmological realm; freer discussions of political m d cuIturaI matters thatened to undermine the p a r v s Stalinist prcrpqanda and reeducation eff0rts.a Cultural relations with Poland rernaltned tied with red tape, just the way Ulbricht wanted it.@The GUR Foreign Ministry was given more respcmsibility for fulfilling cultural a g ~ e m e n t sin 3"35$,,% but the mhistry soon coqlained to the ccr~tralparty orgms that it took far too long for a Pole to get a three-mnth visa to visit the GDR; the mini3tp.y further argued tbat only 7 to 10 percent of East German applicants received visas
to Poland. The ministry proposed openjng more border crossixrgs and allowing border commmities m o freedom ~ to develop exchanges, but the SED Politburo stymied Chese propods as well," At the end of 1955, the SED dictated that all visa applications for GDR citizens had to pass through the party's Department of Foreign Affairs rather than through the less politically reliable Foreig~~ TVfhistry66 The PoIish exile press commented that '"he peopIc in Poland hate the Germans as much today as before, and the Soviets' attempt to cltevelop friendly relations to East Germany has brought no result.'"T East German Ambassador Stefan Heymann agreed: ""l is well known that there are greater difficulties in relations between Germans and Poles (of course not h relations between our two states) than in relatio~~s between Germms and the workers in the other people's dcmocracics," Heymann and other lower-level East Geman offiiciats f ~ p e n t l yexpressed interest in better political and clnlttrral cooperation with Poland. In the summer of 1955, Heymann recommended, direct cooperation between the corrcspunding departments of the SEU a d PZPR Central Cllmmittees and between the Polish and East G e r m Foreit;gn Mkistries. He also proposed more exchanges of hctory, youth, and press delegations." That fall, Heymann again complained that the SET) leadership was placing too mnny obstacles in the way of cztltural cooperati,on with Poland.@H e called the overall state of cultural exchanges ""unsatisfactory," especialiy in the artistic sphrw.7""The SED Politburo ign0rc.d Heymann's recommendations and ordered the Fareign Ministry to devote more attention to cultural relations with Czechoslovakia.71 In contrast to their East German comrades, local PZPR functionaries could issue visas and plan exchanges 'The SED's regional ofiice in Rostock asked to have the same authority; it argued that several visits of smdl Polish delegations to the GDR had changed some East Germans" opposition. to the Oder-Neisse border.72 The SEC>%Department of Foreign Affairs emphatically rejected the proposal: "We are astonished that you have already developed such close connections to the PZPR in Szczcein wjthout first inform,ing the Central Committee.""l-he department remjnded the Rostock office that LalZ exchanges between delegations in the border regimhhad to have Central Committee approv"l.7" Heymam and other East Germm diplomats in Warsaw greatly exaggerated the posithe results of the official cultural exchanges that did take placre. In early 1954, Heymann ~ p o r t e dthat various culturd events in Poland to promte German-Polish friendshjp had been a '"reat success." He noted that the "Week of Progressive German Culture" had been fruitful in acquainting Poles with issues clmfrcmting the GDR, and that "the simple people understand the difference between. the GDR and West Germany much better." H~cymannwas pasticularly pleased that Poles often asked German visitors whether they were a ""Pieck-German" or an
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""Adenauer-C7erman.q At the end of the year, the embassy declared that Polish wwkers were even beg ing to mderstand the importance of the GDR in the questiun of German unification. The embassy was also satisfied with the increase in Polish propaganda against Adenauer and the remilitarization of West Germany.75 The PZPIt leadership doubted that its okvn propaganda had convinced party members, let alone Poles hgenerd, that the East Germans could be trusted. Helena fakubowska observed that "a number of our comrades have still not managed to obrercame their dislike of Germans, whom they view uni.fomly, not distinguishing any significant difierences between fascist and pmgmssive Germans.'"b East German propaganda found relatively little echo in Poland because of its strict adherence to Stalinist ideology Poles thought East German art and literature were devoid of artistic merit; even East German diplomats cro~~ceded this poht.77 One Polish journalist reported that the visit of a Polish delegation to the celebration of the fifth amiversary of the foundillg of the GUR in October 1954 had conf-irmed Polish suspicions that the GDR was merely m obsequious Soviet puppet state: ""Polish Premier Cyrmkiewicz received a very cool welcome there. The German communists opmly demcmstrated their special friendship with the Soviet delegation and paid little &tention to the detegations from the satellite states, which hurt the express sensitivity of the Poles. Cyrankiewicz teft Berth two days earlier than pfarned.lf7" The Polish Embassy in Berfin reported a sig~~ificanl drop in lectures, discussions, and other party psopagmda about Polmd in 1954, The embassy blamed this irr part m the closing of the German-Polislz E'riendship Society.""'The Soviet Efigh Commission in Germany was surprised to find that the society had been dissolved, and told. Polish diplomats that there was still much work to do to improve understand@ betwen East Germans m d Poles"80 The SED" own Deparment of Foreip Affairs knew that too many East Germans, party members among them, rtz.jected the Oder-Neisse border, saw no rcason for friendly rcllations with Poland, and suffered from a general lack of education about the comtry.81Party members confided in Polish diplomats that "if an [East German] mayor is commissiosled to carry out a Polish and a Czech performance, he w o d d ralher orgaslize the Czech, and it is likewise easier far him to mobilize the p&lic to these performances.'%~ccording to the Poles, the SED was also having dificulties overcoming the prej~~dices of the "'kulaks and fascists"" a m g the German refugees from Poland."" The Polish Embassy reported that "raather often irr rural areas [of the GDW it is possible to encounter statements praishg 'the good times' that Hitler ereatedef'g3 Tn 1955, the SED stepped up its propaganda campaign for better relations with Poland, but all exchanges were still kept under tight party cm-
trol, Oxl the tenth anniversary of the end of the war in May, Nezres Uf?~~fschltZnd editor Hermann Axen wrote an article praising cooperation between the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, He stressed that '"through the border of peace on the Oder and Neisse Poland has for the first t h e 117 its history a reliable, peace-loving neighbcrr and friend m its western border.""" me East Germans were encouraged by the Pales' tmatment of Grotewohi and 23012 for the fifth anniversary celebration of the Zgorzekc border agreement inJuly.8" Even the West German governm e ~ ~recognized i: that the visit had stimulated nebv diplomatic activity between the two countries." The East German Embassy called the warm Polish ~ c e p t i o nfor the delegation a "breakthrough"" in Polish-East German relations, -The embassy praised the work of Che Polish press in chmging the Polish prejudices against Germans, and criticized its own press for "contributing far too little in the fight against n-tisconceptims amnng our people." m e ernbassy noted, however, that too many f"oles pe&tioned the East German deletgation about deve2opments in W s t Germany, and that the FRG still received more coverage in the Polish press than the GDR,K7 Cultural exchanges were still fraught with problems. Polish officials filed numemus =ports &out cdtural and economic exchange"hat went acvry In, mmy cases, cdtural events simply verified existing prejudices; Polish olFficial.5 complained, for instance, that their booth at the Lejpzig Trade Fair in 1954 was far too small-much smaller than fie Czechoslovak stand.KWeymann pointed out that Poland's space at C,eipzig was about the same size as Hungary" or Romnia"s.8' But as one of the GDR's most important tradir~gpahers, the Poles felt slighted. Poland did not s e ~ an ~ dexhibit to the Leipzig fair in 1955. The East German Embassy hterpreted the absence as a sign that the Poles underestimated the importance of the fair," and as usual, saw si~~ister Western intluence behind the Poles' decision. 'The East Gcrman hreign Mjnistry spedated that the Western press was stirring up competition between the two trade fairs as part of an overall strategy to divide the Warsaw Pact countries.91 East Germms also showed little e~~thusiasm for the "Wek of GermanPolish Friendhip" that was held in the GDR in 1955.92Polish diplomats complained to the East Geman authorities that a similar CzechoslovakGerman friendship week had been, much better organized," aand the SED's Depastment of Foreign Affairs achowledged that local SEE) organs had shown little enthusiasm for the German-Polish festival,94 Xn m n y cases, East German visitors to Poland, even party mernbers, left a bad. impression, Attestdance was so poor at one East German economic historian's 1ecturr.s that he regretted not leaving Poland earlier than plmned.95 An East Germm botanist on tour in Poland eagerly photographed Polish art galleries and other cultural exhibitions, but he was indifferent about seeing evicience of the German occupation of Poland in
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World War 21. The Polish Foreign Mhistry reported that ""during his stay in Auschwitz he &owed m i n i 4 interest and did not take one photo. AAerwards he said that the visit to the nrrusetlln [at Auschwitz] was undoubtedly useful, but that it had take.n a considerable part of the day, whicl-rcould have been better utilked far scientific endeavorseff9G Polish officials summed up the visit of a mathematics pdessor from the Polytechnical School in Dresden this way: Polish cufture did not interest him in the least. . . . It is worth emphasizing, that at festivities in Poznafi, Professor tandsbesg did not respond with one word to the rector's special greeting and farewell, The same [thing] repeated itself at the conference of the Polish Mathematics %>ciety,where Profernor Borsuk said a few w ~ d about s the friendly relations between 130fand and the GDR, Professor tandsberg responded to those tzrords with. complete siIence.97
m e n the Director of the Romanistic hstitute at the Humboldt Ul-riversity in Berlin, Rta kholner, refused to take a third-class deeper on a Polish train to Warsaw, the Polish Ministry of Culture commented that "Professor Schober stilt holds a certah chauvinism and revisionist tendency, m d she is not even free from mti-%mitis~n.~~9K Ambassador Heymann recognized that such meetings were counterproducthe. He cited another case of two visiting East Geman musicians who " o f t e ~expressed themselves very condescendingly over the condition of the orchestras hPoland, and they also held the view that one cannot: describe tbr PnP as progressive.' Heymann warned that tbis kind of behavior, espedally by SEX) functionaries, was compromising other efforts to foster better understanding between the two peoplcs.100 East German ofBciats were eyually critical of the actions of their Polish guests. Polish students studyhg in the GDR complained that they were treated poorly by East Geman professors, and that their subsidy f r m the GDR was too small. The East German Mhistry of Education had no sympathy for these grie~rances,respondkg that ""Sudents often forget that they are students, that they are learnhg, not working." At a convention for all the f o w i p students in the GDR, Florin awarded diplomas, book prizes, and s r n d grants to twelve of the best students. Polish officials were angered that n m e of the Polish students was so honored,"l The East German diplomats in Warsw strongly berated the P&s for their interest in making connections to Westerners, especially to West Germans. A veteran East German =porter in Poland told Heym "many Poles still do not distinguish between the hivo parts of Germany. Even progressive Poles often fail to disti.nguish between the GDR and the Federal IZepubll4c."lt" Heymann related what happened when a storm forced six flshing boats from Western comtries, among them West Cer-
many to seek refuge in the Polish harbor of W-I:adistawowo.The owner of a Dmish fishir~gboat was efksive in his gratitude to the Poles: "We have visited numrous harbors, but nowfiercl have we been so cordi,all,y received as by ym." Heymann said that the West Germans were also overly complimentary*He noted that East Germm fishrrmen were never afforded such hospitatjty.""" The SED" vigilance over these ""un-Marxist" elements h Poland extended into such mundane matters as the employment of translators in the East German Embassy in Warsaw- When Heymann expressed his concern that the Polish translators were not members of the PZPR, the Polish Foreign Ministry promised to find at least m e party mernber to transiate confidcwial docu,ments.l'"Jh year later, the East Germans were still complaining about the problem.l(J' Nonetheless, Heym was generally optimistic about the state of relations with Poland in 1955. He reported that the people" trust in the GUR had. grown '~extraordinarily,'~dding that relations between the two states was now ""sgnificmtly closer and better in all areas." He cited the increase in delegation visits, cultural relations, and economic ties, and even commented on the "progressive tendencies" of Polish CathoXics.l'E Heymam wrote that there was a "grow* atrumness among the Polish p e q l e that the GDR is a worker and peasant state, and that Potand does not have to fear m y more attacks from the west, The feelisrg of security on the western border is the decidi~~g factor in the cmsolidation of relations."l"" Heymann often blmed East Germans for poisoning the atmos p h e ~m , d cited their contixlued agitation against the Oder-Neisse border; he also complained to the F o w i Ministry ~ about unfulfilled trade agreements. loR Heymann" superiors did not share his views. He was rcpIaccd in 1957 in part because he was tclcr optinlistic about: Poland's socialist developm e ~ ~At decade . after the e~zdof World War 11, relations between the Polish and East German people had nut improved much at all. Although most Poles now h e w the difference between an ""Adenauer-Germanr' and a "l?ieck-Cerman,'"hercl was no te:lling which they prefersed. After Khrushchev" secret speech to the CPSU in Febmary 1956 and Bierut's death i n March, the PZPR began to acknowledge past policy errors, and also reevaluated relations wi& the SED, 'The mask of socialist solidarity was removed, and. the latent hostilities between the two parties soon came into full view.
1. f-leymann to the Fareign Ministry, June 21, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143494.
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2, See Marc Trachtenberg, A Ccsnsfrtkcted Peace: Tke Makirzg I?( the Euroljean Settlemenl. 19453963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 139. He argues that by this time the Sc>vietshad abandoned all serious thaughts about German reunification. 3. Izydorczyk speech to the Polish Parliament, April 1954, PZPR KC, group Izydorczyk, 473/6. 4. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, March 29,4954, MSZ, 1Q/329/37; see alw Peter Bendet; East Eurolje in Senrelz of Seezdrify ((London:Chatto and Windus, 197'2), p. 13, 5. Naszkowski notes of meeting with P-ieymann, February 22, 1954, MSZ, 10/361/39. 6. Skrzeszew-ski notes of meeting with Heymann, April 23, 1954, PZPR KC, 237/V-146; and Heymann to Fritz Grosse, April 24,1954, UDR MfAA, VVarsaw Embassy, A35I74f. 7 . Izydorczyk to Naszkowski, June 24, 1954, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254 / TV-30. 8. See Skrzeszewski notes of meeting with Heymann, April 23,1954, PZPR KC, 237/V-146. 9. GDR Frrreign Ministry anaiiysis of relations with Poland, rmdated, unsigned, ca. December 2954, UDR MfAA, Minister's Office, A15156, 10. Heymann to Grosse on a meeting with Skrzeszewski, April 24,1954, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3579. 11. Stude to the GDR Embassy in Wrsavlr; Nc~vember15, 1954, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 12. Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, September 20, 1954, MSZ, 10/36"i7141, 13. Heymann notes on Polish activities at the United Nations, October 19,1954, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143492. 14. Heymann to Crosse on a meeting with Skrzeszewski, April 24,1954, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy A3579. 15, Quoted in Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Orgn~ization:A Political and Organizational Annlysis (New Ycfrk: St. Martin" Press, 1%0), p. 17. 46. See the documents on this cmfewnce in MSZ, 1Q/466/48. 17. Florin to Ambassador Koenen in Prague, J a n u a 5,1955, ~ DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A36"7; see also Mrermer Hgnisch, Rzrssenpotitik urzd interr-ze;ttir>~tnIe Bezielgungen der BDR, 1949-1955 (The foreign policy and international relatians of the GDR, 1949-4955) (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 248. As usual, East German historians such as Wemer HZnisch said that the conference proceeded withcjut acrimony: "Characteristic for this closer cooperation was the fraternal solidariv of the governments, the parliaments, and the people of Potand and Czecl.loslovakia with the GDR." 48. Heymann tcr Handke, January 24, 4955, DDR MfAA, VVarsatzr Embassy, A36178; and Efandke to Heymann, February 3,11355, DD17 MfAA, Wrsaw Embassy, A34;""0. 19. Heymann to Florin, February 1, 2955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Esnbamy A36";7; and Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, February 7, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670; see also Heymann notes on the meetings in Warsaw between Pot ish representatives and an East German government delega-
tion (led by Bolz), March 7,1955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579. Bolz told Bierut and Cyrankiewicz that his gc3vernmen-twas also ''very interested" in closer ties with Paris. 20. Heyrnann to Flctriin, February 1, 1955, DDR MfAA, VVairsaw Embassy A3670. 21. Grunert to the GDR Embassy in Warsawr February 4,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670, 22. Heymann to Florin, February 1, 2955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embamy A3670. 23. Heymann to Florin, January 10, 2955, BD13 MfAA, HAiX Secretariat, ,437, 24. Heyrnann to Flctriin, February 1, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy A3670, 25. Rybzrnn Lzldzt, January 21,1955, p. 3. 26. H e y m n n to the GDR Fowign Ministry, January 28,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw- Embassy; A367Q. 27, Heymarm to the GDR Foreign Ministry, Ncjvember 253, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A362 Cr. 28. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repcjrt, December 9,4955, SED ZK, microfilm FES 33911M88, 29. GBrallski notes of a meeting with Czechoslcwak and East German representatives (Hager, Florin, et al.), January 5,1955, PZPR KC, 2371XXII-821. 30. Michaef J. Sodaro, Moseozu, Gernfn;rzyfand thc Wesfff"o7rtKJarli~ItelllevCO 66rbachezt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 19i(a0), p. 56. 31. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 22,1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670; and report a n t l ~ erelationship between Germany [sic] and Poland in 1955, undated, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13492. 32. Heymann notes a n meetings in Warsatzr between the GDR government delegatian and Cyrankiewicz and Bierut, et al., March 7,1955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579. 33, Bolz to Grotewohl, March 16, 1955, SEB ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483. 34. Grslnert to the GDR Embassy in Warsaw, March 26,1955, DDR M f M , Warsaw- Embassy; A3616. 35. Heymann to Crosse, April 9, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/1%92; see also Gsosse to Heymann, June 25,1955, DDE MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A314"i". 36. Memorandum on a meeting between SkrzeszewsEri and Heymann, November 24,2955, MSZ, 10/31/39. 37. Heymann notes on meetings b e w e n the GDR go>vernmentdelegation and Cyrankiewicz and Bierut, et al., March 7, 1955, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579.
38, Bcrlz to Grotewohl, March 46, 1955, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483; see also Heymann to Grc>sse,May 3,1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy; A3670. 39. See A m L. Phillips, Sottief I;3oEicy T0zolnl.dEast Genrznuy Reco~s?lder&:The Postwar Decadc (New York: Greenwr>odPress, 49861, pp. 131-180. 40. See Jerzy Hdzer, ""Osteuropa und die neue deutsche Staatenordnungf' (East Europe and the new German State arrangement), in Werner Weidenfeld and
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Hartmut Zirnmerman, eds., Deutsclzland-Handbzld: Eine dopyelte Bilans 1949-1989 (German handbook: A doubte baXancc;3,1949-1989) (Munich: Car1 Hanser Verlag, 1989), pp. 685-697. Holtzer claims that all three states, 1301and, Czechuslovakia, and the GDR were apprehensive about Khrushchev's German policy. 41, Trachtenberg, A Aotzstrlacfed Peacl., pp. 231-233. 42. Bierut speech, undated, ca. July 1955, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/X-5.. fines LIDR43. Hcjrst Grunert, Fiir Nonecker arggtatfcm Pnrketi: Erintzcrzinge~~ Biylanzaten (For Honecker on the smooth parquet: Memoirs of a GB13 diplomat) (Berlin: Edition Qst, 4995), p, 103. 44. ""Poblem of the Federal Republic in the Polish View," by the Office of Expellees, September 26,1955, BRD BfC;DLX7,813"7"1282. 45, Quoted in Nikita Khru~hchev~ Klzrz~slzchevRevzenzbers: Tlzc CEnsnost 'jfapes (Bcjston: Little, Brc>wn,1990), p. "?Ia. 46. Van Mende notes on information from Polish journalists, November 12, hz1954, BRD BKA, E)136/M83; see also Mary F;uXbrc>ok,Anlrforny ofn Dkfnfnrsl~ip; sidc ftze GDR, 2945-1989 (Oxford: Oxfclrd University Press, 49951, p. 435. Fulbrook maintains that these was considerable opgositian to an East German army in the GDR itself: "Fears of loss of family members tzrere combined with a dislike of the notion of Germans shooting on Germameft 4'7. See Peter Merkl, Gemtan Foreigrz blicies, West and ER&: On Clle Thresltold ofn New Euroijent.2 Em (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-Clio, 19741, p, 99, 48. Tzydorczyk to Warsaw December 31,1953, PZPR KC, 237/XXTf-5l8. 4% Heymann to Grussq April 9,111i355, SED ZK, microfilm FEZS 339/1%92; and Grosse to Heymann, June 25, 1%Ci5,DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A36170, 50, Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, July 2,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy; A3670. 51, E-leymann to the East German Foreign Ministry, Nclvember 17, 4955, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3670; and Heymam to the GDR Foreign Ministry, December 30,3955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3616. 52. Die Welt (The MrXB), January 11,1955, in BRD BfGD1F; B137/427. 53. Berlin Office of the BRD Foreign Ministry to Bonn, March 21, 1955, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 84, 54. See Fechter notes, March 25,1955, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 84. 55. Kopa memo, March 23, 1956, MSZ, 10/380/42; see also Mjtech Mastny, "We Are in a Bind? 1301ishand Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the VVarsaw Pact, 19564959," Bulletin: Cold Wfir Infenzntz'onnl Hi5:sl"ol.yProject, no, 1 4 (winter 195)8], pp. 236-250. New archival evidence points to the serious conflicts within the Warsaw Pact in the latter half of the 1950s. 56. Tqbuna Lzddi-l,January 19,1956, pp. 1-2. 5'7. Tybunn Lzldzt, January 20,1956, p. 2. 58. Bringmann to Waher, February 44, 4956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 59. Handke tcr Crutewc~hl,June 45,1956, DDR MfAA, HA/I Secretariat#A37. 60, Heymann to Florin, April 20, 1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, Nl, 18214247, 61. M, K. Bziewanowski, The Communist Party I?( Bolnnd: An Oz-lflineI?( Histoty (Cambridge: Haward Universiv Press, 19%), p. 256.
62. Hefena Jakubowska notes of meeting with Schlage, November 6, 1953, MSZ, 10/475/49. 63. SEU report on relations between Germany [sic] and the PRP in 1955, undated, SED ZK, microfilm F13S 339123492. 64. Izydorczyk to the Pcdish Fstreip Ministryf April 45,1954, MSZ, 40/367/41, 65. GDR Foreign Ministry analysis of the current foreign relations, undated, unsigned, ca. December 1954, DDR MfAA, Minister % Office, A15156. 66. SED Regional Office in Rostock to Schirdewan, December 24, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 939143422. 67. From Dziennik Polski (Polish Daily), December 2 , 1953, in BRD BKA, B136/6$83. 68. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 21, 1955, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 69, Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, October 5, 4955, DDR M f M , Warsaw- Embassy; A3616. 70.Heymarm to the GDR Foreign Ministryf Ncjvember 47, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670. 79% Stude notes of meeting between Grunert and East German represntatives of the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, October 3, 1955, DDR MeAA, HA/I Scretariat, A37. 72, SE13 RegimaX Office in 1;tostock to Schirdewan, December 24, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13422, 7'3. SED Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs to the SED Regional Office in Rc>stock,February I?/ 1956, SED ;SF;, mjcrclfilm FBS 339/13422. 74. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, January 21,1954, DBR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 75. P-ieymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, January 28,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 76. Helena Jakubc)wska notes of a meeting of the PZPR Basic Party Organization (POP), October 29,1954, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-732, 77'. Manfred Schmidt report on cultural, events in Poland in the second quarter of 1955, August 9,1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113911. 78. Vcm Mende notes on infcjrmation from PoXish journalists, November 12, 1954, BRD B U , B136/&83. 79. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry, April 15,2954, MSZ, 1Q/367/41. 80. Pieck answer to a Pybul-zn Ludzd repader, March 7, 1954, SED ZK, Wilhelm P i ~ Papers, k NL 36146LL. 81. Report on relations between the GDR and Poland in 1955, undated, unsigned, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339113492, 82. Wierna to Drc)zdowicz on a meeting with Wendet November 9, 1955, KC PZPR, Bierult Archive, 254111"-27, 83. Stanjstaw Albrecht to the Polish Foreign Ministry, December 30,1955, MSZr 10/3110/41, 84. Article by Hermann Axcm, undated, in SE&)ZK, Hermann Axen Office, IV 212,0351159. 85. ZlTeymann notes on the delegation exchange for the five-year anniversary of the Zgorzetec agreement, undated, ca. July, 2955, SED ZK, microfilm FlBS 33911x94,
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86. Von M e d e tu Bachmann, July 14,1955, BKD BKA, B136/6484. 87. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repc~l"c,December 9,1955, SED Z K j microfilm FBS 33911M88. 88. Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, September 20, 1954, MSZ, 10/36"i741, 89. Heymann to Handkc3, September 18, 1954, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy; A3579; see also Florin to Ulbricht, October 42,1954, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 2 8211247, 90. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repc~rt,December 9,4955, SED ZK, microfilm FES 33911M88, 91. Stude notes on Warsaw Embassy repc~rtfar the second quader of 1955, %ptember 27,1955, DBR MfAA, Warsaw Errtbassy, A3616. 92. Stanisjaw Albrecht to the Polish Foreign Ministry May 31, 1955, MSZ, 10/369/41. 533.Heymann to the East German Foreign Ministry July 2, 1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 94. Report on relations between the GDR and Poland in 1955, undated, unsigned, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 334143492, 95, Ernil Skaut notes on Hans Mottek's visit, May 3,1955, KWKzlZ;, file 152. 96. Stanjslaw Smiarc>wski notes on Emst Reinmuth's visit, May 6, 1955, KWGZ, file 152. 97. Skaut notes on Hans tandsberg" visit, July 27,1955, KWKzZ, file 152. 98. Joanna 01kiewicz notes on Rita Schober" visit, December 16, 1955, KWKzZ, file 152. 99. &port a n the Week of GDR-Pr~lishFriendship from November I"i7o November 22, January 20,1956, SET3 ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 400. Eleyrnam to Grosse, April 9,1955, SET>ZK, microfilm FBS 333113432; see also Grosse to f-leymann, June 25,2955, DUB M f i A Warsaw Embassy, A3670, 101. Notes on a convention of fcjreign students in the GDR, unsigned, January 25, 2 956, PZPR KC, 2371XX-11-732, 102. Internal memo, unsigned, January 19, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143494. 103. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry; January 28, 1955, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 104. Heyrnann notes of meeting with Murawski, December 13, 1955, UDR M f M , Poland Section, A4844. 105. Lobadycz to Bartef, August 22,1956, MSZ, 20/361/39, 106. Heymann report on ]Poland%foreign policy in the second quarter of 1955, August 9,1955, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS 33911394, 107. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Minit;try, NcJvember 17; 1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 108. Heymann tc:, the East German Foreign Ministry; November 17,1955, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A367Q;and Heyrnam to the GDR Foreigm Ministry, December 30,2955, DDR ;VfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A362 Cr.
KhrushchevfsDe-Stalinization Speech and Gomulka's Return to Power, anuary-ctober, 1956. Jn the countries fjmf Iznz7e de-ShJiniu-d fJw ~ P Z OFIcf~zgay S ~ , aud &land, ill auill lozmrd Ihc 'GDR' hm hegu~zt~ s p w d hecausa of ifs tnninlerzarzce 4 t h Sfalinist ~ U!bricjtf.cozrrse.
Niki.ta I(hrushchev's visit to Belgradc to see Tito inthe sprjng of 1,955was the first clear signal to the Soviet bloc parties that the new Soviet leadership intended to chart a new foreip policy course. ?'he Polish press began to devote extensive coverage to relatio~~s with Yugoslavia, as though calling for a Polish Eto and a Polish natinna) road to socialism. The damor for a &ornu$ reform of the PZPR and a reevaluaticm of its relations with l.he other communist parties quickly escalated after mmshchev%dmunciation of Stalin in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU inFebruary 1956. Fisst Secrebry Boledaw Rierut never made it back frnm Ihe congress. He died in Moscow an March 11, and was succeeded by Edward Ochab, Oehah, like Bierut, had spent the war years in the Soviet Union, but he was no Stalinist. Ochab all,o.cved party dormers to conduct an honest analysis of past policies, ixrcluding relatEons with the Soviet Union and the GDR. Reformers set the record straight ahouf;what happened to the W P durhg the Staljrzist purges of the late 19305, and exposed the crimes Stalin committed against Poland during the war, fn February 1956, the Soviet, Polish, Italian, Bulgariart, and Finnish Central Committees declared that the dissolutian of the W P in 1938 had been mistake.Wchab later acknowledged to an East German official that ""when we learned
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'the bitter truth about the KPP"in 19561, it was very difficult for the party leadership to fight on against the trends of middle-class ideology."3 Party reformrs began to agitate for the return of Wiadysiaw Gomulka, who bad been expelled from the party seven years earlier. ~~n;tsE.lcbev% speech sent tremors rougho out the SED. As lea$er of a party that had been formed at Stalin's behst, Ulbricht refused to denounce Stalin"s contribution to communim, He g r h l y defended his StaIinist policies and quashed dissident voices in the SED who sympathized with the Polish reformers. As far as Ulbricht was cmcerned, the KPD m d SED had set the right course for Germany. In March, one SED member confided in a Polish diplomat that ""the appropriate climate has not been creat-ed i,n the GDR to cliscuss the materid of the Twentieth Party C m gress of the CPSW, as there is in Poland, so that a whole group of publicists and activists in the GDR are waiting for what the 'Zetka7lthe SEU Ce~~tral Committee] will decide.'%other East Germm official achowledged to PoZish diplomts that it was not possibk in the GDR to have the kind of honest debates tbat Pdish artists and witers we= having.4 Off the record, officiats in the East German Foreign Ministry told Polish diplomat Stanislaw Kopa that the SED leadership was havhg difficulty justifying Stafin's cult of personality to the party faithhl, because U'lhricht had developed one himself. One dficial: said, that if UIbricht allowed criticism of the SED" p a t policies, the leadership would. lose membersqtoyalty and the SED's c~dibilitywith the other parties in the National Front, not to mention the trust of "a broad strata of German society.""" As m m and more SEC) members compbined about the lack of honest debate within the Central Committee, Kopa wrote that "one would thjnk . . . that the CC of the SED has not committed any mistakes, but of course that is not so.'" 1111May, Kopa ~ p o r t e dthat party members still had not been informed of the exact contents of mrushchev"s speech. Mthotlgh the SEX>leadership spoke in theoretical terms about "democratizing party life,"' inpractice power remained firmly in Uf:bricht"shands.'" Mthotrgh the SED leaders tried to ignortl the sccret speeeh, they werc most sepowerless to prevent word of it from leaking to the people,"@ rious breaches of confidentiality were comhg from Poland. The PZPR was the only Soviet bloc party to circu,late the secret speech for its membership. In May a delegation of East German historians to Poland reported that Khrushchevfs speeeh was being sold on the black markt, and that serious mani.fcsta,t.ionsof anti-Sovietism were reszllting from the public discussions of Stalin's crlmes.9 fn .April, Ambassador H e y m m reported that the situation in the PZPR wap; '"specially difficult'" because p a w mmbers were openly discussing Stalin's dissolution of the K I T before World War XI, the Soviet massacre of Polish officers at the Katyn.
Forest in 1940, and the failure of the Soviet Red Army to support the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans in 1944. H e y m a ~ ~admonished n the Poles for resurrecting w:hat he callcd these "old lies";I%e noted, too, that the PZPR" May Day celcbsation was lackluster, and that Edward Ochah's speech that day was barely interrupted by the usual apphuse. He warned that "the workers' demonstrations carried a marked national character."ll Hcryrnann also rcported that many Poies thought that Stalin had m v e d the Polish border to the Oder-NtLtisse to create p e r p e b l animosity between Polmd and Germany-'" Heyrnann maintahed bls optimistic outlstlk on the general state of relations with Poland, however, and portrayed the Poles as much more disposccf to East Germany than they actually were; he prcdicrted Chat "the last manifestations of anhosity toward Germans will soon d.isappeazUl3 He thought that Ochab was consolidating his cmtrol over the PZPR, m d that the party would not undergo major chmges. H e even declared that most party members favorably viewed the GDR as the "island of cab," m d that their mderstmding for the GDKs special sibation in relation to West Germmy had grown.l"n an interview with the West G e r m newspaper Frankfzdrter Allg~rneilzeNnehrichte~,Heyrnann was typicalb upbeat about Poland's political development: "The vast mqority of the Polish people stmd by the Soviet Union m d also support a strong friendship with the GDR, Of course there are still several circles, abwe LalZ intellectuals, in which anti-soviet and anti-German attitudes are prtrsent. But these circles are insigniticmt and have no influence on the poljtical development of t h PREf'ls I'he political reality in P o h d wggmted ~therMlise,and the de-Stalinization process proceeded apace that spring. Formr secwity chief Stanislaw Radkiewicz was dropped from the government; the StaXin.ist Jakob Beman, the emint.nce grise of thk, Bierut gwernn-tent, resigned from the Politburo in May. nousan& of political prisoners wen. freed and many others amnestied and rehabil2ated. The political balance was shifthg away from the old guard in the PZPR, and toward Comulka. Ochab was a pragmatist, always followkg the Kremlin's lead rather than forging his own policies, Although Ochab believed that Gomu#hfs incarceration had been a mistake, he made pohted references to the dangers of Gomn%ka,'snatiaonalist and revisionist positions, Ochah was markedly critical of Gomufka" agricultural pol,cies after the war, which he aIIeged had allowed the return of ""klak." As popular support for Gomulka swelled that sumnet; Ochab contemplated a way to coopt him without granting him real power. Gomulka would, have none of it. FIe wanted a chance to appear before the party membership to clear his record m d his name.16 Heyrnann informed his superiors that some PZPR PoWburo mmhers were csnternplating the return of Gomuika to power and that "reac-
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tionary" student and ixrtellectual grmps were forming to support h; ncmetheless, Heymam thought the Ochab group was in ccrntrol of the political situation.17 Heymann's misreading of the situation in Poland would eventually lead to his recall in 1957'. To maintain the public facade of good relaticms between East Germany and Polatd was one thing, but the higher-ups in East Berlin expected more honest rcportjng from their diplomats in the field. The Poznah Revolt The workersf rebellion in Pomajti on June 28,1956, resulted in the deaths of fifty-three de~~onstrators. The revolt was hard, evidence that the PZPR was facing more serious politiral and clconamic problems than Heym. letting on,Divisione; within t-he PZPR widened as rclfomers in the party demanded leadership that would renounce such brutal Stalkist tactics m d chmpion Poland" national interests, Gornu&a was just that man. I'he Polish press cautiously alluded to the Legitimate grievances of the I'oznafi kvorkers*Even the PZPR organ Tybuna liudzl, suggested that economic problems were partly to blame fnr the unrest.18 In private, the East German Foreign MInistry agreed, and recommended that every effnrt be made to send prontised exports to mland-above aXI, m m consunter goods, Un the politjcal front, the ministry urged that East German workers' delegations be sent to Poland from those factorks that had "f~ught szxccessfully aga.inst: the fascist coup in the GDR on June 17,1953,""" The P m a h incident abruptly stopped the de-Stalinization cmpaign in the Soviet press, whicl-t portrayed the revolt as an hnperialist plot. At first, Qchat? eondemed the stri:kers as well, but on the first day of pienary session of the PZXZR Central Committee on July 18, he backtracked, acknowledgirtg that the wlrrkers were reacting to a real drop in their standard of living. Octnab promoted a limited "'democra.t.jza.t.ion'"of the party, which met with disapproval: from hard-liners in the Kremlin. Speaking to the plenum on July 24, Soviet Premier Nicholai Bulganin alleged that the P o a ~ a hrioters had been inspired by Western imperialists; he urged. the party to be on the watch for "'hostile and opportunist elements.'m As usual, the SED followed Che Soviet line, blaming the u~zreston fascists, imperialists, reactionaries, and Western spies, The East German Embassy concluefed that "the me&ods of the (~tnpmitionin the preparation and staging of the provocations in PoznaA arc the sarnc ones that were used on June l?, 1953, in Berlh.""" Neues Dezrtsehland wrote that "it is no coincidence that the enerny chose Poznaii as a showplace for the provocation because at that time the internat-ional [trade] fair was takng place, It involved besmirchiq the good name of People" P o l a d and disrupting its growing peaceful international relations."22
Heymann warned that the Mstern agents had boped to instigate a similar violent outbreak in East Germany He cited as proof the discovery of inflammatory pamphlets in German i x ~one of the Pdi& ""resistance nests." Heymmn reported that many young priests had sided with the demonstrators, although the Caitholic Church had not taken an active role in the events in Pozzzafi. Nonetheless, Heymann interpreted the quick suppression of the alleged putsch as a sign of the political consciousness m d reliability of the PZPR and Polish workers.2" Thmughout the summer of 1956, Che SET) and its parbler parties suppressed all honest djscussion of the Poznari demonstrations. Berthold Rose, t-he head of the East German DRU, told Polisfi dipiomats that the enemy !in Poland] is exploiting the !loosened] atmosphere. . . . They brought abaut provocations in PoznaA, We had similar provocations in 1953. Therefc>re,in order to avoid new ones, we cannot allow ourselves such open discussions like they had and are having in the other people's democracies after the Twentieth Party Congress.24
East German Interior Ministry Vice Minister Herbert GrGnstein told :Kopa that the Polish g w e m m e n t f ~ w i fsuppression t of the Poznari demonstrators was right and necessary because the unrest could have spread to the GDR."" The East German press gave k w direct fndications that there was any tension in relatinns with Poland, or Chat C)chab was i,n trouble. Throughout the summer and into the fall,Nezies Dczdtschlnnd carried frequent and mostly positive articles on Poland. East German journalists issued glowing rcports of the visit of Polish delegations to the celebration ol the sixth iversary of the Oder-Neisse agreement on July 6,md. to the 'Week of Polish-German Eriertdship'" in Kostock. One wrote that ""the cordiality with which our Polish friends we= g ~ e t e deveryhere in the cities and towns of our republic, bears witness that the Geman-Polish friendship has becclme a matter of the heart for a broad sectim of our population" Neziirs Dcrzrlschla~~d pointed out that Poland was East: Germanfs second most important trading partner in the Soviet bloc, asking rhetorically, "What would our metallurgical factories be-just to name one example-kvithout Polish coke?""" An East German parliament-q delegation to Poland. s t ~ s s e d the Poles%am reception, which the East Germans attributed to ""theconsistent peace policy [conducted] by both govemmez1ts.~~z7 Heymann" report on the twelfth annjversary celebration of the formation of the Luhlin pmvisional government on frtly 22 was also positive: "[After] the events in Poznai7 . . . the masses, to a greater extent than before, recognize the machinations of the memy and therefore are rallying
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around their government." H e y m m agajn exaggerated the friendlly state of relations between the GDR and Polmd; supposedly the East German delega.t.ionto the celebratiol~had made a good impression and h d contributed to "the close bonds between our two peoples,"'"" The congrah;llatory message that Grotewohl and Lllbricht sent on the amiversary also gave the impression t-hat relations we= on track: "The fraternal solidarily between our two peoples is expressed in the heartfelt connections to each other."z" Many people-to-people meetings contradicted this propagmda. Time and again East German visitors to Poland were confrmted with yuestions about Khrushehev" sspeeeh and the crimes co itted by the cornmunists parties during StaWs rule." An official in the Poijsh Mhistry of Culturc chastised one visiting East German SIavic expert, Eugen FXBusler, for his igncrrmce of the Nazi occupation of Poland, the Warsaw Uprising in 1,944, and his unwillingness to visit Ausch\vitz.31 Cultural exchanges were mose dangerous to the SED now. Much to the dismay of the SED leadership, many East German writers and artists were favora:bly impressed bp the ncw inteUechaal freedom in Poland and the political engagement of the Polish people," One East German art historian said that his visit to Poland was much mow pleasmt tban a recmt. trip to the Soviet Uni,olz. Me cmfjded in one Polish officid t-hat t-he SED placed mmy more obstacles in the way of artistic ireedom than the PZPR." h East Germm fieater delegaticm praised fie Poles for reconstructing monument.^ to Polis)t monarchs,nhnd mother group of East German journalists was surprised to learn that the Poles operated a central press censorship office. The! East Cermns said that if an editor in the GDR did not censor his own publkation, he immediately last his job.3" The Pofish diplomats in East Berlin, generally took a less sanguirte view of relations that summer. The em:hassy cornplair~edthat cultural ties bet w e e ~the ~ two countries had s~~ffercd grea.t.1~ in the last k w years. Few East German p e r s m e l were devoted to cultural cooperation, and the East Germans would not: agrt_.eto more unofficial and spontmeous cultwal exhanges. The eJnhassy was generally satisfied with the SED's p ~ s coverage s of Polish afiairs, but it characterized the provincial press as "a lot worse."36 Although the East German news reports failed to mention problems related to the Friendship Week in Rostock inJune, the Polish Embassy in Berlin complained about a number of unsettling hcidents. h Kostock, East Germans had smashed shop whdows displaying Polish symbols and slogans; and Polish theater and music performances were beset with technical difficulties, lack of publicity, and poor attendance. East German Foreit;gn Mnistry offici& t d d the Poles that because Rostock was a port city, fnreigners, most likely West Germans, had probably broken the win-
dows, and asserted that the problems connected with the Poiish performances were "in no way cmnected to any hostile gesture toward Polandef'37 The Polish diplomatic corps in the GDR was skeptical about whether the East Germans really wmted better relations with Poland; at the same time, East: German officials blamd their Polish counterparts for a basic lack of trust in the GDR, Gottfricd Gfiinberg, the head of the Central Political Office in the NVA (National PeopIe"s Army), told Kopa that ""up to now cooperation