11 SEPTEMBER 2001
War, Terror and Judgement
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11 SEPTEMBER 2001
War, Terror and Judgement
Books of Related Interest FUNDAMENTALISM AND INTELLECTUALS IN EGYPT, 1973–1993 David Sagiv INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN A GLOBAL AGE Securing the Twenty-First Century Clive Jones and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe MILITARY STUDIES IN THE JIHAD AGAINST THE TYRANT The Al-Qaeda Training Manual Jerrold M.Post (ed.) RELIGIOUS RADICALISM IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (eds) SCIENCE, WAR AND TERRORISM From Laboratory to Open Conflict Jacques Richardson TERRORISM AND GRAND STRATEGY Paul B.Rich and Thomas R.Mockaitis TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WEAPONS PROLIFERATION Henry Sokolski and Jim Ludes (eds) VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED IN THE MODERN WORLD Mark Juergensmeyer (ed.) ASYMMETRIES OF CONFLICT John Leech THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM Max Taylor and John Morgan (eds) TECHNOLOGY AND TERRORISM Christopher C.Harman
11 SEPTEMBER 2001 War, Terror and Judgement Editors
BÜLENT GÖKAY R.B.J.WALKER University of Keele
FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR
First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS c/o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, Oregon 97213–3786 Website: www.frankcass.com Copyright © 2003 Bülent Gökay and R.B.J.Walker Previously published by Keele European Research Centre © 2002 ISBN 1 899 488 89 8 (Print Edition) British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 11 September 2001: war, terror and judgement. –2nd ed. 1. September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001 2. War on Terrorism, 2001.– 3. World politics–21st century 4. United States— Foreign relations –2001– I. Gokay, Bulent II. Walker, R.B.J. 973.9′31 ISBN 0-203-49311-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-58399-X (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0 7146 5505 8 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 8403 1 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 11 September 2001: war, terror and judgement/editors, Bülent Gökay, R.B.J.Walker. p. cm. Originally published: Staffordshire, U.K.: Keele European Research Centre, 2002. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–7146–5505–8 (cloth)—ISBN 0–7146–8403–1 (pbk.) 1. September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001. 2. War on Terrorism, 2001–3. World politics–1995–2005. I Gökay, Bülent. II. Walker, R.B.J. HV6432.7A12 2003 973. 931–dc 21 2003043984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.
Contents
List of Contributors
vii
List of Abbreviations
viii
Preface by Paul Rogers
x
Introduction by Bülent Gökay and R.B.J.Walker
1
1.
Reflections on 11 September Hidemi Suganami
3
2.
Invisible Cities Patrick Thornberry
13
3.
The Politics of Terrorism and ‘Civilization’: How to Respond as a Human Being Yoshikazu Sakamoto
31
4.
Identifying Limits on a Borderless Map in the First Post-Modern War Richard Falk
46
5.
War, Terror, Judgement R.B.J.Walker
61
6.
Afghanistan and the Global Environment: Turning Local Language into Global Grammar Andrew Dobson
81
7.
The United States Against the World: Oil, Hegemony, and the Militarization of Globalization Bülent Gökay
87
8.
The Response of the British Government to the Attack on America Dan Keohane
106
9.
The European Union and 11 September John Vogler
124
vi
10.
Terrorism and ‘New Wars’ Susanne Karstedt
134
11.
On Pharmacological War Larry George
149
12.
Immigration, Asylum, Borders and Terrorism: The Unexpected Victims Elspeth Guild
169
13.
Barbarians Alex Danchev
186
Index
189
List of Contributors
Alex Danchev: Professor, Head of the School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment. Andrew Dobson: Professor, Department of Government and Politics, Open University. Richard Falk: Visiting Distinguished Professor of Global Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Emeritus Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. Larry N.George: Professor of Political Science, California State University at Long Beach. Bülent Gökay: Senior Lecturer, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University. Elspeth Guild: Professor, University of Nijmegen; Partner, Kingsley Napley, London. Susanne Karstedt: Professor, Department of Criminology, Keele University. Dan Keohane: Senior Lecturer, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University. Yoshikazu Sakamoto: Emeritus Professor of International Law, University of Tokyo. Hidemi Suganami: Professor of the Philosophy of International Relations, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University. Patrick Thornberry: Professor of International Law, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University; and Rapporteur, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). John Vogler: Professor, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University. R.B.J.Walker: Professor of International Relations, School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University.
List of Abbreviations
ABM ASEAN AWACS BP CAIR CDS CFSP CIA CNPC EC ECHO ECHR EctHR EPC ESDP EU FAIR G7 G8 GATT GDP GDR IGO IMF IRA ISAF JHA
Anti-Ballistic Missile Association of Southeast Asian Nations Airborne Warning and Control Systems British Petroleum Council on American-Islamic Relations Chief of Defence Staff Common Foreign and Security Policy Central Intelligence Agency China National Petroleum Corporation European Community European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office European Convention of Human Rights European Court of Human Rights European Political Co-operation European Security and Defence Policy European Union Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting Group of Seven Group of Eight General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product German Democratic Republic Intergovernmental Agency International Monetary Fund Irish Republican Army International Security Assistance Force Justice and Home Affairs
ix
KFOR KLA MPAC NAFTA NATO NGO OECD OPEC OSCE PoW RAF RMA RUC SADC UN UNOCAL WEU WTO
Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army Muslim Public Affairs Council North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Agency Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Prisoner of War Red Army Faction Revolution in Military Affairs Royal Ulster Constabulary South African Development Community United Nations Union Oil Company of California Western European Union World Trade Organisation
Preface
It might have been possible for the atrocities of 11 September 2001 to have resulted in a serious re-assessment of the western security paradigm. A remarkably powerful state had been shown to be vulnerable to a simple if carefully organized attack, demonstrating that there were significant forces at work that did not accept the diffuse western hegemony that had increasingly evolved after the ending of the Cold War. In practice, this reassessment of vulnerabilities and consequences did not happen, and an almost immediate effort was made to terminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, putative supporters of the al-Qaida network that was considered to be the core opponent in the ‘War on Terror’. This was then followed by the naming of several states as constituting an ‘Axis of Evil’, support for Israel in its vigorous control of the Occupied Territories, and preparations for a possible war with Iraq. By the end of 2002, it was apparent that the ‘War on Terror’ was proving very difficult to prosecute. During the course of the year there were numerous attacks on western targets in Tunisia, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Kenya, with many more attempts intercepted. The al-Qaida network had been disrupted but remained active, and in Afghanistan itself an apparent victory was deteriorating into a situation of deep instability, with a visible absence of commitment by most western states to protracted and serious post-conflict peacebuilding. It was also a year in which initial support and sympathy for the United States across much of the world was replaced by suspicion and even overt antagonism. What was becoming widely believed was that the ‘War on Terror’ was developing into an attempt by a particularly hard-line administration to reimpose order primarily through the use of military force. By the end of the year it was as if the world community was fracturing into three constituencies. One was the United States, in concert with a handful of allied governments such as those in Australia and, to an extent, Britain, which saw the ‘War on Terror’ and the vigorous confronting of rogue states as the fundamental requirements for international security. In much of Europe there was dismay at the evidence of growing instability, especially in the Middle East, and a frank disbelief that Washington could be so supportive of the Sharon government in Israel. Not only was there a greater
xi
concern with trying to understand the root motivations of paramilitary groups such as al-Qaida, but there was also a recognition that support for these groups was not diminishing—indeed it was probably at a higher level than in the period immediately preceding the 11 September attacks. Finally, there was what might be called the ‘majority world’ across most of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In these environments there were many views and opinions, but a dominant theme was a growing current of anti-American sentiments as the ‘War on Terror’ escalated, especially as this was frequently exacerbated by local elites seeking to use this ‘war’ as cover for the harsher treatment of their political opponents. US efforts to regain control and establish itself once more as what has been termed a civilized hegemon running a ‘benign imperium’ was seen in a much cruder light—confirmation that the atrocities of 11 September were being used to defeat paramilitary, and other, opponents with every bit as much vigour as was demonstrated at the height of the Cold War in Latin America, Vietnam and elsewhere. Put bluntly, the US view of a civilized world of liberal market economies was seen in the majority world as the increasingly hard-line control of the world community through the use of economic, political and even military instruments. What is particularly illuminating is that opinion formers and intellectuals in the majority world have little difficulty in recognizing and understanding Washington’s view of the world, even if so many of them embrace such a directly contradictory analysis. Among the conservative thinkers and policy formulators in Washington, on the other hand, the majority world’s view would be almost unrecognizable, or at least would be considered dangerous to the point of malignity. In such circumstances, with a global system capable of deeply unstable divisions, scholars of international relations have a fundamental responsibility to attempt an analysis of current security trends from a global perspective, doing their utmost to go beyond the narrow ethnocentric view of the world that tends to permeate so much of western academe. The present volume seeks to make such a contribution to that task, gathering together scholars from Europe, North America and Asia to offer a series of analyses of the post-11 September world. Not all of them agree, and there are many different viewpoints and modes of analysis represented here. At the same time, what does permeate this volume is a serious and sustained attempt to get beyond the immediate responses to the attacks. As such, the result is a thoughtful and illuminating collection of essays of a kind that is greatly needed in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves. Paul Rogers Professor of Peace Studies Bradford University 30 December 2002
Introduction BÜLENT GÖKAY and R.B.J.WALKER
On 11 September 2001, a group of hijackers turned some commercial aeroplanes into missiles and attacked key symbols of American economic and military power. These attacks flattened the World Trade Center towers in New York and destroyed part of the Pentagon. The military, political and diplomatic responses to this attack have been profound. Moreover, both the attacks and the response to them have led to intense debate not only about the immediate causes of, and responsibilities for, this specific set of events, but also about the broader historical and structural contexts in which these events might begin to make some sense. No one predicted the tragic events of 11 September. They were not inevitable but neither did they come out of the blue. They were the product of long-term structural developments and conjunctural individual actions that might have turned out differently. There is no single cause or set of causes to explain them, and responsibilities rest in many places. What special vulnerabilities does the world of the twenty-first century have to terrorist attacks? What kind of role does the United States see itself playing as the world’s only superpower in the coming decades? How should we now characterise the conduct of the US foreign policy? How should we understand these events in relation to the dynamics of world economy? How will they effect relations between Europe and America? How do they fit into our understanding of various regional conflicts, especially of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the place of Saudi Arabia in the global reach of American military and economic power? Whatever happened to international law and the various institutions of the United Nations? Answers to such questions are perhaps not much clearer now than they were immediately after the attacks, but one of the more positive effects of these attacks has been to stimulate much serious discussion about them, and thus about the place of violence—about changing forms of warfare, about different forms of terror, and about challenges to prevailing accounts of the legitimacy of violence in contemporary political life—in the context of emerging and in many respects dangerously unstable structures of power and authority on a global scale. Earlier versions of some of the essays in this collection first appeared in a Keele European Research Centre book, which resulted from a series of meetings and seminars at Keele University immediately after 11 September 2001.
2 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
Discussion at Keele centred especially on the extent to which these dramatic, and in many respects unprecedented, events could be understood as symptoms of farreaching trends and transformations in contemporary global politics. We have, of course, continued these discussions with colleagues in other places, and now include some additional essays by some very distinguished authorities on international relations and law in order to give a broader sense of the conversations that have been emerging over the past year. These essays do not constitute a unified perspective on what happened on 11 September 2001, and the US response to it. They are perhaps most usefully read as an experiment in writing contemporary history as it evolves. Some essays are primarily concerned to express immediate responses to the specific events of 11 September, while some struggle to make sense of these events in relation to subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and the gradual shift towards a potential attack on Iraq that had taken centre stage by the time the book went to press in the summer of 2002. Some essays contradict others, some are quite specific, and others generalise very broadly. They all affirm, however, that there is no simple answer to difficult questions around the recent events, only a complex braid of explanatory factors that have yet to be fully evaluated. They especially affirm that no serious attempt to understand either the attacks of 11 September or the specific response to them can be made without considering the broad contradictions both in a globalizing political economy and the international system of formally sovereign states, as well as the patterns of inclusion and exclusion and the dynamics of militarization which these contradictions have generated. Like most acts of aggression, large-scale violence, and fanaticism in the contemporary world they were rooted in a sense of deep grievances that grew out of these contradictions. We would like to thank the journal Alternatives: Global, Local, Political and the Keele European Research Centre for providing assistance with organising the Keele seminars and with the preparation of this volume, and Farzana Shain for designing the cover illustration. Keele July 2002
1 Reflections on 11 September HIDEMI SUGANAMI
‘Just about every crime—whether a robbery in the streets or colossal atrocities—has reasons, and commonly we find that some of them are serious and should be addressed’.1 ‘But the mourning had barely begun, when the highest leaders of the land unleashed a spirit of revenge. They put out a simplistic script of “good versus evil” that was taken up by a pliant and intimidated media. They told us that asking why these terrible events had happened verged on treason’.2 I presented a paper on the events of 11 September at an Open Forum organised by my colleagues at Keele about a month after the incident. Titled simply ‘Comments on the Attack on America’, the paper summarised my immediate reactions to the events and my thoughts on the matter over the previous month. I prefaced my presentation by remarking that I did not usually comment, in public, on current affairs. They are, by definition, current, the future was uncertain; I liked certainties, and therefore comments on current affairs were not my kind of thing. But here, I said, was an exception—because I was deeply worried about the way the United States appeared to be responding to the incident at that time. Most of my concerns were shared by the other Open Forum speakers, Rob Walker and Patrick Thornberry, and, to a great extent, it appeared, by the audience—although one member of the audience felt that I was, with the other members of the panel, underestimating the need to deter future terrorist attacks by the use of force proportionate to that end. It turns out that at least some of my immediate worries were exaggerated, although, I hasten to add, there was no way of knowing at that time, for anything like certain, that any of my views would turn out to have been overly pessimistic.3 And, in any case, the worst of my worries—mutual intensification, in scale and frequency, of terrorist/anti-terrorist attacks and counterattacks— remains a distinct possibility. The future, as always, is uncertain, but looking back at the past several months, I cannot help feel that at least one thing is now transparent to all: the unilateralism and remilitarization of what Robert Hunter Wade, among many others, has called ‘The American Empire’.4
4 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
But now let me return to the thoughts that I had on the incident—already over a year ago—and restate my views as I hold them at present. THE TRAGEDY IN CONTEXT In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September, between 5,000 and 7,000 people were thought to have been killed; the estimated number was subsequently reduced to around 3,000— still, undoubtedly, a massive loss of innocent lives. The victims were innocent in the commonly accepted sense that they were civilians carrying out their day-to-day business without any intent to harm others. And some of them were, of course, firefighters trying simply to rescue the victims. This was an extraordinary incident. I had never seen anything so spectacular on the TV screen. I do not say ‘spectacular’ because I am disrespectful of the lives lost or insensitive to the sufferings of the victims, their friends or relatives. But producing and broadcasting visual images of the sort that millions of TV viewers all over the world must have watched on that day, unable even to blink, and the collective act of watching them intently, necessarily turned the events into a spectacle. This must have been one of the aims of the attack’s planners. Distastefully, though not unintelligibly, there were also those in the streets of Palestine or Pakistan, who were reported, again on the TV screen, as no less than rejoicing over what was to them unapologetically a spectacle. My own immediate reaction to the events was not so much to mourn the loss of so many thousands of innocent lives as to think of the everydayness of cruelty inflicted on many more thousands of innocent people all over the world. It seemed that many of those I spoke to around my university campus had a similar reaction. Thousands of people are dying everyday not necessarily because they are wilfully targeted as victims by their killers, but as a consequence—at least partly—of the workings of the global system dominated economically, politically, and militarily by the United States and its allies.5 The thousands of deaths in the United States constituted an extraordinary event. It took place in two prominent power centres of the world, New York City and Washington, DC—conspicuous, prosperous, and eminently secure (or so it seemed). It was wilfully brought about, and it was almost incomparably newsworthy. It is hard in fact to think of a historical parallel. Deaths by the thousands in other, far less conspicuous, largely impoverished, parts of the world do of course receive media attention, but only very selectively and occasionally— precisely because they are part of the everyday reality and because, by and large, these deaths are not brought about wilfully. But we could not responsibly say that structural mega-deaths are categorically less objectionable than wilful mass murders. As I watched and watched again the spectacle of the two passenger aeroplanes, now transformed into weapons of mass murder and destruction, guiding themselves into the World Trade Center buildings one after the other, I
REFLECTIONS ON 11 SEPTEMBER 5
also began to see in my mind’s eye geometrically very similar TV images from many months back—of an Israeli missile attack demolishing Palestinian police headquarters in retaliation for the murder of an Israeli soldier by a Palestinian mob. The attacks on 11 September, then, were perhaps also a hyper-escalatory phase in the so far endless chain of retaliatory use of violence in the tragic circumstances of the Middle East. Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli counterattacks show no definite sign of abatement, and, if anything, the events of 11 September and the American ‘War on Terrorism’ appear to have contributed to entrenching both sides more deeply in their violent mutual definitions. What seemed to me tragic about the events of 11 September, however, was this: so many innocent lives were sacrificed in an attempt (at least partly) to make the people of the United States realise the everydayness— either on the global plane or in parts of the Middle East—of severe insecurity and suffering, but such an attempt has had the opposite effect: the overwhelming American response was to talk in the language of ‘restoring our freedom’, meaning, primarily, the freedom of the American people to live their everyday lives without fear, the consequence of which has been remilitarization and the spread of anti-liberal tendencies.6 RESENTMENT AND POLITICS ‘Explain to me. You are the expert. I don’t understand. Why do they do it?’, a neighbour demanded of me on the afternoon of the 11th. I do not in fact claim any specialist knowledge in the area of motivational analysis, but— and this may well be due to my lack of expertise in the field—I never actually felt that the motives of the terrorists were particularly puzzling. Plainly, to my mind, they were moved by their fanatical hatred, rooted in the intense resentment they felt towards the Americans. Of course, many of the victims were not American, but this could be explained away as damages collateral to their chosen aims. Maybe they never concerned themselves with such niceties—given that they were themselves to die for their cause. The intense resentment on their part is in turn an outcome of a combination of a number of things: their fundamentalist disapproval of aspects of American (and more broadly Western) culture;7 their sense of near impotence in the face of the overwhelming might of the United States; their view of the wrongs done to their kind (however this may be defined) whether directly by the United States or by the American-dominated world system;8 and, on top of all that, the seeming obliviousness on the part of the American leaders and people of all such things. Resentment is a poisonous, consuming emotion, and it is about time that analysts of motives in world politics should take it into account, in addition to all the standard explanatory concepts—national interest, expected utility, insecurity, honour, or identity.9 To say that the attackers were motivated by their intense resentment against the Americans is not to imply that the attacks had no rationale as a means to an
6 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
end. The fact of terrorism itself does not, of course, reveal to us the rationale behind it—for terrorism is not a doctrine about any particular end. It is a doctrine about a means to an end, according to which it is legitimate for the users of force (whether they be ‘terrorists’, guerrilla fighters, regular soldiers or other state agents) to resort to illicit forms of violence (often, though not necessarily, indiscriminate) intended primarily to terrorise the opponent in pursuit of some military gains or political concessions. The terrorism/non-terrorism divide is thus somewhat uncertain, and does not necessarily coincide with the legal line of demarcation between ‘terrorists’ and other users of force. The bombing of Dresden or the mass rape of Muslim women in Bosnia was terroristic as were the IRA’s bombing campaigns. So, what might have been the gains or concessions the attackers on 11 September had hoped to obtain from the United States through their indiscriminate killings of thousands of innocent civilians? This is a difficult question to answer for the perpetrators never even identified themselves, let alone made any demands for concessions. Now practically everyone accepts that the multinational terrorist group, al-Qaida, led by Osama Bin Laden, was responsible for the attacks, although it might be remembered that the US bombing of Afghanistan began without sufficient incriminating evidence being presented to public scrutiny. Be that as it may, the attackers’ choice of their targets would seem to indicate that their aims were to express symbolically their determined refusal to be overwhelmed by the economic power and the military might of America. But such actions would make sufficient political sense only if they were part of a larger campaign effectively to undermine American hegemony. And that was precisely what was foremost in many of our minds in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, as it seemed sensible then not to discount the possibility that the events of that day constituted a beginning of a series of pre-planned attacks on the United States and its allies, rather than just an isolated incident—terrifying though it was in its psychological effect and damaging to the American economy and prestige. However, apart from just one other incident, in which a passenger aeroplane nearly blew up on its way from Paris to Miami, and a pathetic incident in Florida where a 15-year-old committed suicide by flying his light aircraft into an office building, there have been no incident so far to suggest that a long-lasting antiAmerican/Western terrorist campaign had just begun. What has happened instead is an apparent beginning of the American Empire striking back—for it was no less than a ‘War on Terrorism’ that the United States has declared under President Bush, eagerly supported ‘shoulder to shoulder’ by Prime Minister Blair. It is at this point that we should briefly revisit the issue of motives and draw attention to the presence of a different, more political, interpretation of the events of 11 September. According to this view—favoured by Noam Chomsky10 among others—far from being a simple and straightforward manifestation of an anti-
REFLECTIONS ON 11 SEPTEMBER 7
American resentment, the attack was a product of a risky but clever calculation; a trap. According to this interpretation, the aim of al-Qaida leadership was precisely to lure the United States, through an irresistible provocation, into embarking on a campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. This would be to the advantage of the fundamentalists— inasmuch as it would force some of the precarious regimes in the region, most notably the ruling house of Saudi Arabia, to side with the United States, thereby delegitimising themselves further in the eyes of the local population and thus strengthening the cause of the fundamentalists. This interpretation is compatible, of course, with the thought that the rise of fundamentalism itself is a manifestation of intense resentment against the circumstances of the world dominated by the West and in particular by the United States, and, more specifically, against the Western/American influence in the politics of the Middle East. FIGHTING TERRORISM Nothing I have said so far is intended to condone the attacks on 11 September. Clearly, some response was needed; ‘doing nothing’ was here inconceivable. But what was, and is, troubling, is the United States’ explicitly and repeatedly stated intent to fight against terrorism (though, unsurprisingly, their focus is specifically on the anti-American variety). The obvious problem here is that terrorism is not a people inhabiting a particular space under a government, and we cannot therefore wage a war against it in a literal sense. We can try to bring particular terrorists to justice, or bring justice to the terrorists and those who harbour them, but this is not the same as wiping out terrorism as a doctrine or practice.11 But let us confine our attention to the specific case at hand—for if the United States fails in this case, there is little hope of it obtaining any success in its much wider aims. What might be, or might have been, an appropriate way to respond to the events of 11 September such that it secures a satisfactory outcome in this case and contributes to reducing terrorist attacks in the future? My chief criticism of the United States has been its increasingly transparent tendency to consider itself above the law. This does not necessarily mean that, in its fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida, the United States has consistently acted in such a way that its blatant violation of international law is for everyone to see. Rather, what is troublesome is the apparent presumption, on the part of the United States leaders, (1) that because its use of force is retaliatory, punitive and preventive, its legality need not seriously be questioned, and (2) that it can decide when to comply with the law in carrying out this round of war against terrorism. Similar features may have been noted from time to time in the American (or any other Great Power) attitude towards international law especially with respect to the use of force, but that is no excuse. If it is terrorism that America and its
8 11 SEPTEMBER 2001
allies wish to fight, they must be anti-terroristic in their own approach, and being anti-terroristic means, among other things, that they must act, and must be seen to act, within the law. In my view, the American attitude so far has been too cavalier and counterproductive in the long run. For one thing, the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter does not permit states to use force in a retaliatory, punitive or preventive mode. What the United States should have done is to obtain the Security Council’s decision, under Chapter 7, that Afghanistan’s policy constituted a threat to peace, that it must surrender Osama Bin Laden for trial, and that force should be used as a sanction against Afghanistan if it were to refuse to do so. Those who were captured in combat should be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and those captives suspected of membership of al-Qaida brought to a fair trial. What has in fact happened is the resort to force by the United States, whose legality remained largely unquestioned, and the capture of those suspected of alQaida membership, to whom the United States has unilaterally denied a PoW status. How these captives are actually treated in their prison is secondary to the much more fundamental issue—the apparent readiness on the part of the American leadership to assume that, whatever others may say or feel about the matter, it is they who will decide how the captives are to be treated, judged or punished. America, the victim now acts as the policeman, the prosecutor, the judge, the prison governor and, if necessary, the executioner.12 It may be objected to this line of thinking that it is politically naïve. When the State is under attack by internal terrorists (with or without an external support), its government will at times act in a manner whose legality is dubious. It may even resort to extra-legal countermeasures claimed to be necessary. If this is domestically ‘the done thing’, why apply a more stringent criterion internationally to a government when it reacts against external terrorists? What we have here is not a routine circumstance, but a case of emergency, and in emergency what is necessary must be done. What else can ‘sovereignty’ mean? My response is that no sovereign states are above international legal duties; that the United States’ use of force in the current case goes beyond what is permitted in emergency under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; that America’s unilateralist stance contributes in the long run to undermining the legal foundation of international interactions, which in fact could have been strengthened, had the United States acted more consonantly with its basic principles. Instead, we observe, exceptions are rapidly becoming the rule—force will be used as and when the United States considers it suitable, in retaliation, prevention or pre-emption.13 Nonetheless, it may be felt, that the massive overpowering of the Taliban, and apparently also of al-Qaida, within Afghanistan indicates that America has largely achieved its primary goals in Afghanistan itself. President Bush, who has enjoyed enormous popularity within the United States, has spoken of the next targets—Iran, Iraq and North Korea—said by him to form an ‘Axis of Evil’.14
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This, however, suggests to me that the world is not necessarily more secure than it was a year ago. The picture is more complex. To be sure, the Taliban has been destroyed and in its place, thanks to the remarkably speedy United Nations-sponsored Bonn summit on the future of Afghanistan, an interim government was set up, led by Hamid Karzai, who is now the elected Head of State. A 1,500-strong British International Security Assistance Force, deployed in the Kabul region, may have added some stability to the war-torn society, and several leading industrialised countries of the world, meeting in Tokyo, have pledged massive economic aid for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. However, the British assistance in peace-keeping would not increase, despite Karzai’s plea, due to the already serious problem of over-extension, and, indeed, all but 300 of the 1,500 British International Security Assistance Force and the entire 1,700-strong British commando brigade were withdrawn.15 The pledge of economic aid, desperately needed for the country’s reconstruction, was made conditional on all its warlords and ethnic groups contributing to the goals of the Bonn agreement to form a power-sharing government,16 and the United States has declined to commit itself to giving any aid beyond the current fiscal year.17 Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, there are ample signs of factional conflict outside of Kabul, and the future of this once ‘failed state’ is uncertain, to say the least; a slide back into chaos is a rather more likely scenario.18 The al-Qaida network itself may have been destroyed, though there is no conclusive evidence yet to show this; on the contrary, American intelligence is said to believe that tens of thousands of potential terrorists have been trained by al-Qaida in Afghanistan since 1996 and ‘are now spread throughout the world’.19 And senior US government officials are reported as saying that a ‘new alliance of terrorists, though loosely knit, is as fully capable of planning and carrying out potent attacks on American targets as the more centralised network once led by Osama Bin Laden’.20 Although this particular episode may have taught a lesson to some potential terrorist attackers on America, it could also have made others more determined to rise up or fight on, and there just seems no way of either being, or making, sure that terrorism, aimed directly at the United States or not, will decline from now on. Their next weapons are perhaps unlikely to be hijacked aeroplanes again, but may be biological, chemical, or nuclear. Meanwhile, the United States has entered a period of remilitarization and militaristic assertiveness as witnessed by President Bush’s State of the Union address,21 intensifying hostility towards the United States in various parts of the Middle East.22 It is also reported that the United States is involved in the campaign against Muslim terrorist groups in the Philippines, suggesting that its talk of ‘War on Terrorism’ has not been idle.23 A recent disclosure suggests that President Bush had given the CIA and US special forces authority to use lethal force to capture or kill the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein,24 and the war to oust him is now imminent. And all this on top of a serious curtailment of civil liberties in the United States and Britain under the banner of anti-terrorist
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security measures,25 while the underlying problems such as global poverty and repression in the Middle East continue to remain virtually untouched. CONCLUSION Robert Hunter Wade ends his aforementioned article by the following observation: The US and its allies can stamp out specific groups by force and bribery. But in the longer run, the structural arrangements that replicate a grossly unequal world have to be redesigned, so that markets working within the new framework produce more equitable results. Historians looking back a century hence will say that the time to have begun was now.26 In a similar vein, Immanuel Wallerstein, while not believing ‘that America and Americans are the cause of all the world’s miseries and injustices’, observes none the less: ‘I do believe they are their prime beneficiaries. And this is the fundamental problem of the US as a nation located in a world of nations’.27 How might this problem be addressed? We cannot be sure. But if we do not ‘allow our sensitivities to be hardened in the struggle to survive’, there lies: …the possibility, which is far from the certainty, of a more substantively rational world, of a more egalitarian world, of a more democratic world— of a universality that results from giving and receiving, a universality that is the opposite of globalization.28 Our responsibilities are grave. NOTES 1. Noam Chomsky, 9–11 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), p. 24. 2. See ‘Not In Our Name: We Don’t Deny our Consciences’, The Guardian, 14 June 2002, p. 20; reproducing a statement issued by prominent American critics of ‘War against Terrorism’. 3. An eminently euphoric view, around the time of the fall of the Taliban, is found in Polly Toynbee, ‘Peace in Our Time: The Positives Outweigh the Rest— Afghanistan is Free and America Remains Engaged with the World’, The Guardian, 19 December 2001, p. 20. 4. See Robert Hunter Wade, ‘The American Empire’, The Guardian, 5 January 2002, p. 18; originally published in International Herald Tribune. In this article, Wade points to the American domination of the globalised economy as a root cause of fundamentalist terrorism aimed directly at the United States. 5. This is not to ignore the more direct victims of US hegemony. See Chomsky, 9–11, pp. 84–9.
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6. Immanuel Wallerstein reports in his essay on 11 September that, in the United States, there is a widespread denunciation of those who even try to explain why the events occurred: ‘Explanation is considered justification and virtual endorsement of terror’. See Wallerstein, ‘America and the World: The Twin Towers as a Metaphor’, http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/ essays/wallerstein_text_only.htm. See also ‘Not In Our Name’. 7. In making this observation, it is not my intention to subscribe to the pernicious general thesis of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ associated with Samuel Huntington. 8. US policy and attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli conflict, US military presence in Saudi Arabia and perceived US domination of Saudi Arabia, and impact of US sanctions against Iraq for over a decade seem especially pertinent in this context. I owe this interpretation to my colleague, Dan Keohane. 9. There was an interesting article in The Guardian by Ian Buruma, who compared the motives of the attackers to those of the self-sacrificing pilots of Imperial Japan during the Second World War. This was by far the better use of the Japanese analogy than the quite unhelpful parallel, drawn immediately by some, between 11 September and the Pearl Harbor— although the American reactions to the two cases were indeed rather similar. Buruma, however, may have underestimated the extent to which young Japanese pilots in 1944 were forced by peer pressure into volunteering to join the suicide missions; and, correspondingly, it is not so easy to be sure of the motives of the individual suicide attackers on 11 September. Yet, it would seem undeniable that, in both cases, intense resentment against the United States, and the West more broadly, was a condition that made it possible to conceive of participating in such an extreme form of violence. The motives of the attackers, however, may not be the same as those of Osama Bin Laden and his close associates (supposing that they were directly involved in planning the attack). 10. Chomsky, 9–11, passim. 11. Note the different senses of the word, ‘justice’ here. The formulation was President Bush’s. 12. See Adam Roberts, ‘Even our Enemies have Rights. Britain Must Stand Up for Them’, The Independent, 20 January 2002. 13. See ‘The Bush Doctrine Makes Nonsense of the UN Charter’, The Guardian, 7 June 2002, p. 18; ‘Bush Gives CIA Green Light to Kill Saddam’, The Guardian, 17 June 2002, p. 15. 14. International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2002, pp. 1, 3. 15. ‘Visiting Karzai Pleads for More Troops’, The Guardian, 1 February 2002, p. 16; ‘Mission Unaccomplished: How 3,000 Crack British Troops Failed to Find the Enemy’, The Guardian, 20 June 2002, p. 3. 16. ‘Kabul’s £3 billion Aid Package Tied to Democracy’, The Guardian, 23 January 2002, p. 15. 17. ‘Building a Nation: Afghanistan’s Future Remains at Risk’, The Guardian, 22 January 2002, p. 17. It is reported that the Afghan government has so far received only $45 million out of an internationally-pledged annual budget of $400 million. See ‘Secret Deals Boosts Afghans’ Interim Leader’, The Guardian, 3 June 2002, p. 12; ‘Meanwhile in Kabul: The Outside World Must Keep its Promises’, The Guardian, 10 June 2002, p. 19.
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18. ‘A Slide into Chaos: If Western Strategists were to Ask Themselves whether the New Afghanistan Looks Better than the Old One, the Answer Would Have To Be No’, The Guardian, 10 December 2001, p. 17. 19. These are President Bush’s words in his State of the Union address of 30 January 2002. See ‘Bush Assails an “Axis of Evil”’, International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2002, p. 3. He may, of course, be exaggerating the threat in order to justify his militant policy against terrorism. 20. ‘The West is Walking Away from Afghanistan—Again’, The Guardian, 24 June 2002, p. 18. 21. International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2002, pp. 1, 3. 22. ‘Arab States Seethe at “Slap in Face” from Bush’, The Guardian, 1 February 2002, p. 16. 23. ‘US Takes War on Terrorism to Philippines’, The Guardian, 1 February 2002, p. 17. Furthermore, President Bush’s reference to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an ‘Axis of Evil’ suggests that America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ could in principle be aimed at ‘terror weapons’ states. 24. ‘Bush Gives CIA Green Light to Kill Saddam’, The Guardian, 17 June 2002, p. 15. 25. See Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘The War Against Terrorism is Making Villains of Us All’, The Guardian, 22 February 2002, p. 16; Ronald Dworkin, The Real Threat to US Values’, The Guardian (Saturday Review), 9 March 2002, p. 3. 26. Hunter-Wade, ‘The American Empire’. 27. Wallerstein, ‘America and the World’. 28. Ibid., p. 13.
2 Invisible Cities1 PATRICK THORNBERRY
INTRODUCTION The UN General Assembly proclaimed 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilisations.2 In the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings, the attack on America, and the attack on the cities, we have been treated to a jumble of discourses, ‘dialogue’ of a sort. Media favourites have included: • • • • • • • • • • • •
War Just War Jihad Crusade Clash of Civilisations Western superiority and the inferiority of others Terrorism Islamic terrorism Triumphant Liberalism Intolerant Liberalism The defence of democracy Manichean discourses of good and evil
Some of these discourses were dropped, notably President Bush’s deployment of ‘Crusade’,3 a term capable of evoking the demons of history in the Middle East. ‘Just war’ and ‘Jihad’ appear to have endured, enjoying a complementary if not symbiotic relationship.4 Statesmen have taken pains to avoid the hypothesis of wars of religion5 and ‘the clash of civilisations’,6 and even if the Prime Minister of Italy expressed confidence in the superiority of the West, he issued a (partial?) retraction soon afterwards. Triumphalism is to be avoided but remains a temptation for Western leaders and public. Legal analyses emerged rapidly in the present crisis in the face of the burgeoning discourse of ‘security’,7 and the discourse of international law and human rights gained some ground. The paper briefly examines key areas of international law figuring in debate, not all of which have attracted great media attention. The analysis addresses:
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1. ‘Armed attack’ and other grounds for the US (‘Allied’) bombing of Afghanistan. 2. The role of the UN Security Council. 3. Judging the perpetrators. 4. Implications of the events. Among interweaving issues, the problematique of the international lawyers is also addressed, struggling for a space between apology and Utopia,8 between the gates of ivory and the gates of horn. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR ARMED ATTACK?9 The Charter of the United Nations incorporates notions of self-defence, individual and collective, and collective security through the UN Security Council. Widely regarded as expressing a principle of customary international law, and of ius cogens—peremptory norms of general international law10— Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter forbids the use or threat of force in international relations ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’.11 Article 51 furnishes an exception, and is argued as a basis for ‘Allied’ action. It reads in part: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. A key phrase is ‘if an armed attack occurs’, suggesting ex facie the appropriateness of self-defence as a response. Self-defence is not, in any case, to be interpreted broadly: as an exception to Article 51, it is caught by the principle that ‘exceptions to a rule should be interpreted narrowly’. If there is a right of self-defence, it must be exercised proportionately—a notion captured in the nursery rhyme of the ‘four and twenty tailors’ who ‘went out to kill a snail’—and also necessary.12 Traditional concepts of necessity and proportionality are expressed in the case of The Caroline,13 where it was agreed by the parties (the USA and Great Britain) that self-defence may only be exercised when ‘the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. There was plenty of time for deliberation after 11 September before the bombing started. The ‘traditional’ concepts of necessity and proportion ality are generally read into the UN Charter, though they are not specifically mentioned therein. Their utility is that they provide grounds for distinguishing self-defence from legally prohibited retaliation; a second rationale is that if an immediate response is not forthcoming, the second limb of Article 51 should operate, with the matter turned
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over promptly to the Security Council. Gaja correctly emphasises that the use of self-defence as justification for action ‘does not preclude intervention by the UN Security Council. On the contrary, it requires it.’14 ‘Anticipatory self-defence’ is another concept that finds no place in the UN Charter. The logic of the Charter is compelling: what is to be avoided is the ‘remote sensing’ of threats and taking allegedly preventive and dangerous action, though international law is not so much of a suicide club as to require that states wait for a nuclear holocaust to descend upon them before reacting.15 The self-defence concept practised by the United States has sometimes relied on anticipatory self-defence, and is perhaps moving again in that direction, prefaced by identification—‘remote sensing’—of specific countries as an ‘Axis of Evil’.16 However, the context of the UN Charter is an attack by one state on another, despite the open-ended phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs’. The Charter is a ‘worldly’ text,17 and its ‘world’ is essentially that of inter-state relations. Even abstracted from its ‘world’, the text of the Charter makes the derivation clear, and it is an elementary point of interpretation that you interpret a whole text, not merely a phrase, so Article 51 is to be read in the context of the rest of the text regarding standing violation of international criminal law.18 Despite this, NATO, in the language of its Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, had few qualms about invoking ‘armed attack’ as a legal platform: We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the worldwide terrorist network of al-Qaida, headed by Same [sic] Bin Laden and protected by the Taliban. On the basis of this briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the ‘Allies’ in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.19 It may of course be the case, as Drumbl suggests, that, in fact, ‘no nation appears to have attacked the US’.20 But, if Article 51 is to be regarded as germane despite the caveats, the ‘international element’ requires explanation and justification as appropriately ‘international’—unless we are prepared to accept the absurd notion that an attack by terrorists entitles a state to lash out at any target anywhere, disregarding all system proprieties. Leaving this nightmare scenario aside, the logic of an Article 51 approach demands that we identify the ‘attacker’ State. The wrath of the ‘Allies’ duly fell on Afghanistan. The Taliban government was accused (variously) of ‘aiding and abetting’, ‘harbouring’, ‘sheltering’, or even ‘in breach of its responsibility to take reasonable measures to prevent its territory being used to launch attacks against other states’.21 The document issued by the UK government, entitled ‘Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001’, drew the conclusion that Bin Laden and al-Qaida,
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‘were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the Taliban regime, which allowed them to operate with impunity’.22 States are not strictly liable under international law for everything emanating from their territory. In the case of non-state actors, a test of ‘effective legal control’ is generally deemed to apply before responsibility is engaged.23 So, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that, despite the fact that the USA had helped to equip, organize and train the ‘Contra’ rebels against the government of Nicaragua, this level of support did not warrant the conclusion that the acts of the Contras were imputable to the USA. Whether the Taliban government ever exercised such effective control over Osama Bin laden and the al-Qaida network remains a matter of ‘factual’ conjecture. Or did Bin Laden control the Taliban?24 A particular, generalisable problem thus suggests itself for state responsibility: how does it (or should it) apply to weak or ‘collapsed’ states which have no real possibility of controlling powerful terrorist networks? It may be the case that security discourses will attempt to force the attenuation of the Nicaragua standard. If an attenuated doctrine were to be applied in the case of Afghanistan, a wider range of actors would already be implicated, though even a cursory reflection on who might thus be implicated suggests some alarming possibilities.25 As legal justifications, we ought to rule out of court humanitarian intervention (the suggestion that the bombing of Afghanistan was a guns and roses exercise) and pro-democratic intervention. However, there are echoes of both in the statements and speeches of the intervening States, and in Resolutions of the Security Council. Hence the emphasis on human rights and the need to ‘rescue’ the Afghan people from their own government. We can sense a whiff of selfdetermination in distinctions drawn between people and government—the ‘peoples’ of Afghanistan and their miscreant Taliban government.26 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL As indicated above, Article 51 of the UN Charter implies that self-defence is essentially a ‘holding’ provision until the UN Security Council takes action. What of the Security Council? Two Resolutions passed rapidly in the wake of 11 September are particularly relevant: Resolution 1368 (2001) and Resolution 1373 (2001);27 para. 6 of Resolution 1373 established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the Resolution. The first of these two Resolutions describes the attack as ‘a threat to international peace and security’, and recognises ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter’. Both points are reaffirmed in Resolution 1373. A key provision in 1373 is the recalling of the phrases of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 that every state, ‘has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts’. The placing of the action in these contexts is interesting, though the Resolutions do not draw
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conclusions in terms of activating an armed response or authorizing one. They describe rather than recommend in this sense, though the description and legal categorization would be a conceptually necessary prelude to any action. Resolution 1373 is not expressly directed to military action but seeks to strike at the roots of terrorist finance. The implications of self-defence are not argued out in the text. There is in particular no reference to ‘armed attack’ in the Resolutions, only to ‘terrorist attack’, without any attribution of the terrorist attack to a concrete author. It seems clear that the Security Council in these Resolutions has not explicitly authorized the use of force in self-defence, even if it did not interdict reliance of self-defence. The USA and the UK maintain that their actions are ‘consistent with’ the UN Charter and with relevant Resolutions of the Security Council.28 This looks like the Kosovo ‘polo mint’ argument all over again: claims of ‘consistency’ with the UN Charter, perhaps ‘synergy with’ the Charter or other terms in pari materia, substituting for the absence of clear legal authorization.29 One effect of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 is that the Security Council ‘keeps a foot in the door’ and has not ceded its role to action by the US and ‘Allies’—in para. 8 of Resolution 1373, the Security Council ‘expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this Resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter’. Subsequent Resolutions indicate that the Security Council ‘remains actively seized of the matter’.30 However, no condemnation of the action of the intervening powers is forthcoming in subsequent—post-bombing—Resolutions of the Security Council. On the contrary, the opprobrium of the Security Council is reserved to the Taliban, though not the Afghan people.31 Do we sense that, as in Kosovo, the Security Council has once again taken a back seat—at least as far as the military action is concerned? Apart from the question of humanitarian aid, the Security Council effort focuses intensively on the aftermath.32 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, stated: It is vital that the international community now work harder than ever to encourage a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. The United Nations is actively engaged in promoting the creation of a fully representative, multi-ethnic and broad-based Afghan government.33 The programme is endorsed by, inter alia, Security Council Resolution 1378, expressing support for a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a government of Afghanistan, both of which should be ‘broadbased, multi-ethnic an fully representative of all the Afghan people and committed to peace with Afghanistan’s neighbours’, and should respect ‘the human rights of all Afghan people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion’, as well as respecting Afghanistan’s international obligations including that of ‘cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism’.34 The Resolutions affirm the Council’s commitment to the ‘sovereignty, independence, territorial
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integrity and national unity of Afghanistan’,35 and the ‘inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine their own political future’.36 JUDGING THE PERPETRATORS If there are doubts concerning an Article 51 ‘armed attack’, there was at least a ‘criminal attack’, or a ‘terrorist attack’, since the systematic slaughter of so many in New York and Washington suggests itself at the very least as ‘ordinary’ crime, and strongly as terrorist crime. Classification as ‘criminal attack’ as opposed to ‘armed attack’ takes us into different conceptual terrain, away from the geography of Article 51, raising complex questions of jurisdiction,37 extradition and punishment. The characterisation of the conflict determines the range of options for bringing the perpetrators of 11 September to justice. In the initial stages of events—pre-bombing—the most appropriate justice model to be invoked would be that applicable to ‘terrorists’. The model was perhaps clouded by the initial idiomatic usage of ‘war’ by the USA—the war against terrorism, analogous to the ‘War against Drugs’. A ‘War against Terrorism’ is an openended commitment, making about as much sense as declaring a ‘War against Crime’. On the other hand, as was pointed out above, there is a symbiotic relationship between ‘war’ and ‘holy war’ so that it would initially have made sense for the USA to prosecute those connected with 11 September as criminals, rather than justify the claims and self-descriptions of the holy warriors through invocation of the discourse of ‘war’. PRISONERS OF WAR? With the attack on Afghanistan, ‘war’ it was, or ‘armed conflict’ to use the less picky, modern term, and international armed conflict at that, giving rise to arguments about prisoners of war, war criminals, etc. In a move which has created widespread alarm, the USA declined to ascribe prisoner-of-war status to detainees spirited from Afghanistan to the US military facility (Camp X-Ray) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.38 The US administration prefers the term ‘unlawful combatants’, an attribution that draws the following comment from Judge Goldstone: [This] is not a term recognised by international law. They [the US administration] get it from the US Supreme Court in a case in 1942, which dealt with six German spies who were landed in civilian clothes by a submarine on Long Island. They were captured before they committed any criminal offences in the United States and Roosevelt did not want to treat them as prisoners of war or as common criminals. The US Supreme Court invented this category of unlawful combatants and they were tried by a military commission and executed.39
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Combatants entitled to prisoner-of-war status under Article 4 of Geneva Convention III 1949 include the organised armed forces of a state and also ‘members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organised resistance movements, belonging to a party to the conflict’. Conditions are attached to the recognition of such persons as prisoners of war: there must be a command structure; arms must be carried openly; and operations must be conducted in accordance with the laws of war. Non-recognition of the government of Afghanistan does not alter the prisoners’ status. Article 5 provides that in cases of doubt, prisoners shall be treated as prisoners-of-war, until such time as their status has been decided by a competent tribunal: implying that governmental fiat that they are or are not prisoners of war is not an adequate legal strategy. The interrogation of prisoners by the US authorities also goes beyond the principles of the Convention;40 and trial by special commissions as opposed to ‘normal’ military courts is also legally unsound.41 As with the UN Charter, the USA claims that it will act consistently with the Geneva Conventions42—this is, however, less than an acceptance of the Conventions as a matter of legal obligation.43 It may be recalled that the Geneva Conventions are not the only fair treatment and trial standard applicable to the USA. Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the USA is a party, set out basic standards of human rights governing arrest, detention, and trial. While, apart from Article 7,44 these articles are not protected from derogation ‘in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’,45 certain procedures must be followed if measures may infringe human rights guarantees,46 and the Human Rights Committee (the treaty body which monitors the Covenant) has stated that all detainees should be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity and that no circumstances justify deviating from fundamental principles of a fair trial.47 Aspects of the treatment of detainees have aroused widespread public concern,48 as have prospects of trial and possible infliction of the death penalty by specially constituted military tribunals.49 It may be observed that international human rights standards implicate all forms and methods of trial whether national or international. TERRORISM CONVENTIONS In the case of the ‘crime, not war’, or ‘terrorism, not war’, scenarios an outrage had occurred on the territory of the USA, making it legally permissible according to the territorial principle of jurisdiction for US courts to try the offenders, if the USA could bring them before its courts. Alternatively, the USA could persuade other states to extradite the suspects, assisted where relevant by the provisions of one or other of the international conventions against terrorism—there are 12 such UN conventions dealing with various aspects of terrorism; four of these conventions are connected with aviation.50 There is no guarantee that US courts would get the opportunity to ‘do the job’: a consistent treaty proposition is
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‘extradite or punish’—i.e. states’ parties agree to prosecute offences or extradite to a state that will prosecute. ‘Philosophical’ or ‘political’ considerations will not prevent the application of the convention to its particular subject-matter: thus the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 provides in Article 5 that acts proscribed by the convention ‘are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar nature’.51 In a historic Resolution—number 1269 of 1999—the Security Council, in its first Resolution to address terrorism in general, looked to international cooperation to address the phenomenon, and called on states to take steps to deny safe havens to those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts, by ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition. Work goes on in the area of nuclear terrorism. What the international community lacks is a comprehensive convention against terrorism, and a definition of terrorism that can carry the day. Many efforts to achieve a definition have been clogged up by arguments about terrorists and freedom fighters—reflecting the influence of the principle of selfdetermination. Siren voices suggest no definition is needed: that we already have enough to go on in legal terms. In debates in the General Assembly, many governments looked forward and declared willingness to work towards a comprehensive convention.52 How this willingness will translate into action is anyone’s guess. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY There are, of course, other possible bases of jurisdiction besides the territorial,53 and some are provided by relevant conventions: crimes against humanity54 is one such basis. It seems tolerably clear that the concept of a crime against humanity has detached itself from the straitjacket of the Nuremberg tribunal,55 and is now broadly represented as a free-standing category of international criminal law, so that it does not require a ‘connection’ with armed conflict. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, speaking in Dubrovnik date on 8 October, stated that: Those responsible for these cruel deaths [the attacks] must be made individually accountable for the crimes against humanity they perpetrated. To plan and execute such attacks using civilian aircraft intended to kill the maximum number of civilians crosses a line. It is a crime against all human kind and all of us have an interest in seeing that those responsible are punished. The victims and their relatives have a right to expect that all countries will co-operate in finding those responsible at all levels and in ensuring that they are brought to justice.56 Crimes against humanity attract individual criminal responsibility. If the attack of 11 September is a crime against humanity, the jurisdiction to prosecute
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offenders is universal. Drumbl argues that the universal basis of jurisdiction is particularly appropriate ‘insofar as nationals of 81 countries perished in the attacks’.57 International standards relating to planning and conspiring, instigating, aiding and abetting crime, etc., are probably adequate to trap the networks of support for the attackers of 11 September, even if those who crashed the planes are beyond the reach of the law. TRIAL: THE INTERNATIONAL OPTION Besides the ‘national’ options to pursue criminals,58 there is also the ‘international’ option, or a number of such options. Inter alia, we may note that international tribunals do not operate the death penalty, and many governments refuse to extradite to the USA if it were in prospect before a US court.59 There are many contemporary examples of the use of the tribunal, which has come to represent a trend in international law. Many models are available: The Hague and Rwanda Tribunals established by the Security Council; the International Criminal Court, a specially constituted Lockerbie-type tribunal; or something sui generis. While no permanent international institution is yet in a position to prosecute offenders, it would seem particularly appropriate for the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to follow the example of The Hague and Rwanda tribunals in view of its determination that the events constitute a threat to international peace and security.60 At the time of writing, there seems little enthusiasm in the United States for such a course of action, and Camp X-Ray fills up with detainees from the conflict. IMPLICATIONS The Spirit of Unilateralism The above are some of the ‘options’ and ‘arguments’ of international law, addressed with only a modest degree of detail—we can confidently predict that the events of 11 September will occasion much more detailed analyses, as well as investigations, retellings, ceremonies, dramatizations, Hollywood movies, etc. The question for this paper is the significance of the events for international law —its systems and discourses, and its priesthood. While all but a few continue to deplore the events of 11 September, the US response has occasioned considerable disquiet among governments (sometimes masked by the courtesies of diplomacy),61 NGOs, international lawyers and concerned citizenry. The narrow argument for the rule of law is that the West must be seen to demonstrate its ‘moral superiority’ over its opponents and certainly over al-Qaida and the (apparently) vanished and vanquished Taliban: hence, the need to abide by a range of international norms and to observe the proprieties of inter-state relations, international humanitarian law and human rights. In terms of its cavalier
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approach to armed action, the manner of keeping the UN Security Council on the sideline, and apparent inattention to international humanitarian law (‘laws of war’) and human rights law, the USA has been ploughing a path that may serve to weaken international norms and structures on which nations and peoples depend. The need to ‘strike back’ as a psychological phenomenon can be readily understood and even elicit a degree of sympathy; but, apart from the crafting of an immediate and rather flimsy ‘coalition of the willing’, the approach has been in essence unilateral rather than multilateral—an outlook that seems to appeal to US policy-makers.62 Some elements of the ‘rapprochement’ have already unravelled—notably that of Iran, relegated from supporter of anti-Taliban action to an object of vilification in President Bush’s Manichean discourses on the ‘Axis of Evil’. The Multilateral Spirit In terms of legal principle, there is already discussion of whether the events have ‘modified’ customary law. The USA in particular has been engaged for some time in a process of attempting to ‘stretch’ norms relating to armed conflict,63 as well as backing out of inconvenient conventional (treaty) obligations.64 The process continues, and minds will not be set at rest by the present course of events. Changes promoted by a single state or group of states do not meet the test of consensus that is a necessary condition for a change of international principle. The contemporary spirit of international law is multilateral and multidimensional —a conception implicated in Cassese’s plea for underpinning our structures by reference to ‘general principles of law’ with moral and structural dimensions.65 Some international norms should in any case be resistant to changes in state practice: many including the present author would now reject the notion that changes in inter-state practice can ‘legitimate’ violations of fundamental human rights. On the other hand, it is clear that the growth of international terrorism challenges some of the fundamental categories of international law—armed conflict; territory; responsibility; self-determination. A ‘War against Terrorism’ may not be an international conflict—a ‘war’—in the eyes of the law, but it raises equally difficult challenges for states on how to calibrate their response in order to stay within legality and respect the human dimensions of conflict.66 A terrorist ‘network’ percolates through state boundaries like water through a sieve.67 The ‘network’ may have a stranglehold on governments and people alike and when it is broken the people will be victims once more. The form of international terrorism represented by al-Qaida is not the sort for which charitable exceptions are made—the freedom fighters, the liberation armies— even if they claim ‘liberation’ of a sort. Existing concepts of international law appear less than adequate to describe the ontology of the ‘network terrorist’ let alone respond to it. Whatever is legally to be ‘done about terrorism’ must respect human rights, provide outlets for legitimate dissent, respect cultures, and result from an inclusive process of dialogical multilateralism with inputs from
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international civil society. Normative imagination must now be at a premium, and the scepticism of a Sextus Empiricus against the closing of minds.68 RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CITY We may relate our points to a consideration of the causes of the events: the ‘why’ question which, to the credit of our media, is not entirely squeezed out, though many would perhaps prefer ‘not to reason why’. One of the contexts for the rage in the Islamic world is the perception of the double standards of Western powers. There is, for example, little or no cloak of legality for the continuation of aggressive ‘Allied’ actions in Iraq, or for Israel in relation to the Palestinians. The commitment of the West to spreading ‘democracy’ is apparently not inconsistent with toppling inconvenient regimes. What we do has effects in the world, whether we speak of the acts of persons or states. Terrorists do not emerge out of a pure fog of ‘hatred of freedom and democracy’: there are reasons; there are contexts for understanding that can co-exist with condemnation of acts of terror. This not a religious war, but there is the (internally contested) use of Islam as a language of the dispossessed.69 This suggests that the ‘justice’ required by events is not simple defence or retribution or deterrence; it is not exhausted by bringing to trial and meting out punishments. Justice ‘also encompasses social justice, that is, eradication of deep social inequalities such as poverty, economic, social and cultural underdevelopment, ignorance, lack of political pluralism and democracy’.70 In the contemporary discourse of international law, justice translates into the language of human rights. On the relevance of the human rights dimension, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights points out that: The international human rights agenda is relevant to tackling not just the symptoms evidenced in acts of terrorism but the deeper causes at their root during times of threat or insecurity, it is even more important to hold firmly to the fundamental values of the rule of law and the safeguarding of human rights If I were to encapsulate in a simple word the goal of the entire international system of human rights, it would be the word prevention. If human rights are respected, if basic education, housing and health care are secure, if there is freedom for men and women to earn their living and rise their families, not only are human rights violations prevented, but conflict, terrorism and war can be prevented also.71 The rights talk can in turn be linked to an ethic of responsibility72—a responsibility to care, a responsibility to protect, and to provide the conditions for human flourishing. We care for New York and those who die; we share the grief of the families and the horror of the events. We should also care for the other cities, invisible but real nonetheless, not only the cities of our memory, desire or imagination, and make them visible and their inhabitants flourish. We
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owe nothing less to the victims of New York. I take the poet Derek Mahon to express some of this sentiment with reference to the hidden corners of the world, the cities of the dispossessed, all cities, when he wrote of one city that the ‘The things that happen in the kitchen houses and echoing back streets of this desperate city should engage more than my casual interest, exact more interest than my casual pity’.73 If we in the West casually dismiss the cities of the world, we are all diminished by this injustice, and they will exact their interest. NOTES 1. From Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities (London: Pan Books/Picador, 1979). 2. The United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 1998—by Resolution 53/22, November 1998; reaffirmed by Resolution 54/113 of February 2000. Resolution 53/22 was proposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and invited: Governments, the United Nations system, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to plan and implement appropriate cultural, educational and social programmes to promote the concept of dialogue among civilizations, including through organizing conferences and seminars and disseminating information and scholarly material on the subject.
It followed the International Year for the Culture of Peace in 2000, for which UNESCO acted as the lead UN agency. 3. Hwyel Williams, ‘Crusade is a Dirty Word’, The Guardian, 19 September 2001: Today we suffer the consequences not just of an 800-year-old crusading tradition but also an 80-year-old effect: the joint British-American dismantling of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. We designed maps and invented states. We dreamt up national identities where none had existed and the states were designed to be feeble. In this horror, we truly stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States. 4. Among many accounts, see the text-based account of ‘Jihad’ in Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), esp. pp. 135–43. David A.Westbrook, ‘Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 33 (1993), pp. 819–97, is a useful point of reference for the lawyer. 5. Among many such statements, see the speech of the UK prime minster to Parliament on 4 October 2001, which included the claim that ‘the atrocity appalled decent Muslims everywhere and is wholly contrary to the teachings of Islam’: text on http://www.pm.gov.uk/news
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6. A phrase almost invariably associated with Samuel Huntington: ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs (August 1993), pp. 22–49. 7. Appropriate for the information age, exchanges among international lawyers have been facilitated by Internet discussion—the author has drawn on websites maintained by Jurist and by the European Journal of International Law. The UN also has a dedicated site following events post-11 September. 8. The reference is to Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1989). 9. See the detailed commentary by Helen Duffy, Responding to September 11: The Framework of International Law, Interights, October 2000 at: (Part I) (Part II) 10. Articles 53, 64 and 71 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 11. ‘Certain portions of ius cogens are the subject of general agreement, including rules to the use of force by states’, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 515. 12. Nicaragua v US, International Court of Justice 1986, para. 176. 13. 1837. 14. Giorgio Gaja, ‘In What Sense Was There an “Armed Attack”?’ European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum (2001); http//www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ ny-gaja.html 15. Discussed extensively in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, October 1996. 16. President Bush’s State of the Union Message, 29 January 2002. 17. See Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia, Edward Said (London/New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1–48. 18. Neither the Rome Statute nor the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda limits the concept of crimes against humanity to a connection with war. In as far as this is the case with the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, this has been interpreted by the Appeals tribunal of The Hague was a jurisdictional rather than a substantive, conceptual limitation—see Duffy, Responding to September 11, n. 167. 19. Statement by Lord Robertson, 2 October 2001; preceded by a general NATO statement to the same effect on 12 September 2001. Antonio Cassese comments on the NATO position that ‘the preferred this avenue to that of centralized use of force under the authority of the Security Council… Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of international law’, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, Section 3, p. 2; http//www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/nygaja.html 20. Ibid., p. 7 (emphasis added). 21. Professor Robert F.Turner, Jurist website, 8 October 2001. 22. Point 1—document available on http://www.pm.gov.uk/evidence.htm. It is stated elsewhere in the document that the al-Qaida and the Taliban have a close and mutually dependent alliance’ (point 4), and that Bin Laden ‘could not operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taliban régime (ibid.) 23. Nicaragua v US, paras. 86–93. 24. This raises the interesting question of whether the network could be regarded as a ‘de facto organ of state’, engaging state responsibility under Article 4(2) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission on 3 August 2001. The problem is canvassed by Gaja, ‘In What Sense
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25. 26. 27.
28.
Was There an “Armed Attack”?’, p. 2. There is perhaps an element of this notion in the UK document on responsibility (see above) approving (in point 19) an anonymous statement that the Taliban and Bin Laden were ‘two sides of the same coin’. Mark Drumbl, ‘Judging Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, Self-Defence, and Western Innocence’, Jurist website, 2001 p. 9. See below, on Resolutions of the UN Security Council. On 12 September and 28 September 2001, respectively. Reference should also be made to Security Council Resolution 1267, which condemned Bin Laden for sponsoring international terrorism and operating a network of terrorist camps, and demanded that he be surrendered to justice. The Taliban responded by claiming that no evidence existed against Bin Laden. See, for example, the statement by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (Foreign and Commonwealth office website, 11 October 2001): We have effective endorsement of the Security Council for this military action very great care, quite properly, has been taken with extensive legal advice on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that this action is consistent with Article 51.
29. P.Thornberry, ‘“Come, Friendly Bombs”: International Law in Kosovo’, in Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov and Bülent Gökay (eds), Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 43–58. 30. This aspect is the subject of an optimistic appreciation by Pierre-Marie Dupuy, who argues that, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions, ‘the UN aims to play a decisive role in the management of a crisis that it would be wrong to consider as falling, legally speaking, under the exclusive control of the United States’. ‘The Law After the Destruction of the Towers’, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, p. 2; http//www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html 31. Resolution 1378 of 14 November 2001 condemns the Taliban: …for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Usama [sic] Bin Laden, al-Qaida and others associated with them.
The Resolution expresses the Council’s support for ‘the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime’. The preamble to Security Council Resolution 1390 of 16 January 2002 reaffirms the Council’s unequivocal condemnation of the attacks of 11 September, expresses its determination to prevent all such acts, and notes ‘the continued activities of Usama [sic] Bin Laden and the al-Qaida in supporting international terrorism, and [the Council’s] determination to root out this network’. 32. See in particular the set of conclusions and recommendations in Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace (London: Minority Rights Group, 2001).
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33. Speech of 8 October 2001. 34. See also Resolution 1383 of 6 December 2001, which includes a reference to the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions. 35. Resolutions 1378 and 1383: preamble. 36. Resolution 1383: preamble. 37. Usefully summarized by Drumbl, ‘Judging Terrorist Crime’. 38. There has since been some movement from the rigid position of non-applicability of the Geneva Conventions: see n. 43 below. 39. Judge Richard Goldstone, ‘POWs or Common Criminals, They’re Entitled To Protection’, The Guardian, 30 January 2002, pp. 14–15, esp. p. 14. He adds that, ‘If they are not prisoners of war, they’re simply common law criminals. In either case, they’re entitled to some sort of due process’. 40. Article 17 of Geneva Convention III provides that the prisoners may not be subject to any coercion in order to extract information from them and are entitled to disclose only their names, age and rank or position within the armed forces. They may not be subject to punishment or reprisals. 41. Adam Roberts, ‘Even Our Enemies Have Rights: Britain Must Stand Up For Them’, The Independent, 20 January 2002. A prisoner of war should not be prosecuted by the detaining power for fighting on behalf of their armed forces, though serious violations of ‘the laws of war’ may be subject to prosecution. 42. ‘We have indicated that we plan to treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the extent that they are appropriate’. Donald Rumsfeld, US Defence Secretary, cited in Roberts, ‘Even Our Enemies Have Rights’. 43. Emphasis added. States parties to the Geneva Conventions are bound to ‘ensure respect for’ their provisions—Article 1, Geneva Convention IV. The USA and Afghanistan are parties to the Conventions. On 7 February 2002, the US administration shifted its position, purporting to distinguish between the rights of Taliban and al-Qaida prisoners. However, the legal implications of the policy change are unclear: it appears that ‘Neither group will be given prisoner-of-war status’. The Guardian, 8 February 2002. Amnesty International (ibid.) commented that: ‘This partial compliance with the Geneva conventions is a half-measure and continues an arrogant policy of pick and choose with regard to the laws of war’. 44. Article 4.2. of the Covenant prohibits derogation from this basic protection against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The prohibition of torture is widely regarded as being prohibited under customary international law and the doctrine of ius cogens. 45. Article 4.1. of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 46. In particular, under Article 4.3. of the Covenant, a notice of derogations should be entered. At the time of writing no such notice has been received by the UN Secretariat, which may of course indicate the US view that its actions are consistent with obligations under the Covenant. 47. Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 29, On States of Emergency. 48. For expressions of disquiet emanating from NGOs and concerned individuals worldwide, see the article by Senator Joseph Lieberman, The Washington Post, 2 January 2002.
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49. For an examination of the tribunals, see Jordan Paust, ‘Military Commissions: Some Perhaps Illegal, But Most Unwise’, on Jurist website, 14 November 2001. 50. Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963 (The Tokyo Convention); Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970 (The Hague Convention); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 (The Montreal Convention); Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Violence at Airports, etc. 1988. For a full list, see http://www.untreaty.un.org/ English/Terrorism.asp 51. Besides other regional conventions, The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1998 (The Cairo Convention), and The Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism 1999 (The Ouagadougou Convention), are noteworthy. Article 2a of the latter convention provides that, ‘Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and selfdetermination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime’. The preamble to The Ouagoudou Convention recites that member states of the Islamic Conference, ‘Abiding by the lofty, moral and religious principles particularly the provisions of the Islamic Sharia as well as the human heritage of the Islamic Ummah’, etc., adopt the Convention. 52. The main debate took place from 1 to 5 October 2001. See also General Assembly Resolution 56/1, 12 September 2001. Work on a comprehensive international antiterrorism convention is now under way before the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (established in 1996); at the time of writing, the definitions of terrorism (Article 2 of the draft) has not been resolved. 53. According to the position paper of the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists, although, ‘the United States clearly has jurisdiction, it is simply not appropriate for the victim to be also the prosecutor and judge and jury’. European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, para. 46; http// www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html 54. Defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as: Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder; (b) extermination (k) other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
See, in general, Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1999). For a cautious approach to the use of the Rome Statute as a measuring device, see Alain Pellet, ‘No, This Is Not War!’, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum (2001); http//www.ejil.org/ forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html. It may be noted that the USA was one of the states opposing the specific inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute as a crime against humanity. Although policy following adoption of the Statute
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was one of hostility, the USA signed it on 31 December 2001; the signature has not been followed by ratification. At the time of writing, there are 50 states parties to the Rome Statute. 55. When it was limited by the Tribunal to acts committed in connection with war crimes or crimes against peace. 56. See the website of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press Releases. 57. Ibid., p. 15. 58. See the suggestion by Drumbl on securing an Afghan/Islamic input into processes and institutions of trial, ‘Judging Terrorist Crime’, pp. 16ff. 59. The broad ‘European’ view on this issue is expressed in the ‘Declaration for a European Death Penalty-Free Area’ adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 9 November 2000. Inter alia, the Declaration reminds states ‘that have applied or wish to apply for membership [of the Council of Europe] that a commitment to abolish the death penalty within a precise time-frame is a basic condition for accession’. The deterrent effect of the prompt establishment of a tribunal to bring the 60. perpetrators to justice cannot be underestimated Those who would prefer to see Bin Laden and his accomplices assassinated rather than brought to justice should consider that not only would that be potentially unlawful under international law but would give Bin Laden the martyrdom he so desires.
Position Paper of the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, paras. 49 and 50. The ‘threat to international peace and security’ is reaffirmed in Security Council Resolution (1390) of 2002. 61. ‘We are threatened today by a new simplism which consists in reducing everything to the war on terrorism’, remarks of the Foreign Minister of France, Hubert Vedrine; cited in The Guardian, 7 February 2002. 62. See the summary by Jean Bricmont, ‘Quelques questions à l’empire et aux autres’, Le Monde, 27 September 2001. The recent disengagement by the USA from the Durban World Conference against Racism, August–September 2001, is only one such case. 63. Such as those relevant to its intervention in Kosovo. 64. Bricmont, ‘Quelques questions’. 65. Ibid., section 4. 66. ‘Without the clear separation of war and terrorism, there will be no meaningful progress towards a definition of terrorism and, more importantly, no chance to implement meaningful measures to combat terrorism’. Terrorism and Human Rights, progress report prepared by Kalliope Koufa, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, para. 71. 67. There is a determined attempt by some governments to link ‘terrorism’ exclusively with opposition to governments in power. However, ‘terrorist states’ are also identified—mainly by the USA. Koufa reminds us that the ‘régime de la terreur’ was originally used to describe state terrorism in the French revolution—Terrorism and Human Rights, paras 36–41.
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68. ‘Those who are properly called dogmatists think they have discovered the truth; academic philosophers have said that the truth cannot be apprehended; and the sceptics persist in their investigations’; cited in A.J.Ayer and J.O’Grady (eds), A Dictionary of philosophical Quotations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 419–20. 69. See the recent study by Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 70. Cassese, European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, Section 3, p. 2. section 4, p. 3; http//www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-gaja.html 71. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, speech in Boston, MA, 6 January 2002. 72. Mary Midgley, ‘Towards an Ethic of Global Responsibility’, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 160–74; The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001). 73. ‘Spring in Belfast’, in Derek Mahon, Collected Poems (Loughcrew, Oldcastle: The Gallery Press, 1999), p.13.
3 The Politics of Terrorism and ‘Civilization’: How to Respond as a Human Being YOSHIKAZU SAKAMOTO
On 11 September 2001, I was in Britain. Shocking pictures were shown day by day: I was particularly frightened by the two that came out in the London Sunday Times on 16 September. I stared at them transfixed, but at the same time unable to bear the sight. One was a large photo of a group of about 30 people, leaning out of the windows of what might have been near the hundredth floor of the World Trade Center and trying to escape from the flames and smoke about to engulf them. The other prominently featured image was of a man who had jumped from a window and was plummeting head first toward the ground beneath. The pictures of the collapsing World Trade Center were horrifying. But the two images that stay with me most are not ones of buildings, but those of men and women during the final moments of their lives. I was shocked by the terror since I witnessed it as the death of human beings—the indiscriminate murder of innocent people. To me, it did not matter which country or ethnic group they belonged to. It was plainly the death of human beings. In contrast, President George W. Bush declared that the deaths resulted from a war against America, and that it was the United States that would win a war on terrorism. Many Americans also saw the 11 September victims exclusively as citizens of their own nation. The Stars and Stripes inundated New York City and elsewhere in the United States. Here we find a fundamental difference in terms of the perspective from which to look at the terrorist attacks. No doubt, we agree on our opposition to terrorism. But from whose point of view do we oppose it? Is it from the viewpoint of the United States, or any other country for that matter? Or is it from the perspective of humanity? In this context, we must examine the following three points. WHOSE ANTI-TERRORISM? First: the identity of the actors who wage the ‘war’ against terrorism. In his congressional address on 20 September 2001, President Bush stated, ‘This is not just America’s fight. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight… We ask every nation to join us’. A number of commentators hastily judged that this
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was an indication of a shift in US policy from unilateralism to multilateral internationalism. Was this an accurate reading of the American stance? Historically, US foreign policy has been characterized by a pendulum swing between isolationism and universalistic interventionism. The former takes the view that ‘America by itself is the world’, and the latter that ‘the world should be made American’. Despite the apparent contrast, the two are both sides of the same coin, namely, the thesis that ‘America can be equated with the world’. The apparent ‘shift’ in US policy since 11 September must be closely examined in the context of this traditional American mindset. The crux of the matter is: To what extent is the United States able to relativize itself when defining its place in the world? President Bush insisted in the congressional address that ‘every nation in every region’ must decide: ‘either you are with us [the United States] or you are with terrorists’. This remark revealed yet another instance of the USA’s view of itself as the absolute good. Reminiscent of the US Cold War rhetoric—‘the Free World versus Communism, good versus evil’—he frequently equates ‘freedom, democracy, and justice’ with ‘America’. Undoubtedly his claims are based on the tacit, or self-evident, premise that American definitions of these concepts are of universal validity. The reason for the US call for ‘international co-operation’ in response to terrorism that time concerned the impracticality of ‘unilateral’ handling of matters such as intelligence, banking regulations, surveillance and detention in order to counter terrorist activities. In its reaching out for the co-operation of other nations, the United States was consistent in giving priority to the protection of US interests. Further, while a number of countries support the anti-terrorist stand for various reasons, the citizens of the United States stand out for their extreme patriotic fervour. This is yet another manifestation of the Americacentric stance. Even without the approval of the UN Security Council, and without the active support of its allies, the United States doubtless would have started its ‘war’ in the remote periphery of Afghanistan on its own (with Prime Minister Tony Blair along for the ride). This is ‘unilateralism’ determined to execute its universal interventionism even by itself; this same unilateralism led the US government to the notion of trying Osama Bin Laden, not in an international court, but in an exclusively US military tribunal separate from the US legal system. Yet, it must be recognized, at the same time, that history offers few examples of so many countries co-operating with the United States. How should we interpret the participation of such a large number of nations in the campaign against terrorism, Bin Laden and al-Qaida? Does it mean that there has emerged a universal consensus against terror from the viewpoint of humanity? This is the second question we must address.
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THE POLITICAL GAME OF ‘INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION’ There are two types of countries that take an anti-terrorist stand. One comprises those countries, in Europe and elsewhere, where human rights and democracy are firmly consolidated. The other includes anti-democratic, authoritarian countries that go along with anti-terrorism because they wish to suppress the active movements of ethnic minorities and political dissidents on their own soil. For instance, the Russian government confronted by Chechen independence movements, and the Chinese facing a Uighur challenge, normally uphold the principles of ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference with domestic affairs’ in opposition to US interventionism. This time, however, they willingly backed US military expedition to Afghanistan, and were exceptionally in agreement on the UN Security Council. Similarly, Afghanistan’s neighbors, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan —all known for being dictatorial, oppressive, and corrupt, towards which the United States had taken a critical stand before 11 September—nevertheless fell in with the United States because of their common fear of Islamic resistance movements. For other Middle Eastern countries—from Saudi Arabia with its rigid monarchy, to Egypt with its considerably secularized republic—chiming in with the anti-terrorist rhetoric lends rationale to their oppressive practices as they ruthlessly suppress anti-regime movements. The same applies to anti-democratic regimes in other parts of the world. Both democratic and anti-democratic countries agree as far as opposition to terrorism is concerned. Thus, it is small wonder that the USA’s anti-terrorism campaign earned the support of such an overwhelmingly large number of states; for the latter type of regime, ‘anti-terrorism’ was an indulgence for their antidemocratic transgressions. In the end, we must ask from whose perspective do we define ‘terrorism’ and ‘anti-terrorism’? Further, the ‘anti-terrorist grand alliance’ of these disparate countries will not prevent other old or new conflicts from coming to the surface once the ‘war’ is over, or if it is prolonged. Another aspect of international anti-terrorism is the rhetorical manipulation that made the concept escalate from opposition to the specific terrorist incidents of 11 September—unacceptable by any standards—to a ‘War against Terrorism’ in general. This quibbling was further complicated by the lack of universally accepted, clear, definition of ‘terrorism’. This conceptual ambiguity resulted in two types of problem for the United States. First, there is the ambiguity shown by the United States in its stand against measures taken by other countries to suppress movements for national selfdetermination. On 15 October 2001, National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, stated: At the forthcoming APEC meeting, President Bush intends to tell the leaders of Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and other Asian nations
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that he supports their anti-terrorism effort at home, but they must draw a line between legitimate dissent and genuine terrorism and not trample human rights.1 Reportedly, Bush communicated this message to Chairman Jiang Zemin and other leaders. Yet, for political considerations, no specific mention was made of the bearing of this message on the fact that Russia and China aim at taking advantage of the US anti-terrorist campaign to legitimize their own oppressive policies toward ethnic separatist and independence groups such as the Chechens and the Uighurs. Further, the United States and Western Europe rejected the Arab proposal made at the United Nations to exclude movements for national self-determination and liberation from the concept of terrorism. Consequently, a new anti-terrorist treaty was stalled. Second, the ambiguity of the US position was revealed by another country which turned the US campaign to its own advantage. When President Bush, in an effort to obtain the support of Islamic nations for his new war, stated on 2 October that the United States was not against the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Israeli government was infuriated, comparing the Bush administration to the appeasers in the face of Hitler, and claiming that its fight against the Palestinians was exactly the same as that of the US against Afghan terrorists. If Israel’s assertion were correct, it would mean that the US anti-terrorist campaign was on a par with Israel’s problematic Palestinian policies. If Israel was wrong, then the US policy of supporting Israel was also mistaken. Paradoxically, it was the Statement of the Israeli government, a close ally of the United States, which insinuated that the US actions might contain elements of oppression against the struggle for self-determination. In short, this political game of anti-terrorism blurred, wittingly or unwittingly, the distinction between ‘state-sponsored terrorism’, which is generally geared to the internal and/or external defense of the State power structure, on the one hand, and ‘anti-state terrorism’, which includes the indigenous armed struggle of the oppressed people, on the other. It was thanks to this ambiguity in the concept of terrorism, however, that the extensive ‘global alliance against terrorism’ came into being, or appeared to come into being. Terrorism and anti-terrorism must, therefore, be defined in terms of specific political contexts. It is entirely understandable that American citizens should have felt extraordinary rage at the cruel terrorist attacks. However, if that anger is based on an American perspective, and if the ‘broad international support’ backing the American anti-terrorist policies includes that of a large number of regimes that are antithetical to democracy and human rights, then it is uncertain to what extent the US stand can be considered of universal validity. In turn, how could the United States claim that its ‘war’ was universally justifiable? The third question to address thus concerns whether the ‘war’ the USA resorted to as a means to attain the generally justifiable goal of antiterrorism can be considered to be generally justifiable.
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THE ‘LEGALITY’ OF THE USE OF FORCE Legal criticism was made that the US military engagement in Afghanistan was a violation of international law because it did not conform to Article 51 of the UN Charter which refers to, ‘the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs’, and provides that ‘measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.’ This judgment is valid so far as a conflict between states is concerned. But a large-scale terrorist attack like the 11 September incident is of a different kind of conflict not envisaged by the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the United States, while claiming that this was a ‘new type of war’, invoked the ‘old’ conventional provision of ‘individual self-defense’, as did its NATO allies citing the traditional concept of ‘collective defense’ in order to legalize and legitimize their actions. Thus, neither the indictment nor defense was well founded. But when the Security Council resolved on 12 September that, ‘it expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001’, and when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, immediately following the commencement of US bombing in Afghanistan, indicated general approval of the US strikes in the light of the Security Council resolution and stated that there was no need for a new resolution, the debate on the legality of US actions was de facto brought to a close. In my opinion, Kofi Annan’s statement condoning the American use of force set a questionable precedent for the United Nations. But his reactions served to justify the US military expedition, making the legal debate practically irrelevant. At the same time the situation was such that, if the United States had sought official approval of its use of force, it was certain that Russia and China would have cast their votes in favour, thus strengthening the legality of US air strikes. But the United States did not seek UN official approval because that would have tied its hands in subsequent military operations. This was yet another example of American unilateralism, giving priority to a military option of its own design rather than to the question of international law. This implies that there is an important difference between the lawful use of force based on approval from the United Nations and the international community, on the one hand, and the military course the United States actually took, on the other. The use of force in and of itself is not the issue. What we must question is the way military action was taken. Five years ago, I wrote as follows, though with direct reference to ‘humanitarian intervention: Heretofore, if, through a series of trials and errors, progress is made on the international acceptance of common norms and rules it is possible that
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multi-national collaboration will increasingly assume the character of police action rather than military action.2 In other words, as civil society cannot be maintained without police of some sort, we need an apparatus at the international level that will perform police functions. Some people questioned whether the 11 September incidents should be classified as acts of war or as crimes. Clearly, the acts were criminal in nature. But it is also clear that, in dealing with crimes, there must be an agency with coercive power able to arrest and try the suspects. If the US policy aimed at employing beyond national boundaries such coercive force in the form of ‘war’ against the non-state actors located in a territory where no authoritative government existed and no regular legal arrangements for extradition applied, the distinction between crimes and war would not have much relevance for all practical purposes. The more pressing question concerns the conditions an international ‘police action’, as distinct from conventional military actions, must meet. At least the following two conditions must be fulfilled. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A ‘NEW WAR’ The first condition is that there are laws, norms and rules based on the general consensus of the international community, and that nations act in accordance with them, including acts designed to ensure their enforcement. Further, not only the goals but also the means to attain them must be in conformity with those laws, norms and rules, and each nation must bear legal accountability in the event that the means employed are against the law. How does this apply to the US anti-terrorist action? One of the fundamental principles of present international law is, as provided in the UN Charter, that all nations ‘shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means’. If this were the goal of the United States, it would have proceeded in a different manner. For example, it might have supported the tightening of the UN embargo on the transport of weapons into Afghanistan from other countries, Pakistan in particular. At the same time, the United States could have secured the consent of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance for the stationing of an international protection force consisting of troops from Islamic countries so that humanitarian emergency aid to the Afghan people would be safely implemented and would enhance popular aspiration for cease-fire and peace. In the interim, the United States could have encouraged Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries to bring intensified diplomatic pressure to bear on the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden. It had taken several years of negotiation before the Yugoslav government turned over Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague court. If the United States was prepared for a ‘long war’ against terrorism, as stated by President Bush, it should at least have shown its intent to engage in long-term diplomatic deals to induce the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden. To that end, the United States could
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have taken advantage of many post-11 September signs of rift within the Taliban forces, Pashtun warlords, and religious leaders. Instead, it only raised the stakes by, for instance, high-handedly approving the policy of assassinating Osama Bin Laden. It is doubtful that such moves can be considered wise diplomacy, conducive to a ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’. Second, while international public opinion seemed to have largely accepted that US military response was unavoidable, a large number of people posed an agonizing question: ‘How can we justify a “war” that has resulted in so many civilian fatalities and injuries?’ The US air strikes and troop movements led to countless refugees, internal and international, and to difficulties in delivering relief aid that would avert starvation and death of so many Afghan civilians, including children and the aged. In what way did this differ from terrorism? No doubt, the Afghan civilian victims outnumbered the 3,000 lives lost in New York City. If the United States claims that its military actions were legitimate and legal, then it must also take legal responsibility for civilians who were injured or killed as ‘collateral damage’ just as a police force does when an officer kills or injures an innocent person in the course of executing its mission. Should the United States recognize that the use of force will be justifiable only when it agrees to compensate the innocent civilian victims and to bring those responsible to justice, then it might call this a ‘new war’, one that sets a new precedent for international law. It may possibly be difficult to ascertain the identity of the perpetrator when a bomb strays from its target and accidentally hits civilians. Precisely for that reason, however, it is essential to take responsibility for the consequences, by at least paying compensation to the innocent victims. Even if the compensation is to be paid en bloc rather than individually, it must be made unmistakably clear that the money paid is legally accountable ‘compensation’, not charitable ‘aid’. If the rules of ‘new war’ set by George W. Bush were based on the idea that it is right to cross international borders in pursuit of terrorists and hold them accountable to the law, then, by the same token, is it not right to demand the United States pay compensation to Afghan civilian victims transnationally? And shouldn’t Japan and other countries co-operating in the US military incursion also accept ‘burden sharing’ in paying the compensation? We live in an age which is ripe for raising such questions in the name of humanity and ‘civilization’. STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF TERRORISM So far, I have examined, in connection with the ‘war in Afghanistan’, the problems involved in the US stand, the realities of ‘international co-operation’, and the damage incurred by the US military strikes. At the same time, it is obvious that terrorism cannot be tolerated. The fanaticism and violence of terrorists are absolutely incompatible with democracy and civil society. Yet, we must admit that complete eradication of terror is a near impossibility, just as it
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would be utopian to imagine that crime could be entirely done away with. The question we must address, therefore, is how to minimize the incidence of terror by changing the societies that give rise to the population sympathetic to the cause upheld by terrorists. Many have singled out poverty as the main cause of terrorism. In my view, however, terrorism is the product of oppressive political and social structures, of which poverty is a component, and the corresponding political and social consciousness of being oppressed. These oppressive structures in today’s world have three dimensions. First, the global political and military dominance of the United States and its allies and the global dominance of global capital have given rise to global disparity and oppression. Second, and related to this, there are national/internal structures of disparity and oppression, most notably in many developing countries. Third, there is the transnational structure of inequity and discrimination faced by an enormous number of people who move to more ‘advanced’ countries in an effort to escape from the dual pressures of global and internal domination. Statistics compiled by the United Nations and many other organizations testify to the fact that the world we live in today constitutes a huge pyramid characterized by inhumane disparity and oppression. As information dissemination is globalized and the disadvantaged people become increasingly aware of the global inequities and inequalities, it is natural that a growing number of the marginalized should harbor anger and resentment. I have elsewhere commented on the likelihood of urban unrest around the world as the result of the outrage and despair of disadvantaged people under the condition of inequitable global marketization, noting that, ‘While the incidence of inter-state conflict and war will decrease, the ubiquitous urban unrest may possibly become a World War III in the twenty-first century’.3 Although I envisaged a world war that cuts across national boundaries, the inhumanity of the 11 September terrorist attacks went beyond anything I had ever imagined. At the same time, I felt quite uncomfortable when I heard someone characterize the terror as a ‘challenge against civilization’ or a ‘war against civilized society’. Of course, it is antithetical to civilization. But we must ask simultaneously: ‘What do we mean by “civilization”?’ Does our ‘civilization’ not rest upon the global structure of inequity and oppression which we ignore so long as it does not harm our vested interests? Of the many observers and media people in Japan who have commented on terrorism, none (that I know of) has tackled it as part of our own problem, that is, as intrinsic to our way of life called ‘civilization’. Rather, they have treated terrorism as the subject of analysis and policy making, or as the object of military campaign. I have yet to see an account of the causes of terrorism that refers to our own mindset and the modality of our ‘civilization’. This is what has made me deeply uncomfortable. President Bush said in his Congressional address: ‘Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom
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of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other’. I was astounded by this remark, and wondered if he truly believed that his statement would prove convincing to other peoples of the world. There are a number of people, particularly in the developing countries, who do not accept the means used by terrorists but find their objective and intent understandable. These people ‘hate’ America because, while it firmly protects freedom, human rights, and democracy for itself, America has collaborated in the murder and the silencing of those in the developing countries who fought against their oppressive, corrupt regimes in pursuit of freedom, human rights and democracy. Further, America’s ‘global standard’ is seen as having widened the gap between rich and poor and eroded the ‘freedom to disagree’ with America in defence of one’s own cultural values. As far as its continued emulation of American ‘civilization’ is concerned, the Japanese mindset is equally problematic. ‘CIVILIZATION’ AND ‘JUSTICE’ I emphasize the need for soul searching about the nature of ‘civilization’ because I believe we stand at a turning point in post-Second World War history. A shift in the conception of war signals this change as war has often been evoked as a battle between ‘civilization and barbarians’, between ‘justice and the forces of evil’. I will spell out the centrality of the notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘justice’ as they apply to the latter half of the twentieth century. In the Second World War, the Allies vanquished uncivilized Nazism and Japanese militarism in defense of civilization and justice. The subsequent Cold War led to the split of the Allied Powers’ civilization and justice into two incompatible realms. In the post-Cold War phase, we tended to condemn ‘state socialism’ in outright negative terms. But, in reality, many intellectuals and workers in the West had regarded the Russian Revolution as the advent of a ‘new civilization’, and many people in the ‘Third World’ viewed socialism as bearing the promise of a just society. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible why the Cold War could have lasted as long as a half century. Underlying the ideological power of state socialism was the deep rage and despair that emerged as the result of the failures of the twentieth-century capitalism and market economy, culminating in the Depression in the North and the post-independence economic dependency of the South. The end of the Cold War led to the ‘triumph’ of the market economy and liberal democracy and subsequently to the ‘New World Order’ under which a single vision of civilization and justice dominated. The establishment of the ‘New Order’ was exemplified by the Gulf War: because Iraq embarked on an anachronistic ‘old war’ by openly invading the territory of another state with its regular army, it was easy for the international community to condemn Saddam Hussein as an ‘uncivilized’ barbarian. The multinational forces, with the virtual blessing of the United Nations, presented themselves as the fighters for ‘justice’.
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The definition of justice was unequivocal, and ‘uncivilized’ Iraq was expelled from civilized world order. Things changed radically with the occurrence of Yugoslavian ‘ethnic cleansing’ and NATO bombing. Those who asserted in unison that the ethnic cleansing must not be glossed over because it was a gross violation of human rights divided on whether NATO bombing, which led to civilian casualties, that is, to another form of the infringement on human rights, was justifiable. A division emerged within civilization itself, no longer ‘between the civilized and the uncivilized’. On 11 September 2001, the uncivilized terrorists tore into ‘civilization’, and the situation turned into a new phase. But the ‘roots of terrorism’ as distinct from ‘terror’ itself raised the question whether the Western ‘civilization’ which has so far embodied ‘justice’, is not anti-civilizational insofar as it remains indifferent to the global structure of appalling inequity and oppression. It is in this sense that the terror is a ‘challenge to civilization’ and the ‘justice’ of democracies of the North is coming under question. This is why Bush’s repeated insistence that ‘justice shall be done’ and America is conducting a ‘just war’ sounds hollow to many who doubt whether it is the right answer. Precisely because the problems are fundamentally structural, Bush must say the United States is waging an ‘endless war with an invisible enemy’. THE BACKLASH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH It is often said that the terrorists have taken advantage of the democratic freedom of the North for their anti-democratic purposes. Although this is not wrong, terrorism should be considered as a manifestation of the much deeper structural backlash underway on four dimensions. First, there has been the counter-flow of large numbers of immigrants and refugees from South to North, reversing the historical trend of ruling officials and labour force moving from the metropoles to colonies. By settling in the countries in the North these people, while confronting discriminatory, repressive practices, are altering the character of the national identity and national culture of the recipient countries. Second, a backlash can be seen in the development of nuclear weapons by the nations in the South. Twenty years ago, I invited an African friend, for whom I have great respect, to a conference held in Japan. He argued, ‘It is only when we have developed nuclear weapons that we can get the First World to take seriously the poverty in the Third World and the enormous North-South disparity’. When I criticized him for making this kind of inhumane remark at a conference where Abomb survivors were present, he refused to retract his statement. I also pointed out that ‘it is unrealistic to assume that nuclear weapons of the South will be targeted only on the North, and it will amount to the self-denial of the justice of the South if these weapons are directed against other nations of the South’. Yet, the point he made has continued to stick in my mind.
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Third, the backlash can take the form of terrorism using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, which would involve a large number of civilian casualties in the North—undeniably the worst and most dreaded type of protest. Naturally, I loathe the idea of such inhumane, demonic, slaughter of innocents. At the same time, I cannot help but also remember the words of despair my African friend uttered. Finally, the world information and communication order—which is dominated by the mass media of the North, such as CNN, BBC, AP and Reuters—has been challenged by the recent moves in the South intended to disseminate internationally information compiled from the perspective of global peripheries, mostly using internet networks. The most dramatic example of this kind of backlash was a series of interviews with Osama Bin Laden disseminated by the Qatari satellite television, Al Jazeera. The fact that the Bush administration attempted in vain to suppress the telecast, in violation of the very principle of the ‘freedom of speech and press’ it professedly espouses, illustrates the backlash of the free information flow, now from South to North. The backlash on these four dimensions all speak of actions meant to render visible to the society and civilization of the North the very existence of the peoples of the South. The world is entering a phase of South-North backlash. Do our societies in the North respond to this challenge by closing ourselves or by making ourselves open to it? This is one of the fundamental questions raised by the ‘roots of terrorism’. The sort of stance that we should take toward the 11 September incidents has to be determined in this world-historical context. DIPLOMACY TO SHOW THE ‘RISING SUN’ Clearly, Japan’s reactions to the terrorist incidents were deeply affected by what may be called the ‘Gulf War syndrome’. This posture stemmed from the ‘humiliation’ the Japanese government felt when its monetary contribution of as much as US$13 billion was not appreciated by the United States, nor by Kuwait because, as a consequence of constitutional constraints, it did not send troops. In reality, however, none of Japan’s neighbors in East Asia, or South Asia west of Indonesia and Malaysia, which has a significant Islamic presence, was calling at that time for a Japanese military expedition to the Gulf. Further, I later heard one eminent Latin American ambassador to the United Nations say at a UNsponsored conference, ‘There was no need for Japan to become militarily involved. Its response was adequate’. What, then, do the Japanese government and media mean by the ‘international community’, which, in their view, was disappointed with the lack of Japan’s military contribution? Do they not tend to disregard the voices of many nations other than the United States? This UScentric worldview is not only removed from the reality but is also diplomatically counterproductive in the light of the remarkably growing weight Moslems carry in today’s international community.
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Of course, I appreciate the strong interest the Japanese government showed in playing an active role in promoting the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan, as it did for the implementation of the peace accords on Cambodia in the 1990s, but the situation in Afghanistan is far more complex and difficult than that of Cambodia. Afghanistan is characterized by the rivalry of diverse ethnic groups and warlords. Further, it is surrounded by not only major powers such as Russia and China, but also Iran, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, most of which countries share with Afghanistan ethnic groups who reside on both sides of the borders. On top of that, a complex conflict of interest related to the oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region is involved. These complications did not exist in the case of the Cambodian peace. At an international academic conference held in Japan six years ago, I warned of the danger of the ‘Balkanization of Asia’ because Asia is characterized by a wide variety—or even heterogeneity—in terms of traditional cultures, religions, legacies of colonialism, and the levels and modes of economic development as well as the vested interests in the energy resources located in the Caspian Sea region, which is likely to become a ‘Middle East’ in the twenty-first century. If the current international efforts fail to bring about peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, it will become internally ‘Balkanized’; and it is not inconceivable that the repercussions might reach far beyond its borders like a tidal wave. This must be avoided at all cost since the absence of peace in Central Asia will have a profoundly adverse effect on the Eurasian continent, including Japan. Japan has attached so much importance to hosting an international conference of donors for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, held in January 2002, in order to demonstrate Japan’s presence before the international community through its ‘Rising Sun diplomacy’. But the Japanese government must not trivialize the task. Instead, it should be willing to throw itself in earnest into efforts that will truly contribute to rebuilding devastated Afghanistan even if the role it plays should remain inconspicuous. While Japanese products and the signboards of Japanese corporations have a strong presence throughout the world, Japan’s diplomacy has seldom shown an active profile. This is probably the other side of the same coin shown in Prime Minister Koizumi’s peculiar commitment to the active diplomacy of ‘showing the flag of Rising Sun’ in unreserved support of Bush’s war against terrorism. Most distressing is the sense that there is no real will to grapple with the basic problem of the ‘roots of terror’. Instead, the Cabinet and the Diet dealt only with the symptoms of terrorism through the participation in the multinational military force abroad and the tightening of security control at home. The true question we must ask ourselves is whether Japan can be called a ‘civilized’ society if we are content to ignore the reality that one out of five people on earth suffers the ‘subhuman survival’ of poverty and hunger while we enjoy affluence. If our political system is predicated on the practice that democracy and human rights
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‘end at the sea shore’, is it not a fake democracy that runs counter to the rights of humanity? THE CASE FOR A ‘HUMAN SECURITY CORPS’ To consider what Japan should do to tackle the root causes of terrorism, I return to the debate we had at the time of the Gulf War. I then supported the idea put forward by the opposition parties that, instead of dispatching troops, Japan should make a non-military contribution by establishing a corps for peacekeeping and peace-building activities broadly defined, devoted not only to the maintenance of order but also to humanitarian aid and social and economic reconstruction and development. As the result of the bureaucratic opposition of the Defense Agency to the creation of an independent organization for peace-keeping, as well as the cooling of enthusiasm on the part of the opposition parties due to the end of the campaign, the Japanese people missed the opportunity to thoroughly examine what a non-military contribution would be like. When the 11 September terrorist incidents occurred, the Japanese government forged ahead with a ‘military contribution’ as if to fill the vacuum left in the wake of the Gulf War experience. In a similar vein, neither the leftist opposition parties nor citizen groups that stood against both ‘terror and military retaliation’ offered a viable alternative. To avoid repeating Japan’s wasted experience since the Gulf War, we must seriously consider what form of non-military organization we should create. In fact, we know that, in order to grapple with poverty and human rights violation in the global periphery in support of the initiatives taken by indigenous, local NGOs, we must extend assistance in the areas of medicine, education, environmental protection, sustainable economic development, human rights, particularly those of women and children, and so forth. In rough outline, Japan should establish a unique public organization based on co-operation and the division of labour between the government and citizens, including professionals, senior and mid-career people as well as youth. Citizens should be at the centre of this national project, and the government should provide financial support but, in principle, not interfere with the decisions and activities of participating citizens. The key question is whether the government has the will to do so. This organization will not be an instrument of the nationalist diplomatic display of Japan’s presence but a ‘Human Security Corps’ to serve the rights and interests of humanity. If a Japanese, without waving the flag of the ‘Rising Sun’, can earn the trust of the people of other nations, that will become an invaluable moral resource that will ultimately contribute to the national interest of Japan. If Japan will thereby persistently show its human presence at ordinary times, Japan can keep calm at times of international crisis without worrying about the need to demonstrate its national presence. With full confidence, Japan will thus find its own way to shoulder its responsibility in the world.
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In order to sustain a ‘Human Security Corps’ that will continue to make humanitarian contributions over a long period; however, the State and society of Japan will have to transform themselves from within in at least two ways. First, we must train a large cohort skilled in many languages and knowledgeable about diverse cultures, that are non-Western. Japan is said to have played an important role in peace-making in Cambodia; but it is questionable how many Japanese involved in that process were able to communicate with the Cambodian people in the native Khmer language. The training of people for a Human Security Corps will require a radical change of Japan’s educational system, especially at the university level and in foreign language education. Curricula for lower education should include the teaching of history from the perspective of humanity, not Japan-centric national history. The media will also need to reexamine the way it reports and its underlying subconscious prejudices and oversights. Second, Japan must be more open to immigrants and refugees as well as foreign students. I remember well how strange I felt when, upon my return from a stay in the United States, I looked out at the students in my class and found that they all had the same colour of skin and hair (this was in the days before not a few of them began to dye their hair!). In my view, one of the sources of the vitality of American society lies in the fact that there is always a significant segment of the people, if in the minority, which seeks to overcome the tensions generated by its multi-racial, multi-cultural structure. In contrast, Japan does not hold enough allure to make people, young people in particular, in other countries want to live and make their life’s work here. Many come only for short-term employment to earn money. There are considerable obstacles, including the rigid immigration laws, which discourage foreign immigrants and refugees to Japan. As for Afghan asylum seekers in 2001, for instance, only three out of 78 applicants were recognized as refugees. Will the Japanese population lose its vitality as it turns into an aged, homogeneous Japanese nation, consisting of the self-professed ‘Yamato race’? If Japan is a society that fails to attract people abroad to come and cohabit as its equal citizens, how can it nurture citizens who will go abroad and entice the local people to treat the Japanese as acceptable fellow humans? By making ourselves more multi-cultural at home, we will create a society able to prepare citizens to do a positive work in other societies of ‘alien’ cultures. For Japan to transform the substance of its own education, culture, and society, there is no easy path. Yet the question posed by ‘roots of terror’ is whether or not we can so transform our own ‘civilization’. NOTES The Japanese original was published in the monthly journal, SEKAI [The World], January 2002. English version posted on www.Iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/ top.html, February 2002.
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1. Condoleeza Rice, quoted in Edwin Chen and Ching-Ching Ni, ‘War Tops Bush Trip Agenda’, Los Angeles Times, 16 October 2001. 2. Soutaika no jidai [The Age of Relativization] (Tokyo: Iwananami Shoten, 1997). 3. ‘Sekai shijoka e no taiko koso’, Sekai, 652 (September 1998), p. 65ff. An English version was published as, ‘An Alternative to Global Marketization: East Asian Regional Cooperation and the “Civic State”’, Alternatives, 24, 2 (1999), p. 154ff.
4 Identifying Limits on a Borderless Map in the First Post-Modern War RICHARD FALK
Two requirements governed my initial thinking about an appropriate response to the attacks of 11 September: first, the urgent need for effective action by the US Government that would greatly reduce the threat of future mega-terrorist incidents; and, second, the necessity of recognizing the appropriate legal, moral, and political limits that apply to waging such a defensive war. Since 12 September, I have grown increasingly concerned with the gross mishandling of this response pattern, especially the blending of a necessary response to a persisting mega-terrorist threat with the intensification of a pre-existing American empire-building project of global proportions. Because the territorial parameters of warfare seem of secondary importance in understanding and evaluating both of these dimensions of American policy it seems appropriate to identify the originality of this multi-layered globalism by resorting to the admittedly slippery terminology of post-modernism. Such a conceptualization is further reinforced by al-Qaida mirror image: a concealed non-territorial dispersion of presence, a non-negotiable assault on American power and its citizenry, and an aspiration to supersede states in the Arab and Muslim world with the re-establishment of a multi-national Islamic umma as a prelude to the eventual Islamizing of the entire world. Superficially, Osama Bin Laden’s visionary politics resemble most closely pre-modern political solutions, but on further reflection, such an interpretation is not satisfactory. Considering the wider historical circumstances, the technologies of conflict being deployed on both sides, and the impossibility of achieving a reversal of time, the term post-modern, if carefully delineated, fits this Islamic utopia, and its encounter with the West, and specifically the United States, better than any alternative vocabulary. The most important and relevant alternative would be ‘globalization’, which is also vague and variously construed. The point of departure for the analysis presented here is to draw attention to the specifics of the disjuncture in world politics generated by the 11 September attacks. An important part of this effort is to contrast post-11 September with the prior economistic decade that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ending of the Cold War. For this geopolitical disjuncture, the terminology of globalization seemed more clarifying and substantive than relying on a purely chronological label such as ‘the post-
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Cold War world’. Post-modern, although having nothing explicitly in common with the cultural explorations associated with ‘postmodernism’ (such as deconstruction and the critique of meta-narration), seems suitable, given the proximity of the disjuncture with respect to the formidable overhanging legacy of modernity, and the failure of the new reality to assume a definite and enduring form that might warrant the adoption of a defining name. To limit misunderstanding, the spelling of ‘post-modern’ is relied upon for this presentation, emphasizing the temporal meaning of ‘after modernity’, and lessening the likelihood of confusion with the various cultural claims of ‘postmodernism’ as it bears on literary criticism, philosophic interpretation, and the humanities in general. In important respects the global war against terrorism and the accompanying empire-building project could be considered as non-economistic forms of globalization, but this would lead to serious confusions, and a tendency to sidestep the significance of the American-led renewal of, and rationale for, hegemonic geopolitics under the guise of the war against global terror. The contention here is subtle and somewhat complicated, as there is coupled with the rejection of American empire-building claims, a genuine appreciation of the need for a comprehensive response to the ongoing mega-terrorist threat posed by alQaida. Disentangling these two concerns, especially in the face of their deliberate intermeshing by American political leaders, is a formidable task, first for analysts of the global scene, and then, even more so, for both oppositional politics in the United States and elsewhere, and for an intermediate, third force diplomacy that walks the tightrope between resisting the imperial transformation of statism and joining with America in the effort to minimize the mega-terrorist threat. As Ken Booth and Tim Dunne point out, the attacks on America are known around the world simply by reference to 11 September, a moment in time, and not by reference to place, which had been characteristic of disjunctive events in the modern era: consider Munich, Pearl Harbor, the Berlin Wall.1 Part of the waning of modernity involves this displacement of space by time, with a large part of the empire-building enterprise designed to control the future rather than to colonize specific units in space. Within the frame of the argument set forth here, the 11 September label amounts to a post-modern signature that confirms the view that the imagery of borderless war is appropriate, with the idea of border referring primarily to space, but in this sense also to time. As has been noted by Howard Zinn, Gore Vidal and others, the Bush delineation of the war goals amount to the declaration of perpetual war, or worse, a crusading war of extermination directed at all that is designated as evil in this world by Washington policy-makers. This chapter will proceed first to examine the case for recourse to war against Afghanistan and beyond, and then consider the empire-building perspective as delineated by George W.Bush, particularly in the speech given to graduating cadets at West Point in June 2002.
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THE CASE FOR ‘WAR’ War is designated as ‘war’ to call attention to the double reality: there exists a patriotic climate of ultra-nationalism and mobilization of attention and resources that resembles war as traditionally understood, and there have been combat operations undertaken in various settings, especially up to now in Afghanistan. At the same time, the threat posed cannot be treated as subject to elimination by denying it the use of specific territory, or primarily by relying on military tactics and battlefield results. A reconfiguration of psycho-political space seems like the only assured path to victory in this war, which would have the effect of confining the appeal of visionary politics and establish the credibility of more constructive means than mega-terrorism to fulfill religious and cultural aspirations. And so the template of war as it was understood in modernity, needs to be drastically adapted to the template of post-modernity. At the same time, despite this effort, the novelty of this challenge to the idea of modernist war should not be overstated. Transnational wars of liberation and resistance that became so prominent in the course of decolonization prefigured the new struggles associated with global networks and hegemonic states: the Vietnam War was mainly won by the Vietnamese off the battlefield, even though the stakes of the conflict were the control and borders of a traditional sovereign state. As stated at the outset, the need for a prompt and effective American response is taken for granted, given the gravity of the harm inflicted on 11 September by the form of an armed attack, the persistence of the threat posed by the proclaimed intentions and apocalyptic leadership of Osama Bin Laden, the demonstrated capability of al-Qaida to carry out such missions in the future, the dramatic failures of prior reliance on law enforcement techniques to apprehend and punish, and most of all, to deter perpetrators of major terrorist acts, and the inadequacy of intelligence warnings and preventive actions by governmental security agencies to provide societal protection. In essence, it would have been impossible for the government of the United States to retain its legitimacy and credibility with the American people (and elsewhere) if it had not responded as effectively as possible to the 11 September attacks. Indeed, it is a modernist imperative that sovereign states lose their viability as soon as their capacity to provide basic security against external and internal attacks is undermined. Particularly a large and dominant state, such as the United States, which devotes such major resources to its military and intelligence capabilities, and was widely accepted as a global leader, was under great pressure to act decisively in the face of such unprecedented attacks on its homeland. The only open question was how to translate this need for action on behalf of security into policy directives that would be effective against the distinctive reality of this entirely new kind of enemy. Al-Qaida was not an enemy state, but was constituted as a ‘network’ with an operational ‘presence’ in 60 or more countries, including quite possibly the United States, and an apparent ability to shift invisibly its locus of its operations depending on circumstances, without much regard to international boundaries.
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Al-Qaida was never formally or openly associated with any particular state or geographical area, even Afghanistan; it was a network superimposed on the territorial organization of world order, operating on the basis of flows of information, money, and weapons. This organizational form had been pioneered by corporations and bans entering the world economy and by criminal syndicates seeking a multinational base of operations. The novelty of al-Qaida was to fuse this networked organization to a messianic mission. The early decision by the Bush administration to launch a war against Afghanistan, as the first phase of an effective response, was politically almost inevitable, and generally convincing as an immediate priority. There seemed to be strong evidence of the presence of Bin Laden and al-Qaida headquarters in Afghanistan, a presence facilitated and supported by the Taliban regime. This regime was the embodiment of the most severe variant of Islam ever introduced into the governing process of a modern state, and it was this oppressive model of Islamic life that evidently represented the visionary goal of al-Qaida terrorist activity for the entire Muslim world. The Taliban leadership was symbiotically linked to al-Qaida and its leadership. Osama Bin Laden has been quoted on several occasions as expressing his admiration for Taliban-style rule as correctly embodying and prefiguring a desired Islamic political order. There have also been several journalistic assessments—including by Ahmed Rashid, the respected author of Taliban —of the degree to which Mullah Mohammed Omar has accepted the visionary orientation toward the United States articulated by Osama Bin Laden.2 As of late December 2001, the Afghanistan War has met its main early stated objectives, and seemingly reduced significantly al-Qaida’s capabilities to engage in global terrorism and seriously tarnished its image of being an organization that was a credible opponent of the United States in the context of a military and civilizational encounter. Although the US Government did not rely on a rationale of humanitarian intervention, a beneficial side-effect of its military operations has been to emancipate the peoples of Afghanistan from cruel and brutal rule, with improved opportunities of rescue from immediate threats of mass starvation and the deeper conditions of extreme poverty that afflict most of the population, having been worsened by 25 years of war. As this prior set of conditions in Afghanistan seemed irrelevant to the decision to supersede the Taliban, it can be questioned as to whether the provisionally positive effects on the country should be taken into account in evaluating the arguments pro and contra the war itself. I would maintain that beneficial (or detrimental) effects are relevant, particularly in the face of criticism about civilian casualties and the absence of a convincing legal link between the 11 September attacks and Taliban responsibility. The changes brought about in Afghanistan have by no means extinguished the 11 September threat, but it has at the very least decisively weakened al-Qaida’s capacity for mega-terrorist activities originating from the one location in the world where al-Qaida presence was manifest. It was this presence in Afghanistan that made it seem highly reasonable to attribute responsibility to this particular
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sovereign state for al-Qaida mega-terrorism, thereby vindicating recourse to war against it. The goals of this war were not only to destroy al-Qaida presence and weaken its overall capabilities, but to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden and as much of the leadership as possible. It was also a plausible extension of the international law right of self-defense to set out to end Taliban rule in Afghanistan and replacing it with a government that would not allow its territory to be used as a base for global terrorism. The prospect that Afghanistan in the future would be more likely to respect the basic human rights of its people is an incidental benefit not directly relevant to the rationale for war. Unfortunately, this encroachment on the sovereign rights of Afghanistan took place without a specific mandate from the United Nations Security Council, and without much evident consideration and public explanation by the US Government about such casualties was not an official priority, especially when compared with the huge attention given to individual Americans who died or were wounded in the combat theatre, even as a result of accidents. Secondly, there seemed to be little effort by the United States to use its influence to ensure that its Afghan allies on the ground acted in accordance with the international law of war when dealing with their domestic adversaries. The American role in failing to restrain Northern Alliance forces from massacring Taliban prisoners of war, especially in the course of controlling the makeshift prison at Mazar-eSharif has been criticized by respected European journalistic observers, and the criticism seems convincing.3 A BROADER MANDATE? Where the ‘just war’ framework seems most relevant to interpreting the megaterrorist challenge is with respect to the pursuit of just goals, and the extent to which these goals are validated by their genuine linkage to the just cause associated with an effective response to the al-Qaida threat. In this context, the ongoing debate within American government and think tanks about the military extension of the war to Iraq illustrates the problem. To wage war against Iraq seems to widen the agenda beyond the al-Qaida threats to encompass countries that are treated as hostile to the United States, and potentially capable of possessing and possibly using weaponry of mass destruction. Whether any kind of genuine Iraqi military threat to neighbors exists is questionable, but to the extent that it does, it is not a threat that can be linked to the mega-terrorist campaign waged against the United States. It is arguable that at some point Iraq will be capable of mounting a regional threat against Saudi Arabia and Israel as a result of its acquisition of weaponry of mass destruction, but such claims seem implausible. It should be recalled that Iraq at full strength in the 1980s was stymied by Iran caught up in revolutionary turmoil, and that after a decade of sanctions the Iraqi military capability of Iraq is one-third of what it was a decade ago.4
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Iraq behaves as a normal country in the sense of being deterable by retaliatory threats, and has been ‘kept in its box’ since the end of the Gulf War. Besides, there are many problems associated with an American recourse to war against Iraq: it would not likely be supported by a global or regional consensus, it would likely cause widespread devastation and much loss of life, it would divert energies and weaken diplomatic and intelligence efforts to destroy the al-Qaida cells dispersed around the world, and it would exhibit a disrespect for sovereign rights and for prohibitions on recourse to war contained in the UN Charter and modern international law. It should be emphasized that the core rule bearing on the use of force is that recourse to war is only justified if a matter of self-defense, and that self-defense is restricted legally to a proportionate response to a prior armed attack. Without an Iraqi attack, self-defense cannot be properly claimed. And unlike al-Qaida, Iraq as a territorial state, does not pose a challenge that makes preventive and anticipatory action of a pre-emptive nature justifiable. Going to war against Iraq would also produce domestic turmoil in the United States, especially if the war caused heavy casualties and was not quickly ended. Such a development would also end the impressive degree of international unity supporting the American response to al-Qaida, and awaken suspicions in the Islamic world that an inter-civilizational war was underway despite the reassurances of American leaders to the contrary. The most plausible interpretation of just goals would limit post-Afghanistan operations to the nonmilitary domain of intelligence operations, cooperative law enforcement, diplomatic leverage, and financial interdiction. In these undertakings the efforts would be directed toward both the identification and destruction of al-Qaida cells, allowing for some blurred boundaries between what is al-Qaida, and other political organizations that share al-Qaida visionary goals and methods. Such efforts would contribute to the counter-terrorist objective of restoring American security and weakening terrorist operations of ‘global reach’. For this reason, a second limitation of great importance would be to refrain from efforts to destroy political movements that engage in armed struggles associated with limited, national ends. One thinks here, of course, first of Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas, in particular, has openly avowed suicidal attacks on Israeli civilian targets, and has caused great loss of life, as well as generated acute anxiety related to future attacks. But here the context is one in which Israel has also directed its military power in such a way as to wage war against civilian Palestinian society in a manner that relies on modes of violence that are flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and are best conceived of as a species of terrorism undertaken by a state. The best evidence of this Israeli violence is the numbers of Palestinian women and children killed in recent months, which far outweighs the number of Israeli victims of the suicide bombers. Such an assertion is not meant to excuse the violence on either side, but it does call attention to the need for action on both sides if the issue of terrorism is to be constructively addressed.
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Hezbollah’s main violence was directed at dislodging the Israeli army of occupation in Southern Lebanon that remained illegally present since 1982. Such uses of force do not qualify as terrorism by most accepted definitions, and are certainly not to be confused with the transnational mega-terrorism of 11 September. To suppress Hamas/Hezbollah in the setting of the unresolved Israel/ Palestine dispute is to frustrate still further the Palestinian struggle to achieve self-determination, and it would certainly feed the anti-American resentment that already abounds in the Arab world. As a result, it might actually increase the threats of future anti-American terrorism, as well as confuse public opinion about the portion of the American response that was justified and necessary. These adverse impressions are made more likely by the refusal of the United States to mount any serious opposition to Israeli military operations that produce such great suffering for Palestinian civilian society, inducing the despair and extremism that is then translated into terrorist action by militants. At this point, although the US government is keenly aware of the non-military aspects of responding effectively to 11 September, it has focused almost all public attention on its military response. Such a focus has made considerable sense in relation to Afghanistan, but will not subsequently. And months later, the reports from Afghanistan and Pakistan of aftereffects casts some doubt on earlier victory claims. It now appears that al-Qaida and Taliban forces, while conceding control of the State, were never fully defeated, and may yet regroup to fight on another day. It also seems that their most prominent leaders are mostly alive and in hiding. Beyond this, the pro-American Mushareff government in Pakistan has been badly destabilized as a consequence of its siding with the US in the region, and may well be replaced by a far less cooperative leadership. The US Government has consistently emphasized the effectiveness of its response, mainly without even bothering to acknowledge the relevance off limits. The White House has encouraged a surge of patriotism that is resistant to self-criticism. As a result, there is some tendency to downplay the risks of an American military over-reaction, as well as a disposition to neglect the challenge of the deeper roots of terrorism. Influential pundit-scholars, most notably Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, have argued that weak resolve by the United States in the past has encouraged terrorists to take bolder action, and that the best mode of response is one that exhibits a maximal resolve.4 But this kind of approach mirrors Osama Bin Laden’s outlook, and could quickly plunge the world into the enduring darkness of an inter-civilizational struggle. We can and must act to avoid this bleak outcome, and yet not lose sight of the mega-terrorist menace, and what can be done to protect against it. This line of analysis suggests that the response to 11 September in the postAfghanistan phases should substitute police methods for war and a reliance on military methods. The military instrument is too blunt, too premised on seeking out and destroying a territorial adversary, and too indifferent to the political surroundings giving rise to mega-terrorist undertakings. The fundamental tactical mistake after Afghanistan has been to push the war against global terror into a
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statist template despite the non-territorial character of the al-Qaida network. This mistake has been most manifest in the effort by the Bush administration to shift the main theater of combat to the rogue states (also called the ‘Axis of Evil’ countries) despite the lack of significant linkage to the mega-terrorist threat. Such a shift reflects the widening of the American foreign policy agenda beyond the prevention of future terrorism to the implementation of a project to achieve a durable form of global dominance. Indeed, the originality of this historical moment is the acute tension between these moves toward global dominance and the 11 September exposure of acute American vulnerability to attack by a nonstate network animated by extremist goals. George W. Bush’s speeches provide many texts for the study of this interface between war against terrorism and American geopolitical ambitions, but none is more revealing than the address given to graduating cadets at West Point in June 2002. President Bush’s West Point address has mainly attracted attention so far because it is an especially full articulation of a new American strategic doctrine of pre-emption. The radical idea being touted by the White House and Pentagon is that the United States claims the right to attack militarily any state that is seen as hostile, and makes moves to acquire weaponry of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological, or chemical. The obvious initial test case for pre-emption is Iraq, which is being continuously threatened with an American attack to achieve a regime change, either on the model of the displacement of the Taliban in Afghanistan, or proceeding differently. Washington’s war plans have been blatant, although apparently not yet been finalized, and whether the intimations of war, despite the numerous objections having been voiced by neighboring governments and European allies, are to be taken literally is still somewhat uncertain.5 What is certain, and scary, is a new approach to the use of international force that is being adopted by the United States beneath the banner of counter-terrorism and in the domestic climate of fervent nationalism that has existed in America since the 11 September attacks. This new approach repudiates the core idea of the United Nations Charter (reinforced by decisions of the World Court in The Hague), which is a prohibition of any use of international force that is not undertaken in self-defense after the occurrence of an armed attack across an international boundary or pursuant to a decision by the UN Security Council. When Iraq conquered and annexed Kuwait in 1990, even without any UN authorization, Kuwait was legally entitled to act in self-defense to recover its territorial sovereignty. And the United States and others were able to join Kuwait in bolstering its prospects, thereby acting in what international lawyers call collective self-defense. Back in 1956 when the American commitment to this Charter effort to limit the discretion of states to the extent possible was still strong, the US Government surprised its allies and adversaries, by opposing the Suez Operation of Britain, France, and Israel because it was a non-defensive use of force against Egypt despite the provocations associated at the time with Nasser’s anti-Israeli, anti-West militancy, including allowing Egyptian territory
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to be used as a base area for launching trans-border attacks against Israel. This legal commitment had been evolved by stages in the period after World War I, and when the surviving leaders of Germany and Japan were prosecuted for war crimes. At Nuremberg, Crimes Against the Peace, were declared worse even than the atrocities committed in the course of the war. The task of the Charter was to give this rejection of war-making as clear guidelines as possible, which explains why international force is prohibited in general as a security option of states (Article 2(4)), with the single exception a clearly delimited right of self-defense (Article 51). In the mid-1980s, for instance, when the United States claimed that Sandinista efforts to help overthrow the existing government in El Salvador allowed it to act in collective self-defence, a strong majority of the World Court refused to accept the argument. At the time this judicial response angered and embarrassed the Reagan White House to the extent that it withdrew in pique its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, and has never tried to adopt a more constructive stance. In this sense, American refusal to conduct its foreign policy in conformity to the UN Charter and international law is not new. What is new is extending its claims to initiate a major war without any pretense of responding in the spirit of self-defense, and doing so, in defiance of world public opinion as well as international law as generally understood. Pre-emption, in contrast, validates striking first, not in a crisis, as was done by Israel with plausible, yet contested, justification in the 1967 War when enemy Arab troops were massing on its borders after dismissing the UN war-preventing presence. Whether an Arab attack was contemplated remains controversial to this day, but Israeli claims of anticipatory self-defense seemed reasonable given all the surrounding circumstance. In contrast, the Bush doctrine rests its claims on shadowy intentions, alleged potential links to terrorist groups, supposed plans and projects to acquire and transfer weaponry of mass destruction, and anticipations of possible future dangers. It is a doctrine without limits, without accountability to the UN or international law, without any dependence on a collective judgment of responsible governments, and, what is worse, without any convincing demonstration of practical necessity. It is true that the reality of the mega-terrorist challenge requires some rethinking of the relevance of rules and restraints based on conflict in a world of territorial states. The most radical aspects of the al-Qaida challenge are a result of its non-territorial, concealed organizational reality as a multi-state network. Modern geopolitics was framed to cope with conflict and relations among sovereign states; the capacity of a network with modest resources to attack and wage a devastating type of war against the largest state does require an acknowledgement of a different structure of security that will need to be constructed by a post-modern geopolitics. Post-modernity refers here to preoccupations that can no longer reduced to their territorial dimensions. This contrasts with ‘modernity’ born internationally in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia with the emergence of the secular sovereign state, and a world
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politics that could be understood by reference to territorial ambitions and defense. The 11 September didn’t initiate post-modern geopolitics. Globalization did, with its shift in the locus of authority from state to market, its reliance on non-territorial information technology to coordinate behavior on a global scale, and the prominence accorded such non-state arenas of authority as the World Economic Forum. What Osama Bin Laden and George W.Bush did was to give post-modern geopolitics a turn toward war and conflict, back to issues of conquest, violence, and security. On the Bin Laden side the focus was on nonterritorial empowerment via mega-terrorism, tactics designed to realize through struggle a culminating vision of an Islamic umma replacing the modern, Westerninspired structure of distinct sovereign states. On the Bush side the emphasis was on carrying the retaliatory war to the networked enemy concealed in some 60 countries, while taking the opportunity to declare war on all those non-state forces around the world that were engaged in armed struggle, that is, a war without a territorial enemy and waged in disregard of international law and outside the purview of the United Nations, which are from this perspective outmoded modernist modes of global governance. Establishing a new kind of American-led non-territorial global empire provided the framework for US global ambitions; there is nothing new about pursuing imperial ambitions. What is new and innovative, is seeking empire, in the sense of control and dominance, without territorial expansion, and on a scale that encompasses the entire planet. To respond to the threat of mega-terrorism does validate some stretching of international law to accommodate the reasonable security needs of sovereign states. Prior cross-border military reactions to transnational terrorism over the years by the United States, India, Israel, and others, were generally tolerated by the UN and international public opinion because they seem proportionate and necessary in relation to the threats posed, and the use of force relied upon was in its essence reactive, not anticipatory. International law was bent to serve these practical imperatives of security, but not broken. However, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption goes much further, encroaching on highly dangerous terrain. It claims a right to abandon prudent rules of restraint, and of law, patiently developed over the course of centuries, governing the use of force in relation to territorial states, not networks. To propose abandoning the core legal restraint on international force in relations among states is to misread the challenge of 11 September. It permits states to use force non-defensively against their enemies, thereby creating a dreadful precedent for the future. There is every reason to think that ‘containment’ and ‘deterrence’ remain effective ways to approach a state that threatens unwarranted expansion. There is no evidence to suggest that Iraq cannot be deterred. On the contrary, the whole pattern of Iraqi behavior in relation to its war against in Iran in the 1980s, as well as its conquest and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, were based on a rational calculation of gains and losses that when proved incorrect, led in the Gulf War to a reversal of policy, withdrawal and an acceptance of international demands. Brutal and oppressive as is the regime in Iraq, it was accepted until 1990 as a geopolitical
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ally of the United States. As a state, under Saddam Hussein’s rule Iraq has acted and behaved normally for a state that seeks to exert regional influence, ruthlessly seeking opportunities for expansion, but retreating and acquiescing under pressure. Iraq is surrounded and threatened by superior force, and any attempt to lash out at neighbours or others would almost certainly result in the immediate and total destruction of Iraq, which would mean the end of Saddam Hussein and his regime. There is no reason whatsoever to think that deterrence and containment will not succeed in relation to Iraq, even should Baghdad manage to acquire some amount of biological, chemical, or nuclear weaponry. Deterrence and containment succeeded in relation to the Soviet Union for more than four decades under far more demanding circumstances. If considered objectively, Iraq at present is far more threatened than threatening. It is likely that its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is intended mainly for defensive purposes, to deter the very attack upon its political independence that is being so openly threatened by the United States in recent months. Such threats are themselves flagrant violations of the Charter conception of relations among sovereign states, as threats to use force are explicitly prohibited. What is at stake with pre-emption, as tied to the ‘Axis of Evil’ imagery, is more hidden and sinister. What is feared in Washington, I think, is not aggressive moves by these countries, but their acquisition of weaponry of mass destruction that might give them a deterrent capability with respect to the United States, and others. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed the luxury of being undeterred in world politics. It is this circumstance that makes the Bush ‘unilateralism’ particularly disturbing to other countries, and needs to be understood in relation to the moves of the Pentagon, contained in a report leaked in December 2001, to increase US reliance on nuclear weaponry in a variety of strategic circumstances. At West Point Bush declared with moral fervor that ‘[o] ur enemies…have been caught seeking these terrible weapons’. It never occurs to our leaders that these weapons are no less terrible when acquired by the United States, especially when their use is explicitly contemplated as a sensible policy option, and given the recollection that the United States has never to this day apologized for the use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities in 1945. There is every reason for others to fear that when the USA is undeterred it will become again subject to ‘the Hiroshima temptation’, to threaten and use such weapons for military and strategic advantages in the absence of any prospect of retaliation. And Bush goes further, combining empire with utopia, reminding his West Point audience that: The twentieth century ended with a single surviving model of human progress based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justic and religious tolerance.
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The clear intention is to suggest that America is the embodiment of this model. And while Bush does concede that ‘America cannot impose this vision’, he does propose that it ‘can support and reward governments that the right choices for their own people’, and presumably punish those that don’t. Not only does the United States claim a right of global dominance, but it also professes to have the final answers for societal well-being, seeming to forget its homeless, its crowded and expanding prisons, its urban blight, and countless other domestic reminders that we may not be the best of all possible worlds, and especially not, for all possible peoples. This vision of post-modern geopolitics is underwritten by a now familiar strong message of evangelical moralism. Bush notes that ‘[s]ome worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree’, and adds, ‘[m]oral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, in every place’. Such moral absolutism is then applied to the current global realities. Bush insists that: [W]e are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it. Aside from occupying the moral high ground, which exempts America from selfcriticism or from addressing the grievances others have with respect to our policies, such sentiments imply a repudiation of dialogue and negotiation. As there can be no acceptable compromise with the forces of evil, there can be no reasonable restraint on the forces of good. We may lament fundamentalism in the Islamic world and decry the fulminations of Osama Bin Laden, but what about our own? In contemplating this geopolitical vision for the future, one wonders about what happened to presidential candidate Bush’s rhetoric about the importance of ‘humility’ in depicting America’s role in the world. Of course, he was then trying to downsize the humanitarian diplomacy attributed (mostly wrongly) to Clinton/ Gore, but the contrast in tone and substance is still striking. One wonders whether the heady atmosphere of the Oval Office has fed these geopolitical dreams, or whether our president, so known for his lack of foreign policy knowledge, has been manipulated into a crusading mode by bureaucratic hawks who seized the opportunity so tragically provided by 11 September. In fairness, many influential Americans share this dream of a borderless global empire, but adopt less forthright language. For instance, the respected military commentator, Eliot Cohen, writing in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, suggests that: [I]n the twenty-first century, characterized like the European Middle Ages by a universal (if problematic) high culture with a universal language, the US military plays an extraordinary and inimitable role. It has become,
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whether Americans or others like it or not, the ultimate guarantor of international order.7 To make such an assertion without apology or justification is to say, in effect, that the imperial role of the United States is no longer in doubt, or even subject to useful debate. To acknowledge that it makes no difference whether Americans or others support this destiny is to reveal the fallen condition of democracy and the irrelevance of international public opinion. Along similar lines of presupposition, Stephen Biddle, in the same issue of Foreign Affairs, observes in relation to the problems of the Balkans and, specifically, Kosovo that ‘Americans do well in crusades’ but ‘they are not suited to the dirty work of imperial policing to secure second- or third-tier interest’.8 Such an outlook makes the fact of an American global empire a foregone conclusion, and it is significant that Foreign Affairs has itself recently used its influential pages to endorse this shift from an era of globalization to an era of American global dominance.9 Such a line of interpretation has also been supported by such prominent British historians as Paul Kennedy and Niall Ferguson, who compare the American imperial prospect with that of past empires, reinforcing the argument that no prior empire possessed such comprehensive dominance.10 But pre-emption and double standards were not the only troubling features of this post-modern geopolitical outlook outlined in the West Point speech. There is, first of all, the issue of global dominance, a project to transform world order from its current assemblage of sovereign states in the direction of a post-modern (that is, non-territorial) global empire administered from Washington. Bush misleadingly assured the graduating cadets that ‘America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish’, and then went on to describe precisely such undertakings. The President mentions that rivalries of the past among states have arisen because of their efforts to compete with one another, but insists that the future will be different because of American military superiority: ‘America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace’. The worldview here is breathtaking, and overtly imperial, nothing less than to remind all states that the era of self-help security is essentially over, that America is the global gendarme, and that other states should devote their energies to economic and peaceful pursuits, leaving overall security, and the identification and punishment of enemies, in Washington’s hands. One can only wonder at the reaction of foreign ministries around the world, say in Paris or Beijing, when confronted by this language that dramatically diminishes traditional sovereign rights, as well as by the reinforcing moves to scrap the ABM Treaty, to build a missile defense shield, to plan for the weaponization of space, and to dictate to the UN conditions for peacekeeping operations that exempt American personnel for accountability to the International Criminal Court.
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Whether it is Bush at West Point, or the more sedate writings of the American foreign policy elite writing for each other, or for that matter intelligent and progressive criticism, we must proceed from the post-modern need to address a menacing non-state adversary concealed in a network that is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. These new circumstances definitely call for new thinking that adapts international law and global security to these new challenges in an effective and constructive manner. But the adjustments called for by Bush do not meet the specific challenge of mega-terrorism, and unleash a variety of dangerous forces. Instead, what is needed is new thinking that sees the United States as part of a global community that is seeking to find appropriate ways to restore security and confidence, but builds on existing frameworks of just war, legal restraints and works toward a more robust United Nations, and does not claim for itself an imperial role to make up and enforce the rules of world politics as it goes along. Given the bipartisan gridlock that has gripped the United States since 11 September, positive forms of new thinking will almost certainly come, if it comes, from pressures exerted by the citizenry situated abroad and in the United States outside of Washington. As citizens everywhere we have never faced a more urgent duty to make this happen. NOTES 1 See Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 1. 2 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); see also Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 37–53; and Peter Begen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World Osama bin Laden (New York, NY, 2001), esp. pp. 143–66. 3 For representative European expressions of concern see Adam Roberts, ‘Crisis in Kunduz: The Coalition Must Make It Clear That Surrendering Troops Will Be Treated Humanely’, The Guardian, 24 November 2001 (www.guardian.co.uk/ comment/story/ 0,3604,605132,00.html); Editorial Board, World Socialist Website, ‘US War Crime in Afghanistan: Hundreds of Prisoners of War Slaughtered at Mazar-I-Sharif’, 27 November 2001; Editorial, ‘America’s Killing Hour’, Wall Street Journal, 21 November 2001. 4. For this assessment offered by a think tank specialist advocating war against Iraq, see Ranan R.Lurie, ‘Don’t Dither as Hussein Builds Nuclear Devices’, LA Times, 9 July 2002, p. B13. 5. See Bernard Lewis, ‘The Revolt of Islam’, The New Yorker, 19 November 2001, pp. 50–63, esp. pp. 60–3; Lewis, ‘Did You Say “American Imperialism?”’, National Review, 17 October 2001, pp. 26–30. Fouad Ajami, ‘The Uneasy Imperium: Pax Americana in the Middle East’, in James F.Hoge, Jr and Gideon Rose (eds), How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 15–30.
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6. Washington has been blowing the trumpets of war loudly. See Eric Schmitt, ‘US Plan for Iraq is Said to Include Attack on Three Sides’, NY Times, 5 July 2002, pp. Al, A6. 7. Eliot A.Cohen, ‘A Tale of Two Secretaries’, Foreign Affairs, 81, 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 33–46, esp. p. 46. For an even more forthright statement on America’s imperial destiny see Thomas Donnelly, ‘The Past as Prologue: An Imperial Manual’, Foreign Affairs, 82, 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 165–70. 8. Stephen Biddle, ‘The New Way of War? Debating the Kosovo Model’, Foreign Affairs, 81, 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 138–44, esp. p. 139. 9. The most comprehensive account, although avoiding the language of empire, was highlighted as lead article. See Stephen G.Brooks and William C.Wohlworth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, Foreign Affairs, 81,4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20–33. 10. See Paul Kennedy, ‘Maintaining American Power: From Injury to Recovery’, in Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chandra (eds), The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11 (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 53–79 and Niall Ferguson, ‘Clashing Civilizations or Mad Mullahs: The United States Between Informal and Formal Empire’, Ibid., pp. 115–41.
5 War, Terror, Judgement R.B.J.WALKER
The most profound challenges provoked by the suicidal and murderous assault on the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, have been made to prevailing accounts of political judgement. What are we to make of these dramatic acts of violence? On what grounds were we able to make sense of them, to fit them into established expectations about how the world was unfolding after the turn of the millennium? On what grounds were we able to respond to them as challenges to prevailing accounts of legitimate political action: as acts of violence that, while contravening most people’s sense of the general illegitimacy of violence, nevertheless occurred in a world in which most people’s lives ultimately rest on a willingness, sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, to deploy violence on an even greater scale than we saw on one stunning day in September? On what grounds were we encouraged to make sense of them by the narratives that, after a day or so of frantic conceptual scrambling, began to cohere in the official briefings and newsrooms? On what grounds are we now able to reflect on our ability to respond to the place of violence in contemporary political life given the capacities for violence and counter-violence expressed in this specific series of events? Many responses to such questions have been offered by political actors and commentators across the spectrum of established political and ethical debates. Thankfully, not all have been as crude as those used to justify the military action taken by the Bush, Blair and many other governments. Nor, also thankfully, has it been easy to attain credibility by articulating equally crude indictments of these governments’ violent responses to violence. Unless one has been entirely blind to the conflicting and conflictual patterns of contemporary world events, or prepared to accept the extraordinary self-righteousness expressed both in these specific events and in most of the official reactions to them, our responses to all this violence necessarily draws us into some very difficult questions about the grounds on which we now make political judgements, or have our judgements made for us by those who claim all authority to make political judgements. In some places at least, the recourse to easy moralisms on any side of the debate has become a sure sign of political and ethical bankruptcy. I take this to be one of the few positive things that can be said in relation to these events and their immediate aftermath. Yet, while we may be cautiously positive about the degree
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to which many people have been able to resist the easy moralisms preferred by so many political elites, finding any kind of secure ground on which to develop more responsible political judgements has become very difficult, both in relation to this specific set of events and to the dynamics of the contemporary international/global (dis)order more generally. First, some of the more difficult questions we now confront are familiar and have long made modern thinkers a little uncomfortable; though perhaps not uncomfortable enough. They grow out of established accounts of assumptions about the necessity and ethical legitimacy of violence in a world of modern sovereign states. They rest ultimately on the fundamental hypocrisy, the institutionalized double standards, through which the modern world in general, and liberals in particular, have tried to make claims about universal standards of truth and justice while defending their own nation-state’s parochial claim to truth and justice. God, or civilization, or virtue is always on someone’s side, and we have come to know all too well what this means for those who are not. Second, some have to do with the difficulty of interpreting the structural dynamics of power and authority in the contemporary global order. The Bushes and the Blairs may speak as if they are acting in a world of sovereign states, and shape their rhetoric accordingly, but we, and they, know enough about globalization, militarization and inequalities on a global scale to discount their rhetoric; though probably not enough to come up with a more coherent account of a world that has become much too complex to comprehend in the simplistic categories of the speech-writers and international relations textbooks. Third, consequently, even those who are used to dealing in the established hypocrisies of modern political life find themselves in difficulty attempting to respond to the events of 11 September on the basis of forms of internationalism that—while especially popular among statesmen, lawyers, academics and commentators in Europe and many other places— seem to rest on assumptions about how the world is organized politically that don’t quite fit most people’s instincts about what is going on. This is where the difficulties of judgement are most intense. Whatever the specificities of 11 September, they have to be understood as part of a broader pattern of events that express profound challenges to established accounts of legitimate violence in a system of modern sovereign states. These challenges are not new. Nevertheless, the kind of crisis precipitated by the dramas of that day offer a degree of insight into processes many people vaguely sense yet elude even the most sophisticated forms of political analysis. Groping in the blinding light of new world orders, unfolding globalizations, a new liberal peace and an apparently victorious civilization, a flash of darkness exposes new pacts with violence, and still more violence. Here I want to make some brief comments about each of these three sources of uncertainty about our grounds for judgment before concluding with an even briefer comment about the relationship between the difficulty of making judgments in this case and a broader set of concerns about the possibility of meaningful political practice under contemporary—perhaps hegemonic, perhaps
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quasi-imperial, in some respects quite familiar but in others quite perplexing— conditions. Many judgments have been articulated about the significance of the specific events of 11 September, some wise, some quite irresponsible. Judgments about these judgments vary. In my view, wisdom has generally combined some sense of a tradition of internationalism with a sense that these specific events must be placed in some broader historical and structural context, while irresponsiblity has been cloaked in the familiar garb of nationalist hypocrisy masquerading as universal morality. In the end, however, much of the difficulty of making judgements in this case arise from a broader fragility in the established internationalist consensus and from patterns of historical-structural transformation that have been challenging established accounts of legitimate authority for quite some time. MODERN HYPOCRISIES The attacks on New York and Washington rightly provoked outrage in most, though not all, places. Indeed, for many people, the grounds for judgement were as clear and firm as can be imagined. For most Americans, hit for the first time with such violence within their own territories, and on such symbols of political power and authority, outrage remains the only serious ground for judgement. In the USA, especially, political judgement has been powerfully shaped by an elemental ethic of revenge. This ethic has been amplified by crudely manipulative mass media, by profound incomprehension among many, but certainly not all, Americans of their effects on the wider world, by a variety of distinctively American cultural traits, and by the mobilization of nationalist and patriotic sentiments in a daunting exercise in something like state-building. This ethic has in turn served to legitimize massive displays of military and diplomatic power and to delegitimize any politics that challenge the sovereign decisions of the Bush regime. There is no doubt that at that specific moment of crisis, and for some months thereafter, politics was condensed to an awesome decisionism: a decisionism, it must be said, that recalls all too many of the worst moments of twentieth-century history. An emergency was declared, an enemy was defined, violence was unleashed; democracy was once again subordinated to the claimed necessities of state. Still, political life is never so simple, even in a state of emergency, and even for what looks like the greatest of Great Powers. What kind of emergency was this? And for whom? What kind of decision was made, what kind of violence was unleashed, with what kind of ambition, and what kind of legitimacy? As many commentators noted almost immediately, events like this do not appear through magic or devilry. They are episodes in a broader series of events, processes, stmctures, necessities and freedoms. Decisions that respond to the specific event alone risk a loss of political judgment and its replacement with, in the terms Max Weber used to capture the defining contradiction of modern political life at the end of the First World War, an ethics of commitment.1
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Unsurprisingly, the primary critical responses to the immediate ethics of revenge that seemed to drive the Bush regime was to contextualise, to draw attention to other outrageous displays of violence, many with explicit and brutally unapologetic American involvement. They sought to unravel various patterns of historical and structural causation that might somehow explain the violence that simply did not make sense to many people except in the religious categories of good and evil: categories that privilege a theology of saved and damned over all the political categories that the modern world has constructed so carefully so as to avoid the degeneration of politics into wars of religion and ethical conviction. Here we get right to the heart of the problem. Appeals to self-righteous conviction have long been understood to be effective ways of mobilizing support for political ends, especially in moments of crisis. Yet, at least since the end of the seventeenth-century wars of religion in Europe, even since the emergence of Renaissance humanism challenged the primacy of religious authority in the name of a secular political community, one of the primary ambitions of modern politics has been to avoid the reduction of politics to any simple ethics of conviction. This is why the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years War, a war fought primarily on religious grounds, is so often seen as the basic founding moment of modern international relations. Wars of religion are said to be especially nasty, and modern accounts of international relations are predicated on the assumption that it is possible to ameliorate their nastiness by constructing purely secular institutions and forms of statecraft resting on more prosaic forms of self-interest and pragmatic accommodation. In practice, of course, religious or quasi-religious sentiments have often threatened to swamp a purely secular power politics. Both nationalism and the ideological struggles of the Cold War period expressed very powerful even though secularized forms of religious conviction and self-righteousness, bringing extraordinary levels of violence and militarisation to societies that prided themselves on their civilization and enlightenment. Modern secular life is not immune to the dynamics of self-righteousness usually associated with religious conflicts. The twentieth-century experience of mass destruction offers an awesome warning to all those shameless commentators who offered simplistic accounts of Islam as the source of all contemporary troubles or who tried to pretend that liberal modernity has not been complicit with violence. Nevertheless, the hopes of modern internationalism have rested on a gamble that the structures of the modern system of secular sovereign states—peace-loving democracies as we are encouraged to call them—remain strong enough to prevent yet another eruption of ideological fervour. The events of 11 September 2001 marked a moment at which this gamble came to seem exceptionally risky once again. It seemed risky not only because violence was unleashed on parts of an American/global order in the name of a specific religion, but also because the response of the Bush regime, the identification of all opposition to Bush the Younger’s own political agenda as evil, as susceptible to the all purpose and highly mobile status of ‘Terrorist’, goes
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against the grain of every traditional account of what it means to act in a responsible way in a modern system of sovereign states. While it is possible to see how the appeal to good and evil works politically —as a tactic in a state of emergency, as a procedure to promote nationalism, patriotism, state building and the shoring up of quasi-democratic regimes— it is also possible to see how it works to undermine all semblance of responsible politics in a modern system of secular and democratic states. This is a dynamic that goes back right to the beginning of the modern statessystem. It is expressed in the tension between judgements rooted in some kind of private or religious ethics and an ethics rooted in the preservation of a state capable of sustaining a human community of ethical people, and of a statessystem that can guarantee a variety of ethical possibilities in the form of those diverse cultures that make up the community of nations. It is a dynamic that was played out yet again in the wake of the attacks: between the extreme nationalism, or something like it, of most of the Bush administration and Colin Powell’s more internationalist tendencies; between Bush and most of the European states; and in Tony Blair’s attempt to hold onto both positions simultaneously, or to pretend that good internationalism is the same as the defence of good against evil. Blair, of course, can be understood as a clever political player, playing the wellestablished role of intermediary between the USA and Europe. He can also be read as someone who is personally driven more by an ethics of conviction than by an ethics of political responsibility. In either case, the degree with which he has been able to fudge the central contradiction between an ethic of conviction that he is on the side of some universal morality and an ethic of responsibility within a pluralistic system of sovereign states tells us about a more important dynamic than one small politician’s career, or one small state’s place in the world. Many of the difficult questions of judgement in this case might indeed be understandable in terms of something like Weber’s distinction between an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of conviction. Those who urged caution in the resort to violence, or the importance of maintaining an international coalition, or the need to respect established procedures of international law, or the need to contextualize one violent event in relation to the many other violent events that remain a normal part of everyday life for so many people, have tended to make judgements on the ground of international responsibility. Others who thought that this was simply a matter of good and evil were opting for something else: perhaps the righteous nationalism and patriotism of their own state; perhaps for a set of values they believed should apply to every person on the planet; or, the difficult and very dangerous case, for both. Bush, and even Blair, have been forthright proponents of the latter position, the always-difficult case. Sometimes this has been the prerogative of the leaders of ‘hegemonic’ states, those states that were more equal than other states, and with more responsibility for maintaining some semblance of international order. Sometimes this has been the prerogative of ‘revolutionary’ states, those which
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sought to impose their own values more widely as a condition of their own hoped-for hegemonic status. The obvious danger of both hegemonic states and revolutionary states, of course, is that in seeing themselves as more equal, and more righteous, than other states, they see themselves in terms of empire rather than of system of states. Hence, the more daunting difficulties of political judgement in this case: it is not only that we can try to respond to one violent assault and its violent aftermath by replaying the familiar struggle between righteous conviction and international responsibility, but that the very ground on which this way of formulating judgements about political judgement may be in the process of giving way to something else. This possibility has been canvassed many times before, not least in relation to the classic eras of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, but it has been canvassed with renewed vigour since the end of the Cold War. In this context it has been canvassed especially in the form of a claim to humanitarianism made up from a combination of selected aspects of right-based liberalism and the more benign accounts of globalization as a process that is finally taking us away from that old-fashioned world of competing nation-states with its impossible choice between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility. Predictably, these claims have been challenged as a simple imposition by the most powerful; challenges that have had limited purchase given their popularity with the most thuggish of dictators seeking legitimacy under a fig leaf of state sovereignty, but challenges nevertheless that warn against any simplistic shift from a pluralistic community of nations to any New World Order, or Democratic Peace, or End of History ordained by a small elite of highly militarized governments acting in the name of the common good. It is possible that we are living in a world in which all states are democratic and peace-loving, all in control of their own domestic affairs and yet, miraculously, all at one with the kinds of convictions so proudly espoused by Bush and Blair. Or at least, it is possible that with just a bit more help, and a bit more violence, this is the world that is just around the corner, just as soon as we rid ourselves of a few more thuggish dictators, and a few more of those who don’t quite believe that Bush or Blair represent the last word in humanitarian virtue. Relying on something like this story, we might restore some solidity to the ground on which we make political judgements. Bush will come to be known as a great internationalist. The multilateralism associated with Powell and articulately defended by intellectuals of the old foreign policy establishment like Joseph Nye,2 rather than the revolutionary unilateralism of Donald Rumsfeld and others, might eventually be judged to be the proper way of articulating America’s place in the global political order. Stranger things have happened. But of all the stories currently going around about where in the world we are now, it has to be said that this one is not the most obviously persuasive.
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STILL MORE VIOLENCE The hardest part of analysing any political event is deciding where to begin. Some people hanker after some ‘big bang’ that explains everything. Political actors count on the frailties of human memory. To all but the most naive, it was immediately clear that no serious commentary could begin with 11 September 2001. To do so, would be to underestimate both the significance of this specific set of events, and the complexity of the processes that gave rise to them. If part of the difficulty of making judgements in this context can be framed in terms of the traditional tension between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility, a further part can be framed in terms of the increasing difficulty of interpreting the broader context in which contemporary claims about an ethics of responsibility might now be understood. There have been some obvious obstacles to any such understanding. The passions of the moment always tend to cloud our analytical judgements. It has also been very difficult to get basic information, and the information we do have is so obviously corrupted by the dynamics of the mass media and the demands of propaganda, especially given the convergence between technologies and practices of information and communication with new forms of military strategy, tactics and weaponry. Moreover, it has been all too easy to appeal to situations we think we understand in order to make sense of events that seem to defy understanding. Many analogies have been deployed to make sense of these events in relation to the presumed lessons of history. The analogies initially favoured by US and UK politicians referred to a cancer that had to be cut out and to the attack on Pearl Harbour, but these were soon challenged by more complex and more worrying references: to a great iceberg of which 11 September was but a small tip; or a very unstable structure of tectonic plates; or 1914; or aspects of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s; or, even, the fall of the Roman Empire. The more that commentary sought grounding in the lessons of history, the more history seemed a treacherous guide to a situation that attracted at least as many claims about novelty as about continuities. The standard images of wars between states seemed to be especially misleading, as they have been for some time, recent assaults on Iraq and Serbia notwithstanding. Was this a proper war? Or was it a crime? If it was a war, precisely what states were at war with each other? If it was a crime, precisely who was it a crime against —America? Humanity? Modernity? Liberalism? Confusion increased as the response to a specific act of violence quickly morphed into a range of other conflicts. Even for a more than usually engaged public, it was difficult to keep an eye on the ball partly because there were so many balls and partly because it was not clear either what the game was or where exactly it was being played. The response to specific terrorists became both a generalized ‘War against Terrorism’ (promising a broader war against all and sundry, beginning with Iraq), and a specific intervention into a civil war in Afghanistan (promising yet another exercise in ‘state-building’; itself building on
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a longer and often dubious story about ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states and inviting worries about the troubled relation between failed/rogue states and military intervention). By early November, the defining voices seemed to have switched from the more internationally oriented State Department to the more intransigent militarists at the Pentagon and among Bush’s closest advisers, and extraordinary military force was unleashed on the terrain of Afghanistan, a place between places. Yet the clarity with which power was centralized and authorized in Washington at the expense of an internationalist coalition, or of any role for regional states, or the United Nations, only made the interpretation of events more difficult and contestable; or perhaps easier, and even more contestable. That destruction was rained on those specific sites in Washington and New York points to the broad structures of meaning in which these sites had acquired massive symbolic value. That 11 September provoked a ‘War on Terror’ anywhere in the world points to the broad global context of these specific events. That the enemy was so quickly identified as Bin Laden/al-Qaida already points to a much broader and tangled web of conflicts whose centre might be a specific somewhere —Saudi Arabia according to the discourses of immediate causation; Afghanistan according to the discourses of immediate location; Palestine/Israel according to the discourses of proximate injustice; or the geopolitics of oil; according to the discourses of underlying interest—but also with an indiscriminate everywhere where ‘Terror’ might be found. There have been many ways of attempting to draw a more complex picture of the context in which the events of 11 September might be understood and assessed. Seven broad forms of analysis can be identified fairly easily. All have some reasonably obvious bearing on how we might try to make sense of the 11 September attacks and their aftermath, but it is far from clear how they might converge on some more comprehensive picture. First, we might try to understand the geopolitics of a specific region as a crucial site of global geopolitical structures. Here we might focus especially on Saudi Arabia, recognising that while physically expressed on the territories of the USA and Afghanistan, both the assault of 11 September and many features of the civil war in Afghanistan had their most immediate source in dynamics played out there. Or, on the festering sore of the Israeli terror state and the endless cycle of violent Palestinian resistance to decades of colonialism, the massive scandal and counter-scandal through which a broader set of injustices in the region have been interpreted. Or, on Pakistan as another major state implicated in the organization of specific terror networks. Or, on various attempts to depict a complex pattern of alignments and realignments, including those involving Iraq, Iran, various ex-Soviet republics, Somalia, Sudan and Russia. Second, we might try to recognise that this complex regional geopolitics is intricately connected to regional aspects of a changing international political economy. Here we might point to the geopolitics of energy supply, especially in relation to relative importance of oil in the Arab world and in the Caspian basin,
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both in the short and long terms. Or, to the imperatives of a globalizing market economy subject to recession and the imperatives of consumption, to the global organization of financial flows, informal economies of wealth creation of all kinds, not least those involving both criminal and terrorists organizations, and a shift in the role of the state and interstate institutions of governance in managing a certain kind of world economy. Third, there is a need to understand regional aspects of a changing international political order in which the logic of a multicentric states-system is in tension with the logic of global hegemony driven partly by the US state and partly by the dynamics of global capital. Here we are liable to come up against one of the great conceptual challenges confronting all forms of contemporary political analysis. This challenge is helped neither by the widespread tendency to treat ‘America’ and ‘global capital’ as unitary and intensely conspiratorial actors pulling all the strings on the world political stage; nor by the apparent paradox that, in some respects at least, the USA can be understood less as a global hegemon than as perhaps the only state that can still plausibly claim to resemble the old internationalist imagery of an autonomous sovereign state pursuing its own national security. At the very least, it seems clear that we are witnessing a profound change in the character of the old tension between international or multilateral order and Great Power hegemony. Within the USA, this change is expressed as a modulation from the old tension between multilateralism and unilateralism in the sense of isolationism, to a tension between multilateralism and unilateralism in the sense of global hegemony. The usefully double meaning of the term unilateralism—as both a withdrawal from international responsibilities and the equation of international responsibilities with purely national interests—has long provided a helpful way for American foreign policy to fudge one of the central contradictions of modern international politics in this respect. Many people have rightly become suspicious that a unilateralist rhetoric legitimizing a national defence has now finally pushed well beyond the conventions of a hegemonic power within an international system to something much closer to a hegemony subordinating an international system to its own unilateralist—imperialist—form of global order.3 Hence, the increasing structural tensions between the USA state and the multilateralist conventions still urged by Europe; tensions that had been increasing in any case, not least after the war over Europe’s eastern borders waged against Serbia by the USA on Europe’s behalf and in relation to the demands of EU enlargement, the development of ideas about a EU security policy and so on. Hence, also, Blair’s attempts to make a seamless equation between the multilateral and unilateral aspects of the coalition. Moreover, lingering in the background, is the apparent realignment of Russia with the West as well as the tension between the USA and China and all the other longer-term considerations that had, among other things, persuaded powerful American elites to push for new forms of missile defence systems that threaten to undermine all progress on the reduction of weapons of mass destruction.
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Fourth, these three considerations lead by an all too direct path to some familiar observations about the broader pattern of violence in the contem porary world. Many figures might be cited here, but I will choose just one: the death toll in the US A from the 11 September attacks was only about one per cent of the estimated average number of people killed world-wide from political violence each year in the 1990s; political, that is, in terms which exclude those who die from economic exclusions/exploitations or ecological collapse. It is in this context that one can understand the massive levels of hypocrisy in which we are all implicated and which connect us all, willingly or unwillingly, to forces that were at work both in the attacks and in the responses to them. Here we might pause to remember the largely unreported massacres from the Gulf War, the direct effects of the ongoing siege of Iraq, the Srebrenica massacre, and the millions who died in Afghanistan over the past two decades; or, perhaps especially, the ongoing production and trade in weapons that is so central to the everyday production of social life in supposedly civilized parts of the world. The numbers are always contestable, of course, and there will always be someone to justify this or that mass killing, this or that shipment of weapons, this or that investment in the local community that survives on the production of killing machines. What seems quite incontestable and unjustifiable, however, is the ongoing militarization of all societies, including—and in some respects, especially— those that claim to be bastions of liberty and international virtue. It is hardly news that violence breeds violence, and that the more we continue on the path of national security with missile defences and the rest, the less security anyone will have anywhere. Hence, all the demands for some kind of human security rather than national security that have been developed over the past two or three decades, and the claim that we have been living through some especially virulent symptoms generated by pathological forms of militarization on a global scale. Fifth, this is related to a need to understand the changing forms of violence in the contemporary world. Much of the recent debate about security and military affairs has been taken up with a well-publicized shift from overtly international wars to civil wars in the so-called ‘failed states’, on the one hand, and the development of mobile and communications-intensive (netcentric/infocentric) technologies, on the other. Claims about the threat of terror are inseparable from both. The violence unleashed on Afghanistan may well have been military but it has not been a conventional war between states, and the proper way of associating whatever went on there with the resort to terror is no doubt going to be a matter of endless conjecture. Sixth, we might try to understand a range of large-scale globalizing changes that both contribute to, and are an effect of, all of the above. Here we might focus on the novelty of a global, rather than an international, political economy; or a global, rather than an international, political order; or an emerging political system of inter-urban networks rather than of the old nation states; or the dynamics of long-term climate and environmental change. In all cases, whatever
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globalization might involve, it diverges considerably from the popular image of a move towards some kind of supranationality involving the demise of states, and probably involves an unprecedented proliferation of constantly changing networks and profound reworking of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In this respect, and whatever its substantive appeal to an old-time religion, alQaida, like the ‘war’ waged against it, expressed a highly contemporary world of networks and flows familiar to analysts of organized crime, finance, information, and the movements of peoples. Finally, we might begin to acknowledge that interpretation and judgement will be influenced by where one is, by one’s location within the structures of international or global order. It may be, for example, that much of the debate between European defenders of multilateralism and the kind of unilateralism preferred by most of the Bush regime turns on a concern about a shift from international to some kind of imperialism, but many peoples have long experienced various kinds of imperialism as the natural order of things. Judgements about legitimate violence that assume a world of equal and sovereign states are likely to sound especially hollow in places where the most obvious facts of life are inequality and the continuing reproduction of inequality in the name of a globalizing liberal capitalism. There is, after all, more than one way to analyse the normalized and institutionalized hypocrisies of the contemporary global order, hypocrisies that cannot be ignored either in attempts to explain the events of 11 September or in the challenges they present to prevailing accounts of political judgement. WAR BY OTHER MEANS All these, and other, starting points offer potentially endless scope for analysis and debate. The way I have begun to sketch the various directions in which these lines of analysis might have been taken may give some sense of the structures and forces I would especially want to emphasize; but also of the scope for disagreements about what would count as a persuasive explanatory narrative. More significantly, however, they also imply a series of overlapping and mutually reinforcing challenges to some fundamental principles of modern political life, especially as these principles are expressed in the structures and determinations of the states-system that has been the primary enabling condition of modern political life for some centuries. Modern theories of international relations usually begin with some version of the observation that the states-system is fragmented and thus governed in only the most rudimentary way. The consequence is a sequence of more or less peaceful periods of accommodation and adjustment between states and periods of violent change as various states became more powerful; that is periods of war, which has traditionally been seen as necessary for adjusting to change in a system without an overarching source of governance, and thus as legitimate. This is the basic idea that still comes through in images of the great wars of the twentieth
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century—the wars that some still want to fight but anyone with any significant memory of that century knows are now either impossible or insane. Behind this familiar, if increasingly archaic, account of the organization of modern political communities in a states-system are two very basic principles that are still very much with us. There is the principle that the states-system must be organized on more or less rational secular terms; wars must only be fought to pursue pragmatic and materialistic state interests, and not to ensure the universal adherence to any religious or quasi-religious doctrine. There is also the principle that the states-system must not be allowed to relapse into the kinds of empires from which modern states managed to free themselves in order to claim their right of sovereign self-determination. Things have not stood still since the emergence of the modern states-system, and these two principles have been under massive challenge from the beginning. On the one hand, explicitly secular practices have often come to be driven by what looks very much like religious fervour, by an ethics of conviction. The worst excesses of nationalism come to mind here, as do some aspects of fascism and the ideological dynamics of the Cold War era. But many, apparently more benign, tendencies must also be understood in this context, as when we are encouraged to think that we might all be humans united by a common bond of universal brotherhood, even sisterhood; think humanism, universal peace, progress, modernization, and Blair’s speech to the Labour Party in Brighton. In either case, we can see the consequences of the great pact we have made with ourselves as moderns, of our claim to be human, ethical, somehow nearish to God—even when denying His, Her or Its existence. In this pact, we are all good humans except when confronted by, say, Napoleon, Hitler, the Communist Threat, Third World revolutionaries, the Islamic hordes, or, most recently, the terrorists; in which case, God help them. We might feel righteous in making any of these exceptions, but when driven to extremes, our righteousness is precisely a self-righteousness. For all our attachment to various moralities, we are always prepared to make an exception, and to believe that violence, mass violence, is legitimate. God, or at least reason, common sense, civilization, the society that can be both religious and moral without being fanatical, and all the other synonyms for our version of the good, the true and the beautiful, is on our side. In the conventional story, ‘our side’ is interpreted as a national or statist identity of some kind, though the play of friend and enemy has not always been completely contained by the structures of the states-system. We know about our hypocrisies. We often worry about them. At moments of crisis especially, however, we let our hypocrisies loose upon the world. On the other hand, the principle of the sovereign equality of states has long been in tension with the realities of hegemony and Great Power domination (Pax Britannica, Pax Americana, colonialisms and neo-colonialisms, a Cold War between two superpowers), the rise of a globalizing capitalist economy and now the emergence of just one superpower, or hyperpower, or global hegemony, or perhaps some new kind of empire. This tension is expressed, for example, in the
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institutional distinction between the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. It is now unclear whether we are to understand the primary dynamics of political life in relation to some kind of states-system (the great game, the balance of power, the rules of multilateralism, and so on), with the USA playing the role of hegemonic great power, or in relation to an empire read partly in relation to ‘America’ and partly in relation to ‘globalization’ or ‘postmodernity’. According to the conventional wisdom of modern internationalism, we are supposed to expect that when the hypocritical logic of the modern states-system meets the logic of a universalizing empire we are likely to be in trouble. It is not unreasonable to think that we may be living in such a moment, and have been doing so for some time. Again, 11 September appears to be just an episode of a longer story, but in this case it is a story that goes to the heart of the most basic principles through which we have claimed to make sense of our possibilities as modern political beings. It is no doubt possible to keep on telling the story of modern internationalism. We are, it might be said, witnessing a hegemonic power seeking to be the Great Power responsible for sustaining order in a world beset with revolutionary—and, in this case, explicitly religious—fervour. In the process it also generates a certain kind of fervour, perhaps a bit too ‘religious’ in flavour, but ultimately positively expressed as an understandable nationalism, or perhaps a patriotism; and, in any case, harnessed to its international partners in a properly international system that is still capable of maintaining the basic principles of modern political life. This is the great hope of all internationalists, the hope that permits various traditions of liberalism to find some accommodation with yet another resort to mass violence and the support of dubious allies. The difficulty here arises from three suspicions. First, the suspicion that for the Bush regime, internationalism has become a convenient fig leaf for an imperialist form of unilateralism, complete with an array of client states who may whine ungratefully but remain unable to compete on a level playing field of international order. Second, that what some prefer to interpret as the legitimate patriotism of a hegemonic power has turned into a quasi-religious ideology of universal superiority. Third, the suspicion that where conventional fears about hegemons focus on the danger of revolutionary or quasi-imperial states mobilizing quasi-religious ideologies of nationalism and patriotism in order to generate absolutist distinctions between friends and enemies in a totalizing war between states, we have been witnessing signs of a struggle between the saved and the damned, or the civilized and the barbarian, inscribed less on the territorial space of the modern states-system than in a globally articulated and territorially contingent space between competing civilizations. In this context, we see, in part, fears of a return to a world that is, in the modern political imagination, associated with life before the Treaty of Westphalia, with wars of religious or quasi-religious fanaticism; fears that are triggered as much by the Bush’s presidential speeches as by videos of Bin Laden. We also see fears of the kind of distinctions between the supposedly
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civilised and the supposedly barbarian that go back much further in time and are remembered less in relation to the conventions of the modern states-system than to 500 years of crusades, conquests, colonialisms and civilizing missions of all kinds. The most striking feature of Bush’s declarations of war has been that they have been understandable less in relation to a sovereign capacity to declare a state of emergency, a capacity to suspend all norms of everyday behaviour, in relation to another sovereign state, than in relation to an enemy that is essentially intangible and disconnected from any territorial state and which can be projected almost at will onto any convenient territories, bodies and peoples. This may be sovereignty, but it is not sovereignty as we are supposed to know it. And if this is not sovereignty as we are supposed to know it, then we may either hope that internationalism will eventually rescue us from the unilateralist or forthrightly imperialist America, whether as championed by a small clique of fanatics or driven by huge historical forces, or face up to the ways in which the basic rules of the modern states-system, and the internationalist institutions that have made this system workable despite the necessary recurrence of wars, are now really breaking apart in a serious way.4 This point can be made, not only in relation to the spatial logic of a system of modern states, but also to the temporal logic of what we have come to call modernization. For all the appeal to tradition and Islam, the phenomenon we call Bin Laden has been a production of (late or even post-) modernity. He expresses yet another instance in a long line of modern inventions of tradition used to challenge those who have adapted modernity to their own purposes. The standard image here is that of Frankenstein, and it is not so far from trying to understand Bin Laden as a phenomenon to remembering the contradictions built into modern nationalism or the fascist state. Bin Laden grew out of social conditions in which modernization did not mean the gradual process of democratization many fondly imagine to have led ‘the civilized West’ to where it is now, but the collusion of this civilized West, or at least specific parts of it, in sustaining anti-democratic states for its own purposes. Hence, the acute tension between the more or less modernist regimes of states in this region and the various forms of social antagonism that have become increasingly expressed in what many would characterize as pathological or fundamentalist forms of Islam, though they have also been expressed in attempts to articulate a Pan-Arab resistance to various forms of colonialism. At the very least, it is a mistake to assume that the events of 11 September were aimed simply, or even primarily, at the USA; rather than, say, against the House of Saud and all it stands for as an expression of modernist authoritarianism, and as an agent of global/ American political and economic hegemony. What might be said of Saudi Arabia might also be said, with important variations, in relation to Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq, the Gulf States, and so on. By this route we end up with the specific dilemmas of Afghanistan; the combination of a rich but militantly anti-modern Saudi, possibly in association with Islamic Jihad and others, and a
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society massively wrecked by the predations of many outsiders, including the world’s most highly modernized societies. Whatever one might say about the specific peculiarities of Bin Laden, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaida, or the Taliban, it is crucial to understand that they express social contradictions and forces that arise from intense social struggles against globally articulated forms of economic, military and political power. As such, they resonate not only with a socalled ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘extremist’ retreat into some imagined age of the Prophets, but also with many characteristically modern, liberal, feminist and other progressive critiques of the arbitrary and undemocratic forms of government in the region. However outrageous, 11 September was not aimed simply at ‘America’, but at the destabilization of massively corrupt forms of politics in a region in which ‘America’, among others, is the great friend of corrupt regimes. Much of the debate, even critical debate, around this conflict is portrayed as if the options are a simple matter of good and evil, of modernity or barbarism, of the West versus Islam, of ‘America good’ or ‘America bad’. In many places, however, the primary—and much more telling— response has been less to invoke simple Manichean dualisms than to point to blatant forms of hypocrisy: the hypocrisy of the most powerful who have set up the system to their own advantage and then resort to bombs and self-righteousness when it backfires on them; and the hypocrisy of the less powerful who have bought into the system and colluded so as to sustain corrupt regimes and generate the conditions under which extremists respond with violence to widely acknowledged injustices. These hypocrisies play out in many contexts. Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to give up their monopoly on oil wealth, and the Americans are not going to give up on cheap and dependable oil supplies. But the positive consequence of stressing patterns of hypocrisy is that analysis shifts from theologies of good and evil to attempts to understand a world of contradictions and relations, not least in relation to what we so easily characterise simply as modernity as some kind of benign condition. The thinker who has largely presided over how we think about modern war over the past century has been Carl von Clausewitz. He is most famous for the notion that war is the continuation of politics by other means; by which he was referring, in part, to the need to ensure that war was conducted in relation to some kind of political rationality rather than driven by the uncontrollable passions of post-Napoleonic nationalism allied with rapidly modernizing technologies.5 In this respect, Clausewitz was working within an understanding of a world of states; states in which the normal practices of politics could be conducted at home but could not apply in relations with other states, for which one had to prepare for the state of war, or the state of emergency, for the use of other means. Much of the history of the twentieth century can be read in relation to the question of whether this distinction between a rational world of politics and a world of ‘other means’ could be sustained. Clausewitz’s understanding of rationality
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was informed by the philosopher Hegel, and depended on a claim about the general direction of human progress, at least human progress within the modern rational state. By the early twentieth century, this kind of progressive rationality had come to seem a bit dubious. Max Weber was developing a powerful account of the peculiar dialectic of modern rationality through which the greater the grip of a rationalizing instrumental efficiency, the greater the appeal to irrational value commitments—an account that may say something about the experience of extermination camps and nuclear deterrence, the bloodbath of a supposedly progressive century, and the hypocritical moralizing of a modernity that prefers to deny its responsibilities for mass violence.6 Carl Schmitt subsequently offered cryptic reminders that whatever the pretensions of liberals, democrats and other progressives, the modern State depends on an arbitrary and always potentially violent capacity to define those who are violent.7 Perhaps more disturbingly still, Walter Benjamin looked ahead to see not war as politics by other means but politics as war by other means: the excep tionalization of the norm; the inscription of a war-like violence into the practices of daily life; and, perhaps, even the attempt to securitize everything everywhere.8 These are all rather depressing thinkers, but they do get at some of the profound paradoxes of a modernity that has brought both progress and despair, inclusion for some and exclusion for others. Again, their insights might be taken in many directions. Conventional accounts of international relations, for example, assume that the positive side of modernity can be experienced within states and we just have to put up with, or somehow mitigate, the violence between states that makes the good life at home possible. Conventional accounts of modernization give this story a temporal spin and identify the good life with some mid-Atlantic ideal and then insist on the necessity of violence, or limits on democracy, or IMF conditionality, as the price of moving towards this ideal. In either case, we can get some sense of the spatial and temporal dynamics in which the forces of a regional-global geopolitics and political economy get worked out in relation both to a modernizing state with all the usual authoritarianisms and corruptions and a globalizing hegemon/empire expressing every hypocrisy that can be packed into stories about modernity as a perfectly benign journey to an enlightened future. The conventional wisdoms that are generally lined up to respond to this more critical and depressing account of modernity tend to rest on hopes for the supposedly free market or some kind of cosmopolitanism, whether of republics or individual subjects, articulated in relation to some kind of universal reason; some combination of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Again, these wisdoms used to be given an internationalist twist. All universals could find expression in the selfdetermining jurisdictions of sovereign states, the place where normal everyday life could unfold, helped along by a bit of modernization from above or external intervention if necessary. Sam Huntington, once the great teller of stories about the necessities of modernizing states, put a popular name to the shift away from that old story to the new world of competing civilizations.9 But civilizations
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don’t co-exist in a system of states. They don’t have political systems either. While there may be very few, if any, positive things to say about Huntington’s scholarship, he does have a very good nose for the decisive transformation, even if he does give it a misleading name. Huntington makes a very good apologist for an empire in need of a snappy historical script. AFTER THE SLACK Over the decade or so before the planes hit, the fall of the Berlin Wall had become the ground on which claims about a rapidly changing world had become the new currency of scholarly and policy-making credibility. The freezer was unplugged, allowing the accumulated rot to smell and threaten. The New World Order was announced: to be followed by the Coming Anarchy, the Conflict of Civilizations, the promise of Globalization, and all the rest. It seemed that we were living through an era of transitions, of multiple trajectories, a world that had become much looser and differentiated than the rigid divisions of the Cold War. Insofar as one can appeal to slogans, I prefer to think of it as an ‘Era of Slack’, a loose proliferation of trends punctuated by the occasional attempt to bring some discipline to a few selected slackers—Iraq and Serbia most notably—though not others. The 11 September generated a rapid tightening of this slack, a tightening that was more dramatic and determined than had happened in relation to the Gulf War or the redrawing of European boundaries after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The lines have been pulled tight again, but, crucially, they are being drawn less around a world of sovereign states than around something else: a worldwide defence of civilization against a worldwide threat of ‘Terror’. Nevertheless, between 1989 and 2001, the grounds of political judgement had shifted. Where the Cold War had still been understandable in terms of a basic distinction between friends and enemies, articulated on the ground of sovereign states, this distinction is now articulated in relation to something dramatically different. To look for some broader context in which to situate the events of 11 September is not to evade the need to condemn those who resorted to such violence. I have no doubt that these actions constituted an enormous crime, and ought to be dealt with as such. The really terrible thing is that it was an enormous crime among many enormous crimes, and as we know all too well, some of the worst criminals have been our friends, even our heroes; indeed, we are still recruiting them. Worse, some of the greatest crimes against humanity have been generated by huge social forces that destroy the lives of vast numbers of people every day; forces on which some of us thrive at other people’s expense, and against which we have absolutely no legal recourse. We cannot take whole economic, social, cultural or religious systems to court, and we cannot bomb them out of existence. We confront a political problem, not just a legal or an ethical one. Like it or not, arresting or exterminating those who were directly responsible for 11 September is not going to solve the problems of which these events are a symptom.
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We are likely to see a continuing resort to self-righteous fanaticism on both sides. On one side, is a fanaticism generated by extremes of violence, injustice, and exclusion, sustained by the bizarre invention of religious dogmas, and led by networks of people who have benefited both from our own indulgence and willingness to manipulate others to kill for us and from their own long experience of wars of resistance against colonialism. On the other side, is a fanaticism sustained by self-righteous belief in civilizational superiority as well as by much less civilized forms of superiority. Both are dangerous, and both have to be opposed. Some of the world’s most dangerous people hide out in the mountains, and others have legitimate access to the most devastating weapons of mass destruction the world has ever known. The late great Thomas Hobbes had a fairly good idea of the way those who claimed to protect us were always liable to do us serious damage.10 This basic insight is now much more disturbing than it was in the age of the English Civil War. We are also likely to see attempts to revive various forms of internationalism or multilateralism as various states seek both to support the American campaign against terrorism (not least because terrorism is directed at them, in many cases even more so), and also to resist further slippage from a pluralistic states-system to unilateral empire. Hence, the insistence on coalitions and consensus, and, hopefully, resistance to the crazy slope that runs from taking out Bin Laden to taking out Saddam and other highly selective undesirables. In the end, however, the events of 11 September and their aftermath point to a multiplicity of dangers in a world in which prevailing accounts of power, authority, and security are making the world a seriously unsafe place for everyone. It is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to assume we can organize and control the world by drawing the line, both physically and metaphorically, between here and there, this state and that state, America and the Middle East, between the included and the excluded, the citizen of this state and the citizen of that state, the nice people here, the weird or dangerous foreigner there. The most basic assumptions of the internationalist position are increasingly shaky, as a look at the pattern of refugees, financial flows, the drugs trade, the organization of terrorist cells, the organization of military force, and all the rest, have begun to suggest so clearly; though this certainly does not seem likely to prevent various states from seeking to police the line between included and excluded with ever greater degrees of discrimination. The extremists on both sides believe we can and must draw the line, and they do it in the most simplistic way possible. It is especially troubling that the crusading language that so many public figures have endorsed in relation to Islam is only an extreme form of the crusading moralism that all kinds of people have used to cover up and legitimise intolerable everyday violence generated by global patterns of economic and military practice. The road to hell is has been very brightly polished with good intentions. Any attempt to draw the lines tightly, to paint the world as either a conflict of religions or as a play of the great game of sovereign states, is going to make a bad situation worse. One can fear that we are back either to some even more
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awful version of the Thirty Years War or to the final collapse of modern politics into the demands of a self-righteous empire; or both. One can hope, with the internationalists, that these fears are overdrawn. But both spectres mask a complex geopolitical and geoeconomic transformation that goes far beyond the search for specific terrorists in Afghanistan or anywhere else. This is the context in which we should be talking about emerging forms of legal order, more creative forms of cultural relations, and dramatically less scope for a marriage between a globalizing market and a revival of Social Darwinism on a global scale. The tragedy of our times is not that we don’t know how to talk about such things but that our capacities to do so are increasingly divorced from the political processes that might allow us to do so in a meaningful way. In the meantime, General Sharon receives the blessings of the most powerful; the multilateralists are sounding very, very worried; very basic questions about legitimate authority in a rapidly changing world are increasingly difficult to answer; and everyday politics is indeed increasingly becoming the continuation of war by other means. There is certainly a problem here, but it does not go by the name of ‘Terror’. NOTES 1 Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers (eds), Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 2 Joseph S.Nye, Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 3 Evidence for such suspicions can be found, not only in the more volatile comments emerging from Bush and his advisors, but in the kind of analysis expressed in Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy in Perspective’, Foreign Affairs, 81, 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20–33. 4 The most provocative recent discussion of this possibility is Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), which develops an analysis that both converges and diverges with the underlying argument informing my analysis here. See Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J.Ruiz and R.B.J.Walker (eds), Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics (New York: Routledge, 2002); Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (eds), Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Robert Biel, The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradiction in North/South Relations (London: Zed, 2000). 5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) [originally published 1832]. 6 Hence Weber’s concern, in ‘Politics as a Vocation’, with the kind of politician, or man, or personality, who could live up to these spiritually difficult modern times. 7 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, translated with an Introduction by George Schwab and New Foreword by Tracy Strong (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996) [originally published 1932]; and Schmitt, Political Theology:
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Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985) [originally published 1922]. 8 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Critique of Violence’, fragmentary translations in Illuminations, edited with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969). 9. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Penguin, 1997). 10. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
6 Afghanistan and the Global Environment: Turning Local Language into Global Grammar ANDREW DOBSON
‘“You know your government,” he says, “all the Americans I meet are good people, but your government’s foreign policy is so bad. It’s not good, you know, for a country to be hated by so many people”’. (Ahdaf Soueif, The Map of Love)1 On the 12 September 2001, the day after the attack on the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers in New York, the School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment at Keele University, UK (where I then worked), began a twoweek summer school for European doctoral students of environmental politics and policy. As we gathered, the atmosphere was sombre, and I opened the session by reflecting my immediate reaction to the previous day’s events: that the world felt different on the 12 September to how it had felt the day before. This was a view shared by most of us present —and it could not have been more wrong. Now it is clear that the paths and patterns of power set weeks, months and even years ago have not changed direction but have, rather, been marked more clearly and more crudely than ever before. For a brief few weeks after 11 September a few of us clung to the belief that the attacks on New York and Washington would occasion a fundamental review of American (read United States of America) foreign policy that would seek to deal with the fundamental causes of resistance to American style globalisation. The more days that went by without the expected massive retaliation, and the more frantic European diplomacy, in the shape of British Prime Minister Tony Blair became, the more the naïve amongst us (myself included) really thought that a turning point might have been reached. Bad memories of American intransigence over the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, biological weapons agreements, American deter mination to press ahead with the ‘Star Wars’ defence system, and the suggested reneging on the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, all began to recede in the belief that the Bush administration would take stock of its situation and realise that elevating unilateralism to an objective of foreign policy rather than a means to achieving foreign policy objectives (and even that was bad enough) was a grave mistake. How sadly and completely have us poor naïfs been disabused since then. For me, the moment of truth was not 11 September but 7 October, when the bombing of
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Afghanistan began. The sound and fury of the bombing, and the right and proper resistance to it, obscured the deepening divisiveness of American foreign policy initiatives being pursued in its shadow. In this sense, American and British bombing was not only a means to the end of specific objectives in Afghanistan, but also a means to much more general ends. This was—and is—the systematic pursuit of a particular view of globalisation by means of war. Let me take two instances of initiatives pursued by the United States of America while the bombs were falling, and try to build an analysis of the role of the Afghanistan campaign in the creation of an (American) global environment. The two initiatives in question were the latest round of World Trade talks, under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in Doha, Qatar, and the most recent stage of the Kyoto agreement on climate change, in Marrakech, Morocco. Both of these events took place in November 2001, but even an avid observer of the news would have been forgiven for not noticing, so intensively was our attention focussed on events in Afghanistan. Let me take the WTO talks first. In introducing the talks, the Prime Minister of Qatar said that while he welcomed trade liberalisation, he also noted that ‘80 per cent of the world’s population consumes 15 per cent of the world’s resources and 20 per cent consumes 85 per cent of them’. It is not so much the imbalance in the terms of trade I want to point to here, though, but the systematic imbalance in the terms of negotiation. On the face of it there is no imbalance in the terms of negotiation, as the WTO is quick to point out. This is because, as the WTO proudly proclaims, the organisation’s decisions are taken by consensus. This is much more equitable than a simply majority system of voting, says the WTO, since even the smallest and least powerful participant in negotiations can scupper an agreement through using what is effectively the power of veto. The reality, of course, is somewhat different. The most elementary game theory shows that consensus decisionmaking only works in the way the WTO suggests when all participants are equally powerful. As the WTO itself recognises, though, ‘not every country has the same bargaining power’. In cases where governments refuse to come on board, the WTO continues by saying, rather darkly, that, ‘reluctant countries are persuaded by being offered something in return’. The key orientating question here is: ‘What can you offer a country that already has everything?’ What can you offer the United States of America if it refuses to play ball with everyone else? The answer, as the Bush administration has gleefully recognised, is nothing. The United States of America is in such a pre-eminently powerful position that it does not have to think in terms of bargaining, of partnerships. In a way, indeed, it does not have to think at all. Internationally, the United States is in the same position as the oil industry in the United States itself. As Edward Goldsmith has recently commented, ‘the oil industry in the US…no longer has to lobby the government, it is the government’.2 In the same way, the United States has no need to strike international bargains with the international community because it makes the international community’s rules. Inventing the category of ‘unlawful combatant’ to designate the prisoners held at Camp X-Ray in Cuba was simply
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the most bare-faced of a string of unilateral and illegal moves made by the Bush administration post-11 September. This explains why any hopes some of us had that the bombing of Afghanistan might be accompanied by serious efforts to understand the causes of the attacks on the Twin Towers, have been so cruelly dashed. Unilateralism dulls the political senses, and makes the powerful lazy. It also helps to explain the cavalier way in which the United States has left others to clear up the mess made in Afghanistan. It needed no partnership in war— beyond the fig leaf provided by Great Britain—and it has no intention of partnering in the ‘peace’. The WTO, then, prides itself on being a multilateral organisation. Fine. But how is it supposed to cope with fundamentalist unilateralism? The key point is the structural imbalance at work in the world today: some countries can only behave multilaterally, while the powerful ones have the luxury of both multilateralism and unilateralism at their disposal. This takes me to the second event that took place as the bombs were falling on Afghanistan—the Marrakech talks on the Kyoto protocol. It is now common knowledge that the aim of the protocol was, and is, to limit the emissions of the six gases that are most clearly responsible for global warming. The outcome of the talks in Marrakech came nowhere near to satisfying the demands of the environmental movement—nor, indeed, of the International Panel on Climate Change, which recommends a 60 per cent cut in 1990 greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. The Kyoto protocol, even if fully adhered to, will only produce a 5.2 per cent cut, delaying warming that would have occurred in 2094 to 2100—just a six-year respite. Despite the relatively feeble nature of the agreement, of the 39 countries that started out on the long road from Kyoto in 1997, only 38 reached Marrakech in 2001. There are no prizes for guessing which one dropped out along the way. Despite the fact that the US with just five per cent of the world’s population produces a quarter of the world’s greenhouse gases—11 times as much per head of population as China, 20 times more than India, and 300 times more than Mozambique—despite all this, the USA claims that the Kyoto protocol is ‘unfair’, since it exempts developing countries and is against the USA’s best economic interests. Instead of standing shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the world over global warming, as it demanded the rest of the world did after the Twin Towers attack on 11 September, the USA has embarked on a fossil fuel bonanza that will increase its greenhouse emissions by an estimated 35 per cent.3 George Bush’s National Energy Policy calls for between 1,300 and 1,900 electricity plants, the easing of regulations on the siting of power plants and refineries, the opening up of parts of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for oil and gas exploration, a cut in resources for renewable fuels of some 27 per cent, and a cut in federal investment in energy efficiency measures. It is commonly argued that Bush is returning favours accrued during his election campaign, to which various oil, coal, gas and utility companies contributed some $50 million. These connections and favours, and the ways of life and thinking that go with them, surely are linked to
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America’s withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol negotiations. Likewise, the Bush administration’s determination to pursue a fossil-fuelled economy at everincreasing levels of consumption is intimately connected with the Afghanistan campaign itself, as Bülent Gökay points out elsewhere in this book (Chapter 7).4 But neither of these points captures the profundity of what the WTO, Kyoto and Afghanistan stories tell us. When George W.Bush’s administration pulled out of the Kyoto talks, critics dubbed the Bush administration ‘isolationist’. Unfortunately for the rest of us it wasn’t—it was unilateralist, and unilateralism is the privilege granted only to the rich and powerful. This privilege brings with it great responsibility—a responsibility for international justice which the USA, in its current incarnation, is utterly incapable of discharging. What the events of the past few months have shown us is that unilateralism has been elevated by the Bush administration from a means for pursuing foreign policy to the main aim of foreign policy itself. In this regard the attacks on the Twin Towers provided a bejewelled opportunity to push ahead with a hegemonic game plan at a speed the administration itself could not have dreamt of. Again, the naïve amongst us thought that the shoulder-to-shoulder favour granted America by the rest of the world after 11 September would be returned via a reconsideration of the US stance on the Kyoto treaty, for example. This vain hope reckoned without both the pusillanimity of other governments—and especially the British one —and without the most fundamental fact of all: that only one country in the world at present has the luxury of choosing at will between multilateral co-operation and unilateral fiat. Everything suggests that when presented with the opportunity to choose between these two in the future, the United States will always opt the latter. I have heard well-intentioned American commentators suggesting that the events of ‘9/11’ pushed the Bush administration into welcome co-operation with the international community, in contrast to its unilateralist stance before the Twin Towers attack. This is not how things look from outside the USA. America’s reneging on the ABM treaty and the Kyoto treaty, and its determination to press ahead with Star Wars are all decisions that were taken post-September 11, not before. In casting around for a way of making sense of these developments, and in particular the asymmetries of power at work in them, we cannot do much better than the Indian environmentalist Vandana