The Military and Negotitation: The Role of the Soldier-Diplomat (The Cass Series on Peacekeeping)

THE MILITARY AND NEGOTIATION An investigation of the role of the modern soldier-diplomat and the nature of military negotiation in comparison with negotiation in other contexts. An analysis of the role of the military in current operations as negotiators and liaison workers in the field. Deborah Goodwin is a MoD Subject Matter Expert on Military Negotiation, particularly crisis negotiation. As a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, she both lectures and writes on the subject of negotiation in the national and international arena. A published author, she is leading the world research into peacekeeping dynamics, and furthering an understanding of what is going on when someone negotiates. She has trained some 6,500 peacekeepers worldwide in the last 10 years.

THE CASS SERIES ON PEACEKEEPING ISSN 1367–9880 General Editor: Michael Pugh This series examines all aspects of peacekeeping, from the political, operational and legal dimensions to the developmental and humanitarian issues that must be dealt with by all those involved with peacekeeping in the world today. 1. BEYOND THE EMERGENCY: DEVELOPMENT WITHIN UN MISSIONS edited by Jeremy Ginifer 2. THE UN, PEACE AND FORCE edited by Michael Pugh 3. MEDIATING IN CYPRUS: THE CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS by Oliver P.Richmond 4. PEACEKEEPING AND THE UN AGENCIES edited by Jim Whitman 5. PEACEKEEPING AND PUBLIC INFORMATION: CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE by Ingrid A.Lehmann 6. US PEACEKEEPING POLICY UNDER CLINTON: A FAIRWEATHER FRIEND? by Michael MacKinnon 7. PEACEBUILDING AND POLICE REFORM edited by Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide 8. PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION edited by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse 9. MANAGING ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram 10. WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING edited by Louise Olsson and Torunn L.Tryggestad

11. RECOVERING FROM CIVIL CONFLICT: RECONCILIATION, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT edited by Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel 12. MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS edited by Henry F.Carey and Oliver P.Richmond 13. IRELAND AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 1960–2000: A STUDY OF IRISH MOTIVATION by Katsumi Ishizuka 14. PEACE OPERATIONS AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 edited by Thierry Tardy 15. CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE VS PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION by Chandra Lekha Sriram 16. THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA edited by Pia Christina Wood and David S.Sorensen 17. A UN ‘LEGION’: BETWEEN UTOPIA AND REALITY by Stephen Kinloch-Pichat 18. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA by John Terence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees 19. THE MILITARY AND NEGOTIATION: THE ROLE OF THE SOLDIERDIPLOMAT by Deborah Goodwin

THE MILITARY AND NEGOTIATION The role of the soldier-diplomat

Deborah Goodwin

FRANK CASS London and New York

First published in 2005 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS 2 Park Square, Milton Park Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by FRANK CASS 270 Madison Ave, NewYork, NY 10016 Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “ To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 Deborah Goodwin All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Goodwin, Deborah. The military and negotiation: the role of the soldier-diplomat/Deborah Goodwin.—1st ed. p. cm.—(The Cass series on peacekeeping; 19) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-35094-8 (hardback) 1. Negotiation. 2. Peacekeeping forces. I. Title. II. Series. U270.G52 2005 355.4–dc22 2004011144 ISBN 0-203-01028-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-35094-8 (Print Edition)

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

ix

About the Author

x

List of Figures

xi

Abbreviations, Explanations and Caveats

xiv

Foreword

xvii

Background

xviii

PART I SETTING THE SCENE

1

Introduction The General Problem: The Nature of Tactical-level Military Negotiation 1 Review of Extant Literature on Military Negotiation

2

2 Review of Extant Literature and Theories from Proximate Disciplines

13

3 Strategic Interaction

18

4 Situational Influences

60

5 Interpersonal Interaction

73

6 Problems Facing Soldiers in Negotiation Contexts, and the Key Factors Involved

89

PART II CASE STUDIES

8

145

7 A Peacekeeping Operation in Liberia: A Proposed Model of Tactical-level Military Negotiation 8 United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, 1992–1993

147

9 The Hostage Crisis in Sierra Leone, 2000

181

10 Conclusions

155

191

Appendices

197

Bibliography

218

Index

224

To Peter

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As can be imagined, this has been a very complex study to compile and complete, and I would like to thank all the support from serving military personnel for their candid review of their role as negotiators in the field. I would also like to thank other peacekeeping operatives who shared their experiences with me so generously. For helping me to form a coherent whole from such a plethora of material I would like to thank Dr Cecilia Albin, University of Reading, and Professor Tom Woodhouse, University of Bradford, for casting critical eyes. I would also like to thank Professor James McCallum, US Army War College, for his encouragement, and Maureen Everard for helping with all things technical. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Peter, for his tremendous support and infinite patience with a wife absorbed in this research and writing for many years. His belief in me, and my work, helped me through the tricky times. Deborah Goodwin, Ph.D.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR In her professional capacity as a senior lecturer in the Department of Communication and Management Studies, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, the author has had access to worldwide military operations to observe, monitor and analyse negotiation incidents in the field. She has had clearance to speak to personnel, and access to operational written material. This accessibility, which is ongoing, has allowed her to approach practitioners of tactical-level military negotiation, and obtain evidence, in circumstances where many other scholars would have difficulty. She was responsible for the introduction, development and delivery of negotiation training for all Officer Cadets at Sandhurst from 1994 onwards. On an increasingly frequent basis, she is asked by both national and international agencies to train personnel in this particular negotiation type. She is a faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, Canada, and lectures on their ‘Negotiation for Peacekeepers’ course. She has guest-lectured on the subject at the US Army War College, Fort Bragg, Striking Fleet Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia, and trained NATO and UN personnel in the United States. She is a member of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, and the Strategic and Combat Studies Institute.

LIST OF FIGURES 0.1

Similarities and differences in emphasis of key factors in negotiation

6

3.1

The diversity of decision-making influences within a negotiation

19

3.2 Framing contexts and proposed decision-making influences

23

3.3 ‘Increasing the pie’, or options, within a negotiation

24

3.4 Initial perception of agreement areas in negotiation

27

3.5

Possible situational and behavioural influences within the negotiation process

28

3.6

Possible ‘sliding scale’ of agreement

29

3.7 Resolution at A’s point 2

29

3.8

Two-person bargaining with ‘shifting evaluations’

31

3.9

Burton’s definitions

32

3.10 Critical risk

32

3.11 Nash’s equality of outcome in negotiation

36

3.12 Prisoner’s dilemma, 1

38

3.13 Prisoner’s dilemma, 2

39

3.14 Nash’s threat points

40

3.15 The road experiment

47

3.16 Author’s representation of Deutsch’s findings

48

3.17 Frequency of talking in the threat conditions

48

3.18 Basic Fisher/Ury model of negotiation (author’s summation and depiction)

50

3.19 Example of buying a car

51

4.1 5.1 6.1

A model of culture (adapted from Trompenaars and Hampden- 64 Turner) Messages sent and how they are received Similarities and differences in emphasis of key factors in negotiation

756 90

6.2 Sequential time perception

103

6.3 Synchronic time perception

104

6.4 Synchronic time perception with an emphasis on the past

105

6.5 Sequential time perception with an emphasis on the present

106

6.6 Nordic representation of escalation in any encounter

116

6.7 Military negotiation constructs and the effect of stressors

124

6.8 Four methods to use in training situations

129

6.9 Negotiation scenario assessment form

132

7.1 Liberia incident: initial stage

149

7.2 Second stage of development

150

7.3 Third stage of development

151

7.4

153

Final stage

8.1 Perceived new ‘soft skills’ required by peacekeepers

163

8.2 Initial stage of the HVO ‘negotiation’

173

8.3 The multiple factors affecting the HVO negotiation

174

8.4 The dynamics within a peacekeeping operation (after Faure)

176

9.1 Initial proposed structure of the Sierra Leone situation

183

9.2

Suggested model of the initial decision-making factors in Sierra 188 Leone

A.1 Initial model depicting a proposed range of a negotiator’s scope 202 for successful outcomes in either a cooperative or controversial model A.2 Plot 1: using arbitrary numerical values applied to the formula

204

A.3 Initial military negotiation constructs recommended for use in DIAMOND

209

A.4 Example: ‘inter-party co-operation options’

213

A.5 Relationship pairings with likely response modes

214

A.6 Possible interactions in overcoming a roadblock, for modelling 215 purposes Note: All figures are original authorial representations, or adapted from the original.

ABBREVIATIONS, EXPLANATIONS AND CAVEATS AOR

Area of Responsibility

BATNA

Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement

BH

Bosnia-Herzegovina

brc

boundary role conflict

CA

Civil Affairs

DERA

Defence Evaluation and Research Agency

DIAMOND

Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-war Fighting Domain

HQ

Headquarters

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

(M) LO

(Military) Liaison Officer

MSF

Médecins sans Frontières

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO

non-governmental organisation

OOTW

Operations Other Than War

PSYOPS

Psychological Operations

PSOs

Peace Support Operations

ROEs

Rules of Engagement

SOPs

Standard Operating Procedures

TOO

Theatre of Operations

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNMO

United Nations Military Observer

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force

WATNA

Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

ZOPA

Zone of Possible Agreement

LEVELS OF COMMAND EXPLAINED Throughout this book reference will be made to specific levels of command, and clarification of the terminology is given here. Strategic/political The policy makers on a national or international scale (for example the UN or a national government) Operational Overall command in the operational area (for example, battalion headquarters) Tactical

The personnel on the ground, carrying out orders and instructions from the two other command levels (for example, the platoon commander or the individual soldier). This is the level that the book seeks to analyse in terms of the nature of negotiation carried out in this context.

IMPORTANT CAVEAT: USE OF MILITARY SOURCE MATERIAL AND CLASSIFICATION ISSUES All the sources used and then directly quoted in this book are in the public domain. Before starting this research, the author was given permission by the relevant authorities to interview military personnel, but only on the understanding that any comments were to be cited as ‘non-attributable and non-personalised’, for various reasons. Where such material is used within the book, the footnote reference will indicate the anonymity of the source, as requested. Replication and production of any such material both within this book and in any other context has not been attempted, and will not be possible, in any circumstances. For the necessary supporting case-study evidence the author has been allowed to view official and military documentation kept in non-public archives, but direct reference to such documentation, or replication, or duplication of it, has not been made in this book. Only where circumstances and classification settings allow has authorial paraphrasing of findings or statements been alluded to occasionally, but at no time is attribution made or indicated, or any such statements reproduced verbatim, or otherwise, in circumstances that do not allow it. These were requirements imposed by the MoD before the start of this research, and they have been strictly adhered to. The views expressed, and the conclusions drawn within this book, are those of the author, and are in no way intended to represent the views of the Ministry of Defence, or any other organisation, individual or agency.

FOREWORD Developed in the 1950s as a mechanism to prevent the escalation of international conflict, peacekeeping enjoyed a relatively good press in its formative years. In 1957 Lester Pearson, the man who, along with Dag Hammarskjöld, defined the principles under which peacekeeping operations would function, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The same honour was made posthumously to Hammarskjöld in 1961, and in 1988 peacekeeping forces collectively were presented with the award. However, the image of United Nations peacekeeping forces has been tarnished somewhat in the light of troubled experiences in civil wars in the 1990s. Despite general disillusionment, it remains the case, as made by UN Force Commander in Bosnia in the mid-1990s General Sir Michael Rose, that the world would be a much more dangerous place if we lost faith in peacekeeping. A considerable effort has been made in the past few years to critically review the theory and practice of peacekeeping in order to reform and modernise it. The future peacekeeping will depend on the capability and willingness to reform and strengthen peacekeeping mechanisms, and to clarify their role in conflict resolution. Whilst some of this re-thinking has been conducted by policy makers, officials and academic consultants reporting to the UN, there has also been an impressive contribution to the development of new doctrine and operational practice by national militaries seeking to clarify and develop their peacekeeping roles. In this book, Deborah Goodwin, who both designed the course on negotiation for British Army officers and continues to teach on it, presents the results of her research and experience on the uses of negotiation strategies by peacekeepers and ‘soldier-diplomats’. While much has been done to ‘theorise’ this role, there is very little in the literature which provides guidance on how the theory can be operationalised. Military personnel are now operating in missions where soldiers may be mandated to fulfil a range of tasks in humanitarian missions, stability operations and broader peacekeeping operations. The need for soldiers as peacekeepers to function as conflict resolvers and negotiators in the post-Cold War environment is greater than ever. The major contribution of this book is that while drawing on theories of negotiation and conflict management, it also provides unique data from case studies. It sheds new light on the demands and skills of tactical-level conflict management in combative and volatile environments and reveals the importance of conflict management skills in the ‘arsenal of response’ of the modern soldier. The book has important lessons for the ways in which training must be enhanced to develop these skills more fully. In the context of events in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need for sophisticated approaches to winning hearts and minds is critical. This book makes a powerful contribution to meeting this challenge. Professor Tom Woodhouse University of Bradford March 2004

BACKGROUND The modern world is witnessing a revival of the role of the soldier-diplomat in the military operational context. This is mainly due to the inclusion of non-combative imperatives in some modern mission mandates, different rules of engagement and operating procedures, as evinced on peacekeeping operations in particular. In such directives, stress is laid upon Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which emphasises the relevance and importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as preferred ways to resolve disputes. Today’s soldier may be expected to resolve conflicts by using negotiation, rather than immediately resorting to the use of armed force. Thus the soldier needs to possess and display a multiplicity of responses within a conflict zone, ranging from ‘traditional’ outright warfare (where there is a complete negation of negotiation) to a seemingly antithetical skill in the form of negotiation (where armed conflict is avoided). Such a range of response creates a complex decision-making context for the modern soldier. However, the fundamental question concerning the nature of tactical-level military negotiation has not been asked, or answered, to date. Tacticallevel military negotiation has not been analysed as an important specific form of negotiation. This book explores the context of the negotiating soldier, and the dilemmas faced when negotiating in a volatile environment, together with an exploration of the process itself. The main hypothesis of this book is that military tactical-level negotiation, whilst not possessing unique traits and features, combines certain factors in unusually high degrees, and with different emphasis and imperatives from those evinced in other types of negotiation. This is a form of negotiation that is very different in degree, rather than in kind. The consequences of poor performance, or weak agreements, in a combative environment can result in significant, if not deadly, ramifications. A thorough investigation of the negotiation process and essential decision-making factors for a soldier, together with a proposed model of analysis and training, is long overdue. Existing scholarship tends to concentrate on generic forms of negotiation. This book examines the applicability of such theories to tacticallevel military negotiation, and whether the factors discussed in these theories affect the military negotiation context. It will be argued that force, mission, time and restrictive rules of engagement, together with the influence of elements such as culture, communication, power, personality and competitiveness, form the essential elements of tactical-level military negotiation. None of these factors is unique. However, their combination and interplay, and the emphasis placed upon them, appears to be unusual, and they seem to rely on the specific context within which they are found and employed. The originality of this book lies in the analysis of delineating factors in a form of negotiation that takes place in a volatile, aggressive context, and which has been neglected to date. Through direct, and personal, access to examples of such work ‘on the

ground’, and the inclusion and examination of pertinent case studies, including Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, exemplification and exploration of the key negotiating factors on military operations is undertaken. This is an investigative and systematically analytical examination of a form of negotiation that has received little attention, but, since it is an important function of the modern soldier in the post-Cold War environment, the aim is the delineation and development of a discrete multi-variable framework for this form of negotiation that will both represent the practicalities of the process and serve to inform and help to train personnel deploying and encountering tactical-level military negotiation in the future. This research reveals the predominance of negotiation in the ‘arsenal of response’ for the modern soldier. Even in more obviously aggressive military operations, such as the operation mounted in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, some military units continue to work as discrete liaison teams, and negotiate with locals on a daily basis to help to rebuild a shattered infrastructure. All the personnel encountered in the course of this research emphasised the importance they place on negotiation in the field. What troubled some of them was the lack of sufficient, pertinent, pre-deployment training in the subject, with the chance to hone their competence. This work will be used to re-design the delivery of such required training by providing a contextually specific framework for this form of negotiation, and places a significant military skill under the analytical ‘spotlight’ at last.

WHY SHOULD THE MILITARY NEGOTIATE? When the author proposed, introduced and then developed negotiation training for all Army Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, in 1994, it was as a response to the changing role of military personnel on operations around the world. Circumstances were dictating that the military, primarily in their role as peacekeepers, were required to interact with a multiplicity of organisations and individuals on operations in order to achieve safe resolutions to volatile situations. Whilst a military force is inextricably linked with armed response, and this remains an option in most deployments, the growth of civil-military liaison work and non-confrontational encounters with warring factions to uphold a mandate of neutrality dictate an urgent requirement for any soldier to be able to negotiate responsibly and effectively. Problems arose when both training, and the real-world application of that training, could not be based on established negotiation modelling or frameworks with any high degree of relevance. The established analysis of small-scale negotiation, based mainly on business negotiation contexts, labour management negotiations, experiments in interpersonal conflict situations, or pure game-theory modelling, did not reflect or complement the situations within which serving personnel found themselves.1 It became apparent that the military operating environment produced negotiating imperatives that required in-depth analysis and greater clarification. The book seeks to fill this need. It aims to assess the fundamental issues involved in tactical-level military negotiation in order to stimulate and evolve a more pertinent

approach to the dissemination of knowledge to, and training of, those personnel who will undertake such work in the future. Indications are that this new role for the military is increasing rather than being occasional, prompted by operational mandates and rules of engagement that stress such a response. Therefore it is time that the key issues and problems arising from tactical-level military negotiation in the field are probed and assessed in a systematic manner. The book will explore and examine the particular traits and features present in tacticallevel military negotiation which, whilst not being unique in themselves, appear to exist in unusually high degrees in this type of negotiation, and make for a complicated negotiation form. It will be argued that this is a negotiation type that is different in degree, rather than kind. Tactical negotiation possesses particular traits existing in an uncommon mix, with imperatives, both internal and external, delineating and proscribing the decision-making factors. It is argued that the essential factors in military tactical negotiation encounters comprise the issues of force, mission demands, an urgency concerning time, personal duress, and threat moves, with the additional influence of context, culture, communication and personality. Existing literature and theories will prove useful in the analysis, applicability and influence of such factors. The literature most relevant to military negotiation can be found in material that analyses hostage negotiation, or interaction with terrorists; and a review of such material will highlight features and characteristics similar to tactical negotiation, but not all. Whilst the elements present in hostage negotiation might reflect those present in a volatile military setting, the argument will be made that the tactical-level military negotiator encounters other concerns and influences, and has to know how to negotiate in both a volatile and a calm situation, and a soldier has to be able to adapt and react to numerous negotiating encounters in the daily working environment, as well as using pure military skills. Chapter 1 examines the extant literature on hostage negotiation. More general negotiation literature is analysed in Chapter 2 in order to appraise accepted delineating factors in the negotiation process per se, and begins to outline the apparent mixture of such factors within tactical negotiation. The existing literature also provides examples of other forms of negotiation that will be used as a comparison. The intended scholarly contribution of this book is an assessment of the most relevant literature on negotiation, and how well it applies to a type of negotiation that has not been systematically studied to date. The book seeks to add to the theoretical debate concerning negotiation by focusing on a form and application that have remained unexplored. This oversight has been mainly due to scholars being unable to access the military working environment and the personnel in a protracted and wide-ranging manner, and being unable to access supporting written material held in non-public archives. Chapters 3–6 discuss and assess the mixture of factors present in more common negotiation settings, and then further the discussion by proposing and highlighting the key problems facing soldiers in negotiation contexts, as derived from extant literature and empirical evidence. Specific empirical data are then gathered, analysed and discussed in terms of the proposed key characteristics. Particular case studies (Liberia, Bosnia and Sierra Leone)

have been selected to assess the characteristics and the mechanics of the process ‘on the ground’, and this analysis can be found in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. The final aim of the book, once the proposed characteristics have been defined and discussed, is to help to improve practical negotiation training for serving personnel. The theoretical frameworks, delineations and examination of appropriate empirical evidence will culminate in the introduction of a new model for tactical military negotiation that could frame future training and delivery of information in this discipline. This is outlined and discussed in Appendix 3.

NOTE 1. Categories summarised in J.Z.Rubin and B.R.Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1975).

Part I SETTING THE SCENE

INTRODUCTION The general problem: the nature of tactical-level military negotiation At the heart of this book is the contention that the nature of tactical-level military negotiation may be delineated by certain vital factors, all of which affect the decisionmaking process for the operational soldier in a negotiating scenario, and in a specific manner. In comparison with negotiation that is carried out in other contexts, it appears that a military negotiator may have a number of imperatives and demands made upon him or her that do not exist, at least to the same extent, in other negotiating situations.1 The complications that might arise for the serving soldier in modern operations (which increasingly demand the use of negotiation rather than force, at least as an initial response, in any encounter), might affect the scope for creative option making and cooperative interaction. The ability to negotiate effectively while under duress, physical threat and armed intervention suggests a mixture of skills and issues distinctive to the combative arena. It is these factors that need investigation. In recent years the nature and role of serving military personnel, particularly as peacekeepers, has grown and developed on operations around the world, and the associated mandates and Rules of Engagement (ROEs) tend to stress the conciliatory approach whenever possible on operations, as will be seen. British military personnel, together with other national armed forces, are being instructed in negotiation techniques in both their basic training and pre-deployment phases. However, the contention in this book is that the nature of the negotiation situations in which the serving soldier finds him or herself are necessarily very different from other forms of negotiations, and in order to deal successfully with a military operational negotiation it may be necessary to bear certain discrete factors in mind, and to try to train for these eventualities also. THE OPERATING CONTEXT AND NEW DEMANDS To explain briefly at this introductory stage of the work, the core mission of an operation defines the context within which a soldier operates. This is the operating environment as defined by the strategic and political policy makers, which is then detailed in operational ROEs and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) to be used at both the operational and tactical levels of command. Just as a commercial negotiator will have his corporate mission statement with its inherent business aims and objectives, the military can be said to have the equivalent. Deployment into an operational area will demand specific mission statements for the serving personnel, and will generate orders to be implemented at all command levels. To state the obvious, a soldier will carry out those orders whenever and

Introduction

3

wherever possible. If the mission demands that a military peacekeeping force use its armed might to support the distribution of humanitarian aid, then that will be the prime directive for the force. History tends to ‘remember’ the soldier who goes against the mission. Colonel Bob Stewart’s public outbursts over the massacre in Ahmici, Bosnia, were commendable in a moral sense; but he was acting against his military directives by working so directly with the world’s media. Albeit for worthy personal reasons, he was going against the core UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) mission objective—that of military neutrality.2 Frustration and desperation might tempt a soldier to seek to defy the ROEs, but by doing so that soldier will then be acting as an individual, and not as a representative peacekeeper, for example. Such a response raises an issue concerning personality and decision making that might also prove to be a significant issue in military negotiation. Acute consciousness of the all-pervading mission demands will dictate how a military negotiator is likely to respond in a tactical-level negotiation. At all stages of a negotiation the soldier will be aware of the mission brief, and the mission brief might result in inflexibility in ultimate decision making for that soldier. When another party is encountered, one of the first objectives will be to ascertain the extent to which that party is a threat to the mission. Soldiers are likely to ask themselves if their actions hinder the prosecution of orders. The answer to this question is likely to be ‘yes’ in most encounters; for example, people at a roadblock are unlikely to begin a negotiation in a highly cooperative manner, as will be shown. As a soldier explores the situation through conversation, information concerning the armed tactical stance of the other party will be sought constantly. Even though a soldier will engage in cooperative negotiation when it is deemed appropriate, it is likely that should that negotiation compromise the overall mission brief, other options may be exercised. TIME, URGENCY AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES Linked to the conscious mission brief is the time factor, and the urgency to complete the mission brief. Orders are often given with time objectives linked to them; the achievement of a task within a specific time scale allows for smoother operability in the field. Yet one of the indisputable characteristics of negotiation per se is the recognition that ‘it takes as long as it takes’. Because of the sheer diversity of factors at play within a negotiation, it can be very difficult to insist on a set time limit within which the negotiation is to come to a successful resolution. There are occasions when deadlines are set within a negotiation, or imposed from outside, and they can enhance the final decision-making process dramatically, but at the tactical level discussion can be more fluid, if not protracted. Delaying tactics are used frequently in military operational scenarios. As will be discussed later, one of the main reasons for setting up makeshift roadblocks in areas such as Bosnia in the 1990s, for example, was to delay the UN forces, rather than try to obtain anything from them. This happened because the other party knew how the military operated, and the UNPROFOR case study later in the book will explore this interaction. The negotiating counterparts will know that the soldier is likely to be limited, in a sense, by his mission brief, his ROEs, and the directed time within which those orders are to be achieved. It is an easy antagonistic ploy to frustrate the military

The military and negotiation

4

through ‘wasting time’, as it may be perceived. For the military negotiator the added pressure of a consciousness of the time factor could be detrimental to the maintenance of a cooperative stance, as an over-eagerness to achieve the military objective might lead to a more aggressive approach to the other party, which can be effective on occasions.3 The main argument to be made concerning the element of time and stress is that an inability to control the mutability of a negotiation can worry and frustrate a soldier, especially if it takes a lengthy interaction to achieve a successful resolution. Basic military training and ethos imply a requirement to achieve any objective speedily and efficiently, and the vagueness and ambiguity in negotiation runs contrary to this desire. What has been happening in recent peacekeeping scenarios, for example, is that the tacticallevel soldiers have learned to adapt their skills rapidly, since the need to switch from being an armed peacekeeper to a cooperative negotiator can arise at any time, and at any moment in an operational situation. Soldiers are therefore widening the more traditional military skills base, as will be discussed.4 AN AGGRESSIVE CONTEXT A military tactical-level negotiation in a peacekeeping or volatile context is laced with obvious aggressive intent, and this makes for a specific type of bargaining situation. The potential for armed response, by either side and at any point in a negotiation, can make for a dangerous and provocative negotiating situation. This is why peacekeepers are soldiers or police, rather than civilians who would be unused to such aggressive and dangerous contexts. That is not to say that military negotiators necessarily have to be tough and aggressive, but they do have to be aware of their driving concerns on operation, and the possibility of violence. Military negotiation could also be described as negotiating under duress, with an equivalent context being hostage negotiation, for example. Referring to the Iranian Embassy siege in London in 1980, the police negotiators, whilst not negotiating face to face with the hostage takers, were acutely conscious of the potential for those men to stop negotiating at any time and to choose to start shooting, which they did eventually.5 The unusual mixture of factors being postulated in this book might also be applied to the siege, where the mission was the safe retrieval of all hostages and the capture of the terrorists, and ideally to achieve this in as short a time span as possible (given the need to maintain the well-being of the hostages). Force was a conscious option for both sides to use at any time in the process. The terrorists could exhibit force by shooting hostages; the police could exercise the final resolution to the situation by calling in the SAS, or a similar organisation.6 Even while the members of the SAS were standing on the balconies ready to storm the building, the police negotiator was continuing to speak to the head terrorist on the telephone, discussing the details concerning a bus being driven up outside the building for the terrorist ‘getaway’. The negotiation only stopped when the terrorist heard the entry noises coming from above.

Introduction

5

DECISION MAKING As stated earlier, discrete factors delineate the decision-making process of the soldiernegotiator, and they will be seen to be crucial to the context within which soldiers operate. At times, they may limit the scope within a negotiation for flexibility in option creation, but they are there to maintain the security of the personnel involved and the validity of the operation itself. Peacekeepers around the world face life-and-death situations on a daily basis, and not all of these take place in battle, since just as many can be faced in a negotiation, a situation that always has the potential to flare into a firefight at any moment. It takes a skilled negotiator to remain creative in such a setting, and to make the correct decision under pressure. Therefore, the factors shown in Figure 0.1 will be discussed, appraised and analysed in order to explain the context within which the military negotiator operates and seeks to reach resolution. SUMMARY This book thus seeks to analyse and assess the role and nature of ‘face-to-face’ tactical negotiation skills as applied ‘on the ground’ by military personnel, or, as this task will also be described, ‘micro negotiation’. As Figure 0.1 suggests, it examines the hypothesis that there is a distinct military form of negotiation, adapted or otherwise, which is different in type from other forms of negotiation. It also explores the theoretical base for this type of military conflict resolution. Related to this discussion will be the requirement to assess the relationship with general negotiation theory and extant negotiation models, together with the links, or differences, in meaning and implementation, between other negotiating contexts and the military world. To help to exemplify and explore the issues raised, there will be a detailed case study of tactical negotiation as displayed in Liberia in the 1990s, UNPROFOR in the early 1990s, and a comparative case study based upon operations in Sierra Leone in 2000. Analysis of these case studies aims to address the implication that military negotiation in the field had for operational effectiveness. It is hoped that from such a review it will be possible to make recommendations for future training and application of this skill.7 The final aim of this book is to attempt to construct a working model of military negotiation, using the suggested delineating factors, in order to assess and outline the elements present in a military micro negotiation, and to analyse the central dilemmas in any such conflict situation. To this end, the concluding section of the book is dedicated to the construction and testing of a speculative new model for military negotiation, entitled the ‘DIAMOND’ model. It is hoped that this model will provide new scope for pertinent military negotiation training, together with the recommendations made in the concluding comments.

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Figure 0.1 Similarities and differences in emphasis of key factors in negotiation NOTES 1. Wherever the generic term ‘he’ is used in the text it may be interpreted as applying equally to both genders. 2. United Nations Protection Force: this existed in Bosnia in 1992–95. 3. Studies have shown that integrative, ‘cooperative’, negotiation takes much more time, but tends to result in more mutually satisfactory outcomes (see Chapter 3 for detailed analysis and cited sources). However, it will be argued that the soldier is not always concerned with a mutually agreeable outcome; agreements need to satisfy ROEs and mandates. 4. This belief is echoed in the comments by Stephen Collett in his essay ‘Humanitarian Peacekeeping: Ethical Considerations’, in Alex Morrison (ed.), The New Peacekeeping Partnership (Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1994) p. 164, where he states: Training is now seen as an increasingly important element for peacekeeping operations, especially training in negotiation and conflict resolution. This underscores the difference between a soldier just trained for soldiering and someone who is trained additionally for peacekeeping operations. A soldier is trained to go and do what he is told to do, but a peacekeeper cannot rely on that. If a peacekeeper meets a situation of violence with an armed potential opponent and fails to deal with it immediately, there is a probability of escalation…’

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5. The author has had conversations with the Metropolitan Police units involved in such work. For security reasons, personal details cannot be cited here. 6. Special Air Service. 7. The focus is mainly on the British Army throughout this book, but reference is made to other serving forces as applicable.

1 REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE ON THE NATURE OF MILITARY NEGOTIATION The extant literature on the nature of tactical-level military negotiation is sparse. Discussion tends to be limited to sections in broad-based military training manuals that outline general procedures to be followed if personnel find themselves negotiating on operations.1 These procedural rules are necessarily brief and instructional, and seek to define the behavioural response to be taken in any negotiation. The fundamental issues and dilemmas involved in tactical-level military negotiation are rarely assessed in any detailed manner. The existing briefing literature tends to follow the trend of ‘how to do it’ manuals, rather than being investigative in approach, and, as such, tends to be limited in analysis. Part of the reason for this might lie in the fact that negotiation as a key military skill has only really become pre-eminent over the last decade, a decade dominated by peacekeeping. An urgent requirement for procedures for personnel to follow superseded any methodical or analytical modelling of the negotiation process itself. Such contextually specific analysis is appearing only slowly, and often only as an aside to investigations concerning peacekeeping, or modern conflict.2 There is little to be discovered from military training manuals in terms of productive modelling of the process of tactical negotiation, or discussion of the key issues and problems arising from such interaction. Procedural rules imply behavioural response, but do not look below the surface to investigate the factors influencing the process in the military context. The literature that comes closest to the contextual circumstances of military negotiation is that which analyses hostage negotiation, or negotiation in volatile circumstances.3 This literature seeks to place negotiation in a specific dangerous context and explores the factors inherent in a process affected by the potential for violence. An early, and useful, analysis of hostage negotiation was undertaken by Abraham H.Miller in 1980.4 He sought to explore the methods used to deal with hostage situations, and to analyse the political and psychological factors inherent in hostage/barricade incidents.5 The importance of negotiation is emphasised, particularly in the following comment: the major…tactical decisions resided solely with the metropolitan police. They had final decision making and jurisdictional authority over the entire operation. The situation does, however, demonstrate that negotiation in the sense of bartering can lead to an appropriate solution that results in the freeing of hostages without the authorities either outrageously

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compromising themselves or having to set a series of precedents that would make the next encounter more likely or more difficult.6 This assessment bears marked similarities to the working context for the tactical-level soldier. Whilst orders might be imposed from higher levels of command, the ultimate decision lies with the individual negotiating ‘on the ground’. Important also is the emphasis Miller places on the need not to hamper future encounters, or having a sense of working within the ‘shadow of tomorrow’, since soldiers are briefed that negotiated solutions must be effective and also sustainable, but not detrimental to the next negotiator faced with a similar dilemma. Miller stresses the key factors as ‘inequity’ in outcome (for example, the emphasis lies on the negotiator succeeding in his demands, even at the expense of the hostage taker), the need for ‘efficient and overwhelming force’ (p. 32), and a recognition that ‘our domestic police have never viewed hostage techniques…as a substitute for standard police methods, but rather as an extension of them’. These are interesting conclusions that hint at similarities in the military environment, but do not mirror it completely. A case will be made in the book that the tactical soldier, in some contexts, will not seek a win-win solution, but will hope to achieve a resolution that satisfies the mission demands, as Miller suggests. Such an imperative is likely to result in an unequal outcome. This is an unusual approach in any negotiation, but in a volatile context appears to be a reality, when necessary. Differences between the police and the military exist in Miller’s other conclusions also: whilst a soldier is fully capable of using overwhelming force as a solution, he is unlikely to move towards that option unless provoked or physically threatened. In other words, if there is no escalation in violence, the usual operating procedures for the tactical soldier will demand a negotiated outcome, however long that takes, or even a back-down if negotiation fails. Just because a negotiation becomes protracted or stalemated does not mean that the tactical soldier has an imperative to use force; if he did so in a non-violent context then he would be ignoring the ROEs, and that would result in legal culpability.7 Negotiation as an extension of daily duties and practice might be a useful descriptor for police work, but, as will be shown, it is a different skill for the modern soldier whose other ‘daily duties’ revolve around an infantry-based technique of conflict resolution. In terms of behaviour and procedural moves, negotiation can be described as being at the opposite end of a sliding scale of response for the military individual, with war (and the total negation of negotiation) at the other end of the scale of options. In this sense, negotiation is a substitute for standard military operating procedures. Richard E.Hayes continues the discussion concerning negotiation in a violent context.8 He states that research in such a context remains fundamentally flawed and lacking in applicability, and that a diversity of theoretical material, empirical data and analysis is needed if an appropriate framework is to be applied to such a discrete negotiation context. He recognises the need to draw on many negotiating disciplines in order to explain the complexity of the process in a terrorist or violent context. An important point he makes involves the urgent requirement for two-sided databases and models, since most existing research focuses on the terrorist bargaining context and fails to consider important facets of government negotiations, and also greater analysis of the psychological factors at play within such an encounter. These are important conclusions

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in the context of this book, where greater delineation of a specific negotiating context lies at the heart of the analysis. Hayes stresses that some work has been carried out on the way in which hostage takers behave, for example, but little has been attempted to try to delineate the factors influencing the police or government negotiators who interact with these groups. This is a gap in current analytical study. Some attempts have been made to apply more systematic knowledge to the interplay in a hostage negotiation, and the work of Oots (1986) stresses that violence indicates a failed negotiation, that the diversity of interests at play will cause problems in eventual resolution, and that there is no common worldview between the negotiating parties.9 He concentrates on this lack of shared interests, but does not consider other problems such as poor communication and cultural barriers that might compound the difficulty of two diverse parties seeking to negotiate, or that violence can be used in a negotiation as a threat move. Such ideas will be proposed in terms of military negotiation, where seeming disparity in interests, and a violent context, can still lead to negotiated outcomes. Peter Sarna (1997) summarises the factors involved in volatile negotiation incidents as follows:10 worst case scenarios combine high risk factors with low organizational capacity… The task of incident commanders is twofold. First, the complex must be made simple…it also involves the gathering of intelligence to make the situation more understandable (i.e., less equivocal) and thus, hopefully, more manageable. Second, irrationality must be reduced to a point where problem solving becomes possible. As complexity is reduced and irrationality decreases, risk falls. Concomitantly, the likelihood of successful resolution rises. Hayes also comments that some authors seeking to analyse discrete negotiating contexts can draw unsatisfactory conclusions because their own personal disciplines are remote from a world that encompasses terror or violence. The world of academia does not allow for personal experience of a violent context or personal knowledge of the interplay involved, and, thus, scholars can fall into a trap of categorising such a specialist form of negotiation in terms with which they are more familiar, perhaps economic, political or social theory, for example. This, he suggests, is fundamentally unsatisfactory, and, ideally, scholars who have personal involvement in the specialist area that requires analysis ought to be those who lead the research. This has been evident in the work produced for police negotiators, much of which is written by serving police negotiators themselves and supplemented by other related professionals, and in the military context the same should apply, but to date this has not been evident to any great extent.11 Any theories about specialist negotiating contexts, Hayes suggests, will need to encompass a variety of interrelated propositions, from a multiplicity of disciplines, to build upon existing literature in a satisfactory manner.12 Hayes concludes that terrorist negotiation, or violent context negotiation, represents an area of research ripe for testing more general hypotheses about negotiation anyway.13 He highlights cross-cultural bargaining, the perception of cooperation within such a context, and group decision making as being essential facets that would facilitate future research, and give insights into these aspects in the more general view of the negotiating process as

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well. Thus he stresses the implication that a specialist negotiating context, if analysed by appropriate scholars and practitioners, with the application of related theories and views from general negotiation, will enlighten and further the debate on the subject as a whole, and at the same time provide insights into that specialist area. In order to analyse and frame the nature of tactical-level military negotiation, and to take that analysis beyond the procedural, it will be necessary to examine other established theories and discussion concerning the process of negotiation, in whatever context. When the scope of theoretical analysis is broadened to encompass complementary theories, framing and discussion, it may be possible to use such ideas in a subsequent appraisal of the fundamental issues underpinning military negotiation. It may be the case that, while the context may be different, there may be pertinent similarities between key problems arising from the process of negotiation per se, and the fundamental structure, and key facets of, military negotiation. Therefore, attention must now be given to theories of negotiation originating from proximate disciplines to accomplish an ultimate analysis of tactical-level military negotiation factors. An attempt to make the complex simple must be made. NOTES 1. For example, see Wider Peacekeeping (London: HMSO, 1995). Other military training briefs exist, but have a security classification and cannot be cited here. 2. Discussion often revolves around the issues of consensual and non-consensual intervention, and coercive and non-coercive action. See J.N.Rosenau, ‘The concept of intervention’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21 (1967), pp. 165–76; and H.Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 3. See I.W.Zartman in B.Rubin (ed.), The Politics of Counter-Terrorism (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins, 1990). Also Richard L.Clutterbuck, ‘Negotiations 1: negotiations with kidnappers’, in B.M.Jenkins (ed.), Terrorism and Personal Protection (London: Butterworth, 1985), pp. 250–61; G.P.Davidson, ‘Psychological aspects for police in hostage negotiation situations’, Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1981), pp. 35–8; Nehemia Friedland, ‘Hostage negotiations: types, processes, outcomes’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1986), pp. 57–72; Conrad V.Hassell, ‘Terrorism and hostage negotiations’, in D.J.D.Sandole and I.Sandole-Staroste (eds), Conflict Management and Problem Solving (New York: Frances Pinter, 1987), pp. 184–93; and Michael J.McMains and Wayman C.Mullins, Crisis Negotiations: managing critical incidents and hostage situations in law enforcement and corrections, 2nd edn (New York: Anderson Publishing, 2001). 4. Abraham H.Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Westview Special Studies in National and International Terrorism, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). 5. Other relevant literature includes Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: theory and practice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); Richard Brockman, ‘Notes while being hijacked’, The Atlantic (December 1976); Ralph Craib, ‘Crisis negotiators in hostage cases’, The San Francisco Chronicle (29 January 1977), p. 2; Edward Mickolus, ‘Negotiating for hostages: a policy dilemma’, Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 1309–25; Abraham H.Miller, ‘Negotiations for hostages: implications from the police experience’, Terrorism: an International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1978). 6. Ibid., p. 25.

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7. On 18 February 2002 the British media reported an ambiguous shooting incident at a checkpoint in Afghanistan where civilians were killed and injured by Parachute Regiment personnel. This incident is undergoing legal investigation at the time of writing. 8. Richard E.Hayes, ‘Negotiations with terrorists’, in V.A.Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: analysis, approaches, issues (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991), pp. 364– 76. 9. See K.L.Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). 10. Peter Sarna, ‘Managing hostage negotiations’, in Randall G.Rogan, Mitchell R. Hammer and Clinton R.Van Zandt, Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1997), pp. 95–105. 11. The author has personal involvement in the military environment, given her professional academic role for the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and her access to operational negotiation in the field as part of her job. 12. Zartman has proposed a theory about hostage negotiation which embraces many extant general theories. See I.W.Zartman, ‘Negotiations over Hostages’ (unpublished manuscript, 1989). 13. ‘they represent a fertile area for further understanding of the process of negotiation and that general knowledge of negotiations can be applied effectively in the terrorism arena’. Hayes, ‘Negotiations with terrorists’, p. 375.

2 REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE AND THEORIES FROM PROXIMATE DISCIPLINES INTRODUCTION As the late Jim Laue, a scholar and leading negotiator in American ethnic disputes, used to say ‘Well, it seems to work in practice—let’s see if it works in theory.’1 Negotiations take place around the world on a daily basis, in informal and formal settings, in inconsequential or life-threatening contexts, and with differing outcomes and expectations. Yet, despite years of analytical study, the process has proved difficult to define mainly because theories have tended to be selective in nature and scope. An analysis of some of the main ideas about negotiation may start to suggest some delineating factors, and help to progress the thesis concerning the nature of tactical military negotiation key attributes. Therefore an investigation of negotiation based on different disciplines that emphasise and assess particular variables might highlight essential attributes which, when combined, result in a more valid multi-variable model that can be applied to a discrete negotiating context, such as tactical military negotiation. The range of literature on negotiation is wide and diverse.2 However, it is virtually impossible to find a sustained and common interpretation of the intrinsic process. Whilst many theories tend to define negotiation in terms of stages of development and interaction, the diversity of explanations concerning such stages is almost bewildering in its complexity and inconsistency. An excessive focus to date on single-variable explanations of the negotiating process, often reflecting a single discipline (such as a focus on power in political scientists’ models, or personality in psychologists’ models and so on), appear limiting in scope when applied to a specific, or ‘real-world’, negotiation context. The construction of a more comprehensive paradigm is something that, as Hayes has suggested, is emerging only slowly, and in a limited fashion.3 The inherent predicament in any attempt to define the essential issues and problems influencing the negotiation process is the difficulty in establishing precisely what those problems are in the first place, why certain decisions are made in particular contexts, and what might be the driving factors for the personalities involved in a negotiating situation. Considering the vast range of possible negotiating contexts and outcomes, it is extremely unlikely that a comprehensive framework for negotiation could be produced that would satisfy every eventuality. In the absence of such a pioneering text, the optimal way in which to approach an assessment of the main issues and problems existing within the negotiation process is through an evaluation of salient theories in the established literature. These may indicate and reinforce common issues and procedures that might, in

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turn, lead to a greater understanding of a specific context such as tactical-level military negotiation. In broad terms, four main approaches can be distinguished in the generic analysis of negotiation. The first type seeks to define negotiation in terms of a series of strategic moves between the respective parties, or may be described as concession/convergence models.4 Such analysis explains the interaction in terms of joint strategies that encapsulate demands, offers, arguments and concessions. Concession making tends to be seen as the key factor in the movement towards agreement. The main theoretical dilemma within such an analysis is an explanation of the factors that determine the nature of such concessions.5 Exploration of the nature of concessions tends to include further discussion on issues such as behavioural traits (i.e. cooperation or competitiveness displayed within the negotiation), and might also extend to a conceptualisation of the value placed on certain behavioural decisions, in mathematical terms, for example.6 A second approach views the negotiation process as a contest in terms of power, and the consequent ‘battle’ to win the upper hand in any situation.7 Bacharach and Lawler (1981) argue that power is the main influence in the development of the stages within a negotiation, and also in the decision-making elements. The definition of ‘power’ as a concept is difficult to ascertain, and can prove cumbersome when used as the essential analytical tool in the identification of the nature of negotiation.8 Practitioners might seek to discuss the relevance and nature of ‘tactics’ and ‘power-play’, but such concepts have failed to capture the interest of most theoreticians. Another approach moves away from the idea of power-play and concentrates more on the verbal and social interaction that takes place throughout the suggested stages of a negotiation.9 Importance lies in the exchange of information, the interplay between the parties, the verbal signals, messages and nuances of meaning that might affect the other party’s behaviour and decision making, and thus the movement to a common understanding. A strategic analysis of negotiation is attempted in the final approach. Pure mathematical modelling of the movement exhibited within the process, and the factors that influence decisions, is seen as the clearest way in which to depict the fundamental nature of negotiation. Such an approach relies on an analytical delineation of the decisions made, rather than concentration on the personalities of the parties involved or the situational factors that may be influencing the entire process.10 SUMMARY Given the numerous theoretical studies of negotiation in proximate disciplines, the focus will be placed on those studies whose analysis raises similar problems and issues to those that seem apparent in tactical-level military negotiation. Some theoreticians have highlighted issues that, while not being grounded in a military context, nevertheless convey similar dilemmas, and an in-depth discussion of those dilemmas.11 For this reason, it is apposite to consider such arguments in order to establish whether similarities or disparities occur between the construct of negotiation in a variety of settings, and the construct and conduct of negotiation in an operational military context.

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Given the issues that appear to arise in tactical military negotiation, the exploration of extant negotiation theories will be undertaken, as suggested by the categories introduced above. These areas will be: (1) strategic interaction (involving the discussion of cooperation versus competition, threat moves, alternatives to negotiating and the importance of interests); (2) situational influences (context and culture); and (3) interpersonal interaction (personality and communication issues). These are deemed to be important and enlightening debates in this context, and will help to construct the key factors present in tactical negotiation, with its multi-variable construct. They are issues that appear in many negotiation contexts and literature, and indicate a commonality in thought, if not application. These chosen categories should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, since any particular model or interpretation of negotiation may have aspects within it that might overlap the suggested boundaries; yet such a categorisation may form a useful, and more manageable, tool for the elucidation of negotiation issues and approaches, and a subsequent evaluation of discrete military factors. NOTES 1. Comment cited in Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict (New York: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 94. 2. For example, publications range from instructional briefs to discrete analysis in terms of politics, psychology, sociology, linguistics, human interaction or culture. To cite just a few references, see Gavin Kennedy, Everything is Negotiable. How to Negotiate and Win (London: Hutchinson Business, 1985); Harrison M.Holland, Managing Diplomacy: The United States and Japan (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1984); Dean G.Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981); Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2nd edn, 1990); Hans Binnendijk, National Negotiating Styles (USA: Dept of State Publishers, 1987); Edward T.Hall and Mildred Reed, Understanding Cultural Differences: keys to success in West Germany, France and the United States (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1989); and I.W.Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). Other references can be found in the bibliography. 3. Recent research is beginning to construct more of a comprehensive paradigm. See the work of Christer Jönsson, ‘Bargaining, Negotiation and Diplomacy: A research Overview’, International Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (Leicester University Diplomatic Studies Programme, No. 64, April 2000). Other good overviews of the many aspects of negotiation can be found in I.W.Zartman, The 50% Solution: how to bargain successfully with hijackers, strikers, bosses, oil magnates, Arabs, Russians, and other worthy opponents in this modern world (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987); and I.W.Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process: theories and applications (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978). 4. For example, as discussed in O.J.Bartos, Process and Outcome of Negotiation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 5. As discussed in Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior. The importance of conceptions of fairness has also been raised by Bartos, and the issues of timing and learning by Cross. See Bartos, Process and Outcome of Negotiation and J.G.Cross, ‘Negotiation as a learning process’, in Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process, respectively. 6. Evinced in game theory modelling, for example, or by authors who might favour economic theories, for example F.Zeuthen, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930) and J.F.Nash, ‘Noncooperative games’, Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54 (1951), pp. 286–95.

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7. The work of Bacharach and Lawler emphasises the role of power in negotiation. See S.B.Bacharach and E.J.Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1981). 8. Definitions of ‘power’ are diverse among theoreticians. Some view power as a possession and thus something that can be distributed (see H.J.Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1978)). Others believe it can be a factor within negotiation that is likely to predict outcomes. (See I.W.Zartman (ed.), ‘International Organisation on Multilateral Negotiations’, Negotiation Journal, 1989 (entire issue).) ‘Power’ has also been described as ‘the way in which Actor A uses its resources in a process with Actor B so as to bring about changes that cause preferred outcomes’. Habeeb in W.M.Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 15. Theories such as these have tended to focus on the power advantage of one party over another; increasingly theoreticians are shifting the focus towards the moves within a negotiation that might be ‘powerful’. See, for example, R.Fsher and W.Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving in (New York: Penguin, 1984) and Zartman in Zartman (ed.), The 50% solution.

Another implication of the element of power within negotiation is seen in terms of power as ‘time’. This analysis suggests that power is not a constant, but represents the fluctuation in stance and position seeking within the process at different times during that process. If a negotiation drags on, parties may become more positional and anchored in demand making rather than concession building. See P.Pillar, Negotiating Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Pruitt. The significance of power and time will be discussed in a later section in terms of the military context of negotiation. 9. Persuasive communication is a concept discussed widely among theoreticians. Discussion often contains specific, practical advice on how to communicate and the importance of behaviour in negotiation, for example body language. See M.Corcos, Les techniques de vente…qui font vendre (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1982); C.L.Karrass, The Negotiating Game (New York: Crowell, 1970); and G.Nierenberg, Fundamentals of Negotiating (New York: Hawthorn, 1973), for example. 10. For example, Axelrod and his discussion of the Prisoner’s dilemma in R.Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) and ideas on critical risk as discussed in G.H.Snyder and P.Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). 11. An analytical interest in negotiating processes appears mainly to have started in the 1960s with the work of Schelling (1960), Douglas (1962), Walton and McKersie (1965), and then into sociological studies such as Homans (1961), Bartos (1974) and Deutsch (1973). Interest in political international negotiation grew similarly with the studies of Ikle (1964), Lall (1966) and Young (1967), producing concepts related to economics and diplomacy. Negotiation theory also falls into another study area, social psychology, with the reviews of Rubin and Brown (1975), and mathematics with the later work of Young (1975) and his explanations of process through calculus and outcome structures through game theory. These analyses, and more, reveal the development of a relatively new evaluation of a multiplicity of factors in a complex subject, seeking to establish a conceptual base for later application to specific cases.

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In most models there seem to be distinctive features about negotiation as a process, whatever the setting, and analysis of such features tends to reflect such categorisation. There is the ‘analytical orientation’ which is ‘asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive’, as described by Raiffa (1982), where there is an attempt to understand and work with predictions of behaviour and response, in other words, how best to act. Opposed to this stance is the game theory or symmetrically prescriptive approach, where bargainers are assumed to be fully cogent and logical in approach and manner and thus the analysis is more concerned with best choices. Negotiation analysis often assumes purposive action by the bargainers, but not always equality in rationality, as assumed by game theorists. Therefore subjectivity plays its part in the assumption that the bargainers themselves decide upon their interests and forecasting, and that they subsume issues such as self-image, equity and communication styles in the process itself. This is a complicated area to investigate and quantify and, as suggested earlier, few negotiation analysts attempt it in detail. Bazerman (1989), for example, investigates systematic cognitive deviations from strict ‘rationality’ as revealed by negotiators. More widely appraised are the perceptions of the so-called bargaining set or zone of agreement, which encompass the range of possible agreements and movement towards resolution. Schelling (1960) stated that a negotiating process could only be deciphered by ‘a logic of indeterminate solutions’. Such a statement indicates the difficulty of evaluating many of the facets of negotiation, particularly the subjective elements, and the changes which occur within the process and which affect the outcomes and decisions made. Real-world negotiation often includes discussion of tangential scenario areas of information, seemingly unrelated interests and features, and diverse perceptions of the same dilemma; these factors also need to be accounted for in any analysis. See Schelling (1960), Douglas (1962), Walton and McKersie (1965), Homans (1961), Bartos (1974), Deutsch (1973), Ikle (1964), Lall (1966), Young (1967), Rubin and Brown (1975), Young (1975), Raiffa (1982), Bazerman (1991), cited in part in Kremenyuk (1991), p. 463.

3 STRATEGIC INTERACTION NEGOTIATION AS A COOPERATIVE AND COMPETITIVE PROCESS Introduction The main argument within this analysis is that military tactical-level negotiation, while not possessing unique traits and features, combines certain known factors in unusual degrees, and with different emphases and imperatives from those evinced in other negotiating environments. The prominence of certain factors will be examined and evaluated later, in the case studies in Part II, but the important concern at this stage is to establish the relevance of common negotiating factors, as discussed in a wealth of literature. An argument will now be made that multidisciplinary negotiation literature has established certain common denominators that, even though they are given a different emphasis by different disciplines, provide useful indicators of discrete negotiating contexts, such as tactical military negotiation. First, the literature concerning decisionmaking processes will be reviewed in order to ascertain the influences acting upon an individual, and the way in which decisions are made, in any negotiating context. The relevance of such factors will then serve to suggest and highlight the influences working upon a soldier-diplomat also. ‘Framing’ the process and making decisions Everyone views the world, and interacts with it, in terms of mental models.1 These models, or frameworks, shape perceptions and interpretations of the physical world, and help in the solution of intellectual problems. Since many models are subjective and personalised, they may be fallible and flawed in operation and intent. Jones (1979) argues that people tend to make a causal unit of percepts that are salient and contiguous in space and time, and tend to adopt models that they find pleasing and effective in resolution and explanation.2 Negotiators employ mental models throughout the negotiating process, and these are necessarily applied to the given negotiation situation and can be viewed as another circumstantial factor within the process itself. Frequent negotiators, or those who know that negotiation is likely to occur in the course of their duties, construct relevant mental models that ease the discovery and implementation of integrative agreement, should the need arise. See, for example, Figure 3.1.

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Figure 3.1 The diversity of decisionmaking influences within a negotiation3 This model proposes and stresses five main elements that influence the personal choices made by negotiators as the process develops: • driving factors • principles and standards • the role of trust • assumptions about the episodic nature of the process • goals (or outcomes). What it also suggests is the large influence that external factors have on both the negotiator and the negotiating process, whether negotiators are immediately conscious of this or not. Decision making occurs every day in human existence, with some decisions being more important, or crucial, than others. How someone makes those decisions matters in the assessment of key issues within negotiation, since negotiation is essentially a decision-making task in which people choose from a number of alternative courses of action. To assess whether those decisions might be valid or faulty, it is necessary to attempt to understand how ‘good’ decisions might be reached first, and an investigation of decision-making theory should prove useful in this respect. Leigh Thompson suggests that, in general, there are three main types of decisions: riskless choice, decision making under uncertainty and risky choice.4 These three categorisations seem pertinent in relation to negotiation in particular.

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Riskless choice Perhaps better described as choice under certainty, riskless choice involves selection between readily available options—options that do not feel threatening or necessarily negative in both the short and long term. Simple decisions, such as choosing a flavour of ice-cream, for example, are often overlooked as decisions because they are viewed as easy choices to make. However, whether a person is conscious of the decision steps being taken or not, procedural choices and assessment are inherent even in so-called simple decisions. A theory that seeks to analyse riskless choices is Multi-attribute Utility Technique (MAUT).5 MAUT defines four tasks that need to be carried out before a decision is made: (1) identify alternatives; (2) identify the attributes of alternatives; (3) evaluate the utility associated with each alternative; and (4) prioritise each alternative in terms of importance. For example, using the choice of an ice-cream flavour, the tasks are to: (1) identify the range of flavours; (2) identify the look, ingredients and assumed taste of each flavour; (3) evaluate the personal preference in relation to flavour; and (4) make a shortlist of favourite flavours. Although MAUT can describe the way in which someone might make a choice, it cannot explain or delineate the evaluations which form part of the decision making (why a certain flavour is preferred, certain ingredients, the texture, the cost and so on). What is interesting is the emphasis it places on the idea of alternatives, and this echoes the concept of a ‘Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement’ (BATNA), or the ever-present ‘other option’, and its effect on a negotiation process, as will be discussed in detail later. Decision making under uncertainty On occasions, choices have to be made where the alternatives are not known, or are unclear. Ignorance of evaluative factors can hamper the information available to the decision maker—for example, planning to hold a fête indoors or outside on a date a month ahead. The weather on that date would play an important part in the decision as to venue, but it cannot be predicted that far in advance. Yet a decision may need to be made about booking the hall.6 As Thompson states, in such circumstances: The distinction between risk and uncertainty hinges upon whether probabilities are known exactly…or whether they must be judged by the decision-maker with some degree of imprecision.7 Uncertainty and risk tend to be inherent in more complex decision-making situations, and it will be the willingness of the parties involved to risk probable outcomes that will determine the choices made. Risky choice In comparison with decisions under uncertainty, in risky choice situations the probable outcome of a decision might be inferred, or at least guessed. Most theories on decision

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making involve an assessment of the probability that an event will occur, but the exact outcome of that event may not be known. Negotiation can be described as a risky choice situation since the outcomes are not certain (but might be tentatively inferred), and can also be affected at any time by the implementation of a BATNA, for example, or any other influence external to the process itself. Thus there are variables in the process that affect the degree of risk of any decision made. Thompson seeks to further define the particular principles that may apply in risky choice situations.8 One proposition concerns the concept of a dominance principle, where one alternative dominates another if it is superior in at least one aspect, and equally good on all the others. Identifying a dominant option simplifies decision making considerably, since that is the option that should be chosen—a simple idea but, it may be argued, not that realistic. In many instances people are faced with a wide range of alternatives, each of which can be evaluated differently, and it might be difficult to perceive a dominant option.9 Where there are no perceived dominant alternatives, an option might lie in the use of the ‘expected value’ principle instead. The expected value principle applies when a party has to choose between several alternatives that may have different values to that party, according to their prospective outcome.10 In such a situation, it may be that mathematical calculations could be made to help to identify risk factors and alternatives, but it is debatable whether the expected value principle is a main factor in the ultimate decision making, and only explains part of the evaluative process and not the reason for the ultimate choice.11 What it may help to suggest is a party’s attitude towards risk per se. People do not tend to display consistent attitudes towards risk, as attitudes also tend to be context dependent.12 If someone remains indifferent to choices, then they may be described as risk neutral, or risk indifferent. If someone wishes to be certain of an outcome, they are risk averse, and, conversely, if they wish to gamble they can be classified as risk seeking.13 It may be argued that the expected value of any alternative is unfathomable given the infinite variety of outcomes, yet some theorists have argued that it is possible to define such variation and its effect on decision making. For example, the principle of diminishing marginal utility proposes that the value of a gamble or risk should not be related to any expected financial or tangible outcome, but rather to its expected utility to the party concerned, and this utility can diminish in proportion to the perceived outcome.14 In this way, each of the possible outcomes of an alternative has a subjective category of value, and the higher its appeal, the higher its utility value to the party concerned.15 The element of subjectivity within decision making is highlighted by the dilemmas discussed within risk assessment, and the fact that the subjective value associated with an alternative can depend upon the perceived worth of potential outcomes. The way in which each party perceives the scope and context for decision making within a negotiation might affect the entire process, and the possibility of obtaining a mutually acceptable final outcome. Critical subjective factors that may highlight the decision-making element in negotiation also include issues such as: (a) Defining the problem Often decision makers act without a thorough understanding of the actual problem to be solved. This may mean that the wrong problem is solved.

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(b) Issue identification Usually there is more than one objective to be accomplished; therefore the decision maker will need to be aware of a variety of factors. (c) Criteria weighting The factors and issues will need to be rated according to their importance in the overall objective seeking. (d) Alternative generation of options Often there will be a need to think around issues and suggest various constructive solutions or discussion ideas. (e) Rating each alternative on each criterion How well will the proposed solutions achieve the issues and objectives? (f) Computing the optimal decision Basically, this is the multiplication of the expected efficacy of each choice by the weighting given to each criterion, and by the rating of that criterion for the achievement of the objective. The problem is that most people making a decision do not follow such progressive analysis faultlessly; factors are overlooked, ignored or misinterpreted. Very few negotiators speak from a position of pure authority or entire knowledge in a situation, and suggestions such as those above can only attempt to define the optimal decision-making process possible or achievable. When the negotiator ‘frames’ the alternative, or the choice, he/she may be asking himself/herself if there will be a potential gain or loss in regard to the objectives to be achieved, as has been discussed. This framing, or contextual effect, has implications for the tactics that negotiators are likely to employ, since if a negotiator can create referents which induce the other party to react positively, and use terminology which suggests the other’s potential gains, there is likely to be more concessionary behaviour by that party. Stressing that the other party is risking the loss of a sure gain if deliberation continues might also stimulate conciliation. When movement towards a decision is necessary, most people use an ‘anchor point’ in their frames of reference by which decisions can be weighed and adjusted. This anchor point can be subjective and individualistic, often based on external factors that may have little bearing on the real problem to be resolved. For example, to illustrate this effect Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had two groups estimate the number of African countries in the UN.16 Each group was given a number randomly generated by a spinning wheel and asked if they thought the total of countries was higher or lower than the generated number. Group 1’s number was 10, and that group decided the total would be higher and settled on 25. Group 2’s number was 65, and they decided it would be lower at 45. Various attempts were then made to see if the groups would adjust their estimates to match, but there was little movement. Both groups had used an arbitrary number as an anchor point to influence their final decision making. Since the interests and issues involved within a negotiation are often uncertain, unclear or even hidden, wherever the first anchor point is pitched is likely to affect all further decisions and objectives. So negotiators must have the courage of their convictions to discount any anchor points early in the process that are disagreeable or unacceptable to them, otherwise the other party might have the ‘upper hand’ from the beginning of the negotiation. Adjustment to an existing anchor point by the other party will give credence to that anchor, and will reinforce it.17 Therefore tough to soft is a better strategy than soft to tough. Walking away from a negotiation could be a better option than agreeing to an unacceptable anchor.

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How ‘framing’ a situation influences the choices made Figure 3.2 is a suggested depiction of the influence of various types of framing in a negotiation context (scenario non-specific), and an attempt at defining the likely reactions of the parties involved. Figure 3.2 is designed as a reference/training chart, since it outlines the main analyses and strategies employed by parties in any conflict situation. However, any negotiator could refer to these stages and influences, whatever the scenario encountered, with the aim of trying to direct movement in the process towards a constructive integrative resolution. The three suggested contextual themes (adversarial, reflexive and integrative) help to frame the tone of the negotiation and hint at likely behaviour and interests. These factors in turn could assist in any perception and evaluation of risk to be taken in the options created. It seems likely that recognition of such framing could allow a negotiator to delineate expected responses, and to attempt more constructive resolution through the implementation of framing analysis and alteration. Most conflict scenarios can be analysed in this way, from low-level two-party disagreements to strategic, ethnic conflicts.19 Naturally it is an impossible task to depict and include specific contextual factors in such a representation; each situation is unique for a variety of reasons as Framing

Adversarial (competitive)

Reflexive (selfinterested)

Integrative (cooperative)

Definition

Other side is the problem

Own goals at stake

Shared problems

Causes

Blame for, and competition over, resources or wants Aggressive acts of other side seen as dispositionally determined

Derived from own threatened or frustrated needs and values Aggressive acts of own side seem situationally derived

Derived from mutually threatened or frustrated needs and values Aggressive acts of both sides seen as situationally derived

Solving?

Distributive bargaining (meet own needs at the expense of all parties)

Reflexivity (meet own needs)

Integrative (joint gain)

Alternatives

Non-compelling for the other side Redress problems of scarcity and competition

Compelling for own group Address fears, and meet hopes, of own side

Compelling for both sides Redress needs of both sides

Address participants’ re-entry to, and sensibilities of, own group Concerned with own group solutionacceptance

Long term, directed towards all parties Concerned with mutual aid in re-entry, and implementing solutions

Implementation Short term, self-directed Concerned with ways to enforce settlement and its implementation

Figure 3.2 Framing contexts and proposed decision-making influences18

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explained here. Nevertheless, a systemisation of intervention and facilitation is needed to give the process some form of coherence and structure. Without such a structure it is very difficult to educate others about ‘how to do it’ or even ‘what it is’. An idea of what to expect can be a useful tool for the negotiator on the ground, at the very least. Creative problem solving Thompson argues that there are two main mental models concerning negotiation: the ‘creative problem-solving’ model, and the ‘fixed pie model’, and suggests that both of these models could also be driving factors in the decision-making process.20 Creative problem-solving models do not start from a basic concept of inevitable conflict; rather the process should involve constructive interaction to

Figure 3.3 ‘Increasing the pie’, or options, within a negotiation determine needs and outcome.21 If a negotiator knows the scope of the other party’s interests, then realistic proposals and outcomes are likely, or what may be described as ‘integrative solutions’. Such a solution acknowledges shared interests, wants and needs, and fosters an empathy with the other party. If the parties fall into the trap of just ‘dividing the existing pie’ of options, then a’zero sum’ outcome is likely (no more value has been created from the situation), since claims have been made on everything that is visible in the negotiation, and other areas, which may not be so explicit, have not been explored. Greater generation of options is ignored, and the scope of the inevitable outcomes is limited. If the ‘pie of options’ is perceived to be larger (see Figure 3.3), then the resultant increased creativity of thought produces a greater number of potential agreements for both sides, and either or both parties can claim potentially more value from the process. All too often a negotiation is viewed merely as a power struggle, rather than a potentially cooperative process. At the outset of a negotiation the more usual response by both parties is to seek a position, and then to ‘anchor’ on that position. A common misconception stems from the perception that success can lie only in the establishment of one’s power base in any negotiation. It can be postulated that both these negotiation mental models involve different personal attitudes in the negotiators. However, the main difference is probably the approach to information exchange, where the creative problem solver is more

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collaborative and beneficent than the more conflict-based ‘pie’ divider.22 Thompson studied the approaches of these two types of negotiator to try to pinpoint key differences in mental framing, and her findings indicated that a creative mind model led to an emphasis on information exchange, more accurate judgements about the other party, and a convergence of the negotiator’s mental model with that of the other party by the end of the negotiating process.23 The last finding is interesting, and vital to successful negotiation. Perhaps the negotiating ‘game’ to play is not one of pure aggressive hard bargaining, but a process more akin to problem solving which will have the effects of building cooperation and principled argument, and limiting conflict escalation; this approach is widely recognised in negotiation literature and by practitioners. Hard bargaining is an expected stance, the style is understood by most participants, and initially it might result in more short-term victories, but a problemsolving attitude is more complex to undertake as it requires flexibility of approach and the search for mutual outcomes, often resulting in longer-term principled resolutions.24 This would appear to support the greater effectiveness of such congruent problem solving over more typical hard bargaining, since flexibility of argument can tend to be ‘contagious’.25 To summarise, a problem-solving attitude strengthens linkage between negotiators, and makes agreement more likely. The perception that a solution is possible can make agreement more likely; and precedence in agreement tends to have an interesting psychological effect on negotiators.26 Many people feel a natural reluctance to propose a new idea, or make a different decision within a negotiation, if they feel that they might be put down, or ridiculed, by the other party. If it is accepted that flexibility in both the response mode and proposal mode in negotiation is constructive, and to be welcomed, then a rational consideration of any future choice selection by the negotiator will be viable and positive. For example, when considering the question ‘Shall I propose the X plan to the other side?’, an internal rationalisation of the positive and negative consequences might help in the final decision. It might be internally framed in the following way: Consequences if I say yes

Consequences if I say no

+The plan meets my interests

−I have little chance for recognition

+I need not abandon my prior position

−I miss a fading opportunity

+If the plan succeeds I get the credit

−There will be future obstacles

+If it fails I can avoid blame +I keep my options open +It is easy +There is a chance of success +One issue would be resolved

BUT +I have not abandoned my position27

Such a categorisation is not scenario specific, but provides a representation of potential thought processes. The ability to consider the multiplicity of options, and their likely effects, is an important aspect of any negotiation. A possible weakness in any non-

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professional negotiator is an inability to think constructively, as there tends to be overemphasis on response rather than proposal or action rather than careful analysis. Summary Most decisions involve an element of risk, and this is particularly true in the negotiation context. People tend to be risk averse when considering self-gains, and risk seeking when facing loss. Whether a person remains either risk averse or risk seeking depends upon their personal reference point within a negotiation, and whether they alter that reference point as the negotiation proceeds and more information is gleaned. Any inconsistent or intransitive behaviour by either party can make a party vulnerable and prone to exploitation, and negotiators tend to profit from understanding the ways in which they might be hindered by their own judgemental decision-making processes. Any overconfidence that a particular chosen decision will always result in a predicted outcome is flawed and misplaced, since mutability in value and expected outcome is the only factor that remains predictable.28 What appears to be important, and constant, in most negotiation contexts is the interplay between cooperation and competitiveness, and the extent to which this affects decisions and option creation. This tension needs to be analysed further. Cooperation and competition? At the heart of many theories of negotiation lies the debate as to whether negotiation is inherently a cooperative or a competitive process. However, there appears to be a flaw in this perception from the outset: most extant literature assumes that negotiation is either of these two forms, and never both. A small number of works, including this book, contend that negotiation can be both cooperative and competitive, and often both at once. As will be discussed and evaluated in this section, the perception of negotiation as just one type or the other is constrictive in thought and scope, and bears little reality to many ‘realworld’ situations and contexts, including the violent context within which the military work. There is much discussion concerning the essential nature of negotiation and whether it is to be perceived as an essentially distributive (zero sum) or an integrative (positive sum) process. If negotiators attempt to act cooperatively (that is, they wish for joint gains from the process), this does not preclude the possibility that they might also act competitively at any stage of the same negotiation (achieve their own objectives at the expense of the other party). Creating some form of value within the discussion, for example making it more valuable to continue to negotiate rather than stop, is inherently cooperative, whereas claiming all the created value within a negotiation is inherently competitive, and is liable to terminate the discussion, with parties choosing to exercise another option other than negotiating with each other.29 Descriptions such as this tend to be based on

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Figure 3.4 Initial perception of agreement areas in negotiation observation and empirical findings, often supported by theoretical analysis in the form of application of utility theories.30 Earlier analysis of the cooperative/competitive dilemma appears to reveal a more optimistic view of human altruism in interpersonal situations. Homans (1961) established a rule of ‘distributive justice’ as a universal human rule in his sociological analysis of negotiating.31 Basic tenets of this concept imply that humankind is fair at heart and will act accordingly, and will be rewarded in proportion to any individual’s contribution to society. This rather naive view might be challenged on behavioural grounds, where general observation might refute such equity in justice in real human interactions. However, it does suggest a condition where a balance exists, and that is important if negotiation is considered in terms of a sliding scale of agreement/disagreement. To take this one step further, a sociological stance would maintain that such a norm is not automatic, but has to be maintained by society, as it is a conscious act and a societal decision.32 A concept of fairness in negotiation allows for the perception of negotiation as the journey to find the median point of agreement in any dispute.33 This might lead to the conclusion that there is never any real ‘give and take’, and that the parties simply move towards an inevitable median resolution.34 Observable human interaction does not suggest this inevitability, and there appear to be other factors at work. Consider the conscious intention to play down or hide a desired payoff at the beginning of a negotiation; it can even be conjectured that some negotiations appear to start with a ‘lie’, or at least an inflated demand. If the cycle starts with a party ‘going for broke’, how can the true median point be inferred, even on resolution of the process? Misrepresentation and wordplay blur the scale of levels of interaction between the sides, with each guessing at the true resolution point of the other. In graphical terms it might be represented as in Figure 3.4. Each side might perceive the median resolution point to exist in different areas within the possible agreement zone, according to their ability to negotiate successfully. For example, if A is not attempting, or able, to achieve the optimal resolution for himself, then B might well claim more in the agreement. They may ‘feel’ that they have achieved a mutually acceptable resolution, but it is unlikely to be equitable in purely divisional terms.

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Such complexity in the perceived outcome in negotiation also fits with sociological definitions of the term a ‘social norm’.35 In this context, studies and evaluations of the process and outcomes in negotiating are observable and quantifiable, but also imply that special features exist in this type of resolution which may alter or affect the possibility of mutual trust or agreement. For example, Morton Deutsch (1973) cites the key features of a bargaining situation as: 1. both parties perceive that there is the possibility of reaching an agreement in which each party would be better off, or no worse off, than if no agreement is reached 2. both parties perceive that there is more than one such agreement which could be reached 3. each party perceives the other to have conflicting preferences or opposed interests with regard to the different agreements that might be reached.36 Thus he is proposing that at the heart of this process lies the concept that the bargainers have separate motives in the negotiation, and that they are simultaneously working together to reach an outcome, but conflicting with each other in terms of the nature of that outcome in relation to their own interests. It is an intriguing paradox, complicated still further by the addition of situational, dispositional and cognitive elements that impinge on the movement towards resolution. For example, Figure 3.5 shows certain decision-making factors which might be present when a negotiator seeks to influence the other party, or to assume a more threatening stance.

Figure 3.5 Possible situational and behavioural influences within the negotiation process37

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Figure 3.6 Possible ‘sliding scale’ of agreement39

Figure 3.7 Resolution at A’s point 2 This diagram emphasises the idea of negotiation almost as a game of ‘blind man’s bluff’; and if the negotiators are feeling in the dark for an inkling of the other side’s true point of agreement, it would suggest that opening statements and bids are vital verbal clues, and that they set the bargaining scale of the negotiation (whether this is, or should be, a conscious ploy will be discussed later).38 Strategies, threats and alternatives present for both parties make it difficult to gauge who actually wants what, especially in the early stages of a negotiation, and virtually impossible to judge a median resolution point. In this context, therefore, it might be the main aim to construct an opening bid to try to achieve a zero payoff for the opposition, in other words, to try to keep as much of the ‘pie’ for oneself as possible. It is unrealistic to assume that the other party would accept such an opening bid outright, but would move towards a resolution closer to their original ‘want’. It is more probable that this zone of convergence is thus a moveable factor, as indicated in Figure 3.6, plotted on a sliding scale of possibility related to bargainer outcome. This figure suggests that in the middle of the scale lies the presumed median agreement point (0) that would result in mutual benefit from the outcome of the negotiation. It also allows for the possibility of a whole range of outcomes, some of which benefit one party more than another. For example, as depicted in Figure 3.7, if agreement was reached at A’s position 2, then it is highly likely that B has conceded issues below the median/equitable point of 0. Thus it will be an agreement that favours A, but that does not mean that it is a poor agreement if both parties have mutually agreed the outcome, and have satisfied their own interests. For a negotiation to be a negotiation and not just an argument, concessions have to be made. This understanding begs the question as to why a negotiation may still turn out to be laborious when it may be apparent to both negotiators what the agreement point is likely to be. Why don’t they move towards it faster? A simplistic, sociological answer might be that negotiation is not a ‘friendly’ process; it is antagonistic, competitive and challenging, so these elements alone would make for a prolonged discussion.40

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Sociological models thus suggest the importance of context and threat. Their hypothesis is that negotiators are affected by the context within which they operate, and by their own personal norms and values. Furthermore, sociological theorists emphasise the likelihood of the threat move, or the implicit use of force within any negotiation. The suggestion is that the use of threats, or competitiveness, proves irresistible to any negotiator wishing to influence the other. In order to assess the influence of such factors, and to ascertain the emphasis placed upon them in a military environment, the general characteristics of a cooperative and a competitive situation are now further analysed, to determine if knowledge of them would help a bargainer in a practical sense. If negotiation is viewed as a cooperative process, it may be possible to assert the following propositions: • communication will be open, equally exchanged, honest in information;41 • there will be mutual perception and sensitivity to similarities and common concerns, convergence of beliefs and wants; • mutual trust and willingness are important; • the issue can be tackled in a way that best uses each bargainer’s talents and special knowledge, with a common goal of mutual beneficial resolution.42 If negotiation is viewed as a competitive process, then other propositions might be suggested: • there will be little communication. If it does occur, it will be antagonistic, deceptive and negative in approach; • there is an increased antipathy to the other party’s goals, culture, wants and needs; • there will be a polarisation of personal response to the other bargainer, open hostility and mistrust; • individual goals will be desired which are unrelated to those of the other bargainer, and total dominance of one’s own outcome will be desired at the expense of the other.43 These generalisations are open to question and review, but they represent ‘commonsense’ perceptions of the nature of these two polarised conflict resolution techniques. They could be said to represent what we think is going on; however, it is necessary to question whether they accurately represent reality. What appears more realistic is any analysis that encompasses both strategies occurring at the same time, in the same negotiation, as the situation demands.44 It is not unreasonable, or unrealistic, to propose that a negotiator can be both cooperative and competitive, and move between the two in the same negotiating encounter. The later case studies in this analysis concerning UNPROFOR and Sierra Leone will bear this out. Consciousness of both approaches in negotiation, and the effect of choosing one or the other, is demonstrated in US-Soviet talks over intermediaterange nuclear weapons in the 1980s, where an incident stemmed from initial American pressure on German Chancellor Kohl to support a ‘zero option’. Negotiations stalled and Kohl himself held to an unequivocal endorsement…mainly because he knew it to be Reagan administration policy and he did not want to appear to be wavering. He would have been glad, however, had the US…

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adopted a more flexible approach… But in Washington, [Kohl’s] support for the zero proposal was used to justify the Administration’s own adherence to it.45 In this respect, Druckman’s (1977) ‘boundary role conflict’ (brc) theory proposes the existence of two related elements in negotiating: the monitoring of the other person for ‘movement’ and the monitoring of oneself for ‘evidence of preferences’.46 This analysis emphasises the differences in terms of focus and information processing, both of which are closely linked to responsiveness. This in turn is affected by the other party’s concessions, or a complex amalgam of evaluations and expectations. As he explains: The brc can be represented as psychological complexity—a juxtaposition of images that the negotiator has of the interface between the opposite number representatives, of the own nation/other nation relationship, and of the relationship among the various factions within his own party, and his own posture.47 A similar analysis was delineated by Coddington (1968), and is represented in the form of Figure 3.8. This model is a representation of two-person bargaining, and again includes an appreciation of the concept of ‘shifting evaluations’. It represents the notion that agreement takes place through changing behavioural assessments that in turn prompt changed expectations with a view to compromise; these can then make a negotiator soften, or harden, their position respectively. Importantly, such movement can take place within the same encounter. In an attempt to quantify progression in conflict further, Burton (1986) constructed a grid (see Figure 3.9) posing the dilemmas between the movement from power to cooperation, or from win-lose (the traditional ‘aggressive’ conflict resolution) to win-win (a contemporary activist approach).49

Figure 3.8 Two-person bargaining with ‘shifting evaluations’48

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Figure 3.9 Burton’s definitions Negotiation as a resolution of a conflict would fall into quadrant 2, but this quadrant could also be viewed as an idealistic outcome, perhaps even unobtainable. On a macro scale this may well be the case, but on a micro level, that is for the practitioner who is using negotiation to achieve an immediate outcome on the ground, demonstrably it is not, especially in contexts where equity in outcome is not a priority.

Figure 3.10 Critical risk Note: The numbers represent an interval scale; 2 and 1 are the most desired payoffs for A and B respectively; –3 the least desired. The cooperation/competition dilemma continues Other existing models of negotiation continue to stress the dilemma of cooperation versus conflict, emphasising the significance of the implicit threat/resistance manoeuvre that is

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inherent in any negotiation. This idea of the threat move may be a way to view the undoubted presence of implicit or explicit violence that permeates a military tactical negotiation, and an investigation into its nature might assist in an understanding of its significance for the soldier in the operational area. Daniel Ellsberg (1968) developed a concept of ‘critical risk’, which is perhaps more clearly explained by Figure 3.10, which represents a formal game-theoretical characterisation.50 For example, if B resists before A withdraws its demands, there will be a modest gain (+1) and a loss of reputation (−1) respectively, Ellsberg suggests. B would like to both resist and improve standing (1), rather than comply and give in (−3). Ellsberg argues that B’s choice depends on the probabilities that it gives to A’s choices. So if B estimates that A will advance successfully, then B is likely to comply (−2), but if B thinks A will acquiesce, then B will dig in and resist (1). It is the probability at which B moves from comply to resist that Ellsberg calls the ‘critical risk’. His theory echoes the concepts of risk assessment discussed earlier, and amalgamates them with the cooperation/competition debate. However, it is rare to find open statements about the probability that adversaries will adopt particular strategies in international policies or on particular occasions; one case could be John F.Kennedy claiming that he could do no better than ‘somewhere between one out of three and even’ for the probability that the Soviets would follow a hard line on Cuba.51 Glenn Synder (1982) took this idea further, and attempted to construct a typology of conflict tactics where the bargainer’s attempts would fall into one of five categories.52 In a dualistic negotiation, B would have multiple options open to him: the tactics of increasing capabilities; raising the evaluation of the issues at stake; tactics to influence A’s perception of B’s strategic choice; B could influence and affect A’s standing; and B could try to raise critical issues for A and thereby seize the initiative. Essentially for Ellsberg and Synder bargaining is thus about lowering the opponent’s critical risk factor in order to progress the negotiation in one’s favour, and tends to reflect the concept of the zero sum game once again, rather than a win-win view. It can be argued that such synthetic models of negotiation are useful and appropriate to a degree, but that they overlook or disregard assumptions, presuppositions and abstractions that also form an integral part of any negotiation process. Models such as those cited above assume that both parties have complete information and clear priorities and objectives in such a situation. Reality is very different. In many instances the gathering and interpretation of information is a patchy and inconclusive process: priorities shift and perceptions alter, so it is difficult to follow set procedures for resolution. However, the usefulness of referring to these models lies in their attempt to give a guiding structure to what might otherwise be perceived as an unmanageable task. It gives the bargainer an idea of the possibilities within the bargaining process, which should then be tempered by a large dose of reality, recognition of human frailty, and of the inherent lack of neatness in human relations. There is a distinct lack of symmetry in the real world (unlike representations in many models), and precise, quasi-mathematical models have difficulty in interpreting this in any realistic diagrammatic form. For example, the Cuban Missile crisis might have been modelled in a symmetric form, basically giving both the USA and the Soviets equitable

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bargaining stances, but the model’s accuracy would have been questioned. The geographical position of Cuba strengthened the claim of the USA that the island lay in its sphere of influence; similarly its position made it easier for the USA to mount conventional military operations. Cuba’s communism and the presence of Castro favoured the Soviets. Asymmetry is a real-world characteristic that is prominent in realworld conflicts, yet the delineation of these more nebulous factors is difficult. Common objectives in international conflict are to persuade the enemy to give up something it does not wish to, but also to avoid the escalation to war in the attempt. Since these factors can be contradictory, or asymmetric, the bargainer has to evaluate a range of solutions and activities, often complicated by an information deficit.53 Avoiding the issue of cooperation versus competition Other theoreticians often sidestep the issue of duality of behaviour within a negotiation, since it may be that the implicit question of whether bargainers accept a common set of procedural rules to construct their moves in any negotiating process is hard to grasp and to delineate in more formal terms.54 To do so is limiting in scope; I argue that, as the duality of behaviour and approach within a negotiation seems inevitable, it appears evident in reality, and creates a natural mutability that adds to the complexity of interaction within a negotiation. Game theorists tend to argue that there are five main behavioural rules that apply in any micro negotiation, and these tend to be applied rigorously in their models. It is assumed that these ‘rules’ underpin any search for an outcome, and can affect the ‘game’ and the quest for an effective determinate solution.55 However, these five factors are implemented and theorised in purely theoretical procedural modelling; their involvement in actual bargaining situations tends to be less clear, or is indeterminate. It can be suggested that game model rules tend to fall into the following categories, some of which are restrictive in their analytical scope: 1. Realism Restrictive assumptions about the bargainers are required and used by modellers. Real-world bargaining does not show such equity in characteristics and situation. 2. Application Tests of game theory models are ‘heuristic extrapolations from idealised models’.56 3. Informativeness What is needed is an interpretation of why a bargainer will choose to observe a rule, interpret it and apply it, and a purely mathematical model will fail to do this. 4. Neglect of the bargaining process Communicative interaction tends to be treated as a secondary phenomenon in the process, as opposed to a primary concern. 5. Inadequate analysis of environmental constraints External constraints, the relationship between them and the effect on the bargainer’s position is overlooked by modellers. As other theories and definitions of negotiation have tended to suggest, neglect of the human inactive factors inherent within negotiation limits the scope of any analysis of the process. Game theorists fight shy of such elements because they are hard to define in mathematical terms, as Bacharach and Lawler suggest:

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A more systematic concern for the relationship of environmental conditions to the utility functions would add an element of indeterminacy that is simply unacceptable.57 Thus it would appear that game theory modelling cannot characterise the actual processes of bargaining involving human interaction because all such obstacles are removed from the projected scenario. Its usefulness is best described as follows: The mathematician’s elucidation of problems sometimes leads not to a solution but to a clarification, namely of what it is that the problem involves, what obstacles stand in the way of solutions, [and] what special cases of the problem can be treated by what methods.58 Therefore, it may be concluded that game theory models of negotiation reveal a pattern of decision making and behaviour within the process that it is useful to define and appreciate, but little about the real-world decision factors that influence the judgements made by parties as a negotiation proceeds. They are models that rely on a mathematical logic that is not replicated in the complex world of human communication. Game theory is unlikely to highlight key behavioural factors occurring within the process of negotiation; at best, it can help to construct the basis of learning models and computational simulations of a basic negotiated interplay. Also it can interpret raw empirical data in a formal manner, and form a mathematical model from such. Its usefulness in terms of this analysis lies in this applicability, since the final aim is to try to establish a multi-variable learning model and framework for military negotiators to use.59 However, it is envisaged that the new model will be complex, and seek to model many variables that have been ignored to date in other frameworks. The 1944 publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Von Neumann and Morgenstern had given rise to an anticipation that game theory would provide a scientific structure and modelling of negotiation in a new and enlightening way. It was the idea of the prediction of ‘outcomes’ that was appealing, and the hope was that the more complex factors (that is, behaviour and bargainer expectations) could fall within the scope of game theory, and thus provide a more complete analysis of the process. It was even proposed that such a theory could be transposed into practical techniques and advice to be given to practitioners. Such an aspiration has proved fairly unrealistic to date: the best that can be hoped for in many such models and propositions is some sort of strategic analysis with a theoretical stance which suggests the issues and problems inherent in the process. Such a suggestion was expounded by analysts such as Luce and Raiffa, and Bartos: we are indeed sceptical that many such problems [of real life] can be given a realistic formal analysis…the hope is that, by analogy, their analysis will shed light…on the strategic and communication aspects of the real problem.60 to make such predictions possible, we must simplify our conceptions of the process [of negotiations] even more than we have done so far.61

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It is thus important to appreciate that game theorists preferred to construct ‘neat’ models that paid little respect to the complex array of factors that tend to influence and guide a negotiator. Most game theories start with a set of rules and assumptions that in turn dictate and influence the decision-making process. For example, rules such as those represented below are often implemented in the modelling process: 1. Players think and behave rationally, with complete skill and competence (personal and social characteristics being ignored) to calculate the best possible or maximal outcome.

Figure 3.11 Nash’s equality of outcome in negotiation64 2. The rules of play are known and fixed. 3. There is perfect knowledge by each player in many or even all matters, such as the complete range and commensurable sizes of all possible outcomes, the preferences of each player, and the probabilities attached to choices and outcomes. 4. There is no interference from the outside world. 5. There is no (or very little) opportunity for players to use tactics (quite typical of actual negotiations) such as bluff, coercion, persuasion, rationalisation and misrepresentation. 6. There is little or no scope for a player to develop and adjust perceptions, expectations and preferences, or to manipulate those of his opponent.62 With constraints such as these it is to be expected that it will be difficult to apply results from game theory models to real-world negotiating scenarios, as the all-important ‘human factor’ is negated or overlooked.63 As was discussed earlier, decision making relies on a multiplicity of factors which game theory chooses to ignore. Nash (1950), in his concept of a rational utility theory, illustrates the only possible solution to the assumptions made above, and that is a presumption that each party’s utility, or valued outcome, is exactly half of what it would be if each party achieved their most desired outcome, as in Figure 3.11.

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Nash’s theory seeks to establish a specific point prediction for the outcome of a negotiation (the ‘Nash Solution’), which defines the expected outcome from an encounter if the parties behave rationally. Furthermore, his theory assumes several fundamental propositions: that negotiators are rational; they have full knowledge of each other; and the defined agreement point satisfies the axioms of uniqueness, Pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of equivalent utility representations and independence of irrelevant alternatives. This ‘uniqueness axiom’ specifies that there is only one possible and unique solution to each negotiating situation. Pareto optimality encompasses the proposition of joint rationality and joint gain, whereby the bargaining does not yield any outcome that is less desirable for either party. Therefore, in a symmetric negotiation the two parties are perceived as having the same strategic possibilities and bargaining power. Furthermore, Nash postulates that the solution to a negotiation is independent of the exchange rate between the parties’ utility scales.65 The ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom’ specifies that the best outcome, of any possible outcomes, will remain the best outcome even if the range of possible outcomes is altered in any way. Although neat, such a representation as depicted above is unrealistic in real-world terms. Parties are likely to be influenced by different factors and individual needs, as has been discussed, and are unlikely to be seeking to find a median point of compromise, if the cooperative/competitive ‘pull and push’ duality effect is accepted. It may even be the case that, with human nature as it is, there is an inevitable pull in most negotiations towards reaching a resolution that favours oneself over the other party.66 An important rider to the idea of utility functions is the assumption made by modellers such as Nash that if no agreement is reached, then the utility achieved is zero. Again, in real-world terms this is not representational; certainly in military micro negotiation it is often a feat in itself that discourse has taken place, whether a negotiated outcome is achieved or not. An attempt to broaden any such modelling of negotiation was made by Walton and McKersie (1965), who visualised bargaining as four distinct processes.67 The first process concentrates on ‘distributive bargaining’ (division of spoils); then there is ‘integrative bargaining’ (upgrading the common interest); ‘attitudinal structuring’ follows (influencing the perceptions of the opponent) and finally ‘intraparty disagreement’. A model such as this cannot predict a solution point, but tries to examine the movements within the negotiating process and, in this sense, may be more realistic since negotiations can and do fail. Thus it is useful in the proposal that an amalgam of key factors affect a negotiation process. To begin with, the example of the ‘Prisoner’s dilemma’ was used to exemplify the possibility of influences on decision making within bargaining (see Figure 3.12). The frequently represented Prisoner’s dilemma model is used to depict the conflict between distributive and integrative bargaining. A and B have at least two incentives to be dominant in their strategic stance, but will get a poorer ‘payoff’ if they do so (2, 2). This model tries to represent the problem of attempting to overcome such distributive aspirations and improve the interests of both parties to achieve a more preferable outcome of 3 or 4.

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What was becoming apparent in the use of such an example was the need to interpolate situational characteristics within the negotiation model, and to recognise that there are more complex factors at work than just a mathematically

Figure 3.12 Prisoner’s dilemma, 1 Note: Numbers represent quantities of utility, 4 being most desired outcome, 1 the least. constructed movement within the process. A concept of ‘bargaining resources’ can help to define the diversity of probabilities of choice within the bargaining process, and the degree to which the bargainer has room for manoeuvre. Returning to the Prisoner’s dilemma model for a moment, a broadening of the background knowledge to the game should reveal if other factors influence the approach taken by the bargainers. In order to assess such a proposal the model itself needs to become more context-specific. Supposing A and B had been partners in a crime which could result in two levels of prison sentence (minimum 1 year, maximum 10 years), and then, while being interviewed separately, they are given the chance of being let off if they confess that the other committed the crime (and thus they would avoid the 10-year sentence themselves), or if they both confessed to the crime they would serve a slighter lesser time of five years each. But the law, known to both, dictated that if they both denied the crime, then only a lesser charge could be brought, with both serving merely one year. The latter outcome minimises the joint losses for the prisoners, but in these circumstances might not the more realistic individual choice and personal rationale be ‘Whatever the other prisoner does, I’m better off if I confess’? An individual is likely to seek the option which is perceived as least damaging to himself, as the self-preservation ethic is very high. So it is quite likely that both men will confess, thinking it to be in their best interests, and thus both would serve five years, thereby increasing their joint losses (see Figure 3.13). While the context of this model might appear rather artificial, its moral is that if bargainers act independently rather than thinking cooperatively, then narrow calculations of self-interest might not yield the best outcome. However, the context of the decisionmaking factors is rather distorted in its presuppositions of the situation, especially when

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the model is applied to a duopolistic negotiating scenario where there could be more interaction between the bargainers, and

Figure 3.13 Prisoner’s dilemma, 2 Note: Numbers represent quantities of utility, 0 being most desired outcome, −10 the least. movements, both cooperative and competitive, would be more obvious and signposted. Two-by-two games overlook vital institutional aspects of real-world conflict situations, and it may be unlikely that an external enforcer of agreements is always present in such situations. This absence of a ratifier to an agreement, or to use Harvard’s terminology for a moment, ‘a big dude’, might force a narrow perception of any context.68 The Prisoner’s dilemma model thus overlooks the possibility that in interpersonal conflict situations two or more parties can be involved, with each party possibly having minimum control over, or knowledge of, any wider context; and the payoff can depend on an individual’s own actions, plus those of the other bargainers (suggesting strategic interaction). Emphasis on variable-threat, as opposed to fixed-threat bargaining, is a useful central factor in many game theory models of negotiation. Variable-threat bargaining attempts to define and include the multiplicity of factors that fixed-threat theories do not allow for, while still attempting to model the movement from threat point to solution point in a mathematical sense. Nash describes the logic of this procedure as ‘a negotiation model’, where the game consists of two important moves: the ‘threat’ and the ‘demand’.69 The threat entails each bargainer quantifying the position he would be committed to if no agreement were achieved on the demand move. With reference to the Prisoner’s dilemma model, the threat move equates to the zero sum game and to a minimum/maximum resolution in joint outcome game play, and, according to Nash, the solution is determined by the ultimate demand move.70 Nash contends that movement from the threat point to the solution point is predetermined, since if either bargainer adopts his ‘Nash threat’, the other party must also do so in order to avoid receiving a lower ultimate profit after the demand move, as Figure 3.14 shows.

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Here, the solution point is where the product of the differences of the utilities at agreement, or failure, is at its greatest, so a solution can therefore be generated anywhere along the ‘line’ of negotiation (and thus negates the concept of

Figure 3.14 Nash’s threat points negotiation that outcomes are achieved at a ‘mid-point’). The point of origin, and payoff point, is decided by the threat/combative strategies of the bargainers as they proceed. Therefore, this revised model is attempting to delineate the mutability of a negotiation, and the potential for a diversity of outcomes. The problem with theories such as these is that they are difficult to test in the real world, mainly due to the unrealistic assumptions made about the knowledge base of the bargainers, and the lack of an appreciation of ‘unforeseen’ factors. It is also ambiguous whether the models are predictive or prescriptive, which makes a considerable difference to the factors depicted in the process. If predictive, it begs the question of on what evidence the assumption is being made and within which negotiation contexts the conclusions have been drawn, as it is not clear. If prescriptive, similar questions apply. Observation of negotiation taking place in reality strongly suggests that other factors are influencing the process, and the degree to which they do so depends on the negotiation context and environment. The literature on game theory has served to highlight the importance of more ‘nebulous’ factors, and the lack of a neat symmetrical form to negotiation occurring outside conceptual theory. Summary If mathematical models of negotiation are implicitly ‘unrealistic’, the usefulness of game theory modelling needs to be questioned in terms of the main hypothesis of this work. A

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multiplicity of factors may be involved within the negotiation process which, merely for the sake of mathematical neatness, ought not to be ignored. Rational models of negotiation offer interpretations of factors such as understanding, prediction and control and have an appealing logical structure. They also offer a depiction of the ‘perfect’ bargaining scenario, and, perhaps it is only by understanding this that a practitioner can appreciate the flaws in their own negotiating behaviour, and the difficulties within their particular negotiating context. However, the integration of important ‘real-world’ issues appears necessary in order to construct a more cogent, and applicable, paradigm of negotiation. As Allen (1987) comments, ‘Ambiguity spoils games, which are played by rules and governed by stylistic moves. The real world produces squishy problems.’71 An analysis of such issues, and ‘squishy problems’, must now be undertaken in order to pinpoint influential factors in negotiation in a more precise manner, which, in turn, will suggest the amalgam of factors at play in tactical military negotiation. INTERESTS Introduction The Fisher-Ury model also highlighted another significant feature inherent within any negotiation—the power and influence of interests. This is an important issue, and involves trying to delineate key behavioural and decision-making factors. As such it will contribute to the analysis of elements within the discrete context of tactical military negotiation, as well as non-context-specific negotiation. In negotiation, bargainers, especially of a competitive/distributive kind, tend initially to state their positions rather than their interests, as was shown in the previous section.72 Positions explain where someone stands in a negotiation, or the demands being made. Interests are what someone cares about, or the underlying aspirations and needs behind the positional stance.73 If a negotiation remains locked into a positional mode, then creative movement within the process is difficult to achieve. However, if negotiators try to assess the underlying interests of the other party, this understanding can be more informative about the process and the negotiating partners, and can provide greater potential for mutual agreement.74 The nature of interests As discussed earlier, much of the negotiation process may be viewed, erroneously, as the attempt to persuade the other party that one person’s idea is better than the other’s and therefore should be accepted.75 However, it may be possible to go one step further than this and suggest that the process could be described as an attempt to persuade the other party that your idea is the better idea, but to make him believe that it was his idea in the first place. If such a resolution is achieved, then it is to be hoped that a cooperative outcome has also been discovered. As Lax and Sebenius conclude,

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An issue can display, on its face, many possible interests…a key to persuasive appeal lies in emphasizing the face most in line with the target person’s interests.76 Successful negotiation may thus be described as a series of persuasive moves exploring issues, positions and, most importantly, interests. However, the nature of interests can be different for different people at different times. It can be argued that there are two primary types of interests: ‘value-driven interests’ and ‘interest-driven values’.77 Knowing the difference, and which is the driving factor for the other party, might lead to greater insight into the expected behaviour by that party, and increased scope for option generation within the negotiation. ‘Value-driven interests’ reflect a person’s underlying personal values, while ‘interestdriven values’ are those that drive or dictate those values. Thompson also suggests that the difference between the two frameworks is based on whether one’s values are heartfelt or calculated—in other words, if one’s interests are driven by social and moral values that are independent of self-interest, or whether self-interest forms one’s values.78 In a negotiation, most parties believe that their own values are shaping their interests, whereas the interests of the other party are often viewed in a negative fashion, perhaps as a display of self-interest or greed by that person. There may be an inherent belief that one’s own values are perceived as genuine and heartfelt, while those of the other party are capricious. A micro negotiation that can proceed in a context of mutual interest, trust and open communication is likely to be more constructive than a competitively based process, and is also likely to result in mutually successful outcomes. Therefore a dismissal of another party’s interests will limit the scope to ‘expand the pie’ of options, and reduce the likelihood of mutually acceptable agreement. This need for open-mindedness is just as important, if not more, when two parties come from diametrically opposed value systems, for example, an aid worker and a terrorist. If it is important that a negotiated outcome is reached, then in a difficult meeting such as this the emphasis on discovering interests, rather than positions, is essential. A key is to search for cooperative bonds, allegiances or mutual facilitation within the negotiation, based on the recognition of individual interests.79 Tactics to use to diminish such opposition of interests are ‘controlled communication’ (Burton, 1969) or ‘role reversal’ (Rapoport, 1960), techni’ques that try to stress elements that apparently diverse groups actually have in common.80 Thus there remains a need to try to find cooperative aims and objectives if the resolution is to remain mediative and not to become confrontational and destructive. An example of creating value within the scope of a negotiation by recognising interests is exemplified in the following real situation.81 In 1912, Teddy Roosevelt was nearing the end of his presidential campaign and was about to embark on a whistle-stop tour of the USA. At each stop, pamphlets would be distributed with a photograph on the front and inside his ‘Confession of Faith’ speech was reproduced. Three million pamphlets had been printed. However, just before departure a campaign worker noticed a line on the photograph that read ‘Moffett Studios—Chicago’. Since Moffett held the copyright, the campaign could be sued a minimum of three million dollars. Urgent discussion ensued about negotiation options, and, feeling that they were in a weak

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bargaining situation, the team approached George Perkins, a noted financier. Perkins despatched a telegraph to Moffett immediately, saying ‘We are planning to distribute many pamphlets with Roosevelt’s picture on the cover. It will be great publicity for the studio whose photograph we use. How much will you pay us to use yours? Respond immediately.’ Moffett replied speedily: ‘We’ve never done this before, but under the circumstances we’d be pleased to offer you $250.’ This was very creative ‘negotiating’, recognising the interests of both parties. The weakness in this settlement involves the issue of short-term success over long-term dealings. Perkins risked a backlash from Moffett, should he ever discover the whole story. Summary The interests underlying the positions taken in a negotiation tend to define the main problems to be solved. The basic issues in a negotiation often lie in the conflict between each party’s needs, desires, concerns or fears. Behind and beneath opposed positions can lie shared interests, as well as conflicting ones. A common assumption is that because two parties seem to be diametrically opposed, their interests must also be oppositional. This does not necessarily follow. Therefore an understanding and appreciation of interests might allow greater scope for mutual agreement, and be of particular importance in negotiation where the parties can be positional and confrontational. An exploration of underlying interests might offer greater option creation in a situation that appears stalemated, for example. Being aware of interests, be they tangible or intangible aspirations, lies at the heart of conducting a successful negotiation, and this is no different in the case of military negotiation. In fact, perception of the interests which both parties hold could lead to a more satisfactory evaluation of what is going on, particularly in a volatile or aggressive context, and allow for a more productive exchange. Again, this not a unique element; the general literature points to the validity and constructiveness of knowing interests, as has been discussed here, but if a negotiator is in the position of trying to guess another’s reaction in a context of either implicit or explicit violence, then interest awareness will provide significant insight. THREAT MOVES Introduction As has been discussed, Nash suggested the influence and effect of threat moves within a negotiation. An explicit factor in the hostile and aggressive context of military negotiation is the frequency of verbal threats, or even physical threats. How might existing literature explain the importance, and influence, of such a factor? Internal and external influences such as personal motives, other alternatives available to the negotiator (other than those possible within the current negotiation), the strategy being employed and behavioural influences can all affect the process and the ultimate outcome of a negotiation. However, another significant variable within the process is the implementation of threats within the negotiation, and these are intended to escalate the

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pressure being placed on the other party. Such threats tend to be distinguished as compellent threats, which require action by the other party to avoid the threat being realised, and deterrent threats, which may prevent the other party from doing something.82 Often viewed as a last-resort tactic in negotiation, threats might seek to harm the outcome of the negotiation, to perturb the other party or weaken the prospect of an agreement. When threats start to appear in a negotiation, the succeeding movement within the process tends to be escalatory, and counter-threats tend to appear. As Fisher and Ury (1991) state, ‘Threats are pressure. Pressure often accomplishes just the opposite of what it is intended to do; it builds up pressure the other way.’83 Thus the main complication for cooperation in negotiation is the threat move, which can result from other motivational factors within the negotiation, and the negotiator. The nature of the threat move, and the concept of power Fundamentally, a threat is an action meant to undermine the interests of the other bargainer, and it is used to try to force the other bargainer to give in. The threat action usually results in a mirrored counteraction by the other party, because it feels intimidated, and threat actions can quickly escalate a situation so that negotiation turns into argument (which, by its very nature, is negative and destructive). Loss of face and self-esteem is bound up with threat and counter-threat moves, as are culturally based responses to intimidation, and these have obvious implications for military micro negotiation, which occurs between diverse cultures and dispositional types.84 Such behaviour is analysed in the work of Pruitt (1981): Image loss in the eyes of the other is a problem, because it is likely to inspire the other to maintain high demands…and to employ competitive tactics in an effort to coerce concessions from the bargainer.85 The assumption that the search for a power base is a prime element in any negotiating process may seem obvious, as it is embodied in the perception that negotiation is essentially a ‘battle’ for supremacy in any scenario. However, if power equates to domination, rather than influence, then it is debatable whether it remains a desirable element in a necessarily cooperative process such as negotiation.86 The perceived manipulation of power in a bargaining scenario is interlinked with fundamental dynamics operating throughout the process. Each party tries to use all available resources to gain strength for themselves and simultaneously to coerce the other party; this represents ‘power manipulation’. Then, there are the effects of each party’s social norms on the bargaining situation (their values, moral code, social rules and so on), which are used to judge the dispute and any possible resolution of that dispute.87 Outside factors will also affect the bargainer’s perception of freedom of movement (for example interested third parties), and these may impose further constraints on the process. The use of ‘power’ or forcing another party to concede in a negotiation through the use of threats is a difficult concept to delineate; as an element of aggressiveness it is likely to be present in a bargaining situation, and may be used to a certain degree, but the nature of such a tactic is difficult to define in any individualistic sense.88 As Gulliver (1979) comments:

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conceptualisation of power is not helpful to the explanation of the process. Yet the common-sense idea of power as something like a lever, or superior strength, is hard to renounce.89 Bacharach and Lawler (1981) attempt a detailed analysis of power, particularly in relation to the influence on bargaining processes, and they put forward three main propositions defining power as ‘dependence within an exchange relationship in which each party has some resource that the other needs’, and as follows: Proposition 1 The more a party associates with meeting the other party’s demands, the greater the likelihood that it will define bargaining in singleissue, distributive terms; the fewer costs a party associates with meeting the other party’s demands, the greater the likelihood that it will define the bargaining in multiple issue, integrative terms. Proposition 2 The more congruent parties’ perceptions of the costs associated with meeting each other’s demands, the greater the likelihood that they will reach a consensual definition of bargaining issues; the less congruent parties’ perceptions of the costs associated with meeting each other’s demands, the greater the likelihood that they will have nonconsensual definitions of bargaining issues. The outcomes in any negotiation processes thus should be reflective of each party’s bargaining power stance, for example: Proposition 3 The greater a party’s relative power, the greater the likelihood that its definition of bargaining issues will prevail.90 In considering the elements of power or force, emphasis is being placed on a more realistic model of negotiation once more. Power, of whatever type, exists in the real world and in certain situations it is tangible, especially in war-torn societies.91 Yet, if an advantageous outcome is ultimately on the side of rocket launchers, AK 47s and SR 80s, then an argument might be that nothing, not even the most skilled negotiation tactics, will trump such might. Negotiation tends to be described as a basic power struggle, particularly in the genre of ‘how to do it’ manuals, where it is generally perceived as a process to be ‘won’ by the stronger party.92 If a negotiation involves commercial factors as the basic determinants, then power is likely to lie in economic trials of strength; for instance, a union’s strike is only ‘powerful’ if the management is unable to withstand the economic effects of the dispute. In this sense, the bargaining process involves recognition and interplay of power moves by each bargainer, and judged responses to those power plays. However, this is too narrow an assessment; even if there is power play in the bargaining process, there appears to be more going on as well. Zartman (1974) suggested that ‘power’ might be redefined as ‘the ability of one party to cause another to change behaviour in an intended direction’.93 It may be argued that this definition suggests ‘influence’ rather than ‘power’. Social psychological definitions, such as Zartman’s, prefer to see the power element as intrinsic to behavioural

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modifications, rather than a determinant per se. What may be more important is the interaction that results from power play, and the factors that typify that interaction. But concentration on the effects that power moves might have on the bargainers and the process does not suggest a reason or definition for ‘power’ itself; it results in specification of how power can be exercised (for example through threats, body language, deterrents and so on), but not why. Personal and situational standing appear to be key explanations in this context.94 If an individual bargainer has personal characteristics which lend themselves to a positive, dominant bearing, then it may be argued that by just being oneself the exploitation of dominance in any negotiation will be automatic, perhaps almost ‘natural’. However, it can be postulated that negotiations can be effective without the exploitation of threat moves; indeed, cool, controlled discussion can appear to be productive, and it may achieve a satisfactory outcome without recourse to the threat move. As Edmund Burke argued: The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.95 A power battle, of whatever sort, increases stresses and pressure on the negotiator to an extent where lucidity and decision making might be adversely affected. Individual performance can be hampered and influenced by another party’s successful acquisition of a perceived power base, and some researchers have observed a correlation between rising levels of stress and a fall in personal competence.96 For the more ‘powerful’ negotiator this effect might lead to a distinct advantage, but the other party may become frustrated and seek to escalate the situation further. Such conclusions indicate factors inherent in tactical negotiation, factors that appear to significantly influence the military negotiator in what appears to be a power battle, even if it is a negotiation rather than armed struggle. The significant issue of the use of force, something that delineates the soldier’s working environment, and perception of it cannot be overlooked and, given its significance in general negotiation literature also, will be explored further in the specific context of military negotiation.97 Credible threats To be efficient, a proposed threat must be seen to be credible; it must be understandable to the other party, and the other party must be able to comply with the demand if it chooses to do so.98 However, to have greater efficiency the threat should also work without further action from the source. If a threat has to be carried out, then it is only efficient for the source if the outcome is beneficial to that source.99 An actioned threat that results in self-destruction is not efficient.100 The studies undertaken by Horai and Tedeschi (1969) suggest that the viability of the threat also reveals the credibility of the source. The effectiveness of the threat might depend on the negative results of noncompliance as compared with the consequences of compliance.101

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Morton Deutsch (1973) tried to assess the impact of threat using a ‘road map’ model, which is useful to assess here because it reflects typical roadblock micro negotiation encountered frequently in military operations.102 He gave his negotiators the scenario similar to that depicted in Figure 3.15. The ideal outcome for both negotiators would be to come to a mutually beneficial agreement about using the one-lane road, as this is the shortest route. Thus the threat potential in this scenario is the gate. Deutsch gave the subjects certain financial gains and losses according to the route they chose (to give them incentives for bargaining, or not, as the case may be), and the run was repeated 20 times, so that, effectively, the bargaining position was tested 20 times. The subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another until they met on the road. The results were averaged and plotted broadly as in Figure 3.16. As the plotted results indicate, Deutsch found that when there were no gates on the road both A and B traded equitably and mutual financial gain was distributed ‘fairly’, with each party receiving a good amount of profit. As he introduced the gates to the scenario, the cooperation between the two parties lessened, and so did their financial profits. When both gates were in operation on the road, the negotiators tended to act in an individualistic way, with resultant loss of profit. This more selfish attitude to the problem echoes the responses postulated in the Prisoner’s dilemma game: despite perceived loss the individual parties persisted in seeking an outcome which had limited benefit. Deutsch concluded from this experiment that the availability of a threat potential in the bargaining situation adversely affects the bargainer’s ability to reach a satisfactory agreement. The threat factor increases combativeness and lessens cooperation. However, this initial experiment with the road was carried out without allowing mutual communication between the negotiators throughout their

Figure 3.15 The road experiment

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Figure 3.16 Author’s representation of Deutsch’s findings ‘journeys’; it is arguable that if the subjects had been allowed to communicate throughout the road journeys, the influence of communication might have made a difference to the outcomes. It may be so, since Figure 3.16 does reveal that even with two gates in operation the negotiators were improving their mutual profitability as the rounds went on. It appears that they were finding some way to act cooperatively, despite being in a competitive environment.

Mean number of trials on which talking occurred

No threat

Unilateral threat

Bilateral threat

5.7

3.9

3.3

Figure 3.17 Frequency of talking in the threat conditions However, when Deutsch allowed the negotiators full communication throughout the round, this added element still had relatively little effect on the existence of a threat move, which continued to occur when the parties met on the one-lane road; respective ‘payoffs’ did not seem to alter due to prior communication. Deutsch summarised the frequency of communication and the introduction of a threat move, by one or both parties, as shown in Figure 3.17. Thus, when both parties communicated frequently the result was fewer threat moves (in 5.7 trials), whereas in 3.3 trials both parties issued threat moves. However, it is not clear what happened in the other trials and with a small sample size, the findings seem questionable.

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Summary Threats tend to raise questions about the way in which parties seek to behave within a negotiation. It may be that the ethical nature of a negotiation, if deemed important, might be threatened if the legitimacy of the process is questioned by the parties involved, and a perceived cessation in any concession making might become apparent once a threat is also explicit. Threats might be aimed at the other party in a personal sense, and this is an extremely negative and provocative move in any negotiation. However, some theoreticians have started to view ‘less hostile’ threats as playing an important part in the communication process, in terms of the establishment of a relationship between the negotiating parties. If used correctly, they might even advance the process. In order to examine such a proposition in relation to its importance in tactical military negotiation, the recent work from the Harvard Program on Negotiation must be analysed next, as it makes a significant contribution to the perception of negotiation per se and the influence of other options within a negotiation, and appears to indicate vital real-world factors. ALTERNATIVES IN NEGOTIATION: ZOPAs AND BATNAs Introduction According to analysis by Fisher and Ury from the Harvard Program on Negotiation, there are other elements in the negotiation process that are of equal importance to the negotiator if he is to recognise the optimal possibilities within, and outside, the negotiating situation.103 This literature provides a significant insight into the delineation of the multiplicity of factors at work in the negotiation process, many of which will prove crucial in the military environment. A preoccupation with a ‘good result’ from a negotiation may be likely to affect the performance of a negotiator detrimentally, whilst a little forward planning, and perception about the negotiation process, could make a difference to the ‘result’ achieved. Of particular importance is the preparation of a Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), and the identification of interests. A BATNA sets the value threshold that any acceptable negotiated agreement must exceed, and implies the existence, or absence, of what may be described as a Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) in any negotiation (whether it is viable to negotiate at all). It may also describe the options that the negotiator has other than continuing to negotiate, and thus might influence the tone and nature of that negotiation. Therefore it may be that moves away from the table in order to improve one’s own BATNA or to worsen that of the other party are often more important than moves within the ongoing process itself, and such elements can be modelled and defined so as to clarify perception of the negotiation process still further. A BATNA is the next best option rather than continuing to negotiate. It may be an automatic reaction early in any negotiation to plunge in and try to discover the standpoint that everyone is adopting with regard to the situation concerned.

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‘What position are they taking?’ tends to be an initial thought or response when starting to negotiate, and that concern will provide a certain amount of information to any bargainer. However, it is a limited response to the entire situation: once a bargainer discovers another party’s ‘position’, the next concern should be how the process will move from a positional stance to a more constructive encounter. In unsuccessful negotiations it may well be that the bargainers have failed to get past this positional observance, and thus have failed to progress as the negotiation process continues. Again, this concept stresses the validity of viewing negotiation as a simultaneous cooperative and competitive process, and not either/or. The Fisher-Ury model of negotiation A schematic of the negotiation process as described by these theories is shown in Figure 3.18. It is proposed that the fundamental Fisher-Ury model may be applied to any negotiating situation, since it is context non-specific. Each party has basic requirements within the negotiation. The Reserved price (RP) relates to the most desired outcome that party wishes to achieve (but it may not be obtainable). It could also be described as the ‘position’ that a party is taking, or the competitive stance. Since a variety of outcomes is likely in any negotiation, there is a range within which any outcome may be achieved, and this can be described as the Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). Hovering outside the negotiation process is the Best

Figure 3.18 Basic Fisher/Ury model of negotiation (author’s summation and depiction) Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), that each party will have assessed and devised, usually before the negotiation. It may be that the BATNA is the option to be exercised if the negotiations go badly (that is, walk away), or even to use as a threat move within the negotiating process itself, if it is vocalised. Essentially, it is the ‘Plan B’. When viewing a negotiation in the form depicted in Figure 3.18, pertinent aspects, such as defining negotiation as a means of advancing the full set of interests by jointly

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decided action, become apparent.104 Since both parties will have BATNAs, they will also have a range of possible outcomes and agreements according to the interests, wants and needs that are being brought into the situation. Therefore a variety of end points, or outcomes, is possible, any of which may be acceptable to the parties involved. The ZOPA can be viewed as limitless in scope, contained only by the degree of creativity, and value creation, by either party. Any outcome at any point within the ZOPA, if agreed by both parties, is therefore a ‘good’ outcome. Returning to the idea of expanding the pie of possible outcomes in the ZOPA, as discussed earlier by Leigh Thompson and others, an ability to see the potential within the ZOPA requires creative value input which can only be achieved through clear communication from both parties, openness, creativity and joint problem solving.105 When the focus is concentrated on separating people from the problem, on interests rather than positions, and on achieving objective criteria, then it is to be hoped that a more constructive approach will be taken which, in turn, will result in a principled negotiation and that a mutually acceptable agreement is likely to follow. An example To illustrate these concepts, the framework can be applied to a hypothetical negotiation context—for example, buying a car. Assume that person A is the buyer,

Figure 3.19 Example of buying a car and person B is the car salesman. Before A enters the salesroom, he will have prepared for the negotiation in certain ways. He is likely to have worked out his position, which is probably linked to the amount of money he wishes to spend. He will also have gauged his response if the negotiation goes badly for him, or fails completely. In such an eventuality, his BATNA might be to go to another garage, or not buy the car at all. Similarly, B, the salesman, will have worked out his position, and BATNA, as shown in Figure 3.19. Despite differences in their positions, there is scope for negotiation, and, according to their respective negotiating capabilities, numerous outcomes could be achieved in the ZOPA, with some favouring A, and others B. However, the argument has already been made that negotiation is not just a positional battle; it involves movement towards mutual agreement. If A and B maintained their

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positional stance as represented in Figure 3.19, they would be very unlikely to reach a negotiated agreement. There is another element that influences the movement within any negotiation: the issue of personal interests. Interests are what people care about, and can be tangible or intangible. They are likely to influence the decisions made within a negotiation, and the eventual agreements created. In this example, A might care about the model of the car, whether he can get any ‘extras’ such as insurance thrown in, or he might be starting a job on Monday and he needs a car to get to work. He may not voice these concerns during the negotiation, but they will be affecting the way he thinks and the decisions he makes as the negotiation proceeds. Also, if B can find out what A’s real interests are in the negotiation, as opposed to the positional stance solely, then this information can help B in framing options in terms that A is likely to approve. Similarly, B will have personal interests. These could be reaching sales targets for the month, future custom, or his commission; and, again, if A can understand these, then knowledge of such driving factors might assist him in the negotiation also. Therefore the concepts of the BATNA and interests seem to have a significant effect on the way in which negotiators interact and form their decisions. These factors are now examined further. The significance of the BATNA When referring to military micro-negotiation contexts it is a realistic objective by a military negotiator to quantify existing positions on an initial encounter, to ask himself such questions as, ‘Are they about to fire?’ For instance: The negotiations when we were stopped became confrontational quickly with weapons being first produced, then cocked and finally pointed directly at people…106 Such an example pinpoints an aggressive positional stance in an all too vivid way, yet obviously the soldier involved needed such ‘basic’ information in order to judge the next moves in the process on both sides. His own next move is interesting: We had to eventually allow ourselves to be arrested and taken to the head of internal security for the area to explain what we were doing in the area…hence the climb down.107 The negotiator thus came to the conclusion that there was little scope for negotiation with such obviously hostile forces; he needed to devise a safe alternative, a BATNA. A safe, preferable alternative to a risky confrontation was to live, and his decision to be submissive meant that scope remained to talk to another party at another time, which might have a more successful result. Survival through submission was his BATNA, and if it meant losing face in this specific situation, then this was readily acceptable, since it also meant that the other party was stopped from choosing to use their own BATNA, which was force. It is also important to recognise that there is not a ZOPA in every

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‘negotiating’ encounter, and, on operations, a tactical decision has to be made as to the scope for negotiation in the first place. Also, the negotiator had recognised that the armed group had little interest in negotiation, probably having no authority to make a decision about the soldiers’ presence in the area. It thus necessitated the presence of a more powerful local figure to act as a decision maker. The checkpoint soldiers had an added interest: they needed to be seen to be doing their job in the eyes of their commanders, and, by allowing his troop to be arrested, the soldier was satisfying that interest, but at a lower personal cost to himself and others. Being shot at that roadblock was clearly his WATNA (Worst Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement). Thus it may not be sensible to expect a negotiated settlement on every occasion, as a BATNA must be borne in mind at all times, together with the possibility of someone using it at any stage of the negotiation, with the result that the BATNA can become a threat move. If negotiation can be perceived as the creation of agreed collective decisions to achieve a mutually accepted outcome, then the concept of the BATNA is strongly integrative in terms of increasing the benefits to all parties, if used in a positive sense. What the existence of a BATNA suggests also is the importance of assessing the value any party places on its alternative to negotiating, in comparison with the value it places on the choice of proceeding with the negotiation. When parties are using their respective BATNAs to evaluate options, to decide whether to continue, to concede, to force or to agree, then the importance that alternatives play within a negotiation is emphasised.108 The more advantageous the BATNA is for any party, then the smaller the importance of achieving a negotiated outcome. This would imply that for a negotiated agreement to be successful in such circumstances, the potential agreement must have a substantially higher value to both parties. In other words, parties would need to expand the pie to such an extent that the benefits vastly outweighed the use of individual BATNAs. In such circumstances it may be that awareness of other factors influencing decision making might prove influential, particularly an evaluation of the interests of both parties within the negotiation. Summary The Fisher-Ury model of negotiation has highlighted two significant aspects of the process: the range of possible outcomes, and the impact of the BATNA upon decision making and behaviour in negotiation. These two issues, fundamental to any negotiation, might prove to be particularly pertinent in the eventual propositions concerning military tactical-level negotiation. The ZOPA allows for variation in context and interests, whilst the BATNA might allow greater insight into the effect of situational behaviour such as aggression, or an escalation of armed response, and the extent to which it might affect the nature of the negotiation itself. The existence of the BATNA will be shown to be a vital factor in tactical military negotiation, where decisions have to be made in life-threatening environments. Therefore, this literature has revealed and highlighted some essential influences.

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NOTES 1. See P.N.Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) and W.B.Rouse and N.M.Morris, ‘On looking into the black box: Prospects and limits in the search for mental models’, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 100 (1986), pp. 359–63. 2. E.E.Jones. The rocky road from acts to dispositions’, American Psychologist, Vol. 34 (1979), pp. 107–17. 3. Model based on depiction in R.J.Lewicki, D.M.Saunders and J.W.Minton, Essentials of Negotiation (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 1997), p. 93. 4. L.Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 81. 5. As described by J.Baron, ‘Decision analysis and utility measurement’, in Thinking and Deciding (Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 330–51. 6. Decision making under uncertainty is discussed at length by J.F.Yates, Judgment and Decision Making (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990). 7. Thompson, Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, p. 83. 8. Ibid., pp. 84–101. 9. An easy way to spot the dominant alternative in such a situation might lie in observing the alternative which is analogous to the concept of Pareto optimality (no other alternative exists that would improve one party’s outcome while not simultaneously hurting the other party’s outcome), as described in Nash’s utility theories, for example. See page 39 for a detailed exploration of Nash. 10. For example, whether a sum of money should be invested (with the prospect of enhanced future capital growth, but in a risky scheme), or kept and spent. 11. The limitation of mathematical game-theory modelling. 12. It is likely that the risk attitudes in situations such as choosing a paint colour for a room and playing Russian Roulette would be extremely different. 13. Terms used by A.Tversky and D.Kahneman, ‘Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 5 (1992), pp. 297–323. 14. Described as ‘everyman’s utility function’ by D.Bernouilli (L.Summers trans.), ‘Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk’ (original work published in 1738), Econometrica, Vol. 22 (1954), pp. 23–36. Bernouilli created a logarithmic function relating to the utility of money, which results in a concave plot showing the decrease in the utility of money in relation to the proportion of money. For example, increases in money gradually result in diminishing utility of that money (people live up to their means, for example). To use another analogy, the first bite into a highly calorific ice-cream sundae is the best; as it is eaten, the feeling of satiation increases. Thus, Bernouilli contends, a gamble should not be determined by the perceived monetary value, but by the expected utility. The more appealing the outcome, the greater the utility. 15. ‘The expected utility of a prospect is the sum of the utilities of the potential outcomes, each weighted by its probability.’ Thompson, Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, p. 87. 16. A.Tversky and D.Kahneman, ‘Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases’, Science, Vol. 185 (1974), pp. 1124–31. 17. Common anchor points in negotiation involve numerical values or prices. Bargaining to buy a car can all too often turn into numerical haggling, especially when the parties involved lose sight of what the other party might be interested in as well. 18. An authorial amalgam of framing concepts and influences as suggested by R.Fisher, E.Kopelman and A.K.Schneider, Beyond Machiavelli: tools for coping with conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Thompson, Mind and Heart of the Negotiator; and Raymond Saner, The Expert Negotiator (Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 19. A marital argument would fit this model, as would the Arab/Israeli situation. 20. Thompson, Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, p. 255.

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21. A detailed analysis of the creative-processes model is to be found in D.G.Pruitt and P.J.Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1993). 22. Discussion of the power involved in information exchange can be found on page 47f. 23. Thompson, Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, p. 256. 24. Discussed at length in R.Fisher, A.K.Schneider, E.Borgwardt and B.Ganson, Coping with International Conflict: a Systematic Approach to Influence in International Negotiation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997). 25. Particular research in this area has been carried out by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 26. L.Ross and A.Ward, ‘Psychological barriers to dispute resolution’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 27 (1994). For example, a history of no strikes or consistent mutual agreement in a company can have a powerful effect on the maintenance of that ‘norm’. Obtaining a momentum of ‘yes’ responses can have a powerful and positive effect on a negotiation. 27. Adapted from Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli, p. 104. 28. Theories posed by Cross and Bartos, for example, emphasise a concession/convergence model of negotiation that suggests the opposite view to this. See bibliographic details on Cross and Bartos in the bibliography. 29. This analysis is predominant in many modern theories of negotiation, particularly those deriving from the Harvard Business School theoreticians (for example the work of Roger Fisher and William Ury). Further discussion of their particular theories takes place later in this section. This resurrects the concept of the BATNA once more, and its inherent danger. 30. For example, the work of Nash revolves around the concept of utility. See J.F.Nash, ‘The bargaining problem’, Econometrica, Vol. 18 (1950), pp. 155–62 and J.F.Nash, ‘Noncooperative games’, Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54 (1951), pp. 286–95. Also the work of David A.Lax and James K.Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator (New York: The Free Press, 1986). 31. G.C.Homans, Social Behaviour (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1961). An idea of reciprocity or proportionality is favoured in such an approach. Extensive analysis of the idea of fairness, or justice, in negotiation has also been undertaken by Cecilia Albin; see C.Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 32. See the work of M.H.Bazerman, ‘Fairness, social comparison, and irrationality’, in K.Murnighan (ed.), Social Psychology in Organizations (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1993), pp. 184–203, and D.Hofstadter, ‘Metamathematical themes’, Scientific American, Vol. 248, pp. 14–28, for example. 33. For a detailed mathematical model of such a concept, refer to ‘the Nash solution’ concerning experimental negotiation in Bartos (1974), ch. 8. In summary, Nash’s solution is fair in that it gives each side 50 per cent of the maximum payoff it can expect, but also the solution does not give the two sides the same payoff. 34. The main problem with this concept is that in most real negotiating situations it is not clear what ‘split the difference’, ‘the mid-point’, or ‘50/50’ agreements mean in practice. 35. Discussed in these terms in M.Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 215 ff. ‘Norms’ are the mutual understandings which a group has concerning expectations of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or when you think ‘this is how I should behave’. Norms can be formalised as laws of the land, or remain informal as social control. 36. Ibid., p. 216. 37. Model adapted by the author from D.Druckman (ed.), Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1997), p. 69. 38. Zartman has identified eight main approaches taken by social scientists towards negotiation per se: historical, contextual, structural, strategic, personality-type analysis, behaviour skills

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focus, process variables analysis and experimentation and simulation. See I.W.Zartman, The 50% solution (New York: Anchor Press, 1976). 39. Figure suggested by the author. The numerals indicate a sense of greater ‘worth’ to one party or another. Thus 0 is a win-win scenario; settlement at the position of higher numerals would indicate a greater benefit to one party rather than the other. 40. Bartos (1974), p. 286 finds that a negotiator’s toughness (his tendency to make only small concessions) is related to factors such as gender (women tend to be tougher than men), and he found that both sexes are hard on opponents who are young, male, non-Caucasian or poorly adjusted psychologically. 41. Experimental studies have revealed contradictory evidence concerning this proposition. The experiments carried out by Bartos (1974) and Hamner (1974) indicated that if parties opened a negotiation with low-level bids, then the chances of agreement improved, whereas the work of Chertkoff and Conley (1967) and Hinton, Hamner and Pohlen (1974) revealed that negotiators achieved even higher outcomes if their initial bids were ostentatious. See W.C.Hamner, ‘Effects of bargaining strategy and pressure to reach agreement in a stalemated negotiation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 30 (1974), pp. 458–67; J.M.Chertkoff and M.Conley, ‘Opening offer and frequency of concession as bargaining strategies’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 7 (1967), pp. 181–5; B.L.Hinton, W.C.Hamner and M.F.Pohlen, The influence of reward magnitude, opening bid and concession rate on profit earned in a managerial negotiation game’, Behavioral Science, Vol. 19 (1974), pp. 197–203. 42. In Clausewitzian terminology, action is organised around an objective and is, thus, a ‘strategy’. See C.von Clausewitz, On War (M.Howard and P.Paret, eds and trans, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976; originally published 1832). It may be that in negotiation two main strategies can be distinguished: cooperative strategies (mutual gain) and competitive strategies (self-gain). 43. Often described as a ‘zero sum game’. 44. As described by Walton and McKersie (1965) and by Axelrod (1984) in his expansion of the Prisoner’s dilemma game. 45. Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 171. 46. D.Druckman, ‘Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual-responsiveness’, in H.Sauermann (ed.), Contributions to Experimental Economics: Bargaining Behavior (Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B.Mohr, 1978), pp. 344–74. 47. Ibid. 48. Figure amended and summarised from A.J.Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process (Chicago: Aldine, 1968). 49. Author’s amended depiction of J.W.Burton and D.J.D.Sandole, ‘Generic theory: the basis of conflict resolution’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 2 (1986), pp. 333–45. 50. Daniel Ellsberg, The Theory and Practice of Blackmail (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1968). 51. See T.Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 795. 52. Glenn Synder, ‘Crisis bargaining’, in Charles F.Hermann (ed.), International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1982). 53. ‘Concern for disaster avoidance focuses attention almost exclusively on achieving a satisfactory situation rather than on choosing an optimal solution from several moderately varying favorable conditions.’ Charles Lockhart in Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 13. 54. For example, see the work of J.G.March and H.A.Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), and J.C.Harsanyi and R.Selten, ‘A generalised Nash solution for two person bargaining games without complete information’, Management Science, Vol. 18(5) (January 1972), Part Two. 55. Factors cited in S.Bacharach and E.Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1981), p. 15.

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56. Ibid., p. 15. 57. Ibid., p. 16. 58. A.Rapoport, Two Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1966). 59. See the chapter on the DIAMOND model (Chapter 10). 60. R.D.Luce and H.Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 115. 61. O.J.Bartos, Process and Outcome of Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 274. 62. Cited in and summarised from P.Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: a crosscultural perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 44. 63. A group of Harvard undergraduates was set the task of fighting a war game against the Soviet Union by William Martel, a member of the RAND team developing an automated US/USSR war game in the 1980s. As the game reached the critical stage of all Soviet nuclear forces on full alert, the students started to interact with the situation on a more ‘human’ level, rather than technological. ‘The thing began to defuse, and the kids were beginning to deal with…“How do we negotiate X?” “How do we negotiate Y?” “Let’s put together a treaty of some sort, and what will be the talking points?”’ Cited in Thomas Allen, War Games: Inside the Secret World of the Men who Play at World War III (London: William Heinemann, 1987), p. 178. 64. Nash, ‘The bargaining problem’. 65. For example: If A and B were negotiating about dividing 100 poker chips, where each chip is worth £1 to both parties, the Nash solution would state that each party would receive 50 chips (symmetry principle). But, supposing that each chip was worth £1 to A and £5 to B, should the division be different? The Nash solution would state that they should still be divided 50:50 since B’s utilities have not changed, but are merely represented by a different mathematical linear transformation. 66. The difference in personal interests, and the possibility of reaching a resolution despite these, is explained succinctly in a nursery rhyme:

Jack Sprat could eat no fat His wife could eat no lean And so betwixt them both They’d eat the platter clean. 67. R.E.Walton and R.B.McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 68. Terminology used in the Harvard Program on Negotiation to define external ratifiers in any negotiation. Particularly apparent in the writings of Fisher and Ury, and used by Professor James McCallum at the US War College Pennsylvania. (Details in the bibliography.) 69. Nash, ‘Two Person Co-operative Games’, p. 21. 70. ‘Zero sum’ describes the stance taken by negotiators when they view themselves as competitive and strictly opposed disputants. With such a perception, both will achieve limited success, or are even more likely to fail. At best one negotiator gains what the other loses. Described in detail in V.A.Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991), p. 59. 71. Allen, War Games, p. 172. 72. Concept explored in R.Fisher, W.Ury and B.Patton, Getting to Yes (2nd edn, NewYork: Penguin, 1975). 73. Discussion within general negotiation literature debates the nature of interests, needs and values, and sees them as separate entities. Of significance is the work of Burton and Kelman

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in this debate; see J.W.Burton, Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969) and H.C.Kelmen (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1965). An opposing argument is made by Touzard (1977), who states that negotiations concerning values are the most difficult to resolve in a positive fashion, and compromise reveals capitulation; see H.Touzard, La médiation et la resolution des conflits (Paris: PUF, 1977). This is a large, philosophical debate which, while important and valuable in the context of this thesis, is merely accorded recognition; detailed analysis will not render greater insight into the key issues delineating tactical military negotiation. It is sufficient to acknowledge the more general perception that the factors of interests/needs/values exist and respectively play their part in the decision-making process. The nature of values will receive a separate analysis later, in the context of the key factor of culture. 74. Positions can be in complete conflict, or diametrically opposed, whereas the underlying interests of the parties may be similar. 75. An astute student of American presidency, Richard Neustadt, argued that presidential power, for example, ‘is the power to persuade, and the power to persuade is the power to bargain’, cited in Lax and Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator, p. 238. 76. Ibid., p. 239. 77. Proposition put forward by Thompson in Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, p. 269. 78. Ibid. 79. A real-world example of such a difficult negotiation is analysed in Chapter 7. This case study highlights the importance of the recognition of interests, as well as ZOPAs and BATNAs, as being key factors in this type of negotiation. 80. Burton, Conflict and Communication. A.Rapport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960). 81. Case study examined in Larry Bacow and Mike Wheeler, Environmental Dispute Resolution (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), pp. 73–4. 82. See T.C.Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). 83. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) p. 137. 84. Face-saving can be an important factor in the determination of personal behaviour within a negotiation. The importance of face varies from culture to culture, ranging from little significance to a life-and-death issue. Druckman described this factor as ‘the desire to project an image of capability and strength or conversely to avoid projecting an image of incapability, weakness or foolishness’, see D.Druckman (ed.), Negotiations: SocialPsychological Perspectives (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1977). Face-saving might become more important when one party is trying to prove itself to external ratifiers; therefore negotiations with a greater degree of ‘transparency’ are more likely to experience facesaving moves, as will a high-conflict situation. See Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict. Experiments have also shown that face-saving tends to slow down the concession rate; see D.F.Johnson and W.L.Tullar, ‘Style of third party intervention, face saving and bargaining behavior’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 8 (1972), pp. 319–30. 85. D.G.Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (London: Academic Press, 1981), p. 23. 86. A detailed definition of ‘power’, and main references, were stated on page 47. 87. Discussion of cultural norms can be found on page 68 onwards. 88. Vivienne Jabri wrote concerning the influence of power in third-party negotiation: ‘While coercive mediation may be criticized for failing to change its political power base in its dependence on the use of threat and reward tactics for gaining concessions, the…facilitative approach may be criticized for negating power asymmetry in its discourse, thereby creating a myth of equals involved in unobstructed dialogue.’ See V.Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 155. Therefore the concept of power should not be ignored.

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89. P.Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: a cross cultural perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 201. Gulliver’s assessment of ‘power’ echoes Zartman’s; he goes on to stress that power is related to the interactive process with its inherent reassessment structure. 90. Bacharach and Lawler, Bargaining, p. 167. 91. Societies which might be described as struggling for power, in many cases. 92. ‘In so far as the issue is left to collective bargaining there is not even any question of principle involved… The issue is a trial of strength between the parties.’ S.Webb and B.Webb, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans, 1902), p. 184. ‘Within some limits, for variation, the basic determinants of the outcome of collective bargaining negotiations are the determinants of the basic power relationships which underlie the conflict in industrial relations.’ C.M.Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 132. 93. I.W.Zartman, ‘The political analysis of negotiation’, World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1974), pp. 385–99. 94. Young (1975) states that ‘strategic interaction is a central feature of all situations involving bargaining, no matter how the phenomenon of bargaining is conceptualized in detail.’ See bibliography for details. 95. Edmund Burke, ‘Second Speech on Conciliation with America’ (1775), cited in Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution (New York: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 49. 96. P.T.Hopmann and C.Walcott, ‘The impact of external stresses and tensions on negotiations’, Druckman, Negotiations, pp. 301–23. 97. See Chapter 6 for the analysis of force within a military environment. 98. See P.Watzlawick, How Real is Real? Communication, Disinformation, Confusion (NewYork: Random Press, 1979). 99. An example of an individualistic use of deterrence is that of Rommel; he always advised his Panzer divisions to open fire before they were in range of the enemy: if the enemy could be frightened enough before the tanks came within range they might go into hiding, and therefore be ineffective. Collective fear was used in Caesar’s army: any advancing legionnaire who hung back was likely to be killed by the soldiers beside him, and so on. This rule increased their collective, but maybe not their personal, security. 100. See J.Horai and J.T.Tedeschi, ‘Effects of credibility and magnitude of punishment on compliance to threats’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 12 (1969), pp. 164–9. 101. As investigated by J.T.Tedeschi, B.R.Schlenker and T.V.Bonoma, Conflict, Power and Games: the Experimental Study of Interpersonal Relations (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, 1973). 102. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict. 103. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, in particular. 104. Author’s emphasis of Harvard definitions (in ibid.). 105. Terms also used by Fisher and Ury, where the potential outcome is only limited to how big the parties can make their share of a ‘pie’ of options. 106. Non-attributable comment. 107. Non-attributable comments made by a GB peacekeeper to the author. 108. When alternatives are unclear, or shift, decision analysis can provide a systematic guide. See H.Raiffa, Decision Analysis (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968) and H.Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Multiattribute value and utility theories can help to compare outcomes versus no agreement potentials. See R.Keeney and H.Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives (New York: Wiley, 1976). It may be suggested that some game theory concepts, especially those concerning the influence of threats, might also assist negotiators in the assessment of alternatives. See Raiffa, Art and Science of Negotiation and R.D.Luce and H.Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957).

4 SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES CONTEXT Introduction Although it may sound simplistic, the importance of the general context within which the negotiation is occurring should not be underestimated; this was raised in the previous chapter. ‘Context’ implies that environmental, political and social factors are likely to affect both the negotiating parties and the nature of their negotiation and, thus, every negotiation will be different, given the mutability of such circumstances. For example, a negotiation between two competitive commercial companies carried out in a comfortable boardroom will, of necessity, have different external influences playing upon it than a negotiation under fire in the middle of a civil war. The extent to which this contextual factor influences the negotiation deserves some exploration and, it will be proposed, has a substantial effect on the interplay in the general negotiation process, and also on a specific negotiation type, such as tactical military negotiation. The importance of context, and an awareness of it, can be traced through historical approaches to negotiation, particularly at the political and strategic levels. Knowing and understanding their standing on the world stage, and their weaknesses, enabled many civilisations to use negotiation in a variety of guises to outwit enemies and opponents by adapting their negotiation stance to their contextual need. For example, to offset their military inferiority the Byzantines developed a complicated diplomatic approach to other nations and tribes: they implemented a show of strength tactic through the guise of negotiation (an early example of a BATNA in action).1 Byzantine negotiators were sent as ambassadors to many foreign courts, and secretly assessed the strength of that enemy, sending the intelligence back to Byzantium. Acting on this information, commanders of these foreign armies were then invited to Byzantium, where they were wined and dined, but contained in a sumptuous building from which they were not allowed to venture. From this building they could witness multiple military parades, and the movement of considerable numbers of troops in and out of the city gates. It appeared very impressive, and rather daunting a prospect for any army that had cherished a hope of military victory over Byzantium, and it deterred foreign armies for over four hundred years. However, it was all an elaborate hoax: the Byzantines had a small and relatively weak army, and the hordes of troops these commanders witnessed tended to be the same troops going in and out of the gate, but changing their armour regularly. The Byzantines thus had recognised their contextual circumstances and adapted their negotiating behaviour and response in order to affect the outcome of any encounter with an enemy. Risky negotiation, threat moves and a desire for short-term resolution also coloured the Venetian approach to negotiation in the Middle Ages.2 Building on their knowledge and adoption of Byzantine diplomacy, the Venetians, surrounded as they were by other Italian city states and the Vatican, used deception vigorously in all their diplomatic dealings. The chief arbiter of such an approach was Niccolò Machiavelli, who acclaimed

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the tactic of deception in diplomacy, as it proved useful in dealings with volatile neighbouring states, particularly if their downfall was to be effected. He commented, ‘The security and interests of the State have priority over all ethical principles.’3 Because of their political context, the Venetians had employed the deceptive tactics of the Byzantines, but added the ploy of provisional agreement, which helped to ensure their supremacy in the political arena. By contrast, a century later, Cardinal Richelieu of France studied the art of diplomacy from his historical forebears, and concluded that negotiation could provide more durable political alliances, rather than quick gain. Such a resolution favoured France’s nationalist stance in the seventeenth century, and Richelieu was pre-eminently a nationalist and a realist. He based his method of negotiation on copious intelligence and record keeping, and his agreements were detailed so that the outcomes could not be disputed. Thus throughout the century, French diplomacy became the benchmark in Europe for negotiation method. French became the official language of diplomacy, and writers such as Callières stressed the importance of understanding interests within negotiation, and Gracián stipulated the necessity of honour in diplomacy.4 It may be argued that the French approach to negotiation was based on their knowledge of their contextual situation within a Europe where France held the balance of power (until the subsequent rise of Britain, Prussia and Russia). Returning to the contemporary world, the increase in nationalism, religious fanaticisms and ethnic division has made the world less amenable to negotiated outcome in a strategic sense. The hope that negotiation might resolve a situation in a conflict, such as that witnessed in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, is unrealistic in its perception of negotiation as the panacea for all ills. While negotiation can be implemented as part of conflict resolution, it is unlikely to provide the total solution. At best, negotiation might be perceived as providing the steppingstone between a state of war and a state of peace.5 Once this is realised, the possibility of a positive or negative negotiated outcome can be accepted, and, with it, its place in the context of a wider issue.6 Such an acknowledgement allows for the real-world perception that negotiation might not be the applicable dispute resolution technique on occasions, and the operational soldier, for example, always has to make an initial assessment whether it is safe or appropriate to negotiate in the few opening seconds as an unexpected situation occurs. Summary Knowledge of the context within which the negotiation is occurring can influence the style, approach and impetus within the negotiation itself. External factors, such as political security, social standing, the amenability of the environment, physical threats, whom the negotiator represents and why, might influence decisions made and the desired outcome. An awareness of the general context or setting within which the negotiation is taking place, plus the personal context of each negotiator, is likely to offer an enhanced perception of the inherent conflict issue, needs analysis, objectives and strategies that might be employed during the negotiation.7 Negotiating without full appreciation of the external context within which the meeting is taking place limits anticipation, tactics and the room for flexibility of choice. Whether the negotiation is at the strategic or the tactical level the emphasis on context remains the same, as does its influence on the process.

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At the tactical level, therefore, the contextual influences might include the organisation each negotiator represents, the political situation within which they are operating, the aims of their strategic-level commanders or decision makers, the physical environment within which they meet, and their capacity for decision making.8 All of these factors are likely to influence the negotiation itself, some before the parties even meet. Therefore an awareness of a multi-faceted context as an influential external factor ought not to be overlooked.9 CULTURE Introduction The previous section indicated the importance of context in the negotiation process, and also made explicit the influence of the cultural setting, and the individual culture of the negotiators, on the interaction. The tactical military negotiator acts and operates in cultural contexts removed from his own, needs to interact with individuals and groups whose ethnicity may be unfamiliar, and encounters different organisational cultures within an operational environment. Culture is a factor that cannot, and should not, be overlooked. An assessment of literature on this subject will highlight the substantial effect that the cultural element has on the soldier seeking to negotiate in a foreign land, and also when working within a multiplicity of professional organisational cultures. Because negotiation is about communication and people, it is difficult to avoid the ‘human element’ in any situation. Subjectivity, cognition and context are important personal characteristics that each party will bring to the negotiation, consciously or otherwise. Not all theorists have agreed on the importance of these elements; for instance Zartman wrote: Culture is indeed relevant to the understanding of the negotiation process, every bit as relevant as [the] breakfast [the negotiators ate], and to much the same extent.10 It can be argued that Zartman made such a statement because culture is too vague a concept to try to define in a model of negotiation. Due to its complex nature, culture may be difficult to delineate, but to suggest that it is always irrelevant is a step too far. Negotiation literature has addressed the ambiguity of the concept of culture, and attempts have been made to assess its influence on negotiating behaviour.11 It is noticeable that practitioners and theorists of negotiation differ widely in their interpretations of the potential influence of culture. Many practitioners are encouraged to view cultural elements as ‘challenges to overcome’. For example, in the vast numbers of ‘how to do it’ manuals stereotypical cultural behaviour is described for the benefit of the would-be negotiator, and then formalised solutions are provided for any cultural dilemmas and behaviour encountered within a negotiation.12 This approach may be described as understanding ‘what negotiators do, rather than what they think’.13 Another view is based on the proposition that the norms and values of a culture are the key to understanding it, and also that the idea of heterogeneity is equally important.14

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Culture might be viewed as affecting the behaviour of the negotiator in a variety of ways, some of which are not obvious, or may include external, societal, or cultural traits that impinge upon the process itself, rather than just the individual concerned. Thus Janosik argues that: nationality or culture does have an important part to play but any generalization about the negotiation/culture nexus might require modification to account for age, gender, and the negotiating environment.15 The importance of culture Some societal cultures find the whole process of bargaining distasteful, even embarrassing, while others make it a way of life. One of the reasons why negotiation can seem unpleasant is that people often confuse the process with social/personal exchange, as opposed to formal discursive communication. The terms of personal social interaction tend never to be explicit, never enforceable at law, and rarely equitable. Whilst social exchanges can be complicated, discussing issues such as assistance and needs in a more formal way means that those issues have to be viewed in terms of rewards or personal costs, and some people do not find such analyses persuasive, appealing or pertinent. It is important to understand what is meant by ‘culture’ per se, and to try to analyse the major influential factors both for the individual and within the process of negotiation itself. Soldiers operate in cultural environments which can both relish, or shrink from, negotiation; thus a cultural influence will play a part in the exchange in such contexts. At first sight, the term ‘culture’ might be understood to represent a person’s observations of diverse languages, history, traditions, monuments, fashions, or art. However, these qualities are only the top layer of culture, the most easily observable factors, but not necessarily the only influences of culture upon the individual. There are more implicit levels—those that affect people deeply as individuals, but may not be as apparent to a casual observer. Figure 4.1 shows suggested layers of awareness of cultural influences on any individual, working at many levels of consciousness. It is rather like peeling away layers of onion skin: the outer explicit layer of the ‘onion’ hints at deeper tiers of culture which lie beneath; but it remains the immediate way to identify cultural traits for most people in many social and interpersonal encounters.

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Figure 4.1 A model of culture (adapted from Trompenaars and HampdenTurner)16 The middle layer of the ‘onion’ reveals two deeper strands of culture, norms and values. Cultural norms are the mutual understanding that a group has concerning expectations of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or when one thinks ‘This is how I should behave’ (behaviour).17 ‘Values’ determine the definition of ‘good and bad’ and so are related to the ideals shared by a group, or, as an individual, when one thinks, ‘That’s how I aspire to behave’ (an aspiration). For example, some Japanese people might say that they like to bow because they prefer to greet people that way; that is a value. Others might say they do not know why they bow, but do it because everyone else does; that is a norm. Shared meanings of norms and values thus allow for group cultural traditions to be developed.18 At the centre of cultural awareness are the basic assumptions about existence or survival, needs such as food gathering, reproduction and physical safety, and even in the modern world these factors govern behaviour, particularly in stressful or volatile situations. Any message a person receives or transmits is thus affected by their cultural background; in turn, a person uses his or her framework of beliefs, values and norms to construct their interaction with the world. What is being said is evaluated by the individual through frameworks covering sense, the manner of the speech, how it was phrased, intonation, applicability, who the speakers are and whether they are worth one’s

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attention, validity of the information and so on—all in fractions of a second. An individual is then likely to filter the information being received according to his or her own personality and core beliefs. Someone might also stereotype a speaker by gender or age, or by their coming from a different economic or religious group, different ethnicity; an individual may do this with strangers in particular when trying to construct a ‘picture’ of them as quickly as possible. This is limiting and dangerous in terms of negotiation, since it can restrict option creation and mutual interest appreciation, in particular. For example, as the number of serving female soldiers on operational duties increases, there is also a proportional increase in the likelihood of women having to conduct micromilitary negotiation on a ‘frontline’. This is particularly noticeable when women are troop commanders, and responsible for field operations, including ‘blue beret’ peacekeeping work. An example is the case of Lt Amelia Baker, whose peacekeeping responsibilities in Cyprus were reported upon in Harpers and Queen magazine in March 1998, where it was stated: [it] means going up to a bunch of burly Greek or Turkish soldiers and asking them politely, but forcefully, to take down the extra layers of brick they have just added to a wall… Even Lt Baker admitted she was nervous the first time she discussed ‘an incident’. ‘Some Turkish soldiers had put up an illegal sun shelter. I just stood there and insisted their commander approach me. I was standing on the cease-fire line itself, which Turks don’t like. It took half an hour—it felt like forever—but eventually he came over and we achieved what we wanted.’19 Colourful descriptions aside, some interesting dilemmas are raised in this article, specifically relating to the authority a woman has in a bargaining scenario as opposed to a male counterpart, and the cultural perceptions at play. Effective bargaining requires an element of mutual trust and respect at some juncture, but in some operational areas a woman will never achieve trust or respect from cultures that perceive women as ‘secondclass citizens’.20 There are two aspects to discuss here: the linguistic skills of the female soldier in the micro-negotiation scenario and the socio-cultural perception of the female in operational situations. Research in this area shows that there appear to be social consequences of gender differences in language use. Whilst it is not the intention to undertake an in-depth analysis of such research in this book, it will be useful to summarise the main findings as these factors may have a concomitant effect on how a female negotiator is likely to communicate in a bargaining scenario as opposed to a male. Maltz and Borker (1982) state that men and women develop different strategies in conversation, and that female discourse is characterised as being ‘collaboration-oriented’ and male discourse is ‘competition-oriented’.21 Such gender-specific patterns develop, and are formalised, in early childhood. In childhood disputes, it is observed that boys tend to resort to physical violence to resolve conflict, while girls compromise, evade or acquiesce. If these tendencies remain in adult life, then they are very likely to affect the tenor of a negotiation. At first sight, the more cooperative behaviour of females might indicate a predisposition to bargain effectively, whereas the male has an inclination to

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assert and dominate in a confrontational scenario. Gender discourse analysis also tends to this view following observable interaction, and studies of older male children reveal a lack of effective resolution in most conflict exchanges as greater importance is placed on a display of verbal skills rather than resolution.22 Coates (1993) concentrates on the concept of ‘verbal aggressiveness’ as a characteristic of the bargaining process, mainly in the form of power play and situational dominance interaction, as discussed earlier. Using threats and trading ripostes are common features in male aggressive argument, but women try to avoid such overt verbal aggression. To generalise to an extent, women find such interaction unpleasant and are liable to react in a personal way to such an approach rather than remaining personally unconcerned.23 Verbal conflict is viewed as problematic in a mixed-sex setting where women view verbal aggression as disrupting normal discourse, while men perceive it as a normal method of conversing.24 This would suggest an inherent weakness in a woman’s reactions to an aggressive negotiation scenario, especially military micro negotiation, where provocation is a likely tactic by the other party. A balance to the above presumed ‘weakness’ is the greater value women place on listening skills. They use minimal responses, are less likely to interrupt, and they encourage others to speak, whereas men compete to be the speaker and aim to dominate any conversation. A male speaker does not value listening to any great degree. However, listening to the other party, actively encouraging verbal interchange and construing idiosyncrasies and meanings from another’s comments are key features in a successful negotiation. Being a cooperative conversationalist is an asset to any bargainer, and a female predisposition in this area is likely to prove a positive contribution to any bargaining process. Difficulties may therefore arise when negotiation is carried out in a mixed-sex scenario. In such a situation the dominance of males in any discourse is likely to prevail, and, thus, a female negotiator may begin the process in a more submissive, and weaker, position from the outset. She may have further to ‘go’ to achieve the same potential resolution as in a male/male negotiating scenario. Whether this is just a communication frailty or is due more to a cultural/ stereotypical response is open to debate, but it will have an effect on the nature of the interplay in the negotiation. More specifically, it is likely to affect the perception, and authority, of a female soldier in a military negotiation, for example. The dynamics of the bargaining process towards a desirable outcome could be more predisposed to a male counterpart; that is, his ‘journey’ to his goal could be shorter because he may be perceived as an equal, or even superior. A female military negotiator is likely to be disadvantaged through socio-linguistic norms, cultural perception, and probably a stereotypical view of her effectiveness, or otherwise, as a soldier. Stiehm (1989) concedes that it is difficult for women to gain acceptance on the same terms within their own fighting unit, let alone with an outside observer.25 Such a conclusion would be disputed by the Services themselves, where conscious efforts are being made to avoid sexual discrimination in the workplace, and where active training is being implemented to consolidate this initiative. However, as Lt Baker explained:

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I was out with one of my sergeants and a Turkish sentry tried to speak to him rather than me, even though he could see the stripes on my arm and knew I was the commander. On-the-ground observation of female soldier v. male bargainer situations tends to reveal a dynamic that highlights the femininity of the soldier as opposed to her militariness. Interestingly, if a female soldier is cooperative in a negotiation, a male counterpart may concede more to a female soldier than they might to a man.26 But if the female becomes more aggressively dominant and tries to assert herself militarily over a male counterpart, there is often a higher degree of resistance towards her. Or, as Wayne Ulrich, a worker for Médecins sans Frontières, said, ‘It’s all about not losing face’.27 It is impossible for a female military negotiator to avoid an external negativity, or a perception of required subservience, by another party from a different cultural, religious or social background that has such expectations concerning females. The values and political correctness which might hold in the West are not necessarily repeated around the world, and a female military micro negotiator would be well advised to expect such reactions, rather than be surprised by them. Analysis concerning the strength of female, positive communication skills tends not to be supported by real-world application or responses. Female linguistic behaviour would appear to be theoretically more appropriate for negotiation, and it may be that in business scenarios there is greater success for women negotiators. However, in male-dominated military operations, for example, gender differences appear to be more marked. Responses from civilian ‘spokesmen’ or military factional representatives to a female soldier are likely to be more dismissive from the outset, as Lt Baker described. Some cultures will totally ignore a female soldier, preferring to deal with a male soldier of a more junior rank. In spite of this age of political correctness, hostility towards the female soldier can also arise from within their own military ‘culture’. Many serving personnel, in many national forces, view the deployment of female personnel in the operational area as detrimental and, in some cases, dangerous for the women, and for the accompanying male soldiers. Opinions voiced to the author expressed concern that the presence of women on convoy duty, for example, places added responsibility and pressures on the deployed force. It is felt by some that females on convoys can risk escalation to unacceptable levels, especially when they are confronted by nationals who may be drunk, or have religious views concerning the subjugation of women.28 Gender is a situational variable which appears to have a significant influence on military environments, and is also likely to have noticeable effects on the perception of one party by another: The theoretical variables underlying gender differences are unclear; but the absence of clear-cut findings suggests that gender interacts with personality and situational variables.29 Much of this discussion lies in the perceived role of women in the Armed Forces—a complicated and heated debate which is not at issue here. What is significant when assessing the competence of women as military micro negotiators is the perception of them not just by the other negotiator, but also by their own personnel and senior

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officers.30 According to Enloe (1988), the debates concerning women in the military are nothing less than arguments over how to use women’s labour without violating notions of femininity, masculinity and social order, and the basic fact remains that subordination defines women’s relationship to armies.31 As Lt Baker states, If someone points a weapon at you, that’s very grave. We have to avoid getting to that situation. The best way of doing it is by establishing as strong a personal relationship of trust as possible. I suppose in a way, being a woman helps. It gives me an identity…. Western cultures tend to give women the identity of ‘carers and nurturers’, as opposed to the prevailing male identity of ‘achievers and winners’, and when women are dependent on men economically and psychologically they find open conflict difficult to handle. In situations of inequality, women tend to lose conflicts. However, Baker’s comment above suggests a positive influence that female soldiers can have upon building relationships through negotiation in the field, a positive contribution in a mutable context. Until such time as negotiators are viewed as people rather than men or women, the gender-based cultural differences will persist both on a perceptual and a contextual level, and it may be that consideration will need to be given to the deployment of women in certain operational areas. A potential dilemma for policy makers lies in the perception that men are more effective combatants, and women are better communicators, and so perhaps more women should be deployed in G5 roles (Civil Affairs), rather than as frontline soldiers. Becoming culturally sensitive Raymond Cohen has highlighted what he calls ‘Model C’, or culturally sensitive negotiators; they are: …aware of the gamut of cultural differences and do not naively assume that ‘underneath we are all pretty much the same’. Second, they perceive the potency of religious and other cultural resonances. Third, Model C actors grasp that Western rationality is based on culture-bound assumptions. Finally, they do not take for granted that an expedition (such as face to face negotiation) that works for one culture necessarily works for another.32 An awareness of the cultural background of the other party implies a greater sensitivity to the likely response, and possible decision making. It may also enhance awareness of interests underlying positional stance, since culture tends to influence what a person values and is concerned about. Similarly, if someone is listening rather than speaking, then other cultural filters will come into play. There is a tendency to interpret the words that are heard using established expectations and personal filters. For example, if the reader is asked to think of a tree now, he or she will probably imagine something different from another person. Individuals will tend to imagine a tree from their own

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geographical area; and African trees are very different from English oaks, tropical palms, or Canadian maples.33 When the speakers and receivers are from different cultures, the misinterpretation of messages is increasingly likely. Different individual contexts of history, custom, background, traditions, norms and values will cause differences in understanding. Frequently heard comments in general conversation can include responses such as ‘No, you don’t understand…’ or ‘I didn’t mean that…’ or ‘You never listen to me…’. It is not likely to be because someone has suddenly started to speak an incomprehensible language, but because the receiver has interpreted the message in a different way from the one intended.34 Communication is accepted as playing a vital part in peacekeeping operations, as the following comment reveals: Peace-keeping operations…demand that the Commander communicates unambiguously with his counterparts in the warring factions, and it is only by doing so that he is able to retain their respect and confidence: he will then be equipped to defuse misunderstandings before they blow up into major problems.35 Ambiguity can lead to misinterpretation, and misinterpretation can have life-threatening consequences in any tactical situation. However, trying to overcome personal cultural ‘baggage’ is not easy; nor is the attempt to submerge individualistic response or reaction in a situation. On any operation there is a distinct, defined need to do so on the part of any serving personnel; hidden information might prove influential, if not vital. As Roger Brown (1986) suggests, ‘There are the many conceptions we have in our heads that we happen never to have to talk about.’36 The stereotyping of people and their culture tends to reflect existing political relations and how far a party will be responsive to changes in those situations, but it also reflects contemporary alliances, enmities and social relations. These stereotypes are then likely to affect decisions made about groups or individuals, particularly in the ‘impossible to doubt’ phenomenon of discrimination by sex, race or nationality.37 Stereotyping is another barrier to creative problem solving and the ability to expand the pie of options within a negotiation. Summary The issue of culture appears to be one of the key elements in the modelling of a negotiation process, especially in accepting the context within which individual or societal decisions may be made. As Avruch states, Culture is not a homogeneous, reified, uniformly distributed, single level, customary trait list… However, knowing someone’s culture may well allow you to ‘predict’ behaviors that are highly unlikely to occur…38 In light of these thoughts, Zartman’s dismissal of culture is revealing:

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‘Culture is to negotiation’, he writes, ‘what birds flying into engines are to flying aeroplanes or, at most, what weather is to aerodynamics—practical impediments.’ Yes, they are, but one shudders at the consequences of birds in turbines or sudden wind shear, crashes and catastrophe and death.39 To ignore cultural factors is to ignore a significant influence on both the general context of a negotiation and the approach of the individuals towards the process. While it is not possible to explore what is an extremely complex issue in great depth in this book, nevertheless its inclusion by many negotiation theorists into proposed models is significant. It is an issue that affects human behaviour, and is thus likely to influence reactions, perceptions and decisions. In this way, it appears likely to be a factor that will influence the nature of tactical military negotiation, since all participants have different cultural contexts, both geographical and organisational.40 NOTES 1. Information taken from Raymond Saner, The Expert Negotiator (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 16–26. 2. Ibid. 3. A quotation from The Prince, 1520, cited in Saner, Expert Negotiator, p. 18. 4. François de Callières, The Art of Diplomacy (1716, trans; New York: Leicester University Press, 1983). Baltasar Gracián, The art of wordly wisdom: a hand oracle (1647, trans. Joseph Jacob, New York: Shabhala Pocket Classics, 1993). 5. A prime example occurred during the Cold War, when even negotiation over environmental issues was shunned due to contextual East-West hostilities. 6. Another contextual influence might include a desire for self-realisation. President Ronald Reagan made it his ambition to achieve nuclear disarmament, but failed in this objective at Reykjavik. Rebuffed, he went on to build up the US military to a substantial degree, but achieved self-fulfilment when another of his dreams was realised: the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 7. A non-military case study emphasises the importance of environmental factors on negotiation, for example. A Swiss salesman was in Bogotá to offer the Colombian government a deal on a water distribution system. However, the city became very tense following the kidnapping of a Zürich businessman. The salesman was staying in a comfortable hotel, but at night he could hear rapid gunfire and sirens. The negotiations lasted for several days, and the salesman was not sleeping due to the stress and noise until he asked himself if risking his life was worth it. He knew his head office was not too far away; he could haggle a speedy taxi ride to the airport, and do the same for police protection. His major concern switched from the contract to his personal safety, something that he had not foreseen. Cited in Saner, Expert Negotiator, p. 68. 8. It may be contended that individual multinational peacekeeping forces are also liable to the influence of differing contextual influences. For example, US peacekeepers are almost universally viewed as acting too aggressively on any UN operation, particularly by other nations. Even serious observers have noted that the USA appears not to be culturally attuned to the unique challenges of peacekeeping work; the general context influencing American troops is an underlying aggressive stance, promoted by political and military strategists over many decades. See Jonathan T.Howe, ‘The US and UN in Somalia: the limits of involvement’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1995).

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9. A new divide has emerged in scholarly literature on negotiation between those who seek to model ‘traditional’ small-scale, mainly bilateral, negotiations and those who seek to model them in terms of general multilateral negotiation. Examples of this debate can be found in I.W.Zartman (ed.), International Organization on Multilateral Negotiations (1989); J.Z.Rubin and B.R.Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1975); J.K.Sebenius, International Negotiation Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991); and R.Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two level games’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988), pp. 427–60. Both types of negotiation contain similarities and discrepancies, and appear to further the hypothesis that differences exist in degree, but not in kind, and should be viewed as complementary aspects of a more general process. 10. I.W.Zartman, ‘A skeptic’s view’, in G.Faure and J.Rubin (eds), Culture and Negotiation (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), p. 17. 11. See G.Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980) and E.H.Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1985). 12. For example, see Richard D.Lewis, When Cultures Collide (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1998). 13. Comment by R.Janosik, ‘Re-thinking the culture-negotiation link’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1987), p. 385. 14. ‘that tension, not consistency, typifies the component parts of any culture’. Ibid., p. 389. 15. Ibid., p. 391. 16. Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding cultural diversity in business (London: Nicholas Brearley Publishing, 1999), p. 22. 17. See also C.Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 18. For a more detailed discussion refer to F.Kluckhohn and F.L.Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961). 19. Article in Harpers and Queen Magazine, March 1998, pp. 23–7. 20. Gender is one of the studied variables in negotiation, but despite such research the question of how it affects the process is still open to debate. 21. D.Maltz and R.Borker, ‘A cultural approach to male-female miscommunication’, in John Gumerz (ed.), Language and Social Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 195–216. 22. J.Coates, Women, Men and Language (New York: Longman Publishing, 1993). 23. Susan Herring, ‘Gender and participation in computer-mediated linguistic discourse’, paper presented at LSA meeting, Philadelphia, 9–12 January 1992. She concludes that women produce less adversarial discourse, and tend to avoid participating in any adversarial discussion. 24. Amy Sheldon (1990) cited in Coates (1993), p. 158 details a juvenile dispute over toys involving a group of girls and a group of boys: ‘The girls succeeded in negotiating a resolution and maintained interconnectedness among members of the group… The boys by contrast adopted a more adversarial style, and since neither of the main protagonists was prepared to give in, the conflict escalated (and lasted considerably longer than the girls’: 5 minutes compared with 1 minute 45 seconds for the girls). 25. J.Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989). 26. Why this should be the case is not clear; it may be due to a female’s stronger ability to create a positive atmosphere for creative option making, and a greater perception of each party’s interests. 27. Comment made to the author. 28. In an interview with the author (non-attributable), Major L.voiced his unease at using female negotiators in the field, especially if there was antagonism towards them from the other party

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for cultural/military reasons. He would be tempted to replace the woman with a man to achieve positive movement in any negotiation process. This is a rather lamentable choice, but one can understand the operational difficulties which can affect a female military negotiator despite her skills and forte as an excellent bargainer; many concerns are external and are nothing to do with her prowess as a soldier/negotiator. 29. D.Pruitt and P.Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1993), p. 199. 30. ‘the idea that the sight of a blue helmet will automatically cause a belligerent to turn tail is no longer valid, if it ever was…’. Cited in D.D.Smith, Canada in Croatia: peacekeeping and UN reform—the view from the ground (UK: HMSO, 1995), p. 9. It may be a response aggravated still further if the blue helmet is being worn by a female soldier. 31. C.Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The militarisation of women’s lives (London: Pandora, 1988). 32. R.Cohen, ‘An Advocate’s View’, in Faure and Rubin (eds), Culture and Negotiation (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), pp. 35–6. 33. When using this example in the classroom the author has had wide-ranging interpretations that included a genealogical tree and a mug tree. 34. While I do not wish to pursue the debate further here, psychological research is being undertaken to ‘prove’ that difference in interpretations might also be affected by gender, as well as cultural background. Evidently the male predisposition leans towards weaker listening skills. See R.Connell, Gender and Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), or Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 35. F.Ponsonby, ‘Liaison is the lesson for International Forces’, The Officer (May/June 1996), p. 14. 36. Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 588. 37. Brown’s phrase: ibid., p. 609. 38. Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict (New York: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 105. 39. Zartman cited and discussed in ibid., p. 43. 40. Culture tends to play a more significant role in small-scale negotiations where an individual is affected by their own ‘cultural baggage’, the cultural context and any organisational cultural effect. Thus it has a multiple influence on both the negotiating parties and the negotiating context. This is supremely relevant in the military environment, where negotiation is conducted under all such cultural effects, due to the nature of the job. Lang’s discussion of the influence of organisational culture is interesting in this context; see W.Lang, in ABS, Vol. 38, No. 6 (May 1995).

5 INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION COMMUNICATION Introduction The significance of linguistic skills was touched upon in the last chapter, but they have a much more significant effect on negotiation than just reflecting a cultural trait. Words are not the usual means by which a soldier achieves a resolution, so will any seeming deficit in linguistic fluency have a detrimental effect on how the soldier negotiates? Language is of paramount importance in negotiation, with the process per se being a communication exchange. Language is the vehicle by which information and ideas are traded, and through which the issues of cooperation, competitiveness, threats and interests can be voiced. Because so much is invested in the linguistic element of a negotiation, problems and misinterpretations may arise from either the poor use of language or the misunderstanding of its implicit meanings. Communication can be both verbal and non-verbal, of course, and an increasingly important body of research has assessed systems-interaction analysis, where the sequential patterns of messages are stressed. The work of Jablin is important in this respect.1 He concentrates on the view that messages do not fall into discrete, dichotomous categories but may fulfil contradictory demands by combining the integration of cognitive processes and contextual features. An area of research that is starting to be explored concerns the thesis that communication is a comprehensive process, which links messages to the parties involved and to the situation, and that also involves the subsequent feedback processes of amplification and adaptation.2 Efficient communication within negotiation is affected by issues such as cultural filters and language difficulties, and, if mishandled, could even be the prime cause of a breakdown in negotiation. Another common tactic in any negotiation is the reciprocation of the manner in which information is delivered by the other party—for example, to return antagonism for antagonism, frankness for frankness, hostility for hostility. Behaviour in negotiation, or any vocal interaction, is often reciprocated: when you scream at people they tend to scream back; when you apologise you often receive an apology in return; and so on. This is interesting to note in terms of obtaining and transferring information in a negotiation: if a little information is offered early on by one of the parties, might it spur on a reciprocal information transfer? For the military micro negotiator this could be a useful tactic to employ, and in a Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) sense, the offer of information of little worth to the military negotiator might have positive psychological benefits that will reap rewards for both the immediate situation and general operational intelligence. Resolution in a negotiation often relies on creative information sharing, as does information gathering throughout the process itself.

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If the basic concept that behaviour is reflected is accepted, the negotiator can try to use their own personal behaviour to influence the tone of the negotiation. It can be extremely difficult to have an argument with someone who does not argue back, but mollifies. Their response tends to be catching, or at least deflating. As one peacekeeper stated: It is worth trying…an emphasis on body language and mannerisms; they soon realise that you are not going to play their game. You are playing your own game…(Non-attributable comment) The use of communication The issues of language and culture are often seen as interlinked, if not interdependent, and perhaps the most widely used theory in this context is Hall’s ‘high-context/lowcontext’ distinction.3 The heart of this distinction lies in a linguistic and, it may be postulated, a paralinguistic analysis. He makes the proposition that the style and delivery of communication alter according to the context in which that communication is being delivered. He suggests that a ‘high-context’ communication is one in which the information is obvious and may be centred around the person themselves, and parts of the complex message may need to be inferred by some other means by the other party, perhaps through implied and indirect meaning. In comparison, a ‘low-context’ communication contains simpler messages and explicit meaning, where the true message is easier to infer. Hall argues that in high-context communication the language becomes expressive and open; in low-context, it is functional. High-context styles encompass a high degree of accompanying kinesics and gestures (body language), whilst low-context communication is poor in paralinguistic terms. Hall stresses that these two styles of communication define the two ends of a communicational scale, and that styles will also differ within different social groups. For example, communication within family groups tends to be high context, but it will be low context between more task-oriented groups.4 What such a theory does suggest is the greater potential for ambiguity or misunderstanding within a negotiation if such complex communication context styles are in use. The problem of ambiguity will be reviewed in the military context at a later stage of this study; however, Raymond Cohen explored such a communication problem in his study of Egyptian/Israeli diplomacy where ‘the dialogue of the deaf’ ensued.5 A characteristic of negotiation is the probability that the bargainers do not ask for what they really want in the first instance; the entire negotiation process is thus movement towards common ground, and it takes time to achieve this movement. Usually the demands made are more than can be expected initially; most negotiators will structure their initial propositions to reflect their own ideal outcome. Therefore it is extremely difficult for one party to gauge the precise nature of what the other wants from the process, or even whether they want to bargain. Most negotiations start with an element of competitiveness rather than cooperation, which can promote mutual suspicion and mistrust. On military operations, a soldier is trained to be unambiguous in the delivery of information and in the analysis of received information, as within military operations a lack of clarity can be costly in both time and logistical terms. Ambiguity is not tolerated or expected. Thus it is reasonable to expect that a soldier might find this aspect of the negotiating process frustrating, if not annoying, on occasion. It all takes time, and time is

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a precious factor to the military. In other circumstances, the military will strive to achieve their objectives speedily and efficiently as befits the task; but negotiation can run counter to this preferred behaviour. Major B encountered delaying tactics in his attempts to achieve a negotiated solution to an engineering problem: I start to get the feeling that the real difficulty is the disruption to their own traffic, which is affecting their military operations. We go round the same buoy several times; them demanding that we get on and repair the bridge as quickly as possible…(Non-attributable comment) Ambiguity might also reveal itself in indirect communication, which may be hard to read and interpret because of cultural differences. Often glances, tentative statements and the failure to mention a specific demand are indicative signs of a communication that can be explored. The problem is that a signal must be noticeable, and clues are often missed by even an expert negotiator. The ambiguity of language means that communicating signals may not be that precise or clear. Thus the soldier may be likely to miss, or dismiss, ambiguous messages in the urgency to resolve a situation. Signalling messages clearly, be it through verbal or non-verbal cues, is an essential element in negotiation, and is taught to every soldier. The giving and receiving of signs and meanings are often subconsciously carried out, but they can influence any bargainer, especially in a cross-cultural setting where most military operations tend to be based. Messages need not be verbal only, but also rely heavily on overt body language clues, manner and tone of voice, all of which might indicate either passivity or aggression. As Berger (1984) suggested, ‘We are all semioticians, even if we don’t recognise it or understand the technicalities of the subject.’6 Elements the other side needs to hear

Narrative (what it means)

DEMAND address

a way of getting attention

addressee

of a particular party

tone

with a particular tone of request or demand

party or actor

to have the same or another party

action

take a desired action

time

by a particular time

legitimisation

for a valid reason

THREAT OR WARNING minimum required

if at least a certain action is not taken

deadline

by a particular time

actor

then some party

degree of probability

with some lesser or greater degree of certainty

consequences

will take unfavourable action

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time

by a particular time

legitimisation

for a valid reason

OFFER OR COMPROMISE minimum required

if at least a certain action has been taken

deadline

by a particular time

actor

then some party

degree of probability

with a lesser or greater degree of certainty

consequences

will take some favourable action

time

by a particular time

legitimisation

for a valid reason

Figure 5.1 Messages sent and how they are received7 Understanding the message Getting the message across is thus fundamental, as is understanding the message received. Most negotiators concentrate on the spoken word to convey the message. Thus examining the key elements of the verbal message conveyed, and how it is conveyed, can help to organise information about a situation. Early indications of an aggressive intent might be conveyed by underlying hints or emphases. For example, Figure 5.1 suggests some important stages and implications in a verbal message in such a negotiation context. Figure 5.1 suggests that the way in which the information is delivered in a negotiating scenario can affect the impact it has on the receiver, and thus affect the choice of action and decision. If the information is vivid and personalised, then it is likely to have a greater effect on the receiver than information that is less dramatic: ‘What are you going to do to save my dying child?’ has a more immediate impact than ‘The camps are full of people who need assistance’.8 If such propositions are correct, then it may be possible to manipulate a negotiation merely through the nature of information being offered and the manner in which it is being presented. The reaction and response to any received information may be irrational or unexpected: one need only witness personal reactions based on physical appearances, for example. People often make snap judgements of others based on the flimsiest of factual information, perhaps based purely on personal responses and memory association (‘he’s got shifty eyes’, ‘she’s got a mean mouth’, ‘don’t trust him, he’s a Uriah Heep type’, ‘red-haired people are always fiery’ and so on). This trait can also manifest itself in a negative form of stereotyping, which may embody cultural/ gender/positional generalisations, often involving negative value judgements. Similarly, it is rare in communication for two people to ‘talk’ about precisely the same subject, even if they think they are doing so; effective meaning is distorted by all the factors that make up the individual’s cognitive framework. As far as negotiation is concerned, this suggests that an effective negotiator will need to anticipate such differences and the contextual framework that the other party might be using. It also

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means that any personal competitive urge might need to be sublimated at certain stages of negotiation. There may be two versions of any message occurring at any one time—what is being said and what is being heard, and these may not be the same thing. The results of such a disparity may well have dire consequences. An example of such a problem was exemplified by a message sent by the USA to North Vietnam during a US bombing campaign on Hanoi.9 The message said, in essence: ‘We will bomb you tomorrow unless you slow down your supplies next week’. It was not clear to the Vietnamese what they had to do to stop the bombing: clearly if they withdrew totally, cut off supplies, apologised and compensated for their involvement in South Vietnam, then the USA would stop bombing. Yet this was more than the situation demanded; but how much more? In addition, the ‘threat’ was mechanically messy: the North Vietnamese knew they would be bombed the next day, so there was little incentive to halt their own actions. It is rather like saying to a child, ‘You can watch the TV tomorrow, unless you are bad next week.’ Realistically, a child is unlikely to modify its behaviour in the scope of a week for a benefit tomorrow. Therefore, although the Americans thought they were proposing a realistic and reasonable threat move, the message was received very differently: USA said

North Vietnam heard

We bombed you

We bombed you

Government of North Vietnam

tiny weak government of North Vietnam

We insist that you

you must

stop supplying and encouraging

stop supporting your comrades and colleagues

the rebels in the South immediately

immediately

because South Vietnam should be able to determine its own fate.

because we say so.

If you don’t stop encouraging

Unless you cease all forms of support

them now

in coming weeks

then we

then we

will probably

will

bomb you

bomb your civilians

tomorrow

tomorrow

to get you to stop.

because we can.

If you do stop

If you do stop

immediately

immediately

then we

then we

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will stop bombing

will consider

and talk with you

explaining to you

sometime soon

sometime

to help establish a government

how we are going to set up a puppet

in South Vietnam.

government in South Vietnam.10

This example reveals how words can be interpreted in a variety of ways, particularly when the implications of those words might have immediate physical effects in a war zone, or suchlike. Cultural filters and the predetermined judgement of the other party might also play their part in affecting response and reaction; threats are expected before the words are analysed in any other way. If this is so, this is an added danger area for the negotiating soldier; the other party will have judged his approach and message almost before he utters it. Communicating in more than one language Conducting a negotiation in one’s own language is difficult enough, but to conduct the process through the ‘filter’ of one or more translations can be additionally complex. Interpreters themselves might encounter difficulties with cultural nuances that prove impossible to translate accurately.11 It appears that such a problem was faced by interpreters in Vietnam on a regular basis: during a CBS news report an interpreter was used to talk to a local villager and the audience heard the reporter ask his question, heard it go between the interpreter and the villager, and then heard the answer come back in English. But what the interpreter had resorted to was asking the villager to count to 10, which he did, and then the interpreter reported what the villager might have said if they had understood the abstract ideas in the original question. The life experiences of the reporter and the different cultural frameworks of both men presented too great a contrast for the interpreter to handle.12 It is recognised that words are all-important in negotiation—their selection, appropriateness and clarity. Information has to be presented in measured language to try to ensure that confusion and misinterpretation by the other party are limited. Of necessity, a military micro negotiator will be working with an interpreter throughout the process, and similarly there is likely to be an interpreter on the opposite side as well. Such a protracted procedure may well have a number of effects on the negotiation process, particularly the time taken, the possibility for misinterpretation, and possible cultural confusion. The main impact is the likely effect on the structure of the negotiations, or the dynamics at play. Translation into another language necessarily slows down the process; it takes time to relate the message again, for it to be absorbed, and then a response given, which will require another translation. The sound of three, or even four, voices all contributing to the process can be daunting and baffling to the inexperienced micro negotiator at first, and many have commented on the diversity of sound and languages as distracting and disconcerting. As one peacekeeper stated, ‘It was difficult to keep my

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mind on the task, especially if you tried to listen to the translation, not that you made any sense of it…’13 The importance of mutual communication If circumstances allow, prior communication between parties can help to plan and structure a more cooperative negotiation. The opportunity to communicate before a bargaining situation does not, in itself, result in a ‘softening’ of positions, or an increase in cooperation, as Deutsch discovered on his ‘road experiment’ as discussed above. It may be that the threat potential can override any willingness to cooperate communicatively, or it may be that there is fear about loss of face, or a wish not to be seen as submissive. In practical tactical-level negotiation terms, verbal communication seems to become important in the negotiation situation itself, rather than as a pre-emptive tool. However, communication can have negative effects on the process as well as positive. For instance, the bargainers can trade verbal insults and provocations, and thus increase competitiveness. Yet it is also the key to unlocking the competitive stance in bargaining, and creating the movement towards cooperation and agreement.14 It must be added that the previously cited results of Deutsch’s experiments concerning the negotiation over the gate in the road, and the influence of communication on that negotiation, should be treated carefully in this respect since they raise further questions and issues. For example, the subjects were all female clerical staff, unused to persuasive communication and conflict resolution, and this situation in itself might have affected the result.15 Stereotyping and gender-based factors are important to consider, and relate to the negotiating process in practical terms as they may add to the growing list of variables that influence the outcome in any situation.16 To reveal the advantage of greater information concerning the interests of the other party, Leigh Thompson trialled some groups of negotiators where greater provision of communicated information was either provided or sought.17 Three effects were noted: 1. Negotiators who provided or sought information tended to reach integrative agreements compared with more ignorant negotiators. 2. They improved their own outcomes at a greater rate. 3. Neither type of negotiator spontaneously exchanged significant amounts of information. Thus, when the flow of useful information is two-way and beneficial, it appears that joint outcomes increase, although both parties reveal a basic inclination to be secretive. A beneficial outcome might seem a natural consequence of such positive behaviour; yet if only one of the parties seeks or provides information, should it be assumed that the ‘open’ negotiator is placing himself at a situational disadvantage? Thompson’s findings suggest that there appears to be little evidence of a distributive advantage for the negotiator who has extra information about the other party. Perhaps the provision of information about a party’s objectives does not necessarily place the more open negotiator at a disadvantage either, at least in business terms.18

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Summary Interactive patterns suggest the way in which the negotiating parties will communicate with one another, together with an intimation of the internal and external influences that will affect the interaction. Practical problems concerning language can stem from the need to use interpreters, with the resultant advantages and disadvantages of doing so—a lack of clarity, or even an increase in ambiguity, leading to the negative influence of stress, all of which are inherent in the military environment.19 Mutual communication is likely to be an important issue in tactical military negotiation, given the multiplicity of ethnic groups involved in operational contexts and the nature of the issues encountered. It will also play an essential part in avoiding the move towards the use of a BATNA, and language is the most prominent way in which a negotiator can express thoughts, reactions and decisions. PERSONALITY Introduction The extent to which personality may influence the outcome of a negotiated encounter is debatable. Some theorists, such as game theorists, have chosen to subsume the human element inherent within the process in preference to utility and mathematical neatness, as was seen in the earlier discussion. However, personality appears to be a relevant factor in any attempt at a ‘real-world’ modelling of negotiation, and a useful element to explore. It is of particular significance if the personality of a serving soldier, his/her view of the situation, appraisal of the options available, and so on will dictate the decisions made in a volatile, aggressive, and unpredictable negotiating encounter. The overall structure and context of a negotiation will, to a large extent, determine how influential personality, and communicative, factors will be; and in small-scale (for example bilateral) negotiations, such as those faced at the tactical level, these elements may prove to be significant. The ‘human factor’ Social psychologists stress that negotiation is a fundamental illustration of communicative and interpersonal interaction, and thus the modelling of the interpretative, theoretical task of the process is necessarily difficult. However, with this interactive function of the process also comes a consideration of group dynamics and relationship behaviour.20 What appear ultimately to matter are: the perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions that protagonists bring with them into the fray, rather than any objective measure of difference… and it is the realm of beliefs and perceptions that therefore warrants the full and complete attention of scholars and practitioners alike.21

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Analysis of negotiation in psychological terms allows for the inclusion of variables within a model to a much greater degree, and thus attempts to reconcile situational characteristics and formal processes. Psychologically based negotiation models tend to result in complex formulae as far as gauging an outcome from the process is concerned, but the main priority is an increased interest in the causal traits affecting the observed negotiating process.22 A persuasive argument concerning the importance of personality in negotiation is contained in the work of Gilkey and Greenhaigh: Despite the importance of [personality in successful negotiation],… almost no comprehensive attention has been given to how personality affects negotiation…23 In their article, the authors describe courses delivered at the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College, USA, that use self-examination, feedback and personality testing to teach negotiation skills. Their argument concerning the importance of personality is based on shared experience, rather than empirical research, but remains persuasive nevertheless, and is worth quoting at length: Anyone who has negotiated with people who are stubborn, shorttempered, shy, Machiavellian, or risk-averse will attest to how important negotiators’ personalities can be in determining how negotiations unfold. These traits are a small sample of the wide range of personality factors that can make negotiations productive or unproductive. Traits are stable and enduring characteristics of individuals that predispose negotiators to react to situations in particular ways. Negotiators who are aware of their own traits can adjust the strategies and tactics their personalities induce them to adopt; negotiators who are keen observers of others’ personality characteristics know what to expect and can make strategic adjustments in dealing with others. Thus every negotiator should be a student of how individuals differ from each other and how such differences affect negotiating behavior.24 The principal components of the Tuck negotiation skills programme are intensive personality assessment, simulations based on actual business negotiations and feedback. Experience has led the authors to believe that: Personality awareness can be a valuable teaching tool in expanding negotiators’ awareness of the way they think and act. In addition to mobilizing their capacities for self-awareness, negotiators also learn to benefit from feedback from their peers… Such self-awareness can often create the desire for change as the students become aware of alternative approaches to dealing with conflict that can allow them to use their individual strengths more fully.25

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Returning to an earlier core argument that a bargaining scenario is a simultaneous conflict between cooperation and competition, certain psychological processes can be said to be affecting participants because of this conflict, and their personal approach to micro negotiation.26 ‘Substitutability’ (the willingness to allow someone else’s actions to be substitutable for one’s own),‘cathexsis’ (the development of positive or negative attitudes) and ‘inducibility’ (the readiness to be influenced positively by another person) are some key psychological behavioural characteristics during negotiation, and the emphasis placed on any one might influence both the moves and outcome in any given situation, by any bargainer. ‘Substitutability’ in a cooperative situation would result in ‘reflected’ moves, even repetition, so the micro negotiation is likely to be very short as one party is conceding to another. In competitive terms, one bargainer would attempt to cover the same ground as the other by imitating him, yet trying to dominate at the same time. If ‘cathexsis’ is present, either bargainer may react positively to the other’s moves and want to continue cooperating. A negative attitude is more likely when one bargainer’s goal has been reduced by the other’s capable competitive actions, as there is less incentive to cooperate and more to compete. ‘Inducibility’ would be expected in a mutually cooperative situation, but if one bargainer’s actions move way from the other’s goals, then obstruction and resistance will be shown by the party affected. Assuming that most negotiations are a process directed towards a mutually accepted outcome, there will have to be a number of ‘payoffs’ or compromises between the participants in order to achieve such a result. If the micro negotiation is cooperative in tone and application, then there are likely to be more positive effects and a speedier movement towards bargaining and resolution. If, as an example, negotiators A and B are similar in their needs and desired outcomes, then it is to be expected that as the options of one party increase or decrease, so do those of the other party in relation to these movements. So, in such a situation, A’s moves to achieve their goal will reciprocally increase B’s chances; B will not need to repeat or reinforce what A has already achieved in the process; there will be ‘positive substitutability’. ‘Positive cathexsis’ will result from B valuing A’s actions, and should lead to amenability in future negotiation situations, whilst B’s facilitation of A’s actions will promote ‘positive inducibility’. A cooperative process such as this will emphasise mutual interests, foster a trusting attitude, a readiness to communicate in an accurate and non-misleading way, and a sensitivity towards a convergence of values. However, if A is a poor negotiator and their actions are ineffectual and negative, A’s devaluing of the achievable goal will also affect B. B will need to achieve what A has failed to do (‘negative substitutability’), will reject A’s standing in future processes (‘negative cathexsisœ), and will hinder A (‘negative inducibility’).27 The process will also become more antagonistic, hostile and power-based as the communication will be coloured by misinformation and inaccuracy to ‘put off’ the other party. The complexity of people Negotiators are people, and people bring with them into any interaction their own beliefs, perceptions and characteristics. For example, there may be an in-built bias towards the

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other negotiator, the scenario, the outcomes required, and a selective perception of the process itself. Particular danger areas are ‘distorted hypothesis testing’ and ‘stereotypical distortion’, which tend to be common human traits in the negotiating process and in more general communication.28 ‘Distorted hypothesis testing’ structures interpersonal hypotheses about the other party guaranteed to result in confirming data; for example, the question, ‘Why are you so defensive?’, will almost certainly result in a confirmatory behavioural response.29 The more important factor is the latter danger area of ‘stereotypical distortion’, which might include the categorisation of a race, a culture or a regime into extremes of subjective portrayal. Such stereotyping can adversely affect personal perceptions and decisionmaking processes; for example, U.Bronfenbrenner’s essay on Soviet-Russian relations during the Cold War describes the use of such developed ‘information’ in support of the mirrored identical stereotypical views of the other side, and social psychologist R.K.White stresses religious iconoclastic ‘stereotyping’, where the enemy is always diabolical and God is on one’s own side.30 Any negotiator entering a scenario with such preconceptions, conscious or otherwise, might damage or distort positive negotiating outcomes, and such cognitive biases may be an important predispositional element in the negotiating process in practice. Bearing such influences in mind, Daniel Druckman (1977) itemised a series of steps within the negotiation process:31 1. Initial expectations are formed on the basis of information about the other’s attitudes, beliefs, negotiating goals, and so forth. 2. The initial expectations are evaluated against the other’s early bargaining behaviour. 3. Expectations are adjusted, if necessary, on the basis of the early evaluations. 4. The adjusted expectations are evaluated again, later in the sequence, when the other’s strategy becomes apparent. 5. Expectations are readjusted, if necessary, on the basis of the later evaluation. 6. The readjusted expectations are compared with one’s own negotiating pattern to ascertain where he is at and where I am at.32 Druckman is highlighting the way in which negotiators constantly evaluate and reevaluate the process while in progress. Decisions will be made according to these evaluations, however they are formed. He is suggesting that one party decides their strategy within the process purely by observing the other. Deutsch (1973) also specifies personal characteristics inherent in any negotiation: a win-lose competitive orientation, individual inner conflicts, cognitive rigidity, misjudgements and misperceptions, unwitting commitments, escalation spirals and a gamesmanship orientation—and these are seen as key features in any negotiating process, and in the negotiators involved.33 By identifying such issues, Deutsch is stressing the argument that psychological contributions in the negotiating scenario play a far greater role than is suggested by game theorists.

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Summary It is argued by some social psychologists that when psychological and personality factors are suitably explored, it is easier to turn an adversary into an ally, and they can help to underpin strategic manoeuvres within a negotiation.34 Similarly, the relational aspects of negotiation are vital, since they can have implications for outcomes and agreements, but have tended to be overlooked in extant literature, where the emphasis has tended to be on more economic and material considerations. This lack of identification of underlying processes is noted by Kremenyuk: While there are numerous books and manuals that prescribe the right and wrong ways for decision makers to negotiate with representatives from other nations, these contributions have done little to identify the underlying processes that are at work when one negotiates with others from a background different from one’s own.35 It appears that, to a greater or lesser extent, the personalities of those involved are likely to affect the tenor and behaviour in a negotiation. To ignore the ‘human element’ in any analysis seems perverse, since negotiation concerns human communicative interaction and the mutual resolution of created dilemmas. It is another variable in the mutable nature of the negotiation process per se, but one that suggests a significant influence. The volatility, or otherwise, of an individual, their fluency in communication, their perception of the issue and the other party, would seem to be influential factors in the ultimate progression of a negotiation, and thus its potential for success or failure. NOTES 1. See F.Jablin (ed.), Handbook of Organizational Communication (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988). 2. See the work of C.Jonsson, ‘Communication Processes in International Negotiation: Some Common Mistakes’, in F.Mautner-Markhof (ed.), Processes of International Negotiation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), and F.O.Hansberger, Say it: 888 expressions pour négocier en Anglais (Paris: Mazarine, 1985). 3. Presented in full in E.T.Hall, Beyond Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). 4. More information on the idea of high and low contexts can be found in Bernstein’s sociolinguistic theory of ‘restricted’ codes and ‘elaborated’ codes. See Basil Bernstein, ‘Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Consequences’, in J.Gumperz and D.Hymes (eds), The Ethnography of Communication, in American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, No. 6, pt 2 (1964), pp. 55–69. 5. See R.Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990). 6. A.A.Berger, Signs in Contemporary Culture: an introduction to semiotics (New York: Longman, 1984), p. 54. 7. As proposed by R.Fisher, E.Kopelman and A.K.Schneider in Beyond Machiavelli (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 45. 8. See M.Wilson, G.Northcraft and M.Neale, ‘Information competition and vividness effects in on-line judgements’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 44

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(1989), pp. 132–9; S.E.Taylor and G.C.Thompson, ‘Stalking the elusive “vividness” effect’, Psychological Review, Vol. 89 (1982), pp. 155–81. 9. From Fisher et al., Beyond Machiavelli, p. 46. 10. Ibid. 11. Communicating through interpreters can bring extra communication issues into the negotiation process. Most UN manuals, national briefs and military specifications now agree that knowledge and use of the local language is not only a matter of cultural respect but also contributes to the efficiency of work in any operational area. It is frequently the case that the working language of an operation is not the language of the host population, and thus the operational military force tends to rely on field interpreters and translators who are recruited locally to assist in the smooth application of tasks in the deployment area. There is no standard procedure for the selection of proficient interpreters; selection remains scenariospecific and organisation-specific. In UNPROFOR, posts were advertised in the local press, and then candidates had to take written and oral examinations. These exams were graded by HQ UNPROFOR personnel and the successful applicants were deployed according to their standard of interpretation.

When operations begin there will be a large demand for interpreters in a short period of time; for this reason many interpreters who are recruited in these early stages will not be professionals in this area. Often they come from backgrounds such as teaching, or similar professions, and while their translation skills might be proficient, their awareness of procedure in an operational area is unlikely to be. Also, there is a need to identify professional imperatives such as impartiality and confidentiality given the political sensitivity of the work of a mission; the introduction of politically biased ‘plants’ will need to be minimised. Interpreters shoulder a huge amount of responsibility beyond language skills. In situations such as interviewing traumatised victims of torture, rape or other atrocities, the interpreter will need to be able to show personal responses such as empathy and sensitivity as well as pure linguistic work. When, as in Bosnia, over 70 per cent of interpreters are female, this might impose added pressures on the interpreter both during and after such work. No UNMO interpreters in Sector Sarajevo had been trained as interpreters, and their background ranged from university graduates to some who had not finished high school. Most were in the 20–30 age bracket, unmarried and the sole source of income for their immediate family, so how is the deployed force to ensure the safety and viability of such personnel in the operational area? In every operation where interpreters are hired the deployed force should regularly assess the danger and risk of reprisals against local personnel associated with the mission. The host state agreement

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under which any operation is established should also include express guarantees for the safety of all indigenous personnel working with the mission, and the personal safety of interpreters should be reassessed regularly with the interpreters themselves, as their own circumstances might change and impinge upon their personal safety. The military is trained to expect dangerous, difficult conditions, and have the reassurance of a medical and logistical support system behind them for when things get tough. But for locally recruited interpreters none of these comforts exists unless they are provided by the deployed force. Local interpreters do not get leave after a deployment ends. Intimidation could occur as a way of ‘getting back’ at the military without actually attacking them themselves, often taking the form of police or similar groups demanding more information than that present on the interpreter’s UN identity card. In Bosnia the aim would be to obtain the interpreter’s address, which could then be exploited for follow-up harassment. On one occasion Serbian women were attempting to pressure the UN into releasing relatives held by the Bosnians, and they formed a blockade around some UN personnel and vehicles near Hadzici. The female UNMO interpreters were hit, and the male interpreters were taunted because they weren’t doing military service. UNMO interpreters were taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs after NATO aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb targets near Gorazde, even though those interpreters were also Serb. (Incidents discussed in Stankovic, 2000, pp. 310 ff. and Bellamy, 1997, pp. 117 ff. respectively.) Some interpreters were forced to leave Bosnia in fear for their lives, seeking refugee status in nations such as the UK. They continue their assistance in military personnel training by participating in predeployment training, thus providing a vital ‘real’ element in scenario exercises. The role of the interpreters is clear; without them military personnel are unlikely to be able to communicate with other parties in any contexts. All military roles require communication, especially when the military is playing a vital role in providing a communication link between warring factions. Linked with the quality of courage is the ability to persuade…interpreters needed a gift to persuade local commanders that

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in fact the mission of military observers will benefit them…accompanied only by the interpreter I managed to go from Gorazde to Sarajevo without clearances solely on this man’s gift of persuasion at the checkpoints. (Non-attributable comment from a peacekeeper) 12. Example cited in Glen Fisher, International Negotiation: a cross-cultural perspective (New York, Intercultural Press, 1980), p. 61. 13. Non-attributable comment from a peacekeeper. 14. ‘Communication and sharing information can help negotiators to create value jointly.’ David A.Lax and James K.Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: bargaining for cooperation and competitive gain (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 30. 15. See Deutsch experiment details on page 50. 16. This body of research has examined the strategies that can be used to convert an adversary into an ally: among the strategic manoeuvres examined by researchers such as Deutsch (1973) and Axelrod (1984) have been a ‘reactive defensive’ strategy (in which cooperation is responded to in kind, but attack is reciprocated with defensive manoeuvring, and ‘reactive aggressive’ (again cooperation to cooperation, but reacting to attack with counter-attack). Details contained in the main bibliography. 17. L.Thompson, ‘Information exchange in negotiation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1991), pp. 161–79. 18. Ibid., Experiment 2. 19. Language is not neutral, which can be a difficulty in heated negotiations. The work of Hansberger examines the role of linguistics in negotiation in particular; see Hansberger, Say it. 20. For example, the work of Janis (1972) on ‘groupthink’ in I.L.Janis, Victims of Group Think: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982) or the ‘conflict workshop’ approach by Kelman in H.C.Kelman, ‘The Problem Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution’, in R.L.Merritt (ed.), Communication in International Politics (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1972). Also J.W.Burton, Conflict and Communication: The use of controlled communication in international relations (London: Macmillan, 1969) and Doob in L.W.Doob, ‘A Cyprus Workshop: An exercise in intervention methodology’, Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 94 (1974), pp. 161–78. 21. V.A.Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: analysis, approaches, issues (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1991), p. 220. 22. For example, modelling such as y=ax+bz…+e, where y is the outcome and x, z… are the crucial predictors (Wyler, 1971, 1969) in Robert S.Wyler Jr, ‘The prediction of behavior in two person games’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (13 Nov. 1969), pp. 222–38 and ‘Effects of outcome matrix and partner’s behavior in two person games’, ibid. (7 Mar. 1971), pp. 190–210. 23. Article by Roderick W.Gilkey and Leonard Greenhaigh, ‘The role of personality in successful negotiating’, Negotiation Journal (July 1999), p. 245. 24. Ibid., p. 251. 25. Ibid., p 251. 26. Cited in M.Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: constructive and destructive processes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 22. 27. Modified from Deutsch’s arguments; see Deutsch (1973), pp. 366 and 367. 28. Detailed work in this area has been undertaken by Chapman and Chapman in L.J.Chapman and J.P.Chapman, ‘Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs’, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 74 (1969), pp. 271–80 and Hamilton and Gifford in D.L.Hamilton and R.K.Gifford, ‘Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: a

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cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 12 (1976), pp. 392–407. (These specific terms are used by these theorists.) 29. A likely response to such a question is ‘I’m not!’, a defensive reaction in itself. 30. U.Bronfenbrenner, ‘The Mirror-Image in Soviet-American Relations’, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 16 (1961), pp. 45–56. R.K.White, Fearful Warriors: a psychological profile of US-Soviet Relations (New York: Free Press, 1984). 31. D.Druckman, ‘Boundary role conflict: negotiation as dual responsiveness’, paper presented at International Studies Association, St Louis, March 1977. 32. Ibid. 33. Deutsch, Resolution of Conflict. 34. See also the work of Tetlock (1981, 1983, 1985), Axelrod (1984) and Fisher and Brown (1988) in, respectively: ‘Personality and isolationism: content analysis of senatorial speeches’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 41 (1981), pp. 737–43; ‘Policy makers’ images of international conflict’, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 39 (1983), pp. 67–86; ‘Cognitive perspectives on foreign policy’, Political Behavior Annual (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Getting Together: Building a relationship that gets to Yes (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1988). 35. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation, p. 226.

6 PROBLEMS FACING SOLDIERS IN NEGOTIATION CONTEXTS, AND THE KEY FACTORS INVOLVED INTRODUCTION The selective review of extant literature on negotiation in proximate disciplines has revealed key issues in the nature of negotiation, in any context. In particular, the elements of simultaneous cooperation and competition, threat moves and power perception, ZOPAs and BATNAs, the importance of recognising interests rather than positions, and the elements of context, culture, communication and personality have been postulated as important features of negotiation. It will now be argued that these features play an important part in the amalgam of influential factors that comprise military tactical negotiation, but the difference between this form of negotiation and most others is the degree of emphasis placed on such elements. Key negotiation factors can be depicted and summarised as shown in Figure 6.1 in relation to their degree of influence in both a general negotiation setting and the military tactical context. By depicting the key factors in a diagrammatic form, it is possible to see the significant difference in emphasis in many areas between tactical military negotiation situations and other types of bilateral meetings. For the soldier there is a high degree of emphasis on most factors, except that preparation time (since many negotiations at the tactical level are ad hoc, and there is very little time to prepare in any systematic way) and the degree to which he is conscious of external ratification can vary in effect. By contrast, in other negotiation settings there can be more flexibility of response, of emphasis, and movement in decision making, and negotiation in these cases tends to be conducted in a more pacific context. Therefore the imminent danger in a volatile threat move, or the use of force, implied or obvious, tends not to become an important issue around a boardroom table, for example. In order to assess the degree of emphasis of the key factors in tactical-level military negotiation more precisely, a detailed comparison must now be made of the typical problems and issues faced by soldiers in an operational context that

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Figure 6.1 Similarities and differences in emphasis of key factors in negotiation demands negotiated resolution, and the issues affecting negotiation that arise in a more general context. This will allow us to assess the influence such factors have on both the military negotiator and the tactical negotiation itself. What will be revealed is a military negotiation form displaying many known characteristics, but because flexibility of response is restricted, it is dominated by the aggressive context and the threat of armed escalation, and appears to be a simultaneous balancing act between cooperation and competition. SITUATIONAL FACTORS Context: do new missions create the soldier-diplomat? The context of the negotiation is central to the manner in which it will be approached and resolved, as earlier discussion has revealed. If a context is unusual, in the first place, then the negotiations that occur are likely to be unusual also.

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There is a consensus that the presence of an international military force in a peacekeeping context tends to enhance the bargaining positions of any relief operators, be they civilian or military negotiators.1 It can give a ‘negotiating from a position of strength’ stance, specifically military strength, but can only be effective if the military strength is used when necessary.2 As Michael Williams states, the presence of the military ‘helps a mission to retain its legitimacy and credibility’.3 Liaison and verification become important tasks in the military role in such an operation, but tempered with the recognition that any peacekeeping military force cannot completely dissociate itself from its traditional combat role, as and when required, and its emphasis on upholding the mission itself.4 British military policy makers emphasise the role that negotiation has to play within any peacekeeping mission. The official view is now that: Negotiations and mediation are critical techniques in Wider Peacekeeping operations. Their aim is conciliation. All opportunities for negotiation or mediation should be explored and fully exploited to encourage belligerents to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to their problems.5 The British Army also describes this conciliatory type of work as ‘consent techniques’ and it is an element within operational duties per se.6 Stress is laid upon Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which emphasises the relevance and importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as the main ways to resolve disputes. The Army also believes that by implementing negotiation whenever and wherever possible, positive relationships can be built between the warring factions and the peacekeepers. As Bellamy (1997) states, ‘It is the man or woman negotiating, acting as the intermediary, who matters.’7 The ‘person’ is important due to the increasing reliance on intermediary skills in peacekeeping operations, perhaps as a result of strategic social and political trends as a whole, but certainly as a response to requirements and directives from both UN and British Army mandates. Civil/military liaison assists in the promotion of the mission, the upholding of the mission aims and objectives, and the promulgation of positive and longlasting solutions. As stated in the doctrinal manual for the British Army: Objective and effective negotiations created, controlled and fostered at every level by the Wider Peacekeeping force will develop a climate of mutual respect and co-operation. The techniques of negotiation and mediation are therefore likely to prove the primary and most potent means of developing peaceful, agreeable and lasting solutions to conflict in all aspects of a Wider Peacekeeping operation.8 Thus there is a recognition that this type of conflict resolution is of prime importance, and this would suggest that, if carried out effectively and successfully, it will prove an efficient resolution technique, at least in the theoretical terms as stated by the policy makers above.9 However, the means to such an effective end are not analysed or explored to any definitive extent. It can be argued that, in current operational settings, negotiation

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is a necessary supportive task to a form of resolution proving to be more viable and applicable in many modern conflicts. The occasional conflict between the mission and the tangible negotiation situation, together with the decision-making factors that result from a knowledge and awareness of both, might produce undue complexity for the soldier-diplomat, as they might for police negotiators also. For example, the resolution of a situation through negotiation might be possible, but only if mission demands are not compromised or seriously threatened; it may be that the negotiation is allowed to falter, since the soldier is likely to place greater emphasis on the success of the overall operational mission. Peacekeeping, and the growth of negotiating tactics Alan James (1969) warned that the term ‘peacekeeping’, and many of the modern types of conflict in which peacekeeping may be involved, is fraught with ambiguities and a multiplicity of meanings.10 For example, peacekeeping can be described as the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.11 James makes a finer distinction between this role and pure military intervention: Yet when compared with military intervention, there is a distinction between the two [which] was seen to lie in their attitudes towards the associated issues of force and consent, collective security relying, ultimately, on the mandatory use of force, while peacekeeping eschewed force, except in self-defence, and required the consent of the host state for the admission of UN personnel.12 There is a persistent difficulty in defining the ‘task’ in these operational situations, and for the soldier on the ground this can be bewildering and confusing, especially when the only sanctioned form of conflict resolution might be micro negotiation. If the mission statement is unclear, then the difficulties in operating that mission at ground level can be equally fraught with ambiguity. As Brigadier Denaro has pointed out, How obvious to say that before our troops deploy, a clear estimate has to be carried out refining the aim, looking at all the factors, applying troops to the task and then planning how it should evolve. But it was this very evolution that threw all the best intentions and well laid plans; in short, the tasking changed, constantly, and ultimately relied on the initiative, innovation, and determination of the soldiers on the ground to succeed…or not.13 NATO uses a somewhat euphemistic term to cover operations, or missions, other than outright warfare: it calls them ‘flexible deployment’.14 This reflects a conscious effort by

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many to avoid the label ‘war’. ‘War’ appears to have implications and imagery all of its own, and in the 1990s these factors were something to avoid, particularly when public approbation was sought by governments, and military forces, before and during deployment. Thus the Falklands War in 1982 was not officially a ‘war’, the term ‘conflict’ being preferred for political and legal reasons. This linguistic nicety had more complex overtones: declaring an all-out war means that a government has to implement specific legislation and procedures, obviously something that the Conservative government wished to avoid in the UK in 1982, when the ‘conflict’ was thousands of miles away in the South Atlantic. However, if personnel are fighting and dying in such situations, why is the label of ‘war’ avoided whenever possible? The perception of what war entails, its moral, political and legislative effects, appears to have shifted in the last few decades, but how and why? Major-General Mike Willcocks argues: I do not think that anyone would consider themselves at war now and yet we have 20,000 soldiers employed on operations, and there have been sustained some 2700 casualties in Northern Ireland [The Department of Peace and Conflict Research’s definition of a major armed conflict is 100 battle-related deaths]. I hope therefore, that it will be accepted that we need a wider spectrum than simply peace or war.15 Bellamy (1997) makes the point that ‘war’ and ‘peace’ have disappeared as specific contextual terms, and that ‘total war’ (that is, along the lines of the Second World War) is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. He likens current warfare to that of two centuries ago, albeit upgraded by advances in technology, speed of delivery and communications. Whether the military would agree with such a conclusion about contemporary armed conflict is doubtful. The consensus persists that preparation for total war is still necessary, and is still carried out, but it is increasingly supplemented with operationally specific training.16 This approach will allow the armed forces to retain their technology, and the important acquisition of new battlefield equipment, whereas a total commitment to a more nebulous ‘warmaking/peacekeeping’ role might set greater financial strictures on equipment purchase and development, equipment likely to be deemed unnecessary in some operations by some political organisations and fund-holders. The British Defence Doctrine describes categorisations of conflict as ‘general’ war (between major powers), ‘limited conflict’ (conflict short of nuclear strike, a Cold War term), ‘regional conflict’ (limited conflict arising out of regional issues), ‘civil war’ (within the boundaries of a state), ‘insurgency’ (political change through subversion and so on) and ‘terrorism’ (politically motivated violence).17 Traditionally ‘limited war’ indicates a conflict that stops short of a nuclear strike, but it is a term that is declining in use in military and academic books alike.18 It can still be applied to a conflict that is ‘limited in purpose’, fought overseas or fought with different operational parameters other than all-out inter-state warfare. In this sense, the Falklands War might be described as a limited war, and so too might the Gulf War. Political objectives were limited in the Gulf; but the means of fighting to achieve the aim were not. Bellamy (1997) describes it as a ‘classic, Clausewitzian limited war’, in the sense

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that certain objectives (mainly political) were set before the conflict started, and these were the conflict limiters. Once the original objectives were achieved, the conflict stopped; if the war had continued in order to achieve new objectives, then it might have been more applicable to describe it as ‘total’, he hypothesises.19 However, it is doubtful that peacekeeping operations can or will be described as ‘limited warfare’, since they are too bound up with other issues such as humanitarian assistance, mediation, and a societal demand for low casualty rates among military personnel, for example. There are often no obvious conflict limiters, and operational parameters shift constantly since negotiation and political moves force change on military modes of resolution. Initial operational objectives might be set, but intervention, both at a local and international level, can cause the ground to shift beneath the serviceman’s feet. It takes some neat footwork to keep pace with required aims, and the military means to achieve those ends.20 ‘Laws of conflict’ Karl Deutsch proposes several ‘laws’ of conflict which are constructed to allow for the negotiated form of resolution, and may be of use in the analysis of military perception and application of micro negotiation and its relation to the over all mission:21 1. ‘Conflict instigated by fears or aversions in the conflicting parties is more difficult to resolve co-operatively than conflict instigated by desires.’ In other words, conflicts which are fought in terms of deciding ‘who suffers’ are more difficult to resolve than those waged in terms of deciding ‘who gains’. 2. ‘The less intense a conflict is, the easier it is to resolve co-operatively.’ An intense conflict will heighten motives and the resolution to follow certain courses of action; motives might even overtake goals achieved. Responses and moves could be affected by this intense motivation, and the rewards that might be possible. Intensity in conflict has an implicit motivation of domination. Corollaries to this proposition are defined in points 4, 5 and 6 below. 3. ‘Conflict that threatens the self-esteem of the parties involved is more difficult to resolve co-operatively than conflict that does not; conflict over large issues of principle is less likely to be resolved co-operatively than conflict over specific issues relating to the application of a principle.’ This point echoes the earlier discussion concerning the issue of self-esteem and concern for loss of face. If it is a significant interest to a party, then it may block creative option making, and it appears to be a common factor on military missions. 4. ‘Conflict between parties who mutually perceive themselves to be equal in power and legitimacy is more difficult to resolve co-operatively than conflict in which there is a mutual recognition of differential power and legitimacy.’ Parties with an ‘equal standing’ might find it difficult to concede, or create options, whereas asymmetric negotiation might result in one party, at least, seeking to cooperate in order to achieve a resolution, rather than none at all. 5. ‘Unacknowledged or unconscious conflict is more difficult to resolve than conflict that is recognised by the parties involved. Also, conflict between parties who do not recognise the existence and legitimacy of one another is more difficult to resolve than conflict in which there is such recognition.’

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6. ‘Conflict that is resolved by a more powerful tendency suppressing or repressing a weaker one, without the extinction of the weaker tendency’s underlying motives, leads to the return of the repressed tendency in disguised form whenever the vigilance or defenses of the more powerful tendency are lowered.’ 7. ‘There are pathogenic processes inherent in competitive conflict—such as perceptual distortion, self-deception, unwitting involvement—that tend to magnify and perpetuate conflict.’ If factors such as these play a part in the dynamics of human conflict resolution, then they could have a negative effect on any micro negotiation, and need to be taken into account when briefing and, more importantly, training military personnel. At the heart of the resolution of any conflict through negotiation is the balance and emphasis placed on the two factors of cooperation and competition. Simplistically, if the ‘battle’ is to be resolved purely on competitive grounds, then one side must be defeated to give the other success, but if cooperation is acceptable, then both parties ultimately end up with a mutually agreed outcome. However, few real-life conflicts are so neat, and when a field commander is governed by his knowledge of the mission, he may be forced to make certain decisions that sustain the mission at the expense of a potential for greater cooperation in a negotiation sense. This puts a high degree of emphasis on the factor of context, more so than in other negotiation forms, since context might even force a military negotiator to abandon negotiation altogether. In other words, if orders need to be carried out for the sustainability of the mission per se, then a tacticallevel decision will have to be made to determine if negotiation is the best means to achieve those orders. A volatile negotiating context might lead to ambiguity and danger. Interpretations of operational characterisation are varied, and the debate continues as to whether a deployed force can be overtly aggressive or structured in a peacekeeping mode. The implication this has for the deployed military negotiator, in terms of understanding the mission and the role of negotiation within it, can mean unnecessary ambiguity and the influence of hierarchical layers of decision makers both in and outside the theatre. Summary The working context for the modern soldier is an operational environment that, for the most part, dictates the imperative for negotiated dispute resolution techniques, at least as the first option. It is also a context that is inherently unpredictable and volatile, dealing as it does with mutable human relationships grounded in a hostility that has necessitated military intervention. The only other similar working context would be hostage negotiation situations. For the soldier on the ground there remains a persistent need to define the negotiation task in terms of practical contextual responsibilities that need to be undertaken and expected in the overall mission. That negotiation is taking place is indisputable; what remains debatable is the true nature of such interaction in a distinctive working environment, dependent as it is on the contextual imperative. MISSION AND TIME

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The mission defines the task, and the response As was suggested in the previous section, a predominant factor in the working environment for any military personnel is the overriding dictate of the working military mission per se. The mission is the strategic reason for the personnel being present in an area in the first place, and is the overwhelming influence on the decisions and tactics used within a deployment. However, the nature of military missions has altered over the latter half of the twentieth century, increasingly moving away from the ultimate power play between nations, fought through the extensive use of weaponry and manpower, towards a twenty-first-century peacekeeping-type format.22 The peacekeeping military mission is likely to be driven by more political, social and economic factors than have been seen before in a military context, and this development has brought with it new demands for military personnel involved in operations on the ground.23 A more traditional viewpoint concerning the fundamental raison d’être for the military in any operational scenario can be summarised in these comments by E.H.Carr (1939): The supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the ultima [sic] ratio of power in international relations is war. Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use… War lurks in the background of international politics just as revolution lurks in the background of domestic politics.24 Carr refines this comment by stating that military power is only one aspect of greater state power; however, it may be contended that since Carr’s publication there has been a considerable increase in the broader logistical capacity of military power. Advances in technology mean that physical destruction can be achieved over huge distances, but there has also been a corresponding movement in the last sixty years towards using military power as a means to resolve political situations, with a complementary limited use of weaponry.25 Coercion is likely to be used by the military on an operational mission, but this coercion can be multi-faceted, and may not imply armed force. The option for the use of armed force remains (it may be asked why else employ the military if the strategists did not want this option to be sustained), but, increasingly, the form of ‘coercion’ on operations being used by military peacekeepers is negotiation. The soldier-diplomat is now a reality in modern warfare, and the impetus to resolve a situation through persuasive negotiation is substantial. As Andrew Bair comments, The new international environment will require new and different approaches to peacekeeping, or at least significant improvements in the way that peace operations are planned and conducted. The creation of effective mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between civilian and military organizations will support this approach.26 Over the last two to three decades there has been a palpable shift in forms of conflict resolution, rules of engagement, and the role, perceived or established, of military forces in the changing modes of global conflict. Increasingly, preeminence is being given to more negotiated forms of resolution, with technological and weaponry advancement still

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playing their part as dictated by circumstances; however, the evolution of peacekeeping operations rather than total warfare is demanding adaptations in conflict resolution in its wake.27 This ‘human factor’ plays a vital part in conciliation, humanitarian work, and, importantly, in ‘on-the-ground’ negotiation of disputes or grievances.28 It is not the intention of this book to discuss the complex factors governing the rise, and reasons for, the growth of peacekeeping operations in modern warfare; there is considerable literature in this subject area. In the context of the analysis of military negotiation, however, it is important to appreciate that, currently, negotiation is intimately linked with peacekeeping operations; indeed, it is a form of conflict resolution that is preferred and reinforced by many governments and their military forces deployed on these types of operation.29 Increasingly in British Defence documentation there is a greater emphasis on participation in peacekeeping operations, which are now widely recognised as playing a greater part in existing military operations, and, it is envisaged, will continue to do so on future deployments. Attempts to quantify and assess the relevance and application of military micro negotiation, and the way in which it relates to the mission as a whole, are starting to emerge.30 Whether this change in emphasis in conflict resolution is an option or an enforced requirement due to some outside pressure is open to debate, and it generates a diversity of opinions in military, political and academic circles alike.31 Accountability and greater openness in the mission In the new world order of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the more cooperative nature of international political systems can be said to have led to flexible policy options, more collaborative decision making and situational resolution among leading nations.32 Such an unprecedented pooling of resources, knowledge and intelligence among many nations might lead to new international responses to international and intra-state conflicts and disasters. With a political movement towards cooperation and communication comes an impetus for similar approaches in other governmental or state agencies.33 Public accountability in a media- and computer-based Western world is much emphasised, and plays an important part in the general demand for openness of policy and procedure among all sections of society. A question to be asked concerns the implications that this might have for the role of the military and how it might change either their own perceptions of their role, or society’s view of them. Linked to this notion is the question as to whether the progressive rise of micro negotiation on the ‘battlefield’ has been a military or a political response to the flourishing of wider and more concerted international communication, coloured by the demand for more peaceful forms of resolution. The military, and in particular the British Army, is establishing a niche for itself in peacekeeping operations, which, by their very nature, are coercive and protective in form and application. Current models of peacekeeping generally assume the form of a use of low-level aggression by military peacekeepers, stressing factors such as last resort selfdefence, neutrality, communication and observation.34 However, it could be argued that such a role is confined mainly to post-conflict stages of a dispute, and it is not always possible to maintain such openness and a low-level military response throughout the

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various stages of a conflict when external military forces are called in to forcibly keep the peace. Thus there tends to be a return to the need for context specific ‘on-the-ground’ rules of engagement (ROEs), which then need to be updated within the shifting context of operational change, and precise specifications set by the controlling body (such as the UN or NATO).35 Such was the case under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the early 1990s, and analysis of the form and application of micro negotiation and communication within that operational area will be reviewed and assessed later. However, if there has been relatively little review of specific peacekeeping operations because of their character, difficulties can arise for the soldier on the ground trying to resolve some local disputes through micro negotiation and similar tactics. Allegiances may change among the warring factions, as might their relationship to military peacekeepers, and therefore pertinent intelligence plus the appropriate briefing of personnel on a regular basis might assist in tactical-level liaison work. The role of the tactical-level commander At the tactical level of command, the troop commander will have to focus on suitable methods to accomplish missions within the intent and plans of the superior commanders, both in the field and external to it. The tactical commander will consider not only essential specified and implied military tasks in formulating a concept for an operation, but critical ‘political’ tasks as well. In practice, political interests often tend to outweigh military necessity at times and therefore place additional constraints on military forces. Peacekeeping operations are conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and this requires the consent of the parties in conflict. Thus this consent compels UN forces to execute their mandate with absolute impartiality. In the strictest sense, peacekeepers have no enforcement rights, and may employ force, legally, only as a last resort.36 One commander, on his return from deployment in Rwanda, noted that balancing the peacekeeping principles of security and restraint was one of his hardest challenges.37 The military peacekeeping information process will encompass political considerations as well as standard operational procedures; and face-to-face contact with key local faction leaders may provide a commander with the greatest insight into psychological and sociological factors that might affect behaviour and response. A seemingly isolated incident at a remote checkpoint might become the focus of strategic debate for the entire operation.38 Fetherston (1994) proposed that there is a link between peacekeeping per se and the important goal of resolution through a ‘contingency theory of intervention’: First is the role of conflict control which provides the base level of activity of peacekeeping preceding the application of either of the two other roles. Second is the facilitation of an atmosphere conducive to negotiations and settlement, and in the long-term movement toward resolution. Third is the facilitation of an actual settlement and resolution process.39 The military tactical-level negotiator falls into Fetherston’s first category, thus having an influence on larger conflict resolution approaches at higher levels of command also.

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However, ROEs dominate the commander/soldier’s room for manoeuvre in any scenario in a peacekeeping environment. Specified ROEs, being scenario dependent and discrete, tend to be devised and promulgated at different levels of authority, that is, by ‘mother’ political organisations such as the UN, host governments, or by national armies, together with host military structures and specifications. The ROEs are the military’s equivalent of the business person’s organisational structure and policy factors which drive the corporation, and they are the soldier’s precise guidelines in terms of the delineation of when and how to act and react. The ROEs are the means by which the authority and chain of command ensures that strategic goals are met. Therefore, in strategic-level situations they are pertinent and clear, since theory is not being ‘muddied’ by real-world complications, whereas in tactical-level negotiation there is more room for misinterpretation or misapplication of such rules when the context is mutable, volatile and unpredictable. ROEs delineate when and how the soldier can, and cannot, respond aggressively, defensively or constructively.40 Whilst operational objectives and general working parameters are defined by UN resolutions and suchlike, ROEs tend to concentrate on guiding military personnel in correct behavioural response (shoot or don’t shoot), and neglect nebulous determining factors in different forms of conflict resolution, such as micro negotiation. Admittedly, there might be an ROE that recommends ‘negotiate when possible’, but this is then left to ‘stand alone’, so that the soldier has to work out how to negotiate in any given situation, and within which working operational parameters. Moreover, there can be an assumption that personnel know how to negotiate instinctively, and just by recommending such a policy it will be effective and constructive in practice, but this is often far from the reality. The effectiveness of such an ROE would be reinforced only if thorough training in how to negotiate had been given to military personnel before deployment, and so it would not be left as a mere assumption of successful implementation. An ROE that stipulates, for example, ‘all weapons to be held in the G5 position at all times’ is considerably easier to interpret and carry out than ‘negotiate whenever possible before escalating a response’. If an ROE is dependent on individual subjective judgement to such a degree, then it is also open to greater misinterpretation and possible poor application. An in-depth investigation and knowledge of the negotiating process before operational application can only assist in what is a fine balancing act between cooperation and aggression. As one British Officer commented, ‘as I used to say to my soldiers in Bosnia—“If you have to ask me whether you should open fire or not, then you don’t need to”’.41 The professional soldier as the non-professional negotiator In the civilian world a professional full-time negotiator is trained thoroughly, works in a basically rational environment, and without fear for his/her life (unless taking part in police force or hostage negotiation, for example). He or she is likely to apply procedures and protocols that have been gleaned from theoretical and observed contexts, and the negotiator will become practised and conversant with a diversity of negotiating styles and actions. Such negotiation is a complex skill which is honed and modified repeatedly, with as little physical personal cost to the negotiator as possible.

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Such a context contrasts sharply with the situation within which the low-level military negotiator has to operate. The soldier is a professional combatant, not a professional negotiator, who is placed in a chaotic and dangerous working environment. Within this environment, the soldier must ply his trade, diverse as it is, with only a brief reference to some pre-operational negotiating training, if lucky. This is an unusual feature in people who are expected to negotiate in crucial contexts. Even police negotiators receive considerably more explicit negotiation training than their military counterparts, and this suggests a factor in tactical military negotiation that might reveal a weakness in the ability to negotiate effectively. Micro negotiation will not be a familiar procedure, and the counterparts are diverse in nature, often physically threatening and irrational through the use of alcohol, drugs, adrenalin, or a mixture of all three.42 The implications of getting it wrong could be horrendous—for the soldiers, their colleagues, the counterparts, or the operational scenario and context. The soldier is required to employ material and concepts which have not formed a major part of basic training, and, even at a junior level, the soldier will be required to work to a higher level of situational competence than may normally be expected. A key is for the soldier to have the self-confidence to operate at this necessary level. A calm temperament and an ability to take the time needed are thus highly desirable for the soldier-diplomat, as this one peacekeeper suggests: It is a good thing the Finnish character is suitable for peacekeeping. We can take many insults. It takes a lot to arouse us. Nothing gets us excited… Ninety five per cent of this job is not getting excited… Only soldiers with this temperament can be peacekeepers.43 Most junior military personnel have had no experience of real tactical negotiation before deployment, and therefore the learning curve is a steep one.44 A great deal of knowledge comes from informal conversations with colleagues and ‘learning on the job’, which must be a seriously limiting factor, as this comment suggests: ‘You have to learn it on the spot…’45 Moreover, one peacekeeper described the frustration of trying to negotiate at times: We’ll negotiate 90% of the time anyway… We’re not allowed not to negotiate…we need to have the option to use force and strength, but we don’t really have that…there comes a point where negotiations won’t work.46 Ambiguity, with only a gradual development towards negotiated agreement, can make communication time-consuming and laborious. As time pressure increases, the urgency to reach agreement is enhanced; perceptions of ‘wasted time’ might also increase if a party is intolerant of periods of perceived inactivity. Comments and observations from peacekeeping soldiers indicate that this is one of the most frustrating elements in negotiation, since they have an in-built drive to ‘push’ on as quickly as possible: Held there for two hours… very long and tedious journey…many roadblocks…

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the convoy had been trapped for two hours… negotiation at all levels is essentiaZwhilst this may take time… if possible let your counterpart start, and hear him out, don’t interrupt, be patient… discussion/negotiations with town elders can be an interesting and sometimes frustrating experience. Be patient, because they will take a long time to gather and meet with you…47 Yet it can also be very rewarding and beneficial to the mission as a whole if time and effort is made to liaise with local factions and leaders. A Canadian peacekeeper described it as follows: INFANTRY July-August 1996 Interaction with Local Authorities. This interaction must occur at all levels. I had periodic face-to-face meetings (at least monthly) with the mayor of the local city, the Macedonian army border battalion commander from my sector, and adjacent UN unit commanders. This was vital to success, but it paled in importance when compared to my squad leaders’ periodic meetings with their local village mayor, the closest border station’s platoon leader and UN small-unit leaders operation. We had a hard time initially with doing our peacekeeping tasks and sustaining at the same time. The key, we discovered, was to establish a simple SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] and enforce it vigorously. It was this interaction that led to cooperation and a quiet and trouble free sector. It defused numerous incidents that could easily have led to highly visible mission-threatening incidents.48 A sense of urgency to succeed speedily might mean that early pre-negotiation stages could be neglected or skimped, thus making for a more difficult process in the long run.49 The significance of the time imperative for the tactical-level negotiator cannot be overlooked as an important factor in the way in which the negotiation is conducted, and both the short- and long-term implications of decisions made. Understanding and implementing externally imposed rules John Mackinlay proposed four main areas for a peacekeeping task force to consider, before deployment, that have implications for the application and procedural aspects of micro negotiation as a resolution tool in the armoury of the modern soldier: 1. The force commander and his planning staff must visit the proposed area of operations, have time to consider their tasks, and negotiate with the host country who will have to provide a number of basic facilities for his forces. 2. …the chief of staff will need to weld his diversely talented multinational staff into an instrument of command, with common operating procedures, and prepare the main body of the force for their likely tasks.

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3. At troop level the contingent commanders, besides preparing themselves for their particular roles in the operation, will need to prepare their soldiers so they can operate from foreign helicopters and vehicles, and call on fire support from unusual weapons systems manned by unfamiliar regiments. There will be language problems and a need to adapt to a logistic supply system that may provide some surprising items of food and equipment. 4. The logisticians…must preposition their stocks…50 It is worth examining Mackinlay’s list in more detail in terms of military tacticallevel negotiation and the issue concerning the importance of the mission and rules of engagement. Points 1 and 3, in particular, articulate the requirement and relevance of the operational soldier, at whatever level, to be able to communicate persuasively and effectively in the field. It is virtually an assumed tactic, readily available to the operational soldier, but specifications such as these tend to overlook that the skill is a complicated and difficult one to master successfully, be the participant civilian or military. When it is perceived that the success of any negotiations at a tactical level will have implications for the success of the strategic mission itself, then massive importance is being placed on a skill that cannot be presumed to pre-exist in any officer or soldier. To state that personnel should negotiate is simple enough, but there is a vast gap between the concept and the effective application of such a complex skill in the individual soldier on the ground.51 Similar conclusions have been reached by Michael Williams concerning predeployment preparation as far as peacekeeping missions are concerned: Several key areas must be addressed: • Peacekeeping mandates must be clearer, and the military advice available…must be improved; • The UN’s command and control of multinational operations must be strengthened; • Military training must be geared to peacekeeping’s demands; • The military must become more sensitive to the human-rights issues arising from peacekeeping operations; and • Civilians in the field must better appreciate the needs of their military colleagues.52 His comments reflect the suggestion being made here that the mission needs clarity and refined delineation in order to implement a peacekeeping force ready for the multifarious task ahead. A presumption that a soldier might just ‘adapt and survive’ as the operation proceeds is short-sighted, and ineffective. It can be postulated that ‘readiness is all’, and that the integral inclusion of negotiation awareness in the mission per se is preferable. It may be argued that presumption of pre-existing negotiating effectiveness remains a weakness in the initial conceptualisation of the use of negotiation in military operations; that is, the skill is assumed to be present and effective in all serving personnel. There is nothing unusual in this perception; it is a positive approach taken in many ‘how to do it’ negotiation training manuals, for example, where a common assumption might be ‘perhaps with a degree of effort and application just about anyone could argue persuasively’, especially if people follow the behavioural rules specified in the manual. However, when the analysis of the structure of negotiation per se began to take place in depth from the 1960s onwards, it became apparent that there were more complex models of behaviour, linguistics and perception underlying the process. When the Army

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began to apply negotiation more in peacekeeping operations, it appeared that in the early days at least, the complexities of the skill were overlooked or not appreciated to any great degree.53 This was not through any wilful neglect, but rather from an initial ignorance of research into the subject in such spheres as business and international conflict resolution and the linking of that research into the military application of the skill, and therefore into the ultimate training of personnel.54 The mission will remain the structure within which the soldier operates, since it defines the task and the role. However, if the mission briefs and the complementary ROEs are not reviewed frequently, there may be discrepancies between previously assumed circumstances and changing circumstances witnessed on the ground. This, in turn, is liable to lead to difficulty in interpretation and, thus, an ambiguity over the role of the military. Ambiguity and uncertainty do not lend themselves to a positive and creative negotiating atmosphere. Time as a situational perception and as a key negotiation issue for the military Another proposition concerning the main delineating factors in tactical-level military negotiation, and closely linked to that of the mission, concerns the problem of ‘time’. At first sight an awareness of the time taken to conduct a negotiation might appear to be incidental to the entire process; it merely indicates

Figure 6.2 Sequential time perception how long the negotiator has to ‘stand’ there negotiating. However, the general perception of ‘time’ itself and how it relates to the individual can be different in different cultures: it can affect behaviour and the way in which individuals will interrelate, or otherwise, and it can have a greater effect on the negotiating process than is at first apparent, and thus it belies its seeming insignificance. Also, it will be stressed that time might have a negative influence on a tactical negotiation, since a soldier is usually given a deadline within which the objective must be achieved. Set deadlines for resolution run counter to the concept of a flexible approach in a negotiation, and place stresses on the soldier that other negotiators, in other contexts, might not feel. Of particular importance is the perception of time itself, or its ‘shape’. Most cultures tend to fall into two perceptual models: sequential time or synchronic time.55 Sequential time involves a perception of time passing as a series of events with the individual in the

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centre (the present), with events occurring in a straight line through him. For example, see Figure 6.2. As Figure 6.2 suggests, the ‘past’ can start in the last millisecond and extend into years and, similarly, the future can begin in the next millisecond and extend into years. This time shape is common in Western European and North American cultures and it will influence certain individual behavioural factors as well.56 If a person is sequentially time oriented, then it is very likely that they will prefer to do one task at a time, keep any appointments rigorously and always plan in advance, prefer to work on the time schedule rather than the relationship, and sustain the initial plan of action rather than re-evaluate as circumstances change. Therefore a negotiator with this time perception is likely to want to behave in this highly structured manner. Such an approach is typical of a military negotiator from these cultures. Synchronic time represents the past, present and the future as interrelated phases, with each affecting the other. In this way, past events and memories, as well as future aspirations, will shape the present. See Figure 6.3. A synchronically based person will tend to carry out more than one concurrent activity, will view appointments as being approximate meeting times, subordinate

Figure 6.3 Synchronic time perception schedules in preference to building relationships and prefer to follow the course of action that relationships will prompt. Therefore a synchronic negotiator is likely to be more flexible in approach, manner and outcome orientation (the outcome may not be an urgent necessity).57 Cultures with a more synchronic model to time include Southern Europeans, South Americans, Africans and some Asiatic groups. These two models of time are beginning to suggest potential disparities in any negotiating style and expectations. A sequential negotiator is likely to experience difficulties if he has to negotiate with a synchronic negotiator, and vice versa. An example is evident in recent tactical negotiation work in the Balkans, where sequential negotiators (peacekeepers from Northern Europe and the USA) were trying to negotiate with synchronic individuals (Serbs, Albanians, Croats and so on).58 The peacekeepers

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were likely to enter a negotiation with a pre-set agenda and an urgency to achieve the optimum outcome as quickly as possible. (This urgency was also promoted by a military mission imperative.) They encountered people who did not want to ‘do business’, but often wanted to sit and drink or chat about the past. To an agenda-driven negotiator this can be extremely frustrating, or even bewildering. Many accounts contain descriptions of these encounters and include phrases such as ‘time wasted’, or ‘laborious’, or ‘timeconsuming’.59 Yet to the synchronic negotiator none of this ‘socialising’ was time wasted because he would be focused on building the relationship first. The way in which individuals from the Balkans would seek to reflect at length on the past, and make it part of the present, and future, was pronounced on such operations, and highlighted their perception of synchronic time in a very vivid manner. Much has been made of the way in which the Serbs will refer constantly to the ancient battle of Kosovar, and make it part of the political debate today. Western commentators can find this puzzling, because Western culture tends to be sequentially based, but the importance of such past events suggests that there

Figure 6.4 Synchronic time perception with an emphasis on the past could be further expansion of both the previously described synchronic and sequential time models to indicate that certain time phases will hold more significance than others. In the previous figurative representations it is possible to suggest that both the synchronic and sequential individual see the three phases of time as having equal importance.60 This view may not, however, be correct. Certain behaviour, such as that of the Serbs in Kosovo, suggests that different levels of emphasis might be placed on each phase of time. It is possible that the Balkan model of time is synchronic, but with an emphasis on the past phase, so that the past phase has a greater influence on both the present and the future than the symmetry proposed earlier. See Figure 6.4. The past would be perceived as having a greater significance and relevance to the present, and is likely to influence current decisions and future planning. It would have immediacy for the individual and it is probable that most factors would be framed in

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terms of tradition or history, great respect would be held for ancestors, and there could be a strong motivation to recreate any ‘golden age’. Publicly, the Serbs gave many of these reasons for their actions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. A sequential individual might also place emphasis on a certain time phase. Returning to the example of peacekeepers in Bosnia and their comments, it would seem to suggest that the time model was sequential, but with an emphasis on the present. Past events were of no immediate tactical relevance; the military imperative was driving the current situation with an optimal future condition in mind. See Figure 6.5. Of greatest importance to such an oriented individual is the activity in the present (that is, the negotiation), and this receives the greatest emphasis, as illustrated by the Balkans peacekeepers’ approaches to negotiations, and their frustrations.61 Past events have a minimal influence on present and future objectives,

Figure 6.5 Sequential time perception with an emphasis on the present and, while this type of negotiator is also hoping for long-term outcomes, the concentration is focused on achievable results in the present. An example of how disparate the two ‘time’ styles can be when they encounter one another in a negotiation is described by Trompenaars (1999): In the Silent Language Hall revealed that Japanese negotiators would make their major bids for a concession after [sic] their American partners were confirmed on their return flights from Tokyo. Rather than risk their schedules, Americans would often concede to the Japanese demands… Synchronic…styles are extraordinary for those unused to them. The Dutch author once purchased an airline ticket from a woman at a ticket counter in Argentina, who, while making out the ticket (correctly), was talking on the telephone to a friend and admiring her co-worker’s baby.62 In this context, it is easy to envisage that each person may view the other as acting inappropriately in any negotiating situation.63 With reference to Fisher and Ury’s (1981) model of negotiation, it can be argued that their model is an idealised Anglo-centric sequentially based process which will work for some negotiators (if they also fall into these categories), but not for others.64 Fisher and Ury view any actions that depart from

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their prescribed model as suspicious or underhand; but when the context of time and its influence on cultural behaviour is taken into account, this conclusion has to be disputed. Reasoning and decision-making tactics may be influenced by behavioural and social norms that originate from the underlying perception of the world, and how a person relates to that world, and people with different perceptions will act and behave in different ways.65 As Hamill (1990) suggests, Meaning not only structures validity in human thought patterns but also defines truth. Thus syllogisms are structured in the same way from culture to culture. Yet the inventory of true categorical statements varies from culture to culture. Therefore it is possible for a valid conclusion to follow from a syllogism in one culture but to be false in another. Premises are a variable of culture in the same way as attributed causes.66 Different time orientations thus reflect, and affect, procedures in behaviour and responses to other parties, particularly in interpersonal communications such as negotiations. People may place a value on the same event or outcome that has a different significance for both parties involved, depending on when that event occurs.67 Similarly, people at different organisational levels, or career stages, can place different emphases on the importance of the moment when a negotiated outcome occurs. Thus the time taken over a negotiation, or the time when the agreement is made, or the amount of time which will have to pass before the benefits of the agreement can be seen, might all have a profound effect on the nature of the negotiation. In this context, it is important to remember that a soldier normally works in a highly time-constrained environment, and this will create internal conflicts, limitations and frustrations. The timing of responses, and threats If a soldier has ample time in which to manoeuvre and build the process of negotiation; that is, he is not restricted by an order or time limit, then there is unlikely to be a conflict of decision-making guidelines and principles affecting the negotiation, or at least there will be greater flexibility to alter decisions and approaches, if necessary. However, a soldier can often be faced with a sudden block to the successful implementation of orders, and the incident itself can move and escalate extremely quickly, especially if a soldier becomes concerned about achieving an outcome by a certain time. Lack of time in which to consider options can lead to ill-considered responses and poorly judged moves in a negotiation. It can work two ways, of course: not allowing the other party sufficient time to consider can disorientate and confuse them, which can be useful to a bargainer. For example, one officer stated: I decided to give him no time to think. We jumped back into the Warrior and headed straight for the roadblock. They were so surprised that no response was made at all. I achieved my objectives.68

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In this situation, the time span of the negotiation was shortened to the extent that it was abandoned in favour of action, and was successful in this instance, but may not be on any other. Too much time spent in a micro negotiation can be equally destructive; it can weaken the urgency for movement and progression towards outcomes. So allowing an opponent too long to consider options may thus be equally destructive to one’s own cause, especially if the negotiators have different time contexts and perception, as discussed earlier. A key feature within military negotiation thus appears to be the awareness and influence of an uncertain time frame, and the imposed pressures this brings with it. Existing literature, as has been seen, describes and delineates the nature of time within a cultural setting, but fails to explore sufficiently the notion that time can assume a high degree of emphasis in forms of negotiation where time limits are set. It can have a negative effect on creative option building, because a negotiator, working within the confines of the ticking clock, can feel pressured to achieve an instant result. It may not be the most efficient outcome available. The timing of threats within a negotiation follows from such an appreciation of the influence of the time factor itself. The incident described below reveals how the sequentially time-based military commander allowed that time urgency to affect his decision making in the encounter: In 1967 the Dancon commander went down to an OP on the Green Line where a Danish soldier had been disarmed by some Turkish fighters. He went down there with an automatic weapon and waved it at the Turks. He threatened to shoot the whole bunch right there on the spot. It worked. But it got the commander into a lot of trouble with the civilians back at Headquarters. They were out of their minds.69 Such a threat can only work as a deterrent if the opponent is convinced of the likelihood of implementation, as was discussed in the review of general literature on negotiation. For the soldier, this can be both useful and damaging; the effectiveness of the threat has to be questioned if the opponent knows the ROEs and, thus, how to manipulate governed responses by the soldier. Knowledge of the ROEs can allow another party to operate a policy of brinkmanship against a soldier, thus frustrating the military bargainer. Comments like those cited below stem from such instances, and also illustrate the sense of a lack of manoeuvrability, or at least a perception that one exists: We’re sent here with our hands tied behind our backs. We’re like traffic cops, we can only wave our hands. The politicians won’t let us have any authority. If we could use a little muscle, this whole mess would be over in two weeks.70 Bullshitting, bullshitting all the time.71 A dangerous situation can arise if the other party views the threat as merely a bluff; the deliverer of the threat is then forced to carry out at least part of the threat to re-establish a situational power base. This could have serious military implications, escalating to

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strategic and political implications.72 The ‘carrot and the stick’ available for the soldier to use may be limited to an option of the other party conceding before or after the use of force; there are often few other ‘carrots’ which can be used to appeal to the other party.73 The nature of the ‘stick’ is more obvious. Summary Tolerance of time pressures, other viewpoints, and a realisation that there is no obvious movement towards a resolution can be difficult issues for a soldier to appreciate, given the active nature of the military profession. Negotiation is difficult if the professional inclination is to achieve an aim speedily and efficiently, and even more difficult if the people involved are acting in circumstances that are beyond their control, and definitely not ‘run of the mill’. Added political and military pressures further complicate any micro negotiation. Major Beaumont describes a typical encounter affected by such influences: Eventually we turn off the main road and within a few hundred metres come up against a HVO [Croation Defence Council] barricade. Despite having clearances from the local HVO commander in Vitez, the chap in charge of the checkpoint first of all says that we will have to wait ten minutes while he telephones his superior, then won’t let us through anyway; says he won’t be able to get through the BiH checkpoint further up the road and, to cap it all, he believes the route is mined. After arguing with him for a while we all turn round and go back to Vitez where the LO sees the HVO commander again, who agrees to telephone to the checkpoint with our clearance. Back we go and this time after a short delay (supposedly waiting for the call to come through) they start to clear the barricade; we assist by dragging aside the anti-sniper sight screen.74 In this incident ‘time’ is being used, or abused, according to one’s standpoint, to frustrate one party in the encounter. To the other party it is of little consequence and provides an easy way to place pressure on those affected. However, it can be a dangerous game to play, especially if the antagonism it creates then boils over into open aggression. Therefore the implicit, and explicit, presence of violence or force in the tactical situation must be highlighted and evaluated; is force the only BATNA available in the military environment?

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FORCE Introduction The professional expertise of the military lies in the management of violence.75 Even when the military has been deployed to provide protection, the threat of force remains a means to achieving that objective. If the option of force is a choice to be sustained in any operational context, then the deployment of military personnel into the situation, as opposed to civilian personnel, is purposely designed to maintain that capability. The military is designed and disposed, by training and experience, to action and armed aggression. However, in the past decade the military has been deployed into situations where the tools that soldiers are most skilled at using, their weapons, have been vetoed, at least as the first response option. Decision making in an atmosphere of potential violence is fraught with difficulties for the serving soldier and brings with it new pressures and concerns for the modern soldier-diplomat. Force, Violence or Coercion? Working and liaising in a belligerent scenario, without recourse to retaliatory force, is stressful and complicated.76 Some psychologists have coined the term ‘The UN Soldier’s Stress Syndrome’, which may result from factors such as: 1. Conflict between aggressive impulses and the inability to express them 2. Imposed passivity when facing humiliation or threats, which leads to a sense of helplessness and a loss of self-respect 3. Fear of losing control over one’s aggression and failing to remain neutral despite provocation 4. Aggressive thoughts leading to guilt and the suppression of anger, which manifests itself in somatic complaints and conduct problems 5. Fear that errors can have serious political consequences.77 Such concerns are interlinked with the inherent aggressive nature of operations and the protagonists involved. An awareness that violence or force might be used at any stage of an encounter can lead to stressful negotiations where constructive option creation can be difficult to achieve. Although the soldier may be acting in a non-confrontational manner, it will not follow that the other party will follow suit. This uncertainty can lead to problems in ascertaining the behaviour and intent of the other party, and sometimes one’s own behaviour also.78 However, Orth (1996) stresses the main benefits of military negotiating in the operational area as opposed to using force: PKOs [peacekeeping operations] should be based on three key points: a. keeping peace through negotiation

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b. negotiating encourages discussions and reduces the chances of casualties. It will allow for cultural exchange, thus opening doors to local community c. troops are armed only for self-defence.79 Alexander George (1993) emphasises this aspect of military work still further: Coercive diplomacy does indeed offer an alternative to reliance on military action. It seeks to persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping… If force is used in coercive diplomacy, it consists of an exemplary use of quite limited force to persuade the opponent to back down. By ‘exemplary’ I mean the use of just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one’s interests and to establish the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.80 It may be postulated that soldiers are not actually undertaking a negotiation in most circumstances but, more appropriately, are engaged in what George terms ‘coercive diplomacy’. This may be a more appropriate and accurate description of this type of work rather than ‘negotiation’. Therefore the concept of coercive diplomacy, rather than negotiation, is worth review and assessment, together with the influential factor of force inherent in the word ‘coercive’. Pressure can be placed on a soldier-diplomat not only from their personal concern to achieve a result in a way that is timely and complements the mission demands, but also from a realisation that armed aggression might erupt at any point of the negotiation. Such pressures were stressed by Breakwell and Spacie (1997): Modern warfare or non-war operations may require even relatively junior officers to engage in complex negotiations with members of warring factions. Many commanders consider themselves to be unprepared for such negotiations, particularly when they are conducted in a foreign language, through interpreters, at gun-point [for instance, as occurred often in Bosnia]…81 Even with all the training in the world, any negotiator would find the prospect of negotiating at the wrong end of a gun daunting and alarming. The ability to be constructive and cooperative in life-and-death situations must be a challenge.82 Van Doorn (1971) describes this vital dilemma for the soldier-diplomat: There is also a differentiation in orientation between the combatcommander complex and the technical-managerial complex. It is an open question whether it is possible to integrate both types of orientation, which also include a difference in ideological outlook. At this moment the traditional uniform concept of the soldier has become diffuse and ambiguous.83

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Ambiguity, combined with tangible aggression and tempered with vague ROEs, thus makes for a complex negotiation context. Returning to the description of military micro negotiation as ‘coercive diplomacy’ rather than negotiation per se, George (1971) suggests that this allusion stems from the John F.Kennedy development and recognition of a pertinent use of such a tactic in a military context in the 1960s:84 the employment of force is coupled with—i.e. preceded, accompanied, or followed by—appropriate communications to the opponent. The coercive strategy, therefore, has a signalling, bargaining, negotiating character that is built into the conceptualisation and conduct of military operations, a feature absent in the traditional military strategy.85 This appears to be a valid description of military tactical-level negotiation, since it seeks to define the more specialised nature of the scenarios and contexts, and the governing factors for the soldier in any such process. It allows for the military ‘steps of procedure’ in response (as outlined in the specific ROEs and blue cards issued to all personnel on operations) and the soldier’s choice not to use armed response, in the first instance, to deal with a problem (but the possibility persists should it be deemed necessary). Similarly, the strictures on what a soldier might be able to ‘give’ in any bargaining situation can be recognised, since very often a soldier has little or nothing materially with which to bargain, and eventually coercion or force may be the main, or only, bargaining chip. Such a dilemma was faced in the following incident: A little while back there was a Finn soldier who was shot at from a Greek village. The Finns drove up their armoured cars and threatened to shoot the whole village right there and then if there was another shooting. This was the only correct thing to do. Otherwise the Cyps think you’re free game. You have to protect your men above all else. But the Fincon commander was in serious trouble after that. The Headquarters civilians really took after him. ‘No, no, no. You can’t touch a hair on a Cypriot.’ But I’d do the same thing.86 A comment of this type expresses the common uncertainty within the military between taking a combative and non-combative stance, and when to shift between the two. Often the ROEs can be vague in providing guidance as to the point at which this shift is to be made, being, as it is, so dependent on both external and subjective factors. A soldier will have a prime concern for the safety of personnel in the vast majority of incidents, and this is likely to be a governing factor in decision making. However, when military micro negotiation is employed, there may be factors at play that govern assessment and reassessment of the process and strategic response, factors which may be mirrored in higher-level political negotiation, but not in business negotiation, for example. To return to the concept of coercive diplomacy, George outlines six main problems that arise when this tactic is employed:

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Analysis of each of these suggested factors might prove useful in the context of possible option creation within tactical military negotiation. 1. Risks of ultimatum

Will ultimatum be provocative?

2. Conflict between crisis management Will adherence to requirements of crisis management and coercive diplomacy dilute sense of urgency needed for coercion? 3. Timing of strong coercive threats

Has opponent been sufficiently impressed with your determination to threat as credible?

4. Timing of negotiations

Can negotiations be delayed until opponent is sufficiently impressed with your determination?

5. Content of carrot and stick

Are the carrot and stick adequate to overcome opponent’s disinclination to accept demand?

6. Timing of carrot and stick

Can the carrot and stick be applied before military actions harden opponent’s determination?87

An ultimatum is likely in military micro negotiation if prevailing factors do not allow for a lengthy or detailed bargaining process, perhaps a time urgency or mission demands, for example. If the soldier has nothing to ‘bargain’ with; that is, the orders dictate one line of action only with no deviation, the response to any opposition to the achievement of this objective is apt to be more forceful, even provocative: for example, a final demand such as ‘This convoy is coming through this roadblock, and if you don’t move out of the way, I’ll make you move.’ The degree of provocation such an ultimatum might exert on the other party depends on that party’s own ‘military’ security and assurance in terms of back-up support, or the prior agreement from their policy makers on the range of aggressive action to be taken within a conflict zone. Therefore responses to such an ultimatum could range from submission to a firefight. The military micro negotiator will need to be aware of this range of response, and realise that speedy reassessment might be needed following the delivery of such an ultimatum. In bargaining terms, it is not possible to back down from an ultimatum, as it is the ultimate threat. A sense of implicit aggression is alluded to in this comment by a peacekeeper: The toughest job is how to shift a soldier from all the aggression we’ve been teaching him to telling him he can’t be a fighter anymore. Even in peacekeeping you need some trouble to keep the men happy. The more trouble there is, the more everybody enjoys peacekeeping.88 In relation to George’s second factor, the soldier is prone to experiencing a conflict between crisis management and coercion when bargaining. A soldier’s ‘crisis management’ is the provision and application of specific ROEs, which may change as the context of the operation changes, in an attempt to keep pace with shifts in political/social manoeuvres in the geographical area. This factor represents the vagueness which can arise between applying force and continuing discussion; and the question as to at what precise point in a confrontation must the decision to shift response be made, and which rules of behaviour and methodology should be followed at which stage (a dilemma which reflects George’s fourth factor of the timing of negotiation).

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Michael Codner attempts to quantify and qualify a current emphasis and predilection for military coercive diplomacy among policy makers, and explores some of the empirical maxims that might be seen to govern manifestations of defence diplomacy.89 To paraphrase his conclusions, he makes the following arguments: 1. Successful armed inducement is about correct assessment of the values, objectives and perceptions of the target leadership. 2. Early pre-emptive deterrent action is more likely to be effective than later compellent action. 3. It is easier to reinforce than to reverse a preferred course of action by inducement. 4. Use bold strokes. 5. Coercion will be ineffective unless the forces involved have proven capabilities and their governments have a record of resolve. 6. Effective coercive inducement relies on the perceived risk that failure to comply will lead, sooner or later, to the commitment of overwhelming force. If, as Codner suggests, this is the current thinking in British defence policy strategic planning, it seems inevitable that British forces will be deployed as ‘preventive’ troops on operations in the future. Furthermore, diplomacy, rather than military aggression, brings with it unexpected economic implications for any military force. Short-term cuts can be made in terms of savings on the purchase of equipment and suchlike; in the longer term such a force is likely to be involved in fewer major operations that require a massive input of hardware. Engagement in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) relies more on persuasive ‘soft’ skills to achieve its aim, but along with this should come a recognition that savings in terms of hardware ought to be reinvested in training personnel in the required soft skills, if a high level of successful deployment is to be maintained, he suggests.90 Codner’s points imply that, although ‘armed inducement’ is the preferred option, the underlying threat of purposeful force cannot, and will not, be overlooked. Already, there are cases of inappropriate troops being sent into operational areas ill equipped to deal with the work required, with resultant chaos, misunderstanding and misinterpretation.91 The following comments emphasise the need to deploy appropriately trained personnel, sending those who can work in an environment that is necessarily hazardous, but also able to act conciliatorily when required: Take, for instance, Somalia. Once the Americans realised that the locals were liable to be hostile, the gloves were off. You can still see the holes in the wall in one hospital in Mogadishu where an American helicopter gunship fired its rockets, killing various patients and members of the nursing staff, because snipers had fired at them briefly from the roof.92 The Russians genuinely are ferocious, and so dumb that they can endure the worst conditions.93 Lines of operation are going to be much more ambiguous and involve political, social and economic factors.94 The military negotiator is thus more likely to move faster towards armed force as the final option than his civilian counterpart, or face it from the other party, except perhaps

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police negotiators. If the soldier has an order to carry out, with no ‘ifs’, ‘buts’ or ‘maybes’, that particular objective will have to be achieved if at all possible. Determined resistance from the other party, particularly if it is threatening to move towards armed aggression itself, is likely to be met with like, or heavier, response from the military micro negotiator. At such a stage of a negotiation the soldier is likely to look to his ROEs for advice and support. The rules of engagement imposed on the military negotiator in any given scenario might be interpreted as giving him a situational power superiority from the outset, even though they might also lead to inflexibility in movement throughout the mission, as was suggested previously. It may be more appropriate to describe this stance as a need, or a requirement, for ‘situational dominance’, rather than a personal power base. Operational working parameters often force a soldier to express demands in a forthright and direct manner, to allow for little scope for misinterpretation by the other party. Clarity of argument is vital, especially if ROEs are explicit in relation to the soldier’s range of options in any negotiating scenario. The role of ROEs can be defined further in the following way: A British military force will always operate in a political context. That context is defined in terms of a directive to the relevant commander and most particularly in the Rules of Engagement set for the operation.95 With little opportunity for mobility in decision making, due to the strictures of his ROEs, the soldier will need and want to obtain situational dominance as quickly and effectively as possible, as long as operational and personnel safety procedures allow. The soldier’s ‘resources of usable strength’, and thus the basic lever in power terms, are respectively the ROEs, operational awareness, and the implicit/explicit use of force.96 Whilst personal power might be debatable in the negotiation process per se, the power of information may be more of a determinant in achieving an upper hand in the process.97 Negotiators usually lack the complete information about a situation to help to assess an optimal agreement point, or to what extent they could barter with the other party to ensure optimal mutual outcomes. Feeding extra information to an aggressive opponent in a military scenario might, however, prove to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, giving out selective information concerning strategic and operational strengths to a militarily weaker opponent might result in positive influence towards a speedy and desired outcome. On the other, it might escalate the ploy of ‘I can better that…’ or ‘If you threaten me, I can threaten you…’ in the other party. The relevance and effectiveness of selective information exchange underlies the whole process of military Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and is viewed as a useful tactic and strategy in warfare as a whole, and, it may be suggested, in micro negotiation in particular. The gauging and influencing of an opponent’s reactions in any given military scenario may sometimes be more effective than a proactive aggressive response resulting in a firefight. As Captain Fagnan explains: as a junior commander, an understanding of psychological warfare, particularly the psychology of rumours, would help minimise or maximise the intended effects that psychological warfare could have on one’s own

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troops. By understanding and using psychological warfare effectively, a commander can, therefore, maintain greater tactical flexibility.98 Escalation Most nationalities involved in peacekeeping duties have attempted to define and visualise the nebulous sequence of potential escalation in any encounter. For example, the Nordic UN Tactical Manual offers the graphic shown as Figure 6.6 to assist the micro negotiator.99 This diagram illustrates the steps in escalation of force while stressing the need to return to the negotiated response wherever possible. The non-use of weapons box reveals further tactics to be employed, for example visible displays of aggression without recourse to armed response or posture. It suggests that a more powerful position in the negotiation might be achievable by physical presence alone. Contact tactics within an operation are rarely discussed outside military circles and are not outlined as extensively as peacekeeping doctrine itself, and yet they are the vital elements in the day-to-day life of the operational soldier. The Nordic model is a good attempt at an accurate representation of the potential escalation within a negotiation scenario, but the ROEs defined here would apply only to Nordic troops; other nationalities might have significant differences in their own rules. A similar visual representation of contact tactics in every peacekeeping

Figure 6.6 Nordic representation of escalation in any encounter100 soldier’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) might be a practical addition, in informational terms at least. In most military instructional manuals negotiation is

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described in terms of part of the ‘escalation’ within a contact, and it is represented as the first step on a road that might lead to the use of force.101 However, when a negotiation starts it is questionable as to whether everyone is aware of everything that is happening, including factors such as the context, the decision parameters, the personal traits of the other bargainer and the possible zones of agreement. In practice, such a detailed picture can only be built up gradually as the circumstances allow. As Doerner suggests, It is characteristic of complex situations that one doesn’t have complete knowledge of the situation, but rather that one must acquire this information while acting.102 The problem for the military is that as this acquisition of information is taking place, so too is the potential for escalation towards more dangerous armed responses, from either party. Further danger lies in pursuing one’s own objectives while failing to recognise the interests of the other party as a negotiation proceeds; this is a tendency that can emerge when a process is escalating aggressively. As previously suggested, coercion may be commonplace in military negotiation contexts, and it is usually armed coercion. Business negotiation manuals tend to identify aggressive tactics as ‘dirty tricks’, or someone is seen as a ‘hostile’ negotiator, and then they suggest ways of dealing with them. Fisher and Ury’s book, Getting to Yes (1991), recommends negotiating the rules of the ‘game’ with the dirty trickster, the verification of any false information, and the review of the status of the negotiation; and that one does not proceed unless these verifications are obtained. Also rejected by them are psychological mind games, personal attacks and positional tactics; again the recommendation is not to proceed if these are in play. However, the tactics that Fisher and Ury have described as ‘dirty tricks’ are commonplace from aggressors in military negotiation settings on the ground. They tend to be routine, and almost to be expected. If a soldier adhered to Fisher and Ury’s advice, then nothing would ever be negotiated; this is the real, aggressive, unpredictable world in which soldiers have to work. This is where there is divergence from the more logical, amenable approaches taken by generic theories on negotiation, since armed aggressors tend not to play by the ‘rules’ described so neatly in instructional manuals. Where the military micro negotiator has an obvious edge over a professional civilian negotiator is in the matter of force, or ‘turning up the heat’ in a negotiation, as one officer put it.103 The physical force that can be used is obvious and visual, but the fine line comes at the point at which force becomes aggressive intent, or is used when unprovoked (refer to the Nordic model depicted earlier). One incident I was involved with ended up with the Serbian Army showing up with rocket launchers threatening to blow us up. We basically said ‘Go **** yourselves’. They backed down.104 Use is made of the tactic judged to be the most effective with the particular protagonist. On the above occasion the abrupt comment worked as a de-escalation tactic; on another it might have the opposite effect. However, it appears that on many occasions the deflation

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of any military posturing can have the desired de-escalation effect, perhaps because it is linked with a diminution of the counterpart’s standing as a professional soldier. Many serving soldiers have indicated to the author that they have used such retorts to move away from conflict in a micro negotiation, using the ‘you’ve got them, we’ve got them’ response.105 As one serving peacekeeper reported, At this point I noticed that the soldiers were getting RPGs [rocketpropelled grenades] and 66mm rocket launchers out and aiming them at my vehicle. I also noticed a number of barrels pointed at me. I had to show them that I was unperturbed, despite the fact that I was outnumbered, in the open, and armed only with a 9mm pistol. Suffice to say that I had my Warrior behind me, but I knew if anything happened I would be the first casualty. I tried to persuade them that the RPG and rocket launchers would have no effect on my Warrior. They were not convinced, so I pointed out the fact that if they wanted to fire it they should firstly extend it and secondly point it the right way round! The commander of the checkpoint felt embarrassed and this seemed to do the trick.106 This was the first experience of micro negotiation for this particular young officer, and he certainly exhibited a highly perceptive analysis of the situation in his method of deescalation. One might argue that his choice of de-escalating tactics might have backfired if the other party had been predisposed to take exception at being made to look a fool, but that was a risk worth taking in his situation, one feels. A Canadian peacekeeper commented on the diversity of response required: You need an army of trained men who are not used to shooting at everything… Peacekeeping brings out the qualities of the best soldier. We just have to change our outmoded ideas as to what makes a soldier.107 Importantly, weak tactics do not work when faced with armed coercion, and soldiers have found this to be the case time and time again.108 As the following statements argue, Although conditions for a UN deployment may appear to be authoritatively negotiated at operational level with representative factional leaders, these agreements in reality may not be observed at local or tactical levels… faction leaders may even promise co-operation as a ploy, knowing that locally their promises cannot be honored [sic]. Unless an overall faction leader can exercise area-wide control, consent [to any UN or multinational force activity] has to be negotiated case-by-case with local fighters.109 A breakdown in conversation is necessarily a breakdown in negotiation, but continued conversation in itself does not ensure that a negotiation progresses. The extended exchanges of turns at talk must

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serve as building blocks in information exchange, relationship development, and bargaining tasks.110 Summary The emphasis in modern military operations is thus on talking, liaising and negotiating one’s way out of a difficult situation, and on building working relationships within an operational area. The difficulty lies in achieving such work effectively and efficiently in contexts that are often hostile and antagonistic. The existence of force, implicit and explicit, is central to the operating environment of a soldier, and does not disappear if negotiation is used as a resolution tactic as opposed to a firefight. It can create a hostile and volatile negotiation context in which it is difficult to be creative, cooperative or responsive, but the imperative to be so remains. It may well be that force is the central issue in the complex nature of the tactical military negotiation environment, and brings with it complex dilemmas for the soldier-diplomat. Further examination of empirical evidence might reinforce this fundamental argument still further. OPERATIONAL FACTORS Military negotiators as liaison operatives Whilst the focus of this book is an analysis of the dynamics of the negotiating process for the frontline soldier, there already exists a group of military personnel whose primary role is to liaise, cooperate and negotiate with any host nation, and it may be that some of the procedures which they follow would be useful for the general tactical soldier to appreciate and apply on operations. These more specialised military negotiators might delineate and elaborate upon the suggested key factors, and the emphasis placed upon them in the military form of negotiation. At the battalion level and below, the British approach in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has been to establish a network of unit liaison officers who conduct frequent meetings with commanders of warring factions in order to secure enduring support for peacekeeping tasks. As one officer stated, ‘liaison can provide…an instrument that is a non-offensive “force multiplier”—in effect, a powerful carrot, rather than another enforcement stick…’111 The British Army refers to this type of duties as G5, responsible for coordinating the smooth execution of ‘civil affairs’ work with local authorities, the local population, international aid agencies and any warring factions.112 To summarise substantially, critical principles of G5 work can be grouped into twelve categories, as broadly defined by the British Army: • impartiality (neutrality exhibited by the peacekeeping force) • comprehensive coverage (helping all necessary parties) • flexibility (the ability to adapt as situations demand) • multinationality (working with multinational peacekeeping partners) • clear tasking (resourcing and delivering required demands)

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• unarmed status (the rejection of using force as the first option in conflict resolution) • chain of command (using the appropriate command structure to achieve tasks) • peer group credibility (working to the same standard as one’s peers) • coordination with other agencies (working with aid agencies and so on) • mobility (the ability to move into areas as required) • communications (maintaining, providing and sustaining viable communication links) • interpretation (linguistic understanding within the operational area).113 Interestingly, many of the above categorisations mirror some of the key factors postulated in this study: working within mission demands; cultural awareness; good communication; and the recognition of the danger of escalation towards armed aggression, for example. Military liaison officers (MLOs) find that they cannot conduct their work successfully unless they cultivate a high degree of trust in the community, especially with regard to the neutrality of their positions. They are not primarily infantry soldiers; they are tasked with a civil/military liaison role that bears more similarity to the work, and nature, of civilian professional negotiators. However, it is a hazard of the job that the integrity of any such military peacekeeper is questioned repeatedly, because negotiators are capable of acting as armed soldiers, and, if partiality is also suspected, then the fundamental element of trust can be lost. This, in turn, can lead to problems with implementation of support and duties, especially if local consent is withdrawn. Impartiality also implies equity of response towards all warring factions. Everyone needs to be met on a regular basis with no one party dominating proceedings, if it can be avoided. Such an approach means that the military can assess changes in attitude on the ground as and when they occur, and this is useful in intelligence terms for the deployed force. Military liaison is an unarmed activity, or ‘diplomacy in uniform’, and it is intended to foster trust. However, some sort of personal protection must be provided for the working MLO. This is usually done by arming support staff who can physically protect both the MLO and communications equipment, for example. It has been decided that arming MLOs themselves is unlikely to deter any warring faction from acting aggressively towards them, and when weighing up any benefits of being armed against the greater need to be seen as impartial, equitable and non-offensive, the latter outweighs the former choice. As Kaufman suggests, Peacekeepers work by persuasion, negotiation, and re-assurance—often by imposing themselves between the conflicting parties. For such tactics to work, the peacekeepers must be impartial, that is, their actions must not favor [sic] any side to the conflict.114 Neutral troops are more likely to be accepted by warring factions as they have no interest in the ‘identity’ issues that may be at stake in the conflict. Neutral troops are also unlikely to be controversial within the operational area; and they are unlikely to promote their own countries’ interests to the detriment of the factions.115 In addition, they will not be reliant on the warring state’s legal, religious or moral stance but, rather, remain accountable to their own country’s jurisdiction, or that of the overseeing authority such as the UN.116 This, however, is the ideal state of affairs: what often happens in reality is that grievances

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and resentments do arise, even in neutral peacekeeping operations, and this can make it harder for the troops to work effectively.117 John Groom argues: in the absence of a neutral element…the parties dig themselves into a rut. They revive all their old prejudices and stereotypes about each other. It is all too often, at best, a dialogue of the deaf.118 Prolonged operations in such an area can lead to struggles and conflicts between the negotiators and factions due to partiality, real or imagined.119 It has been the case in Bosnia, for example, that Muslims viewed the Turkish troops as their allies, while the Serbs looked to the Russian troops for support (both traditional and historical contexts). It is difficult to see how peacekeeping organisations can avoid historical links and affiliations with regard to forming a neutral force wherever they are deployed in the world as identities run deep, as do cultural and religious links.120 Groom states further: ‘Thus increasing recourse is being made to mediation and even more to conciliation because of their participatory and non-judgmental nature.’121 The military accepts such limitations, and in Wider Peacekeeping, impartiality is considered essential.122 Equally, it is vital for the military micro negotiator to submerge any individual biases and attempt to maintain and sustain rationality throughout the process, if neutrality is to be upheld. However, a measure of irrationality in decision making is likely to arise for a number of reasons; such reasons are analysed in the literature on behavioural decision-making theories.123 As discussed earlier, it is important to note that broadly accepted notions of rational decision making are pertinent in the neutrality issue.124 Summary It is debatable how many of these MLO factors can relate to ‘frontline’ negotiation. Key components such as impartiality, flexibility and good communications have already been stressed as essential to micro negotiation, and are vital for any military negotiator, be they frontline or otherwise. The difference comes with the matter of being armed. Soldiers escorting convoys or inspecting weapon dumps have to have personal self-protection, as the probability of meeting warring factions who will act aggressively is more likely than on any pre-arranged meetings. As has been indicated earlier, being armed affects the negotiating process as parties are likely to act more defensively, or might escalate proceedings at a faster rate. Frontline negotiators will need to appreciate this, and consider carefully how and when to implement the ‘threat’ factor in tactical negotiation. As one serving peacekeeper stated, The prerequisites for successful negotiating technique were a very detailed grasp of the terms of the peace agreement, a clear understanding of the Commander’s intent, the authority and absolute determination to carry it through, and well developed skills…the means and readiness to back it up are the essential background to successful negotiations.125

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DURESS Introduction It is suggested that another element affecting negotiation in military contexts is stress, and the impact of duress. It may be stated that the situation within which military personnel operate is necessarily fraught, often critical, and always tense. Circumstances are often life-threatening or at least demanding in terms of responsibility and the implications for personnel should the ‘wrong’ decision be made. Stressful conditions may give rise to an approach that is somewhat different from the neat theoretical models witnessed in the general literature. The stress reaction occurs in individuals, groups and organisations when a fundamental sense of security and well-being is threatened. High levels of stress tend to produce faulty decision making, where an absence of careful analysis results in decisions being made through intuitive response, satisfying emotional needs rather than objective requirements.126 Faced with hasty and poorly structured decisions, an individual may well delay the disclosure of options, and even seek to question initial considerations in an encounter. Such responses are often negative, and necessarily destructive in the negotiation context.127 As Janis and Mann (1977) observed, when a threat is perceived it tends to inspire an urge to react decisively.128 In addition, Downton (1973) suggested that people stressed by ambiguity seek assistance from dominant parties who might lessen the ambiguity and restructure the situation.129 These concepts suggest that the stressed individual may be likely to respond aggressively, even irrationally, and this would be a dangerous move in a negotiation, particularly in a military scenario. At low levels, stress is more of a stimulant to performance; it is conducive to activity and proactive dealings, especially if the negotiator is confident in the dynamics of the process.130 However, a threshold of tolerable stress can be passed, and this can mean that a stressed negotiator will have problems with complex thinking and tasks. Postman and Bruner (1948) found that stress meant that ‘selection of percepts from a complex field became less adequate and sense is less well differentiated from nonsense’, and that stressed responses often led to more aggressive behaviour overall.131 Another noticeable side effect of stress is increasing intolerance of ambiguity, and slowness in identifying hidden meanings and symbols in a conversation.132 Other effects have been noted, such as cognitive rigidity, failure in problem solving and inability to respond quickly to a changed situation. All of these effects are likely to be detrimental to negotiation per se, mainly since the process involves complicated situations and problems that cannot be simplified or reduced in ambiguity. Perceptual differentiation is also likely to lessen. While these adverse effects of stress must be recognised, it should be stated that a soldier is used to situations involving a high degree of stress and a steep escalation in a personal ‘adrenalised’ condition. In this sense, therefore, combative stress is an integral part of a soldier’s modus operandi. A soldier is trained to deal with the results and implications of being stressed, and is encouraged to maintain clarity of thought and action despite such pressure. That is not to suggest that a soldier is superhuman: the increasing awareness of problems such as posttraumatic stress disorder is proof that the constant

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pressure from a stressed circumstance can take its toll on anyone. Where a soldier might have more of an advantage in a stressed negotiating situation is in the ability to tolerate more than a civilian might, and for longer. Even the immediate stress from a potentially hostile military micro negotiation, that is, threat to life, is the bread and butter of the soldier’s trade. Soldiers are also taught to keep reassessing situations, vital in micro negotiation.133 Harbottle highlights the importance of the competent junior officer in this context: However brilliant the senior commanders and staff may be, they are wholly dependent upon their most junior commanders for instant intelligence of any incident likely to upset the peace, and equally on the personal initiative of those same junior commanders to placate and mediate where incidents occur and to smooth down ruffled feathers.134 Placation and negotiation tend not to be traditionally associated with the military in conflict zones. As suggested, such traits and procedures are highly dependent on individual response and reaction, and an ability to govern reactions to situations involving anger, frustration and confrontation. Deterrence threats play their part in such responses, and these can range from deterrence as specified by mandates or ROEs to physical deterrence tactics implemented on the ground. Flanagan et al. (1952) discovered that military personnel judged taking prompt action in emergency situations as a critical behaviour, and those who acted in this way were considered professionally superior.135 It has to be said that, some fifty years later, the context of military operations has changed somewhat from that of the Cold War era, but it may be that human nature has not altered significantly. A ‘natural’ reaction is still likely to occur in stressful situations where there are tangible threats, as the adrenalin urge to fight or flee is hard to ignore, even in an operational context. In a stressful military context the Fisher/Ury model of negotiation might be represented more accurately as in Figure 6.7. As depicted, the main stressors in a negotiation in a military context may be internal or external, substantive or interpersonal. As the highlighted factors in the figure suggest, internal stressors may result from personal expectations, especially if those expectations are unrealistic or difficult to obtain. External stressors in an operational context are numerous and varied; they include the externally imposed ROEs and mandates that might impose strictures and limitations on the scope of decision making and resultant option creation within the process, or there may exist higher commanders in the field imposing their own demands upon a negotiator, or judging that negotiator by the outcome achieved. Substantive and interpersonal stressors might result from the perception of time within the process (particularly if this varies between the parties involved), the relationship between the parties before the encounter (a potential crisis if the

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Figure 6.7 Military negotiation constructs and the effect of stressors relationship is fundamentally antagonistic and aggressive), and the effect of being able to carry out orders. In addition, it may be suggested that the BATNA in such an encounter is likely to be another stressful element, since many BATNAs in an operational context involve the option to use armed force alone. Depicted thus, it would seem essential that both sides in a negotiation carry out fundamental tasks early in a tactical-level negotiation: they must clarify their own interests, gauge the interests of the partner and their BATNA, and then try to influence the partner’s perceptions of the basic problem. Such moves might limit the contextual stressors somewhat. If the operational relationship between the two parties is favourable, the outcome of any negotiation is likely to be favourable as well. However, given the complexity of inter-group relations in any military operation, pre-existing adverse relationships can cause a negotiation to deteriorate speedily. To counter such a reaction, a military micro negotiator might need to attempt to assess and prepare for other courses of action in any given situation, and try to judge the hidden interests and concerns of the other party (these are often submerged beneath open armed bravado and aggression). The difference between interests and positions might influence decisions made and the likely responses to those decisions throughout the negotiation process, remembering all the time that an interest is a want that may not even be stated publicly. These interests, the alternatives, and the importance of each, are likely to create the stepping stones for creative, calmer negotiation and possible agreement.

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Summary The working environment for the operational soldier is intrinsically threatening and stressful, in both personal and situational terms. Many negotiations start with threat moves, such as the pointing of rifles, shouting, insults and shows of strength; all these can be described as positional stances. Stress might lead to weak decision making and resultant poor negotiated outcomes, and it is in such a situation that the temperament of the tactical soldier becomes an additional important factor in the safe resolution of a negotiation encounter. TEMPERAMENT AND EMOTION Introduction Whilst some theorists have sought to model negotiation, and the decision-making processes within it, in terms of human interaction and judgement, the personality of the negotiator might also affect the tenor of a negotiation, especially in a military context.136 If, as suggested, stressful encounters require a greater degree of focus, clarity of thought and an ability to act rationally rather than emotionally, then the personal temperament of the negotiator is likely to play an important part in the judgement and decision-making processes involved. To summarise the earlier discussion on the nature of decision making, two types of information are crucial to making ‘good’ decisions: subjective probabilities attached to the occurrence of events, and subjective values attached to outcomes of those events at some time in the future.137 However, fundamental to the rationalisation of decisions made in this manner is the ability to consider probabilities and potential outcomes in as unemotional a way as possible. Emotions govern human behaviour and response: a person is always in some type of emotional state.138 If a person is frustrated or antagonistic, then he or she is likely to make a threat in a negotiation; if the other party is seeking to compromise, then a negotiator might view this positively and react accordingly. However, because negotiation is predominantly a rule-governed exchange, negotiators may experience pressure between sustaining the relationship, expressing their own feelings, reacting to the feelings of the other party, and the need to save face.139 Emotions motivate negotiators into altering the circumstances that are prompting that emotion, particularly if a party is displaying negative emotions. For example, if an aggressive person is encountered at a checkpoint, the negotiator may be impelled to block that received aggression, either through positive conciliation or negative reciprocity. Miller and Leary (1992) theorised that when people face adverse emotions they are likely to seek refuge in personal codes of conduct, morals or conventions.140 A hostile negotiation, replete with negative emotions, can prevent integrative agreement. For example, if someone is made to look foolish or inept in front of colleagues, or, in a military context, their soldiers, then they are likely to feel embarrassed and may wish to retaliate.141 Negotiators who are angry towards the other

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party are less able to judge the other party’s interests, and tend to achieve lower personal outcomes.142 Should a relationship prove to be acrimonious, then the hostility arising from a stressful encounter will hinder effective negotiation, since the parties are likely to be interested in their own personal outcome rather than an integrative agreement, and this can result in a positional or ‘fixed-pie’ perception.143 Difficult strategic-level negotiations often fall into this category, for example the problematic negotiations in the Middle East conflict, or the Northern Ireland situation. However, acrimony can also occur at the tactical level, particularly if one party views the other as an ‘enemy’. The desire to reciprocate negative emotions is believed to be basic to human nature.144 The need to retaliate can be an impulsive, rather than a conscious, decision, and can lead to an escalatory spiral of destructive behaviour.145 It has been claimed that emotional stress is linked to those international conflicts that escalate into full-blown crises, since emotions can influence judgements of objectives entirely unrelated to the cause of the emotion itself.146 The escalation of a conflict, or the aggressive responses within an encounter, can originate from misperception or biased perceptions of the other parties involved.147 Such intensification has been described in the ‘Gresham law of conflict’, where the more harmful, and thus dangerous, elements in a situation drive out those that might contain the conflict.148 Opposing parties may explain away their own emotional responses, such as anger, fear and so on, by dehumanising and stereotyping the other party, which results in an extremely negative response to the parties concerned, and the overall situation.149 Summary Military operations can be highly emotional situations. Conflicts imply enemies, and the taking of sides, and thus lead to negotiating encounters that tend to be framed emotionally, rather than rationally. As the later case studies will reveal, it is not unusual for tactical-level military negotiators to be faced with outright aggression, posturing and threat moves from parties who perceive those military negotiators as either an ‘enemy’ or, at least, biased. This analysis proposes that although emotionally fraught negotiations may be encountered in a number of contexts (for example, in police negotiations or high-level political negotiations), emotional contexts tend to be the norm in tactical-level military negotiations, rather than an occasional occurrence. The context is a highly charged antagonistic confrontation, of whatever sort, where reactions to groups perceived to be different are liable to be influenced by emotional response, often defensive in origin. For the soldier attempting to negotiate in such circumstances the problems are legion: the immediate need to defuse any hostility that might entail an armed response; the pressing requirement to ascertain the interests of the other party, rather than the position alone; and the attempt to construct a creative interaction that might lead to a mutually acceptable resolution. Within the dynamics of such an encounter the soldier is liable to act emotionally, if he or she is not extremely careful to avoid such a response, and may have to suppress stereotypical, biased reactions to other parties in order to act constructively within the negotiation. Unfortunately, as the various interpretations of negotiation reviewed in this book have shown, there is no one way in which to behave in a biased

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negotiation, or to rectify it, although a mental deconstruction and related analysis of the situation faced provides greater insight into what is occurring, and thus might offer further solutions. Fraught negotiating circumstances demand specific awareness-raising and appropriate training methods designed to concentrate on coping with the dilemmas indicated in this section. A broad-based negotiation ‘methods’ training, it is proposed, is unlikely to prepare the military tactical-level negotiator for all the inherent difficulties in the combat context. Whether a more complex training model is being devised and designed for future use is debatable. TRAINING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT BRIEFING Introduction A brief review of existing training packages might reveal the priorities currently emphasised in military training on negotiation, and the appropriateness of that training in light of the proposed facets of tactical negotiation as discussed here.150 In essence, peacekeeping work demands that soldiers modify their preexisting knowledge of conventional warfare, and either adapt that knowledge or learn new, related, skills. Although classroom-based training can be enlightening and thoughtprovoking, the real learning experience is likely to occur out on operations. This is not to denigrate the usefulness of pre-deployment training, but to emphasise the likely limitations of training facilities in replicating the diverse nature of war-torn societies, and revealing the way in which each situation is different. Major Scotty Alexander, a Canadian training officer, commented that some peacekeepers can receive up to three months of training before deployment, and others just a few hours.151 In such circumstances, soldiers are likely to enter a country with extremely limited knowledge of the culture, customs, language or even the political situation. Speedy briefings when established in theatre will help to inform personnel, but it may be that many have had little or no practice in essential peacekeeping skills, such as negotiation. As Colonel Isika Savua, from Fiji, stated, From a military standpoint you are trained to close with the enemy and kill him. In the UN, an army is sent in for the purpose of peace. That means a soldier has to change his entire state of mind.152 Any pre-deployment training ought to replicate, as explicitly as possible, the mutability of the peacekeeping role and the emphasis on negotiating skills, tempered with military knowledge. As Major Alexander explained, You play the role of the honest broker, there are times when you have to say ‘You’re wrong in this particular case’, but you need military training to ensure that you know what you’re talking about: what is a threat, what is an escalation of a problem, and what is a normal day-to-day routine with no offensive intention whatsoever. You have to be able to tell the

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difference between a battalion of tanks packed for repairs and a battalion of tanks dug in with overhead cover, prepared to do battle.153 These are important criteria, but the extent to which they can, and are, provided for in pre-deployment training around the world is open to question. Designing a suitable course Theory is always simpler than reality. Even when it seems terribly complex, it is still simplistic, as compared to [sic] the range of factors, operating as conditions, as means, or as ends in any actual concrete situation.154 Viner’s comments above help to reinforce the idea that designs for negotiation training programmes ought to be diverse in nature, content and application. Several decades ago it may have been justifiably argued that the USA and Canada led the field in such training and practical learning, but the Europeans are now increasing their input, since negotiation programmes are likely to be mutually experienced, and attended by many multinational forces. In particular, business and political negotiation training tends to follow an established pattern, with a stress on behavioural and personal skills to use during the process, and a lesser emphasis on interpersonal/relational interaction factors (which might indicate a personal weakness), which are less open to generalisation. Many training courses are scenario and context non-specific; they have to be, otherwise they would become irrelevant to many delegates, and concentration on personal communication and outcome expectations tend to be common denominators in such a skills-based training course.155 It appears to be generally accepted that negotiation skills are not best understood through lectures and literature alone, but that they are necessarily proactive and interactive skills, and the learning process must reflect and respond to the learner’s need for such experience. There tends to be a false perception that you are ‘born to negotiate’, or that it is a hidden mysterious art that only those with a suitable predisposition can master.156 The basic principles and experiential knowledge that courses and books on communication skills promote suggest that the innate skill can be transferred to any willing learner, the only intangible element being the personal application of this knowledge in real-world scenarios by the learner, following ‘enlightenment’. Good negotiation training increases one’s ability to understand and handle human conflict and its resolution. Each course may differ in its structure and organisation, as some trainers will wish to concentrate on theory rather than practice, and others will need to be more context- and role-specific. Of greatest use is any training focusing on advance dispute resolution (ADR), which aims to instruct and inform before implementation, as it allows learners to manage and reflect upon their negotiation styles in environments that are not hostile or destructive, and where mistakes will not be life-threatening.

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Learning and learners It is fair to speculate that in negotiation training, as well as in training in other areas, learners will be open to certain learning modes as opposed to others: if the learners are disposed to learn before arrival, this will make a trainer’s task much simpler. A ‘pressedganged’ group of learners can have the unnerving ability to act less consistently, deflate contextual delineation by joking or lack of response, or by their reluctant participation in role plays. Even so, there will always be varying degrees of aptitude, ability and response among any learner group, and a negotiation trainer will need to design a training programme in light of these varying factors, not pandering to one type or another. Therefore the first step in designing an appropriate negotiation training course will be to appreciate that there are different types of learner, with a variety of reasons for wanting to learn. Categories of learners A need to learn negotiation skills might be motivated by varying degrees of practical necessity, and a suggested categorisation of some main learner groupings will assist in an assessment of relevant training for each: Type A Learners who have a passing interest in the subject, but no urgent necessity to apply the technique in real-world scenarios. (Casual learners.) Type B Learners likely to encounter negotiating scenarios in the course of their day-today work, especially in work/business environments. (Low-level/low-responsibility negotiation.) Type C Learners who earn their living as professional negotiators or political diplomats. (Professionals.) Type D Learners who are to be frequent micro negotiators in given contexts, with greater personal or scenario implications for their failure/success. (Tactical-level military micro negotiators fall into this category.)157

Figure 6.8 Four methods to use in training situations

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Each of these groups is likely to have different learner needs, and therefore will require different levels of training and subject stimulation. Type A learners tend to be new to the subject and so it would be wise to use lectures and visual material to supply fundamental principles at the outset. As Figure 6.8 shows, these learners are more responsive to passive training methods since absorption of facts is the required aim at this stage. Their lack of urgency to apply the skill might result in a lack of responsiveness in an attempt at more interactive training. A large degree of trainer guidance would be required at all stages, especially in discussion or workshop groups. Type B learners are likely to possess a more specialised awareness of the subject, and perhaps have already encountered more formal negotiating scenarios in their working lives. The danger here is that they may enter any training forum with preconceptions, which, if incorrect, will be difficult to alter. Basic structuring of the process will be required here too, to reinforce the main facets of the learning, but a higher degree of interaction will assist the trainer to assess and modify any misconceptions in general learner perceptions. Discussion plays an important part in working through conceptual and cognitive barriers, and aids in the clarification of features and learner applications of the processes, as does the encouragement of listening skills and a workshop approach. Type C learners may be used to dealing with real political negotiation scenarios, rather than simulations, and their background is likely to be in diplomatic fields. Concentration on dialogue, persuasive communication, relational behaviour and the psychological nuances of the process are likely to be the requirements of these learners, rather than basic techniques. Learning might need to be almost exclusively active, with fine details being appraised by the trainer; senior negotiation practitioners love to sit and discuss issues and methodology, but this would need to be tempered with realistic exercises set by the trainer that would expose minute flaws. Videoing a role play would give the scope for analysis within the group in such detail, and might avoid the ‘this is beneath me’ attitude in the learner. Type D learners can pose a trainer dilemma. In many cases they may exhibit type A characteristics inasmuch as they may be starting from a level of ignorance about the subject, but the implications of a weakness in fulfilling the negotiating process effectively might ultimately result in a personal life-or-death outcome in real-world application. Fundamental beginner errors such as escalating when de-escalation would be preferable, overlooking opportunities, positional rather than interest-based negotiation, not listening, talking too much and in too complicated a fashion, are all bound to occur, and these errors must be minimised speedily and effectively. The training regime should start with passive informative material, such as a lecture, visual modelling and so on, and then move into interactive learning processes to an intense level.158 Clearly, guided role play would seem to be a good idea, with structured and constructive immediate debriefs utilising both trainer and learner response to enable a more proactive learning cycle to develop, and videoing exercises would be a good idea also. The training required for the type D military micro negotiator cannot, or should not, be squeezed into a few hours: it should either be a few hours repeated several times in rapid succession, or, preferably, a more intensive course lasting several days, as the negotiation context is necessarily complex. The most ineffective training is any that pays lip-service to the subject matter or context, with only a cursory briefing and handout of notes, all taking place during a broader exercise, for example.

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More importantly, the training should be scenario-specific wherever possible, and ROE-specific, so that military learners appreciate the context and relevance of learning negotiation applicable in a particular operational area. The motivation to learn is a prime factor in any successful training, and should not be overlooked just because the learner has to learn the subject as part of prescribed work duties. They will want to learn a lot, because the implications of not learning could ultimately be life-threatening; this means that they are likely to be demanding on the trainer and the methods of training.159 Variety in active instruction is preferable, plus the repeated reinforcement of key issues. Variety in delivery will usually involve the inclusion of simulation exercises. This kind of exercise can best be described as ‘a device for replacing some aspect of reality for purposes of experimentation, prediction, evaluation, or learning’.160 In this sense, it is to be hoped that a simulation will provide a realistic representation of likely negotiation processes, plus the inherent external factors, which will all be pertinent to the learner. The context is vital: it is not useful for the learner (whatever their category) to take part in a simulation that bears no resemblance to real-life possibilities; how else will a learner turn theory into practice in any meaningful way? Taking up Cunningham’s definition once more, ‘experimentation’ allows for self-testing and exploration of hypothetical outcomes and processes, ‘prediction’ can investigate what might happen and the diversity of factors impinging on the processes, ‘evaluation’ can assess procedural structures (that is, ROEs), and ‘learning’ aims to help the bargainers to apply new information and techniques. Cunningham goes on to suggest that the emphasis should shift from finding solutions to transferring knowledge, but in military micro negotiation this may not be such a practical suggestion. Knowledge has to be transferred in this context, of course, and this can be achieved through formal training sessions, but, given the shifting sands of ROEs, mandates, operational strategic considerations plus personal subjective decision making, in military micro negotiation contexts the finding of relevant solutions is vital, if not pre-eminent—or, more particularly, finding the range of possible solutions is vital. As Sun Tzu stated: Those who are skilled in executing a strategy, Bend the strategy of others without conflict; Uproot the fortifications of others without attacking; Absorb the organisations of others without prolonged operations.161 Sun Tzu’s military precision in strategic negotiation processes reinforces the necessity to analyse the ‘enemy’ in minute detail in any such situation, to weigh up options in decision making through such understanding, and to use this knowledge to underpin strategic moves. In a training context, the military micro negotiator is likely to need scope and the availability of ‘real-life’ scenarios, operational procedures and complementary bargaining procedures, realistic threat moves and suitable counter-moves, plus the stimulation for relevant reassessment of the shifting process throughout, for such training to be effective. As a post-operational report from a Canadian unit stated, The entire concept of low level conflict resolution is based on primary groups led by NCOs and Junior Officers. Training must focus heavily on building these groups. Companies and battalions involved in

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peacekeeping operations may be spread over AORs [Areas of Responsibility] many times larger than current conventional doctrine permits. Much more responsibility devolves onto Junior leaders in this situation and they must be prepared for it.162 The validity of formal negotiation training is thus not disputed; the main issue as far as this analysis is concerned is the relevance and applicability of the training format, context and delivery. When the ultimate goal is the desire to provide military practitioners with knowledge and skills in negotiation that might save lives, the impetus for pertinent training is evident. As Hathaway comments, When the goal of training is to provide people with the skills needed to resolve disputes those newly trained…are not merely ‘wannabes’…we see the utility of training as a form of dispute resolution every day in arenas ranging from the school playground to the Middle East…163 BASIC ISSUES

THEMES

INTELL IGENCE

SOLU TIONS? INTERESTS

Note things done well or badly by the negotiator

Significant topics used by the negotiators

Commands, sounds & observations to be relayed immediately to command and/or tactical personnel

Recommended Assessment of actions based on body language & perceived needs recommendations

BODY LANGUAGE/ BEHAVIOUR

INFOR MATION Evaluation of potential tactical value of incident BATNA ZOPA WATNA

Figure 6.9 Negotiation scenario assessment form One of the easiest ways for military personnel to learn about negotiation scenarios, and the best response to take, is for them to take time to ‘brainstorm’ about a particular context, preferably on a frequent basis. By inviting suggestions, and pooling ideas and responses, a diversity of issues and solutions can be raised, and probably they will be different with each group of learners encountered, so any trainer will need to get used to the unexpected. The trainer should prepare for this seemingly spontaneous work well in advance, because the pedagogic prompts for brainstorming are vital if it is to work successfully. One useful prompt might be the running of a videotaped role play (or, even better, a ‘for-real’ situation, if it is available on film), and this can be viewed and assessed by the learners and then discussed in specific contexts. For example, part of the negotiation training in use at Sandhurst is an assessment form (Figure 6.9) that is given to learners before they watch a ten-minute video of a real military roadblock negotiation.164 This assessment form needs explanation before distribution: learners can be told the meaning of each section of the form and what to watch out for on the video (without feeding responses). Before seeing the negotiation scenario, the learners receive instruction in the theoretical framework of a negotiation, along the lines of the adapted

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Fisher—Ury model described earlier, and discuss case studies, both military and nonmilitary, to broaden their understanding of the mechanics of negotiation. The sections in this form give a more rounded assessment for military negotiators to use, as well as considering the process per se, and there also is the chance to appraise military factors such as information and intelligence matters occurring in the negotiation. While the negotiation is in progress the learners can fill in their reactions and responses to the event. At the end of the viewing, discussion is encouraged and the individual responses collated; the instructor can review certain episodes in the event to assist with learner comments and reactions, and to guide insights into developing better strategies. Finally, group work for Type D learners is vital and more productive than individual response, as there is greater scope for suggestion and thematic development. A form such as shown in Figure 6.9 helps a learner to organise their observations and responses: they can evaluate the effectiveness of the primary military negotiator, the strategies used, the contentious themes or subjects broached, and the evaluation of the information perceived. Development of the case study can be taken further; for instance, it might be useful to consider the cultural, sociological, linguistic and psychological factors at play at the next stage of training. An evaluation such as this also helps to concentrate the learners’ perceptions before attempting any role play themselves, and they may become more conscious of problems and pitfalls. Team evaluation can ensue following learner role play; it is a viable form of assessment and learning, and is preferable to instructor debrief alone. The importance of mutual exchange of knowledge A learning method that is frequently overlooked is the sharing of ideas with mentors and colleagues, through general conversation or more formal interviews. This experience tends to promote higher-level skills, and the refinement of technique and approach, since improvement has no limits. McRae (1998) highlights what he calls the PRICE approach to enhancement learning: Pinpoint, Record, Intervene, Coach, Evaluate.165 Pinpointing establishes ‘specific, concrete, positive change goals’, or target behaviours, in an individual.166 It is a form of self-diagnosis that encompasses the possibility of improvement rather than destructive self-analysis. It is a technique employed in general teaching, where teachers structure the training to ensure more easily achievable goal attainment in the early stages, before building in progression in the learning. Recording one’s behaviour or action is invaluable (it could be audio-visual, notes, or third-party observation) because most people assume they are better than they actually are. It ties in with self-diagnosis, and allows concentration on certain areas such as linguistics and body language. Analysis then allows for self-intervention and implementation of improvement plans. Coaching means involving a third party to observe and comment on changes the learner is trying to adopt, and giving constructive criticism in order to foster the selfchange plan. Immediate relevant feedback is pre-eminent in all learning processes, as is subsequent evaluation. The PRICE model is ideal for the learner who likes to be self-supporting, though they need to be advanced in knowledge of the subject matter since it requires a great deal of

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insight and diagnostic work. What needs to be avoided is a response to what appears to have been a non-specific learning experience, as follows: In several of the role-playing exercises I was in a quandary. I didn’t know what was ethically right. I was somewhat concerned about the others—but how do I know where to draw the line? I didn’t want to be callous, but neither did I want to be a starry-eyed impractical idealist.167 Summary: the value of context-specific training As the following commentator states, a difficulty lies in the perceived transference of theoretical training knowledge into practical real-world application: The difficult area in training was always going to be the less easily definable skills such as using interpreters, negotiation, dealing with the media…the armed drunk, the difficult soldier at a check point or trying to stop a firefight, skills which you could discuss and practise ad infinitum but not really test until you were on the ground.168 Simple role plays can be useful in that they can illustrate phases of negotiation, use and application of language and the nuances of body language, for example. Where they fall down is in the area of focusing on subtleties, psychological concerns, linguistic details, or even realism, as the comment above suggests. Holmes and Sykes (1993) contend that simulations have a different order and clarity of phases compared with real incidents, which are disorganised, muddled and confusing affairs.169 If phase structures are less clear, then it is important that role plays try to replicate this confusion. Hand in hand with this, however, will be the need for constructive debriefs and knowledge reinforcement as discussed previously; otherwise learners could be left muddled and confused themselves. Role plays and scenario-specific negotiation training courses need to be designed carefully, with realism in mind. If they are used together with video and audio evidence, then the idea that flexibility and diversity in approach are a vital part of learning ‘how to do it’ should be realised. Real case material can exemplify the requirement to gather evidence, intelligence and information, rather than just ‘talking someone down’.170 This is an approach increasingly taken by police negotiators, where the strategy of negotiations can be different in every scenario and, as such, bears a high degree of similarity to military tactical negotiation.171 This has been a crucial element to review, since the ultimate aim of this study is to suggest, and devise, new approaches to training military personnel in light of the emphasis on key factors in this type of negotiation. As Hare stresses, ‘Intelligence is the lifeblood of the critical decision maker.’172 NOTES 1. To win without fighting is the acme of skill. Sun Tzu, translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). The involvement of the military in any situation is a deliberate act to ensure physical safety and security, in a way that civilians cannot.

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2. Author’s emphasis. 3. Michael C.Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 73. 4. ‘At the “tactical” level, the consent line is certainly wiggly. If a bunch of Serbs, Croats or Muslims opened fire on a UN military vehicle, or, later, an aid convoy, the British could— and often did—shoot back… In the course of the Bosnian war the British UN troops probably killed several hundred local fighters…’ C.Bellamy, Knights in White Armour (London: Random House, 1996), p. 154. 5. Wider Peacekeeping (London: HMSO, 1995), 5–6, para. 14. 6. Ibid., 5–1, para. 1. 7. Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, p. 196. 8. Wider Peacekeeping, 5–3, para. 5. 9. ‘There are also many other liaison contingencies for which a well organized team of officers with good communications would be required.’ John Mackinley in ‘The role of military forces’, in L.Gordenker and Thomas G.Weiss, Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 25. 10. Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 1. 11. Peacekeepers’ Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 22. 12. James, Politics of Peacekeeping, p. 3 (my emphasis). 13. Brigadier Denaro in British Army Review, No. 113 (August 1996), pp. 25–7. 14. The Transformation of an Alliance: the decisions of NATO’s Heads of State and Government (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), p. 49. 15. Major-General Mike Willcocks, Director General Land Warfare, ‘Future conflict and military doctrine’ lecture of 2 February 1994, in RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 3 (1994), pp. 6–10. 16. ‘The British Army has largely abandoned the use of the term “low intensity” to describe operations other than war because it is quite inappropriate. The equipment of high intensity war is everywhere—it is the best protection for peacekeepers after all.’ Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, p. 189. 17. British Defence Doctrine, JWP 0–01, 2.3, War and Armed Conflict, 1997. 18. See Dr Stewart Woodman, ‘Defining Limited Conflict: A case of mistaken identity’, in O.Young, ed., Defence, 1994, p. 33. 19. ‘Thus, a nation embarking on conflict should have a clear political aim, compatible military objectives, and the military means to achieve them…’. British Defence Doctrine, JWP 0–01, 2.3, War and Armed Conflict, 1997. 20. Witness the shifting deployment tactics in the former Yugoslavia: the rules of engagement under SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in 1997 were considerably different from those under UNPROFOR, for example. Military training has to be constantly modified to keep pace. 21. Points summarised from K.Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968). 22. An idea evinced in the following comments also: ‘How do peacekeepers relate to the places where they are sent? Peacekeepers are the extension into those situations of the US mandate. This implies for one thing a change in the paradigm of politics involved with conflict. It is not simply a matter of identifying who is guilty and how to punish them. The objective overall from mandate to operational activities is to heal nations and to begin early with the reconstruction that will prevent violence and retribution many years later.’ Stephen Collett in his essay ‘Humanitarian Peacekeeping: Ethical Considerations’, in Alex Morrison, The New Peacekeeping Partnership (Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1994), p. 163. 23. As a recent example of a senior officer’s view of the importance of the mission in the complex world of modern peacekeeping, cited here is a quotation from General Sir Michael Rose: ‘I soon realised the political complexities surrounding Bosnia, and saw the difficulties facing all of those who had to live in the Byzantine world of the UN. But I also understood

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that I could not hope to succeed as mission commander if I allowed these factors to divert me from my primary task… I believed that if we succeeded in this, then no one could criticise the mission.’ From General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), p. 15. 24. E.H.Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 109. 25. Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: peaceful settlement of disputes since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 34–5. 26. Andrew Bair, ‘The Changing nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping’, in Morrison, New Peacekeeping Partnership, p. 65. 27. ‘Military force, if it is to be useful in the circumstances of peace enforcement, in circumstances of holding the ring, has to be capable of being deployed and held in abeyance at a distance, possessing a full range of capability but not threatening anything specific at any particular moment.’ A view held by Gwyn Prins and expressed in his essay ‘The Limits upon Civil-Military interactions in the Post Cold War World’, in Alexander Woodcock and David Davis (eds), Analysis of Civil-Military Interactions (Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), p. 64. 28. These comments by Major-General Maclnnis reiterate this view: ‘there is not likely to be a military solution to a peacekeeping mission: there is no victory to be won by armed force’, in his essay ‘Lessons from UNPROFOR’ in Morrison, New Peacekeeping Partnership, p. 181. 29. Most nations have constructed specific peacekeeping manuals and briefs which emphasise negotiation in the rules of engagement. 30. The British Army has delineated the factors involved in this new role for its personnel in various training briefs. Pre-eminent among these is the volume Wider Peacekeeping. A succinct explanation of new deployments is contained within it: ‘Wider peacekeeping conflicts will require resolution by conciliation rather than termination by force. Thus, as in peacekeeping, military operations will be designed principally to create or support the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. As in other OOTW, military action cannot, therefore, be viewed as an end in itself, but will rather complement diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours which together will pursue political objectives. Success will thus be measured by the rate at which the sum total of those activities progresses towards the achievement of the UN mandate… The subordination of operations to political and diplomatic activity may result in shifting and incoherent military objectives—a frustration that may often be faced by military personnel and which will require considerable efforts by military commanders to manage’ (pp. 1–8 and 1–9). 31. Some academics, for example, assess the role of the military on such operations in direct correlation to the effectiveness of their political masters in guiding them: ‘Managing a military operation successfully requires clear political objectives, a unified command structure and firm political control of the military.’ Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, p. 15. 32. As Simon Lunn comments, ‘Barring a dramatic regression in East-West relations, current trends…should stimulate a re-evaluation of the basic principles underlying Alliance strategy: flexible response, how flexible, with which systems and aimed where? Forward defence, of whose territory and with what forces? Such an evaluation will lead to substantial adjustments in the numbers, types, and disposition of the military forces…’. In ‘The Military Balance and Arms Control’, in Brian Holden Reid and Michael Dewar (eds), Military Strategy in a Changing Europe (London: Brasseys, 1991), p. 91. 33. As David Carment argues, ‘like conventional peacekeeping, preventive measures must also be flexible and adapted to the situation. But…flexibility means pursuing confidence and security building measures including efforts at transparency, two-track diplomacy, counterinsurgency military activities and risk reduction. Support for both regional efforts at preventive diplomacy and research on early warning must be an explicit part of this process’, in David Carment, ‘The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict: Early Warning

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Systems, Third Party Intervention and the Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, paper given at the 67th meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 1995, p. 18. 34. ‘Peacekeeping, which requires the cooperation of parties to the conflict in question, has evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety of international conflicts which have been placed on the UN agenda over the years. In effect, peacekeeping sought to settle disputes through the medium of pacific third party initiatives.’ From Wider Peacekeeping, p. 1–2.4. 35. A personal view on this was voiced by British Army Officer Lt Colonel Bob Stewart in 1992: ‘The military are hierarchical, authoritarian, centralised, large and robust, while UNHCR is flat, consensus based with highly decentralised field offices which rely on a centralised logistics base.’ Remarks made at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, 18 September 1993, cited in Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, p. 36. 36. The Blue Helmets (New York: UN Dept of Public Information, 1990), p. 6. 37. Colonel D (not UK), in an open source briefing to the Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre, Hohenfels, Germany, 10 March 1995 (not yet published). 38. A recent example of this is the confrontation between British and Russian troops outside Pristina airport, Kosovo, in June 1999. Initially tactical-level negotiations took place and these encounters were quickly communicated up the chain of command so that political-level decisions could be made about the course of action. These political decisions then filtered back down through the levels of command to those operating tactically. The time frame was hours rather than days. 39. A.B.Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peace-keeping (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994). 40. ‘The rules of engagement must ultimately be based on a Security Council resolution. Under no circumstances must they remove the peacekeeper’s right or the obligation to act in selfdefence.’ Ray Crabbe, ‘Rules of Engagement’, in Alex Morrison, Douglas A.Fraser and James D.Kiras (eds), Peacekeeping with Muscle: the use of force in international conflict resolution (Nova Scotia: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 123. 41. Non-attributable comment by UK officer. 42. ‘the individual may be too intoxicated, angry or mentally deficient to carry on a logical discussion’. Non-attributable comment. 43. Non-attributable comment, Finnish peacekeeper. 44. As from 1995 Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst receive negotiation training as part of their commissioning course. The author was instrumental in its inception and introduction into basic officer training. 45. Non-attributable Canadian corporal. 46. Unattributed comment by a Canadian peacekeeper in J.D.D.Smith, Canada in Croatia: peacekeeping and UN reform—the view from the ground (London, HMSO, 1995), p. 55. 47. Non-attributable comments from a variety of peacekeepers. 48. Captain Thomas Goss, 1996, on CD-ROM issued by the Army Lessons Learned Centre, Canada. 49. An example of the use of time as a competitive strategy in a negotiation occurred in Paris in 1975 when the Americans and North Vietnamese were negotiating an end to the war. From the start there were different perceptions of how long the negotiations would take: the Vietnamese leased a villa for two years, the Americans booked into a suite of hotel rooms for a few weeks. Six weeks into the talks the Vietnamese believed they were still in the opening phase and were continuing to establish the role of each American negotiator, define issues and assess the American position. The Americans believed that by week six the negotiations had reached a much later stage. The Americans, thinking that ‘time was up’, started to make concessions, and the Vietnamese could not understand why. They concluded that the Americans were under time pressures and anxious to conclude, so they responded by

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slowing down the pace of the negotiations. Where you are in a negotiation is important to both parties. Example cited in Eric Evans, Mastering Negotiations: Key skills in ensuring profitable and successful negotiations (London: Thorogood Ltd, 1998), p. 57. 50. Summarised from John Mackinley, ‘The Role of Military Forces’, in L.Gordenker and Thomas G.Weiss, Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 21. 51. Definition of tactical etc. 52. Summarised from Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 17. 53. Frances Walder, a Belgian military officer, chose to describe his views on negotiating in terms of historical religious disputes in the late 1950s. ‘Gentlemen, the paths you follow are complicated and winding… Nothing you say at this table reflects your own thoughts, and nothing you think is said openly and explicitly… Everything is disguised, increased, reduced, or altered depending on what the needs of the…cause happen to require. You dissimulate…you deceive, you delude, you evade…always refuse, refuse to specify, refuse to confirm, to accept a challenge, rejecting everything… Negotiating would become impossible if everyone laid his cards open on the table. You must be able to alter your plans…to change your objectives and leave your opponent the necessary flexibility… Nothing is done, nothing is said, until the very last moment.’ Cited in Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Competitive Strategies (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1981), p. ix. 54. Richard Simpkin suggested that business training is one of the best examples for military commanders in real war. Brigadier Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on TwentyFirst Century Warfare (London: Brassey’s, 1985), p. 24. 55. For further explanation see Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture: understanding cultural diversity in business (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1999), pp. 120–40. The work of Geert Hofstede is pre-eminent in this context also. 56. Ibid., p. 139. 57. Ibid. 58. A detailed case study of UNPROFOR is explored later in this book. 59. Non-attributable comments. 60. Past, present and future. 61. For exemplar real situations see the case study of UNPROFOR. 62. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture, p. 124. 63. Interestingly, very few cultures are future-led in their time models. An exception is the Malagasy culture, where the future is imagined as flowing into the back of the head, or passing from behind, and then it becomes the past as it stretches out in front of the person. The past is in front of their eyes because it is known. It can be consulted and enjoyed, but the future is behind the head because it is unknowable. There are no plans for this unknown time and so situations trigger events. For example, buses in Madagascar do not run to a set timetable but leave when they are full. Also, stocks are not replenished until shelves are empty, petrol stations order petrol when they are dry and so on. Such a perception of time contrasts sharply with linear orientated cultures. 64. The framework as described on page 53. 65. The interpretation of communicated messages also involves a temporal aspect. It can be argued that there are pre-message and post-message stages of cognition. Before a communication recipients are likely to use known information to second-guess an expected message, and these expectations are then either confirmed or denied following the received message. See the work of A.H.Eagly, S.Chaiken and W.Wood, ‘An Attribution Analysis of Persuasion’, in J.H.Harvey, W.Ickes and R.F.Kidd (eds), New Directions in Attribution Research, Vol. 3 (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981). Having received the message, the other

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party can judge the reasons for the other person’s position guided by the pre-message expectations. 66. J.F.Hamill, Ethno-logic: The Anthropology of Human Reasoning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), p. 104. 67. Lax and Sebenius (1986) discuss this proposition at length, describing the effect as ‘differences in time preferences suggest altered payment patterns’ (p. 100). They include a stylised example where a Ms Kanwate has a 10 per cent discount rate and Mr Huree has a rate of 20 per cent and both parties care about the present value of income. Ms Kanwate will receive $100 next year, Mr Huree will receive $100 the year after. Thus the present value of her income is $91 and his is $69. The two could engineer an outcome to ameliorate this difference by playing upon their time preferences. Outcomes can be beneficially arranged in a way that satisfies an impatient party but at no great loss to the more patient party, who might even gain more in the long term. 68. Non-attributable comment, serving officer, UNPROFOR. 69. Danish officer, UNICYP, cited in M.Janowitz and J.Van Doorn, On Military Ideology (Belgium: Rotterdam University Press, 1971) p. 257. 70. Canadian officer, UNICYP, cited in ibid., p. 252. 71. Non-attributable comment. 72. Schelling (1966) reinforces this aspect of using compliance as a block to a spiralling effect of escalated conflict. ‘A deterrent threat usually enjoys some connectedness between the proscribed action and the threatened response’ (p. 86); also ‘military potential is used to influence other countries, their government or their people… There is no name for this kind of diplomacy’ (p. vi). 73. Except perhaps the use of personal rations, chocolate or small personal belongings which can be quite influential in certain cultures, especially Africa. 74. Major J.D.Beaumont, B.Eng, ‘Bosnia Diary’, The Royal Engineers Journals, Vol. 109, No. 1 (April 1995), pp. 5–11. 75. Statement drawn from Samuel P.Huntingdon, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11. 76. If a soldier negotiates, he is trying to de-escalate a potentiality for conflict. Linear and cyclical models of conflict resolution attempt to represent such moves in a coherent ordered framework, and research in this area is well developed. See the work of Chris Mitchell, Problem Solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution (New York: MUP, 1994); Friedrich Glasl, The Process of Conflict Escalation and Roles of Third Parties (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982); Betts Fetherston, ‘Toward a theory of United Nations Peacekeeping’, in Dept of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Peace Research Report, No. 31 (Feb. 1963), pp. 60–61, for example. 77. Factors described by Paul T.Bartone in his slide presentation Peacekeeping Operations: Psychological Preparations (Heidelberg: US Army Medical Research Unit Europe, 1995), no pagination. Open source. 78. This uncertainty forms the basis of much discussion, especially when ROEs are written. As Crabbe states, ‘the fundamental issues of peacekeeping are “hostile act” and “hostile intent”. These terms form the basis of self-defence. By “hostile act” I am referring to an attack or the use of force…something tangible. “Hostile intent”, on the other hand, is a threat: threat of the imminent use of force… I recall a soldier asking me if a belligerent raised his weapon and pointed it at him, whether that was a hostile act or a hostile intent. Simply put, the circumstances under which such an action occurs determines whether it is an act or an intent.’ R.Crabbe, ‘Rules of Engagement’, in Morrison et al., Peacekeeping With Muscle, p. 125. 79. R.Orth, ‘African operational experiences in peacekeeping’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1996), pp. 308–23.

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80. Alexander L.George, Forceful Persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 5. 81. Glynis Breakwell and Keith Spacie, ‘Pressures facing Commanders’, The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional, No. 29 (1997). 82. ‘All commanders must believe that they are only a heartbeat away from a gunfight.’ Comment made by Major-General Carl F.Ernst, Joint Task Force Somalia Afteraction review (undated slide briefing). Open source (US). 83. Van Doorn in On Military Ideology, p. xxvi. 84. ‘Let us begin anew, remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, that sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.’ John F.Kennedy, cited in Nierenberg (1968); details in the bibliography. 85. Alexander L.George in A.L.George, D.Hall and W.E.Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 18. 86. An Irish officer (UNICYP) cited in Janowitz and Van Doorn, On Military Ideology, p. 257. 87. George in George, Hall and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 232. 88. Non-attributable comment, Canadian peacekeeper. 89. Michael Codner, ‘Coercion from the Sea’, in Eric Grove (ed.), The Dimensions of Sea Power (Hull: Hull University Press, 1998). 90. At the time of writing (September 2000) there has been a call to found a specific military training college in the UK for serving UN peacekeeping officers. Such a training institution would emphasise the so-called ‘soft’ skills of negotiation, civil affairs and cultural awareness. 91. For example, the behaviour of certain peacekeepers such as the Americans in Somalia, the Belgians and alleged atrocity cases, and the French Foreign Legion in Bosnia. 92. John Simpson, ‘Why Italians excel at peacekeeping’, The Sunday Telegraph (20 April 1997). 93. Ibid. 94. John M.Keefe, ‘The Operational Art of Peace Enforcement’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1996), p. 71. 95. Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine (HMSO, D/CGS/50/8), pp. 4–14. 96. Term used by Gulliver (1979). 97. As Fisher and Ury (1991) claim, ‘An attractive BATNA is a strong argument with which to persuade the other side to offer more’ (p. 183). 98. From Captain V.J.Fagnan, Applied Military Psychology in the Canadian Armed Forces (Lessons Learned Centre: Canada, 1997, no pagination). 99. Information Circular, ‘Nordic Stand-By Forces and Training System’, not dated. 100. ‘Contact’ may be defined as ranging from verbal exchange through to a shot. Authorial representation. 101. For example a manual written for joint Russo-US peacekeeping exercises states: ‘Peacekeeping forces must always have the possibility to escalate step by step, or breaking off the whole procedure. They should offer the opportunity for negotiation. Activities may change rapidly from non-use of force to the use of force.’ US Foreign Military Studies Office, Russian—United States Guide for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces during the Conduct of Exercises (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1994), p. 80. 102. D.Doerner, ‘On the difficulties people have in dealing with complexity’, Simulation and Games, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1980), p. 101. 103. Informal non-attributable conversation. 104. Non-attributable comment, Canadian peacekeeper. 105. Non-attributable comments. 106. Op Grapple peacekeeper.

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107. Non-attributable comment, Canadian officer. 108. In 1993 a series of shelling incidents caused the evacuation of a UNMO (United Nations Military Observer) house in Sarajevo. The evacuation was conducted by UNPROFOR, but on a return trip the convoy entered an area controlled by a warlord who was autonomous. The vehicles were halted and opened. Many items were taken, but the UNMOs kept most of their equipment because they refused to hand it over. The armed escort was stripped of its personal belongings and small arms, though. UNPROFOR spent several days trying to negotiate the return of goods, eventually succeeding. However, in the interim many other ambushes took place and much was taken from more UNPROFOR troops; even some hostages were seized. Observers blamed this escalation in aggression on the weak stance taken by the UN (summarised source: non-attributable). 109. Mackinley (1996), p. 19. 110. M.Holmes, ‘Processes and patterns in hostage negotiations’, in R.G.Rogan, M.R.Hammer and C.R.Van Zandt (eds), Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiation: theory, research and practice (New York: Praeger, 1997), p. 82. 111. Non-attributable comment made to the author. 112. ‘Civil affairs’ is a recognised term used within the British Army for this type of work. 113. A summary of various Army documentation that cannot be cited verbatim. 114. S.J.Kaufman, ‘Peacekeeping, ethnic violence, and Macedonia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 19 (1996), pp. 229–46, at p. 231. 115. Moskos claims that a ‘constabulary ethic within a force’ is the key to success in peacekeeping: ‘[a] rigid adherence to impartiality and absolute minimum use of force’, C.C.Moskos, Peace Soldiers: the sociology of a United Nations Military Force (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 129 and 133. 116. Geoffrey Carnall, To Keep the Peace: The United Nations Military Force (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 117. ‘Impartiality was hard to maintain’, non-attributable comment. 118. A.J.R.Groom, ‘Problem Solving in International Relations’, in E.E.Azar and J.W.Burton, International Conflict Resolution: theory and practice (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), p. 87. 119. General MacKenzie described the poor result of the role of the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam, 1973. The ICCS made ‘the most basic mistake of employing officers from countries who had a natural and overt affiliation with one of the sides in the conflict.’ L.MacKenzie, Peacekeeper (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 77–8. 120. In 1999 the UN made a more conscious decision to deploy geographically pertinent peacekeeping troops to an operation. In the East Timor crisis peacekeepers from the surrounding nations of Malaysia and Australia were deployed in preference to Europeans (except for the British Gurkha regiments). 121. Groom, ‘Problem Solving in International Relations’, p. 87. 122. The Army Field Manual, Vol. 5, Operations Other than War, Part 2, Wider Peacekeeping (London: HMSO, 1995). 123. As discussed in detail on page 19f. 124. I make particular reference to discussions in M.H.Bazerman, Judgement in managerial decision-making (New York: John Wiley, 1990) here. 125. Non-attributable comment. 126. ‘Lying, for example, is much more often the result of panic than of Machiavellian scheming.’ Simon in H.A.Simon, ‘Making management decisions: the role of intuition and emotion’, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 1, p. 62. 127. As discussed in the work of J.V.Downton, Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process (New York: Paragon House, 1973). 128. I.L.Janis and L.Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977).

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129. Downton, Rebel Leadership. 130. Detailed analysis in Milburn, ‘The management of crisis’, in C.F.Hermann, International Crises: Insights from behavioral research (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 259–77, and D.Kretch and R.Crutchfield, Elements of Psychology (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958) and L. Postman and J.S.Bruner, ‘Perception under Stress’, Psychological Review, Vol. 55 (1948), pp. 314–23. 131. Postman and Bruner, ‘Perception under Stress’, p. 322. 132. See C.D.Smock, ‘The influence of psychological stress on the “intolerance of ambiguity”’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 50 (1955), pp. 177–82. 133. Given the coercive nature of negotiation as previously described in the theoretical models, the question now arises as to whether in negotiation a soldier is likely to be equipped with the preferable skills, or whether it would be more realistic to assume that the attributes fostered by traditional Army training run counter to those more applicable in the bargaining process. See Major Todd Harmanson, Negotiating at the lower tactical level in peace operations (MA thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KA: 1996), figure reproduced in Appendix 1. By suggesting the main attributes in both domains in this figure it is possible to speculate that there are several areas where there may be a perceived weakness in the soldier attempting to negotiate with ease. 134. M.Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 192. 135. J.C.Flanagan, S.Levy et al., Development of an Objective Form of the Leader’s Reaction Test (Pittsburgh, PA: American Institute for Research, 1952). 136. For details on such theories see the section on Personality factors (page 86). 137. See the work of G.Wright, Behavioral Decision Theory (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), R.M.Hogarth, Judgment and Choice: the Psychology of Decision (Chichester: Wiley, 1987) and R.Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). Other research has been carried out by S.R.Watson and D.M.Buede, Decision Synthesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and D.Von Winterfeldt and W.Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioural Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 138. See the work of L.Thompson, J.Nadler and P.Kim, ‘Some like it hot: The case for the emotional negotiator’, in L.Thompson, J.Levine and D.Messick (eds), Shared Cognition in Organizations: The management of knowledge (New York: Erlbaum, 1996), pages not cited. 139. ‘Getting emotional’ is a clue to one’s identity or the interpretation of the situation within which one finds oneself. See B.Parkinson, Ideas and Realities of Emotion (London: Routledge, 1995). 140. R.S.Miller and M.R.Leary, ‘Social sources and interactive functions of embarrassment’, in M.Clark (ed.), Emotion and Social Behaviour (New York: Sage, 1992). Such a thesis also implies a connection with the cultural influences on an individual, it may be proposed. 141. This would be in spite of realising that to do so could worsen their outcome. Observation made by B.Brown, ‘The effects of the need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1968), pp. 107–22. 142. See K.Alldred, J.S. Mallozzi and C.P.Raia, Anger and Compassion in Negotiation, working paper, 1996, no pagination. 143. The effect of anger on negotiations is the focus of an article by Joseph P.Daly, ‘The effects of anger on negotiations over mergers and acquisitions’, Negotiation Journal (Jan. 1991), pp. 31ff. Daly infers that anger inhibits the ability to search effectively for mutually agreeable solutions, and affects an angry negotiator’s goal by introducing new motives to punish or retaliate ‘the offending party’. Daly believes anger is caused by external events and never occurs because of a dysfunctional personality pattern that could be altered through reflection and personal growth. He observes that anger can be functional as an explicit and forceful way of countering ‘unacceptable’ behaviour; but he overlooks the possibility that a

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negotiator could attain enough personal insight to choose whether or not to express anger in the negotiation process. 144. See R.S.Lazarus, ‘Cognition and motivation in emotion’, American Psychologist, Vol. 46 (1991), pp. 352–67. 145. As discussed by J.Z.Rubin, D.G.Pruitt and S.H.Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994). 146. For example, the conclusions drawn by O.R.Holsti, in ‘Crisis decision making’, in P.E.Tetlock, J.L.Husbands, R.Jervis, P.C.Stern and C.Tilly (eds), Behavior, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1:8–84. Also see E.Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972) and N.Schwartz, ‘Feelings as Information’, in R.Sorrento and E.T.Higgins (eds), Handbook of Innovation and Cognition (New York: Guilford, 1990), pp. 2:527–61. 147. An argument made by M.Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973). 148. Described in detail in J.Coleman, Papers on Non-market Decision-making (New York: Vantage Press, 1961). 149. See D.Bar-Tal, and N.Geva, ‘A cognitive basis of international conflicts’, in S.Worchel and W.G.Austin (eds), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1986), pp. 118–33. 150. Detailed reference is made to the work of Keith Elliot Greenberg in this section, who reviewed the multinational approach to peacekeeping training in his article The Essential Art of Empathy’, in Barbara Benton (ed.), Soldiers for Peace (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996), pp. 84–100. 151. Ibid., p. 88. 152. Ibid., p. 89. 153. Ibid., p. 92. 154. J.Viner, Internal Trade and Economic Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 1. 155. Most major international companies provide in-house training for personnel, and negotiation training courses are common. The Civil Service provides management training courses in negotiation, following a similar course construction; details of general negotiation courses can be found on the Internet (Henley Business School, Harvard, and many private training firms). 156. The plethora of ‘how to negotiate’ manuals indicates a belief in a rather simplistic solution to mastering a communication skill. 157. Learning theories summarised from the works of B.F.Skinner, The Technology of Teaching (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), F.S.Keller, ‘Goodbye Teacher’, Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, Vol. 1 (1968), pp. 69–89, A.Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: a social-cognitive theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986) and David Ausubel in D.Ausubel, Educational Psychology: a cognitive view (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) and D.Ausubel, ‘The facilitation of meaningful verbal learning in the classroom’, Educational Psychologist, Vol. 12 (1997), pp. 162–78, all of whom describe modes of learning and receptivity. 158. ‘In summary, I don’t think I learned so much by way of facts and theory models as I learned to think about this kind of information. It gave me a reference against which to hold different administrative theories and models.’ Comment quoted in Lachman Foster and Verstehen Mason, ‘Cognition and the impact of political simulations: It is not as simple as it seems’, Simulation and Games, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1980), p. 223. 159. Speaking from personal experience of training peacekeepers from around the world, the author has found their desire to learn about negotiation striking. They are all desperate to learn a skill that has become essential in the modern peacekeeping world, and in six years of working and developing this subject in the military environment the author has never faced antagonism.

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160. J.B.Cunningham, ‘Assumptions underlying the use of different types of simulations’, Simulation and Games, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1984), p. 215. 161. Sun Tzu, ‘Engaging the entire system, 9 III’, trans. R.L.Wing, The Art of Strategy (New York: Thorsens, 1997), p. 44. 162. 1PPCLI Op Harmony Roto 4 POR, cited on the website http://www.allc.com/website/english/products/dispatch/3–1/dis313ae.html 163. William Hathaway, ‘A new way of viewing dispute resolution training’, Mediation Quarterly, Vol. 13 (Fall 1995), p. 44. 164. RMAS negotiation training sessions in Communication Studies. Devised by the author. 165. Discussed in Brad McRae, Negotiating and Influencing Skills: the art of creating and claiming value (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), pp. 115–25. 166. Ibid., p. 115. 167. Subject comment cited in H.Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 344. 168. Non-attributable comment from an Op Grapple soldier. 169. M.Holmes and R.A.Sykes, ‘Test of the fit of Gulliver’s phase model to hostage negotiations’, Communication Studies, Vol. 44 (1993), pp. 38–55. 170. A proposed structure for military negotiation training, delineating learner imperatives, is described in Appendix 2. 171. The author has worked with the Met Police unit designed to train police negotiators. 172. A Hare, ‘Training crisis negotiators’, in Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt (eds), Dynamic Processes of Crisis Negotiation, p. 160.

Part II CASE STUDIES EXPLANATION OF CASE-STUDY METHODOLOGY Choice of cases Three specific case studies have been selected to test and evaluate the hypothesis that tactical military negotiation reveals an unusual amalgam of negotiation factors: civil wartorn Liberia in the early 1990s; the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission, 1992–95; and the hostage crisis in Sierra Leone, 2000. The reasons for these choices depend on several issues: the availability of analytical material; the accessibility to serving personnel from these missions; and the avoidance of missions which have produced limited material or maintain classification restrictions. The Liberia case study has been chosen since it exemplifies a ‘bridge’ between the civilian world of negotiation and the hostile context of a civil war environment. The negotiation was carried out by an unarmed civilian NGO worker, and therefore it will prove useful in the assessment of imperatives such as time, the mission and force, and whether these are more vital to a soldier than to a civilian in such an environment. However, the context is that of an anarchic, volatile society, directly mirroring peacekeeping environments. The question asked of this case study is: Will this negotiation reveal an amalgam of key factors and imperatives? UNPROFOR was chosen as the main case study in the assessment of the key features for a variety of reasons. It can be viewed as the first military mission that emphasised, and relied upon, negotiation as the main means to resolve confrontations and disputes in the field. It was an essential part of the mission brief and the rules of engagement, to an extent that had not been demonstrated before. However, not all negotiations were successful. Many were not; and failure is an indication of factors at play just as important as success. This makes it well worth assessing in terms of this analysis, since negotiation was viewed as the lynchpin of daily tactical interaction. Another reason for choosing this mission is the availability of personnel to explain encounters and their approach to them, and the existence of useful analytical secondary sources concerning the mission. The more recent Kosovo mission was considered as a possible case study, but is likely to have been less fruitful in availability of primary, attributable material, and restrictive classification of evidence is more of a problem here. It was also less of a catalyst than the UNPROFOR mission in terms of the realisation of the significance of tactical negotiation. Finally, Sierra Leone is reviewed, since this mission, unlike the other two, was not a peacekeeping mission, but a hostage situation. This case study will prove useful in assessing the similarities with police negotiation, as

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suggested in Chapter 1, and the particular impact of the use of force and violence in the negotiating arena. Material was limited, given the recent occurrence of this event, but the open, public sources used provide significant insight. How case-study evidence was obtained The evidence used in the case studies, concerning Liberia, UNPROFOR and Sierra Leone, originates from the public domain and general literature, as specified. When and where serving personnel were interviewed, these interviews were chronicled by the author on an anonymous basis, all information gathered being non-attributable and nonpersonalised, as requested before the research began. Questioning covered the nature of the negotiation encountered by the person, their approach taken, the decision-making factors involved, how any difficulties or challenges were overcome, what worked, their perception of the process itself, and the factors that tended to influence the situation and the people involved. The range of people interviewed covered a wide age span, diverse experience, both genders, and variable prior knowledge of tactical negotiation. Most of the statements and evidence quoted originate from secondary sources, already present in the public domain as indicated, and are cited in full. Proposition to be tested The proposition to be tested is that tactical negotiation is characterised by an amalgam of factors: force, mission, time, restrictive rules of engagement, together with the influence of elements such as culture, communication, power, personality and competitiveness. To what extent do these affect and influence tactical negotiations in these situations, and define this form of negotiation? Conclusions to be drawn There are good reasons to believe that conclusions drawn from these case studies are applicable not only to the missions analysed here, but also to other missions and deployments. As has been explained, these studies were chosen for a variety of reasons, but mainly due to the freedom to use a wider choice of material, and a greater freedom in classification terms. The author has personally observed and analysed tactical military negotiation occurring in other contexts, but cannot affirm the findings given here in the light of such operations due to restrictions on the wider use of such evidence in an open document. What can be emphasised, however, is that in some contemporary modern cases also witnessed by the author, no tactical negotiation incident where the proposed factors do not influence and colour this type of negotiation to a greater or lesser extent, and for good or ill, could be found. Whether the negotiation is a de-escalation of imminent violence, as in Sierra Leone or Afghanistan, through a scale of response down to working and liaising with dying refugees, the amalgam of factors is present, in varying degrees of emphasis and effectiveness.

7 A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN LIBERIA: A PROPOSED MODEL OF TACTICAL-LEVEL MILITARY NEGOTIATION A valuable case study to begin to assess the diversity of suggested factors inherent in tactical military negotiation concerns events in Liberia several years ago.1 An NGO worker, one of the first to enter the war-torn country, was trying to secure safe routes for the medical aid and medical staff following him. He described the situation as follows (account summarised from his comments): On entering one particular village his vehicle was stopped by a gang of young boys. These boys were aged from seven to ten years; all were armed with AK 47s. He left his vehicle and approached the leader of this gang, a boy of about nine years. This boy was the area general and said that he had full authority in the region and would not let the NGO through. The NGO knew that in the existing anarchic infrastructure such gangs were a norm, and that they had initiation rites that included the killing of a person and the removal of the heart. He started to negotiate with the boy general. The negotiation didn’t get very far; the NGO realised that the general wished to maintain his authority by refusing permission to pass through; there seemed little room for manoeuvre, especially as the boys also seemed very trigger-happy. After a while, the NGO noticed that some of the boys who had been standing further back had started to kick an old tin can around in a mock game of football. He let this go on for a while and then asked the general if they liked football. Yes, they did. ‘Well, I was wondering if you could help me, then’, was the response by the NGO. ‘As you know I have to travel around a lot and I need someone to look after the football I’ve got in my car, just to make sure that it is all right until my return; could you help me?’ The general agreed. The ball was handed over on the understanding that the NGO would retrieve it on his return and following the establishment of the safe routes for the medical supplies. The gang was happy to comply and the situation was resolved.2

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Although this situation might appear to be a minor incident, it is nevertheless highly illustrative of tactical-level operational negotiation, and provides an analytical ‘bridge’ between the civilian world of negotiation and the military. The NGO worker is a civilian, without recourse to force, but he was operating in a violent context. Thus it is a useful initial model of negotiation in a peacekeeping context since many issues raised in the earlier theoretical reviews of negotiation can be demonstrated and analysed using this particular situation. CONTEXT First of all, the negotiation was influenced by all the operational levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Strategically the NGO worker had to achieve the political objective of establishing routes for MSF (Médecins sans frontières); he was also aware of the strategic implications of the political and social context within which he was working. It was a war-torn, ravaged economy and society where political power and authority had devolved to those bearing arms, the entry of NGOs into the country was an attempt to proffer support at the highest level possible in the existing situation. Operationally, the NGO worker knew that in these early, dangerous days of the conflict that there was little local support for his mission, and nothing in the way of an overall plan or dictum. In the immediate area, there was a limited command structure. Essentially, the NGO worker was working tactically; he was the decision maker on the ground and had sole responsibility for the success or failure of the mission, but his tactical decisions would affect all levels above him as well. He had to ‘win the battle’ himself and without recourse to external support; thus he had no immediate ratifiers to his decision or eventual outcome. This was a doubleedged sword: it meant that he could make independent decisions, but lacked a second opinion or an alternative option maker with whom he might consult. THE SITUATION OR MISSION Using the conceptual Fisher/Ury model of interest-based negotiation, which appears, at least, to attempt to model real-world factors wherever possible, the negotiation at its start may be modelled as in Figure 7.1. This initial stage reveals a vast discrepancy in the ‘wants and needs’ of both parties, particularly with regard to the respective positions and the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs): it was likely to take considerable creative thinking to ‘expand the pie’ of options within this particular negotiation in order to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution. Indeed, in the first attempts at negotiation the NGO worker achieved very little. It is obvious,

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Figure 7.1 Liberia incident: initial stage however, that other things were going on in this encounter, matters which were to prove crucial to the outcome. The mission for the NGO worker was specific: he was tasked with establishing safe routes into the country so that the medical convoys could travel safely. The overall operation was dependent upon his achieving cooperation on the ground. The mission for the boy general was more ambiguous; presumably he had been tasked to maintain control of the area. Consciousness of both their missions was likely to influence reactions and option creation in either a positive or negative way, respectively. PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER PARTY, AND THE CULTURE OF THE ‘GANG’ An outstanding factor in this case is the way in which the NGO worker reacted to the boys in front of him. Instead of seeing children, he saw them as armed, volatile individuals who believed in their own authority and responsibility in this village. If he had chosen to judge them using his own cultural norms and values, then he would have missed a vital key in the attempt to create a link with them. By treating the boy general with respect, he was openly acknowledging the boy’s status within his own group (an important interest), and it was being recognised by the worker himself. This was a significant and creative decision. A cultural awareness of the nature of armed civilians and child soldiers meant that the NGO worker could determine the likely reaction of the boy

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Figure 7.2 Second stage of development general. It was safe to assume that face saving was an important issue for the boy general; most gang leaders lead through instilling fear in their soldiers. The initiation rite within this gang was the killing of a person and the removal of the heart; so life was worthless, and the killing of an NGO worker, or a soldier, would be viewed as a triumph. This concept might also explain the probable BATNA for the boy general, especially in a lawless society with very little regard for human life. The main concern for the NGO worker in these initial stages was thus to try to alter the boy general’s BATNA; Figure 7.2 expands upon the original Fisher/Ury model in order to model this type of negotiation more effectively. In Figure 7.2, it becomes apparent that the cultural recognition or respect by the NGO worker in order to attempt to alter the boy general’s BATNA also served to hint at the boy’s WATNA; that is, maybe the worst alternative to a negotiated agreement would be his losing face with his ‘gang’, and, perhaps, losing his authority as well. This realisation gives the worker another step along the road to becoming more creative in the options available to him when in a seemingly weak position, especially if he could create an option whereby the boy general actually gained prestige. Then there might be a successful outcome for both of them.

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Figure 7.3 Third stage of development CREATING OPTIONS BASED ON INTERESTS The next creative step was the NGO’s ability to think imaginatively, or laterally. The behaviour of the other boys revealed an option that he would have been unlikely to stumble upon otherwise: by observing their play the NGO worker was simultaneously considering the situation in both a strategic and tactical way. He was thinking tactically in the sense that he saw a way to remedy the immediate situation, but it was also strategic because this was likely to be a long-term solution to the main problem of establishing safe routes in the country. Also, while continuing to show respect for the boy general’s status, he was conscious throughout that he was dealing with children, and this unspoken recognition proved to be the fruitful creative area as far as option making was concerned. By appealing to the status interest for the boy general (see Figure 7.3), the worker was beginning to expand the ZOPA, as this was a key concern for the boy general. At the same time, the worker was slowly altering the tone of the negotiation from being a highly competitive, if not volatile, confrontation to a more cooperative exchange. The NGO worker explained to the author that he took great pains to use appropriate language and terminology, so that the boy general would not feel confused, or look stupid if he misunderstood any words used.3 These moves continued to influence the boy general’s BATNA and WATNA, and they were lessening the likelihood that he would take the easy option of exercising his

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BATNA, rather than negotiate. Another useful perception by the worker was the realisation that although the boy saw himself as being responsible and professional, his lack of maturity was bound to affect his ability to think either creatively or unemotionally. The NGO worker thus realised that it would be up to him to affect movement in the Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), without having to implement his own BATNA, of course. The boy general might well have been frightened and stressed, as was indicated in his manner and speech, but the worker made a conscious effort not to reflect the feeling. His own calm and conciliatory manner helped to both prolong the negotiation, and build upon the relationship. This, in turn, allowed greater scope for the potential for a mutually acceptable outcome. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS It has to be said that the idea of the football was an extremely creative solution in this situation, especially since it was proffered not as a gift but ‘on loan’. This solution worked because it acknowledged the interest of the professional status of the boy as a leader, and a trustworthy one at that, and it appealed to the gang because their leader had secured a football for them from an adult who was not overlooking their standing, or their abilities both as armed individuals and as footballers. As Figure 7.4 shows, this option completely altered the three key areas in the negotiation: the boy general’s BATNA, position and WATNA, without either party losing face or giving way to their original BATNA at any time. It also transformed the ZOPA into a wider zone of positive solutions, rather than a limited area of agreement, as might have been the first perception by the NGO worker. The ‘problem’ of the football, which the boy general could be seen to resolve, acknowledged his interests and needs completely. An adult was placing trust in him, was giving him responsibility, and he was being treated by the adult as the authority in that village. Furthermore, in the eyes of his child followers, he had secured a useful ‘treat’, of which they could take advantage. As Figure 7.4 shows, the worker had transformed the boy general’s BATNA, WATNA and position by finding an outcome that suited his interests perfectly. It was an option that came at very little cost to the worker, since his own BATNA, WATNA and position remained unchanged throughout the entire exchange. This fact reveals that the creativity within the negotiation was one-sided, and that the worker was the party creating value and options, and allowing the boy general to claim that value. However, it can be argued that the worker was allowing the boy general to secure the outcome that the worker wanted him to have, and not any other outcome that he might have preferred, especially in the early stages of the exchange.

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Figure 7.4 Final stage GIVING THEM THE OUTCOME THAT YOU WANT THEM TO HAVE The resolution of the confrontation was successful because it was multi-level in approach and result; it established a link between the two parties that was likely to last, for the foreseeable future at least. Whilst this particular negotiation did not take place between two military parties, the use of force remained an ever-present option throughout the process as one party was armed, and the threat remained that the situation could escalate to dangerous levels at any moment. Such a threat could not be, and was not, overlooked or ignored when options were considered. Because of this attitude taken by the NGO worker, a life-threatening situation was converted into a positive encounter between the two parties. SUMMARY This case study reveals important issues in confrontational and necessarily dangerous and volatile negotiating contexts. The all-encompassing issues of interests, culture, communication, creativity and cooperation apply, and thus suggest their importance in this form of negotiation. It also disproves the game theory contention that parties enter a negotiation with equal understanding and knowledge: the boy general had no real desire to act cooperatively. More importantly, the predominance and the manipulation of the issues of a BATNA and the de-escalation of imminent violent response were key to a

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successful negotiated resolution in this instance. This may suggest that these two elements, at the very least, have an inordinate predominance in tactical-level negotiation, which they might not elsewhere. An interest-based model of negotiation, such as Fisher and Ury’s, provides a useful initial insight into proceedings, but modification to model other pertinent factors also has to take place. The case studies must now focus on further specifically military operations, rather than overtly civilian, to assess whether this is a valid conclusion to draw, and if the lessons from this situation are applicable in other cases. NOTES 1. This incident was described to the author by the NGO worker concerned. For operational reasons he requested that he be allowed to remain anonymous, but gave permission for the incident to be analysed. 2. Conversation between the author and NGO worker. 3. The communication was taking place in French, not the worker’s first language but one in which he was competent enough not to need an interpreter.

8 UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA, 1992–1993 INTRODUCTION Similar situations to the experience of the NGO worker in Liberia were encountered during the early years of the United Nations presence in Bosnia. In particular, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployment was fraught with difficulties, many of which stemmed from uncertainties concerning negotiation work, and involving the issues raised here. A detailed study of this deployment will allow further assessment of the importance of these factors in tactical-level military negotiation, and continue the investigation as to whether the proposed ‘model’ of what might be expected to happen in military negotiation contexts does so in practice. Negotiating is, at once, one of the most important and one of the least practised of the skills required in peacekeeping by the military officer.1 CONTEXT UNPROFOR witnessed the unique experience of the dichotomy between peacemaking and peacekeeping. Though the UN had a limited humanitarian mandate in BosniaHerzegovina in mid-1992, it had neither the resources nor the full mandate to embark on large-scale peacekeeping, which did not get under way more extensively until September 1992. This often made the position of UNPROFOR on the ground virtually untenable. Negotiating the solutions to political problems and implementing such solutions may be a logical division of functions, but actual remedies cannot be found without reference to realities on the ground. The process of implementation of agreed solutions, moreover, is not merely a mechanical matter since it requires an ongoing process, in situ, of consultation and negotiation with the relevant parties. The Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) Command mission to support United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) efforts to deliver humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia was neither a peacemaking nor a peacekeeping operation, in the strict definitions of the terms.2 The Command was deployed at very short notice into a country with three warring factions and where no peace existed, with orders to fulfil a strictly humanitarian and limited political mission, which had no strategic objective. The advent of BH Command heralded a change in UN policy for peacekeeping operations. The Command was formed in theatre in a very short period by some eight (subsequently ten) nations, the majority of which were providing and funding contingents

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(as opposed to individuals), and sharing the cost of the Command HQ. Such an arrangement for a peacekeeping operation was without precedence in UN history and, while operationally effective, led to a degree of independence of thought and action by the contributing nations.3 In the early stages, the effectiveness of HQ BH Command stemmed largely from its formation from the core of an existing NATO headquarters, and the slow implementation of a financial basis caused immense problems and affected operational efficiency. The Command was formed in order to support UNHCR in delivering humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Against this background, the contributing nations met in London (the UK took on the responsibility as lead nation) and agreed force contributions. The HQ was based on a NATO HQ style, with additional staff from the contributing nations, plus communications from The Netherlands and HQ support from Denmark. The proposed structure was forwarded to the UN in New York on 20 September 1992 and subsequently approved. Security Resolution 776 had been adopted on 14 September 1992, and BH Command was complete in theatre by mid-November 1992—a period of two months. This was probably as fast as could reasonably be expected, given the need for national contingents to be self-sufficient. The mandate for UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) was significantly different from that for UNPROFOR in Croatia. With time, the Command had taken on far wider responsibilities than those originally envisaged in the mandate, including peacemaking on the ground, negotiating and monitoring ceasefires, delivering aid in areas too dangerous for UNHCR to enter, assisting refugees and displaced persons, arranging exchanges of prisoners and bodies, and escorting utility repair missions.4 The ability to react rapidly to take advantage of the local situation, both political and operational, was essential, and the HQ structure had to be adjusted accordingly. The selection of troops was a matter for the contributing nations once the political declarations had been made and initial reconnaissance conducted. Each contingent was responsible for its own logistic and administrative support, and selected its force contribution to suit its area of operation. There was considerable variation in the size and equipment of each battalion group, particularly concerning its combat and logistic support. Some units were able to rely on national support elements already in theatre to support the original UNPROFOR units. The force was deployed in a very short time following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 776 on 14 September 1992. HQ BH Command had a limited operational capability in Belgrade within a month and a skeleton HQ in Kiseljak, BosniaHerzegovina, a week later: but it was not fully established until the arrival of its HQ Support Company in early November 1992. By mid-November 1992, all planned BH Command units were in theatre. A successful peacekeeping force must be supported by a proper political and military structure at all levels, with a clear strategic objective and an overall theatre commander responsible for controlling all agencies, both military and civilian. BH Command was devised by the contributing nations on a purely military basis. It was appreciated that the Command was deploying into an area in which a three-sided civil war was in progress and that it had a clear mandate to support UNHCR. It quickly became apparent that the Command had to assume far wider responsibility, including political and military negotiations at the highest level between all three sides. The first Civil

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Affairs/Information Adviser arrived in late November 1992, while the Civil Affairs Coordinator arrived in early January 1993, some three months into the operation, in spite of requests for a team from the outset. Before this, Commander BH Command, or his representative, had to negotiate with both political leaders and military commanders, often without direct political advice.5 THE ‘CULTURE’ OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE The working language of English was an enormous advantage for the HQ as the core staff came from NATO HQ, and thus both officers and soldiers were thoroughly familiar with the language. It was undoubtedly a problem for some other participating nations whose mother tongue was not English, and the speed with which the HQ had to work, particularly in the early stages, meant that there was little time for lengthy translations. It followed that, in a multinational HQ, it was deemed ideal if all personnel arrived with a sound working knowledge of the common language, to be effective in the short term as well as the long term. Although the situation was not quite the same in units that were able to operate in their own language for much of the time, there was an obvious requirement for radio traffic and communications between HQ and units, and between units, to be in a common language. This was particularly true at lower levels, with, for example, convoy escorts needing to communicate with the convoys they were escorting. The capabilities of the members of the staff of the HQ were affected by their ability in the common language, their experience in working in multinational HQ, and their familiarity with the NATO HQ procedures and method of working. Staff officers who had only national experience had more to learn than others did, although this was generally only a problem in the early stages when the HQ was being established. If nothing else, it was likely that inter-organisational communication and negotiation would be fraught with difficulty due to some language deficiencies. HQ BH Command deployed with barely sufficient numbers of G5 (Civil Military Operations), and Public Information (PI) officers. The UN Chief of Press and Information arrived in the mission area in late November 1992 but left in mid-January 1993. A successor was found only in March 1993, and it was some three months after deployment that professional UN Civil Affairs officers, suitable for conducting negotiations at national level, joined the HQ.6 Voices arose to question the viability of placing soldiers in situations where other skills were required: The clear lesson of Somalia and Bosnia is that to confuse the strategic goals of war fighting and peacekeeping will risk the mission and the very lives of the peacekeepers and aid workers themselves. A peacekeeping force designed to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid simply cannot be used to alter the military balance of force in a civil war, to modify political goals of one party or another, or even to attempt to enforce the passage of a convoy, for these are pure acts of war.7 In relation to the overall mission brief, in February 1992 the UN Security Council had authorised the deployment of UNPROFOR with the underlying suggestion that the

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warring parties might have to accept the continual presence of the peacekeepers, not only in a humanitarian role.8 The acceptance of UNPROFOR troops within the operational area was based on consent from the warring parties, for the most part, but the UN reserved a right to act in a different way if it meant humanitarian action could be sustained. However, a more confrontational response was not authorised by the UN for some time, and the perceived passivity of the UN force on the ground led to frustration among many. Such ‘confusion’ within a mission brief was bound to lead to complexities and misunderstandings on all sides. Gradually the Command had accepted additional tasks, and with this growth in new responsibilities came a demand and requirement for Civil Affairs personnel, and ‘on-the-ground’ micro-negotiation skills for all personnel. But the response for the provision of such specialist personnel, and training for general personnel, was woefully slow, as the following comment from a British peacekeeper stresses: Arriving in Bosnia and attempting to grasp the complexities of the situation has been likened to trying to take a sip of water from a fire hydrant. Our preparation package went some way to controlling this gush, or at least to warning us that we were about to be soaked.9 PREPARATION FOR LIAISON AND NEGOTIATION Civil Affairs (CA) personnel were used by deployed Canadian troops to supplement information and intelligence for troops on the ground, and to conduct as many negotiations as possible (obviously pre-arranged as opposed to ad hoc).10 It was felt that involving the CA group early on and in negotiations over disputes between locals and the military they would free the troop commander from an additional ‘time-consuming burden’.11 Since none of the team spoke Serbo-Croat or Macedonian, local contract interpreters were hired and used for local-military liaison. It was stated that the use of these local translators, in conjunction with CA members, proved successful in many aspects of the peacekeeping mission. Many lessons were learned from this experience: whenever possible a CA group should be used to coordinate/negotiate civil-military operations, since the UN did not have a specific unit charged with CA team-type duties, and use the attached team to coordinate civil-military projects which help to win hearts and minds, mindful that the team could provide intelligence and assessment on what was happening on the ground. Of more immediate importance was the growing recognition that the more soldiers knew about the overall situation, and how the mandate was to be applied, the easier it was for them to react properly to situations and to conduct effective low-level negotiations. One Canadian report states: Negotiations. The CA team has actively taken part in most negotiations dealing with U.S. and Macedonian locals. Negotiations with local Macedonians have centered around maneuver damage claims and land disputes. Recently with support from UNPROFOR and the Able Sentry lawyer, CA successfully resolved maneuver damage claims directed against the U.S. CA also participated in negotiations over land owner

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rights between the U.S. Ops and Macedonian privately owned land. Involving CA early on, during negotiations over disputes between locals and U.S./UN military, frees the commander and leaders from this additional somewhat time consuming burden.12 REACTING TO CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE GROUND UNPROFOR demonstrated the new operating procedures required by the serving soldier in such a difficult situation, many of which ran contrary to established military behaviour in a war zone. These practices can be summarised as follows: • direct engagement: the delivery of humanitarian supplies, rebuilding of infrastructure, ‘hearts and minds’ work;13 • protection of NGO personnel and their supplies; • acting as mediators between warring factions; • establishment of safe areas; • liaison and negotiation: bodies, accommodation, movement. The watching world generally hopes that peacekeeping missions will not merely freeze conflicts, but help to restore a sound peace as well. In a military sense, this requires integration of the tactical and operational command levels to support the strategic aim of de-escalating violence and reconciling communities.14 Experience in operational areas such as Cyprus shows that appropriate techniques exist at the tactical level, where peacekeepers have used arbitration, go-between mediation and conciliation to achieve ends. Principled negotiation, consultation and problem-solving meetings are thus more progressive forms of conflict resolution, if the aim is to do more than just keep the belligerents apart physically. Dr Ken Eyre stressed this viewpoint in 1993: Given that the peacekeeping model is changing, it is fair to ask if the tasks that soldiers are now being required to do are still covered in training or general war, or if the changing face of peacekeeping now raises the imperative to train soldiers at all levels in skills that are beyond those needed to successfully prosecute combat operations. Based on experiences from the unstable environment during the Cyprus War in 1974, media reports from events in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia and an informal survey conducted with several hundred troops who served in Sarajevo with the Canadian Contingent in UNPROFOR, the answer is tentatively ‘yes’.15 The UN was forced to realise that the diversity of roles by the troops in UNPROFOR led to concomitant diversification in liaison and ‘on-the-ground’ duties and requirements. As a Canadian contingent stated, ‘Negotiation techniques are critical for LOs, F Echelon leaders from patrol/section level and up, and key CSS personnel.’16 Although the decision to deploy was political, military commanders had to negotiate the terms on which they would support political and/or humanitarian agreements in the operational area. It is always an important factor for the military to ensure (if possible)

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that they are not committed to an operation that is untenable. Military units deployed to facilitate humanitarian aid had to negotiate on a case-by-case basis for freedom of movement to escort the convoys, and this often led to ‘linkage’ negotiations on other humanitarian issues and political problems that would be used as bargaining devices by, and with, local warlords. The following comment exemplifies this: Peacekeeping operations can contain elements of both small and large scale confrontations which have to be dealt with during the de-escalating effort.17 TYPICAL NEGOTIATION ENCOUNTERS The incident described below begins to indicate the volatility and unpredictability of response to military peacekeepers within the UNPROFOR operational area: As an example of this Serbian fixation, all three rifle companies were regularly accused by local Serbs of smuggling Croatians into the Krajina, often under the most outlandish circumstances. On several occasions these accusations resulted in confrontations with angry armed Serb civilians, requiring hours to defuse, constant display of impartial professionalism…persuaded some Serbs, many in the ‘front-line villages’…regarded the battalion with suspicion. This demonstrates the importance of both a strong CIMIC [civil-military cooper ation] program and the need to avoid any provocative actions that are not operationally necessary. For example, driving APC patrols through villages at two o’clock in the morning may quickly lead to armed confrontations and roadblocks. If it is operationally possible, it is much better to select a different route or use wheeled vehicles. 1 PPCLI tried this approach after a few such confrontations and found it successful.18 This description reveals the lengthy process of building working relationships, and the hours of discussion involved, often to achieve a simple task. Such diversity in the nature and role of military personnel in a peacekeeping situation, such as UNPROFOR, highlighted hitherto unknown, or unrecognised, problems for the peacekeeping soldier trying to implement UN mandates. Some of these problems even became debilitating for the force on the ground: for example, peacekeeping can involve making compromises with warring factions, and therefore the impartiality of the peacekeeper can be jeopardised. If consent is required in order for convoys to move and to undertake associated actions, some unsavoury deals may have to be struck on the ground. Furthermore, peacekeeping can tend to favour one side at the expense of the other, again threatening the military impartiality factor. It may be that supplies are delivered to a faction whose need is greatest and safe areas established first for certain displaced peoples, before others. On many occasions, the main aim in stopping peacekeepers at checkpoints appeared to be to delay and hamper the military from achieving its mission. Disruption was

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something that the other protagonists could achieve easily, especially so when the frustration felt by the UNPROFOR personnel was noted and observed. For example: We parked the jeep just short of the chicane barrier and jumped out. After about ten minutes a couple of scruffy looking Serb soldiers popped out of their trench and demanded to know who we were and what we wanted. I explained that we had to speak urgently with the Serb commander in Bratunac. One of them disappeared to make a call. We waited a further half an hour before a car arrived…he also wanted to know who we were and the nature of our business. Time was slipping by so rapidly… After more phone calls and more waiting… In all it had taken us the best part of three hours to meet the Serb Commander face to face.19 Frustration at not being able to achieve the objective in a speedy and efficient manner proved to be a primary concern for the military in such encounters, and emphasises the stress resulting from a sense of time urgency, particularly for the UNPROFOR soldier. Patience was required in such situations, but the provocative nature of such encounters could not be denied, or ignored, and could antagonise frustrated military personnel. COOPERATION OR COMPETITIVENESS? A soldier who is compelled to use military force to achieve an objective in a peacekeeping scenario can compromise his impartiality. Imposing economic sanctions or similar measures, or placing pressure on a party to capitulate over a matter, can appear highly partial to some of the affected parties. As UNPROFOR continued with its work, such a loss of credibility made its personnel vulnerable to hostage taking and reprisals. In an attempt to remedy some of these dilemmas, the UN devised and distributed techniques and hints on negotiation to soldiers on the ground, reflecting upon the experiences and techniques arising from the ambiguous nature of UNPROFOR itself.20 The UN stressed that the soldier’s first responsibility remained the execution of the mandate and, at every opportunity, to demonstrate an unwavering resolve in the face of belligerent forces.21 This might not be conducive to negotiation, however, and would go against other UN statements such as ‘Negotiations are an encounter with an opponent, not an enemy. You represent the UN, and consequently have no enemy in this conflict.’22 It was felt that issues such as freedom of movement, neutrality and security were negotiated at the highest levels of government and in diplomatic circles, but were only effective if resolutely demanded and executed at the lowest level. Such a situation often left junior commanders with difficult choices: The craft of negotiation and mediation from JNCO to Coy Commander was essential, knowing how far to go before you escalate, back down or look for a new approach.23 Such a pressure on a young officer could be fraught with both tactical and strategic ramifications if that person were to make a poor decision, through whatever reason.

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It is rare that a military operation embraces a para-civilian role of economic aid and assistance. However, it is even rarer for the military to be involved in an economic operational commitment organised and directed by a military staff. Humanitarian relief is not an uncommon need, and is something that soldiers understand as a recognised contribution in support of civil relief operations. Most of the tasks in the field of civilian affairs have an immediate UN operational influence, and therefore the execution of these tasks is more suited to a military man than a civilian, in a security and defence context.24 Yet such responsibilities have important implications for the working soldier, who is trained to open fire as a response to aggression and hostility. UNPROFOR was a time for learning new lessons rapidly, reviewing ‘open-fire’ policy, and implementing coercive resolution tactics on a daily basis. There persisted a high degree of uncertainty about how and when to use force, at both a low and high level. Some UN tasks were not covered by ROEs at all, for example Village Visitation Programmes. These tasks required the blending of doctrines for convoy escort, vital point protection, and inner and outer security cordons into a single Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which then would require integration into the grander scheme of things.25 Military micro negotiation fell into this category. The persisting desirability of the negotiation/resolution of incidents at the very lowest level remained valid for most of the deployment. As participants observed: Negotiation was the way we always intended to achieve our aims.26 I was responsible for negotiation with local police and authorities… decisions within the AOR [Area of Responsibility] were very much left to myself with minimal direction from above.27 Local officials tended to escalate their activities to the highest level possible, based on a premise that they need not deal with a platoon commander if a commanding officer was likely to show up. This tactic was evident in Croatia, in particular, and a great deal of persistence was shown by the soldiers to keep issues at the appropriate (low) level of command. One commander felt it necessary to act further: ‘which is why I established a comprehensive system of liaison officers who concentrated on improving relations in a particular area’.28 TRAINING ISSUES Working within such an environment, and using a skill that was unfamiliar at times, meant that there was a further perceived problem for the soldiers. Many soldiers felt inadequately trained in negotiating skills. While some had experience of working in Cyprus, many younger personnel did not, and most international units had no formal predeployment training package or doctrine. Many soldiers have stated that their experiences in Bosnia/Croatia indicated that individuals were either good negotiators or were not, and had little time to alter that fact for the better.29 They were conscious that poorly handled negotiations could have serious ramifications beyond the immediate issue, and when cultural factors and pervading hostility were added, then issues and tempers could

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increase rapidly in intensity. A great deal of damage could be done with very few words. Thus a perception grew that new skills were being required of the soldiers, in addition to traditional armed capability, and so-called ‘soft skills’ were assumed to be in their arsenal. Shortly after the deployment of UNPROFOR, UN staff attempted to review and illustrate the new skills that had been observed on the mission (see Figure 8.l).

Figure 8.1 Perceived new ‘soft skills’ required by peacekeepers30 The delineation of such skills helped to emphasise the additional capacities now required from the operational soldier. This effectively amounted to an acceptance of two levels of tactical techniques: the normal tasks as defined in the left box in Figure 8.1, and the specific peacekeeping skills as defined in the box on the right. It was not only the UN that recognised this diversity of roles: In Bosnia, it was recognised that local co-operation was essential to the success of the UN expedition. For the British, this was to be very much a young captain’s war… It was these young officers, bright and some with a gift for languages, who provided the liaison officers, to develop a ‘framework of trust and confidence’. It was vital to establish working relationships with the leading civil and military personalities.31 In-theatre soldiers began to voice demands for training, and requested that the whole area of negotiation be discussed and addressed in home-nation training packages.32 While the Commanding Officer’s (CO’s) concept of operations and directives on the application of the UN mandate encompassed higher-level parameters, the substance and conduct of micro negotiations depended entirely on the situation in theatre, and the locals being dealt with.

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Many post-exercise comments stressed the need for training to include negotiation instruction in all pre-deployment briefings for all units, whatever the nationality.33 Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) units were formally briefed in such procedures anyway, and it was felt that such information was a valuable source for wider application of negotiation techniques to a greater number of interested parties and practitioners. The PSYOPS emphasis on obtaining the latest intelligence on all participants, interests and issues before negotiating with them was felt to be a pertinent and sensible approach to the task on the ground. The following factors are an amalgam of key instructional points given to serving personnel during UNPROFOR, which relate to the planning and execution of micronegotiation situations.34 It is worth assessing these in the context of what is being postulated here concerning micro negotiation and the military, and to ascertain their relevance and pertinence both in the specific operational context and in the wider application of the skill in general. Some of the arguments made were as follows: The most significant preparation to make before any negotiation is to know about the positions held by UNPROFOR and one’s own unit. It is essential to develop effective arguments based on these already established positions and agreements. Issues such as freedom of movement, neutrality and security are negotiated at the highest level, but are effective only if demanded and executed at the lowest levels. Your first responsibility is to execute your mandate at every opportunity and to demonstrate unwavering resolve in the face of aggressors. [Issues of mission and context] Discover as much as possible about the other party before you meet. Local personalities, histories of disputes at established checkpoints, the current state of relations within an area will give you insight. [Issues of culture and context] Cultivate a detached attitude. Do not dwell on the thought that your outcome will result in the success or failure of a mission. If you worry about this too much then you will become nervous and/or frustrated. [Issues of personality and mission] Overeagerness can be misinterpreted as aggression or desperation. Be patient. [Issue of time] Persistence is important as it demonstrates resolve. [Issue of mission and potential force] Establish the most you hope to gain from negotiations and ask for it. [Issues of mission, competitive approach and potential force] These were sensible suggestions for military tactical-level negotiation procedures in a difficult environment, but were also new concepts and techniques for personnel to understand and use in the early days of UNPROFOR. As has been suggested, most of this advice related to the proposed important factors of mission, time, force, communication, cultural influences, and the personality of the negotiator. For example, it is only since

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1997 that a British Civil Affairs Group has been established to carry out the work as suggested in the first two summarised comments, and it briefs units on an ad hoc basis to this day. The Group realises that more needs to be done before deployment for the sake of effective civil-military liaison, but there are logistical restrictions to the ideal being achieved as yet.35 A leading strategic-level negotiator emphasised the difficulties inherent in the process of negotiation in the field: The negotiations were simultaneously cerebral and physical, abstract and personal, something like a combination of chess and mountain climbing…a dangerous and unpredictable process.36 Working commanders also emphasised the role to be played: in all conflict situations, the Force should try to achieve a return to peace through re-establishing dialogue between the parties. The members of the Force, each of them according to their various levels of function and position, should actively attempt to convince the parties to negotiate. Force members must position themselves to listen and understand, so as to be able to suggest mediation and compromise. Continuous dialogue with the parties in conflict is essential to the success of a peace-keeping mission.37 Gradually, descriptions and instructions, such as the one above, entered UN and national training material, and also operational directives. From these statements, one can detect the emphasis on key strategies for the military negotiator to employ in the operational area; for instance, there is repeated use of terminology such as ‘impartiality’, ‘control’, ‘use of force’ and ‘credibility’, and the comment below highlights the complexity of organisational command: As with all UN missions the conduct of negotiations with opposing forces, incl civs, is crucial to the success and implementation of new programmes and the resolution of long standing problems. Negotiations at even the lowest levels tend to be protracted affairs which reqr extreme patience and perseverance. Negotiations are also complicated by the fact that both sides have a complex chain of comd with an extensive bureaucracy. Comds at all levels can expect to conduct negotiations with representatives from all levels of gov incl: mil forces, civ pol, local municipal auths, and even influential civs.38 Lists of suggested responses were created and distributed among serving personnel, their basis being knowledge through personal experience, to a great extent: a. take steps to ensure the security of own forces; b. estimate danger; c. call for reinforcements or a translator if nec; and

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d. alert the Ops Centre of the sit. 9. Next, take the appropriate steps to defuse the sit: a. maintain a calm, professional approach; b. identify and isolate the leadr(s) of the group(s) if poss; c. separate belligerent if nec; d. calm the subj(s) down; and e. avoid becoming the centre of a mob… 11. Quickly introduce yourself to the ldr: a. avoid threats; and b. ensure that your body language is alert but relaxed, non-threatening (take special note of how your weapon is held). 12. Take time to explain the UN position and explain actions which must be taken to defuse the situation: a. listen politely to belligerent explanations; b. be firm, not hostile in your approach, but do not back down, unless you are clearly in the wrong; c. explain that you are following UN orders/policy; d. offer to advise your superiors of indiv concerns, but do not offer to call them; and e. explain redress systems (who to contact and how) if reqr. 13. Translators are often a scarce commodity. Do not let the language barrier impede the action/negotiation just because a translator is not available: a. learn stock phrases; b. carry cards for certain sits (read aloud if nec); and c. learn to say no, with a handshake and a smile.39 Any such practical advice was welcomed and used by the serving personnel in the field. However, its emphasis remained purely on the modification of behaviour while negotiating, and there was no specific analysis of the process itself, or the provision of a framework that might act as a reference point for practitioners. THE ISSUE OF CULTURE Soldiers who were more familiar with the country, the history, culture and conflict itself functioned in a more confident and effective way when required to negotiate.40 When a soldier shows a lack of appreciation, or knowledge, of the cultural setting within which he or she is operating, there can be resultant problems, as one serving officer recorded: some soldiers had been sharing accommodation with Muslim soldiers. The accommodation had been dug into a hill, and during the period in question there was approximately seven foot of snow on the ground. Due to the soldiers displaying a picture of a topless woman the Muslims

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decided to lock them out of their accommodation. [It was resolved]… due to the personality of one of the soldiers who had formed a relationship with one of the Muslim soldiers which helped to resolve the frosty [sic] situation.41 This was a needless predicament that had been created through ignorance of cultural standards. Resolution was achieved through the implementation of a previous relationship and trust-building stance taken by an UNPROFOR soldier, and again this emphasises the importance of the military understanding the cultural and personal context within which they are operating. However, it had been a lack of understanding that led to this incident in the first place. The problem, as stated in one authoritative view, might be a function of established military training, in a variety of nations: The Army’s current peacekeeping training philosophy can be summed up at both the soldier and unit level as: train for war all the time and do some mission-specific training, both individually and collectively, prior to deployment. The training of soldiers, NCOs and officers at the various battle schools, leadership schools, and career courses are focused almost completely on training for war with virtually no peacekeeping specific training included… UN related individual and collective peacekeeping training is only conducted when a soldier, military observer [UNMO], or unit is tasked for a UN operation.42 In Bosnia, it was readily apparent to those in the field that there was a necessity to brief personnel about the cultural setting within which they were operating, but this was not done in any formal sense in the early days under UNPROFOR. Soldiers tended to learn by experience in the field and by discussing the free flow of ideas and examples from the field, often suffering the tactical consequences if they got it wrong.43 As Lt Colonel Bob Stewart recorded, in various encounters: It may seem a little silly but in Bosnia I was quickly learning that ‘face’ was very much about being recognised with a visit… I had spent a lot of time with the Muslims…in order to get across lines. We sat down at a long table…there was a silence. I decided I had better say something… We didn’t talk much about the problems in Central Bosnia but rather about our different backgrounds—particularly military training… The whole incident turned a little nasty and at one stage it looked as though some British soldiers might be shot… I asked the Muslim soldiers taking cover around the bus to direct me… in rather a heated exchange I told what looked to be a Mujahaddin soldier that the bus and the mines were to be moved and we were to pass through. Surprisingly he obeyed me…44 These situations reveal the need to react appropriately on the ground, for people not to stereotype other parties, and to be conscious of the cultural setting within which the

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negotiation is taking place. Also revealed in these comments is the implicit presence of force, or violence, an option that either side might choose to employ, at any time. THREAT MOVES, FORCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BATNA The situations discussed above, and the comments made, indicate the violent context of many tactical-level negotiations, or, at least, the probable influence that force might have on the decisions made, and the behaviour witnessed. The physical threat to convoy operations in particular was significant at this time in Bosnia, and was expected to occur throughout the operational area. UN convoys were attacked routinely by aggressors, often because these aggressors were bored, drunk or drugged. Regional commanders of the aggressors tended to be local warlords, each with their own priorities and exclusive operational tactics, and, therefore, each incident had to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. In one instance, after a local agreement was made by the peacekeepers with a particular warring faction, the opening of another factional checkpoint was only accomplished after the arrival of the media on the scene. The belligerents did not want to appear uncooperative in front of the camera, and so they conceded the negotiation.45 By the end of 1993, advice and guidelines on negotiation procedure were being drawn up by home nations for distribution to serving personnel, with particular reference to negotiating access, freedom of movement and humanitarian assistance scenarios. The complexity of the process was stressed, as was extensive preparation, care in execution, and thorough ratification of any agreement made.46 Attempts were made to draw up rules of procedure, aimed mainly at pre-empting counterproductive responses from the other party, described variously as ‘loading the agenda’, ‘distortion of information’, ‘red herrings’, ‘delay’, ‘use of incidents’ and ‘non-flexibility’.47 A more formal view was stated as follows: This approach is a manifestation of UNPROFOR’s resolve to protect civilian populations, regardless of ethnic background. It is not, however, UNPROFOR’s intention to defend territory nor to enter the fray as a belligerent. UNPROFOR has been, is and must remain impartial. If UNPROFOR must have recourse to force, this will be in clearly defined circumstances, triggered by the actions of one or another party to the conflict.48 However, a highly charged incident in Konjevic Polje, 1993, was to test the resolve of such a position to its limit. The Serbs had closed in on the valley, and the trapped Muslims became desperate and panicky. When the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) ordered in a UN convoy to escort seriously injured Muslims out of the valley, the vehicles were immediately surrounded, and the military personnel held hostage by the two thousand terrified refugees. This situation lasted for two days, during which lengthy negotiations took place on the ground to try to resolve the situation.

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Matters came to a head when the Serbs started to shell the area, and casualties were sustained by all concerned. Milos Stankovic comments: They’d got out, just… I remember Cumming swearing blind that he would never allow any British troops to be abandoned in a situation where they couldn’t be reached, helped and supported. He swore blind and he meant it.49 Violence, threats and the omnipresent factor of force were proving to be fundamental in tactical-level negotiation encounters—factors that could affect decisions made by all parties concerned. UNPROFOR personnel were working in an environment that demanded humanitarian assistance, but it was also an environment replete with physical danger and violence. NEGOTIATE WHENEVER POSSIBLE Despite instances such as Konjevic Polije, there remained an insistence that UNPROFOR troops should seek to negotiate any resolution in a tactical situation, rather than using armed force. Serving soldiers rapidly assumed such a response wherever and whenever possible, but a lack of stability on the ground meant that negotiation contexts were diverse and dangerous. UNPROFOR troops were often in physical danger, but were still expected to resolve the dilemma through cooperation rather than aggression. In one such case: The site was at an old television transmission which had been bombed by the Americans during the proposed ‘lift and strike’ campaign. They [the UNPROFOR soldiers] initially shared the site with a number of Serb soldiers who were guarding the communication facilities there. One night one of the Serb soldiers walked into the restroom and announced that he was going to kill himself and everyone else with the grenade he was carrying. At the time a Royal Signals Lieutenant was also present, but it was one of the soldiers who managed to calm the Serb soldier down and convince him to replace the pin in the grenade. This soldier probably succeeded in this task due to his sense of humour and the way that he managed to make friends with the Serbs before the situation arose [against orders, which explicitly stated that there were to be no overtly friendly relations with any nationals].50 This particular situation reveals several interesting factors about military micro negotiation. First, there was no time for ‘scene setting’, or meta negotiation; the soldiers were pitched straight into a situation that needed an instant response. If the soldiers had reacted in a ‘traditional’ manner by picking up their rifles, presuming they were to hand, the time-delay factor alone might have resulted in all their deaths. Although the killing of the Serb might be seen as a typical response by a soldier to a threat from a man armed with a grenade, it was obviously not the appropriate action in this case. A soldier, using

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initiative, tried to reinforce the bond he had made with the man previously; by knowing a little about the Serb already, there was more information to work with and the hope for a calmer resolution. He defused the situation with humour, using a lighter touch to emphasise his own calmness concerning the predicament. At no time did he ‘mirror’ the aggression of the Serb; instead, the humour was an effective de-escalatory tactic. This prior knowledge of the Serb, contrary to SOPs, was a lifesaver in this situation, and emphasises the importance for the military micro negotiator of exploring the context and social norms of his operational area and its inhabitants. In this case, such knowledge also gave the soldier, rather than the officer, the confidence to handle the situation. The soldier had had no previous negotiation training or experience, so his response was reactive and personal. Bellamy highlights the skills of peacekeeping and the different demands it places on the modern soldier: What type of soldier will be needed to practise the new art of war and peace? He or she may be called on to act as an ambassador, the lone representative of his or her country, or the UN, at a disputed barricade…51 BELLIGERENCE: PLANNED AND UNPLANNED ENCOUNTERS In many cases, negotiations during the deployment of UNPROFOR began as a result of an incident or situation encountered on the ground, and the nature of the incident dictated whether or not it would be treated as a crisis or as a routine conflict, disagreement or ceasefire violation. Regardless of the nature of the incident, the problem could usually be resolved through face-to-face negotiations, however protracted. Low-level tactical micro negotiation tended to fall into two main types: ‘planned’ and ‘encounters’, each having different implications for the soldier serving under UNPROFOR. Planned negotiations were used in both crisis and routine situations, and were either self-initiated or requested by belligerents. Self-initiated meetings were used mainly to resolve or conduct initial introductions, the resolution of ceasefire violations, the introduction of civil affairs initiatives, and military application of the UN mandate. Meetings or negotiations called by belligerents could be for similar reasons as those above, but additionally were likely to include protests against the UN, requests for humanitarian assistance or help with local rebuilding projects. What was stressed to military personnel was the maxim that such problems should be resolved at the lowest possible level, thus reinforcing the demands made for successful micro negotiation at a junior level. As some post-operational reports from Canada argue: Negotiations normally begin as a result of an incident or sit. The nature of the incident will dictate whether or not it will be treated as a crisis or as a routine conflict, disagreement or cease-fire violation. Regardless of the nature of the incident, the problem will normally be resolved through face to face negotiations. For reasons of simplicity, two types of negotiations have been ident: planned and encounters.

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Planned negotiations are generally formal structured meetings between belligerent, UN and/or civic representatives and are usually conducted at the HQ or sub-unit level. They may be used in both crisis and routine sits depending on the complexity of the problem, the urgency of the sit, and the personalities involved. Encounter negotiations are spur-of-the-moment negotiations entered into by a mil member to resolve minor incidents or sits. The Golden Rule is to negotiate and resolve problems at the lowest possible level, before they can evolve into bigger issues.52 Responses to negotiations were thus being defined by the bearing the situation had on the overall mission. If it was a planned negotiation, then preparation, in terms of mission brief and SOPs, could be undertaken before the meeting, to see if there was scope for bargaining. Unplanned encounters were more difficult to assess on the ground, and were more likely to interfere with mission objectives and security. ZOPAs AND BATNAs: THE CONTEXT AND THE REALITY An unplanned encounter that turned into further planned negotiations, with the pressure of resolution at the lowest level, can be seen in the description of the incident that follows. This serves to exemplify many of the proposed aspects of military micro negotiation already discussed: The journey went without incident until we were stopped at an HVO [Croatian Defence Council] checkpoint… ‘Please get out of the car so we can search it.’ His action was familiar and predictable, so I shoved under his nose our newly acquired guarantee of respect for our status and safety, signed by his commander-in-chief, the general in charge of all HVO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina… When he had read the official document, he nonchalantly tossed it onto the floor of the car with a contemptuous snort and informed us that in these parts, he was in charge… ‘Search or stay where you are.’ We tried to show him the letter again—this time he disdained even reading it. We were left with no alternative but to turn back… The next morning…straight to HVO Military Police HQ to be given an explanation for the remarkable incident of the previous day. To make sure there were no misunderstandings, we took our interpreter with us… The duty officer…had never seen or heard of this document and could not care less. All he wanted to talk about was gun-running for the Armija BiH. Discussion was obviously fruitless and I changed tack and explained the purpose and practicalities of our mission and the importance of our neutrality. It seemed to do the trick—this was information he could handle and before long he had promised to call the checkpoint in question and give orders for our free passage.

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…what we had just witnessed was evidence of a total lack of military discipline…[people were] outlaw warriors—people fighting their own personal vendettas in blissful independence of the agreements reached by the superiors who were running the war. [The military personnel were then shelled the next day by the HVO.] We called the SMO over the radio and asked him seriously to consider another shut-down of our observation post because as far as relations between the Croats and the UNMOs were concerned, we had reached a state of constant confrontation. …Our Croatian liaison officer advised us…there were indeed HVO units that were less than delighted with our presence and which operated outside the military chain of command.53 This incident exemplifies the key elements of military negotiation analysed and defined here, such as: • sense of power in own area (or the effect of personality); • ignoring outside directives (maverick behaviour); • predictable disruption (time urgency); • military sense of predestined failure of negotiation, but persistence is attempted (the demands of the mission); • one group not knowing what the other is doing (lack of knowledge about bigger picture); • use of an interpreter (communication skills); • interpreter knowledge of contextual situation and feelings (cultural awareness); • military stressing impartiality (mission brief); • total confrontation resulting in UN job becoming untenable (the BATNA being force) • frustration (personality factors). Unfortunately, only some of these factors were delineated in the prevalent training and information packages available to the UN peacekeepers at the time, with the UN continuing to emphasise factors such as impartiality to its personnel, and with less stress on the influence and effect of cultural awareness, or the lack of it. Organisational complexity, and a lack of communication between levels of command, caused further frustration to the soldiers, but not to the HVO operatives. Further, and more useful, analysis of this incident might be achieved by modelling the structure of the incident using the adapted Fisher/Ury model as used previously (see Figure 8.2). At first sight, Figure 8.2 reveals the extremes of decision-making factors influencing the two individuals, given their situational context and presumed orders. As seems usual, the element of force as a compulsion is present within the situation, and the HVO’s BATNA is particularly antagonistic. The model indicates that there is little likelihood of reaching an amicable agreement in this situation. However, there were other influences affecting this negotiation, some of them working above the tactical level, and they were thus influencing the response being taken by the HVO and UNPROFOR personnel, with the result that, in this case, the soldier on the

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ground had very little chance to resolve these deeper issues in the short term. These factors can be modelled as in Figure 8.3. Figure 8.3 represents the influences working outside the tactical level; and yet they are factors that impinge on the operational and personal decision making of those involved in this negotiation. Again, many discrepancies between the two parties are evident: UNPROFOR had a fairly rigid structure in mission and

Figure 8.2 Initial stage of the HVO ‘negotiation’ communication terms, while the HVO was suspicious and seemingly resentful of the UN presence, and more concerned with sustaining its own standing. These attitudes would have an influence on any instructions or actions taken: the men on the ground are very reliant on the orders and approach being taken by their next level of command, and they would be unlikely to act in a manner which would dramatically deviate from the greater ethos, or orders, of their parent organisation. More subtle influences also exist alongside these operational factors: when examining the WATNAs of both parties it is possible to identify the impact that personal credibility will have for the tactical negotiators on the ground. The issue of ‘not losing face’ is emphasised in interpersonal interaction in negotiation literature, but in military operations it plays an important part in the maintenance of personal credibility and integrity within oneself, and, as such, as an overt message to one’s ‘troops’. Command depends on a high degree of authority and confidence in any given situation, and a tactical negotiation is no different from a firefight, in that sense. The idea of maintaining a psychological ‘advantage’ over the other party is very appealing in tense situations, such as those experienced in military tactical operations. Much of the manoeuvring in this encounter revolves around the importance both men place on not losing their professional standing.

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In an incident of a different kind concerning Canadian peacekeepers, the following occurred, and this again reveals the protracted nature of some encounters, and the need to preserve authority within a negotiation in such circumstances:

Figure 8.3 The multiple factors affecting the HVO negotiation A Company of 1PPCLI was involved in negotiating an incident which lasted 11 hours, ending at 0200hrs. The entire negotiation took place at a road intersection in the Zone of Separation [ZOS] with the hood of an Iltis

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being used as the negotiation table. Be prepared to negotiate by day or night, in all types of weather. Be able to sustain your negotiating team with hot beverages and food. This will sustain the alertness and endurance of the negotiating team and have a strong psychological effect on the person with whom you’re dealing.54 Not every negotiation in theatre was a roadblock-type scenario; as the account above reveals, situations were diverse and, therefore, testing to the personnel trying to achieve a resolution. Flexibility of approach was a paramount feature, in terms of time and manner, as was the maintenance of discipline and the mission brief. Pre-theatre training tended to concentrate on roadblock negotiation alone, and it was not until several deployments had passed that pre-theatre negotiation training encompassed other scenarios and factors as well.55 THE ISSUE OF PERSONALITY For the UN, negotiation on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) had the ultimate aim of reaching agreements to which all parties had consented freely, and which would help to contain or de-escalate the conflict, and this remains an accepted view to this day.56 As a PSO created objective and effective negotiation situations, controlled and fostered at every level, so, it was hoped, a climate of mutual respect and cooperation would develop from such an approach. Increasing importance was placed on the commander at the scene, with the need to evaluate, identify and address the sources of the incident to find the best level of response. As the realisation of the importance of negotiation techniques grew within the operational area, so did the acknowledgement of its place within peacekeeping skills per se. Figure 8.4 is a replication of a representation of the place of negotiation in PSOs, as drawn by Captain Faure, which attempts to delineate this function and relevance of such skills in the field.57 Faure’s figure stresses the context within which peacekeepers operate, on both the tactical and operational levels of a mission. It illustrates the dilemma facing the peacekeeping force when ‘sandwiched’ between warring parties, and the ‘pull and push’ effect of external agencies and influences upon those serving in the field. With strictures and demands such as those illustrated in Figure 8.4, it is not surprising that without a high degree of alertness to the mutability of the mission, any influential factors might affect the standing and action of a tactical group at any time within that mission. The peacekeepers are having to ‘look’ four ways when engaged in such a mission: to guidance from the mandate, the operational and the tactical judgement of the applicability of the use of force (which itself is a result of an assessment concerning negotiation as the first choice of dispute resolution), and to the nature and context of the warring parties involved.58 It may

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Figure 8.4 The dynamics within a peacekeeping operation (after Faure) be suggested that within Faure’s inner circle of peacekeepers there ought to be a further distinction between multinational personnel with differing ROEs and SOPs, thus causing another complication in the tactical decision-making process. Faure has stressed two of the proposed crucial elements in military negotiation, mission and force, to which the author has suggested adding other key elements such as time urgency, cultural awareness, personality effect and communication skills. UNPROFOR personnel were acutely aware of the limitations of their mission when faced with tactical-level negotiating situations, and force was an option often exercised by an aggressive party in such a confrontation. In this context, the personnel lacked time to prepare and then develop the negotiating process in a more positive way. The urgency to push on with the mission meant that, in some cases, time limits were set within which to achieve a satisfactory outcome,

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otherwise other options would be exercised. Many lessons were learnt from such shortcomings. CONCLUSION UNPROFOR, with all its inherent difficulties, was a useful learning experience for military personnel in the sense that the multiplicity of roles and tasks placed upon the modern peacekeeper were highlighted, together with a recognition that they should not be overlooked, or assumed, in any way. Many accounts, from a number of countries, stress the omnipresent negotiation encounter in the field, and its complexity.59 Many also surmised that of all the skills required in the preparation and conduct of productive peacekeeping operations, negotiation was one of the most important duties, but one of the least practised in the pre-deployment phase. It was deemed important because through compromise and the exchange of ideas within theatre, relationships could be formed to permit a tenable agreement to maintain the peace, or the truce. However, such an approach remains among the least practised skills because negotiation is still regarded by some as a skill not associated with, or included in, day-to-day military training. Fortunately, this is a view which is diminishing as peacekeeping operations repeatedly show the strength and validity of negotiating in theatre, and that it is a requirement at all stages of an operation, and at all operational levels, from the inception of a mission to its termination. It is easy in hindsight to denounce and deprecate the role of UNPROFOR, but to do so would be to overlook the view that it was on this mission that the UN was forced to face head on the realities of peacekeeping in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. While this meant that the role for the personnel on the ground could be confusing and limited at times, it also revealed the evolving nature of the peacekeeping soldier, and the personal demands such work was making on the individual. It has thus allowed, and is still allowing, the review and amendment of both deployment and pre-deployment preparedness in terms of negotiation and liaison skills, and the complicated mix of factors that delineate this form of negotiation. NOTES 1. Non-attributable statement from a British peacekeeper. 2. ‘Peacekeeping is not a neutral activity. It never has been neutral and it will never be neutral. Peacekeeping is an objective activity.’ Alex Morrison in Alex Morrison (ed.), The Changing Face of Peacekeeping (Montreal: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 6. 3. According to one UN tactical commander in Bosnia, Bosnia was an exercise in ‘how not to proceed’ (source cited below). The UN Security Council did not know how to deal with the ongoing war crimes issues, and refused to assume a consistent approach to the problem, even distorting historical precedent on occasions. It has to be questioned whether peacekeeping is feasible in the midst of a raging civil war. For further comments on this evaluation of the UN and Bosnia see Roy Gutman, ‘Bosnia: Negotiation and Retreat’, in Barbara Benton (ed.), Soldiers for Peace (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996), pp. 186–208. 4. ‘In addition to the military component, UNPROFOR also had a legion of civilians welded into the organisation: Civil affairs officers, financiers, accommodation officers, communication officers, mechanics etc. all of whom were professional “UNites” who

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seemed to drift around the globe from one mission to another.’ Milos Stankovic in Milos Stankovic, Trusted Mole: A Soldier’s Journey into Bosnia’s Heart of Darkness (London: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 65. Stankovic, a serving British officer, acted as the interpreter for General Sir Michael Rose. 5. Information in this section taken from an open source from Canada, the Army Lessons Learned CD-ROM, issued November 1997, version 5.0, various documents. 6. Ibid. 7. H.M.Rose, ‘A year in Bosnia: what was achieved’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 19 (1996), pp. 221–8, at p. 223. 8. The UN had voted to send some 12,500 peacekeepers into Croatia (the second largest force of its type ever deployed). Cyrus Vance had overcome the inherent resistance to the force by the Krajina Serbs, and won the support of Milosevic, but, despite this substantial achievement the UN force was sent into areas still effectively controlled by warring Serbs. What ensued was the persistent ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Croats by Krajina Serbs, under the eyes of a UN force with no mandate to respond. Information from Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 33. 9. Non-attributable comment from a British soldier. 10. Report: EX Venom Strike Dec. 1995 filename: CALL0011. Canadian open source. 11. UN statement 1992, cited in ibid. 12. US document cited in Army Lessons Learned Centre, Canada, CD-ROM, Nov. 1995. 13. A term devised by Templar. 14. Compare the proceedings under UNPROFOR with specific guidance given in Operation RESTORE HOPE (Rwanda) ‘In humanitarian operations…[all] must be intimately involved in what the other is doing, and must make an extra effort to ensure that the other is appraised of every activity, meeting, encounter, and operation conducted by the other’ (nonattributable, authorial summary). 15. Dr Kenneth Eyre, comment at symposium on ‘The Changing Face of Peacekeeping’, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993, not published. 16. 12eRBC Mid Tour Report, CANBAT 2, Roto 2, cited on website http://www.allc.com/website/english/products/dispatch/3–1/dis313ae.html. LO is an abbreviation for Liaison Officer. 17. United Nations Civilian Police Handbook (first draft 1995), published by the UN, NewYork: UN. 18. 1PPCLI Operation Report, as cited on CD-ROM Information Warehouse, Version 10.0, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, Canada, Sept. 1999. 19. Stankovic (2000), p. 160 (full details in the Bibliography). 20. Various reports and comments, non-attributable. 21. 77/4 B-77/4, Annex B, SOP 2/5/1, 05231996 (UN). 22. Ibid. 23. Non-attributable comment, Op Grapple soldier. 24. I understand (from a non-attributable source) that in the summer of 1998 discussion took place among NGOs as to whether an armed Red Cross would be more effective than the present organisation. Such an organisation would bridge the two areas of responsibility. However, it was felt to be inappropriate. 25. Yet some commentators felt, and continue to feel, that the traditionally trained soldier is well equipped to deal with peacekeeping work: ‘general purpose combat training produces an efficient, reliable and flexible peacekeeper’. John Bremner in Morrison (ed.), The Changing Face of Peacekeeping, p. 102. 26. Lt Col. Bob Stewart, Broken Lives (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 317. 27. Non-attributable comment, Op Grapple soldier. 28. Stewart, Broken Lives, p. 317. 29. Verbal comments to the author.

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30. My adaptation and enlargement of an original figure in Capt.J.-M.Faure, Commanding United Nations Peace-keeping operations: methods and techniques for peace-keeping on the ground, a course produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peace-keeping Operations, New York, UNITAR-POCI, 1996, p. 87. 31. C.Bellamy, Knights in White Armour (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 164. 32. Non-attributable comments and statements. 33. Conclusions drawn from non-attributable material. 34. These factors are summaries of a mixture of non-attributable military comments, verbal appraisals and directives contained within a variety of sources dating from 1992 to 1995. 35. Summarised conclusions drawn from discussions with the group. Non-attributable. 36. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. xv. 37. Statement from Faure, Commanding United Nations Peace-keeping operations, p. 71. 38. Document 05231996, OPS0047E, Army Lessons Learned Centre, CD-ROM, Nov. 1995. Open source. 39. Information distributed by Canadian peacekeepers in document 05231996, OPS0047E, Army Lessons Learned Centre, CD ROM, Nov. 1995. Open source. 40. Summary of non-attributable comments from ex-UNPROFOR personnel. An example of the diversity of culture within a relatively small area is also described by Milos Stankovic: ‘you hit an HVO checkpoint…usually no problem there… Then round a sharp left hander you arrive at Hell, Kobiljaca, the first Serb checkpoint, Sierra 1. The most obnoxious, obstreperous, and difficult people. They haul over convoys, rip through possessions, confiscate “illegal possessions”, just like that. They hold up convoys of food or wood for weeks… The mad women of Hadzici decide it’s Protest Day and they all sit in the road at S2 with their kids and babies and won’t budge until their demands are met. Nothing goes in or out of Sarajevo all day long. Convoys are stuck on both sides of these women. It’s the most effective way of blocking a road. Soldiers are no good for such a showdown because you can always shoot them or, as Brigadier Cordy-Simpson did once, when one of these oiks pointed his weapon at him, fly into a rage, grab ‘em by the scruff of the neck, and shake them to bits. But with women and kids you can’t do that, certainly no one from the UN is going to run them down, particularly as they’ll always have their own Press there to record the event.’ Stankovic, Trusted Mole, pp. 80–81. 41. Non-attributable account given to author. 42. Non-attributable comment, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, Toronto, Ontario, March 1994. 43. An example of a ‘typical’ encounter at a Serb checkpoint is given by Stankovic, Trusted Mole, p. 87: ‘She was quite the most fearsome woman I had ever seen. It wasn’t the onepiece blue camouflage “frontier guard” uniform, nor the shortbarrelled AK47 carbine slung over her shoulder. It wasn’t even the gruff manner of her questioning. It was the moustache…after another twenty minutes of discomfort the APC once again lurched to a halt… Again the door opened and this time an enormously bearded and long haired Serbian soldier demanded to see our IDs.’ 44. Excerpts from Stewart, Broken Lives. 45. Example cited in A.Morrison, D.A.Fraser and J.D.Kiras (eds), Peacekeeping with Muscle: the use of force in international conflict resolution (Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997). 46. Non-attributable account related to the author. 47. Various descriptions from accounts (non-attributable). 48. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993), S/1994/555, 9 May 1994. 49. Stankovic, Trusted Mole, p. 107. 50. Non-attributable account related by a British officer to the author.

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51. Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, p. 195. 52. Document 05231996, OPS0047E, Army Lessons Learned Centre, Canada, CD-ROM, Nov. 1995. Open source. 53. S.B.Husim, At War without Weapons (London: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1998), pp. 73–7. 54. 1 PPCLI, Op Harmony, Roto 4, POR report, cited on the website http://www.allc.com/website/english/products/dispatch/3–1/dis313ae.html 55. I refer to the excellent pre-theatre training which takes place at the FIBUA village on Salisbury Plain, UK. Currently many national armies send their troops to be trained in peacekeeping skills, which include negotiation prior to deployment. Themes include negotiating for accommodation and negotiating the removal of illegal checkpoints, for example. 56. Detailed reference is made in this section to Lt Col. P.Wilkinson and Lt Col. R.Rinaldo, Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations, a course produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peace-keeping Operations, New York, UNITAR-POCI, 1996. 57. Faure, Commanding United Nations Peace-keeping operations, p. 71. 58. In the case of Bosnia there were three warring parties, of course, which further complicated the interaction on the ground. 59. Where possible, examples of such comments have been cited in this section.

9 THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IN SIERRA LEONE, 2000 In order to assess the validity of the UNPROFOR case study, and to determine the consistency of factors inherent in military tactical negotiation, it will be useful to analyse another operation. More recent than UNPROFOR, the deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000 revealed a number of situations that demanded resolution through negotiation. However, this was negotiation more akin to civil police hostage negotiation, and, as such, might reveal imperatives in an extreme, volatile context. CONTEXT In August 2000, eleven British peacekeepers from the Royal Irish regiment were taken hostage in Sierra Leone by a rebel gang, ‘The West Side Boys’, a faction that had broken away from the main Sierra Leone Army.1 British forces had entered Sierra Leone earlier in May 2000 at the request of the home government, following a breakdown in law and order in the country, resulting in the loss of control of the diamond-producing areas. As Sierra Leone was a former British colony, the government wanted British forces to stabilise the situation around the capital, Freetown, and help to retrain the Army that had factionalised and was unable to resist the growing numbers of gangs and armed civilians. A UN peacekeeping force had been deployed to Sierra Leone before this request to Britain (and this force was headed by Nigeria), but questions were being asked about its effectiveness and its impartiality. Few Sierra Leoneans trusted the UN peacekeeping force, despite its deployed strength of 13,000 troops, which made it the biggest UN operation in the world in 2000.2 Nigerian officers were suspected of making money in deals that, UN insiders said, undermined the ability and will of the entire UN force to protect Sierra Leoneans from rebel atrocities.3 One observer commented, These UN troops are just here for their allowances, British soldiers could sort out this place in a very short time’.4 Once the situation had been stabilised, the Parachute Regiment was replaced by the Royal Marines, who were later followed by the Royal Irish Regiment. These British troops trained up to 2,000 new recruits at a training camp set up in Benguema. Liaison between the locals and the UN peacekeeping force was commonplace, and expected, as part of the mission brief.

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SITUATION On 25 August 2000, following a meeting with Jordanian UN peacekeepers, a group of eleven Royal Irish soldiers, travelling down the relatively safe Masiaka to Freetown road, made the decision to turn off and venture into the Occra hills, which was the stronghold of the ‘West Side Boys’. They were subsequently captured by the gang and held hostage. Over the previous four months, the West Side Boys had become more aggressive and antagonistic. However, they were nominally a part of the government coalition against the rebels in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and so had been tolerated by the UN, the Sierra Leone government and the British. Their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma, was in the Cabinet, and it was felt that he could keep the Boys under his control. However, the gang became troublesome and the government was forced to arrest their chief military commander, ‘Commander Bomb Blast’, or ‘Papa’, as a warning to the gang. It may have been this action that prompted the capture of the British soldiers. Negotiations for the release of the peacekeepers began immediately after their capture. Professional negotiators were sent out to meet and negotiate with the gang members, and several military negotiators were also involved in the meetings. As far as the British were concerned the urgent release of the soldiers seemed a priority. The need for speed in resolution was understandable; in political terms the taking hostage of professionally trained soldiers, acting as peacekeepers, and by an ‘unpredictable’ captor was regrettable, to say the least. In military terms, the incident indicated a tactical mishap, a presumed poor decision on the ground, and a probable embarrassment. It was a frustrating situation that compromised the mission, but necessitated resolution through negotiated means, rather than force, to ensure the physical safety of the captives, at least in the early stages. KNOWING THE OTHER PARTY No negotiator should ever underestimate the other party, and in this situation it was no different. The gang, undoubtedly very aware of the urgency on the side of the peacekeepers and their higher strategic levels of authority, played for time. Fairly straightforward demands were presented to the British within 48 hours of the capture of the soldiers. The gang requested food, medical supplies and media publicity for their cause. In military tactical-level negotiations, these are common demands, mainly because the other party knows that such propositions are possible to achieve at the tactical level, and it is likely that material benefits will be obtained with relative ease.5 Through intermediaries, ‘Brigadier’ Kally stated that he had taken the soldiers hostage because he wanted Britain to act as his protector against government reprisals for his regime of torture and mutilation. When they were given a satellite phone by the negotiators, ‘Commander Cambodia’, one of the militia leaders, called the BBC World Service to give them an interview, such was their hunger for publicity.6 The provision of their requested supplies resulted in the release of five British soldiers.

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Figure 9.1 Initial proposed structure of the Sierra Leone situation INTERESTS AND OPTIONS The subsequent behaviour of the West Side Boys was intriguing. Still holding six British soldiers, the gang made no more specific demands, and the negotiation began to slide into a stalemate. It appeared that the gang, having presumably achieved its initial demands, was hanging on to the rest of the peacekeepers as ‘collateral’ against some future ‘desiderata’. Time was thus irrelevant to them. The gang felt no urgency to resolve the situation and, by holding on to the captives, they could hope to achieve another favourable outcome at some future time. It is, moreover, not unfeasible to suggest that they were aware that such delaying tactics would be frustrating to the British, who were still hoping for a speedy resolution. The possession of the six soldiers also sustained the gang’s prominence in international media coverage. The subsequent requests made by the leader of the gang ‘Brigadier’ Kally, varied from the achievable (a generator and medical supplies), to the unobtainable—a role in Sierra Leone’s government. The underlying interests of the gang might be speculated upon, and this might suggest areas for integrative agreement. Using the ‘Fisher/Ury’ model of negotiation discussed earlier, an attempt will be made at modelling the context of this situation. This is proposed in Figure 9.1.

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Whilst these propositions remain somewhat speculative, it is not unreasonable to suggest that an exploration of the interests of the West Side Boys would have taken place, probably before the initial meeting. Such analysis helps a negotiator to prepare, as has been discussed earlier, and helps to avoid any unduly unexpected behaviour. As Figure 9.1 shows, a representation of probable interests reveals the propensity for movement towards a mutually acceptable agreement. Although the reserved price positional bids reveal different requirements, the underlying concerns that are important for the parties involved are fundamentally similar. Both were likely to be concerned with their status, their standing in the operational theatre and internationally, and both do not want to be embarrassed in some way. Similarly, it is likely that both sides would have realised that their BATNAs involved the use of force. An analysis such as that shown in Figure 9.1 also indicates the overwhelming threat of force in many aspects of the situation; the BATNA option underpinned many of the interests of the Gang, and thus might result in defensive posturing and threat moves at any stage of the proceedings.7 Scope for the continuation of the negotiation, and the preservation of life, lay in the West Side Boys’ interest in ‘face’ and recognition. Personal prestige is often a very important factor within volatile military gangs, as it maintains and sustains personal control.8 The constant concern for the British negotiators was the need to stop the gang from falling back upon their BATNA of force in order to save face, which was a very real possibility. THE ‘GANG CULTURE’ AND THE USE OF THREAT MOVES For the British negotiators an appreciation of the way in which the captors behaved in accordance to their cultural norms might have given insights into possible resolution tactics. Negotiators were required to address the gang leader as ‘Brigadier’ throughout the discussions and had to ask permission to speak during conversations, and keep their eyes downcast.9 While the negotiators talked, Kally and the other gang members drank beer and brandished weapons, and threatened both the negotiators and other civilians with physical harm. The gang formed part of an organisational ‘culture’ that does not place a high value on life, and which was used to warfare, anarchy and torture.10 One woman, who was abducted by the same group just before the peacekeepers were taken, stated that it was normal for the gang to torture and terrify.11 She told how she was held for ten days at Magbeni, where the British were captured, and at Gberi Bana, where Kally and his girlfriend held the female captives. She described the situation further: They were dragged into the village and beaten, forced to confess. It all happened again on the second day, and one of the women said that they had hidden a pot with magic powers and would take the boys to it to end their bad luck. These women were desperate, they would have said anything, then suddenly the boys started shooting, hundreds of bullets. Then they said that as they were witches they would have to cut their heads off, one called for a cutlass. They buried their heads and dumped their bodies in the river.12

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The importance of ‘witchcraft’ and superstition also remained highly significant in the culture of many of the ethnic groups in the geographical area. Human body parts are carried around to act as talismans, and the power of such beliefs should not be overlooked.13 Such beliefs can result in fear and trepidation among both the perpetrators and those they seek to terrorise. Such feelings can then foster irrational responses and poor decision making, as discussed earlier, and thus a dangerous negotiating context. During the summer of 2000 Freetown had been infiltrated by West Side Boys and, in particular, the militia used ‘Small Boy Units’ (SBUs) to carry out minor tasks and acts of torture. ‘They are better because they have no conscience’, said Maxim Sisay, Kally’s brother.14 Some reports also stressed the inclusion of women in their ranks, with the head torturer being Kally’s partner, who ‘drank gin and smoked marijuana constantly’.15 Such behaviour revealed cultural/societal norms that were profoundly different from those of the British negotiators, and even though the negotiators were likely to be extremely experienced in operational negotiation, these norms were a strong indication as to how the gang was likely to react if provoked.16 THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME It is also probable that the members of the group were synchronic in their perception of time, rather than sequential; this explains their lack of ‘urgency’ to resolve. Their synchronic worldview meant that events in the past, present and future were seen to be interrelated and, therefore, a push for an outcome was less compelling for them. For the sequentially time-based British military force the movement towards a resolution by forceful means is likely to have begun as soon as there were indications that negotiations were not proving successful.17 THE OPTION OF FORCE Events were monitored daily by the Ministry of Defence to help gather intelligence and to form a strategic response. The events might be organised as follows (and were even being described as a ‘countdown to a jungle raid’ in the media), and reveal the way in which the situation developed:18 Friday August 25 11 members of the Royal Irish and a Sierra Leonean liaison officer taken hostage in Occra Hills. (The mission is compromised) Sunday August 27 British forces team together with MoD and Scotland Yard negotiators fly to Freetown in a two part strategy aiming first to negotiate and, if that fails, to mount a rescue mission. (Choice of ‘outcome’ being decided) West Side Boys make first demands for food, medicine and the release of ‘General’ Papa, or ‘Bomb Blast’.

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(Opening bids in the negotiation, and the interests of both parties are being explored at this stage) Wednesday August 30 5 junior British soldiers released in return for a satellite phone, food and medicine. Brigadier Kally uses the phone to demand that the elected government step down to be replaced by his political allies. British forces return to GB to train a Parachute Battalion for ‘the military option’. (Early negotiated success but Kally’s action reveals escalation and the probable lack of another timely breakthrough in the immediate future. This is likely to run counter to the British key interest of resolving the situation in a timely and safe manner.) Sunday September 3 British say that negotiations ‘are on the up’ and that they are confident of releasing the hostages. (Negotiation is continuing at the pace set by the gang. Back in the UK the BATNA is being planned, which reveals that although the expectation remains that the situation will be resolved through negotiation, the use of force is not discounted.) Tuesday September 5 British continue with the negotiations, handing over a generator and box of cigarettes amid optimism that the remaining hostages are about to be released. (Negotiators continue to act positively, maintaining communication with the West Side Boys. This continues to buy time for the implementation and consideration of resolution through either negotiation or force.) Wednesday September 6 West Side Boys do not show up for talks. At the political level in Britain, it is decided that enough is enough and orders are given to deploy the rescue force. (Time has run out in the eyes of the British, they have waited too long for a resolution, and the absence of the gang might indicate a change in their tactics also.) Saturday September 9 Kally appears in belligerent mood, threatening to kill the hostages and demanding that his political allies form the government. (Threat of force: the BATNA) Sunday September 10 British forces rescue hostages. 25 West Side Boys killed and 18 taken prisoner, including Kally. One British soldier was killed, one seriously wounded and 11 suffered minor wounds. All the hostages were extracted safely. (Resolution through force, the BATNA was considered the more viable option in the successful resolution of the incident.)

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DECISION-MAKING FACTORS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BATNA The sequence of events in the encounter reveals the way in which the military was likely to structure their response to the incident, concentrating on crucial decision-making factors such as mission, time and force, and the underlying interest of resolution by appropriate means. The mission was compromised as soon as the hostages were taken, but the force option was not used immediately, even though it is likely to have been considered. The reason for the use of negotiation lies in the established standard operating procedures that were set when the British deployed: the right to defend oneself if threatened was maintained, but so was the push for liaison and cooperation with Sierra Leonean nationals. By choosing to negotiate first, and by achieving partial success through this tactic, the option of force was sustained, especially since the negotiation could provide useful intelligence for any future action. The time factor was paramount. Political, strategic and operational imperatives demanded a speedy resolution to an incident that was embarrassing and dangerous for the British. The longer the hostages were held captive, the less credible the British military would seem in an international setting, since a ‘first-rate’ fighting force was being held to ransom by a gang of rebel militia. When negotiations became protracted, with mounting intransigence, the British strategists abandoned the option of negotiation in preference for action (their BATNA). In their eyes, time was up; matters were not proceeding in an agreeable manner since the hostages were being physically threatened, so the factor of force had to be exercised. Force could cut through the intransigence and, if successful, could turn a potential embarrassment into an acclaimed victory. For the West Side Boys, the opposite applied. In what was, essentially, a high-profile hostage negotiation, it was likely that the military would prepare for the use of the option of force, should negotiations fail, or the hostages be threatened physically. This equates to the response in the Iranian Embassy siege, for example. Using the framework for negotiation once more, it is possible to model the probable decision-making factors that influenced the tactics on both sides in the Sierra Leone situation (see Figure 9.2). By using this model of negotiation to suggest the main factors in this particular incident, it is possible to postulate underlying decision-making factors for both parties. The suggested interests reveal that there was scope for negotiation, and the early successes sustain that argument. However, they also reveal conflict: the status of both parties was being threatened, and the reputation of both parties was under scrutiny. It was likely, therefore, that one party would have to ‘succumb’ in order for the situation to be resolved, and that ‘defeat’ would be likely to occur when the BATNA was employed, rather than through negotiation. For as long as the negotiation remained positive and achieved results, it remained the attractive choice for the British, but their BATNA was similarly attractive and more likely to be implemented as soon as negotiated outcomes were not being achieved. Although the West Side Boys had the use of force as their BATNA also, it was less attractive to them, as their WATNA reveals.

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Figure 9.2 Suggested model of the initial decision-making factors in Sierra Leone SUMMARY: IMPORTANCE OF THE BATNA In a military tactical-level negotiation the threat, or reality, of armed force is never far away, as the behaviour in this situation revealed. Therefore the situation in Sierra Leone vividly illustrates the importance of the BATNA in military tactical negotiations, as it is a constant threat and a ploy which either side could choose to employ at any stage, particularly if they feel that negotiations are proceeding badly. As John Keegan stated on the resolution of the Sierra Leone hostage taking, they [the West Side Boys] are amateurs in the use of force. Their British opponents are supreme professionals…are the world’s leading experts in rescuing hostages unharmed from their captors…and an armed child soldier, armed with an assault rifle, can today put out a volume of fire equivalent to that of a platoon of adults in the Second World War.19

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What the Sierra Leone negotiation reveals, and emphasises, is the pervading threat of force, aggression and armed response in many modern military operations, and it is an option for either negotiator. If negotiation is undertaken in such circumstances, it is necessarily a process framed by a mutual awareness of the presence of this type of coercion and tension. For the parties involved the negotiation becomes a stressful, and, on occasions, physically threatening, encounter, with every decision creating the potential for destructive reaction. NOTES 1. At the time of writing, accounts of this incident are in the public domain through national newspapers, television and the Internet. Very little other material in the public domain is available to date. The author has spoken to some of the participants, but details cannot be reproduced here for security reasons specified at the outset of this thesis. All information used in this section is in the public domain. 2. Source: Philip Sherwell and Anton La Guardia, ‘UN pressed to increase its force to 20,500’, Daily Telegraph, 12 Sept. 2000, p. 13. 3. Sam Kiley, ‘Weary nation turns to the British Army’, The Times, 11 Sept. 2000, p. 4. 4. Statement by Issa Bangura in ibid. 5. The demands made to UNPROFOR troops, for example, were very similar. 6. Source: Kim Sengupta, ‘Leader of West Side Boys ordered seizure in fit of drunken pique’, The Independent, 11 Sept. 2000, p. 3. 7. Volatility in such a situation is not unusual; witness the account of Wayne Ulrich, an MSF worker: ‘As we turned to leave we were asked to leave our vehicles and go to a house where they wanted to interrogate us. Our cars and equipment were looted and we were placed under arrest by these boys and told that we would be made an example of. We were divided into groups (local staff from expats, drivers from logisticians etc), and threatened many times with pistols. Some of the boy generals tried to persuade their buddies not to harm us as it would bring repercussions against them. For some 5 hours we negotiated our release and were also questioned and abused. Once we were told to go outside where they shot above our heads and told us to go back inside. They were certainly trying to frighten us…’. Unpublished account. 8. As shown in the case study of the NGO worker and the boy general in Liberia, described in Chapter 7. 9. Information obtained from Sam Kiley, ‘Drugged gangsters put captives through hell’, The Times, 11 Sept. 2000, p. 4. 10. In the six months before this kidnapping other peacekeepers had been taken by other groups in Sierra Leone. Major Andrew Harrison was held for many months and stated that he was tortured during that time. He made his own escape eventually. In Sierra Leone in 2000 the mutilation of rival peoples was commonplace: limbs were routinely hacked off adults and children to serve as warnings to the rest of the community. Source: informal staff briefings at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, non-attributable. 11. ‘Drugged gangsters put captives through hell’, p. 4. 12. Ibid. 13. BBC TV Panorama programme ‘Pulp Future’ first transmitted 20 March 1995. In the programme gang members were depicted carrying human fingers as talismans to ward off their own death. Human heads, and other body parts, were displayed in public to frighten and terrorise villagers. 14. ‘Drugged gangsters put captives through hell’, p. 4. 15. Ibid.

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16. As John Keegan wrote ‘Gang’s bold front collapses in face of real soldiers’, Daily Telegraph, 11 Sept. 2000, p. 5: ‘The West Side Boys, like many of the other armed gangs that terrorise Africa’s innocent inhabitants, look like soldiers. They wear European style camouflage uniforms and carry western assault rifles… They steal boys to serve as child soldiers, girls to become unpaid prostitutes. They frighten voters away from the polls, commonly by gross acts of mutilation or murder if necessary. If threatened, they discharge large quantities of ammunition. Their ability to mount either an effective infantry assault or a well organised defence of a position is zero.’ 17. The hostages were stripped of their uniforms and put through mock executions. They received little food and water. Towards the end of the situation there was a fear that unless something was done, the hostages would die. Alan Jones, the High Commissioner in Freetown, said ‘We decided the hostages were at an extreme risk and the kidnappers made threats which made us believe that they would be harmed.’ Source: Sengupta, ‘Leader of West Side Boys ordered seizure in fit of drunken pique’, p. 3. 18. Source: article in Daily Telegraph, 11 Sept. 2000, by Michael Smith, Philip Sherwell and David Blair, p. 4. 19. ‘Gang’s bold front collapses in face of real soldiers’, Daily Telegraph, 11 Sept. 2000, p. 5.

10 CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A PROPOSED NEW MODEL OF MILITARY NEGOTIATION The case studies of UNPROFOR and Sierra Leone appear to reinforce the hypothesis that key facets exist in tactical-level military negotiation, as suggested here. Further detailed examination of other cases in the future appear likely to reveal similar traits concerning this form of negotiation.1 The UNPROFOR operation occurred at a time when the recognition of negotiation as an essential part of daily military duties was limited. What the case study has revealed is the rather piecemeal approach by the UN to this type of work, with an assumption, early in the deployment, that effective negotiation was an implicit skill, rather than an explicit tactic to master and learn. However, through a variety of means, including the requests of the peacekeepers involved, this rather general assumption concerning the skill of negotiation was later abandoned in favour of greater pre-deployment training and specific procedural guidance. What the UNPROFOR case study has shown more specifically is the complex contextual nature of tactical-level military negotiation. As many of the examples cited revealed, tactical negotiation is carried out in an environment that remains essentially hostile and antagonistic. To be ‘out on the ground’, facing protagonists in conflict, results in a negotiating context replete with emotion, anger, frustration and the all-pervading threat of the use of force at any time. Parties tend to become positional in their demands, since key personal drives revolve around individual survival in a time of great danger, and there can be little incentive to become more cooperative in the negotiation process. Where negotiation proved successful it was due, for the most part, to the creativity of a peacekeeper and a concentration on underlying interests, which still prove to be viable and valuable indicators in a negotiation, however dangerous its setting. It also involved the avoidance of either party choosing to use their BATNA, since BATNAs in volatile contexts tend to involve armed aggression in the majority of cases. The UNPROFOR deployment also highlighted the multiplicity of demands being placed upon a soldier acting in the modern ‘peacekeeping’ world. It emphasised new approaches, and new tactics, as essential options in the peacekeeper’s ‘toolkit’. Foremost among these tactics was the skill of negotiation, with its inherent emphasis on clear communication, astuteness in procedural response, and an awareness of the danger present in the negotiating context. UNPROFOR helped to shape later peacekeeping training and operation in the field, since many vital lessons can be drawn from mistakes made, as well as from success. It also helped to define the new role of the modern soldier, in a world moving away from inter-state conflict to intra-state warfare. The tactical-level negotiations that took place nearly ten years later in Sierra Leone reveal a more organised and thorough approach to this type of conflict resolution. There

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appears to have been a more structured approach to the negotiations that took place, with great emphasis on, and awareness of, the effects of interests, culture, verbal communication and body language, the imperative of time, and the BATNA. These negotiations were occurring in a highly charged setting, with the BATNA likely to be an attractive option for both parties, when force might prove more successful than talk. This particular case study reveals that when negotiation has to take place with an anarchic second party, unpredictability and the potential for violence are ever-present factors. Procedural steps must still be followed, as delineated by the adapted Fisher/Ury negotiation model used throughout this analysis, but this case study suggests and emphasises the dominating effect of the BATNA in military tactical-level negotiation. More often than not, the BATNA in such a context will involve the use of force. When the alternative to negotiating is violence, this is likely to heighten the concentration on trying to ensure that the negotiation remains the more favourable option to the other party, as recourse to any BATNA could prove disastrous. The analysis of these case studies, just two among many recent operations involving negotiation, has revealed the essential nature of tactical-level negotiation for the modern soldier. The UNPROFOR deployment brought the importance of the skill into sharp focus for the UN and the military, while the Sierra Leone situation revealed and emphasised the danger and volatility involved in trying to negotiate in a conflict scenario. Both reveal the imperatives of mission, time and the use of force for the military, which, on some occasions, prove problematic in decision making in a negotiation context, rather than a conventional warfare setting. That negotiation is now recognised as an important skill for the modern soldier is not disputed, nor is its use in current operations. However, what remains ambiguous is the precise modelling of this skill in a format that will allow future practitioners to learn, and it makes obvious the vital part that negotiation can play at the tactical level of an operation, as well as at higher levels of command. It was with this dilemma in mind that the development of a model such as DIAMOND, which, in its final iteration, should result in an interactive learning experience linked to a stochastic framework, was encouraged. A complex training model, together with the use of the amended Fisher/Ury framework of negotiation, might result in a viable training aid for military personnel about to encounter such work on operations. An emphasis on understanding context, culture, decision-making factors, interests, and the all-pervading danger of the BATNA are important objectives to be achieved for any negotiation training to be viable and pertinent to the tactical-level military negotiator, as these elements have proved to be influential in a greater sense than is emphasised in any other extant negotiation theory or modelling to date. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH As important as negotiation is, surprisingly little research-based empirical information is available to guide practitioners, in whatever context or situation. Undoubtedly, practitioners thirst for useful knowledge and examples in order to glean explicit advice, since their decisions and actions often result in enduring consequences, perhaps affecting when a war ceases, hostages are freed, strikes cease, or refugees are clothed and fed.

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When and where empirical research has been undertaken, it reveals the enduring requirement to link any empirical data with a theoretical framework with which to conceptualise negotiation, and, without that vital link, empirical research can be barren. Without a relevant theory, a researcher remains guessing at what is important, and any study becomes merely an attempt to validate hunches. However, before condemning such work, we should ask whether such an outcome is inevitable, given the complexity of the generic negotiation process. As the review of extant theoretical literature suggested, whilst there are many theories, it may be contested that only a limited number are rich in exploratory value concerning multi-variable forms of negotiation, and empirically testable in this sense. As suggested, the reason for this might lie in the complexity of human behaviour and the difficulty in producing meaningful, integral theories and models to explain the same. Stephen Weiss concluded, ‘[N]one of this research proffers a concept linking the various aspects of communication to the negotiation process.’2 Future research might explore the effect of behavioural factors such as personality, culture or communication upon decision making in more detail, but is likely to be grounded in a specific negotiation context, in most cases. Empirical study in negotiation has to be set within parameters in order to be manageable, but this results in study that can be limited in scope and application. It may be that explicit empirical research will prove the most useful approach in the future analysis of negotiation, and, if enough discrete contextual areas are explored, comparison might reveal further complementary factors across the discipline. As a result, it may become possible to construct a more ‘practitioner’ -based model of the process, which might relate to the multifarious contexts within which any negotiator operates. Concerning military negotiation, further attention could be paid to the delineation of the process as witnessed first-hand in the operational area. This would require appropriate researchers, who could gain access to such volatile situations and contexts; there remains scope for detailed investigation into relevant encounters to reinforce the validity of the suggested imperatives of military tactical-level negotiation as discussed in this book, with reference to future operations. Such future operations may see the development of training in military negotiation skills and, therefore, an assessment of the applicability of developmental training with regard to practice in the real world will need to occur, if such training is to remain pertinent and responsive to operational developments. This book has aimed to explore the nature of tactical-level military negotiation, and there appear to be a mixture of pre-existing factors, notable for unusual emphasis and effect, that delineate the negotiation process in a military operational area. Existing literature concerning tactical-level military negotiation is sparse, and any theoretical interpretation of military negotiation was difficult to find as few academics have approached this precise subject area to date. Therefore analysis of hostage negotiation was undertaken, since it contains many similar elements. However, hostage negotiators are trained, full-time professional negotiators, and the serving soldier is a fulltime soldier, not a negotiator, and this begs the question as to other elements that might affect such a form of negotiation in the military environment. Reference was then made to extant general theories of negotiation to ascertain perceptions of the process in noncontext-specific circumstances, and from this review particular common aspects of

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negotiation could be postulated, such as the significant influence of strategic interaction with an emphasis on cooperation and competition, threats, BATNAs and ZOPAs, and the importance of interest-based negotiation. Review of existing theoretical material also highlighted the influence of situational influences such as context and culture, and interpersonal interaction effects, in particular the impact of communication and personality on the process. Attention was then given to how people make decisions, since response is a key facet of negotiation, and the imperatives that might motivate an individual to react in a certain way in particular circumstances. Analysis of many important nuances and components of the process of negotiation allowed for the subsequent appraisal of factors that play an important part in military negotiation. The problems that soldiers face were investigated, and it was concluded that situational circumstances, the mission, time, the issue of force, negotiating under duress, temperament and pre-deployment training all play a vital part in framing the operational negotiating context and process. More detailed analysis, as afforded by the case studies of Liberia, UNPROFOR and Sierra Leone, reinforced the importance of such factors for the military, and stressed the implications of force, and the concept of the BATNA, in particular. Negotiation is conducted by military personnel on an everyday basis in modern operations, and its importance cannot be denied or overestimated. The positive way in which this work is undertaken, sometimes in extremis, is worthy of admiration in itself. In order for both the present and future generations of serving personnel to benefit from past experience, and to garner contextually specific guidance on negotiation in this complex operating environment, the time is right for a detailed analysis of the process, and recommendations for functional and theoretical frameworks. This study aimed to address such a requirement, and, as the first step on what might be a long road, presents a close inspection of the complex skill of tactical-level negotiation, and the circumstances that modern serving personnel encounter. As such, it sheds light on what has been viewed as a vital skill, but rarely investigated in any detailed manner, and has sought to propose specific factors that alter the nature of the negotiation process in the operational field. Knowledge of these factors, together with continued analysis and investigation, might help to improve both the training delivery and the implementation of this skill in the military environment for those involved. If, in some small way, this work can be part of helping to preserve life and to progress the review of an important military conflict resolution tactic, then so much the better. I am often leaving for the field with very little warning. Sometimes I am informed about a mission in the morning and leaving that same night… Sometimes our work would become complicated as often we would only be working on one side of a conflict…our team…had the experience and expertise to negotiate an intervention. People often ask me why do I take the risk? My reply is that every day we wait to help the needy is a day that is lost.3

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NOTES 1. The author is beginning a detailed analysis of negotiation work in Iraq 2003 at the time of the publication of this book. 2. Stephen Edward Weiss, ‘The Language of Successful Negotiators: A study of communicative competence in intergroup negotiation simulations’ (University of Pennsylvania: PhD dissertation, 1984), p. 26 (not published). 3. Non-attributable comment.

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APPENDIX 1 Important negotiating attributes

Pertinence to soldiers’ skills, preparation and circumstances YES

Planning and preparation Knowledge of subject under negotiation Ability to think clearly under pressure Ability to communicate clearly Prolonged listening skills Integrity Persuasion Ability to win the confidence of others Problem-solving skills Self-control Persistence Insight Ability to exploit available power Leadership and control Previous negotiating experience Tolerance of other viewpoints Competitiveness Debating ability Willingness to be disliked Tolerance of ambiguity Appropriate body language Trust Willingness to take personal career

NO

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risk Use of force Work with an interpreter Appreciation of time Note: Adapted from a figure in Major Todd Harmanson, Negotiating at the lower tactical level in peace operations, MA thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KA, 1996.

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APPENDIX 2 Suggested Structure for Military Micronegotiating Training (All Ranks)

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APPENDIX 3 A model for military negotiation?: ‘DIAMOND’ INTRODUCTION Given that recent deployments such as UNPROFOR and Sierra Leone have highlighted the importance of tactical-level negotiation and the defining amalgam issues of mission, force and time, and so on, a useful question to pose at the concluding stage of this analysis is whether this form of negotiation could be modelled with a long-term aim in mind, that is, to instruct and inform those personnel who will find themselves carrying out such work on future operations, and who will need to make decisions with these factors as implicit and explicit influences. Previously described negotiation models are lacking in such ‘real-world’ factors and, therefore, it is proposed that there is now a need for a discrete tactical-level model of military negotiation. The themes of substitutability, cathexsis and inducibility, and the greater or lesser effect of these on the players in a process seem to have a concomitant effect on the effective range within which any successful negotiation takes place, together with the appreciation of the tone of any negotiation (that is, confrontational or cooperative, or a simultaneous interplay of both). The essential influences of mission, time and force, personality, communication ability and cultural imperatives need to be modelled, if at all possible. It is suggested that this negotiation form might be displayed as shown in Figure A.1. Designed into this initial proposal is a representation of what one feels is going on in the tactical military negotiating process per se; for example, if person A has optimal outcomes to achieve and they are low in controversial terms, then there is a high chance of successful agreement. But if A’s optimal outcome is extremely controversial as far as B is concerned, or if it takes too long to resolve, then there is likely to be a block to successful agreement.2 As seen in the UNPROFOR case studies, it is important to understand and to try to amalgamate the nebulous factors such as personal disposition, situational influences, or, for the military negotiator, the influence of ROEs and mandates into such a model. Therefore, there is a ‘zone of agreement’, rather than a fixed plot of agreement points, which is delineated by an ‘axis of consent’ between the parties.3 This would

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Figure A.1 Initial model depicting a proposed range of a negotiator’s scope for successful outcomes in either a cooperative or controversial model allow for influential factors and variety in the range of agreement points, and defines probable movement in the micro-negotiation process for each participant while suggesting the points at which the other negotiator is likely to agree or disagree, respectively. It also expresses the inclination that agreement is not dependent on the number of demands made, be they reasonable or unreasonable, but what is important is the reaction to the controversy of each demand, and its sliding scale of likely consent. A negotiator might make one seemingly reasonable demand, which may be perceived as such by the other party, or, equally, deemed controversial. For example, ‘I want the chocolate bar’ could be an acceptable demand to make of someone who is on a diet and trying to avoid eating such things, but if made to a starving person it is likely to elicit the opposite reaction. The ‘decision context’ is thus different in each case, although the demand remains the same, and it can be contested that the ‘zone of agreement’ is affected by this ‘decision context’ and the ‘controversial context’, and both of these factors need emphasis and modelling. Since this depiction remains a general illustration, there is no inclusion of specific mathematically formalised modelling of all factors; rather it is representational of the presumed dominance of the controversial/cooperative nature of demands in the bilateral procedural decision to move towards successful agreement. As Morton Deutsch states,

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Many conflicts have an unplanned, expressive character… Other conflicts are guided by an instrumental orientation in which courses of action are consciously evaluated and chosen in terms of how likely they are to lead to satisfying outcomes.4 What this initial suggested model also begins to illustrate is the presumed effectiveness of cooperation, or the more positive approaches in micro negotiation. Conflict is often characterised by tension and hostility, and reactive, rather than proactive, response. As de Bono suggests, ‘there cannot be the give and take needed to design an outcome because the basic principle is that nothing must be given unless its surrender is forced’.5 Where the matter is open to debate is to what extent conflict/controversy is a stimulus towards creative problem solving, and therefore it can be contended that it should not be overlooked. The shifting scale on the initial model above attempts to exemplify the negativity in controversial outcome seeking per se, but allows for a recognition of the flexibility of response and attitudinal discretion in both participants which might, in part, be stimulated by active controversy or a more conscious desire to prevail. It also allows for the concept of simultaneous cooperative/ competitive interaction. It might, however, be more useful at this juncture to refine the initial model in the hope of pinpointing the negotiation process area and the likely zones of agreement. In order to reassess the possible scope for such movement in the bargaining scenario, certain factors will have to be introduced into a mathematical modelling of any representation of tactical military negotiation. Since one is trying to represent a process that is nebulous in form, and not scientific and measurable, the mathematics applied will be ad hoc at this stage, but it is hoped will begin to reflect the dynamics at play. By assuming and then refining the power of ‘controversy of demand’ in this ‘equation’, more definition might be achieved in any more detailed model. Assuming that the status of the controversial/cooperative nature of a demand is essential in the acceptance or rebuttal of that demand, then it is important that the proportional emphasis between demands and the controversy factor be weighted towards controversy, in any mathematical sense. Therefore the main hypothesis is that the presence of demands (DEMAND), and the nature of those demands (CONTROVERSY), plus circumstantial factors (FACTOR) will influence the course and outcome of the negotiation process (RESULT).6 It is postulated, therefore, that the subjective nature of CONTROVERSY will have a disproportionate influence on RESULT, compared with DEMAND. This will also be the case for FACTOR, although it has been decided that for ease in the current model FACTOR is viewed as having a lesser effect than DEMAND, at present. It may be possible to express this process as a formulaic expression, although this will require an attempt at assigning a value to the various categories of CONTROVERSY and FACTOR. In the first instance, a formula was designed to try to show how DEMAND, CONTROVERSY and FACTOR combine and influence one another to produce a consequential RESULT. Let the following apply (with POWER representing the resultant calculated outcome): RESULT=POWER ((CONTROVERSY*FACTOR), DEMAND)*−1 (The final −1 prevents two negative factors from cancelling each other out.)

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Where CONTROVERSY/FACTOR is a positive value (that is, a beneficial/ helpful proposal), the formula is as follows (though it must be recognised that there will still be the element of subjective influence in operation which is nigh on impossible to define and calculate in formulaic terms, as game theory has revealed): RESULT=POWER(COOPERATION+DEMAND)FACTOR (For initial trial purposes it was assumed that the subjective FACTOR had a value of 1.25(−).7) Each of these values was then assigned a nominal numerical amount. These values were set at a base level to test the formula, before seeing if it could be applied to realworld statistics at a later date. As these formulae and calculations show (Figure A.2), the plotting results in a lazy ‘s’ shape, as was first intimated in the initial illustration in this section. Figure A.2 indicates that there is a distinct zone within a negotiation where there is a greater likelihood of success (the ZOPA), indicated by the dotted elipse. At either ‘end’ of this zone, then, the process is either so cooperative that it becomes an instant agreement, or so controversial that it is a destructive argument, or a threat move rather than a negotiation (the BATNA). Again, such a finding ties in with the ‘gut reaction’ as to what is happening in the process, and the descriptions of success and failure taken from the UNPROFOR case study in Chapter 8, for example. The formula still works effectively if the previous consideration of the weaker emphasis on the number of demands is reviewed. One demand could be made but be very controversial, and thus result in an instant failure to agree. Ten demands could be made, for example, nine being quite cooperative but the tenth highly controversial; and at that point there is an increased likelihood of the whole process breaking down. What this means in practical terms for the military micro negotiator is that there is a need to assess demands being made within the contextual atmosphere and circumstantial environment of the other bargainer, and to keep reassessing to avoid moving out of the predictable zone of agreement. In order to validate many of the claims within this proposed model, it seems appropriate to attempt to develop a new skills-based model or framework for

Figure A.2 Plot 1: using arbitrary numerical values applied to the formula

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military negotiation, whose key function is to replicate both the mathematical functions of pre-existing mechanisms, plus the integration of real-life tactical negotiation issues in greater detail, and using real-world statistical data. The proposed future model would illustrate the scope of a negotiation in a more pertinent military context, using empirical evidence and stressing the designated delineating factors as discussed here. The author, who is not a systems analyst or mathematical theorist, approached an existing organisation to progress these initial thoughts further.8 MODERN GAME THEORY: COMPUTER MODELLING A ‘natural’ step from pure mathematical modelling is the more contemporary interpretation of the negotiation process through computer technology. Electronic communication technologies allow multidimensional decision making to be plotted and mapped, and situational analysis enables evaluation of complex problems at the collaborative and transactional level. The analysis of tactical micro negotiation has exemplified the highly complex nature of the process within military operations. The interactive nature of current technology also allows for factors such as cross-cultural exchange, cross-border exchange and simultaneous development of models and techniques, which strikes one as being necessary in order to formally quantify the military micro-negotiation context in a more effective manner. A variety of programs are being developed currently in order to evaluate and mirror likely processes in negotiation, and, more particularly, those processes which reflect realworld application.9 For example, INSPIRE is a support system based on analytical models based in decision and negotiation analysis, and it represents the value of negotiation-related constructs (issues, options and offers) to each negotiator by means of utility functions.10 The representation forms the basis of a scoring system, reflecting the more basic approach taken in the section above, which helps negotiators to make comparisons between offers and counteroffers, and to evaluate the importance of a concession. Such approaches appear to be mathematical models that are attempting to illustrate the interactive dimensions of negotiation, and seek to include the ‘human’ elements of negotiation in a formal framework, so they are a detailed refinement of former game theory models. Many current computerised models, most of which are being developed in the USA, are based on a theme of ‘restructurable modelling’, which provides a framework by which the decision maker may generate stories describing a sequence of situations, plus the implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Development of a description may be founded on qualitative structures only, taking the form of text, but may also involve quantitative representations derived from decision theory. Therefore a sequence will reflect the interactions between this decision maker and other agents, plus the evolution of decisions, so that a focus on cognitive efforts tends to suggest that such computer models are generally described as ‘cognitive support systems’.11 Analysts and modellers are attempting to represent the complex nature of the negotiating process. This has meant that the modelling of factors such as decision context, situational context, environmental context and behavioural factors have had to be created and devised in an information processing system. Cognitive science and AI

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provide formal methods for the representation of knowledge and reasoning that can be used in both analogical and generalised approaches to decision making. Cognitive support systems, with or without a user’s interaction, create representations, choose appropriate models, organise diverse models into a coherent whole, retrieve relevant information and determine the order of processing. These tasks are highlighted by the need to help and communicate. Negotiation has many characteristics which add to its complexity, as has already been described, and military negotiation has still further complications (the issues of force/time/mission especially); thus any attempt to represent the process in any extant model has been limited in scope. Most important is the involvement of two, or more, negotiators within the process itself, with all their individual contextual behaviour and impulses brought to bear on their actions and decisions. This reinforces the need for useful interaction if any negotiation is to proceed, but messages are often complex or hidden, open to misinterpretation or lack of recognition; and also the sequential nature of negotiation is significant because it demands dynamic behaviour by the participants, and introduces the likelihood of using different protocols and agendas throughout the process. This characteristic brings with it strategic interaction which necessitates the interpretation of others’ needs and situations. THE PURPOSES OF DESIGNING A NEW MODEL OF MILITARY NEGOTIATION Many contemporary negotiation practitioners use computer models to prepare and analyse the moves likely to be made on both sides. For instance, computer models can be used to determine financial implications, market analysis, the implications of certain decisions, or to display proposals. In most extant models, the systems provide assistance at an individual level, and are used with the working assumption that the ‘world’ within which the negotiation is being attempted is static by nature. However, this is far from satisfactory when, or if, one hopes to use that model to determine ‘real-world’ events; and the earlier analysis of game theory models revealed the huge limitations in the underlying assumptions made by the modellers concerning behaviour and context, and the resultant poor representation of what really goes on. The purpose of a new military tactical negotiation model is to attempt to define and simulate Operations Other Than War (OOTW) for the first time, incorporating an examination of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in a scientific sense, and linking it to the negotiation process. As has been suggested earlier, the ever-increasing commitment of the UK’s armed forces to OOTW has revealed a capability shortfall in high-level modelling tools suitable for analysis of non-warfighting military tasks before deployment. As a result of this shortfall, a model needs to be developed to represent OOTW and to address operations other than conventional combat. The model should also be suitable for exploring the interaction between force mix, rules of engagement, mission development and measures of effectiveness for any given scenario. It was felt that in order to reflect real-world contexts, this new model, to be known as DIAMOND (Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-war fighting Domain) would need to be:12

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• a stochastic simulation • multi-partied • mission-led • mission-based and C2-led13 • capable of representing terrain and environment • capable of representing a variety of entities and their interactions • capable of representing the relationships between different sides • capable of representing negotiation and perception. The final model will be a representation of the Theatre of Operations (TOO), in the form of an electronic interconnected network of arcs and nodes. These nodes would represent key locations or geographical features in the TOO (such as towns, villages and transport junctions). The arcs provide connectivity between the nodes by all methods of transport (land, sea and air). Each node would have one or more arcs attached to it, and each entity (for example, a peacekeeping force or a warring faction) would be positioned at a node and would then ‘interact’ with the model.14 In existing combat models it is traditional to represent only two sides in any conflict, and this is a suitable assumption for most conventional conflicts since, regardless of the number of participants, protagonists tend to fall into the categories of either attacker or defender. In OOTW, this is not a valid assumption since there is often a large number of participants, none of whom can be classified purely as attacker or defender. For example, in Bosnia, there were three main factions, and in Somalia, there were upwards of 25 warlords vying for control.15 In addition to the belligerent forces, it is important to represent the multinational peacekeeping force and the differences in approach between each of the countries and organisations present in the area. Other non-combatants, such as NGOs, the media and international corporations, will also need to be represented in the model, but probably at a later stage of development.16 It has thus become obvious that any future successful construct of an OOTW operation also necessitates the inclusion of multi-party elements in any representation. As concluded previously, the main elements missing from earlier negotiation models are the complex relationships, interests and personal nuances within the tactical negotiation process itself. In order to be more representational of real-life interaction it was recommended that DIAMOND should be constructed to allow any user to define relationships between different parties; these relationships will influence mission decisions and the types of negotiation the parties will follow, and will need to encompass the effect of the other party’s actions on personal perceptions. In the early stages of development of the model it is envisaged that DIAMOND will represent several types of relationship, for example, ‘partnership’ at the highest level (which confers the greatest degree of cooperation), and ‘hostile’ (the least). Parties in partnership will share resources, information and missions, and hostile parties may not be at war with one another, but are likely to be constrained from being so only by their ROEs. Such hostile parties might use negotiation to make exceptional demands and to seek to impose their will on opponents through the process. To increase realism it would be important to allow for a non-symmetrical relationship, which is particularly realistic, thereby allowing any model user to represent a dominant/submissive party in any transaction. These preferred requirements stem from the concerns and evidence gleaned from serving personnel (as witnessed in the cited case studies), plus a realisation that more than one type of

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relationship is present in OOTW, that is, not just the traditional combat modelling mode of hostility between parties. Military personnel are necessarily engaged in such diverse relationships in any deployment and they can, for the sake of simplicity for the model, be defined as generally: • hostile • uncooperative • neutral • sympathetic • friendly. This refined set of relationship definitions was considered sufficient, at least at the early stage of development of the model, to represent vital interaction between parties in a scenario. A further requirement to be taken into consideration is the thought that relationships need not, and in some cases should not, be symmetrical; for example, the military might be neutral in an operational zone but a warring faction might be hostile to them (this is particularly relevant if one were trying to model some of the scenarios described in the UNPROFOR deployment effectively, and in the Sierra Leone situation). Again, with the prime motivation being realism in this proposed model, there needs to be a ‘maverick’ element in the modelling where a tactical negotiator might make an ad hoc judgement on the ground which may go against the general approach of his party in the operation.17 Thus in its initial inception the DIAMOND model seeks to represent military negotiation as shown in Figure A.3. Figure A.3 demonstrates the multidimensional nature of military negotiation which, while echoing many commonly held precepts as described in earlier sections of this book, has extra influences inherent in the process that require modelling. Essential elements in both the discursive and decision-making processes are the constant influences of military mission, time and inherent force (the BATNA), together with the personality of the negotiator and awareness of context and culture. It can be, and is, postulated that these requisites are present in any military micro negotiation, to a lesser or greater degree, and form part of the essential construct, together with other negotiation factors. They play a vital part throughout the process, as examples have revealed, and cannot be viewed as mere ‘bolt-ons’ or peripheral concerns that may colour the judgement; they will colour the decision making and the process itself within OOTW. The most important aspect of DIAMOND must be the capability to represent issues of perception management, as well as to have an in-built flexibility to allow for maverick behaviour and individual contexts, or the element of personality. Perception factors are likely to influence the relationship between parties and respective decision making: it may determine the likely deterioration or improvement in relations as the negotiation proceeds. The negotiation mechanisms to be built into DIAMOND must allow different sides in the simulation to communicate with each other, to cooperate or disagree, to make demands, to settle or not settle. To do otherwise would result in an unrealistic model reflecting previous attempts at theoretical negotiation modelling which bear little resemblance to real-world factors.

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This consideration led to the drawing up of the following possible relationship pairings for the DIAMOND model (those marked with an asterisk are probably unstable relationships and would transform into another relationship on the list once interactions begin between the two parties):

Figure A.3 Initial military negotiation constructs recommended for use in DIAMOND • Hostile/Hostile •Hostile/Uncooperative •Hostile/Neutral •Hostile/Sympathetic* •Hostile/Friendly*

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•Uncooperative/Uncooperative •Uncooperative/Neutral •Uncooperative/Sympathetic •Uncooperati ve/Friendly * •Neutral/Neutral • Neutral/Sympathetic • Neutral/Friendly • Sympathetic/Sympathetic • Sympathetic/Friendly • Friendly/Friendly Relationship changes in the model would be based upon condition statements introduced by the user. It is expected that these statements would cover a variety of generic situations for all parties (such as being attacked), as well as conditions that may be specific to a particular party derived from political-military gaming. In OOTW operations, many types of negotiation occur throughout the life of any deployment, as was the case with UNPROFOR. These include negotiation to resolve local disputes, negotiation to obtain a ceasefire and to obtain access, to name but a few. Each type of negotiation plays an important role in restoring normality or ensuring that potentially escalatory situations are resolved with the minimum amount of force used by either side. As such tasks are an important part of OOTW, it is important that DIAMOND represents some aspect of these interactions and their outcomes. Every instance plays a part in maintaining and developing the perceived role of the military within the area, and can have escalatory effects to many levels above the soldier on the ground, even up to strategic level. However, from the analytical community worldwide there has been very little related work on representing military negotiation in a manner that is suitable for fast-running simulation models. Consequently, DIAMOND would aim to take a ‘two-path approach’ in representing some of the key aspects of tactical military negotiation. The first path would be to use historical analysis contexts, and the second would be to provide a mechanism that will allow the user to enter into the model any insights from other warfare modelling, so that the DIAMOND model can interpret these dynamically. Thereby any user of this model would be both learning from past experience and contributing to new input as they use the model for either training or pre-deployment contextual application. If this can be achieved, then the DIAMOND model will evolve and develop new resolutions to tactical negotiation cases as different operational scenarios and mandates occur, making it a valuable experiential learning tool. Thus this approach would allow DIAMOND to become the first stage in an evolutionary process to modelling negotiation in OOTW and, should either or both techniques prove successful, then further development could widen the scope, but this is an unknown quantity at the moment. CONTEXT Initially the types of negotiation the model would be able to handle include:

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• Negotiation for access • Negotiation for alliances • Requests for humanitarian assistance • Requests for escort • Negotiation for support • Negotiation for supplies (including demands and theft). All of these situations are common in tactical military negotiation, but to model each of them would be complex at an early stage of development and thought. Due to the time and expense incurred by DERA (Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) in conducting historical analysis (HA), and with the recommendation of the author, the DERA software analysts decided that initially only one part of the model would be trialled with an HA-based approach, that is, ‘negotiation for access’.18 As the case studies have shown, roadblocks and other route blocks are a major hindrance to peacekeeping operations as they hinder free movement of peacekeepers, aid agencies and civilian traffic alike. They occur for a variety of reasons, some through a genuine military reason to secure an area, some as a revenue source (tax and theft), and some simply because the protagonists are bored and see it as a means to exert their authority and to pass time. Analysis of ‘negotiation for access’ case studies to identify the principal factors that affect the outcome was felt to be the most important aspect to be highlighted in the initial model, and the main contributory factors of influences such as current relationship, nationality, age and gender, persistence and an opponent’s perception of one’s ability and willingness to use force were deemed to be some of the most influential factors in a tactical negotiation as well. The input data to DIAMOND would thus be configured to match these identified important factors and referenced against a historical model derived from the HA conducted. The output from this would be the time taken for a unit to negotiate and the probability of it successfully obtaining access, or its ‘reserved price’, to use Fisher-Ury terminology. PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING VALID EMPIRICAL DATA There are some limitations adopting this approach, though. The HA conducted can be very region-or context-specific and may not allow for a fully generic approach. However, by ensuring that the HA conducted focuses on areas or situations representative of the more general scenarios, indicated in the case studies discussed earlier, there will be value in the data obtained for study and training use, if not for DIAMOND itself. The other types of negotiation that could be represented in the model would rely upon other types of gaming or military judgement to define the conditions within which such a negotiation may produce a result. In these cases, the time taken to conclude any negotiations would not be factored into the model, and the model would show the effect of a successful negotiation only. When the conditions are satisfied, the model would modify the behaviour of both parties to show the effect of their decisions, but, for practical reasons, the effects would be limited to the scenario’s high-level mission set.

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MODELLING COOPERATIVE/COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR The other types of negotiation encounters can be generically referred to as ‘negotiation for cooperation’, although that cooperation may in itself be as a result of a threat or other aggressive activity. As the user has already configured an extensive series of condition statements that describe each party’s relationship with the other parties through the life of the scenario run, then it will be counterproductive for the user to define another series of condition statements to describe cooperative behaviour. Instead, the user defines whether cooperation on any mission could occur with another party for each possible relationship and, should cooperation be possible, he or she defines which missions they would cooperate on. Again, as with the historical analysis method, there are limitations to this approach. Initially the user, when defining the conditions that change relationships, would have to take into account what effect they will have on cooperation within missions, and, with only five relationships being modelled in the initial stage, rather coarse and potentially extreme changes in behaviour may result. The user may require more subtle changes in behaviour that are only possible by having many different types of relationship, well beyond the five proposed, and bearing more similarity to real-world relationships which may have only subtle differences, rather than any broadly defined positional stance. However, it is important to state that a model has to start somewhere, and that only by creating broad definitions in the first place might the possibility of more subtle nuances occur as the model develops. Similarly, by limiting the cooperative behaviour to the high-level mission, further constraints might need to be applied in the early stages of the model development. For example, two parties may cooperate to secure a particular target against a common enemy, but that does not mean the two parties will cooperate against all enemies, for one party’s enemy may be another’s friend. The addition of these condition statements against cooperative missions increases the work load on any user, and may quickly generate a large, unmanageable rule base on which cooperative behaviour is founded. However, it is an important factor within tactical military negotiation and one which was stressed to the software analysts, together with an insistence that some sort of modelling of ‘cooperative/ competitive’ behaviour is essential. Thus, to militate against such limitations, it is intended to use the ‘negotiation for cooperation’ mechanism to represent only those significant interactions that are clearly defined, and this should enable the concept to be tested to determine its suitability for further enhancement. Subtler, or less easily defined, changes in behaviour should be scripted, instead of dynamically modelled, until the negotiation for cooperation mechanism has been proved to be of use in high-level analysis of OOTW. In other words, the analysts will hope to check the viability of DIAMOND before increasing its complexity. As Figure A.4 illustrates, the user will have a variety of cooperative options to choose from in the initial stages of DIAMOND, and this choice will result in further decisionmaking factors. Party 1 for Party 2 HIGH-LEVEL MISSION: POSSIBLY PREPARED TO DO? Redistribute population

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Secure Escort Supply Execute

Figure A.4 Example: ‘inter-party cooperation options’ The scientific analysts in DERA/DSTL will be seeking to model an essential, but nebulous, factor such as cooperation in purely mathematical terms. In order to do this, some form of statistical assumptions and values has to be given to any action within the negotiation; so where a true value might exist, such a value would be entered in Figure A.4 to denote which of the high-level missions Party 1 is prepared to carry out for Party 2. This concept refers back to the earlier postulation and modelling of the lazy ‘s’ shape inherent in an agreement process, proposed and modelled by the author earlier in this appendix. The variety and nature of the applicability of the offers being made in a negotiation, or the conditions being demanded, will have an effect on the decisionmaking process, stressing always the inherent demands of time, force and mission and so on, upon any military negotiation at the tactical level. MODELLING RELATIONSHIPS AND PERSONALITY A further definition of conditions attached to each mission may be required, and a facility to add in a series of condition statements should be provided for DIAMOND in order to increase its viability in the future. The model should then test these condition statements to ensure that a mission is being interpreted as intended. The ideal intention within an initial model is that each entity within a party shares that party’s relationships; for example, if the UK contingent peacekeepers were neutral to the party of Belligerent Faction A, then each entity within the UK will share that view and perceive themselves as neutral.19 The exceptions to this are commanders (and their subordinate entities), who may have maverick personal attributes. A maverick attribute allows the user to define a relationship different from that of the party that the entity, or commander, belongs to. For example, Belligerent Faction A may consider itself neutral in its dealings with the

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Figure A.5 Relationship pairings with likely response modes UK peacekeeping force, but one faction commander may adopt an uncooperative relationship and thus frustrate the peacekeeping forces. In addition, the relationships between parties may be asymmetric; that is, A may be hostile to B, but B may consider itself neutral to A. This leads to the possible relationship pairings such as those depicted in Figure A.5. As is indicated by the negative and positive symbols, certain pairings will have fairly predictable results, and the ‘bullet’ indicates those pairings where the relationship is liable to be unstable, or prone to decay. These categorisations will assist in a replication of a real-world relationship, a factor that is pertinent in military contexts, as has been shown by the case studies previously discussed. However, a relationship might change, and allowance must be made for such an occurrence. MODELLING MUTABILITY What has become obvious from the literature and case-studies evidence is that relationships are mobile: events, contexts and maverick behaviour can alter the interaction to either positive or negative behaviours within a short space of time. For example, if party A suddenly attacked B, the relationship of A to B would need to be reconfigured to ‘hostile/hostile’. Given that DIAMOND initially aims to detail the negotiation process occurring during a roadblock situation, it was then decided that an attempt at depicting the

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Figure A.6 Possible interactions in overcoming a roadblock, for modelling purposes logical sequence of events during the interaction would prove beneficial at an early stage. Using the descriptive evidence from serving personnel, as cited in earlier sections, it was possible to draft a flow diagram as depicted in Figure A.6. Figure A.6 seeks to illustrate the main decision-making factors for the tacticallevel military commander, as inferred from the case-study material examined in this analysis, and initial HA conducted by DERA/DSTL. Governed by the working parameters of the mission brief, the ROE, the mandate, the orders given and the time in which to

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successfully execute the brief, the stages depicted relate to the main considerations for the commander in the field. Whilst negotiation will be attempted as the first choice in resolution of many situations, the importance and viability of the BATNA has not been, and cannot be, overlooked, as exemplified in the Sierra Leone case study, in particular. SUMMARY Such were the key considerations and evidence used in order to design and develop a workable OOTW model for tactical military negotiation, and the main recommendations that the author gave to the team wishing to construct DIAMOND. Design and development is ongoing, and an initial computer program has been created, allowing future commanders in the field to test their reactions to encounters, and the mutability of a negotiation situation on the ground. As time goes on, more empirical evidence will be gathered from various current, and future, operations in order to verify and test the construct. DERA/DSTL is planning to use the main hypotheses discussed in this study to design and build their computer-based model sometime in the future, and so the project has now been passed to mathematicians and systems analysts. It will be interesting to see if they manage to maintain the all-too-necessary real-world-factors emphasis in the DIAMOND model, and if it can then be used by all personnel deploying into these difficult operational scenarios. It is to be hoped so. NOTES 1. Authorial construct. 2. This construct was borne out in some of the case studies described and analysed in the previous section, particularly the HVO case study. 3. This echoes Fisher and Ury’s concept of a ZOPA. 4. Deutsch (1973), p. 375. 5. E.de Bono, Conflicts: a better way to resolve them (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 93. 6. Circumstantial factors include the delineating ones of mission, time and force as postulated throughout this book. 7. This weighting was chosen randomly to test the suggested modelling in the first instance, but, as will be shown later, similar representational results can be achieved by proportionally similar factors. This attempt at a formula applicable to tactical negotiation is necessarily hypothetical in the early stages of development, since a solution is being sought to a complex, subjective event. More complex mathematical modelling will be undertaken by professional scientists, as discussed in this section. 8. This research has taken place in association between the author and the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) based in Farnborough, UK (from 2001 known as DSTL), and these findings and comments are the results of the author’s work with the High Level Studies Group. The research is original and innovative, and unclassified. 9. Much of this work is taking place in the USA, and can be followed on various Internet sites. For example see http://www.batna.com/, http://interneg.carleton.ca/interneg/research/misc/boston, and related links on these sites for many of the references made in this section.

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10. Information can be found in Bertram I.Spector (ed.), ‘Systems support for international negotiation: implications for application’, special issue, Theory and Decision, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May 1993), and Robert McLaughlan and Denise Kirkpatrick, ‘A decision making simulation using computer mediated communication’, Australian Journal of Educational Technology, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1999), pp. 242–56. Also see J.S.Applegate and D.J.Sarno, ‘FUTURESITE: an environmental remediation game situation’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1997), pp. 13–27, and R.T.Hays and M.J.Singer, Simulation Fidelity in Training System Design: Bridging the gap between reality and training (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988). Other useful sources include P.Reason and J.Heron, ‘Research with people: the paradigm of cooperative experiential enquiry’, Person centred review, Vol. 1 (1986), pp. 457–76, and M.Gredler, Designing and Evaluating Games and Simulations: A process approach (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing, 1992). 11. Description taken from article on the Internet, 29 Oct. 1998 http://interneg.carleton.ca/interneg/research/misc/boston, Perspectives on Representation and Analysis of Negotiation by Gregory E.Kersten and David Cray, Centre for Computer Assisted Management, Carleton University, USA. 12. DIAMOND stands for Diplomatic and Military Operations in a Non-war fighting Domain. 13. C2=Command and Control. 14. In 2000 DERA had built an initial working computer DIAMOND model. Whilst the explanation of the system is unclassified and can be discussed in this book, representations of the working model cannot be reproduced for security reasons. 15. There are numerous publications discussing the events in Somalia in 1993. For example, in particular see Barbara Benton (ed.), Soldiers for Peace (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996), pp. 158–86, and Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 16. NGO=non-governmental organisation. 17. I refer to the example of the soldier defusing the situation with the Serb brandishing a grenade as described in the UNPROFOR case study, Chapter 8, for instance. 18. HA=historical analysis. The analysts mentioned were using the theoretical postulations presented in this book to try to model the process in mathematical terms. The author advised the access negotiation situation since this type of incident occurred most frequently in accounts given to her (unable to cite in detail for reasons stated earlier). 19. This is for ease of use and can be said to be representative of the general ethos within a group.

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INDEX Artificial Intelligence (AI) 221 attitudinal structuring 40 Avruch, K 75 Bacharach, S 15, 37, 48 Baker, A 70, 72–3 Bartos, OJ 38 Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 21–22, 52–57, 65, 133, 160–162, 164, 181, 185, 198, 201, 203, 205–206, 208, 219, 232 behaviour 30, 47, 79–80, 207 Bellamy, C 97, 99–100, 183 Bosnia 167–191, 223 boundary role conflict theory 33 Bronfenbrenner 89 Brown, Roger 75 Burton, JW 33–34, 45 Byzantium 65–66 Callières 66 cathexsis 88, 216 Choice 21–22 Civil Affairs 169–171, 173–174, 178 Coates, J 71 Coddington, AJ 33 Codner, Michael 122 coercion 119–122 Cohen, Raymond 74, 80 communication 74, 79–86 concessions 31 context 65–67, 96, 226 co-operation 19, 28, 32, 35–36, 40, 174, 208, 217, 228 critical risk 35 Cuba 36 culture 67–70, 74–75, 84, 161, 169, 180, 198–199 Cunningham, J.B 140–141 Cyprus 70, 120, 171 decision-making 20–21, 38, 114, 134, 201–202 Deutsch, Karl 100 Deutsch, Morton 30, 50–52, 85, 90, 218 DIAMOND 216–232 distributive bargaining 40

Index

225

Druckman, Daniel 33, 90 duress 130–132, 134 Ellsberg, Daniel 35–36 Enloe, C 73 escalation 124 Fetherston, Betts 105 Fisher, R and Ury, W 44, 47, 52–54, 57, 114, 125–126, 197, 227 fixed pie model 25–26 Faure, Captain 189–190 framing 24–25, 27 game theory 36–39, 43, 220 gender 71–73, 85 George, Alexander 119–120, 122 Gracián 66 Hall, E.T 80 Hayes, Richard, E 11, 14 Holmes, M and Sykes, RA 144 Homans, G.C 29 Horai, J and Tedeschi, JT 50 inducibility 88, 216 INSPIRE 220 integrative bargaining 28, 40 interests 44–46, 55, 163, 197 Iranian Embassy Siege 5 James, Alan 98 Kennedy, John F 35, 120 Konjevic Polje 182 Lawler, E 15, 37, 48 Lax, DA and Sebenius, JK 44 Liberia 159–166, 208 Luce, RD 38 Machiavelli, Niccolo 66 Mackinlay, John 108–109 Maltz, D and Borker, R 71 McKersie, RB 40 McRae, Brad 143 Miller, Abraham H 9–10 mission 102, 104, 217, 231 Morgenstern 38 Multi-Attribute Utility Technique (MAUT) 21

Index

226

Nash, John 39–40, 42–43, 46 NATO 99 Oots, K.L 11–12 peacekeeping 97–98, 100, 102–105, 107–110, 118, 120, 126–130, 136, 159, 167–191, 208–209 personality 86–91, 134, 189, 224, 229–230 power 47–19, 103 Prisoner’s dilemma model 40–42, 50 Pruitt, Dean 47 psychological operations (PSYOPS) 80, 124, 176–177 Raiffa, H 38 Rapoport, A 45 Richelieu, Cardinal 66 Roosevelt, Teddy 45 Rules of Engagement (ROEs) 3, 105–106, 110, 123–124, 140, 190, 223, 231 Sierra Leone 33, 195–203, 205–206, 208, 216, 224, 232 Somalia 223 Soviet Union 36 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 3, 125, 190 stereotyping 75 stressors 133 Substitutability 88, 216 Sun Tzu 141 Synder, Glenn 35–36 Thompson, Leigh 21–22, 25–26, 54, 86 threat 32, 35, 42, 46–47, 50, 52, 54, 107, 115–118, 121, 123–124, 131, 181–182, 184, 195–203, 208 time 4, 102, 107–108, 110–117, 199, 217 training 136–144, 175, 178, 180 Tversky, A and Kahnemen, D 23 United Nations (UN) 105, 109, 127, 170, 172, 174–176, 189 United States 36, 83 UNPROFOR 5, 33, 104, 167–191, 205–206, 208, 216, 219, 224 Vietnam 84 Von Neumann 38 Walton, RE 40 Worst Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA) 56, 162, 164, 187 West Side Boys 195–203 White, RK 90

Index

227

Zartman, William 49, 67–68, 75 zero sum 26, 28, 31, 36 Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) 52–57, 163–164, 185, 208, 216, 219